I.

INTRODUCTION Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all
G.R. No. 127240             March 27, 2000
the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in
ONG CHIA, petitioner, violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
vs. during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention
of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.4
MENDOZA, J.:
Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato 2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since
Philippine citizenship. childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989
The facts are as follows: petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 The state also annexed
income tax returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income
Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a
the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that,
he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a
four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the
citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed
Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's
enumerated in §3 of the law, stated — 1977 marriage contract8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These
17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor license had been required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon owing Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of
to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted after the marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in
February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by 1953, they had already been married.
administrative process was suspended; The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, 10
During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
present any witness against him, he remarked: importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in
Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court held:
in the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG,"
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to which name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270.
present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner, Names and pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to
as well as the petitioner himself.3 include the same militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory
 requirement to allow those persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS
forward and inform the authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his BEEN KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT
application for citizenship. SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised PETITIONER STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former FORMER PLACES OF RESIDENCE.
places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply
IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED
with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give
TO CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS
the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of
NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents
said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . . which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which,
justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered
Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he
as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued,
lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no
consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of
evidence which has not been formally offered.
clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper
and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which
him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . . provides that —
Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election cases, naturalization
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or
tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient. (Emphasis added).
is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being
life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for
appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's
cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the
becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age,
documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more
petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children.
practical and convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings
The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
are not covered by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said pensions
preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis
are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .
of the same documents.
Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:
Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
IN NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We
APPLICATION FOR PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has
PRESENTED BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.
RECORDS OF THE CASE. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the
documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be
in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus: denied.1âwphi1.nêt
The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case hereby DENIED.
number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the
SO ORDERED.
petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17
G.R. Nos. 140538-39             June 14, 2004
Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for
as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet 18 vs.
of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." GODOFREDO B. ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, appellants.
Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented
DECISION
by the State.
PUNO, J.:
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767,
petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income The quiescence of the fading day was shattered by bursts of gunfire, startling the otherwise tranquil
tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus but sanguine folks of Pacol, Naga City. As the fusillade of shots ceased and the wisp of smoke
reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast cleared, frolicking promenaders stumbled upon Ompong Chavez who was gasping his last,
doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in clutching his intestines which had spewed out from his bloodied stomach. He did not in fact reach
relying upon them. the hospital alive. A breath away, Abe Cuya lay lifeless on the pavement. He died on the spot. For
the twinned deaths, the Adors, six (6) of them, were haled to court.
One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all
the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. In two (2) separate informations,1 Diosdado Sr.,2 Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino
Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on and Allan, all surnamed Ador, were charged with the murder of Absalon "Abe" S. Cuya III and
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex Rodolfo "Ompong" S. Chavez. The Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816
A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his identically read:
petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully
published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
compliance with §7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the together and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and the aid of
opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information armed men, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot ABSALON
regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one "ABE" CUYA III (RODOLFO "OMPO" CHAVEZ y SAN ANDRES 3 for Crim. Case No.
time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and 97-6816) with firearms, inflicting upon him multiple and mortal gunshot wounds which
strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by the State, C.A. caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his
With the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and nighttime.
present and former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application of the law
in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement CONTRARY TO LAW.
However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain Perez accompanied the Adors, namely,
were taken into custody. The two (2), Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained at large. Trial thus Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa at the
proceeded only against Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan who all pleaded not guilty. PNP Central Police Headquarters. The Adors were informed of their constitutional rights to remain
Diosdado Sr. is the father of Diosdado Jr., Diosdado III and Godofredo, while Rosalino is the father of silent and to choose their own counsel. They were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the
Allan. Diosdado Sr. and Rosalino are brothers.4 Provincial Headquarters and subjected to paraffin tests. 10 On the way to the crime laboratory,
Godofredo told his police escort that he had been entrusted with a handgun which he kept in his
In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused, the prosecution presented a total of sixteen (16)
witnesses: Mercy Beriña, Larry Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Police residence.11 The information was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian, then Deputy Chief of Police of
Inspector Ma. Julieta Razonable, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, SPO3 Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Naga City, who ordered PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun
Idian, Inspector Reynaldo F. Fulgar, SPO1 Noli Reyes Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C. Bathan, Inspector because Godofredo
Vicente C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno, Absalon Cuya Sr., Efren Chavez and said that he would turn in the gun only to PO3 Nepomuceno. Thus, Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno
Pablo Calsis. and some others accompanied Godofredo to the latter’s residence.
From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that on March 10, 1997, at around seven-thirty in the Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3 Nepomuceno, went to their
evening, while Mercy Beriña, Larry Cado and some eleven (11) others were leisurely walking along backyard, retrieved the gun from under a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter.
Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone 1, Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, to attend a wedding anniversary, Godofredo allegedly told the police that he fired the said gun outside their house on the night of
they heard several gunshots. Shortly after, they met a certain Pablito Umali who told them that
March 10 after he heard several gunshots. 12 PO3 Nepomuceno identified the gun as a caliber .38
"Ompong" Chavez had been shot. They ran to Chavez straight off and saw him already lying on the
ground, about 1½ meters away from a lighted electric post, holding on to his intestines "paltik" handgun which had no serial number. 13 PO3 Nepomuceno then turned over the handgun

which were starting to come out. Beriña shook Chavez and asked him what had happened. Chavez to Major Idian14 who likewise identified it as a .38 caliber revolver. Major Idian returned the
replied "tinambangan kami na Ador" ("We were ambushed by the Adors") and requested that he be handgun to PO3 Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin examination. 15 Thereafter, PO3
brought to the hospital as he was dying. About eight (8) meters from where Chavez was, in a dark Nepomuceno placed his initials on the gun and put it in his private locker while preparing the
spot, lay "Abe" Cuya, dead.5 documents for the examinations and the possible filing of a case for Illegal Possession of
Firearm.16
Upon learning of the shooting incident through their radio communication, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa,
together with PO2 Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to the crime scene to conduct an Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City,
investigation. SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and SPO1 Wilfredo Fernandez, among others, were already conducted an autopsy on the bodies of Chavez and Cuya. Based on the autopsy reports, Dr. Jurado
there.6 SPO1 Barbosa collected some pieces of evidence, took some pictures and made some testified that Cuya sustained five (5) gunshot wounds and died from "cardio-pulmonary arrest,
massive intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-cranial hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot
sketches.7 SPO1 Fernandez on the other hand interviewed one Cresenciana Mendoza in her house
which was nearby, and when he heard people shout that Chavez was still alive, he brought Chavez to wounds penetrating the heart, brain, lungs and digestive tract." 17 Chavez on the other hand had
three (3) gunshot wounds and died from "traumatic shock and massive intra-abdominal
the hospital but the latter expired on the way.8
hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the right kidney and the internal
That same evening, upon being informed that the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas, abdominal organs."18 Dr. Jurado further testified that that he recovered a slug from Cuya’s head
SPO1 Barbosa sought the help of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to accompany him to the three (3) days after he conducted the autopsy - after Cuya’s relatives called his attention to a
residence of the Adors. They arrived at the Adors at around ten o’clock that evening and spoke with protruding mass in Cuya’s head. Thus, he had Cuya’s cadaver sent back to the funeral parlor,
their patriarch, Diosdado Ador Sr. SPO1 Barbosa looked for the other male members of the Ador opened it and was able to extract a deformed .38 caliber slug which he thereafter submitted to the
family but was told by Diosdado Sr. that they were already asleep. Diosdado Sr. nevertheless promised
City Prosecutor’s Office.19
to present them the following day.9
Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be justified for the accused
Laboratory, Camp Ola, Legaspi City, testified that based on the ballistic examination he conducted on Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador, hence, the same is hereby granted
the bullets submitted to his office, the .38 caliber slug recovered from Cuya’s head matched the three insofar as these accused are concerned. Said accused therefore, namely: Diosdado A. Ador,
(3) .38 caliber test bullets which were test-fired from the suspected firearm surrendered by Godofredo. Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-
He however averred that the .38 caliber bullets were actually fired from a .357 Smith and Wesson 6816. The bailbonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby cancelled.
Magnum homemade revolver without serial number, and not from a .38 caliber revolver.20 Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is concerned shall proceed.
The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also transmitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory Services
SO ORDERED.29
for examination and yielded the presence of gunpowder nitrates, thus –
Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.
(1) Diosdado A. Ador – both hands, positive;
For his defense, Godofredo denied any participation in the killings of Cuya and Chavez. He said
(2) Diosdado B. Ador III – right hand, positive; left hand, negative;
that on March 10, 1997, at around seven o’clock in the evening, he heard several gunshots while he
(3) Godofredo B. Ador – right hand, positive; left hand, negative; was having dinner with his wife and four (4) children in their house in Pacol, Naga City. Since his
wife advised him not to go out anymore, he slept after dinner. The following day, while he was
(4) Rosalino A. Ador – both hands, positive;
gathering pili nuts, his long-time friend Dominador Bautista arrived and asked him to go down
(5) Reynaldo T. Ador – both hands, negative;21 from the tree. Bautista wanted to borrow money and on his way to see him, found a gun by the
footpath. Bautista gave the gun to him. It was his first time to hold a gun. He tried it out and fired
(6) Allan T. Ador – both hands, positive.22 three (3) times. After firing the gun, he removed the empty shells from its chambers and threw
them away. He then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a coconut trunk. Bautista left
Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the killing of his son was driven by the long- when he told him that he had no money. He then continued to gather pili nuts until Major Idian and
standing feud between the Adors and his family. He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier accused his three (3) other policemen came.
other son Liberato of frustrated homicide for allegedly stabbing him (Diosdado Jr.). 23 Then, Adelina,
Godofredo’s father told him that they were being suspected of killing Chavez and Cuya the night
a daughter of Diosdado Sr., filed a case for abduction with multiple rape against him, Absalon III,
before. Thus, they went to the provincial headquarters, were subjected to paraffin testing and made
Rayne and Josephine, all surnamed Cuya, after the romantic relationship between Adelina and his
to sign a blank bond paper. After that, they went back to the central police station. At the central
deceased son Absalon III turned sour. 24 He also presented official receipts of the funeral and burial police station, Godofredo narrated to a certain Calabia that that morning, his friend Bautista found
expenses which amounted to ₱10,230.00.25 a gun along the road and gave it to him. He hid the gun under a coconut trunk. Calabia relayed the
information to Major Idian who directed PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get the gun.
Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke of the animosity between the Chavez and Godofredo led PO3 Nepomuceno to where he hid the gun, retrieved it and handed it to the latter.
the Ador families. He produced a certification from the PNP Naga City Police Station that on February They then returned to the police headquarters where he was jailed. He asserted that the gun
17, 1997, a blotter was entered in the Daily Record of Events showing that deceased Chavez reported
presented in court is different from the gun he surrendered to the police.30
a certain Ricardo Ador who while under the influence of liquor caused him physical injury. 26 The
witness likewise presented an official receipt showing that the family spent ₱3,500.00 for the funeral Bautista corroborated Godofredo’s story. He testified that he found the gun which Godofredo
yielded to PO3 Nepomuceno. He said that he was on his way to see Godofredo to borrow money
of the deceased Chavez.27 After presenting Chavez, the prosecution rested its case.
when he chanced upon the handgun on the pathway. He gave the gun to Godofredo and the latter
On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to evidence "for utter lack of evidence." 28 On tested it by pulling its trigger. After firing the gun, Godofredo removed the empty shells and threw
May 13, 1998, the trial court dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr., Rosalino and Allan but denied them. Godofredo then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under a fallen coconut trunk.31
the demurrer to evidence against Godofredo –
Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998, at Barangay Doña, Orani, Bataan, and March 22, 1997. While in Marikina City, they resided and slept together in their barracks at the
committed to the Naga City Jail on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III surrendered to the court construction site.42
and was committed to the same city jail on November 22, 1998. On November 23, 1998, both
Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Hence, trial against Diosdado III also took the witness stand. On March 10, 1997, at around seven o’clock in the
them commenced and proceeded jointly with the case of the remaining accused, Godofredo. evening, he was at their house at Zone 1, Pacol, Naga City, watching television with his parents
and cousins Reynaldo and Allan when they heard gunshots. They ignored the gunshots, continued
The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis32 as a witness against Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III. Calsis watching television and slept at eight o’clock. The following day, at around six o’clock in the
testified that on March 10, 1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the house of morning, while he was fetching water, four (4) policemen arrived at their house and talked to his
Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly called Lola Kising at Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, before father. Thereafter, his father called him, his brother Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan
going home from work. After asking permission from her to go home and while about to urinate and Reynaldo. The policemen then requested all of them to go to the PNP Central Police
outside her house, he heard several gunshots. He ducked by a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower Headquarters for investigation regarding the killings of Chavez and Cuya. Upon reaching the
plantation. As he was about to stand up, he saw Disodado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo and another police headquarters, they were interviewed by the media and afterwards brought to the provincial
unidentified man run away. Godofredo was carrying a short firearm while Diosdado Jr. had a long headquarters where they were subjected to paraffin tests. They were then brought back to the
firearm.33 He saw Chavez and Cuya lying on the road. Chavez was about five (5) meters away from Central Police Headquarters and later allowed to go back home to Pacol.
where he stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away. The place was illuminated by a bright light Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father was arrested by the police. Diosdado III was at their
from an electric post. There were no other people around. Calsis ran away for fear that he might be residence when his father was picked up. Only his father was taken by the police. He continued to
identified by the assailants. He heard Chavez mumbling but shirked nevertheless.34 reside in their house until April, 1998, when he transferred to Sagurong, San Miguel, Tabaco,
Albay, to work as a fisherman. On November 21, 1998, he received a letter from his father telling
Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw only after about one (1) year and nine (9) months.
him to come home. Thus, he went home the following day. On November 23, 1998, he surrendered
Fear struck him.35 He maintained that he knew the assailants because he and his wife lived in the
to the court.43
house of Lola Kising after they got married. 36 Immense fear prevented him from attending to Chavez,
The defense also presented Barangay Captain Josue Perez and an uncle of Diosdado Jr. and
even while he heard him murmuring, and from informing the families of the victims of the incident
Disodado III, Jaime Bobiles. Perez testified that he was the barangay captain of Pacol from 1982
that very same night. He was about to tell the Chavez family the following morning but was counseled
until May, 1997. In 1996, Cresenciana Mendoza left their barangay permanently to live with her
by his Lola Bading, the sister of his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the case. 37 Calsis and his children in Manila because she was sickly and alone in her house. He said that Mendoza never
family left their residence in Pacol one (1) month after the incident because he was afraid the came back. He does not know any Pablo Calsis and the
assailants might have identified him.38 Even Lola Kising left her residence two (2) months after the
latter could not have talked to Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because at that time, Mendoza was not
incident.39 It was only after he learned from Absalon Cuya Sr. that the trial court dismissed the cases
there and her house was already abandoned. 44 Similarly, Bobiles confirmed the testimony that
for lack of evidence insofar as some of the original accused were concerned that he took pity on the
Diosdado III worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in his residence from May 1, 1998, until
respective families of the victims who have failed to get justice for the death of their loved ones. 40
November 1998 when Diosdado III received a letter from his father and had to go home.45
In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997, he was in Marikina City working as a
In rebuttal however, prosecution witness SPO1 Fernandez asserted that he interviewed Cresenciana
warehouseman and timekeeper of the Consuelo Builders Corporation. He was there the whole time
Mendoza that fateful night of March 10, 1997. 46 After the rebuttal witness was presented, the
from February 15, 1997, until March 24, 1997.41 Pablo Aspe, a co-worker of Diosdado Jr.,
corroborated the latter’s testimony. He said that on February 15, 1997, he and Diosdado Jr. left Pacol, cases were finally submitted for decision.47
Naga City, together to work in Consuelo Construction in Marikina City. They were with each other in
Marikina City the whole time from February 15, 1997, until he (Aspe) went home to Naga City on
On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that "a chain of circumstances x x x lead to a sound and logical evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis which may be consistent with their innocence. 54
conclusion that indeed the accused (Diosdado III and Godofredo) committed the offense charged" 48 Also, it should be acted on and weighed with great caution. 55 Circumstantial evidence which has
and as such rendered judgment – not been adequately established, much less corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused Godofredo B. Ador and conviction.56
Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined
and penalized under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be more than one circumstance; (2)
Republic Act 7659 in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816, hereby sentences the said the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the
accused Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 57 Like an ornate
PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. 97-6815; RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal Case No. tapestry created out of interwoven fibers which cannot be plucked out and assayed a strand at a
97-6816, to pay the heirs of Absalon "Abe" Cuya III ₱25,000 each by way of actual damages time apart from the others, the circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which
and ₱50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity. To pay the heirs of Rodolfo leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty
"Ompong" Chavez the sum of ₱50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity, such beyond reasonable doubt.58 The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on
accessory penalties as provided for by law and to pay the cost. For insufficiency of the record are sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. beyond reasonable doubt,
he is hereby ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816. consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence. 59 Accordingly, we
have set guidelines in appreciating circumstantial evidence: (1) it should be acted upon with
The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail is hereby ordered to forthwith release from its caution; (2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt; (3) the facts must
custody the accused Diosdado B. Ador, Jr., unless his further detention is warranted by any exclude every theory but that of guilt; and (4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of
other legal cause or causes. the accused as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the one who

SO ORDERED.49 committed the offense.60

Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado III and Godofredo. They maintain that the trial court Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the conviction of the accused based on the
gravely erred in convicting them of murder based on circumstantial evidence. The testimony of circumstantial evidence presented.
prosecution witness Pablo Calsis that he saw them running away from the scene of the crime was The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that the accused were supposedly
concocted. The handgun turned in by Godofredo was not the same gun presented by the prosecution seen fleeing from the locus criminis, armed with their respective weapons. Thus, the trial court,
during the trial. The unusual discovery of a slug from the head of the deceased - three (3) days after gleaning from the evidence presented, found that "[w]hen about to stand, Calsis saw Godofredo B.
the autopsy was conducted and after the cadaver was turned over to the family of the victim - was Ador, Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. and Diosdado B. Ador III, and a person going to the direction of the
quite doubtful. Even the supposed dying declaration of the victim specifically pointed to neither
house of the Adors which is about 500 meters away." 61 In fact, prosecution witness Calsis
Diosdado III nor Godofredo. And, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence those taken against
allegedly even saw Diosdado Jr. carrying "a long firearm but x x x could not determine what kind
them in violation of their constitutional rights to counsel during custodial investigation. 50
of gun it was."62 However, the trial court acquitted Diosdado Jr. But only rightly so. For, Calsis
The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of had difficulty in identifying the Adors notwithstanding his assertion that he knew and saw them
guilt.51 It may be the basis of a conviction so long as the combination of all the circumstances proven personally. We defer to his direct examination –
produces a logical conclusion which suffices to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
doubt.52 All the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that all Q. You said you recognized the persons running, could you tell us their names?
the accused are guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis
PABLO CALSIS:
that they are innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis except that of guilt. 53 The
A. Yes sir. Q. On the said date and time and place, you said you saw them running, how far were you
from them?
Q. Name them?
A. Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III. A. Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)63

Q. How about the others? The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used against Diosdado III whom he miserably
failed to positively identify during trial. In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by the trial court
A. I could not tell his name but if I see him I could identify him. renders the entire testimony of Calsis in serious doubt. Calsis was presented to positively identify
Q. The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if they are present in court, please point them out? the assailants who were supposedly personally known to him and were just ten (10) meters away
from him. It puzzles us no end why he cannot even identify the Adors in open court.
A. Yes sir.
Thus, despite Calsis’ assertion that Diosdado Jr. was one of the assailants, the trial court doubted
Q. Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.? him and gave credence to the alibi of Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka, Marikina, when
A. (Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of a person inside the courtroom who answered by the killings took place. The trial court favored the unbiased testimony of Aspe who said that
the name Diosdado Ador, Jr.) Diosdado Jr. worked as a timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the Consuelo Construction at
Nangka, Marikina, from February 15, 1997, until March 22, 1997, and went home to Pacol only on
Q. How about this Sadang III? May 27, 1997. This ruling is strengthened by the fact that on the morning following the killings, all
A. (Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who answered by the name of Diosdado Ador III.) the male members of the Ador family were brought to the police headquarters for paraffin

Q. Likewise, point to the third person? examination and Diosdado Jr. was not among them. 64 We thus respect the finding of the trial court
that indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the scene of the crime absent any indication that the lower court
A. (Witness pointed to a man…) overlooked some facts or circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome of the
COURT: case.65

Delete that portion from the record, he is not on trial. While it is true that the courts are not bound to accept or reject an entire testimony, and may

ATTY TERBIO: believe one part and disbelieve another, 66 our Constitution and the law mandate that all doubts
must be resolved in favor of the accused. Calsis committed an obvious blunder in identifying the
Q. You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth one inside the courtroom? supposed assailants which this Court cannot simply let go. On the contrary, it creates reasonable
A. None sir. doubt in our minds if Calcis really saw the persons he allegedly saw or if he was even where he
said he was that evening. For, it is elementary that the positive identification of the accused is
Q. But if you saw that person, will you be able to recognize him? crucial in establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. That is wanting in the instant case.
A. Yes sir. What is more, Calsis’ asseverations, at the outset, could no longer be used against Godofredo since
Q. Why do you know these persons whom you just tapped the shoulder? both the prosecution and the defense have already rested and the case against Godofredo was
already submitted for decision when Calsis was presented. 67 Neither can they still be used against
xxx     xxx     xxx
Diosdado Jr. who was already acquitted by the trial court.
A. I know these persons having lived in the house of Lola Kising.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges hurled against them. But, while it is true that
Q. How far?
alibi and denial are the weakest of the defenses as they can easily be fabricated, 68 absent such
A. Around 100 meters. clear and positive identification, the doctrine that the defense of denial cannot prevail over positive
identification of the accused must yield to the constitutional presumption of innocence. 69 Hence, Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory cannot be presumed not to know the difference between the
while denial is concededly fragile and unstable, the conviction of the accused cannot be based two (2) handguns. Suffice it to say that the prosecution failed to clear up the variance and for this
Court to suggest an explanation would be to venture into the realm of pure speculation, conjecture
thereon.70 The rule in criminal law is firmly entrenched that verdicts of conviction must be predicated
and guesswork. Thus, faced with the obvious disparity in the suspected firearm used in the crime
on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the
and that which was turned over by Godofredo, his declaration that the handgun presented in court
defense.71 was different from the gun he gave to the police deserves serious, if not sole consideration.
The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by Godofredo. But this was bungled by the Consequently, even the third circumstance, the .38 caliber slug supposedly recovered from the
prosecution. Major Idian, Deputy Chief of Police of the Naga City Police Station, to whom the head of the victim three (3) days after the autopsy was conducted loses evidentiary value as its
handgun was turned over after Godofredo surrendered it, identified it as a caliber .38 revolver, thus – source is now highly questionable. It has become uncertain whether the deformed slug was fired
from the .38 caliber revolver turned in by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber handgun as attested to
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor):
by the Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory.
Q. What kind of firearm was it?
Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the dying Chavez nor on the results of the
MAJOR IDIAN: paraffin tests to convict either Diosdado III or Godofredo or both. To refute these, we need not go
far and beyond the 13 May 1998 Order of the trial court partially granting the demurrer to evidence
A. Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6 rounds ammunition.
filed by the accused –
Q. What is the caliber?
The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the testimony of Mercy Beriña, that she
A. .38 caliber.72 heard Rodolfo "Ompong" Chavez say "tinambangan kami na Ador" (We were ambushed by the
Adors). Sad to say, no specific name was ever mentioned by the witness. Neither was she able to
Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had been with the PNP for eight (8) years already and to whom tell how many (persons) "Adors" were involved. This testimony if it will be given credence may
Godofredo turned in the handgun, likewise identified it as a caliber .38, thus – inculpate any person with the family name Ador as assailant. The prosecution therefore was not
ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor): able to establish with moral certainty as to who of the Adors were perpetrators of the offense x x x
x Paraffin tests are not conclusive evidence that indeed a person has fired a gun.
Q. What is the caliber of that gun?
The fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of gunpowder nitrates does not conclusively
PO3 NEPOMUCENO: show that they fired the murder weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such forensic evidence should
be taken only as an indication of possibility or even of probability, but not of infallibility, since
A. .38 caliber.73
nitrates are also admittedly found in substances other than gunpowder. (People v. Abellarosa, G.R.
However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, No. 121195, 27 November 1996; People v. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118; People v. Nitcha, 240
testified that "[t]he indorsement coming from the City Prosecutors Office x x x alleged that the .38 SCRA 283)75
caliber live bullet was fired from a .38 caliber revolver. But our office found out that the firearm was
Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it must identify with certainty the
not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber revolver."74 assailant. Otherwise, it loses its significance. Also, while a paraffin test could establish the
Could it be that the handgun was replaced before it was turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory? presence or absence of nitrates on the hand, it cannot establish that the source of the nitrates was
While the prosecution traced the trail of police officers who at every stage held the gun supposedly the discharge of firearms – a person who tests positive may have handled one or more substances
recovered from Godofredo, it never clarified this discrepancy which is quite glaring to ignore. It is with the same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
difficult to believe that a Deputy Chief of Police and a police officer of eight (8) years will both pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous plants.76 In People v. Melchor,77 this Court acquitted
mistake a .357 caliber for a .38 caliber handgun. Likewise, a Chief of the Firearm Identification the accused despite the presence of gunpowder nitrates on his hands –
 [S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin test is not conclusive. While had an axe to grind against the Chavezes and the Cuyas. For sure, motive is not sufficient to
it can establish the presence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably support a conviction if there is no other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be
show that said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm. The person tested adduced that the accused was the malefactor. 81 Motive alone cannot take the place of proof
may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the same positive
reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals and leguminous beyond reasonable doubt sufficient to overthrow the presumption of innocence.82
plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial court, we cannot rest easy in convicting the
nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in the products of combustion two (2) accused based on circumstantial evidence. For, the pieces of the said circumstantial
of tobacco. The presence of nitrates or nitrites, therefore, should be taken only as an
evidence presented do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that they are guilty. 83 The prosecution
indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that the person tested has fired a gun.
witness failed to identify the accused in court. A cloud of doubt continues to hover over the gun
In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3 Nepomuceno including the gun in used and the slug recovered. The dying declaration and paraffin examination remain unreliable.
question cannot be considered in evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to Godofredo’s uncounseled admissions including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence. And,
counsel. Godofredo was already under custodial investigation when he made his admissions and the supposed motive of the accused is simply insufficient. Plainly, the facts from which the
surrendered the gun to the police authorities. The police had already begun to focus on the Adors and inference that the accused committed the crime were not proven. Accordingly, the guilt of the
were carrying out a process of interrogations that was lending itself to eliciting incriminating accused cannot be established, more so to a moral certainty. It is when evidence is purely
statements and evidence: the police went to the Ador residence that same evening upon being circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated to rely on the strength of its own case
informed that the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas; the following day, all the male and not on the weakness of the defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral
members of the Ador family were told to go to the police station; the police was also informed of the certainty.84
dying declaration of deceased Chavez pointing to the Adors as the assailants; the Adors were all
subjected to paraffin examination; and, there were no other suspects as the police was not considering Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been reduced to nothing but mere suspicions and
any other person or group of persons. The investigation thus was no longer a general inquiry into an speculations. It is hornbook doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of
unsolved crime as the Adors were already being held as suspects for the killings of Cuya and Chavez. conviction in a criminal case.85 Courts must ensure that the conviction of the accused rests firmly
Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial investigation, including the right to counsel, have on sufficient and competent evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice. 86 If the alleged
already attached to the Adors, and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is
waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken with the assistance of counsel. Admissions consistent with the innocence of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
under custodial investigation made without the assistance of counsel are barred as evidence. 78 The evidence is not adequate to support conviction. 87 The court must acquit the accused because the
records are bare of any indication that the accused have waived their right to counsel, hence, any of evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is therefore insufficient to support a
their admissions are inadmissible in evidence against them. As we have held, a suspect’s confession,
judgment of conviction.88 Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt
whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of
such assistance regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the fact that it had been voluntarily of the accused.89 The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the
given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such confession were accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 90 It is thus apropos to repeat
the doctrine that an accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt –
gospel truth.79 Thus, in Aballe v. People,80 the death weapon, a four-inch kitchen knife, which was the prosecution must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond
found after the accused brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot where he had reasonable doubt. The prosecution has failed to discharge its burden. Accordingly, we have to
concealed it, was barred from admission as it was discovered as a consequence of an uncounseled acquit.
extrajudicial confession.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City, Br. 25, in Crim.
With hardly any substantial evidence left, the prosecution likewise played up the feud between the Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 dated August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants Godofredo B.
Adors on one hand and the Chavezes and the Cuyas on the other hand, and suggested that the Adors Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of murder and
imposing on them the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. On August 12, 1994, at around 11:00 a.m., Belrey Oliver, an employee of Ferd’s Upholstery Shop
Accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on reasonable located in Barangay 2, Laoag City, arrived at the Laoag Police Station. He reported to Chief
doubt and their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby ORDERED unless they are being held for some Investigator SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura that the appellant went to their shop looking for a buyer of
other legal cause. marijuana. Oliver recounted telling the appellant that he knew of someone who was interested and
ready to buy marijuana, and instructing him to bring one (1) kilo of the substance to a store located
SO ORDERED.
in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag at General Segundo Avenue, Laoag City at around
1:30 p.m. of that same day.3

Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the
appellant. He assigned SPO1 Orlando Dalusong as the poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marlin Ramos,
SPO2 Warlito Maruquin, SPO1 Rovimanuel Balolong, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, and SPO2
Rosemarie Agustin, all assigned at the Investigation Section of the Laoag Police Station as back-
up. The marked "buy-money" consisting of one P500-bill bearing Serial No. G-242745 was
recorded in the police blotter in accordance with standard operating procedure.4

G.R. No. 140679             January 14, 2004 Except for SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver, the rest of the team left the precinct on board two (2)
owner-type jeeps and posted themselves near the Macmac Store, across the gate of the Divine
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, Word College. Five minutes later, SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver arrived at General Segundo
vs.
Avenue.5 Oliver immediately approached the appellant, who was then standing between the
MANNY A. DOMINGCIL, appellant.
Macmac Store and a xerox center, and introduced poseur-buyer SPO1 Dalusong, who was sporting
DECISION casual clothes and slippers: "Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen" ("Friend, this is the buyer"). At this
point, the appellant who was carrying an orange plastic bag, brought out a brick-like item wrapped
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
in newspaper. He handed the item to SPO1 Dalusong, who forthwith checked the same by making
For the sale and delivery of one (1) kilo of marijuana to a poseur-buyer, the appellant Manny a small hole through it. Convinced that the brick-like item was indeed marijuana, SPO1 Dalusong
Domingcil was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, for violation of handed the P500 bill to the appellant. He thereupon scratched his head, a signal to the back-up men
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which that the transaction had been consummated.6 Momentarily, the back-up officers, who had earlier
reads: positioned themselves separately in different strategic locations near the poseur-buyer, rushed to
That on or about the 12th day of August, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within the scene and arrested the appellant. SPO1 Dalusong then handed the orange plastic bag containing
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not authorized by law, did then and the suspected marijuana to SPO4 Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the appellant and recovered the
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver mixed dried marijuana leaves, tops buy-money from the latter’s pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the headquarters
and seeds in brick form, wrapped with paper placed in a plastic bag, a prohibited drug, where he was booked, and the incident was recorded in the police blotter. 7 The suspected
weighing 800 grams, to a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted by Police Officers marijuana was brought to and initially examined by Dr. Joseph Adaya, an accredited physician of
of Laoag City, in violation of the aforesaid law.1 the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), who certified that the item comprised of three genuine mixture

Upon arraignment on August 29, 1994, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the of marijuana leaves with seeds.8

offense charged.2 The case thereafter proceeded to trial. On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a letter to the Commanding Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La Union, requesting for the examination
The Case for the Prosecution
of samples of the suspected marijuana taken from the appellant. 9 On September 6, 1998, SPO1
Loreto Ancheta, evidence custodian of the Laoag City, PNP, delivered the orange plastic bag could be of help. When he could not find anyone, he decided to personally take the trip. He then
containing the suspected marijuana to the PNP provincial crime laboratory service in Camp Juan, instructed Gamiao to just go home to Vintar and inform his mother that he was going to Cagayan.
Laoag City. The bag, together with SPO4 Ventura’s letter-request, was received by SPO3 Diosdado
The appellant thereafter took a bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan. After three (3) days, he was
Mamotos.10 On September 8, 1994, SPO3 Mamotos forwarded the laboratory request and the able to buy one kilo of marijuana for P300.00. When he returned to Laoag City on August 12,
confiscated item, and were duly received by SPO4 Tampos. 11 The latter, in turn, handed the item to 1994, he went to Ferd’s Upholstery Shop at 11:30 a.m. to inform Oliver that he had procured the
Police Superintendent Theresa Ann B. Cid, Forensic Chemist of the Crime Laboratory Center, Region order. After seeing the marijuana, Oliver instructed him to take it and meet him at about 12:30 p.m.
I, Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union, who conducted an examination of of the same day in front of the Divine Word College where they would hand over the marijuana to
the policemen they intended to help.
representative samples extracted from the suspected marijuana confiscated from the appellant. 12 On
the basis of her examination, Superintendent Cid issued Chemistry Report No. D-074-94 with the At about 12:00 noon, the appellant arrived at Macmac’s Store and took his merienda. Momentarily,
following findings: Oliver arrived alone on a tricycle. Oliver summoned him and they walked southward, away from
the Macmac’s Store, looking for the policemen to whom they would deliver the marijuana. They
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:
walked back northward, at which point they encountered an owner-type jeep which suddenly
One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing eight hundred grams stopped. He was nonplussed when Oliver grabbed him by the neck, seized his knapsack containing
(800) wrapped with newspaper pages contained in an orange plastic bag. the marijuana, and pushed him inside the jeep. He was made to sit beside the driver with another
policeman, while Oliver seated himself at the back seat with another policeman. The jeep they
...
were riding was followed by a patrol car. Still dazed at the sudden turn of events, he asked Oliver
PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION: four times, "Why is it that this is now happening to me(?)," but Oliver did not respond. At the
police station, he was immediately locked up. That afternoon, SPO4 Ventura and SPO2 Ramos,
To determine the presence of marijuana on the above-mentioned specimen.
accompanied by Oliver, brought him to the City Fiscal’s Office. He was later brought to the
F I N D I N G S: provincial hospital where he was subjected to a physical check-up. That was the last time he saw or
Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen prove heard of Oliver.14
POSITIVE result to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.13 On July 9, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment,15 the dispositive portion of which reads :
The Case for the Appellant WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable
The appellant interposed the twin defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that sometime in the first doubt that the accused Manny Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425,
week of August 1994, he and Ernesto Gamiao went to the City of Laoag to canvass the price for the as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The quantity of
repair of the upholstery of a passenger jeepney. On that occasion, they befriended a certain Belrey marijuana involved is more than 750 grams; hence, in accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty
Oliver who was an employee of the Ferd’s Upholstery Shop. In the course of their conversation, provided for in Sec. 4, shall be applied. The accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion
Oliver asked the appellant where he came from and what his occupation was. Upon being told that he perpetua with all its accessory penalties and to pay the costs.
helped in harvesting mangoes in Cagayan, Oliver immediately offered refreshments to Gamiao and the Hence, the present appeal.
appellant. While taking their snacks, Oliver inquired whether they wanted to back up the promotion of
certain policemen who, in the future, might be able to return the favor to them. When the appellant The appellant submits the following assignment of errors:
asked in what way they could extend help, Oliver suggested that they look for somebody in Cagayan 1. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused was not instigated in looking for
from whom they could buy one (1) kilo of marijuana. He agreed to Oliver’s suggestion. The latter marijuana and bringing it to Laoag.
handed to him the amount of P700.00 to cover the purchase of the marijuana. The appellant
immediately went to the terminal bound for Cagayan to look for somebody from that province who 2. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused received the FIVE HUNDRED PESO
bill, despite his denial that he received the same and that his denial cannot prevail over the
 positive testimony of the police officers who are presumed to be regularly performing their Q   And because of that information from Belrey Oliver, what did your Chief, SPO4
official duties, there being no improper motive attributed to them. Ventura do?

3. The lower Court erred in convicting the accused.16 A   SPO4 Ventura made or designed a plan purposely to conduct a buy-bust operation, sir.

The appellant contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Oliver Q   Where will the operation take place?
instigated him to buy marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving credence and probative weight to A   In front of Macmac Store, particularly, in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag,
his testimony and in considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution. sir.
The appeal has no merit. Q   And did you have any participation in that operation?
Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of A   Yes, sir, I acted as the poseur buy (sic).
witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The Q   At what time was the operation scheduled to be executed?
reason for this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide thereon, having personally A   1:30 P.M. of August 12, 1994, sir.
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 17 After a Q   For the said operation, what preparations, if any, did your group take?
thorough and careful review of the records of this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant was
sufficiently established by the evidence, and the trial court’s judgment is well-supported by law and A   Our Chief of Intelligence made a plan, sir.
jurisprudence. Q   What was the plan?
What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale A   To conduct the buy-bust operation, sir.
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.18 In this
Q   And you said that you were to act as poseur buyer, anything was given to you in
case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of
connection with your specific participation?
marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the entrapment operation.
A   I was given the buy-bust money in the amount of P500.00, sir.
Q   How has the case involving drug or marijuana involving the accused brought to your
attention or to your office, for that matter? Q   And what will you do with that P500.00?
A   Our informant by the name of Belrey Oliver tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny A   The Chief of Intelligence, SPO4 Ventura directed me to reflect the serial number of the
Domingcil at the Upholstery Shop along Ablan Avenue and he also informed us that he money in the police blotter, the P500.00 to be used as marked money.
ordered P500.00 worth of marijuana.
Q   And after the serial number was entered in the police blotter, what next did you do?
Q   Who ordered from whom?
A   Before we went out of the station, the team or companions of SPO4 Ventura went
A   Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir. ahead to the place where the transaction will take place, sir.
Q   By the way, who was the chief of the Intelligence Section of Laoag City PNP, at that time? Q   And who were the companions of SPO4 Ventura who went ahead?
A   SPO4 Ventura, sir. A   Rosemarie Agustin, SPO2 Marlin Ramos and SPO4 Balolong, sir, while Oliver and
myself were the ones who went together.
Q   Was he present when the informant Belrey Oliver tipped you of (sic) about this matter?
Q   Who went ahead to the place where the sale will take place?
A   Yes, sir.
A   The team of SPO4 Ventura, sir.
Q   And did you reach the place where the transaction will take place? Q   That was what Oliver told you when he ordered the stuff?
A   Yes, sir. A   Yes, sir.
Q   Before you started to the place where the transaction will take place in front of the Divine Q   When Manny Domingcil said: "There is, pare," what transpired next, if any?
Word College of Laoag, did you know then the face of Manny Domingcil?
A   I told him: "Can I look at it" and he brought out a wrapped brick-type form wrapped in
A   No, sir. a newspaper inside an orange plastic bag.
Q   How did you know his face then? Q   And after he had brought out the said thing, what did you do with it?
A   Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me that the person is Manny Domingcil. A   I checked the contents if it is real marijuana, sir.
Q   So, what you are saying is: when you arrived at the scene where the transaction would Q   You said the thing was wrapped with newspaper and you said you checked its
take place, Manny Domingcil was already there and that Belrey Oliver pointed him to you? contents?
A   Yes, sir. A   Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making a small hole at the side.
Q   After that, what did you do with Belrey Oliver? Q   And what was the result of your inspection?
A   We went near Manny Domingcil, sir. A   I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.
Q   And after or as soon as you were near him, what happened next? Q   And, so what did you do then?
A   Belrey Oliver introduced Manny Domingcil to me as the buyer, sir. A   After I found out that it was marijuana I handed to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso
bill, sir.
Q   What did Oliver say?
Q   And as soon as you have handed the P500.00 bill, what did you do next?
A   "Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen", (which when translated into english[sic] means): "Pare,
this is the buyer." A   I gave the signal to my companions, sir.
Q   And so, what was the reaction of Manny Domingcil? Q   And what did your companions do when you gave the signal?
A   Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he has the stuff that was ordered. A   They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.
Q   And what did he say? Q   What was your signal?
A   Manny Domingcil said: "There is, Pare." A   I scratched my head, sir.
Q   By the way, who ordered the stuff from Manny Domingcil? Q   And, what was your attire at that time you bought the brick-type marijuana from
Manny Domingcil?
A   Belrey Oliver, sir.
A   Ordinary clothes, sir, wearing slippers.
Q   Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that from Manny Domingcil?
Q   And all the time during your transaction with Manny Domingcil, where was Belrey
A   Yes, sir.
Oliver?
Q   Where?
A   At my side, sir.
A   At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue, sir.
 Q   And during the transaction, did Belrey Oliver say anything? conducted the operation and was part of the buy-bust team itself. 20 SPO4 Ventura remained
A   None, sir. steadfast and unwavering on cross-examination despite intense grilling by the defense counsel. 21
Q   And after giving your signal to your companion police officers who were nearby and they Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime
rushed to your place where you were, what happened?
Laboratory Center at San Fernando, La Union, confirmed 22 Dr. Joseph Adaya’s initial finding 23
A   They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir. that the substance seized from the appellant was indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.

Q   And what about the marijuana which you said Manny Domingcil sold to you? It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos 24 and SPO1 Loreto Ancheta25 that the
A   I handed it to SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, sir. confiscated marijuana was the same substance examined by the forensic chemist and later
presented as evidence in court.
Q   And what about the P500 peso bill, do you know what happened to it?
The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete
A   SPO2 Marlin Ramos recovered the P500 peso bill from the pocket of Manny Domingcil. picture of how the appellant’s illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how the sale led to
Q   And after arresting Manny Domingcil where did your group go? his apprehension in flagrante delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous
drugs were in the possession of the appellant who had no authority to possess or sell the same.
A   To the police station, sir. More importantly, all the persons who obtained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the
Q   Do you know if any records were made to your police station when you returned or performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
arrived there? members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly
performing their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. 26
A   Yes, sir.
The appellant’s bare denial of the crime charged and his barefaced claim that he was merely
Q   What for example?
instigated by Oliver into procuring the marijuana cannot prevail over the straightforward and
A   They made a request ... we reflected in the police blotter the apprehension of Manny positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It is incredible that the appellant, who had just
Domingcil, the confiscation of the marijuana and the recovery of the marked money in the met Belrey Oliver in the course of his canvass for the upholstery of his brother’s jeepney, would
amount of P500.00. readily leave his errand behind and allow a stranger to talk him into buying a prohibited drug, a
known criminal activity for which he could be prosecuted, and if convicted, sentenced to reclusion
Q   Was the serial number of the P500 bill you recovered from the pocket of Manny
perpetua. All this he was willing to risk, in exchange for an empty promise of alleged future favors
Domingcil recorded?
from another who was also unknown to the appellant. The appellant supposedly traveled to and
A   Yes, sir. spent almost three days in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able to accommodate a newly found
acquaintance, who handed the appellant the meager sum of P700.00 for the intended purpose. The
Q   And do you know what happened to the stuff later on after you returned to the police
Court cannot give credence to such a preposterous stance as advanced by the appellant and
station?
confirmed by his supposed corroborative witness, Ernesto Gamiao.
A   They made a request to Dr. Adaya to conduct an initial examination on the confiscated
It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the
marijuana, sir.19 mouth of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself such that common experience and
The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was corroborated on material points by SPO4 observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal
Rodrigo Ventura, then Chief of the Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City who organized and prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with
the usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture or speculation. Testimonies that
do not adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence. 27 Besides,
instigation, or the appellant’s claim of a frame-up, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by this The law defines deliver as "a person’s act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another with
Court with disfavor because the same can easily be concocted and is a common standard defense ploy or without consideration."34 Considering that the appellant was charged with the sale and the
in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 28 Thus, in People vs. Bongalon,29 delivery of prohibited drugs, the consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be
the Court held: sufficiently established even in the absence of the marked money. The erasures and alterations in
the Joint Affidavit of the policemen involved in the buy-bust operation did not debilitate the case
As we have earlier stated, the appellant’s denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies
of the prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit of the policemen was not admitted in evidence for any
of the prosecution witnesses. We are not unaware of the perception that, in some instances,
party. Second. The investigator who prepared the "Joint Affidavit" erroneously stated that the two
law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to
P500.00 bills were used by the policemen who conducted the buy-bust operation bearing Serial
harass civilians. However, like alibi, frame-up is a defense that has been viewed by the Court
Numbers AA823675 and G242745. As shown by the prosecution’s evidence the policemen used
with disfavor as it can easily be, concocted, hence, commonly used as a standard line of
only the P500.00 bill bearing Serial No. G242745 for the purchase of the drug. Hence, the "Joint
defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize
Affidavit" of the policemen had to be corrected to reflect the truth.
the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-
being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the policemen’s alleged rotten reputation, All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by
accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely evidence to the contrary and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the fact that the prosecution’s
for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed evidence fully shows and confirms such regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to
exists. reverse or even modify the findings of the trial court giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution.
The failure of the prosecution to present Oliver, the police informant, does not enfeeble the
case for the prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of the IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be Laoag City, Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
dispensed with inasmuch as his or her narration would be merely corroborative, especially so doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby
in this case, when the poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug. 30 AFFIRMED.

The appellant’s claim that the prosecution offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the P500.00 buy SO ORDERED.
money and did not account for its failure to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof is not G.R. Nos. 96027-28             March 08, 2005
supported by the records. The records show that the original, and not merely a xerox copy of the
BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO*, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS D.
marked money, was in fact offered in evidence by the prosecution. 31 The appellant would surely have
CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L. LAT, SGT. ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C ROGELIO B.
objected if the prosecution had offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the bill. The appellant did not
MORENO, C1C MARIO E. LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D. MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO
do so. The only ground for his objection to the admission of the marked money was that it was self-
C. DE GUZMAN, SGT. ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, A1C
serving.
CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT. PABLO S. MARTINEZ, SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT.
Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial court, the ARNULFO ARTATES, A1C FELIZARDO TARAN, Petitioners,
absence of the original of the marked money is inconsequential. The marked money used in the buy- vs.
bust operation is not indispensable in drug cases; 32 it is merely corroborative evidence. Moreover, the SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
appellant was charged not only for the sale of marijuana but also for the delivery thereof, which is RESOLUTION
committed by the mere delivery or transfer of the prohibited drug. The consideration for the
PUNO, J.:
transaction is of no moment.33
Before us is a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of Court filed by petitioners who were
convicted and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011 for the double murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman on II
August 21, 1983.1 There was a grave violation of due process by reason of:
Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquino’s security detail upon his A) Insufficient legal assistance of counsel;
arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together with
several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino B) Deprivation of right to counsel of choice;
who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila C) Testimonies of defense witnesses were under duress;
International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who was also
gunned down at the airport tarmac. D) Willful suppression of evidence;

On December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010-10011 E) Use of false forensic evidence that led to the unjust conviction of the
acquitting all the accused, which include the petitioners. However, the proceedings before the petitioners-movants.
Sandiganbayan were later found by this Court to be a sham trial. The Court thus nullified said III
proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial of the cases. 2 There was serious misapprehension of facts on the part of the Sandiganbayan based on
A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan. false forensic evidence, which entitles petitioners-movants to a re-trial.6
In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused, Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings of the forensic group composed of Prof.
found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder in both Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 Jerome B. Bailen, a forensic anthropologist from the University of the Philippines, Atty. Erwin P.
and 10011. It sentenced them to reclusion perpetua in each case.3 The judgment became final after Erfe, M.D., a medico-legal practitioner, Benito E. Molino, M.D., a forensic consultant and Human
this Court denied petitioners’ petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to show Rights and Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr., D.M.D., a forensic dentistry consultant.
Their report essentially concludes that it was not possible, based on the forensic study of the
reversible error in the questioned decision,4 as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration. 5
evidence in the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they
In August 2004, petitioners sought legal assistance from the Chief Public Attorney who, in turn, descended the service stairway from the aircraft. They posit that Senator Aquino was shot while he
requested the Independent Forensic Group of the University of the Philippines to make a thorough was walking on the airport tarmac toward the waiting AVSECOM van which was supposed to
review of the forensic evidence in the double murder case. The petitioners, assisted by the Public transport him from the airport to Fort Bonifacio. This is contrary to the finding of the
Attorney’s Office, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this Court and ask the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that it was C1C Moreno, the security escort positioned behind
Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the Senator Aquino, who shot the latter. The report also suggests that the physical evidence in these
circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman. cases may have been misinterpreted and manipulated to mislead the court. Thus, petitioners assert
that the September 28, 1990 decision of the Sandiganbayan should be voided as it was based on
Petitioners invoke the following grounds for the re-opening of the case:
false forensic evidence. Petitioners submit that the review by the forensic group of the physical
I evidence in the double murder case constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle
them to a new trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. In addition to the
Existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not available during the second
report of the forensic group, petitioners seek to present the testimony of an alleged eyewitness, the
trial of the above-entitled cases which could have altered the judgment of the Sandiganbayan,
driver of the waiting AVSECOM van, SPO4 Ruben M. Cantimbuhan. In his affidavit submitted to
specifically:
this Court, SPO4 Cantimbuhan states that he saw a man in blue uniform similar to that of the
A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering the false forensic claims that led to the Philippine Airlines maintenance crew, suddenly fire at Senator Aquino as the latter was about to
unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants. board the van. The man in blue was later identified as Rolando Galman.

