ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE

IN ADJUDICATION OF CASES

Due Process
a. Cardinal primary rights

DOMINGO v. RAYALA
Domingo filed a complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala (former Chairman of NLRC)
with the DOLE Secretary. The Committee formed by the Secretary heard the parties and received their
respective evidence, and thereafter found Rayala guilty of the offense charged. The Office of the
President agreed with the Committee’s report and dismissed him. Rayala alleged that his right to due
process has been violated, citing OP’s decision finding him guilty of “disgraceful and immoral conduct”
and not for violation of RA 7877. The Court held that although Rayala questioned the authority of the
Committee to try him, he appeared personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings, and
thus was afforded all the procedural due process safeguards.
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's
legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected.

A.Z. ARNAIZ REALTY, INC. v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Petitioner A.Z. Arnaiz Realty, Inc., filed a petition for Exclusion from CARP over its parcels of
land, but DAR Regional Director dismissed the same. Compared with Domingo v. Rayala, no formal
hearing was conducted when DAR decided to dismiss the petition of A.Z. Arnaiz. The Court, however,
held that petitioner was given all the opportunity to prove his case, and that he participated in the
proceedings by submitting pleadings and documentary evidence, as well as filing Motions for
Reconsideration.
Due process does NOT always require a Trial-type Proceeding, and litigants may be heard
through pleadings, written explanations, position papers, memoranda, or oral arguments. The standard of
due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as
fairness is not ignored.
 The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action
complained of. Any seeming defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a Motion for
Reconsideration since he has already been “heard”.

GANNAPAO v. CSC
A complaint was filed in the PNP against SPO1 Gannapao for harassing the respondents and for
working as a bodyguard while still in service. Gannapao alleged he was denied due process. The Court
ruled that he had been given the opportunity to defend himself in a summary hearing, and that his own
failure to submit an answer (he filed a motion to dismiss instead) was not a denial of his due process.
In the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard. As long as a party was given the opportunity
to defend his interests in due course, he was not denied due process.

INC SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC. v. MORADAS

Moradas filed a complaint for payment of his disability benefits against his employer, INC
Shipmanagement. The Court ruled in favor of the employer as it has proved by substantial evidence that
Moradas’ injury was directly attributable to himself.
In labor cases, as in other administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence or such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion is required.

AGUILAR v. O’PALLICK
In a case before the HLURB, Aguilar obtained a decision in her favor, which allowed her to levy
a condominium unit that was already in the possession of O’Pallick. However, since O’Pallick was not
impleaded in the HLURB case, the Supreme Court ruled that he could not be bound by the decision as he
was not given the opportunity to present his case therein.
The principle that a person cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding
in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

VIVO v. PHIL. AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORP. (PAGCOR)

Vivo alleged that he was denied of due process and right to counsel when his request to
reschedule his conference due to his lawyer’s unavailability was denied by the Adjudication Committee
presiding over his case. The Court ruled that petitioner was accorded due process as he filed for a Motion
for Reconsideration, and that his right to counsel was not violated as it was not indispensable in the
proceedings.
Any procedural defect in the proceedings taken against the government employee therein was
cured by his filing of a motion for reconsideration and by his appealing the adverse result to the
administrative agency.
 In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel.
As such, the right to counsel is not imperative because administrative investigations are themselves
inquiries conducted only to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against
erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.

EBDANE, JR. v. APURILLO

Apurillo et. al. argued that their right to due process was violated when they were not made to
comment on the anonymous complaint against them, and no preliminary investigation was conducted
prior to the issuance of the formal charge. The Court held that when they filed their first Answer, they had
presented their position and expressly waived their rights to a formal hearing, as they sought instead that
the case against them be decided based on the records submitted. Whatever procedural lapses the DPWH
had committed, the same had already been cured by the filing of the Answer.
In administrative proceedings, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain
one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
"To be heard" does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard thru
pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process.

GALINDO AND PINTO v. COA

COA personnel Galindo and Pinto were investigated by COA for receipt of bonuses and benefits
from another government entity, an act prohibited by RA 6758. They were found guilty of grave
misconduct and violation of Reasonable Office Rules and Regulations. Galindo and Pinto decried this and
alleged there was a dearth of the required quantum of evidence to hold them administratively liable. The
Court held that their guilt was sufficiently established by substantial evidence
Mere substantial evidence, or "that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to justify a conclusion," is sufficient to establish administrative liability.

ERWIN L. MAGCAMIT v. INTERNAL AFFAIRS SERVICE – PHIL. DRUG ENFORCEMENT

AGENCY
Magcamit was dismissed with his co-agents when IAS-PDEA found them guilty of Grave
Misconduct. His participation in an extortion scheme was established when he was positively identified in
a sworn statement, which unfortunately was not presented in the proceedings before IAS-PDEA, but only
upon appeal to CSC. The Court held that Magcamit was denied due process as the cardinal right that “the
decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected” was not complied with.
The Court did not apply the doctrine that the filing of a motion for reconsideration will cure the
defects in the observance of the right to due process because it considered that there was no substantial
evidence proving Magcamit’s involvement when IAS-PDEA rendered its decision.
GOSS v. LOPEZ
Nine students were suspended by their school for up to ten days on account of disruptive or
disobedient conduct. They file an action alleging that the Ohio statute authorizing school administrators to
suspend students for ten days violated their right to due process because they were not given the chance to
be heard. SCOTUS ruled that notice and hearing should precede the removal of a student from school. An
informal hearing is sufficient with short suspensions as trial-type proceedings might overwhelm
administrative facilities and is not cost-efficient. However, for heavier penalties such as longer
suspensions and expulsions, more formal procedures may be required.
The fundamental requisite of due process is the opportunity to be heard. Thus, at the minimum, it
is required that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication is preceded by notice and
opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.

MATTHEWS v. ELDRIDGE
Eldridge, a long-time recipient of disability benefits, was stripped of such benefits after the State
and the SSA concluded that his diabetes was gone. He assailed this ruling for violation of due process due
to the absence of an evidentiary hearing, as required in Goldberg v. Kelly. SCOTUS held that
administrative agencies, in ensuring procedural due process, should consider several factors when crafting
their procedure: Private interest, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such private interest, and
government/public interest. SCOTUS found that the case of Eldridge did not necessitate a prior hearing to
the termination of his disability benefits, as compared with the case of Goldberg, where a hearing was
needed as a wide variety of factors was taken into account and a mere written form was not able to take
into account all of them.
Fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and
in a meaningful manner. Due process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular
situation demands.
Procedural due process must be evaluated by using a balancing test that accounts for the
government’s interests, the individual’s interests, and the risk of error under the existing process as well
as how much additional procedures would help.

b. Notice and Hearing

b.1. When required
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO., v. COLLECTOR
Customs authorities declared a TV set in a vessel owned by NDC as a cargo of the vessel that
requires to be manifested, and a fine was imposed upon the vessel despite NDC’s request for an
investigation and hearing on the case. The Court held that NDC’s right to due process was denied as there
was no investigation nor hearing wherein NDC may prove its case.
The doctrine in Ang Tibay on the cardinal rights which must be respected for there to be due
process, especially the right to a hearing, was reiterated in this case.
Even in the administrative proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right
enshrined in our Constitution. The right to due process is not merely statutory. It is a constitutional right.

BAUTISTA v. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION

Bautista’s claim for compensation against PNR was denied on the ground of his repeated non-
appearance before BWC. However, it was found that Bautista’s counsel repeatedly did not receive notice
of hearing prior to the scheduled date of hearing. The Court thus ruled that Bautista was denied due
process.
The very rules of the Commission require the giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party
interested by service upon him personally or by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post
office address or if he is represented by a counsel, through the latter (Sec. 2, Rule 15, Revised rules of the
WCC, 1973), so as to ensure observance and protection of an interested party’s right to a hearing (Sec. 1,
Rule 15, Revised Rules of the WCC).

EQUITABLE BANKING CORP. v. NLRC

An investigation against Sadac found that the numerous charges against him were true and
backed up by evidence, prompting the Bank’s BoD to ask Sadac to voluntarily resign from his position.
Sadac’s request for a full hearing was denied, and he was subsequently dismissed. The Court held that the
Bank failed to follow the procedural requirements for terminating employment (twin notice rule).
Failure to comply with procedural requirements taints the dismissal with illegality. This
procedure is mandatory; any judgment reached by management without that compliance can be
considered void and inexistent.
While it is true that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied
in administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, meetings in the nature of consultation
and conferences such as the case here, however, may not be valid substitutes for the proper observance of
notice and hearing.

FELIX UY ET. AL, v. COA

 Employees of PEO who were dismissed by then Governor Paredes filed for reinstatement and
backwages before MSPB. They were found to be illegally dismissed, but disbursement of backwages was
disallowed because it was deemed to be the personal liability of Paredes for dismissing the employees in
bad faith. The Court held that Paredes could not be held personally liable because there was no
categorical finding that Paredes indeed acted in bad faith, and he was never served notice nor was he
made a party in the proceedings before COA.
Even if administrative agencies are not bound by technical procedures, they cannot dispose with
the basic demands of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is
not a mere technicality but is an indispensable ingredient of due process.

b.2. When not required

SUNTAY v. PEOPLE
DFA Secretary ordered the Consul General in San Francisco, USA to cancel the passport issued
to Suntay and to compel him to return to the Philippines to answer the criminal charges against him. The
Court ruled that hearing in this case was not necessary for there to be due process as it was clear that he
left the country to evade the criminal charge against him. Hearing would have been proper and necessary
if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful.
Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing. When discretion is exercised by an
officer vested with it upon an undisputed fact, such as the filing of a serious criminal charge against the
passport holder, hearing maybe dispensed with by such officer as a prerequisite to the cancellation of his
passport. Lack of such hearing does not violate the due process of law clause of the Constitution; and the
exercise of the discretion vested in him cannot be deemed whimsical and capricious of because of the
absence of such hearing.

BISSCHOP v. GALANG
Bisschop’s application for extension of stay in the Philippines was denied by Bureau of
Immigration after reports of his company being a gambling front and for his non-payment of income tax.
In a letter, he was advised to leave the country within 5 days. The Court held that although formal hearing
was not granted, there was no violation of due process because the letter advising Bisschop to depart is a
mere formality and a preliminary step before the start of the deportation proceedings, unless he departs
voluntarily.
Due process of law is not necessarily a judicial process; much of the process by means of which
the Government is carried on, and the order of society maintained, is purely executive or administrative,
which is as much due process of law, as is judicial process. While a day in court is a matter of right in
judicial proceedings, in administrative proceedings, it is otherwise since they rest upon different
principles. In certain proceedings, therefore, of all administrative character, it may be stated, without fear
of contradiction, that the right to a notice and hearing are not essential to due process of law.
POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD v. COURT OF APPEALS
Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex parte Order directing Solar Textile Corp. immediately
to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations as they were in violation of
the Pollution Control Law. When the case reached CA, it remanded the case to RTC to settle due process
issues over the ex parte order. The Court held that it is not essential that the Board prove that an
“immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life” exists before an ex
parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do
exceed “the allowable standards set by the NPCC.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here
presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into
the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over
the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and
sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years.
In this case, notice and hearing was not required because there was a need for urgent emergency
measures, as the circumstances warranted that the stopping of the act cannot be delayed by the
termination of the proceeding questioning the basis of the cease and desist order.

c. Form of and Promulgation of Judgment

INDIAS v. PHIL. IRON MINES

Indias filed a complaint before CIR against Phil. Iron Mines for unfair labor practices, the
hearings for which were conducted by the hearing examiner of CIR. The hearing examiner rendered his
report to CIR stating the charge was unsubstantiated by evidence and that Indias’ dismissal was with
sufficient cause. CIR approved the recommendation without stating the facts and the law in support
thereof, which Indias alleged was not a proper judgment for lack of discussion of facts and law. The
Court held that such discussion is not needed if the hearing officer has already explained the basis for the
decision, and the court merely affirms such findings.
The CIR does not need to make its own discussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact
because it is not necessary if it is satisfied with the report of its examiner or referee. The report of the
examiner or referee already contains a full discussion of the evidence and the findings of fact based
thereon. The situation differs if the court disagrees with the report in which case it should state the
reasons for its disagreement. If it is in full accord with the report, it is purposeless to repeat what the
referee or examiner has already found in it.

SERRANO v. PSC
 Serrano filed an application with PSC requesting to operate a taxicab automobile service. His
application was heard, and his presentation of evidence completed. Nonetheless, PSC summarily disposed
of his application without stating whether the application was dismissed for lack of interest or failure to
prosecute or denied for failure to qualify. The Court held that the decision must be rendered in such a
manner that the parties to the proceeding may know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the
decisions rendered.
While the PSC is not a court of record within the meaning of the constitutional provision
requiring such courts to render decisions by expressing therein the facts and law on which it is based, it
cannot entirely ignore or disregard the requirements of due process. The last Ang Tibay cardinal primary
right requires that quasi-judicial tribunals render decisions in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.

SOLID HOMES, INC. v. LASERNA

In this case, Solid Homes was assailing the decision of Office of the President for merely
adopting by reference the decision of HLURB BOC, without recitation of facts and law on which it was
based. It argued that it runs afoul of the mandate in Art. VIII, Sec. 14 of 198 Constitution. The Court held
that OP did not violate the same as the constitutional mandate providing that “no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is
based” is not applicable in administrative proceedings. All the provisions under Art. VIII only concern the
judicial branch of the government.
As long as the constitutional requirement of due process is satisfied, the rights of the parties in
administrative proceedings are not violated. There is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and law on which it is based. As long as it is grounded on evidence
and sufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases, the due process requirement is satisfied.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v. CAMPOSANO

The DOH Secretary issued an Order disposing the case against DOH-NCR employees by blindly
relying on the dispositive portion of an earlier resolution by PCAGC. The Court held that the Secretary
failed to comply with administrative due process because she did not conduct her own investigation, as
required by the 6th cardinal principle that “in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its
own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the
views of a subordinate”.
Administrative due process requires that, prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions, the disciplining
authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face, a decision imposing
administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. While the investigation of a case may be
delegated to and conducted by another body or group of officials, the disciplining authority must
nevertheless weigh the evidence gathered and indicate the applicable law. In this manner, the respondents
would be informed of the bases for the sanctions and thus be able to prepare their appeal intelligently.
The actual exercise of the disciplining authority's prerogative requires a prior independent
consideration of the law and the facts. Failure to comply with this requirement results in an invalid
decision. The disciplining authority should not merely and solely rely on an investigator's
recommendation, but must personally weigh and assess the evidence gathered.

