1. Oresteia and an Enemy of the People- the Athenian jury system. Court of law, due process.

Do
not punish someone of of nothing, legal basis. fought for the truth but due to the consequences
which is unfavorable to you in exchange of what u did for the people u tried to help them but
this is how they repay you is simply not worth it- at least u tried to tell them and stuck on your
beliefs, at least you know the difference between right and wrong

2. Natural law tradition- what it should be and legal positivism – explain cite some cases and life
examples - indigenous tribe habeas corpus, watermelon case, salvacion case, republic v
Sandiganbayan (interregnum)

*positivie law- written laws enacted by the legislative jurisprudence, Ten COmmandments

natural law- depnds on something outside the positive law, natural law is not eough, it's
possible that you enact an unjust law- all image and likeness of God, fetus and criminaL, can
you justify then abortion? can you justify the death penalty? using a natural law perspective?
this i the law that I have to follow, because it follows the Divine Law
- what principles can we dervie from nbeing Human which we think derive from God, dervide
from years and years of wisdom from the jewish people, already practicing it

Legal positivism- stick with postiviwe law, dont need to lookat reason, dont have to go to
morality, just apply it or to look reaason
how tocheck if its valid, check if it stuck with the system, by invoking the COnstitution,
ultimate positvie law COnsti in the country

smae sex marriage- violates natural law or positivist law?

equal protection and privacy you can arrive at the same conclusion using natural and
positivist
natural- what i can give you, you can argue that the law is wrong, against God's WIll, in
positivist u can only argue that it violates the Consti
self defense- ntural law agreement, crcumstances of insanity, natural law imbedded in
positivist law

right to a sound environment- right as a human being

natural law- doesnt need to be enacted by the state, it's based on reason, you use reason for
natural law
positive law- always enacted by the state, what is constitutional? basis of Sc- not only SC but
the situation etc petitioner

hasanabi immigartation opinion owning cars housing

giving them free housing why? just becaus they're human beings? this is where you
apply the test actually.
 while natural law is based on morality, it is often somehow very subjective, despite
beingn based on the Laws of God. Man's implementation or interpretation of what is
moral and what is not depends upon one's reasoning. Morever, it does not mean that if
an act is in compliance with the natural law it desont mean that will result in equity
(abortion)
however, positivist law, laws are man made can be changed morality is not necessarily
intertwined at all times, in fact,, i think it is a mistake to pattern our beliefs system on
what is right and wrong based solely on what the law says, if the lange, will you change
too? slavery and women cant vote

In order to know what your legal rights are, you need to look at what laws your society
has.
In order to know what your moral rights are, you need to figure out what is the true
morality. You might have legal rights that the true morality says you shouldn’t have (e.g.
the right to own slaves), and your society might deny you legal rights that the true
morality
says you should have (e.g. the right to be free, to own one’s own body and labor power).

transitions is always messy, even if the moral position of the end of the day is clrystal
clear

While I’ve read that Morality is not concerned or is not made as standard to follow positive law,
it can be the bases for a lot of penalties or the reason why a law is the law. Example: aggravating
circumstances in the RPC, greater persersity of the offender, habitual delinquent
The opposite view- an unjust positive law is not a law at all if this runs counter to the natural law
– the Laws of God
3. Motorcycle laws legal driving speed, lane only for buses, the prisoner detention case, salvacion
case, human beings too, slavery, indigenous, republic v. sandiganbayan
4. : For Sen, the main positive lessons to be
learnt from Rawls are connected with the following points:

1. The idea that fairness is central to justice; (according to Indian Journal of Human
Development)
a. 2. The thesis about the objectivity of practical reason;
b. 3. The distinction between the ‘reasonable’ and the ‘rational’, and more
generally,
c. the reconstruction of the moral powers of persons as related to their capacity for a
d. ‘sense of justice’ and a ‘conception of the good’;
e. 4. The separate and over-riding concern for liberty (as compared with other primary
f. goods);
g. 5. The insistence on a ‘fair equality of opportunities’ as an enrichment of the literature
h. on inequality;
i. Sen versus Rawls 121
j. 6. The need for according special attention to the worst-off people; and
k. 7. The way in which primary goods are conceived, which gives people the opportunity
l. to do what they would like with their own lives.
m. All these points permit us to say that Sen has in common with Rawls “an important
n. shared involvement in being concerned with justice in the first place” (p. 413).

John Rawls (b. 1921, d. 2002) was an American political philosopher in the liberal
tradition. His theory of justice as fairness describes a society of free citizens holding
equal basic rights and cooperating within an egalitarian economic system
e·gal·i·tar·i·an
/iˌɡaləˈterēən/
Learn to pronounce
adjective
relating to or believing in the principle that all people are equal and deserve equal rights
and opportunities.
"a fairer, more egalitarian society"
Rawls suggests that you imagine yourself in an original position behind a veil of
ignorance. Behind this veil, you know nothing of yourself and your natural abilities, or
your position in society. ... Behind such a veil of ignorance all individuals are simply
specified as rational, free, and morally equal beings.

