Katon Vs Palanca

4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 565

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.
*
G.R. No. 151149. September 7, 2004.
GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA, JR.,

LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN
FRESNILLO, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; Settled is the

doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors
of jurisdiction.—Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ of
certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction. Such writ does not
include a review of the evidence, more so when no determination of the
merits has yet been made by the trial court, as in this case.
Same; Same; Motions; Dismissal; Motu Proprio; In four excepted
circumstances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.—
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived,
except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis
pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4) prescription are evident from the
pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four excepted instances, the
court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin
we explained thus: “x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was
traditionally limited to instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction
over the subject matter and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial,
failed to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time or
neglected to comply with the rules or with any order of the court. Outside of
these instances, any motu proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of
the right of the plaintiff to be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding
Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the
amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical change.
Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
566
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016a0cc1b25a61ef629f003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/17
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no

jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.”
Courts; Jurisdiction; Residual Jurisdiction; The trial court still retains
its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve
compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending
appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal.—The “residual
jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is
normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter
involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the perfection of the
appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but
prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on appeal. In
either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to
issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent
litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the
appeal.
Public Lands; Nullification of Title; Allegations; In an action for
nullification of title or declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain
the following allegations.—In an action for nullification of title or
declaration of its nullity, the complaint must contain the following
allegations: 1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff
prior to the issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and
2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in
obtaining a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff.
In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit, but from the fact
that the director of the Land Management Bureau had no jurisdiction to
bestow title; hence, the issued patent or certificate of title was void ab initio.
Same; Reversion; Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically
declares that only the solicitor general or the officer in his stead may
institute such an action.—Neither can petitioner’s case be one for reversion.
Section 101 of the Public Land Act categorically declares that only the
solicitor general or the officer in his stead may institute such an action. A
private person may not bring an action for reversion or any other action that
would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative title, with
the result that the land thereby covered would again form part of the public
domain.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the decision of the Court.
567
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 567

Manuel Abrogar III for petitioner.

Roland E. Pay for respondent Agustin.
Zoilo C. Cruzat for respondents Palanca, Jr., Gapilango and
Fresnillo.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of

action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court,
the action may be dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals,
even if the case has been elevated for review on different grounds.
Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends useless
litigations.
The Case
1
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 2 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the December
3
8, 2000 Decision and the November
20, 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No.
57496. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
“Assuming that petitioner is correct in saying that he has the exclusive right
in applying for the patent over the land in question, it appears that his action
is already barred by laches because he slept on his alleged right for almost
23 years from the time the original certificate of title has been issued to
respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr., or after 35 years from the time the land was
certified as agricultural land. In addition, the proper party in the annulment
of patents or titles acquired through fraud is the State; thus, the petitioner’s
action is deemed misplaced as he really does not have any right to assert or
protect. What he had during the time he requested for the re-classification of
the land was the privilege of applying for the patent over the same upon the
land’s conversion from forest to agricultural.
_______________
1Rollo, pp. 8-18.

2Id., pp. 19-26. Twelfth Division. Penned by Justice Eliezer R. de Los Santos and concurred
in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria (Division chairman) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (member).
3 Rollo, pp. 27-31. Special Former Twelfth Division. Penned by Justice de Los Santos, and
concurred in by Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador. Justices
Labitoria and Bello dissented.
568

