U.S. Ex Rel Szymoniak V Ace Doc 193-1 To Motion To Dismiss Nationwide Title Clearing

0:13-cv-00464-JFA Date Filed 01/15/14 Entry Number 193-1 Page 1 of 50
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COORT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DNISION
UNITED STATES et al. ex rel. SZYMONlAK,
Civil Action No. 0:l 3-cv-00464

Plaintiffs,
Judge Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
v.
ACE SECURITIES CORP.,
Defendants.
JOINT MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'

MOTION TO DISMISS THE SECOND AMENDED
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS .............................................................................................................. 5
A. Szymoniak's Motion to Dismiss Her Foreclosure Action ....................................... 5
B. Other Public Disclosures of Foreclosure Documentation Issues Before
Szymoniak's Investigation .......................................................................................7
C. Szymoniak's Alleged Investigation and Findings of Foreclosure Fraud ................. 9
D. Szymoniak's Effort to Bootstrap a Qui Tam Action Onto Foreclosure
Documentation Issues ............................................................................................ 11
E. The Government's Investigation ofDocX Was Triggered by Someone
Else......................................................................................................................... 12
F. Further Media Coverage of Allegedly Fraudulent Assignments and
Forec losure Mills ....................................................................................................... 14
G. Szymoniak's Testimony Admitting That Her " Findings" Are Based on
Assumptions and Not First-Hand Knowledge of Fraud......................................... 15
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................................. 16
l. THE COUR T LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER THIS
ACTION PURSUANT TO THE FCA' S FIRST-TO-FILE BAR ..................................... 16
II. THE COURT LACKS SUBJ EC T MATTER JURISDICTION OVER
SZYMONIAK'S FCA CLAIMS UNDER THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR.............. 16
A. Szymoniak's Allegations Were Publicly Disclosed in Qualifying Sources........... 20
B. Szymoniak's Claims Are "Based Upon" Qualifying Public Disclosures .............. 23
C. Szymoniak Is Not an "Original Source" of The Alleged Facts Giving Rise
to Her Claims ......................................................................................................... 29
ill . THE STATE AND LOCAL CLAIMS ARE ALSO BARRED ......................................... 32
A. If the Federal Claims Are Dismissed, the Court Must Decline to Exercise
Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the State and Local Claims .................................32
B. The State and Local Claims Are Precluded by the Public Disclosure Bar ............. 33
l. All Claims (Excep t the New York Claim) Are Nearly Identical to
the Federal Claims and Fail for the Same Reasons .................................... 33
2. The New York Claim Is Also Barred ..............................., ....................... 34
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................................. 35
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page(s)
Cases
U.S. ex rel. Afl.atooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs.,

163 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................... 31
U.S. ex rel. Atki.nson v. Pa. Shipbldg. Co.,

473 F.3d 506 (3d Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 29
Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Sookoo,

941 N.Y. S.2d 503 (App. Div. 2012) ....................................................................................... 21
Bank of N.Y. v. Mulligan,

No. 07-29399, slip. op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 3, 2008) ................................................................ 7
Bannon v. Edgewater Med. Ctr.,

406 F. Supp. 2d 907 (N.D. ill . 2005) ....................................................................................... 34
U.S. ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc.,

44 F.3d 699 (8th Cir. 1995)...................................................................................................... 29
U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Cmp,

659 F.3d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2011) .............................................................................................18
U.S. ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academic Training Ctr., inc.,

933 F. Supp. 2d 825 (E.D. Va. 2013) ........................................................................... 22, 24, 32
US. ex rel. Black v. Health & Hosp. Cor,p ofMarion Cnty.,

494 F. App' x 285 (4th Cir. 2012) ..................................................................................... passim
US. ex rel. Blackv. Health &Hosp. Co,p. of Marion Cnty.,

No. 08-0390, 201 l WL 1161737 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2011), ajf'd, 494 F. App'x
285 (4th Cir. 2012) ........................................................................................................ 28, 31
U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co.,

No. 11-602, 2013 WL 5306645 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2013) ............................................... 18, 22
US. ex rel. Colquitt v. Abbott Labs.,

864 F. Supp. 2d 499 (N.D. Tex. 2012) ..................................................................................... 34
U.S. ex rel. Detrick v. Daniel F. Young, Inc.,

909 F. Supp. 1010 (E.D. Va. 1995) .......................................................................................... 31
U.S. ex rel. Doe v. Staples, Inc.,

932 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2013) ........................................................................................... 22
11
U.S. ex rel. Dugan v. ADT Sec. Servs.,

No. 03-3485, 2009 WL 3232080 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2009) ...................................................... 29
US. ex rel. Gilligan v. Medtronic, Inc.,

403 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2005)........................................................................................................ 23
Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson ("Graham
County"),
130 S. Ct. 1396 (2010)............................................................................................................ 19, 23
Grayson v. Adv. Mgmt. Tech.,

221 F.3d 580 (4th Cir. 2000) ................................................................................................... 29
Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co.,

390 F.3d 1276 (10th Cir. 2004) ......................................................................................... 17, 18
US. ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc.,

190 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 1999) ............................................................................................... 29
United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Co,p.,

318 F.3d 214 (D.C. Cir. 2003) .................................................................................................. 17
US. ex rel Harris v. Dialysis C01p.,

No. JKB-09-2457, 2013 WL 5505400 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2013) ................................................... 18
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,

176 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 1999) ................................................................................................... 18
HSBC Bank US,A N A. v. Taher,

962 N.Y. S.2d 301 (App. Div. 2013) ........................................................................................... 21
HSBC Bank USA, Nat'! Ass'n v. Antrobus,

No. 07-43299, 2008 WL 2928553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 31, 2008) ............................................. 7
Indymac Bank, FSB v. Bethley,

No. 08-9615, 2009 WL 27930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2009) ..................................................... 7
U.S. ex rel. Jones v. Collegiate Funding Servs.,

No. 07-290, 201 l WL 129842 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2011), ajj"d, 469 F. App'x
244 (4th Cir. 2012) ............................................................................................................. 23, 24
U.S. ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.,

No. 11-0590, 2013 WL 4400434 (W.D. Mo. July 19, 2013) ................................................... 32
US. ex rel. Lopez v. Strayer Educ., Inc.,

698 F. Supp. 2d 633 (E.D. Va. 2010) .............................................................................. 23, 24, 28
ll1
US. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,

243 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2001) .................................................................................................. 1.8
U.S. ex rel. May v. PurduePharmaL.P.,

737 F.3d 908 ................................................................................................................. 23, 24, 28
U.S. ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA Inc.,

No. 08-0034, 2013 WL 2637032 (D.D.C. 2013) ...................................................................... 18
Ping Chen ex rel. U.S. v. EMSL Analytical, Inc.,

No. 10-7504, 2013 WL 4441509 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2013) ................................................... 32
U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc.,

552 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2009) .................................................................................. 19, 22, 23, 24
U.S. ex rel. Reagan v. E. Tex.Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare Sys.,

274 F. Supp. 2d 824 (S.D. Tex. 2003) ................................................................................ 31
Rockwell Int 'l Corp. v. United States,

549 U.S. 457 (2007) ................................................................................................................. 31
U.S. ex rel. Rosner v. WE/Stellar IP Owner, L.L.C.,

739 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ................................................................................ 22
US. ex rel. Shea v. Verizon Bus. Network Servs. Jnc .,

904F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.D.C. 2012) .............................................................................................. 1.8
U.S. ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,

21F.3d 1339 (4th Cir.1994) ................................................................................................2
. 2,23
U.S. ex rel. Smith v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc.,

411 F. Supp. 2d 64 (D. Conn. 2005) ................................................................................... 18
U.S. e'C rel. Stinson, Lyons, Ger/in & Bustamante , P.A., v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
944 F.2d 1149 (3rd Cir. 1991) ............................................................................................ 31
Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,

521 F. App'x 278 (4th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................................ 32
U.S. ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav,

555 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 2009) ............................................................................................. passim
Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Farmer,

No. 07-27296, 2008 WL 2309006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2008) ................................................... 7
Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Fisch,

959 N.Y.S.2d 260; 261 App. Div. 2013 .................................................................................. 21
lV
0:13- cv-00464-JFA Date Filed 01/15/14 Entry Number 193-1 Page 6 of 50
Whipple v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth.,

No. 3-11-0206, 2013 WL 4510801 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 26, 2013) ............................................ 34
US. ex rel. Wilson v. Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist.,
528 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2008), rev'd on other grounds, 130 S. Ct. 1396 (2010) ........................ 19
US. ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Adm'rs, LLC,

728 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2013) ....................................................................................................... 3
.0
Statutes
740 ILCS l 75/4(e)(4) ............................................................................................................... l 7, 33
31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq ......................................................................................................... passim
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) ........................................................................................................... passim
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)............................................................................................................ passinz
Cal. Gov't Code § 12652(c)(10)............................................................................................... 17
Cal. Gov't Code § 12652( d)(3 ) ........................................................................................................... 33
Cal. Gov't. Code §12652(d)(3)(B) ................................................................................................. 33
Chicago Mun. Code§ l-22-030(£) ................................................................................................. 33
Chicago Mun. Code§ l-22-030(b)(5) ....................................................................................... 17
D.C. Code§ 2-381.03(b)(6) ...................................................................................................... 17
D.C. Code§ 2-381.03(c-1)(2) ................................................................................................... 33
D.C. Code §2-381.03(c-1)(2)(B) ...............................................................................................3..3..
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1203(b)(5.)................................................................................... 17
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1206(c) ............................................................................................... 33
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 68.083(7) ............................................................................................................ 17
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 68.087(3) .............................................................................................................. 33
Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 661- 25(e) .................................................................................................... 17, 33
Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 661-31(b) ............................................................................................................ 33
Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 661-31(c) ............................................................................................................ 33
V
0:13-c v-00464-JFA Date Filed 01/15/14 Entry Number 193-1 Page 7 of 50
740 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 175/4(b)(5) ............................................................................................ 17
Ind. Code Ann. § 5- l l - 5.5-4 (g).................................................................................................. 17, 33
Ind. Code Ann.§ 5-11-5.5-7(-f) ........................................................................................................... 33
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § 5C(6) .......................................................................................... l 7
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § SG(c) ...................................................................................... 33
Minn. Stal Ann. §§15C.01 ............................................................................................................. 33
Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 15C.05(b)...., ....................................................................................... 17
Minn. Stat. Ann. § lSC.05(-f)....... . ........................... ...................................................................... 33
Mont. Code Ann. § 17- 8-4 06(7) ................................................................................................... 17
Mont. Code Ann.§ 17-8-403(6) ........................................................................................ 33
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.§ l-608(b)(5) ........................................................................................... 17
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-61l(d)...................................................................................................... 33
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 167:61-c(II)(b) ..................................................................................... 17
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 167:61-e(lll) ......................................................................................... 33
N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2A:32C-5(i) .................................................................................................... l 7
N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2A:32C-9(c)......................................................................................................... 33
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 27-14-10.C............................................................................................ 33
N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 44-9-5(£)......................................................................................................17
N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 7-804(d) .................................................................................................... 33
N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 7-804(f)(l).............................................................................................l.7
N.Y. State Fin. Law§ 188(7)............................................................................................................ 33
N.Y. State Fin. Law§ 190(4) .................................................................................................... 17
N.Y. State Fin. Law§ 190(9)...............................................................................................3..3........
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 357.080(2)................................................................................................... 17
Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 357.100.............................................................................................3