Rawls’s theory of justice in a nutshell

John Rawls theory of justice had come up at a time when all what everyone talked about
was regarding maximising the welfare of society or the utilitarian concept of maximising
the
happiness of the majority of the people, ‘justice’ as a concept was least talked about,
least
discussed about. Rawls’s theory of justice was in a way an alternative to the classical
utilitarian.
Rawls theory of distributive justice is based on the idea that society is a system of
cooperation for mutual advantage between individuals. As such, it is marked by both
conflicts between differing individuals’ interests and an identity of shared interest.
Principles
of justice should ‘define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of
social cooperation. One must not fail to observe the fact that Rawls’s theory of justice as
fairness,
stretches its roots from the social contract theory, Rawls argues that it is necessary to
distinguish between the genuine judgements about justice (which people have) and
their subjective, self-interested views. After arriving at those objective principles, it
should be measured against our own judgements, there will be inevitable distinction
when one resorts to such measurement, therefore, it is important to modify our own
judgement in such a way that a stage of equilibrium could be reached in which these
two situations are similar; this is the situation of ‘reflective equilibrium’.7
In his rather complex theory, Rawls starts with a moral conjecture, that justice is tied to
fairness, with a fair society and fair institutions and those members of the society adopt
this
situation in order to arrive at fundamental principles of justice. The ‘original position’ is
a
central feature of John Rawls’s social contract account of justice. In the words of Rawls
the
original position is simply a hypothetical thought experiment that seeks to:8

7 Raymond Wacks, Understanding Jurisprudence 222 (Oxford University Press, New

York, 2nd edn. , 2009).
8 Id at 223.
Winter Issue 2016 ILI Law Review
154
Make vivid to ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on
arguments for principles of justice, and, therefore, on these principles
themselves.
Rawls imagine people in the hypothetical situation of ‘original position’ and places upon
them the restraint of the ‘veil of ignorance’. This veil denies them knowledge of their
status
(e.g. gender, ethnicity, economic standing, intelligence etc) and their perception about
‘good
living or well being’. In the words of John Rawls’:9
No one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does
anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his
intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not
know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities.
The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures
that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the
outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since
all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favour his
particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fir agreement or
bargain.
So basically, according to Rawls this is a special type of arrangement, a contract where
people favours for a strategy which maximises the prospects of the least well- off.
Once the
veil of ignorance is lifted and once the people leave their original position, the
contract shall
be maintained, out of respect for each other. So basically this is a kind of radical
egalitarian
liberalism in which focus is on the fact that one person should not resort to
maximising profit
so much that it leads to deterioration of the other person.
Rawls original position has been designed to be a fair and impartial point of view that
is to be
adopted in our reasoning about fundamental principles of justice and exclude personal
interest when choosing the ‘basic principles of justice’ so as to ensure generality and
validity.

SEN
What is justice? What does a just society look like? And what principles should guide us
there? These questions have occupied an entire tradition - the dominant tradition - of
political philosophy, led above all by Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean-Jacque
Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and among contemporary philosophers by John Rawls and
Robert Nozick. But ask Amartya Sen and he will tell you they are precisely the wrong
ones to ask. In his most recent book, The Idea of Justice, he argues that this traditional
strain of political philosophy, which seeks to identify ‘the just’, or a single set of just
principles that can then be used to design perfectly just institutions for governing
society, reveals little about how we can identify and reduce injustices in the here and
now.

According to Sen, the dominant approach, which he refers to as ‘transcendental

(according to Open Democracy website) institutionalism’, is beleaguered by two
central problems: the problem of feasibility and the problem of redundancy. The first is
a result of the practical difficulty, even impossibility, of arriving at a single set of
principles that can help us to select just institutions through a process of impartial
reasoning. In Rawls’ theory of justice, for instance, his two lexically ordered principles of
justice are, it is argued, those that would be unanimously selected through an
impartial decision procedure - through the hypothetical original position using the
‘veil of ignorance’ device. These principles then provide the basis for choosing actual
institutions in the ‘legislative stage’. Clearly, however, much depends on the assumption
that Rawls’ two principles of justice are those that would indeed emerge from the
original position. And Sen is skeptical that this is so.
In fact, Sen maintains that there are many principles that can pass the test of
impartiality. He illustrates this point, first, using an anecdote about the competing
claims of three children over the distribution of a single flute. One child argues that
they should receive the flute because they are the best flautist; the second, because
they are the poorest of the lot; and the third, because they crafted the flute without
help from the others. The three arguments are based, in turn, on principles of utility,
economic equity, and the entitlement to the fruits of one’s unaided efforts. Each can
be defended with strong, impartial arguments. And, returning to Rawls, it is similarly
possible, for example, to provide substantial reasons for selecting Harsanyi’s
utilitarian principle in the place of Rawls’ maximin principle as the basis for resolving
distributional questions within a situation similar to the original position.

