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MODULE 1: Preliminary Considerations, General Matters, Criminal Jurisdiction

CASE #1 Bonifacio v. RTC Makati – 5 May 2010

Facts:
Jessie John Gimenez (Gimenez) filed on behalf of Yuchenco, Family of Yuchenco Group of Companies (YGC) and Malayan Insurance
Co., (Malayan), a criminal complaint for 13 counts of libel under Art. 355 in relation to Art. 353 of the RPC against the members of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition Inc (PEPCI), a group of discontented planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc (PPI) which is owned by the
Yuchengco’s, for they previously purchased traditional pre-need educational plans but were unable to collect thereon or avail of the
benefits of such after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer of suspension of payments.

That PEPCI members owns and moderates a website and a blog with web domains: www.pacificnoplan.blogspot.com,
www.pepcoalition.com, and [email protected]. Gimenez alleged that upon accessing such websites in Makati he read
various articles containing highly derogatory statements and false accusations attacking the Yuchengco Family.

Since the article was first published and accessed by Gimenez at Makati City, pursuant to Art. 360 of the RPC as amended by RA 4363.

Petitioners moved to quash the Amended Information which, they alleged, still failed to vest jurisdiction because it failed to allege that
the libelous articles were "printed and first published" by the accused in Makati; and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the
case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.

Issue:
How should an online article be treated in relation to a written defamation/libel with respect to jurisdiction of the case provided by law
specifically Art. 360 of the RPC?

Ruling:
Art. 360 of the RPC provides:
“Any person who shall publish, exhibit or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar means, shall be
responsible for the same.
xxxx
The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the RTC of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or
where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense. xxxx”

That venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited only to:
1. Where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or
2. Where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.

If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published was used as basis for the venue of the action, the Information
must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published. The same measures cannot be reasonably
expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the
point of its printing and first publication.

To credit Gimenez's premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on petitioners' website in Makati
with "printing and first publication" would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought
to discourage and prevent. It would cause chaos wherein website author, writer, blogger or anyone who post messages in websites
could be sued for libel anywhere in the Philippines.
Therefore, the information is quashed and the case is dismissed.

CASE #2 Tijam v. Sibonghanoy – 15 April 1968

Facts:
Tijam filed for recovery of P1,908 + legal interest from Sibongahanoy. Defendants filed a counter bond with Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co (Surety). Judgement was in favour of the plaintiffs, a writ of execution was issued against the defendant.
Defendants moved for writ of execution against surety which was granted. Surety moved to quash the writ but was denied, appealed to
CA without raising the issue on lack of jurisdiction.
CA affirmed the appealed decision. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of
the effectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of
inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the
case to SC since it has exclusive jurisdiction over "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue.

Issue:
WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first time upon appeal.

Ruling:
YES.
As a rule, jurisdiction over the subject-matter is conferred upon the courts exclusively by law, and the objection may be raised at any
stage of the proceedings.
A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.

SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its
motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a
question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of
estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held
that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the
jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment,
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; PARTY GUILTY OF LACHES MAY NOT INVOKE LACK OF JURISDICTION ON
APPEAL AS IN INSTANT CASE. — It is undisputed fact that the action commenced by appellees in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
against the Sibonghanoy spouses was for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00 only — an amount within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts in accordance with the provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1948 which had taken effect about a month
prior to the date when the action was commenced. True also is the rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred upon the
courts exclusively by law, and as the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of the case, the objection may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, We are of the opinion
that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of annulling everything done
heretofore in the case with its active participation.

2. ID.; ESTOPPEL; DIFFERENT WAYS A PARTY MAY BE BARRED FROM RAISING QUESTION. — A party may be estopped or
barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, of estoppel by deed or by
record, and of estoppel by laches.

3. ID.; LACHES; DEFINITION. — Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
assert it.
fsd
4. ID.; ID.; BASIS. — The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires, for the peace
of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of the inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

5. ID.; ID.; INSTANCES WHEN PARTY MAY BE ESTOPPED FROM INVOKING QUESTION OF JURISDICTION. — A party cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief,
repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of the action
or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of
the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated — obviously for
reasons of public policy.

6. ID.; ID.; FAILURE TO RAISE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AT AN EARLIER STAGE BARS PARTY FROM QUESTIONING IT
LATER. — Where from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu by reason of the sum of money involved which was within the original exclusive
jurisdiction of inferior courts but failed to do so and instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the
Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on
the merits, and it was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally raised said
question of jurisdiction, to sanction such conduct on its part would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the
present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The
inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

CASE #3 Antiporda v. Garchitorena – 23 Dec. 1999

Facts:
Petitioners were charged with the crime of kidnapping one Elmer Ramos filed before the Sandiganbayan without claiming that one of
the accused is a public officer who took advantage of his position. The information was amended to effectively describe the offense
charged herein and for the court to effectively exercise its jurisdiction over the same by stating that Antiporda took advantage of his
position. Accused filed a motion for new preliminary investigation and to hold in abeyance and/or recall warrant of arrest issued. The
same was denied. The accused subsequently filed a motion to quash the amended information for lack of jurisdiction over the offense
charged because of the amended information. This was denied as well as the MR on the same. Hence, this petition before the Supreme
Court.

Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Ruling:
YES. They are estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The original Information filed with the
Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the
prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. However, we hold that the petitioners are
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for
reconsideration and/or reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same court, it was they who "challenged
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration
that the said crime is work connected.

Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for
the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties. In
the case of Arula vs. Espino it was quite clear that all three requisites, i.e., jurisdiction over the offense, territory and person, must
concur before a court can acquire jurisdiction to try a case. It is undisputed that the Sandiganbayan had territorial jurisdiction over the
case. And we are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a
voluntary submission to the Court's authority.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; DEFINED. — Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for
administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of the case on the
merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FILING OF MOTION TO QUASH, TANTAMOUNT TO VOLUNTARY SUBMISSION TO JURISDICTION OF COURT. —
We are in accord with the petitioners when they contended that when they filed a motion to quash it was tantamount to a voluntary
submission to the Court's authority. They cite the case of Layosa vs. Rodriguez in support of their contention. For therein, it was ruled
that the voluntary appearance of the accused at the pre-suspension hearing amounted to his submission to the court's jurisdiction even
if no warrant of arrest has yet been issued.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY CANNOT INVOKE JURISDICTION OF A COURT TO SECURE AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF AGAINST HIS
OPPONENT. — A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent, and after obtaining or
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. A
TEHDc
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARTY ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN WHERE PARTY FILED WITH SAME
COURT PLEADINGS CHALLENGING JURISDICTION OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. — The original Information filed with the
Sandiganbayan did not mention that the offense committed by the accused is office-related. It was only after the same was filed that the
prosecution belatedly remembered that a jurisdictional fact was omitted therein. However, we hold that the petitioners are estopped
from assailing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan for in the supplemental arguments to motion for reconsideration and/or
reinvestigation dated June 10, 1997 filed with the same court, it was they who challenged the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court
over the case and clearly stated in their Motion for Reconsideration that the said crime is work connected.

CASE #4. People v. Eduarte – G.R. No. 88232, 1990

Facts:
Alma T. Aggabao filed with the RTC, an information against private respondents Elvino Aggabao and Villa Suratos for the crime
of concubinage. Upon being arraigned, private respondents entered a plea of not guilty. During the trial, private respondents filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
They argued that concubinage, under Art. 334 of the RPC is punishable with prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, which is equivalent to imprisonment of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, well within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court, and not of the RTC
The prosecution filed an opposition to the motion contending that the RTC has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage
because destierro, the imposable penalty on the concubine has a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.

Issue:
1. Whether or not private respondents are estopped from raising the issue of jurisdiction after the prosecution has rested its case and the
defense has started to present its evidence.
2. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has original jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage.

Ruling:
1. In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. No judgment has yet been rendered by
the trial court in this case. And as soon as the accused discovered the jurisdictional defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the
appropriate motion to dismiss

2. That a crime punishable with the penalty of destierro is within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts. This is so because, in the scale of
penalties outlined in Art. 71, destierro comes after arresto mayor. * And since under the Judiciary Act of 1948 [Republic Act No. 296],
crimes punishable with arresto mayor are within the jurisdiction of the inferior courts, it follows that crimes punishable with destierro
are also within the jurisdiction of such courts. In explaining its conclusion that destierro is lighter than arresto mayor and therefore
cognizable by the inferior courts.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; JURISDICTION; MAY BE RAISED AT ANY STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS; RULING IN VERA v.
PEOPLE AND PEOPLE v. MUNAR, AN EXCEPTION TO GENERAL RULE; VERA AND MUNAR CASES DISTINGUISHED FROM
CASE AT BAR. — In our legal system, the question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings [Rule 117, Sec. 8,
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The ruling in Vera v. People and People v. Munar that jurisdiction may not be raised for the first
time on appeal, is the exception rather than the general rule.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE APPLIED TO INSTANT CASE WHERE UNLIKE IN TIJAM v. SIBONGHANOY CASE THE ELEMENT OF
LACHES IS ABSENT. — Where the pivotal element of laches is absent, that the ruling in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, Vera v. People and
People v. Munar does not control and instead, the general rule that the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of
the proceedings, must apply.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ALLOCATION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS AND INFERIOR COURTS, DEPENDS
UPON GRAVITY OF BOTH THE OFFENSE AND IMPOSABLE PENALTY; UNDER THE JUDICIARY REORGANIZATION ACT OF
1990 CRIMES PUNISHABLE WITH DESTIERRO, VESTED IN INFERIOR COURTS. — Since in the allocation of jurisdiction between
the Regional Trial Courts and the inferior courts the factors considered are the gravity of both the offense and the imposable penalty, it
is not unreasonable to state that the legislature granted to the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over crimes whose penalties are harsher
than those vested in the inferior courts. And since it is already a settled rule that destierro, by its nature, is a lighter penalty than
imprisonment [Uy Chin Hua v. Dingalasan, supra], it follows that even under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, jurisdiction
over crimes punishable with destierro is vested not in the Regional Trial Courts but in the inferior courts.
4. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; CONCUBINE SHOULD BE TRIED WITH ERRING HUSBAND
BEFORE INFERIOR COURTS. — Considering that Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code states that "[t]he offended party [in the crime of
concubinage] cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties," it is clearly in the interest of the orderly
administration of justice that the concubine be tried with the erring husband before the inferior courts. The legislature could not have
intended to allow the absurd situation wherein the inferior court has jurisdiction over the crime of concubinage only as regards the
husband while the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the same crime with respect to the concubine.

5. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION; CRIME OF CONCUBINAGE, WITHIN EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF INFERIOR
COURTS. — The Court holds that the crime of concubinage is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior courts. The
Regional Trial Courts have no original jurisdiction over the said crime.

CASE #5. Miranda v. Tuliao – 31 March 2006

Facts:
In March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Ramon, Isabela which were later identified as the bodies of Vicente Bauzon and
Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two Informations for murder were filed against 5 police officers including SPO2 Maderal in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue
was later transferred to the RTC of Manila. The RTC convicted the accused and sentenced them two counts of reclusion perpetua except
SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time being at large. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted the accused on the
ground of reasonable doubt.
In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a sworn confession and identified the petitioners as the ones responsible for the
death of the victims, so, Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumaliuan issued a
warrant of arrest against the petitioners and SPO2 Maderal.
Then, the petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall or quash the
warrant of arrest. In the hearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of the petitioners and issued a Joint order
denying the urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be
properly heard by the court.

Issues:
1.Whether the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
2.Whether or not a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires jurisdiction over the person of the accused.

Held:
1. YES. As a general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the
consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the
avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. TFhese pleadings are: (1) in civil cases, motions to
dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or not other grounds for dismissal are included;
(2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions
to quash a warrant of arrest.

2.No. Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor custody of
law over the body of the accused.
Citing Santiago v. Vasquez, there is a distinction between the custody of the law and jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the
law is required before the Court can act upon the application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other relief sought by
the dependant where by mere application, thereof, constitutes a waiver of the defence of lack of jurisdiction over the person accused.

CASE #6. Inding v. Sandiganbayan – G.R. No. 143047, 2004

Facts:
An Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Ricardo S. Inding, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Dapitan City, with violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. That accused Ricardo S. Inding, a high-ranking public officer,
being a Councilor of Dapitan City and as such, while in the performance of his official functions, particularly in the operation against
drug abuse, with evident bad faith willfully, unlawfully and criminally, faked buy-bust operations against alleged pushers or users to
enable him to claim or collect from the coffers of the city government a total amount of P30,500.00, as reimbursement for actual
expenses incurred during the alleged buy-bust operations.
The petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction over the officers charged or, in the
alternative, for the referral of the case either to the Regional Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court for appropriate proceedings. The
petitioner alleged therein that under Admin Order No. 270 which prescribes the IRR of the Local Government Code of 1991, he is a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dapitan City with Salary Grade (SG) 25.

Issue:
Whether or not a salary grade of 27 is required before the Sandiganbayan may have jurisdiction over the said officials?

Ruling:
No.While the first part of Section 4 of PD 1606 covers only officials of the executive branch with salary grade of 27 and higher, the
second part thereof “specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of grade 27 and higher but who are by
express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court.
Thus a city councilor who earns 20k is under the jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan.

CASE #7. People v. Yadao – G.R. No. 162144, 2012

Facts:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of the Philippine National Police’s Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11
suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2 Eduardo Delos
Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and
those who were slain.
After investigation, the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers involved. On review, however, the Office
of the Ombudsman reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers involved before the Sandiganbayan. On
March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold the accused for
trial following the recantation of the principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.

The case was reopened on March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition on the ground of double jeopardy
but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try the case. It was re-raffled to branch 81 presided by Judge Yadao. Yadao in
2003 junked the murder case against Lacson and other police officials for lack of probable cause.On March 3, 2004 the prosecution
filed the present special civil action of certiorari

Issue:
1. Whether the case should be under the Jurisdiction of Family Courts
2. Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of probable
cause

Held:
1.NO. Undoubtedly, in vesting in family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over criminal cases involving minors, the law but seeks to
protect their welfare and best interests. For this reason, when the need for such protection is not compromised, the Court is able to relax
the rule. In several cases, or instance, the Court has held that the CA enjoys concurrent jurisdiction with the family courts in hearing
petitions for habeas corpus involving minors.
Here, the two minor victims, for whose interests the people wanted the murder cases moved to a family court, are dead. As
respondents aptly point out, there is no living minor in the murder cases that require the special attention and protection of a family
court. In fact, no minor would appear as party in those cases during trial since the minor victims are represented by their parents who
had become the real private offended parties.

2. The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion when she set the motions for determination of probable
cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The
general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests, to
conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in
their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not
unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and examine
the inconsistent statements and related documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. The SC held
that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the respondents.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of
prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. But the option to order the
prosecutor to present additional evidence is not mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to “immediately dismiss the
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” That is the situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to
establish probable cause against the respondents.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the
tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

CASE #8. Duncano v. Sandigan – G. R. No. 191894, 2015

Facts:
Duncano, a regional director of the BIR,was charged by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, for failure
to disclose in his SALN his financial and business interests/connection on business entities of which he and his family are the registered
owners thereof, and the SUV registered in the name of his son which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public
interest. Duncano questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan asserting that as a public officer, he only had salary grade 26 which
is below the salary grade 27 requirement in order for Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction

In Opposition, the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject law would clearly show that the qualification as
to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to officials of the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically
enumerated. The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without indication as to its salary grade signifies
the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan still assumed jurisdiction over the case

Issue:
Whether or not only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of 27 and higher fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?

Held:
YES. Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of
Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of
regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. Those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan are: (1) officials
of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless
of their salary grades.

Republic Act No. 7975 divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade “26” or lower,
devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose
salary grades were at Grade “27” or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in government regardless
of salary grade. Except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts “where
none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.

CASE #9. MBTC v. Reynaldo – G.R. No. 164538, 2010

Facts:
On January 31, 1997, petitioner MBTC charged respondents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila with the c rime
of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC. In the affidavit of petitioner's audit officer, Antonio Ivan S. Aguirre, it was
alleged that the special audit conducted on the cash and lending operations of its Port Area branch uncovered anomalous/fraudulent
transactions perpetrated by respondents in connivance with client Universal Converter Philippines, Inc. (Universal); through the so-
called Bills Purchase Transaction, Universal was able to make withdrawals totaling P81,652,000.00.

Petitioner presented the following main arguments for our consideration:

1. Novation and undertaking to pay the amount embezzled do not extinguish criminal liability.
2. It is the duty of the public prosecutor to implead all persons who appear criminally liable for the offense charged.

Petitioner persistently insists that the execution of the Debt Settlement Agreement with Universal did not absolve private
respondents from criminal liability for estafa. Petitioner submits that the settlement affects only the civil obligation of Universal but
did not extinguish the criminal liability of the respondents. Petitioner thus faults the CA in sustaining the DOJ which in turn affirmed
the finding of Prosecutor Edad for committing apparent error in the appreciation and the application of the law on novation. By
petitioner's claim, citing Metropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Tonda, the "negotiations pertain [to] and affect only the civil aspect of
the case but [do] not preclude prosecution for the offense already committed."
 In his Comment, Adraneda denies being a privy to the anomalous transactions and passes on the sole responsibility to his
co-respondent Reynado as the latter was able to conceal the pertinent documents being the head of petitioner's Port Area branch.
Nonetheless, he contends that because of the Debt Settlement Agreement, they cannot be held liable for estafa.

Issue:
Whether mandamus is a proper remedy, when the office of the prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice gravely abused their discretion.

Ruling:
YES. Mandamus is a proper remedy when the resolution of a public respondent is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
The writ of mandamus is not available to control discretion neither may it be issued to compel the exercise of discretion. Truly,
it is a matter of discretion on the part of the prosecutor to determine which persons appear responsible for the commission of a crime.
However, the moment he finds one to be so liable it becomes his inescapable duty to charge him therewith and to prosecute him for the
same. In such a situation, the rule loses its discretionary character and becomes mandatory.
Thus, where, as in this case, despite the sufficiency of the evidence before the prosecutor, he refuses to file the corresponding
information against the person responsible, he abuses his discretion. His act is tantamount to a deliberate refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. The Secretary of Justice, on the other hand, gravely abused his discretion when, despite the existence of sufficient
evidence for the crime of estafa as acknowledged by the investigating prosecutor, he completely ignored the latter's finding and
proceeded with the questioned resolution anchored on purely evidentiary matters in utter disregard of the concept of probable cause as
pointed out in Balangauan. To be sure, findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless shown to have been made
with grave abuse. The present case calls for the application of the exception.
Given the facts of this case, petitioner has clearly established that the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion.

CASE #10. Delima v. Guerrero – 10 October 2017

Facts:
A petition was filed by De Lima to assail the issuance of a warrant of arrest against her by Judge Juanita Guerrero of the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa, Branch 204 in the criminal case for Illegal Drug Trading filed by the government after the resolution of the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Department of Justice. Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information,
the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. Sandiganbayan has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case
considering that the acts described in the Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Respondents,
on the other hand, maintain that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of RA 9165, including the acts described in the
Information against the petitioner. They contended that Sandiganbayan was specifically created as an anti-graft court, it was never
conferred with the power to try drug-related cases even those committed by public officials.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over violations of Republic Act No. 9165 committed by a public officer?

Held:
NO. RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to “exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165).”
This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by
RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an
exception to the general.

Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660*, is the general law on jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over crimes and offenses
committed by high-ranking public officers in relation to their office; Section 90 of RA 9165 is the special law excluding from the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction violations of RA 9165 committed by such public officers. In the latter case, jurisdiction is vested upon the
RTCs designated by the Supreme Court as drugs court, regardless of whether the violation of RA 9165 was committed in relation to the
public officials’ office.

MODULE 2: RULE 110 - PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES

Sec. 1. Institution of Criminal Actions

CASE #11. Reodica v. CA - 8 July 1998

Facts:
In the evening of October 17,1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better Living
Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol that resulted to physical injuries to the
complainant and damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00. Consequently, an information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injuries docketed as Criminal Case No. 33919 was filed against her. After trial, the Regional
Trial Court of Makati convicted the petitioner as charged and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor. On Appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the said decision.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether the petitioner’s failure to raise the duplicitous character of the information in a motion to quash before she pleaded to the
information is deemed as a waiver.

Ruling:
YES.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; INFORMATION; DUPLICITOUS CHARACTER THEREOF, MUST BE RAISED
BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT. — Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of reckless imprudence
resulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is not covered by Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage, the duplicitous character of the information, i.e.,
charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit: (1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless
imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in a motion to quash before
she pleaded to the information. Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, when two or more offenses are charged in a single
complaint or information and the accused fails to object to it before trial, the court may convict the accused of as many offenses as are
charged and proved and impose on him the penalty for each of them.

ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION; DETERMINING FACTORS. — The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate as to actions pending before its enactment. . . . The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the
duration of the imprisonment and the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged.

ID.; ID.; ID.; OFFENSES PUNISHABLE BY CENSURE ARE COGNIZABLE BY MeTCs, MTCs AND MCTCs. — Similarly, since
offenses punishable by imprisonment of not exceeding 4 years and 2 months were within the jurisdictional ambit of the MeTCs, MTCs
and MCTCs, it follows that those penalized with censure, which is a penalty lower than arresto menor under the graduated scale in
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code and with a duration of 1 to 30 days, should also fall within the jurisdiction of said courts. Thus,
reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries was cognizable by said courts.

ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTION; THE REVISED PENAL CODE MUST PREVAIL OVER THE RULES ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE. — It
must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section 5(5), Article VIII of the
Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
Hence, in case of conflict between the Rules on Summary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter
prevails.

ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91
thereof and the rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the
termination of this case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offense charged in the information in
this case.

CASE #12. Francisco v. CA – 122 SCRA 538

Facts:
Mrs. Lourdes Cruz, wife of Romulo Cruz, had been suffering from a vaginal bleeding. Her bleeding continued so on December 9, 1965
Lourdes Cruz entered the Morong Emergency Hospital; that she was attended by Dr. Patrocinio Angeles, the complainant; that her
ailment was tentatively diagnosed by Dr. Angeles as "R-Mole, abortion and pregnancy"; that an x-ray examination conducted on Mrs.
Cruz, however, revealed that she was negative for pregnancy; that Mrs. Cruz continued to lose blood and had to be given a transfusion of
fresh blood on December 11, 1965; that as the bleeding did not stop Mrs. Cruz was operated on by the complainant Dr. Patrocinio
Angeles; that her uterus which contained three (3) dead foetal triplets was removed; that the operation was successful and her bleeding
was arrested.
On December 26, 1965 at about 9:20 o'clock in the evening the two accused Dr. Francisco and Atty. Harry Bernardino, together with Dr.
Golla and Ernesto Ocampo went to the house of Mrs. Lourdes Cruz in Tanay, Rizal; that the two accused interviewed Mrs. Cruz and her
husband Romulo Cruz about her operation; that the couple informed the two that they are satisfied with the operation.
In the course of this interview the accused Dr. Emiliano Francisco said that the operation was not correctly done and Mrs. Cruz should
not have been operated on.
On the same occasion the accused Atty. Harry Bernardino said that the physicians in Morong Emergency Hospital were no good, are
incompetent and they are not surgeons and said accused told Romulo Cruz that he could file charges for murder through reckless
imprudence.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals concluded that while it is true that the statements were made on the occasion of the
so-called fact finding interview pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision, the accused went out of bounds by imputing to the
complainant acts which are not only derogatory but constitute a crime that can be prosecuted de oficio. It went on to rule however that
the defamation committed by the accused cannot be considered as grave under the circumstances, and the worst that was said of the
complainant was that he should not have performed the operation, and that he could be prosecuted for murder through reckless
imprudence.

Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the present case was instituted. While the case was pending, Atty. Harry
Bernardino one of the petitioners herein died, hence in the resolution of April 10, 1979 the case was dismissed insofar as he is
concerned.

Issue:
Whether based on the allegations, Francisco can be held liable for the crime of libel.

Ruling:
NO. We cannot see our way clear on how Francisco's questioned statements could be branded as libelous. To stigmatize
them as libelous would be a dangerous precedent whereby a mere criticism on the actuation of another will generate criminal liability
for slander. His alleged defamatory remarks may be likened to a criticism of a lawyer's or Judge's erroneous handling of the case.

It may be mentioned here that in the brief of the Solicitor General, the statements quoted and stigmatized as defamatory are
those only of accused Bernardino. That latter's statements are what the Solicitor General considered as "strong words that are
evidently serious and damaging." Nothing has been said by the Solicitor General regarding the statements uttered by Francisco.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General would like to hold Francisco liable by the utterances of Bernardino on the ground of conspiracy.
Assuming that Bernardino's statement is libelous, Francisco cannot be held liable for the same. Neither the lower court nor the Court
of Appeals found that they conspired with each other to commit the alleged crime. This is so because no evidence was offered to show
that there was prior consultation on what each would say. The fact alone that they were together when those words were uttered is not
proof that there was conspiracy to utter those words. Clearly, each accused spoke spontaneously and individually.

The finding of the Court of Appeals that the "statements were made on the occasion of the so-called fact-finding interview
pursuant to the Ethics Committee decision" is obviously incompatible with the notion that petitioners had gone to the residence of the
Cruz pursuant to a conspiracy to defame or slander Dr. Angeles. The legitimate purpose of going to Tanay, Rizal, having been accepted
as a fact by the Court of Appeals, it is incongruous to allege, as respondents now do, that Atty. Bernardino and Dr. Francisco had
conspired to slander Dr. Angeles.
Therefore, accused Emiliano Francisco was acquitted.

1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMINAL OFFENSES; PRESCRIPTION; NO CONVICTION OF LESSER OFFENSE IF IT HAS

ALREADY PRESCRIBED. — Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense
charged he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already been prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the
circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense.

2. ID.; ID.; ART. 91 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE; DIVERSE INTERPRETATION SET AT REST IN OLARTE, L-13027,
JUNE 30, 1960. — Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the period of prescription shall commence to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information. and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. Before the case of People vs. Olarte (19 SCRA 495), there
were diversity of precedents on the issue of prescription. The Olarte case, however, set at rest the conflicting views and enunciated the
doctrine that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or
investigation should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed cannot try the case on the merits.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OLARTE RULING HELD APPLICABLE TO FILING OF THE COMPLAINT WITH THE FISCAL'S
OFFICE IN CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar, the filing of the denuncia or complaint for intriguing against honor by the offended
patty, later changed by the Fiscal to grave oral defamation, even if it were in the Fiscal's Office, 39 days after the alleged defamatory
remarks were committed (or discovered) by the accused interrupts the period of prescription.
 4. ID.; LIBEL; NOT A CASE OF. — The remarks made by Francisco were but a harmless expression of his opinion on what
should have been done in treating her, if he were the doctor managing her. His statements were nothing more than a comment that
complainant committed a mistake in the diagnosis and management of the patient and do not degrade the competency of a doctor.
Such criticism cannot be considered libelous.

5. ID.; ID.; CONSPIRACY; DEGREE OF PROOF. — Conspiracy being of a far-reaching effect, the degree of proof required
for establishing it must be the same as that required to support a finding of guilt for the crime itself which must be proof beyond
reasonable doubt.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN CASE AT BAR NOT PROOF THEREOF. — The fact alone that they were
together when those allegedly slanderous words were uttered is not proof that there was conspiracy to utter those words. Clearly each
accused spoke spontaneously and individually.

CASE #13. Domingo v. Sandiganbayan – 20 January 2000

Facts:
In a complaint filed by PNB against former Pres. Marcos and 2 other respondents, petitioner, past President of PNB, was
subpoenaed, but the same was returned unserved. On September 1, 1987, he was impleaded and an information for violation of Section
3 (e) in relation to Section 4 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioner on July 30, 1992; and docketed as
Crim. Case No. 17847. The information alleged that petitioner, being then the president of PNB, while in the performance of his official
functions and with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspired and confederated with his co-accused in giving favorable loan
accommodations to CDCP by facilitating the passage of PNB Board Resolution No. 144 which caused undue injury and prejudice to PNB
in the amount of US$29 Million. A petition for reinvestigation, treated as motion for reconsideration, was filed by petitioner. The same
was denied as well as his motion to quash the information. The motion was grounded on prescription and that the facts alleged therein
did not constitute an offense. Hence, the instant petition.

Issue:
Whether the facts charged in the information constitute an offense.

Ruling:
A motion to quash on the ground that the allegations in the information did not constitute an offense should be resolved on the
basis of said allegations. In the case at bar it was readily discernible that the allegations in the information sufficiently describes all the
elements of the offense charged, hence, the motion to quash must fail.

Violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act prescribe in ten years (Section 11, R.A. No. 3019). The prescriptive
period was increased to fifteen years. (B.P. Blg. 195, March 16, 1982).

The applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, a special law, is
Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended. If the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on that
day but if the date is not known the period will begin only from the discovery thereof. The anomaly could only have been discovered
after the February, 1986 Revolution when former President Marcos was ousted from office as before that date no one would have dared
to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. Thus, the crime had not yet prescribed as it was only 6 years when the
information was filed against petitioner, a period within the prescribed period.

Delay caused by the reorganization of the Office of the Ombudsman and to afford petitioner another opportunity to submit his
counter-affidavit, which is beneficial to the accused, did not constitute violation of the right to speedy trial. The petition was dismissed
and the Sandiganbayan was directed to try and decide Criminal Case No. 17847.

REMEDIAL LAW, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MOTION TO QUASH; TEST OF VIABILITY THEREOF. — The fundamental test
on the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred in the information do not amount to an offense is whether the
facts asseverated would establish the essential elements of the crime defined in the law. In this examination, matters aliunde are not
considered. As a general proposition, a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations of the information do not constitute the
offense charged, or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis alone of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically admitted. The informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor could be proved during the trial.

It is also worthy to note at this point the long-standing doctrine that writs of injunction or prohibition will not lie to restrain a
criminal prosecution for the reason that public interest requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the
protection of society. The writ may issue only in specified cases, among which are to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional rights. Such exceptions do not obtain in this case.
 Thus, there being no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, the
Resolution denying DOMINGO's Motion to Quash must be, and is hereby, AFFIRMED.

CASE #14. Domondon V. Sandigan - 16 March 2000

Facts:
Several informations were filed before the First and Third Divisions of the Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other
officials of the Philippine National Police (PNP) due to the discovery of a chain of irregularities within the PNP Command in CY 1992.
Petitioner filed a motion for consolidation before the First Division of the Sandiganbayan to include cases filed before the Third
Division. The Sandiganbayan issued two orders, first, for the prosecution to demonstrate the probable complicity of some of the
accused, including the petitioner, and second, which denied the petitioner's motion for consolidation. The Special Prosecutor of the
Ombudsman ordered the criminal information amended to exclude some of the accused, but not herein petitioner. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration. Another Special Prosecutor recommended his exclusion from the information, but was disapproved by the
Ombudsman and the Overall Deputy Ombudsman. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Issue:
Petitioner raised the issue of whether there was grave abuse of discretion when the Ombudsman denied his motion for reconsideration
and his motion for consolidation.

Ruling:
According to the Supreme Court, petitioner herein had not shown that grave abuse of discretion was committed when the
Ombudsman decided to proceed with the prosecution of the criminal cases against him. On the basis of their reinvestigation,
respondents herein found sufficient probable cause to include petitioner in the indictment. The courts cannot interfere with the
discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman to determine the specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. Petitioner's
recourse is with the Sandiganbayan where the cases are already pending. The instant petition was dismissed.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION; CERTIORARI; GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, DEFINED. — Grave abuse of
discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES; COURTS CANNOT INTERFERE WITH THE
DISCRETION OF THE FISCAL OR OMBUDSMAN; EXCEPTIONS. — As this Court stated in Ocampo, IV vs. Ombudsman, 225 SCRA
725, 729 (1993): "Well settled is the rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained, either through a preliminary or final
injunction or a writ of prohibition, except in the following instances: (1) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused; (2) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) When there is
a prejudicial question which is sub-judice; (4) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5) Where the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; (6) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) Where the Court has no
jurisdiction over the offense; (8) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) Where the charges are manifestly false
and motivated by lust for vengeance; (10) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied; (11) Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of
petitioners." Corollary to the foregoing rule, the courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the fiscal or Ombudsman to determine the
specificity and adequacy of the averments of the offense charged. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it to be insufficient
in form or substance or if he otherwise finds no ground to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation if the
complaint is, in his view, in due and proper form. However, while the Ombudsman has the full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman's action when there is an abuse of discretion,
by way of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. — The Supreme Court reiterates that ". . . [t]his is an exercise of the Ombudsman's powers
based upon constitutional mandate and the courts should not interfere in such exercise. The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts
will be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting
attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant."

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN; LIMITATION ON ITS DUTY TO CONSOLIDATE CASES. — While the Ombudsman has full
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the informations may
not be dismissed, or in the instant case, may not be consolidated with other pending cases, without the approval of the said court.
CASE #15. Ong v. People - 9 October 2000
Facts:
Upon failure of Solid Cement Corporation to deliver the paper bag-making machine allegedly purchased by complainant, the latter filed
a complaint for estafa and other deceits based on Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code with the MeTC of Makati. During trial, the
prosecution presented as its sole witness complainant and presented documentary evidence the admissibility of which were questioned
by the petitioners. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioners filed a demurrer to evidence, claiming that all the documents
presented were unauthenticated photocopies of the originals, the signatures on which were unidentified or unauthenticated, therefore,
inadmissible, and cannot support a finding of guilt.

The MeTC denied the Demurrer to Evidence. On certiorari, the RTC granted the Demurrer to Evidenlce and ordered the MeTC to
dismiss the case. The CA, however, set aside the RTC decision, and ruled that after denial of their demurrer to evidence, petitioners
should have filed an appeal to the RTC.

Issue:
Whether the demurrer to evidence should be denied.

Ruling:
NO. On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that given the paucity of evidence against petitioners, it was grave abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny petitioners' demurrer to evidence. There was no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment.

The RTC, on certiorari, correctly reviewed and reversed the findings of the MeTC which were devoid of support in the evidence on
record. With the grant by the RTC of the demurrer to evidence, the same constituted a valid acquittal and any further prosecution of
petitioners on the same charge would place petitioners in double jeopardy.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE; REMEDY IN CASE OF DENIAL THEREOF;
EXCEPTION. — Indeed, the rule generally prevailing is that "certiorari does not lie to review a trial court's interlocutory order denying
a motion to dismiss (or to acquit), which is equivalent to a demurrer to evidence, filed after the prosecution had presented its evidence
and rested its case. An order denying a demurrer to evidence is interlocutory. It is not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a
petition for certiorari (Tadeo v. People, 300 SCRA 744 [1998])." However, Tadeo itself states that "[f]rom such denial (of the demurrer
to evidence), appeal in due time is the proper remedy, not certiorari, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion or excess of
jurisdiction, or an oppressive exercise of judicial authority." Consequently, if the denial of the demurrer to evidence is attended by
grave abuse of discretion, the denial may be assailed through a petition for certiorari.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The present case presents one such exception warranting the resort to the remedy of
certiorari, the trial court judge having committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
petitioners' demurrer to evidence. In the instant case, there is no competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to
support a verdict of guilt against petitioners. As pointed out by petitioners, all documentary evidence submitted by the private
complainant were uncertified photocopies of certain documents, the signatures on which were either unidentified or unauthenticated.
Being private instruments, their due and valid execution and their genuineness and authenticity must first be established, either by the
testimony of any one who saw the writing executed or by evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker hereof. A
painstaking perusal of the testimony of the prosecution's sole witness reveals, however, that the due execution and authenticity of these
documents were never proved. In fact, the prosecution took no effort to prove the due execution and authenticity of these documents
during the presentation of their sole witness. Absent such proof, these documents are incompetent as evidence. . . . Thus . . ., being
incompetent evidence, the only evidence the prosecution could rely on to prove petitioners' guilt would be the sole testimony of the
private complainant. Unsupported by any other evidence, said testimony is insufficient to sustain a finding of culpability. aIHCSA

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; EVIDENCE, WHEN SUFFICIENT. — Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence
in character, weight or amount as will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be
considered sufficient, therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation
therein by the accused. In the instant case, the prosecution miserably failed to establish by sufficient evidence the existence of the crime
of estafa and other deceit.

CASE #16. Samson v. Guingona - 14 Dec. 2000

Facts:
Petitioners and several other police officers were the subject of a complaint for murder with the Department of Justice in
connection with the fatal shooting of Datu Gemie Sinsuat, a son of a politician from Cotabato. An information was thereafter filed with
the Regional Trial Court against petitioners. The trial court, however, on the basis of the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation, found no probable cause for the issuance of arrest against the petitioner. It then ordered the reinvestigation of the case
against them. Petitioners did not file a motion for reconsideration but instead filed with this Court a petition for injunction to enjoin the
Department of Justice from further proceeding with the reinvestigation of the case.
Issue:
Whether an injunction at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation will restrain a criminal prosecution.

Ruling:
NO. As a general rule, this Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction to enjoin or restrain criminal prosecution.
With more reason will injunction not lie when the case is still at the stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation.

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; WILL NOT, AS A RULE ISSUE WRITS OF PROHIBITION OR INJUNCTION TO
ENJOIN OR RESTRAIN CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. — As a general rule, the Court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction
preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain, criminal prosecution. With more reason will injunction not lie when the case is still at the
stage of preliminary investigation or reinvestigation.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — However, in extreme cases, we have laid the following exceptions: (1) when the injunction is
necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2) when it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question which is subjudice; (4)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (5).where the prosecution is under an invalid law; ordinance or
regulation; (6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the offense; (8) where it is a case
of persecution rather than prosecution; (9) where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (10)
when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.

3. ID.; ID.; DOES NOT, AS A RULE, INTERFERE IN THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OR
REINVESTIGATION. — We find petitioners' plea for a writ of injunction or temporary restraining order utterly without merit. As a rule,
we do not interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor sufficient
latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the
filing of information against an offender.

CASE #17. Arambulo v. Laqui – G.R. No. 138596, 2000

Facts:
An information for libel then was filed before the MTC of Quezon City on May 18, 1994.
After the prosecution presented its evidence, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence. Without resolving the incident, the
MTC ruled that it had no jurisdiction over the case as the same falls under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, and ordered that the case be forwarded to the RTC for further proceedings.
The case was forwarded to RTC of Quezon City docketed as Criminal Case No. 96-6870.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and prescription of the offense of Libel. The RTC
dismissed the case in an Order dated April 2, 1997 but, stating that the offense had not yet prescribed, ordered the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City to re-file the Information for Libel with the RTC.
The Information for Libel was re-filed with respondent court docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-97-70948.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash on the ground of prescription. The motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated
October 3,1997.
Not satisfied with the Resolution and Order of the trial court, the petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the issue
of "whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion or grossly erred in holding that the offense of libel in the
instant case has not yet prescribed." The Court of Appeals, in its decision dated March 01, 1999, upheld the contention of the trial court
that the offense of libel had not yet prescribed and consequently, dismissed the said petition. The appellate court likewise denied herein
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution dated May 11, 1999.
Petitioner is now before this Court seeking a reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Issue:
Whether the offense of libel charged against the petitioner has already been prescribed.

Ruling:
NO.
The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the running of the period of prescription of the offense charged unless otherwise
provided in special laws (Sec. 1, Rule 110).
It has been held under the old rule that the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of
preliminary examination or investigation, interrupts the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court, where
the complaint or information is filed can not try the case on the merits.
Same; Jurisdiction; Libel; Libel cases shall be tried by the Regional Trial Courts having jurisdiction over them to the exclusion of
the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
The error was probably due to the confusion as to the proper venue for the crime of libel brought about by the passage of R.A. 7691
which took effect on April 15, 1994. Under Section 2 of the said Republic Act, the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts was expanded to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years.
However, libel, which is punishable by imprisonment ranging from six months and one day to four years, is not covered as the said law
excludes from its coverage cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. Under Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, the information for libel should be filed with the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. The confusion was cleared
up when this Court issued Administrative Order No. 104-96 dated October 21, 1996 which categorically stated that LIBEL CASES
SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS.

Same; Same;
Evidently, Branch 215 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City was not spared the confusion brought about by R.A. 7691, as its
dismissal of the case then pending before it was made only on November 8, 1996 or more than two years after it had taken cognizance of
the case. Notably, the dismissal by the Metropolitan Trial Court took place a mere eighteen (18) days after the issuance of S.C.
Administrative Order No. 104-96. The mistake of the Office of the City Prosecutor in filing the complaint and of the Metropolitan Trial
Court in taking cognizance of the case was thus understandable. The error was immediately rectified by the said court upon realizing its
mistake when it ruled it was the Regional Trial Court which had the proper jurisdiction over the case. This mistake should not operate to
prejudice the interest of the state to prosecute criminal offenses and, more importantly, the right of the offended party to obtain
grievance.

Same; Same;
Moreover, the doctrine in People vs. Olarte, as applied in later cases, was not meant to apply solely to cases where the filing of the
complaint with the municipal trial court or the prosecutor’s office operates to interrupt the prescription period for the prosecution of a
crime.

Right to a Speedy Trial;

Petitioner’s other argument that she has been denied her right to a speedy trial deserves scant consideration. Well-established is the
doctrine that the right to a speedy trial is violated only where there is an unreasonable, vexatious and oppressive delay without
participation or fault of the accused, or when unjustified postponements are sought which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length
of time. In the case at the bench, besides the filing of the petitions before the Court of Appeals and this Court, petitioner had likewise
filed a Motion to Quash and a Motion for Reconsideration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218. As such, it is clear
that the petitioner is not without fault in the delay in the prosecution of the case against her.

CASE #18. Zaldivia v. Reyes – 2 July 1992

Facts:
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of
1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal.
The offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May 30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the responded judge.
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the charge against her is governed by the following
provisions of the Rule on Summary Procedure.

Issue:
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive period for violations of municipal ordinances.

Ruling:

1. REMEDIAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION; 1985 RULES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD DOES NOT APPLY TO
OFFENSES SUBJECT TO SUMMARY PROCEDURE. — Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure meaningfully
begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the
section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph
obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This
interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the measure,
to discover the true legislative intent.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION (B) REFERS TO SECTION 32(2) OF BP NO. 129. — Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of
"offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the obvious reference is to
Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of
not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment,
regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through
criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos.
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

3. ID.; ID.; RULE ON SUMMARY PROCEDURE; APPLIES TO VIOLATIONS OF MUNICIPAL OR CITfY ORDINANCES. — As it is
clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it
should follow that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that
rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD STARTS ONLY WHEN THE CASE IS ACTUALLY FILED IN COURT. — Under Section 9 of
the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a
preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the
prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the
date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INTERPRETATION IN CONSONANCE WITH ACT NO. 3326. — This interpretation is in consonance with Act No.
3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they
include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it
does.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER GENERAL LAW; PRESCRIPTION IN CRIMINAL CASES IS A SUBSTANTIVE
RIGHT. — The Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to
"diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right.

7. ID.; ID.; CRIME PRESCRIBES IF THE PROSECUTOR DELAYS INTENTIONALLY OR NOT THE INSTITUTION OF NECESSARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS. — The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe even if the complaint is
filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if, intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial proceedings until it
is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the
problem here sought to be corrected.

CASE #19. Jadewell v. Lidua - 7 Oct. 2013

Facts:
Jadewell, pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000, was authorized to render any motor vehicle immobilized by placing its wheels in a
clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Balajadia and the other respondents dismantled, took and carried away the clamps attached to
the wheel of the vehicles, which took place on May 7, 2003. Jadewell filed a complaint for robbery against the respondents with the
Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,2003. However, the Informations were filed with the MTC on October 2, 2003. Balajadia filed a
motion to quash.
The MTC granted the motion to quash and dismissed the case and Jadewell subsequent motion for reconsideration. Jadewell’s petition
for certiorari with RTC was likewise denied. Their motion for reconsideration was also denied. They argued that the filing of the
criminal complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio City, not the filing of the criminal information before Court, is the
reckoning point in determining whether or not the criminal action had prescribed.

Respondents argued that Zaldivia v. Reyes held that the proceedings mentioned in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, refer to
judicial proceedings. Thus, the SC, in Zaldivia held that the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor was not a
judicial proceeding. The prescriptive period commenced from the alleged date of the commission of the crime on May 7, 2003 and
ended two months after on July 7, 2003

Issue:
Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription period of the
commission of the offense charged against respondents

Ruling: NO
In Romualdez v. Hon. Marcelo, this Court defined the parameters of prescription: In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense
charged, the following should be considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted.

The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These actions
effectively commenced the running of the prescription period.

As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where the crime
charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. In
Zaldivia v. Reyes, the violation of a municipal ordinance in Rodriguez, Rizal also featured similar facts and issues
with the present case. In that case, the offense was committed on May 11, 1990. The Complaint was received on May
30, 1990, and the Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.

Under Section 9 of the Rules on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does
not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced
only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.

Jurisprudence exists showing that when the Complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor who then files the Information in court,
this already has the effect of tolling the prescription period.

When the representatives of the petitioner filed the Complaint (on May 23, 2003) before the Provincial Prosecutor of Baguio, the
prescription period was running. It continued to run until the filing of the Information. They had two months to file the Information
and institute the judicial proceedings by filing the Information with the Municipal Trial Court. The conduct of the preliminary
investigation, the original charge of Robbery, and the subsequent finding of the violation of the ordinance did not alter the period within
which to file the Information. Respondents were correct in arguing that the petitioner only had two months from the discovery and
commission of the offense before it prescribed within which to file the Information with the Municipal Trial Court.

Unfortunately, when the Office of the Prosecutor filed the Informations on October 5, 2003, the period had already prescribed. Thus,
respondent Judge Nestor Lidua, Sr. did not err when he ordered the dismissal of the case against respondents. According to the
Department of Justice National Prosecutors Service Manual for Prosecutors, an Information is defined under Part I, Section 5 as: SEC.
5. Information. - An information is the accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor, and filed
with the court. The information need not be placed under oath by the prosecutor signing the same.

*Notes on COMPARE AND CONTRAST (Zaldivia case and Jadewell case):

The offense charged in Zaldivia is [a] violation of municipal ordinance in which case, the complaint should have been filed directly in
court as required by Section 9 of the old Rules on Summary Procedure. On the other hand, in Jadewell vs Lidua, the offenses are for
violations of a city ordinance and as aforestated, "shall be commenced only by information.”

Sec. 2. The Complaint or Information

CASE #20. City of Manila v. Rizal - 9 March 1914

Facts:
Defendant in this case was convicted in the municipality court of the city of Manila of a violation of a municipal ordinance against
gambling, and appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila. In that court a demurrer to the information was sustained on the
ground that the action was brought in the name of the city of Manila, and not in the name of the United States.
Issue:
Whether prosecutions charging violations of municipal ordinances of the city of Manila may be brought in the name of the city of
Manila

Ruling:
No. Section 2 of General Orders, No. 58, provides that in this jurisdiction "all prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the same of the
United States against the persons charged with the offenses." Violations of municipal ordinances for which punishment by fine or
imprisonment is lawfully prescribed are, in our opinion, public offenses as that term is used in the above-cited section of the order, and
prosecutions for such violations of municipal ordinances must therefore be instituted in the name of the United States.

CASE #21. Ngo Yao Tit v. Sheriff of Manila - 28 March 1914

Facts:
Petitioners were detained under a commitment issued upon a final judgement of the CFI of Manila convicting them on a new trial of a
violation of Ordinance No. 152.

In support for their application of the writ of habeas corpus, the petitioners contended that before a conviction can be had under section
3 of Ordinance No. 152, "the defendants may prove, if the fact exists, that they visited the place described in the complaint lawfully and
not in violation of the provisions or the spirit of said ordinance," and that, in effect, it must be shown, to sustain a conviction under said
ordinance that the house visited was one generally used for the smoking of opium, and it appearing by an affirmative statement in the
decision of the Court First Instance that the house in question was a Chinese club and was not destined or generally used for the
smoking of opium, and there being no finding that the accused were unlawfully there, the judgment of conviction has nothing to sustain
it and is, therefore, absolutely void.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy in this case

Ruling:
It is admitted that the court had jurisdiction over the person of the petitioners and that is had jurisdiction to try a person accused of
violating section 3 of Ordinance No. 152. There was, therefore, jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter. It is equally
undoubted that, if the acts of the petitioners constituted the crime defined in that ordinance, they were properly convicted. It having
been demonstrated by the evidence, as stated in the decision of the trial court, that the petitioners were found in the club house in
question and that opium was being smoked therein, it became the duty of the court to determine, by the exercise of its judicial
functions, whether such acts constituted the crime defined by the ordinance. This was a judicial determination admittedly within the
jurisdiction and authority of the court to make. That being so, the exercise of that jurisdiction would not result in a void judgment,
provided the court kept within the limits thereof. In the determination of the case before it, it is clear that the court kept fully within the
limits of its jurisdiction and, a right exercise within that jurisdiction, determined the question whether the acts developed by the
evidence fell within the prohibition of the ordinance. This same question is one which is passed upon by a court every time it tries a
criminal cause. That is one of the necessary adjudications. If it is to be held that a wrong determination of that question deprives the
court of jurisdiction, then the correctness of a judgment of conviction in a criminal case will nearly always be determinable by a writ of
habeas corpus. This, of course, is not the function of that writ, and makers of legislation and constitutions. which preserve the writ never
intended that it should be used in that manner and for that purpose.
The bringing of the action in the name of the city of Manila instead of the United States is an error merely and not a jurisdictional
defect. It is not similar to the case where, as claimed by petitioners, an information is filed by a person who is not authorized in law to
file it. The fact that the city of Manila was the plaintiff in the action does not signify that said city was the person who signed and filed
the information. The accused were prosecuted by the same official, before the same court, and in the same manner as they would have
been if the action had been brought in the name of the United States, and they received the benefit of the same rights and the same
privileges which they would have received if the action had been properly entitled. They have been in no sense injured or prejudiced.

The defect is one which could have been cured at any stage of the trial by an amendment on the motion of the court itself or upon the
motion of any person interested in the prosecution. Defects of that character which are not taken advantage of in the court below in the
manner prescribed by law cannot be raised for the first time here, and especially in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The writ of habeas corpus was not intended and cannot be used to correct mere errors or defects in proceedings, and accordingly does
not lie in the present applications.

Sec. 3. Complaint defined

 Sec. 4. Information defined

CASE #22. People v. Mendez - 5 July 2000

Facts: Rosendo Mendez was charged with raping his 16-year old stepdaughter. RTC convicted him. Hence, this petition. Mendez
contends that the information upon which he was charged was substantially defective. He claims that the information does not charge
an offense because it does not aver that the rape was committed by means of force and intimidation and thus, he cannot ba validly
convicted in an indictment which does not charge an offense.

Issue: Whether or not Mendez should be acquitted

Ruling: NO. The Court ruled that although the information failed to state that Mendez raped the victim “through force and
intimidation,” the complaint filed by the victim expressly alleged that the rape was committed “by means of force.” In case of variance
between the complaint filed by the offended party and the information in crimes against chastity, the complaint controls.

CASE #23. Tam Wing Tak v. Makasiar - 29 January 2001

Facts: Petitioner, as director of Concord-World Properties, Inc., filed a complaint with the Quezon City Prosecutors’ Office charging Vic
Ang Siong with violation of BP 22. However, the City Prosecutor dismissed because petitioner lacked the standing to filed the complaint
on Concord’s behalf and that Concord and Siong had already settled the terms for the payment of the balance. Petitioner appealed to the
Chief State Prosecutor. However, it was also denied. Thus, petitioner filed a civil case for mandamus with the RTC to compel the Chief
State Prosecutor to filed the information charging Siong with violation of BP 22. RTC denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not mandamus will lie to compel the City Prosecutor to file the necessary information in court

Ruling: NO. The Court ruled that mandamus will only lie to compel the public prosecutor to file the necessary information in court
where there is grave abuse of discretion on his part and he willfully refuses to do so in spite of the prima facie evidence of guilt. In this
case, there is no showing that the City Prosecutor acted with grave abuse of discretion. A public prosecutor is under no compulsion to
file a criminal information where no clear legal justification has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilty nor prima facie case
has been presented by the petitioner.

CASE #24. Sanchez v. Demetriou - 9 Nov. 1993

Facts: Sanchez, the Mayor of Calauan, Laguna, was charged with the crime of rape with homicide. Sanchez filed a Motion to Quash the
Information. However, it was denied. Hence, this petition. Sanchez contends that he can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan because he is a public officer.

Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction

Ruling: NO. The Court ruled that the exclusive original jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan is limited to cases involving violations of RA
3019, RA 1379, Chap. 2, Sec. 2, Title 7 of RPC, and other offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office.
In this case, the crime of rape with homicide does not fall under any of them. There is no direct relation between the commission of the
crime of rape with homicide and the office of Sanchez as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element for the crime
charged.

CASE #25. People v. Oso - 10 October 1935

Facts:
Defendant was charged in the CFI of Davao for the complex crime of forcible aduction with rape. Judgement was rendered sentencing
the accused to an indeterminate penalty of from twelve years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

The information states that Sovida was abducted by the defendant. Sovida was in Oso's power for seven days during which her abductor,
through intimidation, cohabited with her several times.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be convicted of forcible abduction with rape

Ruling:
NO. Where the facts which the lower court and this court declare proven constitute the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape,
yet it appears that the offended party's complaint upon which this case was formally instituted in the justice of the peace court alleges
facts which, while sufficient to constitute the crime of forcible abduction, are not sufficient to determine the crime of rape, the accused
cannot be convicted of the latter crime.

There is no doubt that the facts considered as proven by the lower court and this court constitute the complex crime of forcible
abduction with rape. It appears, however, that Sovida's complaint upon which this case was formally instituted in the justice of the
peace court of Manay, alleges facts which, while sufficient to constitute the crime of forcible abduction, are not sufficient to determine
the crime of rape. In fact, the mere allegation that the accused cohabited with the complainant, without her consent, does not concretely
describe the crime of rape in any of its forms which, according to article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, are: the use of force or
intimidation; that the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or that the victim is under twelve years of age, even
though neither of the circumstances above-mentioned is present. Every accused has the right to be duly informed of the nature of the
accusation and this legal requisite has not been complied with in this case. It is true that in the information later filed by the fiscal, when
the case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance for trial on the merits, an attempt was made to correct this defect by supplying the
omission of the allegations of the original complaint, but it is also true that the allegation omitted is jurisdictional in character, the
crime involved being one which cannot be prosecuted de officio, and the omission thereof, is fatal and cannot be corrected in the latter
stages of the proceeding (article 344, Revised Penal Code) The appellant should not therefore be convicted of the complex crime of
forcible abduction with rape, but only of forcible abduction.

CASE #26. People v. Arojado – G.R. No. 207041, 2015

Facts: Respondent was charged with the crime of murder by the Office of the City Prosecutor. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
claiming that the investigating prosecutor who filed the Information failed to indicate the number and date of issue of her Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as required by Bar Matter No. 1922 (B.M. No. 1922). Thus, the RTC
dismissed the Information. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the failure of the investigating prosecutor to indicate her MCLE Compliance number and date of issuance
warrants the dismissal of the information

Ruling: YES. The Court ruled that B.M. No. 1922 requires practicing members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed before the
courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance. Failure to disclose the required
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records. Moreover, an Information is
considered a pleading because the allegations therein, which charge a person with an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a
civil action which alleges a plaintiff’s cause of action. Lastly, the prosecution could have simply re-filed the Information containing the
required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance. However, there is no showing that
the prosecution even attempted to comply with the requirement under B.M. No. 1922.

In any case, the Court previously issued an amendatory Resolution which provided that the failure of a lawyer to indicate in his or her
pleadings the number and date of issue of his/her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case and
expunction of the pleadings from the records and will only subject the lawyer to a prescribed fined and/or disciplinary action. Hence,
the trial court should have just simply required the investigating prosecutor to indicate the number and date of issue of her MCLE
Certificate of Compliance instead of dismissing the INFORMATION.

CASE #27. Quisay v. People – G.R. No. 216920 – 2016

Facts: The Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati issued a Resolution and later filed an Information before the RTC charging Quisay
with violation of RA 7610. Quisay moved to quash the Information claiming that it was filed by a person who lacked the authority to do
so because the Asst. City Prosecutor filed it without the approval of the City Prosecutor and merely showed a Certification saying that
the Asst. City Prosecutor has prior written approval from the City Prosecutor to filed it. However, RTC denied. CA affirmed. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether or not the Certification was sufficient to show that the City Prosecutor approved the filing of the Information
Ruling: NO. The Court ruled that Sec. 4, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court provides that the filing of a complaint or information requires a
prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information may be filed before the courts.
Absent this, the complaints or informations are defective and thus, subject to quashal. In this case, there is no showing that it was
approved by the City Prosecutor. The Certification only stated that “the filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval
of the City Prosecutor.” The Court found this bare and self-serving and thus, rejected it. Therefore, the person who filed the information
had no authority to do so and the case must be dismissed.

Sec. 5. Prosecution of Private Crimes

CASE #28. Visbal v. Judge Ramos - 29 March 2001

Facts: Prosecutor Visbal charged respondent Judge Ramos of the MTC with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of judicial
authority, and negligence. Visbal claimed that Judge Ramos directed him to continue his appearance for a criminal case even when he
had already delegated his prosecutory authority to a private prosecutor due to the unavailability of a regular prosecutor. He cites the
provision of the Rules of Court which succinctly provides that although criminal cases must be prosecuted by the public prosecutor, his
authority may be delegated to a private prosecutor under his control or supervision or to the Chief of Police in the Municipal Trial Court,
when a regular prosecutor is not available. In the instant case, no regular prosecutor is available in respondent Judges sala since he
(complainant) is officially and regularly assigned to RTC, Branch VIII of Tacloban City, thus forcing him to delegate the prosecution of
the case to the police investigator.

Issue: Whether the issuance of the Order directing Visbal to continue on his appearance as prosecution in the said criminal case
constitutes gross ignorance of the law given that he has already delegated it

Ruling: NO.
There is nothing in the said February 18, 1998 Order that constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Generally, all criminal actions must be
prosecuted under the control and direction of the prosecutor. However, when the assigned prosecutor is not available, cases before the
MTC and MCTC may be prosecuted by the offended party, any peace officer, or any proper public officer. Furthermore, such authority
ceases upon the actual intervention of the prosecutor or upon the elevation of the case to the RTC. In this case, a prosecutor had already
intervened in the case. Prosecutor Ricardo P. Candido had actively handled the prosecution which was, however, transferred to
complainant when the former was hospitalized. Hence, a prosecutor was available; there was no reason for the delegation of the
prosecutory authority to the police chief of the municipality.

CASE #29. Bravo v. CA- 8 May 1992

Facts: Viña instituted a civil case against Bravo where Viña won. Bravo appealed to the CA and was able to forestall the execution.
However, the sheriff was not notified of the forestalling of the execution and proceeded to seize the property of Bravo. Thus, Bravo filed
a complaint against Viña for the crime of robbery with force upon tings. While the complaint was pending, Bravo furnished copies of the
complaint to several government agencies. Bravo also wrote to the Provincial Commander alleging that Viña, along with his co-accused
in the robbery case, have threatened him and his family members several times, that they threatened to accuse him of several concocted
crimes, and that they even filed a complaint for illegal possession of firearm against him.

Later, the complaint for robbery was dismissed by the fiscal. Upon investigation, the complaint for threats was also dismissed for lack of
evidence. Thus, Viña filed a complaint for libel against Bravo. RTC found Bravo guilty of two counts of libel. CA modified this by
dismissing the libel case arising from the robbery complaint on the ground of prescription. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that he was convicted of a libel charge which is at variance with the one specified in the Information because he was
being charged with libel allegedly to have been committed in Quezon City and not in Naga City where the said libel was allegedly
committed. Petitioner also contends that there was no fiscal who was physically present during the proceedings of the libel cases
because the entire evidence for the prosecution was presented by a private prosecutor who had no express authority from the fiscal to
represent the State and thus, the entire trial is invalid.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a variance between the offense charged in the information and the offense proved during the trial
(2) Whether or not a fiscal was physically present during the proceedings of the libel cases

Ruling:
 (1) NO. The Court ruled that Art. 360, par. 3, of the RPC allows the filing of a libel complaint at the place where any of the
offended parties reside to establish the proper venue. In fact, there is no variance between the offense charged and the offense
proved because it was proved beyond reasonable doubt that the libel committed by petitioner in Naga City is the very same
offense charged in the Information. Furthermore, the place of the commission of libel is not an indispensable element for the
offense of libel because a libel case may be filed where the libelous article was printed and first published or in the place where
any of the offended party resides. In this case, since Viña resides in Quezon City at the time of the commission of the offense,
then it follows that the lower court properly acquired jurisdiction to try the case.

(2) YES. The Court ruled that during the arraignment before the lower court, it is presumed that the prosecution was personally
represented by a prosecuting fiscal because there is no showing that he was absent. On the first day of the trial on the merits,
the fiscal personally appeared and represented the prosecution. Thus, the presence of the fiscal gave authority to the private
prosecutor to handle the prosecution under his direct control and supervision. This implied authority granted by the
prosecuting fiscal to the private prosecutor continued for the succeeding proceedings. This implied authority granted by the
fiscal to the private prosecutor was also acknowledged by petitioner’s counsel when despite the absence of the prosecuting
fiscal, petitioner's counsel did not object to the cross-examination and presentation of evidence of the private prosector.
Moreover, the prosecuting fiscal was present during the last hearing of the criminal case. This active participation in the said
hearing had the effect of confirming his previous authority granted to the private prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the
case. Hence, it ratified all the acts of the private prosecutor pursuant to such authority.

CASE #30. Chua Burce v. CA -27 April 2000

Facts: The manager of Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company conducted a physical bundle cash count of the cash inside the vault and
found that there was a shortage of P150,000. Several investigations conducted afterward concluded that there was a shortage of
P150,000 and the person primarily responsible was the bank’s Cash Custodian, Chua-Barce. Unable to satisfactorily explain the
shortage, petitioner Chua-Barce was terminated from the bank. The bank then filed a civil case for sum of money and damages. An
information for estafa was also filed against the petitioner. Petitioner and the prosecution entered into a pre-trial agreement that the
evidence adduced in the civil case will also be adopted as evidence in the criminal case. RTC found petitioner guilty of estafa and liable
for P150,000. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition. Petitioner questions the validity of the trial of the criminal case because the pre-trial
agreement dispensed with the intervention of the public prosecutor ina full-blown trial of the criminal case.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid trial of the criminal case

Ruling: YES. The Court ruled that the pre-trial agreement was prepared by petitioner and conformed to by the public prosecutor. Also,
the records show that the public prosecutor actively participated in the prosecution of the criminal case from its inception. It was during
the pre-trial conference when the parties agreed to adopt their respective evidence in the civil case to the criminal case. This is allowed
under. Sec. 2(e), Rule 118 of the Rules of Court which provides that during pre-trial conference, the parties shall consider such other
matters that will promote a fair and expeditious trial. In this case, the parties reduced to writing such agreement in compliance with the
said rule. Therefore, petitioner is bound by the pre-trial agreement and she cannot onw belatedly disavow its contents.

CASE #31. People v. Tañada - 17 Oct. 1988

Facts: Victoria Capillan wrote to the Office of the City Fiscal a letter-complaint saying that she wants to file a criminal charge of rape
against Romulo Postrero. Thereafter, Postrero was charged with the crime of rape by the Asst. Cebu City Fiscal. Postrero then filed a
Motion to Dismiss claiming that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the offense charged because the information filed by the
fiscal is not a complaint signed by the offended party as required by Art. 344, RPC and Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court which require
that the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended party. The lower court granted and dismissed the case for lack of a valid complaint. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for lack of a valid complaint

Ruling: NO. The Court cited Valdepeñas v. People which provided that the complaint required in Art. 344, RPC is merely a condition
precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. The Court also cited People v. Ilarde
which provided that the overriding consideration in determining whether or not Art. 344 has been complied with is the intent of the
aggrieved party to seek judicial redress for the offense committed.

The Court ruled that the letter-complaint submitted by Capillan not only narrated the facts and circumstances constituting the crime of
rape but also explicitly charged Postrero with the said offense. Also, the fiscal expressly stated that the Information was instituted upon
the sworn complaint of the offended party. Clearly, the letter-complaint filed by Capillan contains all the elements of a valid complaint
because it states the name of the defendant, the designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense, the name of the offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place where the
offense was committed. Therefore, there was a valid complaint.

CASE #32. People v. Bugtong - 31 Jan. 1989

Facts: Andres Bugtong was charged with the crime of rape before RTC for raping Irene Cutiam, a 15-year old girl with a mental age of
between 5 and 8 years old. RTC convicted Bugtong. Hence, this petition. Bugtong contends that rape is a personal offense which must
be prosecuted upon a compliant filed by the offended party, as required by Art. 344, RPC and Sec. 5, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Thus, Bugtong contends that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction on the basis of the Information signed by the
fiscal alone.

Issue: Whether or not the offended party initiated the complaint

Ruling: YES. The Court ruled that the prosecution for rape was inititated by the offended party herself with the assistance of her
mother. The Information filed by the fiscal said so which provides “upon a sworn complaint originally filed by the offended party.”
Moreover, it is not necessary for the complainant to sign and very the Information for rape filed by the Fiscal. Therefore, no error can be
imputed to the trial court in taking cognizance of the Information filed by the fiscal.

CASE #33. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera - 30 June 1989

Facts: Petitioner is a Filipino citizen who married a German national at Germany. However, 3 years later, the husband filed for divorce
against petitioner in Germany. The Schoneberg Local Court in Germany granted the divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. 5 months after the decree, the German national filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila claiming
that petitioner had an affair with 2 different men during their marriage. Thus, the city fiscal filed 2 complaints for adultery against
petitioner. The complaints were assigned to 2 different judges. However, the Secretary of Justice ordered that the further proceedings
be deferred. One judge suspended the proceedings while the other did not. Hence, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition. Petitioner contends that the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery which is a private
offenses that cannot be prosecuted de officio because the complainant does not qualify as an offended spouse by virtue of the divorce
decree obtained under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the complainant qualifies as an offended spouse

Ruling: NO. The Court ruled that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse, and nobody else. It necessarily follows that he must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the
time of the filing of the criminal action. Art. 344, RPC presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery. Thus, the offended party must still be married to the accused spouse at the time of the
filing of the complaint.

In this case, the complainant obtained a valid divorce in his country, Germany. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized
insofar as he is concerned in view of the nationality principle in Philippine civil law on the matter of status of persons. Thus, the
complainant has no legal standing to commence the adultery case because he was no longer the husband of petitioner at the time he
filed the complaint. Therefore, the complainant should have filed his complaints for adultery before he obtained the divorce decree.

CASE #34. People v. Schneckenburger - 10 November 1941

Facts: Respondent Schneckenburger married complainant Cartagena. However, several years later, they executed a document agreeing
to live separately from each other because of their alleged incompatibility of character. Respondent then secured a divorce decree from
Mexico. He then contracted another marriage with Julia Medel. Thus, complainant instituted an action for bigamy and an action for
concubinage against respondent. Respondent was convicted of bigamy and concubinage. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is guilty of concubinage

Ruling: NO. The Court ruled that the document executed by the respondent and complainant constituted a valid consent to the act of
concubinage under Art. 344, RPC. By such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego the illicit acts of the other. The consent
which bars the offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and
acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed.

Par. 2 of Art. 344, RPC provides that the offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders. Pardon refers to the offense after its commission while consent refers to the offense prior to the commission. In both
instances, the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her disnor and he/she cannot come to court. Therefore, the agreement
between the parties bars the offended party from prosecuting the offense.

CASE #35. Fernandez v. Lantin - 17 Dec. 1976

Facts: The Asst. City Fiscal filed an information for libel against petitioner claiming that petitioner wrote and caused the publication of
a letter wherein he directly, publicly and maliciously imputed to Iluminada Tandiama, an employee in the Bureau of Prisons, as having
an illicit relationship with another man who was also employed as a Prison Guard and that the said prison guard and alleged paramour
of Tandiama is Hector Valdeleon.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash claiming that Art. 360, RPC provides that no criminal action for defamation which consists in the
imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio shall be brought except upon complaint filed by the offended party and that
the Information was signed by the fiscal only, not the offended party. However, the fiscal countered that “illicit relation” does not
necessarily mean “unlawful cohabitation or intercourse,” and much less does it connote adultery, concubinage, etc., the imputation of
which would necessitate the commencement by the offended party of the action for defamation. Lower court denied the Motion to
Quash and held that Art. 360, RPC does not apply. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not “illicit relation” and “paramour” connote the commission of adultery

Ruling: YES. The Court ruled that the letter-complaint is predicated on the alleged discovery of the existence of an illicit relationship
between Iluminada and Hector. Moreover, “illicit relationship” can only imply that the two are having carnal intercourse with each
other.

“Illicit relationship” when used in a complaint for abduction had been construed to mean the existence of an unlawful sexual
intercourse. According to Webster, the word “paramour” is “one who loves or is loved illicitly; one taking the place without the legal
rights of a husband or wife; mistress - called also lover.” The term “mistress” means “a woman with whom a man habitually fornicates.”

Therefore, to state that Tandiama is having carnal intercourse with Hector Valdeleon is to accuse her of committing adultery because
adultery means the carnal relation between a married woman and a man who is not her husband, the latter knowing her to be married.
Under par. 4 of Art. 360, RPC, if the defamation consists in the imputation of a crime against chastity such as adultery, a complaint by
the offended party is required.

