PD 705

1)

C ASE DI GES T: FELIP E YS M AEL, ETC VS .

DEP UTY EXEC UTIVE S EC R ETARY, ETC
11:09 AM

G.R. No. 79538

Felipe Ysmael, etc vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, etc
October 18, 1990

Petitioner sought the reconsideration of a memorandum order issued by the Bureau of Forest Development which
cancelled its timber license agreement in 1983, as well as the revocation of TLA No. 356 subsequently issued by
the Bureau to private respondents in 1984 by sending letters to the Office of the President and the MNR [now the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Petitioner’s prayers were to no avail. Hence the
petition in the Court, imputing grave abuse of discretion to public respondents.

RULING:

The Court stressed the authority of administrative bodies to handle matters within there scope without need of
interference by the courts of law. These administrative bodies are deemed to be in better positions to determine
issues within their specialty and resolve the same. The Court cited the doctrine of res judicata which avers that the
decisions and orders of administrative agencies have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment. The rule of res judicata thus forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority
acting within their exclusive jurisdiction

The Court also held that the assailed orders by public respondent was in line with the latter’s duty to develop and
conserve the country’s natural resources in view of the constitutional mandate of the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. It is their duty to regulate the
issuance of licenses (TLA) as they see fit, which the court cannot interfere with. The Court further held that sans
grave abuse of discretion which may be imputed to public respondents, the court ruled that petitioner cannot seek
affirmative relief.

2) LEOVEGILDO R. RUZOL v. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR Nos. 186739-960, 2013-04-17

Facts:
Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004... he organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative
Assembly... in view of regulating and monitoring the... transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity
of General Nakar.
During the said assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the... salvaged forests products, the Office of the
Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal
treasurer.[2]
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to transport salvaged forest products
were issued to various recipients, of which forty-three (43) bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining one
hundred seventy-eight (178) were signed by his co-accused
Guillermo T. Sabiduria (Sabiduria), then municipal administrator of General Nakar.[3]
On June 2006, on the basis of the issued Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the
RPC or for Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol and Sabiduria
As Chief Executive of the municipality of General Nakar, Quezon, he is authorized to issue permits to transport
forest products pursuant to RA 7160 which give the LGU not only express powers but also those powers that are
necessarily implied from the powers... expressly granted as well as those that are necessary, appropriate or
incidental to the LGU's efficient and effective governance.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan... acquitting Sabiduria but finding Ruzol guilty as charged
The Sandiganbayan predicated its ruling on the postulate that the authority to issue transport permits with respect
to salvaged forest products lies with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that such
authority had not been devolved to the local... government of General Nakar.[9] To the graft court, Ruzol's
issuance of the subject permits constitutes usurpation of the official functions of the DENR.
Issues:
whether the authority to monitor and regulate the... transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the
DENR, and no one else.
the permits to transport were issued under his power and authority as Municipal Mayor
Whether Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
Ruling:
The petition is partly meritorious.
Whether the Permits to Transport Issued by Ruzol Are Valid... the LGU also has, under the LGC of 1991, ample
authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor and regulate salvaged forest products,
provided that... the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been faithfully complied with.
While the DENR is, indeed, the primary government instrumentality charged with the mandate of promulgating
rules and regulations for the protection of the environment and conservation of natural resources, it is not the only
government instrumentality clothed with such... authority.
Whether in ordinary or in legal parlance, the word
"primary" can never be taken to be synonymous with "sole" or "exclusive." In fact, neither the pertinent provisions
of PD 705 nor EO 192 suggest that the DENR, or any of its bureaus, shall exercise such authority to the exclusion
of all other government instrumentalities, i.e.,... LGUs.
the claim of DENR's supposedly exclusive mandate is easily negated by the principle of local autonomy enshrined
in the 1987 Constitution
To our mind, the requirement of permits to transport salvaged forest products is not a manifestation of usurpation
of DENR's authority but rather an additional measure which was meant to complement DENR's duty to regulate
and monitor forest resources within the
LGU's territorial jurisdiction.
Ruzol is correct to a point. Nevertheless, We find that an enabling ordinance is necessary to confer the subject
permits with validity. As correctly held by the Sandiganbayan, the power to levy fees or charges under the LGC is
exercised by the Sangguniang Bayan through the... enactment of an appropriate ordinance wherein the terms,
conditions and rates of the fees are prescribed.[24] Needless to say, one of the fundamental principles of local
fiscal administration is that "local revenue is generated only from sources expressly... authorized by law or
ordinance."[25]
Ruzol's insistence that his actions are pursuant to the LGU's devolved function to "manage and control communal
forests" under Sec. 17 of the LGC and DAO 1992-30[29] is specious. Although We recognize the LGU's authority
in the management and control of... communal forests within its territorial jurisdiction, We reiterate that this
authority should be exercised and enforced in accordance with the procedural parameters established by law for
its effective and efficient execution.
Ruzol cannot be held guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions
Ruzol stands accused of usurpation of official functions for issuing 221 permits to transport salvaged forest
products under the alleged "pretense of official position and without being lawfully entitled to do so, such authority
properly... belonging to the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
he Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the crime were attendant in the present case because the
authority to issue the subject permits belongs solely to the
DENR.[35]
We rule otherwise.
We note that this case of usurpation against Ruzol rests principally on the prosecution's theory that the DENR is
the only government instrumentality that can issue the permits to transport salvaged forest products. The
prosecution asserted that Ruzol usurped the official... functions that properly belong to the DENR.
But erstwhile discussed at length, the DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue
permits relevant to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare
clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority.
Also, as can be gleaned from the records, the permits to transport were meant to complement and not to replace
the Wood Recovery Permit issued by the DENR.
Principles:

