JUDICIARY On July 26, 1994, then Secretary Rafael M.

Alunan III,
citing as reasons the interest of public service and the
smooth flow of operations in the concerned offices, issued
EN BANC
Department Order No. 94-370, relieving private respondent
of his current duties and responsibilities and reassigning
G.R. No. 127182       January 22, 2001 him as "Director III (Assistant Regional Director), Region
XI,"9 Private respondent, however, did not report to his new
HON. ALMA G. DE LEON, Chairman, HON. THELMA P. assigned position. Instead, he filed a 90-day sick leave, and
GAMINDE, Commissioner, and HON. RAMON P. upon the expiration thereof on December 5, 1994, he
ERENETA, JR., Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, submitted a memorandum for then acting Secretary
and SECRETARY RAFAEL M. ALUNAN, III, Department of Alexander P. Aguirre, signifying his intention to re-assume
Interior and Local Government, petitioners, his position as Department Legal Counsel/Chief, Legal
vs. Services.10
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JACOB F.
MONTESA, respondents. Thereupon, Acting Secretary Aguirre, by memorandum
dated December 6, 1994,11 reiterated to private respondent
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: that the issuance of Department Order No. 94-370,
transferring him to Region XI, was in keeping with the
interest of the public service and of the Career Executive
Can person who lacks the necessary qualifications for a Service (CES) provision on assignment, reassignment, and
public position be appointed to it in a permanent capacity? transfer. Accordingly, private respondent was advised to
report to Region XI immediately.
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the April 25, 1996 Decision,1 and November 20, Private respondent wrote a memorandum dated December
1996 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 12, 1994,12 requesting for reconsideration of Department
38664, which set aside Resolution Nos. 9532683 and Order No. 94-370, but to no avail. Private respondent
9552014 of the Civil Service Commission; and declared as appealed to the Civil Service Commission and the latter
null and void - (1) Department Order No. 94-370,5 issued issued Resolution No. 95-3268,13 dated May 23, 1995 which
by the Department of Interior and Local Government, sustained his reassignment to Region XI, on the ground
relieving private respondent of his duties as Department that: 1) the subject reassignment was not violative of the
Legal Counsel/Director III and reassigning him as Director due process clause of the Constitution or of private
III (Assistant Regional Director), Region XI; and (2) respondent's right to security of tenure; 2) the
Administrative Order No. 235 issued by then President Fidel reassignment did not entail any reduction in rank or status;
V. Ramos, dropping private respondent from the rolls of 3) private respondent could be reassigned from one station
public service, for serious neglect of duty and absences to another without his consent as the rule against
without official leave.1âwphi1.nêt unconsented transfer applies only to an officer who is
appointed to a particular station, and not merely assigned
On August 28, 1986, private respondent Atty. Jacob F. thereto. Private respondent's motion for reconsideration of
Montesa, who is not a Career Executive Service Officer the aforesaid Resolution was similarly denied by the
(CESO) or a member of the Career Executive Service, was Commission in Resolution No. 955201 dated August 22,
appointed as "Ministry Legal Counsel - CESO IV in the 1995.14
Ministry of Local Government" (now Department of Interior
and Local Government [hereafter referred to as On October 10, 1995, the Department directed private
Department]), by then Minister Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. respondent to report to his new assigned post in Region XI,
Private respondent's appointment was approved as stressing that his continued non-compliance with D.O. No.
permanent by the Civil Service Commission. 94-370 is prejudicial to the interest of public service,
particularly in Region XI. Private respondent was also
On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino warned that upon his failure to comply, the Department
promulgated Executive Order No. 262, reorganizing the shall be constrained to consider him on Absence Without
Department. On April 8, 1988, then Secretary Luis T. Leave (AWOL) and as a consequence, drop him from the
Santos, who succeeded Minister Pimental, designated rolls of public service.15
Nicanor M. Patricio as chief, Legal Service in place of private
respondent who, in turn, was directed to report to the office Instead of complying therewith, private respondent, on
of the Secretary to perform special assignments. October 23, 1995, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Review with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
Consequently, private respondent filed before this Court a restraining order and/or preliminary injunction. No
petition for quo warranto,  docketed as G.R. No. restraining order or preliminary injunction, however, was
83470,6 against then Secretary Luis T. Santos and Nicanor issued by the court,.
Patricio. On September 26, 1990, we ruled in favor of
private respondent Montesa and ordered his reinstatement On December 13, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos,
to his former position. upon the recommendation of the Department, issued
Administrative Order No. 235, dropping private respondent
Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 6758 (otherwise known as the Atty. Jacob F. Montesa, Director III. Legal Service, from the
Salary Standardization Law) took effect on July 1, 1989. roster of public servants for serious neglect of duty and
Pursuant thereto, the position of "Department Service absences without leave (AWOL).16
Chiefs," which include the Department Legal Counsel, was
reclassified and ranked with "Assistant Bureau Directors" On April 25, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its
under the generic position title of "Director III".7 decision in favor of private respondent, holding as follows:

Hence, in the execution of the decision of this Court in G.R. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
No. 83470, respondent was reinstated to the position: Department Order No. 94-370 in so far as it
"Department Legal Counsel and/or Director III."8 affects petitioner, Jacob F. Montesa, is hereby
declared null and void. Petitioner is hereby ordered
retained in his position as "Chief, Legal Service" or

1 | Judiciary
 "Department Legal Counsel" in the DILG, without SO ORDERED.19
loss of seniority, rank, emolument and privileges.
The DILG Secretary is hereby ordered to release to
Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the instant petition with this
petitioner his withheld salaries corresponding to
Court, contending that:
the period July 15-21, 1995 and his back salaries,
if also withheld, corresponding to the period July
22, 1995 to September 27, 1995. I

Finding that petitioner has not paid the amount of REPONDENT COURT GARVELY ERRED IN RULING
P 500.00 as deposit for costs (page 1, Rollo), he is THAT RESPONDENT MONTESA'S REASSIGNMENT
hereby ordered to pay the same to the Clerk of IS ACTUALLY AN UNCONSENTED TRANSFER.
this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this
decision II

SO ORDERED.17 RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING

THAT RESPONDENT MONTESA'S "TRANFER"
Both petitioners and private respondent moved for CHANGES HIS APPOINMENT FROM PERMANENT TO
reconsideration. In his Motion for Clarification and/or Partial TEMPORARY AND VIOLATES HIS CONSTITUTIONAL
Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent prayed for RIGHT TO SECURITY OF TENURE.
"backwages to cover the period from October 5, 1995 up to
his actual reinstatement to office, the period from August 1, III
1994 to July 14, 1995 having been covered by approved
leave of absences with pay, while the period July 15-21,
1995 is the period where his name was included in the RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND
payroll but release of his salary was illegally withheld by COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
private respondent Alunan on July 21, 1995, and the period ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF RESPONDENT
of July 22 to October 4, 1995 is the period where MONTESA IN OPEN DISREGARD OF
respondent Alunan withheld his salary even before CSC ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 235 ISSUED BY THE
Resolution No. 95-9201 (should be No. 95-3268) became PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES DROPPING HIM
executory."18 Respondent likewise prayed for the award of FROM THE ROSTER OF PUBLIC SERVANTS.
RATA during the period of his illegal dismissal.
IV
Petitioners, on the other hand, posited that the decision of
the Court of Appeals is not confluent with Administrative RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING
Order No. 235, issued on December 13, 1995 by then THAT RESPONDENT MONTESA IS ENTITLED TO
President Ramos which dropped petitioner from the roster BACKAGES, INCLUDING RATA AND OTHER
of public servants. They further argued that until and unless BENEFITS, CORRESPONDING TO THE PERIOD
the said Order is declared illegal and/or invalid, the FROM JULY 15, 1995 UP TO HIS ACTUAL
presumption is in favor of its validity and it is incumbent REINSTATEMENT.20
upon private respondent to comply therewith so as not to
prejudice the public service.
Succinctly put, the pivot of inquiry here boils down to the
nature of the appointment of private respondent Atty. Jacob
On November 20, 1996, the Court of Appeals issued the F. Montesa.
assailed resolution modifying its April 25, 1996 decision,
thus:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the position of
Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV is embraced in the Career
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Executive Service. Under the Integrated Reorganization
Reconsideration filed by public respondents is Plan, appointment thereto shall be made as follows:
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Petitioner's
Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Motion for
Reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. The c. Appointment. Appointment to appropriate
dispositive portion of the decision is hereby classes in the Career Executive Service shall be
modified to read as follows: made by the President from a list of career
executive eligible recommended by the Board.
Such appointments shall be made on the basis of
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. rank; provided that appointments to the higher
Department Order No. 94-370 in so far as ranks which qualify the incumbents to assignments
it affects petitioner, Jacob Montesa, and as undersecretary and heads of bureaus and
Administrative Order No. 235 are hereby offices and equivalent positions shall be with the
declared null and void. Petitioner is confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
hereby ordered reinstated to his position The President may, however, in exceptional cases,
as "Chief Legal Service" or "Department appoint any person who is not a Career Executive
legal Counsel" in the DILG, without loss of Service eligible; provided that such appointee shall
seniority, rank, emolument and subsequently take the required Career Executive
privileges. The DILG Secretary is hereby Service examination and that he shall not be
ordered to release to petitioner his promoted to a higher class until qualifies in such
withheld salaries and backwages, examination.
including allowances (RATA) and other b
enefits, to which petitioner would have b
een entitled had he not been illegally re At the initial implementation of this Plan, an
moved, corresponding to the period July incumbent who holds a permanent appointment to
15, a position embraced in the Career Executive
1995 up to his actual reinstatement to o Service shall continue to hold his position, but may
ffice. not advance to a higher class of position in the
Career Executive Service unless or until he