“WHEREFORE,
4
the petition is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement
as to cost.”
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner. It affirmed the RTC’s dismissal
of his Complaint in Civil Case No. 3231, not on the grounds relied
upon by the trial court, but because of prescription and lack of
jurisdiction.
The Antecedent Facts
The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows:
“On August 2, 1963, herein [P]etitioner [George Katon] filed a request with
the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for
the re-classification of a piece of real property known as Sombrero Island,
located in Tagpait, Aborlan, Palawan, which consists of approximately 18
hectares. Said property is within Timberland Block of LC Project No. 10-C
of Aborlan, Palawan, per BF Map LC No. 1582.
“Thereafter, the Bureau of Forestry District Office, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, ordered the inspection, investigation and survey of the land subject
of the petitioner’s request for eventual conversion or reclassification from
forest to agricultural land, and thereafter for George Katon to apply for a
homestead patent.
“Gabriel Mandocdoc (now retired Land Classification Investigator)
undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of the area in the
presence of the petitioner, his brother Rodolfo Katon (deceased) and his
cousin, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. During said survey, there were no
actual occupants on the island but there were some coconut trees claimed to
have been planted by petitioner and [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr.
(alleged overseer of petitioner) who went to the island from time to time to
undertake development work, like planting of additional coconut trees.
“The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was
favorably endorsed by the Forestry District Office of Puerto Princesa to its
main office in Manila for appropriate action. The names of Felicisimo
Corpuz, Clemente Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango and Juan Fresnillo were
included in the endorsement as co-applicants of the petitioner.
“In a letter dated September 23, 1965, then Asst. Director of Forestry
R.J.L. Utleg informed the Director of Lands, Manila, that since the subject
land was no longer needed for forest purposes, the same is therefore
certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land Act.
_______________
4CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 25
569
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 569

“Petitioner contends that the whole area known as Sombrero Island had
been classified from forest land to agricultural land and certified available
for disposition upon his request and at his instance. However, Mr. Lucio
Valera, then [l]and investigator of the District Land Office, Puerto Princesa,
Palawan, favorably endorsed the request of [R]espondents Manuel Palanca
Jr. and Lorenzo Agustin, for authority to survey on November 15, 1965. On
November 22, a second endorsement was issued by Palawan District Officer
Diomedes De Guzman with specific instruction to survey vacant portions of
Sombrero Island for the respondents consisting of five (5) hectares each. On
December 10, 1965, Survey Authority No. R III-342-65 was issued
authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor Eduardo Salvador to survey ten
(10) hectares of Sombrero Island for the respondents. On December 23,
1990, [R]espondent Lorenzo Agustin filed a homestead patent application
for a portion of the subject island consisting of an area of 4.3 hectares.
“Records show that on November 8, 1996, [R]espondent Juan Fresnillo
filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the island comprising
8.5 hectares. Records also reveal that [R]espondent Jesus Gapilango filed a
homestead application on June 8, 1972. Respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. was
issued5
Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No. G-7089 on March 3,
1977 with an area of 6.84 hectares of Sombrero Island.
“Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original
certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in
favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through
fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.
“On the other hand, [R]espondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. claims that he
himself requested for the reclassification of the island in dispute and that on
or about the time of such request, [R]espondents Fresnillo, Palanca and
Gapilango already occupied their respective areas and introduced numerous
improvements. In addition, Palanca said that petitioner never filed any
homestead application for the island. Respondents deny that Gabriel
Mandocdoc undertook the inspection and survey of the island.
“According to Mandocdoc, the island was uninhabited but the
respondents insist that they already had their respective occupancy and
improvements on the island. Palanca denies that he is a mere overseer of the
petitioner because he said he was acting for himself in developing his own
area and not as anybody’s caretaker.
“Respondents aver that they are all bona fide and lawful possessors of
their respective portions and have declared said portions for taxation
_______________
5 The date on the Certificate of Title is February 21, 1977. See CA Rollo, p. 28.
570

purposes and that they have been faithfully paying taxes thereon for twenty
years.
“Respondents contend that the petitioner has no legal capacity to sue
insofar as the island is concerned because an action for reconveyance can
only be brought by the owner and not a mere homestead applicant and that
petitioner is guilty of estoppel by laches for his failure to assert his right
over the land for an unreasonable and unexplained period of time.
“In the instant case, petitioner seeks to nullify the homestead patents and
original certificates of title issued in favor of the respondents covering
certain portions of the Sombrero Island as well as the reconveyance of the
whole island in his favor. The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive
right to file an application for homestead patent over the whole island since
it was6 he who requested for its conversion from forest land to agricultural
land.”
Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative

Defenses and Counterclaim in due time. On June 30, 1999, they also
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by
petitioner of the trial court’s Order to amend his Complaint so he
could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased,
Respondent Gapilango. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by the
RTC in its Order dated July 29, 1999.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the July 29, 1999
Order was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated December
17, 1999, for being a third and prohibited motion. In his Petition for
Certiorari before the CA, petitioner charged the trial court with
grave abuse of discretion on the ground that the denied Motion was
his first and only Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of

discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while petitioner
had caused the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to
agricultural land, he never applied for a homestead patent under the
Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired title to that land.
The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a
homestead patent and the reversion of the property to the State were
matters between the latter and the homestead grantee. Unless and
_______________
6CA Decision, pp. 1-5; Rollo, pp. 19-23.
571
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 571

until the government takes steps to annul the grant, the home-
steader’s right thereto stands.
Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had the exclusive right
to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was already barred
by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the
time Respondent Palanca’s title had been issued.
In the Assailed Resolution, the CA acknowledged that it had
erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It agreed with
petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in
perfunctorily dismissing his September 10, 1999 Motion for
Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a third and
prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the
challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five members
—with two justices dissenting—pursuant to its “residual
prerogative” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.
From the allegations of the Complaint, the appellate court opined
that petitioner clearly had no standing to seek reconveyance of the
disputed land, because he neither held title to it nor even applied for
a homestead patent. It reiterated that only the State could sue for
cancellation of the title issued upon a homestead patent, and for
reversion of the land to the public domain.
Finally, it ruled that prescription had already barred the action for
reconveyance. First, petitioner’s action was brought 24 years after
the issuance of Palanca’s homestead patent. Under the Public Land
Act, such action should have been taken within ten years from the
issuance of the homestead certificate of title. Second, it appears from
the submission (Annex “F” of the Complaint) of petitioner himself
that Respondents Fresnillo and Palanca had been occupying six
hectares of the island since 1965, or 33 years before he took legal
steps to assert his right to the property. His action was filed beyond
the 30-year prescriptive period under Articles 1141 and 1137 of the
Civil Code. 7
Hence, this Petition.
_______________
7The Petition was deemed submitted for decision on March 12, 2003, upon the
Court’s receipt of the Memorandum of Respondents Palanca, Gapilango and Fresnillo
signed by Atty. Zoilo C. Cruzat. Respondent Agustin’s 3-page Memorandum,
received on February 10, 2002, was signed
572

Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
“1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for

Certiorari based on an issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the
Petition?
“2. Is the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged ‘residual
prerogative’ under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure8 in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the
Petition?”
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Propriety of Ruling on the Merits
This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the
propriety of the CA’s ruling on the merits. He raised it with the
appellate court when he moved for reconsideration of its December
8, 2000 Decision. The CA even corrected itself in its November 20,
2001 Resolution, as follows:
“Upon another review of the case, the Court concedes that it may indeed
have lost its way and been waylaid by the variety, complexity and seeming
importance of the interests and issues involved in the case below, the
apparent reluctance of the judges, five in all, to hear the case, and the
volume of the conflicting, often confusing,
9
submissions bearing on
incidental matters. We stand corrected.”
That explanation should have been enough to settle the issue. The
CA’s Resolution on this point has rendered petitioner’s issue moot.
Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice it to say that the
appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on the merits
of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in
fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by
the trial court in denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Settled is the doctrine that the sole office of a writ
_______________
by Atty. Roland E. Pay. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Manuel

Abrogar III, was received on February 14, 2003.
8Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; Rollo, p. 160.
9CA Resolution, p. 2; Rollo, p. 28.
573
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 573

of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction.

