T h o m a s Reid on M e m o r y

RENI~ VAN WOUDENBERG

THIS PAPER IS A d i s c u s s i o n o f T h o m a s R e i d ' s views o n m e m o r y as a n " a v e n u e o f

knowledge." Part t deals with various remarks Reid makes concerning mem-
ory, k n o w l e d g e , a n d b e l i e f w h i c h h e h o l d s to b e " o b v i o u s a n d c e r t a i n . " P a r t 2
c o n t a i n s a m o r e d e t a i l e d d i s c u s s i o n o f R e i d ' s t h e s i s t h a t " m e m o r y is u n a c c o u n t -
a b l e . " P a r t 3 i n q u i r e s h o w R e i d ' s c r i t i q u e o f t h e W a y o f I d e a s fits w i t h his o w n
views o n m e m o r y .
R e i d ' s d e a l i n g s w i t h m e m o r y a r e p a r t o f his b r o a d e r i n q u i r i e s i n t o t h e i n t e l -
l e c t u a l f a c u l t i e s o f t h e h u m a n m i n d . I n t h e E s s a y s o n the I n t e l l e c t u a l P o w e r s o f M a n
R e i d d i s c u s s e s n o t o n l y m e m o r y , b u t o t h e r a v e n u e s o f k n o w l e d g e as well, s u c h
as p e r c e p t i o n a n d r e a s o n i n g . I n t h e s e essays R e i d is d o i n g s t r a i g h t e p i s t e m o l -
ogy. T h i s is n o t to d e n y t h a t R e i d a d d r e s s e s o t h e r t o p i c s as well. I n t h e e s s a y o n
m e m o r y , f o r i n s t a n c e , R e i d criticizes J o h n L o c k e ' s a c c o u n t o f p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y .
B u t e v e n t h e n his d i s c u s s i o n f o c u s s e s o n e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l m a t t e r s ; o n e o f his
c o n c l u s i o n s , f o r e x a m p l e , is t h a t L o c k e c o n f o u n d e d p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y w i t h t h e
e v i d e n c e w e h a v e o f o u r p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y , a thesis, R e i d p o i n t s o u t , t h a t is
bristled with absurd consequences. Although, then, Reid's views on memory are
r e l a t e d w i t h h i s v i e w s o n p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y , I will a b s t a i n f r o m a d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e
l a t t e r . H i s e p i s t e m o l o g y o f m e m o r y , I t h i n k , w a r r a n t s a t t e n t i o n in its o w n r i g h t . '

1. MEMORY, KNOWLEDGE, AND BELIEF

I. i I n E s s a y I I I o f his E s s a y s o n the I n t e l l e c t u a l P o w e r s o f M a n [1784],2 e n t i t l e d " O f

Memory," Reid writes:

1Roger D. Gallie discusses Reid's views of personal identity, but does not give a separate treat-
ment of Reid's epistemology of memory (see his ThomasReid and "the Way ofIdeas '{Dordrecht: Kluwer
Academic Publishers, 1989}, 199- 9~ Keith Lehrer offers a summary but not a discussion ofReid's
epistemology of memory (see his Thomas Reid, {London: Routledge, 1989}, 118-122). The present
paper aims to offer a comprehensive discussion of all aspects of Reid's epistemology of memory.
~All references will be to the pages of The Works of Thomas Reid, edited by William Hamilton,
1863, and reprinted in 1994 by Thoemmes Press, in Bristol. The references will be preceded by
either I H M or EIP standing for, respectively, Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common
Sense and Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man.

[117 ]
118 J O U R N A L o r T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 1 J A N U A R Y a 9 9 9

It is by m e m o r y that we have an immediate knowledge of things past. The senses give

us information of things only as they exist in the present moment. (EIP 339)

M e m o r y , says Reid, gives us k n o w l e d g e o f t h i n g s past, w h e r e a s sense p e r c e p -

tion gives us k n o w l e d g e o f t h i n g s p r e s e n t . R e i d takes it to be " o b v i o u s a n d
c e r t a i n " (as the title o f the first c h a p t e r o f Essay I I I indicates) t h a t " T h e object
o f m e m o r y , or t h i n g r e m e m b e r e d , m u s t be s o m e t h i n g t h a t is past; as the object
o f p e r c e p t i o n . . , m u s t be s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is p r e s e n t . W h a t n o w is, c a n n o t be
an object o f m e m o r y ; n e i t h e r can t h a t w h i c h is p a s t a n d g o n e be an o b j e c t o f
p e r c e p t i o n " (EIP 340).
T h e s e r e m a r k s m a y , h o w e v e r , o c c a s i o n s o m e d o u b t s . O n e w a y o f explain-
i n g R e i d ' s r e m a r k t h a t the object o f m e m o r y is s o m e t h i n g t h a t is past, is that
w h e n e v e r s o m e o n e , S, r e m e m b e r s s o m e t h i n g , viz., t h a t p, p will be a p r o p o s i -
tion a b o u t s o m e t h i n g t h a t is past.3 T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n gives t h e r i g h t r e s u l t f o r
s u c h p r o p o s i t i o n s as there was snowfall in late August, a n d she once visited Finland.4
But, as N o r m a n M a l c o l m has o b s e r v e d , it d o e s n o t always give the r i g h t re-
sult.5 F o r , h e says, t h e r e are cases o f S r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t p, w h e r e p is n o t a
p r o p o s i t i o n a b o u t the past. L e t p be his telephone number is 2•9-289-5975, or his
car is in the garage. W h a t is r e m e m b e r e d , in these cases, is a p r o p o s i t i o n a b o u t
s o m e t h i n g t h a t is not past, b u t p r e s e n t (or: a b o u t w h a t is p r e s e n t l y the case). It
is, so it s e e m s at least, possible f o r S to r e m e m b e r the present.
It e v e n s e e m s possible f o r S "to r e m e m b e r the f u t u r e " ( s o m e t h i n g Aristotle
d e e m e d impossible).6 S can r e m e m b e r , f o r instance, that the game starts at 8:00
P.M., o r that there will be elections next year.
N o d o u b t s o m e will f i n d these s u g g e s t i o n s p r e p o s t e r o u s . Still, we say such
t h i n g s as "I r e m e m b e r m y t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r " a n d "I r e m e m b e r the g a m e
starts at 8 : o o P.M." S o m e o n e w h o balks at the s u g g e s t i o n t h a t we can r e m e m -
b e r p r e s e n t a n d e v e n f u t u r e things, t h e r e f o r e , has to find a w a y o f d e a l i n g with
these q u i t e c o m m o n m o d e s o f saying. O n e w a y w o u l d be to a r g u e t h a t these
m a n n e r s o f saying are i n c o r r e c t , a n o t h e r t h a t t h e y are elliptical. Since the first
thesis is u n c o n v i n c i n g (it is, after all, c o r r e c t , i.e., c o r r e c t English to use the
e x p r e s s i o n s u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n ) , we are left with the s e c o n d , viz., t h a t these
m o d e s o f s a y i n g are elliptical. C a n this be m a d e a c c e p t a b l e ? L e t us see.
M i g h t it n o t be, o n e c o u l d ask, t h a t w h e n s o m e o n e says "I r e m e m b e r m y
t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r , " this is s h o r t h a n d f o r s o m e t h i n g like: "I r e m e m b e r the