..3
.....
vi
Nev. Rev. Stat.§ 357.l00(c) ...................................................................................................... 33
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann. § 9-1.l (b)(5) ...............................................................................17, 33
R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.§ 9-l.l-4{

e)(4)(A..)......................................................................................... 33
Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-216.S(E) ............................................................................................... 17
Va. Code Ann.§ 8.01-216.8 ............................................................................................................ 33
Vil
Defendants1 respectfully submit this memorandum of law in support of their motion to
dismiss the Second Amended Complaint (the "Complaint" or "SAC") for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Relator Lynn Szymoniak filed this qui tam action under the federal False Claims Act
("FCA") on November 12, 2010. She subsequently amended her Complaint on February 3 and
June 28, 2011, to add clain1s under certain state and local false claims statutes. Although her
theories of liability are muddled at best, Szymoniak appears to claim that federal, state and local
governments were misled into investing in mortgage-backed securities (' S") because they
did not know, when making their investments, that certain mortgage assignments were not
delivered to the securitization trusts "at the inception of the trust[s]," thereby allegedly impairing
the value of the MBS. SAC , 1, 223. Szymoniak claims that in order "to conceal [from the
government] the true, impaired value of the assets of each of the trusts," Defendants "devised
and operated a schemeto replace the missing assignments with fraudulent, fabricated
assignments." SAC, 7-8. Szymoniak also appears to claim, without an iota of factual detail,
that the federal government was separately harmed in -its capacity as an insurer of mortgage loans
"[e]ach time a Defendant lacking valid notes and mortgage assignments submitted a claim for
1
The Defendants joining this memorandum are: ACE Securities Corp., Aurora Loan Services
LLC, Bank of America Corp. (erroneously sued as ''Bank of Americna ), alleged to be successor
to Countrywide Financial Corporation, Bank of America, N.A. (erroneously sued as "BAC
Home Loans Servicing, LLP"), Banc of America Mortgage Securities, Inc., Barclays Capital
Real Estate1nc. (erroneously sued as Homeq Servicing Corporation d/b/a Barclays Capital Real
Estate, Inc.), Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, Caliber Home Loans, Inc. f/k/a Vericrest Financial,
Inc., California Reconveyance Company, Chase Home Finance LLC, CitiMortgage, Inc.,
Carrington Mortgage Services, LLC, HSBC Mortgage Services, Inc., Litton Loan Servicing, LP,
Nationwide Title Clearing, Inc., Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, OneWest Bank, FSB, Select
Portfolio Servicing, lnc., and Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, d/b/a America's Servicing company
(incorrectly named as a separate entity from Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.) (collectively,
"Defendants").
payment on such guarantee." SAC if 23 4 .
As an initial matter, the first-to-file rule requires dismissal of Szymoniak's claims. Once
a person files an action asserting a claim under the FCA, the FCA's first-to-file provision
prevents a relator from filing an additional action, like this one, which is "a related action based
on the facts underlying the pending action." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). The first-to-file rule, thus,
requires that this action be dismissed because it was filed five months after Relator filed an
essentially identical action in this Court.
In any event, Szymoniak cannot overcome the FCA's jurisdiction-removing public
disclosure bar. The bar divests courts of subject matter jurisdiction over claims made by persons
who cannot prove, that their allegations are r,ot based on public disclosures or, alternatively, that
they are an "original source" of the allegations because they have direct and independent
knowledge of the underlying facts. 31 U.S.C . § 3730(e)(4) (2009); see also U.S. ex rel. Black v.
Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty., 494 F. App'x 285, 291 (4th Cir. 2012). The purpose of
the bar is to discourage opportunistic lawsuits by individuals seeking a financial windfall based
on allegations that are already in the public domain. Id.
Szymoniak is not an "insider." She has never worked for any Defendant on which she
claims to "blow the whistle," and she has never participated in a government purchase of MBS
or been involved in a government payment of a mortgage insurance claim. She similarly has no
direct experience in the securitization process, no personal knowledge of what documents are (or
have been) delivered to any securitization trusts, and no personal knowledge of the
circumstances surrounding the preparation of mortgage assignments. Indeed, her effort to
overcome the public disclosure bar rests exclusively on her assertion that she "conductedher
own investigations in furtherance of a False Claims Act qui tam action and found that the
2
Defendants pursued and continue to pursue foreclosure actions using false and fabricated
mortgage assignments." SAC,6. Asalleged by Szymoniak, the findings of her investigation
provide the sole factual basis for the essential allegations in the Complaint. Id. ii65. Szymoniak
also asserts, despite her lack of involvement in any aspect of the scheme alleged, that she has
"direct and personal knowledge of the fraudulent scheme described.'' Id.1 14.
Szymoniak's assertions fail to meet her burden of establishing the Court 's jurisdiction.
Allegations concerning the preparation and use of purportedly false or fraudulent mortgage
assignments were in the public domain well before December 2009, when Szymoniak alleges she
commenced her investigation. Indeed, Szymoniak commenced her investigation precisely
because she was aware of judicial opinions and news repo1ts describing the same docwnentation
issues she now claims to have discovered on her own. It is Szymoniak's burden to prove, that
the allegations in her Complaint are not "based upon" these prior public disclosures. She cannot
do so. Not only are Szymoniak's allegations substantially similar to allegations contained in
prior public disclosures, but Szymoniak herself cited to numerous public disclosures when
reporting her "findings" to the government in January 2010, many of which pre-date the alleged
commencement of Szymoniak's investigation.
Szymoniak is similarly unable to carry her burden of proving her( ' direct and independent
knowledge" of Defendants' so-called scheme to use allegedly fabricated mortgage documents to
conceal from the government the allegedly impaired value of MBS.. For exa mple, the instances
of foreclosure fraud she claims to have identified-including alleged instances of forged
signatures, the use of improper or unauthorized cmporate titles, the backdating of effective dates
on mortgage assignments, and unlawful notarizations (see SAC,, 88, 101)-all depend on her
review of publicly available documents, including the very mortgage assignments at issue. And
3
Szymoniak has acknowledged in deposition testimony that her method of identifying allegedly
fraudulent mortgage assignments depends on speculation and inference rather than first-hand
knowledge. Similarly, Szymoniak's only information about the government' s purchases of
MBS, and of the statements made in the offering documents for those MBS, comes directly from
prospectuses and other documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"),
media reports, and the government's own press releases and reports.
This is precisely the type of qui tam action that the public disclosure bar was meant to
address. As Szymoniak's own emails to another borrower (and client) reflect, her objective in
filing this lawsuit was to cash in on allegations already in the public domain-not to blow the
whistle on a government harm that she sought to redress. indeed, it required both imagination
and open cynicism for Szymoniak to conjure a government harm that she could allege. Even
th,en Szymoniak knew that her claims were "a real long-shot," and she described them as such:
Here is the problem with the qui tam: the VICTIM must be the
government - as a plaintiff, you stand in the shoes of the
government that has been defrauded.
The government is a victim as it is frantically investing in these
over-valued securities - but we both know that the homeowners
are the real victims.
* * *
[l]f you want to try this too, let me know and we will file together
both knowing that this is a real long-shot. ...
See Exhibit 1 (Szymoniak email to Figueroa, Feb. 17, 2010, available on Pacer) (emphasis
added). Szymoniak revisited this issue the following dayl tasking her client with investigating on
herbeha1f:
For the possible qui tam, we need to lꞏhow harm TO THE

GOVERNMENT (irony here is extreme of course).
I have many articles (from Bloomberg, etc.) that say the
government is busy buying $1.2 trillion in mortgage-backed
securities - but I ,ieed more specificity.
4
Would you see if you can find which securities-what Funds-the

government is buying?
Exhibit 2 (Szymoniak: email to Figueroa, Feb. 18, 2010, available on Pacer) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, the public disclosure bar plainly prevents jurisdiction over Relator's claims.
For these reasons, discussed in greater detail below, the Court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over this action, and the action should be dismissed with prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following summary of relevant facts is limited to the allegations and public
disclosures germane to the Court's consideration of its subject matter jurisdiction over the
action.2 Because the Court may consider extrinsic evidence to determine its jurisdiction, this
factual summary includes publicly available evidence beyond the four comers of the Complaint.
See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav, 555 F.3d 337, 347-48 (4th Cir. 2009) (on a motion to
dismiss under the public disclosure bar, the court may consider materials outside the pleadings
that are publicly available and capable of accurate and ready determination).
A. Szymoniak's Motion To Dismiss Her Foreclosnre Action
Szymoniak is an attorney and resident of Palm Beach Gardens, Florida. SAC ,r 14. She
was admitted to the Florida bar in 1980 and has practiced law in Palm Beach County for at least
31 years. Exhibit 3 (Szymoniak Aff., BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P. v. Davis, Mar. 8, 2011)
at 1 2. She does not allege that she has workedfor any Defendant and, thus, does not allege that
she observed any purported fraud first-hand in the course of her employment with any
Defendant.
As alleged in the Complaint, Szymoniak purchased a home in 1998 in Palm Beach
2
Defendants respectfully refer the Court to their separately-filed motions to dismiss pursuant to
Rules 12(b)(6) and Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a more detailed and
complete description of the allegations in the Complaint.
5
Gardens, Florida, and she refinanced her mortgage in 2006. SAC ,r 47. Two years later,
Szymoniak defaulted on her loan, leading to the commencement of a foreclosure action against
her in July 2008 in the name of DBNTC, in its capacity as trustee for the securitization trust that
held her loan (the "Foreclosure Action"). Id. ,r 52; see also Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v.
Szymoniak, No. 50 2008 CA 022258 XXXMB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach County)
("Szymoniakr ).3
On September 12, 2008, Szymoniak: filed a motion to dismiss the Foreclosure Action. 1n
support of her motion, she cited several judicial decisions dismissing foreclosure actions because
of missing documentation. Exhibit 4 (Motion to Dismiss, Szymoniakl, Sept.12, 2008) at,r,r 12-
13 (citing cases). With respect to DBNTC in particular, Szyrnoniak asserted that the bank "has
repeatedly been identified as a bank that is attempting to take shortcuts in the foreclosure
process." ld. As her basis for this assertion, Szymoniak: cited a decision by New York State
Supreme Court Justice Arthur M. Schack, in Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v.
Castellanos, in which Judge Schack raised concerns about "fraud ... or at least malfeasance"
because of the multiple titles usedby the signatory of the mortgage assignment, as both assignor
and assignee, as well as anomalies with the notarization. Id.; see also Castellanos, No. 07-277,
2008 WL 123798, at *2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 14, 2008).
Szymoniak's reliance on Judge Schack's 2008 opinion (and the other decisions cited in
her motion to dismiss) reveals her- and, more importantly fat this motion, public-awareness of
the documentation issues described in the Complaint more than a year before she undertook her
alleged investigation of the subject in December 2009.
3In March 2010, Szymoniak was sued in a second foreclosure action after she defaulted on her
mortgage loan for another property of hers. US. Bankv. Szymoniak, No. 50 2010 CA 009104
XXXXMB (Fla. Cir. Ct. Palm Beach Co.) ("Szymoniak II").
6
B. Other Public Disclosures Of Foreclosure Documentation Issues Before