2 | Judiciary
 qualifies for membership in the Career Executive General, non-eligible holding permanent appointments to
Service.21 CES positions were never meant to remain immobile in their
status. Otherwise, their lack of eligibility would be a
premium vesting them with permanency in the CES
Corollarily, the required Career Executive Service eligibility
positions, a privilege even their eligible counterparts do not
may be then acquired in the following manner:
enjoy.

Career Executive Service Eligibility

Then too, the cases on unconsented transfer invoked by
private respondent find no application in the present case.
Passing the CES examination entitles the examinee To reiterate, private respondent's appointment is merely
to a conferment of a CES eligibility and the temporary; hence, he could be transferred or reassigned to
inclusion of his name in the roster of CES eligible. other positions without violating his right to security of
Conferment of CES eligibility is done by the Board tenure.
through a formal Board Resolution after an
evaluation of the examinee's performance in the
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Petition
four stages of the CES eligibility examinations.22
is GRANTED. The April 25, 1996 Decision and the
November 20, 1996 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
In the case at bar, there is no question that private CA-G.R. SP No. 38664 are REVERSED and SET
respondent does not have the required CES eligibility. As ASIDE. Resolution Nos. 953268 and 9555201 of the Civil
admitted by private respondent in his Comment, he is "not Service Commission are REINSTATED. No pronouncement
a CESO or a member of the Career Executive Service." as to costs.

In the case of Achacoso v. Macaraig, et al.,23 the Court held SO ORDERED.

that:

It is settled that a permanent appointment can be

issued only 'to a person who meets all the
requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility
prescribed." Achacoso did not. At best, therefore,
his appointment could be regarded only as
temporary. And being so, it could be withdrawn at
will by the appointing authority and "at a
moment's notice," conformably to established
jurisprudence.

The Court, having considered these submissions

and the additional arguments of the parties in the
petitioner's Reply and the Solicitor-General's
Rejoinder, must find for the respondents.

The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career

Service does not automatically confer security or
tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess
the required qualifications. Such right will have to
depend on the nature of his appointment, which in
turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A
person who does not have the requisite
qualifications for the position cannot be appointed
to it in the first place or, only as an exception to
the rule, may be appointed to it merely in an
acting capacity in the absence of appropriate
eligible. The appointment extended to him cannot
be regarded as permanent even if it may be so
designated.

Evidently, private respondent's appointment did not attain

permanency. Not having taken the necessary Career
Executive Service examination to obtain requisite eligibility,
he did not at the time of his appointment and up to the
present, possess the needed eligibility for a position in the
Career Executive Service. Consequently, his appointment as
Ministry Legal Counsel – CESO IV/ Department Legal
Counsel and/or Director III, was merely temporary. Such
being the case, he could be transferred or reassigned
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed right to
security of tenure.1âwphi1.nêt

Private respondent capitalizes on his lack of CES eligibility

by adamantly contending that the mobility and flexibility
concepts in the assignment of personnel under the Career
Executive Service24 do not apply to him because he is not a
Career Executive Service Officer. Obviously, the contention
is without merit. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor

3 | Judiciary
 able to confirm that AAA was touched since AAA's private
organ was swelling. Her underwear was also wet.6

Another teacher, Jason Dalisdis, then brought AAA to

Baguio General Hospital where her underwear was again
G.R. No. 208007               April 2, 2014
inspected. Dr. Anvic Pascua also examined her. On the way
to the hospital, Dalisdis passed by the barangay hall and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, the police station to report the incident.7
vs.
RODRIGO GUTIEREZ Y ROBLES ALIAS "ROD AND
AAA also disclosed during trial that the accused-appellant
JOHN LENNON", Accused-appellant.
had done the same thing to her about 10 times on separate
occasions. After each act, he would give her ten (₱10.00) or
DECISION five (₱5.00) pesos.8

LEONEN, J.: The prosecution also presented Dr. Asuncion Ogues as an

expert witness. Dr. Ogues was the superior of Dr. Pascua
For a measly five- or ten-peso tip that a 10-year-old child who examined AAA. Dr. Ogues testified based on the
would need for lunch money, a known acquaintance of their medical certificate issued by the examining physician that
family would destroy a child's dignity by having illicit carnal there was blunt force penetrating trauma that could have
knowledge of her. This case involves an act that is so been caused by sexual abuse. She also stated that there
dastardly that it is punished by Article 266-A of the Revised was another medico-legal certificate issued by Dr. Carag,
Penal Code as statutory rape which carries a sentence of surgical resident of the Department of Surgery of Baguio
reclusion perpetua. General Hospital, showing findings of some hematoma in
AAA's legs.9

We are asked to review the Court of Appeals decision 1 in

CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02955. This decision affirmed the In his defense, Rodrigo denied that AAA went to his house
conviction of the accused-appellant for statutory rape under at 12 noon on November 29, 2005 and claimed he was
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and imposed the already at work at 1:30 p.m. He has known AAA for a long
penalty of reclusion perpetua. time since his family rented the house of AAA's grandfather
from 2001 to 2004.10 When the police came and asked him
if he knew AAA, he answered in the affirmative. He was
The facts of the case are as follows: then brought to Baguio General Hospital where he was told
that AAA identified him as the one who raped her.11
On November 30, 2005, an information2 was filed against
the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Rodrigo admitted that he had a relationship with AAA's
Baguio City, Branch 59. The information reads: sister, and they even lived together as common-law
spouses.12 He also admitted that a similar complaint was
That on or about November 29, 2005, in the City of Baguio, filed against him by AAA's mother when AAA was eight
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable years old, but they settled the case at the barangay level. 13
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge On July 4, 2007, the trial court rendered a
of the offended party, (AAA), who is under twelve (12) judgment14 finding Rodrigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt
years old. of statutory rape and imposing on him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. He was additionally required to
Contrary to law. indemnify the offended party ₱50,000.00 moral damages
and ₱25,000.00 exemplary damages with costs of suit.
Upon arraignment, Rodrigo Gutierez pleaded "not guilty."
Trial on the merits ensued. Rodrigo appealed15 to the Court of Appeals claiming that
AAA's testimony fell short of the requirement of the law on
the quantum of evidence required. He argued that she did
The prosecution presented the victim, AAA, who was then not cry for help when her family's house was just nearby,
10 years old and a Grade 2 student at Camp 7 Elementary which was cause for reasonable doubt that the trial court
School in Baguio City. She testified that on November 29, failed to appreciate.
2005, she went home from school at around 12 noon to
have lunch.3 On the way home, she met Rodrigo at his
house. He brought her to his room and laid her down on the On February 28, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered a
bed. He then raised her skirt and removed her panties. He decision16 affirming the conviction.
pulled down his pants and then inserted his penis into her
vagina.4 On March 11, 2013, Rodrigo filed a notice of appeal17 with
the appellate court, which was given due course in a
According to AAA, Rodrigo stayed on top of her for a long resolution18 dated March 15, 2013.
time, and when he withdrew his penis, white liquid came
out. He then gave her five pesos (₱5.00) before she went Hence, this appeal was instituted.
back to school.5

In the resolution19 of September 9, 2013, this court

AAA went back to school at about 2:10 p.m. Her adviser, required the parties to submit their respective supplemental
Agustina Chapap, asked her where she came from because briefs, if they so desired. Both parties, however, manifested
she was tardy. AAA initially did not answer. When asked that they were dispensing with the filing of a supplemental
again why she was tardy, AAA admitted she came from brief as their arguments were already substantially and
"Uncle Rod." She also admitted that she went there to ask exhaustively discussed in their respective briefs filed before
for money. Chapap then brought AAA to Rona Ambaken, the appellate court.
AAA's previous teacher. Together, they brought AAA to the
principal's office. AAA was brought to the comfort room
where Ambaken inspected her panties. The principal was
4 | Judiciary
The only issue to be resolved by this court is whether the Q: And, was that the first time you entered the room?
prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused-appellant was guilty of statutory rape
A: (The witness nods.)
punishable under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

Q: After entering the room, what did Uncle Rod tell you?
Rape is defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
which states:
A: He laid me down, Ma'am.
Art. 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. ― Rape is
committed: COURT:

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman Q: Where?

under any of the following circumstances:
A: On the bed, Ma'am.
a. Through force, threat, or intimidation;
PROS. BERNABE:
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; Q: Who were the persons inside the room aside from you
and Uncle Rod?
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and A: (Witness shook her head - meaning no persons around.)