However, this error could be corrected without dismissing the case. Pursuant to sec. 1, par. (a), PD 77, the statement of the complainant
was sworn to before the Investigating Fiscal. Assuming that the recitals in said sworn statement contain all those required of a
complaint under the rules, a copy of said verified statement of the complainant should be filed with the respondent court to comply with
Art. 360, RPC. Otherwise, the respondent Fiscal should file with said court a verified complaint of the offended party.

CASE #36. Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank - 9 March 2000

Facts: Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which employed petitioner and a few others. One day,
an independent accounting firm conducted an audit of the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop. It found anomalies in 28
savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the subsidiary ledgers but not in the passbooks in the possession of
the depositors. It also revealed that to cover them up, fake deposits were recorded in the subsidiary ledgers. All in all, the anomalous
withdrawals amounted to P879,727.08. Thus, the bank filed a complaint for estafa against petitioner and some other employees.

The Provincial Prosecutor charged petitioner with estafa before RTC. However, the Secretary of Justice ordered the prosecutor to
dismiss the information against petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence. Thus, the prosecutor filed a motion before RTC
praying for the dismissal of the case against petitioner only and the admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as one of
the accused. RTC granted. However, the bank filed a motion for reconsideration assailing the dismissal against petitioner. RTC denied
the said motion. Upon appeal, the CA reversed. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
 (1) Whether or not the charges against petitioner should be dismissed based solely on the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice
(2) Whether or not the bank, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the dismissal

Ruling:

(1) NO. The Court ruled that RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to dismiss the charges against
petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The RTC in allowing the amendment of the
information to exclude petitioner effectively dismissed the criminal case against her. The RTC did not make an independent
evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case at all. The trial judge’s reliance on the prosecutor’s claim taht the Secretary
of Justice recommended the dismissal of the case against petitioner was an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction
to determine a prima facie case.

(2) YES. The Court ruled that the bank, as private complainant, had legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
against petitioner. Although it is the OSG that may bring or defend actions on behalf of the State in criminal proceedings
pending in the SC or CA, the private offended party retains the right to bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own
name in criminal proceedings before the courts of law.

In Dee v. CA, the Court held that the private offended party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of ROC if there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, adequate remedy available. Therefore, it follows that if the bank may file a special civil action
for certiorari, then with more reason does it have to move for a reconsideration of the dismissal of the charges against the
petitioner. As a general rule, a special civil action will not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the
respondent court, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.

CASE #37. People v, Dela Cerna – G.R. No.136899, 2002

FACTS: For sexually violating his 15-year old daughter Irene dela Cerna, on January 15, 1989, December 26, 1993, March 3, 1996,
August 25, 1996, February 10, 1997 and March 5, 1997, accused-appellant was convicted of six counts of rape and was sentenced to
reclusion perpetua and death.

Hence, this automatic review. Accused-appellant assailed the decision of the trial court. He mainly relied on the affidavit of desistance
executed by a private complainant claiming that said affidavit created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.

ISSUE: Whether or not, on the basis of the affidavit of desistance by the aggrieved party, the trial court may dismiss the case.

RULING:

NO. The Court shall not give credence to the affidavit of desistance executed by the aggrieved party. After the case has been filed in
court, any pardon made by the private complainant, whether by sworn statement or on the witness stand, cannot extinguish criminal
liability. Clearly, the pardon extended by the victim to her father was made after the institution of the criminal action. Consequently, it
cannot be a ground to dismiss the action in these cases. The reason for this rule is that the true aggrieved party in a criminal prosecution
is the People of the Philippines whose collective sense of morality, decency and justice has been outraged. In such a case, the offended
party becomes merely a complaining witness. It is also a dangerous rule for courts to reject testimony solemnly taken before courts of
justice simply because the witness who gave it later changed his or her mind for one reason or another. This will make a mockery of
solemn trials and put the investigation of crimes at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.

CASE #38. Chiok v. People - 7 Dec. 2005

FACTS: Charged with the crime of estafa for issuing a bouncing check upon presentment for payment due to garnishment and
insufficiency of funds, the RTC convicted Chiok. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the CA reversed the findings of the RTC on the
grounds that the lower court had relied on the weakness of the defense rather than relying on the strength of its evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor general did not file a motion for reconsideration on the basis of double jeopardy. Aggrieved, Chua, instead of
the OSG, filed the motion for reconsideration before the CA. Denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not, Chua has the legal standing to file the motion for reconsideration of the CA.

RULING. No. Chua lacks the personality or legal standing to question the CA Decision because it is only the OSG, on behalf of the
State, which can bring actions in criminal proceedings before this Court and the CA. To be sure, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private
complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.

The rationale behind this rule is that in a criminal case, the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the State and not the
private complainant.The interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited only to the civil liability.In the
prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution such that when a criminal case is
dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State
through the Solicitor General.The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal, but may only do so as to the civil
aspect of the case.

CASE #39. People v. Alapan - 10 Jan. 2018

FACTS: Alapan were charged with 8 counts of violation of BP Blg 22. The MTC convicted the respondent of 8 counts of violation of BP
22. It imposed a penalty of fine instead of imprisonment considering that respondent’s act of issuing the bounced checks was not
tainted with bad faith and that he was a first time offender. The MTC order did not provide for a subsidiary imprisonment as a penalty
in case of non-payment of fine. When the writ of execution was issued, it turned out unsatisfied. Petitioner thus filed a Motion to
Impose Subsidiary Penalty for failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC. Such a motion was denied by the MTC and RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not, the petitioner has legal standing to assail the penalty imposed in the judgment of conviction.

RULING: No. In the appeal of criminal cases before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People
is vested solely in the Solicitor General. This power is expressly provided in Section 35, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 12 of the Revised
Administrative Code.Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.
Jurisprudence has already settled that the interest of the private complainant is limited only to the civil liability arising from the crime.
Also, the final and executory decision of the MTC can no longer be modified.

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of Complaint/Information

CASE #40. People v. Bayya - 10 March 2000

CASE #41. People v. Sandigan – G.R. No. 160619, 2015

FACTS: Castillo was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the May 1998 elections. On September 19, 2000, an
Information was filed against Castillo charging him with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019,3 in relation to the
alleged illegal operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Cavite. According to the Information, Castillo, while in the
performance of his official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits to his co-accused Melencio and Emerenciano
Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the Villa Esperanza dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) and permit from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB). An administrative complaint for Simple Misconduct had
previously been filed against Castillo also in relation to the illegal operation of the dumpsite. The Office of the Ombudsman found
Castillo guilty of the administrative charge and imposed the penalty of one (1) month and one (1) day suspension.

ISSUES: Whether an Information alleging the grant of unwarranted benefits and existence of undue injury must state the precise
amount of the alleged benefit unduly granted as well as identify, specify, and prove the alleged injury to the point of moral certainty?

RULING: NO. Information filed against Castillo and his co-accused is sufficient

The information sufficiently alleges the essential elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Information specifically
alleged that Castillo is the Mayor of Bacoor, Cavite who, in such official capacity, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, and
conspiring with the Arciagas, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally gave unwarranted benefits to the latter, by allowing the illegal
operation of the Villa Esperanza dumpsite, to the undue injury of the residents and students in the area who had to endure the ill-effects
of the dumpsite's operation.
SC disagrees with Sandiganbayan, which allowed the quashal of the Information. For as long as the ultimate facts constituting
the offense have been alleged, an Information charging a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 need not state, to
the point of specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted nor specify, quantify or prove, to the point
of moral certainty, the undue injury caused. We have consistently and repeatedly held in a number of cases that an
Information need only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the finer details of why and how the
crime was committed. Moreover, the rationale for the ultimate facts requirement becomes clearer when one considers the period
when a motion to quash is filed, that is, before the accused's arraignment and the parties' presentation of their evidence. It would be
illogical, if not procedurally infirm, to require specific peso amount allegations of the unwarranted benefit and proof of undue injury - to
the point of moral certainty, no less — at this stage of the criminal proceedings.

CASE #42. Enrile v. People - 11 Aug. 2015

FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, (Napoles and the
PDAF scam) before the Sandiganbayan (SB). Enrile motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad
cautelam motion for bail; and a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of Information. The SB heard
both motions and denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused.

Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him that his arraignment will be on July 11, 2014. Before the date of arraignment, Enrile
filed a motion for bill of particulars before the SB but the latter denied Enrile’s motion essentially on the following grounds:

1. The details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in his supplemental opposition to
the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of information; and
2. The details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated during trial.

Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him and alleges that he was left to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime of plunder had been.

ISSUE: W/N the denial of the motion for bill of particulars because it is just “substantial reiterations” was proper.

RULING: No. The denial was not proper. That every element constituting the offense had been alleged in the
Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for more specific details of the various acts or omissions
he is alleged to have committed. The request for details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars.

Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the crime an accused is charged, the allegations
may still be inadequate for purposes of enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial. To be considered as sufficient and valid, an
information must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed

CASE #43. People v. Bayabos – G.R. No. 171222, 2015

CASE #44. People v. Taundo – G.R. No. 207816 – 2016

Sec. 7. Name of the accused

CASE #45. People v. Ramos - 4 March 1950

CASE #46. People v. Perreras 31 July 2001

CASE #47. People v. Amodia – G.R. No. 173791, 2008

 Sec. 8. Designation of the offense

CASE #48. People v. Labado - 24 July 1980

Facts:
Paulino Labado was charged with Robbery in Band with Multiple Rape penalized by Art. 293 in relation Art. 294 and 296 of RPC. On
Nov. 7, 1973 at around 8:30 in the evening Paulino accompanied by his 5 co-conspirators who are still at large entered the dwelling
on Engracia Baclas, hogtied her husband and son and forcefully took away their properties and on the occasion of such robbery,
appellant and 2 of his co-conspirators raped Engracia successively, one after another. The attendant aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, use of unlicensed firearm and nocturnity were alleged in the information. Paulino executed an affidavit [extrajudicial
confession] on Nov. 22, 1973 admitting that he did the crimes under force and threat at gunpoint by his companions without benefit
of counsel [against Art. 4, Sec. 20 of the Constitution that no person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself]. Paulino was
convicted of Robbery with Rape under Art. 294, par. 2 and penalized under Art. 335, par 3 with the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and that the crime was committed in band with no mitigating circumstances and the penalty of Death.

Issue: W/N the imposition of DP was correct when Articles 293, 294 [par 2], and 296 of RPC does not mete out the penalty of Death
but RP.

Ruling:
The applicable provision is Art. 335 of the Revised-Penal Code, the relevant portion of which reads "Whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death and this is the
provision mentioned in the dispositive portion of the lower court's decision quoted above. The fact that Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code is not mentioned in the information is unimportant and did not deprive the appellant of his constitutional right to be informed
of the accusation against him. Former CJ Moran has said that: from a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern
to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in his defense on the merits.
The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts
allegedly in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of
procedure or of substantive right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute.

CASE #49. People v. Torres - 26 Sept. 1988

CASE #50. People v. Nuñez -8 July 1999

CASE #51. People v. Nava - 19 June 2000

CASE #52. Roallos v. People – 31 December 2013

FACTS: Roallos, a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was the Executive Director of the Aguinaldo Vets and
Associates Credit Cooperative (AVACC). BBB, AAA's mother, worked as the secretary and treasurer of Roallos.AAA went to BBB's
office at Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City; BBB, however, was then out running office errands. AAA decided to stay in her mother's
office and wait for the latter to return. At that time, two women were talking to Roallos... inside the AVACC office. AAA alleged that,
after the two women left, Roallos went by the door of the office, looked outside to see if anybody was around, and then locked it. He
then approached AAA and asked her if there was any pain bothering her; the latter replied that her tooth ached. Thereupon,... Roallos
held AAA's hand and intermittently pressed it. He then asked AAA if there is anything else aching in her body. AAA said none. Roallos
then placed his left hand on the table while his right hand was on AAA's right shoulder. At this point, AAA was seated on a chair
without... a backrest while Roallos was standing behind her. Roallos then slid his hand tow... ards AAA's right breast and mashed it.
AAA asked Roallos why he is touching her. Roallos ignored her. He then mashed AAA's left breast. AAA shouted "Ano ba!," but
Roallos still ignored her and,... instead slid his hand towards AAA's abdomen. AAA then stomped her feet and pushed her chair
towards Roallos. Roallos then left the office.
Thinking that her mother would soon return, AAA stayed inside the office. However, after about ten minutes, Roallos returned to the
office and approached AAA. AAA then felt Roallos' body pressing against her back. Thereafter, Roallos attempted to kiss AAA.

This time, AAA decided to stay outside the AVACC office and wait for... her mother to return. AAA and BBB went to the police station
where a report regarding the incident was prepare... d. Thereafter, the police and the provost marshal brought Roallos to the... police
station for investigation. In his defense, Roallos denied that he molested AAA.Roallos further claimed that... his arrest was illegal
since the same was effected sans any warrant of arrest. He likewise averred that he was not informed of his rights when he was
arrested nor was he made to undergo any preliminary investigation.The RTC rendered a Decision[10] finding Roallos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Roallos sought a reconsideration of the CA Decision... argues that he was denied due process as he was not made to
undergo a preliminary investigation.

ISSUES: WON he was denied due process since he was arrested without any warrant of arrest and that he was not afforded a
preliminary investigation

RULING:

In Miclat, Jr. v. People,[20] the Court emphasized that... the accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity attending his arrest
should he fail to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground prior to arraignment... in Villarin v. People,[22]
the Court stressed that the absence of a proper preliminary investigation must be timely raised. The accused is deemed to have
waived his right to a preliminary investigation by entering his plea and actively... participating in the trial without raising the lack of
a preliminary investigation.

It is undisputed that, at the time of his arraignment, Roallos did not raise any objection to the supposed illegality of his arrest and the
lack of a proper preliminary investigation. Indeed, he actively participated in the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to
have... waived any perceived irregularity in his arrest and has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the RTC. He is
likewise deemed to have waived his right to preliminary investigation.

CASE #53. People v. Jugueta - 5 April 2016

FACTS: Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina were all lying down side by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at
around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by appellant and his companions. They
ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them successively and
indiscriminately, having hit and killed his two daughters, Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old
respectively. In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged
with Multiple Attempted Murder. However, based on the sworn statement of one Danilo Fajarillo, the Provincial Prosecutor found no
prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel. Appellant was then convicted by the trial court of Double Murder and
Multiple Attempted Murder.

Aggrieved by the trial court’s judgments, appellant appealed to the CA, which rendered a Decision affirming appellant’s conviction
for the crimes charged.

ISSUE: Whether the appellant is guilty of the crimes charged.

RULING:

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not parricide or
infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is
liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s two children. Minor children, who by reason of their tender
years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

As to the charge of multiple attempted murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is
attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the
words uttered during, as well as the manner of, the commission of the crime.The Court quoted with approval the trial court’s finding
that appellant is liable for attempted murder.

CASE #54. People v. Torrecampo - 23 Feb. 2004

FACTS: Appellants Renato and Rene Torrecampo (brothers) were charged before the Regional Trial Court with murder for the
killing of one Jovito Gaspillo.

The information alleged: That on or about the 11th day of November 1994, in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one,
NORA TORRECAMPO Y LEYTE whose present whereabouts still unknown and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another,
with intent to kill, taking advantage of superior strength and/or with evident premeditation did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, stab in the different part(s) of his body and even cut off his head with a bladed weapon, one JOVITO
GASPILLO, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds, which directly caused the death of said JOVITO GASPILLO.

On the basis of circumstantial evidence, the trial court found Renato and Rene Torrecampo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder and sentenced them to death.

Appellants contend that the decision of the trial court is not supported and contrary to the evidence adduced during trial.

ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in holding the appellants guilty of murder

RULING: The Information alleged the circumstances of “taking advantage of superior strength and/or evident premeditation,” and
charged the crime of murder. The circumstances that qualify the killing to murder must be proved indubitably as the killing itself. The
prosecution failed to prove these circumstances. Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor. This assumes a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor and
selected or taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime. The evidence does not show that appellants took advantage of
their number in order to overpower the victim. The evidence against appellants is merely circumstantial.

Nor was evident premeditation proved. There is no proof in the instant case of (a) the time when appellants determined to commit the
crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that they clung to their determination to commit the crime; and, (c) the lapse of
sufficient period of time between the determination and the execution of the crime, to allow appellants to reflect upon the
consequences of their act. Hence, this circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated.

CASE #55. People v. Lapore – G.R. No. 191197, 2015

FACTS: On 1 October 1998, when AAA’s parents went to Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, AAA was left at their house with her older
brother, two (2) younger siblings, and accused-appellant Lapore who was staying at their house as a guest. One evening Lapore went
inside AAA’s room and removed AAA’s panty. Lapore then removed his underwear and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA cried.
When she tried to shout, Lapore pointed a knife at her neck and threatened to kill her. With his penis still insider her vagina, Lapore
made push and pull movements and then left., On 20 October 1998, AAA reported her ordeal to her parents. When AAA’s parents
confronted Lapore, he admitted to the rape and promised to marry AAA. After the confrontation, Lapore left. Three (3) months passed.
Lapore failed to return. Thus, AAA and her mother reported the incident to the Barangay Chairman and to the police. AAA was brought
to Dr. Josieveline M. Abiog-Damalerio, the Municipal Health Officer of Quezon, Palawan, for medical examination. On 23 December
1998, AAA filed the instant criminal complaint for the crime of rape against Lapore

ISSUE: What is the effect of failure to allege the qualifying circumstance in the information.

RULING: With regard to the presence of abuse of confidence and obvious ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly weapon, we
affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals. Although the prosecution has duly proved the presence of abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness, minority, and use of a deadly weapon, they may not be appreciated to qualify the crime from simple rape to qualified
rape. Sec. 8 and 9 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that for qualifying and aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, it
must be alleged in the complaint or information. This is in line with the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him. Even if the prosecution has duly proven the presence of the circumstances, the court cannot
appreciate the same if they were not alleged in the information. Therefore, as all the elements necessary to sustain a conviction for
simple rape are present: (1) that Lapore had carnal knowledge of AAA; and (2) that said act was accomplished through the
use of force or intimidation, we find Lapore guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple rape .
 Sec. 9. Cause of Accusation

CASE #56. US v. Tan Choco - 17 Dec. 1908

CASE #57. People c. Canceran – G.R. No. 206442, 2015

FACTS: Damalito Ompoc (Ompoc), a security guard, (Arcenio), the Customer Relation Officer... on or about October 6, 2002, Ompoc
saw Caneeran approach one of the counters in Ororama Caneeran was pushing a cart which contained two boxes of Magic Flakes for
which he paid P1,423.00 Ompoc went to the packer and asked if the boxes had... been checked; that upon inspection by Ompoc and the
packer, they found out that the contents of the two boxes were not Magic Flakes biscuits, but 14 smaller boxes of Ponds White Beauty
Cream worth P28,627.20. Caneeran hurriedly left and a chase ensued; that upon reaching... the Don Mariano gate, Caneeran stumbled
as he attempted to ride a jeepney Arcenio refused to settle; and that his personal... belongings were deposited in the office of Arcenio.
Canceran vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he was a promo merchandiser On his way out, after buying
medicine and mineral water, a male person of around 20... years of age requested him to pay for the items in his cart at the cashier; that
he did not know the name of this man who gave him P1,440.00 for payment of two boxes labelled Magic Flakes... he obliged with the
request of the unnamed person because he was struck by his... conscience; that he denied knowing the contents of the said two boxes;
that after paying at the cashier, he went out of Ororama towards Limketkai to take a jeepney... consummated Theft.
The RTC wrote that Canceran's denial deserved scant consideration because it was not supported by sufficient and convincing evidence
and no disinterested witness was presented to corroborate his claims. Aggrieved, Canceran filed an appeal where he raised the issue of
double jeopardy for the first time.

The CA affirmed

ISSUE: Whether Canceran should be acquitted in the crime of theft as it was not charged in the information... whether there was
double jeopardy.

RULING : The Court finds the petition partially meritorious.

A careful reading of the allegations in the Information would show that Canceran was charged with "Frustrated Theft" only. As stated
earlier, there is no crime of Frustrated Theft. The Information can never be read to charge Canceran of consummated Theft because the
indictment itself stated that the crime was never produced. Instead, the Information should be construed to mean that Canceran was...
being charged with theft in its attempted stage only. Necessarily, Canceran may only be convicted of the lesser crime of Attempted
Theft. "[A]n accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that with which he was charged in the complaint or information and
on which he was tried. Indeed, an accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless it is alleged or necessarily included
in the information filed against him. In this case, although the evidence presented during the trial prove the crime of consummated
Theft, he could be convicted of Attempted Theft only. Regardless of the overwhelming... evidence to convict him for consummated
Theft, because the Information did not charge him with consummated Theft, the Court cannot do so as the same would violate his right
to be informed of the nature and cause of the allegations against him, as he so protests. the real nature of the criminal charge is
determined,... but by the actual recital... of facts in the complaint or information.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that the charge was qualified by the additional allegation, but, nevertheless, did not produce it by
reason... of some cause independent of accused's will, that is, they were discovered by the employees of Ororama Mega Center who
prevented them from further carrying away said 14 cartons of Ponds White Beauty Cream, x x x

This averment, which could also be... deemed by some as a mere conclusion, rendered the charge nebulous. There being an uncertainty,
the Court resolves the doubt in favor of the accused, Canceran, and holds that he was not properly informed that the charge against him
was consummated theft.

No double jeopardy when the first jeopardy never attached

Sec. 10. Place of commission of the offense

CASE #58. Navaja . De Castro – G.R. No. 182926, 2015

FACTS: The case arose from a complaint filed by private respondent DKT Philippines, Inc. Represented by Atty. Edgar Borje against
petitioner Ana Lou Narvaja, alleging that while she was still its Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that
she incurred meal expenses for P1,810.00 instead of the actual amount of P810.00 at Garden Café, Jagna, Bohol, and claimed
reimbursement for it. She was charged with falsification of private document before the MCTC of Jagna Bohol. Narvaja filed a motion to
quash/defer arraignment on the ground that none of the essential elements of the crime of falsification of private document occurred in
Jagna, Bohol, hence, MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case due to improper venue. MCTC denied the motion to
quash. She then filed a motion for reconsideration which was also denied. She then filed a petition for certiorari before RTC for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The court denied it for lack of legal basis or merit and that there were sufficient evidences
indicating that the falsification took place in Jagna Bohol. If the court were to follow the logic of the petition, her claim that her request
for reimbursement was made in Cebu City not in Jagna, Bohol would likewise give no showing or indication that the falsification was
done in Cebu. It would result to a “neither here nor there” situation. Narvaja elevated the case on appeal to the CA and was also
dismissed, affirming in toto the decision of the RTC. Her motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari.

ISSUE: WON the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol does not have jurisdiction over the criminal case and WON there was
an improper venue

RULING: No. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred. Based on the allegations of the complaint, the falsification of private document was actually committed
in Jagna, Bohol. Guided by the settled ruled that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information and not by the result of proof, the court holds that Narvaja’s case falls within the territorial jurisdiction of Jagna, Bohol.

Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense

CASE #59. People v. Gianan - 15 Sept. 2000

FACTS: The first incident of rape happened sometime in December 1992, at around 9 o’clock in the evening, Myra (then eleven years
old) asked permission forom his father if she could go to hebut told Myra to stay and give him a massage. Myra obeyed her father.
Afterwards, she again asked permission to go to their neighbor’s house and was already at the door when accused-appellant pulled her
and started kissing her. Startled, she resisted by pushing and hitting her father, but she was warned to keep quiet or else she would be
killed. She was made to lie down by accused-appellant who then took off her clothes. He also undressed and proceeded to have sexual
intercourse with her. After accused-appellant was through, he got up, dressed and then left. For fear that her father would make good
his threats, Myra kept to herself what happened. A few days later, while Myra was taking a bath in their house in Tondo, accused-
appellant entered the bathroom and started kissing her on the lips, neck and genitalia. Because she resisted and pushed him away,
accused-appellant left. Still, in the same month of December 1992, Myra was again molested by accusedappellant. She was cleaning the
room of their house and her father was the only other person in the house. Accused-appellant suddenly seized her and started kissing
her. As before, her father succeeded in undressing her despite her resistance and eventually consummated the sexual act. Like the first
incident, she did not mention this incident to her mother for fear that accused-appellant would carry out his earlier threats. Shortly
afterwards, the Gianan’s house was destroyed by fire, as a result of which the family moved to Barangay Pag-asa in Dasmariñas, Cavite.
Myra’s mother was able to land a job as bookkeeper at the Santos Pension House where she was required to work from 7:30 in the
morning to 9 o’clock in the evening. Accused-appellant, who was unemployed, was left in their house with the children.[7] Under this
setup, the abuses against Myra continued. One morning in March 1993, while Myra was taking a bath, accused-appellant entered the
bathroom, removed his shorts, then started embracing and kissing her. Myra, who was only in her undergarments, tried to push him
away, but was unsuccessful. Accused-appellant, while seated on the toilet bowl, made Myra straddle him as he did the sexual act.[8] The
fourth rape incident took place in the evening of April 1993, after Myra and her two younger siblings had gone to bed. Their mother had
not yet arrived from work. Myra was awakened as accused-appellant was undressing her. She instinctively kicked him, but she was
warned not to make any noise. Accused-appellant then started kissing her and pinned down her left leg with his feet while undressing.
He then proceeded with the sexual intercourse with Myra who was crying while her father violated her.[9] The fifth rape took place in
November 1995. During the wake for her grandfather, while Myra was serving coffee to those who came to condole with the family, she
was told by accusedappellant to go home. A short while after complainant arrived, her father followed. They were the only ones in the
house. She was then told to prepare the beddings and, while she was doing so, accused-appellant embraced and started kissing her. She
resisted but was told to keep quiet. Although accused-appellant was only able to lower her pants and underwear down to her knees, he
succeeded in abusing her.

ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant is guilty of multiple rape and that the information against him is void.

RULING: The evidence shows that accused-appellant was able to consummate each of the rapes through force and intimidation. Myra
testified that her father threatened to kill her and the other members of their family if she revealed the sexual attacks to anyone. The
threats cannot be minimized considering the moral influence of accused-appellant over her. Indeed, we have consistently ruled that in
cases of incestuous rapes, the father’s moral ascendancy over the victim substitutes for violence and intimidation. This especially holds
true in the case of Filipino children who are traditionally raised to obey and to respect their elders. With regard to the incident in
December 1992 during which accused-appellant kissed complainant in various parts of her body in the bathroom where she was taking
a bath, the crime committed was acts of lasciviousness. The elements of the crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force or intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of
either sex. Although the information filed was for multiple rape, accusedappellant can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because the
crime of acts of lasciviousness is included in rape.

CASE #60. People v. Magbanua - 3 Dec. 1999

FACTS: The victim was sexually abused continuously from the time she was13 years old until she got pregnant after 4 years of sexual
abuse by appellant, her own father. The sexual assaults usually took place at noontime when she was left alone with appellant while her
mother went to town to buy their basic needs and while her brother and sisters were at the house of their grandmother which was far
from their house.

She did not report the rape incidents to her mother because appellant threatened to kill her. When her mother noticed her pregnancy
and asked her about the supposed father, she did not tell her that it was appellant who authored her pregnancy. Instead, as suggested by
appellant, she named one Ricky Pacaul as the one who impregnated her. However, later on, she claimed that she does not know any
person by that name. And only later on when she moved to live with her aunt did she tell the truth about the crime.

ISSUE: Whether the information insufficient to support a judgment of conviction for its failure to state the precise date of the offense,
it being an essential ingredient of the crime charged

RULING:Denial, just like alibi, is insufficient to overcome the positive identification made by the witness for the prosecution. Denial is
an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail over the credible testimony of the witness that the accused committed the crime
charged. It must be supported by strong evidence of non-culpability in order to merit acceptability. Appellant, in the present case, failed
to discharge this burden. His lame attempt to shift the blame to a certain Ricky Pacaul, who may not even exist, in order to exculpate
himself, cannot save him. Moreover, where there is no evidence to show any dubious reason or improper motive why a prosecution
witness would testify falsely against an accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith and
credit.

CASE #61. People v. Ladrillo - 8 Dec. 1999

FACTS: The accused asked the 8 year old victim to come to his house to pick lice from his head. But then after, he stripped naked and
stripped the victim of his clothes and raped her 4 times during that one day. He raised the defenses of denial and alibi and questioned
the sufficiency of the information since it states that the crime was committed “on or about 1992”.

ISSUE: Whether acquittal is proper because the date alleged in the Information is not particular

RULING: ACQUITTED of rape based on insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. Denial and alibi may be weak but courts
should not at once look at them with disfavor. There are situations where an accused may really have no other defenses but denial and
alibi which, if established to be the truth, may tilt the scales of justice in his favor, especially when the prosecution evidence itself is
weak. The crime was supposedly narrated by the victim 2 yrs. after. The crime was alleged to have been perpetrated at the accused’s
residence when the accused was not even living in Abanico at that time. The victim’s narration of the incident was also not credible

CASE #62. People v. Bacus – G.R. No. 208354, 2015

FACTS: Felipe alleges[4] that he and his sister, Fortune, agreed to sell their lots in Canjulao, Cebu, through their parents, Juan L.
Dungog and Emma S. Dungog ("Spouses Dungog")The Spouses Dungog convinced other lot owners... in Canjulao to sell their lots either
directly to them or to Felipe and his sister.On 31 December 1996, the Spouses Dungog entered into a Contract to Sell ("Contract") with
private respondent Carlos A. Gothong Lines, Inc. ("Gothong Lines") covering several lots in Canjulao. The... lots... belonged to various
individuals... which specified the corresponding approximate land areas of each lot. Among these was Lot 1031-F registered in the...
name of Felipe and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10359 of the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City. Under the Contract,
Gothong Lines was to pay on installment basis the purchase price of P65,520,475.00 computed at P500 per square meter. Thus,
Gothong Lines paid a... down payment of P12,000,000.00. For the balance of P53,520,475.00,[6] Gothong Lines issued 15 postdated
checks of P3,568,031.00 each beginning on 31 January 1997 as payment for 15 equal monthly installments. Gothong Lines made good
all the checks, except... the last 4 checks dated 30 December 1997, 31 January 1998, 28 February 1998 and 30 March 1998, which
bounced due to Gothong Lines' stop payment order. Felipe claims... that despite Gothong Lines' stop payment order of its last four
checks, the Spouses Dungog still delivered in February 1998, 8 parcels of land with a total land area of 11,590 square meters valued at
P5,795,000.00. Among those delivered was Lot 1031-F. The Spouses Dungog demanded payment for these 8 parcels of land, but
Gothong Lines refused to pay. Thus, the Spouses Dungog informed Gothong Lines in a letter dated 18 June 1998 that they would no
longer push through with their offer to sell the... remaining lots. On 6 July 1998, Gothong Lines filed a complaint for Specific
Performance, Damages with Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against the Spouses Dungog to enforce the Contract. Gothong
Lines alleged that while the total amount of P51,248,348.26 paid to the Spouses Dungog corresponds to 102,496.69 square meters, the
Spouses Dungog actually delivered to Gothong Lines only 100,613.69 square meters To protect its interest, Gothong Lines ordered the
bank to stop payment on the remaining postdated checks. Gothong Lines asked the trial court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction...
to restrain the Spouses Dungog from canceling the Contract and from preventing its representatives and vehicles from passing through
the properties subject of the Contract. Spouses Dungog contended that it was Gothong Lines which breached the Contract by stopping
payment on the last 4 checks. They further countered that Gothong Lines violated a verbal agreement between them not to develop the
roads until after 30 June 1998, the last day for the Spouses Dungog to deliver and turn over the lots. The Spouses Dungog opposed
Gothong Lines' application for a writ... of preliminary injunction on the ground that Gothong Lines violated the terms of the Contract
and the other contemporaneous agreements between them. the trial court issued the Writ on 18 August 1998 which the sheriff served on
the same date. Felipe assailed the Order and the Writ in a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court, however, dismissed outright Felipe's petition. The appellate court also denied on 24 August 1999 Felipe's motion for
reconsideration. Thus, Felipe... filed the instant petition questioning the propriety of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the
trial court.

ISSUE:MAY PETITIONER BE DEPRIVED OF HIS PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW

RULING : Dismissal by the Court of Appeals of Felipe's petition was proper.

Felipe committed a procedural blunder in filing a special civil action for certiorari to assail the Order and the Writ. Felipe was not a
party in Civil Case No. 5020-L. He could not, therefore, assail the writ of preliminary injunction through a petition for certiorari
before... the Court of Appeals. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Felipe does not possess the requisite standing to file
such suit. Issuance of writ of preliminary injunction... was also proper.

The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction rests entirely within the discretion of the court and is generally not interfered with
except in cases of manifest abuse.[18] The assessment and evaluation of evidence in the issuance of the writ of... preliminary injunction
involve findings of facts ordinarily left to the trial court for its conclusive determination.[19]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Sec. 12. Name of the offended party

Sec. 13. Duplicity of the offense

CASE #63. People v. Jugueta - 5 April 2016

FACTS: On June 06, 2002, The family of Norberto Divina were all lying down side by side about to sleep at around 9:00 o’clock in the
evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta, Roger San Miguel and Gilberto
Alegre. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them having hit and
killed his two daughters. The family of Norberto Divina were unarmed and his children were at very tender ages. Mary Grace Divina and
Claudine who were shot and killed were 13 years old and 3 1⁄2 years old respectively.
The Court finds accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for double murder defined and punished under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for the death of Mary Grace Divina and to indemnify her heirs
in the amount of Php50,000.00 and another to suffer reclusion perpetua for the death of Claudine Divina and accused is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of Claudine Divina in the sum of Php50,000.00. In addition, he is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the
victims actual damages in the amount of Php16,150.00 and to pay for the costs.Aggrieved by the trial court's and Court of Appeal’s
judgments, appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.
Hence, this appeal

ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court imposed proper award of damages on the accused-appellant

RULING:No. The lower court failed to take into account dwelling as an ordinary aggravating circumstance. In view of the attendant
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties and award of damages imposed on accused-appellant. In the
case at bar, the crimes were aggravated by dwelling, and the murders committed were further made atrocious by the fact that the
victims are innocent, defenseless minors – one is a mere 31⁄2-year-old toddler, and the other a 13-year-old girl. The increase in the
amount of awards for damages is befitting to show not only the Court's, but all of society's outrage over such crimes and wastage of lives.

Sec. 14. Amendment or Substitution

CASE #64. Crespo v. Mogul - 30 June 1987\

FACTS: Petitioner Mario Crespo was accused for Estafa in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for
arraignment, the accused filed a motion for defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice. However, Justice Mogul denied the motion, but the arraignment was deferred in a much later date to afford time
for the petitioner to elevate the mater to the appellate court.

The accused filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction to the CA. The CA ordered the
trial court to refrain from proceeding with the arraignment until further orders of the Court. Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Catalino
Macaraig Jr., resolved the petition for review reversed the resolution of the office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the Fiscal to move
for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. Judge Mogul denied the motion for dismissal of the case ad set the
arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary
writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. The CA dismissed the order and lifted the restraining order.

ISSUE:Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under orders fro, the Secretary of Justice and
insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.

RULING:It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. 17 The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. The
reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded
prosecution by private persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant.
However, the action of the fiscal or prosecutor is not without any limitation or control. The same is subject to the approval of the
provincial or city fiscal or the chief state prosecutor as the case maybe and it maybe elevated for review to the Secretary of Justice who
has the power to affirm, modify or reverse the action or opinion of the fiscal. Consequently the Secretary of Justice may direct that a
motion to dismiss the case be filed in Court or otherwise, that an information be filed in Court.
The filing of a complaint or information in Court initiates a criminal action. The Court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case, which
is the authority to hear and determine the case. The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining
whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the
proper court.

CASE #65. Dimatulac v. Villon - 12 Oct. 1988

FACTS: SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Pampanga. A complaint for murder was filed in the MTC and after
preliminary investigation, Judge Designate David issued warrants of arrest against the accused.
Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were arrested and it was only Yambao who submitted his counter-affidavit. Judge David then
issued a resolution finding reasonable ground that the crime of murder has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof.
Though it was not clear whether Pampanga Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted motu proprio, or upon motion
of the private respondents, she conducted a reinvestigation and resolved that the Yabuts and Danny were in conspiracy, along with the
other accused, and committed homicide.
Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of Justice.
However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag ordered for the release of David, Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An information for homicide was
also filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and recalled the warrants of arrest against them.
Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue hold departure order and Urgent Motion to defer proceedings. Judge
Roura deferred the resolution of the first Motion and denied the second. He also set the arraignment of the accused.
The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for hastily setting the date for arraignment pending the appeal in the DOJ and for
prejudging the matter. They also filed a Petition for prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment with the trial court and opposed the inhibition of Roura. He also stated that
he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate. Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and was replaced by Judge
Villon.
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation submitting documentary evidence to support their contention that the offense
committed was murder.
Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the arraignment. The Yabuts entered a plea of not guilty. The petitioners then filed a Urgent
Motion to set aside arraignment.
Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of the petitioners. He also ruled that treachery was present.
The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have already been arraigned and they would be put under double jeopardy.
The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the appeal was held not and academic due to the previous arraignment of the
accused for homicide.
Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside arraignment. The motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari/prohibition and mandamus.

ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave abuse of discretion in reinvestigating the case without having
the respondents within the custody of the law and for filing the information pending the appeal of the resolution with the DOJ.
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding with the arraignment and for denying the Motions to set aside
the arraignment.
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion in reconsidering his order.

RULING: Petition is GRANTED.

Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave abuse of discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite the fact that
the Yabuts were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states that the prosecutor is not bound by the findings of the judge who conducted
the investigation, the resolution should be based on the review of the record and evidence transmitted. Hence, she should have
sustained the recommendation since all the accused, except Yambao, failed to file their counter-affidavits. It is impossible for Alfonso-
Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the DOJ. The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
There is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of an appeal once an information is filed.

Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for deferring the resolution to the motion for a hold departure order. Since
the accused were out on bail, the Motion should have been granted since they could have easily fled. Though he is not bound to the
resolution of the DOJ, he should have perused the documents submitted.

The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for setting aside its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its power of control
and supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has been deprived of due process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is null and void
and double jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.

CASE #66. Dungog v. CA -25 March 1988

CASE #67. Gabionza v. CA - 30 March 2001

FACTS:
On 9 November 1993 an Information was filed against petitioner accusing him of violating Sec. 22, pars. (a) and (d), in relation to Sec.
28, par. (e), of RA 1161. It alleged that "in and about or during the period from January 1991 to May 1993" petitioner, President of the
Manila City Bus Corporation, a compulsorily-covered employer under RA 1161, willfully and unlawfully failed, neglected and refused to
remit to the Social Security System (SSS) contributions for SSS, Medicare and Employee Compensation (EC) amounting to
P1,652,330.10 and the 3% penalty imposed thereon in the amount of P541,417.87 . Petitioner was arraigned on 7 December 1993. On 10
February 1998 or about four (4) years after he was arraigned, the public prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Amend
Information, to change the material dates stated in the Information from "January 1991 to May 1993" to January 1991 to May 1992."
Petitioner opposed the motion contending that the proposed amendment was substantial in nature, hence to allow the same would be a
violation of his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him, and would negate or prejudice defenses that
were otherwise available to him

ISSUE: May an Information be amended to change the material dates of the commission of the offense after the accused had been
arraigned?

RULING :The proper procedure for the amendment of an Information is governed by Sec. 14, Rule 110, of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure - Sec. 14. Amendment. - The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court at any
time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court,
when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the accused
x x xx
After the accused enters a plea, amendments to the Information may be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is
caused to the rights of the accused. The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a Complaint or
Information is when a defense under the Complaint or Information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the Complaint or the Information as
amended. On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the
original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for

CASE #68. Leviste v. Alameda - 3 Aug. 2010

FACTS: On January 16, 2007, an Information was filed against Jose Antonio Leviste charging him with homicide for the death of
Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the RTC of Makati. The private complainants-heirs of de las Alas filed an Urgent Omnibus
Motion praying for the deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the evidence on record or to conduct a
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense. The RTC thereafter issued the Order granting the motion by the complainants, thus,
allowing the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the trial court issued the other order that admitted the Amended
Information for murder and directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner questioned these two orders before the appellate
court. Upon arraignment, the petitioner refused to plead. The trial court entered the plea of "not guilty" for him. Prior to this, the
petitioner filed an Urgent Application for Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela, which the trial court granted on the ground that the
evidence of guilt of the crime of murder is not strong. The trial court went on to try the petitioner under the Amended Information.
Then, the trial court found the petitioner guilty of homicide. From the trial court's decision, the petitioner filed an appeal to the CA. The
appellate court confirmed the decision of the trial court. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition to
the SC.

ISSUE:Whether or not the amendment of the Information from homicide to murder is considered a substantial amendment, which
would make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary investigation.

RULING:Yes. A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the
jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form. The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.
An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the
offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and
not of substance. here is no substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a reinvestigation since both are conducted
in the same manner and for the same objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
What is essential is that petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of murder after the claimed circumstances
were made known to him as early as the first motion. Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present
countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the
proceedings and declined to actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation.
CASE #69. Mayor Amado v. Judge Pamular – 5 September 2018
FACTS: Angelito Espinosa (Angelito) was shot by Carlito Samonte (Samonte) at Corpuz Street, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija on June 4, 2008,
causing his death. Samonte was caught in flagrante delicto and thereafter was arrested. After the inquest proceedings, an Information
for murder was filed against him. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-defense. Priscilla Alcantara-
Espinosa (Priscilla), wife of the deceased, filed a complaint-affidavit before First Assistant Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Florendo).
Other affidavits of witnesses were also filed, one of which was that of witness Alexander Lozano (Lozano) stating that Mayor Amado
Corpus (Corpus) was the one who instructed Samonte to kill Angelito RTC dismissed Priscilla’s complaint and the attached affidavits of
witness. Priscilla filed a motion for reconsideration. Florendo reconsidered and set aside the Information/Resolution, and also
instructed Assistant Public Prosecutor Edwin Bonifacio (Bonifacio) to conduct the review.
Bonifacio was not able to comply with the directive to personally submit his resolution, prompting Florendo to order him to surrender
the records of the case. Florendo took over the the resolution of the case based on the evidence presented by the parties. Florendo then
found probable cause to indict Corpus for Angelito’s murder. He directed the filing of an AMENDED INFORMATION before the RTC,
now alleging conspiracy between Corpus and Samonte in committing the crime of murder. Corpus and Samonte opposed this Motion by
filing a Joint Urgent Manifestation/Opposition. Judge Ramon Pamular of the RTC of Nueva Ecija issued an Order (assailed order)
granting the motion to amend the information and to admit the attached amended information, and also directed the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against Corpus. Corpus and Samonte then filed directly to the Court a Petition for Certiorai with a prayer for an
immediate issuance of a TRO. Priscilla prayed that such TRO be lifted.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Judge Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
allegedly admitted the Amended Information which proscribes substantial amendment or information prejudicial to the right of the
accused.
Whether or not respondent Judge Pamular committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he
conducted further proceedings on the Amended Information and consequently issued a warrant of arrest against Corpus.

RULINGS: The petition for certiorari is partially granted. The case was remanded to the RTC for its preliminary examination of
probable cause and thereafter proceed to the arraignment of petition Amado Corpus.
Rule:
Rule 110, Section 14 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Prcedure provides: Section 14: Amendment or substitution.
- A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused. Any amendment to an information which only states with precision something which has
already been included in the original information, and therefore, adds nothing crucial for conviction of the crime charged is only a
formal amendment that can be made any time. It does not alter the nature of the crime, affect the essence of the offense, surprise, or
divest the accused of an opportunity to meet the new accusation. The following are mere formal amendments:
(1) New allegations which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction;
(2) An amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from that charged in the original
one;
(3) Additional allegations which do not alter the prosecution’s theory of the case as to cause surprise to the
accused and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; and
(4) An amendment which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused.

Sec. 15. Place where the action is to be instituted

CASE #70. Parulan v. Dir. Pf Prisons - 17 Feb. 1968

CASE #71. People v. Grospe - 20 Jan. 1988
FACTS: Manuel Parulan, is an authorized wholesale dealer of San Miguel Corp (SMC). He was charged with BP 22 at the RTC for
issuing a dishonored check in 1983 in favor of SMC (for insufficiency of funds) and, in spite of repeated demands, failed and refused to
make good said check to the damage of SMC. He was also charged with Estafa for issuing another check for payment of the beer he
purchased and refused to redeem said check despite repeated demands
Trial court of Pampanga dismissed the case because it said, that deceit and damage, the elements of the crimes did not occur in
Pampanga, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction. The checks were made in Guiguinto, Bulacan, and delivered to SMC also in Bulacan.
Were deposited in Planter’s Bank (drawee bank) at Santa Maria, Bulacan and was received by BPI at San Fernando, Pampanga for
clearing purposes.
Sol Gen points that 2 checks are involved. That Parulan issued PDB’s check (Bulacan) and was received by SMC at Bulacan. Then it was
forwarded to SMC San Fernando, Pampanga where it was received by te Finance Officer and deposited with BPI San Fernando Branch
then the SMC depository bank received a notice of dishonor for "insufficiency of funds" from the drawee bank, the PDB, in Santa Maria,
Bulacan. This check was the subject of Estafa. For Violation of the Bouncing Checks Law, on the other hand, the elements of deceit and
damage are not essential nor required. An essential element of that offense is knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check
of the insufficiency of his funds, it being mala prohibitum

ISSUE:WON the venue (RTC Pampanga) was proper

RULING: YES, both for Estafa and BP 22

Section 15(a) of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure: (a) In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took
place.
In other words, a person charged with a transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or province where the offense was in
part committed. However, if the acts material and essential to the crime and requisite of its consummation occurred in one municipality
or territory, the Court of that municipality or territory has the sole jurisdiction to try the case
Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may
arise independently in separate places. In this case, deceit took place in San Fernando, Pampanga, while the damage was inflicted in
Bulacan where the cheek was dishonored by the drawee bank in that place. Jurisdiction may, therefore, be entertained by either the
Bulacan Court or the Pampanga Court.
For while the subject check was issued in Guiguinto, Bulacan, it was not completely drawn thereat, but in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where it was uttered and delivered.Because although the check was received by the SMC Sales Supervisor at Guiguinto, Bulacan, that
was not the delivery in contemplation of law to the payee, SMC.
What is of decisive importance is the delivery thereof. The delivery of the instrument is the final act essential to its consummation as an
obligation
In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by
the very fact of its performance, and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of
making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan.
However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an
essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another
Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.

CASE #72. Sto. Tomas v. Salac – G.R. No. 152642, 2012

Facts: On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that,
for among other purposes, sets the Government’s policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection
and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.
On January 8, 2002 respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the
Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City, Branch 96. respondents sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10) and POEA Memorandum Circular 15
(POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rules and regulations
that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them to comply with the
policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042.
The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground that its sweeping application of the penalties failed to make
any distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the application of the penalty imposed on such violation. As an example,
said the trial court, the mere failure to render a report under Section 6(h) or obstructing the inspection by the Labor Department
under Section 6(g) are penalized by imprisonment for six years and one day and a minimum fine of ₱200,000.00 but which could
unreasonably go even as high as life imprisonment if committed by at least three persons.
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such grave penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that
were not as condemnable as the others in the lists.
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that allowing the offended parties to file the criminal case in
their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of criminal cases which is the place where the crime or any of its
essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at
the place of residence of the offended parties violates their right to due process.

Issue: Whether Section 9 of RA 8042 is unconstitutional as it deviate from the Section 15(a), Rule 110 of Roc

Held: No, it is not unconstitutional. Section 9 is valid and constitutional.

SEC. 9. states that Venue. – A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of
other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those criminal actions that have already been
filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.
There is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of R.A. 8042 that
differs from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the latter Rules allows
exceptions provided by laws.
Thus: SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted.— (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in
the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
(Emphasis supplied). Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is, consistent with that law’s
declared policy15 of providing a criminal justice system that protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal recruitment

CASE #73. Union Bank v. People – G.R. No. 192565, 2015

Facts: Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged of deliberately violating
Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) “by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint
that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency”. The Certification
was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was
filed in Makati.

Tomas filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City Court (where the Certificate
against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping
was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case.

The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate against Forum
Shopping was notarized in Makati City. The MeTC-Makati City also ruled that the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged
Tomas with perjury.

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the RTC-Makati City to annul and set aside the MeTC-Makati City orders on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion. The petitioners anchored their petition on the rulings in United States v. Canet and Ilusorio v.
Bildner which ruled that venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented.
Issue: Whether or not the proper venue of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC should be – Makati City, where the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized, or Pasay City, where the Certification was presented to the trial court.
Held: The SC denied the petition and held that the MeTC-Makati City is the proper venue and the proper court to take cognizance of
the perjury case against the petitioners.

The criminal charged was for the execution by Tomas of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the
applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who “makes
an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so
requires.” The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement
containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.

Based on these considerations, SC held that its ruling in Sy Tiong is more in accord with Article 183 of the RPC and Section 15(a), Rule
110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. To reiterate for the guidance of the Bar and the Bench, the crime of perjury
committed through the making of a false affidavit under Article 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and
swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is
committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the
testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor
civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the
oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases,
determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.

Sec. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal section

CASE #74. Diel v. Martinez - 14 March 1946

74.Diel vs Martinez – March 14, 1946
Facts: An information for illegal practice of medicine was filed against petitioner. On January 14, 1946, the respondent attorney was
permitted, over petitioner's objection, to appear in the case as private prosecutor. After the order was entered, although retaining full
control of the prosecution and assuming full responsibility therefor, the fiscal announced that he was turning over to said attorney
the active conduct of the trial.

Petitioner complains that said order was issued with a grave abuse of discretion, there being no offended party named in the
information, no damages sued to be recovered in the criminal action, and Atty. Vicente Sotto having previously announced his
expressed reservation to file at a later date the corresponding civil action against petitioner.
Respondents answered that all the witnesses who testified before the fiscal are offended parties, they having been victims of
petitioner; that, although it is true that said attorney manifested in open court that he had no objection to reserving the right to
institute a civil action, it is not less true that later he withdrew said statement so as to bring the case under the provision of Rule 106,
section 15; that the victims of petitioner wanted to recover in the criminal case the fees they paid to him; that petitioner has another
remedy by appeal; and that there is no abuse of discretion in the issuance of the order in question.
After the hearing of this case, no one appeared to argue in behalf of petitioner. Attorney Juris Sotto appeared for the respondents
and, on her petition, she was allowed to file a memorandum instead of arguing orally.
Petitioner contends that there is no offended party named in the information. Respondents countered this that all the witnesses who
appeared before the fiscal as alleged victims of petitioner should be considered as offended parties. If there are offended parties,
petitioner's contention that no damages are to be recovered in the criminal action will be weak.

Issue: WON the respondent judge did not commit any abuse of discretion or any legal error in permitting the intervention of
respondent attorney as private prosecutor in the criminal case in question.

Held: No, In fact, we do not see anything objectionable in said intervention if we take into consideration that in its order dated
January 14, 1946, the lower court specifically guaranteed: "The court will see to it that the prosecution of this case be pushed through
within the bounds of law, will not tolerate persecution nor delay. The case will be handled under the full responsibility of the fiscal. In
ordinary parlance, attorney Sotto will be guest of fiscal Kintanar, host, who may permit attorney Sotto to assist him. From the record
of this case it can be gleaned that this court has not given consideration to any petition made by private prosecutor without the
consent of the fiscal."
Section 15 of Rule 106, as interpreted by petitioner, is premised on the theory that the prosecution of offenses is a public function. But
said public function can be performed not exclusively by fiscals or other public officers, but by private attorneys in cases where they
are allowed to intervene as private prosecutors. After all, in the performance of their professional duties, lawyers are officers of the
court and assume public and official responsibilities.

CASE #75. Liong v. Lee - 7 Aug. 2013

Facts: Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC
Group of Companies The CKC Group is the subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein
respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.
On July 19, 1999, petitioner's siblings including respondent and some unidentified persons took over and barricaded themselves inside
the premises of a factory owned by CKC.
Petitioner and other factory employees were unable to enter the factory premises. This incident led to the filing of Criminal Case Nos.
971-V-99, 55503 to 55505 including the respondent.
Petitioner on behalf of CHI caused the filing of a verified Petition for the Issuance of an Owner's Duplicate Copy of Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 232238 which covers a property owned by CHI. The case was docketed as LRC Record No. 4004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 4.
Petitioner submitted before the said court an Affidavit of Loss claiming the owner’s duplicate TCT is lost, that exerted diligent effort in
looking for the lost TCT and that there is no encumbrace
Petitioner testified in support. The RTC granted the petition and directed the Register of Deeds of Manila to issue a new Owner's
Duplicate Copy of TCT No. 232238 in lieu of the lost one.
Respondent then filed a complaint-affidavit stating that petitioner made a wilful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in his verified
petition, affidavit and testimony, as he perfectly knew that she was in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy of the said TCT.
Respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit stating that she was accusing petitioner of Perjury. The Investigating Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the case. Upon Review Resolution, the recommendation to dismiss was set aside. Thus an information
for Perjury was filed.

At the trial, Atty. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private prosecutor with the consent and under the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under Article
183 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a private prosecutor cannot
intervene for the prosecution in this case.

MeTC denied said motion, and its MR. CA upheld such decision by the MeTC holding that the presence of the private prosecutor who
was under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor during the criminal proceedings of the two perjury cases is not
proscribed by the rules. The CA ratiocinated that respondent is no stranger to the perjury cases as she is the private complainant
therein, hence, an aggrieved party.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not there is a private offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest.

(2) Whether or not the offended party may intervene in the criminal action.

HELD:

(1) Yes. When a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity, called
the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was
actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.

In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI's property and its loss through
inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent's personal credibility and reputation insofar as her
faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the corporation
itself is likewise undeniable as the court ordered issuance of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only averted by
respondent's timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.

(2) Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that,
"when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to
the criminal action."
Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action for
damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal action.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared that whether
public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by counsel as
merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings, that right must
be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil
liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is always subject to the
direction and control of the public prosecutor.

MODULE 3: RULE 111 - Prosecution of Civil Actions

RULE 111 - PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil action

76. Primo Mina v. CA – 28 January 2019

Facts: A case of perjury was filed against respondent Rodolfo C. Tandoc before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan
(OPP). After the requisite preliminary investigation proceedings, the OPP dismissed petitioners' criminal complaint for lack of
probable cause. Petitioners appealed before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) located in San Fernando City, La
Union.

However, the ORSP affirmed the OPP's findings that no probable cause exists for the crime of Perjury.

Petitioners filed an appeal in CA. It dismissed the appeal as the petitioners availed of wrong remedy. CA contended that they should
have first appealed the adverse ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) before elevating the matter to the regular courts.

Hence, the appeal in SC.

Issue: WON the petitioners availed of the wrong remedy

Held: No, Appeal in CA is the right remedy since ORSP ruling has already achieved finality the correct remedy it a certiorari through
CA not in the DOJ.

DOJ Department Circular No. 7011 dated July 3, 2000, entitled the "2000 NPS Rule on Appeal," which governs the appeals process in
the National Prosecution Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter alia, the Regional State Prosecutor, in cases subject of
preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by filing a verified petition for review before the SOJ.12 However, this
procedure was immediately amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A 13 dated July 10, 2000, entitled "Delegation of
Authority to Regional State Prosecutors to Resolve Appeals in Certain Cases.

DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the authority to rule with finality cases subject of preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, provided that: (a) the case is not filed in the National Capital Region (NCR); and (b)
the case, should it proceed to the courts, is cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MeTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs) and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) – which includes not only violations of city or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties attached thereto.14 This is, however, without prejudice on the part of the SOJ to review the ORSP ruling,
should the former deem it appropriate to do so in the interest of justice.

This was further amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 018-1415 dated June 18, 2014, entitled "Revised Delegation of Authority
on Appealed Cases, which has pertinent provisions:

(a) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be appealable
by way of petition for review before the ORSP, which ruling shall be with finality;

(b) If the complaint is filed outside the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OPP may be
appealable by way of petition for review before SOJ, which ruling shall be with finality;

(c) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be appealable by
way of petition for review before the Prosecutor General, whose ruling shall be with finality;

(d) If the complaint is filed within the NCR and is not cognizable by the MTCs/MeTCs/MCTCs, the ruling of the OCP may be
appealable by way of petition for review before the SOJ, whose ruling shall be with finality;

(e) Provided, that in instances covered by (a) and (c), the SOJ may, pursuant to his power of control and supervision over the entire
National Prosecution Service, review, modify, or reverse the ruling of the ORSP or the Prosecutor General, as the case may be.

In this case, records show that petitioners filed a criminal complaint before the OPP accusing Tandoc of Perjury. The complaint was,
however, dismissed by the OPP and such dismissal was upheld by the ORSP. Since (a) the criminal complaint was filed outside of the
NCR; (b) perjury cases are cognizable by the first-level courts since the maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment for less than six
(6) years;and (c) it appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of control and supervision over the entire NPS by reviewing the
ORSP ruling, the ORSP's affirmance of the OPP ruling was with finality. As such, petitioners have already exhausted its
administrative remedies and may now go to the CA via a petition for certiorari.

77. Mendoza v. Arrieta - 91 SCRA 113

Facts: A three- way vehicular accident involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private jeep owned and driven
by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felipino Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya.

As a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence Causing Damage to Property were filed
against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie Montoya. The trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any liability, civil and
criminal, in view of its findings that the collision between Salazar’s jeep and petitioner’s car was the result of the former having been
bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he was not a complainant against
truck-driver Montoya but only against jeep- owner-driver Salazar.

After the termination of the criminal cases, petitioner filed a civil case against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino
Timbol, the latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for indemnification for the damages sustained by
his car as a result of the collision involving their vehicles.

Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck- owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in solidum allegedly for
the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to whether he was entitled to relief against both on only one of them. Respondent Judge
dismissed the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol and jeep- owner-driver Salazar.

ISSUE: Whether or not the cases against Salazar and Timbol were properly dismissed.

RULING: Yes, the dismissal was proper.

The suit against to truck-owner Timbol:

Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur:

(1)it must be a final judgment; (2) it must have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions, Identity of parties,
Identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action.

It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata are present. However, the court agrees with petitioner that there is no
Identity of cause of action between the criminal and civil case. Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck-driver Montoya
was not prosecuted for damage to petitioner’s car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in said case.
In the criminal cases, the cause of action was the enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under Article l of
the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on quasi-delict under Article 2180.

Petitioner’s cause of action against Timbol in the civil case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint to wit:
that while petitioner was driving his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar
suddenly swerved to his (petitioner’s) lane and collided with his car: That the sudden swerving of Salazar’s jeep was caused either by
the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie Montoya, Timbol’s employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck the same
direction as Salazar’s jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner’s car suffered extensive damage.

Consequently, petitioner’s cause of action being based on quasi-delict, respondent Judge committed reversible error when he
dismissed the civil suit against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless
of the result of the latter. But it is truck-owner Timbol’s submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar) that petitioner’s
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate
civil action. In so far as truck-owner Timbol is concerned, he is not barred by the fact that petitioner failed to reserve, in the criminal
action, his right to file an independent civil action based on quasi-delict.

The suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar:

Petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa aquiliana as
evidenced by his active participation and intervention in the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter’s civil
liability continued to be involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for petitioner to
have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was deemed impliedly instituted in criminal case.
Jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the damages sustained by petitioner’s car. In other words, “the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist.”

And even if petitioner’s cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex-delictu, the end result would be the same, it
being clear from the judgment in the criminal case that Salazar’s acquittal was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a
civil action for damages can no longer be instituted. This is explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted here under:

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence …

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any
declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.

In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned, therefore, we sustain respondent Judge’s Order dated January
30, 1971 dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.

78. Yakult Phils. v. CA - 190 SCRA 357

Facts: A five-year old boy, Roy Camaso, while standing on the sidewalk of M. de la Fuente Street, Sampaloc, Manila, was sideswiped
by a Yamaha motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado.

Salvado was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries in an information that was filed with
the then City Court of Manila. Later on, a complaint for damages was filed by Roy Camaso represented by his father, David Camaso,
against Yakult Philippines and Larry Salvado in the RTC of Manila.

In due course a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering defendants to pay jointly and severally the plaintiff for actual
expenses for medical services and hospital bills, attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit. Although said defendants appealed the
judgment, they nevertheless filed a petition for certiorari in the CA challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court over said civil case.

Petitioners’ thesis is that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence of Salvado, being without
malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Further, it is contended that under
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure such a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is
expressly made.

The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. A motion for reconsideration thereof filed by petitioners was denied. Hence this petition

ISSUE: Whether or not a civil action instituted after the criminal action was filed, before presentation of evidence by the prosecution,
would prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action.

HELD: YES. Petition was denied. Decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
The civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party a) waives the
civil action, b) reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Such civil action
includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. The purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the
offended party from recovering damages twice for the same act or omission.

Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, nevertheless since it was
instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the judge handling the criminal case was informed
thereof, then the actual filing of the civil action is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation
that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence.

Procedural laws have retroactive application.

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:

SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. — When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party:

a. waives the civil action

b. reserves his right to institute it separately, or

c. institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil
actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence
and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.

Although the incident in question and the actions arising therefrom were instituted before the promulgation of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure, its provisions which are procedural may apply retrospectively to the present case.

79. Maniago v. CA - 253 SCRA 674

Facts: Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses. One of his buses, and driven by Herminio Andaya, met vehicular accident with
a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioner's
driver, Andaya.

However, a month later a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado.

Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against
his driver.

The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the
criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case.

Petitioner appealed in CA through a certiorari and prohibition.

The criminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the
consequence that the prosecution failed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioner's argument that since the civil
action to recover damages was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the
dismissal of the civil action.
Respondent defense.

Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, as such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to
bring the action to enforce them separately.

Respondents cited the cases of Abellana v. Marave, Tayag v. Alcantara, Madeja v. Caro, and Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, to the
effect that the requirement to reserve the civil action is substantive in character and, therefore, is beyond the rulemaking power of
this Court under the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the civil action may proceed independently of the criminal action when no reservation of right to bring it
separately was made

Ruling: No, there has to be reservations. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required
by Rule 111, Section 1, otherwise it should be dismissed.

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

It clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise
they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case.

The short of it is that the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition herein made that, on the basis of Rule 111, §§1-3, a
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when
such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it
separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it
was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the
acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.

The requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat
substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. The requirement is merely
procedural in nature.

There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be
reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made
against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability
under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused.

CAVEAT: This case is decided under the old rules on criminal procedure. Now, there is no more need for a reservation of the right to
file independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation and waiver
referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged (Case on Point: DMPI
Employees Credit Cooperative v. Velez, G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001)

80. Nissan Gallery-Ortigas v. Felipe – 11 Nov. 2013

Facts: This case stemmed from a criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) filed by petitioner Nissan
Gallery-Ortigas (Nissan), an entity engaged in the business of car dealership, against respondent Purificacion F. Felipe (Purificacion)
with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. The said office found probable cause to indict Purificacion and filed an
Information before the Metropolitan Trial Court... or her issuance of a postdated check in the amount... of P1,020,000.00, which was
subsequently dishonored upon presentment due to "STOP PAYMENT.

Purificacion issued the said check because her son, Frederick Felipe (Frederick), attracted by a huge discount of P220,000.00,
purchased a Nissan Terrano 4x4 sports and utility vehicle (SUV) from Nissan.
The SUV was delivered on May 14, 1997, but Frederick failed to pay upon delivery. Despite non-payment, Frederick took possession
of the vehicle.

Since then, Frederick had used and enjoyed the SUV for more than four (4) months without paying even a single centavo of the
purchase price. This constrained Nissan to send him two (2) demand letters, on different dates, but he still refused to pay.

Nissan, through its retained counsel, was prompted to send a final demand letter. Reacting to the final demand, Frederick went to
Nissan's office and asked for a grace period until October 30, 1997 within which to pay his full outstanding obligation amounting to
P1,026,750.00.

Frederick reneged on his promise and again failed to pay.he asked his mother, Purificacion, to issue the subject check as payment for
his obligation.

Purificacion acceded to his request. Frederick then tendered her postdated check in the amount of P1,020,000.00. The check,
however, was dishonored upon presentment due to "STOP PAYMENT."

A demand letter was served upon Purificacion, through Frederick, who lived with her.

Purificacion refused to replace the check giving the reason that she was not the one who purchased the vehicle. On January 6, 1998,
Nissan filed a criminal case for violation of BP 22 against her.

During the preliminary investigation before the Assistant City Prosecutor, Purificacion gave P200,000.00 as partial payment to
amicably settle the civil aspect of the case. Thereafter, however, no additional payment had been made.

After trial, the MeTC rendered its judgment acquitting Purificacion of the charge, but holding her civilly liable to Nissan.

Purificacion appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Branch 105 thereof affirmed the MeTC decision. Purificacion moved for a
reconsideration, but her motion was denied.

The CA granted the petition it contended that there was no privity of contract between Nissan and Purificacion. No civil liability
could be adjudged against her because of her acquittal from the criminal charge. It was Frederick who was civilly liable to Nissan.

Issues: Whether or not Purificacion is civilly liable for the issuance of a worthless check despite her acquittal from the criminal
charge.

Ruling: Yes, she is still civilly liable. The acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not change the fact that she issued
the subject check which was subsequently dishonored upon its presentment.

Well-settled is the rule that a civil action is deemed instituted upon the filing of a criminal action, subject to certain exceptions. Section
1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that:

The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation
to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.

As can be gleaned from the foregoing, with respect to criminal actions for violation of BP 22, it is explicitly clear that the
corresponding civil action is deemed included and that a reservation to file such separately is not allowed.

The rule is that every act or omission punishable by law has its accompanying civil liability. The civil aspect of every criminal case is
based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.[16] If the accused, however, is not... found to be
criminally liable, it does not necessarily mean that he will not likewise be held civilly liable because extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

This rule more specifically applies when:

(a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and

(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.
The civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to
him.

Purificacion was charged with violation of BP 22 for allegedly issuing a worthless check.

Purificacion was acquitted because the element of notice of dishonor was not sufficiently established. Nevertheless, the act or
omission from which her civil liability arose, which was the making or the issuing of the subject worthless check, clearly existed. Her
acquittal from the criminal charge of BP 22 was based on reasonable doubt and it did not relieve her of the corresponding civil
liability. The Court cannot agree more when the MeTC ruled that:

If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not
commit the act complained of. It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.

The Court is also one with the CA when it stated that the liability of Purificacion was limited to her act of issuing a worthless check.
The Court, however, does not agree with the CA when it went to state further that by her acquittal in the criminal charge, there was
no... more basis for her to be held civilly liable to Nissan. The acquittal was just based on reasonable doubt and it did not change the
fact that she issued the subject check which was subsequently dishonored upon its presentment.

81. Lee Pue Liong v. Chua Pue Chin Lee – 7 Aug. 2013

Facts: Petitioner Lee Pue Liong, a.k.a. Paul Lee, is the President of Centillion Holdings, Inc. (CHI), a company affiliated with the CKC
Group of Companies (CKC Group) which includes the pioneer company Clothman Knitting Corporation (CKC). The CKC Group is the
subject of intra-corporate disputes between petitioner and his siblings, including herein respondent Chua Pue Chin Lee, a majority
stockholder and Treasurer of CHI.

On June 14, 1999, petitioner on behalf of CHI filed for a verified petition for the Issuance of an Owner’s Duplicate Copy of TCT No.
232238 which covers a property owned by CHI. Petitioner submitted Affidavit of Loss stating that said TCT was inadvertently lost or
misplaced from his files and discovered such loss in May 1999, and despite diligent efforts, such TCT has not been found and is
already beyond recovery. Such petition was granted by RTC and directed the Register of Deeds to issue a new Owner’s Duplicate
Copy in lieu of the lost one.

Respondent, joined by his brother, filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the order of RTC be set aside claiming that petitioner knew
fully well that she was in possession of the said Owner’s Duplicate Copy, being the Corporate Treasurer and custodian of vital
documents of CHI. Respondent added that petitioner merely needs to have another copy of the title because he planned to mortgage
the same with the Planters Development Bank. Thus, RTC recalled and set aside its previous order.

On May 9, 2000, respondent filed a complaint-affidavit stating that petitioner made a wilful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in
his verified petition, affidavit and testimony, as he perfectly knew that she was in possession of the owner’s duplicate copy of the said
TCT. Respondent executed a Supplemental Affidavit stating that she was accusing petitioner of Perjury. The Investigating Prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the case. Upon Review Resolution, the recommendation to dismiss was set aside. Thus an information
for Perjury was filed.

At the trial, Atty. Macam appeared as counsel for respondent and as private prosecutor with the consent and under the control and
supervision of the public prosecutor. Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion asserting that in the crime of perjury punishable under
Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, there is no mention of any private offended party. As such, a private prosecutor
cannot intervene for the prosecution in this case. MeTC denied said motion, and its MR. CA upheld such decision by the MeTC holding
that the presence of the private prosecutor who was under the control and supervision of the public prosecutor during the criminal
proceedings of the two perjury cases is not proscribed by the rules. The CA ratiocinated that respondent is no stranger to the perjury
cases as she is the private complainant therein, hence, an aggrieved party.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not there is a private offended party in the crime of perjury, a crime against public interest.

(2) Whether or not the offended party may intervene in the criminal action.

HELD:

(1) Yes. When a person commits a crime, he offends two entities, namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity,
called the State, whose law he has violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or
property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.

