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VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 113

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

*
G.R. No. 138822. January 23, 2001.

EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs. FGU

INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondent.

Actions; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Words and Phrases; Estoppel

by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it; A
party cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the trial
court’s jurisdiction over the other party’s counterclaim where such
issue was raised with the trial court itself—the body where the
action is pending—even before the presentation of any evidence by
the parties and definitely, way before any judgment could be
rendered by the trial court.—Before going into the substantive
issues, the Court shall first dispose of some procedural matters
raised by the parties. Petitioner claims that respondent is
estopped from questioning her non-payment of docket fees
because it did not raise this particular

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

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issue when it filed in its first motion—the " Motion to Strike out
Answer Compulsory Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In
Default”—with the trial court; rather, it was only nine months
after receiving petitioner’s answer that respondent assailed the
trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaims
based on the latter’s failure to pay docket fees. Petitioner’s
position is unmeritorious. Estoppel by laches arises from the
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,

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warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it

either has abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar,
respondent cannot be considered as estopped from assailing the
trial court’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaim since this
issue was raised by respondent with the trial court itself—the
body where the action is pending—even before the presentation of
any evidence by the parties and definitely, way before any
judgment could be rendered by the trial court.
Same; Same; Same; Although the lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may be
estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part
in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to
the court’s jurisdiction in the event that the judgment or order
subsequently rendered is adverse to him.—Meanwhile, respondent
questions the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals over the appeal
filed by petitioner from the 18 September 1990 and 28 February
1991 orders of the trial court. It is significant to note that this
objection to the appellate court’s jurisdiction is raised for the first
time before this Court; respondent never having raised this issue
before the appellate court. Although the lack of jurisdiction of a
court may be raised at any stage of the action, a party may be
estopped from raising such questions if he has actively taken part
in the very proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to
the court’s jurisdiction in the event that that the judgment or
order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In this case,
respondent actively took part in the proceedings before the Court
of Appeals by filing its appellee’s brief with the same. Its
participation, when taken together with its failure to object to the
appellate court’s jurisdiction during the entire duration of the
proceedings before such court, demonstrates a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case by such tribunal and
accordingly, respondent is now most decidedly estopped from
objecting to the Court of Appeals’ assumption of jurisdiction over
petitioner’s appeal.
Same; Counterclaims; Words and Phrases; “Compulsory
Counterclaim,” Explained.—The basic issue for resolution in this
case is whether or not the counterclaim of petitioner is
compulsory or permissive in nature. A compulsory counterclaim is
one which, being cognizable by the

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Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

regular courts of hustice, arises out of or is connected with the

transaction or occurrence constituting the subject matter of the
opposing party’s claim and does not require for its adjudication

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the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire

jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Criteria or Tests in Determining Whether a
Counter-claim is Compulsory or Permissive; “Compelling Test of
Compulsoriness”; Words and Phrases; Under the “compelling test
of compulsoriness,” “a logical relationship between the claim and
the counterclaim is required, that is, whether conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court.”—In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the
criteria or tests that may be used in determining whether a
counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the same? 2. Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule? 3. Will substantially the same evidence support
or refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant’s counter-claim? 4.
Is there any logical relation between the claim and the
counterclaim? Another test, applied in the more recent case of
Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the “compelling test of
compulsoriness” which requires “a logical relationship between
the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate
trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a
substantial duplication of effort and time by the parties and the
court.”
Same; Same; Docket Fees; Rule on the Payment of Filing Fees.
—There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her
compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the trial
court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive counterclaim,
petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. The rule on
the payment of filing fees has been laid down by the Court in the
case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion—
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate
initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee,
that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or
nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may
allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. 2. The
same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims
and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until
and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court
may allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also
in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary

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period 3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim

by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the
prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has
been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
Same; Same; Same; The trial court should give the defendant
a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglemen-tary period, to pay the filing fees for her
permissive counterclaim.—The above mentioned ruling in Sun
Insurance has been reiterated in the recent case of Suson v. Court
of Appeals. In Suson, the Court explained that although the
payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, its nonpayment does not result in the automatic
dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the
case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is
nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to
evade the payment of the proper docket fees for her permissive
counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion
to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim based on her failure to pay
docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial
court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as compulsory in
nature and therefore exempt from docket fees and, in addition, to
declare that respondent was in default for its failure to answer
her counterclaim. However, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s
counterclaim. Pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Sun Insurance,
the trial court should have instead given petitioner a reasonable
time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive
counter-claim.
Same; Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; There is no need
to file an answer to a permissive counterclaim until the defendant
shall have paid the prescribed docket fees for only then shall the
court acquire jurisdiction over such claim.—Petitioner asserts
that the trial court should have declared respondent in default for
having failed to answer her counterclaim. Insofar as the
permissive counterclaim of petitioner is concerned, there is
obviously no need to file an answer until petitioner has paid the
prescribed docket fees for only then shall the court acquire
jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing by
respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit need not
be answered since it is inseparable from the