3) CRISOSTOMO B. AQUINO vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY AKLAN,

G.R. No. 211356; September 29, 2014

DOCTRINE: Based on law and jurisprudence, the office of the mayor has quasi-judicial powers to order the
closing and demolition of establishments. This power granted by the LGC, as earlier explained, We believe, is
not the same power devolved in favor of the LGU under Sec. 17 (b)(2)(ii), as above-quoted, which is subject to
review by the DENR. The fact that the building to be demolished is located within a forestland under the
administration of the DENR is of no moment, for what is involved herein, strictly speaking, is not an issue on
environmental protection, conservation of natural resources, and the maintenance of ecological balance, but
the legality or illegality of the structure. Rather than treating this as an environmental issue then, focus should
not be diverted from the root cause of this debacle compliance.

 FACTS

Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management Philippines,
Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning compliance with the
municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was already operating a resort in the area, and
the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering the construction of a three-storey hotel over
a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay,
Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.

Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build zone”
demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).

Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action was ever taken
by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal government, enjoining the
expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO
10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s hotel.

Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief with the CA Alleging that the order
was issued and executed with grave abuse of discretion.

PETITIONER CONTENTION: The hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se,
given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the Municipality of Malay, Aklan
should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.

RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor has the
express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally constructed
buildings.

ISSUE

Whether or not a judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can order the closure and demolition
of the property in question.

RULING

Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such a thing is a
nuisance per se.

            Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this case that the
LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of police power
and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general
welfare.

Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the requirement
of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through
their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of the mayor is given
powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has also been endowed with
authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come out with an effective order or
resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the LGC, which empowered the mayor to order
the closure and removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.

4) SUNVILLE TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC. vs. HON.

ALFONSO G. ABAD, COURT OF APPEALS,
ISIDRO GILBOLINGO AND ROBUSTIANO
BUGTAI G.R. No. 85502 February 24, 1992
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
OCTOBER 18, 2017

FACTS:

The petitioner was granted a Timber License Agreement (TLA), authorizing it to cut, remove and utilize timber within
the concession area covering 29,500 hectares of forest land in Zamboanga del Sur, for a period of ten years expiring on
September 31, 1992.‘

in 1987, herein private respondents filed a petition with the DENR for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of
serious violations of its conditions and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.

The same charges were subsequently made, also by the herein private respondents, in a complaint for injunction with
damages against the petitioner.

The petitioner moved to dismiss this case on three grounds, to wit: 1) the court had no jurisdiction over the complaint; 2)
the plaintiffs had not yet exhausted administrative remedies; and 3) the injunction sought was expressly prohibited by
section 1 of PD 605.

Judge Alfonso G. Abad denied the motion to dismiss and the motion for reconsideration. The petitioner then elevated the
matter to the CA, which sustained the trial court .The CA held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not without exception and pointed to the several instances approved by this Court where it could be dispensed with.
The respondent court found that in the case before it, the applicable exception was the urgent need for judicial
intervention.

The decision also declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605, which provides:

Sec. 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or disapproval,
revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the proper administrative official or body on concessions,
licenses, permits, patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition, exploitation, utilization,
exploration and/or development of the natural resources of the Philippines.