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) Q: After lying down on the bed, what did he do next?
years of age or is demented, even though none of
the circumstances mentioned above be present.
A: He raised up my skirt.

xxxx
Q: After raising up your skirt, what else did he do?

Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is

under 12 years of age and (2) the accused has carnal A: He removed my panty, Ma'am.
knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force,
threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of Q: Was he able to remove it from your legs your panty?
reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through [sic]
fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age
of the victim is proven and that there was sexual
intercourse. A: No, Ma'am.

People v. Teodoro20 explained the elements of statutory Q: Until where was he able to remove?
rape committed under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (d):
A: (Witness is pointing down to the ankle.)
Rape under paragraph 3 of this article is termed statutory
rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing Q: After pulling down your panty until your ankle, what
rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal happened?
knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus,
force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not
A: He pulled down his short pants, Ma'am.
relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the
age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took
place. The law presumes that the victim does not and Q: After pulling down his short pants, what did Uncle Rod
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender do?
years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her
presumed incapacity to discern good from evil. (Emphasis A: He brought out his penis.
supplied)

Q: After bringing out his penis, what did he do next?

The defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years
old at the time of the incident. Her birth certificate was
presented before the trial court.21 What is critical in this A: He inserted his penis to my vagina, Ma'am.
case, therefore, is whether there is a showing that Rodrigo
had carnal knowledge of AAA. Q: Will you please show us where is your vagina?

In the testimony of AAA, she narrated that on November A: (The witness stood and pointed to her private part.)
29, 2005, she met Rodrigo in his house, thus:

Q: You also mentioned AAA that Uncle Rod inserted his

Q: Now, when you met the accused, what did he do? penis to your vagina, could you point to the "ari" of Uncle
Rod?
A: He brought me in the room, Ma'am.
A: (The witness pointed to a portion where the private part
Q: The room is located inside his house? of the elder brother was standing.)

A: Yes, Ma'am. Q: Was it painful when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside
your vagina?

5 | Judiciary
A: Yes, Ma'am. old, the ordinary world can be daunting. To be so young
and silently aware that one is the victim of such callous
depravation by Rodrigo, who she could have expected to
Q: Did you cry when Uncle Rod inserted his penis inside
take care of her, can create the kind of lasting fear that
your vagina?
diminishes the development of her own person and her own
convictions.
A: Yes, Ma'am.
In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a
Q: Did he stay long on top of you? At around how many charge of statutory rape since "[t]he law presumes that
minutes? such a victim, on account of her tender age, does not and
cannot have a will of her own."25
A: Very long, Ma'am.
Beyond reasonable doubt, Rodrigo Gutierez raped AAA, a
Q: Did he withdraw his penis from your vagina? minor who was only 10 years of age, on November 29,
2005.

A: Yes, Ma'am.
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code requires that the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed in cases of
Q: And after he withdrew his penis inside your vagina, what rape stated in the first paragraph of Article 266-A where
happened? there are no aggravating or qualifying circumstances
present. The lower courts correctly imposed this penalty.
A: There is some white liquid that came out of his penis,
Ma'am.22 Their award of damages, however, must be modified in light
of recent jurisprudence.
As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a
clear and categorical manner the ordeal that was done to It is settled that the award of civil indemnity is mandatory
her. As a child-victim who has taken significant risks in upon a finding that rape was committed, along with the
coming to court, her testimony deserves full weight and award of moral and exemplary damages.26 In People v.
credence. People v. Veloso23 stated that: Degay,27 the accused-appellant was found guilty of raping
his nine-year-old neighbor. This court did not hesitate to
In a litany of cases, this Court has ruled that the increase the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
testimonies of child-victims of rape are to be given full from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00. In People v. Gambao, 28 we
weight and credence. Reason and experience dictate that a have also increased the award of civil indemnity, moral
girl of tender years, who barely understands sex and damages, and exemplary damages to ₱100,000.00 each.
sexuality, is unlikely to impute to any man a crime so
serious as rape, if what she claims is not true. Her candid Due to the utter heinousness of the crime involved in this
narration of how she was raped bears the earmarks of case, we, therefore, exercise our judicial prerogative and
credibility, especially if no ill will-as in this case-motivates increase the damages to ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity,
her to testify falsely against the accused. It is well-settled ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱100,000.00 as
that when a woman, more so when she is a minor, says she exemplary damages.
has been raped, she says in effect all that is required to
prove the ravishment. The accused may thus be convicted
solely on her testimony-provided it is credible, natural, There are not enough words to condemn the depravity that
convincing and consistent with human nature and the one adult can do to a child-victim. The many years that
normal course of things.24 Rodrigo Gutierez will, by law, serve in prison will, of course,
not make up for the wrong and the injury that he has so
selfishly and callously caused and with utter disregard for
AAA's ordeal was supported by the testimonies of her what truly makes us human: that we care, nurture, and
teachers whose concern for her led to the discovery of the protect our children because we hope that they can make
crime. The medical certificate presented in court, together their world better than ours. All this was lost on Rodrigo
with the testimonies of the physicians, is consistent with the Gutierez. The five pesos that he gave on every occasion
finding that she was sexually abused. that he defiled his child-victim simply underscores the
ignominy of his act.
Rodrigo asserted that AAA's failure to cry out for help shows
reasonable doubt.1âwphi1 He noted that her house was just WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding
near his house where the incident happened. the accused-appellant Rodrigo Gutierez y Robles guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape is AFFIRMED
This argument is so feeble that it could only have been put with MODIFICATION. The accused-appellant is sentenced to
up out of desperation. reclusion perpetua and is ordered to pay AAA the amount of
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, with an
Rodrigo was referred to by the child-victim as "Uncle Rod." interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this decision
He admitted that AAA's family had known him for a long until its full satisfaction.
time. Rodrigo had the trust and respect that any elder in
the family of AAA had. Instead of providing the moral
guidance that his status allowed him, he took advantage of SO ORDERED.
AAA's youthful innocence to satiate his illicit carnal desires.
To cover this up and seemingly justify his actions, he gave
his child-victim the measly sum of five pesos. Rodrigo knew
that what he did was wrong; AAA would have probably
doubted whether such act was normal among adults. EN BANC

With his moral ascendancy, it would not be unreasonable to A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
assume that even the child-victim's desire for help would be
muffled by her fear of her "Uncle Rod." To a young 10-year-
6 | Judiciary
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is
Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.
RESOLUTION — Subject to the provisions of Section 12
of this Rule, default in the payment of
annual dues for six months shall warrant
 
suspension of membership in the
Integrated Bar, and default in such
CASTRO, C.J.: payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed delinquent member from the Roll of
practicing attorney in the Philippines. Attorneys.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in
Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule:
adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No.
MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency SECTION 1. Organization. — There is
of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the hereby organized an official national body
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the
Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership Philippines,' composed of all persons
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution whose names now appear or may
notwithstanding due notice. hereafter be included in the Roll of
Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President
Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the
for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, following words of the Court Rule:
Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which
reads:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member
of the Integrated Bar shall pay such
.... Should the delinquency further annual dues as the Board of Governors
continue until the following June 29, the shall determine with the approval of the
Board shall promptly inquire into the Supreme Court. ...
cause or causes of the continued
delinquency and take whatever action it
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above
shall deem appropriate, including a
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights
recommendation to the Supreme Court
in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition
for the removal of the delinquent
to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to
member's name from the Roll of
be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial
be sent by registered mail to the member
support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
and to the Secretary of the Chapter
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to
concerned.
liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he legal force and effect.
submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating
his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the
Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys,
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable
the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative
on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the
After the hearing, the parties were required to submit Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and
memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are
matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution. made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions
of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's exercise of the legal profession.
pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of
the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence The matters here complained of are the very same issues
conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled
features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition
the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively
Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
cited). ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend unanimous pronouncement that it was
to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 ... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing
Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas conscientious study of all the arguments
adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the