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VOL. 350, JANUARY 23, 2001 117

Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

claims of respondent. If respondent were to answer the

compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely result in
the former pleading the same facts raised in its complaint.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Cruz, Durian, Alday & Cruz-Matters for petitioner.
     Jacinto Jimenez for respondent.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

On 5 May 1989, respondent FGU Insurance

Corporation filed 1
a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati alleging that petitioner Evangeline K.
Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing unliquidated cash
advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges
incurred by petitioner in the course
2
of her work as an
insurance agent for respondent. Respondent also prayed3
for exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.
Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim,
asserted her right for the payment of P104,893.45,
representing direct commissions, profit commissions and
contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December
1986, and for accumulated premium reserves amounting to
P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for attorney’s
fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary
damages for 4
the allegedly unfounded action filed by
respondent. On 23 August 1989, respondent filed a
“Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory
Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default”5
because petitioner’s answer was allegedly filed out of time.
However, the trial court denied the motion on 25 August
1989 and similarly rejected respondent’s
6
motion for
reconsideration on 12 March 1990. A few weeks later, on
11 April 1990, respondent filed a mo-

________________

1 Branch 134.
2 Docketed as Civil Case No. 89-3816.
3 Rollo, 42-44.
4 Ibid., 53-63.
5 RTC Records, 37-39.
6 Ibid., 46, 93.

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Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

tion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim, contending that

the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same 7
because of the non-payment of docket fees by petitioner. In
response, petitioner asked the trial court to declare her
counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since
it is compulsory and that respondent be declared8
in default
for having failed to answer such counterclaim. 9
In its 18 September 1990 Order, the trial court granted
respondent’s motion to dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim
and consequently, denied petitioner’s motion. The court
found petitioner’s counterclaim to be merely permissive in
nature and held that petitioner’s failure to pay docket fees
prevented
10
the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the
same. The trial court similarly denied petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration on 28 February 1991. 11
On 23 December 1998, the Court of Appeals sustained
the trial court, finding that petitioner’s own admissions, as
contained in her answer, show that her counterclaim is
merely permissive.
12
The relevant portion of the appellate
court’s decision is quoted herewith—

Contrary to the protestations of appellant, mere reading of the

allegations in the answer a quo will readily show that her
counterclaim can in no way be compulsory. Take note of the
following numbered paragraphs in her answer:

“(14) That, indeed, FGU’s cause of action which is not supported by any
document other than the self-serving ‘Statement of Account’ dated March
28, 1988 x x x
(15) That it should be noted that the cause of action of FGU is not the
enforcement of the Special Agent’s Contract but the alleged ‘cash
accountabilities which are not based on written agreement x x x.
xxxx

_______________

7 Ibid., 96-102.
8 Ibid., 110-125.
9 Judge Ignacio M. Capulong
10 Rollo, 105.
11 Fourth Division, composed of Justices Jesus M. Elbinias, ponente and
Chairman; Eugenio S. Labitoria; and Marina L. Buzon.
12 Rollo, 36-39.

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(19) x x x A careful analysis of FGU’s three-page complaint will show

that its cause of action is not for specific performance or enforcement of
the Special Agent’s Contract rather, it is for the payment of the alleged
cash accountabilities incurred by defendant during the period form [sic]
1975 to 1986 which claim is executory and has not been ratified. It is the
established rule that unenforceable contracts, like this purported money
claim of FGU, cannot be sued upon or enforced unless ratified, thus it is
as if they have no effect. x x x.”

To support the heading “Compulsory Counterclaim” in her answer

and give the impression that the counterclaim is compulsory
appellant alleged that “FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to
defendant despite repeated demands in gross violation of their
Special Agent’s Contract x x x.” The reference to said contract was
included purposely to mislead. While on one hand appellant
alleged that appellee’s cause of action had nothing to do with the
Special Agent’s Contract, on the other hand, she claim that FGU
violated said contract which gives rise of [sic] her cause of action.
Clearly, appellant’s cash accountabilities cannot be the offshoot of
appellee’s alleged violation of the aforesaid contract.

On 19 May 1999, the appellate 13

court denied petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration, giving rise to the present
petition.
Before going into the substantive issues, the Court shall
first dispose of some procedural matters raised by the
parties. Petitioner claims that respondent is estopped from
questioning her non-payment of docket fees because it did
not raise this particular issue when it filed its first motion
—the “Motion to Strike out Answer With Compulsory
Counterclaim And To Declare Defendant In Default”—with
the trial court; rather, it was only nine months after
receiving petitioner’s answer that respondent assailed the
trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over petitioner’s
counterclaims
14
based on the latter’s failure to pay docket
fees. Petitioner’s position is unmeritorious. Estoppel by
laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has

_______________

13 Ibid., 41.
14 Ibid., 332.

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15
abandoned or declined to assert it. In the case at bar,
respondent cannot be considered as estopped from assailing
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the trial court’s jurisdiction over petitioner’s counterclaim

since this issue was raised by respondent with the trial
court itself—the body where the action is pending—even
before the presentation of any evidence by the parties and
definitely, way before any judgment could be rendered by
the trial court.
Meanwhile, respondent questions the jurisdiction of the
Court of Appeals over the appeal filed by petitioner from
the 18 September 1990 and 28 February 1991 orders of the
trial court. It is significant to note that this objection to the
appellate court’s jurisdiction is raised for the first time
before this Court; respondent never having raised this
issue before the appellate court. Although the lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
action, a party may be estopped from raising such
questions if he has actively taken part in the very
proceedings which he questions, belatedly objecting to the
court’s jurisdiction in the event that that the judgment
16
or
order subsequently rendered is adverse to him. In this
case, respondent actively took part in the proceedings
before the Court 17
of Appeals by filing its appellee’s brief
with the same. Its participation, when taken together
with its failure to object to the appellate court’s jurisdiction
during the entire duration of the proceedings before such
court, demonstrates a willingness to abide by the resolution
of the case by such tribunal and accordingly, respondent is
now most decidedly estopped from objecting to the Court of
Appeals’18
assumption of jurisdiction over petitioner’s
appeal.
The basic issue for resolution in this case is whether or
not the counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or
permissive in nature. A

_______________

15 Philippine National Construction Corporation v. National Labor

Relations Commission, 307 SCRA 218 (1999).
16 National Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 522
(1999).
17 CA Records, 88-115.
18 ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members v. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation, 304 SCRA 489 (1999). See also Stilianopulos v.
City of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523 (1999); Pantranco North Express, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, 224 SCRA 477 (1993).

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compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by

the regular courts of justice, arises out of or is connected
with the transaction or occurrence constituting the subject
matter of the opposing party’s claim and does not require
for its adjudication the presence of 19third parties of whom
the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
20
In Valencia v. Court of Appeal, this Court capsulized
the criteria or tests that may be used in determining
whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive,
summarized as follows:

1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim

and counterclaim largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on
defendant’s claim absent the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or
refute plaintiffs claim as well as defendant’s
counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and
the counterclaim?

Another test, applied in the

21
more recent case of Quintanilla
v. Court of Appeals, is the “compelling test of
compulsoriness” which requires “a logical relationship
between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where
conducting separate trials of the respective claims of the
parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and
time by the parties and the court.”
As contained in her answer, petitioner’s counterclaims
are as follows:

(20) That defendant incorporates and repleads by

reference all the foregoing allegations as may be
material to her Counterclaim against FGU.
(21) That FGU is liable to pay the following just, valid
and legitimate claims of defendant:

______________

19 Rule 6, section 7; BA Finance v. Co, 224 SCRA 163 (1993); Javier v.

Intermediate Appellate Court, 171 SCRA 609 (1989).
20 263 SCRA 275 (1996).
21 279 SCRA 397 (1997).

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(a) the sum of at least P104,893.45 plus maximum interest

thereon representing, among others, direct commissions,
profit commissions and contingent bonuses legally due to
defendant; and
(b) the minimum amount of P500,000.00 plus the maximum
allowable interest representing defendant’s accumulated
premium reserve for 1985 and previous years,

which FGU has unjustifiably failed to remit to defendant despite

repeated demands in gross violation of their Special Agent’s
Contract and in contravention of the principle of law that “every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.”
(22) That as a result of the filing of this patently baseless,
malicious and unjustified Complaint, and FGU’s unlawful, illegal
and vindictive termination of their Special Agent’s Contract,
defendant was unnecessarily dragged into this litigation and to
defense [sic] her side and assert her rights and claims against
FGU, she was compelled to hire the services of counsel with
whom she agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as and for
attorney’s fees and stands to incur litigation expenses in the
amount estimated to at least P20,000.00 and for which FGU
should be assessed and made liable to pay defendant.
(23) That considering further the malicious and unwarranted
action of defendant in filing this grossly unfounded action,
defendant has suffered and continues to suffer from serious
anxiety, mental anguish, fright and humiliation. In addition to
this, defendant’s name, good reputation and business standing in
the insurance business as well as in the community have been
besmirched and for which FGU should be adjudged and made
liable to pay moral damages to defendant in the amount of
P300,000.00 as minimum.
(24) That in order to discourage the filing of groundless and
malicious suits like FGU’s Complaint, and by way of serving [as]
an example for the public good, FGU should be penalized and
assessed exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 or such
amount as the22Honorable Court may deem warranted under the
circumstances.

Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioner’s

counterclaim for commissions, bonuses, and accumulated
premium reserves is merely permissive. The evidence
required to prove petitioner’s claims differs from that
needed to establish respondent’s

_______________

22 Rollo, 61-62.

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Alday vs. FGU Insurance Corporation

demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities from

petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums.
The recovery of respondent’s claims is not contingent or
dependent upon establishing petitioner’s counterclaim,
such that conducting separate trials will not result in the
substantial duplication of the time and effort of the court
and the parties. One would search the records in vain for a
logical connection between the parties’ claims. This
conclusion is further reinforced by petitioner’s own
admissions since she declared in her answer that
respondent’s cause of action, unlike 23her own, was not based
upon the Special Agent’s Contract. However, petitioner’s
claims for damages, allegedly suffered as a result 24of the
filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.
There is no need for petitioner
25
to pay docket fees for her
compulsory counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim,26
petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed
docket fees. The rule on the payment of filing fees has
been laid down by the Court in the case of 27
Sun Insurance
Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion —

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or

appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of
the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature
of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims,
third-party claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may
allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period.

_______________

23 Ibid., 58-59, 60.

24 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 294 SCRA 382 (1998);
Intestate Estate of Amado B. Dalisay v. Marasigan, 257 SCRA 509 (1996).
25 Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, supra.
26 Suson v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 284 (1997).
27 170 SCRA 274 (1989).

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3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a

claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and
payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not
specified in the pleading, or if specified the same
has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien
on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to
enforce said lien and assess and collect the
additional fee.

The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has been 28

reiterated in the recent case of Suson v. Court of Appeals.
In Suson, the Court explained that although the payment
of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional
requirement, its non-payment does not result in the
automatic dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are
paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been
alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to
show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment
of the proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim.
As a matter of fact, after respondent filed its motion to
dismiss petitioner’s counterclaim based on her failure to
pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with
the trial court, asking it to declare her counterclaim as
compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket
fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in 29
default for its failure to answer her counterclaim.
However, the trial court dismissed petitioner’s
counterclaim. Pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Sun
Insurance, the trial court should have instead given
petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the
filing fees for her permissive counterclaim.
Petitioner asserts that the trial court should have
declared respondent 30
in default for having failed to answer
her counterclaim. Insofar as the permissive counterclaim
of petitioner is concerned, there is obviously no need to file
an answer until petitioner has paid the prescribed docket
fees for only then shall the court acquire

_________________

28 Supra. See also Cabaero v. Cantos, 271 SCRA 391 (1997).

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29 RTC Records, 110-125.

30 Rollo, 342-343.

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31
jurisdiction over such claim. Meanwhile, the compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner for damages based on the filing
by respondent of an allegedly unfounded and malicious suit
need not be answered since it is inseparable from the
claims of respondent. If respondent were to answer the
compulsory counterclaim of petitioner, it would merely
result in the
32
former pleading the same facts raised in its
complaint.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on 23 December 1998 and its 19 May
1999 Resolution are hereby MODIFIED. The compulsory
counterclaim of petitioner for damages filed in Civil Case
No. 89-3816 is ordered REINSTATED. Meanwhile, the
Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 134) is ordered to
require petitioner to pay the prescribed docket fees for her
permissive counterclaim (direct commissions, profit
commissions, contingent bonuses and accumulated
premium reserves), after ascertaining 33
that the applicable
prescriptive period has not yet set in.
SO ORDERED.

          Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban and

Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Judgment and resolution modified. Compulsory

counterclaim reinstated.

Notes.—A counterclaim for attorney’s fees partakes of

the nature of a compulsory counterclaim. (Intestate Estate
of Amado B. Dalisay vs. Marasigan, 257 SCRA 509 [1996])
An appeal from the dismissal of the counterclaim,
although not totally unavailable, could well be ineffective,
if not futile, as far as the petitioner is concerned where no
single piece of evidence has yet been presented by it, that
opportunity having been foreclosed by the trial court, on
the dismissed counterclaim which could form

_______________

31 Gegare v. Court of Appeals, 297 SCRA 587 (1998).

32 Ballecer v. Bernardo, 18 SCRA 291 (1966); Navarro v. Bello, 102
Phil. 1019 (1958).
33 Suson v. Court of Appeals, supra.

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People vs. Magabo

part of the records to be reviewed by the appellate court.

(Santo Tomas University Hospital vs. Surla, 294 SCRA 382
[1998])

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