In this case, the statement of petitioner regarding his custody of TCT No. 232238 covering CHI's property and its loss through
inadvertence, if found to be perjured is, without doubt, injurious to respondent's personal credibility and reputation insofar as her
faithful performance of the duties and responsibilities of a Board Member and Treasurer of CHI. The potential injury to the
corporation itself is likewise undeniable as the court ordered issuance of a new owner's duplicate of TCT No. 232238 was only
averted by respondent's timely discovery of the case filed by petitioner in the RTC.

(2) Under the Rules, where the civil action for recovery of civil liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule 111, the
offended party may intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense. Rule 111(a) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
that, "when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the
criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action."

Private respondent did not waive the civil action, nor did she reserve the right to institute it separately, nor institute the civil action
for damages arising from the offense charged. Thus, we find that the private prosecutors can intervene in the trial of the criminal
action.

Even assuming that no civil liability was alleged or proved in the perjury case being tried in the MeTC, this Court declared that
whether public or private crimes are involved, it is erroneous for the trial court to consider the intervention of the offended party by
counsel as merely a matter of tolerance. Thus, where the private prosecution has asserted its right to intervene in the proceedings,
that right must be respected. The right reserved by the Rules to the offended party is that of intervening for the sole purpose of
enforcing the civil liability born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. Such intervention, moreover, is
always subject to the direction and control of the public prosecutor.

82. LBP v. Jacinto – 3 Aug. 2010

Facts: The First Women’s Credit Corporation (FWCC) obtained a loan from the petitioner Land Bank in the aggregate amount of
₱400 million, evidenced by a Credit Line Agreement. As security for the loan, respondent Ramon P. Jacinto, President of FWCC,
issued in favor of Land Bank nine (9) postdated checks amounting to ₱465 million and drawn against FWCC’s account at the
Philippine National Bank. There was a restructuring of agreements between the parties and it changed the terms of payments. When
FWCC defaulted in the payment, LBP presented the postdated checks to the drawee bank but it returned dishonored or refused
payment for the reason "Payment Stopped" or "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds." Respondent also failed to make good the checks
despite demands.

Hence, LBP filed a case of BP 22. Respondent denied the allegations claiming that the obligation was extinguished through novation
when they entered into restructuring of agreements.

Prosecutor De Joya dismissed the complaint finding no probable cause on the violation of BP 22.

They appealed in DOJ which reversed the findings of the prosecutor.

CA on the other hand reinstated the previous ruling by Prosecutor De Joya finding no probable cause. CA ruled that novation is not a
mode of extinguishing criminal liability, it nevertheless held that novation may prevent criminal liability from arising in certain
cases if novation occurs before the criminal information is filed in court because the novation causes doubt as to the true nature of the
obligation.

CA also mentioned the a prejudicial question exists in the case at hand because the subject check has been novated and is the current
subject of the appeal in another civil case.

Petitioner’s MR was denied. Hence the appeal in SC.

Issue: WON there exists a prejudicial question in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending

Held: No, the prejudicial question in the civil case, if it be proven that the loan of FWCC had been novated and restructured then his
liability under the dishonored checks would be extinguished. There was no stipulation in that agreement to release the respondent
from her obligation after the restructuring of the agreement.

A prejudicial question generally exists in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in
the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The elements of
a prejudicial question are provided under Section 7, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, as follows: (i)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

A prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision before a
final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which said question is closely connected. Not every defense raised in a civil
action will raise a prejudicial question to justify suspension of the criminal action. The defense must involve an issue similar or
intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal case and its resolution should determine whether or not the latter action
may proceed. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the
criminal action based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal
case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action
can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. 1avvph

In the instant case, we find that the question whether there was novation of the Credit Line Agreement or not is not determinative of
whether respondent should be prosecuted for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.

83. Guingona v. City Fiscal of Manila - 4 April 1984

Facts:
Private respondent Clement David invested with the National Savings and Loan Association (NSLA) placed on 9 deposits through
the inducement of an Australian national who was allegedly a close associate of petitioners herein. NSLA was then placed under
receivership by the Central Bank. David filed claims for his and his sister’s investments and received a report that only a portion of
the investments they claim were entered in the records of NSLA. David alleged that there was misappropriation of funds and
 violation of Central Bank circulars, hence charged petitioners herein with estafa. Petitioners moved to dismiss the charges on the
ground that David’s claims comprised a purely civil obligation which was itself novated.

In the preliminary investigation, petitioners moved to dismiss the charges against them for lack of jurisdiction because David's claims
allegedly comprised a purely civil obligation, but the motion was denied.

After the presentation of David's principal witness, petitioners filed this petition for prohibition and injunction because:

a. *ONE of the CONTENTIONS* The production of various documents showed that the transactions between David and NSLA were
simple loans (civil obligations which were novated when Guingona and Martin assumed them)
Issue: Will novation extinguish the criminal liability?
Ruling: No.
NOVATION; EFFECTS; MAY PREVENT RISE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY; CASE AT BAR. — While it is true
that novation does not extinguish criminal liability, it may however, prevent the rise of criminal liability as long as it occurs prior to
the filing of the criminal information in court.
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioners Guingona and Martin executed a promissory note on June 17, 1981
assuming the obligation of the bank to private respondent David; while the criminal complaint for estafa was filed on December 23,
1981 with the Office of the City Fiscal. Hence, it is clear that novation occurred long before the filing of the criminal complaint with
the Office of the City Fiscal.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AS A RULE CRIMINAL PROSECUTION MAY NOT BE SUBJECT OF
PROHIBITION AND INJUNCTION; EXCEPTION; CASE AT BAR. — Considering that the liability of the petitioners is purely civil
in nature and that there is no clear showing that they engaged in foreign exchange transactions, We hold that the public
respondents acted without jurisdiction when they investigated the charges against the petitioners. Consequently, public
respondents should be restrained from further proceeding with the criminal case for to allow the case to continue, even if the
petitioners could have appealed to the Ministry of Justice, would work great injustice to petitioners and would render meaningless
the proper administration of justice.

Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended

84. Co v. Muñoz, Jr. – 4 December 2013

Facts: The case springs from the statements made by the respondent against the petitioner, Elizalde S. Co (Co), in several interviews
with radio stations in Legaspi City. Muñoz, a contractor, was charged and arrested for perjury. Suspecting that Co, a wealthy
businessman, wasbehind the filing of the suit, Muñoz made the following statements:

(a) Co influenced the Office of the City Prosecutor of Legaspi City to expedite the issuance of warrant of arrest against Muñoz in
connection with the perjury case;

(b) Co manipulated the results of the government bidding involving the Masarawag-San Francisco dredging project, and;

(c) Co received P2,000,000.00 from Muñoz on the condition that Co will sub-contract the project to Muñoz, which condition Co did not
comply with.

Consequently, Co filed his complaint-affidavit which led to the filing of three criminal informations for libel before the RTC.Notably, Co
did not waive, institute or reserve his right to file a separate civil action arising from Muñoz's libelous remarks against him.

Muñoz countered that he revealed the anomalous government bidding as a call of public duty.

In fact, he filed cases against Co before the Ombudsman involving the anomalous dredging project. Although the Ombudsman
dismissed the cases, Muñoz claimed that the dismissal did not disprove the truth of his statements.

He also emphasized that the imputations dealt with matters of public interest and are, thus, privileged. Applying the rules on privileged
communication to libel suits, the prosecution has the burden of proving the existence of actual malice, which, Muñoz claimed, it failed
to do.
RTC found Muñoz guilty of three counts of libel. The RTC ruled that the prosecution established the elements of libel.

In light of the Ombudsman's dismissal of Muñoz' charges against Co, the RTC also held that Muñoz' statements were baseless
accusations which are not protected as privileged communication.

In addition to imprisonment, Muñoz was ordered to pay P5,000,000.00 for each count of libel as moral damages, P1,200,000.00 for
expenses paid for legal services, and P297,699.00 for litigation expense.Muñoz appealed his conviction with the CA.

The CA held that the subject matter of the interviews was impressed with public interest and Muñoz' statements were protected as
privileged communication under the first paragraph of Article 354 of the RPC.

As a public figure, Co is subject to criticisms on his acts that are imbued with public interest.Hence, the CA reversed the RTC decision
and acquitted Muñoz of the libel charges due to the prosecution's failure to establish the existence of actual malice.

In the present petition, Co acknowledges that he may no longer appeal the criminal aspect of the libel suits because that would violate
Muñoz' right against double jeopardy. Hence, he claims damages only on the basis of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court (ROC),
which states that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

He avers that this principle applies in general whether the civil action is instituted with or separately from the criminal action. He also
claims that the civil liability of an accused may be appealed in case of acquittal

Respondents on the other hand maintained that, since petitioner did not reserve his right to separately institute a civil action arising
from the offense, the dismissal of the criminal action bars him from filing the present petition to enforce the civil liability.

Issue: WON the acquittal from Libel relieved the respondents from damages

Held: The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC applies to civil actions to claim civil liability arising from the offense charged,
regardless if the action is instituted with or filed separately from the criminal action. Undoubtedly, Section 2, Rule 111 of the ROC
governs situations when the offended party opts to institute the civil action separately from the criminal action; hence, its title "When
separate civil action is suspended." Despite this wording, the last paragraph, by its terms, governs all claims for civil liability ex delicto.

The extinction of the penal action does not necessarily carry with it the extinction of the civil action, whether the latter is instituted with
or separately from the criminal action. The offended party may still claim civil liability ex delicto if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the liability may arise exists. Jurisprudence has enumerated three
instances when, notwithstanding the accused’s acquittal, the offended party may still claim civil liability

ex delicto:

(a) if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;

(b) if the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; and

(c) if the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.

In the present case, the CA declared that the libelous remarks are privileged.1âwphi1 The legal conclusion was arrived at from the fact
that Co is a public figure, the subject matter of the libelous remarks was of public interest, and the context of Munoz’ statements were
fair comments. Consequently, malice is o longer presumed and the prosecution has the burden of providing that Munoz acted with
malice in fact. The CA found that the prosecution failed in this respect.

Co assails the CA’s ruling by raising arguments that essentially require a review of the CA’s factual and legal findings. However, the
Court cannot, through the present petition, review these findings without going against the requirements of Rule 45 with respect to
factual matters, and without violating Munoz’ right against double jeopardy given that the acquittal is essentially anchored on question
of fact.

In light of the priviledge nature of Munoz’ statements and the failure of the prosectionto prove malice in fact, there was no libel that was
committed by Munoz. Without the crime, no civil liability ex delicto may be claimed by Co That can be pursued in the present petition.
There is no act from which civil liability may arise that exists
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently

85. Padua v. Robles - 66 SCRA 485

Facts : On the early morning of New Year ’s Day of 1969, a taxicab driven by Romeo Punzalan (operated by Bay Taxi Cab owned by
Gregorio Robles) struck 10-yr old Normandy Padua on the national road, as a result of which he died.

The parents of Normandy (Paduas) filed with the RTC a civil case for damages against Punzalan and Bay Taxi Cab. Likewise, the
fiscal also filed a criminal case with same RTC against Punzalan for homicide with reckless imprudence

Two decisions were rendered by the RTC:

FIRST DECISION: on the civil case: Punzalan was ordered to pay the Paduas damages however the complaint is dismissed insofar as
the Bay Taxicab company is concerned

SECOND DECISION: on the criminal case: Punzalan is guilty of the crime of homicide through reckless imprudence and the civil
liability of accused has already been determined and assessed in the prior civil case

Upon finality of the civil case, the Paduas sought the execution of the judgment however the writ of execution was returned
unsatisfied. Hence, the Paduas instituted in the same court against Gregorio Robles (taxicab operator) to enforce the latter’s
subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the RPC (bale maoniang enforcement of the CIVIL LIABILITY EX DELICTO)

Robles filed a motion to dismiss on the ground (1) barred by res judicata and (2) failure of the complaint to state a cause of action
(NB: Robles was exonerated of his civil liability in the prior civil case filed by the Paduas).

RTC granted the motion to dismiss by Robles on the ground that Paduas’ complaint states no cause of action.

Hence, the Paduas appealed the decision.

ISSUES:

1. WON the judgment in the criminal case (refer to second decision) included a determination and adjudication of Punzalan’s civil
liability ex delicto upon which Robles’s subsidiary civil responsibility may be based?

2. WON Robles is subsidiarily liable to the Paduas?

RULING:

1. YES. The judgment in the criminal case recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the civil liability ex delicto committed by
Punzalan.

It would appear that a plain reading, on its face, of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O, particularly its decretal portion, easily
results in the same conclusion reached by the court a quo: that the said judgment no civil liability arising from the offense charged
against Punzalan. However, a careful study of the judgment in question, the situation to which it applies, and the attendant
circumstances, would yield the conclusion that the court a quo, on the contrary, recognized the enforceable right of the Paduas to the
civil liability arising from the offense committed by Punzalanand awarded the corresponding indemnity therefor.

Civil liability coexists with criminal responsibility. In negligence cases the offended party (or his heirs) has the option between an
action for enforcement of civil liability based on culpa criminal under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for
recovery of damages based on culpa aquiliana under article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability based
on culpa criminal section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court deems simultaneously instituted with the criminal action, unless expressly
waived or reserved for a separate application by the offended party. Article 2177 of the Civil Code, however, precludes recovery of
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission.
In this case, Court held that it is immaterial that the Paduas chose to file first an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana. The court also noted of the absence of any inconsistency between the first civil action filed by the Paduas and the
subsequent application for enforcement of civil liability ex delicto against Robles.

Hence, there was violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages for the same negligent act by the allowance of the
subsequent application to enforce the subsidiary civil liability of Robles. For, as hereinbefore stated, the corresponding officer of the
court a quo returned unsatisfied the writ of execution issued against Punzalan to satisfy the amount of indemnity awarded to the
Paduas in civil case 427-O. Article 2177 of the Civil Code forbids actual double recovery of damages for the same negligent act or
omission.

In view of the above considerations, it cannot reasonably be contended that the court a quo intended, in its judgment in criminal case
1158-O, to omit recognition of the right of the Paduas to the civil liability arising from the offense of which Punzalan was adjudged
guilty and the corollary award of the corresponding indemnity therefor. Surely, it cannot be said that the court intended the
statement in the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal case 1158-O referring to the determination and assessment of
Punzalan's civil liability in civil case 427-O to be pure jargonor "gobbledygook" and to be absolutely of no meaning and effect
whatever. The substance of such statement, taken in the light of the situation to which it applies and the attendant circumstances,
makes unmistakably clear the intention of the court to accord affirmation to the Paduas' right to the civil liability arising from the
judgment against Punzalan in criminal case 1158-O. Indeed, by including such statement in the decretal portion of the said judgment,
the court intended to adopt the same adjudication and award it made in civil case 427-O as Punzalan's civil liability in criminal case
1158-O.

There is indeed much to be desired in the formulation by Judge Amores of that part of the decretal portion of the judgment in criminal
case 1158-O referring to the civil liability of Punzalan resulting from his criminal conviction. The judge could have been forthright
and direct instead of circuitous and ambiguous. But, as we have explained, the statement on the civil liability of Punzalan must surely
have a meaning and even if the statement were reasonably susceptible of two or more interpretations, that which achieves moral
justice should be adopted, eschewing the other interpretations which in effect would negate moral justice.

2. Padua’s subsequent civil case to enforce the subsidiary liability against Robles states a cause of action since the subsidiary liability
of Robles, per judgment of the criminal case, subsists.

Hence, there was NO violation of the proscription against double recovery of damages for the same negligent act by the allowance of
the subsequent application to enforce the subsidiary civil liability of Robles.

Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions

86. Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Fragante - 80 Phil 777

86. Limjoco vs Intestate Estate of Fragrante

Facts : On May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission issued a certificate of public convenience to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing the said intestate estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant with a daily productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2)
tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced from the said plant in the Municipalities of San Juan, Mandaluyong,
Rizal, and Quezon City; that Fragante’s intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.

Petioner argues that allowing the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Fragante for the latter as party applicant
and afterwards granting the certificate applied for is a contravention of the law.

ISSUE: Whether the estate of Fragante be extended an artificial judicial personality.

HELD: The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view of the evidence of
record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has not changed except for
his death, and the economic ability of his estate to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was
the same that it received from the decedent himself.

It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes
vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of
the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as
survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

The estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his
estate which, include the exercise during the judicial administration of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his
estate which survived after his death.

The decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate
for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes those rights and fulfillment of
obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like his pending application at the commission.

87. U.S. v. Dela Torre -25 Phil 36

Facts: These defendants Anastascia De La Torre and Celedonio Gregorio were charged with the crime of the adulteryAfter
ptrliminary examination it was found out that there was probable cause to believe that they guuilty of the crime of adultery. During
trial, however one of the defendants,Anastacia died. Trial in CFI still ensued with the remaining defendant and was adjudged guilty
of the crime of adultery.

Appellant/Defendant Gregorio filed an appeal in SC to question of CFI claiming that since Anastacia already died then he culd not be
tried.

Petitioner countered this by claiming that the mere fact that one or the other died before the cause was brought to trial does not
prevent the continuation of the cause against the survivor

Issue: WON the surviving accused is relieved when the other accused died during the pendency of the trial for Adultery?

Held: No, he is not relieved and the criminal liablirty survives.

The evidence shows that the defendant and appellant had been living in the same house with his codefendant for some weeks or
months and that he had been seen having actual illicit relations with his codefendant. The offended party was a tenant of the
defendant and appellant. The defendants and appellants admits that he knew that Anastacia de la Torre and the offended party were
husband and wife. The evidence clearly shows that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged.

88. Asilo v. People – G.R. No. 159017, 2011

Facts: Private Respondent Visitacion’s late mother Marciana Vda. De Coronado (Vda. De Coronado) and the Municipality of
Nagcarlan, Laguna ) entered into a lease contract of municipality lot in favor of her mother for a period of twenty (20) years
beginning on 15 March 1978 until 15 March 1998, extendible for another 20 years.

The lease contract provided that the late Vda. De Coronado could build a firewall on her rented property which must be at least as
high as the store; and in case of modification of the public market, she or her heir/s would be given preferential rights.

Visitacion took over the store when her mother died sometime in 1984. From then on up to January 1993, Visitacion secured the
yearly Mayor’s permits.
Sometime in 1986, a fire razed the public market of Nagcarlan. Upon Visitacion’s request for inspection by the district engineer, it
was found that the store of Visitacion remained intact and stood strong. This finding of Engineer Gorospe was contested by the
Municipality of Nagcarlan.

The store of Visitacion continued to operate after the fire until 15 October 1993.

Visitacion received a letter from Mayor Comendador directing her to demolish her store in order to give way for the construction of a
new municipal market building which then she replied that there still exists a valid contract and she would only vacate if she'll be
given a stall in the new market and failing to do so would cause her to institute an unlawful detainer against the Mayor Comendador.

Mayor Comendador relying on the strength of Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions authorized the demolition of the store with Asilo and
Angeles supervising the work. Spouses Bombasi, thereafter, filed a civil case for damages and preliminary injunction against the
Municiplity and also a criminal complaint against Mayor Comendador, Asilo and Angeles for violation of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" before the Office of the Ombudsman.

Sandiganbayan consolidated both cases. During the pendency of the case Alberto Angeles, one of the defendants died and the case
against him was dimissed.Right after Mayor Comendador died on 2002 and a year after a decision was promulgated on both cases
claiming obth of them guilty in the civil case and for violating RA 3019.

Counsel of the Mayor countered this that the death of Mayor Comendador prior to the promulgation of the decision extinguished NOT
ONLY Mayor Comendador’s criminal liability but also his civil liability

Issue: WON the death of the Mayor prior to the resolution of the case extinguished both criminal liability andalso his civil liability.

Held: No, it did not extinguish.

Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is
complemented by the fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow, herein petitioner Victoria who
specified in her petition that she has "substituted him as petitioner in the above captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985 Rules in
Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable. Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct when it maintained the
separate docketing of the civil and criminal cases before it although their consolidation was erroneously based on Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606 which deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged.

Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly
from the crime committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of obligation, Article 32(6) of the CC -
The right against deprivation of property without due process of law

89. People v. Lipata – G.R. No. 200302, 2017

Facts: Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder and subsequently found guilty as charged and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the appellant’s appeal and affirmed the RTC’s decision. The PAO filed a notice of appeal on behalf of appellant. During the
pendency of the appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant dies. In view of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s
decision the Supreme Court issued a Resolution which ordered the PAO "to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the
deceased appellant as party; and to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant. In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:
Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based solely on the act complained of, the same does not
survive the death of the deceased appellant. Thus, the death of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon and this being so, it respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the
legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not arise.

ISSUE: Whether the civil liability ex delicto adjudged by the lower courts, upon death of the accused pending appeal, can be enforced
upon the estate of the accused.

RULING: No. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade
after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.

At the outset, we declare that because of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s decision, there is no further need to
determine appellant’s criminal liability. Appellant’s death has the effect of extinguishing his criminal liability. What this Court will
discuss further is the effect of appellant’s death with regard to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas, reconciled
the differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability.
We concluded that "upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there
is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal." We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability
ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 [of the then
applicable] 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony
previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised
determines against whom the same shall be enforced."

Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the Deceased Appellant, Cueno died because of appellant’s
fault. Appellant caused damage to Cueno through deliberate acts. Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi delicto may now be pursued
because appellant’s death on 13 February 2011, before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal liability
and civil liability ex delicto.

Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as
from sources of obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the
"legal representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this case,"
the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in Bayotas, require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute
a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176, as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but
may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The separate civil action proceeds independently of the
criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence.36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against
the estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3 in relation to the rules for
prosecuting claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87.

Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case.
Neither was there any reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present
Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate
civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs
cannot recover even a centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.

The criminal and civil liabilities ex delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final
judgment.

Sec. 5. Judgment in civil action not a bar

90. Salta v. De Veyra - 117 SCRA 212

Facts: Petitioner was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos branch. As such,his duty was to grant loans, or
only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on the amount of the loan applied for. In the performance of this duty, he is
supposed to exercise care and prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the bank.

In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, petitioner indiscriminately granted certain loans
mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in a manner characterized by negligence, fraud and manifest partiality, and upon
securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. This is how the respondent bank found petitioner to have discharged his
duties as branch manager of the bank, and so it filed a civil action in the CFI of Manila on April 22, 1970 to recover losses the
bank suffered and another case onSeptember 23, 1972 . At the same time the bank caused to be filed, based on the same acts, a
criminal case for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (Bale 2 Civil Case at isang criminal case)

In the criminal case, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer to Evidence).

With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases, based on Section 3(c), Rule I I
I of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:(c) extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

Judge de Veyra opposed the MTD while Judge Purisima granted it. Judge de Veyra ruled that the MTD must be denied for the reason
that acquittal in the criminal case will not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a
finding that evencivilly the accused would not be liable-there is no such a finding. Apart from this, Plaintiff in this present civil case
bases its case either on fraud or negligence-evidence that only requires a preponderance, unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the
requisite in criminal cases.

Issue: WON a decision of acquittal in a criminal case operates to dismiss a separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts as
alleged in the criminal case.

Held: No. The filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under the provision of Article 33
of the NCC. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of crime
mentioned in the aforecited provision.Based on the same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly
alleged fraud and negligence as having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. It needs hardly
any showing to demonstrate this fact, which petitioner disputes,particularly as to the sufficiency of the allegation of fraud in the
civil complaints. Definitely, We hold that the following allegation in the complaints unmistakably shows that the complaints
docontain sufficient averment of fraud

The opinion of former Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Dionisio vs. Alvendia is not only enlightening, but authoritative. Thus —". . . in the case
of an independent civil actions under the Civil Code, the result of the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirety
irrelevant to the civil action. This seems to be the spirit of the law when it decided to make these actions 'entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action (Articles 22, 33, 34 and 2177). Hence in these cases, I think Rule 107Sec. l(d) does not apply.

Under Article 31 of the New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action permitted therein to be filed separately from the
criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings "regardless of the result of the latter." It seems
perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed separately
from the criminal case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of the criminal case.

The wisdom of the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code is to be found in the fact that when the civil action is reserved to be
filed separately, the criminal case is prosecuted by the prosecuting officer alone without intervention from a private counsel
representing the interest of the offended party. It is but just that when, as in the present instance, the prosecution of the criminal case
is left to the government prosecutor to undertake, any mistake or mishandling of the case committed by the latter should not work to
the prejudice of the offended party whose interests would thus be protected by the measure contemplated by Article 33 and Art 2177of
the NCC.

CASE#91 People v. Layag – G.R. No. 214875, 2016

(This is just resolution)
Ruling:
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability [,] as well as the civil liability [,] based
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in
senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a
source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way
of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases
where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together
therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. 10
Thus, upon Layag's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Layag's civil liability in connection with his
acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against
the estate of Layag, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to: (a) SET ASIDE the Court's Resolution dated August 3, 2015 in connection with this case; (b)
DISMISS Crim. Case Nos. 2007-9591-MK, 2007-9592-MK, 2007-9593-MK, and 2007-9594-MK before the Regional Trial Court of
Marikina City, Branch 156 by reason of the death of accused-appellant Ariel Layag; and (c) DECLARE the instant case CLOSED and
TERMINATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED

Sec. 6. Suspension by reason of prejudicial question

Sec. 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question

CASE#92 Donato v. Luna - 160 SCRA 441

Facts:
On September 28, 1979, respondent Paz B. Abayan filed before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for
the declaration of nullity of marriage with petitioner Donato. Abayan contends that she had no idea that Donato has been married
prior to the contracted marriage. Donato on the other hand interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was
solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation, and undue influence were employed by Abayan to
obtain petitioner’s consent on the marriage. Petitioner subsequently filed for the suspension of the proceedings of the said case
contending that civil case filed for the nullity of his marriage with respondent raises a prejudicial question which must be determined
or decided before the criminal case can proceed. Hon. Artemon D. Luna on the other hand ruled otherwise directing the proceedings
in he criminal case to proceed as scheduled.
Issue:
Whether or not criminal case proceedings should be suspended in view of the prejudicial question raised by the filed civil case.
Ruling:
A prejudicial question is defined to be one in which resolution is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The requisites of a prejudicial question was not obtain in the case at bar. It must be
noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of petitioner Donato’s guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. The records reveal that prior to petitioner’s second
marriage, he had been living with private respondent as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.
Thus, petitioner’s averments that his consent was obtained through force and undue influence is belled by the fact that both petitioner
and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage for more than five years before the subsequent marriage was contracted. As such, the petition was dismissed for lack of
merit.

CASE#93 Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis -336 SCRA 750

Facts:
On October 21, 1985, respondent Isagani contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce. Without said marriage having been
annulled, Isagani contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a
certain Julia. An information for bigamy was filed against Isagani based on Imelda's complaint. Sometime thereafter, Isagani
initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without
a marriage license. Isagani then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil
case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the
criminal case.
Issue:
Does the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy?
Held:
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. It is a
question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused. It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also
that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. Consequently, the
defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution
determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. Its two essential elements are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial
declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties,
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage.

Isagani, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered
into the second marriage. He was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second
marriage with petitioner. Any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the
criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
Respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist
has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of
nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior
to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

CASE#94 Umali v. IAC - 186 SCRA 680

Facts:
Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea Development Corporation (OROSEA). On September 4. 1979, petitioners purchased from the
spouses Honorio and Salina Edano, Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Bo. Casay, Mulanay, Province of Quezon,
covered by TCT No. RT-(T-36471), in the name of spouses Edano. for the sum of P1.036,500.00 payable in four installments. The first
check for P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment. By arrangement of the petitioners with the Edano spouses, a deed of
absolute sale was executed by the vendors. In the first deferment petitioners issued a check that matured on June 30, 1980 to replace
the check that matured on March 31. 1980. On the second deferment petitioners issued another check dated July 31. 1980 to replace
the check dated June 30, 1980.This second renewal check was presented with the bank but it was dishonored due to lack of funds. So
were the checks postdated September 30, 1980 and March 31. 1981. They were also dishonored upon their presentment for lack of
funds. On May 21. 1981the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners, docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-1, as a
consequence of the dishonor of the checks. On October 14. 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon
against the Edano spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. 8769, for the annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale executed on
September 4. 1979 by and between OROSEA and the Edano spouses covering Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, and for
which the petitioners issued the checks.
Issue:
Whether CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question in relation to CR No. 1423-I so as to require a suspension of proceedings in the
latter case, until the civil case is disposed of
Ruling:
At the time the acts complained of in CR No. 1423-I were committed. the deed of sale sought to be later annulled in CV No. 8769 was
binding upon the parties thereto. including the petitioners. The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial question to exist are: (a)
the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such
issue in the civil action determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Given the nature of a prejudicial question, and
considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769 and CR No. 1423-1, we agree with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the
resolution of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I,
hence, no prejudicial question is involved between the said two (2) cases. What private respondents complained of in CR No. 1423-I is
that the checks issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of funds upon due presentment to the drawee bank.
Undeniably, at the time of said dishonor, petitioners' obligation to pay private respondents pursuant to the deed of sale, continued to
subsist. And because petitioners' checks were dishonored for lack of funds. petitioners are answerable under the law for the
consequences of their said acts. And even if CV No. 8769 were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale should be
annulled; such declaration would be of no material importance in the determination of the guilt or innocence of petitioners-accused
in CR No. 1423-I. The petition for review on certiorari is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

CASE#95 Dreamworks Construction Inc. v. Janiola- 30 June 2009

Facts:
This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding filed by the petitioner in the MTC
for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with respect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent.
The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice-President, filed a Complaint Affidavit against
Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City.
Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC,
entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20, 2006, Janiola instituted a civil complaint against petitioner
for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground that private respondent claim that
the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case. Petitioner opposed the Respondent’s Motion to Suspend criminal
proceeding based on juridical question for the following grounds:
(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a
separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and
(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is that “the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is
missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to the RTC but denied the petition.
Hence, this petition raised.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case on the basis of “Prejudicial
Question “, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.
Held:
This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.
The elements of a prejudicial question are:
(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the criminal action and which requires
a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of
the criminal action.
In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case filed by the State with the RTC.
Thus, no prejudicial question exists. The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action.
Even if the trial court in the civil case declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration,
this would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter is that private respondent
issued checks that were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.
Therefore, it is clear that the second element required for the existence of a prejudicial question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial
question exists.

CASE#96 People v. Armbulo – G.R. No. 186597, 2015

Facts:
Records show that respondent Victoria R. Arambulo (Victoria), Emerenciana R. Gungab, Reynaldo Reyes (Reynaldo), Domingo
Reyes (Domingo), Rodrigo Reyes and Oscar Reyes (Oscar) are the heirs of Spouses Pedro C. Reyes and Anastacia Reyes. Anaped
Estate Inc. (Anaped) was... incorporated as part of the estate planning or as conduit to hold the properties of the estate of Pedro
Reyes for and in behalf of his heirs.
Jose Buban (Buban), as Vice-President and General Manager of Anaped Estate Inc. (Anaped), filed a complaint for estafa against
Victoria and her husband Miguel Arambulo, Jr. (Miguel) before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. He alleged that
Victoria failed... to remit the rentals collected from the time the ownership of the commercial apartments was transferred to Anaped.
On 14 April 2003, respondents filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings on the ground of a prejudicial question in view of the pendency
of two intra-corporate cases pending before the RTC of Quezon City and Makati City.
In their motion to suspend proceedings, respondents asserted that the resolution of the SEC cases in their favor particularly the issues
of whether of the group of Rodrigo and Buban are the lawful representatives of the corporation and whether they are duly authorized
to make a... demand for remittance would necessarily result in their acquittal in the criminal case.
the trial court, through Presiding Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, granted the motion for suspension of the proceedings. The trial court
reasoned that the issue in the SEC cases, i.e., who between the groups has the right to act for and in behalf of... the corporation, has a
direct link to the issue of the culpability of the accused for estafa
The appellate court added that since respondents are challenging the authority of Buban, then the validity of Buban’s demand to turn
over or remit the rentals is put in question. The appellate court concluded that if the supposed authority of Buban is found to be
defective, it... is as if no demand was ever made, hence the prosecution for estafa cannot prosper.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring that there exists a prejudicial question which calls for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings before the trial court.
Ruling:
 Section 7. Elements of prejudicial question. – The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution... of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
As correctly stated by the Court of Appeals, SEC Case No. 05-97-5659 does not present a prejudicial question to the criminal case for
estafa. It is an action for accounting of all corporate funds and assets of Anaped, annulment of sale, injunction, receivership and...
damages. Even if said case will be decided against respondents, they will not be adjudged free from criminal liability. It also does not
automatically follow that an accounting of corporate funds and properties and annulment of fictitious sale of corporate assets would
result in... the conviction of respondents in the estafa case
With respect to SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, however, we affirm the Court of Appeals’ finding that a prejudicial question exists.
prays for the nullification of the election of Anaped directors and officers, including Buban. Essentially, the... issue is the authority of
the aforesaid officers to act for and behalf of the corporation.
it is clear that, should respondents herein prevail in SEC Case No. 03-99-6259, then Buban, who does not own either by himself or in
behalf of Anaped which is the owner, the property heretofore managed by Victoria, cannot demand remittance of the rentals on... the
property and Victoria does not have the obligation to turn over the rentals to Buban.
Verily, the result of SEC Case No. 03-99-6259 will determine the innocence or guilt of respondents in the criminal case for estafa.
Principles:
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.
It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately... connected with it that it determines the guilt
or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the... resolution of the issue or issues raised in
the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

CASE#97 San Miguel Properties v. Perez – G.r. No. 166836 (192253), 2013

*See also RIANO (2019 page 188). (About Admin Case, which is civil in nature).
Facts:
Petitioner San Miguel Properties (SMP) purchased from BF Homes Inc., represented by Atty. Orendain as its duly authorized
rehabilitation receiver, 130 residential lots in its subdivision in BF Homes Parañaque. However, 20 TCTs (out of 40) were withheld
delivery by BF Homes since Atty. Orendain had ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions; BF Homes refused
to deliver the TCTs despite demands. Because of this, SMP filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the Prosecutor (OCP) of Las Pinas
charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with non-delivery of titles in violation of Sec. 25 in relation to Sec. 29 both of
PD No. 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree). Simultaneously, SMP sued BF Homes for specific
performance in the HLURB praying to compel BF Homes to release the 20 TCTs in its favor.
The OCP dismissed SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of PD No. 957 on the ground, among others, that there existed a prejudicial
question necessitating the suspension of the criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was first
determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB. SMP appealed the resolution of the OCP to the DOJ, which denied the same. Upon
elevation of the case to the CA via Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, SMP submitted the issue of whether or not HLURB Case
presented a prejudicial question that called for the suspension of the criminal action for violation of PD No. 957. CA dismissed SMP’s
petition.
Issue:
Whether the HLURB administrative case for specific performance could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal
complaint for the violation of PD No. 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question.
Held:

YES, an action for specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a prejudicial question that
must first be determined before the criminal case for violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 could be resolved.
Prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal
case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and
resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected
with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to
avoid conflicting decisions.
The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal case. Yet, contrary to SMP’s submission that there could be no
prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question arose was pending, the action for specific performance in
the HLURB raises a prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the criminal violation of PD No.
957. This is true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in
the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original. The determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended
because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related
with the issues raised in the criminal complaint for the violation of PD No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues in the former would be
determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case.
Here, the action for specific performance in the HLURB would determine whether or not SMP was legally entitled to demand the delivery of the
remaining 20 TCTs, while the criminal action would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally liable for
withholding the 20 TCTs. The resolution of the former (admin case) must obviously precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold SMP
to be not entitled to the delivery of the 20 TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his
receivership having been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation of Sec. 25 of PD No. 957 would evaporate,
thereby negating the need to proceed with the criminal case.
Hence, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the dismissal of SMP’s criminal complaint for violation of
PD No. 957 for lack of probable cause and for reason of a prejudicial question
Another contention of SMP:
SMP further submits that respondents could not validly raise the prejudicial question as a reason to suspend the criminal proceedings because
respondents had not themselves initiated either the action for specific performance or the criminal action. It contends that the defense of a
prejudicial question arising from the filing of a related case could only be raised by the party who filed or initiated said related case. The
submission is unfounded. The rule on prejudicial question makes no distinction as to who is allowed to raise the defense. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemos. When the law makes no distinction, we ought not to distinguish.

MODULE 4: RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION

Sec. 1. Preliminary Investigation defined

CASE#98 People v. Monteverde, 142 SCRA 668

Facts:
Petitioner Aurea A. Monteverde was from 1991 to 1993 the Barangay Chairman of Barangay 124 of Zone 10, District 1, Malaya, Balut,
Tondo, Manila. In that capacity, she received the amount of P44,800.00 from the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR). The amount... was spent for lighting, cleanliness and beautification programs of the Barangay. To liquidate the amount, she
submitted a financial statement (Exhibits '1 to 1-A-3') with copies of sales invoices/receipts to PAGCOR.
"Sometime in August 1991, Antonio R. Araza, Jose Salvatierra, Santos L. Lopez, and Narciso Cruz, residents of Brgy. 124, charged
Petitioner and Bella Evangelista, then Barangay Treasurer, with Malversation of the following funds: 1.) P82,500.00 from [the]
Barangay General
Fund; 2.) P44,800.00 from the PAGCOR; and 3.) P600.00 allowance of Kagawad Lito Galinda for the period July 16, to December
1990. The complaints were docketed as OMB-0-91-12694 and OMB-0-92-0643 (Exhs. A, B and C)
Issues:
Whether the Sandiganbayan erred in... finding petitioner guilty of falsification despite its finding that no estafa was committed...
applying the presumption that petitioner was the author of falsification in the absence of any proof that she benefited from it.
Ruling:
The Petition is meritorious.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,... complex crime refers to (1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that
must both (or all) be the result of a single act, or (2) one offense must be a necessary means for... committing the other (or others).
Negatively put, there is no complex crime when (1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or (2) committing one
crime is not a necessary means for committing the other (or others).
Using the above guidelines, the acts attributed to petitioner in the present case cannot constitute a complex crime. Specifically, her
alleged actions showing falsification of a public and/or a commercial document were not necessary to commit estafa. Neither were the
two... crimes the result of a single act.
Let us assume that petitioner has correctly been charged with a complex crime, as the SBN supposed. Still, acquittal from a component
offense will not necessarily lead to an acquittal from the other (or others).
When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege in the
information and prove during the trial all the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime.
We stress that the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and the acquittal arising therefrom will not
necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and the
evidence fails... to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the others, so long as they are proved.
Principles:
Well-known is the principle that an information "must charge only one offense, except when the law prescribes a single punishment for
various offenses."
When more than one offense is charged, the accused may move to quash the information.
when two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information, but the accused fail to... object to the defect before trial, the
trial court may convict them of as many offenses as are charged and proven, and impose on them the penalty for each offense, setting
out separately the findings of fact and law in each.
CASE#99: Doromol v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354
Facts:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the
Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of electronic, electrical,
automotive, mechanical and air conditioning equipment to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the
National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).
An information was then filed by the “Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and a preliminary investigation was
conducted.
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the “Tanodbayan” to file the information
without the approval of the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed
to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the
information filed by the “Tanodbayan”.
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer,
being then a Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did then and there willfully and unlawfully,
participate in a business through the Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he is the President, and
which company participated in the biddings conducted by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National
Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it was invalid since there had been no preliminary
investigation for the new information that was filed against him.
The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because both old and new
information involve the same subject matter.
Issues:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both information involve the same subject matter.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation.
Held:
Yes, as to the first and second issues. No, as to the third issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court.

Ratio:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be
charged with having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution"
because "the DITC remained a family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their
deputies or assistants shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any business.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in
that it subjects the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law" provided by the Constitution.
Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to
that fact, a new preliminary investigation must be conducted.
(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should conduct such
investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be
conducted.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No.
12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it pending the
result of such investigation.

CASE#101 Webb v. De Leon, 247 SCRA 652

Facts:
Accused Hubert Webb et. Al, the prime suspects of the sensational Visconde Rape with Homicide case filed petitions for the issuance of
the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with an application for a temporary restraining order and preliminary
injunction. The DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the
preliminary investigation.During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following:
 (1) the sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly saw the
commission of the crime;
(2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila
S. Gaviola;
(3) the sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight
No. 808 bound for New York and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip;
(4) the sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong
investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar;
(5) the sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of
Normal White, a security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted
and they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen (19). The genital
examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of spermatozoa.
Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production and Examination of
Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the documents he’s asking. The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI
submitted photocopies of the documents. Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the
crime at bar as he went to the United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992.His alibi was
corroborated by Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela
Francisco. To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986 Toyota car.
While in the United States on said dates and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License No. A8818707 on June 14,
1991. Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing
certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United
Airlines Flight No. 808.
On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and
recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents. Judge Raul de Leon
(J.Escano’s pairing judge) issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of
arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused because Judge Escano inhibited himself to the case. Webb, Lejano and Gatchalian
voluntary surrendered to the police authorities. Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the
May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged material
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her misdescription of
petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to
clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn statements of the witnesses for the NBI.
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT:
1. l Respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary
examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them:
2. l the DOJ Panel likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the
crime of rape with homicide;
3. l the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation; and
4. l the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the Information
as an accused.
Held:
1. NO. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
· Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the
basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.
· Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise, judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.
· Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law34 repudiate the submission of petitioners that
respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest against
them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing a warrant of
arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.
2. NO. The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners.
· Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a) she allegedly erroneously described petitioner
Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she committed material inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement.
· The DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not erode the credibility of Alfaro.
· In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations when she first executed the
first statement and held back vital information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This being so, the panel believes
that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been sufficiently explained especially especially so where
there is no showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value
of Alfaro's testimony deserves full faith and credit.
 · As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are generally incomplete because they are usually executed when the
affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to comprehend the import of her statement and to
narrate in full the incidents which transpired;
· In the case at bar, there is no dispute that a crime has been committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of
the evidence submitted by the complainant indicate a prima facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration of
the imputed offense.
· The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of
guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,31 while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires
"less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the suspect to stand
trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
3. NO. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were
given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against them.
· Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing in the initial hearing, second
hearing, by filing a "Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence and Documents" , "Reply to the compliance and
Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence" , "Comment and Manifestation",
"Counter-Affidavit", and a "Motion to Resolve", ETC.
· Moreover, It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the preliminary investigation
was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the panel continued to conduct further proceedings.
· The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the
evidence submitted more fully. This directly disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with
indecent haste in violation of the rights of the petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners
were free to adduce and present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.
· This notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court that the investigating officer
shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from the termination of the preliminary investigation.
· Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct of the preliminary
investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed the Information in court against
them.
4. NO. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic Act No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing for A Witness Protection, Security
And Benefit Program And For Other Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10.
· Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion in the criminal
Complaint or Information.
· The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 11938 which gives the court the prerogative to approve the discharge of an
accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision
whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of government whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the
right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the
discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are
best appreciated by prosecutors.

CASE#102 Santos v. Orda, G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010

Facts:
On April 2, 2001, Francis Orda, the son of respondent Domingo Orda Jr., was shot to death in Paranaque City.
1. Gina Azarcon, an eyewitness in the crime, executed her sworn statement that she saw 3 male persons commit the crime and later
identified two of the assailants as Roily Tonion and Jhunrey Soriano. Thus, an Information for the crime of murder was filed against
Tonion and Soriano and docketed as Criminal Case no. 01-0425
2. Emesto Regala and his son, Dennis Regala, also came out as witnesses. On the day before Francis was shot to death (April 1, 2001),
Ernesto saw petitioner Santos hand a gun to Tonion, saying -Gusto ko malinis ang trabaho at w alang bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na
naman si Orda' For his part, Dennis alleged Tonion asked him to return the gun to Santos a few days after the incident. Santos also
instructed him to monitor the activities of respondent
3. Based on the accounts of Ernesto and Dennis, an Information was filed against Santos and Edna Cortez. Upon further testimony of
Azarcon, the information was amended to include petitioner Robert Bunda
4. Gina, Ernesto and Dennis later recanted their testimonies. In June 2002, DOJ issued a joint resolution directing the city prosecutor
to cause the withdrawal of the Informations filed against the accused on the ground that testimonies of the witnesses were not credible
because of their recantation.
5. On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued an order allowing the withdrawal of the Information against the accused and
consequently recalling the warrants for their arrest
6. This prompted respondent Orda to elevate the matter to CA. CA nullified the trial court's orders and declared that the that court
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the information without making an independent evaluation on the
merits of the case
7. Petitioner argues that the that court did not abuse its judicial discretion when it granted the motion of the prosecutor to withdraw the
two information as ordered by DOJ. Petitioner avers that CA erred in relying on the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul since the case involves the
withdrawal of the information and the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence. In contrast, the public prosecutor filed a
motion to withdraw the information and not to dismiss the case for lack of evidence. Moreover, the trial court could not dismiss the case
since the it had yet to acquire complete criminal jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused
8. On the other hand, OSG avers that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused, either by their
respective arrests or by the filing of pleadings before the court praying for affirmative relief
Issue:
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the Information and in
lifting the warrant of arrest against the petitioners on the DOJ's finding that there was no prob able cause for the filing of said
information
Ruling:
if the trial court has failed to make an independent finding of the merits of the case or make an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case, but merely anchored the dismissal of the case on the revised position of the prosecution,... the trial
court has relinquished the discretion he was duty-bound to exercise because, in effect, it is the prosecution through the Department of
Justice which decides what to do and that the trial court was reduced into a mere rubber stamp
Moreover, public respondent having already issued the warrants of arrest on private respondents which, in effect, means that a probable
cause exists in those criminal cases, it was an error to dismiss those cases without making an independent evaluation. We agree with the
appellate court.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before
or after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial... rights of the
accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in... compliance with the directive of the
Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of
Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
In resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information filed by the public prosecutor on his own initiative or pursuant
to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of...
probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that
no crime was committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction... of the accused.
Trial court must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record of the
prosecution... the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine
a prima facie case.
trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or
evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before the...
court;[46] or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
In this case, the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the cases and the evidence on record or in the
possession of the public prosecutor. In granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court
relied... solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as gleaned from its assailed order:
In granting the public prosecutor's motion, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of
Justice.
Worse, as gleaned from the above order, the trial court knew that the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice had not yet become
final and executory because the respondent, the private complainant, had filed a timely motion for the reconsideration thereof which
had not yet... been resolved by the Secretary of Justice. It behooved the trial court to wait for the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent before resolving the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations.
In... fine, the trial court acted with inordinate haste.
Had the trial court bothered to review its records before issuing its assailed order, it would have recalled that aside from the affidavits of
Azarcon, Ernesto and Dennis, there was also the affidavit of Frias implicating the petitioner and the other accused to the killing of
Francis and that it even gave credence to the testimony and affidavit of Azarcon when it denied Tonion and Soriano's petition for bail.
Moreover, the trial court found probable cause against the petitioner and issued a warrant for her arrest despite the pendency of her...
petition for review in the Department of Justice, only to make a complete volte face because of the Joint Resolution.
The bare fact that the trial court had issued warrants of arrest against Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers, and Bunda, who were the
petitioners in the Department of Justice, did not warrant an outright grant of the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the
Informations. The court had already acquired jurisdiction over the cases when the Informations were filed; hence, it had jurisdiction to
resolve the motion of the public prosecutor, one way or the other, on its merits petition is DENIED DUE COURSE

Facts:
On April 2, 2001, Francis Orda, the son of respondent Domingo Orda Jr., was shot to death in Paranaque City.
1. Gina Azarcon, an eyewitness in the crime, executed her sworn statement that she saw 3 male persons commit the crime and later
identified two of the assailants as Roily Tonion and Jhunrey Soriano. Thus, an Information for the crime of murder was filed against
Tonion and Soriano and docketed as Criminal Case no. 01-0425
2. Emesto Regala and his son, Dennis Regala, also came out as witnesses. On the day before Francis was shot to death (April 1, 2001),
Ernesto saw petitioner Santos hand a gun to Tonion, saying -Gusto ko malinis ang trabaho at w alang bulilyaso, baka makaligtas na
naman si Orda' For his part, Dennis alleged Tonion asked him to return the gun to Santos a few days after the incident. Santos also
instructed him to monitor the activities of respondent
3. Based on the accounts of Ernesto and Dennis, an Information was filed against Santos and Edna Cortez. Upon further testimony of
Azarcon, the information was amended to include petitioner Robert Bunda
4. Gina, Ernesto and Dennis later recanted their testimonies. In June 2002, DOJ issued a joint resolution directing the city prosecutor
to cause the withdrawal of the Informations filed against the accused on the ground that testimonies of the witnesses were not credible
because of their recantation.
5. On motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued an order allowing the withdrawal of the Information against the accused and
consequently recalling the warrants for their arrest
6. This prompted respondent Orda to elevate the matter to CA. CA nullified the trial court's orders and declared that the that court
committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the withdrawal of the information without making an independent evaluation on the
merits of the case
7. Petitioner argues that the that court did not abuse its judicial discretion when it granted the motion of the prosecutor to withdraw the
two information as ordered by DOJ. Petitioner avers that CA erred in relying on the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul since the case involves the
withdrawal of the information and the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence. In contrast, the public prosecutor filed a
motion to withdraw the information and not to dismiss the case for lack of evidence. Moreover, the trial court could not dismiss the case
since the it had yet to acquire complete criminal jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused
8. On the other hand, OSG avers that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the persons of all the accused, either by their
respective arrests or by the filing of pleadings before the court praying for affirmative relief
Issue:
WON the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the Information and in
lifting the warrant of arrest against the petitioners on the DOJ's finding that there was no prob able cause for the filing of said
information
Ruling:
if the trial court has failed to make an independent finding of the merits of the case or make an independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case, but merely anchored the dismissal of the case on the revised position of the prosecution,... the trial
court has relinquished the discretion he was duty-bound to exercise because, in effect, it is the prosecution through the Department of
Justice which decides what to do and that the trial court was reduced into a mere rubber stamp
Moreover, public respondent having already issued the warrants of arrest on private respondents which, in effect, means that a probable
cause exists in those criminal cases, it was an error to dismiss those cases without making an independent evaluation. We agree with the
appellate court.
Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or to dismiss the case even before
or after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial... rights of the
accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to due process of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public
prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the Information, or to withdraw the Information in... compliance with the directive of the
Secretary of Justice, or to deny the said motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of
Justice but in sound exercise of its judicial prerogative.
In resolving a motion to dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information filed by the public prosecutor on his own initiative or pursuant
to the directive of the Secretary of Justice, either for insufficiency of evidence in the possession of the prosecutor or for lack of...
probable cause, the trial court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the Secretary of Justice that
no crime was committed or that the evidence in the possession of the public prosecutor is insufficient to support a judgment of
conviction... of the accused.
Trial court must make an independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case and the evidence on record of the
prosecution... the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently
evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine
a prima facie case.
trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or
evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before the...
court;[46] or any evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
In this case, the trial court failed to make an independent assessment of the merits of the cases and the evidence on record or in the
possession of the public prosecutor. In granting the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations, the trial court
relied... solely on the joint resolution of the Secretary of Justice, as gleaned from its assailed order:
In granting the public prosecutor's motion, the trial court abdicated its judicial power and acted as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of
Justice.
Worse, as gleaned from the above order, the trial court knew that the Joint Resolution of the Secretary of Justice had not yet become
final and executory because the respondent, the private complainant, had filed a timely motion for the reconsideration thereof which
had not yet... been resolved by the Secretary of Justice. It behooved the trial court to wait for the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
on the motion for reconsideration of the respondent before resolving the motion of the public prosecutor to withdraw the Informations.
In... fine, the trial court acted with inordinate haste.
Had the trial court bothered to review its records before issuing its assailed order, it would have recalled that aside from the affidavits of
Azarcon, Ernesto and Dennis, there was also the affidavit of Frias implicating the petitioner and the other accused to the killing of
Francis and that it even gave credence to the testimony and affidavit of Azarcon when it denied Tonion and Soriano's petition for bail.
Moreover, the trial court found probable cause against the petitioner and issued a warrant for her arrest despite the pendency of her...
petition for review in the Department of Justice, only to make a complete volte face because of the Joint Resolution.
The bare fact that the trial court had issued warrants of arrest against Santos, Cortez, the Castillo brothers, and Bunda, who were the
petitioners in the Department of Justice, did not warrant an outright grant of the public prosecutor's motion to withdraw the
Informations. The court had already acquired jurisdiction over the cases when the Informations were filed; hence, it had jurisdiction to
resolve the motion of the public prosecutor, one way or the other, on its merits petition is DENIED DUE COURSE

CASE#103 Manibo v. Acosta – G.R. No. 16955, 2009

Facts:
On May 4, 2000, at 6:30 p.m. at Barangay San Mariano, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, Bernadette M. Dimatulac, the victim, and Flordeliza V.
Bagasan were seated beside each other on a papag watching television inside the church of the Kaibigan Foundation, Inc. Suddenly, a
man later identified as SPO1 Roel Acosta (respondent Acosta), with an unidentified male companion, both with short firearms, entered
the church premises. Respondent Acosta approached the victim and Bagasan and, at an arm's length distance, respondent Acosta shot
the victim several times on the head and body causing her instantaneous death.
· Nieva Manebo, sister of the victim, filed a complaint for murder against Acosta and Sapiandante before the Special
Action Unit (SAU) of the NBI
· SAU recommended filing a muder case against respondents and a certain John Doe with the Office of the Chief State
Prosecutor (OCSP), Department of Justice (DOJ) for preliminary investigation
· Respondents filed with DOJ a counter-charge of perjury offering false witness and violation of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1829 against Manebo, Bagasan, and Sardia.
· Respondents denied accusations against them
· On January 22, 2001, State Prosecutor Melvin J. Abad issued a Joint Resolution, approved by the Chief State
Prosecutor and on the same day, an Information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 27,
Cabanatuan City against respondents and a certain John Doe.
· Respondents filed their motion for reconsideration, which was denied in a Resolution[8] dated March 2, 2001.
· On March 23, 2001, respondents filed their appeal with the DOJ Secretary.
· On June 27, 2003, the DOJ Secretary issued his Resolution[10] reversing the appealed resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution is hereby REVERSED. The Chief State Prosecutor is directed to move for the
withdrawal of the information filed against respondents and to report the action taken hereon within ten (10) days
from receipt hereof
In so ruling DOJ said:
All told, the evidence against respondents Acosta and Sapiandante lack the required quantum of proof sufficient to
indict them for the offense charged.
Pursuant to the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw the Information.
· Petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the President (OP), which was dismissed. The OP found that the findings
of fact and conclusions of law of the DOJ Secretary to be amply supported by substantial evidence. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied by OP.
· Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 43 with the CA, which rendered the assailed Decision
dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
The CA said that the OP committed no error in affirming the resolution of the DOJ Secretary; that courts will not interfere in
the conduct of preliminary investigations and leave to the investigating prosecutor a sufficient latitude of discretion in the
determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of information against the
offender. The CA found that all was not lost for petitioner, since the denial of her petition did not mean an automatic dismissal
of the information following the resolution of the DOJ Secretary, as the RTC was mandated to independently evaluate the
merits of the case; and it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the DOJ Secretary, since reliance on the latter
alone would be an abdication of the RTC's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.
Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals, the Office of the President and the Secretary of Justice committed grave errors in the
appreciation of facts and of laws in recommending the dismissal of the complaint based solely on the matters, which are best,
determined during a full-blown trial.
Whether or not the Secretary of Justice may disregard the provisions of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which became
effective on September 1, 2000, particularly Sections 5 and 6.
Whether or not there is probable cause to charge the respondents for the crime of murder.
Ruling:
For the second issue;
Section 5. Contents of the Petition.
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the appealed resolution, a copy of the motion to defer proceedings filed in
court must also accompany the petition.
 Section 6. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements shall constitute sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
Respondents filed their petition for review with the DOJ Secretary on March 23, 2001. On August 20, 2001, they filed with the RTC of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, a Motion to Suspend Proceedings pending a final determination of the merits of their petition by the DOJ
Secretary. On August 27, 2001, respondents filed with the DOJ a document captioned as Compliance where they submitted the motion
to suspend proceedings filed in the RTC. Notably, the motion to suspend proceedings was only filed with the RTC after respondents had
already filed their petition for review with the DOJ which explains why the petition was not accompanied by a motion to suspend
proceedings. Notably, immediately after the motion to suspend proceeding was filed with the RTC, respondents submitted a copy of
such motion with the DOJ. Under the circumstances, we hold that there was substantial compliance with the requirements
under Section 5 of Department Circular No.70.
The first and third issues refer to the question of whether the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the Office of the President, which
adopted the finding of the DOJ Secretary that there was no probable cause to indict respondents for murder.
In this case, we find that the DOJ committed a manifest error in finding no probable cause to charge respondents with
the crime of murder.
In reversing the findings of the prosecutor, the DOJ Secretary found that the police report prepared after the killing incident stated that
the person seated beside the victim, who was watching television when shot, was Liza Gragasan. However, the DOJ Secretary continued
that more than four months after the incident, a witness appeared in the person of Flordeliza Bagasan who claimed to be seated beside,
and witnessed the actual shooting of, the victim. The DOJ Secretary found Flordeliza's description of respondent Acosta different from
the latter's physical attributes. He then ruled that Flordeliza's delayed testimony, coupled with her erroneous description of respondent
Acosta, cast a cloud of doubt on her credibility.
The DOJ Secretary also did not give credence to witness Sardia's testimony on respondent Sapiandante's participation in the incident.
He found that Sardia was not among those mentioned in the police report, and that his testimony was likewise belatedly executed
without any reason given for such delay; that fear could not have been Sardia's reason, since in June 1998, he had already filed a
complaint for attempted murder against respondent Sapiandante, which was later dismissed; and that Sardia did not witness the actual
shooting of the victim.
We are not persuaded.
While the initial police report stated that the name of the person who was seated beside the victim when the latter was shot was Liza
Gragasan, such report would not conclusively establish that Liza Gragasan could not have been Flordeliza Bagasan , the
witness who executed an affidavit four months after the incident. Notably, Flordeliza's nickname is Liza, and her surname Bagasan
sounds similar to Gragasan. Under the rule of idem sonans, two names are said to be "idem sonantes" if the attentive ear finds
difficulty in distinguishing them when pronounced. The question whether a name sounds the same as another is not one of
spelling but of pronunciation. While the surname Bagasan was incorrectly written as Gragasan, when read, it has a sound similar
to the surname Bagasan. Thus, the presence of Bagasan at the crime scene was established, contrary to the conclusion arrived at by the
DOJ Secretary.
The execution of Bagasan's affidavit four months after the incident should not be taken against her, as such reaction is within the
bounds of expected human behavior. Notably, the police report stated that during the conduct of the investigation, Bagasan was
shocked after the incident and could not possibly be interviewed. Initial reluctance to volunteer information regarding a crime due to
fear of reprisal is common enough that it has been judicially declared as not affecting a witness' credibility. Bagasan's action revealed a
spontaneous and natural reaction of a person who had yet to fully comprehend a shocking and traumatic event. Besides, the workings of
the human mind are unpredictable. People react differently to emotional stress. There is simply no standard form of behavioral
response that can be expected from anyone when confronted with a strange, startling or frightful occurrence.
Moreover, a witness' delay in reporting what she knows about a crime does not render her testimony false or
incredible, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case.
The DOJ Secretary's finding that the description given by Bagasan did not fit the physical attributes of respondent Acosta is not
persuasive, since Bagasan was able to positively identify respondent Acosta. She did so when a cartographic sketch of respondent Acosta
was shown to her and later when she was asked to identify him from among the three pictures of men shown to her during the
investigation at the NBI. Notably, there was nothing in the records that showed that Bagasan was impelled by any improper motive in
pointing to respondent Acosta.
The identification made by Bagasan, with respect to respondent Acosta was corroborated by another witness, Sardia, who saw Acosta
with another unidentified male companion rushing out of the chapel where the killing incident took place. Sardia was familiar with the
face of respondent Acosta, since the latter was a witness in a case of frustrated murder against Sapiandante. Although Sapiandante
denied in his counter-affidavit that respondent Acosta ever became such witness, this allegation should be proven during the trial of the
case. Sardia was also able to positively identify Sapiandante as the driver of the get-away vehicle.sss
The DOJ Secretary did not also find the statements given by Sardia as credible, as the latter was not among those mentioned as a
witness in the police report.
We do not agree.
The failure of the police report to mention Sardia's name as a witness would not detract from the fact that he saw respondent Acosta
with an unidentified man running away from the chapel and riding the waiting get- away vehicle driven by Sapiandante. Entries in a
police blotter, though regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not conclusive proof of the truth of such
entries and should not be given undue significance or probative value for they are usually incomplete and inaccurate.[38]
The matter of assigning value to the declaration of a witness is best done by the trial court, which can assess such testimony in the light
of the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witness at the trial stage.
Finally, we also do not agree with the DOJ Secretary's finding that since Sardia's affidavit was also belatedly executed, the same is not
credible. As we have said, witnesses are usually reluctant to volunteer information about a criminal case or are unwilling to be involved
in or dragged into criminal investigations due to a variety of valid reasons. Fear of reprisal and the natural reluctance of a witness to get
involved in a criminal case are sufficient explanations for a witness' delay in reporting a crime to authorities. The DOJ ruling -- that fear
could not have been the reason, because as early as 1998 Sardia had already filed a complaint for attempted murder against
Sapiandante, which was already dismissed -- is merely speculative.
We need not over-emphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable
cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. Considering the foregoing, we find that the CA erred in affirming the DOJ's finding of
the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for murder.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 83300 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Secretary of Justice is hereby ORDERED to direct the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Manila to withdraw the Motion to Withdraw the Information for Murder already filed in the trial court.

CASE#104 Solado Law Offices v. CA, G.R. No. 219914, 2016

Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza and Binay Law Offices vs. The Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 216914. December 6, 2016

Facts:
Challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A
No. 9160, the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as amended, specifically the Anti-Money Laundering Council's authority to file with the
Court of Appeals (CA) in this case, an ex-parte application for inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments, including related
accounts based on probable cause.
In 2015, a year before the 2016 presidential elections, reports abounded on the supposed disproportionate wealth of then Vice President
Jejomar Binay and the rest of his family, some of whom were likewise elected public officers. The Office of the Ombudsman and the
Senate conducted investigations and inquiries thereon.
From various news reports announcing the inquiry into then Vice President Binay's bank accounts, including accounts of members of
his family, petitioner Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm (SPCMB) was most concerned with the article published in
the Manila Times on 25 February 2015 entitled "Inspect Binay Bank Accounts" which read, in pertinent part:
xxx The Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC) asked the Court of Appeals (CA) to allow the [C]ouncil to peek into
the bank accounts of the Binays, their corporations, and a law office where a family member was once a partner.
xx xx
Also the bank accounts of the law office linked to the family, the Subido Pagente Certeza Mendoza & Binay Law Firm,
where the Vice President's daughter Abigail was a former partner.

By 8 March 2015, the Manila Times published another article entitled, "CA orders probe of Binay 's assets" reporting that the appellate
court had issued a Resolution granting the ex-parte application of the AMLC to examine the bank accounts of SPCMB. Forestalled in the
CA thus alleging that it had no ordinary, plain, speedy, and adequate remedy to protect its rights and interests in the purported ongoing
unconstitutional examination of its bank accounts by public respondent Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), SPCMB undertook
direct resort to this Court via this petition for certiorari and prohibition on the following grounds that the he Anti-Money Laundering
Act is unconstitutional insofar as it allows the examination of a bank account without any notice to the affected party: (1) It violates the
person's right to due process; and (2) It violates the person's right to privacy.
Issues:
Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates substantial due process.
Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 violates procedural due process.
Whether Section 11 of R.A No. 9160 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution.
Rulings:
1. No. We do not subscribe to SPCMB' s position. Succinctly, Section 11 of the AMLA providing for ex-parte application and inquiry by
the AMLC into certain bank deposits and investments does not violate substantive due process, there being no physical seizure of
property involved at that stage.
In fact, .Eugenio delineates a bank inquiry order under Section 11 from a freeze order under Section 10 on both remedies' effect on the
direct objects, i.e. the bank deposits and investments:
On the other hand, a bank inquiry order under Section 11 does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of property of the account
holder. What the bank inquiry order authorizes is the examination of the particular deposits or investments in banking institutions or
non-bank financial institutions. The monetary instruments or property deposited with such banks or financial institutions are not
seized in a physical sense, but are examined on particular details such as the account holder's record of deposits and transactions.
Unlike the assets subject of the freeze order, the records to be inspected under a bank inquiry order cannot be physically seized or
hidden by the account holder. Said records are in the possession of the bank and therefore cannot be destroyed at the instance of the
account holder alone as that would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank.
At the stage in which the petition was filed before us, the inquiry into certain bank deposits and investments by the AMLC still does not
contemplate any form of physical seizure of the targeted corporeal property.
2. No. The AMLC functions solely as an investigative body in the instances mentioned in Rule 5.b.26 Thereafter, the next step is for the
AMLC to file a Complaint with either the DOJ or the Ombudsman pursuant to Rule 6b. Even in the case of Estrada v. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the conflict arose at the preliminary investigation stage by the Ombudsman, we ruled that the Ombudsman's denial
of Senator Estrada's Request to be furnished copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents did not violate Estrada's
constitutional right to due process where the sole issue is the existence of probable cause for the purpose of determining whether an
information should be filed and does not prevent Estrada from requesting a copy of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents during
the pre-trial or even during trial.
Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering offenses,
specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising
quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's
constitutional right to due process.

3. No. We now come to a determination of whether Section 11 is violative of the constitutional right to privacy enshrined in Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution. SPCMB is adamant that the CA's denial of its request to be furnished copies of AMLC's ex-parte
application for a bank inquiry order and all subsequent pleadings, documents and orders filed and issued in relation thereto, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion where the purported blanket authority under Section 11: ( 1) partakes of a general warrant intended to aid a
mere fishing expedition; (2) violates the attorney-client privilege; (3) is not preceded by predicate crime charging SPCMB of a money
laundering offense; and ( 4) is a form of political harassment [of SPCMB' s] clientele.
We thus subjected Section 11 of the AMLA to heightened scrutiny and found nothing arbitrary in the allowance and authorization to
AMLC to undertake an inquiry into certain bank accounts or deposits. Instead, we found that it provides safeguards before a bank
inquiry order is issued, ensuring adherence to the general state policy of preserving the absolutely confidential nature of Philippine
bank accounts:
The AMLC is required to establish probable cause as basis for its ex-parte application for bank inquiry order;
The CA, independent of the AMLC's demonstration of probable cause, itself makes a finding of probable cause that the deposits or
investments are related to an unlawful activity under Section 3(i) or a money laundering offense under Section 4 of the AMLA;
A bank inquiry court order ex-parte for related accounts is preceded by a bank inquiry court order ex-parte for the principal account
which court order ex-parte for related accounts is separately based on probable cause that such related account is materially linked to
the principal account inquired into; and
The authority to inquire into or examine the main or principal account and the related accounts shall comply with the requirements of
Article III, Sections 2 and 3 of the Constitution. The foregoing demonstrates that the inquiry and examination into the bank account are
not undertaken whimsically and solely based on the investigative discretion of the AMLC. In particular, the requirement of
demonstration by the AMLC, and determination by the CA, of probable cause emphasizes the limits of such governmental action. We
will revert to these safeguards under Section 11 as we specifically discuss the CA' s denial of SPCMB' s letter request for information
concerning the purported issuance of a bank inquiry order involving its accounts.
All told, we affirm the constitutionality of Section 11 of the AMLA allowing the ex-parte application by the AMLC for authority to inquire
into, and examine, certain bank deposits and investments.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, is declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.

CASE#105 Estrada v. Ombudsman – G.R. No. 212140, 2015

Facts:
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among
others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013
and 14 March 2014.
On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a
respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman).”
The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari case.
Issue:
WON petitioner Estrada was denied due process of law
Held:
NO. The denial did not violate Sen. Estrada’s constitutional right to due process.
First. There is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents.
The SC cited in its decision Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, for ready reference.
Sen. Estrada claims that the denial of his Request for the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents violates his constitutional right to due
process. Sen. Estrada, however, fails to specify a law or rule which states that it is a compulsory requirement of due process in a
preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman furnish a respondent with the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Neither Section
3(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure nor Section 4(c), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman supports Sen. Estrada’s claim. What the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman require is for the
Ombudsman to furnish the respondent with a copy of the complaint and the supporting affidavits and documents at the time the order
to submit the counter-affidavit is issued to the respondent. This is clear from Section 4(b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office
of the Ombudsman when it states, "[a]fter such affidavits [of the complainant and his witnesses] have been secured, the investigating
officer shall issue an order, attaching thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to
submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits x x x." At this point, there is still no counter-affidavit submitted
by any respondent. Clearly, what Section 4(b) refers to are affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses, not the affidavits of the co-
respondents. Obviously, the counter-affidavits of the co-respondents are not part of the supporting affidavits of the complainant. No
grave abuse of discretion can thus be attributed to the Ombudsman for the issuance of the 27 March 2014 Order which denied Sen.
Estrada’s Request.
Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
“probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not
a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt
thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts
obtaining therein.
Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a
strict application of the evidentiary rules.
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the
landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence
needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant
the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than
‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the concept of
probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of
proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are
finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis
can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will change
the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial
evidence of guilt.
Actually, the Ombudsman went beyond legal duty and even furnished Sen. Estrada with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents whom he specifically named, as well as the counter-affidavits of some of other co-respondents. In the 4 June 2014 Joint
Order, the Ombudsman even held in abeyance the disposition of the motions for reconsideration because the Ombudsman granted Sen.
Estrada five days from receipt of the 7 May 2014 Joint Order to formally respond to the claims made by his co-respondents. The
Ombudsman faithfully complied with the existing Rules on preliminary investigation and even accommodated Sen. Estrada beyond
what the Rules required. Thus, the Ombudsman could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion. Since this is a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65, the Petition fails in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman.
The constitutional due process requirements mandated in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are not applicable to preliminary
investigations which are creations of statutory law giving rise to mere statutory rights. A law can abolish preliminary investigations
without running afoul of the constitutional requirements of due process as prescribed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS. The present
procedures for preliminary investigations do not comply and were never intended to comply, with Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS.
Preliminary investigations do not adjudicate with finality rights and obligations of parties, while administrative investigations governed
by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, so adjudicate. Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, requires substantial evidence for a decision against
the respondent in the administrative case.In preliminary investigations, only likelihood or probability of guilt is required. To apply Ang
Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, to preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required to establish probable cause. The
respondent in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, has the right to an actual hearing and to cross-
examine the witnesses against him. In preliminary investigations, the respondent has no such rights.
Also, in an administrative case governed by Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, the hearing officer must be impartial and cannot be the
fact-finder, investigator, and hearing officer at the same time. In preliminary investigations, the same public officer may be the
investigator and hearing officer at the same time, or the fact-finder, investigator and hearing officer may be under the control and
supervision of the same public officer, like the Ombudsman or Secretary of Justice. This explains why Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS,
does not apply to preliminary investigations. To now declare that the guidelines in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, are fundamental
and essential requirements in preliminary investigations will render all past and present preliminary investigations invalid for violation
of constitutional due process. This will mean remanding for reinvestigation all criminal cases now pending in all courts throughout the
country. No preliminary investigation can proceed until a new law designates a public officer, outside of the prosecution service, to
determine probable cause. Moreover, those serving sentences by final judgment would have to be released from prison because their
conviction violated constitutional due process.
Thus, petition dismissed for being premature and it constitutes forum shopping.

