DELUGE SYSTEMS

FALSE OPERATIONS
Deluge Water/Foam Systems:
False operations result in
significant water/Foam
damages and might also cause
destruction by fire!
Deluge Foam Systems:
In case of Fire, the Main Valve might be
close (Management Decision wary about
false operations).
I witnessed several cases, when following an
annunciation, the employees fearing false
deluge, rushed to close the main valve before
making sure it was not a fire!!
Deluge Foam Systems:
Obviously, False Operation might defeat
the Whole Fire Protection notion, yet
there is very little in the Standards to
cope with this problem
 MAIN CAUSES OF DELUGE
SYSTEM FALSE ACTIVATION
• Deluge Valve Related Causes
• False Detection Initiation
• Manual Activation
DELUGE VALVE RELATED CAUSES, Cont.d.,

Surge Pressure in the Supply Line.

While the normal max. pressure in a

system is 12 bars, the actual surge
pressure may exceed 25 bars, causing
opening of the valve.
DELUGE VALVE RELATED CAUSES, Cont.d.,
The Source of a Surge Pressure:
In case of several deluge system fed
from the same Mains and Pump room,
a surge pressure might be created by the
initiation of one of these system.
DELUGE VALVE RELATED CAUSES, Cont.d.,
The Source of a Surge Pressure, Cont,d.,:
4x8” Deluge Valves open simultaneously
Causing pressure drop to ZERO.
Then 6000 GPM Pumps Start…
Imaging Pumps falling down from a
Cliff
DELUGE VALVE RELATED CAUSES, Cont.d.,

It is not only causing FALSE activation

of the second system, but it might
deplete the water supply necessary for
the first activated system resulting in
FAILED EXTINGUISHMENT of this
system!!
Disintegration
of 2x10”, 8” and
4” Pipes due to
8” deluge valve
opening. About
300m long
piping
collapsed.
DELUGE VALVE RELATED CAUSES
Most of the False Deluge initiations
are caused by “Unwanted Alarm”.

Investing heavily in the Water Based

System creates a tendency to
compromise on the detection system.
NFPA 11- False operations
Aircraft Hangars: US Millions $
Potential Losses.

There are several reports from

the USA about false activation
of foam systems.
NFPA 11- False operations
A case we investigated: HiEX
system caused $2.5 Million loss
in a Storage Hall.
NFPA 11- False operations

Ten (10) other false

operations resulted each in
several $ 100K loss.
NFPA 15- Water Deluge System
Water Deluge system protects 60MW
Transformer.
There was a False Operation, the
Transformer was tripped. The
consequential losses: Several Millions US $
We Shall see later several
cases of False operation
FALSE OPERATION AND
DETECTION RELATED
REFERENCE IN
STANDARDS
REFERENCE STANDARDS
NFPA 11: Foam Systems- No reference.

NFPA 12: CO2 Gas extinguishing. Some

remarks about FACP causes of false operation in
the Appendix.

NFPA 15: Instructions regarding Smoke

Detection and some reference for false alarm.
REFERENCE STANDARDS
NFPA 409: Some Remarks about
detection system. Almost nothing about
false operation.
NFPA 2001: Gas Extinguishing Systems-
No much reference.
NFPA 2010: Aerosol Extinguishing- Some
Reference.
NFPA 11- Deluge Foam
Systems: None, except for
reference to environment.