B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual killing of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. Petitioners pray that the Court issue a resolution:
 1. [a]nnulling and setting aside this Honorable Court’s Resolutions dated July 23, 1991 and (c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original
September 10, 1991; judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered accordingly.
(emphasis supplied)
2. [a]nnulling and setting aside the Decision of the Sandiganbayan (3 rd Division) dated
September 28, 1990 in People vs. Custodio, et al., Case No. 10010-10011[;] In line with the objective of the Rules of Court to set guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but
without shackling the hands that dispense it, the remedy of new trial has been described as "a new
3. [o]rdering the re-opening of this case; [and]
invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice." 8 Thus, the Rules
4. [o]rdering the Sandiganbayan to allow the reception of additional defense evidence/re-trial allow the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
in the above entitled cases.7 substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered
evidence. In the proceedings for new trial, the errors of law or irregularities are expunged from the
The issue now is whether petitioners are entitled to a third trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of record or new evidence is introduced. Thereafter, the original judgment is vacated and a new one is
Criminal Procedure.
rendered.9
The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:
Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime may avail of the remedy of new trial before the
Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. — At any time before a judgment of conviction judgment of conviction becomes final. Petitioners admit that the decision of the Sandiganbayan in
becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 became final and executory upon denial of their petition for
consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration. review filed before this Court and their motion for reconsideration. Entry of judgment has in fact
Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following been made on September 30, 1991. 10 Nonetheless, they maintain that equitable considerations
grounds: exist in this case to justify the relaxation of the Rules and re-open the case to accord petitioners the
opportunity to present evidence that will exonerate them from the charges against them. We do not
(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the find merit in their submission.
accused have been committed during the trial;
Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Courts are generally
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could reluctant in granting motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence for it is
not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and presumed that the moving party has had ample opportunity to prepare his case carefully and to
which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment. secure all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such motions are treated with great caution due
xxx to the danger of perjury and the manifest injustice of allowing a party to allege that which may be
the consequence of his own neglect to defeat an adverse judgment. Hence, the moving party is
Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. — The effects of granting a new often required to rebut a presumption that the judgment is correct and that there has been a lack of
trial or reconsideration are the following: due diligence, and to establish other facts essential to warrant the granting of a new trial on the
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities ground of newly discovered evidence.11 This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may
committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence
set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the was discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at
introduction of additional evidence. the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely
(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would
evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other probably change the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have
evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be been very well presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot
taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record. be considered newly discovered.12
These standards, also known as the "Berry" rule, trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry vs. defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of the totality of the
State of Georgia13 where the Supreme Court of Georgia held: circumstances and the facts known to him.17

Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners’ purported evidence does not qualify as
Courts. x x x Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of newly discovered evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third
authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly trial.
discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1 st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners
since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the
sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were physical evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their report that
granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only — viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there the forensic group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred during the
trial, but made their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. They cited the materials
was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or
and methods that they used for their study, viz:
its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the
testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness. (citations omitted) MATERIALS AND METHODS

These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the propriety of motions for MATERIALS:
new trial based on newly discovered evidence. a. Court records of the case, especially photographs of: a) the stairway where the late Sen.
It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new Aquino and his escorts descended; b) the part of the tarmac where the lifeless bodies of the
evidence he seeks to present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial. late Sen. Aquino and Galman fell; and c) the autopsy conducted by the NBI Medico-legal
team headed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz; and the autopsy report of the late Sen. Benigno Aquino[,] Jr.
The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is signed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz and Dr. Solis;
whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two b. The gun and live ammunitions collected at the crime scene;
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when c. A reference human skull photos and X-rays of the same to demonstrate wound location
should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has and bullet trajectory;
relevance.14 We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded d. The reports of interviews and statements by the convicted military escorts, and other
as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence witnesses;
offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now
submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in seeking e. Re-enactment of the killing of Aquino based on the military escorts[’] version, by the
military escorts themselves in the Bilibid Prison and by volunteers at the NAIA Tarmac;
to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it. 15
f. Various books and articles on forensic and the medico-legal field[;]
The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised due
diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case. 16 Nonetheless, it has been observed g. Results of Forensic experiments conducted in relation to the case.
that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the defendant." In METHODS:
other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good faith component.
The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering evidence in support of a. Review of the forensic exhibits presented in the court;
the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence contemplates that the b. Review of TSNs relevant to the forensic review;
 c. Study of and research on the guns, slugs and ammunitions allegedly involved in the crime; portion of the mandible, was "forward, downward and medially." (Autopsy Report No. N-
83-22-36, Exhibit "NNNN-2-t-2")
d. Interviews/re-enactment of the crime based on the military’s accounts, both in the Bilibid
Prison where the convicts are confined and the MIA (now NAIA) stairway and tarmac; A controversy as to this trajectory came about when, upon being cross-examined by
counsel for the defense, Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz made a significant turn-about by stating
e. Conduct of ocular inspection and measurements on the actual crime scene (stairway and
that the correct trajectory of the fatal bullet was "upward, downward, and medially." The
tarmac) at the old Manila International Airport (now NAIA);
present position of Dr. Muñoz is premised upon the alleged fact that he found the petrous
f. Retracing the slug’s trajectory based on the autopsy reports and experts’ testimonies using bone fractured, obviously hit by the fatal bullet. He concluded, in view of this finding, that
an actual human skull; the fatal bullet must have gone upward from the wound of entrance. Since the fatal bullet
exited at the mandible, it is his belief that the petrous bone deflected the trajectory of the
g. X-rays of the skull with the retraced trajectory based on the autopsy report and experts’
bullet and, thus, the bullet proceeded downwards from the petrous bone to the mandible.
testimonies;
This opinion of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz in this regard notwithstanding, We hold that the
h. Evaluation of the presented facts and opinions of local experts in relation to accepted
trajectory of the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was, indeed, "forward,
forensic findings in international publications on forensic science, particularly on guns and
downward and medially." For the reason that the wound of entrance was at a higher
[gunshot] wound injuries;
elevation than the wound of exit, there can be no other conclusion but that the trajectory
i. Forensic experiments and simulations of events in relation to this case.18 was downward. The bullet when traveling at a fast rate of speed takes a straight path from
the wound of entrance to the wound of exit. It is unthinkable that the bullet, while
These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that prevented the projected upwards, would, instead of exiting to the roof of the head, go down to the
petitioners from using them at the time to support their theory that it was not the military, but Rolando mandible because it was allegedly deflected by a petrous bone which though hard is in fact
Galman, who killed Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present motion, failed to present any new a mere spongy protuberance, akin to a cartilage.
forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial even with
the exercise of due diligence. If they really wanted to seek and offer the opinion of other forensic Clear is proof of the downward trajectory of the fatal bullet; First, as Dr. Pedro Solis and
experts at the time regarding the physical evidence gathered at the scene of the crime, there was ample Dr. Ceferino Cunanan, the immediate superiors of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, manifested
before the Court, that, since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is what is
opportunity for them to do so before the case was finally submitted and decided. 19 known as a contusion collar which was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute
A reading of the Sandiganbayan decision dated September 28, 1990 shows a thorough study by the angle of approach, a downward trajectory of the bullet is indicated. This phenomenon
court of the forensic evidence presented during the trial, viz: indicates that the muzzle of the fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of
entry of the fatal bullet.
COURT FINDINGS
There was no showing as to whether a probe could have been made from the wound of
As to the physical entrance to the petrous bone. Out of curiosity, Dr. Juanito Billote tried to insert a probe
evidence from the wound of exit into the petrous bone. He was unsuccessful notwithstanding four or
Great significance has to be accorded the trajectory of the single bullet that penetrated the five attempts. If at all, this disproves the theory of Dr. Muñoz that the trajectory was
head and caused the death of Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to trajectory upward, downward and medially. On the other hand, Dr. Juanito Billote and photographer
ought to be the findings during the autopsy. The prosector in the autopsy, Dr. Bienvenido Alexander Loinaz witnessed the fact that Dr. Muñoz’[s] understudy, Alejandrino Javier,
Muñoz, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, reported in his Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, that the had successfully made a probe from the wound of entrance directly towards the wound of
trajectory of the gunshot, the wound of entrance having been located at the mastoid region, exit. Alejandrino Javier shouted with excitement upon his success and Alexander Loinaz
left, below the external auditory meatus, and the exit wound having been at the anterior promptly photographed this event with Alejandrino Javier holding the protruding end of
the probe at the mandible. (Exhibit "XXXXX-39-A")
To be sure, had the main bullet hit the petrous bone, this spongy mash of cartilage would have Finding of21 a downward
been decimated or obliterated. The fact that the main bullet was of such force, power and trajectory of the
speed that it was able to bore a hole into the mandible and crack it, is an indication that it fatal bullet fatal
could not have been stopped or deflected by a mere petrous bone. By its power and force, it to the credibility
must have been propelled by a powerful gun. It would have been impossible for the main of defense witnesses.
bullet to have been deflected form an upward course by a mere spongy protuberance.
The finding that the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was directed
Granting that it was so deflected, however, it could not have maintained the same power and
downwards sustains the allegation of prosecution eyewitnesses to the effect that Sen.
force as when it entered the skull at the mastoid region so as to crack the mandible and make
Benigno Aquino, Jr. was shot by a military soldier at the bridge stairs while he was being
its exit there.
brought down from the plane. Rebecca Quijano saw that the senator was shot by the
But what caused the fracture of the petrous bone? Was there a cause of the fracture, other than military man who was directly behind the Senator while the Senator and he were
that the bullet had hit it? Dr. Pedro Solis, maintaining the conclusion that the trajectory of the descending the stairs. Rebecca Quijano’s testimony in this regard is echoed by Jessie
bullet was downward, gave the following alternative explanations for the fracture of the Barcelona, Ramon Balang, Olivia Antimano, and Mario Laher, whose testimonies this
petrous bone: Court finds likewise as credible.
First, the petrous bone could have been hit by a splinter of the main bullet, particularly, that The downward trajectory of the bullet having been established, it stands to reason that the
which was found at the temporal region; and, gun used in shooting the Senator was fired from an elevation higher than that of the wound
of entrance at the back of the head of the Senator. This is consistent with the testimony of
Second, the fracture must have been caused by the kinetic force applied to the point of
prosecution witnesses to the effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot as he stood at
entrance at the mastoid region which had the tendency of being radiated towards the petrous
the upper step of the stairs, the second or third behind Senator Aquino, while Senator
bone.
Aquino and the military soldiers bringing him were at the bridge stairs. This is likewise
Thus, the fracture in the occipital bone, of the temporal bone, and of the parietal bone, Dr. consistent with the statement of Sandra Jean Burton that the shooting of Senator Aquino
Pedro Solis pointed out, had been caused by the aforesaid kinetic force. When a force is occurred while the Senator was still on the bridge stairs, a conclusion derived from the fact
applied to the mastoid region of the head, Dr. Pedro Solis emphasized, a radiation of forces is that the fatal shot was fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino crossed the service door
distributed all over the cranial back, including, although not limited to, the parietal bone. The and was led down the bridge stairs.
skull, Dr. Solis explains, is a box-like structure. The moment you apply pressure on the
It was the expert finding of Dr. Matsumi Suzuki that, as was gauged from the sounds of
portion, a distortion, tension or some other mechanical defect is caused. This radiation of
the footsteps of Senator Aquino, as the Senator went down the bridge stairs, the shooting
forces produces what is known as the "spider web linear fracture" which goes to different
parts of the body. The so-called fracturing of the petrous portion of the left temporal bone is of the Senator occurred while the Senator had stepped on the 11th step from the top.
one of the consequences of the kinetic force forcefully applied to the mastoid region. At the ocular inspection conducted by this Court, with the prosecution and the defense in
The fact that there was found a fracture of the petrous bone is not necessarily indicative of the attendance, it should be noted that the following facts were established as regards the
theory that the main bullet passed through the petrous bone. bridge stairs:

Doubt was expressed by Dr. Pedro Solis as to whether the metal fragments alleged by Dr. "Observations:
Bienvenido Muñoz to have been found by him inside the skull or at the wound of exit were The length of one block covering the tarmac – 19’6";
really parts of the main bullet which killed the Senator. When Dr. Pedro Solis examined these
fragments, he found that two (2) of the fragments were larger in size, and were of such The width of one block covering the tarmac – 10’;
shapes, that they could not have gone out of the wound of exit considering the size and shape The distance from the base of the staircase leading to the emergency tube to the Ninoy
of the exit wound. marker at the tarmac – 12’6";
 There are 20 steps in the staircase including the landing; Since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is what is known as a contusion
collar which was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute angle of approach, a
The distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20 th rung which is the landing of downward trajectory of the fatal bullet is conclusively indicated. This phenomenon
stairs – 20’8"; indicates that the muzzle of the fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of
entry of the fatal bullet.
Distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20th rung until the edge of the exit door
– 23’11"; IV

Distance from the 4th rung up to the exit door – 21’; There was no hole from the petrous bone to the mandible where the fatal bullet had exited
and, thus, there is no support to the theory of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz that the fatal bullet
Distance from the 5th rung up to the exit door – 19’11"; had hit the petrous bone on an upward trajectory and had been deflected by the petrous
bone towards the mandible. Dr. Juanito Billote’s testimony in this regard had amplified the
Length of one rung including railpost – 3’4"; matter with clarity.
Space between two rungs of stairway – 9"; xxx
Width of each rung – 11-1/2"; These physical facts, notwithstanding the arguments and protestations of counsel for the
Length of each rung (end to end) – 2’9": defense as now and heretofore avowed, compel the Court to maintain the holding: (1) that
the trajectory of the fatal bullet which hit and killed Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was
Height of railpost from edge of rung to railing – 2’5". "forward, downward and medially"; (2) that the Senator was shot by a person who stood at
a higher elevation than he; and (3) that the Senator was shot and killed by CIC Rogelio
(underlining supplied)20
Moreno on the bridge stairs and not on the tarmac, in conspiracy with the rest of the
The Sandiganbayan again exhaustively analyzed and discussed the forensic evidence in its resolution accused convicted herein.21
dated November 15, 1990 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the convicted accused. The
court held: This Court affirmed said findings of the Sandiganbayan when it denied the petition for review in
its resolution of July 25, 1991. The Court ruled:
The Autopsy Report No. N-83-2236, Exhibit "NNNN-2-t-2" indicated a downward trajectory of the
fatal bullet when it stated that the fatal bullet was "forward, downward, and medially . . ." The Court has carefully considered and deliberated upon all the contentions of the
petitioners but finds no basis for the allegation that the respondent Sandiganbayan has
xxx gravely erred in resolving the factual issues.
II The attempt to place a constitutional dimension in the petition is a labor in vain. Basically,
The wound of entrance having been at a higher elevation than the wound of exit, there can be only questions of fact are raised. Not only is it axiomatic that the factual findings of the
no other conclusion but that the trajectory was downward. The fatal bullet, whether it be a Sandiganbayan are final unless they fall within specifically recognized exceptions to the
Smith and Wesson Caliber .357 magnum revolver or a .45 caliber, must have traveled at a fast rule but from the petition and its annexes alone, it is readily apparent that the respondent
rate of speed and it stands to reason that it took a straight path from the wound of entrance to Court correctly resolved the factual issues.
the wound of exit. A hole indicating this straight path was proven to have existed. If, as xxx
contended on cross-examination by Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, that the bullet was projected
upwards, it ought to have exited at the roof of the head. The theory that the fatal bullet was The trajectory of the fatal bullet, whether or not the victim was descending the stairway or
deflected by a mere petrous bone is inconceivable. was on the tarmac when shot, the circumstances showing conspiracy, the participants in
the conspiracy, the individual roles of the accused and their respective parts in the
III conspiracy, the absence of evidence against thirteen accused and their co-accused Col.
 Vicente B. Tigas, Jr., the lack of credibility of the witnesses against former Minister Jose D. counsel. Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and decisions of their counsel as regards the
Aspiras, Director Jesus Z. Singson, Col. Arturo A. Custodio, Hermilo Gosuico, Major General conduct of the case. The general rule is that the client is bound by the action of his counsel in the
Prospero Olivas, and the shooting of Rolando Galman are all factual matters w[h]ich the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have
respondent court discussed with fairness and at length. The petitioners’ insistence that a few been different had his counsel proceeded differently.26 We held in People vs. Umali:27
witnesses in their favor should be believed while that of some witnesses against them should
be discredited goes into the question of credibility of witnesses, a matter which under the In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and
mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a
records of this petition is best left to the judgment of the Sandiganbayan. 22
result of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a
The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense during ground for a new trial.
the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather recently
If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be
sought, which is not allowed by the Rules.23 If at all, it only serves to discredit the version of the an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that
prosecution which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.
Sandiganbayan.
So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the
The same is true with the statement of the alleged eyewitness, SPO4 Cantimbuhan. His narration sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper
merely corroborates the testimonies of other defense witnesses during the trial that they saw Senator defense, or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial; and in general the
Aquino already walking on the airport tarmac toward the AVSECOM van when a man in blue-gray client is bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and can not be heard
uniform darted from behind and fired at the back of the Senator’s head. 24 The Sandiganbayan, to complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had counsel
however, did not give weight to their account as it found the testimonies of prosecution eyewitnesses proceeded differently. (citations omitted)
Rebecca Quijano and Jessie Barcelona more credible. Quijano and Barcelona testified that they saw Finally, we are not moved by petitioners’ assertion that the forensic evidence may have been
the soldier behind Senator Aquino on the stairway aim and fire a gun on the latter’s nape. As earlier manipulated and misinterpreted during the trial of the case. Again, petitioners did not allege
quoted, the Sandiganbayan found their testimonies to be more consistent with the physical evidence. concrete facts to support their crass claim. Hence, we find the same to be unfounded and purely
SPO4 Cantimbuhan’s testimony will not in any way alter the court’s decision in view of the speculative.
eyewitness account of Quijano and Barcelona, taken together with the physical evidence presented
during the trial. Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new evidence is of such weight IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion is DENIED.
that it would probably change the judgment if admitted. 25 Also, new trial will not be granted if SO ORDERED.
the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching.
II. BASIC CONCEPTS
As additional support to their motion for new trial, petitioners also claim that they were denied due
process because they were deprived of adequate legal assistance by counsel. We are not persuaded. 23G.R. No. 180501             December 24, 2008
The records will bear out that petitioners were ably represented by Atty. Rodolfo U. Jimenez during PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
the trial and when the case was elevated to this Court. An experienced lawyer in criminal cases, Atty. vs.
Jimenez vigorously defended the petitioners’ cause throughout the entire proceedings. The records ROGER MENDOZA y DELA CRUZ, accused-appellant.
show that the defense presented a substantial number of witnesses and exhibits during the trial. After DECISION
the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, Atty. Jimenez filed a petition for review with this Court,
invoking all conceivable grounds to acquit the petitioners. When the Court denied the petition for VELASCO, JR., J.:
review, he again filed a motion for reconsideration exhausting his deep reservoir of legal talent. We This is an appeal from the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
therefore find petitioners’ claim to be unblushingly unsubstantiated. We note that they did not allege CR-H.C. No. 00651, modifying the Decision dated October 27, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court
any specific facts in their present motion to show that Atty. Jimenez had been remiss in his duties as
(RTC), Branch 276 in Muntinlupa City in Criminal Case No. 00-410. The RTC adjudged accused- AAA’s father testified that accused-appellant first applied as a driver in 1995. He came back to
appellant Roger Mendoza guilty of rape. reapply on April 24, 2000, was asked to drive on that day, and stayed for the night. The following
morning, her father left early for work leaving the still sleeping applicant behind.
The Facts
The father narrated what his daughter disclosed when he arrived home from work, adding that,
On April 28, 2000, accused-appellant was charged with rape in an Information which reads as follows:
when he routinely called the house at about 3:00 in the afternoon, the answering AAA called
That on or about the 25 th day of April 2000, in the city of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within accused-appellant "bastos" and explained why so.
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, with AAA’s mother corroborated for the most part her husband’s testimony. She attested that AAA was
force, intimidation and grave abuse of confidence, accused being employed as a driver in the only six years old when it happened.
business of the father of [AAA],1 a six (6) year old minor, did then and there willfully,
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant admitted to being at AAA’s family home on April 24,
unlawfully and feloniously insert his finger inside the latter’s vagina against the will and
2000 and staying overnight. He remained in the house the following day waiting for AAA’s father
consent of the said complainant.
to return so he could collect what he earned for a day’s work. To while his time away, he went
outside to watch and talk to persons doing road repair work. And while outside, he suddenly felt
Contrary to law.2
water falling upon him. As it turned out, AAA was playing in the yard with the water hose aimed at
When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
him, which he did not mind.5 She continued to play with the hose and ended up flooding the
During trial, the prosecution presented AAA and both her parents as witnesses. Accused-appellant garage. Thereafter, he asked the road workers about the possibility of working with them only to be
appeared as the lone witness for the defense. told he would need a barangay clearance. He then left, returning a few days later to submit his
clearance to the workers’ foreperson and to collect his one-day salary. According to accused-
The gist of AAA’s account of the incident is as follows: It occurred in the early afternoon of April 25, appellant, AAA’s father was so angry at him for not waiting last April 25, 2000 that he pushed
2000 after her parents had left for work. She was then six (6) years old. At home with her on that day accused-appellant and banged his head against the garage wall. After AAA’s mother pacified her
was the maid and accused-appellant, who was reapplying as family driver. As she was playing with irate husband, barangay officials arrived and brought accused-appellant to the police station. Once
the water hose in the garage, her dress got wet forcing her to repair to her room to change. Accused- there, accused-appellant was charged with molesting AAA, who, however, did not say anything at
appellant followed. Once inside the room, accused-appellant tried to undress her, tightly held her the police station; it was her mother who answered all the questions of the police investigator. He
hands, and told her to lie in the bed. He thereupon pulled her panties down. In reaction, she pulled it was charged with fingering the sexual organ of AAA. He denied the accusation, asserting that he
up but accused-appellant quickly pulled it down again. It was at this moment when, according to did not touch the child, being outside their house on the day in question watching men doing road
AAA, accused-appellant touched her vagina with his fingers and kissed her on the left cheek. All the
while, he repeatedly assured her of being her friend and that they were just playing the mother-and- repair work.6
father roles. Shortly after, she ran to her parents’ room and locked the door. Accused-appellant On October 27, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty of rape. The
followed but left after AAA ignored his insistence to continue with the father-mother game. dispositive portion of the RTC’s decision reads:
Later in the evening, AAA told her parents about her ordeal, after which they reported the matter to Under these declarations and these statutes, the Court is convinced that the crime of Rape
barangay officials and the police. AAA was then asked to undergo a medical examination.3 has been committed by accused ROGER MENDOZA Y DELA CRUZ as defined and
penalized by the aforesaid laws. He is therefore sentenced to suffer imprisonment for all of
In the course of her direct examination, AAA was presented a sketch of a female body to assist her his natural life or to life imprisonment. This sentence will be served at the New Bilibid
pinpoint what part of her body accused-appellant touched. In response, she shaded the area in between Prison, pending appeal should he desire to so appeal. The Jail Warden is therefore directed
the legs of the female figure.4 to commit the said Accused, to the said prison.

It is SO ORDERED.7
Accused-appellant appealed the RTC decision to the CA. Before the appellate court, accused-appellant 3) whether or not the CA erred in convicting accused-appellant for the crime of acts of
raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court: (1) in not dismissing the case on lasciviousness on the basis of the evidence presented.
account of the violation of his right to speedy trial; (2) in considering the prosecution’s testimonial
The Court’s Ruling
evidence which was not formally offered; and (3) in convicting him for rape without the prosecution
presenting proof of his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Right to Speedy Trial Not Violated
As preliminarily indicated, the CA modified the RTC’s decision, the modification consisting of Accused-appellant states that while he has been detained since April 26, 2000, his arraignment
downgrading the crime to and finding accused-appellant guilty of acts of lasciviousness, a crime came only on March 2, 2001 and the prosecution started to present its evidence only on May 9,
which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the underlying Information. The fallo of the 2001. To compound matters, the prosecution was not deemed to have terminated its presentation of
CA decision dated June 29, 2007 reads, as follows: evidence until April 14, 2004.12 Accused-appellant thus argues that the delays attending his case
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the October 27, 2004 Decision of the Regional should have been enough for the trial court to have dismissed it.
Trial Court of Muntinlupa City, Branch 276 in Criminal Case No. 00-410 finding accused- The Court is not convinced.
appellant guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to life imprisonment, is hereby
MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Roger Mendoza y De La Cruz is found guilty beyond The right to speedy trial, as an adjunct to the right of all persons to a speedy disposition of their
reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, as defined and penalized under article cases before judicial and quasi-judicial bodies, requires that court proceedings should be conducted
336 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article III, Section 5 (b), of Republic Act No. according to fixed rules and must be free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays. 13 The
7610, and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion same right may also be considered violated when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked
temporal, as minimum, to 15 years, 6 [months] and 20 days of reclusion temporal as for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to
maximum and to pay the victim the amount of P30,000.00.
elapse without the parties having their case tried. 14 None of these circumstances are, to us, present
SO ORDERED.8 in the instant case. While perhaps there might have been delays, accused-appellant does not state in
some detail what or who caused the delays, or whether these are of the vexatious or oppressive
The CA predicated its modificatory disposition on the interplay of the following premises: The RTC kind.
hastily concluded that rape was committed because there was insertion by accused-appellant’s finger
What is more, accused-appellant belatedly invoked his right to speedy trial only before the CA.
into the private part of AAA.9 The records, however, show that accused-appellant merely stroked the The proceedings cannot now be claimed to be attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
external surface of AAA’s vagina.10 The medical findings also showed that there was no physical delays. Accused-appellant cannot plausibly seek the protection of the law to benefit from the
manifestation of insertion into AAA’s vagina, bolstering the inference that no insertion took place. 11 adverse effects of his failure to assert his right at the first instance. 15 As the CA correctly and
judiciously observed:
On July 12, 2007, accused-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal of the CA decision.
As can be gleaned from the records, accused-appellant never invoked in the RTC that he
On February 18, 2008, the Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired.
has been deprived of his right to speedy trial and speedy disposition of case. As it is, any
They, however, manifested willingness to submit the case on the basis of available records, logically
allegation of violations of rights should first be ventilated with the RTC concomitant with
suggesting that they are, in the main, reiterating the very same arguments they raised before the CA.
the prayer to dismiss the case with prejudice. It is a bit too late in the day for herein
Thus, the issues tendered in this appeal may be formulated, as follows: accused-appellant to invoke now his right to speedy trial (People vs. Tee, 395 SCRA 443
[2003]). By raising this point belatedly with the [CA], accused-appellant has thus waived
1) whether or not accused-appellant’s right to speedy trial was violated below;
his objection and accordingly forfeits his right to the aforesaid constitutional guarantees. 16
2) whether or not the trial court erred in considering the testimonial evidence of the xxx
prosecution not formally offered;
Objection to Prosecution’s Defective Offer of Evidence Waived
Accused-appellant next questions the manner in which AAA’s testimonial evidence was offered. He Q     What do you call that here?
claims that her testimony was only offered for the purpose of establishing her minority, 17 not to ATTY GARCIA
establish the fact of molestation. The trial court, he says, supposedly erred in considering evidence
which did not conform to the purpose specified in the offer, in accordance with Section 34 of Rule 132 Witness pointing to the private part. You just say, what do you call that? What do
you call that? When you pointed to this, what do you call that?
of the Rules of Court.18
xxxx
Accused-appellant posture is valid to a point. But despite the improper formal offer of AAA’s
testimony, the defense failed to make a timely objection to the presentation of such testimonial COURT
evidence. Accused-appellant in fact proceeded with the trial of the case and, as the CA noted, "even What part of your body did he touch? You stand and point.
subjected the witness to a rigorous cross-examination." 19 The unyielding rule is that evidence not
ATTY GARCIA
objected to may be deemed admitted and be validly considered by the court in arriving at its
judgment.20 In point is People v. Sanchez,21 in which the prosecution called several persons to testify. You just point. May I request, Your Honor that the witness be made to draw in her
No formal offer of testimonial evidence was made prior to or after their testimonies. The trial court, own capacity to identify this. You draw a female. Draw a woman.
nonetheless, considered the testimonies owing to the adverse party’s failure to object to the COURT
presentation of such testimonial evidence. The Court sustained the trial court, reproducing what it
earlier said in People v. Java: We are going to put that on record. The part of the body that she pointed.
ATTY. GARCIA
x x x Section 36 [of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 22] requires that an objection in the course
of the oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds [therefor] shall Q     Where did Roger touch you? Which part is this? Is this your belly or is this your
become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to the admissibility of evidence was made in stomach or is this your vagina?
the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal shall not be considered.23 COURT
Accused-appellant’s belated invocation of the strict application of the rules on evidence to suit his Where did she [point] to?
purpose is quite misplaced, for evidence not objected to, AAA’s testimony in this case, becomes the
ATTY. GARCIA
property of the case, and all the parties to the case are considered amenable to any favorable or
unfavorable effects resulting from the evidence.24 The vagina.

The Prosecution Presented Sufficient Proof of Accused-Appellant’s Guilt Q     That is put in between your legs, the Judge is asking?

In a bid to escape liability owing to insufficiency of evidence, accused-appellant avers, in context, that A     Yes, Ma’am.
the medical findings presented in court do not support the conclusion made by the trial court that Q     Aside from touching your private part, that part between your legs. Where else did
accused-appellant inserted his fingers into AAA’s sexual organ, causing it to hurt. He likewise insists Roger touch you?
that the testimonies of AAA’s parents were hearsay.25 A     No more.
The direct examination of AAA yields the following: Q     And aside from touching you, what else did he do?
Q     And where did he touch you after he pulled down your shorts and panties? COURT:
A     Here. No answer?
ATTY. GARCIA: Q     Where did he put his fingers, [AAA?] You said he used his fingers. Where did he use
his fingers, [AAA?] Please answer and when you said he touched you on your private part,
There was an answer, Your Honor.
[AAA] did he?
A     He was over the window. He was telling me that we were friends. I did not listen to him
COURT
and he already went out of our house. He was already out.
After he touched you[,] you said he went out of your room. When did he [put]
Q     Let’s go back to touching first, [AAA]. So after he touched you, what else did he do to
your dry panty [back on,] after he [touched] you[?] You said he went out of the
you? Did he kiss you [AAA]?
room. How about your dry panty?
A     Yes, Ma’am.
A     After he touched me.
Q     Where did he kiss you?
COURT
A     On the cheek.
He removed your wet panties and then he put on the dry one. When did that
Q     Which part of your cheek if you recall? happen[?] After he touched you or before? Because you said he went out.

A     Left. ATTY. GARCIA

Q     Did he kiss your private part, [AAA]? The answer was before, Your Honor.

(No answer) COURT

COURT You said that he pulled down your shirt. Then he pulled down your wet panties
and then you said that he touched your part in between your legs and then he put
Aside from your cheek, did he kiss also your neck, your ears, breast, the private part
on your dry panties. Was it before he touched your private part or after you were
in between your legs?
touched?
A     No, Your Honor.
A     Before.
COURT
COURT
How about your breast, did he kiss your breast? Did he touch your breast, [AAA]?
So you mean when he touched you in between the legs you already [had] the dry
Do you remember[?] You do not have to be ashamed, we are all women.
panties or no panties yet?
A     I don’t remember.
A     No panties yet.26
ATTY. GARCIA
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether or not accused-appellant is guilty of rape which in
I would like to manifest at this point, Your Honor please, to reiterate what I mean is turn resolves itself into the question of whether or not he inserted his fingers into AAA’s sexual
really shaking, Your Honor. I just got the right word now. organ. The issue has been peremptorily answered in the negative by the CA, basing its resolution
COURT on the relevant finding of the examining doctor and on the testimony of AAA, who, at best, was
tentative in her response when queried about the finger-insertion aspect of the incident. Also, the
You mean he did not kiss your breast? What about the portion of your body in People does not challenge the determination. And precisely because of the fact of non-insertion
between your legs. Did he also kiss it? that the appellate court was impelled, and rightly so, to downgrade the criminal act to acts of
A     No, Ma’am. lasciviousness. The records appear to support the appellate court’s modificatory action. Consider
the following answer given by AAA to the prosecution’s question: "Where did Roger touch you?" grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is
AAA pointed to the vagina of a female figure she had drawn.27 not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the pudendum by the
The following exchanges subsequently between the trial court and AAA, however, while proving in a penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts
convincing way malicious touching, provoke doubts whether indeed accused-appellant inserted his
of lasciviousness.30 (Citations omitted.)
finger into the child’s vagina.
By analogy, we hold that for a charge for rape by sexual assault (with the use of one’s fingers as
Q     [AAA], when you said he [touched] the things between your legs[,] did he use his
the assaulting object, as here) to prosper, there should be evidence of at least the slightest
fingers?
penetration of the sexual organ and not merely a brush or graze of its surface. This is in
COURT consonance with Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic
Act No. 8353, which provides:
Did he use anything in touching you that he used other than his hands. Did he use
anything in touching you? Did he use his fingers, his hands? Art. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed.–Rape is committed–

A     Yes, Your Honor, fingers. 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
Q     Did he insert it inside your private part the thing between your legs, [AAA]?
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
A     No.28
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
We, thus, sustain the finding of the CA, viz:
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
Absent any showing of the actual insertion of the finger in the private part of the child, there
can be no consummated rape. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to establish accused- d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
appellant’s guilt for rape notwithstanding, this Court finds him liable for the lesser crime of though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
acts of lasciviousness. This latter crime is considered an offense included or subsumed in the 2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
rape charge. Thus in Dulla v. Court of Appeals and People v. Bon, the Supreme Court hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
convicted the accused with the crime of acts of lasciviousness even though the information person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal
charged the crime of rape.29 (Citations omitted.) orifice of another person.

The touching of a female’s sexual organ, standing alone, is not equivalent to rape, not even an (Emphasis supplied.)
attempted one. With regard to penile rape, People v. Campuhan explains: Rape through sexual assault, thus, requires that the assault be specifically done through "insertion"
x x x Thus, touching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal into the genital or anal orifices of the victim, a circumstance absent in this case, or at least not
contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external established by the required quantum of evidence.
layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and Accused-appellant’s virtual contention that his guilt for acts of lasciviousness has not been proved
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and by proof beyond reasonable doubt deserves scant consideration. While the RTC and the CA had
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of disagreed as to what crime was committed, the disagreement stemming from their differing
consummated rape. x x x findings on whether or not accused-appellant inserted his fingers into AAA’s vagina, both the
x x x Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be entered for rape to be courts were one in saying that accused-appellant indeed kissed AAA on the face and fondled her
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a
most private part, or, in fine, that he committed lascivious acts on a six-year girl. 31 The Court loathes Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982,
to disturb the ensuing findings of the CA, confirmatory of that of the RTC: petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
The prosecution’s evidence introduced during the entire trial established the presence of all husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin
the elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness. The testimony of the victim shows that and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and
accused-appellant committed lewd acts against her when he pulled down her panties, kissed photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal
her on her left cheek, touched her private part and then squeezing her arm causing her separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against
extreme pain.32 x x x her husband.

As the CA observed, AAA’s telling testimony deserves full faith and credit, given as it were in a Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages
categorical manner by a young and an immature girl who had no motive–and none was ascribed by the against petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which,
after trial, rendered judgment for private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the
defense–to falsely impute the commission of a serious crime against the accused. 33 And if we may
capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of plaintiff's Complaint or those
add, in cases of acts of lasciviousness, the lone testimony of the offended party, if credible, is
further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and any
sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused. 34 The Court, thus, need not dwell into the probative person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
value of the corroborative testimony on the molestation incident of AAA’s parents which accused- P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the
appellant assails as hearsay. costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner
Finally, we also sustain the award of moral damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 in accordance with Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were enjoined from "using or
submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
prevailing jurisprudence.35 Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The CA Decision dated June 29, 2007 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr.
No. 00651 finding accused-appellant Roger Mendoza y Dela Cruz guilty of acts of lasciviousness and Alfredo Martin, and that they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge
imposing upon him the penalty defined therein is AFFIRMED. and consent. For that reason, the trial court declared the documents and papers to be properties of
No costs. private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private respondent and enjoined her from
using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
SO ORDERED. court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,1 this Court
G.R. No. 107383             February 20, 1996 ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in
that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso
CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner, Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the
vs. Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents. respondent's complaint.
DECISION Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among
MENDOZA, J.: other things, private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in
using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the complaint against Atty. Felix,
Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be "impressed
her from private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
with merit:"2
The facts are as follows:
 On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."4 Any violation of this provision renders the
maintains that: evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5
.... The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers
and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A
4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial
person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
Court, there was admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
from using the documents Annex "A-1 to J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having
appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this Court issued a restraining The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged.
order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court. Hence, Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected
during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the spouse while the marriage subsists.6 Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as
genuineness and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for
Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion
annexes, At that point in time, would it have been malpractice for respondent to use for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case pending in the fidelity that each owes to the other.
Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.
Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself
SO ORDERED.
under oath, Such verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in
evidence against him. Petitioner became bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself
of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for legal separation cannot be
treated as malpractice.
Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration
that his use of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their G.R. No. 150224             May 19, 2004
genuiness and authenticity did not constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
means does the decision in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in
vs.
question.
JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", appellant.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of
DECISION
preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents
and papers, enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The PER CURIAM:
TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against
On automatic review is a Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga, Branch
the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the
25, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the special complex crime of Rape
documents and papers became effective again.
with Homicide, and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim, Kathylyn D. Uba, civil indemnity
Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional in the amount of P75,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00, exemplary damages in
injunction declaring "the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" 3 is no less the amount of P50,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P186,410.00, or total damages
applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who amounting to P511,410.00, and costs of litigation.1
is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the
prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or Appellant was charged with Rape with Homicide under the following Information:
 That on or about the afternoon of June 30, 1998 at Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga, and within the Judilyn’s husband then arrived and appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, in order to have carnal knowledge of a house of Isabel.8
certain KATHYLYN D. UBA, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, and
with use of a bladed weapon stab the latter inflicting upon her fatal injuries resulting in the In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house
death of the victim, and on the occasion or by reason thereof, accused, wilfully, unlawfully were off. She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was
and feloniously, and by means of force and violence had carnal knowledge of said Kathlyn D. open. She noticed that the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still
Uba against her will. empty. She went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She
found that the door was tied with a rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9
The facts are:
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
On June 30, 1998, at 8:30 a.m., Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin, seventeen year old granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a
Kathylyn Uba, were on the ground floor of the house of their grandmother, Isabel Dawang, in flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with
Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, her intestines protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance.
to her husband, appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyn’s friend, Cecil Casingan. Kathylyn A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the police.10
handed the letter to appellant earlier that morning.3
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a report that a dead woman was found in
At 9:00 a.m. of the same day, Judilyn and her husband, together with Isabel Dawang, left for their Isabel Dawang’s house. Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house and found
farm in Nagbitayan some two kilometers away. Before Judilyn and her husband departed, Kathylyn the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab wounds.
told Judilyn that she intended to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to leave, she
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that appellant was seen going down the
would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was
ladder of the house of Isabel Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
left alone in the house.4
The police discovered the victim’s panties, brassiere, denim pants, bag and sandals beside her
Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. naked cadaver at the scene of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with blood
They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the house through the back door of the within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was doing there, and he replied that he
When questioned by the police authorities, appellant denied any knowledge of Kathylyns’s
was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother.5
death,11 however, he was placed under police custody.
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the
On July 3, 1998, appellant asked the police officers if he could relieve himself. Police Officer
ladder from the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house. 6 Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet around seven to ten meters away from the police
She later noticed appellant, who was wearing a white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back station. They suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, "Nagtaray!" (He’s running
and forth at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as appellant and his wife used to live away!). Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through the gate of the Police Station and saw
in the house of Isabel Dawang.7 appellant running away. Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station when

At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw appellant when he called her near her house. This time, he was Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. 12 He was charged with Rape with Homicide. When he was
wearing a black shirt without collar and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting the arraigned on July 21, 1998, appellant pleaded "not guilty."
lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She noticed that appellant’s eyes were "reddish After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with Homicide, defined and penalized
and sharp." Appellant asked her where her husband was as he had something important to tell him. under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 8353, otherwise known as the
Anti-Rape Law of 1997, and was accordingly, sentenced to Death.
Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In his timeframe within which the lone presence of appellant lurking in the house of Isabel Dawang was
Brief, appellant assigns the following errors: testified to by witnesses.
I It should also be noted that, although the Postmortem Report by the attending physician, Dr. Pej
Evan C. Bartolo, indicates that no hymenal lacerations, contusions or hematoma were noted on the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING MUCH WEIGHT TO THE
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR victim,20 Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During
DOUBTFULNESS. his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of semen into the vaginal canal could only be

II done through sexual intercourse with the victim. 21 In addition, it is apparent from the pictures
submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was manifested by a bruise and
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-
some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault on her virtue. 22
APPELLANT OF THE SERIOUS CRIME CHARGED DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT.
Significantly, subsequent testing showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
Appellant’s contentions are unmeritorious.
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen to be that of appellant’s gene type.
The issue regarding the credibility of the prosecution witnesses should be resolved against appellant.
This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms. 23 A person’s DNA
witnesses unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which is the same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a
person’s blood is the same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair,
has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted. 13 Well-entrenched is the
rule that the findings of the trial court on credibility of witnesses are entitled to great weight on appeal earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells. 24 Most importantly, because of
unless cogent reasons are presented necessitating a reexamination if not the disturbance of the same; polymorphisms in human genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the
the reason being that the former is in a better and unique position of hearing first hand the witnesses notable exception of identical twins.25
and observing their deportment, conduct and attitude.14 Absent any showing that the trial judge DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight which would affect suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been
the result of the case, the trial judge’s assessment of credibility deserves the appellate court’s highest left. For purposes of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both
respect.15 Where there is nothing to show that the witnesses for the prosecution were actuated by inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account
improper motive, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit. 16 of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of
the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of justice in every case.
The weight of the prosecution’s evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule which
provides that an accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from
circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt that the accused suspicion in the same principle as fingerprints are used. 26 Incidents involving sexual assault would
committed the crime.17 leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the
victim’s body or at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture
Reference to the records will show that a total of eleven (11) wounds, six (6) stab and five (5) incised,
could also be transferred to the victim’s body during the assault. 27 Forensic DNA evidence is
were found on the victim’s abdomen and back, causing a portion of her small intestines to spill out of
helpful in proving that there was physical contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly
her body.18 Rigor mortis of the vicitm’s body was complete when Dr. Bartolo examined the victim at collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant, DNA can be compared with known samples to
9:00 a.m. on July 1, 1998. According to him, the time of death may be approximated from between
place the suspect at the scene of the crime.28
nine (9) to twelve (12) hours prior to the completion of rigor mortis.19 In other words, the estimated
time of death was sometime between 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 1998. This was within the
The U.P. National Science Research Institute (NSRI), which conducted the DNA tests in this case, beyond reasonable doubt: (1) Appellant and his wife were living in the house of Isabel Dawang
used the Polymerase chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) together with the victim, Kathylyn Uba; (2) In June 1998, appellant’s wife left the house because
analysis. With PCR testing, tiny amounts of a specific DNA sequence can be copied exponentially of their frequent quarrels; (3) Appellant received from the victim, Kathylyn Uba, a letter from his
within hours. Thus, getting sufficient DNA for analysis has become much easier since it became estranged wife in the early morning on June 30, 1998; (4) Appellant was seen by Apolonia Wania
possible to reliably amplify small samples using the PCR method. and Beverly Denneng at 1:00 p.m. of June 30, 1998 near the kitchen of the house of Isabel
Dawang, acting strangely and wearing a dirty white shirt with collar; (5) Judilyn Pas-a saw
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following
appellant going down the ladder of the house of Isabel at 12:30 p.m., wearing a dirty white shirt,
factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of
and again at 1:30 p.m., this time wearing a black shirt; (6) Appellant hurriedly left when the
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
husband of Judilyn Pas-a was approaching; (7) Salmalina Tandagan saw appellant in a dirty white
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
shirt coming down the ladder of the house of Isabel on the day Kathylyn Uba was found dead; (8)
the tests.29 The door leading to the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang was tied by a rope; (9) The
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an victim, Kathylyn Uba, lay naked in a pool of blood with her intestines protruding from her body on
the second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang, with her stained pants, bra, underwear and shoes
expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. 30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it scattered along the periphery; (10) Laboratory examination revealed sperm in the victim’s vagina
was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts (Exhibit "H" and "J"); (11) The stained or dirty white shirt found in the crime scene was found to
subject of examination.31 The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the be positive with blood; (12) DNA of slide, Exhibit "J" and "H", compared with the DNA profile of
following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical the appellant are identical; and (13) Appellant escaped two days after he was detained but was
with semen taken from the victim’s vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen subsequently apprehended, such flight being indicative of guilt.35
found in the victim and the blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the
Circumstantial evidence, to be sufficient to warrant a conviction, must form an unbroken chain
trial.
which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of others, is the
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology in the perpetrator of the crime. To determine whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence, three
Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these relatively uncharted requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) facts on which the inferences
waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive jurisprudence that has developed in are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive. conviction beyond reasonable doubt.36
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken
principles could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed from him as well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well
greater discretion over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new as his right against self-incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.
kinds of scientific techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief
testimonial compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process
in its existence or non-existence. 34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the
obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.
quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human
genetics and molecular biology. We ruled in People v. Rondero38 that although accused-appellant insisted that hair samples were
forcibly taken from him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for forensic
Independently of the physical evidence of appellant’s semen found in the victim’s vaginal canal, the
examination, the hair samples may be admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is
trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as being sufficient to sustain a conviction
the use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in nature acquired from the accused court to balance the probative value of such evidence against the likely harm that would result
under duress. from its admission.
Hence, a person may be compelled to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and The judgment in a criminal case can be upheld only when there is relevant evidence from which
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved. Under People v. Gallarde,39 where the court can properly find or infer that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
immediately after the incident, the police authorities took pictures of the accused without the presence beyond reasonable doubt requires moral certainty of guilt in order to sustain a conviction. Moral
of counsel, we ruled that there was no violation of the right against self-incrimination. The accused certainty is that degree of certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the
may be compelled to submit to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an offense of reason and judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. It is certainty beyond
which he is accused. reasonable doubt.42 This requires that the circumstances, taken together, should be of a conclusive
nature and tendency; leading, on the whole, to a satisfactory conclusion that the accused, and no
It must also be noted that appellant in this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of counsel. one else, committed the offense charged. 43 In view of the totality of evidence appreciated thus far,
we rule that the present case passes the test of moral certainty.
Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are
unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto However, as a matter of procedure, and for the purpose of meeting the requirement of proof
law. beyond reasonable doubt, motive is essential for conviction when there is doubt as to the identity