7 | Judiciary
 authoritative materials and the mass of occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to
factual data contained in the exhaustive restraints and burdens in order to secure the general
Report of the Commission on Bar prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
Integration, that the integration of the 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To
and legally unobjectionable'. ... this fundamental principle of government the rights of
individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without
which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the
prevail over authority because then society win fall into
Court.
anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an
undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar
associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
But the most compelling argument sustaining the
membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power
afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of
the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of
which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the following powers:
governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective
xxx xxx xxx
discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility
breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading,
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts,
a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the and the admission to the practice of law
offending member. 2 and the integration of the Bar ...,

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
by overriding considerations of public interest and public
welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and SECTION 1. Within two years from the
legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes approval of this Act, the Supreme Court
upon the personal interests and personal convenience of may adopt rules of Court to effect the
individual lawyers. 3 integration of the Philippine Bar under
such conditions as it shall see fit in order
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all to raise the standards of the legal
legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been profession, improve the administration of
uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
the police power over an important profession. The practice its public responsibility more effectively.
of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege
moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even
owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, looking solely to the language of the provision of the
and takes part in one of the most important functions of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional
degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in
interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression practice of law.
"affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject
to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York,
291 U.S. 502). Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal
profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said
profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. subject to the power of the body politic to require him to
6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of conform to such regulations as might be established by the
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent
such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's submit himself to such reasonable interference and
avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to interest in his concerns.
discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence,
the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining
the integration of the Bar through its Resolution On this score alone, the case for the respondent must
promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the already fall.
Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a
body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we
May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations now concisely deal with them seriatim.
of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the
demands of pressing public necessity.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the
Court is without power to compel him to become a member
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his
8 | Judiciary
constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a
member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment
constitutional freedom to associate. 6 ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of
Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is
of which he is not already a member. He became a member
inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed
of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that
necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the
integration actually does is to provide an official national
argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no
member. 8
less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task
to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar,
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a
with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to honorable profession and to protect the public from
which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or
interest in elevating the quality of professional legal prostituted. ..."
services, may require that the cost of improving the
profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ...
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense and the admission to the practice of law and the integration
compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon
such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the
power of the State. 10 legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of
provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of
membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional
that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and nor illegal.
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which
sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon
power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring
should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby
members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay
ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.
a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory
measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of

the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process and hence infringes on one of
his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a
property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the
holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police
power of the State, and under the necessary powers
granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the
respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not

a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must
bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of

the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its
Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and
are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions
and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are
legion. 14

9 | Judiciary
 which he had filed. Respondent judge responded by
voluntarily inhibiting herself from further consideration of
the case and ordered it forwarded to the Office of the Clerk
of Court for re-raffle. The case was eventually assigned to
Judge Manuel F. Dumatol of Branch 113 of the Pasay City
RTC.

A.M. No. RTJ-96-1338 September 5, 1997 Judge Lopez claims that on April 22, 1993, when the
judgment was promulgated with the reading of the
[Formerly OCA IPI-95-21-RTJ] dispositive portion, her decision was already prepared,
although to prevent leakage in the process of preparing it,
she withheld its dispositive portion until the day of its
ENGINEER FERNANDO S. DIZON, complainant, promulgation. Respondent judge states that after the
vs. dispositive portion had been read to complainant,
JUDGE LILIA C. LOPEZ, Regional Trial Court, Branch respondent gave it to Ma. Cleotilde Paulo (Social Worker II,
109, Pasay City, respondent. presently OIC of Branch 109) for typing and incorporation
into the text of the decision. The court found complainant
MENDOZA, J.: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of private
document under Art. 172, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Respondent states that the delay in furnishing complainant
This is a complaint charging Judge Lilia C. Lopez of the with a copy of the decision was unintentional.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City, with violation
of the Constitution, serious misconduct, inefficiency, and
falsification in connection with her decision in Criminal Case Respondent judge referred to difficulties she had in
No. 91-0716 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Engineer preparing her decision and to a series of personal problems
Fernando S. Dizon." which contributed to this delay in the release of her
decision, to wit: she has only two (2) stenographers to
attend to daily trials in her court, making it necessary for
It appears that on April 22, 1993, judgment was rendered, her to make use of the Social Worker assigned to her to
convicting complainant of falsification of private document. type her decisions. During the period January to December
The promulgation of the judgment consisted of reading the 1993 she had to dispose of 285 cases, apart from the fact
dispositive portion of the decision sentencing him to that there was an unusually big number of criminal, civil,
imprisonment, without serving a copy of the decision on and land registration cases as well as special proceedings
him. The accused and his counsel were told to return in a filed in her court which required the holding of hearings in
few days for their copy of the decision, but although the mornings and in the afternoons. During the same
petitioner and his father by turns went to the court to period, she went through some personal tragedies. She lost
obtain a copy of the decision they were not able to do so. her niece, Gloria Lopez Roque, whom she had raised from
To protect his right, complainant filed a partial motion for childhood, due to a hospital accident. This was followed by
reconsideration on May 5, 1993, expressly reserving his the death on March 1, 1992 of her mother, Margarita Lopez,
light to submit a more elaborate one upon receipt of the who had been under respondent's care for the past eight
decision. The hearing of the motion for reconsideration was years after suffering a stroke. On September 17, 1993,
scheduled on May 12, 1993, but the case was not called as respondent's father died of diabetes, renal failure,
complainant's counsel was told that the decision had not yet pneumonia, and cardiac arrest. Respondent was the one
been finished. On November 29, 1994, complainant filed an who single-handedly brought them in and out of the
"Omnibus Motion to Annul Promulgation of Sentence and to hospital because all her able-bodied relatives are abroad.
Dismiss" the case. On December 16, 1994, the date set for Respondent herself was found to be suffering from diabetes
hearing the motion, complainant was served a copy of the and hypertension, necessitating her treatment and leave of
decision, dated April 22, 1993, the dispositive portion of absence from September 27, 1994 to December 12, 1994,
which states: in addition to her other leaves of absence. Aside from
these, respondent's family suffered financial reverses
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused because of estafa committed against them.
Fernando Dizon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Falsification of Private Document as defined and On February 19, 1996, Deputy Court Administrator
penalized under Art. 172, par. 2 in relation to Art. 171 par. Bernardo P. Abesamis submitted a memorandum, finding
2 and 4 thereof and hereby sentences him to imprisonment the charge of violation of the Constitution to be without
of two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Six merit. He called attention to the written decision of
(6) Years and a fine of P5,000.00. respondent judge, which, albeit delivered to complainant
late, nonetheless states the facts and law on which it is
Complainant alleges that the failure of respondent judge to based. He likewise finds the charge of serious misconduct
furnish him a copy of the decision until almost one year and and falsification to be without basis in view of the absence
eight months after the promulgation of its dispositive of malice. However, he finds the charge of inefficiency to be
portion on April 22, 1993 constitutes a violation of Art. VIII, well founded on the basis of respondent's failure to furnish
§14 of the Constitution which prohibits courts from complainant or his counsel a copy of the decision within a
rendering decisions without expressing therein clearly and reasonable time after its promulgation. Hence, the Deputy
distinctly the facts and law on which they are based and Court Administration believes that Judge Lopez should be
§15 of the same Art. VIII, which provides that in all cases given admonition for her negligence, but recommends that
lower courts must render their decisions within three the other charges against her for violation of the
months from the date of their submission. He alleges Constitution, serious misconduct, and falsification be
further that he was denied the right to a speedy trial in dismissed for lack of merit.
violation of Art. III, §14(2) of the Constitution and that
Judge Lopez falsified her decision by antedating it and The Court finds that respondent violated Art. VIII, §15(1) of
including therein, as additional penalty, a fine of P5,000.00. the Constitution which provides:

On December 26, 1994, complainant filed another motion All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
for reconsideration after receiving a copy of the full decision Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty-four
of the court. On January 3, 1995, he moved to disqualify months from date of submission for the Supreme Court,
respondent from hearing the motions for reconsideration
10 | Judiciary
and, unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months only succeeds in showing that the judgment promulgated
for all lower collegiate courts and three months for all other on April 22, 1993 was a "sin perjuicio" judgment which was
lower courts. incomplete and needed a statement of the facts and law
upon which the judgment was based. As early as 1923, this
Court already expressed its disapproval of the practice of
Although respondent judge promulgated her decision within
rendering "sin perjuicio" judgments, what with all the
three months of the submission of the case for decision, the
uncertainties entailed because of the implied reservation
fact is that only the dispositive portion was read at such
that it is subject to modification when the decision is finally
promulgation. She claims that on April 22, 1993 the text of
rendered.3 This Court has expressed approval of the
her decision, containing her findings and discussion of
practice of some judges of withholding the dispositive
complainant's liability, had already been prepared although
portion from their opinions until the very last moment of
it had to be put in final form by incorporating the dispositive
promulgation of their judgment in order to prevent
portion. However, the fact is that it took a year and eight
leakage,4 but that refers to the preparation of their
months more before this was done and a copy of the
decision, not its promulgation. What must be promulgated
complete decision furnished the complainant on December
must be the complete decision. There would be no more
16, 1994. Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
reason to keep the dispositive portion a secret at the stage
provides:
of promulgation of judgment.