10
Such writ does
not include a review of the evidence, more so when no
determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial court, as
in this case.
Second Issue:
Dismissal for Prescription
and Lack of Jurisdiction
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its “residual

prerogatives” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when
it motu proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and
prescription. According to him, residual prerogative refers to the
power that the trial court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It
follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its “residual
prerogatives” under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with
the “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts over cases appealed to the
CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer
are deemed waived, except when (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and (4)
prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on
record. In the four excepted instances, the court shall 11
motu proprio
dismiss the claim or action. In Gumabon v. Larin we explained
thus:
“x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to

instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his
action for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the
rules or with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu
proprio dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to
be heard. Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and
Section 3, Rule 17, of the Revised Rules of Court,
_______________
10 Oro v. Diaz, 413 Phil. 416, 427; 361 SCRA 108, 117-118, July 11, 2001; Negros Oriental
Electric Cooperative 1 v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 357 SCRA 668, 673, May 9,
2001; Spouses Ampeloquio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 13, 18-19; 333 SCRA 465, June
15, 2000.
11 422 Phil. 222, 230; 370 SCRA 638, 643-644, November 27, 2001.
574

the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical

change. Under the new rules, a court may motu proprio dismiss a claim
when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is another cause of action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or where the 12action is
barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations. x x x.” (Italics
supplied)
On the other hand, “residual jurisdiction” is embodied in Section 9

of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
“SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.—A party’s appeal by notice of

appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal
in due time.
“A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with
respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on
appeal filed in due time.
“In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case
upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the
time to appeal of the other parties.
“In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the
subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in
due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.
“In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record
on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of
the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the
appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order
execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and
allow withdrawal of the appeal.” (Italics supplied)
The “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a stage in

which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the
case or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is
reached upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the
approval of the records on appeal, but prior
13
to the transmittal of the
original records or the records on appeal. In either instance, the trial
court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective

orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of
_______________
12Ibid., per Vitug, J.

13 Zacate v. Commission on Elections, 353 SCRA 441, 448, March 1, 2001. See
also Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. I (seventh rev. ed.), pp. 509-510.
575
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 575

indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the

withdrawal of the appeal.
The CA’s motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s Complaint could
not have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule
41. Undeniably, such order of dismissal was not one for the
protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the
disposition of the case on appeal. What the CA referred to as
residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of the courts
to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in
Section 1 of Rule 149 of the Rules of Court and under authority of
Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it
dismissed the Complaint motu proprio “on more fundamental15
grounds directly bearing on the lower court’s lack of jurisdiction”
and for prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no
jurisdiction over the
16
subject matter, the only power it has is to
dismiss the action.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is
determined by the allegations
17
in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought. In his Complaint for “Nullification of
Applications for Homestead and Original 18
Certificate of Title No. G-
7089 and for Reconveyance of Title,” petitioner averred:
“2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of [petitioner,

Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., [petitioner’s] cousin, in
connivance with his co-[respondent], Lorenzo Agustin, x x x
fraudulently and in bad faith:
2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a prerequisite to

the filing of an application for homestead patent in his name and
that of his Co-[Respondent] Agustin, [despite being] fully aware
that [Petitioner] KATON had previously applied or requested for
re-classification and certification of the same land from forest
_______________
14 The said section provides that “[t]hese rules shall apply in all courts, except as otherwise
provided by the Supreme Court.”
15 CA Resolution, p. 2; Rollo, p. 28.
16 Zamora v. Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 279, 285, March 19, 1990.
17 Alemar’s (Sibal & Sons), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 350 SCRA 333, 339, January 26, 2001;
Gochan v. Young, 354 SCRA 207, 211 & 216, March 12, 2001; Saura v. Saura, Jr., 313 SCRA
465, 472, September 1, 1999.
18 This is the case caption.
576

land to agricultural land which request was favorably acted upon and
approved as mentioned earlier; a clear case of intrinsic fraud and
misrepresentation;
xxx xxx xxx
2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was

applying for the VACANT PORTION of Sombrero Island where
there was none, the same constituted another clear case of fraud
and misrepresentation;
“3. That the issuance of Homestead Patent No. 145927 and OCT No.
G-7089 in the name of [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr. and the
filing of Homestead Patent Applications in the names of
[respondents], Lorenzo Agustin, Jesus Gapilango and Juan
Fresnillo[,] having been done fraudulently and in19bad faith, are ipso
facto null and void and of no effect whatsoever.”
xxx xxx xxx