NFPA 15 is much better! See next slide

NFPA® 11-2016 Edition
Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-
Expansion Foam
4.9.2 Automatically Actuated Systems.
4.9.2.1 An automatic system shall be activated by
automatic detection equipment.
4.9.2.2 Operation shall be controlled by listed or
approved mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, or
pneumatic means.
NFPA® 11, Cont.d.,
4.9.2.5* Automatic Detection Equipment.
A.4.9.2.5 See applicable sections of NFPA 72.
4.9.2.5.1 Automatic detection equipment — whether
pneumatic, hydraulic, or electric — shall be provided
with supervision arranged so that failure of equipment or
loss of supervising air pressure or loss of electric energy
results in positive notification of the abnormal condition.
4.9.2.5.2 Where approved by the AHJ, small systems for
localized hazards shall be permitted to be unsupervised.
NFPA 11. C-6: HIGH AND MEDIUM EXPANSION FOAM
6.7 Operation and Control of Systems
6.7.1* Detection of Fires.
6.7.1.1 Automatic detection shall be used for fixed systems.
6.7.1.1.1* Removal of automatic detection shall be permitted
when approved by the AHJ.
6.7.1.2* Automatic detection shall be by listed or approved
methods or devices capable of detection and indicating heat,
smoke, or flame. Automatic detection devices shall be installed
in accordance with NFPA 72.
NFPA 12-CO2 Extinguishing
A.4.5.2 Modern solid-state circuits, including microprocessors, are
capable of responding to extremely short electrical impulses.
While response to such transient signals is a desirable characteristic
for some types of devices, it is an extremely undesirable
characteristic for control units used to discharge carbon dioxide.
Control units for releasing carbon dioxide systems must be designed
to prevent unwanted discharges due to transient electrical impulses
and to actuate pre-discharge alarms and time delays before
discharging carbon dioxide.
NFPA 12-CO2 Extinguishing
A.4.5.2 Modern solid-state circuits, Cont.d,
Undesired transient impulses can be introduced into the control
panel from sources external to the panel, or unwanted transients can
be generated within the control panel itself.
For example, a microprocessor could produce undesired transient
impulses for various reasons. Designs must incorporate technology
to prevent discharge of carbon dioxide in the event that a
microprocessor in the control unit emits spurious signals. If circuits
that initiate carbon dioxide discharge are not designed to ignore
such transients, an unwanted discharge could result.
NFPA 15- Std. for Fixed Spray
System: Addresses the detection
system in some details for the purpose of
operation with some reference for false
alarm.

See Chapter 6 Installation Requirements

NFPA 15- Chapter 6, Cont.d.,
6.5.2.1 The selection, location, and spacing of automatic fire
detectors for the actuation of fixed water spray systems shall
meet or exceed the applicable requirements of NFPA 72,
National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code, and be consistent
with the following:
(1) Data obtained from field experience
(2) Tests
(3) Engineering surveys
(4) Manufacturer’s recommendations
(5) Detectors’ listing criteria
NFPA 15- 6.5.2.1 Cont.d.,
(6) Nature of the hazard being protected
(7) Both normal and abnormal air velocities
(8) Range of anticipated temperatures
(9) Maximum expected rates of temperature change under non-fire
conditions
(10) Number and height of structural levels
(11) Effects of precipitation (rain and snow)
(12) Presence and magnitude of electromagnetic interference
(13) Presence of obstructions that might retard or mitigate timely
detection
(14) Other conditions that might affect the efficacy of the fire
detection employed
NFPA 15- 6.5.2.1 Cont.d.,
6.5.2.2 Detectors shall be located so as to promptly
respond to a fire, flammable gas release, or other
design condition.
6.5.2.2.1 The detection system shall be capable of
detecting a fire up to the elevation of the highest
level of protected equipment surface.
6.5.2.2.2 Detectors shall be located so that no portion
of the hazard being protected extends beyond the
perimeter line detectors.
See NAPA 15, Chapter 7- Design Objectives

7.7 Automatic Detection Equipment.

7.7.1* General. Detection systems providing an
actuation signal to fixed water spray systems shall be
designed in accordance with NFPA 72, National Fire
Alarm and Signaling Code.
7.7.2 The spacing, location, and position of detectors
shall be in accordance with 6.5.2.
See NFPA 15, Chapter 7- Design Objectives
7.7.3* The following shall be evaluated when selecting and
adjusting detection equipment:
(1) Normally changing conditions
(2) Non-fire temperature changes

7.7.4* Response Time.