AMERICAN TOBACCO CO. v. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS

ATC challenged the validity of Rule 168 of the “Revised Rules of Practice before the Philippine
Patent Office in Trademark Cases,” objecting to the authority of hearing officers to hear their cases,
arguing that it is the Director of Patents who must personally hear and decide inter partes cases. The
Court upheld the validity of Rule 168 as regards the delegation of the power to hear but reiterated that the
power to decide is vested by law only with the Director of Patents.
The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does
not preclude him from utilizing, as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates
to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is
sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.
Neither does due process of law nor the requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of
testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not
deprived of his right to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is
supported by the evidence in the record, there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair
trial are fully met.

ALBERT v. GANGAN
Albert, as the head of NHMFC, filed a letter-complaint against his subordinate employees who
appeared to be responsible for fraud with respect to Amako project loan transactions. However, COA
Resident Auditor of NHMFC found Albert personally liable with other NHMFC officers simply because,
as the approving officer, any transaction presented to him for approval is subject to his discretion. The
Court ruled in favor of Albert as there was no showing he had knowledge of his subordinates’ scheme.
Furthermore, the COA decision merely stated conclusions of law. Facts and circumstances, as well as the
reason for the disallowance, were patently incomplete, inaccurate, or missing.
Due process demands that government agencies must state the facts and the law on which the
decision is based.

AROCHA v. VIVO
The Board of Inquiry rendered a decision admitting Gatchalian into the country as Filipino
citizens. After almost a year, the Board of Commissioners reversed the decision and ordered for the
exclusion of Gatchalian. The issue in the case centered on the actual date of Board of Commissioners’
decision to determine whether it was prescribed within the 1-year period. The Court ruled in favor of the
Commission, as the decision of the Board of Commissioners, the notification to appellee's counsel that
such decision was rendered, and the warrant of exclusion, bear the date July 6, 1962, or within one year
from the reviewed decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
 The operative date of the Commissioners' action is that when the resolution of exclusion was
voted and adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared,
written and signed.
IN RE NERIA v. COM. OF IMMIGRATION
Similar to the facts in Arocha, there was an alteration of the date of the decision. However, unlike
in Arocha, Neria’s case was actually acted upon and decided not on August 2, 1962, as the decision and
the warrant of exclusion would tend to show, but on August 8, 1962, which would put the reversal of the
decision outside of the 1-year period.
Doctrine on operative date from Arocha is reiterated in this case.
The Court defined promulgation as “the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing
and publication”. The word "promulgate" was viewed by the majority in People vs. Dinglasan as the
entry made by the clerk of a judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments made by said clerk.

GO YU TAK WAI v. VIVO

This case has similar facts to Arocha. The issue arose however because the Board of Special
Inquiry’s decision in question was subject to motu proprio review. The Court held that such decisions
need not be promulgated within 1 year period of review, as it is sufficient that the Board review and adopt
a decision within said period.
Same doctrine as Arocha. The decision in extenso must relate back to the day when the resolution
to exclude was adopted.
In Teehankee’s dissent, however, the Justice posited that both the voting and decision should be
done within 1 year based on public policy and due process considerations.

SICHANGCO v. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION

Similar facts to Arocha, but the lower court, in deciding whether the decision of the Board was
promulgated within the 1-year period, considered the date of receipt of the decision by Sichangco and his
sons instead of the date the decision was rendered. The Court ruled that it is the date of the decision that
should be considered rather than the date of its receipt.
The operative date of the Commissioners’ action is that when the resolution was noted and
adopted by them as a Board, regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared, written,
and signed; regardless of the date when such decision is mailed.

REALTY EXCHANGE VENTURE CORP. v. SENDINO

REVI assailed HLURB-OAALA’s decision, arguing that it should have been rendered by the
Commissioner en banc, and not through a division. The Court held that HLURB is given the power to
adopt rules for the effective accomplishment of its function and that there is no provision in law denying
the HLURB the power to delegate adjudicatory functions to a division.
 Rules of procedure are, as a matter of course, construed liberally in proceedings before
administrative bodies. Power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations
necessary to carry out its functions has been held to be an adequate source of authority to delegate a
particular function, unless by express provision or by implication, it has been withheld.
Jurisdiction

GO TEK v. DEPORTATION BOARD

Go Tek assailed the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board in its deportation proceedings against
him, arguing that a pending criminal case based on the same facts is pending before the City Fiscal of
Manila. The Court ruled that the Board has jurisdiction to investigate Go Tek for illegal possession of
fake dollar checks in spite of the fact that he has not yet been convicted thereof and notwithstanding that
act is not among the grounds for the deportation of undesirable aliens under Immigration Law.
The intention of the law is to grant the Chief Executive full discretion to determine whether an
alien's residence in the country is so undesirable as to affect or injure the security, welfare or interest of
the state. The adjudication of facts upon which deportation is predicated also devolves on the Chief
Executive whose decision is final and executory.
The decision of the Deportation Board is merely recommendatory. The Chief Executive has to
approve the board's recommendation.

GUY v. IGNACIO
Upon petition of the Guy siblings, the RTC issued a TRO against the Board of Commissions,
who claimed that they are Canadian citizens illegally working in the Philippines. The CA reversed this,
ruling that pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the RTC has no jurisdiction to decide on the
issue of the citizenship of Guy as it is with the Bureau of Immigration. The Court ruled that the doctrine
of primary jurisdiction admits of exceptions. There was substantial evidence that they are Filipino
citizens, thus their resort to judicial intervention in deportation proceedings is proper.
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail
of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which administrative agencies are
authorized to decide should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first
giving such administrative agency the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction; that is, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within
the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative
tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special
knowledge, experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate
matters of fact.
Exceptions to this rule:
a) estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine
b) challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction
 c) unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant
d) amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive
e) question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice
f) judicial intervention is urgent
g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage
h) controverted acts violate due process
i) issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot
j) there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy
k) when strong public interest is involved
l) quo warranto proceedings

GO v. RAMOS
This case has similar facts to Guy v. Ignacio, but the Court here ruled that there was no
substantial evidence to oust the Board of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings.
Judicial determination is permitted in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is
substantial evidence supporting the claim of citizenship, so substantial that there are reasonable grounds
for the belief that the claim is correct. Moreover, when the evidence submitted by a deportee is conclusive
of his citizenship, the right to immediate review should also be recognized and the courts shall promptly
enjoin the deportation proceedings.

VERA v. CUEVAS
Respondent companies assailed the authority of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to issue
an order directing them to withdraw their products for failure to comply with the provision of the Tax
Code that has already been impliedly repealed. The Court held that since the provision has lost its tax
purpose, the Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only when necessary in the enforcement
of its principal powers and duties consisting of the "collection of all national internal revenue taxes, fees
and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected therewith." The
enforcement of the assailed provision entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thus
unconnected with any tax purpose. This is the exclusive function of the Food and Drug Administration of
the Department of Health.

DE LA FUENTE v. DE VEYRA
The Collector of Customs assailed the order of the CFI allowing the filing of bond to secure the
release M/V Luck Star, which had been seized by BOC for smuggling cigarettes. The Court held that the
exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs precludes CFI
from assuming cognizance over such cases.
It is well-settled that the exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the
Collector of Customs precludes a CFI from assuming cognizance over such cases. The Collector of
Customs when sitting in forfeiture proceedings constitutes a tribunal expressly vested by law with
jurisdiction to hear and determine the subject matter of such proceedings without any interference from
the CFI.

CARIÑO v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

The CHR took cognizance of the case of dismissed teachers that was appealed to its office for
violation of human rights, leading to the question of whether it has the power to try and decide certain
specific types of cases. The Court declared that CHR has no such power, having merely the power to
investigate. The matters involved are clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education,
being within the scope of the disciplinary power, and CHR has no business intruding into the jurisdiction
and functions of DepEd or the CSC.
Fact-finding is not adjudication and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice,
or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty
of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the
authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided
or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may
be provided by law.

SIMON, JR. v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Similar to the case of Cariño, CHR was involved in a case which was outside its jurisdiction. It
issued a preliminary order directing petitioners to desist from demolishing stalls and shanties as it violated
the respondents’ business rights.
Same doctrine as Cariño. The Commission on Human Rights was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country or duplicate much less take over the
functions of the latter.

LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CA

LLDA issued a cease and desist order against Caloocan City for not maintaining an open garbage
dumpsite without an Environmental Compliance Certificate and clearance from LLDA. Caloocan City
Government filed an action to nullify the said order and sought to be declared as the sole authority in said
matter. The Court ruled that LLDA had authority to take cognizance of the complaint and issue cease and
desist orders as the enabling law of LLDA specifically
Jurisdiction is conferred by law. LLDA, as a specialized administrative agency, is specifically
mandated by its enabling charter and amendatory laws, to carry out and make effective the declared
national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake
area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay,
Quezon and Caloocan
UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HLURB
David filed a complaint with HLURB to annul the title of Union Bank and FEBTC over the
condominium unit she bought, which was mortgaged by FRDC without her knowledge and consent.
Petitioners alleged that HLURB had no jurisdiction over the case. The Court held that HLURB has
jurisdiction over the case as the acts of FRDC, which was an unsound real estate business practice and is
highly prejudicial to the buyer, falls under the jurisdiction of HLURB.
The jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate the real estate trade is broad enough to include
jurisdiction over complaints for specific performance of the sale, or annulment of the mortgage, of a
condominium unit, with damages.

OSEA v. AMBROSIO
Spouses Osea filed a case for damages before the RTC against Ambrosio for finding cracks in the
house constructed by the latter. The Court ruled that it is the HLURB, and not the RTC, which has the
jurisdiction over the case. Complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with damages filed
by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB.
Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely,
if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating such agency. Under the doctrine of primary
administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a controversy where the issues for
resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact.

GERONIMO v. CALDERON
Spouses Calderon filed with HLURB for the issuance of a cease and desist order and specific
performance against spouses Geronimo and the subdivision developer as under their contract, the parcel
of land shall be used exclusively for one single-family residential building, yet the Geronimo’s have
erected a church beside their home which has been subject of numerous noise complaints. The Court held
that HLURB have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter as it involved specific performance of contractual
and statutory obligations filed by buyers of the subdivision lots against the developer.
A complaint arising from the contract between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer, or
compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to make the
subdivision a better place to live in clearly falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
When an administrative agency is conferred quasi-judicial functions, all controversies relating to
the subject matter pertaining to its specialization are deemed to be included within its jurisdiction. Split
jurisdiction is not favored.

MATEO v. COURT OF APPEALS

Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager of MOWAD (quasi-public corporation created by law),
was placed under preventive suspension before being terminated by the Board of Directors of MOWAD.
He filed a special civil action for quo warranto and mandamus. The Board moved to dismiss the case, on
the ground of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees. The
Court held that the CSC, not the RTC, had jurisdiction to entertain cases involving the dismissal of
officers and employees under the Civil Service Law.
The hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are governed by the provision of the Civil Service
Law and Rules and Regulations. RTCs have no jurisdiction to entertain cases involving dismissal of
officers and employees covered by the Civil Service Law. Employees of GOCC with original charter fall
under the jurisdiction of the CSC.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. CAB

PAL opposed the application of GrandAir for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity,
alleging that the Civil Aeronautics Board has no jurisdiction over the application as GrandAir does not
possess a legislative franchise authorizing it to engage in air transportation services. The Court upheld the
authority of CAB to hear the application pursuant to RA 776, through which Congress delegated the
authority to authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to CAB.
A franchise may be derived indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this
extent, the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other than those of a
legislative nature. Privileges conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as
much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the Legislature.

ERISTINGCOL v. CA
Eristingcol filed a complaint with the RTC against UVAI for imposing a penalty for her alleged
violations of the village Construction Rules and Regulations, as well as prohibiting her contractors from
entering the village and working on her property, while UVAI claimed that it is HLURB which has
jurisdiction over the case. The allegations in Eristingcol’s complaint revealed that the nature only
superficially delves into the validity of UVAI’s Construction rules but actually goes into the application
of UVAI’s by-laws. Thus, the Court ruled that HLURB has jurisdiction over the case.
In determining which body has jurisdiction over a case, one should consider not only the status or
relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question that is the subject of their controversy. To
determine the nature of an action and which court has jurisdiction, courts must look at the averments of
the complaint or petition and the essence of the relief prayed for.

DELTA VENTURES RESOURCES, INC. v. CABATO

Delta Ventures, a 3rd party to a labor case against Green Mountain, filed a petition for injunction
with the RTC, asserting ownership over the property levied upon as a result of the labor case. The
laborers claimed the jurisdiction is with NLRC. The Court held that that although the complaint before
the trial court was for the recovery of possession and injunction, in essence it was an action challenging
the legality or propriety of the levy vis-a-vis the alias writ of execution, including the acts performed by
the Labor Arbiter and the Deputy Sheriff. The complaint was in effect a motion to quash the writ of
execution of a decision rendered on a case properly within the jurisdiction of the LA. The subject matter
of the third party claim is but an incident of the labor case, a matter beyond the jurisdiction of regional
trial courts.
Jurisdiction over the subject-matter is determined upon the allegations made in the complaint,
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled or not entitled to recover upon the claim asserted therein —
a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial.
Courts have no jurisdiction to act on labor cases or various incidents arising therefrom, including
the execution of decisions, awards or orders. Jurisdiction to try and adjudicate such cases pertains
exclusively to the proper labor official concerned under the Department of Labor and Employment. To
hold otherwise is to sanction split jurisdiction which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice.

JESUS LIM ARRANZA, ET. AL v. B.F. HOMES, INC.

The issue involved in this case is whether it is the SEC or the HLURB that has jurisdiction over a
complaint for specific performance filed by subdivision homeowners against a subdivision developer to
enforce the latter's obligations to provide them their basic needs as purchasers of the lots. BF Homes, Inc.
claimed that inasmuch as BFHI is under receivership, the case is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
SEC. The Court held that HLURB has jurisdiction over the specific performance case as the SEC
proceeds with the rehabilitation of BFHI. Applicable laws confer upon the HLURB jurisdiction over
matters relating to the observance of laws governing corporations engaged in developing subdivisions and
condominiums.
Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine a cause — the right to act in a case. It is
conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of any court or tribunal. It is determined by the
averments of the complaint and not by the defense contained in the answer.
HLURB has jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision
developer and the lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its
contractual and statutory obligations to make the subdivision a better place to live in.

COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. DOLEFIL AGRARIAN BENEFICIARIES COOP

The jurisdiction of Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) to resolve inter-cooperative
disputes in DARBCI was challenged by the members of DARCBI Board of Directors, who were replaced
in the election held during a general assembly held despite the issuance by the CA of restraining orders.
The Court ruled under RA 6369, CDA is to exercise purely administrative functions. Thus, the orders of
CDA as to the disputes were issued in excess of its jurisdiction.
CDA is devoid of any quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate intra-cooperative disputes and more
particularly disputes as regards the election of the members of the Board of Directors and officers of
cooperatives. Being an administrative agency, the CDA has only such powers as are expressly granted to
it by law and those which are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. An agency which is to discharge
purely administrative functions is not automatically vested with quasi-judicial authority to adjudicate.

DE JESUS v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

 De Jesus et. al. assailed the jurisdiction of the COA in disallowing the payment of allowances and
bonuses received by them, claiming it has no jurisdiction to construe any provision of PD 198 on the
compensation and other benefits granted to LWUA-designated members of board of water districts. The
Court ruled that a water district is a government-owned and controlled corporation with a special charter
since it is created pursuant to a special law. COA has the authority to investigate employees of GOCCs,
receiving additional allowances and bonuses, are entitled to such benefits under applicable laws. Thus,
water districts are subject to the jurisdiction of the COA.
The Constitution specially vests in the COA the authority to determine whether government
entities comply with laws and regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow illegal or
irregular disbursements of the same. If the rule were otherwise, administrative agencies, by the mere act
of issuing a resolution, can put to naught the broad and extensive powers granted to the COA by the
Constitution.

CSC v. ALFONSO
Alfonso was charged with grave misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
Service, and violation of Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. He countered that instead of CSC, it is
the BOR of PUP which has jurisdiction over his case as he was its employee.
As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the
performance of and discipline all government employees, including those employed in GOCC’s with
original charters. The creation of disciplinary committees in different branches, subdivisions, agencies
and instrumentalities of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints, or the passage of
laws allowing for the creation of such disciplinary bodies, does not divest CSC of its inherent power to
supervise and discipline government employees, including those in the academe.
To hold otherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established,
i.e., to instill professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would also impliedly
amend the Constitution itself.

SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V.V. v. JALOS

After building a pipeline through the Oriental Mindoro Sea in connection with the Malampaya
Natural Gas Project, subsistence fishers of Oriental Mindoro filed in the RTC a complaint for damages
against Shell claiming that their livelihood was adversely affected by the construction and operation of
the pipeline. Shell moved to dismiss, alleging lack of jurisdiction since the case is a pollution case and
falls within the primary jurisdiction of the Pollution Adjudication Board. The Court held that the case is a
pollution case that falls within the jurisdiction of PAB.
The definition of the term “pollution” itself connotes the need for specialized knowledge and
skills, technical and scientific, in determining the presence, the cause, and the effects of pollution. These
knowledge and skills are not within the competence of ordinary courts. Consequently, resort must first be
made to the PAB, which is the agency possessed of expertise in determining pollution-related matters.

MACHADO v. GATDULA
 Machado and Gatdula submitted themselves to mediation with the Commission on Settlement of
Land Problems. COSLAP ruled in favor of Gatdula. Machado questions the decision alleging that
COSLAP had no jurisdiction. The Court held that COSLAP did not, as its jurisdiction is limited to those
disputes involving public lands or those covered by a specific license. The fact that Machado actively
participated in the proceeding does not cure the defect of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction is conferred by law and a judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without
jurisdiction is void. Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal
where none, by law, exists.
Disputes requiring no special skill or technical expertise of an administrative body that could be
resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular courts.

VDA. DE HERRERA v. BERNARDO

This case has similar facts with Machado, wherein on appeal, Vda. de Herrera questioned the
jurisdiction of COSLAP over the controversy. The Court held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the
case as the dispute does not fall under the cases enumerated in the law that created it. Furthermore,
estoppel by laches does not apply as the lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to
warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it, which is
not the case here.
A jurisdictional issue may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not
lost by waiver or by estoppel.
Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are
specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including
a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or
complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for,
irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs

PAT-OG, SR. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Pat-og questioned for the first time the jurisdiction of the CSC over his grave misconduct case
and contended that administrative charges against a public school teacher should have been initially heard
by a committee to be constituted pursuant to the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. The Court held
that the CSC, DepEd, and PRC have concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases against public
school teachers. As it was CSC which first acquired jurisdiction over the case, it had the authority to
proceed and decide the case to the exclusion of the DepEd and the PRC.
Concurrent jurisdiction is that which is possessed over the same parties or subject matter at the
same time by two or more separate tribunals. When the law bestows upon a government body the
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction
is exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in which
case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Where concurrent jurisdiction exists in
several tribunals, the body that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of the others.
FUNA v. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE
Funa requested for a copy of the latest financial and audit report of MECO, but COA stated that
MECO was not under its audit jurisdiction. Funa then filed a petition for mandamus to compel COA to
audit MECO. The Court held that MECO is a sui generis private entity, not a GOCC, though COA still
has jurisdiction to audit MECO with respect to the collection of verification fees and consular fees.
The MECO is not a GOCC or government instrumentality. It is a sui generis private entity
especially entrusted by the government with the facilitation of unofficial relations with the people in
Taiwan without jeopardizing the country's faithful commitment to the One China policy of the PROC.
However, despite its non-governmental character, MECO handles government funds in the form of the
verification fees it collects on behalf of the DOLE and the consular fees it collects under Sec. 2(6) of EO
No. 15s. 2001. Hence, under existing laws, the accounts of the MECO pertaining to its collection of such
"verification fees" and "consular fees" should be audited by the COA.

DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. TRINIDAD VALLEY REALTY AND

DEVELOPMENT CORP.
Trinidad Valley et. al. opposed the inclusion of a significant portion of their land within the
coverage of CARP. DAR dismissed their oppositions, so the corporations filed a certiorari with the RTC.
DAR argued that jurisdiction over all matters concerning agrarian reform exclusively belongs to DAR
and that the RTC’s jurisdiction in agrarian reform matters is limited only to the determination of just
compensation and prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA 6657. The Court held that it is the CA
which has jurisdiction since it concerns the implementation of CARP by the DAR, pursuant to RA 6657.
It is a cardinal principle in remedial law that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of
an action is determined by the law in force at the time of the filing of the complaint and the allegations of
the complaint. Jurisdiction is determined exclusively by the Constitution and the law and cannot be
conferred by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties. It cannot also be acquired through or waived,
enlarged or diminished by their act or omission, nor conferred by the acquiescence of the court. It is
neither for the court nor the parties to violate or disregard the rule, this matter being legislative in
character.

Administrative and Judicial Proceedings Arising from the same facts

GALANG v. COURT OF APPEALS

Tee Hook Chun was subject to a criminal case and an administrative case for entering the
Philippines under a false name. In the administrative case, Commissioner Galang issued an order for his
exclusion (resulting in his detention), but Tee Hook Chun was acquitted in the criminal case and was
bound for release. The Court ruled that the Commissioner may not be compelled to release Tee Hook
Chun. The act committed by the accused could give rise to both administrative and criminal cases which
are entirely distinct and separate from each other and are not incompatible. It ruled that decision granting
his release on the criminal case does not operate to preclude his administrative penalties.
Criminal and administrative proceedings are entirely different and distinct from each other. One
is not legally inconsistent with the other, and the prosecution for the former does not entail a waiver of the
action due for the latter.
The alleged conflict between said proceedings is purely physical, not legal, in the sense that the
one does not nullify or set aside the other. The conflicts effect mainly the time and place at which certain
things will have to be done. For this reason, some will have to yield to the others, but only in point of
priority or order of execution or performance. However, neither will nullify or set aside the other, or
imply a renunciation of the latter.

CO SAN v. DIRECTOR OF PATENTS

Co San was acquitted in a criminal case for unfair competition, but Director of Patents dismissed
his petition for cancellation of Letters of Patent granted in favor of Ong Lian for insufficiency of
evidence. The Court held that the Director of Patents is not bound by the findings in the CA as they fall
under different jurisdictions and agreed with the Director that the petition for cancellation should be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Findings in judicial proceedings are not automatically binding in administrative proceedings
arising from the same facts, especially where the issues in the criminal case and the administrative case
are distinct and different from one another.

VILLANOS v. SUBIDO
The CSC dismissed Villanos, relying on the decision of the CA in a criminal proceeding against
her finding her guilty of libel. The Court held that she was not given a fair hearing as Villanos was never
given a chance to present evidence in the administrative proceeding to blunt the effects of said decision.
A condemnatory decision in a criminal case, even if final, by itself alone, cannot serve as basis
for a decision in an administrative case involving the same facts, for the simple reason that matters that
are material in the administrative case are not necessarily relevant in the criminal case. So,
notwithstanding that findings in criminal cases must be beyond reasonable doubt, they cannot be
conclusive for administrative purposes.

PNR v. DOMINGO
Mafe was charged with theft in the RTC by his employer PNR. RTC issued a judgment
acquitting. Mafe based on reasonable doubt, then issued an amendatory judgment, ordering PNR to pay
back wages and reinstate Mafe. PNR assailed such amendatory motion for lack of jurisdiction. The Court
held that the amendatory decision is null and void.
 The trial court in the criminal case, has no authority, in the event of an acquittal of the accused
employee, to order payment of back salaries. The reason for the rule is that generally acquittal in the
criminal case does not carry with it relief from administrative liability. The administrative case may
generally proceed against a respondent independently of a criminal action for the same act or omission
and requires only a preponderance of evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond
reasonable doubt of the criminal charge.

TAN v. COMELEC
Tan, an incumbent Davao City Prosecutor, was Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers
for the 1992 elections. Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate but another candidate filed several
cases questioning the validity of the proclamation. All were dismissed, except for the administrative
charge in the COMELEC. Tan moved to dismiss the administrative complaint for alleged lack of
jurisdiction of the COMELEC, he being under the Executive Department of the government. The Court
held that COMELEC is in the best position to assess how its deputized officials performed their duties,
and that the criminal complaint lodged in the Ombudsman and the administrative inquiry in the
COMELEC are two separate proceedings.
An absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice versa.

OCAMPO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

An administrative case against Ocampo was filed for dishonesty, untrustworthiness and for
conduct prejudicial to the service when he failed to remit payment from a foreign client. Ocampo argues
that the administrative case against him should be dismissed since the criminal case of estafa and
falsification filed against him had already been dismissed.
The difference in the quantum of evidence, the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in
criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be
binding on the other.

MIGRALLES v. GO
Similar to the cases above, the criminal case filed against Miralles was dismissed, so Miralles
alleged such dismissal was conclusive of his innocence.
A finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the
administrative case. Conversely, acquittal in a criminal case does not necessarily exculpate a person
administratively. An administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and may proceed
independently thereof. The quantum of proof in the latter is different, such that the verdict in one need not
necessarily be the same as in the other.

FERRER, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN

 In this case, it is the administrative case against Ferrer which has been dismissed instead of the
criminal case, which was still pending in the Sandiganbayan.
The dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal
prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint.

While it is true that the quantum of proof for administrative cases is lower than the quantum of
proof for criminal cases, it should likewise be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs
from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service,
based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of
the criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.

ACUZAR v. JOROLAN
Acuzar was charged with violation of the Child Abuse Act with MTC, and grave misconduct with
PLEB, which subsequently dismissed him. He assailed the PLEB decision, arguing that it should have
waited for the decision of the criminal case before ruling on the administrative case against him.
Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases,
proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.

Rules of Evidence

PHILIPPINE MOVIE PICTURES WORKERS ASS’N v. PREMIER PRODUCTION

The CIR Judge made an ocular inspection and relied on it as evidence to decide the case without
conducting a proper hearing. The Court held that it was a denial of due process.
An ocular inspection is proper if court finds it necessary but is authorized only to help it in
clearing doubt. But it should not exclude the presentation of evidence. It is merely an auxiliary remedy
the law affords parties or the court to reach an enlightened determination of the case.

ESTATE OF FLORENCIO BUAN v. PAMBUSCO

The Commission made an on-the-ground inspection and observation through its own agents and
found that there is already a superabundance of authorized trips. Thus it denied the application of
petitioner for additional bus trips.
Where the findings of the Public Service Commission are obviously supported by more
than substantial evidence the same are binding upon the Supreme Court and the latter is not
required to examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of
evidence really justified the decision appealed from.

RIZAL LIGHT CO. v. MUN. OF RIZAL

Similar to the case above, the Commission based its decision on the inspection reports submitted
by its engineers who conducted the inspection of petitioner's electric service upon orders of the
Commission. It revoked Rizal Light’s CPCN based on such findings.
In reviewing the decision of the Public Service Commission, the Supreme Court is not required to
examine the proof de novo and determine for itself whether or not the preponderance of evidence really
justifies the decision, since its only function is to determine whether or not there is evidence before the
Commission upon which its decision might reasonably be based. The Court will not substitute its
discretion for that of the Commission on questions of fact and will not interfere in the latter's decision
unless it clearly appears that there is no evidence to support it.