“x x x. By a wrongful act or a willful omission and intending the effects
with natural necessity arise knowing from such act or omission,
[Respondent Palanca] on account of his blood relation, first degree cousins, 20
trust, interdependence and intimacy is guilty of intrinsic fraud [sic]. x x x.”
Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1)

nullifying the homestead patent applications of Respondents
Agustin, Fresnillo and Gapilango as well as Homestead Patent No.
145927 and OCT No. G-7089 in the name of Respondent Palanca;
and (2) ordering the director of the Land21Management Bureau to
reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner.
The question is, did the Complaint sufficiently allege an action
for declaration of nullity of the free patent and certificate of title or,
alternatively, for reconveyance? Or did it plead merely for
reversion?
The Complaint did not sufficiently make a case for any of such
actions, over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction.
In an action for nullification of title or declaration of its nullity,
the complaint must contain the following allegations: 1) that the
contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the
issuance of the assailed certificate of title to the defendant; and 2)
that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in
_______________
19Complaint, p. 5; Rollo, p. 39. Citations omitted.

20Id., pp. 4 & 38.
21Id., pp. 8 & 42.
577
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 577

obtaining22 a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the

plaintiff. In these cases, the nullity arises not from fraud or deceit,
but from the fact that the director of the Land Management Bureau
had no jurisdiction to bestow title; 23
hence, the issued patent or
certificate of title was void ab initio.
In an alternative action for reconveyance, the certificate of title is
also respected as incontrovertible, but the transfer of the property or
title thereto is sought to be nullified on the ground that it 24was
wrongfully or erroneously registered in the defendant’s name. As
with an annulment of title, a complaint must allege two facts that, if
admitted, would entitle the plaintiff to recover title to the disputed
land: (1) that the plaintiff was the owner of the land, and (2) that the25
defendant illegally dispossessed the plaintiff of the property.
Therefore, the defendant who acquired the property through mistake
or fraud is bound 26to hold and reconvey to the plaintiff the property
or the title thereto.
In the present case, nowhere in the Complaint did petitioner
allege that he had previously held title to the land in question. On the27
contrary, he acknowledged that the disputed island was public land,
that it had never been privately titled in his name, and that he had
not applied
28
for a homestead under the provisions of the Public Land
Act. This Court has held that a complaint by a private party who
alleges that a homestead patent was obtained by fraudulent means,
and who consequently prays for its annulment, does 29not state a cause
of action; hence, such complaint must be dismissed.
_______________
22 Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, 428 Phil. 249, 260; 378 SCRA 206, 214,
February 27, 2002.
23Ibid.
24Id., p. 262.
25Ibid.
26Id., p. 263.
27Complaint, par. 7, p. 3; Rollo, p. 37.
28 On page 4 of his Complaint, petitioner averred that he “could not have filed an
application for homestead because [Respondent] Manuel Palanca Jr., as an overseer of
Sombrero Island for [petitioner] did not advise [him] of the receipt of the letter dated
September 23, 1965 x x x”; Rollo, p. 38.
29 Spouses Tankiko v. Cezar, 362 Phil. 184, 194-195; 302 SCRA 559, 569,
February 2, 1999 (citing Lucas v. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157, 1157-1158, September 23,
1957).
578