§1. Judgment defined. — The term judgment as used in this

However, the Court finds the other charges against
Rule means the adjudication by the court that the accused
respondent to be without merit.
is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the
imposition of the proper penalty and civil liability provided
for by law on the accused. First, the claim that complainant was deprived of his right to a
speedy trial by reason of respondent's failure to furnish him with a
copy of the decision until after one year and eight months is without
§2. Form and contents of judgment. — The judgment must basis. It appears that despite the destruction of records by fire in
be written in the official language, personally and directly the Pasay City Hall on January 18, 1992 the parties were required to
prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain submit simultaneously their memoranda on August 18, 1992. The
clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved or delay, if any, was not such "vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delay"5 as to justify finding a denial of the right to a speedy trial.
admitted by the accused and the law upon which the
The fact is that the reading of the sentence on April 22, 1993, albeit
judgment is based. not in compliance with the requirement for promulgation of
judgments, nonetheless put an end to trial.
§. Promulgation of judgment. — The judgment is
promulgated by reading the same in the presence of the Second, the delay in furnishing complainant a copy of the complete
accused and any judge of the court in which it was decision did not prejudice his right to appeal or file a motion for
rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, reconsideration. It is true that an accused must be given a copy of
the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his the decision in order to apprise him of the basis of such decision so
that he can intelligently prepare his appeal or motion for
counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or reconsideration. However, in accordance with the ruling in Director
outside of the province or city, the judgment may be of Lands v. Sanz,6 complainant's period to appeal or file a motion for
promulgated by the clerk of court. reconsideration did not begin to run until after he actually received a
copy of the judgment on December 16, 1994. He therefore suffered
no prejudice. If at all, complainant suffered from the anxiety to
It is clear that merely reading the dispositive portion of the refute a conviction which he could not do for lack of a statement of
decision to the accused is not sufficient. It is the judgment the basis of the conviction.
that must be read to him, stating the facts and the law on
which such judgment is based. Since this was done only on
Nonetheless, certain factors mitigate respondent judge's culpability.
December 16, 1994 when a copy of the complete decision Except for this incident, respondent's record of public service as
was served on complainant, it is obvious that the legal officer and agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, as
respondent failed to render her decision within three State Prosecutor, and later Senior State Prosecutor, of the
months as required by Art. VIII, §15 of the Constitution. Department of Justice for 17 years and as Regional Trial Judge for
more than 13 years now is unmarred by malfeasance, misfeasance
or wrongdoing. This is the first time she is required to answer an
If indeed all that had to be done after the dispositive administrative complaint against her. Her failure to decide the case
portion had been read in open court on April 22, 1993 was of complainant was brought about by factors not within her control,
to incorporate it in the text of the decision allegedly then to wit, lack of stenographers and unusually big number of cases;
already prepared, it is difficult to see why it took and her personal loss as a result of the death of her niece and both
respondent judge one year and eight more months before her parents, financial reverses of the family, and poor health as a
result of diabetes and hypertension.
she was able to do so. Respondent claims that she was
prevented from putting out her decision by a series of
personal and other problems which leads the Court to In Mangulabnan v.  Tecson,7 a joint decision in two criminal cases
believe that when she promulgated her sentence she had was rendered by respondent judge on February 24, 1978, six
months and eight days from submission of the case, and a copy was
not finished the preparation of the entire decision. At all
delivered to complainant on September 28, 1979, over 19 months
events, she could have applied for extension of time to after rendition of the decision. Two complaints were filed for
decide the case and put off the promulgation of judgment violation of the constitutional provision requiring submitted cases to
until she had finished it. be decided by lower courts within three months and for violation of
complainant's right to a speedy trial. Respondent judge blamed the
delay in deciding the cases on the fact that his clerks had misfiled
What respondent did in this case was to render what is the records. As to the delay in furnishing complainant with a copy of
known as a "sin perjuicio" judgment, which is a judgment the decision, the judge attributed this to the mistake of his clerk
without a statement of the facts in support of its conclusion who did not think complainant was entitled to receive the same. The
to be later supplemented by the final judgment.1 That is judge was reprimanded. The reason for the delay in that case was
why, in answer to complainant's charge that the dispositive even less excusable than the difficulties experienced by respondent
Judge Lopez, i.e., deaths in respondent's family, her own poor state
portion of the judgment read to him did not impose a fine,
of health, financial reverses suffered by her family, and the volume
respondent contends that the addition of the fine of of work done within the period in question, which somewhat
P5,000.00 was within her power to do even if no such fine mitigate her liability. The Court believes that a similar penalty would
had been included in the oral sentence given on April 22, be appropriate.
1993. As respondent judge states, because the decision was
not complete it could be modified and cites in support of her
contention the case of Abay, Sr. v. Garcia.2 Respondent

11 | Judiciary
In view of the foregoing, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED with the Office of the Ombudsman held that it is within its
WARNING that repetition of the same acts complained of will be jurisdiction to investigate the criminal charges of
dealt with more severely.SO ORDERED. respondent Judge against petitioner.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration6 of the foregoing

order, maintaining that the Office of the Ombudsman
should either refer Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 to the
Supreme Court for preliminary evaluation, or await the
G.R. No. 132177      July 19, 2001 latter’s resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ which
involves the same parties and subject matter. Otherwise,
petitioner argues, the absurd situation may result wherein
JUDGE JOSE F. CAOIBES, JR., petitioner, the Office of the Ombudsman files criminal charges against
vs. petitioner who, on the other hand, is declared without fault
THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN and JUDGE by the Supreme Court.
FLORENTINO M. ALUMBRES, respondents.
In the Order7 dated December 22, 1997, the Office of the
BUENA, J.: Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration and
required petitioner to submit a counter-affidavit within an
Petitioner Jose F. Caoibes, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch inextendible period of five (5) days from receipt thereof.
253 of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, seeks the
review of the following orders of the Office of the Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, asking for
Ombudsman: (1) the Order dated August 22, 1997 denying the reversal of the assailed Orders dated August 22, 1997
the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by and December 22, 1997 of the Office of the Ombudsman
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated December 22, 1997 and the issuance of a writ of injunction or temporary
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and restraining order, directing the Office of the Ombudsman to
directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other refrain from taking further action in the implementation of
controverting evidences. the challenged orders.