Sec. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations

CASE#106 George Miller v. Sec. Hernando B. Perez - May 30, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner George Miller is a British national and an inmate at the Maximum Security Compound of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in
Muntinlupa City. He wrote two confidential letters addressed to NBP Superintendent Col. Gregorio Agalo-os which contain a report on
alleged irregularities and drug activities of respondent Bernardino and Rodolfo Bernardo (Bernardo). On January 6, 1999, at around
2:00 p.m, Miller was stabbed at back of his head. An investigation was thereafter conducted. In the course of the investigation, Quirante
and Ceballos admitted their participation in the attack on petitioner. PGIII Lopez recommended that Quirante and Ceballos be charged
with Frustrated Murder and the case be placed under further investigation "pending the establishment of sufficient evidence to indict
inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid. Prosecutor Antonio V. Padilla issued his resolution finding the evidence
sufficient to charge Quirante with attempted murder while dismissing the case against Ceballos for insufficiency of evidence. Thereafter,
an information attempted murder was filed against Quirante.
On December 2, 1999 Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo executed new affidavits which contained a more detail of the incident and pointed
to Bernardo and Aprid allegedly planned the killing of petitioner together with Toledo. Prosecutor Leopoldo Macinas issued his
Memorandum addressed to the City Prosecutor finding probable cause against Quirante, Ceballos and Toledo in conspiracy with
Bernardino, Aprid and Bernardo, for the crime of attempted murder. Consequently, an Amended Information was filed with the RTC.
Bernardino filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice (DOJ) arguing that there was no sufficient evidence presented to
support a claim of conspiracy, which was based merely on conflicting testimonies or affidavits in a language foreign to the affiants.
Petitioner filed his opposition, alleging that contrary to the claim of Bernardino, the Bureau's investigation was far from complete as the
Report of PGIII Lopez itself stated that the case is recommended for further investigation "pending the establishment of sufficient
evidence to indict inmates Rodolfo Bernardo, Giovan Bernardino and Ace Aprid". Public respondent, then Secretary of Justice
Hernando B. Perez, issued his Resolution finding merit in the petition. According to Secretary Perez, the new affidavits of Quirante,
Ceballos and Toledo are not credible considering "the length of time they were executed since the commission of the crime" and also
because said documents cannot be considered newly discovered evidence. Motion to Admit Second Amended Information, which
dropped the name of respondent Bernardino as one of the accused, was filed in court. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied under Resolution. On appeal, CA rendered its Decision sustaining the ruling of the Secretary of Justice, finding no
grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the questioned resolutions. Hence this case.
Issue:
Whether CA erred in sustaining the ruling of secretary Peres for exclusion of Bernardino in the information of attempted murder as
accused.
Ruling:
Yes. In a preliminary investigation, a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Certainly, it does
not involve the determination of whether or not there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to the guilt of the person. Only
prima fade evidence is required; or that which is, on its face, good and sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts
constituting the party's claim or defense; and which, if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. Therefore, matters of
evidence, such as who are the conspirators, are more appropriately presented and heard during the trial. The term "probable cause"
does not mean actual and positive cause nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus,
a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of
evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge. While it is this Court's general policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, leaving the investigating officers’ sufficient discretion to determine probable cause, courts are nevertheless empowered
to substitute their judgment for that of the Secretary of Justice when the same was rendered without or in excess of authority. Where
the Secretary of Justice dismissed the complaint against the respondent despite sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable
cause, such clearly constitutes grave error, thus warranting a reversal. The CA thus clearly erred in sustaining the ruling of Secretary
Perez for the exclusion of respondent Bernardino from the charge of attempted murder despite a prima facie case against him having
been established by the evidence on record

CASE#107 Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 161602, July 13, 2010

Facts:
On March 6, 1996 respondent Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an action for the forfeiture of alleged unlawfully acquired
property with the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case 0167 against petitioner Alfredo T. Romualdez and his wife Agnes Sison Romualdez as
well as against Romson Realty, Inc., R & S Transport, Inc., Fidelity Management, Inc., and Dio Island Resort, Inc. (collectively, the
Romualdezes) pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) 1379.[1]
On January 16, 2000 the Romualdezes filed a motion to dismiss the action on grounds of a) violation of their right to a speedy
disposition of their case; b) lack of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the action; c) prematurity; d) prescription; and e) litis
pendentia. On September 11, 2002 the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. It also denied on March 10, 2003 their subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
On March 31, 2003 the Romualdezes next filed a motion for preliminary investigation and to suspend proceedings.[2] They claim that
since Civil Case 0167 was a forfeiture proceeding filed under R.A. 1379, the Ombudsman should have first conducted a "previous inquiry
similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases" before the filing of the case pursuant to Section 2 of the law.[3]
In its Comment[4]on the motion, the Republic pointed out that the Office of the Ombudsman in fact conducted such a preliminary
investigation in 1991 in OMB-0-91-0820[5] and issued on January 22, 1992 a resolution, recommending the endorsement of the matter
to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for the filing of the forfeiture case.
On August 13, 2003 the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution,[6] denying the Romualdezes' March 31, 2003 motion. It also denied by
resolution on December 3, 2003 their subsequent motion for reconsideration.[7] Thus, the Romualdezes filed the present petition for
certiorari and prohibition, seeking to annul the Sandiganbayan's rulings and prevent it from further proceeding with Civil Case 0167
until another preliminary investigation is conducted in their case.
Issue:
The sole question presented in this case is whether or not the preliminary investigation that the Ombudsman conducted in OMB-0-91-
0820 in 1991 satisfied the requirement of the law in forfeiture cases.
Ruling:
The Romualdezes point out that the Office of the Ombudsman should not have conducted an investigation of their case, since its
authority to investigate ill-gotten or unexplained wealth cases pertained only to wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and not before
that date.[8] Since the Romualdezes acquired the allegedly ill-gotten wealth involved in their case as early as 1970, then the
Ombudsman had no authority to conduct the investigation that it did in OMB-0-91-0820. In the absence of a prior valid preliminary
investigation, the forfeiture proceedings in Civil Case 0167 cannot continue.
In addition, the Romualdezes insist that it was improper for the Ombudsman to have conducted its investigation in their absence. The
spouses Alfredo and Agnes Romualdez were in the United States when that investigation took place. They were thus denied their right
to be heard in that investigation.
But, as the Sandiganbayan correctly pointed out, quoting Republic v. Sandiganbayan,[9] the Ombudsman has under its general
investigatory powers the authority to investigate forfeiture cases where the alleged ill-gotten wealth had been amassed before February
25, 1986. Thus:
Nonetheless, while we do not discount the authority of the Ombudsman, we believe and so hold that the exercise of his
correlative powers to both investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is
restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth which were amassed after February 25, 1986.
Prior to said date, the Ombudsman is without authority to initiate such forfeiture proceedings. We, however, uphold his
authority to investigate cases for the forfeiture or recovery of such ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed even before
the aforementioned date, pursuant to his general investigatory power under Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770.[10]
(Emphasis supplied)
And, although it was the Ombudsman who conducted the preliminary investigation, it was the OSG that instituted the action in Civil
Case 0167 in line with the Court's ruling in the above-cited Republic and other cases that followed.
The Court cannot also subscribe to the Romualdezes' claim that they are entitled to a new preliminary investigation since they had no
opportunity to take part in the one held in 1991, in OMB-0-91-0820. They admit that the subpoena for that investigation had been sent
to their last known residence at the time it was conducted.[11] The Republic categorically insists that the appropriate subpoena had
been served on the Romualdezes.[12]
Actually, the lament of the spouses was that they left the Philippines because of danger to their lives after the EDSA revolution of
February 1986 and so could not take part in the proceedings against them. While it is true that the Court characterized the departure of
the Romualdezes as forced upon them by the uncertainty of the situation in 1986, it also said that such was the case only until things
shall have stabilized.[13] The Court will take judicial notice of the fact that the people's ratification of the 1987 Constitution on February
2, 1987 signaled the return to normalcy of the political situation in the Philippines. Consequently, the Romualdezes had no valid excuse
for not responding to the subpoena served on them at their last known address in 1991, which they do not deny having received.
The Ombudsman could not be faulted for proceeding with the investigation of the Romualdezes' cases when they did not show up
despite notice being sent to them at their last known residence. As the Court held in a case:
The New Rules on Criminal Procedure "does not require as a condition sine qua non to the validity of the proceedings [in the
preliminary investigation] the presence of the accused for as long as efforts to reach him were made, and an opportunity to
controvert the evidence of the complainant is accorded him. The obvious purpose of the rule is to block attempts of
unscrupulous respondents to thwart the prosecution of offenses by hiding themselves or by employing dilatory tactics."[14]
In sum, no reason exists for suspending or interrupting the conduct of the forfeiture proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

CASE#108 Tamargo v. Awingan. G.R. No. 177727, Jan. 19. 2010

Facts:
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his 8-year-old daughter were shot and killed in 2003. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the
crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit wherein, he stated that a certain Lucio Columna told him
during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed
Atty. Tamargo. Columna was arrested.
On March 8, 2004, Columna executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as “lookout” during the shooting and
implicated Romulo Awingan as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son,
Lloyd Antiporda, ex-mayor and mayor, respectively, of Buguey, Cagayan.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by
Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor.
During the preliminary investigation, Licerio presented Columna’s handwritten letter wherein the latter disowned the contents of his
earlier affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. Licerio also submitted an affidavit
of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten letter. The investigating
prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing so that Columna could clarify his contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During
the hearing, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. Thus, the investigating
prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the charges.
In another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor, however, Columna said that he wasonly forced to withdraw all his
statements against respondents during the clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life inside the jail. The RTC judge denied
the motion to withdraw the information and held that based on the March 8, 2004 affidavit which Columna affirmed before the
investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for trial. CA reversed the decision. Tamargo appealed. Petitioner
argues that, based on the independent assessment of the Judge Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of
Columna. Awingan and the Antiporda’s, on the other hand, contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was inadmissible
against them because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
Issue:
Whether or not the admission of Columna is admissible against Awingan and the Antipordas
Held:
Columna’s extrajudicial confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view
of the rule on res inter alios acta. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused and is considered as hearsay against them.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under Section30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given
in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial
confession. Thus, in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessary that (a)
the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the admission itself (b)the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has
been made while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy. Otherwise, it cannot be used against the alleged co-
conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them.
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the
alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could
corroborate. Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents, had no
probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.

Case # 109: Conquilla v. Bernardo

FACTS: This is an administrative complaint for usurpation of authority, grave misconduct, and gross ignorance of the law filed by
Conquilla against Judge Bernardo, presiding judge of the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. On 4 July 2008, a criminal complaint for direct
assault was filed against complainant before the MTC of Bocaue, Bulacan. Respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and
found probable cause to hold the complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault. Respondent judge then issued a warrant of arrest
with the bail fixed at P12,000. Respondent judge then issued an order reducing the bail for complainant's provisional liberty to P6,000.
On the same date, complainant posted cash bail of P6,00. Complainant then filed an administrative complaint against respondent
judge. The complainant alleged that under A.M. No. 05-08-[2]6-SC, first level court judges no longer have the authority to conduct PIs.
Respondent judge committed an illegal act constituting gross ignorance of the law and procedure when he conducted the PI and issued
the warrant of arrest. The issuance of the warrant of arrest was without legal basis and unjustly prejudiced complainant and deprived
her of her liberty. Respondent judge usurped the power of the prosecutor, who was not even given the chance to comment on
complainant's Motion to Reduce Bail. Furthermore, complainant alleges that when she learned about the warrant of arrest, she called
respondent judge's wife, who said "she would help in having the bail reduced to P6,000.00 and would have the case for direct assault
against herein complainant dismissed provided herein complainant cancel the wife's debt of P35,000.00 and provided that herein
complainant loan the wife an additional amount of P50,000.00." The OCA found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law
for his patent and unjustified violation of the provisions of the Resolution in A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law by conducting a PI.

RULING: Yes. The records of the case clearly show that respondent judge indeed conducted a PI on 8 July 2008. After finding
probable cause to hold complainant for trial for the crime of direct assault, respondent judge then issued a warrant for her arrest. That
respondent judge conducted a preliminary investigation and not just a preliminary examination to determine existence of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is evident in his Order. The conduct of preliminary investigation by respondent judge was in
direct contravention of A.M. No. 05-8-26-SC, which removed the conduct of PI from judges of first-level courts.

Under Section 2 of Rule 112, only the following officers are authorized to conduct preliminary investigations: (a) Provincial or City
Prosecutors and their assistants; (b) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and (c) Other officers as may be authorized by law. MTC
judges are no longer authorized to conduct PI even based on Sec. 5 of Rule 112. The offense charged, direct assault against a public
school teacher, has an imposable penalty with a duration of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years (prision correcional in its medium
and maximum periods). Thus, PI is clearly needed. It was therefore incumbent upon respondent judge to forward the records of the case
to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for PI, instead of conducting the PI himself.

Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional
competence. When a law or a rule is basic, judges owe it to their office to simply apply the law. Anything less is gross ignorance of the
law. Thus, respondent Judge Lauro G. Bernardo was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and was suspended from office for a
period of 6 months without salary and other benefits, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely.

Case # 110: Junio v. Judge Cacatian-Beltran

FACTS: Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (the Child Abuse
Law) and R.A. No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for the Disabled) before the Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office against Sr. Remy Angela
Junio and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the President and the Dean of the School of Health Services, respectively, of St. Paul University of
the Philippines (SPUP).
Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by SPUP for the B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore year because of her cleft palate;
she alleged that the refusal was made despite her completion of SPUP’s College Freshmen Program Curriculum.

The prosecutor’s office in its resolution found probable cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes charged, and recommended the
filing of the corresponding informations against them. Junio and Lorica appealed the resolution of the prosecutor’s office, but
Undersecretary Jose Vicente Salazar of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denied their petition for review.

Afterward, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica’s motion for reconsideration and set aside the resolution of
Undersecretary Salazar. Accordingly, in her resolution dated August 8, 2011, she directed the Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor to
immediately cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of R.A. Nos. 7610 and 7277 against Junio and Lorica for lack of
probable cause.

Subsequently, the prosecutor’s office still filed two informations against Junio and Lorica for violations of Section 10(a), Article VI, in
relation with Article 3(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Section 12 of R.A. No. 7277 before the Regional Trial Court ( RTC) in Tuguegarao
City presided by Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran.

This prompted the accused to file a joint motion to withdraw informations in view of Secretary De Lima’s resolution. They also filed an
administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) alleging that Judge Beltran "arrogated unto herself the
role of a prosecutor and a judge" when she insisted that they stand for trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Justice Secretary De Lima.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the respondent arbitrarily denied the joint motion to withdraw informations.
2. Whether the respondent arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge.

RULING:
1. NO. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be
an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. We stress that once a criminal
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case (whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a
conviction of the accused) rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is the
best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it.
 In the present case, the evidence provides that the respondent judge does not appear to have arbitrarily denied the
joint motion to withdraw informations. She explained the basis of her denial. No proof whatsoever exists in all these,
showing that bad faith, malice or any corrupt purpose attended the issuance of her order. It is also important to note
in this regard that the issue of whether Judge Cacatian-Beltran correctly denied the joint motion to withdraw
informations, despite the finding of Secretary De Lima of lack of probable cause, is judicial in nature: Junio and
Lorica’s remedy under the circumstances should have been made with the proper court for the appropriate judicial
action, not with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint.

2. NO. The court find unmeritorious Junio and Lorica’s argument that Judge Cacatian-Beltran “arrogated unto herself
the role of a prosecutor and a judge” when she insisted that the accused stand trial although she did not find any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary de Lima. When a court acts, whether its action is consistent or
inconsistent with a prosecutor’s recommendation, it rules on the prosecutor’s action and does not thereby assume the
role of a prosecutor.

Case # 111: Quisay v. People

FACTS: Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City (OCP-Makati) issued a Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause against
petitioner for violation of "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act." Consequently, a Pabatid
Sakdal or Information was filed before the RTC on January 11, 2013 charging petitioner of such crime.
Petitioner moved for the quashal of the Information against her on the ground of lack of authority of the person who filed the same
before the RTC.

In this regard, petitioner claimed that nothing in the aforesaid Pasiya and Pabatid Sakdal would show that ACP De La Cruz and/or
SACP Hirang had prior written authority or approval from the City Prosecutor to file or approve the filing of the Information against
her. As such, the Information must be quashed for being tainted with a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured.

The RTC denied petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit. It found the Certification attached to the Pabatid Sakdal to have
sufficiently complied with Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which requires the prior written authority or approval by, among
others, the City Prosecutor, in the filing of Informations.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was, however, denied in an Order. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a
petition for certiorari. The CA affirmed the RTC ruling. It held that the Certification made by ACP De La Cruz in the Pabatid Sakdal
clearly indicated that the same was filed after the requisite preliminary investigation and with the prior written authority or approval of
the City Prosecutor. In this regard, the CA opined that such Certification enjoys the presumption of regularity accorded to a public
officer's performance of official functions, in the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held that the RTC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner's motion to
quash.

RULING: The petition is meritorious. Section 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure states that the filing of a
complaint or information requires a prior written authority or approval of the named officers therein before a complaint or information
may be filed before the courts.

Thus, as a general rule, complaints or informations filed before the courts without the prior written authority or approval of the
foregoing authorized officers renders the same defective and, therefore, subject to quashal pursuant to Section 3 (d), Rule 117 of the
same Rules, to wit:
SECTION 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds:... x x x x
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;

The CA correctly held that based on the wordings of Section 9 of RA 10071, which gave the City Prosecutor the power to "investigate
and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and violations of penal laws and ordinances within their respective
jurisdictions, and have the necessary information or complaint prepared or made and filed against the persons accused," he may indeed
delegate his power to his subordinates as he may deem necessary in the interest of the prosecution service.
In this light, the Pasiya or Resolution finding probable cause to indict petitioner of the crime charged, was validly made as it bore the
approval of one of the designated review prosecutors for OCP-Makati, SACP Hirang, as evidenced by his signature therein.
Unfortunately, the same could not be said of the Pabatid Sakdal or Information filed before the RTC, as there was no showing that it was
approved by either the City Prosecutor of Makati or any of the OCP-Makati's division chiefs or review prosecutors. All it contained was a
Certification from ACP De La Cruz which stated, among others, that "DAGDAG KO PANG PINATUTUNAYAN na angpaghahain ng
sakdal na ito ay may nakasulat na naunang pahintulot o pagpapatibay ng Panlunsod na Taga-Usig" - which translates to "and that... the
filing of the Information is with the prior authority and approval of the City Prosecutor."

Here, aside from the bare and self-serving Certification, there was no proof that ACP De La Cruz was authorized to file the Pabatid
Sakdal or Information before the RTC by himself. In conclusion, the CA erred in affirming the RTC's dismissal of petitioner's motion to
quash as the Pabatid Sakdal or Information suffers from an incurable infirmity - that the officer who filed the same before the RTC had
no authority to do so. Hence, the Pabatid Sakdal must be quashed, resulting in the dismissal of the criminal case against petitioner.

Sec. 3. Procedure; Inquest

Sec. 4. Resolution of Investigating prosecutor and its review

Case # 112: Fortaleza v. Gonzalez

FACTS: This is a case about kidnapping with murder and filed against the petitioners. The case were dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. Department of Justice sent a letter directing the Negros Oriental Provincial Prosecution Office to forward the records for
automatic review. Neg Oriental Provincial Prosecution Office without conducting reinvestigation, issued a Resolution affirming in toto.
Petitioners filed Petition for Certiorari but CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The appellate court held that the Secretary of
Justice has the power of supervision and control over prosecutors and therefore can motu proprio take cognizance of a case pending
before or resolved by the Provincial Prosecution Office. Petitioners filed with this court petition for Review but the court denied the
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of the CA on the validity of the Secretary of Justice Resolution should be considered as the law of
the case pursuant to the law of the case doctrine.

RULING: No. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case continues to
be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue
to be the facts of the case before the court.

The doctrine of the law of the case applies even if the prior resort to the appellate court is in a certiorari proceeding, as in the case at bar.
If this doctrine were to be applied, the previous opinion by the Court of Appeals — that the October 2, 2006 Resolution of the Secretary
of Justice was valid should govern on subsequent appeal.

However, the doctrine of the law of the case requires that the appeal be that of the same parties, and that the pronouncement by the
appellate court be with full opportunity to be heard accorded to said parties:

The doctrine of law of the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration
continues to be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed
in other cases. For practical considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point that was presented
to it with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case
and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case, as the
name implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the former appeal.

G.R. No. 179287 and G.R. No. 182090 do not, however, involve the same parties.

Case # 113: De Lima v. Reyes

FACTS: Dr. Gerardo Ortega was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows in Palawan. In 2011, he was shot dead inside the
Baguio Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. Marlon Recamata was then arrested and made an
extrajudicial confession that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo Edrad, Dennis Aranas and Armando Noel, Jr. Edrad
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the NBI where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel Reyes who ordered
the killing of Dr. Ortega.

Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No. 91 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct
preliminary investigation. The First Panel issued a Resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega (wife of the
victim) filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation and a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution
dated June 8, 2011. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel.

The Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct
reinvestigation of the case. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review (Ad Cautelam) assailing the
First Panel’s Resolution dated September 2, 2011.

Former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel. He argued that the Secretary of
Justice gravely abused her discretion when she constituted a new panel since the parties were already afforded due process.

The Second Panel issued a Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations on all accused including
former Governor Reyes. The RTC of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrest. Former Governor Reyes then filed before the
Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam assailing the Second Panel’s Resolution dated March 12, 2012.

In 2013, the CA rendered a Decision declaring Department Order No. 10 null and void and reinstating the First Panel’s Resolutions
dated June 8, 2011 and September 2, 2011. The CA stated that the Secretary of Justice had not shown the alleged miscarriage of justice
sought to be prevented by the creation of the Second Panel since both parties were given full opportunity to present their evidence
before the First Panel. Aggrieved, the Secretary of Justice and the Second Panel filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
assailing the Decision of the CA.

ISSUE: Whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court, pursuant to
Crespo v. Mogul.

RULING: Yes, the filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of respondent’s warrant to arrest has already rendered
this Petition moot.

Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to dismiss the case or to determine the
accused’s guilt or innocence rests within the sound discretion of the court. Thus, it would be ill-advised for the Secretary of Justice to
proceed with resolving respondent’s Petition for Review pending before her. It would be more prudent to refrain from entertaining the
Petition considering that the trial court already issued a warrant of arrest against respondent. The issuance of the warrant signifies that
the trial court has made an independent determination of the existence of probable cause.

Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel or the Second Panel,
that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has been
transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation in any other venue has
been rendered moot by the issuance of warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.

The CA should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since this
Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.

The prudent course of action at this stage would be to proceed to trial. Respondent, however, is not without remedies. He may still file
any appropriate action before the trial court or question any alleged irregularity in the preliminary investigation during pre-trial.

Case # 114: Primo Mina v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: This case stemmed from an Affidavit-Complaint for Perjury, as defined and penalized under Article 183 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), filed by petitioners against respondent Rodolfo C. Tandoc (Tandoc) before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of
Pangasinan (OPP). After the requisite preliminary investigation proceedings, the OPP dismissed petitioners' criminal complaint against
Tandoc for lack of probable cause. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) located in
San Fernando City, La Union. However, the ORSP affirmed the OPP's findings that no probable cause exists to indict Tandoc for the
crime of Perjury. Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

The CA dismissed the petition outright because the petitioners availed of a wrong remedy. It held that under Department of Justice
(DOJ) Department Circular No. 70-A, petitioners should have first appealed the adverse ORSP ruling to the Secretary of Justice (SOJ)
before elevating the matter to the regular courts.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the ground of petitioners' supposed availment of a
wrong remedy. CAIHTE

RULING: The Court finds for petitioners. DOJ Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000 which governs the appeals process in
the National Prosecution Service (NPS), provides that resolutions of, inter alia, the Regional State Prosecutor, in cases subject of
preliminary investigation/reinvestigation shall be appealed by filing a verified petition for review before the SOJ. However, this
procedure was immediately amended by DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A dated July 10, 2000 which reads:

“all petitions for review of resolutions of Provincial/City Prosecutors in cases cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, except in the National Capital Region, shall be filed with the Regional State Prosecutor
concerned who shall resolve such petitions with finality in accordance with the pertinent rules prescribed in the said Department
Circular.”

DOJ Department Circular No. 70-A delegated to the ORSPs the authority to rule with finality cases subject of preliminary
investigation/reinvestigation appealed before it, which includes not only violations of city or municipal ordinances, but also all offenses
punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable
accessory or other penalties attached thereto.

In this case, records show that petitioners filed a criminal complaint before the OPP accusing Tandoc of Perjury. The complaint was,
however, dismissed by the OPP and such dismissal was upheld by the ORSP. Since ( a) the criminal complaint was filed outside of the
NCR; (b) perjury cases are cognizable by the first-level courts since the maximum penalty therefor is imprisonment for less than six (6)
years; and (c) it appears that the SOJ did not exercise its power of control and supervision over the entire NPS by reviewing the ORSP
ruling, the ORSP's affirmance of the OPP ruling was with finality. As such, petitioners have already exhausted its administrative
remedies and may now go to the CA via a petition for certiorari.

Sec. 5. When warrant of arrest may issue

Case # 115: People v. Inting

FACTS: On February 6, 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros
Oriental with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the
office of the Municipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from COMELEC as
required by law.

After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a prima facie case. Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed
with the respondent trial court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor. In
an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor and fixed the bail at
five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as recommended by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

However, in an order dated October 3, 1988 and before the accused could be arrested, the trial court set aside its September 30, 1988
order on the ground that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The court stated that it "will give due course to the information filed in this case if the same has the written approval of
the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under the supervision and control of the latter."
ISSUE: Whether or not the Provincial Election Supervisor may determine if a probable cause exists for the issuance of warrant of
arrest.

RULING: No. First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor
for the Election Supervisor to ascertain. Only the Judge and the Judge alone makes this determination. Second, the
preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause.
The Judge does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
Prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination. And third, Judges and Prosecutors alike
should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted
in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The determination of probable cause
for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to
believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial is the function of the Prosecutor.

The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the
purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The
evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of
elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right
and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by
public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate.
Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it
quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Orders are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent trial court's
Order is REINSTATED. The respondent court is ordered to proceed hearing the case with deliberate speed until its termination.

Case #116: Lim v. Felix

*NOT SURE IF SAME CASE* From Brattys: while your client is already inside the jail that client of yours already have the right to post
bail. Do not forget.
( about lim case ni na ang lawyer kay after pa na file sa prosecutor ang information sa court nganha pa nag post ug bail.
stupid daw na)

FACTS: At the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of
Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and
Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr.
survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. For the crime of multiple murder and frustrated
murder, the accused were Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94054-57), Jolly T. Fernandez,
Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69.)
The RTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of warrants of arrest. In the same Order, the
court ordered the arrest of the petitioners plus bail for provisional liberty.
The entire records of the case were transmitted to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane
was designated to review the case. A petition to transfer the venue of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati was filed by petitioners and granted by the SC.
On July 5, 1990, the respondent court (RTC Makati) issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The
respondent Judge said:
"In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate which found the
existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof,
which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional Trial Court four separate
informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the
existence of probable cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, this Court
finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each information xxx”

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification and
recommendation that a probable cause exists.

RULING:
No. The Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires "x x x probable cause to be personally determined
by the Judge x x x", not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he
or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional
requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were
still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent
Judge to make his own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest as
mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification.
Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the petitioners’ motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

Case #117: People v. Desmond

FACTS: In 2001, Virginia De Los Santos-Dio (Dio), the majority stockholder of H.S. Equities, Ltd. (HS Equities) and authorized
representative of Westdale Assets, Ltd. (Westdale), was introduced to Desmond, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the
Subic Bay Marine Exploratorium, Inc. (SBMEI), and the authorized representative of Active Environments, Inc. and JV China, Inc. (JV
China), the majority shareholder of SBMEI. After some discussion on possible business ventures, Dio, on behalf of HS Equities, decided
to invest a total of US $1,150,000.00 in SBMEI's Ocean Adventure Marine Park (Ocean Adventure). Dio claimed that Desmond led her
to believe that SBMEI had a capital of US$5,500,000.00, inclusive of the value of the marine mammals to be used in Ocean Adventure,
and also guaranteed substantial returns on investment.

In June 2002, Dio, this time on behalf of Westdale, invested another US $1,000,000.00 in a separate business venture, called the
Miracle Beach Hotel Project (Miracle Beach), which involved the development of a resort owned by Desmond adjoining Ocean
Adventure. However, when the corresponding subscription agreement was presented to Dio by SBMEI for approval, it contained a
clause stating that the "funds in the Subscription Bank Account" were also to be used for the " [f]unding of Ocean Adventure's Negative
Cash Flow not exceeding [US$200,000.00]."This was in conflict with the exclusive purpose and intent of Westdale's investment in
Miracle Beach and as such, Dio refused to sign the subscription agreement.

Dio further claimed that she found out that, contrary to Desmond's representations, SBMEI actually had no capacity to deliver on its
guarantees, and that in fact, as of 2001, it was incurring losses amounting to P62,595,216.00. Eventually, after Dio was ousted as
Director and Treasurer of SBMEI, she filed, on April 19, 2004, two (2) criminal complaints for estafa and grave abuse of confidence.
After the preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated August 26, 2004, finding probable cause against
Desmond for the aforementioned crimes.

The RTC ruled in favor of Desmond and declared that no probable cause exists for the crimes charged against him since the elements of
estafa were not all present. The CA upheld the RTC's authority to dismiss a criminal case if in the process of determining probable cause
for issuing a warrant of arrest, it also finds the evidence on record insufficient to establish probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it dismissed the subject
informations for lack of probable cause.

RULING: The petitions are meritorious. Determination of probable cause may be either executive or judicial.

The first is made by the public prosecutor, during a preliminary investigation, where he is given broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists for the purpose of filing a criminal information in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.
The second is one made by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. In this respect, the
judge must satisfy himself that, on the basis of the evidence submitted, there is a necessity for placing the accused under custody in
order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge, therefore, finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest
warrant. Notably, since the judge is already duty-bound to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused immediately upon the filing of the information, the filing of a motion for judicial determination of probable cause becomes
a mere superfluity, if not a deliberate attempt to cut short the process by asking the judge to weigh in on the evidence without a full-
blown trial.
On this score, it bears to stress that a judge is not bound by the resolution of the public prosecutor who conducted the preliminary
investigation and must himself ascertain from the latter's findings and supporting documents whether probable cause exists for the
purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest.
While a judge's determination of probable cause is generally confined to the limited purpose of issuing arrest warrants, Section 5 (a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure explicitly states that a judge may immediately dismiss a case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause.
In this regard, so as not to transgress the public prosecutor's authority, it must be stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must be
done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is when the records readily
show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. The
petitions are granted.

Case # 118: People v. Grey

FACTS: : An Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph Grey, former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son,
respondent Francis Grey; and two others for the death of Rolando Diocton before the RTC of Gandara, Samar. The Information was
accompanied by other supporting documents and a motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Meanwhile, Presiding Judge Rosario
Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge Bandal found the prosecution’s evidence to be insufficient to
link respondents to the crime charged. She directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence. Later, the judge
inhibited. Thereafter, the venue was changed and Judge Naviadad continued the proceedings of the case. Respondents filed a petition
for certiorari seeking TRO and preliminary injunction alleging that the filing of the murder charge are based on perjured statements
since Joseph Grey announced his candidacy for the Congressional election. The CA held that Judge Naviadad failed to abide with the
constitutional mandate of personally examining the existence of probable cause. Thus, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Naviadad erred in personally examining for the existence of probable cause.

RULING: No. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of
the existence of probable cause.

In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. He should
not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor. It is not mandatory in the determination of probable cause for the issuance
of the warrant of arrest.

In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and evidence before him, determined that there was probable
cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the provincial prosecution, based on the affidavits presented by complainant and her
witnesses, found probable cause to file the criminal Information. This finding of the Provincial Prosecutor was affirmed by the Secretary
of Justice.

Case # 119: Young v. People

FACTS: On separate dates, members of the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (RAHTTF) of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) conducted surveillance operations at Jaguar KTV Bar (Jaguar) in Cebu City, and observed that its customers paid P6,000.00 in
exchange for sexual intercourse with guest relations officers (GROs), or P10,000.00 as "bar fine" if they were taken out of the
establishment.

On April 9, 2011, in the course of an entrapment operation, PO2 Arsua, PO2 Talingting, Jr., and PO1 Jef Nemenzo (PO1 Nemenzo),
acting as poseur customers, handed P15,000.00 worth of marked money to the "mamasang"/manager of Jaguar in exchange for sexual
service. At the pre-arranged signal, the rest of the RAHTTF members raided Jaguar resulting to multiple arrests, seizure of sexual
paraphernalia, recovery of the marked money from one Jocelyn Balili (Balili), and the rescue of 146 women and minor children. Later,
six (6) of these women (AAA Group) — executed affidavits identifying petitioners, Tico, and Ann as Jaguar's owners.
During the pendency of the preliminary investigation, or on May 31, 2011, the AAA Group submitted affidavits stating that their
previous affidavits were vitiated and not of their own free will and voluntary deed, effectively recanting the same.

On June 18, 2012, petitioners filed an omnibus motion for a judicial determination of probable cause, praying that the issuance of the
corresponding warrants of arrest be held in abeyance pending resolution thereof, and for the case against them to be dismissed for lack
of probable cause. The RTC granted the omnibus motion and dismissed the case for lack of probable cause. However, the CA found that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case for lack of probable cause. Consequently, it ordered the
reinstatement of the information and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing the criminal case against
petitioners for lack of probable cause; and

2. Whether or not a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite to filing a certiorari petition.

RULING: The petition is bereft of merit. Determination of probable cause is either executive or judicial in nature. The first pertains to
the duty of the public prosecutor during preliminary investigation for the purpose of filing an information in court. On the other hand,
judicial determination of probable cause refers to the prerogative of the judge to ascertain if a warrant of arrest should be issued against
the accused.

It must be stressed that the judge's dismissal of a case must be done only in clear-cut cases when the evidence on record plainly fails to
establish probable cause — that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus, established facts which unmistakably
negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged. On the contrary, if the evidence on record shows that, more likely than not,
the crime charged has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same, the judge should not dismiss the case and
thereon, order the parties to proceed to trial. Accordingly, a judge may dismiss the case for lack of probable cause only in clear-cut cases
when the evidence on record plainly fails to establish probable cause — that is when the records readily show uncontroverted, and thus,
established facts which unmistakably negate the existence of the elements of the crime charged.

The evidence on record herein does not reveal the unmistakable and clear-cut absence of probable cause against petitioners. Instead, a
punctilious examination thereof shows that the prosecution was able to establish a prima facie case against petitioners for violation of
Sections 4 (a) and (e) in relation to Sections 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208. As it appears from the records, petitioners recruited and hired the
AAA Group and, consequently, maintained them under their employ in Jaguar for the purpose of engaging in prostitution. In view of
this, probable cause exists to issue warrants for their arrest.

Sec. 6. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant (formerly Sec. 7)

Case # 120: Ambre v. People

FACTS: On or about April 20, 2005, the Caloocan Police Station Anti-Illegal Drug-Special Operation Unit conducted a buy-bust
operation pursuant to a tip from a police informant that a certain Abdullah Sultan and his wife Ina Aderp was engaged in the selling of
dangerous drugs at a residential compound in Caloocan City; that buy-bust operation resulted in the arrest of Aderp and a certain
Moctar Tagoranao; that Sultan run away from the scene of the entrapment operation and PO3 Moran, PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo,
pursued him; that in the course of the chase, Sultan led the said police officers to his house; that inside the house, he police operatives
found Ambre, Castro and Mendoza having a pot session; that Ambre in particular, was caught sniffing what was suspected to be a shabu
in a rolled up alumni foil; and that PO3 Moran ran after Sultan while PO2 Masi and PO1 Mateo arrested Ambre, Castro and Mendoza
for illegal use of shabu.
Ambre insists that the warrantless arrest and search made against her were illegal because no offense was being committed at
the time and the police operatives were not authorized by a judicial order to enter the dwelling of Sultan. That Ambre is inside the
residential compound to buy a Malong. She argues that the alleged “hot pursuit” on Sultan which ended in the latter's house, where she,
Mendoza and Castro were supposedly found having a pot session, was more imaginary than real. That the police officer just barged in
and arrested her.
 Rosete testified that after she left Ambre inside along with the vendors and buyers of malong. She returned and found out that
the policemen arrested the people inside the compound.
The RTC rendered its decision declaring that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude the guilt of Ambre. CA
affirmed the decision of RTC,

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid?
2. Whether or not the items seized are inadmissible in evidence?
3. Whether or not chain of custody of evidence was broken?

RULING:
1. Yes, the warrantless arrest of Ambre and the search of her person was valid.
The Court held that the arrest and search done against the petitioner is valid. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, provides three (3) instances when warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a suspect in flagrante
delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said
suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody
serving final judgment or temporarily confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has
just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. Furthermore, Ambre is deemed to have waived her objections to her arrest for not raising them before
entering her plea.

2. Yes, the items seized are admissible in evidence. Evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted and should be excluded. for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In
the language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. But this rule
does not apply in an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exception established by jurisprudence is
search incident to a lawful arrest.

Considering that the warrantless arrest of Ambre was valid, the subsequent search and seizure done on her person was likewise
lawful. Thus, the evidence sized are admissible. Further, the physical evidence corroborates the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses that Ambre, together with Castro and Mendoza, were illegally using shabu. The urine samples taken from them were
found positive for the presence of shabu, as indicated in Physical Science Report No. DT-041-05 to DT-043-05.

3. No, the chain of custody of evidence was not broken. The chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in reality, it is
not as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. The preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items.

In this case, the prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug
paraphernalia had not been compromised. Hence, even though the prosecution failed to submit in evidence the physical
inventory and photograph of the drug paraphernalia with traces of shabu, this will not render Ambre's arrest illegal or the
items seized from her inadmissible. Records bear out that after the arrest of Ambre with Castro and Mendoza, the following
items were confiscated from them: one (1) unsealed sachet with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) strip of rolled up aluminum
foil with traces of suspected shabu; one (1) folded piece of aluminum foil with traces of white crystalline substance also
believed to be shabu; and two (2) yellow disposable lighters. Upon arrival at the police station, PO3 Moran turned over the
seized items to PO2 Hipolito who immediately marked them in the presence of the former.

The testimonies of the police officers have adequately established with moral certainty the commission of the crime charged in
the information and the identity of Ambre as the perpetrator. It upholds the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties. The presumption remains because the defense failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the police
officers did not properly perform their duty or that they were inspired by an improper motive.

See: R.A. 9372 Human Security Act of 2007

Sec. 7. Records

Sec. 8. Cases not requiring a preliminary investigation and covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure

Module 5: RULE 113 – ARREST

Sec. 1. Definition of Arrest

Case # 121: People v. Domantay

FACTS: The accused was convicted of complex rape with homicide for the death of 6-year old Jennifer Domantay and sentenced to
death. He denied the accusations against him. SPO1 Espinoza claimed that the accused-appellant agreed to answer all the queries
that will be raised by the investigator. He confessed everything that had happened without the presence of the counsel. Espinoza also
claimed that the accused admitted that he committed the crime and he even tells where he put the bayonet that he used in stabbing the
victim. But the accused-appellant denied that there is a boundary dispute between him and the victim’s parents. The accused was not
accompanied by his counsel, neither was his statement made in writing.

A DPWR radio reporter named Celso Manuel conducted an interview to the accused-appellant two or three meters away from the
police station. The accused was accompanied by two police officers and there is no lawyer that is present. The accused admitted
again that he did the whole crime and claimed that he used the victim to revenge on the victim’s parents.

Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel are inadmissible in evidence
because they had been obtained in violation of Art. III, Sec. 12(1) of the Constitution and that, with these vital pieces of evidence
excluded, the remaining proof of his alleged guilt, consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

ISSUE: Whether or not the confession of the accused is admissible.

RULING: Yes. This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when the investigation is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect."

R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has
merely been "invited" for questioning. In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the
evening of October 17, 1996,[37] he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying of Jennifer Domantay already
under custodial investigation and the rights guaranteed in Art. III, §12(1) of the Constitution applied to him.

But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the presence of counsel. For this
reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-
appellant's confession to the radio reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible.

Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was "tense and intimidating" and was
similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. We are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed while he was
inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle of the victim. Accused-appellant
could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed.

Case # 122: Soliven v. Makasiar

FACTS: In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised: (1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when
informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President; and (2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated
when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any,
to determine probable cause. Subsequent events have rendered the first issue moot and academic. On March 30, 1988, the Secretary
of Justice denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration and upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary of Justice sustaining the City
Fiscal's finding of a prima facie case against petitioners. A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied
by the Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On appeal, the President, through the Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary on May 16, 1988. With
these developments, petitioners' contention that they have been denied the administrative remedies available under the law has lost
factual support.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or Not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against them although the finding of
the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President.

(2) Whether or Not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable cause

RULING: With respect to petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of due process of law in the preliminary investigation is negated
by the fact that instead of submitting his counter- affidavits, he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceedings Closed," in effect waiving his
right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits. Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case
actually file hiscounter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is that the respondent
be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

The second issue, raised by petitioner Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants
of arrest. The pertinent provision reads: “Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge afte rexamination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.”

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority by the 1973 Constitution
to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the
Constitution now requires the judge to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not
required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and,
on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examination and investigation of
criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. It has not been shown that
respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus, with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained. The petitions fail to establish that public
respondents, through their separate acts, gravely abused their discretion as to amount to lack of jurisdiction. Hence, the writs of
certiorari and prohibition prayed for cannot issue.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public respondents,
the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions in G. R. Nos. 82585, 82827 and 83979. The Order to maintain the status quo contained in
the Resolution of the Court en banc dated April 7, 1988 and reiterated in the Resolution dated April 26, 1988 is LIFTED.

Sec. 2. Arrest, how made

Case # 123: People v. Oanis

FACTS: Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a
telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get
him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.

They were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the telegram. The same instruction
was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector. The Provincial Inspector divided the party
into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta taking the route leading to the house of a bailarina named Irene, where Balagtas
was believed to be staying.

Upon arrival at the place where Irene could be found, Oanis approached and asked Brigada Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada
indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene,
and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32
and .45 caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where the shots
came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and
killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendants should be held liable for Tecson’s death or the latter’s wrongful arrest.

RULING: Yes. If a person acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of his official duties, then he incurs no criminal
liability. Nonetheless, the maxim ignorantia facti excusat, applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In
the instant case, the defendants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action, as the person in the
room being then asleep would give them ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity. Moreover, they were instructed not to kill
Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if resistance or aggression is offered by him. Thus, the crime
committed by defendants was not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence,
the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice.

Two (2) requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. Offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right (Present)

2. Injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right
or office. (Not present)

Case # 124: People v. Tudtud

FACTS: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City received a report from a “civilian
asset” named Bobong Solier about a certain Noel Tudtud. Solier related that his neighbors have been complaining about Tudtud, who
was allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Reacting to the report, PO1 Ronald Desierto, PO1 Ramil
Floreta and their superior,SPO1 Villalonghan, all members of the Intelligence Section of the Toril Police Station, conducted surveillance
in Solier’s neighborhood in Sapa, Toril, Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in
illegal drugs. According to his neighbors, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.

Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier
described Tudtud as big-bodied and short, and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team composed of PO1
Desierto, PO1 Floreta and SPO1 Villalonghan posted themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await Tudtud’s
arrival. All wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 p.m., 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton marked “King
Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men, PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description.
The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1 Floreta and PO1Desierto then approached the suspects and identified themselves as police
officers. PO1 Desierto informed them that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving that night.
The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was carrying any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked him if he could see the
contents of the box. Tudtud obliged, saying, “it was alright.” Tudtud opened the box himself as his companion looked on. The box
yielded pieces of dried fish, beneath which were two bundles, one wrapped in a striped plastic bag and another in newspapers. PO1
Desierto asked Tudtud to unwrap the packages. They contained what seemed to the police officers as marijuana leaves. The police thus
arrested Tudtud and his companion, informed them of their rights and brought them to the police station. The two did not resist. The
confiscated items were turned over to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination. Forensic tests on
specimens taken from the confiscated items confirmed the police officers’ suspicion. The plastic bag contained 3,200 grams of
marijuana leaves while the newspapers contained another 890 grams.

Noel Tudtud and his companion, Dindo Bulong, were subsequently charged before the RTC of Davao City with illegal possession of
prohibited drugs. Upon arraignment, both accused pleaded not guilty. The defense, however, reserved their right to question the validity
of their arrest and the seizure of the evidence against them. Trial ensued thereafter. Tudtud, denying the charges against them, cried
frame-up. Swayed by the prosecution’s evidence beyond reasonable doubt, the RTC rendered judgment convicting both accused as
charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. On appeal, Noel Tudtud and
Dindo Bolong assign, among other errors, the admission in evidence of the marijuana leaves, which they claim were seized in violation
of their right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s all right” when the police officers requested that
the box be opened) be considered a waiver?

RULING: NO. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is secured by Section 2, Article III of the Constitution. The RTC
justified the warrantless search of appellants’ belongings under the first exception, as a search incident to a lawful arrest. A search
incidental to a lawful arrest is sanctioned by the Rules of Court. It is significant to note that the search in question preceded the arrest.
Recent jurisprudence holds that the arrest must precede the search; the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially
contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.

The question, therefore, is whether the police herein had probable cause to arrest Tudtud, et. al. The long-standing rule in this
jurisdiction, applied with a great degree of consistency, is that “reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he “has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.” For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to apply, this
Court ruled, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. Reliable information alone isinsufficient. Thus, herein, in no sense can the knowledge of the arresting officers that
Tudtud was in possession of marijuana be described as “personal,” having learned the same only from their informant Solier. Solier, for
his part, testified that he obtained his information only from his neighbors and the friends of Tudtud. Solier’s information is hearsay.
Confronted with such a dubious informant, the police perhaps felt itnecessary to conduct their own “surveillance.”

This “surveillance,” it turns out, did not actually consist of staking out Tudtud to catch him in the act of plying his illegal trade, but of a
mere “gathering of information from the assets there.” Tudtud's implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of
the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, Tudtud's lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. As the search of Tudtud's box does not come under
the recognized exceptions to a valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in evidence. And as
there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting officers and their informant, the conviction of Tudtud, et. al.
cannot be sustained.

Sec. 3. Duty of Arresting Officer

Case # 125: People v. Rodriguez

FACTS: Appellant and Wilfredo Rodriguez, employed as construction workers in the upper floors of the bank, were charged with the
crime of Robbery with Homicide for the killing of the bank security guard whose lifeless body was discovered by a messenger in the
early morning of October 11, 1991. Both denied any participation in the killing, and claimed they learned of the incident only at around
7:00 A.M of October 11, 1991, when they saw many people milling around the area. The trial court found them guilty of murder. Both
appealed. However, Rodriguez withdrew his appeal for financial reasons.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession of accused Rodriguez is admissible not only against him but also against appellant.

RULING: No. Rodriguez's confession is constitutionally flawed so that it could not be used as evidence against them at all.

The four fundamental requisites for the admissibility of a confession are (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must
be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be
in writing. The second requisite is lacking.

In acquitting the appellant and Rodriguez on appeal, the Supreme Court held: that Rodriguez's sworn statement confessing that he and
appellant together with three other men, killed Matias, was taken in violation of the safeguards in Art. III, Sec. 12 of the 1987
Constitution, hence, could not be used against him and appellant. At the time of their arrest in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, they
were not informed of the well known Miranda rights. Worse, they were not provided with competent counsel during the custodial
investigation prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession. The maong pants allegedly belonging to appellant stained with blood
had no probative value since the blood type of appellant and the victim were not taken for purposes of comparison. Finally, pursuant to
Sec. 11 (a) of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, appellant's acquittal shall benefit Rodriguez although he had withdrawn his appeal since the
evidence against and the conviction of both appellant and Rodriguez were inextricably linked.

Prosecution witness SPO3 Jamoralin testified that the accused and appellant were arrested and brought to the police station at around
5:00 P.M. of October 11, 1991. The records show that the extrajudicial confession of Rodriguez was taken down by Pat. David D. Tuazon
at 2:00 P.M. of October 15, 1991. Atty. Lao confirmed on the stand that the police investigators called him at around 2:00 P.M. of
October 15, 1991, and that he conferred with the accused for about 10 minutes prior to the execution of the extrajudicial confession.
Evidently, Rodriguez and appellant were detained for four days, but Atty. Lao of the PAO was called only on the fourth day of detention
when accused was about to put his confession in writing. Under the factual milieu, the moment accused and appellant were arrested and
brought to the police station, they were already under custodial investigation.|||

Case # 126: Sayo v. Chief of Police

FACTS: Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin
Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the
fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still
detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the proper courts justice. This
case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, and it had
to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division in Baguio for deliberation and decision. SC has not until now an official
information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not the city fiscal of manila is a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the RPC, or
are the petitioners being illegally restrained of their liberty.

RULING: Petitioners’ release is ordered. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next
proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours." The surrender or delivery to the judicial
authority of a person arrested without warrant by a peace officer, does not consist in a physical delivery, but in making an accusation or
charge or filing of an information against the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge, whereby the latter acquires
jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner, because the arresting officer cannot transfer to the judge and
the latter does not assume the physical custody of the person arrested. The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised
Penal Code cannot be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest
or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. For
the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the
material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.

CASE #127. George Antiquera y Codes v. People of the Philippines, December 11, 2013

Facts:
Body xxx (plain)
Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in Pasay City when they saw two unidentified men rush out of a house and
boarded a jeep. Believing that there was a crime, the police officers approached the house. When they peeked through the partially
opened door, they saw Antiquera and Cruz engaged in a pot session. The police officers entered the house, introduced themselves and
arrested Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a jewellery box which contained shabu and unused
paraphernalia. The RTC found them guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The court affirmed the decision of
RTC.

Issue:

Whether or not the arrest was invalid.

Held/Ruling:

Body xxx (plain)

 Sec. 4. Execution of Warrant

CASE #128. Mamangon v. CFI, 189 SCRA 217

Facts:
Body xxx (plain)
Issue:

Body xxx (plain)

Held/Ruling:

Body xxx (plain)

CASE #129. Viudez v. CA – 5 June 2009

Facts:

Honorato Galvez and his driver were fatally shot on June 9, 2000 in Barangay San Juan, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. On June 26, 2000,
a complaint for the alleged murder of the said victims was filed by the 303rd Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation
Division (PNP CID) Team with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Likewise, on July 14, 2000, a complaint for murder against
petitioner Enrique Viudez II was filed by Estrella Galvez, widow of Mayor Honorato Galvez, for the killing of the latter and his
driver.

On March 31, 2001, a Resolution was issued by the Investigating State Prosecutor finding probable cause to indict the petitioner and
others for the crime of murder. On September 19, 2001, two (2) Information for murder were filed with the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan,
which then issued warrants of arrest on the same day.

On September 21, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Suspend the Implementation of the Warrant of
Arrest, Pursuant to Department Circular No. 70 of the Department of Justice (DOJ) arguing that all the accused in the said criminal
cases had filed a timely petition for review with the Secretary of Justice and, pursuant to Section 9 of Department Circular No. 70, the
implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending resolution of the said
petition fo review.

The RTC denied petitioner’s Motion stating that, insofar as the implementation of the warrant of arrest against petitioner was
concerned, said warrant had already been issued for his apprehension. The court also added that there was no way for it to recall the
same in the absence of any compelling reason, and that jurisdiction over his person had not yet been acquired by it; hence, petitioner
had no personality to file any pleading in court relative to the case until he was arrested or voluntarily surrendered himself to the
court. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction but dismissed the same.

Issue:

Whether or not a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice concerning a finding of probable cause
will suspend the proceedings in the trial court, including the implementation of a warrant of arrest.

Held:

No, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused. The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination
of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred pending the resolution
of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer
the implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge.
It must be emphasized that petitioner filed with the trial court a motion to suspend proceedings and to suspend the implementation of
the warrant of arrest in pursuance of a DOJ circular, and not a motion to quash the warrant of arrest questioning the issuance
thereof. Thus, there is no contest as to the validity or regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioner merely wanted the
trial court to defer the implementation of the warrant of arrest pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the petition for
review that he filed citing the following directive contained in Section 9 of DOJ Department Circular:

xxxx

The appellant and the trial prosecutor shall see to it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the proceedings in court are held in
abeyance.

The said provision of the Department Circular is directed specifically at the appellant and the trial prosecutor, giving them latitude in
choosing a remedy to ensure that the proceedings in court are held in abeyance. However, nowhere in the said provision does it state
that the court must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of the court whether or not to suspend the proceedings
or the implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is
in consonance with the earlier ruling of this Court that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as
to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole
judge of what to do with the case before it. In the instant case, the judge of the trial court merely exercised his judicial discretion when
he denied petitioner's motion to suspend the implementation of the warrant of arrest.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant

CASE #130. People v. Bati, 189 SCRA 103

>>>> No case found>>>> will get back to this!

CASE #131. People v. Claudio, 160 SCRA 648

FACTS:

Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City convicted the accused Anita Claudio y Bagtang for violating Sec. 4 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. Prosecution’s witness Danel Obiña, a policeman, testified that while on board the Victory Liner heading back to his
home in Olongapo, Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him after placing a woven buri bag made of plastic
containing some vegetables she was carrying at the back of Obiña’s seat. With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge
to search the woven plastic bag so when they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, he inserted one of his fingers in a plastic bag located at
the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. He could recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at
the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He did not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the
accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus. Obina intercepted her and showed her his ID
Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside
said bag. Claudio replied, "Please go with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead
handcuffed her right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters with her bag
appearing to contain vegetables.

At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl. Tiongco, Obiña, Claudio and
Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo.
ISSUE: WON Claudio’s warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were unlawful?

RULING:

NO, the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful.

Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides for the in flagrante delicto arrest, that is, a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides for a warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest to be lawful. In other words, a person
lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant.

Here, Claudio was caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs. Thus, Pat. Daniel Obiña did not need a warrant to arrest
Claudio. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful ( Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there
was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

The warrantless search, seizure and apprehension were lawful.

CASE #132. People v. Sucro, 195 SCRA 388

Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by their Station Commander to monitor the
activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana

As planned Roy Fulgencio monitored the activities of the accused under the house of Regalado and near the chapel
where the accused was selling marijuana to a group of persons around 5 pm.

Pat reported this to their station commander and instructed him to continue his monitoring.

At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was
transacting with appellant.

At that point, after Macabante bought from the accused, they pursue Macabante and told them he bought it from herein accused-
appellant.

The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks
and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from Macabante,

Accused appealed that the marijuana teabags were seized without serving upon him a search warrant.

The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, is a violation of his rights granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.

He stresses that there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio
informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

ISSUE:

WON the arrest without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently

WON the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD:
 YES. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where an arrest without warrant is considered
lawful. The rule states:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a
warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the
scene thereof.

From the records of the case, Fulgencio saw Sucro three times dealing drugs inside the chapel where he is 2 meters away monitoring his
nefarious activities then after the 3rd deal, the police intercepted the buyer Macabante and when confronted by the police, Macabante
readily admitted that he bought the marijuana from Sucro. Therefore, Sucro had just committed an illegal act of which the police
officers had personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored accused-appellants nefarious activity.

The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities
even prior to the former's joining the police force. Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three days before the incident.

As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years and that after Fulgencio joined the police
force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is possible that because of this friendship, Fulgencio
hesitated to report his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However, because of reliable information
was given by some informants that selling was going on every day, he was constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.

On the oter hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that their knowledge acquired from the
surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause
existed.

The general rule is that searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule... Among the exceptions
granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the RCP which provides that a person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.

Since the arrest was considered valid, the evidence presented is admissible in evidence.

Hence, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed the offense charged. The trial court's decision must
be upheld.

CASE #133. People v. Aminnudin, 163 SCRA 402

CASE #134. Posadas v. Ombudsman, 341 SCRA 388

Dennis Venturina, a Sigma Rho member at the University of the Philippines (UP), died in a rumble between his fraternity and
another fraternity. Petitioner Posadas, then Chancellor of UP, sought the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
determine the persons responsible for the crime. Four days after the incident, private respondent, Chief of the Special Operations
Group of the NBI, and his men went to UP to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla
Juris Fraternity who were supposed to be positively identified by two alleged eyewitnesses.

The NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of the crime. They had no
personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the
supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.
Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime. When respondent Dizon and
his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create
the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal. On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were
taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.

They tried to arrest accused Taparan and Narag who were then at the UP Police Station taking part in a peace talk called to
put an end to the violence on the campus. Petitioners UP officials and Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected to their
warrantless arrest and promised to take them to the NBI office the next day. When they failed to comply, an information for violation of
Section 1 (c) of P.D. 1829 (Obstruction in the Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal Offenders) was filed against them, the Chief of
UP Police, and Atty. Villamor. Petitioners moved to dismiss, but the Office of the Ombudsman directed the special prosecutor to
proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the warrantless arrest was valid.

Ruling: NO.

As a rule, no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by a judge. Three exceptional instances are,
however, provided in Section 5, Rule 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause," which means "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The determination of the existence of probable cause that the
persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make and not for any law enforcer. The law authorizes a police officer
or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime. The failure of NBI
agents to comply with the constitutional and procedural requirements rendered the arrest illegal.

The ruling in the Tonong, Jr. case (205 SCRA 772 [1992]) is not applicable in the case at bar, as in that case the accused
voluntarily went upon the invitation of the police officer and the arrest was made on the same day the crime was committed. In this
case, the attempted arrest was conducted four days after the commission of the crime.

Objection to a warrantless arrest cannot be construed as a violation of Section 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1896 where warrantless arrest
is illegal.

CASE #135. People v. Collado, G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013

Facts:
PO2 Noble received information from a civilian asset that spouses Marcelino and Myra were engaged in selling shabu and that
drug users, including out-of-school youth, were using their residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, for their
drug sessions. A buy-bust operation team was thereafter formed. The asset introduced PO2 Noble to Marcelino as a regular
buyer of shabu. Myra accepted the money. Marcelino then took from his pocket a small metal container from which he brought
out a small plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance and gave it to PO2 Noble.

Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra, where they found Apelo,
Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered around a table littered with various drug paraphernalia
such as an improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of white substance, disposable lighters, and plastic sachets.
A strip of aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was recovered from Ranada.
RTC found Marcelino and Myra guilty of Secs. 5, 6, and 11 of RA 9165. Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang
and Latario are guilty of Sec. 14 of RA 9165. CA affirmed the decision with modification that Apelo, Abache, Sumulong, and
Madarang are accessories, not principals.

Issue:
Whether or not irregularities attended the arrest, detention, and the procedure in handling the specimen seized from them
Held:
The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. The
arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of
having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.

As for the specimen, the failure of the police officers to inventory and photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to the
prosecution's cause, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized substance were preserved, as in this case.

In Rañada’s case, he was actually caught having custody and control of the confiscated drug paraphenalia intended for smoking, injecting,
etc. into one's body. It was also indubitably shown that he failed to present authority to possess the prohibited articles, much less, an
explanation of his possession thereof. However, as regards the other accused who were seen in the company of Rañada, the evidence of
conspiracy against them was insufficient. They were in close proximity to Rañada at the time and place of the incident. But mere presence at
the scene of the crime does not imply conspiracy. The prosecution failed to show specific overt acts that would link these accused to Ranada's
possession of the said contrabands. The CA erred in ruling that they were accessories to the crime.

CASE #136. People v. Ng Yik Bun, G.R. No. 180452, Jan. 10, 2011
FACTS:
On August 24, 2000, around 9pm, Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information from an operative that there
was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon instructions from his superior,
Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team in coordination with a PNP detachment, and, along with the operative, the
team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya.
The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six
Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his
team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was shabu
and pointed to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated.
A laboratory report prepared later by Police Inspector Mary Jean Geronimo on samples of the 172 confiscated bags showed the
white substance to be shabu.
On January 10, 2001, an Amended Information for violation of Sec. 16, Article III of RA 6425 was filed against accused-
appellants, who entered a plea of not guilty upon re-arraignment.
RTC convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged. In questioning the RTC Decision before the CA, accused-appellants
alleged that the trial court erred when it held as valid the warrantless search, seizure and subsequent arrest of the accused-
appellants despite the non-concurrence of the requisite circumstances that justify a warrantless arrest. CA affirmed decision of
RTC. Hence this appeal to the SC. Accused-appellants claim that no valid in flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure
and that the police officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no evidence that an offense was being
committed. Since there was no warrant of arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant subsequently made on them
was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose.

ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrantless search.

Held:

YES.
Art. III, SEC. 2 of the Constitution provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.”
A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a
crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states:
“Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;”XX
The foregoing proviso refers to arrest in flagrante delicto. In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants’ contention, there
was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.
Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers
received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative,
proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a
distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white
substance into a white L-300 van.
The arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband,
more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader.
Thus, the arrest of accused-appellants––who were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white
L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425 is valid.
In People v. Alunday, we held that when a police officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances
created thereby, and proceeds at once to the scene, he may effect an arrest without a warrant on the basis of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court, as the offense is deemed committed in his presence or within his view. In the instant case, it can be argued
that accused-appellants were committing the offense of possessing shabu and were in the act of loading them in a white van
when the police officers arrested them. As aptly noted by the appellate court, the crime was committed in the presence of the
police officers with the contraband, inside transparent plastic containers, in plain view and duly observed by the arresting
officers.
The Court also notes that accused-appellants are deemed to have waived their objections to their arrest for not raising the issue
before entering their plea.
Moreover, present in the instant case are all the elements of illegal possession of drugs: (1) the accused is in possession of an
item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely
and consciously possesses the said drug. Accused-appellants were positively identified in court as the individuals caught loading
and possessing illegal drugs. They were found to be in possession of prohibited drugs without proof that they were duly
authorized by law to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is, therefore, a prima facie evidence of animus
possidendi on the part of accused-appellants. There is, thus, no merit to the argument of the defense that a warrant was needed
to arrest accused-appellants.
Accused-appellants were not able to show that there was any truth to their allegation of a frame-up in rebutting the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. They relied on mere denials, in contrast with the testimony of Capt. Ibon, who testified that he and
his team saw accused-appellants loading plastic bags with a white crystalline substance into an L-300 van at the Villa Vicenta
Resort. Accused-appellants, except for Tan, claimed that they were ordered by the police officers to act like they were loading
bags onto the van. Accused-appellant Tan told a different tale and claims he was arrested inside a restaurant. But as the trial
court found, the persons who could have corroborated their version of events were not presented in court. The only witness
presented by Tan, a tricycle driver whose testimony corroborated Tan’s alone, was not found by the trial court to be credible.
As no ill motive can be imputed to the prosecution’s witnesses, we uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties and affirm the trial court’s finding that the police officers’ testimonies are deserving of full faith and credit.
Appellate courts generally will not disturb the trial court’s assessment of a witness’ credibility unless certain material facts and
circumstances have been overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED.

CASE #137. People v. Manlangit, G.R. No. 189806, Jan. 12, 2011

Dangerous Drugs Act; buy-bust operation. A prior surveillance or test buy is not required for a valid buy-bust operation, as long
as the operatives are accompanied by their informant. Settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does
not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has
left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. A prior surveillance, much
less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the
entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. When time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for prior
surveillance. In the instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who was peddling the dangerous
drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance before they undertook the buy-bust operation. People of
the Philippines vs. Francisco Manlangit, G.R. No. 189806, January 12, 2010.

Facts:
1. November 24, 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Court, the accused, not being
lawfully authorized by law, did then and there wilfully and feloniously sell, give away, distribute and deliver aero point four
(0.04) gram of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), which is a dangerous drug.
2. November 24, 2003, in the City of Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Court, the accused, not being
authorized by law to use dangerous drugs, and having been arrested and found positive for use of Methylaphetamine, after a
confirmatory test, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously use a dangerous drug in violation of the said law.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the accused-appellant be convicted despite the prosecution’s failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. (Diri ang discussion sa arrest)

2. Whether or not the findings in the procedure for the custody and control of prohibited drugs was complied with. (This is
for evidence but I just added lang -- exclude when you read.)

Held:
1. Yes. The accused-appellant’s guilt was proved beyond reasonable doubt merely on the basis of punishing the act of selling
dangerous drugs [Sec.5 of RA 9165] and the use of dangerous drugs [Sec.15, RA 9165]. The pieces of evidence found in the
records demonstrate that all the elements of the crimes charged were satisfied. The lower courts gave credence to the
prosecution’s witnesses’ testimonies, which established the guilt of the accused for the crimes beyond reasonable doubt.
Moreover, settled is the rule that the absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust
operation.

Furthermore, accused-appellants contention that the buy-bust team should have procured a search warrant for the validity of the
buy-bust operation is misplaced. The Court had the occasion to address this issue in People v. Doria:[15]

We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless
arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, to wit:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. Appellant Doria was caught in the act of
committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation,
the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.
The Court reiterated such ruling in People v. Agulay:[16]

Accused-appellant contends his arrest was illegal, making the sachets of shabu allegedly recovered from him
inadmissible in evidence. Accused-appellants claim is devoid of merit for it is a well-established rule that an
arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid
warrantless arrest, in line with the provisions of Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a valid and effective
mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the
offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for
constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.

2. No. the accused-appellant contends that the arresting officers did not comply with the requirements for the handling of
seized dangerous drugs as provided for under Sec.21 (1) of RA 9165 which states that custody and disposition of confiscated,
seized, and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals,
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment. Though the accused argued that there was no photograph made of
plastic sheet in the presence of the accused, media, any elected local official, or the DOJ Rep. in clear violation of Section 21, R.A.
No. 9165, the court stated that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void such
seizures and custody over said items. Therefore, the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the
required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated pursuant to said guidelines, is not fatal and does not
automatically render accused-appellant’s arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.

Wherefore, the appeal is denied. CA’s decision is affirmed in toto.

CASE #138. Rontos v. People, G.R. No. 188024, June 5, 2013

Facts: PO2 Masi dispatched PO1 Pacis and PO1 Labaclado of the Station Anti-Illegal Drugs Task Force to conduct surveillance
in Sampaloc St., Camarin, Caloocan City because of reports of illegal drug activity in the said area. Upon coming closer, they saw
that the plastic sachets appeared to contain a white crystalline substance similar to shabu. PO1 Pacis approached petitioner and
confiscated the plastic sachets. Thereafter, he introduced himself as a police officer and informed petitioner of the offense the
latter had committed. The two police officers informed petitioner of his constitutional rights, while he just remained silent. A
Complaint for possession of dangerous drugs, Article II of R.A. 9165, was drawn up and referred to the city prosecutor for the
filing of charges before the court.

The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the concurrence of all the elements of possession of dangerous drugs.
On appeal, The CA ruled that the question over the legality of the arrest was deemed waived by petitioner when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a plea of "Not Guilty" and participating in the trial of the case. In
any case, the CA explained that while the arrest was without a warrant, it was with probable cause since petitioner was arrested
in flagrante delicto. He committed a crime in plain view of the police officers, as he was spotted in the act of holding and
examining plastic sachets containing shabu

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred when it held that the question of legality was deemed waived when petitioner entered a
plea of not guilty?

Held: No.

In his arraignment before the trial court, petitioner never raised any issue and instead "freely and voluntarily pleaded Not Guilty
to the offense charged." Thus, he was estopped from raising the issue of the legality of his arrest before the trial court, more so on
appeal before the CA or this Court. However, on the basis of the non-observance of the rules of procedure for handling illegal
drug items, we resolve to acquit petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt.
In illegal drugs cases, the identity and integrity of the drugs seized must be established with the same unwavering exactitude as
that required to arrive at a finding of guilt. The case against the accused hinges on the ability of the prosecution to prove that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same one that was recovered from the accused upon his arrest.