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA of the culprit.44
typing involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Pertinently, it must be noted that Judilyn Pas-a, first cousin of the victim, testified that she last saw
Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
the victim alive in the morning of June 30, 1998 at the house of Isabel Dawang. 45 She witnessed
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.
the appellant running down the stairs of Isabel’s house and proceeding to the back of the same
Appellant’s twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be sustained. The forensic DNA evidence and house.46 She also testified that a few days before the victim was raped and killed, the latter
bloodied shirt, notwithstanding the eyewitness accounts of his presence at Isabel Dawang’s house
during the time when the crime was committed, undeniably link him to the June 30, 1998 incident. revealed to her that "Joel Yatar attempted to rape her after she came from the school." 47 The
Appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence an impossibility to be in two places victim told Judilyn about the incident or attempt of the appellant to rape her five days before her

at the same time, especially in this case where the two places are located in the same barangay. 40 He naked and violated body was found dead in her grandmother’s house on June 25, 1998. 48 In
lives within a one hundred (100) meter radius from the scene of the crime, and requires a mere five addition, Judilyn also testified that when her auntie Luz Dawang Yatar, wife of appellant, separated
minute walk to reach one house from the other. This fact severely weakens his alibi. from her husband, "this Joel Yatar threatened to kill our family." 49 According to Judilyn, who was
personally present during an argument between her aunt and the appellant, the exact words uttered
As to the second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the court a quo committed reversible error
by appellant to his wife in the Ilocano dialect was, "If you leave me, I will kill all your family and
in convicting him of the crime charged. He alleges that he should be acquitted on reasonable doubt.
your relatives x x x."50 These statements were not contradicted by appellant.
Appellant’s assertion cannot be sustained.
Thus, appellant’s motive to sexually assault and kill the victim was evident in the instant case. It is
Generally, courts should only consider and rely upon duly established evidence and never on mere a rule in criminal law that motive, being a state of mind, is established by the testimony of
conjectures or suppositions. The legal relevancy of evidence denotes "something more than a witnesses on the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after the commission of
minimum of probative value," suggesting that such evidentiary relevance must contain a "plus the offense, deeds or words that may express it or from which his motive or reason for committing
value."41 This may be necessary to preclude the trial court from being satisfied by matters of slight it may be inferred.51
value, capable of being exaggerated by prejudice and hasty conclusions. Evidence without "plus
value" may be logically relevant but not legally sufficient to convict. It is incumbent upon the trial Accordingly, we are convinced that the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide. Appellant sexually assaulted Kathylyn Uba, and by reason
or on the occasion thereof, in order to conceal his lustful deed, permanently sealed the victim’s lips by P100,000.00, P93,190.00 in actual damages and P75,000.00 in moral damages. The award of
stabbing her repeatedly, thereby causing her untimely demise. exemplary damages is DELETED.
The following are the elements constitutive of rape with homicide: (1) the appellant had carnal Upon the finality of this Decision and in accordance with Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as
knowledge of a woman; (2) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat or amended by Sec. 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the
intimidation; and (3) by reason or on the occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat President of the Philippines for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.
or intimidation, appellant killed the woman. 52 However, in rape committed by close kin, such as the Costs de oficio.
victim’s father, step-father, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that
SO ORDERED.
actual force or intimidation be employed.53 Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence
and intimidation.54 The fact that the victim’s hymen is intact does not negate a finding that rape was
committed as mere entry by the penis into the lips of the female genital organ, even without rupture or
laceration of the hymen, suffices for conviction of rape. 55 The strength and dilatability of the hymen
are invariable; it may be so elastic as to stretch without laceration during intercourse. Absence of
G.R. No. 97525. April 7, 1993.
hymenal lacerations does not disprove sexual abuse especially when the victim is of tender age. 56
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
In the case at bar, appellant is the husband of the victim’s aunt. He is seven years older than the victim vs.
Kathylyn Uba. Before he and his wife separated, appellant lived in the house of his mother-in-law, JOEL SARTAGODA y BOCANEGRA, JIMMY BASCUÑA y LAZARTE, VICENTE STA. ANA
together with the victim and his wife. After the separation, appellant moved to the house of his y GUTIERREZ and JOHN DOE, accused-appellants.
parents, approximately one hundred (100) meters from his mother-in-law’s house. Being a relative by
affinity within the third civil degree, he is deemed in legal contemplation to have moral ascendancy The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
over the victim. Ernesto M. Maiquez for accused-appellants.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of death is imposed when by reason or on SYLLABUS
the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed. Although three (3) Justices of this Court maintain
their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, they 1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FINGERPRINTS; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT
nevertheless submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is not unconstitutional, and that the death ELIMINATE POSSIBILITY THAT ACCUSED COULD HAVE BEEN AT SCENE OF THE
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar. CRIME. — Although We agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints
has great significance, We cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the
As to damages, civil indemnity ex delicto of P100,000.00, 57 actual damages incurred by the family of fingerprint examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be
the victim that have been proved at the trial amounting to P93,190.00, 58 and moral damages of concluded that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all
times lead to a valid conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of
P75,000.0059 should be awarded in the light of prevailing law and jurisprudence. Exemplary damages
identifiable latent prints other than their not being present at the scene of the crime. Only latent
cannot be awarded as part of the civil liability since the crime was not committed with one or more
fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime laboratory
aggravating circumstances.60 because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of complete and
continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint examination. The
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the RTC of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga,
latent fingerprints are actually oily substance adhering to the surfaces of objects that come in
Branch 25 in Criminal Case No. 35-98, sentencing appellant Joel Yatar alias "Kawit" to Death for the
contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread such that when the
special complex crime of Rape with Homicide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he be
fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only smudges
ORDERED to pay the family of the victim Kathylyn Uba civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of
instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to be guided 5. CRIMINAL LAW; CIVIL LIABILITY OF PERSONS GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST
accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination. Noting the CHASTITY; INDEMNITY TO VICTIM FOR MULTIPLE RAPE ATTENDED BY
interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of proper latent CONSPIRACY; ACCUSED SOLIDARILY LIABLE THEREFOR. — With regard to the
fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately eliminate the indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of
possibility that the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime. They may be there one being the act of all, each must be liable for all the three rapes committed, they must be held
yet they had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at bar, only ten latent solidarily liable for said indemnity which the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or a
fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination are not sufficient to total of P90,000.00.
case even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.
6. ID.; ID.; IN MULTIPLE RAPE ACCUSED NOT REQUIRED TO RECOGNIZE OFFSPRING.
2. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED; POLICE LINE-UP NOT REQUIRED BY LAW — This Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to "recognize the
FOR PROPER IDENTIFICATION; FACE AND BODY MOVEMENT OF ASSAILANT CREATE offspring if there by any." In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized the offspring of
LASTING IMPRESSION ON VICTIM. — Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the the offended woman. In a case where three persons, one after another, raped a woman, neither of
fact is that they were positively identified at the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as the accuse was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was impossible to determine
essential to a proper identification. The complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her the paternity thereof.
attackers cannot be doubted for she had during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of
DECISION
the men who ravaged her. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to
see the looks and faces of their assailants and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. CAMPOS, JR., J p:
Most often the face of the assailant and body movement thereof, create a lasting impression which
The Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 36, Calamba, Laguna convicted all three
cannot easily be erased from their memory.
accused-appellants in its decision ** dated November 7, 1990, the dispositive portion of which
3. ID.; ID.; NON-FLIGHT NOT PROOF OF INNOCENCE; CASE AT BAR. — They claim that the reads:
fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee, even when they had all the opportunities to
"WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused Joel Sartagoda y Bocanegra, Jimmy Bascoña
do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home after Vilma failed to identify them
(sic) y Lazarte and Vicente Sta. Ana y Gutierrez all guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals
during the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and did not flee until they were
of the crime of Robbery With Rape, defined and penalized in Article 294, paragraph 2 of the
again required to appear at the police station for the second time. The accused-appellants in effect
Revised Penal Code; there being two aggravating circumstances without any mitigating
posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to flee, having the opportunity
circumstance to offset the same, hereby sentences each of the said accused to suffer the penalty of
to do so, is a sign of innocence. We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight
Reclusion Perpetua with the accessories provided for by the law.
indicates guilt, it does not necessarily follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so when
there is overwhelming evidence to establish their guilt. Each of the three accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party Vilma de Belen the sum of
P30,000.00, and each of them shall recognize the offspring if there be any.
4. ID.; APPEAL; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL JUDGE ENTITLED TO HIGHEST RESPECT;
EXCEPTION. — this Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in The said accused are likewise ordered to return the personal properties stolen or pay its equivalent
convicting the three accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 amount of P17,490.00 to Rogelio de Belen, the lawful owner thereof.
par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the
SO ORDERED." 1
evidence presented at the trial. We reiterate our ruling thus: "There is need to stress anew that this
Court has long been committed to the principle that the determination by a trial judge who could The facts of the case may be summarized as follows:
weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts fully proved is entitled to the highest respect, unless it
It was the evening of July 2, 1988 while Rogelio de Belen, his two daughters and his sister Vilma
could be shown that he ignored or disregarded circumstances of weight or influence sufficient to call
de Belen were sleeping in their house at Calamba, Laguna, when appellant broke in and woke him
for a different finding."
up, poking a knife at him. They tied up his hands and made him lie flat on his stomach and asked
for the key to his cabinet. Fearing for his life and that of his companions, he reluctantly told them Although We agree with their opinion that a positive finding of matching fingerprints has great
where the key was kept. significance, We cannot sustain their theory that from the negative findings in the fingerprint
examination conducted in the course of the investigation in the instant case, it must be concluded
Just on the other room was Vilma, who heard whispers (kaluskos) but simply played possum. When
that they could not have been at the scene of the crime. Negative findings do not at all times lead to
the three saw her on the bed, they approached her. One covered her mouth as another poked a knife at
a valid conclusion for there may be logical explanations for the absence of identifiable latent prints
her neck. They threatened to kill her if she should make an outcry.
other than their not being present at the scene of the crime.
They raised her blouse and removed her underwear. They tied both her hands so that she could offer
Only latent fingerprints found on smooth surface are useful for purposes of comparison in a crime
no resistance. She was at such a pitiful state when the accused Jimmy Bascuña went on top of her,
laboratory because prints left on rough surfaces result in dotted lines or broken lines instead of
kissing her on different parts of her body, while Vicente Sta. Ana held her legs apart. Jimmy finally
complete and continuous lines. Such kind of specimen cannot be relied upon in a fingerprint
inserted his sex organ inside her and satisfied his bestial desire. After Jimmy was over, Vicente took
examination. The latent fingerprints are actually oily substances adhering to the surfaces of objects
his turn and then Joel. After the three of them had successfully deflowered Vilma, they left, carrying
that come in contact with the fingers. By their very nature, oily substances easily spread such that
with them the money and other personal belongings of the de Belen family.
when the fingers slide against the surface they touch, no identifiable latent print is left, only
After the three men left, Rogelio, with his hands and feet still tied up, tried to get up from the bed and smudges instead. Not all police investigators are aware of the nature of latent fingerprints so as to
switched the lights on and called to his neighbors for help. Vilma, meanwhile, had lost consciousness be guided accordingly in deciding which objects to submit for fingerprint lifting and examination.
due to shock. Noting the interplay of many circumstances involved in the successful lifting and identification of
proper latent fingerprints in a particular crime scene, the absence of one does not immediately
Meanwhile, Petra Lamire, his sister-in-law who lives right next to his house responded to his cry for
eliminate the possibility that the accused-appellants could have been at the scene of the crime.
help. She went to their house and untied Rogelio. She saw Vilma with her upper body naked and
They may be there yet they had not left any identifiable latent fingerprint. Besides, in the case at
sobbing so she covered Vilma with a blanket. Soon after, his other sister-in-law also arrived. They
bar, only ten latent fingerprints are involved. The findings in this particular fingerprint examination
reported the incident to the Barangay Captain.
are not sufficient to cast even just a reasonable doubt in their finding of guilt for the crime charged.
They had Vilma examined by Dr. Danilo A. Ramirez at Dr. Jose Rizal Memorial Hospital at about
The accused-appellants likewise contend that the police line-up had been irregularly conducted
10:00 that same morning. He conducted external and internal examinations. His external examination
revealing suggestibility to their prejudice. They accused Pat. Reyes of coaching complainant Vilma
showed no physical injuries except that he noted several abrasions at the genital area. His internal
de Belen when she identified her three assailants. They claim that it was Pat. Reyes' fault that "they
examination showed fresh lacerations of the hymen at 9:00 and 4:00 positions. The vagina admitted
were not allowed to select their positions at the line-up; that they were not placed in line under a
two fingers with ease.
numeral against a wall marked to indicate their respective height in feet and inches; that there was
In the present appeal the lone assigned error is: no record made of their descriptions and physical characteristics; that the witness/victim was not
out of view of the three (3) accused lined-up for identification purposes." 2
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING (THAT) THE EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND We find these claims of irregularities of little if not, of no significance at all when considered in the
REASONABLE DOUBT HENCE, THEIR ACQUITTAL IS INEVITABLE. light of the natural desire in the victim to seek retribution not simply from anybody who may be
put before her but from the very same offenders who actually did violence against her. It would be
This appeal has no merit.
most illogical for an outraged victim to direct her anger against anyone other than her three
The accused-appellants fault the trial court of ignoring the fingerprint examination report submitted by offenders. We cannot accept the accused-appellants' claim that it was on Pat. Reyes' suggestion that
the Crime Laboratory of the PC/INP Camp Crame which stated that none of the specimen latent the victim pointed to the accused-appellants as her assailants. No amount of coaching will be
fingerprints were found to be positive. It is their contention that since their fingerprints were not found sufficient to counter the natural outrage of a rape victim against her abuser when said abuser is
in the objects found in the scene of the crime they cannot be held guilty of the crime charged beyond presented before her in a police line-up. The outrage displayed by the rape victim was a
reasonable doubt. spontaneous reaction. She identified her assailants because of no other reason except to let people
know who hurt her.
Whether or not there was a previous police line-up, the fact is that they were positively identified at Q At the time you examined the patient in your medical opinion it could have been 5 or 6 days had
the trial. There is no law requiring a police line-up as essential to a proper identification. 3 The elapsed?
complainant's recognition of the accused-appellants as her attackers cannot be doubted for she had
A Yes, sir.
during the carnal acts ample opportunity to see the faces of the men who ravaged her. It is the most
natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often the face of the assailant and
That will be all." 6
body movements thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot easily be erased from their
memory. 4 The trial court, in the exercise of its discretion to seek clarification in witness' testimony proceeded
as follows:
The accused-appellants further claim that "the Medical Findings of Dr. Danilo Ramirez concludes that
the alleged victim of rape, Vilma de Belen must have had sexual experienced (sic) five (5) to six (6) "COURT:
days before the alleged incident happened on July 2, 1988 at about 3 to 4 o'clock in the morning". 5
Q Doctor, in your findings you noted that there was an abrasion?
There is no truth to this claim. In fact, there was no categorical or positive assertion on the part of Dr.
Ramirez that the sexual intercourse with Vilma was committed on the very date when the alleged A Yes, your Honor.
"robbery with rape" took place on July 2, 1988.
Q Is that more than one abrasion?
This is a clear distortion of the testimony of Dr. Ramirez who on cross-examination testified as
A I found 3 mm., your Honor.
follows:
WITNESS (continuing):
"ATTY. MAIQUEZ:
— and on the lower opening of the vagina on the right side, that is the only place, sir.
Q You cannot also determine when was the first and when was the last intercourse as per your
examination? COURT:
FISCAL Q Aside from that injury or rater (sic) that portion there is no other injury which you found?
Objection, witness is incompetent. A None, your Honor.
COURT Q Because laceration stated in your medicolegal certificate that there was fresh hymenal laceration
noted at 9 and 4 o'clock on the face of the clock?
Witness may answer.
A Yes, your Honor.
A The findings suggest that because of hymenal laceration the injuries was (sic) recent not more than
one week, sir. Q Do we gather it right when you stated in your medicolegal certificate fresh it is not yet healed?
Q When you say it is not more than one week, could it be 6 or 5 days? A Yes, your Honor.
A Possible, sir. Q From that finding of yours regarding the existence of fresh hymenal laceration you said that it
least one or 2 days had elapsed before you have conducted the physical examination?
Q When you say it is possible that the victim could have experienced sexual intercourse 6 to 5 days
that was indicated in your examination marked as Exh. A, can you determine as per your finding? A Yes, your Honor.
A Well, yes, sir, I placed fresh hymenal laceration because laceration will determine whether it is fresh Q In other words from one to 5 days?
or old because of the characteristice (sic) of the laceration, sir.
A Yes, your Honor.
COURT: solidarily liable 9 for said indemnity which the trial court fixed at P30,000.00 for each offender or
a total of P90,000.00. 10
Q But it is possible that it could be more than one or two days?.
However, this Court cannot uphold the trial court's ruling ordering each of the accused to
WITNESS:
"recognize the offspring if there be any". In multiple rape, not one maybe required to recognized
A Yes, your Honor." 7 the offspring of the offended woman. In a case 11 where three persons, one after another, raped a
woman, neither of the accused was ordered to recognize the offspring simply because it was
It is evident that Dr. Ramirez never categorically concluded that the sexual intercourse causing the
impossible to determine the paternity thereof.
fresh hymenal lacerations took place five to six days before the date of her examination. The accused-
appellants' claim that the sexual intercourse took place on June 26 or 27, 1988 is conjectural and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the
without factual basis. MODIFICATION that the accused-appellants are held jointly and severally liable to indemnify
Vilma de Belen for multiple rape in the amount of P90,000.00, and that none of the accused is
The claim of the accused-appellants that the prosecution failed to present rebuttal evidence to refute
required to recognize the offspring.
the averments of Joel Sartagoda that they tried in vain to persuade him to admit the charge against him
and to implicate his two (2) co-accused did not deserve the attention of the trial court nor does it SO ORDERED.
deserve Ours, being per se unacceptable and unbelievable in the light of human experience.
Finally, they claim that the fact that Vicente Sta. Ana and Jimmy Bascuña did not flee, even when they
had all the opportunities to do so, prove their innocence. When they were allowed to go home after
Vilma failed to identify them during the first confrontation at the police station, they stayed home and
did not flee until they were again required to appear at the police station for the second time. The
accused-appellants in effect posit that if flight is an indication of guilt, non-flight or the decision not to
flee, having the opportunity to do so, is a sign of innocence.
CASES:
We do not agree. Although it is settled that unexplained flight indicates guilt, it does, not necessarily 1. BILL OF RIGHTS
follow that absence thereof proves innocence, specially so when there is overwhelming evidence to
establish their guilt. G.R. No. 130612 May 11, 1999
This Court finds no reversible error having been committed by the trial court in convicting the three PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
accused-appellants for the crime of robbery with multiple rape under Article 294 par. 2 of the Revised vs.
Penal Code. We affirm its findings of fact which are firmly grounded on the evidence presented at the BERNARDINO DOMANTAY, @ "JUNIOR OTOT," accused-appellant.
trial. We reiterate our ruling thus:
 
"There is need to stress anew that this Court has long been committed to the principle that the
MENDOZA, J.:
determination by a trial judge who could weigh and appraise the testimony as to the facts duly proved
is entitled to the highest respect, unless it could be shown that he ignored or disregarded circumstances This case is here on appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City
of weight or influence sufficient to call for a different finding." 8 (Branch 57), finding accused-appellant guilty of rape with homicide and sentencing him to death,
and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P480,000.00, and to pay the costs.
We are for the affirmance of the conviction of the three accused-appellants. With regard to the
indemnity to Vilma de Belen for multiple rape, there having been evidence of conspiracy, the act of
one being the act of all, each must be liable for all the three rapes committed, they must be held
The facts hark back to the afternoon of October 17, 1996, at around 4 o'clock, when the body of six- Jennifer Domantay, inflicting upon her multiple stab wounds, which resulted to
year old Jennifer Domantay was found sprawled amidst a bamboo grove in Guilig, Malasiqui, her death, to the damage and prejudice of her heirs.
Pangasinan. The child's body bore several stab wounds. Jennifer had been missing since lunch time.
At the trial, the prosecution presented seven witnesses, namely, Edward, Jiezl, Lorenzo, all
The medical examination conducted the following day by Dr. Ma. Fe Leticia Macaranas, the rural surnamed Domantay, Joselito Mejia, Antonio Espinoza, Celso Manuel, and Dr. Ronald Bandonill,
health physician of Malasiqui, showed that Jennifer died of multiple organ failure and hypovolemic to establish its charge that accused-appellant had raped and killed Jennifer Domantay.
shock secondary to 38 stab wounds at the back. Dr. Macaranas found no lacerations or signs of
Edward Domantay testified that in the morning of October 17, 1996, accused-appellant and his two
inflammation of the outer and inner labia and the vaginal walls of the victim's genitalia, although the
brothers-in-law, Jaime Caballero and Daudencio Macasaeb, had a round of drinks in front of the
vaginal canal easily admitted the little finger with minimal resistance. Noting possible commission of
latter's house in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. Edward Domantay said that he was in front of
acts of lasciviousness, Dr. Macaranas recommended an autopsy by a medico-legal expert of the NBI.2
Macasaeb's house, tending to some pigeons in his yard.5 After the group had consumed several
The investigation by the Malasiqui police pointed to accused-appellant Bernardino Domantay, a bottles of San Miguel gin, accused-appellant gave money to Edward Domantay and asked him to
cousin of the victim's grandfather, as the lone suspect in the gruesome crime. At around 6:30 in the buy two bottles of gin and a bottle of Sprite.6 Edward said he joined the group and sat between
evening of that day, police officers Montemayor, de la Cruz, and de Guzman of the Malasiqui Daudencio Macasaeb and accused-appellant. 7 Edward said that accused-appellant, who,
Philippine National Police (PNP) picked up accused-appellant at the Malasiqui public market and took apparently had one too many then, rolled up his shirt and said: "No diad Antipolo tan L[i]pa et
him to the police station where accused-appellant, upon questioning by SPO1 Antonio Espinoza, walay massacre, diad Guilig wala, walay massacren kod dia, walay onakis-akis" ("In Antipolo and
confessed to killing Jennifer Domantay. He likewise disclosed that at around 3:30 that afternoon, he Lipa, there were massacres; here in Guilig, there will also be a massacre. I will massacre somebody
had given the fatal weapon used, a bayonet, to Elsa and Jorge Casingal, his aunt and uncle here, and they will cry and cry"). Edward Domantay saw that tucked in the left side of accused-
respectively, in Poblacion Sur, Bayambang, Pangasinan. The next day, October 18, 1996, SPO1 appellant's waistline was a bayonet without a cover handle.8 It was not the first time that Edward
Espinoza and another policeman took accused-appellant to Bayambang and recovered the bayonet had seen accused-appellant with the knife as the latter usually carried it with him.9
from a tricycle belonging to the Casingal spouses. The police officers executed a receipt to evidence
Jiezl Domantay, 10, likewise testified. She said that, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October
the confiscation of the weapon.3
17, 1996, she and four other children were playing in front of their house in Guilig, Malasiqui,
On the basis of the post-mortem findings of Dr. Macaranas, SPO4 Juan Carpizo, the Philippine Pangasinan. Jiezl saw accused-appellant and Jennifer Domantay walking towards the bamboo
National Police chief investigator at Malasiqui, filed, on October 21, 1996, a criminal complaint for grove of Amparo Domantay where Jennifer's body was later found. Accused-appellant was about
murder against accused-appellant before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Malasiqui. On October two meters ahead of Jennifer. The bamboo grove was about 8 to 10 meters from the house of Jiezl
25, 1996, Dr. Ronald Bandonill, medico-legal expert of the NBI, performed an autopsy on the Domantay. 10
embalmed body of Jennifer. The result of his examination of the victim's genitalia indicated that the
Lorenzo Domantay, a relative of the victim, corroborated Jiezl's testimony that accused-appellant
child's hymen had been completely lacerated on the right side. Based on this finding, SPO4 Carpizo
had gone to Amparo Domantay's bamboo grove in the afternoon of October 17, 1996. Lorenzo said
amended the criminal complaint against accused-appellant to rape with homicide. Subsequently, the
that afternoon, on his way to his farm, he saw accused-appellant about 30 meters away, standing at
following information was filed:4
the spot in the bamboo grove where Jennifer's body was later found. Accused-appellant appeared
That on or about the 17th day of October, 1996, in the afternoon, in barangay Guilig, restless and worried as he kept looking around. However, as Lorenzo was in a hurry, he did not try
Municipality of Malasiqui, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the to find out why accused-appellant appeared to be nervous. 11
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and
Prosecution witness Joselito Mejia, a tricycle driver, said that, in the afternoon of October 17,
armed with a bayonnete, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
1996, he was about to take his lunch at home in Alacan, a neighboring barangay about half a
sexual intercourse with Jennifer Domantay, a minor of 6 years old against her will
kilometer from Guilig, when accused-appellant implored Mejia to take him to Malasiqui at once.
and consent, and on the same occasion, the said accused with intent to kill, then and
Mejia told accused-appellant that he was going to take his lunch first, but the latter pleaded with
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab with the use of a bayonnete, the said
him, saying they will not be gone for long. Mejia, therefore, agreed. Mejia noticed that accused-
appellant was nervous and afraid. Accused-appellant later changed his mind. Instead of going to the A I asked him what was his purpose for human interest's sake as
town proper, he alighted near the Mormon's church, outside Malasiqui. 12 a reporter, why did he commit that alleged crime. And I asked
also if he committed the crime and he answered "yes." That's it.
In addition, the prosecution presented SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and Celso Manuel who testified that,
on separate occasions, accused-appellant had confessed to the brutal killing of Jennifer Domantay. x x x           x x x          x x x
SPO1 Espinoza testified that he investigated accused-appellant after the latter had been brought to the PROS. QUINIT:
Malasiqui police station in the evening of October 17, 1996. Before he commenced his questioning, he
Q You mentioned about accused admitting to you on the
apprised accused-appellant of his constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and
commi[ssion] of the crime, how did you ask him that?
independent counsel, in English, which was later translated into Pangasinense. 13 According to SPO1
Espinoza, accused-appellant agreed to answer the questions of the investigator even in the absence of A I asked him very politely.
counsel and admitted killing the victim. Accused-appellant also disclosed the location of the bayonet
Q More or less what have you asked him on that particular
he used in killing the victim. 14 On cross-examination, Espinoza admitted that at no time during the
matter?
course of his questioning was accused-appellant assisted by counsel. Neither was accused-appellant's
confession reduced in writing. 15 Espinoza's testimony was admitted by the trial court over the A I asked "Junior Otot," Bernardino Domantay, "Kung
objection of the defense. pinagsisisihan mo ba ang iyong ginawa?" "Opo" sabi niya, "Ibig
mo bang sabihin Jun, ikaw ang pumatay kay Jennifer?", "Ako
Celso Manuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of station DWPR, an AM station based
nga po" The [l]ast part of my interview, "Kung nakikinig ang
in Dagupan City. He covers the third district of Pangasinan, including Malasiqui. Sometime in
mga magulang ni Jennifer, ano ang gusto mong iparating?",
October 1996, an uncle of the victim came to Dagupan City and informed the station about Jennifer
"kung gusto nilang makamtan ang hustisya ay tatanggapin ko".
Domantay's case. 16 On October 23, 1996, Manuel went to Malasiqui to interview accused-appellant
That is what he said, and I also asked Junior Otot, what was his
who was then detained in the municipal jail. He described what transpired during the interview thus:
purpose, and he said, it was about the boundary dispute, and he
17
used that little girl in his revenge.
PROS. QUINIT:
On cross-examination, Manuel explained that the interview was conducted in the jail, about two to
Q Did you introduce yourself as a media practitioner? three meters away from the police station. An uncle of the victim was with him and the nearest
policemen present were about two to three meters from him, including those who were in the radio
A Yes, sir.
room. 18 There was no lawyer present. Before interviewing accused-appellant, Manuel said he
Q How did you introduce yourself to the accused? talked to the chief of police and asked permission to interview accused-appellant. 19 On
questioning by the court, Manuel said that it was the first time he had been called to testify
A I showed to Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior Otot" my I.D.
regarding an interview he had conducted. 20 As in the case of the testimony of SPO1 Espinoza, the
card and I presented myself as a media practitioner with my tape
defense objected to the admission of Manuel's testimony, but the lower court allowed it.
recorder [in] my hand, sir.
Dr. Bandonill, the NBI medico-legal who conducted an autopsy of the victim on October 25, 1996,
Q What was his reaction to your request for an interview?
testified that Jennifer Domantay died as a result of the numerous stab wounds she sustained on her
A He was willing to state what had happened, sir. back, 21 the average depth of which was six inches. 22 He opined that the wounds were probably
caused by a "pointed sharp-edged instrument." 23 He also noted on the aforehead, neck, and breast
Q What are those matters which you brought out in that interview
bone of the victim. 24 As for the results of the genital examination of the victim, Dr. Bandonill said
with the accused Bernardino Domantay alias "Junior Otot"?
he found that the laceration on the right side of the hymen was caused within 24 hours of her death.
He added that the genital area showed signs of inflammation. 25
Pacifico Bulatao, the photographer who took the pictures of the scene of the crime and of the victim SO ORDERED.
after the latter's body was brought to her parents' house, identified and authenticated the five pictures
In this appeal, accused-appellant alleges that: 32
(Exhibits A, B, C, D, and E) offered by the prosecution.
I
The defense then presented accused-appellant as its lone witness. Accused-appellant denied the
allegation against him. He testified he is an uncle of Jennifer Domantay (he and her grandfather are THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE EXTRAJUDICIAL
cousins) and that he worked as a janitor at the Malasiqui Municipal Hall. He said that at around 1 CONFESSION[S] MADE BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
o'clock in the afternoon of October 17, 1996, he was bathing his pigs outside in the house of his
II
brother-in-law Daudencio Macasaeb in Guilig, Malasiqui, Pangasinan. He confirmed that Daudencio
was then having drinks in front of his (Macasaeb's) house. Accused-appellant claimed, however, that THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE
he did not join in the drinking and that it was Edward Domantay, whom the prosecution had presented FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
as witness, and a certain Jaime Caballero who joined the party. He also claimed that it was he whom REASONABLE DOUBT.
Macasaeb had requested to buy some more liquor, for which reason he gave money to Edward
First. Accused-appellant contends that his alleged confessions to SPO1 Antonio Espinoza and
Domantay so that the latter could get two bottles of gin, a bottle of Sprite, and a pack of cigarettes. 26
Celso Manuel are inadmissible in evidence because they had been obtained in violation of Art. III,
He denied Edward Domantay's claim that he (accused-appellant) had raised his shirt to show a
§ 12(1) of the Constitution and that, with these vital pieces of evidence excluded, the remaining
bayonet tucked in his waistline and that he had said he would massacre someone in Guilig. 27
proof of his alleged guilt, consisting of circumstantial evidence, is inadequate to establish his guilt
Accused-appellant also confirmed that, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, he went to Alacan passing beyond reasonable doubt. 33
on the trail beside the bamboo grove of Amparo Domantay. But he said he did not know that Jennifer
Art. III, § 12 of the Constitution in part provides:
Domantay was following him. He further confirmed that in Alacan, he took a tricycle to Malasiqui.
The tricycle was driven by Joselito Mejia. He said he alighted near the Mormon church, just outside of (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the town proper of Malasiqui to meet his brother. As his brother did not come, accused-appellant the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
proceeded to town and reported for work. That night, while he was in the Malasiqui public market, he independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
was picked up by three policemen and brought to the Malasiqui police station where he was services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
interrogated by SPO1 Espinoza regarding the killing of Jennifer Domantay. He denied having owned except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
to the killing of Jennifer Domantay to SPO1 Espinoza. He denied he had a grudge against the victim's
xxx xxx xxx
parents because of a boundary dispute. 28 With respect to his extrajudicial confession to Celso
Manuel, he admitted that he had been interviewed by the latter, but he denied that he ever admitted (3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or section 17
anything to the former. 29 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.
As already stated, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, "when the investigation is no
its decision reads: 30 longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a
suspect." 34 R.A. No. 7438 has extended the constitutional guarantee to situations in which an
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court hereby finds the accused,
individual has not been formally arrested but has merely been "invited" for questioning. 35
Bernardino Domantay @ "Junior Otot" guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the
crime of Rape with Homicide defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Decisions 36 of this Court hold that for an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, it must satisfy
Penal Code in relation and as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 and accordingly, the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of
the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection, and competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the total amount of Four Hundred Eighty
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the Malasiqui police station in the
Thousand Pesos (P480,000.00), 31 and to pay the costs.
evening of October 17, 1996, 37 he was already a suspect, in fact the only one, in the brutal slaying
of Jennifer Domantay. He was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the rights Accused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the jail when he was interviewed was
guaranteed in Art. III, § 12(1) of the Constitution applied to him. SPO1 Espinoza narrated what "tense and intimidating" and was similar to that which prevails in a custodial investigation. 42 We
transpired during accused-appellant's interrogation: 38 are not persuaded. Accused-appellant was interviewed while he was inside his cell. The interviewer
stayed outside the cell and the only person besides him was an uncle of the victim. Accused-
[I] interrogated Bernardino Domantay, prior to the interrogation conducted to him, I
appellant could have refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed. He answered questions
informed him of his constitutional right as follows; that he has the right to remain
freely and spontaneously. According to Celso Manuel, he said he was willing to accept the
silent; that he has the right to a competent lawyer of his own choice and if he can not
consequences of his act.
afford [a counsel] then he will be provided with one, and further informed [him] that
all he will say will be reduced into writing and will be used the same in the Celso Manuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around because about two to
proceedings of the case, but he told me that he will cooperate even in the absence of three meters from the jail were the police station and the radio room. 43 We do not think the
his counsel; that he admitted to me that he killed Jennifer Domantay, and he revealed presence of the police officers exerted any undue pressure or influence on accused-appellant and
also the weapon used [and] where he gave [it] to. coerced him into giving his confession.
But though he waived the assistance of counsel, the waiver was neither put in writing nor made in the Accused-appellant contends that "it is . . . not altogether improbable for the police investigators to
presence of counsel. For this reason, the waiver is invalid and his confession is inadmissible. SPO1 ask the police reporter (Manuel) to try to elicit some incriminating information from the accused."
Espinoza's testimony on the alleged confession of accused-appellant should have been excluded by the 44 This is pure conjecture. Although he testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no
trial court. So is the bayonet inadmissible in evidence, being, as it were, the "fruit of the poisonous evidence to show that Celso was a police beat reporter. Even assuming that he was, it has not been
tree." As explained in People v. Alicando: 39 shown that, in conducting the interview in question, his purpose was to elicit incriminating
information from accused-appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take an opposite
. . . According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
stance against the government by exposing official wrongdoings.
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from
it is also inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a Indeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or that the interview
direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that accused-appellant confessed to the
removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is killing our of fear. As already stated, the interview was conducted on October 23, 1996, 6 days
based the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to after accused-appellant had already confessed to the killing to the police.
gain other evidence because the originally illegal obtained evidence taints all
Accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession is corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti, namely,
evidence subsequently obtained.
the fact of death of Jennifer Domantay. In addition, the circumstantial evidence furnished by the
We agree with the Solicitor General, however, that accused-appellant's confession to the radio other prosecution witnesses dovetails in material points with his confession. He was seen walking
reporter, Celso Manuel, is admissible. In People v. toward the bamboo grove, followed by the victim. Later, he was seen standing near the bamboo
Andan, 40 the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews with the grove where the child's body was found. Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
media. In holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused gave his answers without
§3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction. — An
the assistance of counsel, this Court said: 41
extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground for
[A]ppellant's [oral] confessions to the newsmen are not covered by Section 12(1) and conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
(3) of Article III of the Constitution. The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with
§4. Evidence necessary in treason cases. — No person charged with treason shall
the relation between a private individual and another individual. It governs the
be convicted unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on
relationship between the individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
confession in open court.
primarily addressed to the State and its agents.
Accused-appellant argues that it was improbable for a brutal killing to have been committed
without the children who were playing about eight to ten meters from Amparo Domantay's grove,
where the crime took place, having heard any commotion. 45 The contention has no merit. Accused- while the victim was not shown to have had any; there were 38 stab wounds; and all the knife
appellant could have covered the young child's mouth to prevent her from making any sound. In fact, wounds are located at the back of Jennifer's body.
Dr. Bandonill noted a five by two inch (5" x 2") contusion on the left side of the victim's forehead,
But we think the lower court erred in finding that the killing was committed with cruelty. 48 The
which he said could have been caused by a hard blunt instrument or by impact as her head hit the
trial court appears to have been led to this conclusion by the number of wounds inflicted on the
ground. 46 The blow could have rendered her unconscious, thus precluding her from shouting or
victim. But the number of wounds is not a test for determining whether there was circumstance. 49
crying.
"The rest . . . is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the victim's suffering
Accused-appellant also contends that the testimony of Jiezl Domantay contradicts that of Lorenzo thus . . . there must be proof that the victim was made to agonize before the [the accused] rendered
Domantay because while Jiezl said she had seen accused-appellant walking towards the bamboo the blow which snuffed out [her] life." 50 In this case, there is no such proof of cruelty. Dr.
grove, followed by the victim, at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October 17, 1996. Lorenzo said Bandonill testified that any of the major wounds on the victim's back could have caused her death
he saw accused-appellant standing near the bamboo grove at about the same time. as they penetrated her heart, lungs and liver, kidney and intestines. 51
These witnesses, however, did not testify concerning what they saw exactly the same time. What they Second. There is, however, no sufficient evidence to hold accused-appellant guilty of raping
told the court was what they had seen "at around" 2 o'clock in the afternoon. There could have been a Jennifer Domantay. Art. 335. of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in part provides:
between difference in time, however little it was, between the time Jiezl saw accused-appellant and the
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having
victim walking and the time Lorenzo saw accused-appellant near the place where the victim's body
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances.
was later found. Far from contradicting each other, these witnesses confirmed what each had said each
one saw. What is striking about their testimonies is that while Jiezl said she saw accused-appellant 1. By using force or intimidation;
going toward the bamboo grove followed by the victim "at around" 2 o'clock in the afternoon on
2. When the woman is deprive of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
October 17, 1996, Lorenzo said he had seen accused-appellant near the bamboo grove "at around" that
time. He described accused-appellant as nervous and worried. There is no reason to doubt the claim of 3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
these witnesses. Lorenzo is a relative of accused-appellant. There is no reason he would testified
As the victim here was six years old, only carnal knowledge had to be proved to establish
falsely against the latter. Jiezl, on the other hand, is also surnamed Domantay and could also be related
rape. Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual
to accused-appellant and has not been shown to have any reason to testify falsely against accused-
bodily connections with a woman. 52 For this purpose, it is enough if there was even the
appellant. At the time of the incident, she was only 10 years old.
slightest contact of the male sex organ with the labia of the victim's genitalia. 53 However,
For the foregoing reasons, the Court is convinced of accused-appellant's guilt with respect to the there must be proof, by direct or indirect evidence, of such contact.
killing of the child. It is clear that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that accused-
Dr. Ronald Bandonill's report on the genital examination he had performed on the deceased reads:
appellant is guilty of homicide. Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
54
Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 [parricide] shall kill
GENITAL EXAMINATION; showed a complete laceration of the right side of the
another without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next
hymen. The surrounding genital area shows signs of inflammation.
preceding article [murder], shall be deemed guilty of homicide and be punished by
reclusion temporal. xxx xxx xxx
The killing was committed with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. REMARKS: 1) Findings at the genital area indicate the probability of penetration
The record shows that the victim, Jennifer Domantay, was six years old at the time of the killing. She of that area by a hard, rigid instrument.
was a child of small build, 46" in height. 47 It is clear then that she could not have put up much of a
Hymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape; 55 neither does its presence prove its
defense against accused-appellant's assault, the latter being a fully grown man of 29 years. Indeed, the
commission. As held in People v. Ulili, 56 a medical certificate or the testimony of the physician is
physical evidence supports a finding of abuse of superior strength: accused-appellant had a weapon,
presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to show that the latter had lost her virginity.
Consequently, standing alone, a physician's finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated Q This Genital Examination showed a complete laceration of the
does not prove rape. It is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal knowledge right side of the hymen, this may have been possibly caused by a
that rape may be deemed to have been established. 57 dagger, is it not?
This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a hymenal tear may be caused by objects A No, sir. I won't say that this would have been caused by a
other than the male sex organ 58 or may arise from other causes. 59 Dr. Bandonill himself admitted dagger, because a dagger would have made at its incision . . . not
this. He testified that the right side of the victim's hymen had been completely lacerated while the a laceration, sir.
surrounding genital area showed signs of inflammation. 60 He opined that the laceration had been
Q But this laceration may also have been caused by other factors
inflicted within 24 hours of the victim's death and that the inflammation was due to a trauma in that
other the human male organ, is that correct?
area. 61 When asked by the private prosecutor whether the lacerations of the hymen could have been
caused by the insertion of a male organ he said this was possible. But he also said when questioned by A A hard bl[u]nt instrument, sir could show.
the defense that the lacerations could have been caused by something blunt other than the male organ.
Q My question is other than the human male organ?
Thus, he testified: 62
A Possible, sir.
PROS. F. QUINIT:
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Now, what might have caused the complete laceration of the right
side of the hymen, doctor? COURT:
A Well, sir, if you look at my report there is a remark and it says Q You mentioned that the hymen was lacerated on the right side?
there; findings at the genital area indicated the probability of
A Yes, your Honor.
penetration of that area by a hard rigid instrument.
Q And if there is a complete erection by a human organ is this
Q Could it have been caused by a human organ?
possible that the laceration can only be on the right side of the
A If the human male organ is erect, fully erect and hard then it is hymen?
possible, sir.
A Yes, your Honor, its possible.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q How about if the penetration was done by a finger, was it the
ATTY. VALDEZ: same as the human organ?
Q In your remarks; finding at the genital area indicates the A Well, it defends on the size of the finger that penetrat[es] that
probability of penetration of that area by a hard rigid instrument, this organ, if the finger is small it could the superficial laceration, and
may have also been caused by a dagger used in the killing of if the finger is large then it is possible your honor.
Jennifer Domantay is that correct?
Q How about two fingers?
A Well, sir when I say hard rigid instrument it should not be sharp
A Possible, sir.
pointed and share rigid, it should be a hard bl[u]nt instrument.
To be sure, this Court has sustained a number of convictions for rape with homicide based on
Q Do you consider a bolo a bl[u] instrument, or a dagger?
purely circumstantial evidence. In those instances, however, the prosecution was able to present
A The dagger is a sharp rigid but it is not a bl[u]nt instrument, sir. other tell-tale signs of rape such as the location and description of the victim's clothings, especially
her undergarments, the position of the body when found and the like. 63 In People v. Macalino, 64
for instance, the Court affirmed a conviction for the rape of a two-year old child on the basis of Even assuming that Jennifer had been raped, there is no sufficient proof that it was accused-
circumstantial evidence. 65 appellant who had raped her. He did not confess to having raped the victim.
The Court notes that the testimony or medical opinion of Dr. Gajardo that the fresh From the foregoing, we cannot find that accused-appellant also committed rape. In the special
laceration had been produced by sexual intercourse is corroborated by the testimony complex crime of rape with homicide, both the rape and the homicide must be established beyond
given by complainant. Elizabeth that when she rushed upstairs upon hearing her reasonable doubt. 73
daughter suddenly cry out, she found appellant Macalino beside the child buttoning
Third. The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay the heirs of Jennifer Domantay the amount
his own pants and that she found some sticky fluid on the child's buttocks and some
of P30,000.00 as actual damages. However, the list of expenses produced by the victim's father,
blood on her private part.(Emphasis in the original)
Jaime Domantay, only totaled P28,430.00. Of this amount, only P12,000.00 was supported by a
In contrast, in the case at bar, there is no circumstantial evidence from which to infer that accused- receipt. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides that a party may recover actual or compensatory
appellant sexually abused the victim. The only circumstance from which such inference might be damages only for such loss as he has duly proved. Therefore, the award of actual damages should
made is that accused-appellant was seen with the victim walking toward the place where the girl's be reduced to P12,000.00.
body was found. Maybe he raped the girl. Maybe he did not. Maybe he simply inserted a blunt object
In addition, the heirs of Jennifer Domantay are entitled to recover exemplary damages in view of
into her organ, thus causing the lacerations in the hymen. Otherwise, there is no circumstance from
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Art. 2230 of the Civil
which it might reasonably be inferred that he abused her, e.g., that he was zipping up his pants, that
Code provides for the payment of exemplary damages when the crime is committed with one or
there was spermatozoa in the girl's vaginal canal.
more aggravating circumstance. An amount of P25,000.00 is deemed appropriate. 74
Indeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. Bandonill militates against the finding of rape. In describing the
In accordance with our rulings in People v. Robles 75 and People v. Mengote, 76 the indemnity
stab wounds on the body of the victim, he testified: 66
should be fixed at P50,000.00 and the moral damages at P50,000.00. 77
[A]fter examining the body I took note that were several stab wounds . . . these were
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered
all found at the back area sir . . . extending from the back shoulder down to the lower
FINDING accused-appellant guilty of homicide with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
back area from the left to the right.
superior strength and sentencing him to a prison term of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
Considering the relative physical positions of the accused and the victim in crimes of rape, the 20 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERING him to pay the heirs of Jennifer
usual location of the external bodily injuries of the victim is on the face, 67 neck, 68 and Domantay the amounts of P50,000.00, as indemnity, P50,000.00, as moral damages, P25,000.00,
anterior portion 69 of her body. Although it is not unnatural to find contusions on the posterior as exemplary damages, and P12,000.00, as actual damages, and the costs.1âwphi1.nêt
side, these are usually caused by the downward pressure on the victim's body during the
SO ORDERED.
sexual assault.70 It is unquestionably different when, as in this case, all the stab wounds
(except for a minor cut in the lower left leg) had their entry points at the back running from 2. RULE 129, SEC. 1, 2 & 3. JUDICIAL NOTICE
the upper left shoulder to the lower right buttocks.
A.M. No. RTJ-92-876 September 19, 1994
It is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue shorts and white shirt when her body was
STATE PROSECUTORS, complainants,
immediately after it was found. 71 Furthermore, there is a huge bloodstain in the back portion of her
vs.
shorts. 72 This must be because she wearing this piece of clothing when the stab wounds were
JUDGE MANUEL T. MURO, Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, Manila, respondent.
inflicated or immediately thereafter, thus allowing the blood to seep into her shorts to such an extent.
As accused-appellant would naturally have to pull down the girl's lower garments in order to
consummate the rape, then, he must have, regardless of when the stab wounds were inflicted, pulled
PER CURIAM:
up the victim's shorts and undergarments after the alleged rape, otherwise, the victim's shorts would
not have been stained so extensively. Again, this is contrary to ordinary human experience.
In assaying the requisite norms for qualifications and eminence of a magistrate, legal authorities place 4. That in dismissing aforecited cases on August 13, 1992 on the basis of a Central
a premium on how he has complied with his continuing duty to know the law. A quality thus Bank Circular or Monetary Board Resolution which as of date hereof, has not
considered essential to the judicial character is that of "a man of learning who spends tirelessly the even been officially issued, and basing his Order/decision on a mere newspaper
weary hours after midnight acquainting himself with the great body of traditions and the learning of account of the advance announcement made by the President of the said fact of
the law; is profoundly learned in all the learning of the law; and knows how to use that learning." 1 lifting or liberalizing foreign exchange controls, respondent judge acted
prematurely and in indecent haste, as he had no way of determining the full intent
Obviously, it is the primary duty of a judge, which he owes to the public and to the legal profession, to
of the new CB Circular or Monetary Board resolution, and whether the same
know the very law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy. He is called upon to exhibit more
provided for exception, as in the case of persons who had pending criminal cases
than just a cursory acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. Party litigants will have great
before the courts for violations of Central Bank Circulars and/or regulations
faith in the administration of justice if judges cannot justly be accused of apparent deficiency in their
previously issued on the matter;
grasp of the legal principles. For, service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the
law from beginning to end. 2 5. That respondent Judge's arrogant and cavalier posture in taking judicial notice
purportedly as a matter of public knowledge a mere newspaper account that the
In a letter-complaint 3 dated August 19, 1992, respondent Judge Manuel T. Muro of the Regional Trial
President had announced the lifting of foreign exchange restrictions as basis for
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 54, was charged by State Prosecutors Nilo C. Mariano, George C. Dee
his assailed order of dismissal is highly irregular, erroneous and misplaced. For
and Paterno V. Tac-an with ignorance of the law, grave misconduct and violations of Rules 2.01, 3.01
the respondent judge to take judicial notice thereof even before it is officially
and 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, committed as follows:
released by the Central Bank and its full text published as required by law to be
1. That on August 13, 1992, respondent judge issued an Order dismissing eleven (11) effective shows his precipitate action in utter disregard of the fundamental precept
cases (docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92- 101969, inclusive) filed by the of due process which the People is also entitled to and exposes his gross ignorance
undersigned complainant prosecutors (members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors) of the law, thereby tarnishing public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
against the accused Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, for Violation of Central Bank How can the Honorable Judge take judicial notice of something which has not yet
Foreign Exchange Restrictions, as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960, in relation to come into force and the contents, shape and tenor of which have not yet been
the penal provisions of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended, . . .; published and ascertained to be the basis of judicial action? The Honorable Judge
had miserably failed to "endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts" in the case at
2. That respondent Judge issued his Order solely on the basis of newspaper reports
bar contrary to Rule 3.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct constituting Grave
(August 11, 1992 issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Daily Globe)
Misconduct;
concerning the announcement on August 10, 1992 by the President of the Philippines
of the lifting by the government of all foreign exchange restrictions and the arrival at 6. That respondent Judge did not even ha(ve) the prudence of requiring first the
such decision by the Monetary Board as per statement of Central Bank Governor Jose comment of the prosecution on the effect of aforesaid Central Bank
Cuisia; Circular/Monetary Board resolution on the pending cases before dismissing the
same, thereby denying the Government of its right to due process;
3. That claiming that the reported announcement of the Executive Department on the
lifting of foreign exchange restrictions by two newspapers which are reputable and of 7. That the lightning speed with which respondent Judge acted to dismiss the
national circulation had the effect of repealing Central Bank Circular No. 960, as cases may be gleaned from the fact that such precipitate action was undertaken
allegedly supported by Supreme Court decisions . . ., the Court contended that it was despite already scheduled continuation of trial dates set in the order of the court
deprived of jurisdiction, and, therefore, motu, prop(r)io had to dismiss all the eleven (the prosecution having started presenting its evidence . . .) dated August 11, 1992
cases aforementioned "for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases to wit: August 31, September 3, 10, 21, & 23 and October 1, 1992, all at 9:30
over which it has no more jurisdiction;" o'clock in the morning, in brazen disregard of all notions of fair play, thereby
depriving the Government of its right to be heard, and clearly exposing his bias
and partiality; and
 8. That, in fact, the motive of respondent Judge in dismissing the case without even as an intention to be effected in the future, because of the use of the present perfect tense or past
waiting for a motion to quash filed by the counsel for accused has even placed his tense "has lifted," not that he "intends to lift," foreign exchange controls.
dismissal Order suspect.
Finally, respondent judge asseverates that complainants who are officers of the Department of
Pursuant to a resolution of this Court dated September 8, 1992, respondent judge filed his comment, 4 Justice, violated Section 6, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court which provides that "proceedings
contending, inter alia, that there was no need to await publication of the Central Bank (CB) circular against judges of first instance shall be private and confidential" when they caused to be published
repealing the existing law on foreign exchange controls for the simple reason that the public in the newspapers the filing of the present administrative case against him; and he emphasizes the
announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general circulation lifting foreign fact that he had to immediately resolve a simple and pure legal matter in consonance with the
exchange controls was total, absolute, without qualification, and was immediately effective; that admonition of the Supreme Court for speedy disposition of cases.
having acted only on the basis of such announcement, he cannot be blamed for relying on the
In their reply 5 and supplemental reply, 6 complainants aver that although the saving clause under
erroneous statement of the President that the new foreign exchange rules rendered moot and academic
Section 16 of CB Circular No. 1353 made specific reference to CB Circular No. 1318, it will be
the cases filed against Mrs. Marcos, and which was corrected only on August 17, 1992 but published
noted that Section 111 of Circular No. 1318, which contains a saving clause substantially similar to
in the newspapers on August 18, 1992, and only after respondent judge had issued his order of
that of the new circular, in turn refers to and includes Circular No. 960. Hence, whether under
dismissal dated August 13, 1992; that the President was ill-advised by his advisers and, instead of
Circular No. 1318 or Circular No. 1353, pending cases involving violations of Circular No. 960 are
rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming responsibility for errors in the latter's
excepted from the coverage thereof. Further, it is alleged that the precipitate dismissal of the eleven
announcement, they chose to toss the blame for the consequence of their failures to respondent judge
cases, without according the prosecution the opportunity to file a motion to quash or a comment, or
who merely acted on the basis of the announcements of the President which had become of public
even to show cause why the cases against accused Imelda R. Marcos should not be dismissed, is
knowledge; that the "saving clause" under CB Circular No. 1353 specifically refers only to pending
clearly reflective of respondent's partiality and bad faith. In effect, respondent judge acted as if he
actions or investigations involving violations of CB Circular No. 1318, whereas the eleven cases
were the advocate of the accused.
dismissed involved charges for violations of CB Circular No. 960, hence the accused cannot be tried
and convicted under a law different from that under which she was charged; that assuming that On December 9, 1993, this Court issued a resolution referring the complaint to the Office of the
respondent judge erred in issuing the order of dismissal, the proper remedy should have been an Court Administrator for evaluation, report and recommendation, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 140 of
appeal therefrom but definitely not an administrative complaint for his dismissal; that a mistake the Rules of Court, as revised, there being no factual issues involved. The corresponding report and
committed by a judge should not necessarily be imputed as ignorance of the law; and that a "court can recommendation, 7 dated February 14, 1994, was submitted by Deputy Court Administrator
reverse or modify a doctrine but it does not show ignorance of the justices or judges whose decisions Juanito A. Bernad, with the approval of Court Administrator Ernani Cruz-Paño.
were reversed or modified" because "even doctrines initiated by the Supreme Court are later reversed,
The questioned order 8 of respondent judge reads as follows:
so how much more for the lower courts?"
These eleven (11) cases are for Violation of Central Bank Foreign Exchange
He further argued that no hearing was necessary since the prosecution had nothing to explain because,
Restrictions as consolidated in CB Circular No. 960 in relation to the penal
as he theorized, "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through his
provision of Sec. 34 of R.A. 265, as amended.
hat' (to use a colloquialism) and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication (as now
alleged by complainants), of a still then non-existent CB circular? . . . As it turned out, CB Circular The accused Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos pleaded not guilty to all these cases;
No. 3153 (sic) does not affect my dismissal order because the said circular's so-called saving clause apparently the other accused in some of these cases, Roberto S. Benedicto, was
does not refer to CB Circular 960 under which the charges in the dismissed cases were based;" that it not arrested and therefore the Court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person;
was discretionary on him to take judicial notice of the facts which are of public knowledge, pursuant trial was commenced as against Mrs. Marcos.
to Section 2 of Rule 129; that the contention of complainants that he acted prematurely and in indecent
His Excellency, the President of the Philippines, announced on August 10, 1992
haste for basing his order of dismissal on a mere newspaper account is contrary to the wordings of the
that the government has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions and it is also
newspaper report wherein the President announced the lifting of controls as an accomplished fact, not
reported that Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia said that the Monetary Board
arrived at such decision (issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, August 11, 1992
 and issue of the Daily Globe of the same date). The Court has to give full confidence heard, and solely on the basis of newspaper reports announcing that the President
and credit to the reported announcement of the Executive Department, specially from has lifted all foreign exchange restrictions.
the highest official of that department; the Courts are charged with judicial notice of
The newspaper report is not the publication required by law in order that the
matters which are of public knowledge, without introduction of proof, the
enactment can become effective and binding. Laws take effect after fifteen days
announcement published in at least the two newspapers cited above which are
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
reputable and of national circulation.
newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided (Section 1,
Per several cases decided by the Supreme Court (People vs. Alcaras, 56 Phil. 520, Executive Order No. 200). The full text of CB Circular 1353, series of 1992,
People vs. Francisco, 56 Phil. 572, People vs. Pastor, 77 Phil. 1000, People vs. entitled "Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation" was published in the
Crisanto Tamayo, 61 Phil. 225), among others, it was held that the repeal of a penal August 27, 1992 issue of the Manila Chronicle, the Philippine Star and the Manila
law without re-enactment extinguishes the right to prosecute or punish the offense Bulletin. Per certification of the CB Corporate Affairs Office, CB Circular No.
committed under the old law and if the law repealing the prior penal law fails to 1353 took effect on September 2 . . . .
penalize the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed
Considering that respondent judge admittedly had not seen the official text of CB
law, the repealed law carries with it the deprivation of the courts of jurisdiction to try,
Circular No. 1353, he was in no position to rule judiciously on whether CB
convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to its repeal.
Circular No. 960, under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged, was already
Under the aforecited decisions this doctrine applies to special laws and not only to the
repealed by CB Circular No. 1353. . . .
crimes punishable in the Revised Penal Code, such as the Import Control Law. The
Central Bank Circular No. 960 under which the accused Mrs. Marcos is charged is xxx xxx xxx
considered as a penal law because violation thereof is penalized with specific
A cursory reading of the . . . provision would have readily shown that the repeal of
reference to the provision of Section 34 of Republic Act 265, which penalizes
the regulations on non-trade foreign exchange transactions is not absolute, as there
violations of Central Bank Circular No. 960, produces the effect cited in the Supreme
is a provision that with respect to violations of former regulations that are the
Court decisions and since according to the decisions that repeal deprives the Court of
subject of pending actions or investigations, they shall be governed by the
jurisdiction, this Court motu proprio dismisses all the eleven (11) cases as a
regulations existing at the time the cause of action (arose). Thus his conclusion
forestated in the caption, for not to do so opens this Court to charges of trying cases
that he has lost jurisdiction over the criminal cases is precipitate and hasty. Had he
over which it has no more jurisdiction.
awaited the filing of a motion to dismiss by the accused, and given opportunity for
This order was subsequently assailed in a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals, the prosecution to comment/oppose the same, his resolution would have been the
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Hon. Manuel T. Muro, Judge, RTC of Manila, Br. 54 and Imelda result of deliberation, not speculation.
R. Marcos," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 29349. When required to file her comment, private
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts. The power to
respondent Marcos failed to file any. Likewise, after the appellate court gave due course to the
take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite
petition, private respondent was ordered, but again failed despite notice, to file an answer to the
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
petition and to show cause why no writ of preliminary injunction should issue. Eventually, on April
negative. 10
29, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision 9 setting aside the order of August 13, 1992, and
reinstating Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be
one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not
In finding that respondent judge acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the
issuing the order of dismissal, the appellate court held that:
court. 11 The provincial guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is
The order was issued motu proprio, i.e., without any motion to dismiss filed by that of notoriety. 12 Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public
counsel for the accused, without giving an opportunity for the prosecution to be records and facts of general notoriety. 13
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is merely another way of saying that the usual pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of
form of evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the fact can be otherwise acquired. 14 This is action accrued shall govern.
because the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it will not be disputed. 15 But judicial
Respondent judge contends that the saving clause refers only to the provisions of Circular No.
notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial
1318, whereas the eleven criminal cases he dismissed involve a violation of CB Circular No. 960.
knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not
Hence, he insists, Circular No. 960 is deemed repealed by the new circular and since the former is
generally or professionally known, the basis of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of those
not covered by the saving clause in the latter, there is no more basis for the charges involved in the
matters which are "commonly" known. 16
criminal cases which therefore warrant a dismissal of the same. The contention is patently
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial notice, may be matters coming to the unmeritorious.
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
Firstly, the second part of the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 explicitly provides that "any
which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned
regulation on non-trade foreign transactions which has been repealed, amended or modified by this
demonstration. 17 Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be found in
Circular, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or investigations, shall not be
encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided they are of such
considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being
universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the
understood that as to such pending actions or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the
common knowledge of every person. 18
cause of action accrued shall govern." The terms of the circular are clear and unambiguous and
Respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the basis of a mere newspaper account leave no room for interpretation. In the case at bar, the accused in the eleven cases had already
which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence twice removed, took judicial notice of the been arraigned, had pleaded not guilty to the charges of violations of Circular No. 960, and said
supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not and cannot be considered of cases had already been set for trial when Circular No. 1353 took effect. Consequently, the trial
common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an administrative regulation court was and is supposed to proceed with the hearing of the cases in spite of the existence of
which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Jurisprudence dictates that judicial Circular No. 1353.
notice cannot be taken of a statute before it becomes effective. 19 The reason is simple. A law which is
Secondly, had respondent judge only bothered to read a little more carefully the texts of the
not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of common knowledge capable of ready and
circulars involved, he would have readily perceived and known that Circular No. 1318 also
unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements before a court can take judicial notice
contains a substantially similar saving clause as that found in Circular No. 1353, since Section 111
of a fact.
of the former provides:
Evidently, it was impossible for respondent judge, and it was definitely not proper for him, to have
Sec. 111. Repealing clause. - All existing provisions of Circulars 365, 960 and
taken cognizance of CB Circular No. 1353, when the same was not yet in force at the time the
1028, including amendments thereto, with the exception of the second paragraph
improvident order of dismissal was issued.
of Section 68 of Circular 1028, as well as all other existing Central Bank rules and
II. Central Bank Circular No. 1353, which took effect on September 1, 1992, further liberalized the regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with or contrary to the
foreign exchange regulations on receipts and disbursements of residents arising from non-trade and provisions of this Circular, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided,
trade transactions. Section 16 thereof provides for a saving clause, thus: however, that regulations, violations of which are the subject of pending actions or
investigations, shall be considered repealed insofar as such pending actions or
Sec. 16. Final Provisions of CB Circular No. 1318. - All the provisions in Chapter X
investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such pending actions
of CB Circular No. 1318 insofar as they are not inconsistent with, or contrary to the
or investigations, the regulations existing at the time the cause of action accrued
provisions of this Circular, shall remain in full force and effect: Provided, however,
shall govern.
that any regulation on non-trade foreign exchange transactions which has been
repealed, amended or modified by this Circular, violations of which are the subject of It unequivocally appears from the section above quoted that although Circular No. 1318 repealed
pending actions or investigations, shall not be considered repealed insofar as such Circular No. 960, the former specifically excepted from its purview all cases covered by the old
pending actions or investigations are concerned, it being understood that as to such
regulations which were then pending at the time of the passage of the new regulations. Thus, any IV. This is not a simple case of a misapplication or erroneous interpretation of the law. The very act
reference made to Circular No. 1318 necessarily involves and affects Circular No. 960. of respondent judge in altogether dismissing sua sponte the eleven criminal cases without even a
motion to quash having been filed by the accused, and without at least giving the prosecution the
III. It has been said that next in importance to the duty of rendering a righteous judgment is that of
basic opportunity to be heard on the matter by way of a written comment or on oral argument, is
doing it in such a manner as will beget no suspicion of the fairness and integrity of the judge. 20 This
not only a blatant denial of elementary due process to the Government but is palpably indicative of
means that a judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in
bad faith and partiality.
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity.
While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce The avowed desire of respondent judge to speedily dispose of the cases as early as possible is no
the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him license for abuse of judicial power and discretion, 25 nor does such professed objective, even if
should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias true, justify a deprivation of the prosecution's right to be heard and a violation of its right to due
and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should process of
moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion. law. 26
21
The lightning speed, to borrow the words of complainants, with which respondent judge resolved
Moreover, it has always heretofore been the rule that in disposing of controverted cases, judges should to dismiss the cases without the benefit of a hearing and without reasonable notice to the
show their full understanding of the case, avoid the suspicion of arbitrary conclusion, promote prosecution inevitably opened him to suspicion of having acted out of partiality for the accused.
confidence in their intellectual integrity and contribute useful precedents to the growth of the law. 22 Regardless of how carefully he may have evaluated changes in the factual situation and legal
A judge should be mindful that his duty is the application of general law to particular instances, that standing of the cases, as a result of the newspaper report, the fact remains that he gave the
ours is a government of laws and not of men, and that he violates his duty as a minister of justice prosecution no chance whatsoever to show or prove that it had strong evidence of the guilt of the
under such a system if he seeks to do what he may personally consider substantial justice in a accused. To repeat, he thereby effectively deprived the prosecution of its right to due process. 27
particular case and disregards the general law as he knows it to be binding on him. Such action may More importantly, notwithstanding the fact that respondent was not sure of the effects and
have detrimental consequences beyond the immediate controversy. He should administer his office implications of the President's announcement, as by his own admission he was in doubt whether or
with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository not he should dismiss the cases, 28 he nonetheless deliberately refrained from requiring the
of arbitrary power, but a judge under the sanction of the law. 23 These are immutable principles that prosecution to comment thereon. In a puerile defense of his action, respondent judge can but
go into the very essence of the task of dispensing justice and we see no reason why they should not be rhetorically ask: "What explanation could have been given? That the President was talking 'through
duly considered in the present case. his hat' and should not be believed? That I should wait for the publication of a still then non-
existent CB Circular?" The pretended cogency of this ratiocination cannot stand even the minutest
The assertion of respondent judge that there was no need to await publication of Circular No. 1353 for
legal scrutiny.
the reason that the public announcement made by the President in several newspapers of general
circulation lifting foreign exchange controls is total, absolute, without qualification, and immediately In order that bias may not be imputed to a judge, he should have the patience and circumspection
effective, is beyond comprehension. As a judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, respondent is to give the opposing party a chance to present his evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's
supposed to be well-versed in the elementary legal mandates on the publication of laws before they proofs might not be adequate to overthrow the case for the other party. A display of petulance and
take effect. It is inconceivable that respondent should insist on an altogether different and illogical impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold
interpretation of an established and well-entrenched rule if only to suit his own personal opinion and, neutrality of an impartial judge." 29 At the very least, respondent judge acted injudiciously and
as it were, to defend his indefensible action. It was not for him to indulge or even to give the with unjustified haste in the outright dismissal of the eleven cases, and thereby rendered his
appearance of catering to the at-times human failing of yielding to first impressions. 24 He having actuation highly dubious.
done so, in the face of the foregoing premises, this Court is hard put to believe that he indeed acted in
V. It bears stressing that the questioned order of respondent judge could have seriously and
good faith.
substantially affected the rights of the prosecution had the accused invoked the defense of double
jeopardy, considering that the dismissal was ordered after arraignment and without the consent of
said accused. This could have spawned legal complications and inevitable delay in the criminal speak well of respondent and cannot but further depreciate his probity as a judge. On this point, it
proceedings, were it not for the holding of the Court of Appeals that respondent judge acted with is best that pertinent unedited excerpts from his comment 32 be quoted by way of graphic
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. This saved the day for the People since in illustration and emphasis:
the absence of jurisdiction, double jeopardy will not set in. To stress this point, and as a caveat to trial
On the alleged ignorance of the law imputed to me, it is said that I issued the
courts against falling into the same judicial error, we reiterate what we have heretofore declared:
Order dismissing the eleven (11) cases against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos on the basis
It is settled doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's of newspaper reports referred to in paragraph 2 of the letter complaint without
setting aside of the trial court's judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the awaiting the official publication of the Central Bank Circular. Ordinarily a Central
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied due Bank Circular/Resolution must be published in the Official Gazette or in a
process. . . . . newspaper of general circulation, but the lifting of "all foreign exchange controls"
was announced by the President of the Philippines WITHOUT
Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its
QUALIFICATIONS; as published in the Daily Globe, August 11, 1992" the
case, its right to due process is thereby violated.
government has lifted ALL foreign exchange controls," and in the words of the
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic constitutional rights, Philippine Daily Inquirer report of the same date "The government yesterday
courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the violation of the State's right to due LIFTED the LAST remaining restrictions on foreign exchange transactions, . . ."
process raises a serious jurisdictional issue . . . which cannot be glossed over or (emphasis in both quotations supplied) not only the President made the
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is announcement but also the Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia joined in the
apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction . announcement by saying that "the Monetary Board arrived at the decision after
. . . 30 noting how the "partial liberalization" initiated early this year worked."