Szymoniak's Investigation
Courts continued to focus on foreclosure documentation issues in the context of MBS
throughout 2008 and 2009, periodically rejecting foreclosure actions on the basis of alleged
documentation defects similar to those asserted in the Complaint. S,ee e.g.,Indymac Bank, FSB
v. Bethley , No. 08-9615, 2009 WL 27930 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 6, 2009); HSBC Bank USA, Nat' l
Ass'n v. Antrobus, No. 07-43299, 2008 WL 2928553 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. July 31, 2008); Wells Fargo
Bank. N.A. v. Farmer , No. 07-27296, 2008 WL 2309006 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 2008); Bank of N.Y.
v. Mulligan, No. 07-29399, slip. op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 3, 2008). These decisions, and the
documentation issues they describe, attracted significant media attention at both the national and
local level. For example:
• On July 26, 2008, The Wall Street Journal published an article describing
increased judicial scrutiny of mortgage assignments and judges' discovery of
" flaws in documents that borrowers may be able to use to keep their homes."
Exhibit 5 (Amir Efrati, Some Judges Stiffen Foreclosure Standards, Wall St. J.,
Jul. 26, 2008, at A3).
• On April 24, 2009, The New York Times published an article discussing, among
other things, the "recreation" of documents used in foreclosure actions and the
multiple job titles used by individuals signing those documents. The article
quotes another decision by Judge Schack, from February 2009, dismissing a
foreclosure action based on a mortgage assignment in which an employee of the
foreclosing bank bad identified herself as a vicepresident of MERS.. As reported
in the article, Judge Schack referred to the employee as "'a milliner's delight by
virtue of the number of hats she wears," ' and he questioned whether she was
'" engaged in a subterfuge.' " Exl1ibit 6 (Mike Mclntire, Murky Middleman, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 24, 2009, at Bl).
• On May 3, 2009, the St. Petersburg Times published an article discussing, among
other things, the preparation of documentation that has appeared in foreclosure
cases. According to this article, employees at one services provider signed
documents as officers of multiple banks as part of what critics were describing as
"an assembly-line process designed to resolve a big problem: In the rush to 'flip'
loans as fast as possible in order to make more money, the new loan holders often
failed to get the proper paperwork showing they owned the loan and had the right
to foreclose." Exhibit 7 (Susan Taylor Martin, So, Who Owns Your Home Loan?,
St. Petersburg Times, May 3, 2009, at JD).
7
• On August 31, 2009, The New York Times published an article aboutJudge
Schack in which the Times noted the large munber of foreclosure actions
dismissed by him because of documentation issues similar to those alleged in the
Complaint. The article describes how one bank representative signed an affidavit
as the vicepresident of two different banks and had his signature notarized in
Texas despite the fact that bis office was located in Kansas City, Missouri.
According to the article, Judge Schack's ''often scathing decisions" had attracted
..the attention of judges and lawyers from Florida to Ohio to California,"
including at judicial conferences in Chicago and Arizona. Exhibit 8 (Michael
Powell, A 'Little Judge ' Who Rejects Foreclosures, Brooklyn Style, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 31, 2009, at Al).
• OnDecember24, 2009, The Wall Street Journal published an article discussing
recent judicial opinions in Massachusetts, New York and Texas that "mark a new
phase in the judiciary' s battle to stem the rising tide of foreclosures by punishing
mortgage companies for paperwork mistakes and alleged mistreatment of
borrowers.'' Exhibit 9 (Amir Efrati, Foreclosure Challenges Raise Questions
About Judicial Role, Wall St. J., Dec. 24, 2009, at Al 5).
Public interest ran so high that Judge Schack himself became the focus of media
attention, and he was interviewed on national television by CBS News. The interview, which
aired on September 12, 2009, was also posted on YouTube and included a discussion ofth.e types
of documentation issues being encountered in foreclosure proceedings. N.Y. Judge Takes on
Foreclosures (CBS News television broadcast Sept. 12, 2009).4
Courts were prompted to issue new rules to address the foreclosure documentation issues
being identified by judges. For example, in March 2009, the Florida Supreme Court established
a Task Force on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases "to recommend to the Supreme Court
policies, procedures, strategies, and methods for easing the backlog of pending residential
mortgage foreclosure cases while protecting the rights of parties." In re Task Force on
Residential Mortg. Foreclosure Cases, Fla. Admin Order No. AOSC09-8, at 2 (Mar. 27, 2009).
After an expedited proposal and comment period, the Florida Supreme Court adopted new m les
requiring the verification of foreclosure complaints to conserve judicial resources wasted on
4 The broadcast can be viewed at http ://www.cbsnews.com/news/ny-judge-takes-on-

foreclosures.
8
allegedly '' inappropriately pleaded 'lost note' counts and inconsistent allegations . . . and
[potential] harm to defendants resulting from suits brought by plaintiffs not entitled to enforce
the note." in re Amendments to the Fla. Rules ofCiv. Procedure

, Fla. Admin. Order No. SC09-
1460, at 4 (Feb. 11, 2010). Szymoniak clearly knew about the Florida rule amendments when
she filed her Complaint in November 2010, because she highlighted the purpose for which they
were implemented in a motion to dismiss her second foreclosure proceeding on May 14, 2010.
See Exhibit IO (Motion to Dismiss, SzymoniakII, May 14, 2010) at 3.
Others began to catalogue foreclosure documentation issues as well, including in
publicly-disclosed documents. In October 2009, for example, Marie McDonnell, a self-
described mortgage fraud and forensic analyst, submitted an affidavit in a bankruptcy action in
which she described "bogus" assignments executed by DocX employee Linda Green. The
affidavit described McDonnell's review of public records to find examples of purportedly
fraudulentassignments and notarizations, and it identified examples substantially similar to the
ones alleged by Szymoniak in the Complaint. See Exhibit 11 (McDonnell Aff., Vo v. Twin-V,est
LLC, Oct. 20, 2009) at 4.5
C. Szymoniak's Alleged Investigation and Findings of Foreclosure Fraud
Szymoniak alleges that she began her investigation into potential foreclosure fraud in
December 2009, after the previously missing note and mortgage assignment were filed in her
5 Also in October 2009, David Breidenbach, the individual credited with blowing the whistle on
improper document execution practices at Lender Processing Services ("LPS") and DocX (see
infra at 13) posted an online message encouraging borrowers to question the authenticity of
signatures on the mortgage assignments used in their foreclosures:
look at your assignments of mortgage-who signed them?- look
at releases for signatures-the titles may be defended by showing
the docs werent [sic] signed following requirements.- tell your
lawyers to look at the kansas supreme court and massacbussets
[sic] cases . . .-look for proof of bad sig1Jatures ....
Exhibit 12 (Breidenbach blog post, Oct. 26, 2009) (emphasis added).
9
0:13-cv-00464-JFADate Filed 01/15/14 Entry Number 193-1 Page 18 of 50
Foreclosure Action. SAC,r 58. Although the docket sheet in the Foreclosure Action indicates
that the documents were filed on December 28, 2009, Szymoniak has claimed in another
proceeding that the documents were filed on December 23. Compare Docket Entry No. 10 with
Motion for Sanctions, Szymoniak I, at ,r 10. Regardless of which date is correct, Szymoniak
could not have begun her investigation until December 23 at the earliest, with just five business
days left in the year, including both Christmas Eve and New Year's Eve.
The Complaint alleges that "[a]fter discovering the forged mortgage assignment in
Relator' s Foreclosure, Relator investigated thousands of mortgage assignments", and she "folDld
the same forged assignments in all of these cases." SAC ,r 93. Then, also in the month of
December, Szymoniak claims she "began reporting her findings of widespread fabricated
mortgage assignments used by mortgage-backed securities trusts" to various government offices.
SAC, 67.
Atthesame time, Szymoniak indisputably continued to follow foreclosure-related
decisions by Judge Schack. On January 14, 2010, she published an article summarizing six of
Judge Schack' s decisions, each of wbfoh dismissed a foreclosure action on grounds that the
mortgage assignment bore what Judge Schack considered to be indicia of fraud. See Exhibit 14
(Lynn Szyrooniak, An Officer of Too Many Banks, Fraud Digest, Jan. 14, 2010).
A few days later, Szymoniak submitted a letter to the Financial Crisis Inquiry
Commission ("FCIC" ) expressing concern about "fabricated and forged mortgage-related
documents" prepared by DocX. See Exhibit 14 (Szymoniak Jetter to FCIC, Jan. 19, 2010).
Although Szymoniak claims in the letter to have conducted her own investigation into the issue,
she directed -the Commission to judicial decisions describing "questionable Assignments from
document mills," and "especially" to the decisions of Judge Schack. She also tellingly supported
10
her letter by enclosing her1anuary 14 article cataloguing numerous judicial decisions dismissing
foreclosure actions on the basis of documentation issues substantially similar to those alleged in
the Complaint. Id. Conspicuously absent from her letter is a single reference to a securitization
transaction, let alone any federal or state government investment or harm.
D. Szymoniak's Effort to Bootstrap a Qui Tam Action Onto Foreclosure

Documentation Issues
Although an essential element of a qui' tam action is a fraud on the government,
Szymoniak had no direct or independent knowledge of any false claim or other hann to the
government when she allegedly began reporting her findings to the government in December
2009. Indeed, to this day, it appears that the only basis for her allegations of a false claim or
other harm to the government is information she obtained either in the course of her own
foreclosure proceeding or second- and third-hand from news reports and government press
releases and reports, many of which she cites in the Complaint. See SAC11213, 214, 216, 217,
219,220,222, 244-46.
Szymoniak has even been sued by her former client, Ignacio Figueroa, who claims that
he, not she, bad tlJe idea of filing a qui tam action based on a1leged government harm. See
Exhibit 15 (Compl aint, Figueroa v. Szymoniak). In support of his allegations, Figueroa attached
certain of his emails with Szymoniak to bis complaint, including an email, dated February 17,
2010, in which Szymoniak advised Figueroa:
Here is the problem with the qui tam: the VICTIM must be the
government - as a plaintiff, you stand in the shoes of the
government that has been defrauded.
The government is a victim as it is frantically investing in these
over-valued securities - but we both know that the homeowners
are the real victims.
Also, you must have information unknown to the general public to
be the ' Relator.'
11
Qui Tams are filed under seal for the first 90 days.
I have one in the works - with ME as Relator - but I do not
expect much from it as everything I know is already in the public
domain as I have shared it with anyone who will listen.
But if you want to try this too, let me know and we will file
together both knowing that this is a real long-shot "
Exhibit I (Szymoniak email to Figueroa, Feb. 17, 2010, available on Pacer) (emphasis added).
Szymoniak sent an email the next day askingFigueroa to research any investments by the
government in RMBS:
For the possible qui tam, we need to show harm TO THE

GOVERNMENT (irony here is extreme of course).
1 have many articles (from Bloomberg, etc.) that say the
government is busy buying $1.2 trillion in mortgage-backed
securities - but I need more specificity.
Would you see if you can find which securities- what Funds- the
government is buying?
Exhibit 2 (Szymoniak email to Figueroa , Feb. 18, 2010, available on Pacer) (emphasis added).
That same day, Figueroa began sending Szymoniak links to various federal government
websites, which he described as containing information regarding government investment in
RMBS. Exhibit 16. (Figueroa email to Szymoniak, Feb. 18, 2010, available on Pacer).
E. The Government's Investie:ationof DocX Was Triggered by Someone Else
Although Szymoniak holds herself out as the person responsible for triggering the
government' s investigation of DocX, the publicly-available Non-Prosecution Agreement entered
into between the govemment (the putative plaintiff in this action) and LPS confirms that she was
not. As stated therein, a man sent a letter to LPS's external auditors in October 2009 (two
months before Szymoniak saw the mortgage assignment filed in her foreclosure action) "alleging
fraud and forgery in the execution of documents related to his mortgage by DocX." See Exhibit
17 (LPS Non-Prosecution Agreement, Feb. 14 , 2013) at Appenclix.A , ,r 1 6 . The auditors
forwarded the letter to LPS's corporate headquarters, and corporate representatives confronted
12
Lorraine Brown, the then-President and founder of DocX, whose employment with DocX was
terminated shortly thereafter. Id. On February 9, 2010, Brown was interviewed by an agent with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Id.1 17,
The man who blew the whistle on DocX is David Breidenbach. By letter dated October
27, 2009, Breidenbach notified LPS's outside auditors of the creation of allegedly "faulty
[foreclosure] documentation" by employees at LPS and DocX. See Exhibit 18 (Breidenbach
letter to KPMG, Oct. 27, 2009). A few-weeks later, in November 2009, Breidenbach delivered a
more expansive letter to the SEC, which he copied to U.S. Senator Sherrod Brown, in which he
described "potential forgers/forgeries en masse" at DocX. See Exhibit 19 (Breidenbach letter to
SEC, Nov. 23, 2009). Breidenbach's SEC letter includes the kind of detail that is conspicuously
missing from Szymoniak's letter to the FCIC, sent three months later. Id. It also voices concern
about a potential fraud on the government as a result of its purchases of MBS and possible
payment of mortgage insurance claims- the same concerns that Szymoniak failed to raise in her
letter to the FCIC. Id. But even Breidenbach admitted that his investigation had been triggered
by the publicly available decisions of Judge Schack, and be candidly conceded that his concerns
about potential fraud were based upon "speculation" rather than first-band knowledge. Id.
("Simply speculating, . . . . [t]his could be a fraud on securities investors ....... ").
LPS stopped executing foreclosure-related documents as of December 31" 2009. See
Exhibit 20. In its Form 10-K for the period ended December 31, 2009, filed with the SEC in
February 2010, LPS disclosed that it had conducted an internal review of its "document
solutions'' subsidiary, DocX, which had uncovered a process thatbad resulted in erroneous
notarizations of foreclosure documents. See Exhibit 21 (Excerpt from LPS Annual Report (Fonn
I0- K), Feb. 23, 2010) at 17. The 10-K also revealed an inquiry by a Georgia regulator and an
13
investigation by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Florida into the DocX
fraud. Id.
On December 31, 2009, Breidenbach filed an amended answer and "counter-complaint"
in his own foreclosure action containing more than 200 pages of detailed allegations concerning
potential mortgage and foreclosure fraud. See Exhibit 22 (Excerpts from Second Amended
Answer and Third Amended Counter-Complaint, Bank of New N Yv. Breidenbach). Included
among those allegations were specific examples of allegedly false or fraudulent mortgage
assignments executed by employees of LPS or DocX. Id. As alleged by Breidenbach,
employees of LPS and DocX routinely " created" mortgage assignments and other foreolosure-
related documentation using" unauthorized" or potentially forged signatures and "false notary
attestations." id.
F. Further Media Coverage of Allegedly Fraudulent Assignments and