CASE #139. People v. Bronola, 4 April 2018

Facts:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated 19 May 2014, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 which
affirmed the Decision[2] dated 18 April 2013, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Misamis Oriental (RTC), in Criminal Case
No. 2011-671 finding Renante Comprado y Bronola (accused-appellant) guilty of illegal possession of marijuana.

On 19 July 2011, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 11, Article 2 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
Version of the ProsecutionOn 15 July 2011, at 6:30 in the evening, a confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to Police
Inspector Dominador Orate, Jr. (P/Insp. Orate), then Deputy Station Commander of Police Station 6, Puerto, Cagayan de Oro
City, that an alleged courier of marijuana together with a female companion, was sighted at Cabanglasan, Bukidnon. The alleged
courier had in his possession a backpack containing marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. At
9:30 in the evening, the CI called P/Insp. Orate to inform him that the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with body number
.2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added that the man would be carrying a backpack in
black and violet colors with the marking "Lowe Alpine." Thus, at about 9:45 in the evening, the police officers stationed at Police
Station 6 put up a checkpoint in front of the station
Version of the Defense
Accused-appellant denied ownership of the bag and the marijuana. He maintains that on 15 July 2011, at around 6:30 in the
evening, he and his girlfriend went to the house of a certain Freddie Nacorda in Aglayan, Bukidnon, to collect the latter's debt.
When they were about to leave, Nacorda requested him to carry a bag to Cagayan de Oro City
The RTC Ruling...
the RTC found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of marijuana. It held that accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim
that he was merely requested to bring the bag to Cagayan de Oro City, did not prove his innocence; mere possession of the illegal
substance already consummated the crime and good faith was not even a defense.
premises considered, this Court finds the accused RENANTE COMPRADO y BRONOLA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime defined and penalized under Section 11, [7], Article II of R.A. No. 9165, as charged in the Information, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT, and to pay the Fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
[P500,000.00], without subsidiary penalty in case of nonpayment of fine.
The CA Ruling...
the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant. It opined that accused-appellant submitted to the jurisdiction of the court
because he raised no objection as to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment
It added that while it was admitted by the arresting police officers that no representatives from the media and other personalities
required by law were present during the operation and during the taking of the inventory, noncompliance with Section 21, Article
II of R.A. No. 9165 was not fatal and would not render inadmissible accused-appellant's arrest or the items seized from him
because the prosecution was able to show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. The CA
disposed the case in this wise
Issues:
I. Whether accused-appellant's arrest was valid;
II. Whether the seized items are admissible in evidence; and
III. III. Whether accused-appellant is guilty of the crime charged.
Ruling:
The Bill of Rights requires that a search and seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, any evidence
obtained from such warrantless search is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.[14] This proscription, however, admits
of exceptions, namely: 1) Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2) Search of evidence in plain view; 3) Search of a
moving vehicle; 4) Consented warrantless search; 5) Customs search; 6) Stop and Frisk; and 7) Exigent and emergency
circumstances.[15]
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others'
safety, he is entitled [to] the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer
clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in the stop and frisk committed by the police in People v.
Cogaed (Cogaed). In that case, the police officers received a message from an informant that one Marvin Buya would be
transporting marijuana from Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union, to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union.
The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant told the police that a certain "Aling
Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The
informant pointed at a woman crossing the street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling Rosa," and
they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag contained marijuana leaves.
The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances in this case is not sufficient to incite a genuine reason that would justify a
stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An examination of the records reveals that no overt physical act could be properly
attributed to accused-appellant as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.
As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful arrest must precede the search of a
person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.[30] Thus, it becomes imperative to determine whether accused-
appellant's warrantless arrest was valid.
Without the confiscated marijuana, no evidence is left to convict accused-appellant. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite
accused-appellant's failure to object to the regularity of his arrest before arraignment. The legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of
the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The 19 May 2014 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01156 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Renante Comprado y Bronola is ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
detention unless he is detained for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to
IMPLEMENT this Decision and to report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

CASE #140. People v. Bolasa – 22 Dec. 1999

Facts:
An informer told the police that an illegal transaction of prohibited drugs were being conducted at a certain house in
Sta. Brigida St. Karuhatan Valenzuela Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas
immediately proceed to the said house. Upon reaching the house, they peeped through a small window and saw a man and
woman repacking suspected marijuana. They enter the house and introduce themselves as police officers and confiscated the tea
bag and other drug paraphernalia.Afterwhich, the police officers arrested the two,Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes.
Upon examination by the NBI, the tea bags were confirmed as marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes were charged
with violation of Sec.8 of Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC convicted
them of the crime charged.
 Accused Bolasa asserts that the search and her arrest was illegal. She insists that the trial court should not regard the
testimony of PO3 cCarizon credible because he does not have personal knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest and search
making his testimony a hearsay.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest and seizure were valid
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the arrest was invalid because the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at
the time of their arrest, accused-apellants had just committed, were committing or about to commit a crime. The arresting
officers also have no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor have a reasonable ground to believe that the accused
committed the crime. And accused appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment.

With respect to the seizure of the tea bags,the court held that it is also invalid because the objects were not seized in
plain view. There was no valid intrusion and the evidence was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally
peeped through the window to ascertain the activities of appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be
categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless arrest, a customs search, or a stop and frisk situations.

The court stated that the arresting officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identities and
addressed of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of
probable cause, they should have secured a warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio,
the accompanying search was also illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against the
accused-appellants.
The Court held that the State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their
houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful
arrests and other forms of restraint.

The Court held that the State cannot in a cavalier fashioni ntrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses,
papers and effects. The constitutional provision protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests
and other forms of restraint

The Court enumerated the exceptions as follows:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in plain view.

The elements of the plain view doctrine are:

(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are;
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and,
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.

3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy
especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable causethat the
occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search
5. Customs search
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

Citing the Rules of Criminal Procedure on lawful warrantless arrest, the Court stated that an arrest is lawful even in the absence
of a warrant:
(a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence;
b) when an offense has in fact been committed and he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and,
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another. (A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of
the commission of the offense

CASE #141. Antiquera v. People – 11 December 2013

Facts:
Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in Pasay City when they saw two unidentified men rush out of a house
and boarded a jeep. Believing that there was a crime, the police officers approached the house. When they peeked through the
partially opened door, they saw Antiquera and Cruz engaged in a pot session. The police officers entered the house, introduced
themselves and arrested Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a jewellery box which contained
shabu and unused paraphernalia. The RTC found them guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The
court affirmed the decision of RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was invalid.

Held:
Yes, there was unlawful arrest because the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed,
even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. Clearly, no crime was
plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the
above-mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal

CASE #142. People v. Edano – G.R. No. 181133, 2014

Theme: Inadmissibility of evidence in arrest inflagrante delicto; Chain of custody requirement: Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165

FACTS:
The prosecution charged the appellant Edaño and Godofredo Siochi with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165
under two separate Informations.

The appellant and Siochi pleaded not guilty to the charge on arraignment. Joint trial on the merits followed.

Prosecution Defense

Witnesses: Police Inspector (P/Insp.) Aylin Casignia Witnesses: Siochi and Ruben Forteza
and Police Officer (PO) 3 Elmer Corbe
 On the evening of August 6, 2002, members of the At around 4:00 p.m. on August 6, 2002, he called Siochi on
Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group, together with the phone, and informed him that the motorbike starter the
a female informant, went to the parking area of latter needed was already available. On the same day,
McDonalds, West Avenue to conduct an entrapment Vanessa Paduada called the appellant, and asked for the
operation against a certain alias "Nato." directions to McDonalds, West Avenue. At around 6:00 p.m.,
Siochi and Ruben arrived at the gate of Philam Homes on
board a space wagon. The appellant met them at the
At around 7:00 p.m., the appellant arrived on board a
subdivision gate, and showed the starter to Siochi. Thereafter,
space wagon driven by Siochi. 5 The informant
Vanessa called on the appellant's cellular phone. The
approached the appellant and talked to him inside the
appellant then boarded the vehicle, and told Siochi that he
vehicle. Afterwards, the informant waved at PO3 Corbe.
would just talk to a person at McDonalds. Afterwards,
6 When PO3 Corbe was approaching the appellant, the
Vanessa called him from inside a parked car. The appellant
latter went out of the vehicle and ran away.
approached Vanessa who, for her part, alighted from the car.
Vanessa told the appellant to get inside the car's rear. The
PO3 Corbe recovered a "knot-tied" transparent plastic appellant did as instructed. Immediately after, the male driver
bag from the appellant's right hand, while PO3 Alcancia alighted from the vehicle and entered the car's rear. The
seized a gun tucked in the appellant's waist. The other appellant went out of the car, but the male driver followed
members of the police arrested Siochi. Thereafter, the him and grabbed his hand. The appellant resisted, and
police brought the appellant, Siochi and the seized wrestled with the driver along West Avenue. During this
items to the police station for investigation. commotion, the appellant heard a gunfire; four (4) persons
approached him, and then tied his hands with a masking tape.
The police placed him on board a pick-up truck, and then
P/Insp. Casignia, the Forensic Chemical Officer examined the brought him to Bicutan. In Bicutan, the police brought him to
seized items and found them positive for the presence of the interrogation room, where they punched him and placed a
shabu. plastic on his head.

RTC: found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165,
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment. It also ordered him to pay a P500,000.00 fine. The RTC, however, acquitted
Siochi on the ground of reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA added that strict compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was not
required as long as the integrity of the seized item had been ensured. It further held that the police officers were presumed to have regularly
performed their official duties. Finally, the CA held that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of illegal possession of shabu.

The appellant moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied his motion in its resolution dated December 23, 2008.
Hence, the instant appeal.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid, and if so, whether or not the seized items were admissible?

RULING:
1. No, the shabu purportedly seized from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence for being the
proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree.
Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. This is
known as arrest in flagrante delicto.
"For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer."
In the present case, there was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the appellant to rouse
suspicion in the mind of PO3 Corbe that he (appellant) had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. In
fact, PO3 Corbe testified that the appellant and the informant were just talking with each other when he approached them.
As testified to by PO3 Corbe himself, the appellant and the informant were just talking to each other; there was no exchange of money and
drugs when he approached the car. Notably, while it is true that the informant waved at PO3 Corbe, the latter admitted that this was not the
pre-arranged signal to signify that the sale of drugs had been consummated. PO3 Corbe also admitted on cross-examination that he had no
personal knowledge on whether there was a prohibited drug and gun inside the space wagon when he approached it.
That the appellant attempted to run away when PO3 Corbe approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to
charge the police officer with personal knowledge that the appellant had just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to
engage in criminal activity.

As the Court explained in People v. Villareal:

Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be attributed to one's consciousness of guilt. It is not a
reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances, for even in high crime areas there are many innocent reasons for
flight, including fear of retribution for speaking to officers, unwillingness to appear as witnesses, and fear of being
wrongfully apprehended as a guilty party.
In other words, trying to run away when no crime has been overtly committed, cannot be evidence of guilt. Considering that
the appellant's warrantless arrest was unlawful, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise
illegal. Thus, the alleged plastic bag containing white crystalline substances seized from him is inadmissible
in evidence, having come from an invalid search and seizure.

CASE #143. Commerciante v. People – G.R. No. 205926, 2015

FACTS: In the evening of Julu 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan of the NARCOTICS group and P03 Bienvy Calag II (P03 Calag)
were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend. While cruising, they spotted, at a distance of
about ten meters, two men later identified as Comerciante and Erick Dasilla standing and showing "improper and unpleasant
movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they
immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. After introducing themselves to be police officers, P03 Calag
arrested the both of them and confiscated two plastic sachets containing what was later confirmed to be shabu. In his defense,
Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain “Barok," who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when
suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police
station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for
their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest
proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

ISSUE: Was the search and seizure of the shabu in violation of Commerciante's constitutional right?

RULING: YES, it was in violation of his constitutional right against unlawful searches and seizure. Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated
upon the existence of probable cause. In the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule,
"unreasonable” within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures,
Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution provides an exclusionary rule which instructs that evidence obtained and confiscated
on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words, evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. While the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for three exceptions, the
same cannot be applied in the present case. P03 Calag himself admitted that he was aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of
around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing “improper and unpleasant
movements,” with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. On the basis of the foregoing, he decided to effect an arrest.
It is highly implausible for P03 Calag, even assuming that he had perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy miniscule amounts of shabu inside two very small plastic sachets held by Commerciante. Likewise, there could be no
overt act that could rouse the suspicion in the mind of P03 Calag that Commençante had just committed, was committing, or
was about to commit a crime.
CASE #144. Pestilos v. Generoso – G.R. No. 182601, 2014
Facts:

On February 20, 2005, at around 3: 15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno
Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police District, Station to report the incident. Acting on this report, the Desk Officer
dispatched policemen to go to the scene of the crime and to render assistance. The policemen arrived at the scene of the crime
less than one hour after the alleged altercation and they saw Atty. Generoso badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the
petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to the Police Station for
investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers.
At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty.
Generoso fortunately survived the attack. The petitioners were indicted for attempted murder.
The petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully
arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they
were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest
proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule
112 of the Rules of Court.
RTC denied the motion. The court likewise denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The petitioners challenged the lower court's ruling before the CA on a Rule 65 petition for certiorari. They attributed grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the RTC for the denial of their motion for preliminary investigation.
CA dismissed the petition.

Issue:
Were the petitioners validly arrested without a warrant?

Ruling:
For purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved
is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) Did the arresting
officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? And 3) based on these
facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and
prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners?
From a review of the records, we conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which
they had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against the petitioners.
The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police
officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those
responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more
importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident
with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.
With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour
from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable
to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless
arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest.
These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting
them to make the warrantless arrests.
Personal knowledge of a crime just committed under the terms of the above-cited provision, does not require actual presence at
the scene while a crime was being committed; it is enough that evidence of the recent commission of the crime is patent (as in
this case) and the police officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the
person to be arrested has recently committed the crime.

FACTS:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse the Decision dated September 8,
2011 and Resolution dated December 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01199, which affirmed the
judgment of conviction against petitioner Amado I. Saraum (Saraum) rendered by the Regional Trial Court (ATC), Branch 57, Cebu
City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737.

Saraum was charged with violation of Section 12, Article II (Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

In his arraignment, Saraum, with the assistance of a counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Trial ensued. Meantime,
Saraum was released on bail.

PO3 Jeffrey Larrobis and PO1 Romeo Jumalon testified for the prosecution while the defense presented no witness other than
Saraum.

According to the prosecution, on August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3 Larrobis regarding the illegal drug activities
in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. A buy-bust team was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2
Nathaniel Sta. Ana, PO1 Roy Cabahug, and PO1 Julius Aniñon against a certain "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana was designated as the poseur-
buyer accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as the back-up of PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest of the team as the perimeter
security. PO1 Aniñon coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) regarding the operation. After preparing all
the necessary documents, such as the pre-operation report and submitting the same to the PDEA, the team proceeded to the subject
area.

During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside the house, which was divided with a curtain
as partition, the buy-bust team also saw Saraum and Peter Esperanza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in
preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum's possession a lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin
foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated the items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua wrapper, and made initial markings ("A"
for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police station, PO3 Larrobis marked as "AIS-08-17-2006" the paraphernalia recovered
from Saraum. After the case was filed, the subject items were turned over to the property custodian of the Office of City Prosecutor.

By way of defense, Saraum denied the commission of the alleged offense. He testified that on the date and time in question, he was
passing by Lorega Cemetery on his way to the house of his parents-in-law when he was held by men with firearms. They were
already with "Antik" and "Pata," both of whom were his neighbors. Believing that he had not committed anything illegal, he resisted
the arrest. He learned of the criminal charge only when he was brought to the court.

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision and Saraum was charge guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

On appeal, the CA sustained the judgment of conviction; hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WON the warrantless arrest of Saraum is valid?

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a),
Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the very moment he
is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid
in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has
just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer.

Elements of valid arrest in flagrante delicto: 1. Person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime. 2. Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.

Even if We consider the arrest as invalid, Saraum is deemed to have waived any objection thereto when he did not raise the issue
before entering his plea. "The established rule is that an accused may be estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed
to move for the quashing of the Information against him before his arraignment. Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure
in the court's acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise the objection
is deemed waived." In this case, counsel for Saraum manifested its objection to the admission of the seized drug paraphernalia,
invoking illegal arrest and search, only during the formal offer of evidence by the prosecution.

Settled is the rule that, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted, the findings and conclusion of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect and
will not be disturbed because it has the advantage of hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment and manner of testifying.
The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the CA as in this case. In this case, the
quantum of evidence necessary to prove Saraum's guilt beyond reasonable doubt had been sufficiently met since the prosecution
stood on its own strength and did not rely on the weakness of the defense. The prosecution was able to overcome the constitutional
right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

CASE #146. Sapi v. People – G.R. No. 200370, 2017

FACTS:

Petition for Review on Certiorari... assails the Decision... of the Court of Appeal... which affirmed his conviction for violation of Article
II, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165

Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna... did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2.72 grams of dried
marijuana leaves, a dangerous drug.

On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves... informing him that Veridiano, was on the way to
San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs

Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.

At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna.

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.

PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials.

Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights.

He was then brought to the police station.

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials.

PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory. The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana

For his defense, Veridiano testified

Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano. However, they found nothing on his person. Still, Veridiano was
accosted and brought to the police station where he was informed that "illegal drug was . . . found in his possession

Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested."
He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree.'"

On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that

Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity in his arrest.

the prosecution argued that Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the
warrantless search

On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the guilt of Veridiano.

ISSUE:

First, whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;

Second, whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner; and

Lastly, whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

The Petition is granted.

The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction over the person of
an accused; (b) criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus
rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a motion to quash before an
accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is "estopped from questioning the legality of
his [or her] arrest."

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation during trial cures any
defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused."60

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from questioning the admissibility of
evidence seized. The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to question the court's jurisdiction over his or
her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are
separate and mutually exclusive consequences of an illegal arrest.

Petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful.

search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made. Otherwise stated, a
lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed."78 For there to be a lawful arrest, law enforcers must be
armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant;

When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.

In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court.
He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the
presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip
they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be
arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law
enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would
justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and frisk"
searches.

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards crime prevention, there is a
need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is not required, a "stop
and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of a suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers must have a genuine reason to believe,
based on their experience and the particular circumstances of each case, that criminal activity may be afoot.112 Reliance on one (1)
suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce a reasonable search.
Similar to Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give police
officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in any
check point. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to
infer anything suspicious

Sec. 6. Time of making arrest

Sec. 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of a warrant

CASE #147. People v. Palatin, 311 SCRA 186

Facts: Alfonso Patalin and Alex Mijaque, herein accused were convicted of Robbery with Multiple Rape committed in the evening of
August 11, 1984 against the Aliman family. They were meted the supreme penalty of death. At the time the crimes charged were
committed in 1984, robbery with rape was punishable by death, however, by virtue of the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, the
death penalty was abolished and all death penalties already imposed were reduced to reclusion perpetua. The decision for the present
case was promulgated on June 14, 1995, after the effectivity of RA 7659 which restored the death penalty. Appellants now contend
that the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty as the same was suspended upon ratification of the 1987 Constitution.

Issue: When the death penalty was abolished in 1987 and was retroactively applied to herein accused, did they gain a vested right
thereto so that any future law restoring the death penalty would no longer cover them?

Held: Although at the time of the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution the present case was still its trial stage, it is clear that the
framers intended the provision to have a retroactive effect on pending cases without any penalty of death having been imposed yet.
The retroactive effect may be given during three possible stages of a criminal prosecution: a) when the crime has been committed and
the prosecution began; b) when sentence has been passed but service has not begun; and c) when the sentence is being carried out.
The abolition of the death penalty benefits herein accused by virtue of Art 22 of the RPC which provides that penal laws shall have
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the felony who is not a habitual criminal. Hence, they are subject to a
reduction of penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. A subsequent statute cannot be applied retroactively as to impair a right that
accrued under the old law.

According to Art. 3 of the Civil Code, Laws shall not have retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided. As a General Rule, All
laws shall be made prospectively or “Moving Forward”, however, one of the exemptions when the laws shall be given retroactive
effect is when it is penal in nature that it favors the accused WHO IS NOT A HABITUAL CRIMINAL. Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that All Penals Statute shall be given retroactive effect as it favors the accused who is not a habitual criminal.

In the instant case, Patalin et al are not habitual criminals because that have not been convicted for more than 3 criminal case, hence
they benefited from the retroactive effect. In other words, they were not subjected to the punishment of Death Penalty because they
are not habitual criminal and the law provides that Laws can be given retroactive effect as long as they favor the accused who is not
a habitual criminal.

CASE #148. Cadua v. CA 312 SCRA 703

Facts:

This case stemmed from a charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms.

"The undersigned Assistant City Prosecutor accuses EDWIN CADUA Y QUINTAYO ov (sic) violation of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions), committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of January, 1992, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without any authority in law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have in his possession and under his control and custody one (1) .38 cal. revolver "Smith and Wesson" paltik, brown finished and
wooden handle with four (4) live ammunitions, without first having obtained the proper license therefor from the proper authorities.

Assisted by counsel de oficio, petitioner was arraigned in open court, waived the reading of the Information, and entered a plea of not
guilty.

Trial on the merits ensued, resulting in his conviction.

Petitioner seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. The CA ruled that the
warrantless arrest of petitioner was based on probable cause and that the police officers had personal knowledge of the fact which
led to his arrest. The subsequent search was therefore an incident to the arrest, making the firearm found in his possession admissible
in evidence. Moreover, the CA stated that the positive declaration of prosecution witness Joselito Burdeos, that the .38 "paltik"
revolver was found in petitioner’s possession, already proved one of the essential elements of the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms.

Petitioner now comes before us on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue: THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE "PALTIK" WAS RECOVERED IN AN INCIDENTAL SEARCH
DURING A WARRANTLESS ARREST MADE BY THE POLICE OFFICERS, HENCE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.
Held: Considering the circumstances in this case, we find that there was sufficient reason to justify a warrantless arrest of petitioner
for illegal possession of firearms. Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

The findings of the trial court, accepted by the appellate court, show the pertinence of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5 abovecited.
Through police dispatch to the scene of a crime report and in the presence of complainants, it was ascertained that a robbery had just
been committed, and the arresting officers had personal knowledge that petitioner was directly implicated as a suspect.

As explained by a respected authority on criminal procedure:

“It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts", in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause, which means
an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. . . . Peace officers may pursue and arrest without warrant any person found in
suspicious places or under suspicious circumstances reasonably tending to show that such person has committed, or is about to
commit, any crime or breach of the peace. Probable cause for an arrest without warrant is such a reasonable ground of suspicion
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves as to warrant a reasonable man in believing the accused to be guilty.
Besides reasonable ground of suspicion, action in good faith is another protective bulwark for the officer. Under such conditions, even
if the suspected person is later found to be innocent, the peace officer is not liable. The cases hold that a peace officer might arrest and
detain in prison for examination persons walking in the street at night whom there is reasonable ground to suspect of felony,
although there is no proof of a felony having been committed; but the arrest would be illegal if the person so arrested was innocent
and there were no reasonable grounds of suspicion to mislead the officer. The reason of the rule is apparent. Good people do not
ordinarily lurk about the streets and uninhabited premises at midnight. Citizens must be protected from annoyance and crime.
Prevention of crime is just as commendatory as the capture of criminals. Surely the officer must not be forced to await the
commission of robbery or other felony, The rule is supported by the necessities of life.”

Given the circumstances in this case, we are constrained to affirm the finding below that the warrantless arrest of petitioner is
lawful. We also agree that the incidental search and subsequent seizure of the unlicensed firearm in question is likewise lawful and
valid pursuant to Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

When petitioner was searched contemporaneously with the arrest, the "paltik" was found in his possession, and seized. Such seizure
cannot be considered unlawful nor unreasonable. Moreover, at that moment of search and seizure, there was in the mind of the
arresting officer more than a mere suspicion that petitioner was armed. Petitioner's movements clearly suggested the presence of a
weapon tucked at the side of his waist. The fact that Burdeos made an immediate draw for his service revolver was an instinctive
response to petitioner's actions which, under the circumstances, indicated a high probability of an offensive attack with lethal
weapon.

Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, to the arrest, or question concerning the defect or irregularity
attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.44 The records in this case shows no such objection to the arrest,
nor any question as to the irregularity of his arrest, raised by petitioner.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby SENTENCED to
2 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision correccional medium as minimum, to 5 years, 4 months, and 20 days of prision correctional
maximum as maximum, there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus a fine of P15,000.00 with subsidiary
imprisonment should petitioner fail to pay. however, since petitioner has already served more than seven (7) years, (5) months in
prison, which is now beyond the maximum principal penalty imposed at present for his offense, even if the subsidiary penalty for
unpaid fine is included, he is hereby ordered RELEASED immediately, unless he is being held for any other lawful cause.

CASE #149. Genuino v. de Lima – G.R. No. 193730. 17 April 2018

Facts:

Then DOJ Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III issued DOJ Circular No. 17, prescribing rules and regulations governing the issuance of HDOs.
The said issuance was intended to restrain the indiscriminate issuance of HDOs which impinge on the people's right to travel.

Then Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued the assailed DOJ Circular No. 41, consolidating DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, which
will govern the issuance and implementation of HDOs, WLOs, and ADOs. Section 10 of DOJ Circular No. 41 expressly repealed all rules
and regulations contained in DOJ Circular Nos. 17 and 18, as well as all instructions, issuances or orders or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with its provisions.

In three separate letters dated October 20, 2011, October 21, 2011, and October 24, 2011, GMA requested for the issuance of an ADO,
pursuant to Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 41, so that she may be able to seek medical attention from medical specialists abroad for her
hypoparathyroidism and metabolic bone mineral disorder.

He mentioned six different countries where she intends to undergo consultations and treatment

GMA filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 199034, to annul and set aside DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLOs issued
against her for allegedly being unconstitutional

While the petitioners anchor their right in esse on the right to travel under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the said right
is not absolute. One of the limitations on the right to travel is DOJ Circular No. 41, which was issued pursuant to the rule-making
powers of the DOJ in order to keep individuals under preliminary investigation within the jurisdiction of the Philippine criminal justice
system.

Issue: The petitioners impute the respondents of violating their constitutional right to travel through the enforcement of DOJ Circular
No. 41. They claim that the issuance unnecessarily places a restraint on the right to travel even in the absence of the grounds provided in
the Constitution.

Held: Liberty under the foregoing clause includes the right to choose one's residence, to leave it whenever he pleases and to travel
wherever he wills.

It is apparent, however, that the right to travel is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory and inherent limitations regulating the
right to travel. Section 6 itself provides that the right to travel may be impaired only in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law.

Clearly, under the provision, there are only three considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to travel: national security,
public safety or public health. As a further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of statutory law or the Rules of Court[80]
providing for the impairment.

It is clear from the foregoing that the liberty of abode may only be impaired by a lawful order of the court and, on the one hand, the right
to travel may only be impaired by a law that concerns national security, public safety or public health. Therefore, when the exigencies of
times call for a limitation on the right to travel, the Congress must respond to the need by explicitly providing for the restriction in a
law. This is in deference to the primacy of the right to travel, being a constitutionally-protected right and not simply a statutory right,
that it can only be curtailed by a legislative enactment.

To begin with, there is no law particularly providing for the authority of the secretary of justice to curtail the exercise of the right to
travel, in the interest of national security, public safety or public health. As it is, the only ground of the former DOJ Secretary in
restraining the petitioners, at that time, was the pendency of the preliminary investigation of the Joint DOJ-COMELEC Preliminary
Investigation Committee on the complaint for electoral sabotage against them.

To be clear, DOJ Circular No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of
lawmakers, and submitted to the President for approval. It is a mere administrative issuance apparently designed to carry out the
provisions of an enabling law which the former DOJ Secretary believed to be Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292, otherwise known as the
"Administrative Code of 1987." She opined that DOJ Circular No. 41 was validly issued pursuant to the agency's rule-making powers
provided in Sections 1 and 3, Book IV, Title III, Chapter 1 of E.O. No. 292 and Section 50, Chapter 11, Book IV of the mentioned Code.

It is, however, important to stress that before there can even be a valid administrative issuance, there must first be a showing that the
delegation of legislative power is itself valid. It is valid only if there is a law that (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy
to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.
A painstaking examination of the provisions being relied upon by the former DOJ Secretary will disclose that they do not particularly
vest the DOJ the authority to issue DOJ Circular No. 41 which effectively restricts the right to travel through the issuance of WLOs and
HDOs.

A plain reading of the foregoing provisions shows that they are mere general provisions designed to lay down the purposes of the
enactment and the broad enumeration of the powers and functions of the DOJ. In no way can they be interpreted as a grant of power to
curtail a fundamental right as the language of the provision itself does not lend to that stretched construction.

In the same way, Section 3 does not authorize the DOJ to issue WLOs and HDOs to restrict the constitutional right to travel. There is
even no mention of the exigencies stated in the Constitution that will justify the impairment.

The provision simply grants the DOJ the power to investigate the commission of crimes and prosecute offenders, which are basically the
functions of the agency. However, it does not carry with it the power to indiscriminately devise all means it deems proper in performing
its functions without regard to constitutionally-protected rights.

It does not speak of any authority or power but rather a mere clarification on the nature of the issuances that may be issued by a
secretary or head of agency.

The questioned circular does not come under the inherent power of the executive department to adopt rules and regulations as clearly
the issuance of HDO and WLO is not the DOJ's business.

As such, it is a compulsory requirement that there be an existing law, complete and sufficient in itself, conferring the expressed
authority to the concerned agency to promulgate rules.

Consistent with the foregoing, there must be an enabling law from which DOJ Circular No. 41 must derive its life. Unfortunately, all of
the supposed statutory authorities relied upon by the DOJ did not pass the completeness test and sufficient standard test. The DOJ
miserably failed to establish the existence of the enabling law that will justify the issuance of the questioned circular.

Department of Justice Circular No. 41 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Sec. 8. Method of arrest by officer without warrant

CASE #150. Dela Cruz v. People – G.R. No. 209387, 2016

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants, are not unreasonable searches per
se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the
safety of the traveling public.

Dela Cruz, an OJT of an interim-vessel, was at a pier of the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly
left his bag on the floor with a porter. When his bag was placed in the x-ray machine, the operator saw firearms inside his bag. Upon
seeing the suspected firearms, the operator called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the baggage inspector then.
Dela Cruz claimed ownership for the bag and consented to manual inspection. Dela Cruz was charged with violation of RA. 8294 for
illegal possession of firearms. The trial court held that the search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable and, thus, valid. The
Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of BP
Blg. 881.

Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search

ISSUE:
Whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and whether the search was valid

HELD:

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Hence, items seized pursuant to a
reasonable search conducted by private persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule.

However, Court held this doctrine is not applicable in this case since port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related
functions and deemed agents of government. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port security measures are not unreasonable per se.
The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not
violative of his constitutional rights.

The search rendered was not unreasonable when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the police.
The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and vehicles within the port. At this
point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.

It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person's right to travel if weighed against the safety of all
passengers and the security in the port facility.

In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, events must be weighed in its entirety. When his
bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms were detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port
authorities. It was after the port personnel's inspection that Officer Abregana's attention was called and the bag was inspected anew
with petitioner's consent. Also, there was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the search of his personal
effects.

With the foregoing reasons, the search conducted on petitioner's bag is valid.

Sec. 9. Method of arrest by private person

Sec. 10. Officer may summon assistance

Sec. 11. Right of Officer to break into building or enclosure

Sec. 12. Right to break out from building or enclosure

Sec. 13. Arrest after escape or rescue

Sec. 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested

RULE 126 – SEARCH AND SEIZURE

 Sec. 1. Search warrant defined

CASE #151. Nolasco v. Paño, 139 SCRA 154

FACTS: (At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th) Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the
intersection of Mayon Street, Quezon City. The record does not disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously been issued against
NOLASCO.

(At 12:00 N. on August 6th) On the same day, a searched was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno On August 6th, at around 9:00
A.M)applied for search warrant from the respondent judge Cruz-Pano, to be served at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City,
determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE, after almost a month of "round the clock surveillance" of the premises as
a "suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA." after a month of “round the clock” surveillance of the premises as a “suspected
underground house of the CPP/NPA”,

AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
particularly connected with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes.

The City Fiscal filed the information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents.

Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with
particularity the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable cause had not been properly established for lack of
searching questions propounded to the applicant’s witness.

ISSUE: WON the search warrant is a general warrant.

HELD: YES. It is at once evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described
and not particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding the Communist Party of
the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what the
manuals not otherwise available to the public contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion.
There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law
discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus
in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the constitutional mandate requiring the particular description of the things to be
seized.

Moreover, the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to
establish probable cause. The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant comprehends such facts and
circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in pursuant thereof.

The examination conducted was general in nature and merely repetitious of the deposition of the said witness. Mere generalization
will not suffice and does not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.

CASE #152. Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

FACTS:

The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum” newspapers were searched and its office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as
numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos,
Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized based on the strength of the two [2] search warrants issued by
respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.
Petitioners averred that the search warrant should be declared illegal because:

1. The judge failed to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the
above-quoted constitutional provision as wen as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

2. There are two (2) search warrants issued but pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping
and concealing the articles listed.

3. That the articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were
seized although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. Alone.

4. That real property was seized under the disputed warrants like machinery, receptacles, instruments, etc.

5. The search warrant was based only on the affidavits of Col. Abadilla’s that they conducted surveillance of the premises could not
have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause.

Respondents insinuates that petitioners are estopped by laches that they only impugned the search warrant six months later.

ISSUE: Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

HELD: The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a typographical error and
immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent
to search two distinct premises was evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo,
ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or
plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted
as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable
property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant.

However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the requirement of probable cause, the
statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description
and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the
said items.
CASE #153. Corro v. Lising, 137 SCRA 541

FACTS:

On September 29, 1983, respondent Regional Trial Court Judge Esteban Lising of Quezon City, upon application filed by Lt. Col.
Berlin Castillo of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued Search Warrant No. Q-00002 authorizing the...
search and seizure of

1. Printed copies of Philippine Times;

2. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publica: Printed copies of Philippine Times;

3. Manuscripts/drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine Times;

4. Newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times;

5. Subversive documents, articles, printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners; Typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing
and tape recording machines, video machines and tapes... crime of inciting to sedition... have been used and are being used as
instrument and means of committing the crime of inciting to sedition defined and penalized under Article 142 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by PD 1835

On January 28, 1985, respondent Judge Lising denied the motion in a resolution, pertinent portions of which state:

"x x x The said articles presently form part of the evidence of the prosecution and they are not under the control of the prosecuting
arm of the government. Under these circumstances, the proper forum from which the petition to withdraw the articles should be...
addressed, is the Office of the City Fiscal, Quezon City and not with this Branch of the Court. It is to be further noted that it is not even
with this Branch of the Court that the offense of inciting to sedition is pending." (p. 29 Rollo)

Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by respondent Judge Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void ab initio... respondents claim
that petitioner is guilty of laches.

ISSUE: WON there was sufficient probable cause for the issuance of search warrant.

HELD: The statements made in the affidavits are mere conclusions of law and do not satisfy the requirement of probable cause. The
language used is all embracing as to include all conceivable words and equipment of petitioner regardless of whether they are legal
or illegal. The search warrant under consideration was in the nature of a general warrant which is objectionable.

Considering the above circumstances, the claim that petitioner had abandoned his right to the possession of the seized properties is
incorrect.

Search Warrant No. Q-00002 issued by the respondent judge on September 29, 1983 is declared null and void and, accordingly, SET
ASIDE.

the return of the seized articles is GRANTED... all properties seized thereunder are hereby ordered RELEASED to petitioner... ordered
to RE-OPEN... the padlocked office premises of the Philippine Times

CASE #154. Columbia Pictures v. Flores, 223 SCRA 761

FACTS:

As a consequence of a complaint filed by the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., NBI agents conducted surveillance
operations on certain video establishments, among them respondent FGT Video Network, Inc. (FGT), for “unauthorized sale, rental,
reproduction and/or disposition of copyrighted film," a violation of PD 49 (the old Intellectual Property Law). After an NBI agent
was able to have copyrighted motion pictures “Cleopatra” (owned by 20th Century Fox) and “The Ten Commandments” (owned by
Paramount) reproduced in video format in FGT, the NBI applied for and was able to obtain from the respondent judge the subject
Search Warrant No. 45.

In the course of the implementation of the search warrant in the premises of FGT, the NBI agents found and seized various video
tapes of copyrighted films owned and exclusively distributed by petitioners. Also seized were machines and equipment, television sets,
paraphernalia, materials, accessories, rewinders, tape head cleaners, statements of order, return slips, video prints, flyers,
production orders, and posters.

FGT moved for the release of the seized television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipment and other machines or paraphernalia seized by virtue of the subject warrant. It argued that as a licensed video
reproducer, it had the right possess the seized reproduction equipment, which are not illegal per se, but are rather exclusively used
and intended to be used for reproduction and not in the “sale, lease, distribution or possession for purposes of sale, lease distribution,
circulation or public exhibition of pirated video tapes.”

Finding that FGT was a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and under special instructions and
conditions reproducer of videograms and that, therefore, its right to possess and use the seized equipment had been placed in serious
doubt, the lower court ordered the return of the “television sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders, tape head cleaners, accessories,
equipment and other machines or paraphernalia” to FGT.

ISSUE: Did the respondent judge act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate
return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant?

WON there are requirements to the issuance of a valid search warrant.

HELD:

NO, the respondent judge DID NOT act with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering the immediate
return of some of the items seized by virtue of the search warrant. Search Warrant No. 45 fails to satisfy the test of legality. This is
more so because the Court has previously decided a case dealing with virtually the same kind of search warrant. In 20th Century Fox
vs. CA, the Court upheld the legality of the order of the lower court lifting the search warrant issued under circumstances similar to
those obtaining in the case at bar. A striking similarity between this case and 20th Century Fox is the fact that Search Warrant No.
45, specifically paragraph (c) thereof describing the articles to be seized, contains an almost identical description as the warrant
issued in the 20th Century Fox case.

The language used in paragraph (c) of Search Warrant No. 45 is thus too all-embracing as to include all the paraphernalia of FGT in
the operation of its business. As the search warrant is in the nature of a general one, it is constitutionally objectionable.

The Court concluded that the respondent judge did not gravely abuse his discretion in ordering the immediate release of the
enumerated items, but that he was merely correcting his own erroneous conclusions in issuing Search Warrant No. 45. This can be
gleaned from his statement that “. . . the machines and equipment could have been used or intended to be used in the illegal
reproduction of tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films, yet, it cannot be said with moral certainty that the machines or
equipment(s) were used in violating the law by the mere fact that pirated video tapes of the copyrighted motion pictures/films were
reproduced. As already stated, FGT Video Network, Inc. is a registered and duly licensed distributor and in certain instances and
under special instructions . . . reproducer of videograms, and as such, it has the right to keep in its possession, maintain and operate
reproduction equipment(s) and paraphernalia(s).”
YES. In issuing a search warrant, the just must strictly comply with the constitutional and statutory requirements. He must
determine the existence of probable cause by personally examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of search questions.
The search warrant must contain a specific description of the place to be searched and the articles sought to be seized and must be
described with particularity.

CASE #155. Kho v. Makalintal, 306 SCRA 70

FACTS:

· May 15, 1990 – NBI Agent Salvador applied for a search warrant against Benjamin Kho in his residence at BF Homes,
Paranaque. On the same day NBI Agent Arugay also applied to the same court for a warrant against the Kho for in his house at
Brgy. Moonwalk, Paranaque.

· The warrants were applied for after NBI trams had conducted personal surveillance and investigation in the two houses
based on the confidential information they received that the places were being used as storage centers for unlicensed firearms and
“chop-chop” vehicles.

· NBI sought the issuance of the warrants in anticipation of criminal cases to be filed against Kho.

· On the same day, the Judge Makalintal conducted the necessary examination of the applicants and their witnesses, after
which he issued the warrant.

· May 16, 1990 – Armed with the search warrant, the NBI agents searched the subject premises and recovered various high-
powered firearms and hundreds of rounds of ammunition, explosives, and various radio and telecommunication equipment. (In both
houses)

· The items were confiscated. Upon verification with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, the NBI agents found out that no
license has ever been issued to any person/entity for the confiscated items.

· May 22, 1990 – NBI submitted separate returns to Judge Makalintal requesting that the items seized be in the continued
custody of the NBI.

· May 28, 1990 – Petitioners presented a Motion to Quash the said warrants; Judge Makalintal dismissed their petition.

ISSUES:

WON the subject search warrants were issued without probable cause.

WON the subject search warrants are prohibited under the Constitution for being ‘general warrants’.

WON the said warrants were issued in violation of the procedural requirements set forth in the Constitution and the Rules of Court.

HELD:

NO. Petitioners argue that the surveillance and investigation conducted by the NBI within the premises were not sufficient to vest in
the applicant’s personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances showing or indicating the commission of the crime.

· But the records show that the NBI agents who conducted the surveillance and investigation testified unequivocally that they saw
guns being carried to and unloaded in the two houses.

· Applicant Salvador and Agent Vargas testified that they personally attended the surveillance together with their witnesses
and saw the firearms being unloaded from motor vehicles and brought into the houses.

· It is therefore decisively clear that the application for the questioned search warrants was based on the personal knowledge
of the applicants and their witnesses.
· Furthermore, Judge Makalintal, examined the applicants and their witnesses to assess their testimonies and to find out their
personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances enough to create a probable cause.

· Judge Makalintal was the one who personally examined the applicants and witnesses who asked searching questions vis-à-
vis the applications for search warrants.

· The Judge was able to observe and determine whether the subject applicants and their witnesses gave accurate accounts of
the surveillance and investigation.

· NO. Petitioners claim that subject search warrants are general warrants proscribed by the Constitution; that the things to
be seized were not described and detailed out.

· But the records on hand indicate that the search warrants under scrutiny specifically describe the items to be seized.

· The use of the phrase “and the like” is of no moment and does not make the search warrants in general warrants.

· The said warrants comply with the Constitutional and statutory requirements. The law does not require that the things to be
seized must be described in precise and minute detail as to leave no room for doubt on the part of the searching authorities,
otherwise, it would be virtually impossible for the applicants to obtain a warrant as they would not know exactly what kind of things
are looking for.

· In this case, the NBI agents could not have been in the position to know beforehand the exact caliber or make of the firearms
to be seized.

· Verily, the failure to specify detailed descriptions in the warrants did not render the same general.

NO. Nothing improper is perceived in the manner the respondent Judge conducted the examination of the applicants and their
witnesses.

· The Judge personally examined them under oath and asked them searching questions on the facts and circumstances
personally known to them, in compliance with prescribed procedure and legal requirements.

· The sworn statements and affidavits submitted by the witnesses were duly attached to the pertinent records of the
proceedings.

· It was within the discretion of the examining judge to determine what questions to ask the witnesses so long as the
examinations asked are germane to the pivot of inquiry – the existence or absence of a probable cause.

DOCTRINE:

· “General warrants” – “a description of the property to be seized need not be technically accurate nor necessarily precise;
and its nature will necessarily vary according to whether the identity of the property, or its character, is the matter of concern.
Further, the description is required to be specific only so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.” (Justice Ricardo Francisco)

· People v. Rubio – “But where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, for this could mean that no warrant could issue.”
CASE #156. Te v. Breva - 5 August 2015

FACTS:

It appears that respondent Presiding Judge issued a search warrant against the petitioner upon the application of respondent Special
Investigator U R. Bahinting of the Saranggani District Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI SARDO) on the basis of his
finding of probable cause for a violation of Section 2(b) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1865, for
hoarding large quantities of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) in steel cylinders belonging to respondent Pryce Gases, Inc. (Pryce Gases).
The application for the search warrant was filed at the instance of Pryce Gases through its letter dated September 28, 2003 to the NBI
SARDO complaining about the collection and hoarding by the petitioner of embossed or name-plated Pryce Gases' LPG cylinders in
violation of Sections 155, 156, 168 and 169 of Republic Act No. 8293 (Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines.

On October 14, 2003, the petitioner presented his Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or Suppress Evidence and to Order Return
of Seized Items, raising therein the lack of probable cause, failure to specify the single offense committed, illegality of the nighttime
search, improper application of the plain view doctrine, and inclusion of other offenses.

In his order of November 20, 2003,1 respondent Presiding Judge denied the petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Quash Warrant and/or
Suppress Evidence and to Order Return of Seized Items by observing that he had issued the search warrant for one specific offense; that
there was probable cause to issue the search warrant; that the search began late in the day and continued into the night, but the actual
seizure was carried out in the daytime of the next day; and that the seizure of the blue cylinders with the markings and logo of Pryce
Gases was justified under the plain view doctrine because they were found among the large stockpile of cylinders in the petitioner's
warehouse.

The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on January 5, 2004.

The petitioner assailed the order of November 20, 2003 on certiorari, mainly positing that respondent Presiding Judge had committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. However, the CA promulgated the first assailed order on March 25, 2004,
dismissing the petition for certiorari for failure to implead the People of the Philippines as respondents, and for lack of any showing that
a copy of the petition had been served on the OSG.

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that impleading the People of the Philippines as respondents was premature because
no criminal case had yet been filed against him with only the application for the issuance of the search warrant having been made; and
that serving the copy of the petition on the OSG pursuant to Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court was not indispensable.

On July 21, 2004, the CA denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that although the petitioner had served on
the OSG copies of the petition and the motion for reconsideration he did not file the appropriate motion or manifestation to amend the
petition and to actually amend the petition in order to implead the People of the Philippines as respondents. According to the CA, it was
left with no choice but to deny the motion for reconsideration.

ISSUES:

In this appeal, the petitioner relevantly avers in his petition for review on certiorari, as follows:

1. Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in dismissing
the petition by ruling that the failure to implead the People of the Philippines as an indispensable party is a fatal defect. The
petition has shown a grave violation of a constitutional right that must necessarily override a rule on technicality, assuming it is
applicable and correct

2. Specifically, it is submitted that it is not a necessary requisite and an indispensable condition that the People of the Philippine
(sic) be impleaded in a petition filed assailing the denial of a motion to quash a search warrant. And that such failure to so include it
as an indispensable party is not a fatal defect more so with the fact that there was a showing of a gross violation of a constitutional
right.
HELD:

The petition lacks merit.

The petitioner argues that his petition for certiorari did not need to implead the People of the Philippines because there was yet no
criminal case commenced in court.

The argument of the petitioner is untenable.

Impleading the People of the Philippines in the petition for certiorari did not depend on whether or not an actual criminal action had
already been commenced in court against the petitioner. It cannot be denied that the search warrant in question had been issued in the
name of the People of the Philippines, and that fact rendered the People of the Philippines indispensable parties in the special civil
action for certiorari brought to nullify the questioned orders of respondent Presiding Judge.

Accordingly, the omission of the People of the Philippines from the petition was fatal.

The requirement that the search warrant be issued in the name of the People of the Philippines is imposed by Section 1, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, to wit: Section 1. Search warrant defined. -- A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People
of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described
therein and bring it before the court.

We may agree with the petitioner that the application for the search warrant was not a criminal action; and that the application for the
search warrant was not of the same form as that of a criminal action. Verily, the search warrant is not similar to a criminal action but is
rather a legal process that may be likened to a writ of discovery employed by no less than the State to procure relevant evidence of a
crime. In that respect, it is an instrument or tool, issued under the State's police power, and this is the reason why it must issue in the
name of the People of the Philippines.

Equally clear is that the sworn application for the search warrant and the search warrant itself were upon the behest of the People of the
Philippines. It defies logic and common sense for the petitioner to contend, therefore, that the application against him was not made by
the People of the Philippines but by the interested party or parties. The immutable truth is that every search warrant is applied for and
issued by and under the authority of the State, regardless of who initiates its application or causes its issuance.

The petitioner could have quickly rectified his omission by the immediate amendment of the petition. However, although made aware of
the omission as a fatal defect, he did not cause the amendment but continued to ignore the need to amend. He thereby exhibited his
adamant refusal to recognize the People of the Philippines as indispensable parties, which impelled the CA to aptly remark in its denial
of his motion for reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed

CASE #157. Pilipinas Shell v. Romars International - 16 Feb. 2015

Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and Petron Corporation vs. Romars International Gases Corporation

G.R. No. 189669, February 16, 2015

FACTS:
Respondent Romars International Gases Corporation, not an authorized distributor or reseller of Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation
and Petron Corporation products was found to distribute and/or sell LPG products using the same containers of Petron and Shell. These
containers were refilled at respondent’s premises located in San Juan, Baao, Camarines Sur. The petitioners requested the NBI to
investigate said activities of respondent. The NBI investigation report confirmed that respondent was engaged is said activities and
distributing the gas cylinders in different places, one of them a store called “Edrich Enterprises” located at 272 National Highway, San
Nicolas, Iriga City.
The NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTC-Naga), two separate Applications for
Search Warrant for Violation of Section 155.1, in relation to Section 170 of R.A. No. 8293 against respondent and/or its occupants. The
RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting said Applications and two Search Warrants which were served by the NBI on the same day at
the respondent’s premises and articles or items described in the warrants were seized.

Respondent filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrants on the ground that: (a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of
four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned
by respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. RTC-Naga denied the
Motion to Quash.

On its Motion for Reconsideration, it raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at
the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. It pointed
out that the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which
does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime, as required by Section 2 (b), Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that it was already too late for respondent to
raise the issue regarding the venue of the filing of the application for search warrant, as this would be in violation of the Omnibus
Motion Rule.

RTC-Naga issued an Order granting respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, thereby quashing the search warrants. The CA denied the
appeal and the MR

Hence, petitioners filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not venue in an application for Search Warrant is jurisdictional.
2. Whether or not the newly raised issue of the defect in the application is an issue of jurisdiction which may be raised at any time.

HELD:
NBI failed to comply with Section 2(b), Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
The petitioner’s application for a search warrant was insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to
state therein the compelling reasons why they had to file the application in a court that did not have territorial
jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed. Paragraph (b) of Section 2, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure mandates that, the application for search warrant should state the
compelling reasons why the search warrants were being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City,
considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was
committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced.
The omnibus motion rule is applicable to motions to quash search warrants
The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all
available objections be included in a party’s motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed waived; and,
the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are:
(a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and
(c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
In accordance with the omnibus motion rule, therefore, the trial court could only take cognizance of an issue
that was not raised in the motion to quash if, (1) said issue was not available or existent when they filed the
motion to quash the search warrant; or (2) the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Obviously, the issue of the defect in the application was available and existent at the time of filing of the motion
to quash.
A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge
and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court.
A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar
remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.

Application for search warrants is not criminal in nature, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does
not apply thereto.
In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants, such
warrant is definitively considered merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its
ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court pursuant to its original jurisdiction.
Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action.
The grant of the Motion to Quash was not proper
It was improper for the RTC-Naga to have taken into consideration an issue which respondent failed to raise in
its motion to quash, as it did not involve a question of jurisdiction over the subject matter. It is clear that the
RTC-Naga had jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search warrant.

CASE #158. People v. Castillo - GR No. 204419, 2016

Facts:

Judge Cabalbag of the MTC of Gattaran, Cagayan issued a search warrant against the premises of Rabino for violation of RA 9165. A
search was conducted wherein the PDEA and PNP found 1 sachet of shabu inside the house of Rabino in Aparri, Cagayan. Rabino was
charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. The case was raffled to RTC, Branch 6, Aparri, Cagayan, presided by Judge Castillo.

Before arraignment, Rabino filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and for Suppression of Illegally Acquired Evidence, citing lack of
probable cause among other grounds. Judge Castillo granted the motion to quash, holding that because the minimum penalty for illegal
possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day to 20 years, which penalty is way
beyond imprisonment of 6 years, MTC Gattaran did not have jurisdiction to entertain the application for and to issue the search
warrant. As such, the search warrant is null and void and all proceedings had in virtue thereof are likewise null and void.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied.

Issue:

May a municipal trial court issue a search warrant involving an offense in which it has no jurisdiction?

Held:

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined
personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oatn or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or
she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically
describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized. Necessarily, a motion to quash a search warrant may be based on grounds
extrinsic of the search warrant, such as (1) the place searched or the property seized are not those specified or described in the search
warrant; and (2) there is no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.

The respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in quashing the search warrant on a basis other than the accepted grounds. It must
be remembered that a search warrant is valid for as long as it has all the requisites set forth by the Constitution and must only be
quashed when any of its elements are found to be wanting.

This Court has provided rules to be followed in the application for a search warrant. Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides
Sec. 2. Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. - An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed.

(b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of
the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.

However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only be made in the court where the criminal action is
pending.

Apparently, in this case, the application for a search warrant was filed within the same judicial region where the crime was allegedly
committed. For compelling reasons, the Municipal Trial Court of Gattaran, Cagayan has the authority to issue a search warrant to
search and seize the dangerous drugs stated in the application thereof in Aparri, Cagayan, a place that is within the same judicial region.
The fact that the search warrant was issued means that the MTC judge found probable cause to grant the said application after the latter
was found by the same judge to have been filed for compelling reasons. Therefore, Sec. 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was duly
complied with.

It must be noted that nothing in the above-quoted rule does it say that the court issuing a search warrant must also have jurisdiction
over the offense. A search warrant may be issued by any court pursuant to Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and the resultant
case may be filed in another court that has jurisdiction over the offense committed. What controls here is that a search warrant is
merely a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a
court pursuant to its original jurisdiction. Thus, in certain cases when no criminal action has yet been filed, any court may issue a search
warrant even though it has no jurisdiction over the offense allegedly committed, provided that all the requirements for the issuance of
such warrant are present.

Sec. 3. Personal property to be seized

CASE #159. Yee Sue Koy v. Alemeda, 70 Phil 141

FACTS: In response to a sworn application of Mariano G. Almeda, chief agent of the Anti-Usury Board, dated
May 5, 1938, the justice of the peace of Sagay, Occidental Negros, after taking the testimony of applicant's
witness, Jose Estrada, special agent of the Anti-Usury Board, issued on the same date a search warrant
commanding any peace officer to search during day time the store and premises occupied by Sam Sing & Co.,
situated at Sagay, Occidental Negros, as well as the person of said Sam Sing & Co., and to seize the
documents, notebooks, lists, receipts and promissory notes being used by said Sam Sing & Co. in connection
with their activities of lending money at usurious rates of interest in violation of law, or such as may be found,
and to bring them forthwith before the aforesaid justice of the peace of Sagay. On the same date, May 5, 1938,
at 10:30 a. m., search was accordingly made by Mariano G. Almeda, Jose Estrada, two internal revenue
agents and two members of the Philippine Army, who seized certain receipt books, vales or promissory notes,
chits, notebooks, journal book, and collection list belonging to Sam Sing & Co. and enumerated in the
inventory receipt issued by Mariano G. Almeda to the owner of the documents, papers and articles seized.
Immediately after the search and seizure thus effected, Mariano G. Almeda filed a return with the justice of the
peace of Sagay together with a request that the office of the AntiUsury Board be allowed to retain possession
of the articles seized for examination, pursuant to section 4 of Act 4109, which request was granted. The first
unsuccessful effort exerted by Sam Sing & Co. with a view to recovering the articles seized, was when their
attorney, Godofredo P. Escalona, under date of March 4, 1939, addressed a letter to the Executive Officer of
the Anti-Usury Board requesting the return of said articles, on the ground that the search warrant and seizure
of May 5, 1938 were illegal, only to receive the reply that the request "cannot be complied with until after they
have served the purpose for which they were seized" and that "the return of the papers must be with the
consent and knowledge of the court which issued the search warrant." Thereafter, under date of March 11,
1939, the same attorney filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros praying that the
search warrant issued on May 5, 1938 by the justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure effected
thereunder be declared illegal and set aside and that the articles in question be ordered returned to Sam Sing
& Co., which motion was denied in the order dated July 24, 1939. A similar motion was presented to the justice
of the peace of Sagay on October 27, 1939 but was denied the next day, October 28, 1939. Meanwhile, an
information dated September 30, 1939 had been filed in the Court of Frst Instance of Occidental Negros,
charging Yee Fock alias Yee Sue Koy, Y. Tip and A. Sing, managers of Sam Sing & Co., with a violation of Act
No. 2655, the case being docketed as No. 11591. Before this criminal case could be tried, the present petition
was filed in this court on November 6, 1939, in which the petitioners pray that the search warrant of May 2,
1938 and the seizure of May 5, 1938 of the articles described in annex "D" of the petition be declared illegal
and set aside; that the respondents Mariano G. Almeda and Jose S. Estrada, as agents of the Anti-Usury
Board, be ordered and directed to return to the petitioners the articles listed in said annex "D" of the petition;
that pending these proceedings the provincial fiscal of Occidental Negros be commanded to refrain from using
said articles as evidence in criminal case No. 11591 which was set for trial on November 13, 1939; that the
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros, in case all or some of the articles in
question should be introduced as evidence for the prosecution in said criminal case No. 11591, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Yee Fock (alias Yee Sue Koy), Y. Tip and A. Sins," be likewise commanded to
refrain from admitting the same.

ISSUE: The petition is grounded on the propositions (1) that the search warrant issued on May 2, 1938, by the
justice of the peace of Sagay and the seizure accomplished thereunder are illegal, because the warrant was
issued three days ahead of the application therefor and of the affidavit of the respondent Jose Estrada which is
insufficient in itself to justify the issuance of a search warrant, and because the issuance of said warrant
manifestly contravenes the mandatory provisions both of section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the
Constitution and of section 97 of General Orders No. 58, and (2) that the seizure of the aforesaid articles by
means of a search warrant for the purpose of using them as evidence in the criminal case against the
petitioners, is unconstitutional because the warrant thereby becomes unreasonable and amounts to a violation
of the constitutional prohibition against compelling the accused to testify against themselves.

HELD: he criticism of the petitioners that the search warrant n question was not issued in accordnce with the
formalities described by section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and of section 97 of General
Orders No. 58, is mfounded. On the contrary, we are satisfied that strict >bservance of such formalities was
followed. The applicant Mariano G. Almeda, in his application, swore that "he made iis own personal
investigation and ascertained that Sam Sing & Co. is lending money without license, charging isurious rate of
interest and is keeping, utilizing and conealing in the store and premises occupied by it situated at 5agay,
Occidental Negros, documents, notebooks, lists, reeipts, promissory notes, and book of accounts and records,
ill of which are being used by it in connection with its activities of lending money at usurious rate of interest in
iolation of the Usury Law." In turn, the witness Jose Estrada, in his testimony before the justice of the peace of
Sagay, swore that he knew that Sam Sing & Co. was lending money without license and charging usurious
rate of interest, because he personally investigated the victims who had secured loans from said Sam Sing &
Co. and were charged usurious rate of interest; that he knew that the said Sam Sing & Co. was keeping and
using books of accounts and records containing its transactions relative to its activities as money lender and
the entries of the interest paid by its debtors, because he saw the said Sam Sing & Co. make entries and
records of their debts and the interest paid thereon. As both Mariano G. Almeda and Jose Estrada swore that
they had personal knowledge, their affidavits were sufficient for, thereunder, they could be held liable for
perjury if the facts would turn out to be not as they were stated under oath. (Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance
of Tayabas, et al., 35 Off. Gaz., 1183; People vs. Sy Juco, 37 Off. Gaz., 508; Rodriguez vs. Villamiel, 37 Off.
Gaz., 2416.) That the existence of probable cause has been determined by the justice of the peace of Sagay
before issuing the search warrant complained of, is shown by the following statement in the warrant itself, to
wit: "After examination under oath of the complainant, Mariano G. Almeda, Chief Agent of the Anti-Usury
Board, Department of Justice and Special Agent of the Philippine Army, Manila, and the witness he presented,
* * * and this Court, finding that there is just and probable cause to believe as it does believe, that the above
described articles, relating to the activities of said Sam Sing & Co. of lending money at usurious rate of
interest, are being utilized and kept and concealed at its store and premises occupied by said Sam Sing & Co.,
all in violation of law." The description of the articles seized, as given in the search warrant, is likewise
sufficient. Where, by the nature of the goods seized, their description must be rather general, it is not required
that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. (Alvarez vs. Court of First
Instance of Tayabas et al., 35 Off. Gaz., 1183, citing People vs. Rubio, 57 Phil., 384; and People vs. Kahn,
256, 111. App., 415.) Neither can there be objection to the fac1 the objects seized from the petitioners were
retained by the agents of the Anti-Usury Board, instead of being turned over to the justice of the peace of
Sagay, for the reason that the custody of said agents is the custody of the issuing officer or court, the retention
having been approved by the latter. (Molo vs. Yatco et al., 35 Off. Gaz., 1335.)

CASE #160. Laud v. People - 19 November 2014

Facts: On July 10, 2009, the Philippine National Police (PNP), through Police Senior Superintendent Roberto
B. Fajardo, applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 50 (Manila-RTC) for a warrant to
search three (3) caves located inside the Laud Compound in Purok 3, Barangay Ma-a, Davao City, where the
alleged remains of the victims summarily executed by the so-called "Davao Death Squad" may be found. In
support of the application, a certain Ernesto Avasola (Avasola) was presented to the RTC and there testified
that he personally witnessed the killing of six (6) persons in December 2005, and was, in fact, part of the group
that buried the victims.

Judge William Simon P. Peralta (Judge Peralta), acting as Vice Executive Judge of the Manila-RTC, found
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant, and thus, issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which
was later enforced by the elements of the PNP-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group, in coordination
with the members of the Scene of the Crime Operatives on July 15, 2009. The search of the Laud Compound
caves yielded positive results for the presence of human remains.

On July 20, 2009, herein petitioner, retired SPO4 Bienvenido Laud (Laud), filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
and to Suppress Illegally Seized Evidence premised on the following grounds: (a) Judge Peralta had no
authority to act on the application for a search warrant since he had been automatically divested of his position
as Vice Executive Judge when several administrative penalties were imposed against him by the Court; (b) the
Manila-RTC had no jurisdiction to issue Search Warrant No. 09-14407 which was to be enforced in Davao City;
(c) the human remains sought to be seized are not a proper subject of a search warrant; (d) the police officers
are mandated to follow the prescribed procedure for exhumation of human remains; (e) the search warrant was
issued despite lack of probable cause; (f) the rule against forum shopping was violated; and (g) there was a
violation of the rule requiring one specific offense and the proper specification of the place to be searched and
the articles to be seized
In an Order dated July 23, 2009, the Manila-RTC granted the motion of Laud "after a careful consideration [of]
the grounds alleged [therein]." Aside from this general statement, the said Order contained no discussion on
the particular reasons from which the Manila-RTC derived its conclusion.

Unconvinced, the People filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 113017.

In a Decision dated April 25, 2011, the CA granted the People's petition and thereby annulled and set aside the
Orders of the Manila-RTC for having been tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

The CA debunked the claim of forum shopping, finding that the prior application for a search warrant filed
before the Davao-RTC was based on facts and circumstances different from those in the application filed
before the Manila-RTC.

Issues: The issues for the Court's resolution are as follows: (a) whether the administrative penalties imposed
on Judge Peralta invalidated Search Warrant No. 09-14407; (b) whether the Manila-RTC had jurisdiction to
issue the said warrant despite non-compliance with the compelling reasons requirement under Section 2, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court; (c) whether the requirements of probable cause and particular description were
complied with and the one-specific-offense rule under Section 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court was violated;
and (d) whether the applicant for the search warrant, i.e., the PNP, violated the rule against forum shopping.

Held:

While the Court does agree that the imposition of said administrative penalties did operate to divest Judge Peralta's authority to act as
Vice-Executive Judge, it must be qualified that the abstraction of such authority would not, by and of itself, result in the invalidity of
Search Warrant No. 09-14407 considering that Judge Peralta may be considered to have made the issuance as a De Facto officer whose
acts would, nonetheless, remain valid.

In order for the De Facto doctrine to apply, all of the following elements must concur: (a) there must be a De Jure office; (b) there must
be color of right or general acquiescence by the public; and (c) there must be actual physical possession of the office in good faith.

The existence of the foregoing elements is rather clear in this case. Undoubtedly, there is a De Jure office of a 2nd Vice-Executive Judge.
Judge Peralta also had a colorable right to the said office as he was duly appointed to such position and was only divested of the same by
virtue of a supervening legal technicality that is, the operation of Section 5, Chapter III of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC as above-explained;
also, it may be said that there was general acquiescence by the public since the search warrant application was regularly endorsed to the
sala of Judge Peralta by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Manila-RTC under his apparent authority as 2nd Vice Executive Judge.
Finally, Judge Peralta's actual physical possession of the said office is presumed to be in good faith, as the contrary was not established.
[43] Accordingly, Judge Peralta can be considered to have acted as a De Facto officer when he issued Search Warrant No. 09-14407,
hence, treated as valid as if it was issued by a De Jure officer suffering no administrative impediment.

Section 12, Chapter V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC states the requirements for the issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by
the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City. These special criminal cases pertain to those "involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions, as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual
Property Code, the Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included herein by the Supreme Court." Search warrant applications for such cases may be filed
by "the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force (ACTAF)," and
"personally endorsed by the heads of such agencies." As in ordinary search warrant applications, they "shall particularly describe
therein the places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in the Rules of Court." "The Executive Judges
[of these RTCs] and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station, the Vice-Executive
Judges" are authorized to act on such applications and "shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts." The Court observes that all the above-stated requirements were complied with in this case.

In this case, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of Search Warrant No. 09-14407 is evident from the first-hand account of
Avasola who, in his deposition, stated that he personally witnessed the commission of the afore-stated crime and was, in fact, part of the
group that buried the victims.
Verily, the facts and circumstances established from the testimony of Avasola, who was personally examined by Judge Peralta,
sufficiently show that more likely than not the crime of Murder of six (6) persons had been perpetrated and that the human remains in
connection with the same are in the place sought to be searched.

In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the quantum of proof to establish the existence of probable cause had been met. That a
"considerable length of time" attended the search warrant's application from the crime's commission does not, by and of itself, negate
the veracity of the applicant's claims or the testimony of the witness presented. As the CA correctly observed, the delay may be
accounted for by a witness's fear of reprisal and natural reluctance to get involved in a criminal case. Ultimately, in determining the
existence of probable cause, the facts and circumstances must be personally examined by the judge in their totality, together with a
judicious recognition of the variable complications and sensibilities attending a criminal case. To the Court's mind, the supposed delay
in the search warrant's application does not dilute the probable cause finding made herein. In fine, the probable cause requirement has
been sufficiently met.

The Court similarly concludes that there was compliance with the constitutional requirement that there be a particular description of
"the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."

Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant

CASE #161. Uy v. BIR, 344 SCRA 36

FACTS: Petitioners assail the validity of the warrants issued for the search of the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation, and pray
for the return of the items seized by virtue thereof.

On 30 September 1993, a certain Rodrigo Abos reported to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) that petitioners Unifish Packing
Corporation and Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy were engaged in activities constituting violations of the National Internal Revenue Code.
Abos, who claimed to be a former employee of Unifish, executed an Affidavit alleging illegal activities being practiced by the said
company among others, selling thousands of cartons of canned sardines w/o issuing receipt.

On 1 October 1993, Nestor N. Labaria, Assistant Chief of the Special Investigation Branch of the BIR, applied for several search
warrants.The application sought permission to search the premises of Unifish.

On the strength of these warrants, agents of the BIR, accompanied by members of the Philippine National Police, on 2 October 1993,
searched the premises of the Unifish Packing Corporation. They seized, among other things, the records and documents of petitioner
corporation. A return of said search was duly made by Nestor Labaria with the RTC of Cebu , Branch 28.

Petitioner impugned the intrinsic validity of the SW stating that it violates constitutional right to unreasonable search and seizure.

1. Multiple sets of Books of Accounts; Ledgers, Journals, Columnar Books, Cash Register Books, Sales Books or Records; Provisional &
Official Receipts;

2. Production Record Books/Inventory Lists [,] Stock Cards;

3. Unregistered Delivery Receipts;

4. Unregistered Purchase & Sales Invoices;

5. Sales Records, Job Order;

6. Corporate Financial Records; and

7. Bank Statements/Cancelled Checks

ISSUE: WON the SW complied with the proper constitutional mandates.

HELD: The SC AFFIRMED the order of the RTC insofar as said Resolutions upheld the validity of the subject Search Warrants
authorizing the seizure of the unregistered delivery receipts and unregistered purchase and sales invoices, but REVERSED with respect
to the rest of the articles subject of said warrants.

PEOPLE VS. CA, 291 SCRA 400

HELD: In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first four (4) separate
apartment units at the rear of ABIGAIL VARIETY STORE in Quezon City to be the subject of their search. The
same was not, however, what the Judge who issued the warrant had in mind, AND WAS NOT WHAT WAS
ULTIMATELY DESCRIBED IN THE SEARCH WARRANT. As such, any evidence obtained from the place searched
which is different from that indicated in the search warrant is inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and
in any proceeding.
This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to search a place different from that
stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched—although not that specified in the search
warrant—is exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had demarcated in their
supporting evidence. WHAT IS MATERIAL IN DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A SEARCH IS THE PLACE STATED
IN THE WARRANT ITSELF, NOT WHAT THE APPLICANTS HAD IN THEIR THOUGHTS, OR HAD REPRESENTED IN
THE PROOFS THEY SUBMITTED TO THE COURT ISSUING THE WARRANT. As such, it was not just a case of
“obvious typographical error”, but a clear case of a search of a place different from that clearly and without
ambiguity identified in the search warrant.
NOTE: Very Important: Where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal action base don the
results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, IT IS NOT THE RULE THAT A MOTION TO
QUASH THE WARRANT (or to retrieve the things seized) MAY BE FILED ONLY IN THE ISSUING COURT—SUCH A
MOTION MAY BE FILED FOR THE FIRST TIME IN EITHER THE ISSUING COURT OR THAT IN WHICH THE CRIMINAL
PROCEEDING IS PENDING.

d. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informer’s tip. Note the two (2) conflicting
decisions of the Supreme Court.