BORJA v. MORENO
In this case, there was substantial evidence to support the finding of the DPWH Secretary that
Borja closed a public stream. However, the Court did not uphold the decision because there was a virtual
denial of due process, since the investigator conducted it with grave abuse of discretion.
If there is substantial evidence to support the findings of an administrative official in matters
within his competence, that is, "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusions", the courts are bound to look no further, not even to consider contrary evidence of
a preponderant nature.
An exception to the rule requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before resort to the
courts may be had is when during the investigation was conducted, there was a virtual denial of due
process

MACEDA v. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD

During the courseof the hearings, the ERB changed the way of presentation of evidence – they
made it mostly through affidavits. Maceda contends that his right to due process was violated because he
did not finish cross examining Petron’s witness and he did not cross-examine Caltex and Shell’s
witnesses. The Court ruled that Maceda was not deprived of due process as the order of testimony within
the discretion of the court.
Such a relaxed procedure is especially true in administrative bodies, such as the ERB, which in
matters of rate or price fixing, is considered as exercising a quasi-legislative, not quasi-judicial, function.
As such administrative agency, it is not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence governing court
proceedings
BANTOLINO v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS, INC.
In the complaint for ULP of the employees against Coke, some of the affidavits were not affirmed
in trial and were not cross-examined. When the case reached the CA, these affidavits were deemed as
hearsay and not given probative value and were stricken off the record. The Court ruled that
administrative bodies, like the NLRC, are not bound by the strict procedural rules of regular courts.
Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and
procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Indeed, the Revised Rules of Court and prevailing
jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and
effect.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. COLANGCO

The CA reversed the decision of the CSC, stating that the photocopies of the documents
presented as evidence were not authenticated, and therefore should not have been admitted in evidence.
The Court ruled that administrative rules of procedure are construed liberally in the furtherance of justice.
The CSC, in investigating complaints against civil servants, is not bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence applicable in judicial proceedings.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

FACTORS AFFECTING FINALITY OF ADMINISTRATIVE DECISIONS

SWITCHMEN’S UNION OF NORTH AMERICA v. NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD

Switchmen, after losing the union election, brought the decision of the National Mediation Board
to the Federal District Court. The Court held that the district court had no jurisdiction over the
controversy.
Where Congress has not expressly authorized judicial review, the type of problem involved and
the history of the statute in question become highly relevant in determining whether judicial review may
be nonetheless supplied.
Congress has long delegated to executive officers or executive agencies the determination of
complicated questions of fact and of law. Where no judicial review was provided by Congress, Court has
often refused to furnish one, even where questions of law might be involved.

CHEVRON USA INC. v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.

 NRDC questioned the authority of the Environmental Protection Agency to set regulations
pursuant to the Clean Air Act. The US Court held that EPA’s interpretation is entitled to deference
because it is a question of policy.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, really
centers on the wisdom of the agency's policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice within a gap
left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges have a duty to respect
legitimate policy choices made by those who do.

FORTICH v. CORONA
DAR Secretary came up with a resolution to appease both Provincial Government and the farmer-
beneficiaries protesting the conversion of 144 hectares land in Bukidnon. The Provincial and Municipal
governments protested the resolution arguing that the case had already reached finality, making Corona’s
resolution is null and void. The Court struck down the resolution and ruled that the issue had already
become final and executory, as it was filed out of time.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-
judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. A resolution which
substantially modifies a decision after it has attained finality, is utterly void.

ANTIQUE SAWMILL INC. v. ZAYCO

. Zayco’s MR was denied for having been filed beyond the reglementary period. Secretary of
Agricultural and Natural Resources still ruled that the bid must be awarded to Zayco. The Court ruled that
the period is not merely mandatory but jurisdictional, hence Secretary. could not have acquired
jurisdiction over a decision that has acquired finality through Zayco’s failure to appeal within the period.
The requirement regarding the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional. Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be
altered at every step.

SOTTO v. RUIZ
Juan Ruiz, director of posts, refused to forward as registered mail copies of “The Independent”
because of alleged libelous content. Sotto, the proprietor of The Independent, filed a petition for
mandamus to direct the distribution through the mails of the copies thereof. The Court ruled that the law
gives the director of posts the power to determine whether certain mail is obscene, lewd or libelous, but
this authority can be subject to review of the court when there is clear error in his judgment.
The courts of law will not interfere with the decision of an administrative agency unless clearly of
opinion that it was wrong. Whether an article is or is not libelous, is fundamentally a legal question. In
order for there to be due process of law, the action of the Director of Posts must be subject to revision by
the courts in case he has abused his discretion or exceeded his authority.
UY v. PALOMAR
Even though the Postal Law contains no provision for judicial review of decisions of the
Postmaster General, the Court, however, has ruled that the action of the Postmaster General is subject to
revision by the courts in case he exceeded his authority or his act is palpably wrong, and that the courts
may interfere with the decision of the Postmaster General if it is clearly of opinion that the Postmaster
was wrong. The Court, by ruling thus, recognizes the availability of judicial review over the action of the
Postmaster General, notwithstanding the absence of statutory provision for judicial review of his action.
Same rule as that in Sotto. When what is involved is a purely legal question, judicial review is
available.

MANUEL v. VILLENA
Manuel was denied his Tree Farm Application with the Department of Agricultural & Natural
Resources by the Director of Forestry. Upon appeal to the Department Secretary, it was found that
irregularities with District Forester’s investigation prompting Secretary to order reinvestigation. Prior to
resolution of the reinvestigation, Secretary dismissed the appeal. Manuel filed complaint with CFI
alleging due process violation. The Court held that there was no violation of due process as he was given
the opportunity to be heard.
Courts, as a rule, will refuse to interfere with proceedings undertaken by administrative bodies or
officials in the exercise of administrative functions. This is so because such bodies are generally better
equipped technically to decide administrative questions and that non-legal factors. However,
administrative proceedings may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that:
a) the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or
clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion
b) decision was vitiated was fraud, imposition or mistake

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. SECRETARY OF LABOR

Yanglay, Jr. was dismissed by SMC for illegal trafficking in company medicines. He filed a case
in the NLRC and it adopted the findings of the mediator. Yanglay argued that the Court has no
jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC under the principle of separation of powers. The Court
ruled in the negative.
It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative
power, there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of
law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute.

UCPB v. E. GUANZON, INC.

EGI loaned from UCPB and defaulted. EGI filed with the BSP an administrative complaint for
violations of Sec. 36 and 37 of RA 6753 (Article IV of the New Central Bank Act) in relation to RA 8791
and for the commission of irregularities and conducting business in an unsafe or unsound manner, which
was dismissed. The CA reversed and remanded the case. The Court held that the CA has appellate
jurisdiction over decisions of the BSP/Monetary Board. There is nothing in RA 6753 or in RA 8791
which explicitly allows an appeal of the decisions of the BSP Monetary Board to the CA. However, this
shall not mean that said decisions are beyond judicial review.
The CA has appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments, orders, resolutions, or awards of the
BSP Monetary Board. This is because BP 129 expressly confers to the CA appellate jurisdiction over
quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions. The BSP is a quasi-judicial agency
exercising quasi-judicial functions. Even if the BSP MP is not in the list of quasi-judicial agencies under
Sec. 1 of Rule 43, it does not mean that the CA is bereft of appellate jurisdiction over it. The list in Rule
43 is not exclusive.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

PASCUAL v. PROV. BOARD

Pascual filed a MTD with the Provincial Board but the charges that were filed against him, but
this was denied. He then filed a petition for prohibition in the CFI but this was opposed by the Provincial
Board because Pascual did not comply with the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. The
Court held that Pascual’s case falls under the exception to the general rule, thus he need not exhaust
administrative remedies.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction that where the law has delineated the procedure by which
administrative appeal or remedy could be effected, the same should be followed before recourse to
judicial action can be initiated, but we believe that this rule is not without exceptions
The rules will be relaxed where:
a) there is grave doubt as to the availability of the administrative remedy
b) the question in dispute is purely a legal one, and nothing of an administrative nature is to
be or can be done
c) although there are steps to be taken, they are, under the admitted facts, merely matters of
form, and the administrative process, as a process of judgment, is really over
d) the administrative remedy is not exclusive but merely cumulative or concurrent to a
judicial remedy. A litigant need not proceed with optional administrative process before
seeking judicial relief.

ALZATE v. ALDANA
Not having any ruling on his request for reconsideration before the Director of Public Schools,
and fearing that the supposed salary would be reverted to the general funds of the government if not
disbursed before the end of the closing year, Alzate filed a mandamus case in the CFI. This was dismissed
for being premature since there was no final decision yet by the Bureau of Public Schools. The Court held
that in view of the special situation, a resort to the court without awaiting the final decision of the
administrative agency is not premature.
 In effect, the Court was saying that this case presents a special situation which warrants the non
-exhaustion of administrative remedies, taking note of the validity and urgency of the action taken by
Alzate. This is because if the petitioner waited for the decision of Bureau of Public Schools, and the
decision is favorable to him, he would still not be able to obtain the salary increase due to the automatic
reversion of the appropriated amount to the general funds if not disbursed before the end of fiscal year.

CIPRIANO v. MARCELINO
Cipriano filed an action for mandamus to compel the Municipal Treasurer to pay her salary and
equivalent of unused leaves. The Municipal Treasurer moved to dismiss because Cipriano did not exhaust
all administrative remedies i.e. bring it all the way to the Office of the President. The Court held that the
doctrine of exhaustion is not applicable when the question to be resolved is purely of law.
The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not without exception, not is it a
condition precedent to judicial relief. The principle may be disregarded when it does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy. It may and should be relaxed when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage.

CORPUZ v. CUADERNO
This case has similar facts to Cipriano, wherein the case in court was dismissed on the ground of
not exhausting administrative remedies as it was not appealed to the Commissioner of Civil Service or
brought up to the Office of the President. The Court held that there is no law requiring an appeal to the
President and while there are provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to Commissioner of
Civil Service and the Civil Service Board of Appeals, Corpuz is not bound to observe them.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not apply where, by the terms or
implications of the statute authorizing an administrative remedy, such is permissive only, warranting the
conclusion that the legislature to allow the judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy has not
been exhausted.

DE LARA v. CLORIVEL
What was involved in this case was an application for renewal of a timber license, which was
protested because of the conflict it would cause to the area covered by the timber concession. The Court
ruled that CFI did not commit GAD for granting an ex parte writ of preliminary investigation as the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be relaxed when its application may cause great and
irreparable damage.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable if it should appear that an
irreparable damage and injury will be suffered by a party if he should await the final action of the
administrative official concerned on the matter before taking court action.

PAREDES v. C.A.
 Paredes et. al, filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction to
stop the Bureau of Patents from enforcing the increased fees payable for the registration of patents and
trademarks. Unlike the previous cases, what was involved here was not of quasi-judicial functions, but of
quasi-legislative functions of the agency i.e. rate-fixing. The Court denied the petition as they had not
exhausted administrative remedies at the time they filed their petition.
Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other remedy is available which is sufficient to
afford redress. That the petitioners have another and complete remedy at law either by appeal or
otherwise, is generally a sufficient reason for dismissing the writ.
Where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review, and provides a system
of administrative appeal, or reconsideration, the courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, will
not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate
authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative
forum.
QUASHA v. SEC
The SEC Hearing Officer denied the application of Quasha for injunctive relief, to restrain the
sale of proprietary shares of Manila Polo Club at the height of the Christmas holidays and a few days
before the deadline given by the Club to its members in buying such shares. Quasha, without appealing to
the SEC en banc, raised the case to the Supreme Court. The Court held that the filing of the petition was
proper in view of the extremely limited time allotted to Quasha, ruling that going through the prescribed
procedure of appeal was obviously not a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.

REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
PCGG issued sequestration orders against Sipalay Trading Corp. and Allied Banking Corp. Two
separate petitions were filed by Sipalay and Allied before the SC assailing the sequestration orders. It was
referred to the Sandiganbayan. PCGG file d a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies. The Court ruled that PCGG’s motion was belated since it filed it 7 years after
the filing of Sipalay and Allied, and that the cases fall within the exemption of the requirement to exhaust
administrative remedies of estoppel and unreasonable delay or inaction.
The general rule is that there ought to be prior exhaustion of administrative remedies. However,
this rule is not inflexible. The rule on non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to many
exceptions, to wit: (i) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; (ii) where the
challenged administrative act is patently illegal amounting to lack of jurisdiction; (iii) where there is
unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; and (iv) where
the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice.

PAAT v. CA
The truck of de Guzman was seized for failure to produce the required documents for the forest
products found in the truck. The spouses de Guzman filed a letter of reconsideration which went to the
Secretary of DENR. Pending resolution, however, they filed a suit for replevin in the RTC. The Court
held that RTC should not have entertained the suit while there was a pending case before the DENR
Secretary.
 Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should
have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the
administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be
exhausted first before court's judicial power can be sought

LOPEZ v. CITY OF MANILA

Lopez filed a special proceeding for the declaration of nullity of a Manila City Ordinance which
increased tax assessments alleging that these are unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory. City of
Manila moved for the dismissal of the case because of the failure of Lopez of exhausting administrative
remedies. The Court held that this case does not fall under the exceptions to the general rule.
Where the law provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body, or
officer, relief to courts can be sought only after exhausting all remedies provided. Reason rests upon the
presumption that the administrative body, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error, may amend
its decision on a given matter and decide it properly. It also prevents premature recourse to the courts.
Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies
entrusted with regulations of activities coming under special technical knowledge and training of such
agencies.

GARCIA v. CA, PCA GOVERNING BOARD, AND GRAJEDA

PCA filed an administrative complaint against Garcia, who in turn filed a petition for a writ of
preliminary injunction with the RTC to enjoin the committee from further investigating. The Court ruled
that Garcia violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and that the proper remedy of
Garcia is to let the PCA decide on the case; and if the decision is against him, to appeal to the Civil
Service Commission
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse through court action,
cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies would have first been exhausted. The doctrine
does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve, or interfere in, a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is lodged initially with an administrative body of special competence.
Where a law has delineated the procedure by which administrative appeal or remedy could be
effected, the same should be followed before recourse to judicial action can be initiated.

DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM v. APEX INVESTMENT AND FINANCING CORP.

Apex-owned lots were subjected to compulsory acquisition without its knowledge, as notices
were sent to its old office address. Apex filed a Protest but PARO did not immediately act on it and
waited a year before forwarding the same to DAR, which merely required the submission of additional
evidence. Meanwhile, the TCTs were already cancelled and transferred to the Republic and to a farmer-
beneficiary. DAR answered that there was failure to exhaust administrative remedies, but the Court held
that the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies may be disregarded where a) there are circumstances indicating the
urgency of judicial intervention; and b) the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. NTC

SMART and other telco companies filed a TRO against the NTC for issuing various
memorandum circulars, going straight to the courts to question the validity of the same. The Court held in
favor of SMART on the ground that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies do not apply
when questioning an act done by an agency in their quasi-judicial function. Hence, the petitioners were
correct in filing the case immediately with the trial court.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative
agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies
only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

ESTRADA v. CA
Without first going to the DENR, Estrada et al. filed a complaint against BCC before the RTC to
prevent them from operating a cement plant in Subic. The Court ruled that the determination of the
existence of pollution lies with the DENR in this case, and the case with the RTC should have been
dismissed since it had no jurisdiction.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
same may be elevated to a court of justice for review. A premature invocation of a court’s invocation
renders the complaint without a cause of action and dismissible on such ground. The reason is that this
entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier disposition of controversies, and also comity and
convenience.