On May 23, 1997, respondent Florentino M. Alumbres, The issue in this case is whether or not the Office of the
Presiding Judge of Branch 255 of the Regional Trial Court of Ombudsman should defer action on case No. OMB-0-97-
Las Pinas City, filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, a 0903 pending resolution of Adm. Case No. 97-387-RTJ.
Criminal Complaint1 for physical injuries, malicious mischief
for the destruction of complainant’s eyeglasses, and assault
upon a person in authority. Respondent alleged therein that The issue is not novel. In Maceda vs. Vasquez,8 this Court
on May 20, 1997, at the hallway on the third floor of the resolved in the affirmative the issue of whether or not the
Hall of Justice, Las Pinas City, he requested petitioner to Ombudsman must defer action on a criminal complaint
return the executive table he borrowed from respondent; against a judge, or a court employee where the same arises
that petitioner did not answer so respondent reiterated his from their administrative duties, and refer the same to this
request but before he could finish talking, petitioner Court for determination whether said judge or court
blurted "Tarantado ito ah," and boxed him at his right employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
eyebrow and left lower jaw so that the right lens of his duties.
eyeglasses was thrown away, rendering his eyeglasses
unserviceable; and that respondent had the incident Invoking Section 15 of R.A. 6770, the Office of the
blottered with the Las Piñas Police Station. He prayed that Ombudsman refuses to refrain from taking cognizance of
criminal charges be filed before the Sandiganbayan against Case NO. OMB-0-97-0903 in favor of this Court on the
the petitioner. ground that, allegedly, the accusations therein against
petitioner constitute simple criminal charges falling within
On June 13, 1997, respondent Judge lodged another the parameters of its constitutional power and duty to
Complaint2 against petitioner, this time and administrative investigate and prosecute any act or omission of any public
case with the Supreme Court, docketed as Adm. Case No. officer or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust,
97-387-RTJ, praying for the dismissal of petitioner from the improper or inefficient.
judiciary on the ground of grave misconduct or conduct
unbecoming a judicial officer. Said complaint is based on Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770 grants, among others, the
the same facts as those in the complaint filed earlier with following powers and duties to the Office of the
the office of the Ombudsman. Ombudsman:

In the Order3 dated June 25, 1997, the Office of the "(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own, or on
Ombudsman required petitioner to file a counter-affidavit complaint by any person, any act or omission of
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof. Instead of filing a any public officer or employee, office or agency
counter-affidavit, petitioner filed on July 7, 1997 and "Ex- when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
Parte Motion for Referral to the Honorable Supreme unjust, improper, or inefficient. It has primary
Court,"4 praying that the Office of the Ombudsman hold its jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
investigation of Case No. OMB-0-97-0903 in abeyance, and Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
refer the same to the Supreme Court which, through the jurisdiction, it may takeover, at any stage, from
Office of the Court Administrator, is already investigating any investigatory agency of Government, the
what transpired on May 20, 1997. Petitioner contended that investigation of such cases;
the Supreme Court, not the Office of the Ombudsman, has
the authority to make a preliminary determination of the
"(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance,
respective culpability of petitioner and respondent Judge
any officer or employee of the Government, or of
who, both being members of the bench, are under its
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
exclusive supervision and control.
as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter, to perform and
On August 22, 197, the Office of the Ombudsman issued an expedite any act or duty required by law, or to
Order5 denying the motion for referral to the Supreme
Court. Invoking Section 15 (1) of Republic Act No. 6770,
12 | Judiciary
 stop, prevent and correct any abuse or impropriety court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of
in the performance of duties; Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is
only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and
court personnel’s compliance with all laws, and take the
"(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
proper administrative action against them if they commit
appropriate action against a public officer or
any violation thereof. No other branch of government may
employee at fault or who neglects to perform an
intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
act or discharge a duty required by law, and
doctrine of separation of powers.
recommend his removal, suspension, demotion,
fine, censure or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith, or enforce its disciplinary WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act..." hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
dismiss the complaint filed by respondent Judge Florentino
M. Alumbres and to refer the same to this Court for
The foregoing provisions supply the legal basis for the
appropriate action.1âwphi1.nêt
Ombudsman in maintaining its jurisdiction over the charges
of physical injuries, malicious mischief and assault upon a
person in authority filed by respondent Judge against SO ORDERED.
petitioner. This conclusion seems to be reinforced by
Section 16 of R.A. 6770 which states that the powers of the
Office of the Ombudsman apply to all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance committed by public officers
and employees during their tenure or office.

The Office of the Solicitor General in its Manifestations, in

Lieu of Comment, correctly opined and we quote:

"xxx the grant of the aforequoted powers to the

Office of the Ombudsman is not tantamount to
giving it exclusive authority thereon. In fact,
Section 15 (1) of R.A. 6770, which is relied upon
by the Office of the Ombudsman in its assailed
order, provides that it has primary, not exclusive,
jurisdiction over graft and corruption cases and
felonies committed by public officers in relation to
their office. Moreover, it was held in Sanchez vs.
Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993], that the
Ombudsman’s power under Section 15 (1) of R.A.
6770 is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged."9

It appears that the present case involves two members of

the judiciary who were entangled in a fight within court
premises over a piece of office furniture. Under Section 6,
Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court
which is vested with exclusive administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this
premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and
by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges
and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme
Court for determination as to whether and administrative
aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true
regardless of whether an administrative case based on the
act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is
already pending with the Court. For, aside from the fact
that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless
he is informed of it, he should give due respect for and
recognition of the administrative authority of the Court,
because in determining whether an administrative matter is
involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative
liabilities but also other administrative concerns, as is
clearly conveyed in the case of Maceda vs. Vasquez.10

The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to

its findings that a case before it does or does not have
administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court
of the exercise of its administrative prerogatives and to
arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned.
This is a dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on
judicial independence.

Maceda  is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional

power of administrative supervision over all courts and

13 | Judiciary
 Formaran, III, and Jose H. Afalla, an employee from the
Office of Asst. CSP (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr. The
defense on the other hand presented ten (10) witnesses:
respondent Justice Demetria, Asst. Chief State Prosecutor
(ACSP) Severino Gaña, Jr., Senior State Prosecutor (SSP)
Romeo Dañosos, Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai, MTC Judge
Orlando Siapno, Peter Young, Atty. Reinerio Paas, lawyer of
Go Teng Kok, Danilo J. Mijares, bodyguard of Go Teng Kok,
and Luisito Artiaga, official of the Philippine Amateur Track
and Field Association (PATAFA).
EN BANC