Foreclosure Mills
News media coverage of foreclosure documentation issues, including the fraudulent
document execution practices at DocX, continued after January 2010, when Szymoniak
submitted her letter to the FCJC. In April 2010, for exa mple, The Wall Street Jorimal published
the following articles:
• On April 3, 2010: an article describing a criminal investigation into DocX, which

follows on the dismissal of numerous foreclosure cases in which judges across the
U.S. have found "that the materials banks had submitted[] to support their c1aims
were wrong." The article notes that "[f]aulty bank paperwork has been an issue in
foreclosure proceedings since the housing crisis took hold a few years ago."
Exhibit 23 (Amir Efrati & Carrick Mollenkamp, US. Probes Foreclosure-Data
Provider, Wall St. J., Apr. 3, 2010, at Bl).
• On April 17, 2010: an article describing questionable paperwork in foreclosure
actions. The article highlights the dismissal of a Florida foreclosure case due to
the faulty "assignment of mortgage" prepared by one of several "foreclosure
mills." Exhibit 24 (Amir Efrati, Judge Bashes Bank in Foreclosure Case, Wall
St. J., Apr. 17, 2010, § Law).
These public disclosures, among others, were readily available to Szymoniak when she
14
was prepa1ing her Complaint.
G. Szymoniak's Testimony Admitting That lier "Findings" Are Based on

Assumptions and Not First-Hand Knowledge of Fraud
From at least the time of her first Foreclosure Action, Szymoniak has been an active
participant in a network of individuals who share information about alleged "foreclosure fraud."
Thus, for example: Szymoniak launched a website with the domain name "FraudDigest," that
attracted many bloggers, and she kept abreast of what others were posting on similar biogs, such
as "4closurefraud.org". See Exhibit 25 (Szymoniak Transcript Excerpts, Stepankovsky, May 24,
2011) at 65-66. Eventually, she solicited engagements as a self-styled expert witness on the
subject of "foreclosure fraud" and, as a result, has provided deposition testimony in other
proceedings. See, e.g., id.
Alfhough Defendants do not have access to all of Szymoniak' s testimony on the subjec t,
it is clear from her deposition testimony in the Stepankovsky case that her "findings" from her
alleged investigation were based on surmise and conjecture derived from public information, not
eyewitness (or other first-band) knowledge of fraud. This is clear because, more than a year after
completing her investigation, Szymoniak' s information about so-called foreclosure fraud was
limited to guesswork that anyone could have made:
Q; It's really just your eyes, you're able to see these

variances, correct?
A: Not just my eyes. Other people are able to see significant
variations in tlte signatures of these individuals.
Q; But you're testifying based on your own eyes, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: In this particular case, Stepankovsky, you have no idea
whether Linda Green or Tywanna Thomas actually
signed those assignments on exactly the day the mortgage
assignments say they were signed, right?
A: On those particular assignments, no, I don't. Because
15
until 1 see an actual copy of the real Linda Green's

signature and the real Tywa11na Thomas' signature,
which I have not seen, I would not be able to say that
these signatures are forgeries.
But I am familiar with the practice called surrogate signing.
That's the name given to many different people signing the
same name in the Alpharetta office [of DocX] and that
there was [a government] investigation of surrogate
signing.
There was a disclosure by LPS to its clients that this went
on . . ..
Q: But you have no basis to tell the court that surrogate
signing is used, as you have described it, happened on the
assignments in this case, or that you've testified about for
this case?
* * *
A: I do not know that the actual- you're right. I d01i't know
that Linda Green and Tywanna Thomas didn't actually
sign this document in front of these witnesses on that
particular day.
* * *
Q: And as you sit here today, yon cannot testify that on or
about that date [when the securitization transactio11
closed}, the note and the mortgage for the Stepankovsky
loan were delivered to the trust?
A: That's correct.
** *
Q: You can't testify that neither Linda Green or Tywanna
Thomas have never been authorized as signing officer for
MERS, right?
A: That's correct.
Exhibit 25 (Szyrnoniak Transcript Excerpts, Stepankovsky, May 24, 2011) at 54-56, 58-59
(emphasis added).
ARGUMENT
L THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER TIDS

ACTION PURSUANT TO THE FIRST-TO-FILE BAR
As a threshold matter the SAC should be dismissed under the FCA' s first-to-file bar.
16
Once a person files an action based on an alleged violation of the FCA, "no person other than the
Government may intervene or bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending
action." 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5). Section 3730(b)(5) is a "jurisdictional limit on the courts'
power to hear certain duplicative qu.i tam suits." Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co., 390
F.3d 1276, 1278 (10th Cir. 2004); U.S. ex rel. Harris v. Dialysis Corp.,No. JKB-09-2457, 2013
WL 5505400, at *5 (D. Md. Oct. 1, 2013) ("Any claim that is later filed and is based on the facts
underlying the pending case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.").6
Here, the plain language of the statute bars this action. On June 4, 2010, Relator filed the
South Carolina Action. See Compl, US. ex. rel. Szymoniak, 10-cv-1465 (D.D.C. June 4. 2010)
(Dkt. 1). Over five months later, on November 12, 2010, Relator filed the North Carolina Action.
See 0 kt. No. l.7 Both actions are based on virtually identical allegations and assert claims under
the same provisions of the federal, state, and local false claims acts. Compare generally SAC
6 Each of the false claims acts of the qui tam States, the District of Columbia, Chicago, and New
York also contains a first-to-file rule. See Cal. Gov't Code§ 12652(c)(10); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6,
§ 1203(b)(5); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 68.083(7); Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 661-25(e); 740 lll. Comp. Stat. §
175/4(b)(5); Ind. Code Ann.§ 5- l l- 5.5-4 (g);Minn. Stat.§ 15C.05(b); Mont. Code Ann.§ 17-
8-406(7); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 357.080(2;) N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 167:61-c (Il)(b); N.C. Gen.
Stat.§ 1-608(b)(5;) N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2A:32C-5(i); N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 44-9-5(E); N.Y. State Fin.
Law§ 190(4); R.I. Gen. Laws Ann.§ 9- l. l-4 (b)(5); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § 5C(6) ; Va.
Code Ann.§ 8.0l-216.5(E); D.C. Code§ 2-381.03(b)(6); Chicago Mun. Code§ l-22-030(b)(5);
N.Y.C. Admin. Code§ 7-804(f)(l).
7
The North Carolina case names some defendants not named in the South Carolina case. The
first-to-file rule nonetheless applies and bars Relator's claims against additional defendants,
particularly where, as here, Relator has alleged an industry-wide scheme to defraud. See United
States ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 F.3d 503, 517 (6th Cir. 2009) ("[B]ecause the
purpose of the FCA's first-to-file provision is to prevent the filing of more qui tam suits once the
government already has been made aware of the potential fraud perpetrated against it, the fact
that the later action names different or additional defendants is not dispositive as long as the two
complaints identify the same general fraudulent scheme." (internal citations omitted)); United
States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp.,318 F.3d 214, 218-19 (D.C. Cir.
2003) (given the first-filed complaint's "broad allegations" of a "corporate-wide'' fraud, the
addition in the later-filed complaint of a corporate subsidiary and the subsidiary's employees
were "merely variations on the fraud" and thus immaterial).
17
with Am. Compl., U.S. ex. rel. Szymoniak, 10-cv-1465 (D.D.C. May 13,201l)(Dkt. 35); see
also Dkt. No. 56 at 2 (Relater conceding that the South Carolina Action contained "claims
identical to those asserted" in the North Carolina Action) (emphasis added). Finally, Relator is a
person "other than the Government." See SAC, 14. The plain statutory language extends the
bar to ''to successive related actions brought by the same relator.' ' U.S. ex rel. Shea v. Verizon
Bus. Network Servs. Inc., 904 F. Supp. 2d 28, 34 (D.D.C. 2012).8
Thus, after Relater filed the South Carolina Action, she was barred from filing a
successive lawsuit basedon the facts underlying the South Carolina Action. 31 U.S.C. §
3730(b)(5). Accordingly, pursuant to section 3730(b)(5), the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear the
North Caro lina Action. id.9
Il. THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OVER