3As I will be thinking of it, a proposition is a non-linguistic entity distinct from, but capable of
being expressed by a sentence (which is a linguistic entity). I will adopt the following convention:
propositions will be represented in italics, sentences will appear between quotation marks.
4Or, to be more precise, it gives the right result, provided the propositions mentioned are true
(for more on this, see section 1.4).
5Norman Malcolm, Knowledgeand Certainty (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), ~o4.
6Aristotle, De Memoria et Reminiscientia, 449 b.
 THOMAS REID ON MEMORY 119

occasion on which I learned my telephone number by heart"; and when some-

o n e says "I r e m e m b e r t h e r e will b e e l e c t i o n s n e x t y e a r " this is s h o r t h a n d f o r "I
r e m e m b e r t h e o c c a s i o n o n w h i c h I l e a r n e d t h a t n e x t y e a r t h e r e will b e e l e c -
t i o n s " ? I t d o e s n o t s e e m so. A f t e r all, s o m e o n e m i g h t r e m e m b e r h e r t e l e p h o n e
n u m b e r w i t h o u t r e m e m b e r i n g t h e o c c a s i o n o n w h i c h s h e l e a r n e d it; a n d s o m e -
o n e m i g h t r e m e m b e r t h a t n e x t y e a r will b e e l e c t i o n y e a r , w i t h o u t h a v i n g e v e n
t h e s l i g h t e s t m e m o r y w h e n (or h o w o r f r o m w h o m ) h e l e a r n e d this fact.
T o m a k e a n e x t try, m i g h t it n o t b e t h a t w h e n S says "I r e m e m b e r t h a t n e x t
y e a r will b e e l e c t i o n y e a r " this is s h o r t h a n d f o r "I r e m e m b e r t h a t I l e a r n e d [ a n d I
h a v e o r h a v e n o t c o m p l e t e l y f o r g o t t e n t h e o c c a s i o n o n w h i c h I l e a r n e d it] t h a t
n e x t y e a r will b e e l e c t i o n y e a r " ? T h i s w a y o f l o o k i n g at t h e m a t t e r p r o c e e d s f r o m
t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t it is p o s s i b l e to r e m e m b e r (the b a r e fact, so t o s p e a k ) that
t h e r e was a n o c c a s i o n o n w h i c h o n e l e a r n e d t h a t n e x t y e a r will b e e l e c t i o n y e a r ,
w i t h o u t r e m e m b e r i n g t h e l e a r n i n g o c c a s i o n itself. A n d this a s s u m p t i o n d o e s
n o t s e e m w i l d l y i m p l a u s i b l e . I f so, it is n e i t h e r i m p l a u s i b l e to h o l d t h a t S's
r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t n e x t y e a r will b e e l e c t i o n y e a r , is a c a s e o f r e m e m b e r i n g in
R e i d ' s s e n s e (as I h a v e b e e n t r y i n g to e x p l a i n it) : it is a c a s e o f S's r e m e m b e r i n g a
p r o p o s i t i o n a b o u t t h e p a s t (viz., there w a s a n o c c u r r e n c e o n w h i c h S l e a r n e d t h a t n e x t
y e a r w i l l be election year). W h a t i n i t i a l l y l o o k e d like a case o f r e m e m b e r i n g t h e
f u t u r e , c a n b e c o n s i d e r e d as a case o f r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t o n e h a s l e a r n e d s o m e -
t h i n g (in t h e past) a b o u t t h e f u t u r e . 7 S i m i l a r t h i n g s c o u l d b e s a i d o f cases o f
r e m e m b e r i n g t h e p r e s e n t . T h e r e f o r e , w e c a n c o n c u r w i t h R e i d in h o l d i n g t h a t
t h e o b j e c t o f m e m o r y is s o m e t h i n g t h a t is p a s t .
z. 2 "By m e m o r y , " R e i d h o l d s , "we h a v e a n i m m e d i a t e k n o w l e d g e o f t h i n g s
p a s t . " Sir W i l l i a m H a m i l t o n ( w h o s e s t a n d a r d s f o r e d i t i n g t e x t s d i f f e r e n o r -
m o u s l y f r o m t h o s e p r e s e n t l y o b s e r v e d ) in his e d i t i o n o f R e i d ' s w o r k s s o u n d e d a
critical n o t e r i g h t h e r e . " A n i m m e d i a t e k n o w l e d g e o f a p a s t t h i n g , " h e says, "is a
c o n t r a d i c t i o n . F o r w e c a n o n l y k n o w a t h i n g i m m e d i a t e l y , i f w e k n o w it i n itself,
o r as e x i s t i n g ; b u t w h a t is p a s t c a n n o t b e k n o w n in itself, f o r it is n o n - e x i s t e n t . " s
The terminological distinction between mediate and immediate can be
a p p l i e d to v a r i o u s s u b j e c t m a t t e r s (or: m a y b e u s e d to e x p r e s s d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p -
t u a l d i s t i n c t i o n s ) . R e i d a p p l i e s it to k n o w l e d g e ( a n d b e l i e f ) . 0 M e d i a t e k n o w l -

7In other words, what initially looked like "S remembers that P," where P is next year will be
election year, can be considered as "S remembers that O~" where Q is there was an occasion on which S
learned that P.
8Hamilton edited Reid's works with an enormous amount of critical (not in the sense of "text
critical," but "critical" with respect to Reid's thinking) footnotes at the bottom of the pages. The
quotation in the body of the text is from 339-
9To avoid repetition, in this section I will only mention knowledge (but it should be borne in
mind that everything that Reid says about the distinction presently under consideration applies to
both knowledge and belief). The next section (1.3) deals explicitly with Reid's thoughts on the
relation between knowledge and belief.
120 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37: ~ JANUARY ~999
e d g e involves r e a s o n i n g (or a r g u m e n t ) , w h e r e a s i m m e d i a t e k n o w l e d g e does
not. K n o w l e d g e o f the P y t h a g o r e a n t h e o r e m , f o r instance, is m e d i a t e ; for, in
o r d e r to "see" (and h e n c e to know) t h a t the t h e o r e m is true, o n e has to e n g a g e
in reasoning. We d o n ' t i m m e d i a t e l y "see" its truth. M e m o r y knowledge, by
contrast, is i m m e d i a t e ; in the typical cases of m e m o r y o n e d o e s n ' t e n g a g e in
r e a s o n i n g (inductively, deductively, etc.). W h e n s o m e h a r d - t o - s p e c i f y condi-
tions obtain, a p e r s o n simply finds h e r s e l f with s o m e piece o f m e m o r y knowl-
edge. F o r e x a m p l e , S receives a p o s t c a r d f r o m Scotland; this triggers her
m e m o r y a n d she finds h e r s e l f with the k n o w l e d g e that she has b e e n in A b e r -
d e e n . She d o e s n ' t k n o w this on the basis o f reasoning. W h e n Reid says that by
m e m o r y we have an i m m e d i a t e k n o w l e d g e of past things, this (at least) is the
distinction he has in mind. It is identical with the distinction that various
c o n t e m p o r a r y epistemologists have m a d e in t e r m s o f "basic" a n d "non-basic"
knowledge, lo
H a m i l t o n , o n the o t h e r h a n d , has his eye on a v e r y d i f f e r e n t distinction. "A
thing is k n o w n immediately," says H a m i l t o n , "when we cognise it in itself," medi-
ately w h e n we cognise it in or through something numerically different. T M Now, what
d o e s it m e a n to cognize s o m e t h i n g "in itself"? A t h i n g is k n o w n in itself, says
H a m i l t o n "in as m u c h as the thing k n o w n is itself presented to o b s e r v a t i o n . . . ;
a n d in as m u c h as the thing i s . . . as it were viewed by the mind face to face." By
contrast, s o m e t h i n g is m e d i a t e l y k n o w n "in as m u c h as the thing k n o w n is held
up or mirrored to the mind in a vicarious representation." E l a b o r a t i n g on this he
continues: "In i m m e d i a t e cognition t h e r e is one sole object; the thing (immedi-
ately) k n o w n a n d the thing existing b e i n g o n e a n d the same. In a . . . m e d i a t e
cognition there m a y be discriminated two objects; the thing (immediately)
known, a n d the thing existing b e i n g n u m e r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . "
Now, w h a t exactly is H a m i l t o n ' s distinction h e r e ? It is, first o f all, a distinc-
tion c o n c e r n i n g ways in which things can be p r e s e n t to the m i n d . A thing can
be directly or indirectly p r e s e n t to the m i n d ; in the last case it is represented to
the m i n d " t h r o u g h s o m e t h i n g n u m e r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m it [i.e., different
f r o m t h a t which does the r e p r e s e n t i n g ] . " In case S stands in f r o n t o f the
Liberty Statue, the Statue is directly p r e s e n t to S. I n the case, however, that S
perceives a p o s t c a r d o f the Liberty Statue, the Statue is n o t directly p r e s e n t to S