CASE #162. People v. CA, 216 SCRA 101

CASE #163. Tambasen v. People, 246 SCRA 184

FACTS: On August 31, 1988, P/Sgt. Flumar Natuel applied for the issuance of a search warrant from the MTCC, alleging that he
received information that petitioner had in his possession at his house "M-16 Armalite Rifles (Mags & Ammos), Hand Grenades, .45 Cal.
Pistols (Mags & Ammos), Dynamite Sticks and Subversive Documents," which articles were "used or intended to be used" for illegal
purposes. On the same day, the application was granted by the MTCC with the issuance of Search Warrant No. 365, which allowed the
seizure of the items specified in the application.

At around 6:30 P.M. of September 9, 1988, a police team searched the house of petitioner and seized the following articles: two (2)
envelopes containing cash in the total amount of P14,000.00, one (1) handset w/antenae (sic), one (1) YAESU FM Transceiver FT 23R
w/Antenae (sic); one (1) ALINCO ELH 230D Base; one (1) DC Regulator Supply 150 V. 13.8 V 12 AMP — 128 VAC; one (1) brown
Academy Notebook & Assorted papers; and four (4) handsets battery pack.

On September 19, 1988, the MTCC, acting on petitioner's urgent motion for the return of the seized articles, issued an order directing
Sgt. Natuel to make a return of the search warrant. The following day, Sgt. Natuel submitted a report to the court. Not considering the
report as a "return in contemplation of law," petitioner filed another motion praying that Sgt. Natuel be required to submit a complete
and verified inventory of the seized articles. Thereafter, Sgt. Natuel manifested that although he was the applicant for the issuance of the
search warrant, he was not present when it was served.

On October 7, 1988, petitioner filed before the MTCC a motion praying that the search and seizure be declared illegal and that the seized
articles be returned to him.

On December 23, 1988, the MTCC issued an order directing Lt. Col. Torres to return the money seized to the petitioner. The court
opined that in the implementation of the search warrant, any seizure should be limited to the specific items covered thereby. It said that
the money could not be considered as "subversive documents"; it was neither stolen nor the effects of gambling.

Three months later, the Solicitor General filed before the RTC, Branch 44, Bacolod City a petition for certiorari seeking the annulment
of the order of the MTCC (Civil Case No. 5331). The petition alleged that assuming that the seizure of the money had been invalid,
petitioner was not entitled to its return citing the rulings in Alih v. Castro, 151 SCRA 279 (1987) and Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687
(1986). In those cases, the Court held that pending the determination of the legality of the seizure of the articles, they should remain in
custodia legis. The petition also averred that a criminal complaint for "any of the crimes against public order as provided under Chapter
I, Title III of the Revised Penal Code" had been filed with the City Fiscal (BC I.S. No. 88-1239) and therefore, should the money be
found as having been earmarked for subversive activities, it should be confiscated pursuant to Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code.

On July 20, 1989, RTC, Branch 44 issued an order granting the petition for certiorari and directing the clerk of court to return to the
MTCC the money pending the resolution of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the city prosecutor on the criminal
complaint.

Consequently, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order commanding the city prosecutor to cease and desist from continuing with the preliminary investigation and the RTC from taking
any step with respect to Civil Case No. 5331. He also prayed that Search Warrant No. 365 and the seizure of his personal effects be
declared illegal and that the Order of July 20, 1989 be reversed and annulled.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC, Branch 44 gravely abused its discretion in directing that the money seized from petitioner's house,
specifically the amount of P14,000.00, be retained and kept in custodia legis

HELD: YES.

On its face, the search warrant violates Section 3, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court, which prohibits the issuance of a search
warrant for more than one specific offense. The caption of Search Warrant No. 365 reflects the violation of two special laws: P.D. No.
1866 for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives; and R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion Law. Search Warrant No.
365 was therefore a "scatter-shot warrant" and totally null and void.

Moreover, by their seizure of articles not described in the search warrant, the police acted beyond the parameters of their authority
under the search warrant. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution requires that a search warrant should particularly describe the
things to be seized. "The evident purpose and intent of the requirement is to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
particularly described in the search warrant — to leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they should
seize, to the end that unreasonable searches and seizures may not be made and that abuses may not be committed". The same
constitutional provision is also aimed at preventing violations of security in person and property and unlawful invasions of the sanctity
of the home, and giving remedy against such usurpations when attempted. Clearly then, the money which was not indicated in the
search warrant, had been illegally seized from the petitioner. The fact that the members of the police team were doing their task of
pursuing subversives is not a valid excuse for the illegal seizure. The presumption juris tantum of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an individual. Although public welfare is the
foundation of the power to search and seize, such power must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens.

For the retention of the money seized by the police officers, approval of the court which issued the search warrant is necessary (People v.
Gesmundo, 219 SCRA 743 [1993]). In like manner, only the court which issued the search warrant may order their release (Temple v.
Dela Cruz, 60 SCRA 295 [1974]; Pagkalinawan v. Gomez, 21 SCRA 1275 [1967]).

Section 3(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

The information in Criminal Case No. 8517, with petitioner as the sole accused, was ordered quashed by the trial court and the
prosecution's motion for the reconsideration of the quashal order had been denied. Even in BC I.S. Case No. 88-1239, which was being
investigated by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Marcos, petitioner was dropped as a respondent. Hence, there appears to be no criminal
prosecution which can justify the retention of the seized articles in custodia legis.

A subsequent legal development added another reason for the return to him of all the seized articles: R.A. No. 1700, the Anti-Subversion
Law, was repealed by R.A. No. 7636 and, therefore, the crimes defined in the repealed law no longer exist.

CASE #164. People v. Tuan, G.R. No. 176066, Aug. 11, 2010

FACTS:

On January 2000, two informants namely, Tudlong and Lad-ing arrived at the office of CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group) in Baguio City, and reported to SPO2 Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain "Estela
Tuan" had been selling marijuana atBarangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio City. SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and
Lad-ing.On the afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and accompanied the two
informants to the accused Tuan’s house. Tudlong and Lading entered the house, while SPO2Fernandez waited at the adjacent house.
Later, Tudlong and Lad-ing came out and showed SPO2 Fernandez the marijuana they bought. Upon returning to the CIDG office,
SPO2 Fernandez requested a laboratory examination on the specimen and yielded positive results for marijuana.

SPO2 Fernandez, together with the informants, filed the Application for a Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes
(Judge Cortes) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City on Jan uary 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three
o’clock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad- ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, which
stated Tuan’s residence as “the house of the accused Estela Tuan at Brgy. Gabriela Silang, Baguio City”. Even though accused Tuan was
not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused’s father, after he was shown a copy of
the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez guarded the surroundings of the house, while SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez searched inside.
They saw, in the presence of Magno, a movable Cabinet in Tuan’s room, below of which they found a brick of marijuana and a firearm.
Later Tuan arrived and thereafter, the police officers asked Tuan to open a cabinet, in which they saw more bricks of marijuana. The
defence, on the other hand, disclaimed ownership of the bricks and alleged that a Search Warrant was issued for her house because of a
quarrel with her neighbour named Lourdes Estillore (Estillore). The RTC found accused guilty as charged. On appeal, the CA modified
by acquitting Tuan of the charge for illegal possession of firearm but affirming her conviction for illegal possession of marijuana. Tuan
raised the matter to the Supreme Court contending, among others, that the warrant failed to particularly describe the place because the
house was a two-storey building composed of several rooms.

ISSUES:

1. WON there was probable cause for the judge to issue a Search Warrant and whether thesearch warrant particularly described the
place to be searched.

2. WON the search warrant particularly described the place to be searched.

RULING:

1. YES. The validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors:(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;(2) the
probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person;(3) in the determination of
probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

The only issue is compliance with the first and fourth factors, i.e., existence of probable cause; and particular description of the place to
be searched and things to be seized. Probable cause generally signifies reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged. It likewise refers to the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent

Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record

CASE #165. Asian Surety Inc. Co. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312

FACTS:

● On October 27, 1965, respondent Judge Herrera, upon the sworn application of NBI agent Celso Zoleta, Jr. supported by the
deposition of his witness, Manuel Cuaresma, issued a search warrant in connection with an undocketed criminal case for
estafa, falsification, insurance fraud, and tax evasion, against the Asian Surety and Insurance Co. commaning to make an
immediate search at any time in the ----- of the premises seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report including subrogation receipt and proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of
Accounts, including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, check vouchers, income tax returns, and other papers
connected therewith ... for the years 1961 to 1964.
● Armed with the search warrant Zoleta and other agents assigned to the Anti-graft Division of the NBI entered the premises of
the Republic Supermarket Building and served the search warrant upon Atty. Alidio of the insurance company, in the presence
of Mr. William Li Yao, president and chairman of the board of directors of the insurance firm. After the search they seized and
carried away two (2) carloads of documents, papers and receipts.
● Petitioner assails the validity of the search warrant, claiming that it was issued in contravention of the explicit provisions of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court, particularly Section 3, of Art. IV of the onstitution, and Sections 3, 5, 8 and 10 of Rule 126
of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:

Whether the search and seizure conducted was valid

RATIO: NO.

1. In the case at bar, the search warrant was issued for four separate and distinct offenses of : (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax evasion
and (4) insurance fraud, in contravention of the explicit command of Section 3, Rule 126, of the Rules providing that: "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."

2. The property to be searched and seized, viz: Fire Registers, Loss Bordereau, Adjusters Report, including subrogation receipts and
proof of loss, Loss Registers, Books of Accounts including cash receipts and disbursements and general ledger, etc. are not contraband
goods, stolen or embezzled and other proceeds or fruits of one and the same offense. What is plain and clear is the fact that the
respondent Judge made no attempt to determine whether the property he authorized to be searched and seized pertains specifically to
any one of the three classes of personal property that may be searched and seized under a search warrant under Rule 126, Sec. 2 of the
Rules. The respondent Judge simply authorized search and seizure under an omnibus description of the personal properties to be
seized.

3. The search warrant violated the specific injunctions of Section 8 of Rule 126. 6 Annex "A" of the Petition which is the search warrant
in question left blank the "time" for making search, while actual search was conducted in the evening of October 27, 1965, at 7:30 p.m.,
until the wee hours of the morning of October 28, 1965, thus causing untold inconveniences to petitioners herein. Authorities are of the
view that where a search is to be made during the night time, the authority for executing the same at that time should appear in the
directive on the face of the warrant.

RULING:

Petition is GRANTED; the search warrant of October 27, 1965, is nullified and set aside, and the respondents are rdered to return
immediately all documents, papers and other objects seized or taken.
CASE #166. People v. Peña, 97 Phil 669
(Wa ko kitag digest)

Sec. 6. Issuance and form of search warrant

CASE #167. WHO v. Aquino, 48 SCRA 242

FACTS: Dr. Leonce Verstuyft, assigned on Dec. 6, 1971 by the WHO from his last station in Taipei to the Regional Office in Manila as
Acting Assistant Director of Health Services. He is entitled to diplomatic immunity, pursuant to the Host Agreement executed on July
22, 1951 between the Phil. Government and the World Health Organization.

Diplomatic immunity carries with it, among other diplomatic privileges and immunities, personal inviolability, inviolability of the
official's properties, exemption from local jurisdiction, and exemption from taxation and customs duties.

Dr. Verstuyft's personal effects entered the Philippines on Jan. 10, 1972. They were allowed free entry from duties and taxes.

Judge Aquino issued on March 3, 1972 upon application of COSAC [Constabulary Offshore Action Center] officers of a search warrant
for alleged violation of Republic Act 4712 amending section 3601 of the Tariff and Customs Code directing the search and seizure of the
dutiable items in said crates.

Upon the protest of Dr. Francisco Dy, WHO Regional Director for the Western Pacific with station in Manila, Sec. of Foreign Affairs
Carlos P. Romulo personally wired the judge, informing him that Dr. Vertuyft is entitled to immunity from search on the basis of the
Host Agreement.

Judge Aquino set the Foreign Affairs Secretary’s request for hearing and heard the same, but still issued an order maintaining the
effectivity of the search warrant despite an official plea for diplomatic immunity and the a list of the articles brought in by Dr. Verstuyft.
Dr. Versuyft special appearance for the purpose of pleading his diplomatic immunity and a motion to quash did not move Judge
Aquino.

At the hearing thereof held on May 8, 1972, the OSG appeared and filed an extended comment stating the official position of the
executive branch of the Philippine Government that (a) Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic immunity, (b) he did not abuse his diplomatic
immunity, and (c) that court proceedings in the receiving or host State are not the proper remedy in the case of abuse of diplomatic
immunity.

The Solicitor General accordingly joined petitioner Verstuyft's prayer for the quashal of the search warrant. The judge still denied the
quashal of the search warrant. .

An original action for certiorari and prohibition to set aside Judge Aquino’s refusal to quash the search warrant was thereafter filed
before the SC. The SC then issued a restraining order.

ISSUES: WON Dr. Verstuyft the search warrant should be quashed in view of his diplomatic immunity.

RULING: YES, the search warrant should be quashed because Dr. Verstuft’s diplomatic immunity

RATIO:
1. The executive branch of the Philippine Government has expressly recognized that Dr. Verstuyft is entitled to diplomatic
immunity, pursuant to the provisions of the Host Agreement. The DFA formally advised respondent judge of the Philippine
Government's official position that accordingly "Dr. Verstuyft cannot be the subject of a Philippine court summons without
violating an obligation in international law of the Philippine Government" and asked for the quashal of the search warrant,
since his personal effects and baggages after having been allowed free entry from all customs duties and taxes, may not be
baselessly claimed to have been "unlawfully imported" in violation of the tariff and customs code as claimed by respondents
COSAC officers. The Solicitor-General, as principal law officer of the Government, likewise expressly affirmed said petitioner's
right to diplomatic immunity.
2. Judge Aquino should not have relied on the suspicions of the COSAC officers regarding the unopened crates which contained
Dr. Verstuyft’s persona effects rather than on the assurance of the OSG that Dr. Verstufyt did not abuse his diplomatic
immunity, which is based on the official positions of the highest exec. Officials with the competence and authority on the
matter, namely the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Finance. Hence, even assuming arguendo that Judge Aquino had some
 ground on which he can base his decision, he should have acceded to the quashal of the search warrant and forwarded his
findings to the DFA.
3. There was a clear lack of coordination between the various departments involved in the subject matter. Such lack of
coordination allowed the COSAC to go against the determination of the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs and Finance.

This fact is highlighted by Republic Act 75 enacted since October 21, 1946 to safeguard the jurisdictional immunity of
diplomatic officials in the Philippines are taken into account. Said Act declares as null and void writs or processes sued out or
prosecuted whereby inter alia the person of an ambassador or public minister is arrested or imprisoned or his goods or chattels
are seized or attached and makes it a penal offense for "every person by whom the same is obtained or prosecuted, whether as
party or as attorney, and every officer concerned in executing it" to obtain or enforce such writ or process.

Judge Aquino, therefore, acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when he did not quash the search
warrant.

DISPOSITIVE: ACCORDINGLY, the writs of certiorari and prohibition prayed for are hereby granted, and the temporary restraining
order heretofore issued against execution or enforcement of the questioned search warrant, which is hereby declared null and void, is
hereby made permanent. The respondent court is hereby commanded to desist from further proceedings in the matter. No costs, none
having been prayed for. The clerk of court is hereby directed to furnish a copy of this decision to the Secretary of Justice for such action
as he may find appropriate with regard to the matters mentioned in paragraph 3 hereof. So ordered.

CASE #168. World Wide Web Corporation v. People, G.R. No. 161106, Jan. 13, 2014
*see also page 284-285 Riano for Ruling
*Focus on Search Warrant

Facts:

Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine
National Police filed applications for warrants... to search the office premises of... petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation
(WWC)... as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet)

The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and
violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing... the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone
Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT).

Over a hundred items were seized,... including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables,
diskettes and files, and a laptop computer.

Petitioners claim that the subject search warrants were in the nature of general warrants because the
descriptions therein of the objects to be seized are so broad and all-encompassing as to give the implementing
officers wide discretion over which articles to seize. In fact, the CA observed that the targets of the search warrants
were not illegalper se, and that they were "innocuous goods." Thus, the police officers were given blanket authority to
determine whether the objects were legal or not, as in fact even pieces of computer equipment not involved in
telecommunications or Internet service were confiscated.
On the other hand, PLDT claims that a search warrant already fulfills the requirement of particularity of
description when it is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow.
Issues:

Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause, considering that the acts complained of
allegedly do not constitute theft.

Ruling:
A general warrant is defined as "(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the
property to be seized." 59 It is one that allows the "seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another" and gives the
officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take.

Within the context of the above legal requirements for valid search warrants, the Court has been mindful of the difficulty
faced by law enforcement officers in describing the items to be searched, especially when these items are technical in
nature, and when the extent of the illegal operation is largely unknown to them.|||The things to be seized must be
described with particularity. Technical precision of description is not required. Any description of the place or thing to
be searched that will enable the officer making the search with reasonable certainty to locate such place or thing
is sufficient.

In this case, considering that items that looked like "innocuous goods" were being used to pursue an illegal operation that
amounts to theft, law enforcement officers would be hard put to secure a search warrant if they were required to pinpoint
items with one hundred percent precision. In People v. Veloso, we pronounced that "[t]he police should not be hindered in
the performance of their duties, which are difficult enough of performance under the best of conditions, by superficial
adherence to technicality or far-fetched judicial interference." 65

A search warrant fulfills the requirement of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the
things described are limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. 66
PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and
the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera
conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was then able to confirm that they had "utilized various
telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers,
PABX or switching equipment, and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other
documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.

CASE #169. People v. Nuñez, G.R. No. 177138 June 20, 2009

*Page 277 Riano

Facts:
In a search and seizure conducted based on reports of drug possession, the appellant’s room was surveyed in his presence while his
family, PO2 Ortega and the two barangay officials remained in the living room. 31 packets of shabu, lighters, improvised burners,
tooters, and aluminum foil with shabu residue and a lady’s wallet containing P4,610 (pesos) inside appellant’s dresser were found.

The group also confiscated a component, camera, electric planer, grinder, drill, jigsaw. electric tester, and assorted carpentry tools on
suspicion that they were acquired in exchange for shabu. Following the search, SPO1 Ilagan issued a Receipt for Property Seized and a
Certification of Orderly Search which appellant signed. The RTC convicted appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of
Republic Act 6425, as amended. Appellant elevated the case to this Court, but the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals where
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming appellant’s conviction.

Issues:
Whether or not, there was an irregularity in the seizure of personal property conducted?

Ruling:
Turning to the objects which may be confiscated during the search, Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
SEC. 3. Personal property to be seized. – A search warrant may be issued for the search and seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense.
As a rule, only the personal properties described in the search warrant may be seized by the authorities. In the case at bar, Search
Warrant No. 42 specifically authorized the taking of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and paraphernalia(s) only. By the
principle of ejusdem generis, where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character,
the generic word will usually be limited to things of a similar nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be something in
the context of the statement which would repel such inference.

Thus, we are here constrained to point out an irregularity in the search conducted. Certainly, the lady’s wallet, cash, grinder, camera,
component, speakers, electric planer, jigsaw, electric tester, saws, hammer, drill, and bolo were not encompassed by the word
paraphernalia as they bear no relation to the use or manufacture of drugs. In seizing the said items then, the police officers exercised
their own discretion and determined for themselves which items in appellant’s residence they believed were "proceeds of the crime" or
"means of committing the offense." This is absolutely impermissible.

The purpose of the constitutional requirement that the articles to be seized be particularly described in the warrant is to limit the things
to be taken to those, and only those particularly described in the search warrant -- to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they should seize. A search warrant is not a sweeping authority empowering a raiding party to undertake a
fishing expedition to confiscate any and all kinds of evidence or articles relating to a crime. Accordingly, the objects taken which were
not specified in the search warrant should be restored to appellant.

principle of ejusdem generis

ejusdem generis . THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE. This is to give effect to both the particular and general words, by treating the
particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically
named by the particular words.

The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application; it should be used to carry out, not to defeat the intent or purpose of the law;
the rule must give way in favor of the legislative intent;

Limitations of Ejusdem Generis Requisites:

1. Statue contains an enumeration of particular and specific words, followed by a general word or phrase;
2. The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the same kind;
3. The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by examples;
4. There is no indication of legislative intent to give general words or phrases a broader meaning.

Sec. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search

Sec. 8. Search of house, room, or premises, to be made in presence of two witnesses

CASE #170. Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago, 162 SCRA 840

FACTS
American nationals Andrew Harvey and John Sherman, 52 and 72 years, respectively, and Adriaan Van Elshout, 58, a Dutch citizen,
are all residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna. Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago issued Mission Orders to the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID) to apprehended petitioners at their residences.
The “Operation Report” read that Andrew Harvey was found together with two young boys. Richard Sherman was found with two naked
boys inside his room. While Van Den Elshout in the “after Mission Report” read that two children of ages 14 and 16 has been under his
care and subjects confirmed being live-in for some time now.
Seized during the petitioner’s apprehension were rolls of photo negatives and photos of suspected child prostitutes shown in
scandalous poses as well as boys and girls engaged in sex. Posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes were also
found.
Petitioners were among the twenty-two (22) suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close
surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Only the three petitioners have chosen to face deportation.
Warrants of Arrest were issued by respondent against petitioners for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and
Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code.The Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against petitioners. Petitioners filed a
Petition for Bail which the CID denied.
Andrew Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had “finally agreed to a self-deportation” and praying that he be
“provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the
country.” However, it appears that on the same date that the aforesaid Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners
had already filed the present petition.
Petitioners availed of this Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. A Return of the Writ was filed by the Solicitor General and the Court
heard the case on oral argument on 20 April 1988. A Traverse to the Writ was presented by petitioners to which a Reply was filed by
the Solicitor General.
 ISSUES
Whether or not the Philippine Immigration Act clothed the Commissioner with any authority to arrest and detain petitioners pending
determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation.
HELD
AFFIRMATIVE. [The Court] reject petitioners’ contentions and uphold respondent’s official acts ably defended by the Solicitor General.
The Petition is dismissed and the Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.
There can be no question that the right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Constitution is available to all
persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant
of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.
In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months
during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the
photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. [The fact that] petitioners were not “caught in the act” does not make their
arrest illegal.

The deportation charges instituted by respondent. Commissioner are in accordance with Section 37(a) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940, in relation to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge,
does not extend to deportation proceedings.”

What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be
conducted with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.
The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners’ release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order because in deportation
proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the part of the Commissioner of Immigration
and Deportation. As deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may
not be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.
Every sovereign power has the inherent power to exclude aliens from its territory upon such grounds as it may deem proper for its self-
preservation or public interest. The power to deport aliens is an act of State, an act done by or under the authority of the sovereign
power. It is a police measure against undesirable aliens whose continued presence in the country is found to be injurious to the public
good and the domestic tranquility of the people. Particularly so in this case where the State has expressly committed itself to defend the
tight of children to assistance and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development (Article XV, Section 3[2]). Respondent Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation, in instituting
deportation proceedings against petitioners, acted in the interests of the State.

CASE #171. Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 155

DOCTRINE: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants

FACTS:

1. Rosalie Tesoro charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar for illegal recruitment before the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA).

2. Rosalie claims that upon arriving from Japan, Hortencia took her PECC Card on the premise that Hortencia would find
her another booking in Japan. 9 months passed and there is still no booking. Rosalie transferred to another agency but
Hortencia would not give her the PECC Card.

3. The POEA ordered Hortencia to appear before the POEA Anti-Illegal Recruitment Unit. That same day, public
respondent, Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso issued a CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER against
Hortencia, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency.

4. Subsequently, a POEA group, assisted by Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen, proceeded to the residence of the
Hortencia to implement the Closure and Seizure Order. There it was found that petitioner was operating Hannalie Dance
Studio.

5. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty
more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion
Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
 6. Because of this event, Hortencia filed a letter with the POEA requesting that the personal properties seized at her
residence be immediately returned.

Petitioner’s basis:
· She has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence the Closure and Seizure Order violated "due process of law"
guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of the Philippine Constitution.
· POEA’s actions violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine Constitution which guarantees right of the people " to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose."

ISSUES: W/N the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) may validly issue warrants of search
and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code à NO

PROVISION: Article 38 of the Labor Code. Illegal recruitment xxx The Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of
authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead
to further exploitation of job-seekers. The Secretary shall order the search of the office or premises and seizure of
documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies,
establishments and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment, without having been licensed
or authorized to do so.

RULING + RATIO: NO.

· We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the
authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code,
unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
· For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of
arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the
Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of
deportation.

· The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order
arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the
courts.

DISPOSITION: Petition is granted.

CASE #172. People v. Punzalan - GR No. 199087, 2015

FACTS: The prosecution established that on November 3, 2009, at around 4:30 in the morning, Intelligence Agent 1 Liwanag Sandaan
(IA1 Sandaan) and her team implemented a search warrant issued on October 28, 2009 by then Manila RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta,
Jr. to: (i) make an immediate search of the premises/house of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, Vima Punzalan, Jaime
Punzalan, Arlene Punzalan-Razon and Felix Razon who are all residents of 704 Apelo Cruz Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay
City; and (ii) to seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs, including the proceeds or fruits and
bring said property to the court.

Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be occupied by the accused-appellants, a sketch of the
compound describing the house to be searched was prepared and attached to the search warrant.

Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the barangay hall to coordinate with Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad
Larry Fabella and Kagawad Edwin Razon. The team likewise brought with them a media representative affiliated with "Sunshine Radio"
to cover the operation. From the barangay hall, they walked toward the target place using as a guide the sketch they prepared.
When they were already outside the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, which is a three-storey structure, IA1 Sandaan knocked on the
door. A woman, later identified as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door. When they introduced themselves as
PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but was not
successful since the PDEA agents pushed the door open. The team was able to enter the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan who were
both surprised when found inside the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant in front of accused-appellants.

Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the table. Intelligence Officer 1 Pagaragan (IO1 Pagaragan)
was able to seize 9 heat-sealed plastic sachets, 2 square-shaped transparent plastic containers and a small round plastic container. All 3
plastic containers contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of white crystalline substance of suspected shabu. There were also other
paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale. Accordingly, Special Investigator 2 Esteban (SI2 Esteban) and Intelligence
Officer 2 Alvarado (IO2 Alvarado) effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan after informing them of their
constitutional rights. IO1 Pagaragan immediately marked the seized items by placing the marking "ADP". After searching and marking
the evidence found on the first floor, the team, together with the barangay officials and accused-appellants, proceeded to, and
conducted the search on the second and third floors but found nothing. They went downstairs where they conducted the inventory of
recovered items. IO1 Pagaragan prepared the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly Search which were
later signed by the barangay officials.

After their arrest, accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were brought to the PDEA Office in Quezon City for investigation. IO1
Pagaragan presented the seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Request for
Drug Test/Physical and Medical Examination. Laboratory examination of the seized pieces of drug evidence gave positive results for the
presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.

Thereafter, the accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal possession of 40.78
grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.

On March 29, 2010, the trial court convicted accused-appellants for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165. The trial court held
that the issuance of a search warrant against the premises of different persons named therein is valid as there is no requirement that
only one search warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for its validity. Also, the address of the accused-appellants Jerry
and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and adequately described. A sketch that specifically identifies the places to be searched was attached
to the records and such description of the place was unquestionably accurate that the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to
successfully conduct their operation in the premises described in the search warrant.

In its findings, the trial court observed that there were actually two phases of the search done in the Punzalan house. The first or initial
search was done at the ground floor of the house, immediately after the PDEA agents gained entry and was beyond doubt made in the
presence of both accused. This is where the bulk of illegal drugs were found, confiscated and consequently marked. It is of no moment
that the barangay officials were not able to witness the said initial search and their failure to arrive on time to witness the first or initial
search at the ground floor of the Punzalan house, or even their total absence thereat, will not render the subject search invalid and
unlawful inasmuch as their presence is not required.

The second phase of the search was conducted at the upper floors of the house after the markings on the 293 sachets of confiscated
specimens were completed by 101 Pagaragan. This was witnessed and participated in by the barangay officials. Finally, after the search
of the entire house was concluded, it is not disputed that an inventory of all the items seized was conducted by IO1 Pagaragan in
compliance with the provisions of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants. The CA held that there was a valid search and seizure conducted and
the seized items are admissible in evidence. The prosecution was able to prove all the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by
law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the search conducted was valid – YES.
2. Whether or not the chain of custody rule has been complied with – YES.

RATIO:
I. Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two witnesses. - No search of a house, room, or any other
premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter,
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present during the initial search, the search was witnessed by
accused-appellants themselves, hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in
the same locality" must be present applies only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member of his family.

To successfully prosecute a case of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be established: (1) the accused is
in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the
accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. In the case at bench, the prosecution was able to establish with moral certainty
the guilt of the accused-appellants for the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Accused-appellants were caught in actual
possession of the prohibited drugs during a valid search of their house. It bears stressing that aside from assailing the validity of the
search, accused-appellants did not deny ownership of the illegal drugs seized. They have not proffered any valid defense in the offense
charged for violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

II. This Court has time and again adopted the chain of custody rule, a method of authenticating evidence which requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims
it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered
to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered from the suspect is the very same substance
offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. In this case, the
chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was duly established from the time the heat-sealed plastic sachets were seized and marked by
IO1 Pagaragan to its subsequent turnover to Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office in Quezon City. IO1 Pagaragan was also the one who
personally delivered and submitted the specimens composed of 293 sachets of shabu to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory
examination. The specimens were kept in custody until they were presented as evidence before the trial court and positively identified
by IO1 Pagaragan as the very same specimens he marked during the inventory.

The fact that the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized was not signed by Atty. Gaspe does not undermine the integrity and evidentiary
value of the illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants. The failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory
of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused

RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated October 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 04557 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Sec. 9. Time of making search

Sec. 10. Validity of search warrant

Sec. 11. Receipt for the property seized

173. Quintero v. NBI, 162 SCRA 467

Facts:

1. May 19, 1972 – Petitioner Eduardo Quintero was a delegate of the 1 st District of Leyte in the 1971 ConCon

2. He disclosed in his speech that certain persons had distributed money to some delegates to influence them in the
discharge of their functions.
 3. Quintero delivered to the Concon the ‘payola” he himself received, for Concon’s action. However, he did not reveal the
names of those who gave him money.

4. Eventually, he was pressured to name them so he released a sworn statement addressed to the Concon, mentioning the
names of the persons who gave him the “payola”.

5. In his statement, it appeared that varying amounts of money were being handed to him by different people from
different offices, some from other delegates, from wives of representatives.

6. The then First Lady Imelda Marcos was among those implicated in Quintero’s expose.

7. Due to this, Pres. Ferdinand Marcos denounced Quintero and made a statement sayng that he will uncover the people
behind this act making Quintero as a tool.

8. That same day/evening, NBI agents raided the house of Quintero on the basis of a search warrant issued by the CFI
Manila Judge Asuncion. NBI claimed to have found bundles of money in Quintero’s residence.

9. NBI filed a criminal complaint for direct bribery against Quintero with the court issuing a TRO enjoining the use in any
proceeding of the objects seized by NBI from his residence.

10. The search warrant delivered to the occupant of the searched premises was issued in connection with the offense of “grave
threats” and not “direct bribery” which was the criminal complaint filed against Quintero.

11. The 1935 Constitution was enforced at that time of the issuance of the search warrant which was being questioned.

Issue: Whether or not the questioned search warrant issued by the judge is null and void for being violative of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court

Ruling: YES. The Court finds, and so holds, that the questioned search warrant issued by the judge is null and void for being violative
of the Constitution and the Rules of Court

No relation at all can be established between the crime supposedly committed and the evidence ordered to be seized. There
was thus no ground whatsoever for the respondent judge to claim that facts and circumstances had been established, sufficient for him
to believe that the crime being charged had been committed.

Statements of applicant and complainant did not provide sufficient basis for the finding of probable cause.

The respondent judge should have known that an application for search warrant if based on hearsay cannot justify the issuance
of a search warrant, before he issued the questioned search warrant

The search itself that was conducted by the NBI agents who raided the house of petitioner pursuant to the questioned search
warrant was highly irregular as no members of the household were in a position to watch them, thus they conducted the search on their
own. This procedure is held to be violative of both the spirit and the letter of the law, which provides that “no search of a house, room,
or any other premises shall be made, except in the presence of at least one competent witness, resident of the neighborhood.”

Requirements of Section 10, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court were not complied with. “The officer seizing property under the
warrant must give a detailed receipt for the same to the person on whom or in whose possession it was found, or in the absence of any
person, must in the presence of one witness, leave a receipt in the place in which he found the seized property.” In the case at bar, the
one who attested to the receipt from the raiding party was himself a member of the raiding party.

The circumstances prevailing before the issuance of the questioned warrant , and the actual manner in which the search was
conducted, strongly suggest that the entire procedure ws an orchestrated movement designed to destroy Quintero’s public image with
“incriminating evidence” and that the evidence allegedly seized from his residence was “planted” by the very raiding party that was
commanded to seize such.

Fallo: WHEREFORE, Search Warrant No. 7 issued on 31 May 1972 by respondent Judge is declared NULL and VOID and of no force
and effect. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 6 June 1972 is hereby made PERMANENT. The amount of
P379,200.00 allegedly seized from the house of petitioner Quintero, now in the possession of the Central Bank, and already
demonetized, is left with Central Bank, to be disposed of, as such, in accordance with the law and the regulations.SO ORDERED.
 Sec. 12. Delivery of property and inventory thereof to court; return and
proceedings thereon

174. Vlason Ent. Corp. v. CA, 155 SCRA 186

FACTS:
Poro Point Shipping Services was then acting as the local agent of Omega Sea Transport Company of Honduras & Panama (Omega)
when it requested permission for its vessel M/V Star Ace, experiencing engine trouble, to unload its cargo and have it stored in the
Philippine Ports Authority compound in San Fernando, La Union while awaiting transhipment to Hongkong. It approved by the Bureau
of Customs. Howvever, the customs personnel still boarded the vessel when it docked on the suspicion that it was the hijacked M/V
Silver Med owned by Med Line Philippines and that its cargo would be smuggled into the country. The vessel and its cargo were seized.
A notice of hearing was served on its consignee, Singkong Trading Co. of Hongkong, and its shipper, Dusit International Co., Ltd of
Thailand.

While seizure proceedings were ongoing, three typhoons hit La Union, and the vessel ran aground and was abandoned. A salvage
agreement was entered into with the respondent Duraproof Services to secure and repair the vessel.

The warrant of seizure was lifted upon finding that there was no fraud. However, the Customs Commissioner declined to issue a
clearance and even forfeited the vessel and its cargo. A decision was decreed for the forfeiture and sale of the cargo in favor of the
government.

Seeking to enforce its preferred lien, the Duraproof filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the RTC of Manila
attacking the actions of the Bureau. PPA, Rep. Silverio Mangaoang and Med Line Phils. were are named as respondents. Subsequently,
Duraproof amended its petition as to include former District Collector Quiray, PPA Port Manager Adolfo Amor, Jr., Vlason Enterprises
Singkong Trading Company, Dusit International Co., Inc., Thai-Nan Enterprises Ltd. And Thai-United Trading Co., Ltd as respondents.
In both its petitions, there was failure to allege against Vlason Enterprises or pray for a relief against it.

Summonses for the amended petition were served to the respondents and their counsels. Summons by publication were allowed to be
served upon the alien respondents who had no representatives in the country.

The cases against the other respondents were dismissed on the grounds of litis pendentia and lack of jurisdiction despite Duraproof
moving to declare them in default. Duraproof again moved to declare the other respondents in default. There was no record that these
motions were acted upon. Thereafter, Duraproof amended again its petition with supplemental petition. The rest of the respondents
were declared in default and Duraproof was allowed to present its evidence. With regard to Vlason Entreprises, it was alleged that it
exhibited constant intimidation and harassment and incurred heavy overhead expenses causing irreparable damages. The trial court
rendered a decision in favor of Duraproof.

Vlason, by special appearance, filed a motion for reconsideration on the grounds it was not impleaded, served summons or declared in
default. It also filed a special appearance before the CA praying that the levy be lifted off its properties, or a TRO be issued against the
auction. Its motion was granted and the previous decision was reversed. However, Duraproof countered that although Vlason filed the
motion for reconsideration in a timely manner, it has otherwise failed to include a notice of hearing making its motion a mere scrap of
paper.

Duraproof filed a motion to file a supplemental petition impleading Vlason as one of the respondents. It was granted by the CA.
Furthermore, it was able to obtain a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents to prevent them from interfering in the
transfer of the vessel and its cargo from the PPA compound.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not Vlason Enterprises was properly served with summons.

HELD: No. Appeal GRANTED.

A corporation may be served summons through its agents or officers who under the Rules are designated to accept service of process. A
summons addressed to a corporation and served on the secretary of its president binds that corporation. This is based on the rationale
that service must be made on a representative so integrated with the corporation sued, that it is safe to assume that said representative
had sufficient responsibility and discretion to realize the importance of the legal papers served and to relay the same to he president or
other responsible officer of the corporation being sued. The secretary of the president satisfies this criterion. This rule requires,
however, that the secretary should be an employee of the corporation sought to be summoned. Only in this manner can there be an
assurance that the secretary will “bring home to the corporation [the] notice of the filing of the action” against it.

In the present case, Bebero was the secretary of Angliongto, who was president of both VSI and petitioner, but she was an employee of
VSI, not of petitioner. The piercing of the corporate veil cannot be resorted to when serving summons.

Doctrinally, a corporation is a legal entity distinct and separate from the members and stockholders who compose it. However, when the
corporate fiction is used as a means of perpetrating a fraud, evading an existing obligation, circumventing a statute, achieving or
perfecting a monopoly or, in generally perpetrating a crime, the veil will be lifted to expose the individuals composing it. None of the
foregoing exceptions has been shown to exist in the present case. Quite the contrary, the piercing of the corporate veil in this case will
result in manifest injustice. This we cannot allow. Hence, the corporate fiction remains.

Petitioner claims that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over it, because the former had not been served summons anew for the
Second Amended Petition or for the Second Amended Petition with Supplemental Petition.

We disagree. Although it is well-settled that an amended pleading supersedes the original one, which is thus deemed withdrawn and no
longer considered part of the record, it does not follow ipso facto that the service of a new summons for amended petitions or
complaints is required. Where the defendants have already appeared before the trial court by virtue of a summons on the original
complaint, the amended complaint may be served upon them without need of another summons, even if new causes of action are
alleged. After it is acquired, a court’s jurisdiction continues until the case is finally terminated. Conversely, when defendants have not
yet appeared in court and no summons has been validly served, new summons for the amended complaint must be served on them. It is
not the change of cause of action that gives rise to the need to serve another summons for the amended complaint, but rather the
acquisition of jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants. If the trial court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over them, a new service
of summons for the amended complaint is required.

In this case, the trial court obviously labored under the erroneous impression that petitioner had already been placed under its
jurisdiction since it had been served summons through the secretary of its president. Thus, it dispensed with the service on petitioner of
new summons for the subsequent amendments of the Petition. We have already ruled, however, that the first service of summons on
petitioner was invalid. Therefore, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction, and the said court should have required a new service of
summons for the amended Petitions.

175. PDEA v. Richard Brodett, et al., G.R. No. 196390, Sept. 28, 2011

Doctrine: Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of RA 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002) that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to the lawful owner who is not liable for the unlawful act. But
the trial court may not release such objects pending trial and before judgment.

FACTS:
On April 13, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Muntinlupa charged Richard Broderr and Jorge Joseph for violating
Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b) of RA 9165 after being caught selling 9.8388 grams of methamphetamine HCL – sixty pieces of
blue – colored tablets with Motorola (M) logos. Likewise, on April 16, 2009, Brodett was charged for violating sec. 11 of RA 9165 for
possession of Ecstasy (4.9007 grams), Coccaine (3.959 grams), and Tetrahydrocannabinol (54.5331 grams).

On July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidence, among which is a 2004 Honda Accord registered in the name
of Myra S. Brodett that PDEA refused to return as it was used in the commission of the crime and which was supported by the OCP,
stating that such vehicle be kept during the duration of the trial to allow the prosecution and defense to exhaust its evidentiary value.

The RTC ordered the return of the car to Myra S. Brodett after it was duly photographed. PDEA filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied. PDEA then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which was also denied, citing Sec. 20 of RA 9165.

ISSUE:
w/n the Court erred in ordering the return of Myra S. Brodett’s car which was used in the commision of a crime – YES

RATIO:
In a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order upon conviction of an accused the seizure
of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including documents, papers, and other effects that are the necessary means to commit the
crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or possession of which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the
accused must not profit from his crime, or must not acquire property or the right to possession of property through his unlawful act. As
justification for the second, to return to the convict from whom the contraband was taken, in one way or another, is not prudent or
proper, because doing so will give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the contraband again. Indeed, the court having jurisdiction
over the offense has the right to dispose of property used in the commission of the crime, such disposition being an accessory penalty to
be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for the offense that it was used as the instrument to
commit.
Personal property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense either by authority of a search warrant or as the product of a
search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a search warrant, the personal property that may be seized may be that
which is the subject of the offense; or that which has been stolen or embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; or that which
has been used or intended to be used as the means of committing an offense. If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may
be made of dangerous weapons or anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the commission of an offense. Should
there be no ensuing criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is used as evidence, its return to the person from whom
it was taken, or to the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of course, except if it is contraband or illegal per se. A
proper court may order the return of property held solely as evidence should the Government be unreasonably delayed in bringing a
criminal prosecution. The order for the disposition of such property can be made only when the case is finally terminated.
The RTC granted accused Brodett’s Motion To Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the criminal proceedings were
still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that point of the proceedings was premature,
considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids the disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or
income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the
proceedings in the Regional Trial Court. Section 20 further expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom should
remain in custodia legis in all that time and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.
Indeed, forfeiture, if warranted pursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, would be a part
of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whether or not the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful
act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear
as to this.

RULING:The directive to return the non-drug evidence has overtaken the petition for review as to render further action upon it
superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation and
forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify the extent of the
power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165. This the Court must now do in view of the question about the confiscation
and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of repetition in the future. We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall
comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the
duration of the trial and before the rendition of the judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review is DENIED.

Sec. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest

CASE #176. Padilla v. CA, 269 SCRA 402

Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident on Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help of a civilian witness. Upon
arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession:

1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition

2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo

3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo

4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver

Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of
firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of
Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as
minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of
Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other
petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed “Manifestation in Lieu of Comment” praying
for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).

Issues:
1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the
course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule

No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of
petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure—a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in
his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in
flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioner’s warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually
committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time
between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.

Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:

? Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which
police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c)
evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects
whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant)

? Search of moving vehicle

? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within
arrestee’s custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest.

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the
scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers
function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or
irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.

2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to
carry the subject firearms

No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm
and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The
first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioner’s possession via a valid warrantless
search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution.
Indeed, petitioner’s purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the
prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts
contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent court’s incisive observation. Furthermore,
the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of
Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would
justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be
licensed to a civilian.

3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed
by the 1987 Constitution

Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court “in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive
context” and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason
for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple
illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.

The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at
the time of appellant’s commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of
judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866
which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.

Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple
possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant’s
erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question
lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality
of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that “the pertinent laws on illegal possession of
firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution…” Appellant’s grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty
should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively
within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the
courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the lower court of the crime of
simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioner’s indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to
“10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.

CASE #177. People v. Guzman, 351 SCRA 573

Facts: Prior to the arrest of Danilo de Guzman, the Police Chief Inspector of the Cavite Philippine National Police Command issued an
Order of Battle listing the names of the suspected drug pushers in Cavite City. Included therein was the name of de Guzman. In
response to the said directive, the Noveleta Police Station assigned SPO1 Arnel Cuevas to conduct surveillance at the Villamar Beach
Resort. On 18 October 1992, SPO1 Arnel Cuevas spotted Danilo de Guzman at the Villamar Beach Resort, but the latter stayed for only
30 minutes. Subsequently, he learned that De Guzman was engaged in a drug sale that day and reported the same to headquarters.
Pursuant to his report, the Chief of Intelligence of their station, SPO2 Rowell Tendero, instructed him to continue his surveillance of
said beach resort with the hope of catching de Guzman. On 26 October 1992, at around 9:00 p.m., de Guzman returned to Villamar
Beach Resort with companion Edsel Martin. They rented one of the resort cottages. 15 minutes later, SPO1 Cuevas climbed the ladder
which he perched on the concrete wall of the cottage. He, then, peeped through the window of the cottage and saw Danilo and Edsel
seated face to face while using shabu. He also saw on top of the table 3 plastic bags of shabu, a weighing scale and other drug related
paraphernalia. SPO1 Cuevas hurriedly descended the ladder and hailed a tricycle and instructed the driver to inform SPO2 Tendero to
proceed to Villamar Beach Resort immediately. Shortly, SPO2 Tendero, along with other police officers, arrived at the beach resort.
However, instead of rushing to the cottage of De Guzman and Martin, the police officers decided to wait for them to come out of the
cottage. SPO1 Cuevas explained that they did this so as not to forewarn the two of their presence. Otherwise, the two might simply flush
the shabu down the toilet bowl and destroy the evidence. The police officers waited the whole night for De Guzman and Martin to come
out of the cottage. Finally, De Guzman came out at around 7:40 a.m. the next day. SPO2 Tendero nabbed him upon seeing that his waist
was bulging with a gun. While Police Officer Vedar held De Guzman, SPO2 Tendero went up the cottage to check on Martin. SPO2
Alfaro and SPO3 Benavise, accompanied by a chambermaid and a boy from the resort, also went up with him. Inside the cottage, the
same paraphernalia which the witness saw the night before were found, namely, 3 plastic bags of shabu, a plastic scoop, a burner, a
lighter, several empty rolled aluminum foils, 3 pieces of tooter, rubber band, several pieces of paper, a black clutch bag containing a
disposable lighter, 2 forceps, a pair of scissors, a knife and a key holder with a knife, filter, sandpaper, electric plug, pocket electronic
weighing scale. De Guzman was brought to the police station for questioning and detention. The police officers were without warrants of
arrest or search warrants at the time of the arrests and seizure of evidence. As the operation was conducted largely during nighttime, the
police officers were unable to secure the necessary warrants for fear of leaving the place of surveillance. Subsequent forensic
examination by Felicisima Francisco of the National Bureau of Investigation showed that the substance seized was indeed
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu weighing 299.5 grams. In Criminal Case 39-94, De Guzman and Martin, the latter is still at
large, were charged with violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972). In Criminal Case 40-94,
de Guzman was charged with violation of Section 1, PD 1866 (Unlawful Possession of Firearms and Ammunition). De Guzman was
arraigned on 22 February 1993 with the assistance of his counsel de officio. He pleaded "not guilty" to both charges. On 22 August 1994,
the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 17, found de Guzman guilty of violation of Section 16, Article III, Republic Act 6425 and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P50,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency. Furthermore, the trial court found him guilty of violation of Section 1, Presidential Decree 1866 and sentenced him to suffer
imprisonment of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and to pay the
costs in both instances. De Guzman appealed.

Issue: Whether de Guzman’s arrest and the subsequent seizure of drug paraphernalia inside de Guzman’s cottage were legal even
without issued warrants for those purposes.

Held: Rule 113, Section 5 (a) of the Rules of Court provides that "A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." In this jurisdiction, the mere possession of a firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be
used in the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition is a criminal offense under PD 1866. De Guzman was caught by the police
officers in flagrante delicto while carrying a firearm without the necessary permit or license. Clearly, it was in violation of PD 1866,
Section 1, at the time of the arrest. Necessarily, the search conducted immediately after De Guzman's arrest was valid. Rule 126, Section
12 of the Rules of Court provides that "a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. The legal parameters of this rule limit its application to
instances when the search is made contemporaneous to the arrest and within a permissible area of search." In this case, it was
impossible for the police officers to obtain a search warrant as they were merely on surveillance, and to do so might abort any possible
illegal activity that was taking place. Any attempt at leaving the place may cause them to lose sight of the accused-appellant altogether.
Second, their presence in the area was not planned as they acted purely on a tip given by a fellow officer. Further, there was not enough
opportunity to obtain a warrant of arrest or a search warrant as the surveillance was conducted from 10:00 p.m. up to 7:00 a.m. The
search conducted immediately after de Guzman was apprehended was made more necessary by the presence of his companion inside
the cottage which was just a few steps away from where he stood. The presence of de Guzman's companion posed a danger to the police
officers' life and limb, hence, it became necessary for them to locate him. Upon entry at the rented cottage, the police officers saw the
shabu and drug- related paraphernalia scattered on top of the table. Jurisprudence allows the seizure of personality despite absence of
warrant under the "plain view doctrine," so long as the area of search is within the immediate control of the arrested person and that the
object of the search was open to the eye, as in the present case.

CASE #178. People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 609

Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt.
Ani was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to
Musa’s house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.

The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to
the house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100 meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going
on. Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked
money. Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and
inspected it. He raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the
house. Belarga frisked Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga
and Sgt. Lego went to the kitchen and found a ‘cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at the corner of the kitchen.’ They asked
Musa about its contents but failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana leaves inside. Musa was then placed
under arrest.

Issue: Whether the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.

Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure,
as an incident to a suspect’s lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. Objects in the ‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject
to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The ‘plain view’ doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. It will not justify the seizure of the
object where the incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the ‘plain view’ of the object.

In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the ‘plain view’ of the police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into
the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the ‘plain view’ of said object.

Therefore, the ‘plain view’ does not apply. The plastic bag was seized illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article
III Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.

CASE #179. People v. Rodriguez, 205 SCRA 791

FACTS: Patrolmen Gonzales and Bongalos searched Abrera and Rodriguez without any warrant, due to alleged information from an
unidentified telephone caller that someone was selling marijuana inside the Wonder Dog Circus. As Abrera and Rodriguez were found
to be acting suspiciously, the patrolmen approached and placed them under arrest. They found marijuana in the pockets of Rodriguez
and Abrera voluntarily handed over a plastic tea bag containing marijuana, both of which were turned over for investigation. When
investigated, Abrera voluntarily admitted to having possessed the marijuana that was confiscated from him but pointed at Rodriguez as
the one who gave him the marijuana and blamed Rodriguez for it. Consequently, Rodriguez was charged with violating Sec. 4, Art. II of
RA 6425. However, Abrera was not similarly charged because he was a user, with the police opting not to press any charges against him.

ISSUE: W/N the conviction of Rodriguez, based on the marijuana seized by the arresting officers without warrant, was valid.
HELD: No. The marijuana confiscated from Rodriguez is inadmissible in evidence for having been taken without a warrant. The SC
agrees with the SolGen’s assertion that the prosecution failed to establish that Rodriguez unlawfully sold, distributed and delivered
marijuana since the records show that the two prosecution witnesses (Pats. Gonzalez and Bongalos) did not actually see Rodriguez
transact any business dealing with marijuana. The person, who is in the best position to testify whether Rodriguez sold marijuana or
not, was Abrera, as he was the person whom Rodriguez allegedly dealt with. The SC is placed at a quandary as to why Abrera was not
prosecuted together with Rodriguez nor was he made to testify for the prosecution when he was named as one of its witnesses. As
testified to be the prosecution witnesses, Abrera was not similarly charged with Rodriguez because Abrera, when investigated, pointed
at Rodriguez as the person who gave him the marijuana. The reliance made by the police investigator on Abrera’s word is simply
puzzling. Admittedly, Pat. Gonzalez searched Rodriguez without a warrant. It is contended however that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of Rodriguez itself was also made without a warrant of arrest. In such a case, the arrest can be
justified only if there was a crime committed in the presence of the arrest officers. The arresting officers went to the “Wonder Dog
Circus” to verify a telephone call that a person with a knapsack had marijuana in his possession. Pat. Gonzalez admitted that they
arrested Rodriguez because he acted suspiciously. Pat. Bongalos also admitted in his testimony that he did not personally know whether
Rodriguez was in possession of the prohibited drug. There is no evidence to show that Rodriguez was committing any crime at the time
of arrest. The cardinal rule is that no person may be subjected by the police to a search of his house, body or personal belonging except
by virtue of a search warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. If a person is searched without a warrant, or under circumstances
other than those justifying an arrest without warrant in accordance with law, merely on suspicion that he is engaged in some felonious
enterprise, and in order to discover if he has indeed committed a crime, it is not only the arrest which is illegal but also, the search on
the occasion thereof as being ‘the fruit from the poisonous tree.’ The marijuana supposedly confiscated from Rodriguez is therefore
inadmissible in evidence for having been taken in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus,
the RTC decision convicting Rodriguez is reversed and set aside. Rodriguez is acquitted of the offense charged for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

CASE #180. People v. Usana. 323 SCRA 754

Facts:On 5 April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the MakatiPolice, namely, PO3 Eduardo P. Suba, PO3
Bernabe Nonato, SPO4 Juan de los Santos,and Inspector Ernesto Guico, were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator GilPuyat
Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX). They were checking the cars goingto Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious,
and imposing merely a running stopon the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride. P03 Suba saw a longfirearm on the
lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified asVirgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Julian D.
Escaño, to open the door.P03 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escaño, uponorder of the police,
parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were searchedfor more weapons.Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which
they seized from Escaño. The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3
Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the
vehicle, he requested Escaño toopen the trunk. Escaño readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. Theynoticed a blue
bag inside it, which they asked Escaño to open. The bag contained a parcelwrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National
Bureau of Investigation ForensicChemist Emilia A. Rosaldos, was found positive for hashish weighing 3.3143 kilograms.Virgilio T.
Usana and Jerry C. Lopez, together with Julian D. Escaño, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
64.Escaño and Usana were also charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition in violation of PresidentialDecree 1866. The
cases were consolidated and jointly tried. In its Decision of 30 May1997, which was promulgated on 17 June 1997, the trial court
convicted Escaño, Lopez,Usana and Escaño.

Issue: Whether the search conducted on Escano’s car is illegal, and whether the evidence acquired therein would be sufficient to
convict Lopez and Usana for possession of illegal drugs.

Held: The Court has ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal.

Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists
are allowed.

For, admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to certain extent, on motorists’ right to “free passage without interruption,” but it
cannot be denied that, as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are required to
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the
inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive. The checkpointherein
conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the COMELEC.

The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would
also defeat the purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during said period would know that they
only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their malicious designs. The facts adduced do not constitute a ground for a violation of the
constitutional rights of the accused against illegal search and seizure. PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they
deemed suspicious, such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof were carrying guns. At best they
would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars they would stop, without opening the car’s doors or subjecting its passengers to a
body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation demands. Despite the validity of the search, the Court
cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of RA 6425, as amended. The following factors militate against a finding
of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused
were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the
car’s trunk was opened, with the permission of Escaño,without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police
station and until the opening of the car’s trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced
to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escaño in the latter’s car before the
“finding” of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate
them to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and
Lopezknew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized.

CASE #181. People v. Che Chung Ting, 328 SCRA 592

Facts:

Accused-appellant was charged and convicted for dispatching in transit and having in his possession large amounts of shabu.
He contends that the shabu is inadmissible in evidence as it was seized without a valid search warrant.

Issue: Whether or not

Ruling:

The lawful arrest being the sole justification for the validity of the warrantless search under the exception, the same must be
limited to and circumscribed by the subject, time and place of the arrest. As to subject, the warrantless search is sanctioned only with
respect to the person of the suspect, and things that may be seized from him are limited to “dangerous weapons” or “anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.” Stated otherwise, to be valid, the search must have been conducted at about the
time of the arrest or immediately thereafter and only at the place where the suspect was arrested, or the premises or surroundings under
his immediate control.

As a consequence of the illegal search, the things seized on the occasion thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the
exclusionary rule. They are regarded as having been obtained from a polluted source, the “fruit of a poisonous tree.” However, objects
and properties the possession of which is prohibited by law cannot be returned to their owners notwithstanding the illegality of their
seizure. Thus, the shabu seized by the NARCOM operatives, which cannot legally be possessed by the accused under the law, can and
must be retained by the government to be disposed of in accordance with law.

CASE #182. Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, Sept. 3. 2009

Facts:

A duly issued warrant of arrest to the petitioner in a case of kidnapping for ransom was released. Valeroso was found and
arrested and was bodily searched and after which a firearm with live ammunition was found tucked in his waist. The subject firearm was
later confirmed and revealed to have not been issued to the petitioner but to another person.

The defense on the other hand claimed that Valeroso was arrested and searched (without a search warrant) in the boarding
house of his children. Later, an operative came out of the room exclaiming that he has found a gun inside. Jerry C. Valeroso was then
charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegally possessing a revolver without securing the necessary license/permit.
The petitioner through a letter of appeal asked the court to be reconsidered.

Issue: Whether the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm and ammunition has merit and valid

Ruling:
 Some valid grounds for a warrantless search and seizure are as follows: A person who was arrested lawfully may be searched so
that the officer may remove any weapons that the accused may be used to resist arrest. This is to protect the welfare of the officers and
to make sure that the arrest will happen. This is also to find evidence that otherwise can be destroyed by the accused. Further, a valid
arrest allows the seizure of evidence or any weapons either on the person or within the area of his immediate control.

Based on the statement of the petitioner, the petitioner did not resist arrest, He was tied and placed outside the room where
the gun was found; therefore the room where the gun was found could not be “in his immediate control. ” Incidental searches
without a warrant states that officers are permitted to seize any weapon that they can inadvertently found during the
arrest under the “plain view doctrine.” However, the firearm was not found accidentally but was actually searched and therefore
not incidental. Clearly, the search was illegal, a violation of Veloroso’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. Therefore, the
evidence obtained is inadmissible to court and cannot be used against him.

CASE #183. People v. Collado, G.R. No. 185719, June 17, 2013

Facts:

A buy bust operation team was conducted by PO2 Noble against spouses Marcelino and Myra. They were engaged in selling
shabu and that drug users, including out-of-school youth, were using their residence in 32 R. Hernandez St., San Joaquin, Pasig City,
for their drug sessions.

Meanwhile, SPO2 Cruz and another police officer went inside the house of Marcelino and Myra, where they found Apelo,
Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang and Latario gathered around a table littered with various drug paraphernalia such as
an improvised water pipe, strips of aluminum foil with traces of white substance, disposable lighters, and plastic sachets. A strip of
aluminum foil used for smoking marijuana was recovered from Ranada.

RTC found Marcelino and Myra guilty of Secs. 5, 6, and 11 of RA 9165. Apelo, Cipriano, Ranada, Abache, Sumulong, Madarang
and Latario are guilty of Sec. 14 of RA 9165. CA affirmed the decision with modification that Apelo, Abache, Sumulong, and Madarang
are accessories, not principals.

Issue: Whether or not irregularities attended the arrest, detention, and the procedure in handling the specimen seized from them

Held:

The arrest of the appellants was an arrest in flagrante delicto made in pursuance of Sec. 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
The arrest was effected after Marcelino and Myra performed the overt act of selling to PO2 Noble the sachet of shabu and Ranada of
having in his control and custody illegal drug paraphernalia.

As for the specimen, the failure of the police officers to inventory and photograph the confiscated items are not fatal to the
prosecution's cause, provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized substance were preserved, as in this case.

In Rañada’s case, the evidence of conspiracy against them was insufficient. Mere presence at the scene of the crime does not
imply conspiracy. The prosecution failed to show specific overt acts that would link these accused to Ranada's possession of the said
contrabands. The CA erred in ruling that they were accessories to the crime.

CASE #184. Sy v. People, G.R. No. 182178, August 15, 1011

Facts:

Petitioner was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 or RA 9165. Facts state that arresting officers,
PO3 Faelogo and PO3 Paquera, received information from a caller, informing them of an illegal drug trade. The two proceeded to the
reported place where they found petitioner, flicking a plastic allegedly containing shabu. The police officers arrested petitioner and
seized the said plastic as well as the lighter found in the petitioner’s possession. Petitioner denied ownership. He further claimed that he
wasn’t doing anything illegal and so the arrest done was a violation of his rights and that the article seized should be inadmissible since
it is the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was right in averring that the evidence was inadmissible, it being the ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’.

Ruling:

The court held that the petitioner’s failure to raise the issue on the validity of his arrest before arraignment and his active participation
in the proceedings in the lower court estopped him from assailing the same on appeal. He was deemed to have waived his right.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a) When, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an
offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

The following occasions also permits a warrantless search:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"

3. Search of a moving vehicle;

4. Consented warrantless search;

5. Customs search;

6. Stop and Frisk; and

7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.

The Court held that sufficient evidence supported the warrantless arrest of petitioner effected under Section 5 (a), or the arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto. The police officers witnessed petitioner flicking a transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline
substance in plain view. Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting officers immediately approached
petitioner, introduced themselves as police officers and effected the arrest. After laboratory examination, the white crystalline
substance placed inside the plastic sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.

The arrest having been lawful, the item seized was likewise lawful. Not to mention, the item’s veracity was well established. The Court
affirmed the lower courts decision and found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

CASE #185. Miclat v. People, G.R. No. 176077, Aug. 31, 2011

Facts:

Police Operatives received an INFOREP memo from Camp Crame regarding the drug trading activities being undertaken in
Brgy. Palmera Spring II. The officers were led to the house of petitioner Abe Miclat. PO3 Antonio positioned himself at the perimeter of
the house, while the rest of the group deployed themselves nearby. Thru a small opening in the curtain-covered window, PO3 Antonio
peeped inside and saw Abe arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be containing Shabu. PO3 Antonio
gained entrance and told to Miclat that he was a police officer, and Miclat voluntarily handed the 4 sachets to PO3 Antonio. PO3
Antonio then made the arrest

Petitioner claims that he was watching television with his father and sister when they heard a noise downstairs and saw men in
civilian clothes, who introduced themselves as police and arrested him, and the shabu was later planted while travelling in the police
station. Trial Court found the petitioner guilty of violating RA 9165.

Issue: Whether or not the warrantless arrest made was valid

Ruling:

Yes. At the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. He actively
participated before the trial court. He is deemed to have waived any perceived defect in his arrest.

At any rate, an arrest without warrant is lawful when (1) the person arrested execute an overt act that indicates he has just
committed, actually committing, or is attempting a crime; (2) the overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer. The petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto, and the shabu found falls within the “plain view doctrine” where: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he
observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure.

CASE #186. Valdez v. People, G.R. No. 170180, November 23, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Arsenio Valdez was found guilty by the lower courts for the violation of Section 11 of RA 9165 (Illegal possession of
dangerous drugs) after dried marijuana leaves were found in his possession by three barangay tanods who made a search on him.

Petitioner denied ownership and purported that he had just alighted from the bus when one of the barangay tanods
approached him and requested to see the contents of his bags. The petitioner was then brought by the three tanods to the house of Brgy.
Captain Mercado, who again ordered to have the bag opened. During which, the dried marijuana leaves were found.

Petitioner prays for his acquittal questioning, although for the first time on appeal, that his warrantless arrest was effected
unlawfully and the warrantless search that followed was likewise contrary to law.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner should be acquitted for the lack of a warrant supporting the arrest and the search.

Ruling:

The Court ruled for the reversal of the decision by the lower courts. The accused was acquitted by reasonable doubt.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedures provides for the only occasions permitting a warrantless arrest: (a)
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.The Court held that none of the circumstances was attendant at the time of the
arrest.

The Court also posed 2 exceptions to the said rule, to wit: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. None of the petitioner’s actuations (i.e. his looking around and alleged fleeing upon approach of
the tanods) is adequate to incite suspicion of criminal activity to validate the warrantless arrest.
 The Court added that the petitioner’s lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his
constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.

CASE #187. Abelita III v. Doria, 170672, Aug. 14, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner Judge Abelita filed a complaint for damages under Art. 32(4) and (9) of the Civil Code against Respondents Doria and
Ramirez. Petitioner alleged that he and his wife was on their home when the respondents accompanied by 10 unidentified police
officers, requested them to proceed to the PNP headquarters. Petitioner allemoged that when she parked his car in front of their house,
SPO3 Ramirez grabbed him and took his car keys, bared into the vehicle and conducted as search without a warrant. The search
resulted to the seizure of a licensed shotgun and an unlicensed .45 caliber pistol allegedly found inside the vehicle.

However, the respondent has a different version of the case. Doria alleged that they received a telephone call from a relative of Rosa Sia
about a shooting incident. He dispatched a team headed by Ramirez to investigate the incident. Ramirez reported that a certain William
Sia is wounded while Petitioner and his wife just left the place of the incident. Doria looked for the petitioner and when he found him,
he informed him about the incident, he requested Petitioner to go with him in the PNP HQ but the petitioner suddenly sped up his
vehicle and proceeded to his residence, they caught up with petitioner as he was about to run towards his house . The police officers saw
a gun in the front seat and a shotgun at the back. They confiscated the firearms and charged Petitioner for illegal possession of firearms
and frustrated murder and an administrative case.

Issue:

Whether or not the arrest and seizure was valid.

Whether or not the Respondents are liable for damages.

Whether the findings in the administrative case against petitioner is conclusive in this case.

Ruling:

Yes, the seizure was valid under plain view doctrine, objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence. The requisites of plain view are: the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; the discovery
of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and it is immediately apparent to the police officers that the firearm may be an evidence of a
crime. Hence, they were justified in seizing the firearms.

No, the court did not agree that petitioner was framed-up and that the respondents were presumed to be performing their duties in
accordance with law. They should not be held liable for damages.

While the present case and the administrative case are based on the same essential facts and circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata
will not apply. The requisites of res judicata are:

the former judgment must be final;

it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulation submitted by
the parties at the trial of the case;

it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;

there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of the parties, of subject matter, and cause of action; this requisite is
satisfied f the two actions are substantially between the same parties.
A administrative case deals with the administrative liability which may be incurred by the respondent for the commission of the acts
complained of. This case deals with the civil liability for damages of the police officers. There is no identity of causes of action in the
cases. While identity of causes of action is not required in the application of res judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, it
is required that there must always be identity of parties in the first and second cases. There is no identity of parties since the
administrative case was filed by Bejamin Sia Lao against petitioner and Benjamin is not a party to this case.

CASE #188. People v. Calantiao - 18 June 2014

FACTS:
Edwin Lojera narrated that while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic dispute
(gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8 th avenue street. Thereat, the passengers
of said taxicab, one of them is Medario Calantiao (accused), alighted and fired their guns . Surprised, Lojera could not do anything but
continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.

The officers on duty, PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez immediately proceeded to the scene where they found the white taxi. While
approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away. The officers
chased them and recovered from the armed men a black bag containing two cricks of marijuana and a magazine of super 38 stainless
with ammos, and recovered from Calantiao’s companion, Rommel Reyes, a .38 revolver.
The two suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 Temena, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police Station
for investigation and markings of the seized items and forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result of the
examination revealed that the same was positive for marijuana.
RTC: rendered judgment convicting Calantiao for violating RA 9165, for illegally possessing 997.9 grams of marijuana fruiting tops.
RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered during a body search after Calantiao was caught in
flagranted delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers.
CA: affirmed and found that the warrantless arrest was justified, as the police officers were acting on a legitimate complaint and had a
reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense. Likewise, the search and subsequent
seizure of the marijuana in question as lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest.
Hence, the present petition.

CALANTIAO’S CONTENTION:
He is questioning the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession, as evidence against him on the grounds of illegal search
and/or its custodial chain was broken.

ISSUE: WON the arrest is invalid and therefore in violation of Bill of Rights for right against illegal searches and seizures.

HELD: ARREST WAS VALID.

WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL ARREST

Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by the revised rules of criminal procedure. In lawful arrests, it
becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect,
but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.
The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be
inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the
safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.
In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control. He could
have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containg the marijuana was
in Calantiao’s possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE NOT APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE

Calantiano’s argument that the marijuana cannot be said as evidence against him because its discovery was in violation of the
plain view doctrine is misplaced. The plain view doctrine is not applicable in Calantia’s situation because the police officers purposely
searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession;
they deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.

PRESUMPTION OF REGULAR PERFORMANCE OF DUTY

 Unless it can be shown that there was bad faith, ill will, or tampering of the evidence, the presumption that the integrity of the
evidence has been preserved will remain. The burden of showing the foregoing to overcome the presumption that the police officers
handled the seized drugs with regularity, and that they properly discharged their duties is on Calantiao. Unfortunately, Calantiao failed
to discharge such burden.

Search conducted with the aid of canine dog

CASE #189. Indianapolis v. Edmonds 531 U.S. 32 (2000)

In 1998, the City of Indianapolis began to operate vehicle checkpoints in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. At each roadblock, one
office would conduct an open-view examination of the vehicle. At the same time, another office would walk a narcotics-detection dog
around the vehicle. Each stop was to last five minutes or less, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Both James Edmond
and Joell Palmer were stopped at one of the narcotics checkpoints. They then filed a lawsuit, on their behalf and the class of motorists
who had been stopped or were subject to being stopped, alleging that the roadblocks violated the Fourth Amendment and the search
and seizure provision of the Indiana Constitution. The District Court denied a request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the
checkpoint program did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals reversed.

Issue:
Whether their rights pertaining to a valid search and seizure was violated.