SZYMONIAK'S FCA CLAIMS UNDER THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR
The qui tam provisions of the FCA are designed to enlist the help of private citizens in
uncovering and combating fraud against the government, while simultaneously preventing
parasitic lawsuits based upon publicly disclosed allegations. Hanison v. Westinghouse
Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999). To strike this balance, the FCA includes
a " public disclosure bar" that "deprives courts of jurisdiction over qui tam suits when the
8
See also U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton C,o. 1:10-cv-864-JCC/TCB , 2011 WL 2118227 (E.D.
Va. May 24, 2011); U.S. ex rel. Smith v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc., 411 F. Supp. 2d 64, 74-75
(D. Conn. 2005) (applying bar and noting, inter alia, that"the burden is properly placed on the
original relater to ensure that he or she comes forward with all the information he or she has in
the first suit, rather than file piecemeal lawsuits").
9
The District Court in North Carolina transferred the North Carolina Action before defendants
were served and while the case was under seal. The Court had no occasion to consider the
legislatively-mandated FCA first-to-file bar under section 3730(b)(5). Unlike the "first-filed"
rule that grants courts in the Fourth Circuit the discretion to dismiss, stay or transfer the case,
section 3730(b)(5) requires dismissal of the later-filed action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5); G, ynberg,
390 F.3d 1276 at 1278; US. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Co,p, 659 F.3d 1240, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2011);
US. e.x rel. L11jan v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 243 F.3d 1181, 1183 (9th Cir. 2001) (Section
3730(b)(5) "establishes an exception-free, first-to-file bar").
18
relevant information has already entered the public domain through certain channels." Graham
Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson ("Graham County" ), 130 S. Ct.
1396, 1401 (2010).10
As applicable to this case, the public disclosure bar provides:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section

based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a
criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing,
audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is
brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action
is an original source of the information.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4) (2009).1L Because the bar is jurisdictional, it is a relator's burden to
prove that the bar doesnot deprive the court of jurisdiction. See Black, 494 F. App'x at 293;
Vuyyuru, 555 F.3d at 347.
"In an FCA action, when subject matter jurisdiction is challenged under the public
disclosure bar, a court must engage in a three-pronged analysis to determine (1) if there was a
public disclosure, (2) if the relator' s allegations were ' based upon' the public disclosure, and, if
so, (3) whether the relator is nonetheless entitled to original source status as an individual who
10 As further explained by the Fourth Circuit, the public disclosure bar furthers the "twin goals
of rejecting swts which the government is capable of pursuing itself, while promoting those
which the government is not equipped to bring on its own." U.S. ex rel. Wilson v. Graham Cnty.
Soil & Water Conservation Dist., 528 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2008), rev'd onother grounds, 130
S. Ct. 1396 (2010); see also U.S. ex rel. Black v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty., 494 F.
App' x 285,291 (4th Cir. 2012) (where " the critical elements exposing the alleged .fraud are
already placed in the public doma,in " then the government "is already in a position to vindicate
society' s interests, and a qui tam action would serve no purpose") (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted) (alteration in original).
11 The public disclosure bar was amended in March 2010 by the Patient Protection. and
Affordable Care Act. See Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 901 (Mar. 23, 2010). This case must
be decided under the previous version of the bar, however, because the factual allegations
underlying each of Szymoniak' s claims concern alleged conduct that pre-dates the March2010
amendments, and the amendments are not retroactive. See U.S. ex rel. May v. Purd z,e Phanna
L.P., 737 F.3d 908. 914-18 (4th Cir. 2013). All refere nces and citations to§ 3730(e)(4) are to
the statutory text as it existed prior to March 23, 2010.
19
hasdirect and independent knowledge of the infonnation on which the allegations are based."
Black, 494 F. App'x at 293 (citations and quotations omitted). Because Szymoniak cannot
Satisfy her burden of proving that the bar does not apply, the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and the Complaint should be dismissed.
A, Szymoniak's Allegations Were Publicly Disclosed in Qualifying Sources
This qui tam action is based upon Szymoniak's allegations that:
• ln numerous (unspecified) instances, mortgage assignments required to be

delivered to securitization trusts at the time of securitization were never delivered,
thereby impairing the value of the securities (see, e.g.,SAC ,i,r 6 , 74) ;
• To conceal the missing assignments and impaired value of the securities, and "to
meet the evidentiary requirements imposed by courts in the foreclosure cases,"
Defendants conspired to make "widespread [use of] fabricated mortgage
assignments" (SAC ,i,i 8, 67);
• Unaware that the securities were impaired because of missing mortgage
assignments, the U.S. government purchased (or financed the purchase of) RMBS
through the Maiden Lane vehicle, Public-Private Investment Partnership ("PPIP")
financing, and direct purchases of securities issued by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
and Ginnie Mae (see, e.g.,SAC at fl 205, 208-222); and
• In reliance on allegedly fabricated assignments, the government also overpaid for
services and/or paid claims on loans whose payments were guaranteed by federal
,r, r
government agencies (see , e.g. , SAC at 225 27 , 234).
These allegations were in the public domain well before Szymoniak filed her original
Complaint on November 12, 2010. See supra at 5-15. From at least 2007 through November
2010, federal and state court judges across the country bad issued numerous foreclosure
decisions highlighting documentation issues substantially similar to those described in he
Complaint (see su.pra at 7-9). Indeed, the "often scathing" decisions issued by Judge Arthur
Schack of New York became so well-known that they attracted national and local media
attention and led ultimately to a nationally televised interview of the judge on CBS News (also
20
posted on YouTube) (see sz pra at 8). 12 Szymoniak's own Motion to Dismiss her Foreclosure
Action, filed in September 2008, highlighted several judicial decisions addressing the subject, as
did an article published by her in January 2010 (see sup ra at 7-11). In October 2009, a proposed
expert witness submitted an affidavit in connection with a federal bankruptcy hearing in which
the witness catalogued (based on her own investigation in 2008) what she referred to as "bogus''
assignments executed by DocX employee Linda Green (se e s-upra at 9). The following month,
David Breidenbach made allegations in a letter to the SEC that are identical to the allegations
made in the Complaint (see supra at 13), and on December 31, 2009, Breidenbach filed a
pleading in which he made those same allegations public (see supra at 14). By March 2010, the
Florida Supreme Court bad proposed new rules for foreclosure actions to address such issues,
which were promptly adopted (see supra at 8-9).
The news media and government (through, among other things, press releases) also
reported extensively on the government bail-out known as the Troubled Asset Relief Program
("TARP") and on the government' s use of the Maiden Lane vehicle, PPIP financing, and direct
purchases to acquire or finance the purchase of troubled assets. Indeed, Szymoniak herself cites
repeatedly to news articles, government press releases, and government websites as the basis for
her allegations in the Complaint concerning the government' s so-called '' investments" in
RMBS- allegations that are essential to her futile effort to identify a " false claim" to support a
qui tam action. See, e.g., SAC ,i,i 210, 211., 213, 214, 216, 217, 222 (citing U.S. Treasury and
Federal Reserve Bank of New York press releases and websites and articles published in The
12 Defendan ts ' reliance on Judge Schack's opinions as qualifying public disclosures under the
FCA is not intended, and should not be construed, as agreement with the holdings in those cases,
several of which have been reversed on appeal. See, e.g., HSBC Bank USA, NA. v. Taher, 962
N.Y. S.2d 301 (App. Div. 2013); Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Fisch, 959 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261 App.
Div. 2013; Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Sookoo, 941 N.Y. S.2d 503 (App. Div. 2012).
21
Wall Street.Journal). Szymoniak also readily admits that the mortgage assignments she now
claims were fraudulent were all publicly available in court .filings or on var ious internet
databases and websites. Exhibit 25 (Szymoniak Transcript Excerpts, Stepankovsky, May 24,
2011) at 23-24, 87.
All of these disclosures fall plainly within the scope of the public disclosure bar.
Allegations contained in news media reports, civil hearings, and administrative reports all fall
within the express language of the statute. 31 U.S.C . § 3730(e)(4 )(A). And courts have
consistently held that the term " civil hearings," as used in the version of the statute applicable
here, encompasses both state and federal actions, including judicial opinions and documents filed
with the clerk's office. See, e.g., May, 737 F.3d at 917 (the term incl udes "both federal and state
trials and hearings") (emphasis in original); U.S. ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21
F.3d 1339, 1350 (4th Cir. 1994) ("[A]ny information disclosed through civil litigation and on file
with the clerk's office should be considered a public disclosure of allegations."); U.S. ex rel.
Carterv. Halliburton Co. , No. 11-602, 2013 WL 5306645, at *8 (E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2013)
("Judfoial opinions may be considered public disclosures."). Courts have further held that online
articles and blog posts qualify as "news media'' under the FCA. U.S. ex rel. Beauchamp v.
Academic Training Ctr., Inc., 933 F. Supp. 2d 825, 845 n.37 (E.D. Va. 2013) (collecting cases).
Records available on public, searchable databases or websites qualify as news media and
administrative reports. See U.S. ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA Inc., No. 08-0034, 2013 WL
263703,2 at *6 -7 (D .D.C. 2013) ; US. ex rel. Doe v. Staples, Inc. , 932 F. Supp. 2d 34, 40 (D.D.C.
2013); U.S. ex rel. Rnsner v. WE /Stellar JP Owner, L.L.C., 739 F. Supp. 2d 396, 407 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
Because the public disclosures described in the Statement of Facts, above, revealed the
22
core allegations in the Complaint, they triggered the public disclosure bar. See Graham County,
130 S. Ct. at 1404 (the public disclosure bar is satisfied by disclosures that "put the Federal
Government on notice of a potential fraud") (collecting cases); U.S. ex rel. Gilligan v. Medtronic,
Inc.,403 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2005) ("[P]ublic disclosures contained in different sources,
which together provide information that leads to a conclusion, of fraud, trigger the public
disclosure bar."); U.S. ex rel. Jones v. Collegiate Funding Servs., No. 07-290, 2011 WL 129842,
at *8 (E.D. Va. Jan. 12, 2011), aff'd, 469 F. App'x 244 (4th Cir. 2012) (theꞏpublic disclosure bar
is not "limited in application to a single comprehensive public disclosure which embraces each
and every element of the alleged fraud"); U.S. ex rel. Lopez v. Strayer Educ., Inc., 698 F. Supp.
2d 633, 644 (E.D. Va. 2010) (the "disclosures in their totality ... are sufficient to put the
government on notice of the likelihood of related :fraudulent activity" ) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted).13
B. Szymoniak's Claims Are "Based Upon" Qualifying Public Disclosures
The Fourth Circuit has held that a relator's action is ''based upon" a public disclosure
''where the relator has actually derived from that disclosure the allegations upon which his qui
tam action is based." Siller, 21 F.3d at 1348. The Court bas since clarified that an action need
not be totally derived from public disclosures for the bar to apply. The bar applies where the
relator's allegations are"even partly" based upon prior public disclosures. May, 737 F.3d at 919
(emphasis added); see also Vuyyuru, 555 F.3d at 351; Jones , 469 F. App'x at 254.14
13
See also Black, 494 F. App'x at 294 (public disclosures are not required to "match[] with
specificity the allegations made by a qui tam relator") (emphasis in original); Jones, 469 F.
App'x at 257 (holding that SEC filing was a qualifying public disclosure because ''[w]hile such a
report does not necessarily alert federal agencies to wrongdoing, it certainly provides easily
accessible notice of the transactions . . . from which an investigation could have begun or
developed.").
14
The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit to use the "derived from" standard. May, 737 F.3d at
918-19; see also Beau.champ , 933 F. Supp. 2d at 841. All other Circuits have interpreted the
23
If a relator cannot prove that her own experiences provided the facts necessary to plead
all the elements of an FCA claim, the court must conclude that the complaint is partly based
upon public disclosures. See, e.g.,Lopez, 698 F. Supp. 2d at 637 ("Itis clear that [relator] knows
no facts derived from her own experiences which might serve as a basis for alleging [the
necessary elements ofber FCA claims], which, in tum, exposes the true source of the allegations
in her Complaint."). Substantial similarities between a relator's allegations and prior public
disclosures are "significant proof ' that the relator derived her allegations from public disclosures.
Vuyyuru, 555 F.3d at 350-51, Such proof is bolstered where, as here, the relator is not an
employee whose job responsibilities would have provided her with access to information
supporting her claims. id. at 351-52; see also Jones, 2011 WL 129842, at *3 (relators' limited
role as telemarketers did not give them "access to infonnation regarding claims for government
reimbursement submitted by [defendants]").
1n the Complaint, Szymoniak alleges that her investigation was the source of her
"knowledge" that Defendants schemed to manufacture "false and fabricated mortgage
assignments" to conceal from the government the allegedly missing assignments and impaired
value ofMBS. SAC,r 6; see also id. 1 65. Setting aside, for purposes of this motion, how
improbable Szymoniak's allegations concerning her investigation are,15 they also fail to satisfy
public disclosure bar more broadly, and have held that it bars any suit where the relator' s
allegations are "substantially similar" to public disclosures. "regardless of where the relator
obtained bis information." Lope>z 698 F. Supp. 2d at 637 n.3. This may explain why Szymoniak
filed her action in South Carolina, a jurisdiction with which she has no known (or alleged)
personal connection.
5
Szymoniak claims that the impetus for her investigation was the filing, in December 2009, of
a previously-missing mortgage assignment in her first foreclosure action. SAC11 58-59.
Szymoniak then alleges that she both began and completed her investigation, which included her
review of more than 1,000 mortgage assignments, and started reporting her findings of
widespread fraud to the government by the end of December 2009. SAC,r 67. However, the
assignment that allegedly triggered her investigation was not filed until December 23 at the
24
her burden of proving that her claims are not based, at least in part, upon qualifying public
disclosures.
It is apparent from the Complaint that Szymoniak's substantive allegations are based on
public disclosures in the news media and other qualifying sources, not on any information she
learned as an "insider'' of any Defendant or as a government employee. Indeed, Szymoniak's
investigation itself was triggered by public disclosures concerning the precise types of
documentation issues she now claims to have discovered on her own. Szymoniak cited public
sources, including the Castellanos decision by Judge Schack, in a motion to dismiss her
foreclosure action on September 2008- fifteen months before receiving the mortgage
assignment that she now credits with triggering her investigation (see supra at 6).
Moreover, Szymoniak continued to keep track of Judge Schack's foreclosuredecisions
and on January 14, 2010, published an article cataloguing several of them. Her article, titled "An
Officer of Too Many Banks," includes the following lengthy excerpt from Judge Schack' s
decision in Castellanos:
In my recent review of the moving papers in the renewed motion,1