It is also significant that accused Marcos, despite due notice, never submitted either her comment on Therefore, because of the ABSOLUTE lifting of ALL restrictions on foreign
or an answer to the petition for certiorari as required by the Court of Appeals, nor was double exchange transactions, there was no need to await the publication of the repealing
jeopardy invoked in her defense. This serves to further underscore the fact that the order of dismissal circular of the Central Bank. The purpose of requiring publication of laws and
was clearly unjustified and erroneous. Furthermore, considering that the accused is a prominent public administrative rules affecting the public is to inform the latter as to how they will
figure with a record of influence and power, it is not easy to allay public skepticism and suspicions on conduct their affairs and how they will conform to the laws or the rules. In this
how said dismissal order came to be, to the consequent although undeserved discredit of the entire particular case, with the total lifting of the controls, there is no need to await
judiciary. publication. It would have been different if the circular that in effect repealed
Central Bank Circular No. 960, under which the accused was charged in the cases
VI. To hold a judge liable for rendering a manifestly unjust order through inexcusable negligence or
dismissed by me, had provided for penalties and/or modified the provisions of
ignorance, it must be clearly shown that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in
said Circular No. 960.
the performance of his duty that diligence, prudence and care which the law is entitled to exact in the
rendering of any public service. Negligence and ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest The Complainants state that the lifting of controls was not yet in force when I
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, and even though there is a dismissed the cases but it should be noted that in the report of the two (2)
misunderstanding or error of the law applied, it nevertheless results logically and reasonably, and in a newspapers aforequoted, the President's announcement of the lifting of controls
very clear and indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept. 31 was stated in the present perfect tense (Globe) or past tense (Inquirer). In other
words, it has already been lifted; the announcement did not say that the
In the present case, a cursory perusal of the comment filed by respondent judge reveals that no
government INTENDS to lift all foreign exchange restrictions but instead says
substantial argument has been advanced in plausible justification of his act. He utterly failed to show
that the government "has LIFTED all foreign exchange controls," and in the other
any legal, factual, or even equitable justification for the dismissal of the eleven criminal cases. The
newspaper cited above, that "The government yesterday lifted the last remaining
explanation given is no explanation at all. The strained and fallacious submissions therein do not
restrictions on foreign exchange transactions". The lifting of the last remaining toss the blame for the consequence of their failing to me, who only acted on the
exchange regulations effectively cancelled or repealed Circular No. 960. basis of announcements of their Chief, which had become of public knowledge.
The President, who is the Chief Executive, publicly announced the lifting of all x x x           x x x          x x x
foreign exchange regulations. The President has within his control directly or
The Court strongly feels that it has every right to assume and expect that respondent judge is
indirectly the Central Bank of the Philippines, the Secretary of Finance being the
possessed with more than ordinary credentials and qualifications to merit his appointment as a
Chairman of the Monetary Board which decides the policies of the Central Bank.
presiding judge in the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, stationed in the
No official bothered to correct or qualify the President's announcement of August 10, City of Manila itself. It is, accordingly, disheartening and regrettable to note the nature of the
published the following day, nor made an announcement that the lifting of the arguments and the kind of logic that respondent judge would want to impose on this Court
controls do not apply to cases already pending, not until August 17 (the fourth day notwithstanding the manifest lack of cogency thereof. This calls to mind similar scenarios and how
after my Order, and the third day after report of said order was published) and after this Court reacted thereto.
the President said on August 17, reported in the INQUIRER's issue of August 18,
In one case, an RTC Judge was administratively charged for acquitting the accused of a violation
1992, that the "new foreign exchange rules have nullified government cases against
of CB Circular No. 960 despite the fact that the accused was apprehended with US$355,349.00
Imelda R. Marcos, telling reporters that the charges against the widow of former
while boarding a plane for Hongkong, erroneously ruling that the State must first prove criminal
President Marcos "have become moot and academic" because of new ruling(s) which
intent to violate the law and benefit from the illegal act, and further ordering the return of
allow free flow of currency in and out of the country" (Note, parenthetically, the
US$3,000.00 out of the total amount seized, on the mistaken interpretation that the CB circular
reference to "new rules" not to "rules still to be drafted"). The INQUIRER report
exempts such amount from seizure. Respondent judge therein was ordered dismissed from the
continues: "A few hours later, presidential spokeswoman Annabelle Abaya said,
government service for gross incompetence and ignorance of the law. 33
RAMOS (sic) had "corrected himself'." "He had been belatedly advised by the
Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia and Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon that the Subsequently, the Court dismissed another RTC judge, with forfeiture of retirement benefits, for
Monetary Board Regulation excluded from its coverage all criminal cases pending in gross ignorance of the law and for knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment when he
court and such a position shall stand legal scrutiny', Mrs. Abaya, said." granted bail to an accused charged with raping an 11-year old girl, despite the contrary
recommendation of the investigating judge, and thereafter granted the motion to dismiss the case
I will elaborate on two points:
allegedly executed by the complainant. 34
1. If the President was wrong in making the August 10 announcement (published in
Similarly, an RTC judge who was described by this Court as one "who is ignorant of fairly
August 11, 1992, newspapers) and in the August 17 announcement, SUPRA, and thus
elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked
I should have relied on the Presidential announcements, and there is basis to conclude
penchant for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of
that the President was at the very least ILL-SERVED by his financial and legal
controversies, exhibits indifference to and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies
advisers, because no one bothered to advise the President to correct his
the law whimsically, capriciously and oppressively, and displays bias and impartiality," was
announcements, not until August 17, 1992, a few hours after the President had made
dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and with prejudice to
another announcement as to the charges against Imelda Marcos having been rendered
reinstatement in any branch of the government or any of its agencies or instrumentalities. 35
moot and academic. The President has a lot of work to do, and is not, to my
knowledge, a financier, economist, banker or lawyer. It therefore behooved his Still in another administrative case, an RTJ judge was also dismissed by this Court for gross
subalterns to give him timely (not "belated") advice, and brief him on matters of ignorance of the law after she ordered, in a probate proceeding, the cancellation of the certificates
immediate and far-reaching concerns (such as the lifting of foreign exchange of title issued in the name of the complainant, without affording due process to the latter and other
controls, designed, among others to encourage the entry of foreign investments). interested parties. 36
Instead of rescuing the Chief Executive from embarrassment by assuming
Only recently, an RTC judge who had been reinstated in the service was dismissed after he
responsibility for errors in the latter's announcement, these advisers have chosen to
acquitted all the accused in four criminal cases for illegal possession of firearms, on the ground
that there was no proof of malice or deliberate intent on the part of the accused to violate the law. The The crime is aggravated by nocturnity, craft, dwelling, treachery and abuse of
Court found him guilty of gross ignorance of the law, his error of judgment being almost deliberate superior strength.
and tantamount to knowingly rendering an incorrect and unjust judgment. 37
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
ACCORDINGLY, on the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court finds respondent Judge
Pursuant to the order of arrest issued on November 5, 1985, the accused were arrested and
Manuel T. Muro guilty of gross ignorance of the law. He is hereby DISMISSED from the service, such
committed to the custody of the Provincial Warden on November 22, 1985.
dismissal to carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits,
and disqualification from reemployment in the government service. 38 On December 4, 1985, accused Prudencio Pugal, Antonio Soriano, Ricardo Adduca and Artemio
Panagan, assisted by their defense counsel, Attys. Cesar Purugganan and William F. Claver, were
Respondent is hereby ordered to CEASE and DESIST immediately from rendering any judgment or
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged.
order, or continuing any judicial action or proceeding whatsoever, effective upon receipt of this
decision. Accused Ricardo Adduca posted his bail bond and was ordered released on October 2, 1986.
However, on the basis of a motion to withdraw by his bondsman, Adduca was re-arrested and
SO ORDERED.
committed to the provincial jail. While detained therein, Adduca escaped. On February 2, 1989, the
G.R. No. 96037 October 29, 1992 trial court issued an order for his arrest but until now he remains at large.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Accused Antonio Soriano was "receipted" for by a certain Roberto Baggay, the Acting Mayor of
vs. Pudtol, Kalinga-Apayao, inexplicably without the approval of or an order from the trial court
PRUDENCIO PUGAL, ANTONIO SORIANO and RICARDO ADDUCA, accused, authorizing him to do so. Subsequently, said accused also remained at large.
PRUDENCIO PUGAL, accused-appellant.
The trial court dismissed the case as against accused Artemio Panagan upon motion of the
prosecution on the basis of an affidavit of desistance of Erlinda Salamanca, wife of the victim,
wherein she stated that the former was not one of those who killed her husband. Trial, however,
REGALADO, J.:
proceeded against the herein three accused since they had all been arraigned and the absence of
In an information 1 filed on November 5, 1985 before the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Branch 25, accused Soriano and Adduca was unjustified.
Kalinga-Apayao, herein accused Prudencio Pugal, Antonio Soriano, Ricardo Adduca and one Artemio
The record show that on January 11, 1989, accused Prudencio Pugal had been ordered released
Panagan were charged with the crime of "Robbery with Homicide with the Use of Unlicensed
from jail after filing his bail bond. However, after the promulgation of the judgment of the trial
Firearm" under Article 294, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Presidential Decree
court hereunder indicated, said court issued an order on July 17, 1989 cancelling his bail bond and
No. 1866, committed as follows:
committing him to the provincial jail where he was accordingly detained. 2
That on or about the evening of July 23, 1985 at Riverside, Laya West, Tabuk,
Parenthetically, aside from the above-named accused charged in the information filed by the
Kalinga-Apayao and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
Provincial Fiscal of Kalinga-Apayao, Pat. Raymund Caseñas of Pinukpuk, Kalinga-Apayao was
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, with
also charged in connection with the said killing of Jacinto Salamanca but the case against him was
treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to gain and by the use of force,
forwarded to the military tribunal pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1850, as
violence and intimidation of persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
amended, 3 and the same is not involved in the present proceeding.
feloniously take and carry away the amount of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) Pesos,
Philippine Currency, belonging to the victim and his wife, to their damage and On July 17, 1989, the trial court rendered judgment disposing as follows:
prejudice in said amount, and by reason and on the occasion of said Robbery, the
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused PRUDENCIO
accused tied said JACINTO SALAMANCA to a coconut tree and thereafter,
PUGAL, RICARDO ADDUCA and ANTONIO SORIANO guilty beyond
willfully, and feloniously shot Jacinto Salamanca on different parts of his body (and)
reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE
said multiple gunshot wounds caused his direct and immediate death.
 WITH THE USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARM, defined and penalized under Prudencio Pugal and Ricardo Adduca standing near the door. The place was then lighted by a 20-
Article 294, in relation with P.D. 1866, sentencing each of the accused to suffer the watt flourescent lamp. 7
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the
Erlinda told Jacinto to open the door. Once it was opened, however, Pugal pulled Jacinto out of the
deceased Jacinto Salamanca the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) plus
house, and then three masked men rushed inside the house. One of the men who had a long
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) moral and exemplary damages without
armalite rifle stood guard at the door, while the other two, one of whom had a short firearm,
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency pursuant to Article 39 of the Revised
entered the house. 8 Adduca, one of the two men who came inside, demanded money and an
Penal Code and to pay the costs.
armalite rifle from the occupants of the house, and when the latter failed to produce any, Adduca
SO ORDERED. 4 ransacked the house. 9 Erlinda was thus compelled to give her earnings for the day amounting to
P1,000.00 and, in addition, she gave the ring of her daughter-in-law. They were then ordered and
Appellant Prudencio Pugal, the lone accused who appealed to us from said decision, assigns the
forced to lie on the floor face down. Subsequently, Erlinda and Hizon heard the clapping of hands
following errors allegedly committed by the court a quo:
from outside the house. 10 Sensing that nobody was guarding them anymore, Erlinda and Hizon
1. The trial court grievously erred in holding that the killing of the victim was crawled towards the window. From there, they saw the men drag Jacinto and tie him to a coconut
positively witnessed by prosecution witnesses Hizon and Erlinda Salamanca; tree with a rope. Erlinda also saw Pugal slap and kick Jacinto. Then, the man with an armalite rifle
pointed his gun upwards and fired it several times. Afterwards, he moved backward, pointed the
2. The lower court grievously erred in giving full evidentiary weight and credence to
gun at Jacinto, and shot the latter several times. 11
the testimonies of Hizon and Erlinda Salamanca who are biased and whose
testimonies are pregnant with serious and material inconsistencies, improbabilities The malefactors thereafter fled towards the north and when they reached the "canto" leading to
and shaky; Cabaruan, another gunshot was heard. Upon seeing that the culprits were already far away, Erlinda
and Hizon rushed to where Jacinto was, only to find his already lifeless body. Erlinda then sent
3. The lower court erred in finding that appellant Prudencio Pugal was the one who
Hizon to call for assistance and, in no time, the barangay people and the police arrived at the scene
pulled the deceased from inside the house, brought him outside and tied him to a
of the crime. When Jacinto's body was brought to their house, Hizon noticed that his father's false
coconut tree;
teeth were missing. Efforts to look for the same at and near the place where Jacinto was killed
4. The lower court erred in disregarding the plea of alibi by appellant Prudencio proved futile. 12
Pugal;
Two days after Jacinto died, Pugal went to the house of the Salamancas and handed over to Hizon
5. The lower court committed grave error in not acquitting Prudencio Pugal on the missing artificial dentures of Jacinto which he allegedly found near the place where the victim
ground of reasonable doubt. 5 was killed. Puga stayed in the house of the Salamancas for the entire duration of the wake until the
ninth day of prayer. 13
The prosecution presented as witnesses Hizon Salamanca, son of the deceased Jacinto Salamanca;
Erlinda Salamanca, wife of said victim; Dr. Jaime Almora; and Atty. Wayne Odiem, whose collective On July 24, 1985, Dr. Jaime Almora, a resident physician at the Kalinga-Apayao Provincial
testimonies establish the facts of this case as hereunder summarized. Hospital, conducted an autopsy on Jacinto Salamanca and submitted the following —

On July 23, 1985, at around 9:00 P.M., Erlinda Salamanca, together with her son Hizon and daughter- POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
in-law Lolita, was resting inside their house at Laya West, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao. Her husband,
External Examination = Cadaver fully clothed, flaccid, with no
Jacinto Salamanca, had just started to eat supper when the dogs started barking and they heard and
sign of rigor mortis or lividity or decomposition.
recognized the voice of Prudencio Pugal call "Apo" three times. 6 Jacinto, who was followed by
Erlinda, went to the sala and asked, "Who are you?" Somebody answered, "Dakami," meaning "We Head = Left side of skull sagging and with multiple fracture due
are the ones." When Jacinto again called out, "Who are you," the person outside replied, "We are the to multiple gunshot wounds with loss of some brain tissue and
ones, we came from Dagupan." Jacinto and Erlinda peeped through the jalousie window and they saw left eye.
 Chest = Gunshot wound with point of entry measuring 5mm to 7mm First, he contends that Hizon testified that the two men who entered the house wore masks,
at the 54th ics mid clavicular line directed posteriorly, medially & whereas Erlinda testified that their faces were not covered. This inconsistency, he claims, cannot be
horizontally exiting at the (L) mid clavicular line level of the 8th lcs. considered trivial.
Extremities = R Thigh = grazing wound directed downward at the As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant was obviously confused. Hizon's
anterior upper third of R thigh. testimony was in answer to the question when the robbers were already inside the house, while
Erlinda's was with respect to the first time she saw appellant and his co-accused who were then
L Thigh = entry wound at the middle third, medial
calling from outside the house. 20 Thus, Hizon Salamanca stated:
aspect of left thigh directed laterally, posteriorly
downward. Q Now, Mr. Witness, you said that particular night and time of
July 23, 1985, two (2) men entered your house, were they using
Left leg = Entry wound at the antero-medial aspect
mask?
of left leg middle third with no point of exit. Copper
Jacket of Bullet recovered. A Yes, sir. 21
CAUSE OF DEATH: Multiple gunshot wound(s), head, chest, thigh, and leg. 14 and the testimony of Erlinda Salamanca was as follows:
It appears that Erlinda and Hizon Salamanca gave their sworn statements on August 16 15 and Q Now, you said you saw Prudencio Pugal and Ricardo Adduca
September 8, 1985, 16 respectively, both to Police Sgt. Artemio Catabay in the investigation room of when you peeped with your husband through the jalous(ie). How
the Tabuk Police Station at Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao. were you able to identify them?
The records further reveal that on September 24, 1985, accused Antonio Soriano, accompanied by A Because during that night time we used 20 watts flourescent
Sgts. Taguiam and Aquino, went to the office of prosecution witness Atty. Wayne Odiem, District lamp and so I saw them there, sir.
Citizen Attorney of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, to seek the latter's help in the taking of
Q How far were they — this Adduca and Pugal when you saw
Soriano's confession. After having informed Soriano of his constitutional rights to remain silent, to
them?
counsel, and to engage a counsel of his own choice, with the requisite warnings on the possible use of
his statement, Atty. Odiem assisted Soriano while the latter gave his extrajudicial confession 17 to the A Pugal is near the window and Ricardo Adduca is behind
police investigators. During the investigation, Soriano, never intimated to him that the former was Prudencio Pugal, sir.
coerced and threatened into giving his statement wherein he implicated herein appellant Pugal as one
Q Were they in mask?
of the assailants.
A No, they were not in mask because we opened it, if they were
As against the straightforward testimonies of the two principal prosecution witnesses, appellant could
using a mask we did (sic, would) not open the door, sir. 22
only present the defense of alibi cum denial. Pugal stated that on the night of July 23, 1985, he was at
home at Laya West, which is about one and a half kilometers away from the house of the victim, and Furthermore, there could be no inconsistency to speak of precisely because Erlinda likewise
that he did not notice any unusual incident that night. 18 On the other hand, the second defense testified that the accused were already wearing masks when they entered the house, in effect
witness, Lydia Magno, testified that appellant is her uncle, that he and Adduca were part of the corroborating the testimony of Hizon on this point. Hence, in her direct examination, Erlinda
"ronda" which went around the barrio, but nowhere in her testimony did she state anything about the declared —
exact whereabouts of Adduca or appellant on that particular night. 19
Q Can you identify any of the two (2) persons who actually
I. Appellant Pugal asserts that the trial court erred in relying on the testimonies of Erlinda and Hizon entered your house?
Salamanca which are allegedly replete with inconsistencies and contradictions.
 A I can not identify the other one because he has a very tight mask Thus, in People vs. Gardon, 28 we held: "That appellant did not flee from the scene of the crime is
but I can identify the other one because he has a loose mask which not necessarily indicative of a clear conscience. He may have smugly thought that the two men
when talking he bite (sic) his bonnet with his mouth, sir. 23 fishing on the pier would not be able to identify him, or that they would keep "quiet about it" at his
behest." In People vs. Bautista, 29 we further ruled that:
which she further clarified in her cross-examination:
The fact that the appellant joined the search for the victim and that he and a
Q Let us go back to the crime when the two persons stood guard to
certain Gabriel Madlangbayan went to Noveleta, Cavite to buy a coffin for the
the door of the house, one allegedly Ricardo Adduca rushed in to
victim does not disprove his culpability of the offense charged nor strengthen his
search to (sic) your belonging(s), these three (3) persons were all
claim of innocence. . . .
masked, is it not Mrs. Salamanca?
xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, sir. It was only Pugal who was not masked, sir. 24
. . . The solicitous attitude of appellant was part of his craft to divert attention
The fact that it was only appellant who was not masked was corroborated by Hizon with the same
from him and appear blameless. Appellant assumed this posture of innocence
declaration in court:
despite his awareness that his charged because he was doubly certain that
Q You said that the incident happened at around 9:00 o'clock in the Francisca, who feared for her life as well as the lives of her relatives, would not
night of July 23, 1985, my question is: How could you have expose him.
recognized Prudencio Pugal as the one who pulled your father?
Still, in another case, this Court held that:
A It is because we have twenty (20) watts fluorescent lamp which
In some cases of murder, robbery, or even rape where a person is a prime suspect,
energized (sic) by a battery — 12 volts battery.
his not fleeing may be a badge of innocence. In the present case, however, the
Q Was Prudencio Pugal masked at that time, Mr. Witness? crime was committed with impunity on three occasions by one who thought the
victim would not complain. Under the circumstances of this case, the appellant
A No, sir. 25
would most likely not have been discovered if Josephine did not become
Second, appellant theorizes that it is hard to believe that a person who will kill someone who is well pregnant. The appellant did not have to flee. 30
known in the community will not hide his face, this being contrary to human nature and common
And, finally, in People vs. Luardo, et al. 31 where the accused, as in the case at bar, likewise
experience. Appellant premises this postulation on his presence at the house of the victim during the
attended the vigil and funeral of the deceased, the Court, did not apply the general rule with this
wake until the ninth day of prayer, which fact supposedly negated any and all indicia of guilt on his
explanation:
part.
The defense laid stress on the fact that appellants could have escaped, but did not.
This, at best, is a mere conjectural pose which cannot stand against the positive identification of the
On the contrary, both Bedico and Capio attended the vigil and funeral of the
accused. Appellant's pretended innocence is clearly non sequitur to his decision not to flee. Apart from
deceased and even helped carry the bier of the latter. . . .
the fact that there is no case law holding that non-flight is a conclusive proof of innocence, the
argument does not hold weight in the light of the positive identification of the appellant. The material Verily, there is no argument on the fact that flight is indicative of guilty so that it
factor here is that there is positive identification of the accused as the author or, more accurately, co- may be considered in favor of the accused in the case at bar that they did no
author of the crime. 26 escape. Nonetheless, it has also been held by this Court that the fact that the
accused did not take flight but even helped the police to locate the supposed
Generally, the decision of an accused not to flee despite an opportunity to do so is hardly characteristic
culprits, is not a sufficient ground to exculpate them from the proved criminal
of a guilty person seeking to escape retribution for his crime. 27 But this is not without exceptions. In
liability.
a number of cases, we have had the occasion to rule that the fact that accused did not flee from the
scene of the crime is not a sufficient ground to exculpate them from the proven criminal liability.
Third, appellant asseverates that the failure of Hizon and Erlinda Salamanca to immediately give their A No, I did not say it immediately to my brothers because they
statements to the police (which they gave only after the lapse of 67 days after the incident took place) were studying in Tuguegarao.
affects their credibility.
Q But immediately after the killing the policemen of Tabuk came
As a general rule, the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he had to Laya West, is that correct?
witnessed cannot be taken against him for it is not uncommon for a witness to a crime to show some
A Yes, sir.
reluctance about getting involved in a criminal case. The natural reticence of most people to get
involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice, and the fear of eyewitnesses when townmates are Q They made an investigation of the crime?
involved in the commission of the crime is understandable for they may provoke retaliation from the
A Yes, sir.
accused. The delay, when adequately explained, does not impair the credibility of the witness; neither
will it render his testimony biased nor destroy its probative value. 32 Q And they asked you know (sic) the killers, is it not?
In the case at bar, the two principal witnesses for the prosecution gave more than adequate reason for A Yes, sir.
their initial reluctance in giving their sworn statements to the police, that is, fear for their safety and
Q And you told them you do not know because you were afraid?
their lives. As a matter of fact, after the ninth day of prayer for the deceased, the Salamancas had to
leave their house and transfer to another place in apprehension of possible reprisals from the culprits. A Yes, sir.
When asked why he failed to immediately report and disclose the identity of the suspects, Hizon Q According to you — you stayed in Tabuk for the whole seven
Salamanca testified: days that your father was in his wake, is that correct?
Q Now, Mr. Hizon Salamanca, in spite (of) the death of your father, A Yes, sir.
in spite of the threats of Pugal, and in spite of the fact that you
Q And there were many visitors who came even the Mayor of
mauled him before and you know that he is smaller than you are,
Tabuk came to your house, is that correct?
you did not report his name to the police — that he was the one who
entered your house and killed your father? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir, because we were afraid, for fear that they might come Q And they asked you if you know who the killers were?
back for us.
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not even tell that to anyone else — You told it only to
Q But just the same you stick (sic) your belief that you should
your mother, is that correct?
not tell them the truth?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q You did not even tell that to your wife?
COURT:
A I told this to my wife and to my brothers.
Did you not know that if only you told them the identity of the
Q Who were your brothers? killers of your father, the police could have arrested them and put
them to jail and for this reason there would be no more danger in
A Raymundo and all my brothers, sir.
your life?
Q You gave this information to them that Pugal was one of the
WITNESS:
murderers immediately after the incident, is that correct?
 Yes, but I am afraid, for fear that they might have still other cannot prevail over the positive identification of prosecution witnesses. 39 To be given credence, it
companions. must not only appear that the accused interposing the same was at some other place but also that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. 40
COURT:
In the case at bar, appellant was positively identified by Hizon and Erlinda. The following
Proceed.
observations thereon in appellee's brief accordingly merit our approval:
Q But when you gave your statements two months and seven days
. . . Appellant was not only seen and recognized through his face, he was
after the incident, you were no longer afraid?
identified also through his voice.
A No more, sir, because they were already apprehended.
As testified to by both prosecution witnesses, Erlinda and Hizon, appellant was
Q It did not occur to you that there are still others at the time and the one who called "Apo" for three times and also the one who replied "Dakami"
they could go out after you? and "Naggapu kami Idiay Dagupan", when asked. (TSN, p. 7 Erlinda S.; TSN, p.
9, testimony of Salamanca). The voice of appellant is familiar to both Erlinda and
A No more, sir, because they (sic) already there in the jail,
Hizon because they have had occasions in the past to talk to him oftenly
depressed. 33
considering that appellant is their neighbor and barriomate for more than 20 years.
Fourth, appellant claims that Hizon and Erlinda are biased as witnesses considering that they are (TSN, p. 7, Erlinda S.; TSN, p. 8, Hizon S.).
related and very close to the deceased, hence they have the tendency to exaggerate or give false color
Appellant was also seen and identified by prosecution witnesses as he was not
to their testimonies.
wearing any mask and neither was his face covered during the time he was calling
This Court has repeatedly held that mere relationship of the witnesses to the victim does not render from outside the house. (TSN, p. 8, Erlinda S.; TSN, p. 13-16, Hizon S.).
their clear and positive testimony less worthy of full faith and credit. On the contrary, their natural
Appellant was recognized by the prosecution witnesses because of the fluorescent
interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating persons other than
lamp in front of the house energized by a 12-volt battery then illuminating their
the culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. 34 Hence, the closeness of their
house. Besides, the night then was a moonlit night. (TSN, p. 8, Erlinda S.; TSN, p.
relationship to the deceased should not, contrary to appellant's view, be deemed erosive of their
13, Hizon S.).
credibility as witnesses. That they are the wife and son of the victim does not make them incompetent
as witnesses, nor should it serve to detract from the credit otherwise due them. 35 xxx xxx xxx

Besides, there is no iota of evidence to show that the family of the victim was actuated by improper Worthy to note is the testimony of Erlinda that when she recognized the identity
motives to testify falsely against the accused. It is a jurisprudentially embedded and conceded rule that of the persons calling from the outside, she even told her husband to open the
the mere fact that the witness is a relative is not a valid or sufficient ground to disregard the former's door. This is but natural and in accord with common observation and human
testimony nor does it render the same less worthy of credit, in the absence of any ill motive. 36 experience.
Furthermore, the prosecution witnesses are not merely relatives of the deceased; they are likewise
Otherwise, if the persons calling were masked as claimed by the defense, the
victims of the robbery committed by the accused.
natural and logical reaction would be to suspect that they were bad elements and
II. Appellant's defense hinges primarily on alibi. He claims though that while alibi is the weakest of all there would be reason not to open the door. . . . 41
defenses, nevertheless, where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and betrays lack of
The pretension that appellant was allegedly at his house at the time of the incident cannot stand
concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused committed the crime charged, the defense
against the clear and positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. Also, the Solicitor
of alibi assumes importance.
General correctly concluded that considering the proximity in the distance between the two houses,
Time and again we have stressed, virtually to the point of repletion were it not for its pertinency, that it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the locus criminis and then return to his
alibi is one of the weakest defenses an accused can invoke 37 because it is easy of fabrication. 38 It house shortly afterwards.
Finally, conspiracy has been sufficiently established in this case. The concerted acts of the accused SYLLABUS
began with the deceased Juanito being called by Pugal and Adduca who purposely made themselves
identifiable to facilitate their entry into the house. Once the door was opened, three of the accused who
were already wearing masks entered the house while Pugal pulled Jacinto outside. Then one of the 1. CRIMINAL LAW; RAPE; GUILT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
three who entered the house stood guard at the door while the two others ransacked the place. ACCUSED’S SALES TALK ABOUT "TRIPS" FACILITATED COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
— We hold that his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The fact is that Estella knew
Thereafter, upon hearing the clapping of hands from the outside, the three malefactors immediately nothing about Ornacol. It was Lintag’s sales talk about "trips" which inveigled her into asking him
left. The deceased was tied to the coconut tree and then shot to death. By these concerted actions, it is to buy Ornacol. His culpability is sanctioned by the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es
beyond cavil that the accused acted in unison and cooperated with each other towards the causa del mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused) (I Cuello
accomplishment of a common criminal design, which was to rob the Salamancas and thereafter kill Calon, Derecho penal, 15th Ed., 1975, p. 343; People v. Ural, L-30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA
Jacinto. The trial court definitely did not err in finding the existence of a conspiracy. 138).

Where conspiracy is shown to exist, the act of one is the act of all. 42 While it has not been 2. ID.; ID.; SEXUAL CONGRESS WITH A CONSCIOUS WOMAN WHOSE RESISTANCE IS
established that it was appellant who actually shot the victim, conspiracy having been found to exist, TAKEN AWAY BY ADMINISTERING DRUGS, CONSTITUTES RAPE; CASE AT BAR. — The
he is equally guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide. The rule is whenever homicide has been rule is that "if the ability to resist is taken away by administering drugs, even though the woman
committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in may be conscious, sexual intercourse with her is rape’’ (33 Cyc. 1426-1427 cited in Hirdes v.
Ottawa Circuit Judge, 146 N.W. 646). What the accused did in this case was to employ a subtle or
the robbery will also be held guilty as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of
sophisticated form of overcoming the resistance of the victim by the use of Ornacol capsules. He
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the was able to consummate his felonious objective, considering that the victim was a mere teenager
homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide. 43 There is nothing and considering the propensity of the present youth to succumb to drug addiction and to indulge in
in the records to show that the exception applied in this case. practices which their parents consider immoral or unconventional.
We, however, reject that portion of the decision of the trial court finding that the liability of the
accused for the crime of robbery with homicide was attended by, and ostensibly should be modified by DECISION
the circumstances of, their use of unlicensed firearms. No evidence was presented to show, and even AQUINO, J.:
the trial court made no finding, that the firearms used by herein accused were unlicensed. In addition, There is no dispute that at around six o’clock in the evening of April 17, 1978 Carmelito Lintag,
the indemnity for which the accused is liable for the death of Jacinto Salamanca should be increased to 19, a jeepney driver, residing at Bago Bantay, Quezon City (he finished first year high school), had
P50,000.00 in accordance with the policy adopted by the Court en banc on August 30, 1990. 44 sexual congress with Estella Redoble, 15 (born on January 30, 1963), a resident of 19 Maryland
Street, Cubao, on a bamboo bed (papag) in a shack in the squatter’s area near Kamias Street and
WHEREFORE, subject to the above-stated modifications, the judgment of the court a quo is hereby the Nepa-Q-Mart, Quezon City (Exh. C and D).
AFFIRMED in all other respects.
Before the carnal intercourse, Estella took ten Ornacol capsules. Judicial notice may be taken of
SO ORDERED. the fact that Ornacol is a medical preparation against cough and colds with its antitussive and
decongestant components: destromethorphan hydrobromide and phenylpropanolamine HCl. Taken
[G.R. No. L-62324. December 29, 1983.] in the prescribed dose of one to two capsules every twelve hours, it is not dangerous.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARMELITO LINTAG, Defendant- But, as observed by Doctor Carmen Concepcion-Valero, the chief of the medical clinic of this
Appellant. Court, an overdose is dangerous because of its sedative action: it causes drowsiness. (See Pims
1983 Edition, page 81). Lintag admits that about half an hour after taking the ten tablets Estella
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee. was feeling dizzy and she wanted to sleep (4 tsn May 20, 1981).
Nestor L. Torio, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant. His story is that he met Estella on March 17, 1978. She became his sweetheart. On April 17, 1978,
he happened to meet her in the Bernardo Park near the Nepa-Q-Mart. He invited her to take a stroll
inside the market. Then, they went to the Mercury Drugstore nearby and she asked him to buy ten
Ornacol capsules with her money. She used the ten capsules.
He contends that the trial court erred in not finding that the case for the prosecution is utterly
They went to a restaurant but as she felt dizzy he took her to the house of a friend in the squatter’s unfounded and in finding that he made Estella take ten Ornacol capsules which caused her to lose
area. His friend left them alone in the house. They had sexual intercourse there with her consent. (In all power to resist his advances. He calls attention to Estella’s admission in her statement to the
his statement, Exhibit D, dated April 21, 1978, he said that he met Estella for the first time on April police that she became interested in Ornacol and she gave Lintag the money to purchase it (Exh.
17, 1978, not a month earlier).chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph B).