1~ Pojman, What can we know? (Behnont: Wadsworth, 1995), 213; Alvin Plantinga, War-
rant and ProperFunction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 6 aft.; Jonathan Dancy, Contempo-
rary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), 53ff.; William Alston, EpistemicJustification (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1989), 72-74-
,1 The next couple of quotations are from Hamilton's Supplementary Note B to The Works of
Thomas Reid, devoted to a discussion of the distinction between "presentative and representative
knowledge," 8o5ff.
 THOMAS REID ON MEMORY 121

b u t re~presented to S t h r o u g h s o m e t h i n g " n u m e r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m " it, viz.,

t h e postcard.~2
H a m i l t o n ' s m e d i a t e / i m m e d i a t e d i s t i n c t i o n , t h e n , is d i f f e r e n t f r o m R e i d ' s
(as I h a v e e x p l a i n e d it t h u s far). H a m i l t o n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n a p p l i e s to ways i n w h i c h
t h i n g s c a n b e p r e s e n t to the m i n d , R e i d ' s to w h e t h e r o r n o t a p r o p o s i t i o n is
k n o w n o n t h e basis o f r e a s o n i n g . A n d , w h a t is m o r e i m p o r t a n t , t h e r e is n o t h -
i n g i n H a m i l t o n ' s d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t m a k e s t r o u b l e f o r R e i d ' s thesis t h a t b y m e m -
o r y we h a v e a n i m m e d i a t e k n o w l e d g e o f t h i n g s p a s t (in t h e s e n s e e x p l a i n e d ,
i.e., w i t h o u t r e a s o n i n g ) .
H o w e v e r , i n R e i d t h e r e is also another m e d i a t e / i m m e d i a t e d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t is
c o u n t e r e d by H a m i l t o n . H a m i l t o n holds that w h e n S has m e m o r y k n o w l e d g e
o f a p a s t e v e n t e (S k n o w s , f o r e x a m p l e , t h a t e t o o k place), t h e n e m u s t s o m e h o w
b e r e p r e s e n t e d to S t h r o u g h s o m e t h i n g " n u m e r i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t " f r o m e. T h i s is
the s u b s t a n c e o f H a m i l t o n ' s c l a i m t h a t m e m o r y k n o w l e d g e is o f t h e m e d i a t e
sort. I t is n o t exactly clear w h i c h e n t i t i e s H a m i l t o n t h i n k s are n u m e r i c a l l y
d i f f e r e n t f r o m e a n d c a p a b l e o f r e p r e s e n t i n g e. O n e live p o s s i b i l i t y , h o w e v e r , is
t h a t h e h e l d t h a t it is m e n t a l items ("ideas" as Locke, H u m e , a n d B e r k e l e y c a l l e d
t h e m ) t h a t a r e c a p a b l e o f r e p r e s e n t i n g p a s t t h i n g s to S. I f this is w h a t H a m i l t o n
t h o u g h t , h e c o m e s d a n g e r o u s l y close to h o l d i n g e x a c t l y w h a t R e i d was a t t a c k -
i n g : t h e so-called " t h e o r y o f Ideas,"13 a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h t h e o n l y i t e m s t h e
m i n d is d i r e c t l y a w a r e o f a r e "ideas," m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . 1 4 R e i d , b y c o n -
trast, is c o m m i t t e d to t h e thesis t h a t S's h a v i n g m e m o r y k n o w l e d g e o f e i n v o l v e s
n o m e n t a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s o f e; e's b e i n g a p a s t e v e n t , o n his view, d o e s n ' t
p r e v e n t e f r o m b e i n g d i r e c t l y p r e s e n t to S. I n p a r t 3 o f this p a p e r I will t u r n to
R e i d ' s d i r e c t realist view o f m e m o r y a n d see if s e n s e c a n b e m a d e o f it.
z. 3 I n o w s h o u l d like to m a k e a r e m a r k a b o u t R e i d ' s h a n d l i n g o f t h e
n o t i o n s " k n o w l e d g e " a n d " b e l i e f " t h a t s e e m s to m e to b e o f s o m e i m p o r t a n c e
f r o m a h i s t o r i c a l p o i n t o f view. I t is a well k n o w n fact t h a t all o f R e i d ' s i m m e d i -

~2As I have said, Hamilton applies the mediate/immediate distinction "first of all" to different
ways in which a thing can be present to the mind. But he does not leave it at that. Hamilton ties the
mediate/immediate distinction with respect to awareness to a mediate/immediate distinction with
respect to knowledge. His thought seems to be that whatever is immediately present to the mind,
is immediately known, and whatever is mediately present to the mind is mediately known. There
are serious problems with this close connection; it remains unclear, for instance, whether Hamil-
ton held that awareness (immediate or mediate) is knowledge (immediate or mediate), or that
awareness occasions knowledge. One thing that is clear, however, is that Hamilton's distinction
belween immediate and mediate knowledge differs from Reid's in that Reid does make reference
to the presence or absence of reasoning. In my paper "In Defense of Intuitive Knowledge" (as yet
unpublished) I have tried to carefully distinguish awareness and knowiedge.
~Cf. Roger D. Gallie, Thomas Reid and the Way of Ideas (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989).
~4Applied to memory, the view is called "the indirect realist view of memory"; cf. Jonathan
Dancy, Contemporary Epistemology, 184,
129 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 1 J A N U A R Y 199 9
ate predecessors conceived o f "knowledge" a n d "belief" as two mutually exclu-
sive states. W h e n S is in the state o f k n o w i n g that p, they held, S c a n n o t be at
the same time in the state o f believing that p. W h a t one knows, one d o e s n ' t
believe, a n d w h a t one believes one d o e s n ' t know. Reid's immediate predeces-
sors were, o n this score at least, the heirs o f an impressive tradition that goes
back as far at least as Plato.
I n Reid, by contrast, we find n o t h i n g o f this; in Reid k n o w i n g a n d believing
are n o t mutually exclusive states. " M e m o r y , " Reid says, "is always a c c o m p a -
nied with the belief o f that which we r e m e m b e r , as p e r c e p t i o n is a c c o m p a n i e d
with the belief o f that which we perceive" (EIP 34o; m y italics). So, w h e n there is
m e m o r y , t h e r e is belief; a n d w h e n there is n o belief, there certainly is no
m e m o r y . M e m o r y , we could say, evokes belief. W h a t belief?. Belief that what is
r e m e m b e r e d actually h a p p e n e d , or actually was the case.
At the same time, however, Reid says that "this belief, which we have f r o m
distinct m e m o r y , we a c c o u n t real knowledge, no less certain than if it was
g r o u n d e d o n d e m o n s t r a t i o n " (ibid., m y italics). For J o h n Locke what is d e m o n -
strated falls in the area o f knowledge, n o t in the area o f belief; knowledge, he
holds, excludes belief.'5 For Reid, by contrast, the belief that accompanies
what we distinctly r e m e m b e r is epistemically on a p a r with demonstrative
k n o w l e d g e ; they are equally certain. S's being in the state o f knowing that p
(where p m a y be the object o f m e m o r y ) , for Reid, then, d o e s n ' t exclude S's
being in the state o f believing that p. A n d if p is the object o f o t h e r faculties
such as p e r c e p t i o n or reason, again Reid holds that k n o w i n g that p a n d believ-
ing that p are n o t mutually exclusive. I f o n e were asked to answer the question
who was the first to systematically " d e c o n s t r u c t " the traditional opposition
between knowledge a n d belief, "Reid" w o u l d n o t be an altogether unwar-
r a n t e d answer. ~6
T h e s e remarks, o f course, d o n ' t give us a clue as to h o w Reid conceived o f
the exact relation between knowledge a n d belief. But it seems as if Reid es-
p o u s e d a f o r m o f reliabilism before there were reliabilists a r o u n d . Reid should
n o t be viewed as identifyingknowledge a n d belief. Knowledge, we could say, for
Reid includes (or implies, or involves) belief, but n o t all belief is knowledge. In
o r d e r for belief to be knowledge some f u r t h e r condition(s) must be satisfied.
O n e obvious condition, as I will argue in the next section, is that the belief be
true. A n o t h e r (one that gives Reid's t h o u g h t a reliabilist flavor) is that the
belief be f o r m e d by a reliable noetic faculty, i.e., by a faculty that is in a s o u n d