CSC v. DEPT. OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

The CSC filed a mandamus case against DBM to release its budget for year 2002. DBM withheld
the budget based on its “no report, no release policy” which CSC deemed to be in violation of its fiscal
autonomy. The Court held that the filing of the petition was proper as CSC is not mandated by law to seek
clarification from Secretary of DBM prior to filing an action against it.
The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only where there is an express legal
provision requiring such administrative step as a condition precedent to taking action in court.

OBIASCA V. BASALLOTE
Obiasca and Basallote were appointed to the same position. Instead of asking the CSC for
Reconsideration under the CSC Rules, Obiasca elevated the case to the CA which upheld the appointment
of Basallote. The Court ruled that the CSC Resolution had already become final and executory because of
Obiasca’s non-recourse to the administrative remedy before him.
 The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity
and convenience, where the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides
a system of administrative appeal or reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the
available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO

Gallo filed a petition before RTC for the correction of clerical errors in her birth certificate. OSG,
however, opposed alleging Gallo did not comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103. The
Court ruled that she complied under Rule 108 as the corrections sought were clerical, harmless, and
innocuous.
Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, a party must first avail of all
administrative processes available before seeking the courts' intervention. The administrative officer
concerned must be given every opportunity to decide on the matter within his or her jurisdiction. Failing
to exhaust administrative remedies affects the party's cause of action as these remedies refer to a
precedent condition which must be complied with prior to filing a case in court. However, failure to
observe the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not affect the court's jurisdiction.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION OR PRELIMINARY RESORT

TEXAS & PAC. RAILWAY CO. v. ABILENE

Abilene was suing Texas, as carrier, for charging excessive rates for their shipments. Texas
argued that since the shipments were interstate, it is within the coverage of the Interstate Commerce Act
and thus, the Interstate Commerce Commission has to rule first whether the rates are unreasonable. The
SCOTUS ruled that ICC, considering the powers granted to it by law, has primary jurisdiction over the
case.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that a dispute that fits within the jurisdiction of an
Administrative Agency should be taken first to that Agency, even if the case in theory could be taken into
court.

PHIL. GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. RELOVA

Phil. Global Comm. filed with the Board of Telecommunications an application for authority to
establish a branch or station in Cebu City. Private respondents opposed this and filed a petition for
declaratory relief alleging that the legislative franchise of Phil. Global Comm. did not justify the
establishment of another branch in Cebu. Phil. Global Comm. filed a petition for certiorari on the ground
that the question raised in such suit pertained to the National Telecommunications Commission, the body
with primary jurisdiction. The Court held that a petition for declaratory relief is proper.
Absent such clarity as to the scope and coverage of franchise, a legal question arises which is
more appropriate for the judiciary than for an administrative agency to resolve. The doctrine of primary
jurisdiction calls for application when there is such competence to act on the part of an administrative
body.

VIADAD v. RTC OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL

Public school teachers who staged a strike were administratively charged. They, in turn, filed a
case for prohibition and damages before the RTC against the DECS officials conducting the investigation.
The Court ruled that RTC should not have issued restraining orders pending administrative proceedings.
While no prejudicial question strictly arises where one is a civil case and the other is an administrative
proceeding, in the interest of good order, it behooves the court to suspend its action on the cases before it
pending the final outcome of the administrative proceedings.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of
special competence.

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

IEI assigned its coal operating contracts through a MOA to MMIC in accordance with the
objective of rationalizing the country’s over-all coal supply-demand balance. However, it subsequently
filed for rescission of the MOA due to violations of the terms and conditions by MMIC. RTC rendered
summary judgment in favor of IEI. The Court ruled that it was BED, and not RTC, that had jurisdiction to
hear and decide the issue.
If the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge
of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved,
then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction.

CONRAD AND CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

Fitrite instituted injunction proceedings against Conrad and Co. for infringement of its trademark
“Sunshine” on its biscuit products. Conrad sought the dismissal of the case, claiming that there was a
pending administrative case before Bureau of Patents, Trademarks, and Technology Transfer and that the
primary jurisdiction is lodged with the BPTTT. The Court held that the two cases involved different
issues, hence the injunction proceedings may proceed.
While an application for the administrative cancellation of a registered trademark under the
Trademark Law falls under the exclusive cognizance of BPTTT, an action, however, for infringement or
unfair competition, as well as the remedy of injunction and relief for damages, is explicitly and
unquestionably within the competence and jurisdiction of ordinary courts.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK v. CA

 Philippine Veterans Bank owned 4 parcels of land which were taken by the Department of
Agrarian Reform pursuant to RA 6657. Dissatisfied with the valuation of the land, Veterans Bank filed
for just compensation, but RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day
reglementary period for filing appeals from the orders of the DAR Adjudication Board. Veterans Bank
contended that DAR has no jurisdiction to determine the just compensation because this is vested in
RTCs designated as Special Agrarian Courts, hence, the 15-day period does not apply.
In accordance with settled principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the
DAR as an administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable compensation to
be paid for the lands taken under RA 6657, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.

The jurisdiction of the RTC is not any less "original and exclusive" because the question is first
passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative
determination. For that matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and
unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the theory that courts are the
guarantors of the legality of administrative action.

CRUSADERS BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC. v. NTC

Crusaders applied for renewal of its temporary permit to operate a radio station, but this was
denied by NTC and its assigned frequency was recalled. The Court held that the NTC findings are
supported by substantial evidence, so it will be accorded respect by reason of the acquired expertise of
NTC in the regulation of the nation’s airwaves.
Similar doctrine to previous cases. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction prevents this Court from
“arrogating unto itself” the authority to resolve a controversy which falls under the jurisdiction of a
tribunal possessed of a special competence

LIM v. GAMOSA
Gamosa, representing the Tagbanua people, filed a complaint with NCIP against Lim et. al. for
violation of required prior and informed consent as required by IPRA. NCIP took cognizance and heard
the case. The Court ruled in favor of Lim et. al. as IPRA only contemplates that the NCIP has jurisdiction
over disputes where both parties are IPs and all remedies under their indigenous customs has been
exhausted.
Primary jurisdiction, also known as the doctrine of Prior Resort, is the power and authority vested
by the Constitution or by statute upon an administrative body to act upon a matter by virtue of its specific
competence
Primary jurisdiction does not necessarily denote exclusive jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the
resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of
an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to
the administrative body for its view.
MATEO v. DAR, LBP, AND RODRIGUEZ ET. AL.
Mateo filed a complaint before the SAC against LBP, DAR, and farmer beneficiaries after it
rejected the valuation of LBP on its coconut and rice lands, although there were no summary
administrative proceedings conducted yet. The Court ruled that doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies finds no application in the instant case where the DAR took no initiative and inordinately
delayed the conduct of summary administrative proceedings, and where during the pendency of the case
before the SAC, the DARAB rendered decisions affirming the LBP's prior valuations of the subject
property.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction bas been increasingly called into play on matters demanding
the special competence of administrative agencies even if such matters are at the same time within the
jurisdiction of the courts. A case that requires for its determination the expertise, specialized skills, and
knowledge of some administrative board or commission because it involves technical matters or intricate
questions of fact, relief must first be obtained in an appropriate administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts although the matter comes within the jurisdiction of the courts. The
application of the doctrine does not call for the dismissal of the case in the court but only for its
suspension until after the matters within the competence of the administrative body are threshed out and
determined.

STANDING TO CHALLENGE

URSAL v. CTA
Ursal assessed Noel and Samson’s real properties for taxation purposes. The latter appealed to the
Cebu Board of Assessment Appeals which reduced the assessments. Ursal appealed to the CTA insisting
that his assessments were correct. The Court held that Ursal lacked standing because there was no
material damage inflicted upon him, and deciding on the issue was not a function of the CTA.
The Court of Tax Appeals as created by RA 1125 is a part of the judicial system and was not
made to decide mere conflicts of opinion between administrative officers or agencies.

LOZADA v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Lozada and Igot filed a petition for mandamus compelling COMELEC to hold an election to fill
the vacancies in the IBP for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election. The Court ruled
that they did not have legal standing either as taxpayers or as voters.
As taxpayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax
money is being illegally spent. Even his plea as a voter is predicated on an interest held in common by all
members of the public and does not demonstrate any injury specially directed to him in particular.

OPOSA v. FACTORAN, JR.

 Petitioners are minors represented and joined by their parents, claiming to represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn. The complaint alleges that they "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural
resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." It was prayed that the Secretary of DENR
cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country; and cease and desist from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements.
The Court held that minors can file a class suit for themselves, for others of their generation and
for succeeding generations. Their personality to sue is based on intergenerational responsibility insofar as
the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.

JOYA v. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

PCGG requested for the authority of the President to sign the proposed Consignment Agreement
between the Philippines through PCGG and Christie’s of New York concerning the sale of 82 Old
Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila. The Court held that PCGG has no jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with
Christie’s for the sale of the artworks.
One having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-
plaintiff in an action.
"Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.
The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the
interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional
right of some third and related party.

KILOSBAYAN, INC. v. GUINGONA

PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue.
PGMC was to operate the online lottery system. Kilosbayan, however, opposed this.
Petitioners as members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of any
personal and substantial interest on the matter. They have convincingly shown that in their capacity as
taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply demonstrated.
A party’s standing before the SC is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised. Insofar taxpayers’ suits are concerned,
the SC had declared that it is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained or that
it enjoys an open discretion to entertain the same or not.
KILOS BAYAN, INC. v. MORATO
Kilosbayan sought to invalidate the Equipment Lease Agreement entered into by Morato, PCSO
Chairman, and PGMC, alleging that the ELA is just the same as the contract of lease struck down by the
Court in Kilosbayan vs Guingona. Respondents argue that Kilosbayan has no standing since they are not
parties to the contract. The Court held that Kilosbayan lacked the requisite standing to file the case and is
also not the real party-in-interest and hence its petition must be dismissed outright.
Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some cases suits are brought not by
parties who have been personally injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.
Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have “alleged such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions

DOMINGO v. CARAGUE
Domingo et. al. questioned the legality of the Organizational Restructuring Plan as it
unceremoniously divested certain employees of their positions and caused them financial prejudice. They
claim to have standing as taxpayers and because the subject matter is of transcendental importance. The
Court ruled that they have no standing as they failed to show any present substantial interest in the
outcome of the case.
He who is directly affected and whose interest is immediate and substantial has the standing to
sue. Thus, a party must show a personal stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can
be redressed by a favorable decision in order to warrant an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction.

FUNA v. MANILA ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL OFFICE

Meco argued that Funa has no cause of action to compel performance of ministerial duty since
there was no demand prior to the petition for MECO and COA to submit to audit prior to filing of
petition. The Court held that Funa has standing as a concerned citizen to file the petition, since the issues
are of transcendental importance as they are with the performance of a constitutional duty, allegedly
neglected, by the COA
The following rules may be culled from the cases decided by the Court. Taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
a) the cases involve constitutional issues
b) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
c) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
 d) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled early; and
e) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.

ASS’N OF DATA PROCESSING SERVICE ORGANIZATION v. CAMP

An action by data processers' associations and data processing corporations was filed to review
the ruling of the Comptroller that national banks, including defendant bank, could make data processing
services available to other banks and to banks' customers. The US District Court dismissed for lack of
standing. SCOTUS held that plaintiffs, as competitors of national banks which are engaging in data
processing services, were "aggrieved" persons who, under Administrative Procedure Act, were entitled to
judicial review of ruling. The questions as to whether the Bank Service Corporation Act or National Bank
Act gave plaintiffs legal interest protecting them against violation of Acts and whether Acts were violated
were related to questions of merits rather than to standing.
Two tests as regards legal interest in this case:
a) injury in fact - In injury in fact, the injury must not be speculative, but it need not be economical
(i.e., are they going to suffer an injury?)
b) zone of interest - In zone of interest, the economic injury from the competition arguably brings it
into the petitioner’s zone of interest. It requires that the interest sought to be protected be the sort
of interest the statute or constitutional guarantee was designed to protect.

SIERRA CLUB v. MORTON

Sierra Club opposes the proposed development of a ski resort in Mineral King alleging that they
had special interest in its conservation. SCOTUS held they did not allege any harm to itself or its
members so they lacked standing to sue.
A person has standing to challenge only if he can show that he himself has suffered or will suffer
injury, whether economic or otherwise. The "injury in fact" test requires more than an injury to a
cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking review be himself among the injured.

SIMON v. EASTERN KENTUCKY WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION

Several low-income individuals and organizations brought a class suit against the Secretary of
Treasury and the CIR alleging that IRS violated the Internal Revenue Code and the Administrative
Procedure Act by issuing a Revenue Ruling allowing tax exemption to hospitals that do not serve
indigents. The Court ruled that respondents have no standing since the injury is speculative.
Standing focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a court, not on the issues that he
wishes to have adjudicated. The test of standing is whether, assuming justiciability of the claim, the
plaintiff has shown an injury to himself that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Absent such
showing, the court cannot take cognizance of the case without overstepping its assigned role to adjudicate
only actual cases and controversies.
 The organizations that filed this suit have described themselves as dedicated to promoting access
of the poor to health services. Standing cannot be established simply on their respective goals. An
organization’s abstract concern with a subject that could be affected by an adjudication could NOT
substitute for the concrete injury required for standing. Since the organizations did not allege any injury to
themselves as organizations, they can only establish standing as representatives of their members who
have been injured.

LUJAN v. NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION

NWF filed complaint against the Director of Bureau of Land Management for allegedly violating
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 and the National Environment Policy Act. NWF
claims that the reclassifying of public lands for private use would open them to mining activities, thereby
destroying their natural beauty. NWF presented two affidavits of its members to substantiate its claims.
DC ruled that NWF lacked standing. The Court ruled that the affidavits failed to show that they were
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of the relevant statute.
Two requirements must be satisfied:

 Must have been affected by some agency action, which must be “final agency action”
because neither of the statutes cited (FLPMA and LWRP) provide for a private right of
action.
 Must prove that they were adversely affected within meaning of the relevant statute. This
requires a showing of injury complained of that falls within the “zones of interest” sought
to be protected by the said statutes.