having one set of what is moral and just necessarily excludes those who may have a
similar yet unppopular claim (ex: flute?)
The second problem - the redundancy problem - is that the identification of fully just
social arrangements is neither a necessary nor sufficient guide to reasoned choice of just
 policies, strategies or institutions. It is insufficient because, as Sen explains, ‘the
characterization of spotless justice, even if such a characterization were to emerge
clearly, would not entail any delineation whatsoever of how diverse departures from
spotlessness would be compared and ranked’. In other words, using an analogy with
paintings, the fact that a person regards Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa as the most perfect picture
in the world does not reveal anything about how they would rank a Picasso against a
Van Gogh. But it is also unnecessary because in adjudicating between the various merits
of a Picasso and a Van Gogh there is no reason to identify the most perfect picture in
the world, just as when determining the relative heights of Mount Kilimanjaro and
Mount McKinley knowing that Mount Everest is taller than both is an entirely redundant
fact.
In contrast to transcendental institutionalism, Sen advocates what he calls a
‘realization-focused comparative approach’. In doing so, he sides with thinkers such as
Adam Smith, Marquis de Condorcet, Jeremy Bentham, Mary Wollstonecraft, Karl Marx,
and JS Mill, among others, who each attempted to evaluate the desirability of
particular ‘social realizations’, rather than search for a set of perfectly just first
principles. It may not be possible to agree on perfectly just institutions, but, Sen
contends, using a comparative approach we can at least arrive at widespread consensus
on the injustice of certain practices or outcomes relative to others.
This, in particular, is something that Sen believes that Rawls’ theory does not do well.
Sen offers Rawls’ use of the original position as an example of what he calls ‘closed
impartiality’. The ‘veil of ignorance’ device is, Sen admits, a useful, if hypothetical, way
of reaching an impartial social choice, free of various vested interests. But it does not
ensure the open scrutiny of the values of the people within the original position. The
vast plurality of alternative views held by outsiders - their unique moral perspectives
and rankings of social realizations that can reveal hidden biases in our choice of basic
principles - are simply beyond the scope of Rawls’ theory. Furthermore, by limiting
moral claims of outsiders we may be doing an injustice to those that fall outside the
artificially closed circle of the original position.
Sen contrasts this example of ‘closed impartiality’ with the ‘open impartiality’ of
Adam Smith’s ‘impartial spectator’. Smith’s reflective device, which asks us to observe
our actions and institutions from the standpoint of an outsider, specifically refrains
from limiting the extent to which the views of others can be considered, refusing to
confine moral discussion within the boundaries of a nation-state or any other locality.
And, as in social choice theory, such openness to, and critical reflection upon,
alternative views and different ways of approaching social problems, Sen believes, can
provide a more solid ground for ranking the ‘just-ness’ or, at least, manifest injustice of
certain social realizations, even if they are merely partial and ordinal rather than
comprehensive, cardinal rankings.
2. Apply John Rawls and Amartya Sen’s theories of justice to the Marcos Burial case and the
detention prisoners and a decision based on the decision promulgated by the Supreme Court
can be justified.
 - criminal procedure: them being convicted of the crime of reclusion perpetua – bail is
discretionary, court have not yet conducted trial on the merits, the Supreme Court is not a trial
—finding court, remanded.

CRUEL TREATMENT – VEIL OF IGNORANCE, ORIGINAL POSITION- THEY ARE IMMUNE TO THE
VIRUS JUST LIKE EVERYBODY ELSE– THEIR PENALTY DOES NOT EXLCUDE BEING ARBITRARILY
CONFINED IN SUCH A HIGH RISK POSITION OF GETTING THE VIRUS- AS HUMANS THEY
DESERVED TO STILL BE TREATED WITH DECENCY- NOT TREATING THEM AS A HUMAN BEING-
BEING WILL NOT GOOD FOR THE COLLECTIVE SOCIETY – MEDICAL STAFF WILL HAVE LESS ON
THEIR HANDS LESS OBLIGATIONS – GOOD FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE PEOPLE (RAWL)
ALSO MEDICAL STAFF WILL HAVE LESS ON THEIR HANDS LESS OBLIGATIONS (SEN TOO)
STEPPING INTO THE SHOES OF THE OUTSIDER – THE NUANCES OF THEIR SITUATION THESE ARE
PEOPLE WHO SACRIFICE SELF-QUARANTINE CANT EVEN SEE THEIR FAMILIES – ALTHOUGH
THERE ARE PROCEDURAL RULES FOR A REASON, SPEEDY , ORDERLY DISPOSTIION OF CASES –
MAY DISREGARD TRANSCEDENTAL IMPORTANCE, DECENCY – REMANDED, sui generis, the poe
case

5. Franz Kafka, Before the Law – there are several guardians, nobody’s passing through because the
gateway is only for him, all his properties were taken, this is parallel to what the situation is right now in
our contry, those who have less continue to suffer.