,5 See his Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding, IV, chapter 2, "Of the Degrees of Knowledge."
I will be quoting from Peter Nidditch's edition, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
16Cf. for this Nicholas Wolterstorff, "Reid on Rationality," in: Hendrik Hart, Johan Vander-
Hoeven, Nicholas Wolterstorff (eds.), Rationality in the Calvinian Tradition (Lanham: University
Press of America, 1983), 45-
 THOMAS REID ON MEMORY 123

state.'7 So w h e n the belief that p is f o r m e d by S's m e m o r y faculty w h i c h is in a

s o u n d state, a n d is a true belief, then, on Reid's account, S knows that p.18
x. 4 In o r d e r to see m o r e clearly the relation between knowledge, belief and
m e m o r y in Reid's t h o u g h t , we must try to get a yet firmer grip on Reid's
already q u o t e d r e m a r k that " m e m o r y is always a c c o m p a n i e d with the belief o f
that which we r e m e m b e r . " "In m a t u r e years, a n d in a s o u n d state o f m i n d , "
says Reid, "every m a n feels that he must believe w h a t he distinctly r e m e m b e r s ,
t h o u g h he can give no o t h e r reason o f his belief, but that he r e m e m b e r s the
thing distinctly" (EIP 34o). So w h e n s o m e o n e asks y o u w h y y o u believe y o u
once visited A b e r d e e n , on Reid's view saying that y o u distinctly r e m e m b e r it
w o u l d be a g o o d answer. A few r e m a r k s are in o r d e r here.
First, it should be n o t e d that Reid d o e s n ' t identify m e m o r y of p with the
belief that p (where p is believed "on the basis o f m e m o r y " ) . A p p a r e n t l y Reid
thinks o f these as distinct p h e n o m e n a , a l t h o u g h he d o e s n ' t spell out the differ-
ences in any detail. Let us refer to the first p h e n o m e n o n h e n c e f o r t h as " m e m -
ory o f p" (or: " r e m e m b e r i n g p") a n d to the second as "having the m e m o r y
belief that p" (or: "believing that p on the basis o f m e m o r y " ) . A n instance o f the
first w o u l d be S having m e m o r y images o f climbing the Matterhorn,19 an
instance o f the second S's belief that he once climbed the M a t t e r h o r n .
Second, it is, says Reid, only distinct m e m o r y that is a c c o m p a n i e d with
belief. We can see why he says so, w h e n we consider the following e x a m p l e
(borrowed f r o m Carl Ginet). ~~ S u p p o s e S were asked w h a t his t e l e p h o n e
n u m b e r was twenty years ago and, a l t h o u g h he is very u n c e r t a i n o f it, comes
u p with the right n u m b e r . T h e n we w o u l d n o t say that S has the m e m o r y
belief (or m e m o r y knowledge) that his t e l e p h o n e n u m b e r is as his m e m o r y
m a d e him say, a l t h o u g h we w o u l d say that S r e m e m b e r s his t e l e p h o n e n u m -
ber. T h e reason for this is that S d o e s n ' t have distinct m e m o r y o f the n u m b e r .
(This example is just a n o t h e r illustration o f the distinction between remember-
ing p a n d having the memory belief that p).
T h i r d , in what way must (as Reid says) S's distinct r e m e m b e r i n g p be accom-
p a n i e d with the belief that p? T h e answer to this question (that will be m o r e
fully discussed in part ~ o f this paper) is that, as Reid thinks a b o u t it, we are
u n d e r a psychological necessity to believe w h a t we distinctly r e m e m b e r . But is

17Reid states this condition more or less explicitly in IHM loo, EIP 246, 248, ~59 (and in many
other passages as well, especially those in which he deals with the fool, the madman, the lunatic).
lSA contemporary (and very subtle) version of this analysis is advanced by Alvin Plantinga; see
his Warrant and Proper Function.
19This is not to suggest that rememberingpalways involves imagery. S might remember reading
a book, without having any image of that event. Remembering telephone numbers and birth dates
are other obvious examples.
~~ Ginet, Knowledge, Perception, and Memory (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1975), 147.
12 4 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:1 JANUARY 1999
this really so? Is n o t it possible f o r S to distinctly r e m e m b e r c l i m b i n g the
M a t t e r h o r n (as I e x p l a i n e d it, viz., h a v i n g m e m o r y i m a g e s o f climbing it)
w i t h o u t actually f o r m i n g the belief that he climbed the M a t t e r h o r n ? More
generally, is n o t it possible for S to r e m e m b e r p, w i t h o u t S, at that time, actually
f o r m i n g the belief that p? O n e m i g h t t h i n k that Reid is u n a b l e to a c k n o w l e d g e
this possibility, c o m m i t t e d as he is to the thesis that distinct m e m o r y o f p is
always a c c o m p a n i e d with the belief that p.
It s e e m s likely that Reid overstated his case here. H e seems to t h i n k that it
is s o m e h o w i n c o h e r e n t for S to distinctly r e m e m b e r p, b u t n o t to believe that p.
B u t this, as e m e r g e s f r o m the M a t t e r h o r n case, is a clear possibility a n d not
i n c o h e r e n t at all. W h a t really is i n c o h e r e n t is that S distinctly r e m e m b e r s p, and
yet believes not-p. It is i n c o h e r e n t for S to distinctly r e m e m b e r c l i m b i n g the
M a t t e r h o r n , a n d believe that he n e v e r c l i m b e d it. Iri o r d e r to state the relation
b e t w e e n r e m e m b e r i n g a n d m e m o r y b e l i e f m o r e precisely, the occurrent/
dispositional distinction can be o f help. W h a t is i n c o h e r e n t is that S distincdy
r e m e m b e r s p, w i t h o u t believing e i t h e r o c c u r r e n t l y or dispositionally that p. It
s e e m s to m e that h a d Reid k n o w n this distinction, he w o u l d have b e e n h a p p y
to use it; t h e r e is n o t h i n g in his t h o u g h t that w o u l d have p r e v e n t e d h i m f r o m
d o i n g so.
F o u r t h : Reid, I think, n o t only subscribed to the thesis that to distinctly
r e m e m b e r p is always a c c o m p a n i e d with believing that p is true (as I e x p l a i n e d
it), b u t also to the s t r o n g e r thesis that to distincdy r e m e m b e r that p entails p's
truth. T h i s e m e r g e s f r o m the following e x a m p l e : "I r e m e m b e r , " says Reid,
"the transit o f V e n u s o v e r the sun in the year 1769. I m u s t t h e r e f o r e have
p e r c e i v e d it at the time it h a p p e n e d , otherwise I c o u l d n o t n o w r e m e m b e r it."
H a d Reid n o t subscribed to the s t r o n g e r thesis, t h e n the last s e n t e n c e o f the
q u o t a t i o n should have r e a d s o m e t h i n g like "I m u s t t h e r e f o r e believe 1 have
p e r c e i v e d it at the time it h a p p e n e d . . . . "
I take it, t h e r e f o r e , that Reid thinks it is i n c o h e r e n t to say that S r e m e m b e r s
that p, w h e n p is in fact false. In this r e s p e c t "S r e m e m b e r s that p" b e h a v e s like
"S knows that p" (an instance o f which is "S has m e m o r y k n o w l e d g e that p").
W h e n p is a false p r o p o s i t i o n , e.g., "the e a r t h is fiat," we d o n ' t w a n t to say that
p can be k n o w n by S. Likewise with m e m o r y . S c a n n o t r e m e m b e r climbing the
M a t t e r h o r n , w h e n in fact she n e v e r did. R e m e m b e r i n g p entails p's truth. ~
But if this is so, t h e n it is self-contradictory to s p e a k o f remembering incorrectly,
as M a l c o l m rightly observes. 2'
Since, however, we often talk a b o u t "incorrect m e m o r i e s , " o n e m i g h t be

2, Ginet, it seems to me, is t h e r e f o r e s i m p l y w r o n g w h e n he d o e s n ' t i n c l u d e t r u t h in the

analysis o f "S r e m e m b e r s t h a t p"; see his Knowledge, Perception, and Memory, 153.
~ Knowledge and Certainty, 188.
 THOMAS REID ON M E M O R Y 12 5