The facts as borne out by the evidence presented by the

A.M. No. 00-7-09-CA            March 27, 2001 prosecution are quite clear. In an Information dated 9
December 1998, SP Formaran III charged Yu Yuk Lai,
IN RE: DEROGATORY NEWS ITEMS CHARGING COURT together with her supposed nephew, a certain Kenneth
OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO Monceda y Sy alias William Sy, before the RTC of Manila,
DEMETRIA WITH INTERFERENCE ON BEHALF OF A Br. 18,5 with violation of Sec. 15, Art. III, RA 6425, as
SUSPECTED DRUG QUEEN: amended, for "conspiring, confederating and mutually
COURT OF APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DEMETRIO helping one another, with deliberate intent and without
G. DEMETRIA, respondent. authority of law . . . (to) willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
sell and deliver to a poseur-buyer three (3) kilograms, more
or less, of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu),
PER CURIAM: which is a regulated drug."6 Accused of non-bailable
offense, both Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth Monceda were held at
Men and women of the courts must conduct themselves the detention cell of the PNP Narcotics Group in Camp
with honor, probity, fairness, prudence and discretion. Crame, Quezon City. On 25 June 1999, accused Yu Yuk Lai
Magistrates of justice must always be fair and impartial. filed a Petition for Bail on the ground that the evidence of
They should avoid not only acts of impropriety, but all her guilt was not strong.
appearances of impropriety. Their influence in society must
be consciously and conscientiously exercised with utmost On 10 November 1999, upon receiving information that the
prudence and discretion. For, theirs is the assigned role of accused, especially Yu Yuk Lai, had been seen regularly
preserving the independence, impartiality and integrity of playing in the casinos of Heritage Hotel and the Holiday Inn
the Judiciary. Pavilion, SP Formaran III filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to
Transfer the Detention of the Accused to the City Jail.7 On
The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates a judge to "refrain the same day, Judge Perfecto A. S. Laguio, Jr., granted the
from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or motion and ordered the immediate transfer of the two (2)
dispute pending before another court or administrative accused to the Manila City Jail.8
agency."1 The slightest form of interference cannot be
countenanced. Once a judge uses his influence to derail or On 18 January 2000, Judge Laguio, Jr., concluded that "the
interfere in the regular course of a legal or judicial evidence standing alone and unrebutted, is strong and
proceeding for the benefit of one or any of the parties sufficient to warrant conviction of the two accused for the
therein, public confidence in the judicial system is crime charged" and denied the petition for bail of accused
diminished, if not totally eroded. Yu Yuk Lai for lack of merit.9 Consequently, both accused
filed a Joint Motion for Inhibition arguing that the trial
Such is this administrative charge triggered by newspaper court's actuation "do not inspire the belief that its decision
accounts which appeared on the 21 July 2000 issues of The would be just and impartial."10 On 28 January 2000, Judge
Manila Standard, The Manila Times, Malaya, The Philippine Laguio, Jr., believing that the joint motion was utterly
Daily Inquirer and Today. The national dailies collectively without merit but considering the gravity of the offense and
reported that Court of Appeals Associate Justice Demetrio for the peace of mind of the accused, inhibited himself. 11
G. Demetria tried to intercede on behalf of suspected
Chinese drug queen Yu Yuk Lai, alias Sze Yuk Lai, who went The case was re-raffled to Branch 53, presided by Judge
in and out of prison to play in a Manila casino.2 Angel V. Colet. Accused Yu Yuk Lai then filed a Motion to
Order the Confinement of the Accused in a Hospital. Before
That same day, 21 July 2000, Chief Justice Hilario G. Judge Colet could resolve the motion, the case was handled
Davide, Jr., issued a Memorandum to Justice Demetria by the Branch's Pairing Judge Manuel T. Muro.
directing him to comment on the derogatory allegations in
the news items.3 On 24 July 2000, Justice Demetria On 15 May 2000 Judge Muro granted accused Yu Yuk Lai's
submitted his Compliance. Subsequently, Chief State motion and allowed her to be confined at the Manila Doctors
Prosecutor (CSP) Jovencito R. Zuño, who disclosed to the Hospital for a period not exceeding seven (7)
media the name of Justice Demetria, and State Prosecutor days,12 contrary to the recommendation of Dr. Jose Estrada
(SP) Pablo C. Formaran III, a member of the Task Force on Rosal, Chief of the Health Services of the Manila City Jail,
Anti-Narcotics Cases of the Department of Justice (DOJ) that Yu Yuk Lai be confined at the Philippine General
prosecuting the case of the suspected Chinese drug queen, Hospital.13
filed their respective Comments on the Compliance of
Justice Demetria.4
On 5 June 2000 Judge Muro granted Yu Yuk Lai's Urgent
Motion for Extension of Medical Confinement "for a period of
On 8 August 2000, the Court En Banc ordered an one (1) month, or until such time that she is fit to be
investigation and designated Mme. Justice Carolina C. discharged from the said hospital."14 On 7 July 2000 Judge
Griño-Aquino as Investigator and Court Administrator Muro also granted Yu Yuk Lai's Motion for Leave of Court to
Alfredo L. Benipayo as Prosecutor. An investigation then File Demurrer to Evidence with Motion to Admit Demurrer
commenced on 22 August 2000 and continued until 16 to Evidence.15 Soon, rumors circulated in the Manila City
November 2000. Hall that Judge Muro was partial towards accused Yu Yuk
Lai.
The Prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely, CSP
Zuño, SP Formaran III, Agnes P. Tuason, secretary of SP
14 | Judiciary
The rumors did not end there. On 6 July 2000 unidentified Thereafter, SP Formaran III went to see CSP Zuño and
employees of the RTC Manila calling themselves informed the latter of what had transpired. CSP Zuño
"CONCERNED COURT EMPLOYEES" wrote the Secretary of replied, "No way!" SP Formaran III also told ACSP Guiyab,
Justice, copy furnished the Chief State Prosecutor, the Jr., who gave the same reply.22
Ombudsman, and Judge Muro. The letter alleged that Judge
Muro ordered the hospitalization of Yu Yuk Lai "even if she
At around 3:00 o'clock that same afternoon, CSP Zuño
(was) not sick and there (was) already a rumor circulating
received a call from Justice Demetria who requested him to
around the City Hall, that the notorious Judge had given the
instruct SP Formaran III to withdraw the motion for
go signal to the counsel of the accused to file the Motion to
inhibition of Judge Muro so that the Judge could already
Quash, which (would) be granted for a consideration of
issue an order. "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor
millions of pesos and the contact person (was) allegedly the
Formaran na i-withdraw na iyong kanyang Motion to Inhibit
daughter of the Judge, who is an employee in the said
para naman makagawa na ng Order si Judge Muro," Justice
branch."16
Demetria was quoted as saying.23 Politely, CSP Zuño said
that he would see what he could do. "Tingnan ko po kung
Accordingly on 14 July 2000, SP Formaran III filed a Motion ano ang magagawa ko."24
for Inhibition praying that Judge Muro inhibit himself "from
further handling this case and/or from resolving the
On 20 July 2000, The Philippine Daily Inquirer reported that
demurrer to evidence filed by the accused Yu Yuk Lai as
a "Supreme Court Justice . . . and an outspoken sports
well as any other pending incidents therein." 17
person and leader"25 had been exerting "undue pressure" on
the DOJ to go slow in prosecuting re-arrested drug queen
On 16 July 2000, at around 7:30 o'clock in the morning, Yu Yuk Lai. That same afternoon, the names of Justice
while she was supposed to be confined at the Manila Demetria and Mr. Go Teng Kok were disclosed to the media
Doctors Hospital, accused Yu Yuk Lai was arrested inside to clear the name of the Supreme Court justices who might
the VIP room of the Casino Filipino at the Holiday Inn have been affected by the erroneous news report. The
Pavilion, Manila, while playing baccarat. She was following day, 21 July 2000, several newspapers named
unescorted at the time of her arrest. Justice Demetria and Go Teng Kok as "drug lawyers."

On 18 July 2000, at 9:00 o'clock in the morning, the Motion Also on 20 July 2000 the DOJ received a copy of an Order
for Inhibition of Judge Muro was heard and submitted for dated 19 July 2000 of Judge Muro inhibiting himself from
resolution. Later, at around 11:30 o'clock, when SP further hearing the case of Yu Yuk Lai and Kenneth
Formaran III arrived in his office from the hearing, he was Monceda.26
informed by his secretary, Agnes Tuason, that the staff of
Court of Appeals Justice Demetrio Demetria had called
Respondent Justice Demetria, for his part, vehemently
earlier and said that the Justice wanted to speak with him.
denied having interceded for Yu Yuk Lai. While he admitted
The caller requested for a return call. As requested, SP
that he indeed visited the DOJ on 18 July 2000, he went
Formaran III immediately returned the call of Justice
there to "visit old friends" and his meeting Go Teng Kok
Demetria but the Justice had already gone out for lunch.
whom he did not know until that time was purely
accidental. Expectedly, Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok
Later in the afternoon, between 1:30 and 2:00 o'clock, corroborated the claim of respondent Justice.
Justice Demetria, PATAFA President Go Teng Kok and Atty.
Reinerio Paas, lawyer of Go Teng Kok and a close friend of
Justice Demetria explained that he merely requested SP
Justice Demetria, went to the office of SP Formaran III in
Formaran III "to do something to help Go Teng Kok about
the DOJ which SP Formaran III shares with SP Albert
the case" without ever specifying the kind of "help" that he
Fonacier. Apparently, Justice Demetria was not familiar with
requested. He averred that it was purely on the basis of
SP Formaran III as he greeted SP Fonacier "Kamusta ka,
erroneous impression and conjecture on the part of SP
Prosecutor Formaran?"18
Formaran III that he impliedly asked him to withdraw the
motion "because that is what Mr. Go Teng Kok was
Soon the visitors were seated. Go Teng Kok immediately appealing and requesting."27 Respondent claimed that the
pleaded with SP Formaran III to withdraw his motion to "help" he was requesting could well be "within legal bounds
inhibit Judge Muro as this would purportedly delay the or line of duty."
resolution of the case. Go Teng Kok also expressed his
apprehension that if Judge Muro would inhibit, a new judge
Justice Demetria claimed that if ever he said anything else
might convict his friend, accused Yu Yuk Lai, who was then
during the discussion between Go Teng Kok and SP
already receiving bad publicity.
Formaran III, such was not a form of intervention. He only
admonished Go Teng Kok "to cool it" when the discussion
Justice Demetria then asked about the status of the case. between the prosecutor and Go Teng Kok became heated.
SP Formaran III informed the Justice that a motion for While he asked about the status of the case this, he said,
inhibition has been submitted for resolution, one basis of demonstrated his lack of knowledge about the case and
which was the unsigned letter of the concerned court bolstered his claim that he could not have possibly
employees. Justice Demetria opined that it was a bit interceded for Yu Yuk Lai.
dangerous to anchor the inhibition of a judge on an
unsigned, anonymous letter. The Justice then advised Go
Respondent Justice likewise argued that the bases of his
Teng Kok who was becoming persistent to "keep his cool"
identification by CSP Zuño as the Justice exerting undue
and asked SP Formaran III if he could do something to help
pressure on the DOJ were all hearsay. Respondent
Go Teng Kok. Apparently, prior to 18 July 2000, Go Teng
submitted that CSP Zuño based his identification from a
Kok had already been asking SP Formaran III to go slow in
newspaper account, from the statement of his secretary
prosecuting accused Yu Yuk Lai.19 SP Formaran III at first
that it was he (Justice Demetria) who was on the other end
politely declined the request. But later, "just to put an end
of the telephone and from SP Formaran III when the latter
to (the) conversation," 20 he told them that he would bring
consulted the Chief State Prosecutor about the visit of the
the matter to CSP Zuño. "Iyon pala," Justice Demetria
Justice and Go Teng Kok impliedly asking him to withdraw
replied. The Justice then stood up, bade good bye and left.
the motion.
Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok followed closely behind.21