RULING:
YES.
*Ruling on the Validity of the Canine sniff test: does not constitute a “search”
It is well established that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure. The fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection
dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a search.
An exterior sniff of an automobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information other than the
presence or absence of narcotics. A sniff by a dog that simply walks around a car is "much less intrusive than a typical search." Rather,
what principally distinguishes these checkpoints from those we have previously approved is their primary purpose.

Because the checkpoint program's primary purpose is indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control, the checkpoints
violate the Fourth Amendment (Bill of Rights).

(a) The rule that a search or seizure is unreasonable absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing has limited exceptions. For
example, this Court has upheld brief, suspicionless seizures at a fixed checkpoint designed to intercept illegal aliens, and at a sobriety
checkpoint aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road. The Court has also suggested that a similar roadblock to verify drivers'
licenses and registrations would be permissible to serve a highway safety interest. However, the Court has never approved a
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.

(b) The latter purpose is what principally distinguishes the checkpoints at issue from those the Court has previously approved, which
were designed to serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety.
Petitioners state that the Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte checkpoints had the same ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected of
committing crimes. Securing the border and apprehending drunken drivers are law enforcement activities, and authorities employ
arrests and criminal prosecutions to pursue these goals.

But if this case were to rest at such a high level of generality, there would be little check on the authorities' ability to construct
roadblocks for almost any conceivable law enforcement purpose. The checkpoint program is also not justified by the severe and
intractable nature of the drug problem. The gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning what means law
enforcement may employ to pursue a given purpose.

Rather, in determining whether individualized suspicion is required, the Court must consider the nature of the interests threatened and
their connection to the particular law enforcement practices at issue. Nor can the checkpoints' purpose be rationalized in terms of a
highway safety concern, or merely likened to the antismuggling purpose, nor precludes an inquiry into the checkpoint program's
purposes. And if the program could be justified by its lawful secondary purposes of keeping impaired motorists off the road and verifying
licenses and registrations, authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also included a
license or sobriety check.
That is why the Court must determine the primary purpose of the checkpoint program. This holding does not alter the constitutional
status of the checkpoints approved in Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte, or the type of checkpoint suggested in Prouse. It also does not affect
the validity of border searches or searches in airports and government buildings, where the need for such measures to ensure public
safety can be particularly acute. Nor does it impair police officers' ability to act appropriately upon information that they properly learn
during a checkpoint stop justified by a lawful primary purpose. Finally, the purpose inquiry is to be conducted only at the programmatic
level and is not an invitation to probe the minds of individual officers acting at the scene.

CASE #190. Illinois v. Caballes – 543 U.S. 405 (2005)

After an Illinois state trooper stopped respondent for speeding and radioed in, a second trooper, overhearing the transmission, drove to
the scene with his narcotics-detection dog and walked the dog around respondent’s car while the first trooper wrote respondent a
warning ticket. When the dog alerted at respondent’s trunk, the officers searched the trunk, found marijuana, and arrested respondent.
At respondent’s drug trial, the court denied his motion to suppress the seized evidence, holding, inter alia, that the dog’s alerting
provided sufficient probable cause to conduct the search. Respondent was convicted, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, finding
that because there were no specific and articulable facts to suggest drug activity, use of the dog unjustifiably enlarged a routine traffic
stop into a drug investigation.

Held: A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance
that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Accordingly, the use of a well-trained narcotics-detection dog—one that "does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise would
remain hidden from public view," Place, 462 U. S., at 707—during a lawful traffic stop, generally does not implicate legitimate privacy
interests. In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respondent’s car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation.
Any intrusion on respondent’s privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement.

This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana
in a home constituted an unlawful search. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27 (2001). Critical to that decision was the fact that the
device was capable of detecting lawful activity—in that case, intimate details in a home, such as “at what hour each night the lady of the
house takes her daily sauna and bath.” Id., at 38. The legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain
private is categorically distinguishable from respondent’s hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband in the trunk
of his car. A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a
substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.

The judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this
opinion.

CASE #191. Florida v. Jardines – 569 U.S. 1 (2013)

In 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the Miami-Dade Police Department received an unverified tip that mari-juana was being grown in
the home of respondent Jardines. One month later, the Department and the Drug Enforcement Administration sent a joint surveillance
team to Jardines’ home. Detective Pedraja was part of that team. He watched the home for fifteen minutes and saw no vehicles in the
driveway or activity around the home, and could not see inside because the blinds were drawn.

Detective Pedraja then approached Jardines’ home accompanied by Detective Douglas Bartelt, a trained canine handler who had just
arrived at the scene with his drug-sniffing dog. The dog was trained to detect the scent of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and several other
drugs, indicating the presence of any of these substances through particular behavioral changes recognizable by his handler.

Detective Bartelt had the dog on a six-foot leash, owing in part to the dog’s “wild” nature, and tendency to dart around
erratically while searching. As the dog approached Jardines’ front porch, he apparently sensed one of the odors he had been trained to
detect, and began energetically exploring the area for the strongest point source of that odor. As Detective Bartelt explained, the dog
“began tracking that airborne odor by . . . tracking back and forth,” engaging in what is called “bracketing,” “back and forth, back and
forth.”
 After sniffing the base of the front door, the dog sat, which is the trained behavior upon discovering the odor’s strongest point.
Detective Bartelt then pulled the dog away from the door and returned to his vehicle. He left the scene after informing Detective Pedraja
that there had been a positive alert for narcotics.

On the basis of what he had learned at the home, Detective Pedraja applied for and received a warrant to search the
residence. When the warrant was executed later that day, Jardines attempted to flee and was arrested; the search revealed marijuana
plants, and he was charged with trafficking in cannabis.

At trial, Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana plants on the ground that the canine investigation was an unreasonable
search.

The trial court granted the motion, and the Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed.

Issue: Whether the search with the use of the trained narcotics dog was valid.

Ruling:

NO. The Supreme court held that the employment by the police of a trained drug-detection dog to sniff narcotics on the front porch of a
private home, in the absence of the consent of the owner, REQUIRES A SEARCH WARRANT, because the dog sniff was as being a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

When the Government obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses, papers, or effects, a search within the original
meaning of the Fourth Amendment has "undoubtedly occurred." The right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from
unreasonable governmental intrusion is the "very core” of the Fourth Amendment.

The area immediately surrounding and associated with the home, the curtilage, is part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment
purposes. The front porch is the classic exemplar of an area to which the activity of home life extends. The officers' entry was not
explicitly or implicitly invited. Officers need not "shield their eyes" when passing a home on public thoroughfares but "no man can set
his foot upon his neighbour's close without his leave." A police officer without a warrant may approach a home in hopes of speaking to
occupants, because that is “no more than any private citizen might do” but the scope of a license is limited not only to a particular area
but also to a specific purpose, and there is no customary invitation to enter the curtilage simply to conduct a search.

Thus, the government’s use of trained police dogs to investigate the home and its immediate surroundings is a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

CASE #192. Rodriguez v. U.S. – 575 U.S. (2015)

Officer Struble, a K–9 officer, stopped petitioner Rodriguez for drziving on a highway shoulder, a violation of Nebraska law. After Struble
attended to everything relating to the stop, including, checking the driver’s licenses of Rodriguez and his passenger and issuing a
warning for the traffic offense, he asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his dog around the vehicle. When Rodriguez refused, Struble
detained him until a second officer arrived. Struble then retrieved his dog, who alerted to the presence of drugs in the vehicle. The
ensuing search revealed methamphetamine. Seven or eight minutes elapsed from the time Struble issued the written warning until the
dog alerted.

Rodriguez was indicted on federal drug charges. He moved to suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle on the ground, among
others, that Struble had prolonged the traffic stop without reasonable suspicion in order to conduct the dog sniff.

After receiving evidence, a Magistrate Judge recommended that the motion be denied. The Magistrate Judge found no probable
cause to search the vehicle independent of the dog alert. (apart from “information given by the dog,” “Officer Struble had [no]thing
other than a rather large hunch”).

He further found that no reasonable suspicion supported the detention once Struble issued the written warning. Under Eighth Circuit
precedent, however, he concluded that prolonging the stop by “seven to eight minutes” for the dog sniff was only a de minimis intrusion
on Rodriguez’s Fourth Amendment rights and was for that reason permissible.

The District Court then denied the motion to suppress. Rodriguez entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to five years in
prison. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. Noting that the seven or eight minute delay was an acceptable “de minimis intrusion on Rodriguez’s
personal liberty,” the court declined to reach the question whether Struble had reasonable suspicion to continue Rodriguez’s detention
after issuing the written warning.

Held:

1. Absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop in order to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield
against unreasonable seizures.

Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes “ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.”
Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver,
and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the
traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

A dog sniff, by contrast, is a measure aimed at “detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.” Candidly, the Government
acknowledged at oral argument that a dog sniff, unlike the routine measures just mentioned, is not an ordinary incident of a traffic stop.
Lacking the same close connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries, a dog sniff is not fairly characterized as part of the
officer’s traffic mission.

The Government’s argument that an officer who completes all traffic-related tasks expeditiously should earn extra time to pursue an
unrelated criminal investigation is unpersuasive, for a traffic stop “prolonged beyond” the time in fact needed for the officer to complete
his traffic-based inquiries is “unlawful,” The critical question is not whether the dog sniff occurs before or after the officer issues a ticket,
but whether conducting the sniff adds time to the stop.

2. The Magistrate Judge found that detention for the dog sniff in this case was not independently supported by individualized
suspicion, and the District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge’s findings.

The Court of Appeals, however, did not review that determination. The question whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
justified detaining Rodriguez beyond completion of the traffic infraction investigation, therefore, remains open for Eighth Circuit
consideration on remand.The determination adopted by the District Court that detention for the dog sniff was not independently
supported by individualized suspicion was not reviewed by the Eighth Circuit.

That question therefore remains open for consideration on remand.

Therefore the lower court's ruling was vacated and remanded.

CASE #193. Edstrom v. Minnesota –916 N.W.2d 512 (Minn. 2018)

In October 2015, police received information from a confidential informant that Courtney John Edstrom was selling methamphetamine
from a Brooklyn Park apartment building. This informant also told police that Edstrom lived on the third floor of this building, drove a
black Cadillac sedan, and had been seen carrying a pistol within the last three months. Police showed the informant a picture of
Edstrom, and the informant affirmed that the man in the photo was the individual selling narcotics in Brooklyn Park. Police used
vehicle registration records to confirm that Edstrom did in fact drive a black Cadillac. Based on these facts, police conducted a
warrantless dog sniff in Edstrom’s apartment building. Police gained access to the apartment building through a key that property
management placed inside a Knox Box. As police walked the dog down the common hallway, it sniffed other apartment doors but did
not alert to narcotics until sniffing the door of apartment #305. Following this positive alert, police applied for and received a search
warrant. Within the warrant affidavit, law enforcement presented details surrounding the dog sniff, including that the dog alerted after
sniffing the seam of the apartment door. Police executed the warrant for Edstrom’s apartment and recovered firearms, ammunition,
scales with methamphetamine residue, some marijuana, and about 226 grams of methamphetamine.

Following execution of the search warrant, the state charged Edstrom with two counts of first-degree controlled substances crimes, one
count of prohibited person in possession of a firearm, and one count of fifth-degree controlled substance crime.106 Edstrom moved to
suppress the evidence obtained from the search of apartment #305, arguing the warrantless dog sniff violated his constitutional
rights.107 At a Rasmussen108 hearing, the State offered officer testimony about the Knox Box in Edstrom’s apartment building and the
circumstances of the dog sniff.109 The district court denied Edstrom’s motion to suppress the recovered methamphetamine, marijuana,
drug paraphernalia, and firearms.110 The district court’s reasoning was twofold: (1) Edstrom lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the common hallway of the apartment building; and (2) Edstrom could not have a property right in the common hallway area because
it was not within the curtilage of his apartment.111

the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s denial of suppression.

ISSUE: “whether a warrantless narcotics-dog sniff in the hallway outside respondent’s apartment violated [Edstrom’s] right to be free
from unreasonable searches under the United States or Minnesota Constitution.”

RULING:

The court noted that a search can occur under the Fourth Amendment in two ways: “First, there can be a search when the government
physically intrudes into a constitutionally protected area. Second, there can be a search when the government intrudes upon a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.” Examining the dog sniff under the property-rights prong of the Fourth Amendment, the Minnesota
Supreme Court considered whether the dog sniffed the curtilage of Edstrom’s home.
The court noted that Edstrom failed to establish his exclusive use or possession of the common hallway outside his apartment door.136
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals’ holding that the dog sniff did not implicate the curtilage of Edstrom’s
residence.

the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed whether the dog sniff violated Edstrom’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
In the majority’s opinion, the key inquiry in evaluating the government’s actions is whether the device can detect both lawful and
unlawful activity. The court, citing Place, concluded that a dog sniff could only reveal illegal activity because the sniff “discloses only the
presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.” From there, the majority reasoned that because one cannot possess a legitimate
interest in possessing contraband, “government conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate
privacy interest.’”

In summary, the majority affirmed the court of appeals’ decision related to the curtilage analysis of the common hallway but reversed
the court of appeals’ conclusion that the dog sniff violated Edstrom’s expectation of privacy. The majority relegated perhaps the most
important part of its analysis to a footnote, asserting: Jardines did not disturb this well-settled treatment of dog sniffs. It was not merely
the presence of the dog sniffing for narcotics that constituted a search in Jardines; it was the government agents entering the curtilage
of the home not simply to talk to the occupant—just as any person could do—but to search for evidence of a crime (citation omitted).
The presence of the dog is immaterial if there is no entry into the curtilage, nor does the presence of a dog create curtilage where it
would not otherwise be.

Search conducted through the use of thermal imaging

CASE #194. Kyllo v. United States – 533 U.S. 27 (2001)

In 1991 Agent William Elliott of the U.S. Dept. of the Interior came to suspect that marijuana was being grown in the home belonging to
petitioner Danny Kyllo, part of a triplex on Rhododendron Drive in Florence, Oregon. Indoor marijuana growth typically requires high
intensity lamps. In order to determine whether an amount of heat was emanating from the petitioner's home consistent with the use of
such lamps, at 3:20 a.m. on January 16, 1992, Agent Elliott and Dan Haas used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan
the triplex. Thermal imagers detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is not visible to the naked eye. The
imager converts radiation into images based on relative warmth-black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences;
in that respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.

The scan of Kyllo's home took only a few minutes and was performed from the passenger seat of Agent Elliott's vehicle across the
street from the front of the house and also from the street in back of the house.

The scan showed that Kyllo's garage roof and a side wall were relatively hot compared to the rest of his home and substantially warmer
than the neighboring units. Based in part on the thermal imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home,
where the agents found marijuana growing.

After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then
entered a conditional guilty plea. The Ninth Circuit ultimately affirmed, upholding the thermal imaging on the ground that Kyllo had
shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home. Even if he
had, ruled the court, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the thermal imager did not expose any
intimate details of Kyllo's life, only amorphous hot spots on his home's exterior.
Held: Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would
previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment "search," and is
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.

(a) The question whether a warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no in most
instances, but the antecedent question whether a Fourth Amendment "search" has occurred is not so simple. This Court has approved
warrantless visual surveillance of a home, ruling that visual observation is no "search" at all. In assessing when a search is not a
search, the Court has adapted a principle first enunciated in the case of Katz: A "search" does not occur-even when its object is a
house explicitly protected by the Fourth Amendment-unless the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the
searched object, and society is willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.

(b) While it may be difficult to refine the Katz test in some instances, in the case of the search of a home's interior-the prototypical and
hence most commonly litigated area of protected privacy-there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in the common law, of the minimal
expectation of privacy that exists, and that is acknowledged to be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation
would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. Thus, obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the home's interior that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical "intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area," constitutes a search-at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use.
This assures preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.

(c) Based on this criterion, the information obtained by the thermal imager in this case was the product of a search. The Court rejects
the Government's argument that the thermal imaging must be upheld because it detected only heat radiating from the home's external
surface. Such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was rejected in Katz, where the eavesdropping device in question
picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone booth to which it was attached. Reversing that approach would
leave the homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology-including imaging technology that could discern all human activity in the
home. Also rejected is the Government's contention that the thermal imaging was constitutional because it did not detect "intimate
details." Such an approach would be wrong in principle because, in the sanctity of the home, all details are intimate details . It would
also be impractical in application, failing to provide a workable accommodation between law enforcement needs and Fourth
Amendment interests.

(d) Since the imaging in this case was an unlawful search, it will remain for the District Court to determine whether, without the evidence
it provided, the search warrant was supported by probable cause-and if not, whether there is any other basis for supporting admission
of that evidence.

Thus, the case was reversed and remanded.

Search conducted on a moving vehicle

CASE #195. People v. Tangliben – April 6, 1990

Facts: At around 9:30 in the evening the Patrolmen noticed a person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting suspiciously and they
confronted him; that the person was requested by Patrolman Quevedo and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person
refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen identified themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in
plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less.

The counsel for the accused stated that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without a
warrant and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

Issue: Whether the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant and is therefore
inadmissible in evidence.

Held: No. The contention is devoid of merit.

One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest . Thus,
Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
“Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.”

Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:

“xxx A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.”

Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls
squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.

CASE #196. People v. Maspil – 266 Phil. 815 (1990)

ID.; ID.; ID.; SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT AT CHECKPOINTS; VALIDITY THEREOF; CASE AT BAR. — U pon inspection at a
checkpoint in front of the Municipal Hall at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, the jeep driven by Maspil with Bagking as his companion was
found loaded with suspected dried marijuana leaves. The appellants were arrested as a consequence and the suspected marijuana
leaves were confiscated. The search was conducted within reasonable limits. There was information that a sizeable volume of
marijuana will be transported to take advantage of the All Saints Day holiday wherein there will be a lot of people going to and from
Baguio City.

In fact, during the three day (October 30, 1986 to November 1, 1986) duration of the checkpoint, there were also other drug related
arrests made aside from that of the two appellants. As held in the case of Valmonte, checkpoints during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful community. But even without the
Valmonte ruling, the search would still be valid. This case involves a search incident to a lawful arrest which is one of the exceptions to
the general rule requiring a search warrant. This exception is embodied in Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. The appellants were caught in flagrante delicto since they were transporting the prohibited drugs at the time of their arrest.
A crime was actually being committed.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NO SUFFICIENT TIME FOR POLICE OFFICERS TO OBTAIN A WARRANT IN CASE AT BAR. — The
appellants, however, cite the case of People v. Aminnudin, (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In said case, the PC officers received information
that the accused-appellant, on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City, was carrying marijuana. When the accused-appellant was
descending the gangplank, the PC officers detained him and inspected the bag that he was carrying and found marijuana.

The Court ruled that since the marijuana was seized illegally, it is inadmissible in evidence. There are certain facts of the said case
which are not present in the case before us. In the Aminnudin case, the records showed that there was sufficient time and adequate
information for the PC officers to have obtained a warrant. The officers knew the name of the accused, that the accused was on board
M/V Wilcon 9, bound to Iloilo and the exact date of the arrival of the said vessel. On the other hand, in this case there was no
information as to the exact description of the vehicle and no definite time of the arrival. A jeepney cannot be equated with a passenger
ship on the high seas. The ruling in the Aminnudin case, is not applicable to the case at bar.

CASE #197. People v. Cogaed – 740 Phil. 212 (2014)

According to the prosecution, at about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, Police Senior Inspector Sofronio Bayan (PSI Bayan)
of the San Gabriel Police Station in San Gabriel, La Union, "received a text message from an unidentified civilian informer" that one
Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat) "[would] be transporting marijuana" from one barngay to a poblacion in La Union.

PSI Bayan organized checkpoints in order "to intercept the suspect." 5 PSI Bayan ordered (SPO1 Taracatac), a member of the
San Gabriel Police, to set up a checkpoint in the waiting area of passengers from San Gabriel bound for San Fernando City.

A passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at SPO1 Taracatac's checkpoint. 7 The jeepney driver disembarked and
signalled to SPO1 Taracatac indicating the two male passengers who were carrying marijuana. 8 SPO1 Taracatac approached the two
male passengers who were later identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. 9 Cogaed was carrying a blue bag
and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.
 SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. 11 Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that
they did not know since they were transporting the bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. 12 After this exchange, Cogaed
opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana.

They were escorted to the police station.

While at the police station, the Chief of Police and Investigator PO3 Stanley Campit (PO3 Campit) requested Cogaed and
Dayao to empty their bags. 18 Inside Cogaed's sack was "four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," 19 and inside
Dayao's yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana. PO3 Campit prepared the suspected marijuana for laboratory testing. 21 PSI
Bayan personally delivered the suspected marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. 22 Forensic Chemical Officer Police Inspector
Valeriano Panem Laya II performed the tests and found that the objects obtained were indeed marijuana.

Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid stop and frisk in this case.

RULING:

NO. Unlike many of the cases cited by the Supreme Court, which indicated suspicion. The case of Cogaed was different. He was
simply a passenger carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney. There was nothing suspicious, moreover, criminal, about riding a
jeepney or carrying a bag. The assessment of suspicion was not made by the police officer but by the jeepney driver. It was the driver
who signalled to the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The jeepney driver had to point to Cogaed. He would not have been identified by the police officers otherwise.

It is the police officer who should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion of a person. The police
officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. This is necessary to justify that the person suspected be stopped and
reasonably searched. Anything less than this would be an infringement upon one's basic right to security of one's person and effects.

Stop and frisk

Normally, "stop and frisk" searches do not give the law enforcer an opportunity to confer with a judge to determine probable
cause.

For warrantless searches, probable cause was defined as "a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is
charged."

Malacat v. Court of Appeals 89 clarifies the requirement further. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be
mere suspicion. 90 It has to be a "genuine reason" 91 to serve the purposes of the "stop and frisk" exception: 92

A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about him.

The court also cited another case that reminds us that police officers must not rely on a single suspicious circumstance. 95
There should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity, which, taken together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity." The Constitution prohibits "unreasonable searches and seizures." 97 Certainly, reliance on only one suspicious
circumstance or none at all will not result in a reasonable search. 98

There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable cause
requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the
name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was
transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search
Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant.

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless there is compliance with the
"genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and
detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without
probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to
take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. 99 (Emphasis supplied)
 The "stop and frisk" search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons. 100
As in Manalili, 101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk" for cases involving dangerous drugs.

The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. 102 In that case, an informant told the police that a certain
"Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by bus. 103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. 104
The informant pointed at a woman crossing the street 105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa." 106 The police apprehended "Aling
Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. 107 The bag contained marijuana leaves. 108

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. 109 There were no suspicious circumstances that
preceded Aruta's arrest and the subsequent search and seizure. 110 It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend
her. 111 The evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search. 112 Consequently, Aruta was acquitted. 113

Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police's informant, who informed the police
that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. 114 Here, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing drugs. 115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted
Aminnudin while he was disembarking from a boat. 116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin's bag and found bundles
of what turned out to be marijuana leaves. 117 The court declared that the search and seizure was illegal. 118 Aminnudin was
acquitted. 119 SEDICa

People v. Chua 120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been receiving information that
the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in Angeles City." 121 One night, the police received information that this
drug dealer would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. 122 A car "arrived and parked" 123 at the
hotel. 124 The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing drugs. 125 The man alighted from his car. 126 He
was carrying a juice box. 127 The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and in
the juice box he was holding. 128

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua's situation when the police apprehended him
and ruled that "[t]here was no valid 'stop-and-frisk'."

CASE #198. Veridiano v. People, G.R. No. 200370, 7 June 2017,

Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.

January 15, 2008, in the Municipality of Nagcarlan, Province of Laguna... did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, control and custody one (1) small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 2.72 grams of dried marijuana
leaves, a dangerous drug.

On October 9, 2008, Veridiano was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the offense charged

7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves... informing him that

Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs

Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano.

At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing what appeared to be marijuana.

PO1 Cabello confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials

Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights.

He was then brought to the police station.

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials.

PO1 Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he personally brought with the seized tea bag to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory.[21] The contents of the tea bag tested positive for marijuana

For his defense, Veridiano testified

Two (2) armed men boarded the jeepney and frisked Veridiano.[28] However, they found nothing on his person.[29] Still, Veridiano was
accosted and brought to the police station where he was informed that "illegal drug was . . . found in his possession

Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested."

He argued that the tea bag containing marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree.'"

On the other hand, the prosecution asserted that

Thus, by entering his plea, Veridiano waived his right to question any irregularity in his arrest.

the prosecution argued that Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the
warrantless search

On November 18, 2011, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[39] affirming the guilt of Veridiano.

Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs

Veridiano appealed the decision of the trial court asserting that "he was illegally arrested.

Veridiano further argued that the police officers failed to comply with the rule on chain of custody.

the prosecution argued that Veridiano's "submissive deportment at the time of the search" indicated that he consented to the
warrantless search

In the Decision dated July 16, 2010,[31] the Regional Trial Court found Veridiano guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of illegal
possession of marijuana.

The Court of Appeals found that "Veridiano was caught in flagrante delicto" of having marijuana in his possession.

Issues:

Whether the warrantless search was valid.

Ruling: NO.
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court.
He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the
presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip
they received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be
arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed. [106]

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The law
enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would
justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The warrantless search cannot be justified under the reasonable suspicion requirement in "stop and frisk" searches.
Similar to the case of Cogaed, petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that would give
police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons will act in a nervous manner in
any check point. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that would reasonably allow them to
infer anything suspicious.

Moreover, petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the warrantless search. Although the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver, the prosecution must prove that the waiver was
executed with clear and convincing evidence

routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a visual search. This holds especially true
when the object of the search is a public vehicle where individuals have a reasonably reduced expectation of privacy. On the other hand,
extensive searches are permissible only when they are founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained will be subject to the
exclusionary principle under the Constitution.
That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify an extensive search absent probable cause.
Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of confidential or tipped information. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable
it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits of warrantless searches. They
had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar
activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The
checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana seized
from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being
no evidence to support his conviction, petitioner must be acquitted.

CASE #199. Saluday v. People – 3 April 2018

Facts: Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army at a checkpoint to check the
presence of contraband, illegal firearms or explosives and suspicious individuals. A bag, small but too heavy for its size, belonging to
the Petitioner, Marcelo G. Saluday, was found by SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco). Petitioner was arrested for failure to produce authority
to carry firearms and explosives. In an inquest conducted, the Prosecutor of Davao City found probable cause for violation of PD 1866
for carrying firearms, explosives and ammunition.

The trial court declared the Petitioner in actual or constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority or license and was
adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosives under PD 1866.

On appeal, the Petitioner questioned the decision of the trial court on the ground on misappreciation of evidence and illegality of the
search. The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Hence, this petition

Issue: Whether the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal

Ruling:

No. Indeed, the constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition. Rather, it operates against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures only. Conversely, when a search is "reasonable," Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not apply. As to what qualifies as
a reasonable search, the pronouncements of the U.S. Supreme Court, which are doctrinal in this jurisdiction.

In the seminal case of Katz v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the electronic surveillance of a phone
conversation without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, what the Fourth Amendment
protects are people, not places such that what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his or her own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection in much the same way that what he or she seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.

Further, Justice John Harlan laid down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of the
Fourth Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation is one that society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable (objective).

A survey of Philippine case law would reveal the same jurisprudential reasoning. To illustrate, in People v. Johnson, the Court
declared airport searches as outside the protection of the search and seizure clause due to the lack of an expectation of privacy that
society will regard as reasonable and as well as seaport searches on the ground that the safety of the traveling public overrides a person's
right to privacy. Similarly, the Court in the case of People v. Breis, justified a bus search owing to the reduced expectation of privacy of
the riding public.
 In the cast at bar, the bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable search.
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have a reduced expectation of privacy.
Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted the petitioner's bag. This visual and minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-
ray and physical inspections done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open their bags and
luggages. Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution finds no application, thereby
precluding the necessity for a warrant.

Moreover, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right, which may be waived.
However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. In this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA Buco asked if he could
open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered"yes, just open it" based on petitioner's own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to
the search of the contents of his bag.

To emphasize, a reasonable search, on the one hand, and a warrantless search, on the other, are mutually exclusive. W hile both
State intrusions are valid even without a warrant, the underlying reasons for the absence of a warrant are different. A reasonable search
arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason Section 2, Article III of the Constitution fiinds no applicati on. Examples
include searches done at airports, seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public places. In contrast, a warrantless search is
presumably an "unreasonable search," but for reasons of practicality, a search warrant can be dispensed with. Examples include search
incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain view, consented search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle.

Hence, the petition was denied.

CASE #200. People v. Sapla – G.R. No. 244045, 16 June 2020

Facts:

In the morning of 10 January 2014, an unnamed officer at the Regional Public Safety Battalion (RPSB) in Tabuk, Kalinga
received a text message from an informant (concerned citizen) that an individual will be transporting marijuana from Kalinga to
Isabela. PO2 Jim Mabiasan (not the officer who received the text message) then relayed the information to the deputy commander who
coordinated with the PDEA.

About 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, a follow up information via text message was received by the RPSB this
time detailing the description of the drug courier, to wit: male, wearing collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying
a blue sack; he will be boarding a passenger jeepney bearing plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Based on this
information, a checkpoint was organized by the PNP.

At around 1:20 o’clock, the jeepney arrived. The police officers stopped the jeepney and inside they saw the person described in
the text message they received. They approached said person and asked him if the blue sack in front of him was his. The person
answered yes. The police officers then requested the person to open the blue sack. The person hesitated but he eventually complied. The
content of the blue sack was four bricks of marijuana. The person was later identified as Jerry Sapla.

In court, Sapla denied the allegations as he claimed that when he boarded the jeep, he did not have any sack with him; that the
blue sack was only attributed as belonging to him by the police. Sapla was convicted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
conviction and ruled that the informant’s tip was sufficient to engender probable cause upon the minds of the police officers; that it was
sufficient to conduct a warrantless search and seizure.

Issue: (1)W/N there was a valid search and seizure conducted by the police officers on the sole basis of an unverified tip relayed by an
anonymous informant
 (2) W/N the situation presented is a search of a moving vehicle

Ruling:

(1) No. In a long line of cases (Pp. vs Aminnudin, Pp. vs Cuizon, Pp. vs Encinada, Pp. vs Aruta, Pp. vs Cogaed, Veridiano vs
Pp., Pp. vs Comprado, Pp. vs Yanson, and Pp. vs Gardon-Mentoy), the Supreme Court has always said that a mere informant’s tip is
not sufficient to engender probable cause. The police officer receiving the informant’s tip must rely on his senses. The police officer
must not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. The police officer, with his/her personal knowledge, must observe the facts
leading to the suspicion of an illicit act and not merely rely on the information passed on to him/her.

Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of a tip. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to
constitute probable cause in the absence of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion

Hence, considering the foregoingi discussion, the Court now holds that the cases adhering to the doctrine that
exclusive reliance on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot engender probable cause that permits a warrantless
search of a moving vehicle that goes beyond a visual search — which include both long-standing and the most recent
jurisprudence —should be the prevailing and controlling line of jurisprudence.

Any person can easily hide in a shroud of anonymity and simply send false and fabricated information to the police.
Unscrupulous persons can effortlessly take advantage of this and easily harass and intimidate another by simply giving false
information to the police, allowing the latter to invasively search the vehicle or premises of such person on the sole basis of a bogus tip.

Applying the foregoing discussion in the instant case, to reiterate, the police merely adopted the unverified and
unsubstantiated suspicion of another person, i.e., the person who sent the text through the RPSB Hotline. Apart from the information
passed on to them, the police simply had no reason to reasonably believe that the passenger vehicle contained an item, article or object
which by law is subject to seizure and destruction

The police did not even endeavor to inquire how this stranger gathered the information. The authorities did not even ascertain
in any manner whether the information coming from the complete stranger was credible. Moreover, as testified by PO3 Mabiasan
himself, tipped information received by the authorities through the duty guard was unwritten and unrecorded and was considered by
the Court as double hearsay.

Surely, probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless search and seizure cannot possibly arise from double hearsay
evidence and from an irregularly-received tipped information. A reasonably discreet and prudent man will surely not believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item sought in connection with said offense are in the place to be searched based solely on the
say-so of an unknown duty guard that a random, unverified text message was sent to an unofficial mobile phone by a complete stranger.

Therefore, with the glaring absence of probable cause that justifies an intrusive warrantless search, considering that the police
officers failed to rely on their personal knowledge and depended solely on an unverified and anonymous tip,the warrantless search
conducted on accused- appellant Sapla was an invalid and unlawful search of a moving vehicle.

(2) No. According to jurisprudence, "warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the
vehicle is limited to visual inspection."

On the other hand, an extensive search of a vehicle is permissible, but only when "the officers made it upon probable cause,
i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains [an]
item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction."

The Court finds error in the CA's holding that the search conducted in the instant case is a search of a moving vehicle. The
situation presented in the instant case cannot be considered as a search of a moving vehicle.
 In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In
this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person.

In the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the target of the search conducted was not the passenger jeepney
boarded by accused-appellant Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the person who matched
the description given by the person who called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the person wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, red
ball cap, and carrying a blue sack.

Therefore, the search conducted in the instant case cannot be characterized as a search of a moving vehicle.

Sec. 14. Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress evidence; where to file

CASE #201. Tan v. Sy Tiong Gue. G.R. No. 174570, Dec. 15, 2010

Facts:

An information on the crime of Robbery was filed against Sy Tiong Gue and others for the taking of a large amount of cash,
post dated checks and other equipments in the office of Guan Yiak Hardware in Binondo Manila belonging to Sy Siy Ho and Sons
represented by Romer S. Tan. Two search warrants were applied for stating therein the personal knowledge of the police officer of the
items lost. Judge Lanzanas issued the Search warrants. The warrants were later served. Under the first search warrant, twelve Hennessy
XOs and one box containing seven Hennessy XOs, were seized. However, the enforcement of the other search warrant yielded negative
results.

Hence, respondents filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrants which petitioner opposed. The RTC issued an order denying
the motion. Hence, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA granted the motion to quash the search warrants.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by RTC of the subject search warrants.

Ruling:

Yes. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed by a judge and directed
to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described therein and to bring it before the court. The issuance of a
search warrant is governed by Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.

Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must be issued upon probable
cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter
may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such reasons supported by
facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper. Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. It does not call for an
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. Applying these set standards,
this Court finds that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in issuing the subject search warrants.

The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested in the trial judges in the exercise of their judicial functions. A finding
of probable cause, which would merit the issuance of a search warrant, needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. The determination of whether probable cause exists as to
justify the issuance of a search warrant is best left to the sound discretion of a judge.
 Apparent in the case at bar and as aptly found by the RTC judge, there was probable cause justifying the issuance of the search
warrants. This was established by the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the testimonies, consisting of no less than 37 pages, given by witnesses
who had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the crime of robbery had been committed and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense were in the place sought to be searched. The facts narrated by the witnesses while under oath, when they were asked by
the examining judge, were sufficient justification for the issuance of the subject search warrants.

CASE #202. World Wide Web v. People - 13 Jan. 2014

Facts:

Police Chief Inspector Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office of the PNP filed applications for warrants
before the RTC of Quezon City to search the office premises of Worldwide Web Corporation and Planet Internet Corporation located at
the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet
Corporation (Planet Internet) located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City.

The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation
of P.D. No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or
Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the PLDT. The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for
search warrants. The applicants Rivera and Gali of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses.

The RTC granted the application for search warrants. Three warrants were issued against the office premises of petitioners,
authorizing police officers to seize various items in the office premises of WWC and Planet Internet, which includes various
telecommunications equipment to support the illegal toll bypass operations. The warrants were implemented on the same day by
RISOO operatives of the NCR-PNP.

Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 CPUs, 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a
laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the
transmission of international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well
as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.

Petitioners filed their respective motions to quash the search warrants, citing basically the same grounds:

(1) the search warrants were issued without probable cause, since the acts complained of did not constitute theft;
(2) toll bypass, the act complained of, was not a crime;
(3) the search warrants were general warrants; and
(4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree."

The RTC granted the motions to quash on the ground that the warrants issued were in the nature of general warrants.
However, this was reversed by the CA declaring the search warrant valid and effective.

Issue:

1) Whether or not conformity of the public prosecutor is necessary prior filing a motion for reconsideration to question an order
quashing search warrants
2.) Whether or not an order quashing a search warrant issued independently prior to the filing of a criminal action is deemed a final
order that can be the subject of an appeal

Ruling:

(1) No. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, therefore, conformity of the public prosecutor is not
necessary to give PLDT personality to question the RTC. The general rule is that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the
prosecution of all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information.
 However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application
therefor.An application for a search warrant is a special criminal process, rather than a criminal action. The application for and the
obtention of a search warrant cannot be equated with the institution and prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court

The requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the
institution of a criminal action. A warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.

A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in
its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity

(2)· An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the filing of a criminal action, is not
merely an interlocutory order. It partakes of a final order and can be the proper subject of an appeal. Therefore, PLDT was correct when
they assailed the quashal orders via an appeal rather than a petition for certiorari.

An application for a search warrant is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case already filed in
court or in anticipation of one yet to be filed. Whether the criminal case (of which the search warrant is an incident) has already been
filed before the trial court is significant for the purpose of determining the proper remedy from a grant or denial of a motion to quash a
search warrant. Where the search warrant is issued as an incident in a pending criminal case, the quashal of a search warrant is merely
interlocutory.
In contrast, where a search warrant is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the order
quashing the warrant (and denial of a motion for reconsideration of the grant) ends the judicial process.
When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court.
Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.

CASE #203. People v. Calantiao - 18 June 2014

Facts:

Edwin Lojera narrated that while driving a towing truck and traversing along EDSA, Balintawak, Quezon City, he had a traffic
dispute (gitgitan) with a white taxi cab prompting him to follow said vehicle until they reached along 8th avenue street. Thereat, the
passengers of said taxicab, one of them is Medario Calantiao (accused), alighted and fired their guns. Surprised, Lojera could not do
anything but continued his driving until he reached a police station nearby where he reported the incident.

The officers on duty, PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez immediately proceeded to the scene where they found the white taxi.
While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted therefrom, fired their guns towards them (police officers) and ran away. The
officers chased them and recovered from the armed men a black bag containing two cricks of marijuana and a magazine of super 38
stainless with ammos, and recovered from Calantiao’s companion, Rommel Reyes, a .38 revolver.

The two suspects and the confiscated items were then turned over to SPO3 Temena, police investigator at Bagong Barrio Police
Station for investigation and markings of the seized items and forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis. The result
of the examination revealed that the same was positive for marijuana.

The RTC rendered judgment convicting Calantiao for violating RA 9165, for illegally possessing 997.9 grams of marijuana
fruiting tops. RTC held that the illegal drug seized was admissible in evidence as it was discovered during a body search after Calantiao
was caught in flagranted delicto of possessing a gun and firing at the police officers.

The CA affirmed and found that the warrantless arrest was justified, as the police officers were acting on a legitimate complaint
and had a reasonable suspicion that the persons identified at the scene were the perpetrators of the offense. Likewise, the search and
subsequent seizure of the marijuana in question as lawful and valid, being incidental to a lawful arrest.

Hence, the present petition.

Issue: Whether or not the marijuana found in his possession was an admissible evidence against him.

HELD: Yes.

Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by the revised rules of criminal procedure. In lawful arrests, it
becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect,
but also in the permissible area within the latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous
weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control.

The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is to protect the arresting officer from
being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence
within reach. It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be
inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee. It seeks to ensure the
safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession and within his immediate control. He could
have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was
in Calantiao’s possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.

Module 6: RULE 114 – BAIL

Section 1: Bail Defined

CASE #204. Almeda v. Villaluz, 86 SCRA 38

Facts:

Leonardo Almeda was charged, together with five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle in the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of
Almeda was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing,
Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him but such request was denied.
Because of this, Almeda filed the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction against respondent Judge Villaluz.
Almeda contends that the judge has no authority to require that the bond be strictly in cash.

Issue: Whether or not the judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and disallow the petitioner’s attempt to post a surety
bond for his provisional liberty

Ruling:

No. Bail is "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail
is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. In order to safeguard the right
of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall not be required." This is logical because the imposition
of an unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself

The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of
bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when required by the
court, and there should be no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance
of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case,
the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail
presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the
option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. The trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable
sureties and insist that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.

But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge, we cannot fault the motive that caused him to
demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety bond. Based on the petitioner's past record, 7 the range of his career in crime weighs heavily
against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail. The likelihood of his jumping bail or committing other harm to the citizenry
while on provisional liberty is a consideration that simply cannot be ignored.

Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. First, it could increase the amount of the bail
bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of
discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as
one of the conditions of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements. And third,
the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution.
"Trial may proceed notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."

CASE #205. Maguddatu c. CA, 326 SCRA 362

Facts:

Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, Atty. Teodoro Rubino, Antonio Sabbun Maguddatu and several
other “John Does” were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Makati for the killing of Jose S. Pascual.

On October 23, 1985, petitioners filed a motion to be admitted to bail on the ground that the prosecution’s evidence is not
strong. After partial trial on the merits, the trial court issued an order, dated December 20, 1985, granting petitioner’s motion for bail
and fixing the amount at P30,000.00 each. On the same day, petitioners posted bail through AFISCO Insurance Corporation.

On January 6, 1987, the AFISCO Insurance Corporation filed a motion before the trial court praying for the cancellation of
petitioner’s bail bond because of the latter’s failure to renew the same upon its expiration on December 20, 1986. There is no showing,
however, of any action by the court on said motion.

On January 2, 1998, the trial court convicted petitioners of the crime of Homicide and sentenced them to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of EIGHT (8) YEARS to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of RECLUSION TEMPORAL. The judgment of conviction
was promulgated in absentia.

Accordingly, on February 19,1998, the trial court issued an order for the immediate arrest of petitioners and their commitment
to the custody of proper authorities.

On February 27, 1998, Petitioners, while at large, filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of conviction for homicide with a
motion to be granted provisional liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal.

On June 23, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the resolution under question denying petitioners’ application for bail and
ordering their arrest.

Aggrieved by the foregoing resolution, petitioners brought the instant petition for certiorari with this Court on August 30,
1999, contending that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their application for bail and their prayer to
recall the order of arrest issued by the trial court.

Issue:

Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their application for bai

Held:

The Court of Appeals committed no error in denying petitioners’ plea to be granted bail. The Constitution guarantees the right
to bail of all the accused except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong.
This was stated in Sections 4, 5 and 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

Despite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of Appeals, petitioners had remained at large.
It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise, deprived of liberty. The purpose of
bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.
 Petitioners’ Compliance and Motion, dated February 08, 1999, came short of an unconditional submission to respondent
court’s lawful order and to its jurisdiction. The trial court correctly denied petitioners’ motion that they be allowed provisional liberty
after their conviction, under their respective bail bonds. Apart from the fact that they were at large, Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94, provides that:

“The Court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to
appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.”

The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the 15-day period to appeal (Rule 122) and not
during the entire period of appeal. This is consistent with Section 2(a) of Rule 114 which provides that the bail “shall be effective upon
approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it.”

From the records of the case, petitioners are not entitled to bail. Firstly, petitioners violated the conditions of their bail. Bail is
defined as a security for the release of a person conditioned upon his appearance before any court. Moreover, it appears that petitioners
failed to renew their expired bail bond, as shown by a Motion, dated January 06, 1987, filed by AFISCO Insurance Corporation, praying
for the cancellation of petitioners’ bail bond because of the latter’s failure to renew the same upon its expiration.

CASE #206. Bangayon v. Butacan, 345 SCRA 301

Facts:

Complainant Antonio M. Bangayan filed charges of grave threats against Antonio Cauilan, Sr. and Antonio Cauilan, Jr.
Complainant alleges that respondent issued two warrants of arrest for the apprehension of Antonio Cauilan, Sr. and Antonio Cauilan,
Jr. and set the bail for the provisional liberty of the accused at P24,000.00 each.

By virtue of these warrants, Antonio Cauilan, Sr. was arrested on April 29, 1999, while Antonio Cauilan, Jr. was apprehended
on April 30, 1999. Both were, however, ordered released by respondent judge on April 30, 1999.

It is further alleged that on May 7, 1999, another order was issued by respondent for the release of Antonio Cauilan, Sr. and
that on May 11, 1999, Antonio Cauilan, Jr. filed a Motion for the Reduction of Bail in Criminal Case Nos. 5944 and 5945; and that the
motion was approved by respondent and Antonio Cauilan, Jr. was ordered released.

According to complainant, it was apparent that Butacan approved the Order of Release of Antonio Cauilan, Jr., on April 30,
1999 without the submission of the required bond which was supposed to precede the approval of the said Order of Release but
nonetheless such bond was submitted only on May 11, 1999 after the approval of the reduction of bail; and, (2) Judge Jimmy Butacan
did not give opportunity for the prosecution [to] oppose [the] motion for reduction of bail as the same was immediately approved on
that very day

Hence, an administrative complaint was filed against him.

Issue:

W/N he is guilty of gross misconduct for having committed the aforementioned acts.

Held:

Yes. The order of release dated April 30, 1999 on Criminal Case No. 5944 is proper. Antonio Cauilan, Sr. posted bail on that
day, on the basis of which respondent issued an order of release.

However, in Criminal Case No. 5945, no bail was posted by the accused, yet he was released. This is a violation of the rules on
the part of respondent judge. ven if Antonio Cauilan, Sr. was arrested on April 29, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 5944 and posted bail, still
respondent should not have ordered the release of the accused. Respondent knew very well that there was another case against Antonio
Cauilan Sr. Even if the arresting officer did not serve the warrant in Criminal Case No. 5945, respondent should not have allowed the
release on bail of the accused in that case.
 Also, the records disclose that no hearing was even conducted by respondent before granting reduction of the bail. This is
contrary to Rule 15, §4 which requires written motions to be heard and "served in such a manner as to ensure receipt by the other party
at least three days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice

Under the present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. A motion to reduce
the amount of bail likewise requires a hearing before it is granted in order to afford the prosecution the chance to oppose it.
Respondent's haste in granting Antonio Cauilan, Jr.'s motion for reduction of bail certainly makes his act suspect.

CASE #207. Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472

Facts:

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested
by members of the Philippine Constabulary. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina,
mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o
just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the
court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

Issue:

W/N the petitioners have the right to bail.

No. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if
the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded
during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would,
without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the

invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

CASE #208. Aswat v. Galido, 204 SCRA 205

Facts:

Petitioner Eduardo N. Aswat and victim Felix B. Nebres were both enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines ("AFP")
respectively holding the ranks Private First Class and Corporal. Aswat and Nebres were assigned to the SOLCOM but Aswat was
detailed as caretaker of Brigadier General Galido's Baguio resthouse while Nebres was assigned to act as a personal driver of Brigadier
General Galido's wife. On 29 December 1988, petitioner was involved in a shooting incident at Dominican Hills, Baguio City, which
resulted in the death of Nebres.
Records disclose that petitioner voluntarily surrendered to the Baguio City police and was transferred to Southern Luzon Command.

Issue:

W/N he is entitled to the right to bail

Held:
No. Although the right to bail applies to “all,” the Court has very recently ruled that the guarantee is not without any exception.
The Court held that that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. No. 95020 has traditionally not been recognized
and is not available in the military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula,
where we observed that the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right to bail does not exist.

The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men from the constitutional coverage on the
right to bail. Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within the framework of the democratic
system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid
out of revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their activities outside of and against the existing
political system.

In the case at bar, Petitioner, as already noted, is a person subject to military law, and under Article 70, A.W., "any person
subject to military law charged with crime or with a serious offense under these article shall be placed in confinement or in arrest, as
circumstances may require."

Confinement is one way of ensuring presence during sessions of the General Court-Martial; the more important reason
underlying the authority to impose confinement is the need to enable the proper military authority to instill discipline with the
command and thereby achieve command efficiency. By confining the petitioner, petitioner's unmilitary conduct may be curtailed from
spreading within the ranks of the command.

CASE #209. Enrile v.Sandiganbayan G.R. No. 213847, 2015

Facts:

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the
basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF). Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail.

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden
of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the
right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua
considering the presence of two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into
account that he is already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense;
that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the
lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant circumstances.

Issue: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?

Held:

Yes. Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to
hear and determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight
or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community
arising from national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has
authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged
in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of
his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do
not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder,
he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service,
and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

Sec. 2. Conditions of the Bail; Requirements

CASE # 210. Manotoc Jr. v. CA 142 SCRA 149

Facts:

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities
Inc., a stock brokerage house. He was in US for a certain time. He went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a
management committee for both businesses. Pending disposition of the case, the SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration not
to clear Manotoc for departure, and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner.

Meanwhile, six clients of Manotoc Securities Inc. filed separate criminal complaints for estafa against Manotoc. Manotoc
posted bail in all cases. He then filed a motion for permission to leave the country in each trial courts stating as ground therefor his
desire to go to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." His motion was denied. He also wrote the
Immigration Commissioner requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum, but said request was also denied.

Thus, he filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the judges' orders, as well as
the communication-request of the SEC, denying his leave to travel abroad. The same was denied; hence, he appealed to the Supreme
Court.

He contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, the courts which granted him bail could not prevent him
from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

Issues:

1. Whether a court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.

2. Whether the constitutional right to travel is absolute

Held:

A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature
and function of a bail bond. Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a
person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in
the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without
sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.

The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution (Sec 6. Art. III, 1987 Constitution) states:

“The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health”

The order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted
constitutional provision.
CASE # 211. Burgos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 16971, Feb. 8, 2010

Facts:

On 1992 assailants attacked the household of Sarah Marie Palma killing Sarah et.al. Four months after the incident, the police
arrested suspects, who pointed two others and respondent Co who allegedly masterminded the whole thing. After 10 years of hiding,
respondent Co surrendered. The prosecution charged him with two counts of murder and two counts of frustrated murder. Upon
arraignment, Co pleaded not guilty to the charges.

On September 25, 2002 respondent Co filed a petition for admission to bail which the RTC granted on the ground that the
evidence of guilt of respondent Co was not strong. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the RTC denied the same prompting
petitioner to seek a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction before the CA. The CA dismissed the petition for having been
filed without involving the OSG, in violation of jurisprudence and the law, specifically, Section 35, Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
Administrative Code.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied it for lack of merit. Thus, this case is about the legal standing of the
offended parties in a criminal case to seek, in their personal capacities and without the Solicitor General’s intervention, reversal of the
trial court’s order granting bail to the accused on the ground of absence of strong evidence of guilt.

Issue:

Do the private offended parties have the legal standing, without Solicitor General’s intervention, to seek reversal of trial court’s order
granting bail to the accused?

Ruling:

No. The offended party is regarded merely as a witness for the state. Only the state, through its appellate counsel, the OSG, has
the sole right and authority to institute proceedings before the CA or the Supreme Court. As a general rule, the mandate or authority to
represent the state lies only in the OSG. Thus it is patent that the intent of the lawmaker was to give the designated official, the Solicitor
General, in this case, the unequivocal mandate to appear for the government in legal proceedings. The Court is firmly convinced that
considering the spirit and the letter of the law, there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the Administrative Code than
that it is, indeed, mandatory upon the OSG to “represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its
officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. For the above reason, actions
essentially involving the interest of the state, if not initiated by the Solicitor General, are, as a rule summarily dismissed. The Court
denies the petition and affirms the Court of Appeals.

Here, the question of granting bail to the accused is but an aspect of the criminal action, preventing him from eluding
punishment in the event of conviction. The grant of bail or its denial has no impact on the civil liability of the accused that depends on
conviction by final judgment. Here, respondent Co has already been arraigned. Trial and judgment, with award for civil liability when
warranted, could proceed even in his absence.

Sec. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail

CASE #212. Ambil v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No. 175457

This is actually a consolidated case. The accused Ambil Jr. was the provincial governor and Apelado Sr. was the provincial
warden of Eastern Samar. Francisco Adalim was the Mayor of Taft and was arrested for a case of murder for which he was charged in
court. After his imprisonment at the provincial jail, he was brought out from said jail and delivered to the alternate custody of governor
Ambil Jr. in his residence.
 The latter refused to abide by the order from the DILG for him to return Adalim to the provincial jail. For their acts, Ambil Jr.
and Apelado Sr. were charged with violation of R.A. 3019 and delivering prisoners from jail under the Revised Penal Code. They were
tried before the Sandiganbayan and were convicted and sentenced.

The accused justified their action by saying that the very poor condition of the jail warranted Adalim’s transfer to Ambil’s
residence. The Sandiganbayan did not give weight to this argument since there were available quarters or facility inside the jail where
Ambil could have been housed.

Both accused appealed their conviction invoking among others the lack of jurisdiction and lack of basis for their conviction.
One of the main contentions of the accused is the fact their act did not cause disadvantage to the government or incur financial benefit
in their favor.

Issue:

Whether or not a provincial governor has authority to take personal custody of a detention prisoner.

Held:

No. Section 3, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Section 3, Rule 114 provides:

SEC. 3. No release or transfer except on court order or bail. No person under detention by legal process shall be
released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.

Indubitably, the power to order the release or transfer of a person under detention by legal process is vested in the court, not in
the provincial government, much less the governor. Still, petitioner Ambil, Jr. insisted on his supposed authority as a "provincial jailer."
Said petitioner’s usurpation of the court's authority, not to mention his open and willful defiance to official advice in order to
accommodate a former political party mate, betray his unmistakable bias and the evident bad faith that attended his actions.

Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception

CASE #213. People v. Gako, Jr., 348 SCRA 334

Rafael Galan, Sr. was shot dead. On 3 July 1991, Leopoldo de la Peña executed an Extra-judicial Confession implicating
therein Sonny Herodias and Vicente Go in the conspiracy to kill and murder Galan. Therefore, an Information was filed against the
three accused namely, de la Peña, Herodias and Go, charging them with the murder of Galan, Sr.

Judge Godardo Jacinto, then the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, issued a Warrant of Arrest against
the accused. However, an Urgent Motion to Confine Go in a hospital was filed.

On 20 November 1992, the Information against Go and Herodias was dismissed with prejudice on the ground that their right to a
speedy trial had been violated, leaving de la Peña to face trial. The prosecution then challenged the Order of Dismissal with Prejudice
before the Court of Appeals. Thus, the Court of Appeals annulled and set aside the Order of Dismissal, ordered the inhibition of
Judge Agana, and ordered the raffle of the case to another branch.

The case was re-raffled to RTC-17 and on 28 October 1996, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was issued against Go and Herodias. On
2 February 1997, Dr. Matig-a, the physician of Go, filed a Clinical Summary on the illness of Go and, on 13 February 1997, Go filed a
Petition for Bail.

The case was finally assigned to Branch 5 with Judge Gako, Jr. as presiding judge. Hearing resumed. Later, Judge
Gako, Jr. issued an Order granting the Petition for Bail of Go.

On 12 November 1992, the prosecution moved for the reconsideration of the Order of the court dated 10 November 1997, the
order which granted bail to Go. On 14 November 1997, a Supplemental Motion to Inhibit Judge Gako, Jr. was filed by the counsel of the
offended party because Judge Gako, Jr. allegedly pre-judged the evidence of the prosecution without carefully evaluating why it is short
of the requirement to sustain a verdict of life imprisonment.

Issue:

Whether the appreciation of the strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt may be based on the “voluminous records” of the case,
without necessarily hearing the prosecution.

Held:

The assailed Order dated 10 November 1997 granting bail is legally infirm for failing to conform with the requirement that in
cases when the granting of bail is not a matter of right, a hearing for that purpose must first be conducted.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides the instances when bail is a matter of right or discretionary, Section
7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, reiterates that "no person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”

Based on the foregoing, bail is not a matter of right with respect to persons charged with a crime the penalty for which is
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, when the evidence of guilt is strong. Go, accused in the criminal case, was charged with
murder in 1991, before the passage of RA 7659, the law that re-imposed the death penalty. Murder then was a crime punishable
by reclusion perpetua. Thus, accused Go’s right to bail is merely discretionary.

When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to
determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties. It is inconceivable how Judge Gako, Jr. could have appreciated the strength or weakness of the
evidence of guilt of the accused when he did not even bother to hear the prosecution. The reliance of Judge Gako, Jr. on the
“voluminous records” of the case simply does not suffice. As judge, he was mandated to conduct a hearing on the petition for
bail of the accused since he knew that the crime charged is one that carries a penalty of reclusion perpetua, and in that hearing, the
prosecution is entitled to present its evidence. It is worth stressing that the prosecution is equally entitled to due process. Without the
required hearing, the bail granted to accused Go in the amount of P 50,000.00 is undoubtedly arbitrary and without
basis.

CASE #214. Comia v. Astona, 337 SCRA 656

Facts:

This administrative case stemmed from a sworn affidavit complaint filed by Luzviminda Comia, wife of deceased Numeriano
Comia. CA Justice Guerrero summarized the complaints as:
1. ignorance of the law,
2. conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the Court, and
3. deliberately violating existing doctrines and jurisprudence laid by the SC.

The case for murder for the death of Numeriano Comia was raffled to the court presided by Judge Antona. He issued a WOA
against accused Dante Fajardo, Filipina Fajardo, and Pio Arce.

While still at large, Atty. Dimayacyac Sr. filed a Petition for the Grant of Bail to accused Dante and Filipina with Supplemental
Reduction of Bail for Pio. Judge Antona directed that the petition be made part of the records of the case and thereafter, issued an order
tentatively setting the hearing of the petition for bail.

During the hearing for bail, the prosecutors presented that the WOA was served by the PNP Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group in QC. Prosecutor continued that a commitment order be issued for the confinement of the accused at the Batangas
City Jail.
 Judge Antona, however, remarked that the 3 accused voluntarily surrendered and the hearing is set specifically for bail and no
other. The prosecutor maintained that the 3 accused were still not committed in the proper agency. When bail proceedings were
terminated, the 3 accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, Judge Antona granted bail in the amount of P200k each
for Dante and Filipina, and P100K for Pio.

Issue:

W/N he is guilty of gross ignorance of law

Held:

Judge Antona is guilty of procedural lapse in hearing the petition for bail in as much as the order and manner of presentation
of evidence in the bail hearings were flawed and highly irregular. Since bail is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of the accused, it
can only be availed of by a person who is in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.

Likewise, in granting and reducing bail, Judge Antona failed to recite summary of evidence for the prosecution. In this case,
proof is extant that in the bail hearings, the prosecution was not afforded adequate opportunity within a reasonable time to present
evidence within its grasp to substantiate the degree and gravity of guilt of the accused, for purposes of resolving bail petition.

When the grant of bail is discretionary, as in this case, the issue of whether or not an accused should be admitted to bail lies on
the strength of the prosecution’s evidence as to their guilt, without prejudice to the right of the defense to cross-examine.

Judge Antona is liable for gross ignorance of the law.

CASE #215. Paderanga v. CA, 247 SCRA 741

Facts:

Petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder for the killing
of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time.

Petioner Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail before a Warrant of Arrest could be issued by the
lower court. Petitioner Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed medical attention specifically
"acute costochondritis." Petitioner’s counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local
chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered
being in the custody of the law.

The Court of Appeals denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on his right to bail. Respondent court observed in its
decision that at the time of petitioner's application for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered.

ISSUE:

Whether the petitioner may already exercise his right to bail.

Held:
Yes. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law,
furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the conditions specified in said
Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance
at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody
over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender.

However, the undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Through his lawyers, he
expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the
trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by
unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his
arrest had been issued, petitioner never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his
whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of
the hearing thereof.

At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on account of an acute ailment, which facts
were not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the
authority of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the president
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis Oriental Chapter.

The general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to be released
on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper
application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing
conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other
hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing,
mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court is required with the participation of both
the defense and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for
the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
required quantum.

CASE #216. Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil 756

Facts:

Haydee Herras Teehankee is a political detainee delivered by the Counter Intelligence Corps, United States Army, to the
Commonwealth Government. She is now confined in the Correctional Institution for Women under the custody of the Commonwealth
Government since October, 1945, when she was thus delivered to the said government.

On 2 October 1945, Herras Teehankee, through her husband, Alberto Teehankee, filed with the People's Court a petition
wherein, invoking the provisions of Executive Order No. 65, promulgated by the President of the Philippines, she prayed that her
immediate release be ordered on the ground that no evidence exists upon which she could be charged with any act punishable by law,
or, alternatively, that the People's Court fix the bail for her provisional liberty, in conformity with the aforesaid executive order, and
upon approval of such bail, that an order be forthwith issued directing the officer having official custody of her person to immediately
release her.

On 9 October 1945, the Hon. Leopoldo Rovira, Presiding Judge of the People's Court, entered an order referring the petition
for provisional release for consideration by the Fifth Division of the People's Court, but adding the following statement: "in my opinion,
it should be denied notwithstanding the recommendation of the Solicitor General for her provisional release under a bond of P50,000."

On the same date, the Hon. Pompeyo Diaz, Associate Judge of the People's Court, entered an order disposing of said petition
and denying the same "in view of the gravity of the offense as can be deduced from the fact that the office of the Special Prosecutors
recommends as high as P50,000 for her provisional release." Herras Teehankee filed for reconsideration, but the Court, through
Associate Judge Pompeyo Diaz, denied said motion. Herras Teehankee filed a petition for the writs of certiorari and mandamus before
the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether a person may file for bail even before a formal charge or information is filed against him.
Held:

`Yes. Article III, section 1(16) of the Commonwealth Constitution -- which provides that "All persons shall before conviction be
bailable by sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be
required" -- refers to all persons, not only to persons against whom a complaint or information has already been formally filed. It lays
down the rule that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is
strong.

According to the provision, the general rule is that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, except when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who have
been arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said provision. But in order
that a person can invoke this constitutional precept, it is not necessary that he should wait until a formal complaint or information is
filed against him.

From the moment he is placed under arrest, detention or restraint by the officers of the law, he can claim this guarantee of the
Bill of Rights, and this right he retains unless and until he is charged with a capital offense and evidence of his guilt is strong. Indeed if,
as admitted on all sides, the precept protects those already charged under a formal complaint or information, there seems to be no legal
or just reason for denying its benefits to one as against whom the proper authorities may even yet conclude that there exists no
sufficient evidence of guilt. To place the former in a more favored position than the latter would be, to say the least, anomalous and
absurd. If there is a presumption of innocence in favor of one already formally charged with criminal offense (Constitution, Article III,
section 1[17]), a fortiori, this presumption should be indulged in favor of one yet so charged, although already arrested or detained.

Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary

CASE # 217. Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, 134 SCRA 466

Facts:
In the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr., is charged with murder for the killing of one Ramon Abiog.
Detained in the city jail of Naga after his arrest, petitioner filed a motion for bail based on two reasons: (a) that the evidence against him
is not strong in view of the retraction by Ferdinand del Rosario, one of the prosecution witnesses, of his previous statement naming
petitioner as the assailant; and (b) that he is a minor of 16 years, entitled as such to a privileged mitigating circumstance under Article
68 of the Revised Penal Code which would make the murder charge against him non-capital.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to bail as a matter of right.

Held/Ruling:
Yes. The orders of respondent Judge denying bail to petitioner are set aside. In the interest of dispatch, bail for petitioner is fixed at
P15,000.00 and his release is ordered upon the posting thereof and its approval by the trial judge, unless petitioner is held for some
other cause.

To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would require a consideration not only of the evidence of the
commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete
trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. Such procedure would defeat the purpose of bail,
which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending trial.

An accused who is charged with murder with aggravating circumstances, but who is only 16 years old is entitled to bail as the penalty on
him, if convicted, is the next lower than that prescribed by law which rules out the death penalty.

The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is accused of a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is strong. The
obvious reason is that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee. This reason does not hold
where the accused has been established without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death.
The constitutional mandate that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except those charged with capital offenses when evidence
of guilt is strong, is subject to the limitation that the person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived
of his liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one’s release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. ( Feliciano vs.
Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888.)

The allowance of bail after conviction is a matter of discretion and not of right. (People vs. Caderao, 7 SCRA 639.)

Sec. 6. Capital offense defined

Sec. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua of life imprisonment, not bailable.

Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application

CASE #218 Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz, 328 SCRA 505

When the penalty prescribed by law is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing must be conducted by the trial judge
before bail can be granted to the accused. Absent such hearing, the order granting bail is void for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion. In parricide, the accused cannot be considered an offended party just because he was married to the deceased. In the interest
of justice and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister of the victim may be deemed to be an "offended party"; hence,
she has the legal personality to challenge the void order of the trial court.

Facts:

This is a PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of Joselito Narciso, Asst. City
Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and thereafter filed, the information for parricide against Joselito
Narciso on November 13, 1991, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed therein as Criminal Case No. Q-91-24179.|||
Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the prosecutor's resolution before the Department of Justice (DOJ) which was however
denied. Motion for reconsideration was also denied by the DOJ.

Failing before DOJ, the accused| filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reinvestigation and to Lift the Warrant of Arrest." The Motion was
granted and the case was set for reinvestigation by another prosecutor.
Assistant Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro, to whom the case was assigned for reinvestigation, found no reason to disturb the findings of the
previous prosecutor and recommended the remand of the case to the court for arraignment and trial.

Accused filed an 'Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused Joselito Narciso to Post Bail'. The Public Prosecutor
registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00.|||
The private prosecutor representing private complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister of accused's deceased wife, filed an
"Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail'.

Not obtaining any resolution on her 'Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail,' private complainant filed Petition for
Certiorari before the CA. CA granted the petition.

Hence this case, Petitioner averred that CA erred when it reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
which granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong evidence or proof of his guilt, and more
especially when the public prosecutors, who have direct control of the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have
themselves recommended the grant of bail.

Issue:

(1) The validity of the grant of bail.

(2) Private respondent's standing to file the Petition before the CA.

Held/Ruling:

The Petition is devoid of merit.

First Issue: Validity of the grant of bail.

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua
when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required." Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides: "No person charged with a
capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted
to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution."

No hearing had been conducted on the application for bail — summary or otherwise. The appellate court found that only ten minutes
had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed
sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence.

Second Issue: Respondent's Standing to File the Petition.

The crime charged against the accused is parricide; hence, the accused cannot be regarded as an offended party. That would be a
contradiction in terms and an absurdity in fact. Nor can one expect the minor child to think and to act for himself. Hence, SC rule that
in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister of the deceased is a proper party-litigant who is akin to the "offended party,"
she being a close relative of the deceased. There is no closer kin who may be expected to take up the cudgels of justice for the deceased.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES:

1. Judges are compelled to conduct hearings in bail applications in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense.
2. A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for the
prosecution is weak or strong.
3. Court’s grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution; Its absence will invalidate the
grant or the denial of the application for bail.
4. The offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as “persons aggrieved” to file the special civil
action of prohibition and certiorari.
5. A party cannot be left without recourse to address a substantive issue in law.
6. Accused who is charged with parricide cannot be regarded as an offended party.

Sec. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines

CASE # 219 De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1

Facts:

Petitioner De la Camara was the Mun. Mayor of Misamis Oriental who was arrested and detained at the Prov. Jail of Agusan for his
alleged participation in the killing of 14 & wounding of 12 other laborers at the Tirador Logging Co., at Agusan del Sur. The Prov. Fiscal
of Agusan filed with the CFI a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple

murder against petitioner. He then filed an application for bail filed with the lower court asserting that there was no evidence to link
him with such fatal incident which the court granted and fixed the amount at Php 1,195,200.00 which is the sum of Php 840,000.00 for
the information charging multiple murder and Php 355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder.

Issue:

W/N the amount of bail required by the court is proper?

Held/Ruling:

NO.

With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling can be had on his plea to nullify the order.||| This case is
dismissed for being moot and academic.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such right flows
from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no
prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order fixing the amount
of bail at Php 1,195,200.00 as the bail should be posted by petitioner is clearly violative of the constitutional provision.

The guidelines in the fixing of bail was summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6)
character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds, (9) whether the
accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases."
Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is
with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant
seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our
supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.”

Sec. 10. Corporate Surety

Sec. 11. Property bond, how posted

Sec. 12. Qualification of sureties in property bond

CASE# 220 Villaseñor v. Abano, 21 SCRA 312

Facts:

Petitioner, a mere government employee, earning but a monthly salary, of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a family of five, was
charged with the murder of a Boac police sergeant. He was admitted to a P60k bail which was reduced to P40k. The petitioner on May
29 posted a property bond and was set at provisional liberty.

-However, respondent Provincial Fiscal amended the information, now accusing the petitioner with “Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a
Person in Authority with Murder" before the arraignment on the murder charge. So on August 7, respondent judge cancelled the
petitioner’s bond and ordered his immediate arrest.

-On September 9 upon petitioner’s motion to reconsider, the respondent judge resolved to admit petitioner to bail provided he puts up a
cash bond of P60k.

-On September 15, on petitioner’s motion that original bond previously given be reinstated, respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond
anew in real property in the amount of P60,000, but to be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying,
therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and ownership of said residents for five years."

-On October 1, petitioner filed a prayer for prelim injunction to SC, seeking to set aside respondent judge orders of August 7, September
9 and 15, and to reinstate the bail bond approved on May 29 (original bond), charging the respondent judge of having acted w/o and/or
in excess of his jurisdiction and w/grave abuse of discretion, and w/ violation of the Consti and the ROC in issuing the disputed orders

-Oct 3: the Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P1k bond.

-Nov 5: SC allowed continuation of the proceedings of the criminal case to avoid delay in its prosecution.

Issue:

1. WON the orders of August 7 and 9 should be set aside

2. WON THE P60K bond fixed by respondent judge transgress the constitutional injunction that "(e)xcessive bail shall not be required?