noticed that the July 21, 2006 "affidavit of merit'' was executed by
JeffRivas, who claims to be Deutsche Bank's Vice President
Default Timeline Management. On the same day, Mr. Rivas
executed, before the same notary public, M. Reveles, a mortgage
assignment from Argent Mortgage Company, LLC, claiming to be
Argent's Vice President Default Tirneline Management. Did Mr.
Rivas somehow cha11ge employers 011 July 21, 2006 or is J,.e
concu"ently a Vice President of both assignor Argent Mortgage
Company, LLC and assignee Deutsche Bank. . . ?
Also, Mr. Rivas claims that Argent Mortgage Company, LLC is
located at 1100 Town and County Road, Suite 200, Orange,
California. Did Mr. Rivas execute the assig,imem at 100 Town
and County Road, Suite 200, a11d then travel to One City
earliest (see supra at 9-10). It is very unlikely that Szymoniak could have " investigated" more
than one thousand mortgage assignments (as she claims) and begun reporting her findings of
"widespread fabricated mortgage assignments" to the government all within a one-week period.
25
Boulevard West, witli the same notary public, M. Reveles, in tow?

The court is concerned that there may be fraud ... or at least
malfeasance. If plaintiff renews its motion for a judgment of
foreclosure and sale, the Court requires a satisfactory explanation
by Mr. Rivas of his recent employment history . . . .
Exhibit 13 (Lynn Szymoniak, An Officer of Too Many Banks, Fraud Digest, Jan. 14, 2010)
(emphasis added). Certainly, this decision alerted Szymoniak-both in January 2010 and when
she first cited it in September 2008- to the same documentation issues she now claims to have
uncovered through her own investigation.
Szymoniak also lacked-and still lacks- personal knowledge of perhaps the most
fundamental element of her FCA claims: the submission of a false claim or use ofa fa1se record
or statement to get a claim paid or approved by the government, including, without limitation,
any insurance or mortgage guarantee claims submitted by any servicers. This is presumably why
Szymoniak cited to judicial decisions in her letter to the FCIC and referred only to an alleged
fraud on the courts and homeowners:
It appears that Deutsche Bank, and others, are engaged in a wide-

ranging fraud on Courts and homeowners. In most cases,
however, homeowners in foreclosure do not have the resources to
hire attorneys, or the knowledge and resolve to challenge a
financial giant like Deutsche Bank.
Exhibit 14 (Szymoniak letter to FCIC, Jan 19, 2010) (emphasis added). Szymoniak said nothing
in her letter about potential false claims to the government. Instead, she stated that she "would
appreciate an investigation of this matter by your committee, appropriate action and relief for
homeowners who have been victimized by these practices." Id. (emphasis added).
The reason Szymoniak was silent about potential false claims to the government is that
she did not know- and still does not have personal knowledge------of any. As reflected in her
contemporaneous email communications with her then-client, Figueroa, Szymoniak believed that
the " real victims" of so-called foreclosure fraud were homeowners, but she wanted to bring a qui
26
tam action and therefore needed to find an alleged harm to the government. After reading news
reports about government purchases ofMBS, she decided to use those as her hook. Lacking any
first-hand information1 however, she tapped Figueroa for additional information, asking him to
research publicly available sources and let her know what he found (see supra at 11-12).
And, of course, Szyrnoniak's investigation itself was based on her review of mortgage
assignments found in the public domain.
Where, as here, a relator cannot prove that her personal knowledge is sufficient to plead
all the necessary elements of a cause of action under the FCA, the court must conclude that the
complaint is based at least partly on public disclosures. In Vuyyuru, for example, although the
relator could prove that hebad witnessed unnecessary medical procedures and other misconduct
by the defendant doctor, he could not carry his burden of proving that he had personal
knowledge of the defendant's alleged use of a false record or statement to get a fraudulent
Medicare claim paid or approved by the government. The Fourth Circuit thus affirmed the
district court' s dismissal of his FCA claims. Id., 555 F.3d at 351 ("[E]ven under the best-case-
scenario for Relator Vuyyuru, which is that some of the allegations in his Third Amended
Complaint pertaining to the FCA claims were not based upon a public disclosure, e.g., Dr.
Jadhav performed colonoscopies in less than five minutes when they normally take fifteen
minutes," te lator cannot demonstrate any personal knowledge of Dr. Jadhav "defrauding the
government by presenting or causing to be presented even a single false or fraudulent claim for
payment to the government, which is the sin qua non [sic] of a§ 3729(a)(l) violation.").
Similarly, in Black, the Fourth Circuit affinned dismissal of a qui tam complaint because
the relator could not establish his personal knowledge of defendants' alleged (i) knowing
submission of a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval to the government; (ii)
27
knowing creation or use of a false record or statement to geta false or fraudulent claim paidor
approved by the Government; or (iii) conspiracy to defraud the Government by getting a false or
fraudulent claim allowed or pa,jd U.S. ex rel. Black v. Health & Hosp. Corp. of Marion Cnty,,
No. 08-0390, 2011 WL 1161737, at *7-8 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2011), affd,494 F. App'x285 (4th
Cir. 2012). Reviewing the relator's allegations ''through the lens of the proof necessary for
Relator to make his False Claims Act allegations," the district court in Black concluded, in
language equally applicable here:
With regard to his allegations under Section 3729(a)(l) of the FCA,

Black possesses no facts which would enable him to prove that
[defendant] presented a false claim to the government. Similarly,
under subsection (a)(2), he possesses no facts proving that
[defendant] made a false record or statement for the purpose of
getting a false or fraudulent claim paid by the government. Finally,
under subsection (a)(3), Relator alleges no facts purporting to show
any conspiracy involving [defendant] to defraud the government.
AU this begs the simple question; where, if not from the public
disclosure,s did Relator get the information underpinning his
allegations?"
Black,2011 WL 1161737, at *8 (analyzing claims under earlier but substantively identical
version of the FCA); see a/so Lopez, 698 F. Supp. 2d 633, 637 (E.D. Va. 2010) ("Lopez
possesses ho facts which nabJe her to allege ' that the University not only knew, when it signed
the phase-one application, that contingent fees to recruiters are forbidden, but also planned to
continue paying those fees while keeping the Department of Education in the dark."' ).
Like the relators in Black and Vuyyuru, Szymoniak cannot establish her personal
knowledge of all the essential elements of her claims. As a result, the public disclosure bar
divests the Court of subject matter jurisdiction unless Szymoniak can establish that she is an
"original source." For the reasons discussed immediately below, she cannot.
28
C. Szymoniak Is Notan ''Original Source,, of The Alleged Facts Giving Rise to

Her Claims
Although the public disclosure bar has a carve-out for claims brought by persons who
qualify as an "original source," a relator is an original source only if she can establish, by
detailed factual allegations, that she "bas direct and independent knowledge of the information
on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily provided the information to the
Government before filing" the qui tam action. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(B) (emphasis added).
Szymoniak is not an original source under this standard.16
For purposes of tl1e "o rigi nal source" carve-out, a relator' s knowledge is "d irect" if the
relator '"acquired it through his own efforts, without an intervening agency,"' and it is
"independent" if it does not depend on any public disclosure. Black, 494 F. App'x at 295-96
(quoting Grayson v. Adv. Mgm t. Tech., 221 F.3d 580, 583 (4th Cir. 2000)); see also U.S. ex rel.
Hafter v. Spectmm Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 1999)
("secondhand information, speculation, background information or collateral research" is not
direct knowledge); U.S. ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc., 44 F.3d 699, 703 (8th Cir. 1995)
(" LA] person who obtains secondhandinformation from an indivjdual who bas direct knowledge
of the alleged fraud does not himself possess direct knowledge and therefore is not an original
source under the Act."),17
16
A relator is required to "allege specific facts- as opposed to mere conclusions- showing
exactly how and when he or she obtained direct and independent knowledge of the fraudulent
acts alleged in the complaint and support those allegations with competent proof." U.S. ex rel.
Dz,gan v. ADT Sec. Servs., No. 03-3485, 2009 WL 3232080, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 29, 2009)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Because the Complaint here is devoid of any detailed
allegations concerning the "who, what, when and how" of Szymoniak's " investigation," it fails
to establish the Court's jurisdiction on this basis alone.
17
Additionally, where a substantial volume of publicly disclosed allegations predated the
relator's complaint, " the extent of reliance on information already in the public domain shouldbe
a consideration during the original source inquiry, even if that information is not a public
disclosure within the meaning of [the FCA]." U.S. ex rel. Atkinson v. Pa. Shipbldg. Co., 473
29
Here, instead of supporting a finding that Szymoniak: is an original source, the public
record establishes that (i) Szymoniak relied on the efforts of others, including information
obtained second- and third-hand, in the course of her investigation, and (ii) with the possible
exception of her own foreclosure action, Szymoniak's alleged "knowledge" of fraud depended
on information found in the public domain. Testimony and affidavits submitted by Szymoniak
in other borrowers' foreclosure actions further belie any claim she might make to original source
status. As Szymoniak: conce ded in one action, even after her investigation, her method for
identifying potentially false or fraudulent mortgage assignments depended on speculation, not
first-hand knowledge (see supra at 15-16).
As noted above, Szymoniak:: never worked for any Defendant, did not have access to any
Defendant' s books or records, and was not involved in any of the MBS purchases or fmancings
giving rise to her claims. Her claims under the FCA are based on nothing more than hunches
and speculation that at least some of the assignments identified by her as being potentially
"fra udulent" are associated with loans deposited (years ago) in securitizations for which one or
more oftbe Defendants has acted as.trustee or servicer. She knows of no fact (and alleges none)
to support her allegation that Defendants either knew of or directed the fraudulent document
execution practices by certain employees at DocX-an allegation negated by LPS' s own
admissions in its non-prosecution agreement with the government. Exhibit 18 (LPS Non-
Prosecution Agreement, Feb. 14, 2013) at Appendix A,1110-14 (reciting admissions that DocX
employees ''took various steps to conceal their actions from detection" and "concealed their
conduct from clients," including during client on-site visits).
F.3d 506, 522 (3d Cir. 2007) ; see also US. ex rel. Zizic v. Q 2Adm'rs, LLC, 728 F.3d 228, 240
(3d Cir. 2013) (the concept of public disclosure for original source purposes encompasses not
only sources enumerated in the FCA, but also "information that is part of the public domain").
30
As a matter of well-settled law, Szymoniak's guesswork and speculation are not enough
to makeher an original source.18 Original source status cannot be established "merely by
communicating to the government, 'I think something fishy is going on ... ,' and then relying on
the evidence of fraud, if any, disclosed by a subsequent government investigation .......... (S]uch a
standard invites the very type of parasitic, opportunistic lawsuit Congress sought to preclude
when it first enacted a jurisdictional bar based on publicly disclosed information." US. ex rel.
Detrick v. Daniel F. Young, Inc., 909 F. Sup p. 1010 , 1022 (E.D. Va. 1995); see also Black, 201 l
WL 1161737, at * l O ("' [M]ere suspicion that there must be a false or fraudulent claim lurking
around somewhere simply does not carry [the relator's] burden of proving that he is entitled to
original source status.' ") (quoting Vuyyuru, 555 F.3d at 353); US. ex rel. Ajlatooni v_ Kitsap
Physicians Servs., 163 F.3d 516, 526 (9th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he purposes of the Act would not be
served by allowing a relator to maintain a qui tam suit based on pure speculation or conjecture.").
Because Szymoniak cannot carry her burden of proving that she is anoriginal source, the
Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.19
18 To the extent the Complaint describes Szymoniak's research of approximately one thousand
m01tgage assignments, see, e.g., SAC193, her ''prediction" of an actionable false claim based
on her review of those publicly available assignments "does not qualify as direct and
independent knowledge." Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S. 457, 475 (2007); see
also Grayson, 221 F.3d at 583 (to be " independen t," a relator's knowledge must ''not (be]
dependent on public disclosure"); U.S. ex rel. Stinson, Lyons, Gerfin & Bustamante, P.A., v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1160 (3rd Cir. 1991) ("[T]he relator must possess
substantive information about the particular fraud, rather than merely background information
which enables a putative relator to understand the significance of a publicly disclosed transaction
or allegation."); U.S. ex rel. Reagan v. E. Tex. Med. Ctr. Reg'/ Healthcare Sys., 274 F. Supp. 2d
824, 860 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (Relator's experience observing invoices "arguably allowed her to
make better sense of this infonnation [on the invoices], [but] her backgr0tmd alone does not
change her status from 'recipient of information' to 'direct source."').
19
Szymoniak' s claims fare no better under the public disclosure bar as amended in March 2010.
31 V.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2010). The claims would fail even if analyzed under the amended
statute because the underlying allegations are "substantially similar" to allegations that were
publicly disclosed in the news media and federal court proceedings, including bankruptcy
31
ill. THE STATE AND LOCAL CLAIMS ARE ALSO BARRED
Szymoniak also purports to bring claims under the false claims statutes of seventeen
states, the District of Columbia and two municipalities.20 See SAC ,r,r 287-445. Should
Szymoniak' s claims under the FCA be dismissed, Fourth Circuit precedent requires that her state
and local claims be dismissed as well for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. Even in the absence
of such precedent, the claims would be precluded by the public disclosure bar contained in each
of the relevant statutes.21
A. If the Federal Claims Are Dismissed, the Court Must Decline