7.7.4.1 The detection system shall be designed to cause
actuation of the system actuation valve to operate without
delay.
7.7.4.2 Where ambient conditions exist that cause false
system operations, detection systems shall be permitted to
include delays that would override these conditions.
See NAPA 15, Chapter 12 Ultra-High-Speed Water Spray Systems

12.3.14 Detection.

12.3.14.1 General. The detection systems

shall be in accordance with NFPA 72,
National Fire Alarm Code.
 See NAPA 15, Chapter 12 Ultra-High-Speed Water Spray Systems
12.3.14.2 Sensing devices shall be as follows:
(1) Response characteristics:
(a) Radiant energy-sensing devices capable of sensing the expected
wavelength emissions of the materials in combustion.
(b) Other types of sensing devices having equivalent response
characteristics to radiant energy-sensing devices shall be permitted
to be used.
(2) Protected from physical damage
(3) Suitable for the electrical area classification where they are
installed
(4) Accessible for testing, cleaning, and maintenance
(5) Aimed and adjusted to minimize false actuation
 See NAPA 15, Chapter 12 Ultra-High-Speed Water Spray Systems

12.3.15 Control Panel.

12.3.15.1 The control panel shall conform to the requirements
of NFPA 72, National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code.
12.3.15.2 The control panel shall be located in an area
protected from physical injury and from electromagnetic
energy emitted from other electrical devices that could induce
false actuation.
12.3.15.3 Control panel enclosures shall be rated for the
ambient environment where they are located.
NFPA 409- Aircraft Hangars, Cont.d.,;
6.2.8 Detection and Actuation System Design.
6.2.8.1 General.
6.2.8.1.1 Actuation systems shall be provided with
complete circuit supervision and shall be arranged in
accordance with Section 6.4.
6.2.8.1.2 These detectors shall be installed in accordance
with NFPA 72.
6.2.8.1.3 Detection systems shall be provided with
supervision as required by NFPA 72.
NFPA 409- Aircraft Hangars, Cont.d.,;
Chapter 7: High Expansion System & Pre-Action

7.7 Detection and Actuation Systems.

7.7.1 Detectors for actuating pre-action

sprinkler systems shall be Rate-of-rise, Fixed-
temperature, or Rate-compensation type.
Note: These type have very slow response!!
NFPA 409- Aircraft Hangars, Cont.d.,;
Chapter 7: High Expansion System

7.7.2 Detectors for actuating high- or low-

expansion foam systems shall be rate-of-rise,
fixed-temperature, or rate compensation
type or water flow of a wet pipe sprinkler
system.
Note: These type have very slow response!!
NFPA 409- Aircraft Hangars, Cont.d.,;
Chapter 7: High Expansion System & Pre-Action

7.7.3 These detectors shall be

installed in accordance with NFPA 72.

7.7.4 Detection systems shall be

provided with supervision as required
by NFPA 72.
NFPA 2001-Gas Extinguishing;
Abort Switch is necessary.
No guidelines for “prevention”.
NFPA 2010-Aerosol Extinguishing

6.4.6* Unwanted System Operation.

Care shall be taken to thoroughly evaluate
and correct any factors that could result
in unwanted discharges.
NFPA 72- Detection; The
term used is: “Unwanted
Alarm”. But there is no reference
for extinguishing systems except
for “Abort Switch” if exist.
NFPA 72- National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code

3.3.304* Unwanted Alarm. Any alarm that occurs

that is not the result of a potentially hazardous
condition.
3.3.304.1 Malicious Alarm. An unwanted activation
of an alarm initiating device caused by a person
acting with malice.
NFPA 72- National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code

3.3.304.2* Nuisance Alarm. An unwanted activation of a

signaling system or an alarm initiating device in response
to a stimulus or condition that is not the result of a
potentially hazardous condition. 3.3.304.3 Unintentional
Alarm. An unwanted activation of an alarm initiating
device caused by a person acting without malice.
3.3.304.4 Unknown Alarm. An unwanted activation of an
alarm initiating device or system output function where
the cause has not been identified.
NFPA 72- Cont.d.,
Unwanted alarms might be intentional, unintentional, or
unknown. If they were caused intentionally, they might have
been done by someone with the intent to cause disruption and
should be classified as malicious.
However, an unintentional alarm might occur when, for
example, a child activated a manual fire alarm box not
knowing the consequences. Similarly, someone accidentally
causing mechanical damage to an initiating device that results
in an alarm is causing an unintentional alarm.
NFPA 72- Cont.d.,
A.3.3.304 Unwanted Alarm. Unwanted alarms are any
alarms that occur when there is no hazard condition
present.
These are sometimes also called false alarms.
Because the term false has been used by many people to
mean many different things, this Code is instead using
the terms unwanted, fault, nuisance, unintentional,
unknown, and malicious to categorize the different types
of alarms.
THE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEM,
What do we get?
The Foam Designer System, being a
“Water Engineer” has no Idea.
The Fire Detection Designer being an
Electrical / Electronic Engineer, has no
idea about the Foam /Deluge system
requirements.
Detection Approved System, what is this:
There is UL approval Standard,

UL 864 Standard for Control Units and

Accessories for Fire Alarm Systems –
Edition 9

Edition 10 is dated Dec 1, 2014 to be

effective Dec 1, 2018
UL 864 Standard, Cont.d.,
More Stringent Testing to reduce
False Alarm.
In Israel Systems are Approved
based on older UL edition .
Probable adoption of Edition 9 in
2017, 10 years after the official
adoption in the US
UL 864 Standard, Cont.d.,
For the approval Detection Lab., the
“Detection” is of importance.

For the Deluge System’s designer, the

mere detection is less important than
the releasing role both in terms of
operation and reliability.
Detection Reliability
One Addressable Loop to which many
detectors are connected, many none
water proof connection boxes are
unreliable.
After one test the detection system
circuity is wet. The system is approved
but the damage remains….
Releasing Reliability

To achieve better reliability use a

Dedicated Releasing Module or Panel
rather than an “Output Module” for the
job.
CODES REFERENCE SUMMARY

The only “respectable” reference to

false operation is by NFPA 15, NFPA
2010 and Some Explanation in
NFPA-12.
CAUSES OF FALSE OPERATION:
• Unwanted Activation of the FACP:
• Detectors responding to none-fire
elements such as Dust, Steam, Water Fog,
Exposure to moisture, corrosion….
• Human Error
• Intentional Activation.
CAUSES OF FALSE OPERATION: Detectors

In the case of Linear Beam Detectors:

Any Obscuration, Misalignment, Partial
Obstruction, Lighting Fixtures as well as
wrong positioning.
CAUSES OF FALSE OPERATION: Detectors

The New “OSID” Detectors are supposed to

respond only to smoke particles via UV and
IR radiation.
WE had 3 unexplainable initiations in one
system.
The detectors also responded to FOAM!
CAUSES OF FALSE OPERATION: FACPs

FACP may activate operation due to voltage

disturbances, lightning, effect of nearby
power system (See also NFPA 12 reference)
It may also activate system due to initiation
of unrelated detector.
CAUSES OF FALSE OPERATION: FACPs

We had recently a case of a point type

detector that responded to dust. The
FACP activated a foam deluge system
although this detector was not configured
by the software to activated the foam
system!
CAUSES OF FALSE OPERATION: DELUGE
VALVES

The Diaphragm was damaged by

previous pressure surges.
Stones or Debris caught between the
diaphragm and the seat.
Pressure Surges overcoming the
diaphragm.
CAUSES OF FALSE OPERATION: DELUGE
VALVES, Cont.d.,

The Pressure Surge is prevalent on

Pump Starts when the pressure in the
Main was low, mainly due to line
maintenance.
CAUSES OF FALSE OPERATION,
THE DELUGE VALVES

In particular when the pressure on the

diaphragm drops whist the main
pressure is minimal or zero.
DEPENDANCE ON
THE RELIABILITY
FIRE DETECTION
SYSTEMS.
The Deluge system requires a detection system.
NFPA 11 that addresses Foam Systems send us to NFPA 72 which
is Detection System Code.
The Time Response of the Foam system which is a function of the
performance of the detection system is critical to its success. Yet,
no guidelines are provided (Unlike NFPA 15).
NFPA 72 addresses Detection but has no guidelines about the
applications initiated by detection system except for the
notification arrangements.
Water Based Engineers using NFPA 11 have no communication
with the Electronic Engineers dealing with the detection system.
CASE #1
False Alarm operating a Low Expansion Foam system in a storage
space.
The system was configured to discharge foam upon initiation of
any of four (4) Flame Detectors.
The detection system consisted of a FACP with 4 flame detectors.
An additional point type smoke detector was added to “protect”
the FACP. This detector was configured to operate only a
notifying device.
The FACP and the detector where positioned about 30 m from
the protected space.
CASE #1, Cont.d.,

The point type detector was installed just next to

the FACP, a poor position.
While drilling a concrete floor for installation of a new
rack, about 4 m from the FACP , the dust cloud
generated initiated the detector installed 1.5 m above
the floor.
The detector initiated through the FACP the foam
system.
The detector initiated through the FACP the foam
system.
 CASE #2
False
Discharge of
Hi-Ex Foam.
Linear Beam
Detectors
responded to
windy dust
activated the
system.
Header
feeding
4x8”
deluge
Valves.
 CASE #3
False
Discharge
of Hi-Ex
Foam due
to False
operation
of two
linear
beam
detectors
CASE #3 & 4
Two Foam Deluge Valves, for
two storage halls.
Two False Foam Discharge:
#1: False Initiation of two
Linear Beam Detectors.
#2: Shutoff of Main Line for
several hours, Pump Restart
when the pressure on the
Diaphragm was low.
CASE #4, Pressure loss over the diaphragm
During
Mains
shutoff
for
repairs

Cutoff of Main Supply for repairs.

CASE #4, Cont.d.,

One of two
deluge valves.
The Easy Lock
internal balls
playing the roll
of Non-Return
Valve. Dripping
CASE #4, Cont.d.,

We disconnected
the Supply
System.
CASE #4, Cont.d.,
Within 4 hours
the pressure on
the diaphragm
drops from 140 to CASE #4, Cont.d.,

56PSI.
When a pump
starts the deluge
valve opens.
CASE #4, Cont.d.,

There is no filter in the system,

thus stones propelled by the
rushing water might cause the
damage seen on the photo below.
CASE #4, Cont.d.,
After two false
operations and a
couple of testing
the diaphragm of
the valve failed
due to “Surge
Pressures” (Water
Hammer).
CASE #5 & 6

Due to maintenance, the fire pumps were

tripped.

After a day the Pumps were restarted. The

pressure in the mains overcome the
diaphragm.
CASE #7

Storage Hall,,
no detector
initiation.
Seems to be
FACP false
initation.
Recommendations:
1. Make sure there is a suitable filter
upstream to prevent debris ingress.
2. Prevent pressure drop from the
Diaphragm.
3. If the Mains is shut off, instructs
closing the system Valve.
Recommendations, Cont.d.,
4. Install a pressostat warning against Low
Pressure over the Diaphragm. .
5. Regarding the Manual operation, don’t
make it trivial for a curious person to
play with it.
6. It is very important to provide
maintenance instructions with the valve.
 Recommendations, Cont.d,
7. For close air pressurized system, make
sure the air compressor is provided with a
dryer..
8. Detection System plays a major part in
the successful operation of the whole
system as well as i.r.o. False Operation :
See Item 10 below
Recommendations, Cont.d,
9. The Detection System Designer should
study the importance of prompt operation
of the whole system. NFPA-15 has
reasonable guidelines

10. Make sure that the FACP together with

the releasing station are approved by
UL Edition 9 or EN54 and EN 12094
Recommendations, Cont.d,
11. Use dedicated Releasing Module or
Panel

12. False operations might have severe

consequences. It is up the designer
to take it under consideration
Recommendations, Cont.d,

11. False operations might have

severe consequences. It is up the
designer to take it under
consideration