LUJAN v. DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE

Defenders challenged the orders to implement the Endangered Species Act. Secretary Lujan to
reinstate an initial interpretation of the Endangered Species Act The Secretary invoked lack of standing
by Defenders. SC held that the Defenders failed to establish injury in fact or redressability.
Congress cannot create standing when an injury in fact, a causal connection and redressability are
not present.
Standing has 3 elements:
a) plaintiff must suffer an injury in fact, an invasion of a legally protected interest which is
(a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or
‘hypothetical’
b) there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of. The
injury has to be “fairly traceable to the challenged action
c) it must be “likely,” not merely “speculative,” that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision

RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS OF THE PROTECTED SEASCAPE TAÑON STRAIT, ET. AL. v.
SEC. ANGELO REYES, ET. AL.
 On behalf of Marine Mammals in Tanon Strait, RMM assail the validity of Service Contract-46,
which is an exploration contract entered into between the government and JAPEX. Respondents assail the
standing of resident marine mammals. The Court held that what is decisive is that the mammals can be
represented by someone who has standing, which in this case was satisfied.
The need to give the Resident Marine Mammals legal standing has been eliminated by our Rules,
which allow any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to bring a suit to enforce our environmental laws.
It is worth noting here that the Stewards are joined as real parties in the petition and not just in
representation of the named cetacean species.

RIPENESS

ABBOT LABORATORIES v. GARDNER

Drug Amendments Act of 1962 requires manufacturers of prescription drugs to print the
“established name” of the drug prominently. The FDA Commissioner promulgated an order requiring a
prescription drug to bear the proprietary name or designation of the drug, accompanying the established
name of such drug. Present action was brought by 97 individual drug manufacturers and by the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association alleging that the Commissioner exceeded his authority in
promulgating such order. The Court ruled that there was indeed an issue ripe for adjudication.
Ripeness’ basic rationale is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication,
from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and also to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt
in a concrete way by the challenging parties.

NATIONAL AUTOMATIC LAUNDRY AND CLEANING COUNCIL v. SHULTZ

A written letter opinion was issued by the administrator of the wage and hour division of the
Dept. of Labor which declared that coin-operated laundries are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.
This was questioned by NALCC. District court dismissed the action saying that there was no controversy.
SCOTUS held that the issue is ripe for judicial review.
Twofold aspect in the issue of ripeness:
a) Fitness of the issues for judicial resolution
b) Hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.
The courts have to use judicial review while according deference to the interpretation given the
statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration. However, there is also the desirability
that such limitations exist, and should not defer in effectiveness, provided that appropriate instances for
examining and stating the limits are established by controversies which are real and suitable for
determination of the issue.
 MODES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

CERTIORARI

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOMES v. NLRC

St. Martin filed a petition for certiorari with the Court after its motion for reconsideration was
denied by the NLRC. The Court remanded the petition to the CA by virtue of the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts.
The mode of judicial review for the decisions by the NLRC to the Supreme Court would refer to
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. Such action is within the concurrent jurisdiction of both the CA and
the Supreme Court. The Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be
obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of
a remedy within and calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction.

PUREFOODS CORPORATION v. NLRC

Purefoods filed its MR of the NRLC decision outside the reglementary period, prompting it to file
a civil action of certiorari. The Court held that the it cannot lie and dismissed their petition.
Certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law against the acts of respondent.
The only question involved in certiorari is jurisdiction, either the want or excess thereof, and
abuse of discretion warrants the issuance of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari only when the same is
so grave, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,
prejudice or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined, or to act at all, in contemplation of law, as to be
equivalent to having acted without jurisdiction. The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed
for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment.
AZORES v. SEC
Azores’ complaint in the SEC was dismissed, as well as his appeal for being filed out of time. He
then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court, but the Court ruled that the errors alleged by Azores are
not errors of jurisdiction errors of jurisdiction nor do they constitute grave abuse of discretion which are
the only issues that can be raised on a petition for certiorari. The alleged errors cited by Azores are mere
errors of judgment.
Errors of judgment cannot be raised through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

VILLARUEL v. NLRC
Villaruel alleged in his petition for certiorari that there was Grave Abuse of Discretion on the part
of NLRC when it found that there was an existing employer-employee relationship between him and
Guarino. The Court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of NLRC.
The jurisdiction of this Court to review a decision or resolution of the NLRC, in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, does not include a correction of its evaluation of the
evidence but is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion
is committed when the judgment is rendered in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. GENERAL FOODS (PHILS.), INC.

General Foods filed for a tax deduction, but the CIR disallowed half of the claimed deduction.
General Foods appealed to the CTA, but the latter dismissed the appeal. The CA reversed the CTA
decision. The Court reversed the CA decision holding that the deductions claimed by General Foods did
not fall under those allowed by the law.
It has been a long-standing policy and practice of the Court to respect the conclusions of quasi-
judicial agencies such as the Court of Tax Appeals, a highly specialized body specifically created for the
purpose of reviewing tax cases. The CTA, by the nature of its functions, is dedicated exclusively to the
study and consideration of tax problems. It has necessarily developed an expertise on the subject. We
extend due consideration to its opinion unless there is an abuse or improvident exercise of authority.

CRUZ v. GANGAN
The government-issued phone that was given to Cruz was stolen. She requested relief from
accountability but was denied on the ground that she lacked the required diligence in the custody of
government properties. The Court reversed the decision and held that there is no evidence to support that
there was negligence on the part of Cruz.
The general rule is that findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected, so long as
they are supported by substantial evidence. But lacking support, the factual finding of administrative
agency, in this case COA, cannot stand on its own and is therefore not binding on the Court.
HADJI-SIRAD v. CSC
Hadji-Sirad was found guilty of letting another person take the Career Service Professional Exam
for her. Hadji-Sirad appealed to the CSC, which affirmed the findings of the CSCRO. Hadji-Sirad filed
before the CA a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 on the ground that the CSC Resolutions were issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction., but it was dismissed for
being a wrong mode of appeal. She should have filed a petition for review under Rule 43, not a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. The Court held that Hadji-Sirad failed to provide any justification for her
resort to a special civil action for certiorari, when the remedy of appeal by petition for review was clearly
available.
A special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost or lapsed remedy of appeal. They
are mutually exclusive remedies. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is
no appeal or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

INC SHIPMANAGEMENT, INC. v. MORADAS

Moradas filed a claim for full disability benefit under POEA-SEC contending that his burns
render him permanently disabled to work as a seaman. Petitioners dispute this claim, contending that the
burns and injury of Moradas are self-inflicted, after he was dismissed after being caught stealing supplies
from the vessel. The Court ruled that Moradas is not entitled to disability benefit.
The Court’s jurisdiction in cases brought before it from the CA via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is generally limited to reviewing errors of law. The Court is not the proper venue to consider a factual
issue as it is not a trier of facts. This rule, however, is not ironclad and a departure therefrom may be
warranted where the findings of fact of the CA are contrary to the findings and conclusions of the NLRC
and LA, as in this case. In this regard, there is therefore a need to review the records to determine which
of them should be preferred as more conformable to evidentiary facts.

TZE SUN WONG v. WONG

The Court discussed the three options that may be availed from the denial of the BOI Board of
Commissioners' MR. Court said that while petitioner leap-frogged other available remedies, the urgency
of the case justified his direct resort to certiorari. However, the Court denied the petition on substantive
grounds stating that the petition revolved around factual matters which have already been settled before
the BOI Board of Commissioners.
The extraordinary remedy of certiorari may be deemed proper “when it necessary to prevent
irreparable damages and injury to a party, where an appeal would be slow, inadequate, and insufficient
and in case of urgency”.
In a special civil action for certiorari brought against a court with jurisdiction over a case, the
petitioner carries the burden to prove that the respondent tribunal committed not merely a reversible error
but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the impugned order.
 Grave abuse of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in
an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge,
tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MICHELLE SORIANO GALLO

The Court held that the issue brought up by petitioner is a factual issue, which is improper in a
Petition for review on Certiorari. Petitioner raises a question of fact not proper under a Rule 45 Petition,
which should only raise questions of law. Petitioner raised an issue which requires an evaluation of
evidence as determining whether or not the change sought is a typographical error or a substantive change
requires looking into the party's records, supporting documents, testimonies, and other evidence.
Only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45 since factual questions are
not the proper subject of an appeal by certiorari. It is not this Court's function to once again analyze or
weigh evidence that has already been considered in the lower courts.

GALINDO AND PINTO v. COA

After COA held them guilty for Grave Misconduct and Violation of Reasonable Office Rules and
Regulations, Galindo and Pinto filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 before the Court, alleging that
COA committed GAOD for finding them guilty as it was not able to make use of the proper quantum of
evidence. The Court rule that the petition is not the proper remedy, and that COA did not commit GAOD
since the evidence relied upon by it met the requirements of substantial evidence.
As a general rule, Sec. 7, Art. IX-A of the Constitution provides that “unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution, or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” In
other terms, this general rule does not apply if other provisions of the Constitution, or the law provides for
a specific procedure for appeal.

PROHIBITION

CHUA HIONG v. DEPORTATION BOARD

Proceedings were instituted before the Deportation Board against Chua Hiong, who allegedly
secured the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration through fraud and misrepresentation, and
exercised privileges and rights belonging to citizens of the Philippines. Before the Supreme Court, Chua
Hiong claims that as his liberty as a citizen is involved, the constitutional guarantee of due process of law
demands that his alleged citizenship should first be determined in a judicial proceeding.
A respondent who claims to be a citizen and not therefore subject to deportation has the right to
have his citizenship reviewed by the courts, after the deportation proceedings. When evidence is
conclusive of citizenship, the right to immediate review should be recognized and the courts should
promptly enjoin the deportation proceedings. A citizen is entitled to live in peace, without molestation
from any official or authority, and if he is disturbed by a deportation proceedings, he has the
unquestionable right to resort to the courts for his protection, either by a writ of habeas corpus or of
prohibition, on the legal ground that the Board lacks jurisdiction. If he is a citizen and evidence thereof is
satisfactory, there is no sense nor justice in allowing the deportation proceedings to continue, granting
him the remedy only after the Board has finished its investigation of his undesirability. The legal basis of
the prohibition is the absence of the jurisdictional fact, alienage.

CO v. THE DEPORTATION BOARD

The Deportation Board filed charges against the Co’s, alleging that they were Chinese nationals
who failed to register as such with the BOI. The trial court held that they were Filipinos and restrained the
Board from taking further cognizance of the proceeding. The Court held that judicial intervention, even
prior to the Board’s final decision, is allowed.
When the evidence submitted by a respondent is conclusive of his citizenship, the right to
immediate review should also be recognized and the courts should promptly enjoin the deportation
proceedings.
The exception to the rule is if the evidence is not conclusive, judicial determination is allowable
in cases when the courts themselves believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the claim of
citizenship, wherein there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. The remedy should
be allowed only in the sound discretion of a competent court in a proper proceeding.

SIMON, JR. v. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Quezon City Mayor file a petition for prohibition with the Court against CHR to prevent it from
promulgating its resolution in the case of the displaced vendors of the People’s Park project. The Court
granted the petition and ruled that the CHR has no jurisdiction and prohibited it from further hearing the
case.
Prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be done, and not
intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished.

PAREDES v. COURT OF APPEALS

Paredes et. al. filed a petition for prohibition with the CA to stop Navarro and Sapal from
enforcing the assailed administrative orders. The CA dismissed the petition for non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies.
Prohibition is not the proper remedy. The enabling law itself, which is BP 325, has specifically
tasked the Cabinet to review and approve any proposed revisions of rates of fees and charges. Paredes et
al should have availed of this easy and accessible remedy instead of immediately resorting to the judicial
process. The grant (or denial) of a writ of prohibition is ordinarily within the sound discretion of the court
to be exercised with caution and forbearance, according to the circumstances of the particular case, and
only where the right to seek relief is clear. Prohibition is granted only in cases where no other remedy is
available which is sufficient to afford redress. That Paredes et al have another and complete remedy at
law either by appeal or otherwise, is generally a sufficient reason for dismissing the writ.

MANDAMUS

BLANCO v. BOARD OF EXAMINERS

Blanco et. al. filed a petition for mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior to compel him to
confirm the final results of the physician’s examination. The Court held that Mandamus cannot issue as it
is discretionary on the part of the Secretary to confirm the report of the medical examiners.
The writ of mandamus will not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public
officer. Where the law imposes upon a public officer the right and duty to exercise judgment, in reference
to any matter to which he is called upon to act, it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the
court. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial.

NG GLOC LIU v. SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Ng Gloc Liu’s request that the Philippine Consulate at Amoy, China be authorized to issue a
returning resident visa to his unemancipated minor son was denied, so he applied for a writ of mandamus
to compel the DFA Secretary to issue the same. The Court held that since the issuance of a visa is not a
ministerial function on the part of the DFA Secretary, and involves the exercise of discretion, mandamus
does not lie.
The determination of whether or not an applicant for a visa has a non-immigrant status and
whether or not his entry into this country would be contrary to public safety, is not a simple ministerial
function. It involves the exercise of discretion and cannot therefore be controlled by mandamus.

POLICARPIO v. PHIL. VETERANS BOARD

Policarpio applied for a writ of mandamus to compel the Veterans Board to release treasury
warrants so that she may resume her pension. The Court denied the petition.
Mandamus does not lie to review or control the action or decision of a pension board or other
board or officer having authority over pension matters, where the action or decision is one resting in the
discretion of such board or officer, or where it involves the construction of the law and the application of
the facts thereto.
TAN v. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION
The facts are similar to the Policarpio case wherein a widow seeks to receive pension for her
deceased spouse. In this case however, there was a ministerial duty on the part of the VBPC since the
facts granting backpay were established.
As to the claim that mandamus is not the proper remedy to correct the exercise of discretion of
the Commission, the Commission’s discretion is limited to the facts of the case, i.e., in merely evaluating
the evidence whether or not the claimant is a member of a guerrilla force duly recognized by the United
States Army. Nowhere in the law is the VBPC given the power to adjudicate or determine rights after
such facts are established.
Having been satisfied that deceased TCB was an officer of a duly recognized guerrilla outfit,
certified to by the AFP, having served under the US-Chinese Volunteers in the Philippines, a guerrilla
unit recognized by the United States army and forming part of the Philippine Army, it becomes the
ministerial duty of the Commission to give due course to his widow's application.

PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN v. REPARATIONS COMMISSION

Pangasinan applied for a writ of mandamus when the Contract of Transfer of Reparation Goods
was not acted upon by the Reparations Commission. The Court held that mandamus is not the proper
remedy because the case is one for settlement of contractual rights and obligations, and there is
insufficient evidence that the performance of the act prayed for is the duty of respondent.
Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its chief use. But mandamus does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to
compel a course of conduct.
It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the plaintiff should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the defendant to Perform the act
required. It never issues in doubtful cases.

MERALCO SECURITIES CORPORATION v. SAVELLANO

Upon application of Maniago, CFI issued a writ of mandamus ordering the CIR to collect from
Meralco its deficiency income tax. The Court held that mandamus could not lie as the acts of the
Commissioner is discretionary and not a ministerial duty.
Mandamus only lies to enforce the performance of a ministerial act or duty and not to control the
performance of a discretionary power. Purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be
interfered with by the courts.
Discretion, as thus intended, means the power or right conferred upon the office by law of acting
officially under certain circumstances according to the dictates of his own judgment and conscience and
not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.
 Mandamus may not be resorted to so as to interfere with the manner in which the discretion shall
be exercised or to influence or coerce a particular determination.

CRUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS

Cruz filed a petition for mandamus to compel DBM to comply with the MPSB Order and release
her salary that is reflective of her pay grade. The Court ruled that it is not MPSB, but the DBM which has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. Thus, mandamus will not lie.
The rule on the issuance of a writ of mandamus is that the writ will not issue to compel an official
to do anything which it is not his duty to do or to which it is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant
anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is
simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

PRC v. DE GUZMAN
De Guzman and other graduates of Fatima College of Medicine filed for mandamus to compel
PRC to allow them to take the physician’s oath. However, investigation revealed that these examinees
gained early access to the test questions. The Court set aside the writ of mandamus issued by the CA.
Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of competent jurisdiction, in the name of the state
or the sovereign, directed to some inferior court, tribunal, or board, or to some corporation or person
requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which duty results from the official
station of the party to whom the writ is directed, or from operation of law.
The function of mandamus is not to establish a right but to enforce one that has been established
by law. If no legal right has been violated, there can be no application of a legal remedy, and the writ of
mandamus is a legal remedy for a legal right.

DECLARATORY RELIEF

AZAJAR v. ARDALLES
Azajar applied to purchase a parcel of land belonging to the public domain in Albay but was
opposed by Ardales stating she was not a Filipino citizen. She brought an action for declaratory relief to
declare her citizenship. SC held that such declaratory relief was not the proper remedy.
Citizenship could not be determined in a complaint for declaratory relief. If as she claims she was
Filipino then she should proceed with the administrative proceedings and submit the evidence to adduce
such fact of citizenship. Only when denied could she may resort to the courts being denied the exercise of
her rights
De Borja was a fish peddler who was required by the Director of Fisheries to produce a commercial
fishing boat licence as required by Act 2003. De Borja filed a complaint for declaratory relief before CFI
Manila praying that he be declared not required by law to secure such licence. This complaint was
dismissed and SC affirmed the dismissal holding that an action for declaratory reliew must be brought
before there has been a breach of contract or statute the construction is being sought.
The purpose of declaratory judgement is to provide adjudication of legal rights and must be
brought before such has been breached.

NATIONAL DENTAL SUPPLY CO. v. MEER

National Dental Supply filed an action for declaratory Relief on the question whether or not
dental or gold alloys come within the purview of NIRC art 184. CIR moved to dismiss for imporper
remedy which was upheld by the SC. The proper remedy being to sue for recovery after payment.
When Tax is due and collectable, taxpayers cannot prevent collection by declaratory action and
should pay the tax first and sue for recovery within the period provided by law. Declaratory relief is
proper when tax is not yet due to test validity.

MIRANDO v. WELLINGTON TY & BROS. INC.

Mirando among others in the same situation were relocated from Arellano to lots formerly owned
by Japanese and taken possession by Phil. Board of Liquidators. Houses were constructed and nominal
fees were paid. Howvwer the lots were bartered of to another ending in the hands of Wellington Ty.
Mirando Filed Declaratory Relief assailing the barter which CFI denied. SC ruled that the board had
authority to barter, previous occupants had no preferential right and they enjoyed no right which was
violated.
For actions for declaratory relief to be entertained there must be: justifiable controversy, interest
adverse between persons, party seeking must have a legal interest and that the issue must be ripe for
judicial determination.

HABEAS CORPUS

MEJOFF v. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

Mejoff, a Russian national and a secret operative was arrested as a Japanese spy and subsequently
declared as an illegal entrant to the Philippines. Deportation was ordered but could not be effected as no
Master of any Russian vessel wants to take him. SC ordered that a writ of Habeas Corpus subject to some
conditions so that he could be released.
A foreign national and not an enemy whom no criminal charges have been formally made may
not be indefinitely kept in detention. The rights of life and liberty as well as all other fundamental rights
are to be applied to all human beings as proclaimed in the Universal declaration of Human rights.
CO v. DEPORTATION BOARD
Petitioners were subjected to deportation proceedings by the deportation board which alleged that
they were Chinese subjects residing in the Philippines who had failed to register as Chinese Nationals.
They filed a habeas corpus case before the CFI which was decided in their favour. CFI appealed stating
that the court cannot rule on the case as there was no final decision by the Board which had primary
jurisdiction. SC held that the court had jurisdiction.
Judicial determination is allowed in cases when the courts believe that there is substantial
evidence to support their claim for citizenship. Their birth certificates and exercise of the right to suffrage
proved sufficient as substantial evidence.

LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA v. LIWAG

Lucien Tran was a French national and a temporary visitor in the Philippines. CID Commissioner
Liwag received a sworn complaint from Lucien’s Landlord and issued an order to invite Lucien to CID.
Lucien petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. SC ruled that such arrest was not legal but subsequent
events cured this defect.
General rule is that release whether permanent or temporary of a detained person renders the
petition for habeas corpus moot and academic unless restraints are attached to the release which preclude
freedom in which case the court can still inquire in a petition for habeas corpus.

INJUNCTION AS PROVISIONAL REMEDY

COLLECTOR v. REYES
Collector of internal revenue send a letter demanding from Reyes payment of deficiencies in his
income taxes among others. Reyes failed to pay prompting a warrant of levy and distraint on his
properties. Reyes appealed to the CTA of a review of his assessment and to restrain said warrant.
Collector opposed this hoever CTA ruled in favour of Reyes.
While sec 305 of the NIRC prohibits courts from issuing an injunction, Sec. 11 of RA 1125
authorizes CTA to suspend at any stage of proceedings the collection when it can jeopardize the interest
of the government or taxpayer provided taxpayer deposits or files a surety amount.

PINEDA v. LANTIN
Minority Stockholders of Bacolod Murica Miling filed a complaint with the SEC against the
company and its president. They moved to quash the proceedings alleging lack of jurisdiction of the SEC
and filed a special civil action for injunction. SEC moved to dismiss on ground of impropriety as CFI has
no jurisdiction over SEC orders. SC agrees with SEC that CFI has no jurisdiction because the case of
prohibition jurisdiction lies exclusively with the SC.
 CFI has no jurisdiction to grant an injunctive relief against the SEC as this power belongs
exclusively with the Supreme court.

LEMI v. VALENCIA
Respondents and PAGCOM obtained a search warrant and seized transmitter of radio station
DZQR. Lemi filed mandamus with a petition for the issuance of injunction. SC granted injunction
considering the petitioner’s inability to continue broadcasting affecting his contractual relations.
Courts should exercise restraint and great care in granting preliminary mandatory injunction
because the writ not only operates to preserve status quo but compel one of them to perform a positive
act. There should be no hesitation when the following are present, extreme urgency, right to the writ is
clear, considerations of relative inconvenience are strongly in favour, wilful invasion of petitioner’s right,
effect would not be to create a new relation but re-establish a pre-existing relation.

HONDA v. SAN DIEGO

Hahn filed a trademark for HM Honda which was opposed by Honda stating that they own the
trademark long before Hahn. Hahn filed a motion to dismiss Honda’s lack of capacity. Patent office
denied his motion promting him to file petition for certiorari with the CFI which was issued by CFI judge
San Diego. SC held that the judge has no authority to issue such order.
Writ of injunction, prohibition or certiorari may be issued against a court only by another court of
superior in rank to the former. The CFI and patent office are of the same rank and category therefore no
injunction can be issued within the same rank.

NOCNOC v. VERA
Nocnoc was awarded a claim filed under the Workmen’s compensation act. His employer filed a
petition for injunction to enjoin enforcement of the writ of excecution. SC held that CFI had no
jurisdiction to entertain the case.
The judge in reviewing alleged nullity of the award and enjoing its execution over a matter which
could have been elevated to the Workmen’s Compensation Commission and then appealed to the SC
assumed jurisdiction improperly. CFI is not empowered to review or modify an award or order of
execution of the Workmens’s Compensation Commission.
 EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

THE LAW-FACT DISTINCTION

DAUAN v. SEC.
A record for a homestead application filed by Dauan was lost during World War II. There were
sales subsequent to this which were done without the required approval of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. The Director of Lands as well as the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources ruled that such sale were void with approved homestead application. No appeal to the president
was done and instead CFI reversed the decision.
While exhaustion of administrate remedies is generally required before seeking relief before the
courts, when the question is purely a legal one or when nothing of an administrative nature is to be done
such requisite can be set aside. In this case as the records were destroyed and circumstantial evidence was
introduced, a conclusion from the facts is a conclusion of law which the courts may review.

REYES VDA. DE SANTIAGO v. REYES

Santiago was a driver of an autocalesa owned by Reyes. He was found dead after last being seen
driving at night. The Workmen’s Compensation Commission found that he was driving outside of his
prescribed route against instruction of his employer and was considered a factor in his death. This
incident was deemed to be an occasion outside of his employment and compensation was denied by the
Commission.
A presumption under the section 43 of the Workmen’s compensation act is that when the
deceased died in the course of his employment would be presumed to have arisen out of said
employment. Since the employer failed to provide contrary proof of that Santiago not engaged in work as
when he was last seen or voluntarily drove outside his route presumption holds.

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORP. v. PEPETI

Pepito’s wife filed a claim for compensation and death benefits on the assumption of death of her
husband who disappeared while onboard as crew member of M/V Aboitiz. This was opposed by Aboitiz
alleging that their employee was merely missing.
The non-controversion of the petitioner of fact that their employee was missing admits that fact
but is not an admission of the fact of death. However in this case petitioner was directed to pay
compensation without injury and the fact of death was a violation of due process. Due to this WCC was
directed to hear the in fact Pepito is alive or presumed to be dead.
QUESTION OF LAW

ORTUA v. VICENTE SINGSON ENCARNACION

Ortua filed an application to purchase public land in Camarines Sur but was denied by the Bureau
of Lands on the ground that he was a Chinese citizen. Public Land Law requires that only Filipino citizens
could purchase public agricultural land. Director of Lands then ruled that Ortua was presumptively a
Filipino Citizen.
The decision of the Director of lands upon a question of fact is conclusive and not subject to
review. The exception would be the showing that such decision was rendered in fraud, imposition or
mistake, or error in judgement in appreciation of evidence.

MEJIA v. MAPA
The parties filed separately with the Bureau of Lands a homestead application which claims the
same lot. Director of Lands ruled in favour of Mejia, later reversed by the SANR. Further appeal to the
courts was allowed on questions of law.
The court cited the ruling in Ortua v. Encarnacion doctrine would not apply if conclusions drawn
were erroneous, therefore subject to judicial review.

PEOPLE v. SANTOS
Santos was convicted for violating section 28 of admin order which outlaws fishing within 3km
of shorelines of island used as military bases. He appealed that the case should be dismissed as it does not
fall within jurisdiction as it was not lawfully delegated to the secretary of natural resources.
The conditional clause in the administrative order supplies a defect which would be amounts to
undue delegation of power. Such conditional clause lacking determinate and specific power is void.

JAPANESE WAR NOTES CLAIMANTS v. SEC.

JWNCAP filed for review after the SEC Commissioner issued an order which requires them to
show cause from why it should not be proceeded against in misrepresentation to the public about
registering Japanese war notes.
The court here is not permitted to examine the finding of the SEC that JWNCAP as to
misrepresentation. Such is a question of fact that may not be subject to review. Only questions of law
could be raised through review.

YSMAEL v. CIR
 Ysmael Steel Salesmen’s Union was certified as the SEBR by the CIR (sole and exclusive
bargaining agent). The Ysmael company appealed on the ground that such is a violation of Art VIII
section 12 of the constitution.
As the CIR decision was based on a question of law, such is reviewable by the courts.

O’LEARY v. BROWN PACIFIC-MAXON, INC.

Valak while in a recreation center maintained by his employer, drowned while attempting to
rescue two men. The court sustained award granted by the deputy commissioner and revered the holding
that swimming to rescue was not an act in the course of employment. The issue now is whether the
findings of the deputy commissioner should be sustained.
Findings of administrative agencies are to be accepted unless they are unsupported by substantial
evidence. Records in this case support that the deputy commissioner’s finding was supported by
substantial evidence.

O’KEEFFEE v. SMITH ASSOCIATES

Ecker who was employed at a defense base in South Korea, drowned while boating on a lake.
Deputy Commissioner awarded death benefits relying on the ruling in Brown-Pacific-Maxon which
established the doctrine which states that as long as conditions of employment create the “zone of danger
out of which the injury arose” benefits may be awarded.
As in the previous case of O’leary, no evidence that the Deputy Commissioner made a decision
without substantial evidence as such cannot be overturned.

QUESTION OF FACT

GONZALES v. VICTORY LABOR UNION

Gonzales was charged of unfair labor practices after dismissing 4 of his employees due to their
membership to Victory Union. He denied such and stated it was because of attempt to steal from the catch
of the fishing boat.
The court ruled that a conclusion of the bare majority does not meet the substantial evidence rule.
Also due to the inconsistent date with the attendance sheet of the employees the case was overturned.

SUARNABA v. WCC
Rosita Suarnaba made a claim for death benefits after her husband who was an employee of
Clavecilla Radio System died. WCC layer found evidence that proof she was the wife of Ireneo was
insufficient and barred her from recovering.
 As a quasi-judicial body WCC is granted powers to decide claims for compensation under the
Workmen’s compensation act. However, such should be without regard to technicalities or rules of
evidence. Substantial evidence is sufficient to support the decision of the WCC.

ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

Meralco was assessed special import tax under RA 1394 for importing insulating oil. Meralco
claimed that it was exempt by section 6 of the same RA as well as its Franchise which exempts insulators
from all taxes.
As a body dedicated to the study of tax problems, the CTA’s findings on questions of fact are
binding. Only when errors of law and not rulings on the weight of evidence can be disturbed, facts as
ascertained cannot be disturbed.

BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK v. MONETARY BOARD

The Monetary Board issued a resolution which declared Banco Filipino to be insolvent, ordering
its closure and to be placed under receivership. The debtors question authority of Valenzuela and the
Central Bank to prosecute these cases.
The principle that administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered with by the
courts is a general rule. Grave abuse of discretion when there is whimsical exercise of judgement or in an
arbitrary manner will allow courts to intervene. As in this case the substantial due process was not
observed in the examination of the condition of the bank was and that the bank is insolvent along with
necessary informing the MB in writing.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. CONFESSOR

The Collective Bargaining Agreement between PAL and Philippine airlines Employee’s
Association expired and new terms were not agreed upon specifically the economic package. The
Secretary of Labor awarded some of the demands of the union which prompted PAL to file a petition for
certiorari.
Here there was grave abuse of discretion when the Secretary of Labor failed to consider the
evidence. The allocation of 1/3 of PAL’s net profits to PALEA was not thoroughly explained.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. v. NLRC

An employee of Meralco (Masaya) was charged with a violation (illegal connection) of the
company code of employee discipline. He admitted to the said violation and a week after being placed
under preventive suspension he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA and NLRC ruled in favor of the
employee.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required as basis for a judgement on dismissal of an
employee with substantial evidence being sufficient. There was grave abuse of discretion in requiring a
higher quantum of evidence for the dismissal.
LAMEYRA v. PANGILINAN
Lamerya was a janitor and messenger for the municipal hall of Famy, Laguna who was dismissed
by the Mayor for insubordination and absence without leave. Lamerya claims that he was prevented from
signing the log book of the personal officer and still was present at work.
While the doctrine is that findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected by the
courts, such findings of fact should be supported by substantial evidence. Here such evidence was lacking
that the certification of the personnel officer was substantial evidence considering the same was alleged to
have prevented Lamerya from signing such log.

GERMAN MARINE AGENCIES, INC. v. NLRC

De Lara was a radio officer for M/V T.A. Voyager who got sick while on board and did not
receive immediate medical attention. He was later demanded payment of disability benefits and unpaid
balance of his sickness wages. German marine appealed the favourable decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The doctrine of respect and finality to the findings of fact, in this case of the NLRC and the Labor
Arbiter, when supported by substantial evidence cannot be disturbed. As a special quasi-judicial agency it
is also respected to have acquired the expertise with its jurisdiction being limited to these specific matters.

VELASQUEZ v. HERNANDEZ
Administrative and criminal charges were filed by Velasquez against Hernandez, who are co-
teachers for demanding money in consideration of appointments or promotions. CA reversed CSC
holding that such failure of Velasquez to inform the CSC of pending proceedings before the Ombudsman
constituted violation of rules against forum shopping.
Administrative proceedings are governed by substantial evidence with a different quantum as
required in that of criminal proceedings. Dismissal of the criminal case does not foreclose administrative
action as both are independent of the other.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. CAYOBIT

Cayobit was appointed as the Livelihood specialist of the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Later it was discovered that her eligibility was not entered and she was failed the exam in the master list
leading her appointment disapproved. CSC found her guilty of dishonesty and dismissed. CA later
reversed the decision in that her certificate was to be respected rather than the master list.
The quantum of evidence in administrative proceedings is only substantial or that which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Evidence that Cayobit was responsible
for the misconduct is enough to warrant the dismissal.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. SANTOS

 A complaint was filed against Santos for dishonesty and grave misconduct. She was found guilty
by the Ombudsman but was later reversed by CA stating that the decision was not supported by
substantial evidence. The Court held that there was sufficient evidence to prove Santos administrative
liability.
Finding of guilt of the administrative case should be sustained as long as it is supported by
substantial evidence that respondent committed the acts stated in the complaint.

UNIVERSAL CAMERA CORP. v. NLRB

The NLRC ordered Universal Camera to reinstate an employee, but the CA held that the findings
of the Board were supported by substantial evidence, and that the examiner’s findings of fact were not
relevant for the decision of the Board.
The reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a board decision when evidence supporting
that decision when such is viewed in the entirety. The findings of the examiner must also be considered
along with the consistency of the testimony.

QUESTION OF DISCRETION

LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO. v. PSC

Lacdan filed for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) with the Public Service Commission
(PSC) to operate a passenger and freight auto truck line. Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. and other operators
opposed this application however such was still granted by the PSC. Their argument was that there was
no finding that present services were inadequate.
The SC cited the rule that it will not substitute its own judgement for that of the administrative
agency (PSC) since its enabling law emphasize that it can only do so when there is no reasonable support
in evidence, against the law or issued without jurisdiction.

MANILA TRADING v. ZULUETA

Ramollo, a gatekeeper of Manila Trading, was suspended for a breach of duty when he allowed
one of the customers to pass through the exit gate without paying for the work done on his car. Philippine
Labor union filed a petition requesting reinstatement of Ramollo which was granted by the CIR despite
finding Ramollo guilty.
Finding of the administrative agency can be overturned here since such was against the law in
ordering reinstatement despite the guilty verdict for Ramollo.

KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA LA SUERTE-POITAF v. NORIEL

Federation of Free workers filed a petition certification election to which a motion to dimiss was
filed by Kapisanan ng mga Mangagawa sa La Suerte-POITAF on the ground that they did not comply
with the 30% requirement for certification election. Motion to dismiss was not granted. Sc ruled that there
was no improvident or arbitrary exercise of authority which warrants certiorari.
Without a lack of power or arbitrary or improvident exercise of authority is shown, the court may
not pass upon the validity of decisions reached by administrative agencies.

FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS v. NORIEL

Connected to the first Noriel case, petitioner filed a petition for certification election which was
denied. Even when the 30% requirement was met the certification election was not called. SC ruled that
such was a violation of the Labor Code.
Administrative agencies cannot ignore the imperative of the provisions of law. While the same
are entrusted with the enforcement of the statutes, with discretion, such is not unlimited or unbounded as
not to follow the directives when clear.

PLDT v. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

EPTI applied for a Certificate of public convenience and necessity and permission to build an
international gateway facility. NTC granted contrary to objections of PLDT that ETPI could not do so
without a legislative franchise.
Courts do not have the technical and economic competence that special administrative agencies
have and should not intervene save very clear violations of law.

ENFORCEMENT OF AGENCY ACTION

RES JUDICATA; FINALITY OF JUDGMENT

IPEKDJIAN MERCHANDISING v. CTA

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed and demanded from Ipekdijan Merchandising
Co. compensating tax and surcharges for violating the Tax Code in the importation of gold chains. They
appealed this assessment to the Court of Tax Appeals and subsequently to the SC however such was
dismissed and became final and executory. A refund was still pursued later but was denied for being res
judicata. An appeal on certiorari was filed arguing that res judicata only applies to court decisions and
does not extend to administrative agencies. This was also dismissed by the SC stating that the previous
case was judicially confirmed.
Res judicata applies to decisions of bodies whom judicial powers have been confirmed. When
these bodies vested with authority to judicially determine a question such becomes final as if made by a
court of general jurisdiction.
NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC. v. NLRC
Nasipit Lumber filed for clearance to dismiss an employee with the regional office and Secretary
of Labor which was granted. Collado filed a separate action of illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter
which was oppseon on the ground that the clearance proceeding was a bar to filing an action for illegal
dismissal by Res Judicata. SC held here that res judicata could not be invoked in labor relations
proceedings.
Res judicata here could not be invoked because the Labor code provides that such proceedings
are “non-litigious and summary” in nature without regard to legal technicalities. This does not run
contrary to the previous case of Ipekdijan since the doctrine of res judicata applies to judicial and quasi-
judicial proceedings only and not to the administrative powers.

DULAY v. MINISTER OF NATURAL RESOURCES

There were two Department of Agriculture and Natural Resource cases on resolving a conflict on
a fishpond. These were not brought to courts for judicial review, becoming final and executor. One of the
parties still requested for reopening on the ground of newly discovered evidence. The SC ruled that such
reopening was barred by res judicata.
Decision of Administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority upon
attaining finality has the force and binding effect of a final judgement by the doctrine of res judicata. This
same doctrine would prevent reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authorities.

PHIL. AMERICAN GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

Davao Union Marketing Corporation shipped on board a vessel operated by Transpacific Cargo
of cement and galvanized steel. The cargo was not unloaded immediately, and a typhoon struck causing
the crew to abandon the ship and it was pilfered. A marine protest was filed absolving the crew and
captain from administrative liability which was used by transpacific as a bar to the present case. The court
ruled that res judicata does not apply.
For res judicata to apply there must be an identity o subject matters and causes between the first
and second case. Here Transpacific was invoking a ruling which was had cause of action on a different
party hence could not be applied as res judicata.

MANILA ELECTRIC CO. v. PHIL. CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, ET. AL.

Phil Consumers Foundation filed with the Board of Energy(BOE) seeking refund by MEralco on
the savings it realized under PD No. 551. BOE dismissed the petition and upon appeal to the SC such was
affirmed. Subsequently Phil Consumers filed declaratory relief 4 years later and RTC rendered a decision
that the savings should be return. Meralco assails said decision on the basis of res judicata which the SC
ruled in favor of.
 The issue already being settled and litigated again on the same issue cannot be allowed under the
principle of res judicata.

FACURA v. CA
Facura and Tuason filed a complaint against the respondents for falsifying appointment papers of
confidential staff of the Board members of Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). This had
spawned two cases, a criminal case for falsification as well as an administrative case. The first was
dismissed on the ground of lack of probable cause. The respondent argues that the dismissal here amounts
to res judicata with regard to the administrative case. SC rules in his favour as both a determination of
probable cause require only substantial evidence and that both cases were grounded on the same facts.
Principle of conclusiveness of judgement when a right or fact has been judicially tried and
established by a court of competent jurisdiction or when a trial was held as long as it has not been
overturned should be conclusive upon the parties privy.

HEIRS OF MAXIMO DERLA v. HEIRS OF CATALINA DERLA VDA. DE HIPOLITO

Derla entered into agreements with Hipolito involving fishponds which ended in Derla trasfering
her rights over the pond to Hipolito for money. They both filed a Fishpond Application and Derla’s
application was denied for overlapping with Hipolito. His application was opposed and denied by the
Municipality of Panabo. After changing of regime revival of the fishpond sales application was filed and
Derla’s heirs filed for MR. SC ruled that there was res judicata and such was granted to the Hipolitos.
While the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial and quasi-judical proceedingsand not
administrative functions, such is further limited to purely administrative functions and not proceedings
which take on an adversary character where res judicata can apply.

EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORPORATION v. H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC.

H.D. Lee filed before the Intellectual Property Office an application for the registration of a
trademark claiming that such was first used in the Philippines for use in jeans. Emerald opposed on the
ground that the application will violate the exclusive use of its marks. A decision was rendered that H.D.
Lee has established by substantial evidence that it was the owner of such design. Emerald filed a petition
for review which was denied by the CA and appealed again with the SC.
The Court reiterates the concept of res judicata as a final judgement or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction. Elements for such to apply are that the former judgement is final, court
tendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties, it was based on the merits, and there was
identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.

WRIT OF EXECUTION; MANDAMUS

APOLEGA v. HIZON
Hizon filed a notice of claim with DOLE that he had injuries which were the result of his
employment under Apolega. Regional Director of DOLE granted the claim and later Hizon died from
complications. His widow filed a death compensation claim with the same office. Apolega later opposed
the claim that Hizon was his employee at the time of the accident and that such claim was already time
barred.
The regional office here had authority to write the writ of execution and such was necessary in
the enforcement of the award. Such power of execution may be legislated upon by Congress.

VDA. DE CORPUZ v. THE COMMANDING GENERAL, PHIL. ARMY

De Corpuz was a widow of an army officer who died a service-related death and was awarded a
sum which became final and executor. She sought to enforce this against the office of the Commanding
General which was refused and only served half the amount. Mandamus was held by the SC to be proper
as there was no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy for the full payment of the award.
The final and executor award entitles petitioner to the enforcement of the full award. Deducting
from such is an unlawful act depriving what was due to the petitioner.

AMBROSIO v. SALVADOR
A group of taxi drivers filed a complaint with NLRC against Extraco Taxi stating that wage
deductions by Extraco are void and should be returned to them and remitted to SSS as contribution. LA
ordered the reimbursement and Lim Pa filed motion to quash arguing he was not a party to the case and
also filed injunction with the CFI. SC ruled that injuction was not proper since the CFI has no authority to
issue injunction against a semi-judicial body the NLRC.

MERANO v. TUTAAN
NLRC ordered here the reinstatement of Merano to his former position in San Miguel
corporation. SC dismissed SMC’s petition for review and the decision became final and executor. SMC
then asked if it be allowed to pay separation pay in lieu of reinstattment and NLRC ruled that backwages
should be paid as well as separation pay. Merano filed in the CFI separately an action of mandamus
against SMC and the LA since the decision had not been enforced yet which was dismissed stating that it
had no jurisdiction.
CFI here is not the proper tribunal to pass upon the claim even if there was a failure to enforce the
NLRC decision. Proper remedy would be to call attention of NLRC and not to file Mandamus with CFI
with no jurisdiction as both courts are of the same rank hence mandamus cannot be used.

GSIS v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

 GSIS dismissed employees and to which was appealed to the Merit Systems Board and such
dismissals were found to be illegal. When the heirs filed a motion for the execution of the CSC resolution
GSIS opposed.
The grant to a tribunal or agency adjudicatory powers or authority to hear and try cased should
normally be deemed to include authority to enforce judgements.

CLAVANO v. HLURB
Clavano and Spouces Tenazas entered into a contract to sell a house. Alleging default on the
spouces refused to accept payments to which the spouses filed a complaint for specific performance with
the HLURB which was granted. The decision became final and executory however upon execution the
spouses filed a motion with the HLURB about several defects in the housing unit which made the
HLURB order Clavano to reimburse the Spouses. SC held such orders by the HLURB as improper.
The orders given by HLURB to reimburse were separate and independent of the decision. There
was nothing in the decision where the petitioner must pay for the amounts spent in transferring the title
and to the respondents. New matters which were material and substantial go beyond the decision and
cannot be done.