t e m p t e d to a r g u e t h a t r e m e m b e r i n g , a f t e r all, d o e s not e n t a i l t r u t h . T h e a r g u -
m e n t m i g h t g o like this. S o m e t i m e s p e o p l e say s u c h t h i n g s as "I r e m e m b e r
t h e r e w e r e f o u r p e o p l e in t h e r o o m , " w h e n in f a c t t h e r e w e r e five, a n d "I
r e m e m b e r w e v i s i t e d S a l t L a k e C i t y o v e r t h e w e e k e n d , " w h e n in f a c t it was in
t h e m i d d l e o f t h e w e e k . W h a t w e h a v e h e r e a r e cases o f i n c o r r e c t m e m o r y , i.e.,
o f r e m e m b e r i n g s o m e t h i n g t h a t is false. M e m o r i e s , t h e r e f o r e , d o n o t e n t a i l
truth.
T h i s a r g u m e n t , h o w e v e r , is u n c o n v i n c i n g . W h e n S r e m e m b e r s t h a t t h e r e
w e r e f o u r p e o p l e in t h e r o o m , w h e n in f a c t t h e r e w e r e five, t h e n w h a t is
r e m e m b e r e d (viz., t h a t t h e r e w e r e f o u r p e o p l e in t h e r o o m ) is c l e a r l y false. B u t
in t h e n e a r b y v i c i n i t y t h e r e is a t r u t h l u r k i n g t h a t is r e m e m b e r e d ; w h a t is t r u e
is t h a t t h e r e w e r e p e o p l e in t h e r o o m . A n d i f this was w h a t was r e m e m b e r e d ,
we w o u l d h a v e a g e n u i n e case o f r e m e m b e r i n g . B u t this t r u t h was, so to s p e a k ,
" p a i n t e d o v e r , " o r " e n r i c h e d " w i t h s o m e t h i n g false. P s y c h o l o g i c a l l y a t r u t h a n d
a f a l s e h o o d b e c a m e m i x e d u p a n d this m i x i n g u p a c c o u n t s f o r o u r s p e a k i n g o f
remembering incorrectly. Still, a l t h o u g h t h e s e two t h i n g s a r e j u m b l e d t o g e t h e r ,
o n l y o n e t h i n g is r e m e m b e r e d (viz., t h a t t h e r e w e r e p e o p l e in t h e r o o m ) , a n d
t h e o t h e r is n o t (viz., t h a t t h e r e w e r e f o u r p e o p l e in t h e r o o m ) . T h e r e f o r e ,
w h e n we s a y t h a t s o m e o n e remembers incorrectly t h a t t h e r e w e r e f o u r p e o p l e in
t h e r o o m , w e a r e s p e a k i n g in a c a r e l e s s m a n n e r . T o r e m e m b e r p (as R e i d a n d
M a l c o l m h a v e r i g h t l y said) e n t a i l s p ' s t r u t h .

2. "MEMORY IS U N A C C O U N T A B L E "

2. z I n this s e c t i o n I w i s h to d i s c u s s R e i d ' s c l a i m t h a t t h e k n o w l e d g e w e h a v e o f
t h i n g s p a s t , b y m e m o r y , is " u n a c c o u n t a b l e " (EIP 3 4 o ) . M y l e a d i n g q u e s t i o n s will
b e : w h a t is it, o n R e i d ' s view, f o r s o m e t h i n g to b e u n a c c o u n t a b l e ? a n d : W i t h
r e s p e c t to m e m o r y , e x a c t l y what k n o w l e d g e d o e s R e i d h o l d u n a c c o u n t a b l e ?
I n t h e Inquiry R e i d says,

Why sensation should compel o u r belief of the p r e s e n t existence of a thing, m e m o r y a

belief of its past existence, a n d imagination no belief at all, I believe no p h i l o s o p h e r can
give a shadow of reason, but that such is the nature of these operations; they are all
simple a n d original, a n d therefore inexplicable acts of the mind. (IHM lo5,1o6 )

A n d in t h e s e c o n d c h a p t e r o f Essay I I I , h e says,

I think it appears, that m e m o r y is an original faculty, given us by the A u t h o r of o u r

being, of which we can give no account, but that we are so made. T h e knowledge which
I have o f things past, by my memory, seems to me as unaccountable as an i m m e d i a t e
knowledge would be of things to come; and I can give no reason why I should have the
one and not the other, but that such is the will of my Maker. I find in my m i n d a distinct
conception, and a firm belief of a series of past events; b u t how this is p r o d u c e d , I know
not. I call it memory, but this is only giving a n a m e to i t - - i t is not an account of its
cause. I believe most firmly what I distinctly r e m e m b e r ; b u t I can give no reason of this
126 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 7 : i JANUARY 1 9 9 9

belief. It is the inspiration of the Almighty that gives me this understanding. W h e n I

believe the truth of a mathematical axiom, or of a mathematical proposition, I see that
it must be so: every m a n who has the same conception of it sees the same. T h e r e is an
evident a n d necessary connection between the subject and the predicate of the proposi-
tion; and I have all the evidence to support my belief which I can possibly conceive.
W h e n I believe that I washed my hands and face this m o r n i n g , there appears no
necessity in the truth of this proposition. It might be, or it might be not. A m a n may
distinctly conceive it without believing it at all. How then do I come to believe it? I
r e m e m b e r it distinctly. This is all I can say. This r e m e m b r a n c e is an act of my mind. Is it
possible that this act should be, if the event had not happened? I confess I do not see
any necessary connection between the one a n d the other. If any m a n can shew such a
necessary connection, then I think that belief which we have of what we r e m e m b e r will
be fairly accounted for; b u t if this cannot be done, that belief is unaccountable, and we
can say no more but that it is the result of our constitution. (EIP 34 o)

T h e s e q u o t a t i o n s c o n t a i n t h e e l e m e n t s o f the a n s w e r s we are l o o k i n g for.

S u p p o s e we s t a r t w i t h t h e s e c o n d q u e s t i o n , "what, w i t h r e s p e c t to m e m o r y ,
d o e s R e i d h o l d u n a c c o u n t a b l e ? " O n e t h i n g h e h o l d s u n a c c o u n t a b l e is t h e fact
t h a t m e m o r y is always a c c o m p a n i e d w i t h belief,~3 a n d a n o t h e r the fact t h a t
m e m o r y gives rise to true belief.~4
A n d w h a t is it f o r t h e s e facts to b e u n a c c o u n t a b l e ? I t m e a n s t h a t we d o n ' t
k n o w w h y o r h o w t h e y o b t a i n . T h e s e facts are b r u t e a n d i n e x p l i c a b l e .
N o t all belief, h o w e v e r , is u n a c c o u n t a b l e ; n o t all q u e s t i o n s as to h o w o r w h y
t r u e b e l i e f arises are w i t h o u t a n s w e r . B e l i e f i n m a t h e m a t i c a l t r u t h s is Reid's
e x a m p l e to i l l u s t r a t e this. S o m e o n e m a y b e l i e v e t h a t 2 + ~ = 4 , b e c a u s e h e sees
that it m u s t be so. I n (some) m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n s t h e r e is a n e c e s s a r y a n d
e v i d e n t c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e s u b j e c t a n d the p r e d i c a t e o f the s e n t e n c e
e x p r e s s i n g the p r o p o s i t i o n , a c o n n e c t i o n t h a t c a n be " s e e n . " A n d this "seeing"
is t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t s u p p o r t s o n e ' s b e l i e f i n the m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n , a n d
h e n c e " a c c o u n t s " f o r t h e belief.
T o state R e i d ' s p o i n t i n a m o r e g e n e r a l way: t h e r e is a type o f b e l i e f t h a t is
a c c o u n t a b l e , n a m e l y b e l i e f i n n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s . A n d t h e a c c o u n t is this: these
t r u t h s h a v e the p r o p e r t y o f b e i n g n e c e s s a r y - - a n d t h e s e p r o p e r t i e s m a y be
" s e e n " b y a k n o w i n g s u b j e c t . W h a t is " s e e n " is t h a t these p r o p o s i t i o n s c o u l d
n o t p o s s i b l y b e false, t h a t t h e y m u s t b e t r u e . T h i s " s e e i n g " a c c o u n t s f o r the
b e l i e f i n t h e s e p r o p o s i t i o n s , b e c a u s e w h a t is "seen" (viz., the n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c -
t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t w i t h the p r e d i c a t e ) is evidence i n s u p p o r t o f the belief.
M e m o r y belief, b y c o n t r a s t , s t a n d s w i t h o u t t h e e v i d e n t i a l s u p p o r t o f such
" s e e i n g " a n d is t h e r e f o r e u n a c c o u n t a b l e . B u t R e i d ' s t h o u g h t o n this m a t t e r can