On the other hand, Estella (who finished first year high school) testified that at about two o’clock in We hold that his guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. The fact is that Estella knew nothing
the afternoon of April 17, 1978, while she was at the Bernardo Park near Quezon City Hall, she was about Ornacol. It was Lintag’s sales talk about "trips" which inveigled her into asking him to buy
approached by Lintag who informed her that her friend and former classmate in Grade six nicknamed Ornacol. His culpability is sanctioned by the doctrine that "el que es causa de la causa es causa del
Baby was looking for her near the jukebox at K-10 Street. mal causado" (he who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused) (1 Cuello Calon,
Derecho Penal, 15th Ed., 1975, p. 343; People v. Ural, L-30801, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 138).
Estella went with Lintag, whom she had seen before at the Nepa-Q-Mart, although she did not know
his name, to look for Baby. They did not find Baby. Lintag suggested that they take a walk. They went Appellant testified that Estella allegedly visited him in jail three or four times and they also had
to the vicinity of Mercury Drugstore near the Nepa-Q-Mart at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue. Later, sexual intercourse in that public place. No credence was given by the trial court to that claim.
they returned to K-10 Street but as Baby was not yet there, they played the jukebox until six o’clock in
the afternoon. They talked about drugs and the "trips" caused by taking the same.chanrobles law He also anchors his defense on certain handwritten documents. One is an unsworn certification
library : red dated April 26, 1978 (two days after she filed the complaint) wherein she states that she left her
residence and was residing with her friend, Remedios Ocido (who also signed the certification), at
Lintag bought Ornacol capsules at the Mercury Drugstore. He asked Estella to take them but she Project 2 (Exh. J). Remedios is the common-law wife of Boy Lintag, the accused’s brother.
refused. Lintag assured her that nothing would happen to her by taking the tablets and that she could
make her "trip" while listening to the music from the jukebox. She relented and Lintag forced her to Another letter, dated May 13, 1978, addressed to "Mahal Kong Lito" in jail was about their aborted
open her mouth and placed ten Ornacol capsules therein, five at a time. marriage (Exh. G). Another very long letter dated "Friday 30, 1978," is addressed to "Nanay Lina
at Tatay Gani" (Exh H). Another three-page letter dated June 4, 1978 recounts the circumstances
Sometime later, Estella became dizzy and weak (4 tsn April 25, 1979). Lintag placed her in a jeep and surrounding her sexual intercourse with Lintag on April 27, 1978 (Exh. I to I-2).cralawnad
took her to a shack in the squatter’s area near the Nepa-Q-Mart. The persons in that house left when
they arrived. Lintag undressed her and placed her on a bamboo bed (papag). Estella testified that she was forced to write those letters after she was kidnapped by Boy Lintag,
the brother of the accused. She was brought to Lintag’s house in Bago Bantay, then to the house of
As she was feeling weak, she was not able to offer any resistance. In that condition, Lintag had sexual a certain Colonel Lintag in Scout Magbanua Street, and then to the house of Boy Lintag and his
congress with her. The carnal intercourse caused her much pain. ("Naramdaman ko ang sakit at ang common-law wife in Pasig, Rizal from which she later escaped. She was kidnapped in the
hapdi ng ipasok ni Lito ang kanyang ari vs akin"). afternoon of April 24 and was able to escape on June 15, 1978 (7-8 tsn April 25, 1979).

She dressed up and returned to the parked jeep. At this juncture, her parents arrived in a taxi. Lintag She declared that she wrote Exhibit G by copying the original prepared by Colonel Lintag. Exhibit
fled from the scene. That same evening, she and her mother reported the outrage to Detective Vicente H, addressed to the parents of the accused, was copied from the letter prepared by the accused’s
Madero of the Quezon City Police. Her statement was not taken then because she was in a state of father, Tatay Gani, in the house of Colonel Lintag. She did not write the name "Stella" at the end of
shock. It was taken three days later (Exh B). the said letter.

The medical examination showed her "hymen with old lacerations at 5, 6, 9 and 11 o’clock positions." In his house, Colonel Lintag also told Estella to copy the letter, Exhibit I, so that she could be set
Her vagina admits two fingers with ease. Her mons veneris had scanty pubic hair (Exh. A). free (11 tsn April 25, 1979). No probative value can be assigned to the said letters. They only
strengthen the evidence proving the guilt of the accused.
Estella filed a complaint for rape against Lintag a week after the incident (Exh. F). After trial, the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch V, convicted him of rape, sentenced him to Lintag was charged with having caused Estella to take ten capsules of Ornacol, thus making her
reclusion perpetua and ordered him to indemnify the offended party and her parents in the sum of dizzy and dazed, and thereafter he had sexual intercourse with her against her will.
P31,000 as damages (Criminal Case No. Q-9435). He appealed to this Court.
The rule is that "if the ability to resist is taken away by administering drugs, even though the woman CORPORATION, Respondents.
may be conscious, sexual intercourse with her is rape" (33 Cyc. 1426-1427 cited in Hirdes v. Ottawa ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS BERHAD, Intervenor.
Circuit Judge, 146 N.W. 646).
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
"If the woman’s will is affected by the anesthetic so that the connection is had without her consent,
though she may be more or less conscious, the act will be rape" (3 Wharton and Steele on Medical G.R. No. 180428
Jurisprudence, 4th Ed., sec. 597, cited in State v. Still, 202 N.W. 479, 480). LUIS SISON, Petitioner,
vs.
In the Still case, the defendant, a physician, administered an injection containing 1-50 grain
strychnine, 1-30 grain digitalin and 1-8 grain morphine to the victim to put her to sleep. When she PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION and RADSTOCK
awoke and was drowsy, dizzy and physically weak, the defendant had sexual intercourse with her SECURITIES LIMITED, Respondents.
although she resisted by the use of the muscles of her abdomen and legs and by pulling his hair and
DECISION
crying out. He was held guilty of rape.
CARPIO, J.:
In People v. Ing, 422 Pac. 2nd 590, defendant doctor gave a seventeen-year-old girl, who wanted an
abortion, a shot that caused her to pass out. Upon awakening, and as she was feeling dizzy, light- Prologue
headed and "high", the doctor had sexual intercourse with her. He did this three times. It was held that
the defendant was guilty of rape because the intoxicating narcotic or anesthetic substance administered This case is an anatomy of a ₱6.185 billion 1 pillage of the public coffers that ranks among one of
to the victim prevented her from resisting his sexual advances.chanrobles virtualawlibrary the most brazen and hideous in the history of this country. This case answers the questions why our
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph Government perennially runs out of funds to provide basic services to our people, why the great
masses of the Filipino people wallow in poverty, and why a very select few amass unimaginable
In Rhine vs, State, 337 Pac. 913, the defendant, a licensed physician, administered intravenous
injections of nembutal or sodium pentobarbital to a married woman who became momentarily wealth at the expense of the Filipino people.
unconscious. When she woke up, the physician got in bed with her and they had sexual intercourse On 1 May 2007, the 30-year old franchise of Philippine National Construction Corporation
The woman was conscious of all that went on but she had no power of resistance as she was both
(PNCC) under Presidential Decree No. 1113 (PD 1113), as amended by Presidential Decree No.
scared and paralyzed. The court upheld the jury’s verdict of guilty because the injection of narcotic
and anesthetic agent left the woman dazed and without power of resistance. 1894 (PD 1894), expired. During the 13th Congress, PNCC sought to extend its franchise. PNCC
won approval from the House of Representatives, which passed House Bill No. 5749 2 renewing
What the accused did in this case was to employ a subtle or sophisticated form of overcoming the PNCC’s franchise for another 25 years. However, PNCC failed to secure approval from the Senate,
resistance of the victim by the use of Ornacol capsules. He was able to consummate his felonious
dooming the extension of PNCC’s franchise. Led by Senator Franklin M. Drilon, the Senate
objective, considering that the victim was a mere teenager and considering the propensity of the
present youth to succumb to drug addiction and to indulge in practices which their parents consider opposed PNCC’s plea for extension of its franchise. 3 Senator Drilon’s privilege speech 4 explains
immoral or unconventional. why the Senate chose not to renew PNCC’s franchise:

WHEREFORE, the lower court’s judgment is affirmed. Costs de oficio. I repeat, Mr. President. PNCC has agreed in a compromise agreement dated 17 August 2006 to
transfer to Radstock Securities Limited ₱17,676,063,922, no small money, Mr. President, my dear
SO ORDERED. colleagues, ₱17.6 billion.
What does it consist of? It consists of the following: 19 pieces of real estate properties with an
G.R. No. 178158               December 4, 2009 appraised value of ₱5,993,689,000. Do we know what is the bulk of this? An almost 13-hectare
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, property right here in the Financial Center. As we leave the Senate, as we go out of this Hall, as we
vs. drive thru past the GSIS, we will see on the right a vacant lot, that is PNCC property. As we turn
RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION right on Diosdado Macapagal, we see on our right new buildings, these are all PNCC properties.
That is 12.9 hectares of valuable asset right in this Financial Center that is worth ₱5,993,689.000.
What else, Mr. President? The 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC with a par value of was allegedly incurred, PNCC suddenly recognized this obligation in its books when in fact this
₱2,300,000,000-- I repeat, 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC worth ₱2,300 billion-- was obligation was not found in its books for 20 years?
assigned to Radstock.
In other words, Mr. President, for 20 years, the financial statements of PNCC did not show any
In addition, Mr. President and my dear colleagues, please hold on to your seats because part of the obligation to Marubeni, much less, to Radstock. Why suddenly on October 20, 2000, ₱10 billion in
agreement is 50% of PNCC’s 6% share in the gross toll revenue of the Manila North Tollways obligation was recognized? Why was it recognized?
Corporation for 27 years, from 2008 to 2035, is being assigned to Radstock. How much is this worth?
During the hearing on December 18, Mr. President, we asked this question to the Asset
It is worth ₱9,382,374,922. I repeat, ₱9,382,374,922.
Privatization Trust (APT) trustee, Atty. Raymundo Francisco, and he was asked: "What is the basis
xxxx of your recommendation to recognize this?" He said: "I based my recommendation on a legal
opinion of Feria and Feria." I asked him: "Who knew of this opinion?" He said: "Only me and the
Mr. President, ₱17,676,000,000, however, was made to appear in the agreement to be only worth
chairman of PNCC, Atty. Renato Valdecantos." I asked him: "Did you share this opinion with the
₱6,196,156,488. How was this achieved? How was an aggregate amount of ₱17,676,000,000 made to
members of the board who recognized the obligation of ₱10 billion?" He said: "No." "Can you
appear to be only ₱6,196,156,488? First, the 19 pieces of real estate worth ₱5,993,689,000 were only
produce this opinion now?" He said: "I have no copy."
assigned a value of ₱4,195,000,000 or only 70% of their appraised value.
Mysteriously, Mr. President, an obligation of ₱10 billion based on a legal opinion which, even Mr.
Second, the PNCC shares of stock with a par value of ₱2.3 billion were marked to market and
Arthur Aguilar, the chairman of PNCC, is not aware of, none of the members of the PNCC board
therefore were valued only at ₱713 million.
on October 20, 2000 who recognized this obligation had seen this opinion. It is mysterious.
Third, the share of the toll revenue assigned was given a net present value of only ₱1,287,000,000
Mr. President, are the members of our Committee not entitled to know why Radstock Securities
because of a 15% discounted rate that was applied.
Limited is given preference over all other creditors notwithstanding the fact that this is an
In other words, Mr. President, the toll collection of ₱9,382,374,922 for 27 years was given a net unsecured obligation? There is no mortgage to secure this obligation.
present value of only ₱1,287,000,000 so that it is made to appear that the compromise agreement is
More importantly, Mr. President, equally recognized is the obligation of PNCC to the Philippine
only worth ₱6,196,000,000.
government to the tune of ₱36 billion. PNCC owes the Philippine government ₱36 billion
Mr. President, my dear colleagues, this agreement will substantially wipe out all the assets of PNCC. recognized in its books, apart from ₱3 billion in taxes. Why in the face of all of these is Radstock
It will be left with nothing else except, probably, the collection for the next 25 years or so from the given preference? Why is it that Radstock is given preference to claim ₱17.676 billion of the assets
North Luzon Expressway. This agreement brought PNCC to the cleaners and literally cleaned the of PNCC and give it superior status over the claim of the Philippine government, of the Filipino
PNCC of all its assets. They brought PNCC to the cleaners and cleaned it to the tune of people to the extent of ₱36 billion and taxes in the amount of P3 billion? Why, Mr. President? Why
₱17,676,000,000. is Radstock given preference not only over the Philippine government claims of ₱39 billion but
also over other creditors including a certain best merchant banker in Asia, which has already a final
xxxx
and executory judgment against PNCC for about ₱300 million? Why, Mr. President? Are we not
Mr. President, are we not entitled, as members of the Committee, to know who is Radstock Securities entitled to know why the compromise agreement assigned ₱17.676 billion to Radstock? Why was
Limited? it executed?5 (Emphasis supplied)
Radstock Securities Limited was allegedly incorporated under the laws of the British Virgin Islands. It Aside from Senator Drilon, Senator Sergio S. Osmeña III also saw irregularities in the transactions
has no known board of directors, except for its recently appointed attorney-in-fact, Mr. Carlos involving the Marubeni loans, thus:
Dominguez.
SEN. OSMEÑA. Ah okay. Good.
Mr. President, are the members of the Committee not entitled to know why 20 years after the account
to Marubeni Corporation, which gave rise to the compromise agreement 20 years after the obligation Now, I'd like to point out to the Committee that – it seems that this was a politically driven deal
like IMPSA. Because the acceptance of the 10 billion or 13 billion debt came in October 2000 and
the Radstock assignment was January 10, 2001. Now, why would Marubeni sell for $2 million three maybe there’s a clause there, a secret clause, that says, "I want 20 percent of whatever you’re able
months after there was a recognition that it was owed ₱10 billion. Can you explain that, Mr. to eventually collect." So $2 million. But whatever it is, Marubeni practically wrote it off.
Dominguez? Radstock’s liability now or exposure is only $2 million plus all the lawyer fees, under-the-table,
etcetera. All right. Okay. So it’s pretty obvious to me that if anybody were using his brain, I would
MR. DOMINGUEZ. Your Honor, I am not aware of the decision making process of Marubeni. But my
have gone up to Radstock and say, "Here’s $4 million. Here’s P200 million. Okay." They would
understanding was, the Japanese culture is not a litigious one and they didn't want to get into a, you
have walked away. But evidently, the "ninongs" of Radstock – See, I don’t care who owns
know, a court situation here in the Philippines having a lot of other interest, et cetera.
Radstock. I want to know who is the ninong here who stands to make a lot of money by being able
SEN. OSMEÑA. Well, but that is beside the point, Mr. Dominguez. All I am asking is does it stand to to get to courts, the government agencies, OGCC, or whoever else has been involved in this, to
reason that after you get an acceptance by a debtor that he owes you 10 billion, you sell your note for agree to 6 billion or whatever it was. That’s a lot of money. And believe me, Radstock will
100 million. probably get one or two billion and four billion will go into somebody else’s pocket. Or Radstock
will turn around, sell that claim for ₱4 billion and let the new guy just collect the payments over
Now, if that had happened a year before, maybe I would have understood why he sold for such a low
the years.
amount. But right after, it seems that this was part of an orchestrated deal wherein with certain
powerful interest would be able to say, "Yes, we will push through. We'll fix the courts. We'll fix the x x x x7
board. We'll fix the APT. And we will be able to do it, just give us 55 percent of whatever is
recovered," am I correct? SEN. OSMEÑA. x x x I just wanted to know is CDCP Mining a 100 percent subsidiary of PNCC?

MR. DOMINGUEZ. As I said, Your Honor, I am not familiar with the decision making process of MR. AGUILAR. Hindi ho. Ah, no.
Marubeni. But my understanding was, as I said, they didn't want to get into a … SEN. OSMEÑA. If they’re not a 100 percent, why would they sign jointly and severally? I just
SEN. OSMEÑA. All right. want to plug the loopholes.
MR. AGUILAR. I think it was – if I may just speculate. It was just common ownership at that
MR. DOMINGUEZ. ...litigious situation.6
time.
xxxx
SEN. OSMEÑA. Al right. Now – Also, the ...
SEN. OSMEÑA. All of these financial things can be arranged. They can hire a local bank, Filipino, to
MR. AGUILAR. Ah, 13 percent daw, Your Honor.
be trustee for the real estate. So ...
SEN. OSMEÑA. Huh?
SEN. DRILON. Well, then, that’s a dummy relationship.
MR. AGUILAR. Thirteen percent ho.
SEN. OSMEÑA. In any case, to me the main point here is that a third party, Radstock, whoever owns
it, bought Marubeni’s right for $2 million or ₱100 million. Then, they are able to go through all these SEN. OSMEÑA. What’s 13 percent?
legal machinations and get awarded with the consent of PNCC of 6 billion. That’s a 100 million to 6
MR. AGUILAR. We owned ...
billion. Now, Mr. Aguilar, you have been in the business for such a long time. I mean, this hedge funds
whether it’s Radstock or New Bridge or Texas Pacific Group or Carlyle or Avenue Capital, they look xxxx
at their returns. So if Avenue Capital buys something for $2 million and you give him $4 million in
SEN. OSMEÑA. x x x CDCP Mining, how many percent of the equity of CDCP Mining was
one year, it’s a 100 percent return. They’ll walk away and dance to their stockholders. So here in this
owned by PNCC, formerly CDCP?
particular case, if you know that Radstock only bought it for $2 million, I would have gotten board
approval and say, "Okay, let’s settle this for $4 million." And Radstock would have jumped up and MS. PASETES. Thirteen percent.
down. So what looks to me is that this was already a scheme. Marubeni wrote it off already. Marubeni
SEN. OSMEÑA. Thirteen. And as a 13 percent owner, they agreed to sign jointly and severally?
wrote everything off. They just got a $2 million and they probably have no more residual rights or
MS. PASETES. Yes. under Administrative Orders No. 14 and 64, series of 1987 and 1988, respectively. 13 Also, the
SEN. OSMEÑA. One-three? So poor PNCC and CDCP got taken to the cleaners here. They sign for a Presidential Commission on Good Government holds some 13.82% of PNCC’s voting equity
100 percent and they only own 13 percent. under a writ of sequestration and through the voluntary surrender of certain PNCC shares. In fine,
the Government owns 90.3% of the equity of PNCC and only 9.70% of PNCC’s voting equity is
x x x x8 (Emphasis supplied) under private ownership.14
I. Meanwhile, the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid. On 20 October 2000, during
The Case
the short-lived Estrada Administration, the PNCC Board of Directors 15 (PNCC Board) passed
Before this Court are the consolidated petitions for review 9 filed by Strategic Alliance Development Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 admitting PNCC’s liability to Marubeni for ₱10,743,103,388
Corporation (STRADEC) and Luis Sison (Sison), with a motion for intervention filed by Asiavest as of 30 September 1999. PNCC Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 reads as follows:
Merchant Bankers Berhad (Asiavest), challenging the validity of the Compromise Agreement between RESOLUTION NO. BD-092-2000
PNCC and Radstock. The Court of Appeals approved the Compromise Agreement in its Decision of
25 January 200710 in CA-G.R. CV No. 87971. RESOLVED, That the Board recognizes, acknowledges and confirms PNCC’s
obligations as of September 30, 1999 with the following entities, exclusive of the
II. interests and other charges that may subsequently accrue and still become due
The Antecedents therein, to wit:

PNCC was incorporated in 1966 for a term of fifty years under the Corporation Code with the name a). the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of
Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP). 11 PD 1113, issued on 31 March ₱36,023,784,751.00; and
1977, granted CDCP a 30-year franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the North
and South Luzon Tollways. PD 1894, issued on 22 December 1983, amended PD 1113 to include in b). Marubeni Corporation in the amount of ₱10,743,103,388.00. (Emphasis
CDCP’s franchise the Metro Manila Expressway, which would "serve as an additional artery in the supplied)
transportation of trade and commerce in the Metro Manila area."
This was the first PNCC Board Resolution admitting PNCC’s liability for the Marubeni loans.
Sometime between 1978 and 1981, Basay Mining Corporation (Basay Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, Previously, for two decades the PNCC Board consistently refused to admit any liability for the
obtained loans from Marubeni Corporation of Japan (Marubeni) amounting to 5,460,000,000 yen and Marubeni loans.
US$5 million. A CDCP official issued letters of guarantee for the loans, committing CDCP to pay
Less than two months later, or on 22 November 2000, the PNCC Board passed Board Resolution
solidarily for the full amount of the 5,460,000,000 yen loan and to the extent of ₱20 million for the
No. BD-099-2000 amending Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000. PNCC Board Resolution No.
US$5 million loan. However, there was no CDCP Board Resolution authorizing the issuance of the
BD-099-2000 reads as follows:
letters of guarantee. Later, Basay Mining changed its name to CDCP Mining Corporation (CDCP
Mining). CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans when CDCP and CDCP Mining were still RESOLUTION NO. BD-099-2000
privately owned and managed.
RESOLVED, That the Board hereby amends its Resolution No. BD-092-2000 dated
Subsequently in 1983, CDCP changed its corporate name to PNCC to reflect the extent of the October 20, 2000 so as to read as follows:
Government's equity investment in the company, which arose when government financial institutions
converted their loans to PNCC into equity following PNCC’s inability to pay the loans. 12 Various RESOLVED, That the Board recognizes, acknowledges and confirms its obligations
government financial institutions held a total of seventy-seven point forty-eight percent (77.48%) of as of September 30, 1999 with the following entities, exclusive of the interests and
PNCC’s voting equity, most of which were later transferred to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) other charges that may subsequently accrue and still due thereon, subject to the final
determination by the Commission on Audit (COA) of the amount of obligation
 involved, and subject further to the declaration of the legality of said obligations by the On 19 March 2003, this Court issued a temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 156887 forbidding
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), to wit: the trial court from implementing the writ of preliminary attachment and ordering the suspension
of the proceedings before the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In its 3 October 2005 Decision,
a). the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in the amount of this Court ruled as follows:
₱36,023,784,751.00; and
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED and insofar as the Motion to Set Aside the Order
b). Marubeni Corporation in the amount of ₱10,743,103,388.00. (Emphasis and/or Discharge the Writ of Attachment is concerned, the Decision of the Court of Appeals on
supplied) August 30, 2002 and its Resolution of January 22, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66654 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The attachments over the properties by the writ of preliminary
In January 2001, barely three months after the PNCC Board first admitted liability for the Marubeni attachment are hereby ordered LIFTED effective upon the finality of this Decision. The Decision
loans, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock for US$2 million or less than ₱100 million. In and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED in all other respects. The Temporary
short, Radstock paid Marubeni less than 10% of the ₱10.743 billion admitted amount. Radstock Restraining Order is DISSOLVED immediately and the Court of Appeals is directed to PROCEED
immediately sent a notice and demand letter to PNCC. forthwith with the appeal filed by PNCC.
On 15 January 2001, Radstock filed an action for collection and damages against PNCC before the No costs.
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (trial court). In its order of 23 January 2001,
the trial court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against PNCC. The trial court ordered PNCC’s SO ORDERED.17
bank accounts garnished and several of its real properties attached. On 14 February 2001, PNCC
On 17 August 2006, PNCC and Radstock entered into the Compromise Agreement where they
moved to set aside the 23 January 2001 Order and to discharge the writ of attachment. PNCC also
agreed to reduce PNCC’s liability to Radstock, supposedly from ₱17,040,843,968, to
filed a motion to dismiss the case. The trial court denied both motions. PNCC filed motions for
₱6,185,000,000. PNCC and Radstock submitted the Compromise Agreement to this Court for
reconsideration, which the trial court also denied. PNCC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court
approval. In a Resolution dated 4 December 2006 in G.R. No. 156887, this Court referred the
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66654, assailing the denial of the motion to dismiss. On 30
Compromise Agreement to the Commission on Audit (COA) for comment. The COA
August 2002, the Court of Appeals denied PNCC’s petition. PNCC filed a motion for reconsideration,
recommended approval of the Compromise Agreement. In a Resolution dated 22 November 2006,
which the Court of Appeals also denied in its 22 January 2003 Resolution. PNCC filed a petition for
this Court noted the Compromise Agreement and referred it to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 156887.
CV No. 87971. In its 25 January 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals approved the Compromise
Meanwhile, on 19 June 2001, at the start of the Arroyo Administration, the PNCC Board, under a new Agreement.
President and Chairman, revoked Board Resolution No. BD-099-2000.
STRADEC moved for reconsideration of the 25 January 2007 Decision. STRADEC alleged that it
The trial court continued to hear the main case. On 10 December 2002, the trial court ruled in favor of has a claim against PNCC as a bidder of the National Government’s shares, receivables, securities
Radstock, as follows: and interests in PNCC. The matter is subject of a complaint filed by STRADEC against PNCC and
the Privatization and Management Office (PMO) for the issuance of a Notice of Award of Sale to
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the
Dong-A Consortium of which STRADEC is a partner. The case, docketed as Civil Case No. 05-
defendant is directed to pay the total amount of Thirteen Billion One Hundred Fifty One Million Nine
882, is pending before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146 (RTC Branch 146).
Hundred Fifty Six thousand Five Hundred Twenty Eight Pesos (₱13,151,956,528.00) with interest
from October 15, 2001 plus Ten Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) as attorney’s fees. The Court of Appeals treated STRADEC’s motion for reconsideration as a motion for intervention
and denied it in its 31 May 2007 Resolution. STRADEC filed a petition for review before this
SO ORDERED.16 Court, docketed as G.R. No. 178158.
PNCC appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. Rodolfo Cuenca (Cuenca), a stockholder and former PNCC President and Board Chairman, filed
87971. an intervention before the Court of Appeals. Cuenca alleged that PNCC had no obligation to pay
Radstock. The Court of Appeals also denied Cuenca’s motion for intervention in its Resolution of 31 The Court of Appeals denied STRADEC’s motion for intervention on the ground that the motion
May 2007. Cuenca did not appeal the denial of his motion. was filed only after the Court of Appeals and the trial court had promulgated their respective
decisions.
On 2 July 2007, this Court issued an order directing PNCC and Radstock, their officers, agents,
representatives, and other persons under their control, to maintain the status quo ante. Section 2, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Meanwhile, on 20 February 2007, Sison, also a stockholder and former PNCC President and Board SECTION 2. Time to intervene.– The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition
Chairman, filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment Approving Compromise Agreement before the of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
Court of Appeals. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97982. motion and served on the original parties.
Asiavest, a judgment creditor of PNCC, filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File the The rule is not absolute. The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to
Attached Opposition and Motion-in-Intervention before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. make the powers of the Court completely available for justice. 19 It is aimed to facilitate a
97982. comprehensive adjudication of rival claims, overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing
In a Resolution dated 12 June 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed Sison’s petition on the ground that of the claims.20 This Court has ruled:
it had no jurisdiction to annul a final and executory judgment also rendered by the Court of Appeals.
In the same resolution, the Court of Appeals also denied Asiavest’s urgent motion. [A]llowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court
after consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of
Asiavest filed its Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File the Attached Opposition and procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for
Motion-in-Intervention in G.R. No. 178158.18 justice. Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. Thus, interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the
Sison filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 5 November 2007 Resolution, the Court of Appeals higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have
denied Sison’s motion. not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,
On 26 November 2007, Sison filed a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. when the petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the
180428. Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim
v. Pacquing (310 Phil. 722 (1995)], the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the
In a Resolution dated 18 February 2008, this Court consolidated G.R. Nos. 178158 and 180428. Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for
On 13 January 2009, the Court held oral arguments on the following issues: all the substantive issues raised by the parties.21
1. Does the Compromise Agreement violate public policy?
In Collado v. Court of Appeals,22 this Court reiterated that exceptions to Section 2, Rule 12 could
2. Does the subject matter involve an assumption by the government of a private entity’s be made in the interest of substantial justice. Citing Mago v. Court of Appeals,23 the Court stated:
obligation in violation of the law and/or the Constitution? Is the PNCC Board Resolution of
20 October 2000 defective or illegal? It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of the
proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x the same affirmed by
3. Is the Compromise Agreement viable in the light of the non-renewal of PNCC’s franchise the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said judgments is already
by Congress and its inclusion of all or substantially all of PNCC’s assets? submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and, manifestly late, beyond the period
4. Is the Decision of the Court of Appeals annullable even if final and executory on grounds prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of Court.
of fraud and violation of public policy and the Constitution? But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of
III. procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully and
Propriety of Actions completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is
to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created not to In this case, the PNCC Board cannot conceivably be expected to attack the validity of the
hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. It does not constitute the Compromise Agreement since the PNCC Board itself approved the Compromise Agreement. In
thing itself which courts are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best fact, the PNCC Board steadfastly defends the Compromise Agreement for allegedly being
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. advantageous to PNCC.
Concededly, STRADEC has no legal interest in the subject matter of the Compromise Agreement. Besides, the circumstances in this case are peculiar. Sison, as former PNCC President and
Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states: Chairman of the PNCC Board, was responsible for the approval of the Board Resolution issued on
19 June 2001 revoking the previous Board Resolution admitting PNCC’s liability for the Marubeni
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. - A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in
the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely loans.29 Such revocation, however, came after Radstock had filed an action for collection and
affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer damages against PNCC on 15 January 2001. Then, when the trial court rendered its decision on 10
thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the action. The Court shall consider December 2002 in favor of Radstock, Sison was no longer the PNCC President and Chairman,
whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the although he remains a stockholder of PNCC.
original parties, and whether or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate When the case was on appeal before the Court of Appeals, there was no need for Sison to avail of
proceeding. any remedy, until PNCC and Radstock entered into the Compromise Agreement, which disposed of
STRADEC’s interest is dependent on the outcome of Civil Case No. 05-882. Unless STRADEC can all or substantially all of PNCC’s assets. Sison came to know of the Compromise Agreement only
show that RTC Branch 146 had already decided in its favor, its legal interest is simply contingent and in December 2006. PNCC and Radstock submitted the Compromise Agreement to the Court of
expectant. Appeals for approval on 10 January 2007. The Court of Appeals approved the Compromise
Agreement on 25 January 2007. To require Sison at this stage to exhaust all the remedies within the
However, Asiavest has a direct and material interest in the approval or disapproval of the Compromise corporation will render such remedies useless as the Compromise Agreement had already been
Agreement. Asiavest is a judgment creditor of PNCC in G.R. No. 110263 and a court has already approved by the Court of Appeals. PNCC’s assets are in danger of being dissipated in favor of a
issued a writ of execution in its favor. Asiavest’s interest is actual and material, direct and immediate private foreign corporation. Thus, Sison had no recourse but to avail of an extraordinary remedy to
characterized by either gain or loss from the judgment that this Court may render. 24 Considering that protect PNCC’s assets.
the Compromise Agreement involves the disposition of all or substantially all of the assets of PNCC,
Besides, in the interest of substantial justice and for compelling reasons, such as the nature and
Asiavest, as PNCC’s judgment creditor, will be greatly prejudiced if the Compromise Agreement is
eventually upheld. importance of the issues raised in this case, 30 this Court must take cognizance of Sison’s action.
This Court should exercise its prerogative to set aside technicalities in the Rules, because after all,
Sison has legal standing to challenge the Compromise Agreement. Although there was no allegation the power of this Court to suspend its own rules whenever the interest of justice requires is well
that Sison filed the case as a derivative suit in the name of PNCC, it could be fairly deduced that Sison
was assailing the Compromise Agreement as a stockholder of PNCC. In such a situation, a stockholder recognized.31 In Solicitor General v. The Metropolitan Manila Authority,32 this Court held:
of PNCC can sue on behalf of PNCC to annul the Compromise Agreement. Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its inherent
power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning ‘pleading,
A derivative action is a suit by a stockholder to enforce a corporate cause of action. 25 Under the
practice and procedure in all courts.’ In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended
Corporation Code, where a corporation is an injured party, its power to sue is lodged with its board of
in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be miscarried because of a rigid and
directors or trustees.26 However, an individual stockholder may file a derivative suit on behalf of the formalistic adherence to such rules. x x x
corporation to protect or vindicate corporate rights whenever the officials of the corporation refuse to
We have made similar rulings in other cases, thus:
sue, or are the ones to be sued, or hold control of the corporation. 27 In such actions, the corporation is
the real party-in-interest while the suing stockholder, on behalf of the corporation, is only a nominal Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
party.28
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. x x x Time and again, this Court has fact, the case hinges on – they knew that this claim has prescribed but because of that board
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher resolution which recognized the obligation they filed their complaint, is that correct?
interests of justice so require.
MR. CIMAFRANCA. Apparently, it's like that, Senator, because the filing of the case came after
IV. the acknowledgement.
The PNCC Board Acted in Bad Faith and with Gross Negligence
SEN. DRILON. Yes. In fact, the filing of the case came three months after the acknowledgement.
in Directing the Affairs of PNCC
MR. CIMAFRANCA. Yes. And that made it difficult to handle on our part.
In this jurisdiction, the members of the board of directors have a three-fold duty: duty of obedience,
SEN. DRILON. That is correct. So, that it was an obligation which was not recognized in the
duty of diligence, and duty of loyalty. 33 Accordingly, the members of the board of directors (1) shall financial statements of PNCC but revived – in the financial statements because it has
direct the affairs of the corporation only in accordance with the purposes for which it was prescribed but revived by the board effectively. That's the theory, at least, of the plaintiff. Is
organized;34 (2) shall not willfully and knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of that correct? Who can answer that?
the corporation or act in bad faith or with gross negligence in directing the affairs of the Ms. Pasetes, yes.
corporation;35 and (3) shall not acquire any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty
MS. PASETES. It is not an obligation of PNCC that is why it is not reflected in the financial
as such directors or trustees.36
statements.39 (Emphasis supplied)
In the present case, the PNCC Board blatantly violated its duty of diligence as it miserably failed to
In short, after two decades of consistently refuting its liability for the Marubeni loans, the PNCC
act in good faith in handling the affairs of PNCC.
Board suddenly and inexplicably reversed itself by admitting in October 2000 liability for the
First. For almost two decades, the PNCC Board had consistently refused to admit liability for the Marubeni loans. Just three months after the PNCC Board recognized the Marubeni loans, Radstock
Marubeni loans because of the absence of a PNCC Board resolution authorizing the issuance of the acquired Marubeni's receivable and filed the present collection case.
letters of guarantee.
Second. The PNCC Board admitted liability for the Marubeni loans despite PNCC’s total liabilities
There is no dispute that between 1978 and 1980, Marubeni Corporation extended two loans to Basay far exceeding its assets. There is no dispute that the Marubeni loans, once recognized, would wipe
Mining (later renamed CDCP Mining): (1) US$5 million to finance the purchase of copper out the assets of PNCC, "virtually emptying the coffers of the PNCC." 40 While PNCC insists that
concentrates by Basay Mining; and (2) Y5.46 billion to finance the completion of the expansion
project of Basay Mining including working capital. it remains financially viable, the figures in the COA Audit Reports tell otherwise. 41 For 2006 and
2005, "the Corporation has incurred negative gross margin of ₱84.531 Million and ₱80.180
There is also no dispute that it was only on 20 October 2000 when the PNCC Board approved a Million, respectively, and net losses that had accumulated in a deficit of ₱14.823 Billion as of
resolution expressly admitting PNCC’s liability for the Marubeni loans. This was the first Board
31 December 2006."42 The COA even opined that "unless [PNCC] Management addresses the
Resolution admitting liability for the Marubeni loans, for PNCC never admitted liability for these
issue on net losses in its financial rehabilitation plan, x x x the Corporation may not be able
debts in the past. Even Radstock admitted that PNCC’s 1994 Financial Statements did not reflect the
to continue its operations as a going concern."
Marubeni loans.37 Also, former PNCC Chairman Arthur Aguilar stated during the Senate hearings
Notably, during the oral arguments before this Court, the Government Corporate Counsel admitted
that "the Marubeni claim was never in the balance sheet x x x nor was it in a contingent account." 38 the PNCC’s huge negative net worth, thus:
Miriam M. Pasetes, SVP Finance of PNCC, and Atty. Herman R. Cimafranca of the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel, confirmed this fact, thus: JUSTICE CARPIO

SEN. DRILON. x x x And so, PNCC itself did not recognize this as an obligation but the board x x x what is the net worth now of PNCC? Negative what? Negative 6 Billion at least[?]
suddenly recognized it as an obligation. It was on that basis that the case was filed, is that correct? In ATTY. AGRA
Yes, your Honor.43 (Emphasis supplied) letter of September 3, 1986, letter of Marubeni to then PNCC Chair Mr. Jaime. We have the June
24, 1986 letter from Marubeni to the PNCC Chairman. Also the March 4, 1988 letter...
Clearly, the PNCC Board’s admission of liability for the Marubeni loans, given PNCC’s huge negative
net worth of at least ₱6 billion as admitted by PNCC’s counsel, or ₱14.823 billion based on the 2006 SEN. DRILON. The March 4, 1988 letter is not a demand letter.
COA Audit Report, would leave PNCC an empty shell, without any assets to pay its biggest creditor, MS. OGAN. It is exactly addressed to the Asset Privatization Trust.
the National Government with an admitted receivable of ₱36 billion from PNCC.
SEN. DRILON. It is not a demand letter? Okay.
Third. In a debilitating self-inflicted injury, the PNCC Board revived what appeared to have been a
dead claim by abandoning one of PNCC’s strong defenses, which is the prescription of the action to MS. OGAN. And we have also...
collect the Marubeni loans. SEN. DRILON. Anyway...

Settled is the rule that actions prescribe by the mere lapse of time fixed by law. 44 Under Article 1144 THE CHAIRMAN. Please answer when you are asked, Ms. Ogan. We want to put it on the record
of the Civil Code, an action upon a written contract, such as a loan contract, must be brought within whether it is "yes" or "no".
ten years from the time the right of action accrues. The prescription of such an action is interrupted
MS. OGAN. Yes, sir.
when the action is filed before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditor,
SEN. DRILON. So, even assuming that all of those were demand letters, the 10 years prescription
or when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. 45
set in and it should have prescribed in 1998, whatever is the date, or before the case was filed in
In this case, Basay Mining obtained the Marubeni loans sometime between 1978 and 1981. While 2001.
Radstock claims that numerous demand letters were sent to PNCC, based on the records, the
MR. CIMAFRANCA. The 10-year period for – if the contract is written, it's 10 years and it should
extrajudicial demands to pay the loans appear to have been made only in 1984 and 1986. Meanwhile,
have prescribed in 10 years and we did raise that in our answer, in our motion to dismiss.
the written acknowledgment of the debt, in the form of Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000, was
issued only on 20 October 2000. SEN. DRILON. I know. You raised this in your motion to dismiss and you raised this in your
answer. Now, we are not saying that you were negligent in not raising that. What we are just
Thus, more than ten years would have already lapsed between Marubeni’s extrajudicial demands in
putting on the record that indeed there is basis to argue that these claims have prescribed.
1984 and 1986 and the acknowledgment by the PNCC Board of the Marubeni loans in 2000.
However, the PNCC Board suddenly passed Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 expressly admitting Now, the reason why there was a colorable basis on the complaint filed in 2001 was that somehow
liability for the Marubeni loans. In short, the PNCC Board admitted liability for the Marubeni loans the board of PNCC recognized the obligation in a special board meeting on October 20, 2000.
despite the fact that the same might no longer be judicially collectible. Although the legal advantage Hindi ba ganoon 'yon?
was obviously on its side, the PNCC Board threw in the towel even before the fight could begin.
MS. OGAN. Yes, that is correct.
During the Senate hearings, the matter of prescription was discussed, thus:
SEN. DRILON. Why did the PNCC recognize this obligation in 2000 when it was very clear that
SEN. DRILON. ... the prescription period is 10 years and there were no payments – the last demands
at that point more than 10 years have lapsed since the last demand letter?
were made, when? The last demands for payment?
MR. AGUILAR. May I volunteer an answer?
MS. OGAN. It was made January 2001 prior to the filing of the case.
SEN. DRILON. Please.
SEN. DRILON. Yes, all right. Before that, when was the last demand made? By the time they filed the
complaint more than 10 years already lapsed. MR. AGUILAR. I looked into that, Mr. Chairman, Your Honor. It was as a result of and I go to the
folder letter "N." In our own demand research it was not period, Your Honor, that Punongbayan in
MS. OGAN. On record, Mr. Chairman, we have demands starting from - - a series of demands which
the big folder, sir, letter "N" it was the period where PMO was selling PNCC and Punongbayan
started from May 23, 1984, letter from Marubeni to PNCC, demand payment. And we also have the
and Araullo Law Office came out with an investment brochure that indicated liabilities both to
national government and to Marubeni/Radstock. So, PMO said, "For good order, can you PNCC board MR. CIMAFRANCA. Yes, Senator, we did issue an opinion upon the request of PNCC and our
confirm that by board resolution?" That's the tone of the letter. opinion was that there was no valid obligation, no valid guarantee. And we incorporated that in our
SEN. DRILON. Confirm what? Confirm the liabilities that are contained in the Punongbayan pleadings in court.48 (Emphasis supplied)
investment prospectus both to the national government and to PNCC. That is the reason at least from Clearly, PNCC had strong defenses against the collection suit filed by Radstock, as originally
the record, Your Honor, how the PNCC board got to deliberate on the Marubeni. opined by the OGCC. It is quite puzzling, therefore, that the PNCC Board, which had solid
THE CHAIRMAN. What paragraph? Second to the last paragraph? grounds to refute the legitimacy of the Marubeni loans, admitted its liability and entered into a
Compromise Agreement that is manifestly and grossly prejudicial to PNCC.
MR. AGUILAR. Yes. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Ito po 'yong – that"s to our recollection, in the records, that
was the reason. Fourth. The basis for the admission of liability for the Marubeni loans, which was an opinion of the
Feria Law Office, was not even shown to the PNCC Board.
SEN. DRILON. Is that the only reason why ...
Atty. Raymundo Francisco, the APT trustee overseeing the proposed privatization of PNCC at the
MR. AGUILAR. From just the records, Mr. Chairman, and then interviews with people who are still time, was responsible for recommending to the PNCC Board the admission of PNCC’s liability for
around. the Marubeni loans. Atty. Francisco based his recommendation solely on a mere alleged opinion of
SEN. DRILON. You mean, you acknowledged a prescribed obligation because of this paragraph? the Feria Law Office. Atty. Francisco did not bother to show this "Feria opinion" to the members of
the PNCC Board, except to Atty. Renato Valdecantos, who as the then PNCC Chairman did not
MR. AGUILAR. I don’t know what legal advice we were following at that time, Mr. Chairman. 46 also show the "Feria opinion" to the other PNCC Board members. During the Senate hearings,
(Emphasis supplied) Atty. Francisco could not produce a copy of the "Feria opinion." The Senators grilled Atty.
Francisco on his recommendation to recognize PNCC’s liability for the Marubeni loans, thus:
Besides prescription, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) originally believed
that PNCC had another formidable legal weapon against Radstock, that is, the lack of authority of THE CHAIRMAN. x x x You were the one who wrote this letter or rather this memorandum dated
Alfredo Asuncion, then Executive Vice-President of PNCC, to sign the letter of guarantee on behalf of 17 October 2000 to Atty. Valdecantos. Can you tell us the background why you wrote the letter
CDCP. During the Senate hearings, the following exchange reveals the OGCC’s original opinion: acknowledging a debt which is non-existent?
THE CHAIRMAN. What was the opinion of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel? MR. FRANCISCO. I was appointed as the trustee in charge of the privatization of the PNCC at
that time, sir. And I was tasked to do a study and engage the services of financial advisors as well
MS. OGAN. The opinion of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel is that PNCC should
as legal advisors to do a legal audit and financial study on the position of PNCC. I bidded out these
exhaust all means to resist the case using all defenses available to a guarantee and a surety that there is
engagements, the financial advisership went to Punongbayan and Araullo. The legal audit went to
a valid ground for PNCC's refusal to honor or make good the alleged guarantee obligation. It
the Feria Law Offices.
appearing that from the documents submitted to the OGCC that there is no board authority in favor or
authorizing Mr. Asuncion, then EVP, to sign or execute the letter of guarantee in behalf of CDCP and THE CHAIRMAN. Spell it. Boy Feria?
that said letter of guarantee is not legally binding upon or enforceable against CDCP as principals,
MR. FRANCISCO. Feria-- Feria.
your Honors.47
THE CHAIRMAN. Lugto?
xxxx
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes. Yes, Your Honor. And this was the findings of the Feria Law Office – that
SEN. DRILON. Now that we have read this, what was the opinion of the Government Corporate the Marubeni account was a legal obligation.
Counsel, Mr. Cimafranca?
So, I presented this to our board. Based on the findings of the legal audit conducted by the Ferial
Law Offices, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. Why did you not ask the government corporate counsel? Why did you have to ask Now, we asked to be here because the franchise of PNCC is hanging in a balance because of the –
for the opinion of an outside counsel? on the questions on this acknowledgement. So we want to be educated.
MR. FRANCISCO. That was the – that was the mandate given to us, sir, that we have to engage the ... Now, the paper trail starts with your letter. So, that’s it – that’s my kuwan, Frank.
THE CHAIRMAN. Mandate given by whom? Yes, Senator Drilon.
MR. FRANCISCO. That is what we usually do, sir, in the APT. SEN. DRILON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. Ah, you get outside counsel? Yes, Atty. Francisco, you have a copy of the minutes of October 20, 2000?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, we... MR. FRANCISCO. I’m sorry, sir, we don’t have a copy.
THE CHAIRMAN. Not necessarily the government corporate counsel? SEN. DRILON. May we ask the corporate secretary of PNCC to provide us with a copy?
MR. FRANCISCO. No, sir. Okay naman andiyan siya.
THE CHAIRMAN. So, on the basis of the opinion of outside counsel, private, you proceeded to, in (Ms. Ogan handing the document to Mr. Francisco.)
effect, recognize an obligation which is not even entered in the books of the PNCC? You probably
You have familiarized yourselves with the minutes, Atty. Francisco?
resuscitated a non-existing obligation anymore?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.
MR. FRANCISCO. Sir, I just based my recommendation on the professional findings of the law office
that we engaged, sir. SEN. DRILON. Now, mention is made of a memorandum here on line 8, page 3 of this board’s
minutes. It says, "Director Francisco has prepared a memorandum requesting confirmation,
THE CHAIRMAN. Did you not ask for the opinion of the government corporate counsel?
acknowledgement, and ratification of this indebtedness of PNCC to the national government which
MR. FRANCISCO. No, sir. was determined by Bureau of Treasury as of September 30, 1999 is 36,023,784,751. And with
respect to PNCC’s obligation to Marubeni, this has been determined to be in the total amount of
THE CHAIRMAN. Why?
10,743,103,388, also as of September 30, 1999; that there is need to ratify this because there has
MR. FRANCISCO. I felt that the engagements of the law office was sufficient, anyway we were already been a representation made with respect to the review of the financial records of PNCC by
going to raise it to the Committee on Privatization for their approval or disapproval, sir. Punongbayan and Araullo, which have been included as part of the package of APT’s disposition to
the national government’s interest in PNCC."
THE CHAIRMAN. The COP?
You recall having made this representation as found in the minutes, I assume, Atty. Francisco?
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir. But I’d like to be refreshed on the memorandum, sir, because I don’t
THE CHAIRMAN. That’s a cabinet level?
have a copy.
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir. And we did that, sir.
SEN. DRILON. Yes, this memorandum was cited earlier by Senator Arroyo, and maybe the
THE CHAIRMAN. Now... So you sent your memo to Atty. Renato B. Valdecantos, who unfortunately secretary can give him a copy? Give him a copy?
is not here but I think we have to get his response to this. And as part of the minutes of special meeting
MS. OGAN. (Handing the document to Mr. Francisco.)
with the board of directors on October 20, 2000, the board resolved in its Board Resolution No. 092-
2000, the board resolved to recognize, acknowledge and confirm PNCC’s obligations as of September MR. FRANCISCO. Your Honor, I have here a memorandum to the PNCC board through Atty.
30, 1999, etcetera, etcetera. (A), or rather (B), Marubeni Corporation in the amount of ₱10,740,000. Valdecantos, which says that – in the last paragraph, if I may read? "May we request therefore, that
a board resolution be adopted, acknowledging and confirming the aforementioned PNCC obligations In any case, now you’re saying it’s the Feria Law Office who rendered that opinion? Can we – you
with the national government and Marubeni as borne out by the due diligence audit." know, yesterday we were asking for a copy of this opinion but we were never furnished one. The ...
no less than the Chairman of this Committee was asking for a copy.
SEN. DRILON. This is the memorandum referred to in these minutes. This memorandum dated 17
October 2000 is the memorandum referred to in the minutes. THE CHAIRMAN. Well, copy of the opinion...
MR. FRANCISCO. I would assume, Mr. Chairman. MS. OGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we were never furnished a copy of this opinion because it’s
opinion rendered for the Asset Privatization Trust which is its client, not the PNCC, Mr. Chairman.
SEN. DRILON. Right.
THE CHAIRMAN. All right. The question is whether – but you see, this is a memorandum of Atty.
Now, the Punongbayan representative who was here yesterday, Mr...
Francisco to the Chairman of the Asset Privatization Trust. You say now that you were never
THE CHAIRMAN. Navarro. furnished a copy because that’s supposed to be with the Asset ...

SEN. DRILON. ... Navarro denied that he made this recommendation. MS. OGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. He asked for opinion, legal opinion. THE CHAIRMAN. ... but yet the action of – or rather the opinion of the Feria Law Offices was in
effect adopted by the board of directors of PNCC in its minutes of October 20, 2000 where you are
SEN. DRILON. He said that they never made this representation and the transcript will bear us out.
the corporate secretary, Ms. Ogan.
They said that they never made this representation that the account of Marubeni should be recognized.
MS. OGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
MR. FRANCISCO. Mr. Chairman, in the memorandum, I only mentioned here the acknowledgement
and confirmation of the PNCC obligations. I was not asking for a ratification. I never mentioned THE CHAIRMAN. So, what I am saying is that this opinion or rather the opinion of the Feria Law
ratification in the memorandum. I just based my memo based on the due diligence audit of the Feria Offices of which you don’t have a copy?
Law Offices.
MS. OGAN. Yes, sir.
SEN. DRILON. Can you say that again? You never asked for a ratification...
THE CHAIRMAN. And the reason being that, it does not concern the PNCC because that’s an
MR. FRANCISCO. No. I never mentioned in my memorandum that I was asking for a ratification. I opinion rendered for APT and not for the PNCC.
was just – in my memo it says, "acknowledging and confirming the PNCC obligation." This was
MS. OGAN. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that was what we were told although we made several requests to
what ...
the APT, sir.
SEN. DRILON. Isn’t it the same as ratification? I mean, what’s the difference?
THE CHAIRMAN. All right. Now, since it was for the APT and not for the PNCC, I ask the
MR. FRANCISCO. I – well, my memorandum was meant really just to confirm the findings of the question why did PNCC adopt it? That was not for the consumption of PNCC. It was for the
legal audit as ... consumption of the Asset Privatization Trust. And that is what Atty. Francisco says and it’s
confirmed by you saying that this was a memo – you don’t have a copy because this was sought for
SEN. DRILON. In your mind as a lawyer, Atty. Francisco, there’s a difference between ratification
by APT and the Feria Law Offices just provided an opinion – provided the APT with an opinion.
and – what’s your term? -- acknowledgment and confirmation?
So, as corporate secretary, the board of directors of PNCC adopted it, recognized the Marubeni
MR. FRANCISCO. Well, I guess there’s no difference, Mr. Chairman. Corporation.