In defense of respondent Justice, Atty. Paas stated that it

was actually he, not Justice Demetria, who later called up
15 | Judiciary
CSP Zuño to inquire about the latter's decision regarding Even the requested "help" for Go Teng Kok, whom
the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit since SP Formaran respondent Justice claims he did not know and met only
III had earlier told Go Teng Kok that the matter would be that time, could not have meant any other assistance but
taken up with his superiors. the withdrawal of the motion to inhibit Judge Muro. True,
Justice Demetria never categorically asked SP Formaran III
to withdraw his Motion. But when respondent Justice
In fine, respondent Justice Demetria maintains that it is
Demetria asked the state prosecutor at that particular time
inconceivable for him to ask SP Formaran III whom he just
"to do something . . . to help Mr. Go Teng Kok," the latter
met for the first time to do something for Go Teng Kok
was pleading for the withdrawal of the motion, and nothing
whom he claims he just likewise met for the first time.
else. That was the only form of "help" that Go Teng Kok
Neither did he know Yu Yuk Lai, a claim Yu Yuk Lai herself
wanted. The subtle pressure exerted simply pointed to one
corroborated. It would be unthinkable for him to intercede
particular act. Thus, subsequently respondent Justice called
in behalf of someone he did not know. Indeed respondent
CSP Zuño to ask for just that — the withdrawal of the
Justice asserted that his meeting Go Teng Kok on 18 July
motion to inhibit Judge Muro.
2000 at the DOJ was purely coincidence, if not accidental.

Justice Demetria also claimed that he, together with Atty.

So, did respondent Justice Demetria really intercede in
Paas, went to the DOJ, first, to see Secretary Artemio
behalf of suspected drug queen Yu Yuk Lai?
Tuquero and seek assistance in the appointment of Atty.
Paas to the Court of Appeals, and second, to "visit old
Investigating Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino believes so. friends,"32 and that the meeting with Go Teng Kok was
In her Report dated 5 January 2001, she found respondent purely accidental. But respondent Justice never mentioned
Justice Demetria "guilty of violating Rule 2.04, Canon 2, in his earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the Chief
Code of Judicial Conduct" and recommended that Justice that his primary purpose in going to the DOJ was to
"appropriate disciplinary action be taken against him by this see Sec. Tuquero, and since Sec. Tuquero was not in, he
Honorable Court."28 instead decided to see some officials/prosecutors whom he
had not visited for a long time.
Only rightly so. The evidence is clear, if not overwhelming,
and damning. Thus, even the Senate Committee on Justice We find this assertion difficult to accept. For, even his very
and Human Rights, after a hearing, found that "there was a own witnesses belied his alibi. ACSP Gaña, Jr. testified and
conspiracy to commit the following offenses on the part of confirmed that Justice Demetria only said "hi."33 SSP
CA Associate Justice Demetrio Demetria and PATAFA Dañosos, denied seeing him and claimed that it was only
President Go Teng Kok and Miss Yu Yuk Lai: obstruction of Atty. Paas who peeped into his room.34 Suspiciously, it was
justice punishable under PD No. 1829 and Article 3(a) of RA really in the office of SP Formaran III, whom respondent
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act."29 Justice Demetria did not know, where Justice Demetria,
Atty. Paas and Go Teng Kok decided to "stay a while."35
While Justice Demetria vehemently denied interfering with
the criminal case, his denial cannot stand against the Thus, as found by Mme. Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino,
positive assertions of CSP Zuño and SP Formaran the Investigating Justice, Justice Demetria and company
III,30 which are consistent with natural human experience. could not have been there to exchange pleasantries with
To accept the testimony of the defense witnesses that it SPs Formaran III and Fonacier since they were not
was Atty. Paas who telephoned CSP Zuño, and not Justice acquainted with each other. Prior to this incident, Justice
Demetria, and that the "help" the respondent Justice was Demetria did not personally know either SP Formaran III or
requesting SP Formaran III was something "within legal SP Fonacier, a fact corroborated by respondent himself.36
bounds or line of duty" other than the withdrawal of the
motion is to strain too far one's imagination.
All of these contradict and belie respondent Justice
Demetria's earlier Compliance to the Memorandum of the
The testimony of CSP Zuño is plainly unambiguous and Chief Justice that "[b]ecause Prosecutor Formaran is also a
indubitably consistent with the other facts and friend, we decided to drop by his office . . . (and) I stayed a
circumstances surrounding the case — while."37

CSP Zuño: As far as I could recall Justice Demetria As pointed out by the Investigating Justice, respondent
said, "Pakisabi mo nga kay State Prosecutor Justice was there "to join forces with Go Teng Kok in
Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion arguing for the withdrawal of Formaran's Motion for
to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Inhibition of Judge Muro, which was the real purpose of
Judge Muro."31 their visit to SP Formaran and to the DOJ. The uncanny
coincidence in the timing of Justice Demetria's visit to SP
In his discussion with Go Teng Kok and Justice Demetria, Formaran's office, and that of Go Teng Kok, could not have
SP Formaran III said that he would consult his superiors been 'accidental' but pre-arranged."38 And, "visiting old
regarding the proposal to withdraw the motion. The timely friends" only came as an afterthought. The circumstances
telephone call to CSP Zuño was thus a logical follow-up. simply show that Justice Demetria and Atty. Paas, together
And no one could have made the call except respondent with Go Teng Kok, did not go to the DOJ to see Sec.
Justice since it is not uncommon for anyone to believe that Tuquero, but to visit, if not "pressure," CSP Zuño and SP
CSP Zuño would recognize the voice of respondent Justice Formaran III.
who was CSP Zuño's former superior in the DOJ. Thus, the
confident utterance "[p]akisabi mo nga kay State Justice Demetria also claimed that it is inconceivable for
Prosecutor Formaran na iwithdraw na iyong kanyang Motion him to help Yu Yuk Lai and Go Teng Kok, both of whom he
to Inhibit para naman makagawa ng Order si Judge Muro" did not personally know, and more unthinkable that he
could not have come from anyone else but from respondent would be asking help from SP Formaran III whom he had
Justice who had moral ascendancy over CSP Zuño, he being just met for the first time.
a Justice of the Court of Appeals and a former
Undersecretary and at one time Acting Secretary of the
The argument cannot be sustained. It is admitted that
DOJ.
respondent is a very close friend of Atty. Paas, lawyer of Go
Teng Kok. And, it is not necessary that respondent Justice
Demetria be acquainted with Go Teng Kok, Yu Yuk Lai or SP

16 | Judiciary
Formaran III for him to intercede in behalf of the accused.
It is enough that he is a close friend of the lawyer of Go
Teng Kok, who has been helping the accused, and that he
wields influence as a former DOJ Undersecretary and later,
Acting Secretary, and now, a Justice of the Court of
Appeals.

In sum, we find the testimonies of the prosecution

witnesses convincing and trustworthy, as compared to
those of the defense which do not only defy natural human
experience but are also riddled with major inconsistencies
which create well-founded and overriding doubts.

The conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an

office charged with the dispensation of justice is
circumscribed with the heavy of responsibility. His at all
times must be characterized with propriety and must be
above suspicion.39 His must be free of even a whiff of
impropriety, not only with respect to the performance of his
judicial duties, but also his behavior outside the courtroom
and as a private individual.

Unfortunately, respondent Justice Demetrio Demetria failed

failed to live up to this expectation. Through his
indiscretions, Justice Demetria did not only make a mockery
of his high office, but also caused incalculable damage to
the entire Judiciary. The mere mention of his name in the
national newspapers, allegedly lawyering for a suspected
drug queen and interfering with her prosecution seriously
undermined the integrity of the entire Judiciary.

Although every office in the government service is a public

trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness tha a seat in the
Judiciary.40 High ethical principles and a sense of propriety
should be maintained, without which the faith of the people
in the Judiciary so indispensable in orderly society cannot
be preserved.41 There is simply no place in the Judiciary for
those who cannot meet the exacting standards of judicial
conduct and integrity.42

WHEREFORE, we sustain the findings of the Investigating

Justice and hold Justice Demetrio G. Demetria GUILTY of
violating Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. He is
ordered DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to his appointment or
reappointment to any government office, agency or
instrumentality, including any government owned or
controlled corporation or institution.

SO ORDERED.

17 | Judiciary