~3I will conduct the discussion of the unaccountability of memory in Reid's own terms (al-
though those terms, as I argued in the previous section, are not completely accurate; the reader is
free, however, whenever Reid deals with belief, to add "either occasional or dispositional.")
24Reid also held that the very existence of the faculty of memory is unaccountable.
 THOMAS REID ON MEMORY 127
b e c o n s t r u e d in two q u i t e d i f f e r e n t ways. F i r s t , to u s e o n e o f R e i d ' s o w n
e x a m p l e s , w h e n s o m e o n e r e m e m b e r s t h a t h e w a s h e d his h a n d s a n d f a c e this
m o r n i n g , w h a t is r e m e m b e r e d is n o t a n e c e s s a r y t r u t h ("it m i g h t b e , o r it m i g h t
b e n o t , " as R e i d says); his r e m e m b e r i n g t h a t h e w a s h e d his h a n d s a n d f a c e
d o e s n o t r e s t o n t h e e v i d e n t i a l b a s i s o f " s e e i n g t h a t it m u s t b e t r u e , " a n d h e n c e
is u n a c c o u n t a b l e . B u t R e i d ' s t h o u g h t c a n b e c o n s t r u e d in a q u i t e d i f f e r e n t w a y
as well. W h a t is n o t " s e e n , " o n this c o n s t r u a l , is n o t t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n
b e l i e v e d is n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , b u t t h a t t h e r e is n o n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n
t h e b e l i e f a n d t h e e v e n t . W h e n s o m e o n e r e m e m b e r s t h a t h e w a s h e d his h a n d s
a n d f a c e t h i s m o r n i n g h e "sees" n o n e c e s s a r y c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e b e l i e f
t h a t h e d i d so a n d t h e e v e n t t h a t c o n s i s t e d in his d o i n g so. So, his b e l i e f h a s n o
e v i d e n t i a l s u p p o r t f r o m s u c h " s e e i n g " a n d h e n c e is u n a c c o u n t a b l e . I n t h e
q u o t a t i o n j u s t g i v e n R e i d s e e m s to s l i d e f r o m t h e first i n t o t h e s e c o n d
c o n s t r u a l . I t a k e it, h o w e v e r , t h a t t h e s e c o n d o n e is his c o n s i d e r e d o p i n i o n .
W h a t m e m o r y b e l i e f l a c k s is e v i d e n t i a l s u p p o r t f r o m " s e e i n g " a n e c e s s a r y
c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n r e m e m b e r e d e v e n t , a n d t h e e v e n t itself.
B u t n o w a n o b j e c t o r m i g h t r e a s o n as f o l l o w s : " T h e r e a r e v a r i o u s t y p e s o f
e v i d e n t i a l basis. T h e r e is t h e t y p e t h a t R e i d h a s i d e n t i f i e d - - t h a t o f ' s e e i n g t h a t
t h e p r o p o s i t i o n u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n m u s t b e t r u e a n d c a n n o t p o s s i b l y b e false'.
A n d w h a t R e i d h a s s h o w n is t h a t m e m o r y a c c o m p a n y i n g b e l i e f (or " m e m o r y
b e l i e f , " f o r s h o r t ) d o e s n ' t r e s t o n that e v i d e n t i a l basis. B u t m a y b e t h e r e a r e
a l t e r n a t i v e t y p e s o f e v i d e n t i a l basis, a n d m a y b e it is o n o n e o f t h o s e t h a t
m e m o r y b e l i e f rests. I f so, m e m o r y b e l i e f s are a c c o u n t a b l e . " T h e q u e s t i o n to b e
a s k e d , t h e n , is: d o e s m e m o r y b e l i e f r e s t o n s u c h a n a l t e r n a t i v e e v i d e n t i a l basis
a n d i f so, w h a t is t h a t basis?
I t s e e m s t h a t R e i d h a s a n t i c i p a t e d t h i s o b j e c t i o n . F o r in o n e p a s s a g e h e
d e s c r i b e s ( a n d rejects) s u c h a n a l t e r n a t i v e :

Perhaps it may be said, that the experience we have had of the fidelity of m e m o r y is a
g o o d reason for relying u p o n its testimony. I deny not that this may be a reason to
those who have h a d this experience, and who reflect u p o n it. But I believe there are few
who ever t h o u g h t of this reason, or who f o u n d any n e e d of it. It m u s t be some rare
occasion that leads a man to have recourse to it; a n d in those who have done so, the
testimony of m e m o r y was believed before the experience of its fidelity, a n d that belief
could not be caused by the experience which came after it. (EIP 341)

T h e a l t e r n a t i v e e v i d e n t i a l basis t h a t R e i d s u g g e s t s h e r e f o r m e m o r y b e l i e f is a
f a v o r a b l e t r a c k r e c o r d . I n o r d e r to f i n d o u t w h e t h e r o r n o t b e l i e f s h o u l d
a c c o m p a n y m e m o r y , so t h e r e a s o n i n g g o e s , w e m u s t see w h e t h e r o r n o t m e m -
o r y h a s a f a v o r a b l e t r a c k r e c o r d . I f w e f o u n d t h a t it h a s o n e ( t h a t is, i f w e
i n d u c t i v e l y f o u n d o u t t h a t t h e b e l i e f t h a t g o e s w i t h m e m o r y is t r u e , or, f o r
s h o r t , i f w e f o u n d t h a t m e m o r y is r e l i a b l e ) , t h e n w e h a v e "a r e a s o n " (an
128 J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 3 7 : 1 J A N U A R Y 1 9 9 9

evidential basis) for o u r m e m o r y beliefs. I f we f o u n d it has not, t h a n we have

n o such reason.
Reid d o e s n ' t spell o u t this line o f r e a s o n i n g in a n y detail. Still, he makes a
b r i e f r e m a r k on the inductive track r e c o r d p r o c e d u r e as such that is o f u t m o s t
philosophical significance. T h e p r o c e d u r e , I i n t e r p r e t Reid's last couple o f
sentences to imply, can only be successful if the reliability o f m e m o r y can be
established by a line o f r e a s o n i n g t h a t n o w h e r e involves or p r e s u p p o s e s the
reliability o f m e m o r y . B u t that is impossible, because the testimony o f m e m o r y
was believed b e f o r e the e x p e r i e n c e o f its fidelity, a n d h e n c e the belief (of its re-
liability) can n o t be evidentially b a s e d on a positive track r e c o r d (as we m i g h t
r e p h r a s e Reid's thought). It c a n n o t be s h o w n that m e m o r y is reliable, without
p r e s u p p o s i n g the reliability o f m e m o r y . It is possible for B to c h e c k the reliabil-
ity o f A's m e m o r y . B u t B can only do that while p r e s u p p o s i n g the reliability o f
his own m e m o r y . T h e reliability of n o o n e ' s m e m o r y can be established without
s o m e w h e r e a l o n g the line p r e s u p p o s i n g the reliability o f s o m e o n e ' s m e m o r y .
T h e r e is a kind o f circularity involved h e r e , that is n o t the m o s t direct kind o f
logical circularity. T h e track r e c o r d a r g u m e n t for the reliability o f m e m o r y
d o e s n ' t have a m o n g its p r e m i s e s the p r o p o s i t i o n that m e m o r y is reliable. Nev-
ertheless, the reliability o f m e m o r y is a s s u m e d in using it to g e n e r a t e the
p r e m i s e s of the a r g u m e n t . T h i s k i n d o f circularity m i g h t be called epistemic
circularity.
As William Alston has shown, the reliability o f sense p e r c e p t i o n c a n n o t be
established by track r e c o r d a r g u m e n t s either, b e c a u s e they too suffer f r o m
epistemic circularity. T o be sure, all o t h e r a r g u m e n t s that have b e e n p r o p o s e d
to establish its reliability a n d that are n o t to be discredited on o t h e r g r o u n d s ,
suffer f r o m the s a m e circularity35 T h e s a m e holds for a r g u m e n t s d e s i g n e d to
establish the reliability o f m e m o r y .
As for Reid, I suggest that he clearly r e c o g n i z e d the p r o b l e m o f epistemic
circularity. H e was aware o f the fact that it is impossible to show, in a non-
circular fashion, that a n y o f o u r faculties is reliable, m e m o r y included. T h a t is
w h y he called m e m o r y "an original faculty." We simply find ourselves believ-
ing the deliverances o f m e m o r y . We c a n n o t give a justification c o n f e r i n g ac-
c o u n t o f the fact that m e m o r y gives rise to true belief. We c a n n o t explain why
m e m o r y gives rise to true belief.
T h i s last s t a t e m e n t , it should be noted, m a y be misleading in o n e respect.
F o r Reid was of the o p i n i o n that the question as to why (but not the question as
to how) m e m o r y gives rise to true b e l i e f has in a sense a perfectly g o o d answer.
M e m o r y gives rise to true belief, he insists, because the A u t h o r o f o u r being