SEN. DRILON. Right. You read the minutes of the October 20, 2000 meeting of the board of directors on Item V. The
resolution speaks of .. so, go ahead.
Anyway, just of record, the Punongbayan representatives here yesterday said that they never made
such representation. MS. OGAN. I gave my copies. Yes, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. In effect the Feria Law Offices’ opinion was for the consumption of the APT. SEN. DRILON. Apparently, [it] just ended up in the personal possession of Mr. Valdecantos
because the corporate secretary, Glenda Ogan, who is supposed to be the custodian of the records
MS. OGAN. That was what we were told, Mr. Chairman.
of the board never saw a copy of this.
THE CHAIRMAN. And you were not even provided with a copy.
MR. FRANCISCO. Well, sir, my – the copy that I gave was to Mr. Valdecantos because he was the
THE CHAIRMAN. Yet you adopted it. one sitting in the PNCC board, sir.

MS. OGAN. Yes, sir. SEN. DRILON. No, you sit in the board.

SEN DRILON. Considering you were the corporate secretary. MR. FRANCISCO. I was just an ex-officio member. And all my reports were coursed through our
Chairman, Mr. Valdecantos, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. She was the corporate secretary.
SEN. DRILON. Now, did you ever tell the board that there is a legal position taken or at least from
SEN. DRILON. She was just recording the minutes.
the documents it is possible that the claim has prescribed?
THE CHAIRMAN. Yes, she was recording.
MR. FRANCISCO. I took this up in the board meeting of the PNCC at that time and I told them
Now, we are asking you now why it was taken up? about this matter, sir.

MS. OGAN. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, this was mentioned in the memorandum of Atty. Francisco, SEN. DRILON. No, you told them that the claim could have, under the law, could have
memorandum to the board. prescribed?

SEN. DRILON. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Francisco represented APT in the board of PNCC. And is that MR. FRANCISCO. No, sir.
correct, Mr. Francisco?
SEN. DRILON. Why? You mean, you didn’t tell the board that it is possible that this liability is no
THE CHAIRMAN. You’re an ex-officio member. longer a valid liability because it has prescribed?

SEN. DRILON. Yes. MR. FRANCISCO. I did not dwell into the findings anymore, sir, because I found the professional

MR. FRANCISCO. Ex-officio member only, sir, as trustee in charge of the privatization of PNCC. opinion of the Feria Law Office to be sufficient.49 (Emphasis supplied)

SEN. DRILON. With the permission of Mr. Chair, may I ask a question... Atty. Francisco’s act of recommending to the PNCC Board the acknowledgment of the Marubeni
loans based only on an opinion of a private law firm, without consulting the OGCC and without
THE CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes, Senator Drilon. showing this opinion to the members of the PNCC Board except to Atty. Valdecantos, reflects how
SEN. DRILON. Atty. Francisco, you sat in the PNCC board as APT representative, you are a lawyer, shockingly little his concern was for PNCC, contrary to his claim that "he only had the interest of
there was a legal opinion of Feria, Feria, Lugto, Lao Law Offices which you cited in your PNCC at heart." In fact, if what was involved was his own money, Atty. Francisco would have
memorandum. Did you discuss – first, did you give a copy of this opinion to PNCC? preferred not just two, but at least three different opinions on how to deal with the matter, and he
would have maintained his non-liability.
MR. FRANCISCO. I gave a copy of this opinion, sir, to our chairman who was also a member of the
board of PNCC, Mr. Valdecantos, sir. SEN. OSMEÑA. x x x

SEN. DRILON. And because he was... All right. And lastly, just to clear our minds, there has always been this finger-pointing, of course,
whenever – this is typical Filipino. When they're caught in a bind, they always point a finger, they
MR. FRANCISCO. Because he was my immediate boss in the APT. pretend they don't know. And it just amazes me that you have been appointed trustees, meaning,
representatives of the Filipino people, that's what you were at APT, right? You were not Erap's
representatives, you were representative of the Filipino people and you were tasked to conserve the
assets that that had been confiscated from various cronies of the previous administration. And here, The PNCC Board acted in bad faith in relying on the opinion of a private lawyer knowing that
you are asked to recognize the P10 billion debt and you point only to one law firm. If you have cancer, PNCC is required to rely "exclusively" on the OGCC’s opinion. Worse, the PNCC Board, in
don't you to a second opinion, a second doctor or a third doctor? This is just a question. I am just admitting liability for ₱10.743 billion, relied on the recommendation of a private lawyer whose
asking you for your opinion if you would take the advice of the first doctor who tells you that he's got opinion the PNCC Board members have not even seen.
to open you up.
During the oral arguments, Atty. Sison explained to the Court that the intention of APT was for the
MR. FRANCISCO. I would go to three or more doctors, sir. PNCC Board merely to disclose the claim of Marubeni as part of APT's full disclosure policy to
prospective buyers of PNCC. Atty. Sison stated that it was not the intention of APT for the PNCC
SEN. OSMEÑA. Three or more. Yeah, that's right. And in this case the APT did not do so.
Board to admit liability for the Marubeni loans, thus:
MR. FRANCISCO. We relied on the findings of the …
x x x It was the Asset Privatization Trust A-P-T that was tasked to sell the company. The A-P-T, for
SEN. OSMEÑA. If these were your money, would you have gone also to obtain a second, third purposes of disclosure statements, tasked the Feria Law Office to handle the documentation and
opinion from other law firms. Kung pera mo itong 10 billion na ito. Siguro you're not gonna give it up the study of all legal issues that had to be resolved or clarified for the information of prospective
that easily ano, 'di ba? bidders and or buyers. In the performance of its assigned task the Feria Law Office came upon the
Marubeni claim and mentioned that the APTC and/or PNCC must disclose that there is a claim by
MR. FRANCISCO. Yes, sir.
Marubeni against PNCC for purposes of satisfying the requirements of full disclosure. This
SEN. OSMEÑA. You'll probably keep it in court for the next 20 years. seemingly innocent statement or requirement made by the Feria Law Office was then taken by two
officials of the Asset Privatization Trust and with malice aforethought turned it into the basis for a
x x x x50 (Emphasis supplied)
multi-billion peso debt by the now government owned and/or controlled PNCC. x x x. 51
This is a clear admission by Atty. Francisco of bad faith in directing the affairs of PNCC - that he (Emphasis supplied)
would not have recognized the Marubeni loans if his own funds were involved or if he were the owner
While the PNCC Board passed Board Resolution No. BD-099-2000 amending Board Resolution
of PNCC.
No. BD-092-2000, such amendment merely added conditions for the recognition of the Marubeni
The PNCC Board admitted liability for the ₱10.743 billion Marubeni loans without seeing, reading or loans, namely, subjecting the recognition to a final determination by COA of the amount involved
discussing the "Feria opinion" which was the sole basis for its admission of liability. Such act surely and to the declaration by OGCC of the legality of PNCC’s liability. However, the PNCC Board
goes against ordinary human nature, and amounts to gross negligence and utter bad faith, even reiterated and stood firm that it "recognizes, acknowledges and confirms its obligations" for the
bordering on fraud, on the part of the PNCC Board in directing the affairs of the corporation. Owing Marubeni loans. Apparently, Board Resolution No. BD-099-2000 was a futile attempt to "revoke"
loyalty to PNCC and its stockholders, the PNCC Board should have exercised utmost care and Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000. Atty. Alfredo Laya, Jr., a former PNCC Director, spoke on his
diligence in admitting a gargantuan debt of ₱10.743 billion that would certainly force PNCC into protests against Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 at the Senate hearings, thus:
insolvency, a debt that previous PNCC Boards in the last two decades consistently refused to admit.
MR. LAYA. Mr. Chairman, if I can …
Instead, the PNCC Board admitted PNCC’s liability for the Marubeni loans relying solely on a mere
THE CHAIRMAN. Were you also at the board?
opinion of a private law office, which opinion the PNCC Board members never saw, except for Atty.
Valdecantos and Atty. Francisco. The PNCC Board knew that PNCC, as a government owned and MR. LAYA. At that time, yes, sir.
controlled corporation (GOCC), must rely "exclusively" on the opinion of the OGCC. Section 1 of
THE CHAIRMAN. Okay, go ahead.
Memorandum Circular No. 9 dated 27 August 1998 issued by the President states:
MR. LAYA. That's why if – maybe this can help clarify the sequence. There was this meeting on
SECTION 1. All legal matters pertaining to government-owned or controlled corporations, their
October 20. This matter of the Marubeni liability or account was also discussed. Mr. Macasaet, if I
subsidiaries, other corporate off-springs and government acquired asset corporations (GOCCs) shall
may try to refresh. And there was some discussion, sir, and in fact, they were saying even at that
be exclusively referred to and handled by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC).
stage that there should be a COA or an OGCC audit. Now, that was during the discussion of
(Emphasis supplied)
October 20. Later on, the minutes came out. The practice, then, sir, was for the minutes to come out at MR. LAYA. I think so, sir. That was our – personally, that was my position.
the start of the meeting of the subsequent. So the minutes of October 20 came out on November 22
SEN. DRILON. How did it happen, Corporate Secretary Ogan, that the minutes did not reflect
and then we were going over it. And that is in the subsequent minutes of the meeting …
what the board …
THE CHAIRMAN. May I interrupt. You were taking up in your November 22 meeting the October 20
THE CHAIRMAN. Ms. Pasetes …
minutes?
MS. PASETES. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
MR. LAYA. Yes, sir.
THE CHAIRMAN. … you are the chief financial officer of PNCC.
THE CHAIRMAN. This minutes that we have?
MS. PASETES. Your Honor, before that November 22 board meeting, management headed by Mr.
MR. LAYA. Yes, sir.
Rolando Macasaet, myself and Atty. Ogan had a discussion about the recognition of the obligations
THE CHAIRMAN. All right, go ahead. of 10 billion of Marubeni and 36 billion of the national government on whether to recognize this as
an obligation in our books or recognize it as an obligation in the pro forma financial statement to
MR. LAYA. Now, in the November 22 meeting, we noticed this resolution already for confirmation of
be used for the privatization of PNCC because recognizing both obligations in the books of PNCC
the board – proceedings of October 20. So immediately we made – actually, protest would be a better
would defeat our going concern status and that is where the position of the president then, Mr.
term for that – we protested the wording of the resolution and that's why we came up with this
Macasaet, stemmed from and he went back to the board and moved to reconsider the position of
resolution amending the October 20 resolution.
October 20, 2000, Mr. Chair.52 (Emphasis supplied)
SEN. DRILON. So you are saying, Mr. Laya, that the minutes of October 20 did not accurately reflect
the decisions that you made on October 20 because you were saying that this recognition should be In other words, despite Atty. Laya’s objections to PNCC’s admitting liability for the Marubeni
subject to OGCC and COA? You seem to imply and we want to make it – and I want to get that for the loans, the PNCC Board still admitted the same and merely imposed additional conditions to temper
record. You seem to imply that there was no decision to recognize the obligation during that meeting somehow the devastating effects of Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000.
because you wanted it to subject it to COA and OGCC, is that correct? The act of the PNCC Board in issuing Board Resolution No. BD-092-2000 expressly admitting
MR. LAYA. Yes, your Honor. liability for the Marubeni loans demonstrates the PNCC Board’s gross and willful disregard of the
requisite care and diligence in managing the affairs of PNCC, amounting to bad faith and resulting
SEN. DRILON. So how did... in grave and irreparable injury to PNCC and its stockholders. This reckless and treacherous move
MR. LAYA. That's my understanding of the proceedings at that time, that's why in the subsequent on the part of the PNCC Board clearly constitutes a serious breach of its fiduciary duty to PNCC
November 22 meeting, we raised this point about obtaining a COA and OGCC opinion. and its stockholders, rendering the members of the PNCC Board liable under Section 31 of the
Corporation Code, which provides:
SEN. DRILON. Yes. But you know, the November 22 meeting repeated the wording of the resolution
previously adopted only now you are saying subject to final determination which is completely of SEC. 31. Liability of directors, trustees or officers. -- Directors or trustees who willfully and
different import from what you are saying was your understanding of the decision arrived at on knowingly vote for or assent to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or who are guilty of gross
October 20. negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the corporation or acquire any personal or
pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors or trustees shall be liable jointly and
MR. LAYA. Yes, sir. Because our thinking then... severally for all damages resulting therefrom suffered by the corporation, its stockholders or
SEN. DRILON. What do you mean, yes, sir? members and other persons.

MR. LAYA. It's just a claim under discussion but then the way it is translated, as the minutes of When a director, trustee or officer attempts to acquire or acquires, in violation of his duty, any
October 20 were not really verbatim. interest adverse to the corporation in respect of any matter which has been reposed in him in
confidence, as to which equity imposes a disability upon him to deal in his own behalf, he shall be
SEN. DRILON. So, you never intended to recognize the obligation.
liable as a trustee for the corporation and must account for the profits which otherwise would have toll revenues that were being assigned and the value of the new shares of PNCC the difference is
accrued to the corporation. about ₱12 Billion Pesos. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Soon after the short-lived Estrada Administration, the PNCC Board revoked its previous admission of V.
liability for the Marubeni loans. During the oral arguments, Atty. Sison narrated to the Court: The Compromise Agreement is Void
for Being Contrary to the Constitution,
x x x After President Estrada was ousted, I was appointed as President and Chairman of PNCC in
Existing Laws, and Public Policy
April of 2001, this particular board resolution was brought to my attention and I immediately put the
matter before the board. I had no problem in convincing them to reverse the recognition as it was For a better understanding of the present case, the pertinent terms and conditions of the
illegal and had no basis in fact. The vote to overturn that resolution was unanimous. Strange to say Compromise Agreement between PNCC and Radstock are quoted below:
that some who voted to overturn the recognition were part of the old board that approved it. Stranger
COMPROMISE AGREEMENT
still, Renato Valdecantos who was still a member of the Board voted in favor of reversing the
resolution he himself instigated and pushed. Some of the board members who voted to recognize the
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
obligation of Marubeni even came to me privately and said "pinilit lang kami." x x x. 53 (Emphasis
supplied) This Agreement made and entered into this 17th day of August 2006, in
Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, Philippines, by and between:
In approving PNCC Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099-2000, the PNCC Board caused
undue injury to the Government and gave unwarranted benefits to Radstock, through manifest PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, a government
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence of the PNCC Board. Such acts are acquired asset corporation, created and existing under the laws of the Republic of the
declared under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as "corrupt Philippines, with principal office address at EDSA corner Reliance Street,
practices xxx and xxx unlawful." Being unlawful and criminal acts, these PNCC Board Resolutions Mandaluyong City, Philippines, duly represented herein by its Chairman ARTHUR
are void ab initio and cannot be implemented or in any way given effect by the Executive or Judicial N. AGUILAR, pursuant to a Board Resolution attached herewith as Annex "A" and
made an integral part hereof, hereinafter referred to as PNCC;
branch of the Government.
Not content with forcing PNCC to commit corporate suicide with the admission of liability for the - and -
Marubeni loans under Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099-2000, the PNCC Board
drove the last nail on PNCC’s coffin when the PNCC Board entered into the manifestly and grossly RADSTOCK SECURITIES LIMITED, a private corporation incorporated in the
disadvantageous Compromise Agreement with Radstock. This time, the OGCC, headed by Agnes British Virgin Islands, with office address at Suite 1402 1 Duddell Street, Central
Hongkong duly-represented herein by its Director, CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ,
DST Devanadera, reversed itself and recommended approval of the Compromise Agreement to the
pursuant to a Board Resolution attached herewith as Annex "B" and made an integral
PNCC Board. As Atty. Sison explained to the Court during the oral arguments: part hereof, hereinafter referred to as RADSTOCK.
x x x While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, Radstock in a rare display of extreme
generosity, conveniently convinced the Board of PNCC to enter into a compromise agreement for ½ WITNESSETH:
the amount of the judgment rendered by the RTC or ₱6.5 Billion Pesos. This time the OGCC, under
WHEREAS, on January 15, 2001, RADSTOCK, as assignee of Marubeni
the leadership of now Solicitor General Agnes Devanadera, approved the compromise agreement
Corporation, filed a complaint for sum of money and damages with application for a
abandoning the previous OGCC position that PNCC had a meritorious case and would be hard press writ of preliminary attachment with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Mandaluyong
to lose the case. What is strange is that although the compromise agreement we seek to stop ostensibly City, docketed as Civil Case No. MC-01-1398, to collect on PNCC’s guarantees on
is for ₱6.5 Billion only, truth and in fact, the agreement agrees to convey to Radstock all or the unpaid loan obligations of CDCP Mining Corporation as provided under an
substantially all of the assets of PNCC worth ₱18 Billion Pesos. There are three items that are Advance Payment Agreement and Loan Agreement;
undervalued here, the real estate that was turned over as a result of the controversial agreement, the
WHEREAS, on December 10, 2002, the RTC of Mandaluyong rendered a decision in 2. This Compromise Amount shall be paid by PNCC to RADSTOCK in the
favor of plaintiff RADSTOCK directing PNCC to pay the total amount of Thirteen following manner:
Billion One Hundred Fifty One Million Nine Hundred Fifty-Six Thousand Five Hundred
Twenty-Eight Pesos (₱13,151,956,528.00) with interest from October 15, 2001 plus Ten a. PNCC shall assign to a third party assignee to be designated by RADSTOCK all its
Million Pesos (₱10,000,000.00) as attorney's fees. rights and interests to the following real properties provided the assignee shall be
duly qualified to own real properties in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, PNCC had elevated the case to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. SP No.
66654) on Certiorari and thereafter, to the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 156887) which (1) PNCC’s rights over that parcel of land located in Pasay City with a total
Courts have consistently ruled that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion area of One Hundred Twenty-Nine Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Eight
when it denied PNCC’s Motion to Dismiss which sets forth similar or substantially the (129,548) square meters, more or less, and which is covered by and more
same grounds or defenses as those raised in PNCC's Answer; particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34997 of the
Registry of Deeds for Pasay City. The transfer value is ₱3,817,779,000.00.
WHEREAS, the case has remained pending for almost six (6) years even after the main
action was appealed to the Court of Appeals; PNCC’s rights and interests in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-34997 of
the Registry of Deeds for Pasay City is defined and delineated by
WHEREAS, on the basis of the RTC Decision dated December 10, 2002, the current Administrative Order No. 397, Series of 1998, and RADSTOCK is fully
value of the judgment debt against PNCC stands at ₱17,040,843,968.00 as of July 31, aware and recognizes that PNCC has an undertaking to cede at least 2
2006 (the "Judgment Debt"); hectares of this property to its creditor, the Philippine National Bank; and
that furthermore, the Government Service Insurance System has also a
WHEREAS, RADSTOCK is willing to settle the case at the reduced Compromise current and existing claim in the nature of boundary conflicts, which
Amount of Six Billion One Hundred Ninety-Six Million Pesos (₱6,196,000,000.00) undertaking and claim will not result in the diminution of area or value of the
which may be paid by PNCC, either in cash or in kind to avoid the trouble and property. Radstock recognizes and acknowledges the rights and interests of
inconvenience of further litigation as a gesture of goodwill and cooperation; GSIS over the said property.

WHEREAS, it is an established legal policy or principle that litigants in civil cases (2) T-452587 (T-23646) - Parañaque (5,123 sq. m.) subject to the clarification
should be encouraged to compromise or amicably settle their claims not only to avoid of the Privatization and Management Office (PMO) claims thereon. The
litigation but also to put an end to one already commenced (Articles 2028 and 2029, transfer value is ₱45,000,900.00.
Civil Code);
(3) T-49499 (529715 including T-68146-G (S-29716) (1,9747-A)-Parañaque
WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement has been approved by the respective Board of (107 sq. m.) (54 sq. m.) subject to the clarification of the Privatization and
Directors of both PNCC and RADSTOCK, subject to the approval of the Honorable Management Office (PMO) claims thereon. The transfer value is
Court; ₱1,409,100.00.

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises, and the mutual (4) 5-29716-Parañaque (27,762 sq. m.) subject to the clarification of the
covenants, stipulations and agreements herein contained, PNCC and RADSTOCK have Privatization and Management Office (PMO) claims thereon. The transfer
agreed to amicably settle the above captioned Radstock case under the following terms value is ₱242,917,500.00.
and conditions:
(5) P-169 - Tagaytay (49,107 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱13,749,400.00.
1. RADSTOCK agrees to receive and accept from PNCC in full and complete
settlement of the Judgment Debt, the reduced amount of Six Billion, One (6) P-170 - Tagaytay (49,100 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱13,749,400.00.
Hundred Ninety-Six Million Pesos (₱6,196,000,000.00) (the "Compromise
Amount"). (7) N-3320 - Town and Country Estate, Antipolo (10,000 sq. m.). The
transfer value is ₱16,800,000.00.
 (8) N-7424 - Antipolo (840 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱940,800.00. agreement, based further on current generally accepted accounting standards which
stipulates the valuation of shares to be based on the lower of cost or market value.
(9) N-7425 - Antipolo (850 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱952,000.00.
Subject to the procurement of any and all necessary approvals from the relevant
(10) N-7426 - Antipolo (958 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱1,073,100.00. governmental authorities, PNCC shall deliver to RADSTOCK an instrument
evidencing an undertaking of the Privatization and Management Office (PMO) to
(11) T-485276 - Antipolo (741 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱830,200.00. give RADSTOCK or its assignee the right to match any offer to buy the shares of the
capital stock and debts of PNCC held by PMO, in the event the same shares and debt
are offered for privatization.
(12) T-485277 - Antipolo (680 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱761,600.00.
c. PNCC shall assign to RADSTOCK or its assignee 50% of the PNCC's 6% share in
(13) T-485278 - Antipolo (701 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱785,400.00.
the gross toll revenue of the Manila North Tollways Corporation (MNTC), with a Net
Present Value of ₱1.287 Billion computed in the manner outlined in Annex "C"
(14) T-131500 - Bulacan (CDCP Farms Corp.) (4,945 sq, m.). The transfer value herein attached as an integral part hereof, that shall be due and owing to PNCC
is ₱6,475,000.00. pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement between PNCC and First Philippine
Infrastructure Development Corp. dated August 29, 1995 and other related existing
(15) T-131501 - Bulacan (678 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱887,600.00. agreements, commencing in 2008. It shall be understood that as a result of this
assignment, PNCC shall charge and withhold the amounts, if any, pertaining to taxes
(16) T-26,154 (M) - Bocaue, Bulacan (2,841 sq. m.). The transfer value is due on the amounts assigned.
₱3,779,300.00.
Under the Compromise Agreement, PNCC shall pay Radstock the reduced amount of
(17) T-29,308 (M) - Bocaue, Bulacan (733 sq. m.). The transfer value is ₱6,185,000,000.00 in full settlement of PNCC’s guarantee of CDCP Mining’s debt
₱974,400.00. allegedly totaling ₱17,040,843,968.00 as of 31 July 2006. To satisfy its reduced
obligation, PNCC undertakes to (1) "assign to a third party assignee to be designated
(18) T-29,309 (M) Bocaue, Bulacan (1,141 sq. m.). The transfer value is by Radstock all its rights and interests" to the listed real properties therein; (2) issue
₱1,517,600.00. to Radstock or its assignee common shares of the capital stock of PNCC issued at par
value which shall comprise 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC; and (3)
(19) T-260578 (R. Bengzon) Sta. Rita, Guiguinto, Bulacan (20,000 sq. m.). The assign to Radstock or its assignee 50% of PNCC’s 6% share, for the next 27 years
transfer value is ₱25,200,000.00. (2008-2035), in the gross toll revenues of the Manila North Tollways Corporation.

The transfer values of the foregoing properties are based on 70% of the appraised value A. The PNCC Board has no power to compromise
of the respective properties. the ₱6.185 billion amount.
Does the PNCC Board have the power to compromise the ₱6.185 billion "reduced" amount? The
b. PNCC shall issue to RADSTOCK or its assignee common shares of the capital stock
answer is in the negative.1avvphi1
of PNCC issued at par value which shall comprise 20% of the outstanding capital stock
of PNCC after the conversion to equity of the debt exposure of the Privatization The Dissenting Opinion asserts that PNCC has the power, citing Section 36(2) of Presidential
Management Office (PMO) and the National Development Company (NDC) and other Decree No. 1445 (PD 1445), otherwise known as the Government Auditing Code of the
government agencies and creditors such that the total government holdings shall not fall
Philippines, enacted in 1978. Section 36 states:
below 70% voting equity subject to the approval of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and ratification of PNCC’s stockholders, if necessary. The assigned SECTION 36. Power to Compromise Claims. — (1) When the interest of the government so
value of the shares issued to RADSTOCK is ₱713 Million based on the approximate last requires, the Commission may compromise or release in whole or in part, any claim or settled
trading price of PNCC shares in the Philippine Stock Exchange as the date of this
liability to any government agency not exceeding ten thousand pesos and with the written approval
of the Prime Minister, it may likewise compromise or release any similar claim or liability not Thus, Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
exceeding one hundred thousand pesos, the application for relief therefrom shall be submitted, through applies to PNCC, which indisputably is a government owned or controlled corporation.
the Commission and the Prime Minister, with their recommendations, to the National Assembly.
In the same vein, the COA’s stamp of approval on the Compromise Agreement is void for violating
(2) The respective governing bodies of government-owned or controlled corporations, and self- Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. Clearly,
governing boards, commissions or agencies of the government shall have the exclusive power to the Dissenting Opinion’s reliance on the COA’s finding that the terms and conditions of the
compromise or release any similar claim or liability when expressly authorized by their charters and if Compromise Agreement are "fair and above board" is patently erroneous.
in their judgment, the interest of their respective corporations or agencies so requires. When the
charters do not so provide, the power to compromise shall be exercised by the Commission in Citing Benedicto v. Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN, BBC and IBC, 55 the
accordance with the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied) Dissenting Opinion views that congressional approval is not required for the validity of the
Compromise Agreement because the liability of PNCC is not yet "settled."
The Dissenting Opinion asserts that since PNCC is incorporated under the Corporation Code, the
PNCC Board has all the powers granted to the governing boards of corporations incorporated under In Benedicto, the PCGG filed in the Sandiganbayan a civil case to recover from the defendants
the Corporation Code, which includes the power to compromise claims or liabilities. (including Roberto S. Benedicto) their ill-gotten wealth consisting of funds and other properties.
The PCGG executed a compromise agreement with Roberto S. Benedicto ceding to the latter a
Section 36 of PD 1445, enacted on 11 June 1978, has been superseded by a later law -- Section 20(1), substantial part of his ill-gotten assets and the State granting him immunity from further
Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of prosecution. The Court held that prior congressional approval is not required for the PCGG to enter
1987, which provides: into a compromise agreement with persons against whom it has filed actions for recovery of ill-
Section 20. Power to Compromise Claims. - (1) When the interest of the Government so requires, the gotten wealth.
Commission may compromise or release in whole or in part, any settled claim or liability to any In Benedicto, the Court found that the government’s claim against Benedicto was not yet settled
government agency not exceeding ten thousand pesos arising out of any matter or case before it or unlike here where the PNCC Board expressly admitted the liability of PNCC for the Marubeni
within its jurisdiction, and with the written approval of the President, it may likewise compromise or loans. In Benedicto, the ownership of the alleged ill-gotten assets was still being litigated in the
release any similar claim or liability not exceeding one hundred thousand pesos. In case the claim or Sandiganbayan and no party ever admitted any liability, unlike here where the PNCC Board had
liability exceeds one hundred thousand pesos, the application for relief therefrom shall be submitted, already admitted through a formal Board Resolution PNCC’s liability for the Marubeni loans.
through the Commission and the President, with their recommendations, to the Congress[.] x x x PNCC’s express admission of liability for the Marubeni loans is essentially the premise of the
(Emphasis supplied) execution of the Compromise Agreement. In short, Radstock’s claim against PNCC is settled by
virtue of PNCC’s express admission of liability for the Marubeni loans. The Compromise
Under this provision,54 the authority to compromise a settled claim or liability exceeding ₱100,000.00
Agreement merely reduced this settled liability from ₱17 billion to ₱6.185 billion.
involving a government agency, as in this case where the liability amounts to ₱6.185 billion, is vested
not in COA but exclusively in Congress. Congress alone has the power to compromise the ₱6.185 The provision of the Revised Administrative Code on the power to settle claims or liabilities was
billion purported liability of PNCC. Without congressional approval, the Compromise Agreement precisely enacted to prevent government agencies from admitting liabilities against the
between PNCC and Radstock involving ₱6.185 billion is void for being contrary to Section 20(1), government, then compromising such "settled" liabilities. The present case is exactly what the law
Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. seeks to prevent, a compromise agreement on a creditor’s claim settled through admission by a
government agency without the approval of Congress for amounts exceeding ₱100,000.00. What
PNCC is a "government agency" because Section 2 on Introductory Provisions of the Revised
makes the application of the law even more necessary is that the PNCC Board’s twin moves are
Administrative Code of 1987 provides that –
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the Government. First, the PNCC admitted solidary
Agency of the Government refers to any of the various units of the Government, including a liability for a staggering ₱10.743 billion private debt incurred by a private corporation which
department, bureau, office, instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or a local PNCC does not even control. Second, the PNCC Board agreed to pay Radstock ₱6.185 billion as a
government or a distinct unit therein. (Boldfacing supplied) compromise settlement ahead of all other creditors, including the Government which is the biggest
creditor.
The Dissenting Opinion further argues that since the PNCC is incorporated under the Corporation with original charters, and on a post-audit basis: (a) constitutional bodies, commissions and offices
Code, it has the power, through its Board of Directors, to compromise just like any other private that have been granted fiscal autonomy under this Constitution; (b) autonomous state colleges and
corporation organized under the Corporation Code. Thus, the Dissenting Opinion states: universities; (c) other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; and (d)
such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through
Not being a government corporation created by special law, PNCC does not owe its creation to some
the Government, which are required by law or the granting institution to submit to such audit as a
charter or special law, but to the Corporation Code. Its powers are enumerated in the Corporation
condition of subsidy or equity. However, where the internal control system of the audited agencies
Code and its articles of incorporation. As an autonomous entity, it undoubtedly has the power to
is inadequate, the Commission may adopt such measures, including temporary or special pre-audit,
compromise, and to enter into a settlement through its Board of Directors, just like any other private
as are necessary and appropriate to correct the deficiencies. It shall keep the general accounts of
corporation organized under the Corporation Code. To maintain otherwise is to ignore the character of
the Government and, for such period as may be provided by law, preserve the vouchers and other
PNCC as a corporate entity organized under the Corporation Code, by which it was vested with a
supporting papers pertaining thereto.
personality and identity distinct and separate from those of its stockholders or members. (Boldfacing
and underlining supplied) (2) The Commission shall have exclusive authority, subject to the limitations in this Article, to
define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required
The Dissenting Opinion is woefully wide off the mark. The PNCC is not "just like any other private
therefor, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the
corporation" precisely because it is not a private corporation but indisputably a government owned
prevention and disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable
corporation. Neither is PNCC "an autonomous entity" considering that PNCC is under the Department
expenditures, or uses of government funds and properties. (Emphasis supplied)
of Trade and Industry, over which the President exercises control. To claim that PNCC is an
"autonomous entity" is to say that it is a lost command in the Executive branch, a concept that violates In explaining the extent of the jurisdiction of COA over government owned or controlled
the President's constitutional power of control over the entire Executive branch of government. 56 corporations, this Court declared in Feliciano v. Commission on Audit: 58

The government nominees in the PNCC Board, who practically compose the entire PNCC Board, are The COA's audit jurisdiction extends not only to government "agencies or instrumentalities," but
public officers subject to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, accountable to the Government and also to "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters" as well as "other
the Filipino people. To hold that a corporation incorporated under the Corporation Code, despite its government-owned or controlled corporations" without original charters.
being 90.3% owned by the Government, is "an autonomous entity" that could solely through its Board
xxxx
of Directors compromise, and transfer ownership of, substantially all its assets to a private third party
without the approval required under the Administrative Code of 1987, 57 is to invite the plunder of all Petitioner forgets that the constitutional criterion on the exercise of COA's audit jurisdiction
such government owned corporations. depends on the government's ownership or control of a corporation. The nature of the corporation,
whether it is private, quasi-public, or public is immaterial.
The Dissenting Opinion’s claim that PNCC is an autonomous entity just like any other private
corporation is inconsistent with its assertion that Section 36(2) of the Government Auditing Code is The Constitution vests in the COA audit jurisdiction over "government-owned and controlled
the governing law in determining PNCC's power to compromise. Section 36(2) of the Government corporations with original charters," as well as "government-owned or controlled corporations"
Auditing Code expressly states that it applies to the governing bodies of "government-owned or without original charters. GOCCs with original charters are subject to COA pre-audit, while
controlled corporations." The phrase "government-owned or controlled corporations" refers to both GOCCs without original charters are subject to COA post-audit. GOCCs without original charters
those created by special charter as well as those incorporated under the Corporation Code. Section 2, refer to corporations created under the Corporation Code but are owned or controlled by the
Article IX-D of the Constitution provides: government. The nature or purpose of the corporation is not material in determining COA's audit
jurisdiction. Neither is the manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a general or special
SECTION 2. (1) The Commission on Audit shall have the power, authority, and duty to examine, law.
audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of
funds and property, owned or held in trust by, or pertaining to, the Government, or any of its Clearly, the COA’s audit jurisdiction extends to government owned or controlled corporations
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations incorporated under the Corporation Code. Thus, the COA must apply the Government Auditing
Code in the audit and examination of the accounts of such government owned or controlled
corporations even though incorporated under the Corporation Code. This means that Section 20(1), This contention is untenable.
Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 on the power to
The proviso in Section 2 of PD 1894 refers to the franchise granted for the Metro Manila
compromise, which superseded Section 36 of the Government Auditing Code, applies to the present
Expressway and all extensions linkages, stretches and diversions constructed after the approval of
case in determining PNCC’s power to compromise. In fact, the COA has been regularly auditing
PD 1894. It does not pertain to the NLEX because the term of the NLEX franchise, "which is 30
PNCC on a post-audit basis in accordance with Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the
years from 1 May 1977, shall remain the same," as expressly provided in the first sentence of the
Government Auditing Code, and COA rules and regulations.
same Section 2 of PD 1894. To construe that the NLEX franchise had a new term of 30 years
B. PNCC’s toll fees are public funds. starting from 2005 glaringly conflicts with the plain, clear and unequivocal language of the first
sentence of Section 2 of PD 1894. That would be clearly absurd.
PD 1113 granted PNCC a 30-year franchise to construct, operate and maintain toll facilities in the
North and South Luzon Expressways. Section 1 of PD 111359 provides: There is no dispute that Congress did not renew PNCC’s franchise after its expiry on 1 May 2007.
However, PNCC asserts that it "remains a viable corporate entity even after the expiration of its
Section 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, there is hereby granted to the franchise under Presidential Decree No. 1113." PNCC points out that the Toll Regulatory Board
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), a corporation duly organized (TRB) granted PNCC a "Tollway Operation Certificate" (TOC) which conferred on PNCC the
and registered under the laws of the Philippines, hereinafter called the GRANTEE, for a period of authority to operate and maintain toll facilities, which includes the power to collect toll fees. PNCC
thirty (30) years from May 1, 1977 the right, privilege and authority to construct, operate and maintain further posits that the toll fees are private funds because they represent "the consideration given to
toll facilities covering the expressways from Balintawak (Station 9 + 563) to Carmen, Rosales, tollway operators in exchange for costs they incurred or will incur in constructing, operating and
Pangasinan and from Nichols, Pasay City (Station 10 + 540) to Lucena, Quezon, hereinafter referred maintaining the tollways."
to collectively as North Luzon Expressway, respectively.
This contention is devoid of merit.
The franchise herein granted shall include the right to collect toll fees at such rates as may be fixed
and/or authorized by the Toll Regulatory Board hereinafter referred to as the Board created under With the expiration of PNCC’s franchise, the assets and facilities of PNCC were automatically
Presidential Decree No. 1112 for the use of the expressways above-mentioned. (Emphasis supplied) turned over, by operation of law, to the government at no cost. Sections 2(e) and 9 of PD 1113 and
Section 5 of PD 1894 provide:
Section 2 of PD 1894,60 which amended PD 1113 to include in PNCC’s franchise the Metro Manila Section 2 [of PD 1113]. In consideration of this franchise, the GRANTEE shall:
expressway, also provides:
(e) Turn over the toll facilities and all equipment directly related thereto to the government upon
Section 2. The term of the franchise provided under Presidential Decree No. 1113 for the North Luzon expiration of the franchise period without cost.
Expressway and the South Luzon Expressway which is thirty (30) years from 1 May 1977 shall
remain the same; provided that, the franchise granted for the Metro Manila Expressway and all Section 9 [of PD 1113]. For the purposes of this franchise, the Government, shall turn over to the
extensions linkages, stretches and diversions that may be constructed after the date of approval of this GRANTEE (PNCC) not later than April 30, 1977 all physical assets and facilities including all
decree shall likewise have a term of thirty (30) years commencing from the date of completion of the equipment and appurtenances directly related to the operations of the North and South Toll
project. (Emphasis supplied) Expressways: Provided, That, the extensions of such Expressways shall also be turned over to
GRANTEE upon completion of their construction or of functional sections thereof: Provided,
Based on these provisions, the franchise of the PNCC expired on 1 May 2007 or thirty years from 1 However, That upon termination of the franchise period, said physical assets and facilities
May 1977. including improvements thereon, together with equipment and appurtenances directly related to
PNCC, however, claims that under PD 1894, the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) shall have a term their operations, shall be turned over to the Government without any cost or obligation on the part
of 30 years from the date of its completion in 2005. PNCC argues that the proviso in Section 2 of PD of the latter. (Emphasis supplied)
1894 gave "toll road projects completed within the franchise period and after the approval of PD No. Section 5 [of PD No. 1894]. In consideration of this franchise, the GRANTEE shall:
1894 on 12 December 1983 their own thirty-year term commencing from the date of the completion of
the said project, notwithstanding the expiry of the said franchise." (a) Construct, operate and maintain at its own expense the Expressways; and
 (b) Turn over, without cost, the toll facilities and all equipment, directly related thereto to the x x x My question is very simple x x x Is the income from these assets of the national government
Government upon expiration of the franchise period. (Emphasis supplied) (interrupted)
The TRB does not have the power to give back to PNCC the toll assets and facilities which were DEAN AGABIN:
automatically turned over to the Government, by operation of law, upon the expiration of the franchise
of the PNCC on 1 May 2007. Whatever power the TRB may have to grant authority to operate a toll Yes, Your Honor.63
facility or to issue a "Tollway Operation Certificate," such power does not obviously include the xxxx
authority to transfer back to PNCC ownership of National Government assets, like the toll assets and
facilities, which have become National Government property upon the expiry of PNCC’s franchise. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Such act by the TRB would repeal Section 5 of PD 1894 which automatically vested in the National So, it’s the government [that] decides whether it goes to the general fund or another fund. [W]hat is
Government ownership of PNCC’s toll assets and facilities upon the expiry of PNCC’s franchise. The that other fund? Is there another fund where revenues of the government go?
TRB obviously has no power to repeal a law. Further, PD 1113, as amended by PD 1894, granting the
franchise to PNCC, is a later law that must necessarily prevail over PD 1112 creating the TRB. Hence, DEAN AGABIN:
the provisions of PD 1113, as amended by PD 1894, are controlling. It’s the same fund, Your Honor, except that (interrupted)
The government’s ownership of PNCC's toll assets and facilities inevitably results in the government’s ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
ownership of the toll fees and the net income derived from these toll assets and facilities. Thus, the toll
fees form part of the National Government’s General Fund, which includes public moneys of every So it goes to the general fund?
sort and other resources pertaining to any agency of the government. 61 Even Radstock’s counsel DEAN AGABIN:
admits that the toll fees are public funds, to wit:
Except that it can be categorized as a private fund in a commercial sense, and it can be categorized
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: as a public fund in a Public Law sense.
Okay. Now, when the franchise of PNCC expired on May 7, 2007, under the terms of the franchise ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
under PD 1896, all the assets, toll way assets, equipment, etcetera of PNCC became owned by
Okay. So we agree that, okay, it goes to the general fund. I agree with you, but you are saying it is
government at no cost, correct, under the franchise?
categorized still as a private funds?
DEAN AGABIN:
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
Yes, Your Honor.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. So this is now owned by the national government. [A]ny income from these assets of the
But it’s part of the general fund. Now, if it is part of the general fund, who has the authority to
national government is national government income, correct?
spend that money?
DEAN AGABIN:
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.62 Well, the National Government itself.
xxxx ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Who in the National Government, the Executive, Judiciary or Legislative?
DEAN AGABIN: xxxx
Well, the funds are usually appropriated by the Congress. Section 85. Appropriation before entering into contract.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: 1. No contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an
appropriation therefor, the unexpended balance of which, free of other obligations, is sufficient to
x x x you mean to say there are exceptions that money from the general fund can be spent by the
cover the proposed expenditure.
Executive without going t[hrough] Congress, or xxx is [that] the absolute rule?
xxxx
DEAN AGABIN:
Section 86 of PD 1445, on the other hand, requires that the proper accounting official must certify
Well, in so far as the general fund is concerned, that is the absolute rule set aside by the National
Government. that funds have been appropriated for the purpose. 66 Section 87 of PD 1445 provides that any
contract entered into contrary to the requirements of Sections 85 and 86 shall be void, thus:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Section 87. Void contract and liability of officer. Any contract entered into contrary to the
x x x you are saying this is general fund money - the collection from the assets[?] requirements of the two immediately preceding sections shall be void, and the officer or officers
DEAN AGABIN: entering into the contract shall be liable to the government or other contracting party for any
consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private
Yes.64 (Emphasis supplied) parties. (Emphasis supplied)

Forming part of the General Fund, the toll fees can only be disposed of in accordance with the Applying Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution, as implanted in Sections 84 and 85 of the
fundamental principles governing financial transactions and operations of any government agency, to Government Auditing Code, a law must first be enacted by Congress appropriating ₱6.185 billion
wit: (1) no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by as compromise money before payment to Radstock can be made. 67 Otherwise, such payment
law, as expressly mandated by Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution; and (2) government funds violates a prohibitory law and thus void under Article 5 of the Civil Code which states that "[a]cts
or property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes, as expressly mandated by Section 4(2) of executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when
PD 1445 or the Government Auditing Code.65 the law itself authorizes their validity."

Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides: Indisputably, without an appropriation law, PNCC cannot lawfully pay ₱6.185 billion to Radstock.
Any contract allowing such payment, like the Compromise Agreement, "shall be void" as provided
Section 29(1). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law. in Section 87 of the Government Auditing Code. In Comelec v. Quijano-Padilla, 68 this Court
ruled:
The power to appropriate money from the General Funds of the Government belongs exclusively to
the Legislature. Any act in violation of this iron-clad rule is unconstitutional. Petitioners are justified in refusing to formalize the contract with PHOTOKINA. Prudence dictated
them not to enter into a contract not backed up by sufficient appropriation and available funds.
Reinforcing this Constitutional mandate, Sections 84 and 85 of PD 1445 require that before a Definitely, to act otherwise would be a futile exercise for the contract would inevitably suffer the
government agency can enter into a contract involving the expenditure of government funds, there vice of nullity. In Osmeña vs. Commission on Audit, this Court held:
must be an appropriation law for such expenditure, thus:
The Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. 1445) further provides that no contract involving the
Section 84. Disbursement of government funds. expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless there is an appropriation therefor and the
1. Revenue funds shall not be paid out of any public treasury or depository except in pursuance of an proper accounting official of the agency concerned shall have certified to the officer entering into
appropriation law or other specific statutory authority. the obligation that funds have been duly appropriated for the purpose and the amount necessary to
cover the proposed contract for the current fiscal year is available for expenditure on account thereof. Well, I believe that that may not be necessary. Your Honor, because earlier, the government had
Any contract entered into contrary to the foregoing requirements shall be VOID. already decreed that PNCC should be properly paid for the reclamation works which it had done.
And so (interrupted)
Clearly then, the contract entered into by the former Mayor Duterte was void from the very beginning
since the agreed cost for the project (₱,368,920.00) was way beyond the appropriated amount ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
(₱,419,180.00) as certified by the City Treasurer. Hence, the contract was properly declared void and
No. I am talking of the funds.
unenforceable in COA's 2nd Indorsement, dated September 4, 1986. The COA declared and we agree,
that: DEAN AGABIN:
The prohibition contained in Sec. 85 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code) is explicit and And so it is like a foreign obligation.
mandatory. Fund availability is, as it has always been, an indispensable prerequisite to the execution of
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
any government contract involving the expenditure of public funds by all government agencies at all
levels. Such contracts are not to be considered as final or binding unless such a certification as to Counsel, I'm talking of the general funds, collection from the toll fees. Okay. You said, they go to
funds availability is issued (Letter of Instruction No. 767, s. 1978). Antecedent of advance the general fund. You also said, money from the general fund can be spent only if there is an
appropriation is thus essential to government liability on contracts (Zobel vs. City of Manila, 47 Phil. appropriation law by Congress.
169). This contract being violative of the legal requirements aforequoted, the same contravenes Sec.
DEAN AGABIN:
85 of PD 1445 and is null and void by virtue of Sec. 87.
Yes, Your Honor.
Verily, the contract, as expressly declared by law, is inexistent and void ab initio. This is to say that the
proposed contract is without force and effect from the very beginning or from its incipiency, as if it There is no law.
had never been entered into, and hence, cannot be validated either by lapse of time or ratification.
DEAN AGABIN:
(Emphasis supplied)
Yes, except that, Your Honor, this fund has not yet gone to the general fund.
Significantly, Radstock’s counsel admits that an appropriation law is needed before PNCC can use toll
fees to pay Radstock, thus: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: No. It’s being collected everyday. As of May 7, 2007, national government owned those assets
already. All those x x x collections that would have gone to PNCC are now national government
Okay, I agree with you. Now, you are saying that money can be paid out of the general fund only
owned. It goes to the general fund. And any body who uses that without appropriation from
through an appropriation by Congress, correct? That’s what you are saying.
Congress commits malversation, I tell you.
DEAN AGABIN:
DEAN AGABIN:
Yes, Your Honor.
That is correct, Your Honor, as long as it has already gone into the general fund.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
I agree with you also. Okay, now, can PNCC xxx use this money to pay Radstock without
Oh, you mean to say that it’s still being held now by the agent, PNCC. It has not been remitted to
Congressional approval?
the National Government?
DEAN AGABIN:
DEAN AGABIN:
Well, if PNCC (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: DEAN AGABIN:
But if (interrupted) Yes, Your Honor.
DEAN AGABIN: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
If this is the share that properly belongs to PNCC as a private entity (interrupted) But those are expenses. We are talking of the net income. It goes to the general fund. And it’s only
Congress that can authorize that expenditure. Not even the Court of Appeals can give its stamp of
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
approval that it goes to Radstock, correct?
No, no. I am saying that – You just agreed that all those collections now will go to the National
DEAN AGABIN:
Government forming part of the general fund. If, somehow, PNCC is holding this money in the
meantime, it holds xxx it in trust, correct? Because you said, it goes to the general fund, National Yes, Your Honor.69 (Emphasis supplied)
Government. So it must be holding this in trust for the National Government.
Without an appropriation law, the use of the toll fees to pay Radstock would constitute
DEAN AGABIN: malversation of public funds. Even counsel for Radstock expressly admits that the use of the toll
Yes, Your Honor. fees to pay Radstock constitutes malversation of public funds, thus:

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Okay. Can the person holding in trust use it to pay his private debt? x x x As of May 7, 2007, [the] national government owned those assets already. All those x x x
collections that would have gone to PNCC are now national government owned. It goes to the
DEAN AGABIN: general fund. And any body who uses that without appropriation from Congress commits
No, Your Honor. malversation, I tell you.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: DEAN AGABIN:

Cannot be. That is correct, Your Honor, as long as it has already gone into the general fund.

DEAN AGABIN: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

But I assume that there must be some portion of the collections which properly pertain to PNCC. Oh, you mean to say that it’s still being held now by the agent, PNCC. It has not been remitted to
the National Government?
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
DEAN AGABIN:
If there is some portion that xxx may be [for] operating expenses of PNCC. But that is not
Well, if PNCC (interrupted)
DEAN AGABIN:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Even profit, Your Honor.
But if (interrupted)
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
DEAN AGABIN:
Yeah, but that is not the six percent. Out of the six percent, that goes now to PNCC, that’s entirely
national government. But the National Government and the PNCC can agree on service fees for If this is the share that properly belongs to PNCC as a private entity (interrupted)
collecting, to pay toll collectors. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
No, no. I am saying that – You just agreed that all those collections now will go to the National SEN. OSMEÑA. If they’re not a 100 percent, why would they sign jointly and severally? I just
Government forming part of the general fund. If, somehow, PNCC is holding this money in the want to plug the loopholes.
meantime, it holds x x x it in trust, correct? Because you said, it goes to the general fund, National
MR. AGUILAR. I think it was – if I may just speculate. It was just common ownership at that
Government. So it must be holding this in trust for the National Government.
time.
DEAN AGABIN:
SEN. OSMEÑA. Al right. Now – Also, the ...
Yes, Your Honor.70 (Emphasis supplied) MR. AGUILAR. Ah, 13 percent daw, your Honor.
Indisputably, funds held in trust by PNCC for the National Government cannot be used by SEN. OSMEÑA. Huh?
PNCC to pay a private debt of CDCP Mining to Radstock, otherwise the PNCC Board will be
liable for malversation of public funds. MR. AGUILAR. Thirteen percent ho.

In addition, to pay Radstock ₱6.185 billion violates the fundamental public policy, expressly SEN. OSMEÑA. What’s 13 percent?

articulated in Section 4(2) of the Government Auditing Code, 71 that government funds or property MR. AGUILAR. We owned ...
shall be spent or used solely for pubic purposes, thus: MS. PASETES. Thirteen percent of ...
Section 4. Fundamental Principles. x x x (2) Government funds or property shall be spent or used SEN. OSMEÑA. PNCC owned ...
solely for public purposes. (Emphasis supplied)
MS. PASETES. (Mike off) CDCP ...
There is no question that the subject of the Compromise Agreement is CDCP Mining’s private debt to
Marubeni, which Marubeni subsequently assigned to Radstock. Counsel for Radstock admits that SEN. DRILON. Use the microphone, please.
Radstock holds a private debt of CDCP Mining, thus: MS. PASETES. Sorry. Your Honor, the ownership of CDCP of CDCP Basay Mining ...
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: SEN. OSMEÑA. No, no, the ownership of CDCP. CDCP Mining, how many percent of the equity
So your client is holding a private debt of CDCP Mining, correct? of CDCP Mining was owned by PNCC, formerly CDCP?

DEAN AGABIN: MS. PASETES. Thirteen percent.

SEN. OSMEÑA. Thirteen. And as a 13 percent owner, they agreed to sign jointly and severally?
Correct, Your Honor.72 (Emphasis supplied)
MS. PASETES. Yes.
CDCP Mining obtained the Marubeni loans when CDCP Mining and PNCC (then CDCP) were still
privately owned and managed corporations. The Government became the majority stockholder of SEN. OSMEÑA. One-three?
PNCC only because government financial institutions converted their loans to PNCC into equity when
So poor PNCC and CDCP got taken to the cleaners here. They sign for a 100 percent and they only
PNCC failed to pay the loans. However, CDCP Mining have always remained a majority privately
own 13 percent.
owned corporation with PNCC owning only 13% of its equity as admitted by former PNCC Chairman
Arthur N. Aguilar and PNCC SVP Finance Miriam M. Pasetes during the Senate hearings, thus: x x x x73 (Emphasis supplied)
SEN. OSMEÑA. x x x – I just wanted to know is CDCP Mining a 100 percent subsidiary of PNCC? PNCC cannot use public funds, like toll fees that indisputably form part of the General Fund, to
MR. AGUILAR. Hindi ho. Ah, no. pay a private debt of CDCP Mining to Radstock. Such payment cannot qualify as expenditure for a
public purpose. The toll fees are merely held in trust by PNCC for the National Government,
which is the owner of the toll fees.
Considering that there is no appropriation law passed by Congress for the ₱6.185 billion compromise ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
amount, the Compromise Agreement is void for being contrary to law, specifically Section 29(1),
Can a foreigner who xxx cannot own land assign the right of ownership to the land?
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 87 of PD 1445. And since the payment of the ₱6.185 billion
pertains to CDCP Mining’s private debt to Radstock, the Compromise Agreement is also void for ATTY. AGRA:
being contrary to the fundamental public policy that government funds or property shall be spent or
Again, Your Honor, at that particular time, it will be PNCC, not through Radstock, that chain of
used solely for public purposes, as provided in Section 4(2) of the Government Auditing Code.
events should be, there’s a qualified nominee (interrupted)
C. Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Radstock is a private corporation incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. Its office address is at
Yes, xxx you said, Radstock will assign the right of ownership to the qualified assignee[.] So my
Suite 14021 Duddell Street, Central Hongkong. As a foreign corporation, with unknown owners
question is, can a foreigner own the right to ownership of a land when it cannot own the land
whose nationalities are also unknown, Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines
itself?
pursuant to Section 7, in relation to Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution. These provisions state:
ATTY. AGRA:
Section. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands,
and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according The foreigner cannot own the land, Your Honor.
to the uses to which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such lands of the public domain
except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five But you are saying it can own the right of ownership to the land, because you are saying, the right
years, and not to exceed one hundred thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease of ownership will be assigned by Radstock.
not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
ATTY. AGRA:
homestead, or grant.
The rights over the properties, Your Honors, if there’s a valid assignment made to a qualified party,
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and subject to the
then the assignment will be made.
requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public
domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions therefor. ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
xxxx Who makes the assignment?
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed ATTY. AGRA:
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
It will be Radstock, Your Honor.
domain.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
The OGCC admits that Radstock cannot own lands in the Philippines. However, the OGCC claims
that Radstock can own the rights to ownership of lands in the Philippines, thus: So, if Radstock makes the assignment, it must own its rights, otherwise, it cannot assign it, correct?
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: ATTY. AGRA:
Under the law, a foreigner cannot own land, correct? Pursuant to the compromise agreement, once approved, yes, Your Honors.
ATTY. AGRA: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, Your Honor. So, you are saying that Radstock can own the rights to ownership of the land?
ATTY. AGRA: ATTY. AGRA:
Yes, Your Honors. No, Your Honor. PNCC, will still hold on to the property, absent a valid assignment of properties.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes? But what rights will PNCC have over that land when it has already signed the compromise? It is
just waiting for instruction xxx from Radstock what to do with it? So, it’s a trustee of somebody,
ATTY. AGRA:
because it does not, it cannot, [it] has no dominion over it anymore? It’s just holding it for
The premise, Your Honor, you mentioned a while ago was, if this Court approves said compromise Radstock. So, PNCC becomes a dummy, at that point, of Radstock, correct?
(interrupted)
ATTY. AGRA:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
No, Your Honor, I believe it (interrupted)
No, no. Whether there is such a compromise agreement - - It’s an academic question I am asking you,
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
can a foreigner assign rights to ownership of a land in the Philippines?
Yeah, but it does not own the land, but it still holding the land in favor of the other party to the
ATTY. AGRA:
Compromise Agreement
Under the Compromise Agreement, Your Honors, these rights should be respected.
ATTY. AGRA:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, that will happen.
So, it can?
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
ATTY. AGRA:
Okay. May I (interrupted)
It can. Your Honor. But again, this right must, cannot be perfected or cannot be, could not take effect.
ATTY. AGRA:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Again, Your Honor, if the compromise agreement ended with a statement that Radstock will be the
But if it cannot - - It’s not perfected, how can it assign? owner of the property (interrupted)

ATTY. AGRA: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Not directly, Your Honors. Again, there must be a qualified nominee assigned by Radstock. Yeah. Unfortunately, it says, to a qualified assignee.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: ATTY. AGRA:

It’s very clear, it’s an indirect way of selling property that is prohibited by law, is it not? Yes, Your Honor.

ATTY. AGRA: ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:

Again, Your Honor, know, believe this is a Compromise Agreement. This is a dacion en pago. And at this point, when it is signed and execut[ed] and approved, PNCC has no dominion over that
land anymore. Who has dominion over it?
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
ATTY. AGRA:
So, dacion en pago is an exception to the constitutional prohibition.
Pending the assignment to a qualified party, Your Honor, PNCC will hold on to the property.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO: Conformably to existing state policy, the divestment or disposal of government property as
contemplated herein shall be undertaken primarily thru public auction. Such mode of divestment or
Hold on, but who x x x can exercise acts of dominion, to sell it, to lease it?
disposal shall observe and adhere to established mechanics and procedures in public bidding, viz:
ATTY. AGRA:
a. adequate publicity and notification so as to attract the greatest number of interested
Again, Your Honor, without the valid assignment to a qualified nominee, the compromise agreement parties; (vide, Sec. 79, P.D. 1445)
in so far as the transfer of these properties will not become effective. It is subject to such condition.
b. sufficient time frame between publication and date of auction;
Your Honor.74 (Emphasis supplied)
c. opportunity afforded to interested parties to inspect the property or assets to be disposed
There is no dispute that Radstock is disqualified to own lands in the Philippines. Consequently, of;
Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the Philippines. Contrary to
the OGCC’s claim, Radstock cannot own the rights to ownership of any land in the Philippines d. confidentiality of sealed proposals;
because Radstock cannot lawfully own the land itself. Otherwise, there will be a blatant circumvention e. bond and other prequalification requirements to guarantee performance; and
of the Constitution, which prohibits a foreign private corporation from owning land in the Philippines.
In addition, Radstock cannot transfer the rights to ownership of land in the Philippines if it cannot own f. fair evaluation of tenders and proper notification of award.
the land itself. It is basic that an assignor or seller cannot assign or sell something he does not own at It is understood that the Government reserves the right to reject any or all of the tenders. (Emphasis
the time the ownership, or the rights to the ownership, are to be transferred to the assignee or buyer. 75 supplied)

The third party assignee under the Compromise Agreement who will be designated by Radstock can Under the Compromise Agreement, PNCC shall dispose of substantial parcels of land, by way of

only acquire rights duplicating those which its assignor (Radstock) is entitled by law to exercise. 76 dacion en pago, in favor of Radstock. Citing Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 79 PNCC argues that a dacion
Thus, the assignee can acquire ownership of the land only if its assignor, Radstock, owns the land. en pago is an exception to the requirement of a public bidding.
Clearly, the assignment by PNCC of the real properties to a nominee to be designated by Radstock is a PNCC’s reliance on Uy is misplaced. There is nothing in Uy declaring that public bidding is
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition against a private foreign corporation owning lands in dispensed with in a dacion en pago transaction. The Court explained the transaction in Uy as
the Philippines. Such circumvention renders the Compromise Agreement void. follows:
D. Public bidding is required for We do not see any infirmity in either the MOA or the SSA executed between PIEDRAS and
the disposal of government properties. respondent banks. By virtue of its shareholdings in OPMC, PIEDRAS was entitled to subscribe to
3,749,906,250 class "A" and 2,499,937,500 class "B" OPMC shares. Admittedly, it was financially
Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code,77 the disposition
sound for PIEDRAS to exercise its pre-emptive rights as an existing shareholder of OPMC lest its
of government lands to private parties requires public bidding. 78 COA Circular No. 89-926, issued on proportionate shareholdings be diluted to its detriment. However, PIEDRAS lacked the necessary
27 January 1989, sets forth the guidelines on the disposal of property and other assets of the funds to pay for the additional subscription. Thus, it resorted to contract loans from respondent
government. Part V of the COA Circular provides: banks to finance the payment of its additional subscription. The mode of payment agreed upon by
the parties was that the payment would be made in the form of part of the shares subscribed to by
V. MODE OF DISPOSAL/DIVESTMENT: - PIEDRAS. The OPMC shares therefore were agreed upon by the parties to be equivalent payment
This Commission recognizes the following modes of disposal/divestment of assets and property of for the amount advanced by respondent banks. We see the wisdom in the conditions of the loan
national government agencies, local government units and government-owned or controlled transaction. In order to save PIEDRAS and/or the government from the trouble of selling the
corporations and their subsidiaries, aside from other such modes as may be provided for by law. shares in order to raise funds to pay off the loans, an easier and more direct way was devised in the
form of the dacion en pago agreements.
1. Public Auction
Moreover, we agree with the Sandiganbayan that neither PIEDRAS nor the government sustained any SEN. OSMEÑA. All right. So if you owe the national government 36 billion and you owe
loss in these transactions. In fact, after deducting the shares to be given to respondent banks as Marubeni 10 billion, you know, I would just declare bankruptcy and let an orderly disposition of
payment for the shares, PIEDRAS stood to gain about 1,540,781,554 class "A" and 710,550,000 class assets be done. What happened in this case to the claim, the 36 billion claim of the national
"B" OPMC shares virtually for free. Indeed, the question that must be asked is whether or not government? How was that disposed of by the PNCC? Mas malaki ang utang ninyo sa national
PIEDRAS, in the exercise of its pre-emptive rights, would have been able to acquire any of these government, 36 billion. Ang gagawin ninyo, babayaran lahat ang utang ninyo sa Marubeni without
shares at all if it did not enter into the financing agreements with the respondent banks. 80 any assets left to satisfy your obligations to the national government. There should have been, at
least, a pari passu payment of all your obligations, 'di ba?
Suffice it to state that in Uy, neither PIEDRAS 81 nor the government suffered any loss in the dacion MS. PASETES. Mr. Chairman...
en pago transactions, unlike here where the government stands to lose at least ₱6.185 billion worth of
assets. SEN. OSMEÑA. Yes.

Besides, a dacion en pago is in essence a form of sale, which basically involves a disposition of a MS. PASETES. PNCC still carries in its books an equity account called equity adjustments arising
from transfer of obligations to national government - - 5.4 billion - - in addition to shares held by
property. In Filinvest Credit Corp. v. Philippine Acetylene, Co., Inc., 82 the Court defined dacion en
government amounting to 1.2 billion.
pago in this wise:
SEN. OSMEÑA. What is the 36 billion?
Dacion en pago, according to Manresa, is the transmission of the ownership of a thing by the debtor to
the creditor as an accepted equivalent of the performance of obligation. In dacion en pago, as a special THE CHAIRMAN. Ms. Pasetes...
mode of payment, the debtor offers another thing to the creditor who accepts it as equivalent of
SEN. OSMEÑA. Wait, wait, wait.
payment of an outstanding debt. The undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that
is, the creditor is really buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged THE CHAIRMAN. Baka ampaw yun eh.
against the debtor's debt.As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely, consent, object
SEN. OSMEÑA. Teka muna. What is the 36 billion that appear in the resolution of the board in
certain, and cause or consideration must be present. In its modern concept, what actually takes place in
September 2000 (sic)? This is the same resolution that recognizes, acknowledges and confirms
dacion en pago is an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an accepted
PNCC's obligations to Marubeni. And subparagraph (a) says "Government of the Philippines, in
equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of the contract of sale, while
the amount of 36,023,784,000 and change. And then (b) Marubeni Corporation in the amount of
the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any case, common consent is an essential prerequisite,
10,743,000,000. So, therefore, in the same resolution, you acknowledged that had something like
be it sale or innovation to have the effect of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation. 83 (Emphasis P46.7 billion in obligations. Why did PNCC settle the 10 billion and did not protect the national
supplied) government's 36 billion? And then, number two, why is it now in your books, the 36 billion is now
E. PNCC must follow rules on preference of credit. down to five? If you use that ratio, then Marubeni should be down to one.

Radstock is only one of the creditors of PNCC. Asiavest is PNCC’s judgment creditor. In its Board MS. PASETES. Sir, the amount of 36 billion is principal plus interest and penalties.
Resolution No. BD-092-2000, PNCC admitted not only its debt to Marubeni but also its debt to the SEN. OSMEÑA. And what about Marubeni? Is that just principal only?
National Government84 in the amount of ₱36 billion.85 During the Senate hearings, PNCC admitted
MS. PASETES. Principal and interest.
that it owed the Government ₱36 billion, thus:
SEN. OSMEÑA. So, I mean, you know, it's equal treatment. Ten point seven billion is principal
SEN. OSMEÑA. All right. Now, second question is, the management of PNCC also recognize the
plus penalties plus interest, hindi ba?
obligation to the national government of 36 billion. It is part of the board resolution.
MS. PASETES. Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.
MS. OGAN. Yes, sir, it is part of the October 20 board resolution.
SEN. OSMEÑA. All right. So now, what you are saying is that you gonna pay Marubeni 6 billion and presumption is strengthened by the fact that the conveyance has virtually left PNCC’s other
change and the national government is only recognizing 5 billion. I don't think that's protecting the creditors, including the biggest creditor – the National Government - with no other asset to garnish
interest of the national government at all.86 or levy.

In giving priority and preference to Radstock, the Compromise Agreement is certainly in fraud of Notably, the presumption of fraud or intention to defraud creditors is not just limited to the two
PNCC’s other creditors, including the National Government, and violates the provisions of the Civil instances set forth in the first and second paragraphs of Article 1387 of the Civil Code. Under the
Code on concurrence and preference of credits. third paragraph of the same article, "the design to defraud creditors may be proved in any other
manner recognized by the law of evidence." In Oria v. Mcmicking, 93 this Court considered the
This Court has held that while the Corporation Code allows the transfer of all or substantially all of
following instances as badges of fraud:
the assets of a corporation, the transfer should not prejudice the creditors of the assignor
corporation.87 Assuming that PNCC may transfer all or substantially all its assets, to allow PNCC to 1. The fact that the consideration of the conveyance is fictitious or is inadequate.
do so without the consent of its creditors or without requiring Radstock to assume PNCC’s debts will 2. A transfer made by a debtor after suit has begun and while it is pending against him.
defraud the other PNCC creditors88 since the assignment will place PNCC’s assets beyond the reach 3. A sale upon credit by an insolvent debtor.
of its other creditors.89 As this Court held in Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v. PNOC Shipping and Transport
4. Evidence of large indebtedness or complete insolvency.
Corporation:90
5. The transfer of all or nearly all of his property by a debtor, especially when he is
While the Corporation Code allows the transfer of all or substantially all the properties and assets of a insolvent or greatly embarrassed financially.
corporation, the transfer should not prejudice the creditors of the assignor. The only way the transfer
6. The fact that the transfer is made between father and son, when there are present other
can proceed without prejudice to the creditors is to hold the assignee liable for the obligations of the
of the above circumstances.
assignor. The acquisition by the assignee of all or substantially all of the assets of the assignor
necessarily includes the assumption of the assignor's liabilities, unless the creditors who did not 7. The failure of the vendee to take exclusive possession of all the property. (Emphasis
consent to the transfer choose to rescind the transfer on the ground of fraud. To allow an assignor to supplied)
transfer all its business, properties and assets without the consent of its creditors and without requiring
the assignee to assume the assignor's obligations will defraud the creditors. The assignment will place Among the circumstances indicating fraud is a transfer of all or nearly all of the debtor’s assets,
the assignor's assets beyond the reach of its creditors. (Emphasis supplied) especially when the debtor is greatly embarrassed financially. Accordingly, neither a declaration of
insolvency nor the institution of insolvency proceedings is a condition sine qua non for a transfer
Also, the law, specifically Article 138791 of the Civil Code, presumes that there is fraud of creditors of all or nearly all of a debtor’s assets to be regarded in fraud of creditors. It is sufficient that a
when property is alienated by the debtor after judgment has been rendered against him, thus: debtor is greatly embarrassed financially.

Alienations by onerous title are also presumed fraudulent when made by persons against whom some In this case, PNCC’s huge negative net worth - at least ₱6 billion as expressly admitted by PNCC’s
judgment has been rendered in any instance or some writ of attachment has been issued. The decision counsel during the oral arguments, or ₱14 billion based on the 2006 COA Audit Report -
or attachment need not refer to the property alienated, and need not have been obtained by the party necessarily translates to an extremely embarrassing financial situation. With its huge negative net
seeking rescission. (Emphasis supplied) worth arising from unpaid billions of pesos in debt, PNCC cannot claim that it is financially stable.
As a consequence, the Compromise Agreement stipulating a transfer in favor of Radstock of
As stated earlier, Asiavest is a judgment creditor of PNCC in G.R. No. 110263 and a court has already substantially all of PNCC’s assets constitutes fraud. To legitimize the Compromise Agreement just
issued a writ of execution in its favor. Thus, when PNCC entered into the Compromise Agreement because there is still no judicial declaration of PNCC’s insolvency will work fraud on PNCC’s
conveying several prime lots in favor of Radstock, by way of dacion en pago, there is a legal other creditors, the biggest creditor of which is the National Government. To insist that PNCC is
presumption that such conveyance is fraudulent under Article 1387 of the Civil Code. 92 This very much liquid, given its admitted huge negative net worth, is nothing but denial of the truth.
The toll fees that PNCC collects belong to the National Government. Obviously, PNCC cannot
claim it is liquid based on its collection of such toll fees, because PNCC merely holds such toll fees in xxxx
trust for the National Government. PNCC does not own the toll fees, and such toll fees do not form
• 2002 deficiency internal revenue taxes totaling ₱72.916 Million.
part of PNCC’s assets.
PNCC owes the National Government ₱36 billion, a substantial part of which constitutes taxes and x x x x.95 (Emphasis supplied)
fees, thus: Clearly, PNCC owes the National Government substantial taxes and fees amounting to billions of
SEN. ROXAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. pesos.

Mr. PNCC Chairman, could you describe for us the composition of your debt of about five billion – The ₱36 billion debt to the National Government was acknowledged by the PNCC Board in the
there are in thousands, so this looks like five and half billion. Current portion of long-term debt, about same board resolution that recognized the Marubeni loans. Since PNCC is clearly insolvent with a
five billion. What is this made of? huge negative net worth, the government enjoys preference over Radstock in the satisfaction of
PNCC’s liability arising from taxes and duties, pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code on
MS. PASETES. The five billion is composed of what is owed the Bureau of Treasury and the Toll
Regulatory Board for concession fees that’s almost three billion and another 2.4 billion owed concurrence and preference of credits. Articles 2241, 96 224297 and 224398 of the Civil Code
Philippine National Bank. expressly mandate that taxes and fees due the National Government "shall be preferred" and "shall
first be satisfied" over claims like those arising from the Marubeni loans which "shall enjoy no
SEN. ROXAS. So, how much is the Bureau of Treasury?
preference" under Article 2244.99
MS. PASETES. Three billion.
However, in flagrant violation of the Civil Code, the PNCC Board favored Radstock over the
SEN. ROXAS. Three – Why do you owe the Bureau of Treasury three billion? National Government in the order of credits. This would strip PNCC of its assets leaving virtually
nothing for the National Government. This action of the PNCC Board is manifestly and grossly
MS. PASETES. That represents the concession fees due Toll Regulatory Board principal plus interest,
disadvantageous to the National Government and amounts to fraud.
Your Honor.
During the Senate hearings, Senator Osmeña pointed out that in the Board Resolution of 20
x x x x94 (Emphasis supplied) October 2000, PNCC acknowledged its obligations to the National Government amounting to
In addition, PNCC’s 2006 Audit Report by COA states as follows: ₱36,023,784,000 and to Marubeni amounting to ₱10,743,000,000. Yet, Senator Osmeña noted that
in the PNCC books at the time of the hearing, the ₱36 billion obligation to the National
TAX MATTERS Government was reduced to ₱5 billion. PNCC’s Miriam M. Pasetes could not properly explain this
The Company was assessed by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of its deficiencies in various discrepancy, except by stating that the ₱36 billion includes the principal plus interest and penalties,
taxes. However, no provision for any liability has been made yet in the Company’s financial thus:
statements. SEN. OSMEÑA. Teka muna. What is the 36 billion that appear in the resolution of the board in
• 1980 deficiency income tax, deficiency contractor’s tax and deficiency documentary stamp tax September 2000 (sic)? This is the same resolution that recognizes, acknowledges and confirms
assessments by the BIR totaling ₱212.523 Million. PNCC's obligations to Marubeni. And subparagraph (a) says "Government of the Philippines, in
the amount of 36,023,784,000 and change. And then (b) Marubeni Corporation in the amount of
xxxx 10,743,000,000. So, therefore, in the same resolution, you acknowledged that had something like
• Deficiency business tax of ₱64 Million due the Belgian Consortium, PNCC’s partner in its LRT P46.7 billion in obligations. Why did PNCC settle the 10 billion and did not protect the national
Project. government's 36 billion? And then, number two, why is it now in your books, the 36 billion is now
down to five? If you use that ratio, then Marubeni should be down to one.
• 1992 deficiency income tax, deficiency value-added tax and deficiency expanded withholding tax of
₱1.04 Billion which was reduced to ₱709 Million after the Company’s written protest. MS. PASETES. Sir, the amount of 36 billion is principal plus interest and penalties.
SEN. OSMEÑA. And what about Marubeni? Is that just principal only? But, Your Honor, if the Honorable Court would approve of this compromise agreement, I
believe that this would be binding on Congress.
MS. PASETES. Principal and interest.
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
SEN. OSMEÑA. So, I mean, you know, it's equal treatment. Ten point seven billion is principal plus
penalties plus interest, hindi ba? Ignore the Constitutional provision that money shall be paid out of the National Treasury
only pursuant to an appropriation by law. You want us to ignore that[?]
MS. PASETES. Yes, sir. Yes, Your Honor.
DEAN AGABIN:
SEN. OSMEÑA. All right. So now, what you are saying is that you gonna pay Marubeni 6 billion and
change and the national government is only recognizing 5 billion. I don't think that's protecting the Not really, Your Honor, but I suppose that Congress would have no choice, because this is a final
interest of the national government at all.100 judgment of the Honorable Court. 101

PNCC failed to explain satisfactorily why in its books the obligation to the National Government was xxxx
reduced when no payment to the National Government appeared to have been made. PNCC failed to
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
justify why it made it appear that the obligation to the National Government was less than the
obligation to Marubeni. It is another obvious ploy to justify the preferential treatment given to So, if Radstock makes the assignment, it must own its rights, otherwise, it cannot assign it, correct?
Radstock to the great prejudice of the National Government.
ATTY. AGRA:
VI.
Pursuant to the compromise agreement, once approved, yes, Your Honors.
Supreme Court is Not Legitimizer of Violations of Laws
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
During the oral arguments, counsels for Radstock and PNCC admitted that the Compromise
Agreement violates the Constitution and existing laws. However, they rely on this Court to approve So, you are saying that Radstock can own the rights to ownership of the land?
the Compromise Agreement to shield their clients from possible criminal acts arising from violation of
ATTY. AGRA:
the Constitution and existing laws. In their view, once this Court approves the Compromise
Agreement, their clients are home free from prosecution, and can enjoy the ₱6.185 billion loot. The Yes, Your Honors.
following exchanges during the oral arguments reveal this view:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes?
If there is no agreement, they better remit all of that to the National Government. They cannot just
ATTY. AGRA:
hold that. They are holding that [in] trust, as you said, x x x you agree, for the National Government.
The premise, Your Honor, you mentioned a while ago was, if this Court approves said compromise
DEAN AGABIN:
(interrupted).102 (Emphasis supplied)
Yes, that’s why, they are asking the Honorable Court to approve the compromise agreement.
This Court is not, and should never be, a rubber stamp for litigants hankering to pocket public
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE CARPIO:
funds for their selfish private gain. This Court is the ultimate guardian of the public interest, the
We cannot approve that if the power to authorize the expenditure [belongs] to Congress. How last bulwark against those who seek to plunder the public coffers. This Court cannot, and must
can we usurp x x x the power of Congress to authorize that expenditure[?] It’s only Congress never, bring itself down to the level of legitimizer of violations of the Constitution, existing laws or
that can authorize the expenditure of funds from the general funds. public policy.

DEAN AGABIN: Conclusion

In sum, the acts of the PNCC Board in (1) issuing Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099- SO ORDERED.
2000 expressly admitting liability for the Marubeni loans, and (2) entering into the Compromise
Agreement, constitute evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence, amounting to fraud, in the
management of PNCC’s affairs. Being public officers, the government nominees in the PNCC Board
must answer not only to PNCC and its stockholders, but also to the Filipino people for grossly
mishandling PNCC’s finances.
Under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, the Compromise Agreement is "inexistent and void from the
beginning," and "cannot be ratified," thus: G.R. No. 130656               June 29, 2000
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
ARMANDO REANZARES* also known as ARMANDO RIANZARES, accused-appellant.
order or public policy;
BELLOSILLO, J.:
xxx
This case is with us on automatic review of the 26 May 1997 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
of Tanauan, Batangas, finding accused ARMANDO REANZARES also known as "Armando
These contracts cannot be ratified. x x x. (Emphasis supplied) Rianzares" guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 5322 and sentencing him to the
extreme penalty of death. He was also ordered to pay the heirs of his victim Lilia Tactacan
The Compromise Agreement is indisputably contrary to the Constitution, existing laws and public
P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses, P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, P1,000.00
policy. Under Article 1409, the Compromise Agreement is expressly declared void and "cannot be
for the cash taken from her bag, and to reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00 for the Seiko
ratified." No court, not even this Court, can ratify or approve the Compromise Agreement. This Court
wristwatch taken from him.1âwphi1.nêt
must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution, existing laws, and fundamental public
policy. This Court must not shirk in declaring the Compromise Agreement inexistent and void ab The facts, except as to the identity of accused Armando Reanzares, are undisputed. Spouses
initio. Gregorio Tactacan and Lilia Tactacan owned a sari-sari store in San Miguel, Sto. Tomas, Batangas.
On 10 May 1994 at around 8:10 in the evening, the Tactacan spouses closed their store and left for
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 180428. We SET ASIDE the Decision dated 25
home in Barangay San Roque, Sto. Tomas, Batangas on board their passenger-type jeepney. As
January 2007 and the Resolutions dated 12 June 2007 and 5 November 2007 of the Court of Appeals.
Gregorio was maneuvering his jeep backwards from where it was parked two (2) unidentified men
We DECLARE (1) PNCC Board Resolution Nos. BD-092-2000 and BD-099-2000 admitting liability
suddenly climbed on board. His wife Lilia immediately asked them where they were going and
for the Marubeni loans VOID AB INITIO for causing undue injury to the Government and giving
they answered that they were bound for the town proper. When Lilia informed them that they were
unwarranted benefits to a private party, constituting a corrupt practice and unlawful act under Section
not going to pass through the town proper, the two (2) said they would just get off at the nearest
3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and (2) the Compromise Agreement between the
intersection. After negotiating some 500 meters, one of the hitchhikers pointed a .38 caliber
Philippine National Construction Corporation and Radstock Securities Limited INEXISTENT AND
revolver at Gregorio while the other poked a balisong at Lilia's neck and ordered Gregorio to stop
VOID AB INITIO for being contrary to Section 29(1), Article VI and Sections 3 and 7, Article XII of
the vehicle. Two (2) other persons, one of whom was later identified as accused Armando
the Constitution; Section 20(1), Chapter IV, Subtitle B, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of
Reanzares, were seen waiting for them at a distance. As soon as the vehicle stopped, the accused
1987; Sections 4(2), 79, 84(1), and 85 of the Government Auditing Code; and Articles 2241, 2242,
and his companion/approached the vehicle. Gregorio was then pulled from the driver's seat to the
2243 and 2244 of the Civil Code.
back of the vehicle. They gagged and blindfolded him and tied his hands and feet. They also took
We GRANT the intervention of Asiavest Merchant Bankers Berhad in G.R. No. 178158 but his Seiko wristwatch worth P2,500.00. The accused then drove the vehicle after being told by one
DECLARE that Strategic Alliance Development Corporation has no legal standing to sue. of them, "Sige i-drive mo na."3
Gregorio did not know where they were headed for as he was blindfolded. After several minutes, he that he saw the accused off on 9 May 1994, the day before the incident. Romeo maintained that he
felt the vehicle making a u-turn and stopped after ten (10) minutes. During the entire trip, his wife accompanied the accused to the bus stop that day and even helped the latter carry his things to the
kept uttering, "Maawa kayo sa amin, marami kaming anak, kunin nyo na lahat ng gusto ninyo." bus. He however could not categorically state where and when the accused alighted or that he in
Immediately after the last time she uttered these words a commotion ensued and Lilia was heard fact reached Bicol. 10
saying, "aray!" Gregorio heard her but could not do anything. After three (3) minutes the commotion
On 26 May 1997 the trial court found the prosecution's evidence credible and ruled that the alibi of
ceased. Then he heard someone tell him, "Huwag kang kikilos diyan, ha," and left. Gregorio then
the accused could not prevail over his positive identification by complaining witness Gregorio
untied his hands and feet, removed his gag and blindfold jumped out of the vehicle. The culprits were
Tactacan. The court a quo declared him guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD 532
all gone, including his wife. He ran to San Roque East shouting for help.4
and sentenced him to death. It further ordered him to pay the heirs of Lilia Tactacan P50,000.00 as
When Gregorio returned to the crime scene, the jeepney was still there. He went to the driver's seat. indemnity for death, P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses, and P1,000.00 for the
There he saw his wife lying on the floor of the jeepney with blood splattered all over her body. Her cash taken from her bag. The accused was also ordered to reimburse Gregorio Tactacan P2,500.00
bag containing P1,200.00 was missing. He brought her immediately to the C.P. Reyes Hospital where for the Seiko wristwatch taken from him. 11 But the trial court exonerated the accused from the
she was pronounced dead on arrival.5 charge of carnapping under RA 6539 for insufficiency of evidence.
At the time of her death Lilia Tactacan was forty-eight (48) years old. According to Gregorio, he was The accused insists before us that his conviction for Highway Robbery with Homicide under PD
deeply depressed by her death; that he incurred funeral, burial and other related expenses, and that his 532 is erroneous as his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that the testimony
wife was earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher.6 of private complainant Gregorio Tactacan, who implicated him as one of the perpetrators of the
crime, is incredible. He maintains that Gregorio failed to identify him because when the latter was
Dr. Lily D. Nunes, Medical Health Officer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas, conducted a post-mortem
questioned he stated that he did not know any of the culprits. He also claims that in the publication
examination on the body of the victim. Her medical report disclosed that the victim sustained eight (8)
of Hotline by Tony Calvento in People's Tonight, Gregorio even asked the readers to help him
stab wounds on the chest and abdominal region of the body. She testified that a sharp pointed object
identify the malefactors.
like a long knife could have caused those wounds which must have been inflicted by more than one
(1) person, and that all those wounds except the non-penetrating one caused the immediate death of The trial court observed that Gregorio Tactacan testified in a categorical, straightforward,
the victim.7 spontaneous and frank manner, and was consistent on cross-examination. Indeed, Gregorio might
not have immediately revealed the name of accused Armando Reanzares to the police authorities
Subsequently, two (2) informations were filed against accused Armando Reanzares and three (3) John
when he was first investigated but the delay was not an indication of a fabricated charge and
Does in relation to the incident. The first was for violation of PD 532 otherwise known as the Anti-
should not undermine his credibility considering that he satisfactorily explained his reasons
Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for allegedly conspiring, with intent to gain and
therefor. According to him, he did not immediately tell the police about the accused because he
armed with bladed weapons and a .38 caliber revolver, to rob and carry away one (1) Seiko wristwatch
feared for the safety of his family as his neighbors told him that they saw some people lurking
owned by Gregorio Tactacan and P1,000.00 cash of Lilia Tactacan, and on the occasion thereof, killed
around his house on the day of the incident. Moreover, he was advised not to mention any names
her. The second was for violation of RA 6538, An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, for
until after the burial of his wife. No ill motive could be attributed to him for implicating the
taking away by means of violence and intimidation of persons one (1) passenger-type jeepney with
accused. If at all, the fact that his wife died by reason of the incident even lends credence to his
Plate No. DBP 235 owned and driven by Gregorio Tactacan and valued at P110,000.00. Only the
testimony since his natural interest in securing the conviction of the guilty would deter him from
accused Armando Reanzares was arrested. The other three (3) have remained unidentified and at large.
implicating persons other than the real culprits, otherwise, those responsible for the perpetration of
The accused testified in his defense and claimed that he could not have perpetrated the crimes imputed the crime would escape prosecution.
to him with three (3) others as he was in Barangay Tagnipa, Garchitorena, Camarines Sur, for the
To further undermine the credibility of Gregorio, the accused underscores Gregorio's refusal to be
baptism of his daughter Jessica when the incident happened.8 His father, Jose Reanzares, corroborated
subjected to a lie detector test. We cannot subscribe to this contention as the procedure of
his story. Jose claimed that the accused borrowed P500.00 from him for the latter's trip to Bicol
ascertaining the truth by means of a lie detector test has never been accepted in our jurisdiction;
although he could not say that he actually saw the accused leave for his intended destination. 9 To
thus, any findings based thereon cannot be considered conclusive.
bolster the alibi of the accused, his brother Romeo Reanzares also took the witness stand and alleged
Finally, the accused chides Gregorio for supposedly suppressing a very material piece of evidence, Art. 294, par. (1) of the Revised Penal Code as amended punishes the crime of robbery with
i.e., the latter failed to present as witnesses a certain Renato and his wife who allegedly saw the homicide by reclusion perpetua to death. Applying Art. 63, second par., subpar. 2, of the Revised
holduppers running away from the crime scene. But this is only a disputable presumption under Sec. Penal Code which provides that "[i]n all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of
3, par. (e), Rule 131, of the Rules of Court on evidence, which does not apply in the present case as two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the application thereof: . . . 2.
the evidence allegedly omitted is equally accessible and available to the defense. [w]hen there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed,
the lesser penalty shall be applied," the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposed in the
These attempts of the accused to discredit Gregorio obviously cannot hold ground. Neither can they
absence of any modifying circumstance.
bolster his alibi. For alibi to be believed it must be shown that (a) the accused was in another place at
the time of the commission of the offense, and (b) it was physically impossible for him to be at the As to the damages awarded by the trial court to the heirs of the victim, we sustain the award of
crime scene. 12 P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the wrongful death of Lilia Tactacan. In addition, the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages is ordered. Also, damages for loss of earning capacity of Lilia
In this case, the accused claims to have left for Bicol the day before the incident. To prove this, he
Tactacan must be granted to her heirs. The testimony of Gregorio Tactacan, the victim's husband,
presented his father and brother but their testimonies did not meet the requisite quantum to establish
on the earning capacity of his wife, together with a copy of his wife's payroll, is enough to
his alibi. While his father testified that the accused borrowed money from him for his fare to Bicol for
establish the basis for the award. The formula for determining the life expectancy of Lilia Tactacan,
the baptism of a daughter, he could not say whether the accused actually went to Bicol. As regards the
applying the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, is as follows: 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus
claim of Romeo, brother of the accused, that he accompanied the accused to the bus stop on 9 May
the age of the deceased). 16 Since Lilia was 48 years of age at the time of her death, 17 then her
1994 and even helped him with his things, seeing the accused off is not the same as seeing him
life expectancy was 21.33 years.
actually get off at his destination. Given the circumstances of this case, it is possible for the accused to
have alighted from the bus before reaching Bicol, perpetrated the crime in the evening of 10 May At the time of her death, Lilia was earning P3,430.00 a month as a teacher at the San Roque
2000, proceeded to Bicol and arrived there on 12 May 2000 for his daughter's baptism. Elementary School so that her annual income was P41,160.00. From this amount, 50% should be
deducted as reasonable and necessary living expenses to arrive at her net earnings. Thus, her net
Thus the trial court was correct in disregarding the alibi of the accused not only because he was
earning capacity was P438,971.40 computed as follows: Net earning capacity equals life
positively identified by Gregorio Tactacan but also because it was not shown that it was physically
expectancy times gross annual income less reasonable and necessary living expenses —
impossible for him to be at the crime scene on the date and time of the incident.
Indeed the accused is guilty. But that the accused was guilty of Highway Robbery with Homicide Net earning reasonable &
life gross annual
under PD 532 was erroneous. As held in a number of cases, conviction for highway robbery requires capcity = x - necessary; living
expectancy income
(x) expenses
proof that several accused were organized for the purpose of committing it indiscriminately. 1 There is
no proof in the instant case that the accused and his cohorts organized themselves to commit highway 2 (80-48)
robbery. Neither is there proof that they attempted to commit similar robberies to show the x = x [P41,164.00 - P20,580.00]
"indiscriminate" perpetration thereof. On the other hand, what the prosecution established was only a
3
single act of robbery against the particular persons of the Tactacan spouses. Clearly, this single act of
depredation is not what is contemplated under PD 532 as its objective is to deter and punish lawless = 21.33 x P20,580.00
elements who commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless
= P438,971.40
inhabitants who travel from one place to another thereby disturbing the peace and tranquility of the
nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people.1avvphil However, the award of P1,000.00 representing the cash taken from Lilia Tactacan must be
increased to P1,200.00 as this was the amount established by the prosecution without objection
Consequently, the accused should be held liable for the special complex crime of robbery with from the defense. The award of P172,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses must be
homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659 14 as the allegation in reduced to P22,000.00 as this was the only amount sufficiently substantiated. 18 There was no
the Information are enough to convict him therefor. In the interpretation of an information, what other competent evidence presented to support the original award.
controls is the description of the offense charged and not merely its designation. 15
The amount of P2,500.00 as reimbursement for the Seiko wristwatch taken from Gregorio Tactacan That on or about the 7th day of November, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within
must be deleted in the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence aside from the self-serving the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant
valuation made by the prosecution. An ordinary witness cannot establish the value of jewelry and the MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there
trial court can only take judicial notice of the value of goods which is a matter of public knowledge or wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against
is capable of unquestionable demonstration. The value of jewelry therefore does not fall under either the latter’s will.
category of which the court can take judicial notice. 19
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Accused ARMANDO REANZARES also
Upon arraignment appellant, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charges.
known as "Armando Rianzares" is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with
Homicide under Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended and is sentenced to reclusion The two cases were consolidated and a joint trial ensued.
perpetua. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, another
Appellant’s defense was bare denial. He claimed that private complainant had fabricated the rape
P50,000.00 for moral damages, P1,200.00 for actual damages, P438,971.40 for loss of earning
charges against him since he and his daughter, "had a quarrel when he accordingly reprimanded her
capacity, and P22,000.00 for funeral, burial and related expenses. Costs de oficio.
for going out whenever he was not at home."3
SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
Appellant did not present any witness to reinforce his testimony.
G.R. Nos. 135695-96               October 12, 2000
On August 31, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, thus:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, Joint Judgment is hereby rendered, to wit:
vs.
TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant. I. In Criminal Case No. DU-6186 -
DECISION a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
QUISUMBING, J.:
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
For automatic review is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in
Criminal Cases Nos.DU-6186 and DU-6203, finding appellant Tomas Tundag guilty of two counts of (1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon
incestuous rape and sentencing him to death twice. her; and
On November 18, 1997, private complainant Mary Ann Tundag filed with the Mandaue City (2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article
Prosecutor’s Office two separate complaints for incestuous rape. The first complaint, docketed as 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the
Criminal Case No. DU-6186, alleged: pain and moral shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime
of rape with one qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
That on or about the 5th day of September, 1997, in the City of Mandaue, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the father of complainant c) To pay the costs.
MARY ANN TUNDAG, who is a 13-year-old girl, with deliberate intent, did then and there wilfully,
II. In Criminal Case No. DU-6203 -
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with the said offended party against the latter’s
will. a) Finding the herein accused TOMAS TUNDAG guilty beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of rape, said accused is hereby sentenced to the penalty of death;
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
b) To indemnify the offended party Mary Ann Tundag the following amounts:
The other, docketed as Criminal Case No. DU-6203, averred:
(1) P50,000.00 by reason of the commission of the offense of rape upon her; and
 (2) Another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under Article 2219 in again by using a very sharp knife which he was holding and was pointing it at the right side of her
relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the New Civil Code for the pain and moral neck which made her afraid.
shock suffered by her and for the commission of the crime of rape with one
That in the early morning of the following day, she left her father’s place and went to her neighbor
qualifying aggravating circumstance; and
by the name of Bebie Cabahug and told her what had happened to her, who, in turn, advised her to
(3) To pay the costs. report the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the policemen, she went to the
Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and after her medical examination, she was
SO ORDERED.4
brought back by the police and was investigated by them."5
In its judgment, the court below gave credence to complainant’s version of what accused did to her.
Appellant’s claim that the complainant’s charges were manufactured did not impress the trial court,
The evidence for the prosecution as adduced during the trial on the merits clearly shows that private which found him twice guilty of rape. Now before us, appellant assails his double conviction,
complainant Mary Ann Tundag is a 13 year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has simply contending that:6
an IQ of 76% which is a very low general mental ability and was living with her father, the herein
THE TRIAL COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING THE ACCUSED-
accused, at Galaxy Compound, Mandaue City.
APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED IN THE INFORMATIONS DESPITE THE
xxx PRESENCE OF REASONABLE DOUBT TO EXCULPATE HIM OF THE SAME.

That on September 5, 1997 at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening, she was in the house together with Appellant flatly denies that the incidents complained of ever took place. He contends that on
her father. But before she went to sleep, her father was already lying down on the mat while herself September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman near Gal’s Bakery in Mandaue City
(sic) just lied down at his head side which was not necessarily beside him. However, when she was Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 o’clock that evening. On November 7,
already sleeping, she noticed that her father who was already undressed was beside her and was 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have raped
embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted but her father used a knife and told her that his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, "he went to work and naturally, being
he would kill her if she shouts and after that, he inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings."7
shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and was
The Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court to affirm the trial
very painful.
court’s decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and indemnity ex delicto be
That when the penis of her father was already inserted in her vagina, her father was all the time asking modified to conform to prevailing jurisprudence.
by saying (sic) : ‘Does it feel good?’ And at the same time, he was laughing and further, told her that a
Considering the gravity of the offense charged as a heinous crime and the irreversibility of the
woman who does not marry can never enter heaven and he got angry with her when she contradicted
penalty of death imposed in each of these cases before us, the Court leaves no stone unturned in its
his statement.
review of the records, including the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the defense.
That while the penis of her father was inside her vagina and (he) was humping over her, she felt Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt.8 But here we find no room to
intense pain that she cried and told him to pull it out but did not accede and in fact, said: ‘Why will I disturb the trial court’s judgment concerning appellant’s guilt, because his defense is utterly
pull it out when it feels so good(?)’ untenable.

That after removing his penis from her vagina and after telling her that she could not go to heaven if Appellant’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving. It hardly counts as a worthy
she did not get married, her father just stayed there and continued smoking while she cried. and weighty ground for exculpation in a trial involving his freedom and his life. Against the
testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative matters,9 such defense is not only
That in the evening of November 7, 1997, she was at home washing the dishes while her father was
trite but pathetic. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of
just smoking and squatting. That after she finished washing the dishes, she lied (sic) down to sleep
the positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor.10 Indeed, we
when her father embraced her and since she does not like what he did to her, she placed a stool
find that private complainant was unequivocal in charging appellant with ravishing her. The
between them but he just brushed it aside and laid down with her and was able to take her womanhood
victim’s account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and consistent.11 Her
testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father could be meted out the Dr. Acebes testified that her findings of healed hymenal lacerations in the complainant’s private
death penalty if found guilty by the court.12 parts meant a history of sexual congress on her part.17 According to her, the lacerations may have
been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into complainant’s genitals. The examining
In a prosecution for rape, the complainant’s credibility is the single most important issue.13 The
physician likewise pointed out that previous coitus may be inferred from complainant’s U-shaped
determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of the trial court. The rationale
fourchette since the fourchette of a female who has not yet experienced sexual intercourse is V-
for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed at first hand the demeanor of the
shaped.18 While Dr. Acebes conceded under cross-examination, that the existence of the datum
witnesses on the stand and, therefore, is in a better position to form an accurate impression and
"U-shape(d) fourchette does not conclusively and absolutely mean that there was sexual
conclusion.14 Absent any showing that certain facts of value have clearly been overlooked, which if
intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other things,"19
considered could affect the result of the case, or that the trial court’s finding are clearly arbitrary, the
nonetheless, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainant’s claim
conclusions reached by the court of origin must be respected and the judgment rendered affirmed.15
that she was raped by appellant.
Moreover, we note here that private complainant’s testimony is corroborated by medical findings that
Appellant next contends that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she had
lacerations were present in her hymen. The examination conducted by Dr. Bessie Acebes upon the
quarreled with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior. He stresses that the prosecution did
private complainant yielded the following results:
not rebut his testimony regarding his quarrel or misunderstanding with private complainant. He
Genitalia: grossly female urges us to consider the charges filed against him as the result of his frequent castigation of her
delinquent behavior.20
Pubic Hairs: scanty
Such allegation of a family feud, however, does not explain the charges away. Filing a case for
Labia Majora: coaptated
incestuous rape is of such a nature that a daughter’s accusation must be taken seriously. It goes
Labia Minora: -do- against human experience that a girl would fabricate a story which would drag herself as well as
her family to a lifetime of dishonor, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect
Fourchette: U-shaped
her honor.21 More so, where her charges could mean the death of her own father, as in this case.
Vestibule: pinkish
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the crimes
Hymen: + old healed laceration at 3 and 9 o’clock position(s). imputed to him considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care for. This
argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his wife, and
Orifice: admits 2 fingers with ease
private complainant was the only child who lived with him.22 As pointed out by the Solicitor
Vagina: General, appellant was thus "free to do as he wished to satisfy his bestial lust on his daughter."23

Walls: pinkish Nor does appellant’s assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems and a
low IQ of 76 in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of her
Ruganities: prominent
testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the consequences of
Uterus: small prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as shown by the following testimony of the
victim on cross-examination:
Cervix: closed
Q : Were you informed that if, and when your father will be found guilty, your father will be
Discharges: Mucoid, minimal
sentenced to death?
Smears:
A : Yes.
Conclusions: sperm identification (-)
Q : Until now you wanted that your father will be sentenced by death?
Gram staining of vaginal disc.16
A (Witness nodding.) mandatory or discretionary. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides when court shall
take mandatory judicial notice of facts -
xxx
SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice without the
Q : I will inform you, Miss Witness, that you have filed two cases against your father and in case your
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,
father would be found guilty, two death sentences will be imposed against him?
forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
A: Yes. courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
Q: With that information, do you still want this case would proceed?
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.
A: I want this to proceed.24
Section 2 of Rule 129 enumerates the instances when courts may take discretionary judicial notice
Indeed, appellant is guilty. But is the penalty of death imposed on him correct? of facts -

Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659,25 penalizes rape SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial notice of matters which are
of a minor daughter by her father as qualified rape26 and a heinous crime. In proving such felony, the of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be known to
prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual congress; (2) with woman; (3) by judges because of their judicial functions.
force or without her consent27 and in order to warrant the imposition of capital punishment, the
Thus, it can be considered of public knowledge and judicially noticed that the scene of the rape is
additional elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape and (5) the
not always nor necessarily isolated or secluded for lust is no respecter of time or place. The offense
offender is a parent of the victim.28
of rape can and has been committed in places where people congregate, e.g. inside a house where
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victim’s father.29 But the there are occupants, a five (5) meter room with five (5) people inside, or even in the same room
victim’s age was not properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She testified that she which the victim is sharing with the accused’s sister.32
was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she did not know exactly
The Court has likewise taken judicial notice of the Filipina’s inbred modesty and shyness and her
when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She further said that her birth certificate was
antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.33
likewise with her mother. In her own words, the victim testified - 30
On the other hand, matters which are capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of
COURT TO WITNESS
professional and scientific knowledge. For example, in People v. Alicante,34 the trial court took
Q: When were you born? judicial notice of the clinical records of the attending physicians concerning the birth of twin baby
boys as "premature" since one of the alleged rapes had occurred 6 to 7 months earlier.
A: I do not know.
As to matters which ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions, an example
Q: You do not know your birthday?
would be facts which are ascertainable from the record of court proceedings, e.g. as to when court
A: My mama did not tell me exactly when I asked her. notices were received by a party.

COURT: Proceed. With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial notice, the
court can take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule 129 of the
FISCAL PEREZ: For our failure to secure the Birth Certificate Your Honor, may we just request for
Rules of Court which requires that -
judicial notice that the victim here is below 18 years old.
SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the court, on its own initiative,
ATTY. SURALTA: Admitted. …
or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without the parties to be heard thereon.
proof because they already know them.31 Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice may either be
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or on request Considering the statutory requirement in Section 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 8353, we reiterate here what the Court has held in Javier without any
matter is decisive of a material issue in the case. dissent, that the failure to sufficiently establish victim’s age by independent proof is a bar to
conviction for rape in its qualified form. For, in the words of Melo, J., "independent proof of the
In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense counsel’s
actual age of a rape victim becomes vital and essential so as to remove an ‘iota of doubt’ that the
admission, thereof acceding to the prosecution’s motion. As required by Section 3 of Rule 129, as to
case falls under the qualifying circumstances" for the imposition of the death penalty set by the
any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take judicial notice of such fact.
law.
Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim, or in
the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents were lost or destroyed, by other documentary In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed by the
or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose. death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its unqualified
form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659, is reclusion
Thus, in People v. Rebancos, 172 SCRA 426 (1989), the victim was below 12 and we found that the
perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7, 1997, after the effectivity of R.A. 8353,
rape committed was statutory rape. The mother testified that her daughter was born on October 26,
also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22, 1997. The penalty for
1974, and so was only 9 years old at the time of the rape on February 12, 1984. Although no birth
rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
certificate was presented because the victim’s birth had allegedly not been registered, her baptismal
certificate was duly presented. Hence, we ruled that the mother’s testimony coupled with the As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded P50,000.00 for each count of rape as civil
presentation of the baptismal certificate was sufficient to establish that the victim was below 12 at the indemnity. However, the award of another P50,000.00 as "moral and exemplary damages under
time of the rape. Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code" for each count is imprecise.
In rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need for
However, in People v. Vargas, 257 SCRA 603 (1996), we ruled that appellant can only be convicted of
pleading or proof as to the basis thereof.38 Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the
simple rape, and not statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to prove the minority of the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape.1âwphi1 The prosecution failed to
present either the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was no showing that the said The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and for a
documents were lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We held that testimony of the different amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial, we find
victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not correct for the trial court to judge the age of the that the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an aggravating
victim by her appearance. circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed
when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence, we find an
In several recent cases, we have emphasized the need for independent proof of the age of the victim,
award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that generally, in rape
aside from testimonial evidence from the victim or her relatives. In People v. Javier,35 we stressed
cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer appreciated as a generic
that the prosecution must present independent proof of the age of the victim, even though it is not
aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The
contested by the defense. The minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and clearness
father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the nature of a special circumstance
as the crime itself. In People v. Cula,36 we reiterated that it is the burden of the prosecution to prove
which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory.39 However, in this case, the special
with certainty the fact that the victim was below 18 when the rape was committed in order to justify
qualifying circumstance of relationship was proved but not the minority of the victim, taking the
the imposition of the death penalty. Since the record of the case was bereft of any independent
case out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence. Hence, relationship can be appreciated as a
evidence thereon, such as the victim’s duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing
generic aggravating circumstance in this instance so that exemplary damages are called for. In
private complainant’s age, appellant could not be convicted of rape in its qualified form. In People v.
rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters, exemplary damages may be imposed to deter
Veloso,37 the victim was alleged to have been only 9 years of age at the time of the rape. It held that
other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own
the trial court was correct when it ruled that the prosecution failed to prove the victim’s age other than
daughters.40
through the testimony of her father and herself.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 28, in Criminal During his service as B-707 captain, plaintiff on August 24, 1980, while in command of a
Case Nos. DU-6186 and DU-6203, is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellant Tomas Tundag is flight, committed a noise violation offense at the Zurich Airport, for which plaintiff
found guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape; and for each count, sentenced to reclusion perpetua and apologized.(Exh. "3", p. 307, Rec.).
ordered to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and
Sometime in 1980, plaintiff featured in a tail scraping incident wherein the tail of the
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
aircraft scraped or touched the runway during landing. He was suspended for a few days
No pronouncement as to costs. until he was investigated by board headed by Capt. Choy. He was reprimanded.
SO ORDERED. On September 25, 1981, plaintiff was invited to take a course of A-300 conversion training
at Aeroformacion, Toulouse, France at dependant's expense. Having successfully
completed and passed the training course, plaintiff was cleared on April 7, 1981, for solo
duty as captain of the Airbus A-300 and subsequently appointed as captain of the A-300
fleet commanding an Airbus A-300 in flights over Southeast Asia. (Annexes "D", "E" and
"F", pp. 34-38, Rec.).
G.R. No. 114776           February 2, 2000
Sometime in 1982, defendant, hit by a recession, initiated cost-cutting measures.
MENANDRO B. LAUREANO, petitioner, Seventeen (17) expatriate captains in the Airbus fleet were found in excess of the
vs. defendant's requirement (t.s.n., July 6, 1988. p. 11). Consequently, defendant informed its
COURT OF APPEALS AND SINGAPORE AIRLINES LIMITED, respondents. expatriate pilots including plaintiff of the situation and advised them to take advance
leaves. (Exh. "15", p. 466, Rec.)
QUISUMBING, J.:
Realizing that the recession would not be for a short time, defendant decided to terminate
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse the
its excess personnel (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, p. 17). It did not, however, immediately terminate
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 29, 1993, in C.A. G.R. No. CV 34476, as well as its
it's A-300 pilots. It reviewed their qualifications for possible promotion to the B-747 fleet.
Resolution dated February 28, 1994, which denied the motion for reconsideration.
Among the 17 excess Airbus pilots reviewed, twelve were found qualified. Unfortunately,
The facts of the case as summarized by the respondent appellate court are as follows: plaintiff was not one of the twelve.

Sometime in 1978, plaintiff [Menandro B. Laureano, herein petitioner], then Director of On October 5, 1982, defendant informed plaintiff of his termination effective November 1,
Flight Operations and Chief Pilot of Air Manila, applied for employment with defendant 1982 and that he will be paid three (3) months salary in lieu of three months notice (Annex
company [herein private respondent] through its Area Manager in Manila. "I", pp. 41-42, Rec.). Because he could not uproot his family on such short notice, plaintiff
requested a three-month notice to afford him time to exhaust all possible avenues for
On September 30, 1978, after the usual personal interview, defendant wrote to plaintiff,
reconsideration and retention. Defendant gave only two (2) months notice and one (1)
offering a contract of employment as an expatriate B-707 captain for an original period of two
month salary. (t.s.n., Nov. 12, 1987. p. 25).
(2) years commencing on January 21, 1978. Plaintiff accepted the offer and commenced
working on January 20, 1979. After passing the six-month probation period, plaintiffs Aggrieved, plaintiff on June 29, 1983, instituted a case for illegal dismissal before the
appointment was confirmed effective July 21, 1979. (Annex "B", p. 30, Rollo). Labor Arbiter. Defendant moved to dismiss on jurisdiction grounds. Before said motion
was resolved, the complaint was withdrawn. Thereafter, plaintiff filed the instant case for
On July 21, 1979, defendant offered plaintiff an extension of his two-year contract to five (5)
damages due to illegal termination of contract of services before the court a quo
years effective January 21, 1979 to January 20, 1984 subject to the terms and conditions set
(Complaint, pp. 1-10, Rec.).
forth in the contract of employment, which the latter accepted (Annex "C" p. 31, Rec.).
Again, defendant on February 11, 1987 filed a motion to dismiss alleging inter alia: (1)
that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, and (2) that Philippine
 courts have no jurisdiction over the instant case. Defendant contends that the complaint is for Singapore Airlines timely appealed before the respondent court and raised the issues of
illegal dismissal together with a money claim arising out of and in the course of plaintiffs jurisdiction, validity of termination, estoppel, and damages.
employment "thus it is the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC who have the jurisdiction pursuant to
On October 29, 1993, the appellate court set aside the decision of the trial court, thus,
Article 217 of the Labor Code" and that, since plaintiff was employed in Singapore, all other
aspects of his employment contract and/or documents executed in Singapore. Thus, defendant . . . In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by
postulates that Singapore laws should apply and courts thereat shall have jurisdiction. (pp. 50- plaintiff-appellee only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity
69, Rec.). date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already
prescribed.
In traversing defendant's arguments, plaintiff claimed that: (1) where the items demanded in a
complaint are the natural consequences flowing from a breach of an obligation and not labor WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
benefits, the case is intrinsically a civil dispute; (2) the case involves a question that is beyond complaint is hereby dismissed.
the field of specialization of labor arbiters; and (3) if the complaint is grounded not on the
employee's dismissal per se but on the manner of said dismissal and the consequence thereof, SO ORDERED.3
the case falls under the jurisdiction of the civil courts. (pp. 70-73, Rec.) Petitioner's and Singapore Airlines' respective motions for reconsideration were denied.
On March 23, 1987, the court a quo denied defendant's motion to dismiss (pp. 82-84, Ibid). Now, before the Court, petitioner poses the following queries:
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied. (p. 95 ibid.)
1. IS THE PRESENT ACTION ONE BASED ON CONTRACT WHICH
On September 16, 1987, defendant filed its answer reiterating the grounds relied upon in its PRESCRIBES IN TEN YEARS UNDER ARTICLE 1144 OF THE NEW CIVIL
motion to dismiss and further arguing that plaintiff is barred by laches, waiver, and estoppel CODE OR ONE FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM AN INJURY TO THE RIGHTS
from instituting the complaint and that he has no cause of action . (pp. 102-115)1 OF THE PLAINTIFF WHICH PRESCRIBES IN FOUR YEARS UNDER ARTICLE
1146 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE?
On April 10, 1991, the trial court handed down its decision in favor of plaintiff. The dispositive
portion of which reads: 2. CAN AN EMPLOYEE WITH A FIXED PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT BE
RETRENCHED BY HIS EMPLOYER?
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff Menandro Laureano and
against defendant Singapore Airlines Limited, ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the amounts 3. CAN THERE BE VALID RETRENCHMENT IF AN EMPLOYER MERELY
of — FAILS TO REALIZE THE EXPECTED PROFITS EVEN IF IT WERE NOT, IN
FACT, INCURRING LOSSES?
SIN$396,104.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the
time of payment, as and for unearned compensation with legal interest from the filing of the At the outset, we find it necessary to state our concurrence on the assumption of jurisdiction by the
complaint until fully paid; Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9. The trial court rightly ruled on the application of
SIN$154,742.00, or its equivalent in Philippine currency at the current rate of exchange at the Philippine law, thus:
time of payment; and the further amounts of P67,500.00 as consequential damages with legal Neither can the Court determine whether the termination of the plaintiff is legal under the
interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid; Singapore Laws because of the defendant's failure to show which specific laws of
P1,000,000.00 as and for moral damages; P1,000,000.00 as and for exemplary damages; and Singapore Laws apply to this case. As substantially discussed in the preceding paragraphs,
P100,000.00 as and for attorney's fees. the Philippine Courts do not take judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. The defendant
that claims the applicability of the Singapore Laws to this case has the burden of proof.
Costs against defendant.
The defendant has failed to do so. Therefore, the Philippine law should be applied.4
SO ORDERED.2
Respondent Court of Appeals acquired jurisdiction when defendant filed its appeal before said court. 5 In the light of Article 291, aforecited, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that
On this matter, respondent court was correct when it barred defendant-appellant below from raising petitioner's action for damages due to illegal termination filed again on January 8, 1987 or more
than four (4) years after the effective date of his dismissal on November 1, 1982 has already
further the issue of jurisdiction.6
prescribed.
Petitioner now raises the issue of whether his action is one based on Article 1144 or on Article 1146 of In the instant case, the action for damages due to illegal termination was filed by plaintiff-
the Civil Code. According to him, his termination of employment effective November 1, 1982, was appelle only on January 8, 1987 or more than four (4) years after the effectivity date of his
based on an employment contract which is under Article 1144, so his action should prescribe in 10 dismissal on November 1, 1982. Clearly, plaintiff-appellee's action has already prescribed.
years as provided for in said article. Thus he claims the ruling of the appellate court based on Article
1146 where prescription is only four (4) years, is an error. The appellate court concluded that the We base our conclusion not on Article 1144 of the Civil Code but on which sets the prescription
action for illegal dismissal originally filed before the Labor Arbiter on June 29, 1983, but which was period at three (3) years and which governs under this jurisdiction.
withdrawn, then filed again in 1987 before the Regional Trial Court, had already prescribed. Petitioner claims that the running of the prescriptive period was tolled when he filed his complaint
for illegal dismissal before the Labor Arbiter of the National Labor Relations Commission.
In our view, neither Article 1144 7 nor Article 11468 of the Civil Code is here pertinent. What is
However, this claim deserves scant consideration; it has no legal leg to stand on. In Olympia
applicable is Article 291 of the Labor Code, viz:
International, Inc., vs., Court of Appeals, we held that "although the commencement of a civil
Art. 291. Money claims. — All money claims arising from employee-employer relations action stops the running of the statute of prescription or limitations, its dismissal or voluntary
accruing during the effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time abandonment by the plaintiff leaves in exactly the same position as though no action had been
the cause of action accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred.
commenced at all."12
xxx     xxx     xxx
Now, as to whether petitioner's separation from the company due to retrenchment was valid, the
What rules on prescription should apply in cases like this one has long been decided by this Court. In appellate court found that the employment contract of petitioner allowed for pre-termination of
illegal dismissal, it is settled, that the ten-year prescriptive period fixed in Article 1144 of the Civil employment. We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said,
Code may not be invoked by petitioners, for the Civil Code is a law of general application, while the
It is a settled rule that contracts have the force of law between the parties. From the
prescriptive period fixed in Article 292 of the Labor Code [now Article 291] is a SPECIAL LAW
moment the same is perfected, the parties are bound not only to the fulfillment of what has
applicable to claims arising from employee-employer relations.9 been expressly stipulated but also to all consequences which, according to their nature,
may be in keeping with good faith, usage and law. Thus, when plaintiff-appellee accepted
More recently in De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals,10 where the money claim was based on a written the offer of employment, he was bound by the terms and conditions set forth in the
contract, the Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Court held: contract, among others, the right of mutual termination by giving three months written
. . . The language of Art. 291 of the Labor Code does not limit its application only to "money notice or by payment of three months salary. Such provision is clear and readily
claims specifically recoverable under said Code" but covers all money claims arising from an understandable, hence, there is no room for interpretation.
employee-employer relations" (Citing Cadalin v. POEA Administrator, 238 SCRA 721, 764 xxx     xxx     xxx
[1994]; and Uy v. National Labor Relations Commission, 261 SCRA 505, 515 [1996]). . . .
Further, plaintiff-appellee's contention that he is not bound by the provisions of the
It should be noted further that Article 291 of the Labor Code is a special law applicable to Agreement, as he is not a signatory thereto, deserves no merit. It must be noted that when
money claims arising from employer-employee relations; thus, it necessarily prevails over plaintiff-appellee's employment was confirmed, he applied for membership with the
Article 1144 of the Civil Code, a general law. Basic is the rule in statutory construction that Singapore Airlines Limited (Pilots) Association, the signatory to the aforementioned
"where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed Agreement. As such, plaintiff-appellee is estopped from questioning the legality of the said
therefore should prevail." (Citing Leveriza v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282,
agreement or any proviso contained therein.13
294.) Generalia specialibus non derogant.11
Moreover, the records of the present case clearly show that respondent court's decision is amply JUMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS, NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS,
supported by evidence and it did not err in its findings, including the reason for the retrenchment: SALVADOR MAMARIL y MENDOZA, HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH, JAINUDDIN
HASSAN y AHMAD, IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH, JALINA HASSAN DE KAMMING,
When defendant-appellant was faced with the world-wide recession of the airline industry
FREDDIE MANUEL @ "Ajid" and several JOHN and JANE DOES, accused, JAILON
resulting in a slow down in the company's growth particularly in the regional operation (Asian
KULAIS, appellant.
Area) where the Airbus 300 operates. It had no choice but to adopt cost cutting measures,
such as cutting down services, number of frequencies of flights, and reduction of the number
of flying points for the A-300 fleet (t.s.n., July 6, 1988, pp. 17-18). As a result, defendant-
PANGANIBAN, J.:
appellant had to lay off A-300 pilots, including plaintiff-appellee, which it found to be in
excess of what is reasonably needed.14 The trial court's erroneous taking of judicial notice of a witness' testimony in another case, also
pending before it, does not affect the conviction of the appellant, whose guilt is proven beyond
All these considered, we find sufficient factual and legal basis to conclude that petitioner's termination reasonable doubt by other clear, convincing and overwhelming evidence, both testimonial and
from employment was for an authorized cause, for which he was given ample notice and opportunity documentary. The Court takes this occasion also to remind the bench and the bar that reclusion
to be heard, by respondent company. No error nor grave abuse of discretion, therefore, could be perpetua is not synonymous with life imprisonment.
attributed to respondent appellate court.1âwphi1.nêt
The Case
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
CV No. 34476 is AFFIRMED. On August 22, 1990, five Informations for kidnapping for ransom (Crim. Case Nos. 10060, 10061,
10062, 10063 and 10064) and three Informations for kidnapping (Crim Case Nos. 10065, 10066
SO ORDERED. and 10067), all dated August 14, 1990, were filed 1 before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. City against Carlos Falcasantos, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais, Jalina
Hassan de Kamming, 2 Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul Plasin, Jaimuddin Hassan, Imam 3 Taruk Alah,
Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid," and several John and Jane Does. The Informations for kidnapping for
ransom, which set forth identical allegations save for the names of the victims, read as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being all private individuals, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting one another, with threats to kill the person of FELIX
ROSARIO [in Criminal Case No. 10060] 4 and for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the said Felix Rosario or his families or employer, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of said Felix
Rosario, 5 a male public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, who was
then aboard a Cimarron vehicle with plate No. SBZ-976 which was being
ambushed by the herein accused at the highway of Sitio Tigbao Lisomo,
G.R. No. 100901 July 16, 1998
Zamboanga City, and brought said Felix Rosario 6 to different mountainous
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, places of Zamboanga City and Zamboanga del Sur, where he was detained, held
hostage and deprived of his liberty until February 2, 1989, the day when he was
vs.
released only after payment of the ransom was made to herein accused, to the
JAILON KULAIS, CARLOS FALCASANTOS @ "Commander Falcasantos," AWALON damage and prejudice of said victim; there being present an aggravating
KAMLON HASSAN @ "Commander Kamlon," MAJID SAMSON @ "Commander Bungi,"
 circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed with the aid of armed men WHEREFORE, for the five charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom, and pursuant to
or persons who insure or afford impunity. Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, five life imprisonments are imposed on
Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
The three Informations for kidnapping, also under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, likewise
Kadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
alleged identical facts and circumstances, except the names of the victims:
For kidnapping Mrs. Virginia San Agustin-Gara, a female and public officer and
That on or about the 12th day of December, 1988, in the City of Zamboanga and
pursuant to Art. 267, Revised Penal Code (par. 4.), another life imprisonment is
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being all
imposed on Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y
private individuals, conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
Mendoza and Hadjirul Plasin y Alih (Crim. Case No. 10066)
assisting one another, by means of threats and intimidation of person, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously KIDNAP, take and drag away and detain For kidnapping Monico Saavedra y Limen, and Calixto Francisco y Gaspar, and
the person of MONICO SAAVEDRA Y LIMEN [Criminal Case No. 10065] 7 a male their kidnapping not having lasted more than five days, pursuant to Art. 268,
public officer of the City Government of Zamboanga, against his will, there being Revised Penal Code, and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the same four accused
present an aggravating circumstance in that the aforecited offense was committed — Jainuddin Hassan y Ahmad, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril y Mendoza and
with the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity. Hadjirul Plasin y Alih — are sentenced to serve two (2) jail terms ranging from
ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
Of the twelve accused, only nine were apprehended, namely, Jailon Julais, Jumatiya Amlani, Norma
temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065 and 10067).
Sahiddan de Kulais, Salvador Mamaril Hadjirul Plasin, Jainuddin Hassan, Imam Taruk Alah, Jalina
Hassan and Freddie Manuel. 8 3. JAMATIYA AMLANI DE FALCASANTOS [n]ot [g]uilty in the three charges
of [k]idnapping and she is acquitted of these charges. (Crim. Cases Nos. 10065,
On their arraignment on September 13, 1990, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Joint trial on the
10066 and 10067).
merits ensued. On April 8, 1991, Judge Pelagio S. Mandi rendered the assailed 36-page Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads: But Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is [g]uilty as accomplice in the five charges
of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom.
WHEREFORE, above premises and discussion taken into consideration, this Court
renders its judgment, ordering and finding: WHEREFORE, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos is sentenced to serve five (5)
imprisonments, ranging from TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to
1. FREDDIE MANUEL, alias "AJID" and IMAM TARUK ALAH y SALIH [n]ot
EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum (Crim. Cases Nos.
[g]uilty of the eight charges of [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping, their
10060-1 0064).
guilt not having been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
4. NORMA SAHIDDAN DE KULAIS, 18 years old, and JALIHA HUSSIN
Their immediate release from the City Jail, Zamboanga City is ordered, unless
(charged as Jalina Hassan de Kamming), 15 years old, [n]ot [g]uilty in the three
detained for some other offense besides these 8 cases (Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-
charges for [k]idnapping and are, therefore, ACQUITTED of these three charges.
10067).
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10065, 10066 & 10067).
2. JAINUDDIN HASSAN y AHMAD, JAILON KULAIS, SALVADOR MAMARIL
But Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are found [g]uilty as
y MENDOZA and HADJIRUL PLASIN y ALIH [g]uilty as principals by conspiracy
accomplices in the five charges for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom. Being miners, they
in all these 8 cases for [k]idnapping for [r]ansom and for [k]idnapping (Crim. Cases
are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority which lowers the
Nos. 10060-10067).
penalty imposable on them by one degree.
Their guilt is aggravated in that they committed the 8 offenses with the aid of armed
WHEREFORE, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jalina Hussin are sentenced to
men who insured impunity. Therefore, the penalties imposed on them shall be at their
serve five imprisonments ranging from SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional as
maximum period.
 minimum to TEN YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY OF prision mayor as maximum
(Crim. Cases Nos. 10060-10064).
Due to the removal of the suspension of sentences of youthful offenders "convicted of
an offense punishable by death or life" by Presidential Decree No. 1179 and One Steel Tape P 250.00
Presidential Decree No. 1210 (of which [k]idnapping for [r]ansom is such an offense)
the sentences on Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and Jaliha Hussin de Kamming are NOT
To Edilberto S. Perez:
suspended but must be served by them.
Januddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul Plasin are sentenced
further to return the following personal effects taken on December 12, 1988, the day One (1) Rayban P 1,000.00
of the kidnapping, or their value in money, their liability being solidary.
One Wrist WatchP P 1,800.00
To Jessica Calunod:

Cash P 300.00
One (1) Seiko wrist watchP P 250.00

To Virginia San Agustin-Gara:

One Bracelet P 2,400.00

One (1)Wrist Watch P 850.00

One Shoulder Bag P 200.00

Cash P 200.00
The benefit of Art. 29, Revised Penal Code, on preventive suspension, shall be
extended to those sentenced.
To Armado C. Bacarro: The cases against Majid Samson, alias "Commander Bungi" Awalon Kamlon
a.k.a. "Commander Kamlon" Carlos Falcasantos and several "John Does" and
Jane "Does" are ARCHIVED until their arrest.
One (1) wrist watch P 800.00
Costs against the accused convicted.

One Necklace P 300.00 SO ORDERED. 9

On May 7, 1991, Jailon Kulais, Jumatiya Amlani de Falcasantos, Norma Sahiddan de Kulais and
Jaliha Hussin filed their joint Notice of Appeal. 10 In a letter dated February 6, 1997, the same
One Calculator P 295.00
appellants, except Jailon Kulais, withdrew their appeal because of their application for "amnesty."
In our March 19, 1997 Resolution, we granted their motion. Hence, only the appeal of Kulais
Eyeglasses P 500.00 remains for the consideration of this Court. 11
The Facts
 The Version of the Prosecution negotiations between Mayor Vitaliano Agan of Zamboanga City and the
representatives of the kidnappers. (pp. 2, 6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1990)
The solicitor general summarized, in this wise, the facts as viewed by the People:
. . . 12
On December 12, 1988, a group of public officials from various government
agencies, organized themselves as a monitoring team to inspect government projects The prosecution presented fifteen witnesses, including some of the kidnap victims themselves:
in Zamboanga City. The group was composed of Virginia Gara, as the head of the Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro, Edilberto Perez, Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Calixto Francisco,
team; Armando Bacarro, representing the Commission on Audit; Felix del Rosario, and Monico Saavedra.
representing the non-government: Edilberto Perez, representing the City Assessor's
The Version of the Defense
Office; Jessica Calunod and Allan Basa of the City Budget Office and Monico
Saavedra, the driver from the City Engineer's Office. (p. 3, TSN, October 22, 1990.) The facts of the case, according to the defense, are as follows: 13
On that particular day, the group headed to the Lincomo Elementary School to check On May 28, 1990, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, while weeding their
on two of its classrooms. After inspecting the same, they proceeded to the Talaga farm in Sinaburan, Zamboanga del Sur, accused-appellant Jumatiya Amlani was
Footbridge. The group was not able to reach the place because on their way, they picked up by soldiers and brought to a place where one army battalion was
were stopped by nine (9) armed men who pointed their guns at them (p. 4, TSN, stationed. Thereat, her five (5) co-accused, namely Salvador Mamaril, Hadjirul
ibid.). Plasin, Jainuddin Hassin, Imam Taruk Alah and Freddie Manuel were already
detained. In the afternoon of the same day, appellants spouses Jailon Kulais and
The group alighted from their Cimarron jeep where they were divested of their
Norma Sahiddan were brought to the battalion station and likewise detained
personal belongings. They were then ordered to walk to the mountain by the leader of
thereat. On May 30, 1990, the eight (8) accused were transported to Metrodiscom,
the armed men who introduced himself as Commander Falcasantos (p. 5, TSN, ibid.).
Zamboanga City. Here on the same date, they were joined by accused-appellant
While the group was walking in the mountain, they encountered government troops Jaliha Hussin.
which caused their group to be divided. Finally, they were able to regroup
At the time Amlani was picked up by the military, she had just escaped from the
themselves. Commander Kamlon with his men joined the others. (pp. 7-8, TSN,
captivity of Carlos Falcasantos and company who in 1988 kidnapped and brought
ibid.).
her to the mountains. Against their will, she stayed with Falcasantos and his two
The kidnappers held their captives for fifty-four (54) days in the forest. During their wives for two months, during which she slept with Falcasantos as aide of the
captivity, the victims were able to recognize their captors who were at all times armed wives and was made to cook food, wash clothes, fetch water and run other errands
with guns. The wives of the kidnappers performed the basic chores like cooking. (pp. for everybody. An armed guard was assigned to watch her, so that, for sometime,
9-10. TSN, ibid.) she had to bear the ill-treatment of Falcasantos' other wives one of whom was
armed. After about two months, while she was cooking and Falcasantos and his
Commander Falcasantos also ordered their victims to sign the ransom notes which
two wives were bathing in the river, and while her guard was not looking, she
demanded a ransom of P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange for twenty (20) sets
took her chance and made a successful dash for freedom. (TSN, January 29, 1992,
of uniform. (p. 15, TSN, ibid.)
pp. 2-15)
On February 3, 1989, at around 12:00 o'clock noontime, the victims were informed
Likewise a kidnap victim herself is accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin, who was
that they would be released. They started walking until around 7:00 o'clock in the
thirteen years old at the time (she was fifteen years old when the trial of the
evening of that day. At around 12:00 o'clock midnight, the victims were released after
instant cases commenced). She was kidnapped by Daing Kamming and brought to
Commander Falcasantos and Kamlon received the ransom money. (p. 19, TSN, ibid.)
the mountains where he slept with her. She stayed with him for less than a month
The total amount paid was P122,000.00. The same was reached after several
sleeping on forest ground and otherwise performing housekeeping errands for
Kamming and his men. She made good her escape during an encounter between
 the group of Kamming and military troops. She hid in the bushes and came out at who saw all the witnesses testify, [p]rosecution witnesses testified only because
Ligui-an where she took a "bachelor" bus in going back to her mother's house at they were impelled by [a] sense of justice, of duty and of truth.
Pudos, Guiligan, Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. One day, at around 2:00 o'clock in
Contrarily, [d]efense evidence is weak, uncorroborated and consisted only of
the afternoon, while she was harvesting palay at the neighboring village of
alibis. The individual testimonies of the nine accused dwel[t] principally on what
Tigbalangao, military men picked her up to Ticbanuang where there was an army
happened to each of them on May 27, 28 and 29, 1990. None of the accused
battalion detachment. From Ticbawuang, she was brought to Vitali, then to
explained where he or she was on and from December 12, 1988, to February 3,
Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City, where on her arrival, she met all the other accused
1989, when [p]rosecution evidence show[ed] positively seven of the nine accused
for the first time except Freddie Manuel. (Ibid., pp. 16-21)
were keeping the five or six hostages named by [p]rosecution evidence.
Another female accused is appellant Norma Sahiddan, a native of Sinaburan,
The seven accused positively identified to have been present during the course of
Tungawan, Zamboanga del Sur. At about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of a day in
the captivity of the five kidnap-victims-complainants are: (1) Jumatiya Amlani;
May, while she and her husband were in their farm, soldiers arrested them. The
(2) Jaliha Hussin; (3) Norma Sahiddan; (4) Jailon Kulais; (5) Hadjirul Plasin; (6)
soldiers did not tell them why they were being arrested, neither were they shown any
Salvador Mamaril and (7) Jainuddin Hassan.
papers. The two of them were just made to board a six by six truck. There were no
other civilians in the truck. The truck brought the spouses to the army battalion and The two accused not positively identified are: Freddie Manuel alias "Ajid", and
placed them inside the building where there were civilians and soldiers. Among the Imam Taruk Alah. These two must, therefore, be declared acquitted based on
civilians present were her six co-accused Hadjirul Plasin, Salvador Mamaril, reasonable doubt.
Jaimuddin Hassan, Ima[m] Taruk Alah, Freddie Manuel and Jumatiya Amlani. That
The next important issue to be examined is: Are these seven accused guilty as
night, the eight of them were brought to Tictapul, Zamboanga City; then to Vitali;
conspirators as charged in the eight Informations; or only as accomplices?
and, finally, to the Metrodiscom, Zamboanga City where they stayed for six days and
Prosecution evidence shows that the kidnapping group to which the seven accused
six nights. On the seventh day, the accused were brought to the City Jail, Zamboanga
belonged had formed themselves into an armed band for the purpose of
City. (TSN, January 30, 1991, pp. 6-11)
kidnapping for ransom. This armed band had cut themselves off from established
The husband of Norma Sahiddan is Jailon Kulais who, as heretofore narrated, was communities, lived in the mountains and forests, moved from place to place in
arrested with his wife the day the soldiers came to their farm on May 28, 1990. He order to hide their hostages. The wives of these armed band moved along with
has shared with his wife the ordeals that followed in the wake of their arrest and in their husbands, attending to their needs, giving them material and moral support.
the duration of their confinement up to the present. (TSN, January 22, 1991 pp. 2-4). These wives also attended to the needs of the kidnap victims, sleeping with them
or comforting them.
The Trial Court's Ruling
x x x           x x x          x x x
The trial court found Appellant Kulais guilty of five counts of kidnapping for ransom and one count of
kidnapping a woman and public officer, for which offenses it imposed upon him six terms of "life II The guilt of Jainuddin Hassan, Jailon Kulais, Salvador Mamaril and Hadjirul
imprisonment." It also found him guilty of two counts of slight illegal detention for the kidnapping of Plasin. The Court holds these four men guilty as conspirators in the 8 cases of
Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. The trial court ratiocinated as follows: kidnapping. Unlike the three women-accused, these male accused were armed.
They actively participated in keeping their hostages by fighting off the military
Principally, the issue here is one of credibility — both of the witnesses and their
and CAFGUS, in transferring their hostages from place to place, and in guarding
version of what had happened on December 12, 1988, to February 3, 1989. On this
the kidnap hostages. Salvador Mamaril and Jailon Kulais were positively
pivotal issue, the Court gives credence to [p]rosecution witnesses and their
identified as among the nine armed men who had kidnapped the eight kidnap
testimonies. Prosecution evidence is positive, clear and convincing. No taint of evil or
victims on December 12, 1988.
dishonest motive was imputed or imputable to [p]rosecution witnesses. To this Court,
 The higher degree of participation found by the Court of the four accused is IV
supported by the rulings of our Supreme Court quoted below.
The trial court erred in denying to accused-appellant Jaliha Hussin and Norma
(1) The time-honored jurisprudence is that direct proof is not essential to prove Sahiddan the benefits of suspension of sentence given to youth offenders
conspiracy. It may be shown by a number of infinite acts, conditions and considering that they were minors at the time of the commission of the offense. 15
circumstances which may vary according to the purposes to be accomplished and
As earlier noted, Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha Hussin and Norma Sahiddan had withdrawn their appeal,
from which may logically be inferred that there was a common design, understanding
and as such, the third and fourth assigned errors, which pertain to them only, will no longer be
or agreement among the conspirators to commit the offense charged. (People vs.
dealt with. Only the following issues pertaining to Appellant Jailon Kulais will be discussed: (1)
Cabrera, 43 Phil 64; People vs. Carbonel, 48 Phil. 868.)
judicial notice of other pending cases, (2) sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, and (3) denial as
(2) The crime must, therefore, in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which a defense. In addition, the Court will pass upon the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial
existed between the sixteen accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party court.
created by them, and they are all equally responsible for the murder in question. (U.S.
The Court's Ruling
vs. Bundal, et. al. 3 Phil 89, 98.)
The appeal is bereft of merit.
(3) When two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether through
the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each First Issue:
individual whose evil will actively contribute to the wrongdoing is in law responsible
Judicial Notice and Denial of Due Process
for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone. (People vs. Peralta, et.
al. 25 SCRA 759, 772 (1968).) 14 Appellant Kulais argues that he was denied due process when the trial court took judicial notice of
the testimony given in another case by one Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who was the team leader of
The Assigned Errors
the government troops that captured him and his purported cohorts. 16 Because he was allegedly
The trial court is faulted with the following errors, viz: deprived of his right to cross-examine a material witness in the person of Lieutenant Feliciano, he
contends that the latter's testimony should not be used against him. 17
I
True, as a general rule, courts should not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other
The trial court erred in taking judicial notice of a material testimony given in another
proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court, or have been heard and
case by Lt. Melquiades Feliciano, who allegedly was the team leader of the
are actually pending before the same judge. 18 This is especially true in criminal cases, where the
government troops which allegedly captured the accused-appellants in an encounter;
accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.
thereby, depriving the accused-appellants their right to cross-examine him.
Having said that, we note, however, that even if the court a quo did take judicial notice of the
II
testimony of Lieutenant Feliciano, it did not use such testimony in deciding the cases against the
On the assumption that Lt. Feliciano's testimony could be validly taken judicial appellant. Hence, Appellant Kulais was not denied due process. His conviction was based mainly
notice of, the trial court, nevertheless, erred in not disregarding the same for being on the positive identification made by some of the kidnap victims, namely, Jessica Calunod,
highly improbable and contradictory. Armando Bacarro and Edilberto Perez. These witnesses were subjected to meticulous cross-
examinations conducted by appellant's counsel. At best, then, the trial court's mention of
III
Lieutenant Feliciano's testimony is a decisional surplusage which neither affected the outcome of
The trial court erred in finding that accused-appellants Jumatiya Amlani, Jaliha the case nor substantially prejudiced Appellant Kulais.
Hussin and Norma Sahiddan provided Carlos Falcasantos, et. al., with material and
Second Issue:
moral comfort, hence, are guilty as accomplices in all the kidnapping for ransom
cases. Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Appellant was positively identified by Calunod, as shown by the latter's testimony: Q Now will you look around this Honorable Court and see if any
of those you mentioned are here?
CP CAJAYON D MS:
A Yes, they are here.
Q And how long were you in the custody of these persons?
Q Some of them are here?
A We stayed with them for fifty-four days.
A Some of them are here.
Q And during those days did you come to know any of the persons
who were with the group? x x x           x x x          x x x
A We came to know almost all of them considering we stayed there Q Where is Tangkong? What is he wearing?
for fifty-four days.
A White t-shirt with orange collar. (witness pointing.) He was
Q And can you please name to us some of them or how you know one of those nine armed men who took us from the highway.
them?
RTC INTERPRETER:
A For example, aside from Commander Falcasantos and
Witness pointed to a man sitting in court and when asked of his
Commander Kamlon we came to know first our foster parents, those
name, he gave his name as JAILON KULAIS.
who were assigned to give us some food.
CP CAJAYON D MS:
Q You mean to say that the captors assigned you some men who will
take care of you? Q Aside from being with the armed men who stopped the vehicle
and made you alight, what else was he doing while you were in
A Yes.
their captivity?
Q And to whom were you assigned?
A He was the foster parent of Armando Bacarro and the husband
A To Ila Abdurasa. of Nana.
Q And other than your foster [parents] or the parents whom you are COURT:
assigned to, who else did you come to know?
Q Who?
A Pagal and his wife; Tangkong and his wife Nana; the two (2)
A Tangkong.
wives of Commander Falcasantos — Mating and Janira — another
brother in-law of Commander Kamlon, Usman, the wife of Kamlon, xxx xxx xxx 19
Tira.
Likewise clear and straightforward was Bacarro's testimony pointing to appellant as one of the
x x x           x x x          x x x culprits:
Q Now, you said that you were with these men for fifty-four days FISCAL CAJAYON:
and you really came to know them. Will you still be able to
x x x           x x x          x x x
recognize these persons if you will see the[m] again?
Q And what happened then?
A Yes, ma'am.
A Some of the armed men assigned who will be the host or who will Q And because Tangkong was always with you as your host even
be the one [to] g[i]ve food to us. if he did not tell you that he [was] one of those who stopped you,
you would not recognize him?
Q [To] whom were you assigned?
A No, I can recognize him because he was the one who took my
A I was assigned to a certain Tangkong and [his] wife Nana.
shoes.
x x x           x x x          x x x
COURT:
Q Now, you said you were assigned to Tangkong and his wife. [D]o
Q Who?
you remember how he looks like?
A Tangkong, your Honor.
A Yes.
xxx xxx xxx 20
Q Now, will you please look around this Court and tell us if that said
Tangkong and his wife are here? Also straightforward was Ernesto Perez' candid narration:
A Yes, ma'am. FISCAL CAJAYON:
Q Could you please point this Tangkong to us? x x x           x x x          x x x
A Witness pointed to a person in Court. [W]hen asked his name he Q Who else?
identified [himself] as Jailon Kulais.
A The last man.
Q Why did you say his name is Tangkong? Where did you get that
Q Did you come to know his name?
name?
A Only his nickname, Tangkong. (Witness pointed to a man in
A Well, that is the name [by which he is] usually called in the camp.
Court who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q And what was Tangkong doing in the mountain?
ATTY. FABIAN (counsel for accused Kulais)
A The same, guarding us.
Q When did you first meet Tangkong?
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. SAHAK.
A That was on December 11, because I remember he was the one
Q Engr. Perez, you stated that you were ambushed by nine armed
who took us.
men on your way from [the] Licomo to [the] Talaga Foot Bridge.
Q When you were questioned by the fiscal a while ago, you stated [W]hat do you mean by ambushed?
that Mr. Mamaril was one of those who stopped the bus and took
A I mean that they blocked our way and stopped.
you to the hill and you did not mention Tangkong?
Q They did not fire any shots?
A I did not mention but I can remember his face.
A But they were pointing their guns at us.
x x x           x x x          x x x
 Q And among the 9 armed men who held you on your way to [the] for Ransom
Talaga Footbridge, you stated [that] one of them [was] Commander
That the kidnapping of the five was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom is also apparent
Falcasantos?
from the testimony of Calunod, who was quite emphatic in identifying the accused and narrating
A Yes. the circumstances surrounding the writing of the ransom letters.
Q Could you also recognize anyone of the accused in that group? CP CAJAYON D MS:
A Yes. Q Now, you were in their captivity for 54 days and you said there
were these meetings for possible negotiation with the City
Q Will you please identify?
Government. What do you mean by this? What were you
A That one, Tangkong. (The witness pointed to a man sitting in court supposed to negotiate?
who identified himself as Jailon Kulais.)
A Because they told us that they will be releasing us only after
x x x           x x x          x x x the terms. 22

CROSS-EXAMINATION BY ATTY. FABIAN. Q And what were the terms? Did you come to know the terms?

Q You said Jailon Kulais was among those who guarded the camp? A I came to know the terms because I was the one ordered by
Commander Falcasantos to write the letter, the ransom letter.
FISCAL CAJAYON:
Q At this point of time, you remember how many letters were
Your Honor, please, he does not know the name of Julais, he used
you asked to write for your ransom?
the word Tangkong.
A I could not remember as to how many, but I can identify them.
ATTY. FABIAN
Q Why will you able to identify the same?
Q You said Tangkong guarded you[. W]hat do you mean?
A Because I was the one who wrote it.
A He guarded us like prisoners[. A]fter guarding us they have their
time two hours another will be on duty guarding us. Q And you are familiar, of course, with your penmanship?

Q Where did you meet Tangkong? A Yes.

A He was one of the armed men who kidnapped us. Q Now we have here some letters which were turned over to us
by the Honorable City Mayor Vitaliano Agan. 1,2,3,4,5 — there
xxx xxx xxx 21
are five letters all handwritten.
It is evident from the foregoing testimonies of Calunod, Bacarro and Perez that kidnapping or
COURT:
detention did take place: the five victims were held, against their will, for fifty-three days from
December 12, 1988 to February 2, 1989. It is also evident that Appellant Kulais was a member of the Original?
group of armed men who staged the kidnapping, and that he was one of those who guarded the victims
CP CAJAYON D MS:
during the entire period of their captivity. His participation gives credence to the conclusion of the trial
court that he was a conspirator. Original, your Honor.
Kidnapping
Q And we would like you to go over these and say, tell us if any of x x x           x x x          x x x
these were the ones you were asked to write.
INTERPRETER (Translation):
A (Witness going over [letters])
This is what they like you to prepare[:] the amount of
This one — 2 pages. This one — 2 pages. No more. P100,000.00 and P14,000.00 in exchange [for] 20 sets of uniform
on Friday, February 3, 1989.
Q Aside from the fact that you identified your penmanship in these
letters, what else will make you remember that these are really the x x x           x x x          x x x
ones you wrote while there?
Q Now you also earlier identified this other letter and this is
A The signature is there. dated January 21, 1988. 24 Now, could you please explain to us
why it is dated January 21, 1988 and the other one Enero 31,
Q There is a printed name here[,] Jessica Calunod.
1989 or January 31, 1989?
A And over it is a signature.
A I did not realize that I placed 1989, 1988, but it was 1989.
Q That is your signature?
Q January 21, 1989?
A Yes, ma'am.
A Yes.
Q How about in the other letter, did you sign it also?
x x x           x x x          x x x
A Yes, there is the other signature.
Q Now, in this letter, were the terms also mentioned?
Q There are names — other names here — Eddie Perez, Allan Basa,
Please go over this.
Armando Bacarro, Felix Rosario, Jojie Ortuoste and there are
signatures above the same. Did you come up to know who signed A (Going over the letter)
this one?
Yes, ma'am.
A Those whose signatures there were signed by the persons. [sic].
Q Could you please read it aloud to us?
Q And we have here at the bottom, Commander Kamlon Hassan,
A (Witness reading)
and there is the signature above the same. Did you come to know
who signed it? Gusto nila and P100,000.00 ng kapinan nu ug 20 sets nga
completong uniformer (7 colors marine type wala nay labot ang
A [It was] Commander Kamlon Hassan who signed that.
sapatos), tunga medium ug tunga large size. 25
x x x           x x x          x x x
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q Jessica, I am going over this letter . . . Could you please read to us
INTERPRETER:
the portion here which says the terms? . . .
They like the P100,000.00 and an addition of 20 sets of complete
A (Witness reading) "Mao ilang gusto nga andamun na ninyo ang
uniform (7 colors, marine-type not including the shoes), one half
kantidad nga P100,000 ug P14,000 baylo sa 20 sets nga uniforms sa
medium, one half large.
Biyernes (Pebrero 3, 1989). 23
x x x           x x x          x x x
 Q After having written these letters, did you come to know after Thus, in the present case, the detention of Gara, Saavedra and Francisco for only a few hours is
[they were] signed by your companions and all of you, do you know immaterial. The clear fact is that the victims were public officers 37 — Gara was a fiscal analyst
if these letters were sent? If you know only. for the City of Zamboanga, Saavedra worked at the City Engineer's Office, and Francisco was a
barangay councilman at the time the kidnapping occurred. Appellant Kulais should be punished,
A I would like to make it clear. The first letter was ordered to me by
therefore, under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, and not Art, 268, as the trial
Falcasantos to inform the City Mayor that initial as P500,000.00,
court held.
and when we were already — I was asked again to write, we were
ordered to affix our signature to serve as proof that all of us are The present case is different from People vs. Astorga, 38 which held that the crime committed was
alive. 26 [sic] not kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4, but only grave coercion. The appellant in that case
had tricked his seven-year-old victim into going with him to a place he alone knew. His plans,
Calunod's testimony was substantially corroborated by both Armando Bacarro 27 and Edilberto Perez.
however, were foiled when a group of people became suspicious and rescued the girl from him.
28 The receipt of the ransom letters, the efforts made to raise and deliver the ransom, and the release
The Court noted that the victim's testimony and the other pieces of evidence did not indicate that
of the hostages upon payment of the money were testified to by Zamboanga City Mayor Vitaliano
the appellant wanted to detain her, or that he actually detained her.
Agan 29 and Teddy Mejia. 30
In the present case, the evidence presented by the prosecution indubitably established that the
The elements of kidnapping for ransom, as embodied in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, 31
victims were detained, albeit for a few hours. There is proof beyond reasonable doubt that
having been sufficiently proven, and the appellant, a private individual, having been clearly identified
kidnapping took place, and that appellant was a member of the armed group which abducted the
by the kidnap victims, this Court thus affirms the trial court's finding of appellant's guilt on five counts
victims.
of kidnapping for ransom.
Third Issue:
Kidnapping of
Denial and Alibi
Public Officers
The appellant's bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker in the face of the
Victims Virginia San Agustin-Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco were members of the
prosecution witnesses' positive identification of him. Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the
government monitoring team abducted by appellant's group. The three testified to the fact of
positive narration of prosecution witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense. 39
kidnapping; however, they were not able to identify the appellant. Even so, appellant's identity as one
Between positive and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a
of the kidnappers was sufficiently established by Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, who were with Gara,
bare denial on the other, the former generally prevails. 40 Jessica Calunod, Armando Bacarro and
Saavedra and Francisco when the abduction occurred.
Edilberto Perez testified in a clear, straightforward and frank manner; and their testimonies were
That Gara, Saavedra and Francisco were detained for only three hours 32 does nor matter. In People compatible on material points. Moreover, no ill motive was attributed to the kidnap victims and
vs. Domasian, 33 the victim was similarly held for three hours, and was released even before his none was found by this Court.
parents received the ransom note. The accused therein argued that they could not be held guilty of
We agree with the trial court's observation that the appellant did not meet the charges against him
kidnapping as no enclosure was involved, and that only grave coercion was committed, if at all. 34
head on. His testimony dwelt on what happened to him on the day he was arrested and on
Convicting appellants of kidnapping or serious illegal detention under Art. 267 (4) of the Revised
subsequent days thereafter. Appellant did not explain where he was during the questioned dates
Penal Code, the Court found that the victim, an eight-year-old boy, was deprived of his liberty when
(December 12, 1988 to February 3, 1989); neither did he rebut Calunod, Bacarro and Perez, when
he was restrained from going home. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense
they identified him as one of their kidnappers.
consisted not only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in any
manner, of his liberty. 35 Likewise, in People vs. Santos, 36 the Court held that since the appellant Reclusion Perpetua, Not Life Imprisonment
was charged and convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the duration of the deprivation
The trial court erred when it sentenced the appellant to six terms of life imprisonment. The penalty
of liberty which was important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
for kidnapping with ransom, under the Revised Penal Code, is reclusion perpetua to death. Since
the crimes happened in 1988, when the capital penalty was proscribed by the Constitution, the
maximum penalty that could have been imposed was reclusion perpetua. Life imprisonment is not
synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it
accessory penalties provided in the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life
imprisonment is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while reclusion
perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code. 41
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Appellant Jailon Kulais as principal in five counts of kidnapping for
ransom and in three counts of kidnapping is AFFIRMED, but the penalty imposed is hereby
MODIFIED as follows: Appellant is sentenced to five terms of reclusion perpetua, one for each of his
five convictions for kidnapping for ransom; and to three terms of reclusion perpetua, one each for the
kidnapping of Public Officers Virginia Gara, Monico Saavedra and Calixto Francisco. Like the other
accused who withdrew their appeals, he is REQUIRED to return the personal effects, or their
monetary value, taken from the kidnap victims. Additionally, he is ORDERED to pay the amount of
P122,000 representing the ransom money paid to the kidnappers. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.