This was held to be an encroachment on the judicial power vested in the Supreme Court and the lower courts by Article
VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution. The respondent court cited Export Processing Zone Authority v.  Dulay, where
several presidential decrees were declared unconstitutional for divesting the courts of the judicial power to determine just
compensation in expropriation cases.

ISSUES:
 1. Whether the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not correctly applied and
that the declaration of the unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605 was improper.
2. Whether the RTC is correct when it declared invalid Section 1 of PD 605.

RULING:

1. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction
before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the
doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed in the Rules of
Court for the dismissal of the complaint. The deficiency is not jurisdictional. Failure to invoke
it operates as a waiver of the objection as a ground for a motion to dismiss and the court may
then proceed with the case as if the doctrine had been observed.

One of the reasons for the doctrine of exhaustion is the separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a
becoming policy of non-interference with matters coming primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of the
other departments. The theory is that the administrative authorities are in a better position to resolve questions addressed
to their particular expertise and that errors committed by subordinates in their resolution may be rectified by their
superiors if given a chance to do so. A no less important consideration is that administrative decisions are usually
questioned in the special civil actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which are allowed only when there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the petitioner. It may be added that strict enforcement of the rule
could also relieve the courts of a considerable number of avoidable cases which otherwise would burden their heavily
loaded dockets. 9

As correctly suggested by the respondent court, however, there are a number of instances when the doctrine may be
dispensed with and judicial action validly resorted to immediately.

Among these exceptional cases are:

1) when the question raised is purely legal;

2) when the administrative body is in estoppel;

3) when the act complained of is patently illegal;

4) when there is urgent need for judicial intervention;

5) when the claim involved is small;

6) when irreparable damage will be suffered;

7) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;

8) when strong public interest is involved;

9) when the subject of the controversy is private land; and

10) in quo warranto proceedings.

The private respondents now submit that their complaint comes under the exceptions because forestry laws do not
require observance of the doctrine as a condition precedent to judicial action; the question they are raising is purely legal;
application of the doctrine will cause great and irreparable damage; and public interest is involved.

We rule for the petitioner.

Even if it be assumed that the forestry laws do not expressly require prior resort to administrative remedies, the reasons
for the doctrine above given, if nothing else, would suffice to still require its observance. Even if such reasons were
disregarded, there would still be the explicit language of pertinent laws vesting in the DENR the power and function “to
regulate the development, disposition, extraction, exploration and use of the country’s forests” and “to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction” in the “management and disposition of all lands of the public domain,” and in the Forest Management
Bureau (formerly the Bureau of Forest Development) the responsibility for the enforcement of the forestry laws aid
regulations here claimed to have been violated. This comprehensive conferment clearly implies at the very least that the
DENR should be allowed to rule in the first instance on any controversy coming under its express powers before the
courts of justice may intervene.

The argument that the questions raised in the petition are purely legal is also not acceptable. The private respondents
have charged, both in the administrative case before the DENR and in the civil case before the RTC, that the petitioner
has violated the terms and conditions of the TLA and the provisions of forestry laws and regulations.

The charge involves factual issues calling for the presentation of supporting evidence. Such evidence is best evaluated
first by the administrative authorities, employing their specialized knowledge of the agreement and the rules allegedly
violated, before the courts may step in to exercise their powers of review.

As for the alleged urgent necessity for judicial action and the claimed adverse impact of the case on the national interest,
the record does not show that the petitioners have satisfactorily established these extraordinary circumstances to justify
deviation from the doctrine by exhaustion of administrative remedies and immediate resort to the courts of justice. In
fact, this particular submission must fall flat against the petitioner’s uncontested contention that it has since 1988 stopped
its operations under the TLA in compliance with the order of the DENR.

2.

There in no question that Civil Case No. 2732 comes within the jurisdiction of the respondent court. Nevertheless, as the
wrong alleged in the complaint was supposedly committed as a result of the unlawful logging activities of the petitioner,
it will be necessary first to determine whether or not the TLA and the forestry laws and regulations had indeed been
violated. To repeat for emphasis, determination of this question is the primary responsibility of the Forest Management
Bureau of the DENR. The application of the expertise of the administrative agency in the resolution of the issue raised is
a condition precedent for the eventual examination, if still necessary, of the same question by a court of justice.