2~William Alston, The Reliability of Sense Perception (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Cf.
too his paper "Epistemic Circularity," in William Alston, EpistemicJustification, 319-49.
 THOMAS REID ON MEMORY i2 9
willed it thus. G o d constituted us in such a way that we c a n n o t b u t believe w h a t
we distinctly r e m e m b e r . T o be sure, this d o e s n ' t a m o u n t to an "account" o f
m e m o r y (as Reid thinks o f account, viz., as g o i n g back to necessary c o n n e c -
tions that can simply be "seen"). B u t it is compatible with the absence o f such
account.
2.2 C o n t e m p o r a r y epistemologists have discussed w h a t has been called a
causal t h e o r y o f m e m o r y ? 6 This t h e o r y attempts to explain m e m o r y , to give
an a c c o u n t o f it. M e m o r y is a c c o u n t e d for, the p r o p o n e n t s o f the t h e o r y insist,
if it is causally explained. E . J . Furlong, discussing the e x a m p l e o f his r e m e m -
b e r i n g his visit to Tbilisi, offers the following account: "particles o f m y n e r v o u s
system are in constant causal c o m m e r c e with their e n v i r o n m e n t . A c h a n g e in
my n e r v o u s system b r o u g h t a b o u t by m y visit to Tbilisi is i n c o r p o r a t e d in this
c o m m e r c e , a n d plays a necessary part in a c c o u n t i n g or m y ability to r e m e m b e r
the incident (i.e., to retain a n d to recall).'2v T h e a c c o u n t i n g work, then, is d o n e
by the "causal chain," the "causal c o m m e r c e " that links the past visit to the
p r e s e n t m e m o r y o f it.
I do n o t i n t e n d to offer a full blown discussion o f the causal t h e o r y o f
m e m o r y . I only wish to draw attention to the fact that f r o m Reid's p o i n t o f
view the causal t h e o r y o f m e m o r y , even if it is true (which is highly c o n t r o v e r -
sial), does n o t constitute an "account" in his sense. For, even s u p p o s i n g the
causal c o m m e r c e that the causal t h e o r y claims is real, h o w does this "explain"
the fact that m e m o r y is a c c o m p a n i e d with belief, indeed, that distinct m e m o r y
gives rise to true belief?. T h e causal t h e o r y does n o t enable us to "see" that
distinct m e m o r y must give rise to true belief. A n d h e n c e it fails to give an
a c c o u n t in Reid's sense.

3. REALISM AND MEMORY BELIEF

3 . i T h r o u g h o u t Reid's works, we e n c o u n t e r the rejection o f a t h e o r y a b o u t

h u m a n knowledge that Reid believed to be almost universally accepted. Reid
refers to it as "the t h e o r y o f ideas" (or "the ideal system," or "the way o f ideas").
T h e basic c o n t o u r s o f this theory are simplicity itself, b u t allow m a n y varia-
tions w h e n it comes to the details. I n this section I will discuss Reid's rejection
o f that t h e o r y a n d try to show in w h a t way this is relevant for Reid's views
c o n c e r n i n g m e m o r y . I n the next, a n d last, section, I will be looking m o r e
deeply into Reid's own positive a p p r o a c h o f m e m o r y - - a n a p p r o a c h that can
a p p r o p r i a t e l y be labelled as direct realism.

~6Versions of this theory are defended by C.B. Martin and Max Deutscher ("Remembering,"
PhilosophicaIReview 75 {1966}),and E.J. Furlong ("Memory re-chained," in: G.H. von Wright (ed.),
Problems in the Theory of Knowledge{The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972}).Roger Squires ("Memory
unchained," Philosophical Review 78 {1969}) is highly critical of this kind of theory.
~7op.cit.,a8.
i3o J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 37:1 J A N U A R Y 1999
W h a t is t h i s t h e o r y o f i d e a s t h a t R e i d r e j e c t s ? I t c a n b e s t a t e d m o s t easily in
its a p p l i c a t i o n to s e n s e p e r c e p t i o n . O n e s u m m a r y s t a t e m e n t o f it is

T h a t nothing is perceived but what is in the m i n d which perceives it: T h a t we do not

really perceive things that are external, but only certain images a n d pictures of them
i m p r i n t e d u p o n the mind, which are called impressions and ideas. (IHM, Letter of
Dedication, 96 )

And another that:

according to this system, we have no intercourse with the external world, but by means
of the internal world of ideas, which represents the other to the mind. (EIP 356)

A c c o r d i n g to t h e t h e o r y o f i d e a s , t h e n , w h e n S p e r c e i v e s o b j e c t O , S in f a c t
p e r c e i v e s a n i d e a o f O t h a t r e p r e s e n t s O to S. W h e n S p e r c e i v e s O, h e d o e s n ' t
p e r c e i v e it i m m e d i a t e l y , o r d i r e c t l y , b u t m e d i a t e l y , o r i n d i r e c t l y ; O ' s p e r c e p -
t i o n is m e d i a t e d b y m e n t a l i t e m s , c a l l e d " i d e a s , " o r " i m p r e s s i o n s , " t h a t a r e t h e
immediate objects of perception.
R e i d h a d g o o d r e a s o n to c o u n t L o c k e a m o n g t h e a d h e r e n t s o f t h e t h e o r y o f
i d e a s . I n his Essay Concerning H u m a n Understanding L o c k e lays it d o w n as a
g e n e r a l r u l e t h a t " t h e m i n d , in all its t h o u g h t s a n d r e a s o n i n g s , h a t h n o o t h e r
i m m e d i a t e o b j e c t b u t its o w n i d e a s , w h i c h it a l o n e d o e s o r c a n c o n t e m p l a t e . ''28
As becomes clear from Locke's subsequent discussion, "thoughts and reason-
i n g s " i n c l u d e s e n s e p e r c e p t i o n a n d m e m o r y as well.
I n a d i f f e r e n t t h o u g h r e l a t e d way, B e r k e l e y a n d H u m e a d h e r e d to t h e
I d e a l T h e o r y as well. T h e y b o t h h e l d t h a t t h e o n l y t h i n g s t h e m i n d is d i r e c t l y
a w a r e o f a r e i d e a s . I n this t h e y a g r e e d w i t h L o c k e . T h e y d i s a g r e e d , h o w e v e r ,
with Locke's representationalism;s0 they held that ideas do not represent exter-
nal, m a t e r i a l o b j e c t s to t h e m i n d . L o c k e h e l d to a f o r m o f indirect realism,
w h e r e a s B e r k e l e y a n d H u m e h e l d to f o r m s o f phenomenalism. ( A n d R e i d ? H e
h e l d , as will b e s e e n in d u e c o u r s e , to s o m e f o r m o f direct realism.) T h e s e labels
s h o u l d n o t p r e v e n t us f r o m o b s e r v i n g t h a t p h e n o m e n a l i s m a n d i n d i r e c t r e a l -
i s m s h a r e o n e i m p o r t a n t f e a t u r e , viz., a d h e r e n c e to t h e t h e o r y o f i d e a s . A n d it