to Exercise Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the State and Local Claims
To the extent Szymoniak's claims under the federal FCA are dismissed, Fourth Circuit
precedent requires dismissal of her state and local claims. See Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty.
Dep't of Soc. Servs., 521 F. App'x 278,291 n.25 (4th Cir. 2013) (''When a district court
dismissed federal claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, there was never a valid claim to
proceedings, and they did not "materially add to" the information already in the public domain.
See, e.g.,BeauchamPi 933 F. Supp. 2d at 844-46 (holding that online news article discussing
lawsuit involving "substantially the same" allegations required dismissal ofr elator' s qui tam
complaint even though the complaint was not"based upon" the news article); see also Ping Chen
ex rel. U.S. v. Elv/SL Analytica,l Inc., No. 10-7504, 2013 WL 4441509, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.
16, 2013). Moreover, Szymoniak is not an original source under either version of the statute.
See, e.g.,U.S. ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kansas City Power & Light Co., No. 11-0590, 2013 WL
4400434, at *6 (W.D. Mo. July 19, 2013) (holding that relator was not an original source under
the amended bar because "independent" knowledge must be acquired first-hand, and relator
"obtained his information from his father, conversations he overheard, and other second-hand
conversations he had ...."); sea elso Beauchamp 933 F. Supp. 2d at 843. Should the Court
consider any portion of Szymoniak's claims under the amended statute, Defendants request that
the Court to take judicial notice of the news articles, court decisions, and court filings submitted
as Exhibits to this Memorandum.
20
The Complaint asserts claims under the false claims statutes of California, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
Virginia, Chicago, and New York City.
21
Every one of the purported state and local law claims also fails to state a claim for the reasons
set forth in Defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(6), including because certain of the statutes
were enacted after the period at issue or are limited to Medicaid fraud.
32
which the state claims could be considered supplemental, and dismissal of the state claims is also
required." (citing Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 644 (4th Cir. 2011)).
B. THE STATE AND LOCAL CLAIMS ARE ALSO BARRED
t. AU Claims (EJ:cept the New York Claim) Are Nearly Identical to the
Federal Claims and Fail for the Same Reasons
Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court might exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
the state and local claims, each claim should be dismissed under its own public disclosure bar.
Other than the New York state statute, every state and local false claim statute invoked by
Szymoniak contains a public disclosure bar similar to the applicable federal bar in all material
respects.22 In essence, all of these statutes prevent a private citizen from bringing a qui tam
action based upon allegations or transactions that were disclosed in civil hearings, government
reports, or the news media, unless the relator has " independent" knowledge of the facts
underlying her claims. Thus, for all the same reasons Szymoniak's federal claims fail, the state
and local claims fail as well. See Point I supra.23
Courts routinely reject state and local claims where the same claim is barred under the
22
See Cal. Gov' t Code§ 12652(d)(3); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 1206(c); D.C. Code§ 2-381.03(c-
1)(2);Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 68.087(3); Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 661-31(b); 740 ILCS l75/4(e)(4); Ind. Code
Ann.§ 5-11-5.5-7(f); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 12, § SG(c); Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 15C.05(f);
Mont. Code Ann.§ 17-8-403(6)N ; ev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 357.100; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 167:61-
e(ill); N.J. Stat. Ann.§ 2A:32C-9(c;)N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 27-14-10.C ; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 1-
61l(d); R.L Gen. Laws Ann.§ 9-l.l-4(e)(4)(AV );a. Code Ann.§ 8.01-216.8; Chi Mun. Code §
l-22-030(f;) NYCAdmin. Code § 7-804(d).
23
Several of the statutes provide that the relator must also prove that her disclosure to the
government was the "basis or catalyst" for the original chain of events that led to the allegations
becoming publicly disclosed. See Cal. Gov' t. Code §I2652(d)(3)(B); D.C. Code §2-381.03(c-
1)(2)(B);Haw. Rev. Stat. §661-3l(c); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§1SC.01, Subdivision 4; Mont. Code
Ann. §17-8-403(6); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 357.lO0(c). Here, Szymoniak's purported communications
with the government in December 2009 were not the "basis or catalyst" for the myriad earlier
publicdisclosures described in the Statement of Facts, above.. Neither were they the catalyst for
the government investigations of LPS and DocX, which were precipitated instead by David
Breidenbach in October 2009. See Exhibits 17-19 (Breidenbach letters and LPS Non-
Prosecution Agreement).
33
federal statute. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Colquitt v. Abbott Labs., 864 F. Supp. 2d 499, 537 (N.D.
Tex. 2012) ("All of the state false claims statutes [including California, Delaware, D.C., Florida,
Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Virginia] include public disclosure bars that are
substantively identical to the FCA's. Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction over [the] state ...
claims as to all Defendants for the same reasons it lacks jurisdiction over those claims brought
under the FCA-they arebased on publicly disclosed allegations and transactions, and are not
based on information of which [PlaintiffJ is an original sonrce."); Bannon v. Edgewater Med.
Ctr.,406 F. Supp. 2d 907, 915 n.8 (N.D. lll. 2005) (same for Illinois); Whipple v. Chattanooga-
Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth., No. 3-11-0206, 2013 WL 4510801, at *9 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 26,
24
20l3) (same for North Carnlina, "which basically mirror[s] the federal Jaw '').
2. The New York Claim Is Also Barred
Szymoniak's claims are precluded under the New York statute as well, which provides,
in relevant part:
The court shall dismiss a qui tam action under this article,
unless the qui tam plaintiff is an original source of the
information, 25 if substantially the same allegations or
24
Szymoniak's failure to assert her non-federal claims until March 2011 further supports the
conclusion that she did not know of these potential claims until after a review of publicly
available sources. Just as Szymoniak had Figueroa research MBS purchases by the federal
government, she presumably researched purchases by state and local governments as well.
Moreover, by that time Szymoniak filed her first amended pleading in March 2011, media
coverage of the underlying allegations was even more pervasive, including coverage of
government investigations into potential "forgeries'' by employees at DocX. See, e.g., Abigail
Field, Florida Attorney General Subpoenas Lender Processing Services, Daily Finance, Oct. 14,
201O; Gretchen Morgenson, Banks' Flawed Paperwork Throws Some Foreclosures Into Chaos,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 4, 2010, at Al; David Streitfeld, JPMorgan Suspending Foreclosure>s N.Y.
Times, Sept. 30, 2010, at Bl (collected as Exhibit 26).
25
"Original source" is defined as "a person who (a) prior to a public disclosure ... has
voluntarily disclosed to the state or a local government the information on which allegations or
transactions in a cause of action are based, or (b) who hasknowledge that is independent of and
materially adds to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has voluntarily
provided the information to the state or a local government before or simultaneous withfiling an
action under this article." N.Y. State Fin. Law§ 188(7).
34
0:13-cv
-00464-JFA Date Filed 01/15/14 Entry Number 193-1 Page 43 of 50
transactions as alleged in the action were publicly disclosed:

(i) in a state or local government criminal, civil, or
adminjstrative hearing in which the state or a local government
or its agent is a party;
(ii) in a federal, New York state or New York local government
report, hearing, audit, or investigation . . .;
(iii) in the news media provided that such allegations or
transactions are not "publicly disclosed" in the "news media"
merely because infotmation of allegations or transactions have
been posted on the internet or on a computer network.
N.Y..State Fin. Law§ 190(9) (emphasis added).
As demonstrated in Point I, supra, the allegations in the Complaint are "substantially
similar" to allegations contained in qualifying public disclosures. Moreover, Szymoniak has not
pleaded and cannot show that she had "independent" knowledge that ''materially add(ed]" to the
publicly disclosed allegations. Indeed, by the time Szymoniak amended her Complaint to add
her state and local claims, the relevant allegations had already received pervasive national news
coverage. See Exhibit 26 (collecting articles). Thus, her claim under the New York statute fails
as well.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the Court dismiss the
Second Amended Complaint in its entirety , with prejudice, and grant such other and further relief
as the Court deems just and proper.
35
DATED this12day of January, 2014.
Respectfully Submitted,
NELSON MULLINS RILEY &

SCARGOROUGH LLP
s/ E. Bart Daniel s/ A. Mattison Bogan
E. Bart Daniel (Federal Bar No. 9002) A. Mattison Bogan (Federal Bar No. 9826)
([email protected]) ([email protected])
7 State Street 1320 Main Street, 17thFloor
Charleston, SC 29401 P.O. Box. 11070 (29211-1070)
Telephone: (843) 722-2000 Columbia, SC 29201
Facsimile: (843) 722-6254 Telephone: (803) 799-2000
-and- -and-
SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP PAUL, WEISS , RIF KIND , WHARTON &

Dougla s A. Axel GARRISON LLP
(pro hac vice application pending) Maria T. Vullo
([email protected]) (pro hac vice application pending)
Anand Singh (mvu llo@paulwei ss.com)
(pro hac vice application pending) 1285 Avenue of the Americas
([email protected]) New York, NY 10019
555 West Fifth Street Telephone: (212) 373-3000
Los Angeles, California 90013
Telephone: (213) 896-6000 Attorneys for Defendant CitiMortgage,
Facsimile: (213) 896-6600 I,nc
Attorneys for Defendants Bank of

America Corporation, Bank of America,
N.A., and Banc of America Mortgage
Securities, Inc.
36
MCGUIREWOODS LLP DUFFY & YOUNG, LLC

s/ Robert A. Muckenfuss s/ Brian C. Duffy
Robert A. Muckenfuss (D.S.C. Bar No. Brian C. Duffy (Federal Bar No. 9491)
7333) ([email protected])
([email protected]) Seth W. Whitaker (Federal Bar No. 10244)
Wm. Grayson Lambert (D.S.C. Bar No. ([email protected])
11761) 96 Broad Street
([email protected]) Charleston, SC 29401
201 North Tryon Street, Suite 3000 Telephone: (843) 720-2044
Charlotte, NC 28202 Facsimile: (843) 720-2047
Telephone: (704) 343-2000
Facsimile: (704) 343-2300 -and-
-and- ARNOLD & PORTER, LLP

s/ James W. Cooper
LATHAM & WATKINS LLP James W. Cooper
Richard D. Owens (admitted pro hac vice)
(pro hac vice application pending) ([email protected])
William 0. Recl<ler Stephen K. Marsh
(pro hac vice application pending) (admitted pro hac vice)
Marianne M. Recher ([email protected])
(pro hac vice application pending) 555 Twelfth Street, NW
885 Third Avenue Washington, DC 20004-1206
New York, NY 10022 Telephone: (202) 942-5000
Telephone: (212) 906-1200 Facsimile: (202) 942-5999
Facsimile: (212) 751-4864
Attorneys for Defendant Aurora Loan
Attorneys for Defenda11I Services LLC
ACE Securities Corp.
37
NELSON MULLINS RILEY & WYCHE,P.A.

SCARBOROUGH LLP s/ Henry L. Parr, Jr.
s/ Thomas William McGee, ill Henry L. Parr, Jr. (Federal Bar No. 02984)
Thomas William McGee Ill (Federal Bar ([email protected])
No. 11317) Wade S. Kolb, Ill (Federal Bar No. 11485)
Tara C. Sullivan (Federal Bar No. 79806) 44 East Camperdown Way
([email protected]) Greenville, SC 29601
1320 Main Street, 17th Floor Telephone: (864) 242-8200
Post Office Box 11070 (29211-1070)
Columbia, SC 29201 -and-
Telephone: (803) 799-2000
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP
-and- Jeffrey T. Scott
(admitted pro lzac vice )
ALSTON & BIRD, LLP ([email protected])
Michael Lawrence Brown Kathleen M. Cochrane
(pro hac vice application pending) (admitted pro hac vice)
One Atlantic Center Mark A. Popovsky
1201 West Peachtree Street (admitted pro hac vice)
Atlanta, GA 30309-3424 ([email protected])
Telephone: (404) 881-7589 125 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004
Attomeys for Defendant Select Porlfolio Telephone: (212) 558-4000
Servicing, Inc.
Attorneys for Defendant Barclays Capital
Real Estate Inc.
38
K&L GATES LLP NEXSEN PR UET , LLC

s/ J. Walker Coleman, IV s/ Marguerite S. Willis
J. Walker Coleman, IV (Federal Bar No. Marguerite S. Willis (Federal Bar No.
6007) 11293)
134 Meeting Street, Suite 200 Daniel C. Leonardi (Federal Bar No. 9332)
Charleston, SC 29401 ([email protected])
Telephone: (843) 579-5600 1230 Main Street, Suite 700
Facsimile: (843) 579-5601 Columbia, SC 29201
Telephone: (803) 771-8900
Attomey for Defe11da 11t Wells F(Il'go
Home Mortgage, dlbla/ America's -and-
Servicing Company
BINGHAM MCCUTCHEN LLP
Mark E. Robinson
(pro hac vice application pending)
([email protected])
Patrick Strawbridge
([email protected])
Jacqueline S. Delbasty
(Jacque [email protected])
One Federal Street
Boston, MA 021 L0-1 726
Telephone: (617) 951-8000
Attorneys for Defenda11t Carrington

Mortgage Services, LLC
39
JOE GRIFFITH LAW FlRM, LLC NELSON MULLINS RlLEY &

s/ Joseph P. Griffith, Jr. SCARBOROUGH LLP
Joseph P. Griffith, Jr., Esquire (Federal Bar s/ B. Rush Smith
No, 2473) B. Rush Smith Ill (Federal Bar No. 5031)
Seven State Street 1320 Main Street/17th Floor
Charleston, South Carolina 29401 Post Office Box 11070 (29211-1070)
Telephone: (843) 225-5563 Columbia, SC 29201
Facsimile: (843) 722-6254 Telephone: (803) 799-2000
-and- -and-
MORGAN LEWIS & BOCI<IUS LLP MAYER BROWN LLP

Robert M. Brochin, Esquire Michael 0 . Ware
(pro hac vice motion pending) (pro hac vice application pending)
[email protected] (mware@rnayerbrow n.com)
Brian M. Ercole, Esquire Jennifer M. Rosa
(pro hac vice motion pending) ([email protected])
(bercole @morganlewis.com) 1675 Broadway
200 South Biscayne Boulevard, Suite 5300 New York, NY 10019
Miami, Florida 33131- 2339 Telephone: (212) 506-2500
Telephone: (305) 415-3000
Facsimile: (305) 415-3001 Attorneys for Defendant HSBC Mortgage
Services, Inc.
Attorneys for Defendants Chase Home
Finance LLC and California
Reconveyance Compa11y
40
0:13-cv -00464-JFA Date Filed 01/15/14 Entry Number 193-1 Page 49 of 50
K&L GATES LLP ROBINSON, MCFADDEN & MOORE,

s/ J. Walker Coleman, IV P.C.
J. Walker Coleman, IV (Federal Bar No. s/ Clay Robinson
6007) Clay Robinson (Federal Bar No. 3505)
134 Meeting Street, Suite 200 Post Office Box 944
Charleston, SC 29401 Columbia, SC 29202
Telephone: (843) 579-5600 Telephone: (803) 779-8900
Facsimile: (843) 579-560l Facsimile: (803) 744-1546
Attorneys for Defenda1its Bayview Loa11 -and-

Servicing, LLC, and Caliber Home Loans,
Inc.,flkla/ Vericrest Financial, Inc. AKERMANLLP
Gregory M. Mccoskey
([email protected])
401 East Jackson Street, Suite 1700
Tampa, FL 33602
Telephone: (813) 223-7333
Facsimile: (813) 223-2837
Attorneys for Defendant Nationwide Title

Clearing, Inc.
41
SCHMIDT & COPELAND, L.L.C. BURR & FORMAN LLP

s/ Melissa J. Copeland s/ Edward D. Cotter
Melissa J. Copeland (Federal Bar No. Edward D. Cotter (Federal Bar No. 11414)
6241) ([email protected])
([email protected]) 420 20th Street North
1201Main Street, Suite 1100 3400 Wells Fargo Tower
Columbia, South Carolina 29201 Birmingham, AL 35203
Telephone: (803) 748-1342 Telephone: (205) 458-5130
Facsimile: (803) 748-1210
-and-
-and-
O' MELVENY & MYERS LLP
MCGLINCHEY STAFFORD PLLC Jonathan Rosenberg
Gerard E. Wimberly, Jr. ( (pro hac vice application pending)
(admitted pro hac vice) ([email protected])
David R. Dugas Times Square Tower
(admitted pro hac vice) 7 Times Square
Daniel T. Plunkett New York, NY 10036
(admitted pro hac vice) Telephone: (212) 326-2000
Gabriel A. Crowson
(admitted pro hac vice) O' MELVENY & MYERS LLP
Melissa H. Harris David J. Leviss
(admitted pro hac vice) (pro hac vice application pending)
601 Poydras Street, 12th Floor ([email protected])
New Orleans, LA 70130 1625 Eye Street, NW
Telephone: (504) 586-1200 Washingto n , DC 20006
Telephone: (202) 383-5300
Attorneys for Defenda11ts Litton Loan
Servici11g, LP and Ocwe,i Loan Servicing, Attomeys for Defendant OneWest Bank,
LLC FSB
42

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0:13-cv-00464-JFA Date Filed 01/15/14 Entry Number 193-1 Page 1 of 50

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COORT

UNITED STATES et al. ex rel. SZYMONlAK,

Civil Action No. 0:l 3-cv-00464

JOINT MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS'

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ..................................................................................................... 1

U.S. ex rel. Afl.atooni v. Kitsap Physicians Servs.,

U.S. ex rel. Atki.nson v. Pa. Shipbldg. Co.,

Aurora Loan Servs., LLC v. Sookoo,

Bank of N.Y. v. Mulligan,

Bannon v. Edgewater Med. Ctr.,

U.S. ex rel. Barth v. Ridgedale Elec., Inc.,

U.S. ex rel. Batiste v. SLM Cmp,

U.S. ex rel. Beauchamp v. Academic Training Ctr., inc.,

US. ex rel. Black v. Health & Hosp. Cor,p ofMarion Cnty.,

US. ex rel. Blackv. Health &Hosp. Co,p. of Marion Cnty.,

U.S. ex rel. Carter v. Halliburton Co.,

US. ex rel. Colquitt v. Abbott Labs.,

U.S. ex rel. Detrick v. Daniel F. Young, Inc.,

U.S. ex rel. Doe v. Staples, Inc.,

U.S. ex rel. Dugan v. ADT Sec. Servs.,

US. ex rel. Gilligan v. Medtronic, Inc.,

Grayson v. Adv. Mgmt. Tech.,

Grynberg v. Koch Gateway Pipeline Co.,

US. ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc.,

United States ex rel. Hampton v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Co,p.,

US. ex rel Harris v. Dialysis C01p.,

Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co.,

HSBC Bank US,A N A. v. Taher,

HSBC Bank USA, Nat'! Ass'n v. Antrobus,

Indymac Bank, FSB v. Bethley,

U.S. ex rel. Jones v. Collegiate Funding Servs.,

U.S. ex rel. Kraxberger v. Kansas City Power & Light Co.,

US. ex rel. Lopez v. Strayer Educ., Inc.,

US. ex rel. Lujan v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,

U.S. ex rel. May v. PurduePharmaL.P.,

U.S. ex rel. Oliver v. Philip Morris USA Inc.,

Ping Chen ex rel. U.S. v. EMSL Analytical, Inc.,

U.S. ex rel. Poteet v. Medtronic, Inc.,

U.S. ex rel. Reagan v. E. Tex.Med. Ctr. Reg'l Healthcare Sys.,

Rockwell Int 'l Corp. v. United States,

U.S. ex rel. Rosner v. WE/Stellar IP Owner, L.L.C.,

US. ex rel. Shea v. Verizon Bus. Network Servs. Jnc .,

U.S. ex rel. Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,

U.S. ex rel. Smith v. Yale-New Haven Hosp., Inc.,

Stratton v. Mecklenburg Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.,

U.S. ex rel. Vuyyuru v. Jadhav,

Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Farmer,

Wells Fargo Bank, NA. v. Fisch,

Whipple v. Chattanooga-Hamilton Cnty. Hosp. Auth.,

US. ex rel. Zizic v. Q2Adm'rs, LLC,

740 ILCS l 75/4(e)(4) ............................................................................................................... l 7, 33

31 U.S.C. § 3729, et seq ......................................................................................................... passim

31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) ........................................................................................................... passim

31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)............................................................................................................ passinz

Cal. Gov't Code § 12652(c)(10)............................................................................................... 17

Cal. Gov't Code § 12652( d)(3 ) ........................................................................................................... 33

Cal. Gov't. Code §12652(d)(3)(B) ................................................................................................. 33

Chicago Mun. Code§ l-22-030(£) ................................................................................................. 33