3. WON the condition that the property bond be posted only by "residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein" is
within the power of the respondent judge

4. WON the requirement that properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership of the sureties for at least five
years” is within the power of the respondent judge

Held/Ruling:
1. NO NEED

Ratio A rule of ancient respectability is that it is not the function of a court of justice to furnish answers to purposeless questions that no
longer exist.

Reasoning The said orders were replaced by the last order of September 15, 1964, by virtue of which the cash bond required was
reverted back to property bond. The two orders of August 7 and September 9, 1964 thus became functus offcio.

2. NO

Ratio the principal factor considered, to the determination of which most other factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance
of the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.

Reasoning Guidelines in fixing bail: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2)) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the
accused appearing at trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if
the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

- Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court (definition of bail): "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance."

-Circular 47 of the Department of Justice, reiterated in Circular 48, directed prosecuting attorneys to recommend bail at the rate of
P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of the penalty prescribed for the offense charged, unless
circumstances warrant a higher penalty. Here, petitioner is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a person in
authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the imposition of capital punishment.

3. YES.

Ratio: Bondsmen in criminal cases, residing outside of the Philippines, are not within the reach of the processes of its courts.

- Bail is given to secure appearance of the accused. If bondsmen reside in far away places, even if within the Philippines, the purpose of
bail may be frustrated.

Reasoning Weighing as heavily against petitioner's case is the fact that a reading of his petition fails of an averment that the requisite
exacted that bondsmen be residents of and actually staying in Marinduque would cause him prejudice. The burden of his arguments
solely is that such a condition runs counter to the rules of court (Section 9, Rule 114, Rules of Court).

-reason why respondent judge issued such condition: it is hard to send notices to people outside of the province through registered mail
accompanied by return cards which in many instances have not been received in court when trial comes and when the parties fail to
appear, there is no way of knowing whether the notices have been duly received; therefore, he cannot order the confiscation of the bond
and the arrest of the accused because he is not sure whether the bondsmen have been duly notified; that sending telegrams to people
outside the province is costly, and the court cannot afford to incur much expense

4. YES

Reasoning Circular 2 of the Secretary of Justice, addressed, amongst others, to Judges of First Instance recites that it had been brought
to the attention of the Department of Justice that in certain provinces, unscrupulous persons who are spurious land owners have been
accepted as sureties. The Secretary then suggested that "(1)t may be a good policy not to accept as bail bonds real properties not covered
by certificates of title unless they have been declared for taxation purposes in favor of the person offering them as bond for at least five
(5) years."

-rationale of Circular 2: prevent the commission of frauds in connection with the posting of personal bail bonds and to protect the
interests of the Government.

- the order of September 15, 1964 is to be understood as excluding properties covered by Torrens titles from the requirement that
properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership of the sureties for at least five years.
Disposition With the observations heretofore adverted to, we vote to dismiss the petition for certiorari, and to dissolve the writ of
preliminary injunction issued herein. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.

Sec. 13. Justification of sureties

Sec. 14. Deposit of cash as bail

CASE #221 Lachica v. Judge Tormis – 20 Sept. 2005

Facts:

On July 2, 2003, Domugho was apprehended by PO3 Epifanio G. Sanjorjo at around 8:45 p.m. and was placed under PNP custody at
9:30 p.m. However, on July 3, 2003, at around 8:30 a.m., complainant was surprised to receive a call from the accused informing her
that she was released on July 2, 2003 at 10:00 p.m. Complainant inquired from the police station if an Order of Release was issued by
the court, but she was informed that the accused was released because the respondent judge called the police station and told the desk
officer that the accused had posted a cash bail bond and may already be released. However, the case record did not contain Order of
Release. During the investigation, it was established that the accused was indeed set free without a release order at 10:00 PM.
Respondent judge claimed that she issued the Order of Release on July 2, 2003 at around 7:00 p.m., which she also claimed was
received by SP01 James Estrera. An examination of the records, however, discloses that what SPO1 Estrera received was only a copy of
the Receipt of the Cash Bail Bond dated July 2, 2003 and not the Order of Release. It was improbable that, as claimed by respondent
judge, she issued the Order of Release on July 2, 2003 at around 7:00 p.m. considering that the accused was apprehended at 8:45 p.m.
It is also undisputed that respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for the accused.

Issue:

Whether the judge is guilty of gross misconduct by her act of receiving the cash bond.

Held/Ruling:

The Court rules in the affirmative.

In the case of Office of the Court Administrator v. Fernandez, the Court held that: The rules specify the persons with whom a cash bail
bond may be deposited namely: the collector of internal revenue, or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. Section 14 of Rule 114 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (effective December 1, 2000) provides:

SEC. 14. Deposit of Cash as bail The accused or any person acting in his behalf may deposit in cash with the
nearest collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer the amount of the bail fixed by
the court, or recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. xxx

A judge is not one of those authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail, nor should such cash be kept in the office of the judge.

The respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted the cash bail
bond of the accused and for deliberately making untruthful statements in her comment and during the investigation of the instant
administrative case with intent to mislead this Court. For this act alone, respondent is already administratively liable. Section 14, Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom a cash bail bond may be deposited, namely: the
collector of internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer. A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail
nor should such cash be kept in his office.

Sec. 15. Recognizance

Sec. 16. Bail, when not required; reduced bail or recognizance

Sec. 17. Bail, where filed

CASE #222 Borinaga v. Tamin, 226 SCRA 206

Facts:

Judge Camilo E. Tamin of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, was charged with grave incompetence
and ignorance of the law in connection with Criminal Case No. 92-10-300 for murder, entitled "People vs. Antonio Ruaya, et al.,
An amended criminal complaint for murder dated March 4, 1992, for the killing of herein complainant's husband, Regino Borinaga, was
filed by the Chief of Police of Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur against Antonio Ruaya, alias Tony Ruaya; Roberto J. Rada, alias Totoy;
Edwin Rada, alias Negger; and Jojo Valenzuela before the 27th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dumingag-Mahayag, Zamboanga del
Sur, for preliminary investigation.

Ruaya averred that no bail was fixed by the investigating judge who issued a warrant of arrest against him; that he had waived the
second stage of the preliminary investigation, with a reservation to challenge the criminal action against him; and that the evidence of
guilt against him was not strong, hence he was entitled to bail as a matter of right.

Accused Ruaya prayed that the bail be fixed at P20,000.00.

Public prosecutor failed to attend hearing, judge (Tamin) fixed bail at P20, 000.00 in accordance with Art. III Sec. 13 of the
Constitution due to failure to present evidence that the guilt of the accused is strong.

Issue:

Whether the judge erred in granting the petition for admission to bail.

Held/Ruling:

YES.

The court ruled that as now revised in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure and provided in Rule 114 thereof, the rules on availability of
bail to an accused may be restated as follows:

Admission to bail is a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge is not for a capital offense or is not punishable by
reclusion perpetua;

Regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution, no bail shall be allowed if the accused is charged with a capital offense or of an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong;

Even if a capital offense is charged and the evidence of guilt is strong, the accused may still be admitted to bail in the discretion of the
court if there are strong grounds to apprehend that his continued confinement will endanger his life or result in permanent impairment
of health, but only before judgment in the regional trial court; and

No bail shall be allowed after final judgment, unless the accused has applied for probation and has not commenced to serve sentence,
the penalty and offense being within the purview of the probation law.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent judge had jurisdiction to hear the petition for bail, under the circumstances attendant to the
case he should nonetheless be held liable for granting the same without benefit of a hearing. This requirement is so basic and
fundamental that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof.

It is true that at the hearing of an application for admission to bail, where admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the prosecution has
the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong. However, we have held that admission to bail as a matter of discretion
presupposes the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first be
accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for bail, it is on the basis of such
evidence that judicial discretion is weighed against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion
must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that is, after evaluation of the evidence submitted
by the prosecution. Any order issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
outright arbitrariness.

In the case at bar, the petition for bail was granted by respondent judge on the simple reason that the prosecution failed to appear and
present evidence despite due notice. Forthwith, he concludes that by reason of the failure of the prosecution to appear at the scheduled
hearing, the applicant is entitled to bail as a matter of right. He aggravated this flagrant error when in his aforequoted comment, he
justified his subsequent denial of the prosecution's motion for the cancellation of the bail bond and the arrest of the accused on the
incredible theory that the prosecution's failure to appear was a "waiver on its part . . . and it is legally already in estoppel" to challenge
the grant of bail since that right to bail "became irrevocably vested" in the accused who had thereby acquired "a vested constitutional
right beyond the power and authority of the respondent to recall."
In the first place, respondent judge did not have the authority to set the petition for bail for hearing in view of the fact that he had not
even acquired jurisdiction over the criminal case since the information therefor had not yet been filed in the trial court. In doing so, he
acted with grave abuse of discretion and in wanton disregard of established rules and jurisprudence. Secondly, it has been held that
even where the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the
prosecution such questions as would ascertain the strength of the state's evidence or judge the adequacy of the amount of bail. Here, the
non-appearance of the prosecution at the hearing scheduled by respondent judge on March 30, 1992 was obviously justified since, to
repeat, respondent had no authority to schedule and/or conduct the same.

CASE #223 Cruz v. Judge Yaneza, 304 SCRA 294

Facts:

Pursuant to the unsworn letter-complaint of a certain Victorino Cruz against respondent Judge Reynold Q. Yaneza of MeTC, Branch 54,
Navotas, Metro Manila, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) conducted an independent investigation as well as directed
Executive Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr. to conduct a discreet investigation on the matter. Judge Aquino in his report confirmed that
Judge Yaneza had been improperly approving several bail bonds and irregularly issuing release orders for accused persons who were
neither arrested nor detained within the territorial jurisdiction of respondent Judge's court and whose cases were not pending before
his sala. In his answer Judge Yaneza admitted the findings of the OCA but he reasoned out that he did it in good faith and not for any
pecuniary consideration. However, despite the filing of the administrative complaint against him and even after his attention was called
to the matter, Judge Yaneza continued approving bail bonds and issuing release orders for cases outside of his jurisdiction. Hence, the
OCA recommended that Judge Yaneza be immediately dismissed from the service.

Issue:

Whether or not the acts of Judge Yaneza in approving the bail bonds and issuance of release orders for cases outside his court’s
jurisdiction is justified under the law and Rules of Court.

Held/Ruling:

The Court ruled that as a judge, respondent must have the basic rules at the palm of his hands as he is expected to maintain professional
competence at all times. Since Judge Yaneza presides over MeTC-Br. 54 in Navotas, Metro Manila, his territorial jurisdiction is confined
therein. Therefore, to approve bail applications and issue corresponding release orders in cases pending in courts outside his territorial
jurisdiction, some even in courts as far as Nueva Ecija and Palawan, particularly so where the accused are detained thereat and not in
his jurisdiction and therefore cannot personally appear before him as required, constitute ignorance of the law so gross as to amount to
incompetence and even corruption.

Consequently, Judge Reynold Q. Yaneza was ordered DISMISSED from the service effective immediately with forfeiture of his
retirement benefits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including government-
owned or controlled corporations.

CASE #224 Tormis v. Judge Paredes – 4 February 2015

Facts:

Jill was a former student of judge Paredes at Southwestern University College of Law in Cebu. In his class discussions, Judge Paredes
named Jill’s mother, Judge Rosabella Tormis, then Presiding Judge of Branch 4, Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Cebu City, as
one of the judges involved in the marriage scams in Cebu City. Judge Paredes also mentioned in his class that Judge Tormis was
abusive of her position as a judge, corrupt, and ignorant of the law; and also included her brother, Francis Tormis, in his discussions
stating that he was a “court-noted drug addict”.

Jill, however, claimed that Judge Paredes committed an offense worse than that committed by her mother, in accepting a cash
bail bond for the temporary release of an accused in a criminal case. Thus, she prayed that Judge Paredes be administratively
sanctioned for his actuations.

Judge Paredes admitted that he personally accepted a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused. He claimed though that
the approval of the bail bond was in accordance with Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No. 03-8-62-SC which allowed executive judges to
act on petitions for bail and other urgent matters on weekends, official holidays and special days. That he merely followed procedure, he
issued a temporary receipt and on the following business day, he instructed the Branch Clerk of Court to remit the cash bond to the
Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond and issued an official receipt. It was not his fault that the
Clerk of Court acknowledged the receipt of the cash bond only a week after.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Paredes is guilty of grave misconduct for accepting a cash bail bond for the temporary release of an accused in a
criminal case.

Held/Ruling:
No.

Judge Paredes justified his action by stating that he was merely following the procedure set forth in Section 14, Chapter 5 of A.M. No.
03-02-SC, which authorizes executive judges to act on petitions for bail on Saturdays after 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Sundays,
official holidays, and special days. Said rule also provides that should the accused deposit cash bail, the executive judge shall
acknowledge receipt of the cash bail bond in writing and issue a temporary receipt therefor. Considering that Judge Paredes merely
followed said procedure, he cannot be held administratively liable for his act of receiving the cash bail bond.

Moreover, respondent judge is authorized to receive the cash bail bond under Section 17 (a), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Under said provision, the bail bond may be filed either with the court where the case is pending, or with any Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of the place of arrest, or with any judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court or the Municipal Trial Court of the place of arrest.

Lastly, Section 1 (h), Chapter 4 of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC provides that executive judges are authorized to exercise other powers and
prerogatives which are necessary or incidental to the performance of their functions in relation to court administration. In the instant
case, Judge Paredes was merely exercising powers incidental to his functions as an Executive Judge since he was the only judge
available at that time. In addition, the judge assigned to the court where the case was then pending and the executive judge of the
MTCC, Cebu City were not available to receive the bail bond. Judge Paredes was the only judge available since the practice was for one
judge to be present on Saturdays

Sec. 18. Notice of application to prosecutor

CASE #225 People v. Raba, 130 Phil 384

Facts:

Clemente Talantor and Melquiades Raba were charged with murder before the Court of First Instance of Antique and the bail for each
was fixed by the court at P30,000 as recommended by the provincial fiscal.|||

On April 26, 1956, after the arraignment of the accused at which both pleaded not guilty to the charge, Talantor filed with the court an
urgent motion praying that the amount of the bond fixed for his provisional liberty be reduced from P30,000 to P14,000 in order to
enable him to go on bail. While the motion setting the hearing thereof in the morning of the same date contains a notification to the
provincial fiscal, however, the latter was actually notified at 9:40 o'clock in the morning of the same day. Despite this lack of due notice,
the court promptly granted the motion for the reduction of bail one hour later.|

On April 28, 1956, the provincial fiscal presented a motion for reconsideration of the order granting the reduction of the bail to P14,000
on the ground that it is irregular because no proper notice of the hearing of the motion for such reduction was given to him as required
by the rule to enable him to prove that there exists strong evidence which would warrant the denial of the motion. The motion was
denied, hence this appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the order granting the reduction of bail is in accordance with law and Rules of Court

Held/Ruling:

No.

The Rules of Court make it a duty of a movant to serve notice of his motion on all parties concerned at least three days before the
hearing thereof (section 4, Rule 26). This requirement is more imperative in a criminal case where a person is accused of a capital
offense for in such a case admission to bail is a matter of discretion which can only be exercised after the fiscal has been heard regarding
the nature of the evidence he has in his possession. Thus, it is provided that "When admission to bail is a matter of discretion the court
must require that reasonable notice of the hearing of the application for bail be given to the fiscal" (section 8, Rule 110), and such notice
is necessary because "the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong is on the prosecution" (section 7, Rule 110). Here Talantor is
charged with a capital offense and while the fiscal fixed a bail of P30,000 for his provisional liberty, its further reduction could not be
granted without hearing him because the evidence in his possession may not warrant it.

Considering that Talantor did not serve notice of his motion to reduce bail on the provincial fiscal at least three days before the hearing
thereof and the court failed to require that a reasonable notice thereof be given to said fiscal, it is evident that the court acted improperly
in reducing the bail without giving the fiscal an opportunity to be heard.

CASE# 226 Parada v. Veneracio, 269 SCRA 371

Facts:

Danilo Parada was charged with 4 counts of Estafa. He was duly bonded with an accredited bonding company. In October of 1993,
Parada’s counsel formally notified the court and the manager of the bonding company of change of address. Apparently, the notice of
hearing was sent to complainant’s former address. For failure to appear on the date of hearing, respondent judge ordered the arrest of
the accused, confiscation of the bond and a trial in absentia was conducted. No bail was recommended for Parada’s arrest.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent judge was correct in not recommending bail for Parada.

Held/Ruling:

No, the judge was not correct in not recommending bail.

The warrant of arrest with no recommendation for bail that was issued by respondent Judge is a downright violation of Parada’s
constitutional right to bail. The rule is clear that unless charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt
is strong, all persons detained, arrested or otherwise under the custody of the law are entitled to bail as a matter of right. It should be
noted that the crime with which Parada was charged is estafa which is undoubtedly a bailable offense. This circumstance could not have
escaped the attention of the respondent judge when he issued on June 3, 1994 the order of arrest of Parada with no recommendation for
his bail. In so doing, respondent judge exhibited that degree of ignorance so gross which the Court can not countenance.

Sec. 19. Release on bail

CASE# 227 Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, August 18, 2015

FACTS:

The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).
Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile claims
that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to
show clearly and conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the
Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of
two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come forward with proof showing that
his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over
the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing. In its Comment, the Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is
discretionary as he is charged with a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted to
determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty,
regardless of the attendant circumstances.

ISSUE:

Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what ground(s)?

HELD/ RULING:
YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian grounds.

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and
determine his criminal case. The strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity for flight or for
causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial,
or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community
arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in
Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and
due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has
authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court
indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of his
indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do not
ignore that at an earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he
already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public service,
and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him
bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

CASE# 228 People v. Sandigan – 529 SCRA 704—-kani kay galibog ko kay lahe ang makita sa CDASIA, not about bail..but
nakakita ko case na mofit about bail:

People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan and Jinggoy Estrada, G.R. No. 158754, 10 August 2007

FACTS: This petition seeks to reverse and set aside the Resolution of herein respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) issued on
March 6, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558, granting bail to private respondent Senator Jose Jinggoy Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for
brevity). Jinggoy was among the respondents in the crime of Plunder filed by the Office of the Ombudsman. Jinggoy filed with the Court
an Urgent Motion praying for early resolution of his Petition for Bail on Medical/Humanitarian Considerations. He reiterated his earlier
plea for bail filed with the Sandiganbayan. Jinggoy filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Application for Bail against which the
prosecution filed its comment and opposition. Bail hearings were then conducted, followed by the submission by the parties of their
respective memoranda. Petitioner suggests that Jinggoy is harboring a plan to escape, thus a flight risk. But in a Resolution, the
Sandiganbayan granted Jinggoy’s Omnibus Application for Bail. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.

ISSUE: Is the grant of bail in favor of Jinggoy proper on the ground that he is no longer considered a flight risk?

HELD: YES, the grant of bail is proper.

To begin with, Section 13 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution mandates:
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. xxx.
Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to the weakness of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail may justifiably still be
denied if the probability of escape is great. Here, ever since the promulgation of the assailed Resolutions a little more than four (4) years
ago, Jinggoy does not, as determined by Sandiganbayan, seem to be a flight risk. We quote with approval what the graft court wrote in
this regard:
It is not open to serious doubt that the movant [Jinggoy] has, in general, been consistently respectful of the Court and its processes. He
has not ominously shown, by word or by deed, that he is of such a flight risk that would necessitate his continued incarceration. Bearing
in mind his conduct, social standing and his other personal circumstances, the possibility of his escape in this case seems remote if not
nil.
The likelihood of escape on the part individual respondent is now almost nil, given his election on May 10, 2004, as Senator of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Court takes stock of the fact that those who usually jump bail are shadowy characters mindless of their
reputation in the eyes of the people for as long as they can flee from the retribution of justice. On the other hand, those with a reputation
and a respectable name to protect and preserve are very unlikely to jump bail. The Court, to be sure, cannot accept any suggestion that
someone who has a popular mandate to serve as Senator is harboring any plan to give up his Senate seat in exchange for becoming a
fugitive from justice.

Sec. 20. Increase or reduction of bail

CASE# 229 Sy Guan v. Amparo, 79 Phil 690

Facts:

Sy Guan alias Lim Hong is under prosecution with two others for visiting an opium den. The case is now pending in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, to which the accused appealed from a sentence of one month and one day of imprisonment imposed by the
municipal court. Having failed to appear in the Court of First Instance when the cause was called for trial, Sy Guan's bond, for P300,
was ordered forfeited and a warrant for his arrest was issued. Upon being rearrested, this prisoner offered to put up a new bond. The
offer was rejected by the Honorable Rafael Amparo, Judge, "in view of the fact that Sy Guan has heretofore jumped his bail.”

Issue:

Whether or not to the respondent judge can be compelled to admit the petitioner to bail

Held/Ruling:

It is ordered that the petitioner be released upon filing a new bond with sufficient sureties, without special judgment as to costs.

The petitioner denies that he fled or avoided going to trial. He alleges misunderstanding on his part and change of address as the cause
of his nonappearance. The point is unimportant. Assuming for the sake of this case that the petitioner purposely "jumped" his bail, that
fact does not operate as a forfeiture of his right to temporary liberty. Except where bail is a matter of right, irrespective of such
circumstance the breach of a prior bond is a compelling reason for the refusal of bail in the same cause. But where bail is a matter of
right and prior absconding and forfeiture is not excepted from such right bail must be allowed irrespective of such circumstance. (8 C. J.
S., 77; Rowan vs. Randolph , 268 Fed., 527.)

Bail before conviction is a constitutional right of an accused, except in prosecutions for capital offenses where the proof of guilt is
strong. (Article III, section 1, paragraph 16, Philippine Constitution.) Other than this, the Constitution makes no exceptions. The
existence of high degree of probability that the defendant will abscond confers upon the court no greater discretion than to increase the
bond to such an amount as would reasonably tend to assure the presence of the defendant when it is wanted, such amount to be subject,
of course, to the other provision of the same section and paragraph cited, that excessive bail shall not be required."

Sec. 21. Forfeiture of Bail

Sec. 22. Cancellation of Bail

CASE# 230 People v. Lorredo, 50 Phil 209

Facts:
This is an appeal taken by Victor Amador and Ciriaco Morales from an order of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas of November 4,
1925, decreeing the forfeiture of the bond executed and subscribed by said appellants for the temporary release of Silvestre Lorredo,
who was accused of the crime of illegal possession of firearms.|||

It appears from the record that Victor Amador and Ciriaco Morales executed and subscribed a bail bond for the temporary release of
Silvestre Lorredo, accused of illegal possession of firearms.

However, when the CFI rendered judgement finding Lorredo on guilty of the crime of illegal possession of a firearm,

The sureties filed a motion to withraw the bond and delivering the body of the accused to be taken into custody based on the ground
that the accused being in another town and having no fixed residence, it is very difficult for them to comply with their duties as sureties.
They prayed that the bond filed by them be withdrawn, relieving them of all liability in connection therewith. Motion was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the lower court erred on not granting the motion and relieving the sureties from their obligation.

Held/Ruling:

No.

In the present case it does not appear that the fiscal had been notified of the petition for the discharge of the bond, nor had the court
issued an order of discharge. The mere presentation or presence of an accused in an open court is not sufficient in itself. The attention of
the court must be called to his presence and the intention to surrender the body of the accused must be clearly and definitely stated and
understood by the court (6 C. J., page 243, paragraph 313). A surety who desires to produce and surrender the body of the accused in
open court is not relieved from further liability upon his bond until the court accepts said surrender, and the only evidence of such act is
the record of the court. (Du Lawrence vs. State, 31 Oh. Cir., 418)||| (People v. Lorredo, G.R. No. 26886, [March 30, 1927], 50 PHIL 209-
221)

The mere filing of a motion stating the surrender of the person of the accused and asking for their release from liability upon the
obligation contracted by virtue of a bond for temporary release, where it does not appear that the attention of the court had been called
to said surrender and that the latter had so understood it, and without an express order accepting said surrender and relieving the
sureties from all liability, does not relieve them from the same, notwithstanding the fact that the court granted the accused the period of
ten days within which to comply with the judgment under a verbal guaranty of his attorney.

Sec. 23. Arrest of the accused out on bail

CASE# 231 Silverio v. CA. 195 SCRA 760

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in the Criminal Case of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.

More than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to
cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several
times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner’s
passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This
order was based primarily on the Trial Court’s finding that since the filing of the Information, “the accused has not yet been arraigned
because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo
C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court”. Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.
Issue:

WON the Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on
grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

Held/Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that the foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the
Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be
restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that “An accused released on bail may be
re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where
the case is pending.

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of
abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of
national security, public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.

Sec. 24. No bail after final judgment, exception

Sec. 25. Court supervision of detainees

Sec. 26. Bail not a bar on objection on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary investigation

CASE# 232 Borlongan, Jr., et al. v. Peña, G.R. No. 143591, May 5, 2010

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Respondent Magdaleno Peña instituted a civil case for recovery of agent’s compensation against Urban Bank and the petitioners, for
when he allegedly entered into an agreement with the petitioners wherein Peña undertook to perform acts necessary to prevent any
intruders or squatters from unlawfully occupying Urban Bank’s property.

Petitioners presented documents (letters and memorandums) in an attempt to show that the respondent (Peña) was appointed as agent
by ISCI (former owner of the banks property) and not by Urban Bank or by the petitioners. While, on the other hand, Peña claimed that
said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither
stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI.

The City Prosecutor rules in favor of Peña and concluded that the petitioners were guilty of crime of introducing falsified
documents, subsequently, information were filed with the MTCC of Bago City, Negros, Occidental. The Judge subsequently issued
warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.

Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion to Recall Warrants of Arrest and insisted that they were denied due process because they were not
afforded the right to submit their counter-affidavits. And avers that since they were not afforded to submit their counter-affidavit, the
trial judge merely relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the warrants of arrest, in
contravention of the Rules. Petitioners further prayed that the information be quashed for lack of probable cause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Petitioners are entitled to submit counter-affidavit before determining if warrant of arrest shall be issued against them;

RULING:

No. The prosecutor may take the appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents submitted by the
complainant. It means that the prosecutor may either dismiss the complaint if he does not see sufficient reason to proceed with the case,
or file the information if he finds probable cause. The prosecutor is not mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits.
Probable cause may then be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the
petitioners.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine
and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the
existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause;
and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause

In determining probable cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest there is no provision of law or procedural rule which makes the
submission of counter-affidavits mandatory before the judge can determine whether or not there exists probable cause to issue the
warrant.

GshshehehsGrounds for new trial

Case no. 379 Crim Pro cases People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 188106, Nov. 25, 2009
Facts
The victim in this case was, at the time of the incident, a 16-year-old lass, who, together with her siblings, stayed with her mother's live-
in partner, appellant Dalisay, in a rented second-door room in Fairview, Quezon City. Their mother worked as a babysitter and helper in
Makati City and only came home at the end of every month. On that fateful evening of July 10, 2003, the victim was alone playing cards
in the aforesaid rented room, while her siblings were watching television in the common area on the ground door. Appellant entered the
room to change his clothes. He then laid himself down on the door near the young lady, pulled her shirt up, and touched her breasts and
thighs. Bent on satisfying his lust, he forced the girl down on the door, took off her shorts and underwear, and placed himself on top of
her. The defenseless lass resisted by kicking his legs and by pleading for him to stop. He, however, remained deaf to the girl's earnest
entreaty, warned her that he would kill her entire family, and proceeded to bombard the gate to her chastity with his bestial toughness.
Prior to this assault, appellant had already been repeatedly molesting the girl since she was 13 years old by inserting his anger into her
genitalia. However, paralyzed by the terror that he would make real his threats of annihilating her family, she was compelled to suffer in
silence. Her trepidation was further fueled by her knowledge that appellant always carried a knife with him

Issue
Whether or not the case can be subject to new trial

Held
Guys in this case only the award of damages was mentioned. Noo mention of grounds for new trial huhu
Prior to the effectivity of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, courts generally awarded exemplary damages in criminal cases when
an aggravating whether ordinary or qualifying, had been proven to have attended the commission of the crime, even if the same was not
alleged in the information. This is in accordance with the aforesaid Article 2230. However, with the promulgation of the Revised Rules,
courts no longer consider the aggravating circumstances not alleged and proven in the determination of the penalty and in the award of
damages. Thus, even if an aggravating circumstance has been proven, but was not alleged, courts will not award exemplary damages.
Pertinent are the following sections of Rule 110:

Case no. 380 People v. Senit - 11 January 201

Facts
In the morning of September 2, 2000, private complainant Mohinder Toor,
Sr. was driving north along Aglayan from the direction of Valencia on board his Toyota pick-up with his wife Rosalinda Toor, their
three-year-old son Mohinder Toor, Jr., and househelper Mezelle Jane Silayan. He turned left and was coming to the center of Aglayan
when a speeding Super 5 bus driven by petitioner and coming from Malaybalay headed south towards Valencia, suddenly overtook a big
truck from the right side. Petitioner tried to avoid the accident by swerving to the right towards the shoulder of the road and applying
the brakes, but he was moving too fast and could not avoid a collision with the pick-up. The bus crashed into the right side of private
complainant's pick-up at a right angle.

Issue
Whether or not the case can be subject to new trial

Held
The Court finds that no errors of law or irregularities, prejudicial to them substantial rights of the petitioner, have been committed
during trial. The petitioner anchors his motion for new trial on Rule 121, Section 2 (a) of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to
wit: Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The Court shall grant a new trial on any
of the following grounds:
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused have been committed during the trial;
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered
which the accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment

To sum up the claims of the petitioner, he theorizes that there was an error of law or irregularities committed when the RTC
promulgated a decision in absentia and deemed that he had waived his right to present evidence resulting to denial of due process, a
one-sided decision by the RTC, and a strict and rigid application of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure against him. First, it must
be noted that the petitioner had already been arraigned and therefore, the court a quo had already acquired jurisdiction over him. In
fact, there was already an initial presentation of evidence for the defense when his whereabouts became unknown. The petitioner's
claims that he had not testified because he did not know the schedule of the hearings schedule of the hearings, and mistakenly believed
that the case had already been terminated with the departure of Toor, Sr., do not merit our consideration. The holding of trial in
absentia is authorized under Section 14 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. It is
established that notices have been served to the counsel of the petitioner and his failure to inform his counsel of his whereabouts is the
reason for his failure to appear on the scheduled date. Thus, the arguments of the petitioner against the validity of the proceedings and
promulgation of judgment in absentia for being in violation of the constitutional right to due process are doomed to fail.

In the instant case, the Court finds no reason to waive the procedural rules in
order to grant the motion for new trial of the petitioner. There is just no legal basis for
the grant of the motion for new trial. The Court believes that the petitioner was given
the opportunity to be heard but he chose to put this opportunity into waste by not being
diligent enough to ask about the status of the criminal case against him and inform his
counsel of his whereabouts.

Grounds for reconsideration

Case no. 381 Mapagay v. People, G.R. No. 178984, Aug. 19, 2009
Facts
That on or about the 20th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of
Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,well knowing at
the time of issue did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for payment in full of the amount of such check upon its
presentment which check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereto, was subsequently dishonored by
the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the
face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
When arraigned on 9 November 1998, petitioner, assisted by her counsel de oficio, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge. On 30 June 1999,
the MeTC provisionally dismissed the instant case on the basis of an amicable settlement between petitioner and private complainant
Relindia dela Cruz. 8 On 9 August 1999, private complainant for the revival of the present case claiming that petitioner failed to comply
with the terms of their agreement. Said motion was granted by the MeTC in its Order dated 18 February 2000. 10
On 7 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order terminating the pre-trial conference on the instant case. Trial on the merits thereafter
ensued.

Issue
Whether or not the denial of the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused violated her right to appeal.

Held
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of
the judgment of conviction may be filed within 15 days from the promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed
from. Failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period renders the subject decision final and executory. Once
a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may
no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact
or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by this Court. Decisions that
have long become final and executory cannot be annulled by courts, and the appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial
court's final judgment. This doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
errors, judgments must become final at some point in time
Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modiCed in any respect, even if the
modiCcation is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether
themodification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by this Court. 34 Decisions that have long become Cnal and
executory cannot be annulled by courts, and the appellate court is deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial court's Cnal judgment. 35
This doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound practice that, at
the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some point in time. 36Evidence on record shows that petitioner's counsel
of record, Atty. Antonio JBallena (Atty. Ballena), received on 21 September 2004 a copy of the RTC Decision dated 14 September 2004,
which a;rms petitioner's conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 37 Hence, petitioner may Cle a motion for reconsideration
within 15
days from such date of receipt, which must be on or before 6 October 2004. However,petitioner Cled her motion for reconsideration
only on 3 November 2004, or on the 43rd day, which was obviously way beyond the 15-day reglementary period. 38 Consequently, the
RTC Decision dated 14 September 2004 has become final and executory. ECcTaH
Petitioner alleges that she learned of the RTC Decision only on 20 October 2004when she asked a friend to check on the status of the
case and that Atty. Ballena didnot inform her of the RTC DecisionThe rule is that when a party is represented by counsel, notices of all
kinds, including motions, pleadings and orders, must be served on the counsel. Notice t counsel of record is binding on the client, and
the neglect or failure of counsel to inform
him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on
its face. 39
It is indeed settled that the omission or negligence of counsel binds the client. This is more true if the client did not make a periodic
check on the progress of her case. Otherwise, there would be no end to a suit, so long as a new counsel could be employed who would
allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced, or learned. 40
In the case at bar, there is no showing that petitioner had constantly followed up

Case no. 382 De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 326 Phil. 182 (1996)

Facts
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court saw it then, petitioner's guilt was duly established by 1) lone prosecution witness Josephine
Angeles' 6 testimony that no such training programs were held at the designated places, 7 and 2) petitioner's failure to present a single
receipt to support due disbursement of the P200,000.00, resulting from his former lawyers' insistence in filng a demurrer to evidence
despite prior leave for that purpose having been denied by the Sandiganbayan In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time,
seeks to be relieved from what he considers as the serious and costly mistake of his former lawyers in demurring to the prosecution
evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of which deprived him of presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of
documentary evidence that would have completely belied the accusation against him. Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies
of the list of expenses and receipts.

Issue
Whether or not
Petitioner's "Omnibus Motion" is violative of the Court's adopted policy on second
motions for reconsideration as expressed in a Resolution
dated April 7, 1988 stating that:

"Where the Court has resolved to deny a motion for reconsideration and
decrees the denial to be Cnal, no motion for leave to Cle second motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained

Held
To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to
repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting his
evidence which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court, for
the general rule is that we are not triers of facts. Without prejudging the result of such appreciation, petitioner's documentary evidences
prima facie appear strong when reckoned with the lone prosecution witness Angeles' testimony, indicating that ocial training programs
were indeed actually conducted and that the P200,000.00 cash advance he received were spent entirely for those programs.

The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the
dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for
otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial
discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice have always been, as
they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way around.
Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, "should give
way to the realities of the situation." 30 And the grim reality petitioner will surely face, if
we do not compassionately bend backwards and Lex technicalities in this instance, is
the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have
committed after all. More so, considering that petitioner's record as public servant
remained unscathed until his prosecution. Indeed, "while guilt shall not escape,
innocence should not suffer."

REMEDIAL LAW; RULES OF PROCEDURE; MAY BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED TO

SERVE THE END OF JUSTICE. — The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations
whenever the purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned. In not a few instances, this Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases
on grounds not mentioned in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency of counsel, improvident plea of guilty,
disqualification of an attorney de officio to represent the accused in trial court, and where a judgment was rendered on a stipulation of
facts entered into by both the prosecution and the defense. Similarly, in a considerable host of cases has this prerogative been invoked
to relax even procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal. Let us not forget
that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid
application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided.
Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and
encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case.

In resume, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render
justice where justice is due — to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is
charged. To borrow Justice Padilla's words in "People v. CA, et al.", 32 (where substantial justice was upheld anew in allowing therein
accused's appeal despite the withdrawal of his notice of appeal and his subsequent escape from confinement) that "if only to truly make
the courts really genuine instruments in the administration of justice," the Court believes it imperative, in order to assure against any
possible miscarriage of justice resulting from petitioner's failure to present his crucial evidence through no fault of his, that this case be
remanded to the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner's evidence.

Case no. 383 Astorga vs. People, G.R. No. 154130, Aug. 20, 2004
Facts
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of
the Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On
September 1, 1997, they, together with SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine National Police Regional
Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging
activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being
constructed at Barangay Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, who turned out to be the owner
of the boats. A heated altercation ensued between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements and, moments
later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s
house in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m. On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was
charged with and convicted of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986.

Issue
Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration can be granted

Held

While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited

pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same, provided it is
filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served thereby. ESIcaC
The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the
court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical
rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except a
particular case from its operation.

Case no. 384 Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164815, Sept. 3, 2009
Facts
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., Disuanco received a Dispatch Order from the desk officer directing him and three (3) other
policemen to serve a Warrant of Arrest, issued by Judge Ignacio Salvador, against Valeroso for a case of kidnapping with ransom. After
a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on Valeroso
checking his hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan. Eventually, the team members proceeded to the Integrated National Police
(INP) Central Police Station in Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw Valeroso about to board a tricyle. Disuanco and his team
approached Valeroso. They put him under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. They found a
Charter Arms revolver, with five (5) pieces of live ammunition, tucked in his waist. Valeroso was then brought to the police station for
questioning. Upon verification in the Firearms and Explosives Division in Camp Crame, Deriquito presented a certification that the
subject firearm was not issued to Valeroso, but was licensed in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila. 9
On the other hand, Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. (Timbol), and Adrian Yuson testified for the defense. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows: On July 10, 1996, Valeroso was sleeping inside a room in the boarding house of his children located at Sagana
Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City. He was awakened by four (4) heavily armed men in civilian attire who pointed their guns at
him and pulled him out of the room. 10 The raiding team tied his hands and placed him near the faucet (outside the room) then went
back inside, searched and ransacked the room. Moments later, an operative came out of the room and exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha
akong baril sa loob!"

Issue
Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration can be granted

Held

The Letter-Appeal is actually in the nature of a second motion for

reconsideration. While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a
prohibited pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same,
provided it is Aled with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better served
thereby. 24
This is not the Arst time that this Court is suspending its own rules or excepting a
particular case from the operation of the rules. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,
despite the denial of De Guzman's motion for reconsideration, we still entertained his
Omnibus Motion, which was actually a second motion for reconsideration. Eventually,
we reconsidered our earlier decision and remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for
reception and appreciation of petitioner's evidence. In that case, we said that if we
would not compassionately bend backwards and Lex technicalities, petitioner would
surely experience the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might
not have committed after all. 26 Also in Astorga v. People, on a second motion for
reconsideration, we set aside our earlier decision, re-examined the records of the case,
then Anally acquitted Benito Astorga of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground
of reasonable doubt. And in Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v. Amante, by
virtue of the January 13, 2004 En Banc Resolution, the Court authorized the Special First
Division to suspend the Rules, so as to allow it to consider and resolve respondent's
second motion for reconsideration after the motion was heard on oral arguments. After
a re-examination of the merits of the case, we granted the second motion for
reconsideration and set aside our earlier decision. Clearly, suspension of the rules of procedure, to pave the way for the re- examination
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law earlier made, is not without basis. Rues of procedure are merely tools designed to
facilitate the attainment of justice. They are conceived and promulgated to effectively
aid the courts in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of
technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always
been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that, on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat to substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus,
if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than to promote justice, it
would always be within our power to suspend the rules or except a particular case from
its operation
Form of motion and notice to the prosecutor
Case no. 385 Paredes v. Borja, 3 SCRA 495

Facts
On 9 July 1958 the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of occidental Misamis filed a petition for certiorariwith preliminary injunction in the
Court of First Instance of the said province against Felix V. Borja, Justice of the Peace of Bonifacio, Occidental Misamis, and Cresencio
Catalan respondents, alleging that on 2 June the chief of police subscribed and on 3 June 1958 swore to a complaint charging the last
named respondent with malicious mischief for pulling and destroying the corn plants of Josefa Lapora, a tenant of Exaltacion Jagonia
de Amparado, and filed it in the Justice of the Peace Court (crim. case 488, Annex A); that on 6 June 1958, upon arraignment,
respondent, defendant therein, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of guilty and the respondent Justice of the Peace Court
sentenced him to indemnify the defended party in the sum of P10, to suffer the penal ten days imprisonment and to pay the costs
(Annex B); that on the same day the respondent filed a motion for consideration on the ground that the imposition of the penalty of ten
days imprisonment "is too severe considering the fact that under Article 329, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty may
be arresto menoror a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than 200 pesos

Issue
Whther or not the the liability in the administrative case against him was not established by substantial evidence, so will his criminal
case necessarily fall, demanding as it does, a heavier quantum of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Held
Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for the court being
indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without impleading the lower courts or
judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by
the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly
legible duplicate originals or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of
the Regional Trial Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the petition.

The appellee contends that the respondent Justice of the Peace Court should not have entertained the appellant's motions for
reconsideration because they were not verified and not supported by affidavits. In support of his contention he cites the cases of Fiscal
of Manila vs. Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 20 and People vs. Damiao, 56 Phil. 734, where the rule is that after a judgment of conviction has been
entered in a criminal case, the motion filed for the purpose of substituting a plea of guilty by one of not guilty is equivalent to a petition
for reopening the case, and must not only be verified but accompanied by an affidavit of merit. Such rule enunciated in those two cases,
decided on 25 August 1928 and 31 March 1932, respectively, while the law on criminal procedure was General Order No. 58, in no
longer controlling. The present rules on criminal procedure are as provided for in the Rules of Court which took effect on 1 July 1940,
and do not require that a motion for new trial be verified. And while the Rules of Court also require, as in the supplanted law, that an
affidavit of merit be attached to support a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, yet the defect of lack of it in the
appellant's motions for reconsideration or rehearsing had been cured by the testimony under oath of the appellant at the hearing of the
motion for reconsideration on 25 June 1958. It was the appellee himself who presented in evidence the judgment (Exhibit B) which is
the basis of the appellant's motions for reconsideration.

Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration

Case no. 386 People v. Ebias, 324 SCRA 675

Facts
During the trial, Ronaldo Narez reiterated in open court that accused-appellant Ernesto Ebias and Boy Marantal were one and the same
person.[6] However, he could not identify accused-appellant's companion as the latter's face was covered with a yellow handkerchief.[7]

Accused-appellant's defense consisted of denial and alibi. A defense witness, Isagani Maray, claimed that accused-appellant Ebias,
together with several laborers, was working in a citrus plantation in Pangil, Laguna on the day in question.[8] Maray admitted, however,
that the plantation where accused-appellant was allegedly working was only around 10 meters from the place of the incident.[9]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was at the Vista Villamayor Citrus Plantation at the time of the commission of the crime. At around
12 noon of that day, when the shooting took place, he ate lunch at his house with Isagani Maray and other members of his family.
Issue

The question now is whether or not Eliseo's confession constitutes newly-discovered evidence warranting a new trial in favor of
accused-

Held
The question now is whether or not Eliseo's confession constitutes newly-discovered evidence warranting a new trial in favor of
accused-appellant. For newly-discovered evidence to be a ground for new trial, the following requisites must concur: (a) the evidence is
discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; and (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that, if admitted,
could probably change the judgment.

On the other hand, we cannot say that Ronaldo Narez was mistaken in identifying accused-appellant as the person who shot him and his
cousin. After all, he never deviated from his testimony that he saw accused-appellant when the latter shot them. The crime was
committed at noontime with the shooter a mere fifteen meters away from his victims. Ronaldo Narez was thus able to see his attacker in
full view. We cannot, therefore, discount Ronaldo Narez's positive identification of accused-appellant as the person who shot him and
his cousin.

There is thus a need for a new trial in order to determine the veracity of Ronaldo Narez's positive identification vis--vis the alleged
confession made by Leonardo Eliseo since no less than a life is at stake. We recognize that "[c]ourt litigations are primarily for the
search of truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the
best way to ferret out such truth."[32] Hence, a liberal interpretation of the rule granting a motion for new trial is called for.[33] We
cannot in good conscience convict accused-appellant and impose upon him the death penalty when evidence which would possibly
exonerate him may be presented by him in a new trial. Neither can we acquit him on the sole ground that another person confessed to
having committed the crime.

In previous cases, we granted the accused's motion for new trial on the basis of affidavits executed either by witnesses or by the
perpetrators of the crime as they tend to establish the innocence of the accused.[34] In People v. Amparado[35] and Cuenca v. Court of
Appeals,[36] affidavits confessing to the actual commission of the crime were executed by the supposed culprits. The Court remanded
the cases to the trial court because of the possibility that, should the affidavits be proven true, the conviction of the accused could be
reversed or at least modified. As has been said, the overriding need to render justice demands that an accused be granted all possible
legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged.[37]

On the other hand, we cannot discount the possibility that the confession by Leonardo Eliseo is a last-ditch effort by accused-appellant
to avoid the death penalty. For this reason, this case should be reopened only for the purpose of allowing the defense to present the
testimony of Leonardo Eliseo and for the prosecution to present any rebutting evidence which it may desire to present.
(People vs. Ebias G.R. No. 127130 October 12, 2000)

Case no. 387 People v. De Grano, G.R. No. 167710, June 5, 2009
Facts
On November 28, 1991, an Information for murder committed against Emmanuel Mendoza was filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 6, Tanauan, Batangas, against Joven de Grano (Joven), Armando de Grano (Armando), and Estanislao Lacaba
(Estanislao), together with their co-accused Leonides Landicho (Leonides), Domingo Landicho (Domingo), and Leonardo Genil
(Leonardo), who were at-large. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 2730, the pertinent portion of which reads: That on April 21, 1991,
between 9:00 o'clock and 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in Barangay Balakilong, [M]unicipality of Laurel, [P]rovince of Batangas, and
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, all the above named accused, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another,
motivated by common design and intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and by means of treachery and
with evident premeditation, shoot EMMANUEL MENDOZA with firearms, inflicting upon him eight gunshot wounds and causing his
death thereby, thus committing the crime of MURDER to the damage and prejudice of his heirs in the amount as the Honorable Court
shall determine. Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while their co-accused
Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained atlarge. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the prosecution's
evidence was not strong. Duly arraigned, Joven, Armando, and Estanislao pleaded "not guilty" to the crime as charged; while their co-
accused Leonides, Leonardo, and Domingo remained atlarge. Thereafter, respondents filed a motion for bail contending that the
prosecution's evidence was not strong.

Issue
Whether or not the Joint Motion for reconsideration can be granted with the other accused knowing that only Estanislao was present in
the promulgation of the judgment.

Held
When the Decision dated April 25, 2002 was promulgated, only Estanislao Lacaba was present. Subsequently thereafter, without
surrendering and explaining the reasons for their absence, Joven, Armando, and Domingo joined Estanislao in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration. In blatant disregard of the Rules, the RTC not only failed to cause the arrest of the respondents who were at large, it
also took cognizance of the joint motion.
The RTC clearly exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the joint Motion for Reconsideration with respect to the respondents who
were at large. It should have considered the joint motion as a motion for reconsideration that was solely filed by Estanislao. Being at
large, Joven and Domingo have not regained their standing in court. Once an accused jumps bail or flees to a foreign country, or escapes
from prison or confinement, he loses his standing in court; and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is
deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.63
Thus, Joven, Armando, and Domingo, were not placed in double jeopardy because, from the very beginning, the lower tribunal had
acted without jurisdiction. Verily, any ruling issued without jurisdiction is, in legal contemplation, necessarily null and void and does
not exist. In criminal cases, it cannot be the source of an acquittal.64
However, with respect to Estanislao, the RTC committed no reversible error when it entertained the Motion for Reconsideration. He
was in custody and was present at the promulgation of the judgment. Hence, the RTC never lost jurisdiction over his person.
Consequently, the RTC's ruling downgrading his conviction from murder to homicide stands. For Estanislao, and for him alone, the
proscription against double jeopardy applies.

Who may appeal

Case no. 388 People v. Paet, 100 Phil. 357
This is the whole case guys
In an amended information dated January 27, 1955, filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Alejandro Paet y Velasco was accused
of a violation of Circulars Nos. 20 and 42, as amended by Circular No. 55, of the Central Bank of the Philippines, in relation to section
34, Republic Act No. 265, committed as follows:chanroblesvirtual 1awlibrary

"That on or about the 20th day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, having in his possession the
amount of $3,140, did then and there willfully and unlawfully conceal, fail and refused to declare the same with any authorized agent of
the Central Bank of the Philippines as prescribed by circulars 20 and 42 as amended by Circular 55 of the Central Bank."chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

Upon calling the case for hearing on May 13, 1955, the defendant with the assistance of counsel asked permission to withdraw his
former plea of not guilty and to substitute therefor a plea of guilty, which permission was granted. Upon rearraignment, he pleaded
guilty to the amended information, and upon recommendation of the prosecution, the trial court in a decision dated June 10, 1955,
found him guilty of the charge and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of ten (10) days imprisonment, to pay a fine of one hundred
pesos (P100), with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

It would appear that before the decision was rendered, counsel for the defendant had filed a memorandum, praying that the amount of
$3,140, marked as Exhibit 1, or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, which had been taken by the authorities from the said defendant, be
returned to the latter as the lawful owner hereof. The trial court either overlooked this prayer or else did not deem it necessary to
include it in its decision. The fact is that the decision did not provide for the confiscation or forfeiture of the aforementioned amount in
favor of the government. It seems that this point was subsequently raised both by the prosecution and the defense, the former
contending that the confiscation should have been included in the decision as part of the penalty, and the latter naturally claiming
return to the accused. At the suggestion of the trial court, written memoranda were filed by both parties. Thereafter, the lower court
issued a resolution dated July 30, 1955, expressing the opinion and holding that the amount of $3,140 should not be confiscated, but
should be exchanged with pesos in the Philippine currency at the Central Bank, and delivered to the accused. The government, through
the Solicitor General, is appealing from the resolution directly to this Court.
With the view we take of the propriety and legality of the appeal, we find it unnecessary to go into the merits of the contention of the
parties, although it may not be out of place to state that according to the decision of June 10, 1955, as well as the appealed resolution,
the penalty imposed which did not include the confiscation of the amount of $3,140, was upon the recommendation of the prosecution
itself. In the first place, the confiscation or forfeiture of the above mentioned sum would be an additional penalty and would amount to
an increase of the penalty already imposed upon the accused. To reopen the case for the purpose of increasing the penalty, as is sought
in the Government’s appeal, would be placing the accused in double jeopardy, and under Rule 118, section 2 of the Rules of Court, the
Government cannot appeal in a criminal case if the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. (People v. Cornelio Ferrer,
supra, p. 124; People v. Ang Cho Kio, 95 Phil., 475, 50 Off. Gaz., No. 3, p. 3563; People v. Luis M. Taruc, 97 Phil., 927.) In the present
case, the defendant-appellee did not file any brief, naturally, this point of the legality of the appeal of the Government is not raised; even
so, this Tribunal feels it is its duty to apply the law, specially when it favors the accused in a criminal case. In the second place, the
record shows that at the time the appealed resolution was issued on July 30, 1955, the decision of June 10, 1955 had already become
final and no longer subject to modification for the reason that the accused had already served the sentence, not partially but totally.
(Rule 116, section 7, Rules of Court.).

Case no. 389 Central Bank v. CA, 171 SCRA 49

FACTS:
On April 28, 1965, Island Savings Bank, upon favorable recommendation of its legal department, approved the loan application for
P80,000.00 of Sulpicio M. Tolentino, who, as a security for the loan, executed on the same day a real estate mortgage over his 100-
hectare land located in Cubo, Las Nieves, Agusan, and covered by TCT No. T-305, and which mortgage was annotated on the said title
the next day. The approved loan application called for a lump sum P80,000.00 loan, repayable in semi-annual installments for a period
of 3 years, with 12% annual interest. It was required that Sulpicio M. Tolentino shall use the loan proceeds solely as an additional capital
to develop his other property into a subdivision. The loan called for a lump sum of P80,000, repayable in semi-annual installments for 3
yrs, with 12% annual interest. After the agreement, a mere P17,000 partial release of the loan was made by the bank and Tolentino and
his wife signed a promissory note for the P17,000 at 12% annual interest payable w/in 3 yrs. An advance interest was deducted fr the
partial release but this prededucted interest was refunded to Tolentino after being informed that there was no fund yet for the release of
the P63,000 balance.
On August 13, 1965, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank, after finding Island Savings Bank was suffering liquidity problems, issued
Resolution No. 1049, which provides the prohibition of the bank from making new loans and investments [except investments in
government securities] excluding extensions or renewals of already approved loans, provided that such extensions or renewals shall be
subject to review by the Superintendent of Banks, who may impose such limitations as may be necessary to insure correction of the
bank’s deficiency as soon as possible.

ISSUE
Can the People of the Philippines appeal in the case at bar?

RULING:
Ordinarily, errors of judgment may be corrected in a timely appeal from the judgment on the merits. Such remedy, however, is not
available in the case at bar, the decision involved being one of acquittal. An appeal therefrom by the People would run counter to the
accused's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.
We discern in this petition for certiorari a subtle attempt to have us review the judgment of the appellate court on the merits. While the
petition at bar is denominated a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and the issues raised therein
ostensibly dealt with the jurisdiction of the appellate court, petitioners' attack on the appellate court's jurisdiction is premised on the
conclusions that (a) the findings of facts of the appellate court were based on conjectures and speculations, or on misapprehension of
facts and contrary to the documents and exhibits; (b) the exhibit relied upon by the appellate court has not been offered nor admitted in
evidence during the trial; and (c) the appellate court gave to a document a meaning contrary to its contents. But how valid and tenable
these premises are remains a question. To determine their validity would entail a review and re- evaluation of the evidence on record as
well as the procedure taken vis-a-vis the conclusions arrived at by the appellate court; in effect, a review of the judgment of acquittal,
which we cannot do in a petition for certiorari and without violating the private respondents' constitutional right against double
jeopardy.
Section 2 of Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that "the People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed
thereby in double jeopardy." The argument that the judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and therefore, null and void, is
flawed because whatever error may have been committed by the lower court was merely an error of judgment and not of jurisdiction. It
did not affect the intrinsic validity of the decision. This is the kind of error that can no longer be rectified on appeal by the prosecution
no matter how obvious the error may be. 20 The rule therefore, in this jurisdiction is that a judgment of acquittal is not reviewable by a
higher court, for an appeal by the government from the judgment would put the accused in second jeopardy for the same offense. 21
Case no. 390 People v. Desalisa, 125 Phil. 27
Facts
By reason of the subsequent death of the victim Gertrudes Adecer and ascertainment of the extent of the injuries sustained by victim
Candido Aguinaldo, Jr., the above information was amended on May 27, 1958, by dropping therefrom the name of the deceased and
adding thereto the clause "those (physical injuries) of Candido Aguinaldo, Jr. requiring medical attendance for a period of more than
thirty (30) days". On the same date, an information for Homicide Thru Reckless Imprudence was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila (Crim. Case No. 44176) against the same accused, for the death of Adecer.
The accused were arraigned in the Municipal Court (for physical injuries) on June 20, 1958, wherein they entered a plea of not guilty;
while arraignment in the Court of First Instance (for homicide) was held on June 23, 1958, wherein the accused also pleaded not guilty.
On August 29, 1958, the case for physical injuries of all complainants, except Vicenta Aguinaldo and Candido Aguinaldo, Jr. was
dismissed by the Municipal Court upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, Thereafter, the trial proceeded with the Aguinaldos taking the
witness stand. At this stage, defense counsel filed a motion to quash the information, on the ground of double jeopardy, it being alleged
that the filing of separate cases (one in the Municipal Court, and the other in the Court of First Instance) for offenses arising out of a
single act, placed them in danger of being twice convicted and penalized for the same act.
The defense contended that the appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal of the Municipal Court subjects them to a second
jeopardy before the Court of First Instance

Issue
Whether or not the appeal of the Prosecution can be granted

Held
There are two cardinal principles that must first be remembered: first, the first sentence of Rule 118, Section 2 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 122, Amended Rules) which reads, "The People of the Philippines cannot appeal if the defendant would be placed thereby in
double jeopardy," does not import to be an absolute prohibition tor the prosecution to appeal.[2] For, it may be pointed out, this
provision prohibiting the appeal by tne prosecution, is actually a negative statement conditioned on defendants being thereby placed in
double jeopardy. In fine, it is only another way of saying that the prosecution can appeal except when the defendant would, by such
appeal, be placed in double jeopardy. This is further supported by the succeeding sentence of the same provision, thus:

"in all other cases, either party (which includes the prosecution) may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after
judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant."
Secondly, it is now the established rule that the immunity of an accused to a second jeopardy of conviction for the same offense is a
personal privilege which the accused may waive.[3]
Putting these doctrines together, we may state that the prosecution can appeal from a dismissal-order of the lower court if such appeal
will not place the accused in second jeopardy, or if there is waiver by the accused of the defense of double jeopardy

Case no. 391 Bernardo v. CA, 190 SCRA 63

FACTS:
Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement
of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing
of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias
and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor
of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente,
Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.
The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing,
at which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the
memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased
Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half
share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of
the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the
testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.

ISSUE
Who may represent or appeal in behalf of the deceased

HELD
 NO. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in
order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings,
including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the
executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of
the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it
is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir
to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the
widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.

Case no.392 People v. Sison, 312 SCRA 792

Facts
Casuera and Magalona met appellant and the latter briefed Castuera on the requirements for working as a fruit picker in Australia. She
introduced Castuera to another man who related that he was able to go to Australia with her help. She also showed Castuera pictures of
other people she had supposedly helped to get employment in Australia. Appellant further narrated that a couple she had helped had
given her their car as payment. Because of her representations, Castuera believed in her promise that she could send him to Australia.
Appellant asked Castuera for ₱180,000 for processing his papers.
Appellant, however, failed to secure an Australian visa for Castuera. Together with Dedales and Bacomo, appellant convinced Castueara
that that it was difficult to get an Australian visa in the Philippines so they had to go to Malaysia or in Indonesia to get one.
Subsequently, Castuera's application for an Australian visa in Indonesia was denied. Dedales asked for US$1,000 for the processing of
his U.S. visa, which he paid. However, when his U.S. visa came, Castuera saw that it was in an Indonesian passport bearing an
Indonesian name. Because of this, Castuera decided to just return to the Philippines.

Issue
Whther or not the the conviction was correct

Held
SIson is liable for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be convicted separately for
illegal recruitment under RA 8042 and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. In People v. Daud, the Court explained:
In this jurisdiction, it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The offense of illegal recruitment is
Malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary. for conviction, while estafa is malum in se where the
criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for
offenses punishable by other laws. Conversely, conviction for estafa under par. 2(a) of Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a
conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. It follows that one's acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in
his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa.[50] (Citations omitted)
The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC are:
(a) that there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent
means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
All these elements are present in this case.

First, Sison misrepresented her qualifications and authority to send Castuera to work in Australia. She actively made Castuera believe
that she had the ability to do so she showed pictures of her "recruits," had one of them give a testimonial, and told him stories to
convince him of such ability. It did not matter that "they had no agreement that their transaction was for recruitment or deployment. All
her acts were calculated to convince Castuera that Sison was qualified to send him abroad for employment. It is enough that she "gave
the impression that [she] had the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.

Second, Sison's false representation was made prior to or simultaneous to the commission of the fraud. Sison used these false
representations to convince Castuera that he would be able to go to Australia and be a fruit picker, just like her other recruits. These
representations were clearly mere devices to convince Castuera, whom she only met at that time, that she was a legitimate recruiter.

Third, Castuera relied on Sison's representations. He believed that she could send him to Australia because of the pictures and
testimonials she showed him. He also relied on the fact that his aunt knew Sison's husband, a police officer, adding to her
trustworthiness. Sison banked on that trust to convince Castuera to part with his money and be "recruited" into overseas employment.
Castuera believed that Sison had the same ability to send him to Australia. He did not even ask for her authority or check for himself
with the POEA, relying instead on her word. This tells us that he was fully convinced based on Sison's representations.

Fourth, Sison's misrepresentation resulted in damage to Castuera. He paid the P80,000 down payment that Sison required of him as
processing fee, but the purpose for which it was paid never materialized. Likewise, said amount was never reimbursed to Castuera
despite his demands for its return.

Case no. 393 People v. Velasco, GR No. 127444, 2000

Facts
The idyllic morning calm in San Ildefonso, Bulacan, a small town north of Manila, was shattered by gunshots fired in rapid succession.
The shooting claimed the life of young Alex Vinculado and seriously maimed his twin brother Levi who permanently lost his left vision.
Their uncle, Miguel Vinculado, Jr. was also shot. A slug tunneled through his right arm, pierced the right side of his body and burrowed
in his stomach where it remained until extracted by surgical procedure.
As a consequence, three (3) criminal Informations — one (1) for homicide and two (2) for frustrated homicide — were originally filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, against Honorato Galvez, Mayor of San Ildefonso, and Godofredo Diego, a
municipal employee and alleged bodyguard of the mayor. After a series of legal maneuvers by the parties, venue of the cases was
transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Metro Manila. There the cases were stamped with new docket numbers (Nos. Q-
94-55484, Q-94-55485, Q-94-55486 and Q-94-55487, respectively), and rafled to Branch 103 presided over by Judge Jaime Salazar, Jr.
In the course of the proceedings, the judge inhibited himself and the cases were re-rafled to respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco of
Branch 89. On 8 October 1996 a consolidated decision on the four (4) cases was promulgated. The trial court found the accused
Godofredo Diego guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated murder. However, it acquitted Mayor
Honorato Galvez of the same charges due to insuffciency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of illegal carrying of firearm
upon its finding that the act was not a violation of law. Thus, the government brought this petition.

Issue
Whether or not elevating the issue of criminal culpability of private respondent Galvez before this Tribunal despite acquittal by the trial
court can be considered violative of the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy

Held

The Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure relative to double jeopardy and the effect thereon of acquittals adhere strictly to
constitutional provisions. Under Sec. 1 of Rule 117 providing for former conviction or acquittal and double jeopardy, there can be no
mistaking the requisites for invoking double jeopardy: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) before a competent court before which
the same is led; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not
distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal from a judgment of conviction. This rmly establishes the nality-
of-acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is nal
and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.

As to the finality of acquital, the court opined as observed in Lockhart v. Nelson, "(t)he fundamental tenet animating the Double
Jeopardy Clause is that the State should not be able to oppress individuals through the abuse of the criminal process." Because the
innocence of the accused has been conrmed by a nal judgment, the Constitution conclusively presumes that a second trial would be
unfair. Thus, "emerging American consensus on jury acquittals" notwithstanding, on solid constitutional bedrock is well engraved our
own doctrine that acquittals by judges on evidentiary considerations cannot be appealed by government. The jurisprudential metes and
bounds of double jeopardy having been clearly dened by both constitution and statute, the issue of the effect of an appeal of a verdict of
acquittal upon a determination of the evidence on the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused against being twice placed in
jeopardy should now be finally put to rest.

Case no. 394 Estrallado-Mainar v. People - 29 July 2015

Facts
Said accused well knowing at the time of issue did not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the bank for payment in full of the amount of such check upon its presentment which check when presented for
payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereto, was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account
Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, the accused failed to pay said payee the face amount of said check or to make
arrangement for full payment thereof within ve (5) banking days after receiving said notice. Private complainant testied that petitioner
borrowed money from her in
November 1996. Petitioner gave her a signed check for the loan and promised to replace the check with cash. Upon failure of petitioner
to give her cash despite repeated demands, she presented the check to the drawee bank. The check was dishonored by the drawee bank
for the reason "Account Closed". Thereafter, private complainant consulted a lawyer. Her lawyer sent a demand letter to petitioner, but
the latter refused to receive it. Private complainant told petitioner to pay the loan or the former would sue her in court. Petitioner
promised to pay, but failed to do so. Thus, she filed a case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 against petitioner.

Issue
Whether or not the accused was denied the right to to appeal

Held
Under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction may be filed within 15 days
from the promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. Failure to file a motion for reconsideration
within the reglementary period renders the subject decision final and executory. Once a judgment attains finality, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering
it or by this Court. Decisions that have long become final and executory cannot be annulled by courts, and the appellate court is
deprived of jurisdiction to alter the trial court's final judgment. This doctrine is founded on considerations of public policy and sound
practice that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments must become final at some point in time.

Evidence on record shows that petitioner's counsel of record, Atty. Antonio J. Ballena (Atty. Ballena), received on 21 September 2004 a
copy of the RTC Decision dated 14 September 2004, which affirms petitioner's conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. 37
Hence, petitioner may file a motion for reconsideration within 15 days from such date of receipt, which must be on or before 6 October
2004. However, petitioner filed her motion for reconsideration only on 3 November 2004, or on the 43rd day, which was obviously way
beyond the 15-day reglementary period. 38 Consequently, the RTC Decision dated 14 September 2004 has become final and executory.
Petitioner alleges that she learned of the RTC Decision only on 20 October 2004 when she asked a friend to check on the status of the
case and that Atty. Ballena did not inform her of the RTC Decision. The rule is that when a party is represented by counsel, notices of all
kinds, including motions, pleadings and orders, must be served on the counsel. Notice to counsel of record is binding on the client, and
the neglect or failure of counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for
setting aside a judgment, valid and regular on its face. It is indeed settled that the omission or negligence of counsel binds the client.
This is more true if the client did not make a periodic check on the progress of her case. Otherwise, there would be no end to a suit, so
long as a new counsel could be employed who would allege and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent,
experienced, or learned.

Case no. 395 AAA v. CA - 25 Feb. 2015

Facts
On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation
ceremony. Afterwards, they had a luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from
her mother to go to the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went at
around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner party with
her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at Purok, Bulahan,
Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson's Palace, which was merely a walking distance away from Gemeno's house.
Outside the Alson's Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they went
inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel
dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo. Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their
graduation, to which the rest agreed.
They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks — two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they arranged
themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing the sweetener (Pepsi) and
the other glass containing the liquor. At rst, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried hard liquor before. During the session,
they shared their problems with each other. When it was AAA's turn, she became emotional and started crying. It was then that she took
her rst shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy.
Issue
Who may appeal in criminal cases where the offended party is the State

Held
It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private
offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness
for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal
aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the
Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the said offended party or
complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused.
In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial court
committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules state that the
petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the private offended party or
complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such special civil action questioning the
decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing, complainant should not bring the action in the name
of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in [the] name of said complainant.19 Private respondents argue that the
action should have been filed by the State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the authority to represent
the State in appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG.20
Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly has the right to bring the
action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in obtaining justice in the case precisely
because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v. CA,21 where the Court sustained the private offended party’s
right in a criminal case to file a special civil action for certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the
Solicitor General’s intervention was not necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in her
own name and not in that of the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause in its Comment,22 thereby
fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.23

Case no. 396 People v. Francisco, 254 SCRA 475

Facts
On March 4, 1945, defendant, who had been previously arrested on charges of robbery, was being held as detention prisoner in the
municipal jail of Mansalay, Mindoro. On that date he requested permission from the chief of police, and he was allowed to go with
Sergeant Pacifico Pimentel, who was detailed to guard him. Upon their reaching the house, the sergeant allowed the prisoner to see his
wife who was at the time in a room of said house, while said sergeant remained at the foot of the stairs. After a few moments, Pimentel
heard the scream of a woman. Running upstairs, he met defendant's wife running out of the room and holding her right breast which
was bleeding. Still moments later, Pimentel saw defendant lying down with his little son Romeo, aged one year and a half, on his breast.
Pimentel also found defendant to have a wound in his belly while his child had a wound in the back. Pimentel found the child dead.

Issue
Who may appeal in crimes where the offended party is the State

Held
At this point, it behooves us to emphasize the all-important role of the State in this case. The State being interested in laying the truth
before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the rebutting testimony in
question, even against the objection of the accused, because it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity. It may be said that
the accused husband thought that he would have more chances of convincing the court of his pretended innocence if he pointed to his
wife as having caused the death of their child, instead of simply denying that he was the author of the fatal act. To this we would counter
by saying that if he was to be allowed, for his convenience, to make his choice and thereby impute the act upon his spouse, justice would
be partial and one-sided if both the State and the wife were to be absolutely precluded from introducing the latter's rebutting testimony.

case no. 397People v. Lipata - 20 April 2016

Facts
That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two (2) other persons whose true names, identities and definite
whereabouts have not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and
treachery, and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him repeatedly with bladed
weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal stab wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Ronaldo Cueno y Bonifacio. The Quezon City Jail
Warden, in a letter dated 22 October 2012, 16 informed this Court that appellant passed away on 13 February 2011. The former Quezon
City Jail Warden wrote to the RTC about appellant's demise in a letter dated 23 February 2011. Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter
were photocopies of appellant's death certificate and medical certificate, as well as the former Quezon City Jail Warden's letter.

Issue:
Who may appeal in lieu of the death of the accused

Held
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from
sources of obligation other thandelict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal
representative of the estate of the deceased [appellant] for purposes ofrepresenting the estate in the civil aspect of this case," 33 the
current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in Bayotas, 34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to institute a
separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33,
34 and 2176, aswell as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be
filed separately by the offended party even without Reservation. 35 The separate civil action proceeds independently of the criminal
proceedings and requires only a preponderance of evidence. 36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the estate or
legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions of Section 16 of Rule 3 37 in relation to the rules for prosecuting
claims against his estate in Rules 86 and 87. 38 Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no
separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any
reservation for 8ling a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno
should 8le a separate civil case in order to obtain 8nancial retribution for their loss. The lack of a separate civil case for the cause of
action arising from quasi-delict leads us to the conclusion that, a decade after Cueno's death, his heirs cannot recover even a centavo
from the amounts awarded by the CA.