Neither can petitioner’s case be one for reversion. Section 101 of the
Public Land Act categorically declares that only the solicitor
30
general
or the officer in his stead may institute such an action. A private
person may not bring an action for reversion or any other action that
would have the effect of canceling a free patent and its derivative
title, with the result that the
31
land thereby covered would again form
part of the public domain.
Thus, when the plaintiff admits in the complaint that the disputed
land will revert to the public domain even if the title is canceled or
amended, the action is for reversion; and the proper party who may 32
bring action is the government, to which the property will revert. A
mere homestead applicant, not being the real33party in interest, has no
cause of action in a suit for reconveyance. As it is, vested rights
over the land applied for under a homestead may be validly claimed
only by the applicant, after approval by the director of the Land
Management
34
Bureau of the former’s final proof of homestead
patent.
Consequently, the dismissal of the Complaint is proper not only
because of lack of jurisdiction,
35
but also because of the utter absence
of a cause36
of action, a defense raised by respondents 37
in their
Answer. Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court ordains that
every
_______________
30 Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, supra; Spouses Tankiko v. Cezar, Id., pp.
193 & 195; Peltan Development Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 824, 836; 270
SCRA 82, March 19, 1997.
31 Lucas v. Durian, supra; Sumail v. Judge of the Court of First Instance, 96 Phil.
946, 953, April 30, 1955.
32 Gabila v. Barriga, 148-B Phil. 615, 618; 41 SCRA 131, September 30, 1971
(cited in Heirs of Kionisala v. Heirs of Dacut, supra).
33 Quinsay v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 195 SCRA 268, 277, March 18, 1991;
Nebrada v. Heirs of Alivio, 104 Phil. 126, 129-130, June 30, 1958.
34 Quinsay v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra.
35§1(g) of Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
36 Pp. 3-4 thereof; Rollo, pp. 46-47. This affirmative defense was also raised by
Respondent Agustin in his “Answer with Affirmative Defense” on p. 4 thereof; Rollo,
p. 53.
37§2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court reads:
“SEC. 2. Parties in interest—A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise
579
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 579

action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party

in interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit. Indeed, one who has no right or interest to protect has no
cause of action by which 38
to invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the
jurisdiction of the court.
Finally, assuming that petitioner is the proper party to bring the
action for annulment of title or its reconveyance,
39
the case should still
be dismissed for being time-barred. It is not disputed that a
homestead patent and an Original 40
Certificate of Title was issued to
Palanca on February 21, 1977, while the Complaint was filed only
on October 6, 1998. Clearly, the suit was brought way past ten years
from the date of the issuance of the Certificate, the prescriptive 41
period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property.
It must likewise be stressed that Palanca’s title—which attained
the status of indefeasibility one year from the issuance of the patent
and the Certificate of Title in February 1977—is no longer open to
review on the ground
42
of actual fraud. Ybañez v. Intermediate
Appellate Court ruled that a certificate of title, issued under an
administrative proceeding pursuant to a homestead patent, is as
indefeasible as one issued under a judicial registration proceeding
one year from its issuance; provided, however, that the land covered
by it is disposable public land, as in this case.
_______________
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in

the name of the real party in interest.”
38 Borlongan v. Madrideo, 380 Phil. 215, 224; 323 SCRA 248, 256, January 25,
2000.
39 Respondents raised this defense on p. 4 of their Answer; Rollo, p. 47.
40CA Rollo, p. 28. The title was issued pursuant to Section 122 of Act No. 496
(now Section 103 of PD 1529), which mandates the registration of patents like other
deeds and conveyances.
41 Ybañez v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 194 SCRA 743, 751, March 6, 1991
(citing Caro v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 401, 407, December 20, 1989). See also
Article 1144 in relation to Article 1456 of the Civil Code.
42 194 SCRA 743, 748-749, March 6, 1991.
580

43
In Aldovino v. Alunan, the Court has held that when the plaintiff’s
own complaint shows clearly that the action has prescribed, such
action may be dismissed even if the defense of prescription
44
has not
been invoked by the defendant. In Gicano v. Gegato, we also
explained thus:
“x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on