~sEssay IV,I, 1.
~gThere is a long tradition which reads Locke as an indirect realist (most clearly recently stated
by Reginald Jackson, "Locke's Version of the Doctrine of Representative Perception," in C.B.
Martin and D.M. Armstrong (eds.), Locke and Berkeley{Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1968 } and Nicholas Wolterstorff, John Locke and the Ethics of Belief{Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996}, 14 ft.) It should be noted, however, that there is also a recent tradition
which reads him as a direct realist, notably John Yolton (see his "Locke and Malebranche: Two
Concepts of Ideas," in R. Brandt (ed.),J0hn Locke: Symposium WolfenMittelz979 {New York: Walter
de Gruyter, 1981}). Locke's formulation of his position is ambiguous indeed. But, as it seems to
me, Jackson's, Wolterstorff's (and Reid's) interpretations are much more convincing than
Yolton's.
 THOMAS REID ON MEMORY 131
is this thesis that is the target o f Reid's criticism. Let us see first w h a t the t h e o r y
c o m e s to w h e n a p p l i e d to m e m o r y , a n d t h e n t u r n to Reid's criticism o f it.
M e m o r y , says Locke, "is as it were the s t o r e - h o u s e o f o u r ideas," or "a
repository, to lay u p those ideas, which at a n o t h e r time [the mind] m i g h t have
use of."3o T o r e m e m b e r is f o r the m i n d "to revive p e r c e p t i o n s . . , with this
additional p e r c e p t i o n a n n e x e d to t h e m , that it has h a d t h e m before."~l
Reid's r e s p o n s e to this is first o f all a question: h o w is this all to be r e c o n -
ciled with Locke's o t h e r thesis that ideas are " n o t h i n g b u t actual p e r c e p t i o n s in
the m i n d , which cease to be a n y t h i n g , w h e n t h e r e is n o p e r c e p t i o n o f them"?3~
H o w , he asks, can things, ideas, t h a t have ceased to exist (because t h e r e is n o
p e r c e p t i o n o f them) be laid u p in a repository, a n d later be d r a w n o u t o f it (EIP
355)? Locke's r e j o i n d e r is that m e m o r y is the p o w e r "to revive p e r c e p t i o n s . "
"But," Reid insists, "it seems to m e as difficult to revive things that have ceased
to be anything, as to lay t h e m u p in a repository, or to b r i n g t h e m out o f it.
W h e n a thing is once annihilated, the s a m e thing c a n n o t be again p r o d u c e d ,
t h o u g h a n o t h e r thing similar to it m a y " (EIP 355). F r o m this, Reid concludes,
rightly so it seems, t h a t w h a t L o c k e calls the reviving o f ideas really is the
creation o f n e w ideas, similar to those we h a d before. A n d , w h a t e v e r m e m o r y
is, it is n o t the creation o f s o m e t h i n g .
But, Reid p r o c e e d s , s u p p o s e for a m o m e n t that m e m o r y is w h a t L o c k e says
it is, viz., the p o w e r to revive in the m i n d ideas that have d i s a p p e a r e d or b e e n
laid out o f sight. Reid a r g u e s t h a t t h e r e are instances t h a t p e r f e c t l y fit this
description, b u t that clearly are n o t cases o f m e m o r y . T h i s is Reid's c o u n t e r
e x a m p l e : "I see b e f o r e m e the p i c t u r e o f a friend. I shut m y eyes, a n d t u r n
t h e m a n o t h e r way, a n d the p i c t u r e disappears, or is, as it were, laid o u t o f
sight. I have a p o w e r to t u r n m y eyes a g a i n towards the picture, a n d i m m e d i -
ately the p e r c e p t i o n is revived" (EIP 356). Surely this fits the definition, b u t is
not memory.
By way o f criticism Reid a r g u e s f u r t h e r m o r e that the t h e o r y o f ideas leads
to scepticism with r e g a r d to m e m o r y . A c c o r d i n g to this t h e o r y ideas are things
p r e s e n t to the m i n d (or only actual w h e n p r e s e n t l y perceived). B u t t h e n the
inevitable question arises: h o w can we, f r o m certain ideas in the m i n d , con-
clude that s o m e e v e n t really h a p p e n e d ten or twenty y e a r s ago? W h a t is
n e e d e d , on this theory, is " a r g u m e n t s to prove, that the ideas o f m e m o r y are
pictures o f things that really did h a p p e n " (E1P 358). B u t h o w can S c o n c l u d e to
e's having o c c u r r e d or h a p p e n e d s o m e time in the past f r o m p r e m i s e s t h a t
exclusively c o n c e r n m e n t a l ideas? T h a t , Reid c o n t e n d s , c a n n o t be d o n e . T h e

3~ Essay,II,x,2.
3~Ibid.
3~Ibid.
132 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 37: I JANUARY 1999
t h e o r y o f ideas t h e r e f o r e leads to absolute scepticism in the area o f m e m o r y (as
it does in the area o f sense perception).
Reid's overall evaluation o f Locke's a c c o u n t o f m e m o r y is that "it gives no
light to this faculty, b u t r a t h e r tends to d a r k e n it"; in n o way does it enable us
to u n d e r s t a n d "how we r e m e m b e r " (EIP 355), a l t h o u g h it is offered as doing
just that.3~
3.2. We have now r e a c h e d the stage w h e r e we should e n c o u n t e r Reid's
positive views o f m e m o r y . In the Inquiry Reid says, s u p p o s e

that once and only once, I smelled a tuberose in a certain room . . . . Next day I relate
what I saw and smelled. When I attend as carefully as I can to what passes in my mind
in this case, it appears evident that the very thing I saw yesterday, and the fragrance I
smelled, are now the immediate objects of my mind, when I remember it. (IHM to6)

Given the prevalence o f the t h e o r y o f ideas, Reid is well aware of the fact that
m a n y p h i l o s o p h e r s disagree with his thesis that the thing smelled (or seen)
y e s t e r d a y is the immediate object o f the m e m o r y o f it today. He says, "philoso-
p h e r s i n d e e d tell me that the i m m e d i a t e object o f m y m e m o r y . . , in this case is
n o t a past sensation, b u t an idea o f it, an image, p h a n t a s m , or species of the
o d o u r ! smelled; a n d the mind, c o n t e m p l a t i n g this p r e s e n t idea, finds it a
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of what is p a s t . . , a n d accordingly calls it m e m o r y " ( I H M lO6).
So, this is the alternative Reid sketches: m e m o r y has an object, an immediate
object. But what is it? Is it that which has passed (that what h a p p e n e d some
time ago), or some r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f it (an idea) ? Reid believes the first: " U p o n
strictest attention, m e m o r y a p p e a r s to have things that are past, a n d n o t pres-
ent ideas, for its object" (IHM lo6). In o t h e r words, Reid's choice is between
indirect a n d direct realism, a n d he argues for the latter. T h e ultimate question,
t h e r e f o r e , is w h e t h e r we can make sense o f a direct realist position c o n c e r n i n g
m e m o r y . Can things past ever be the immediate object o f m e m o r y ?
Well, why can't they? O n e reason to suppose they can't would be that to
r e m e m b e r involves c o m p l e x neurophysiological processes, and brain states;
these processes and states are intermediaries between us and the event r e m e m -
b e r e d ; a n d t h e r e f o r e past events c a n n o t be the direct objects o f m e m o r y . But
this r e a s o n i n g is u n c o n v i n c i n g , because neurophysiological brain processes
a n d brain states are, at best, intermediaries in a causal, n o t in an epistemologi-
cal sense. We are n o t aware o f such processes a n d states.
A n o t h e r reason m i g h t be that we can only be directly aware o f what exists
at the time of o u r awareness, and that, because past things by definition do not
exist now, past things c a n n o t be the immediate objects o f awareness. H o w can
s o m e t h i n g that is absent a n d n o t p r e s e n t be the i m m e d i a t e object o f aware-

33Mutatis mutandis the same evaluation holds for Hume's account of memory.
 THOMAS REID ON MEMORY 133
ness? T h e r e is, so it s e e m s , a t i m e l a g t h a t p r e v e n t s this. T h i s t i m e l a g o b j e c t i o n
to a d i r e c t r e a l i s t p o s i t i o n c o n c e r n i n g m e m o r y is, I b e l i e v e , u n c o n v i n c i n g as
well. I t t r a d e s o n a n a m b i g u i t y in t h e n o t i o n o f " p r e s e n t . " S o m e t h i n g c a n b e
" p r e s e n t " in o n e s e n s e o f t h a t w o r d , w h e n it is n o t a b s e n t (e.g., b e c a u s e it t o o k
p l a c e at a n o t h e r t i m e t h a n t h e p r e s e n t , o r b e c a u s e it t a k e s p l a c e a t a g e o g r a p h i -
cally d i s t a n t p l a c e ) . I n this s e n s e o f t h e w o r d , a t h i n g p a s t c a n n o t b e p r e s e n t .
B u t in a n o t h e r s e n s e s o m e t h i n g c a n b e " p r e s e n t " in t h a t it is p r e s e n t e d to u s
w i t h o u t b e i n g r e p r e s e n t e d b y s o m e i n t e r m e d i a r y i t e m . I n this s e n s e t h i n g s p a s t
can b e p r e s e n t a n d h e n c e b e i m m e d i a t e o b j e c t s o f a w a r e n e s s . A n d this, I
c o n t e n d , is w h a t R e i d h a d in m i n d w h e n h e says t h a t m e m o r y h a s t h i n g s p a s t
as its o b j e c t s .
So, R e i d a f f i r m s t h e f o l l o w i n g two t h e s e s c o n c e r n i n g m e m o r y t h a t t o g e t h e r
a m o u n t to a p o s i t i o n t h a t a p p r o p r i a t e l y c a n b e c a l l e d " d i r e c t r e a l i s m " :

(i) S's r e m e m b e r i n g that p is direct in the sense that there are no items (such as ideas)
that represent p to S and are intermediaries between S a n d the objects S r e m e m b e r s ; p
itself is the direct object of S's memory.

E a r l i e r , in s e c t i o n 1.~, we e n c o u n t e r e d t h e o t h e r thesis t h a t is p a r t o f R e i d ' s

direct realism:

(ii) S's r e m e m b e r i n g that p is direct in the sense that the formation of m e m o r y beliefs
doesn't involve any kind o f reasoning on S's part.34

Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam

34For comments on an earlier draft of this paper I am much indebted to John Greco, Joe
Houston, Andr6 van Kooij, Peter Schouls, and two anonymous referees for this journal.