In view of the above observations, we find that there was no need for the respondent court to declare the
unconstitutionality of Section 1 of PD 605. The rule is that a question of constitutionality must be avoided where the case
can be decided on some other available ground, as we have done in the case before us. The resolution of this same
question must await another case, where all the indispensable requisites of a judicial inquiry into a constitutional
question are satisfactorily established. In such an event, it will be time for the Court “to make the hammer fall, and
heavily,” in the words of Justice Laurel, if such action is warranted.

The petition is GRANTED.

5) Paat vs CA Admin Law Digest

Leonardo Paat
 
vs
 
Court of Appeals, et. Al.
 
GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997
 
266 SCRA 167
 
FACTS
 The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way
to Bulacan because thedriver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed
in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to
explain. Private respondents failed to submit required
explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation
and ordered th
eforfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private
respondents filed areplevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the casecontending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for
their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trialcourt denied their motion. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari. Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertainthe suit for replevin because
the truck was under administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
HELD
 The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of thecourt, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative
processed afforded him. Hence, if a remedywithin the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving
the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial
power can b
e sought.The premature invoc
ation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.
 The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual
and circumstantialsettings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when
the issue involved is purely a legalquestion, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppelson the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5)
when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the respondent is a departmentsecretary whose acts as an alter ego of
the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to requireexhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the
subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. A suit
for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for
administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as amended. Dismissal of the
replevin suit for lack of
cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been
the proper course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently
issuing the writ ordering the return of the truck.

G.R. No. 108310 September 1, 1994RUFINO O. ESLAO, in his capacity as President of Pangasinan State
University,
petitioner,vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondent
FACTS:
 On 9 December 1988, PSU entered into a Memorandum of Agreement ("MOA")
 
with theDepartment of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") for the evaluation of eleven (11)government
reforestation operations in Pangasinan. The evaluation project was part of the commitmentof the Asian
Development Bank ("ADB") under the ADB/OECF Forestry Sector Program Loan to theRepublic of the Philippines
and was one among identical project agreements entered into by the DENRwith sixteen (16) other state
universities. Per advice of the PSU Auditor-in-Charge with respect to thepayment of
honoraria
 and
 per diems
 of PSU personnel engaged in the review and evaluation project,PSU Vice President for Research and Extension
and Assistant Project Director Victorino P. Esperorequested the Office of the President, PSU, to have the
University's Board of Regents ("BOR") confirmthe appointments or designations of involved PSU personnel
including the rates of
honoraria
and
 perdiems
 corresponding to their specific roles and functions.The BOR approved the MOA and later on PSU issued Voucher
No. 8902007 representing theamount of P70, 375 for payment of
honoraria
to PSU personnel engaged in the project. Later, however,the approved
honoraria
 rates were found to be somewhat higher than the rates provided for in theguidelines of National Compensation
Circular ("NCC") No. 53. Accordingly, the amounts were adjusteddownwards to conform to NCC No. 53.
Adjustments were made by deducting amounts from subsequentdisbursements of
honoraria
. By June 1989, NCC No. 53 was being complied with. Bonifacio Icu, COAresident auditor at PSU, alleging that
there were excess payments of
honoraria
, issued a "Notice ofDisallowance"
 
disallowing P64,925 from the amount of P70,37 stated in Voucher No. 8902007,mentioned earlier. The resident
auditor based his action on the premise that Compensation PolicyGuidelines ("CPG") No. 80-4 issued by the
Department of Budget and Management which provided forlower rates than NCC No. 53, also issued by the
Department of Budget and Management, was theschedule for
honoraria
 and
 per diems
 applicable to work done under the MOA of 9 December 1988between the PSU and the DENR.
ISSUE:
 Whether or not the evaluation project is in fact a "special project" and that there were excess ofpayments of
honoraria
HELD:
 Sec. 2.1 of CPG No. 80-4 defines "special project" as an inter-agency or inter-committee
activity
or an
undertaking by a composite group of officials/employees from various agencies
which [activity or undertaking] is not among the regular and primary functions of the agencies involved. COA,
under its constitutional mandate, is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for any applicable law or
administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does not agree, at least notbefore
such law or regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of government
 –
 i.e., the courts
 –
 As unconstitutional or illegal and void. The COA, like all other government agencies, must respect the
presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes and administrative regulations are entitled until
such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or until set aside in appropriate case by a competent court and
ultimately the Supreme Court.

6) REPUBLIC VS CA and BERNABE