the ground of prescription when the parties’ pleadings or other facts on
record show it to be indeed time-barred; (Francisco v. Robles, Feb. 15,
1954; Sison v. McQuaid, 50 O.G. 97; Bambao v. Lednicky, Jan. 28, 1961;
Cordova v. Cordova, Jan. 14, 1958; Convets, Inc. v. NDC, Feb. 28, 1958; 32
SCRA 529; Sinaon v. Sorongan, 136 SCRA 408); and it may do so on the
basis of a motion to dismiss (Sec. 1, f, Rule 16, Rules of Court), or an
answer which sets up such ground as an affirmative defense (Sec. 5, Rule
16), or even if the ground is alleged after judgment on the merits, as in a
motion for reconsideration (Ferrer v. Ericta, 84 SCRA 705); or even if the
defense has not been asserted at all, as where no statement thereof is found
in the pleadings (Garcia v. Mathis, 100 SCRA 250; PNB v. Pacific
Commission House, 27 SCRA 766; Chua Lamco v. Dioso, et al., 97 Phil.
821); or where a defendant has been declared in default (PNB v. Perez, 16
SCRA 270). What is essential only, to repeat, is that the facts demonstrating
the lapse of the prescriptive period be otherwise sufficiently and
satisfactorily apparent on the record; either in the averments 45 of the
plaintiff's complaint, or otherwise established by the evidence.” (Italics
supplied)
Clearly then, the CA did not err in dismissing the present case. After
all, if and when they are able to do so, courts must endeavor 46to settle
entire controversies before them to prevent future litigations.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed

Resolution AFFIRMED. The dismissal of the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 3231 is SUSTAINED on the grounds of lack of jurisdic-
_______________
43 Dino v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 594, 604; 359 SCRA 91, 100, June 20, 2001
(citing Aldovino v. Alunan III, 230 SCRA 825, 834, March 9, 1994).
44 157 SCRA 140, January 20, 1988 (cited in Dino v. Court of Appeals, supra).
45 Ibid., pp. 145-146, per Narvasa, J. (later C.J.) See also Garcia v. Mathis, 100
SCRA 250, 252, September 30, 1980.
46 Chua v. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 262, 270; 271 SCRA 546, 554, April 18,
1997.
581
VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 8, 2004 581

Tan vs. Rosete
tion, failure to state a cause of action and prescription. Costs against

petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez and Corona, JJ., concur.

Carpio-Morales, J., On Official Leave.
Petition denied, resolution affirmed. Dismissal of complaint in

Civil Case No. 3231 sustained.
Note.—In cases of appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses

jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in
due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of other parties.
(Marawi Marantao General Hospital, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 349
SCRA 321 [2001])
——o0o——
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4/11/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 437

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 565

GEORGE KATON, petitioner, vs. MANUEL PALANCA, JR.,

Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; Certiorari; Settled is the

566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Katon vs. Palanca, Jr.

when it appears from the pleadings or evidence on record that it has no

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of

The facts are stated in the decision of the Court.

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 567

Manuel Abrogar III for petitioner.

Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of

1Rollo, pp. 8-18.

568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The Antecedent Facts

The CA narrates the antecedent facts as follows:

4CA Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 25

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 569

570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of

6CA Decision, pp. 1-5; Rollo, pp. 19-23.

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 571

572 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

“1. Is the Court of Appeals correct in resolving the Petition for

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

by Atty. Roland E. Pay. Petitioner’s Memorandum, signed by Atty. Manuel

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 573

of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction.

Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its “residual

“x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to

574 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure brought about no radical

On the other hand, “residual jurisdiction” is embodied in Section 9

“SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof.—A party’s appeal by notice of

The “residual jurisdiction” of trial courts is available at a stage in

court still retains its so-called residual jurisdiction to issue protective

12Ibid., per Vitug, J.

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 575

indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the

“2. That on November 10, 1965, without the knowledge of [petitioner,

2.1. x x x made the request for authority to survey as a prerequisite to

576 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

2.3. In stating in his application for homestead patent that he was

xxx xxx xxx

Thereupon, petitioner prayed, among others, for a judgment (1)

19Complaint, p. 5; Rollo, p. 39. Citations omitted.

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 577

obtaining22 a document of title over the parcel of land claimed by the

578 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 437, SEPTEMBER 7, 2004 579

action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party

authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in

580 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

“x x x [T]rial courts have authority and discretion to dismiss an action on

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed