Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)

Simultaneous
Operations
(SIMOPS)
A 5-Day In-house Training Course for
12 - 16 January 2019
Alexandria, Egypt
Presented by: Mr. Sasa Kocic
www.petroknowledge.com
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Simultaneous Operations
SIMOPS
12 - 16 January 2020
Alexandria, Egypt
Mr. Sasa Kocic MSc

Senior Consultant
2
Table of Contents
Why choose this training course? ................................................ 4

What are the goals? ....................................................................... 4
How will this Training Course be Presented? ............................. 5
Organisational Impact .................................................................... 5
Personal Impact .............................................................................. 5
Daily Agenda ................................................................................... 6
Instructor Profile ............................................................................. 7
Day One SIMOPS Introduction ...................................................... 9

SIMOPS process.............................................................................................................9
Area classification in Refineries .................................................................................12
Oil refinery Risks and Hazards ...................................................................................15
Safety by design ...........................................................................................................17
SIMOPS in refinery operations: Fires and Explosion Protection .............................20
Workshop: Case Studies & Worked Examples ..........................................................21
Day Two SIMOPS Risk Management .......................................... 22

Risk Management methodologies ..............................................................................22
Risk Matrix and the construction of risk matrix ........................................................24
Job Hazard Analysis ....................................................................................................27
SIMOPS Checklist ........................................................................................................29
Permit to Work (PTW) system and issuing process..................................................29
Day Three SIMOPS in Specific Cases ......................................... 31

Common Process Hazards ..........................................................................................31
SIMOPS in construction ..............................................................................................31
SIMOPS in maintenance ..............................................................................................34
SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

Simultaneous Operations Course Presenter
3
Day Four PTW Procedure and SIMOPS ...................................... 38

PTW system ..................................................................................................................38
SIMOPS assessment review ........................................................................................40
SIMOPS interface document .......................................................................................40
SIMOPS flowchart ........................................................................................................41
SIMOPS Toolbox Talk ..................................................................................................41
Day Five Refinery Specific Risks and SIMOPS .......................... 43

Risk Management .........................................................................................................43
Management of change ...............................................................................................44
Integrated SIMOPS tool ...............................................................................................48
Ensuring contractor alignment with safety culture ...................................................49
Human factor and ergonomics, behavioral based safety .........................................50
SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

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Why choose this training course?

Any industry works with concurrent or simultaneous operations. The hazards
associated with the simultaneous operations or SIMOPS as they call increase as the
companies or contractors working on them do not have the same goals, operational
or health and safety procedures.
Simultaneous operations are usually defined as independent operations in which the

personnel, assets, execution and incidents in any operation may impact the safety of
personnel, equipment, and environment of another operation.
Before SIMOPS start, company is required to analyze the potential risks by

conducting two or more critical operations at the same time. SIMOPS was most
common in the oil and gas industry, but also other industries are now realizing that
SIMOPS are a part of their operations and dedicate more and more attention to
simultaneous and concurrent operations.
Participants on the SIMOPS training course will become versatile in:
• Identifying most common simultaneous operations in refineries

• Understanding the principles of SIMOPS
• Dealing with health and safety related issues in oil refineries
• Effective communication necessary for making SIMPOS efficient and safe
• Identification of risk mitigation measures in case of SIMOPS activities
• Preparing the SIMOPS plan
• Creating the SIMOPS matrix
• Conducting a Job Hazard Analysis and organizing the operation handover
What are the goals?
By the end of this training course, participants will learn to:
• Apply techniques to handle effectively the simultaneous operations (SIMOPS)

• Ability to analyze both concurrent/simultaneous operations in plant operation
• Recognize and catalogue hazards and risks involved in SIMOPS
• Recognize the roles and responsibilities of all parties involved
• Prepare the SIMOPS plan and SIMOPS matrix
• Use the SIMOPS checklist and conduct a SIMOPS toolbox talk
SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

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How will this Training Course be Presented?

Participants to this training course will receive a thorough training on the subjects covered
by the seminar outline with the Tutor utilizing a variety of proven adult learning teaching and
facilitation techniques. The Simultaneous Operations System training course is based on
real life examples and adult learning techniques. The emphasis in the training course will be
on the preparation of SIMOPS documentation based on the industrial practice regarding the
risk assessment of simultaneous operations and related activities in oil and gas industry.
The training material also has the worked examples of SIMOPS plan and SIMOPS matrix.
Organisational Impact
The organizations are almost daily involved in SIMOPS operations and cannot rely on luck
alone to prevent incidents from happening, individual and separate risk assessments are
not sufficient in the environment where multiple operations are conducted simultaneously.
This course is designed to help organizations adequately train their people to identify the
risk in the simultaneous operations and prepare adequate risk mitigation or risk removal
measures for the complex operations in plant industries.
Personal Impact
The participants will acquire the knowledge needed to conduct risk assessments, prepare
SIMOPS plans and develop SIMOPS matrix.
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Daily Agenda
Day One SIMOPS Introduction
• SIMOPS process
• Area classification in refineries
• Oil refinery risks and hazards
• Safety by design
• SIMOPS in refinery operations: Fires and Explosion Protection
• Workshop: Case Studies & Worked Examples
Day Two SIMOPS Risk Management
• Risk Management methodologies

• Risk Matrix and the construction of risk matrix
• Job Hazard Analysis
• SIMOPS Checklist
• Permit to Work (PTW) system and issuing process
Day Three SIMOPS in Specific Cases
• Common Process Hazards

• SIMOPS in construction
o Tie-in
o Additional equipment installation
• SIMOPS in maintenance
o Shutdown and isolation
o Pressure testing
o Inspection
Day Four PTW Procedure and SIMOPS
• PTW system
• SIMOPS assessment review
• SIMOPS interface document
• SIMOPS flowchart
• SIMOPS Toolbox Talk
Day Five Refinery Specific Risks and SIMOPS
• Risk Management
• Management of change
• Integrated SIMOPS tool
• Ensuring contractor alignment with safety culture
• Human factor and ergonomics, behavioral based safety
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Mr. Sasa Kocic
Managing Predictive Maintenance
• Performance and Nationality : Serbian
Efficiency Monitoring
• Managing the Predictive
Languages Maintenance effort Russian, Serbian, Croatian, Bulgarian
Spoken : English,
• Cost Analysis
Total Years of Practical/Training/Consultancy/ in the same field: 13 yrs
• Reporting Techniques
Instructor Profile
Sasa Kocic is a Senior Consultant with PetroKnowledge specializing in Data

Analysis, Energy Economics, Project Management, Optimization, Simulation,
Trading and Economics Model development.
Senior Consultant with 18 years’ experience in working with the government,

public and private institutions and companies, and 13 years’ experience in
training and consultancy. Extensive experience in training and teaching
delegates. Actively trained professionals in oil and gas industry, civil engineering
industry, maritime and shipping industry, as well as military and police, and has
also worked as a lecturer at a college of applied sciences.
Participated in negotiation for implementation of a new legal requirements with

representatives of syndicates and non-governmental institutions. Lead
negotiations with companies and vendors as Contract Holder and successfully
implemented Change Management through the contract duration.
Participated in FEED projects for oil and gas fields, with special emphasis on
developing upstream petroleum cost models and forecasts.
Teaching students in the oil and gas field on the importance of data analysis,
using statistics in oil and gas industry, reservoir modelling, as well as economics
and human behavior.
Consultancy and training for multinational, international and national oil

companies in: machine and deep learning techniques, Data mining, Enhancing
data collection procedures, Processing, cleansing, and verifying the integrity of
data used for analysis, doing analysis and presenting results in a clear manner,
statistical testing, regression analysis and time series analysis.
Also building different models for data analysis in Excel, R, Visual Basic, Python,
SQL, etc.
Highly valued and recommended by the delegates, as well as peers and

supervisors.
Prepared models for bond valuation, price forecasting, risk management and
valuation for different companies and institutions using Excel and R.
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SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT IN:
• Root Cause Analysis

• Risk Management
• Investigation
• Contract management
• Big Data Analytics, Machine Learning and Deep Learning
• Geostatistics, Well Data Analysis, Reserves Modelling
• Data Analysis and Statistics
• Trading, Forecasting, Financial Model Development
• Infographics and design
• R, Phyton, SPSS, SAS software
• Contract Negotiation
• Logistics and Supply Chain
EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS
• PhD candidate focusing on applying machine learning to predict human

behavior, University of Nish,
• MSc in Engineering, Logistics and Supply Chain, University of Belgrade
• Certified Tripod Beta Trainer, Energy Institute UK
• Certified BowTie risk analysis trainer, CGE risk management solutions,
Holland
PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS
• Energy Institute UK-Certified Trainer

• Institute of Transportation Engineers USA-International Member
• Chartered Institute of Logistics and Transport UK-Chartered Member
• American Production and Inventory Control Society-International Member
• Professional Engineer (Chartered Engineer as per UK nomenclature) in
Serbian Chamber of Engineers
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Day One SIMOPS Introduction
SIMOPS process
Obviously, on any site there will be many different tasks to be done, often at the same time.
The distinction here relates to major work events, such as having two different well heads
in close proximity. They could be at any stage of production, one might be abandoned, and
one might be being freshly spudded.
To a lesser degree, some might refer to any important events on the same rig as SIMOPS,
even if there is only one well bore. A rig crew needs to focus on each job at hand, be that
deploying the drill string, casing or cement. Any other major task in the background that
might counteract, distract, or impact in any way could be described as a SIMOP situation.
An expert in this area will see the bigger picture, with data points from both operations. From
a higher view point, risk and performance can be properly assessed and contingencies can
be prepared.
A SIMOP describes two or more well bore operations that are close enough to interfere with
each other, and transfer risk or performance implications.
This is a HSE and well integrity concept that’s mostly used in the well completions stage of
the drilling process. Both well bores might be drilled concurrently, but it’s more likely that
one has been in production for a period of time.
Here are some examples of SIMOP situations:
• A well is being hydraulically fractured, and the reservoir is shared with other nearby
leases that are being conventionally drilled. (Or vice versa).
• On an offshore rig, a drilling, slickline and coiled tubing unit might be working at the
same time.
• On a multi platform land rig, separate wells will affect the reservoir pressure, and
hydrocarbon flow.
• A crane lift positioned close to another work area.
The considerations for a SIMOPS expert to factor in are numerous, and there will be those
that might not immediately come to mind. For a safe and efficient well operation, there are
many things to consider, when there are simultaneous operations, this number multiplies.
Someone planning or overseeing a SIMOP will consider the more obvious things such as:
• Well integrity factors

• Environmental factors
• Reservoir pressure
• National rules and regulations
• International rules and regulations
• Operator rules and regulations
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Also, there will be extra considerations, that are different to those of individual operations:
• Clashes between decision makers at the same hierarchy, on each operation

• Cultural differences if the different operations are done by different companies
• Schedule clashes
• Physical clashes between equipment or third party interfaces
• Issues with maintenance access.
• Contractual implications, on all affected contracts.
It’s important that a SIMOP is identified as early as possible in the planning stage, and then
bought into the well plan. The priority is to avoid accidents, and down time. In some
situations, a potential clash or safety concern might be so serious as to render one or more
operation non-viable. That’s something that you’d want to discover at the very earliest
opportunity.
The SIMOP should be planned as if it were a separate drilling operation. A workshop must
be organized where all of the important data can be examined. The workshop will include
managers, geologists, engineers, safety specialists, construction teams, fluid specialists,
and anyone else who would be involved in a DWOP or similar process. Representatives
from all companies and organizations with vested interests need to be present so that
everyone ends up on the same page.
During the workshop, brainstorming with a list of previous findings and incidents can help
identify potential issues. preemptive risk assessments, and the collective knowledge and
experience of everyone in the room can ensure that every potential hazard is covered. This
process focuses on hazard identification (HAZID) as its main priority. (Another common term
in this area is HIRA which means hazard identification and risk assessment).
The result of the workshop will be a planning blueprint with a full risk assessment and action
points. After the initial plan, ongoing meetings and interaction need to take place for
successful progress monitoring and interaction.
There will be a list of action points including a MOPO (Matrix of Permitted Operations) that
can be done at any time. Risks that can be eliminated or mitigated will be, others will be
monitored.
Typical action steps might include:
• The substitution of fluid, equipment or personnel for more compatible solutions.

• The physical location of the operations can be moved away from each other.
• Permits, contracts, schedules and procedures can be adjusted to avid a simop
altogether.
• Additional equipment, controls or safety measures can be implemented.
The creation of a list of operations that CAN be done simultaneously, and a list that CAN’T.
SIMOPS represent additional risks and challenges, so experienced managers and
consultants need to be deployed. Any drilling operation holds dangers and these must never
be underestimated. Operators and contractors have experiences based on previous SIMOP
issues, and have developed procedures and programs. On an individual level, professional
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teams on each operation that will be conducted simultaneously will cognizant of the need
for full respect, communication and disclosure1.
Simultaneous operations (SIMOPs) are situations where two or more operations or activities
occur at the same time and place in a facility.
They may interfere or clash with each other and may involve risks that are not identified
when each activity is considered by itself. Thus, they can increase the risks of the activities
or create new risks. A number of major process industry accidents have involved
simultaneous operations.
In the wake of Hurricane Harvey, the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) issued a Safety Alert on
precautions needed during restart of processes that were shut down. The CSB noted that
startup requires a higher level of attention and care than normal processing because
numerous activities occur simultaneously. This is one example of when simultaneous
operations occur. Other examples include construction activities near active equipment and
maintenance activities near process operations.
Usually, the situations involved in simultaneous operations are not considered during
process hazards analysis (PHA) studies which focus attention on individual process
operation. Moreover, PHA teams may not recognize the importance of examining how
simultaneous operations may interfere with each other. Furthermore, it is difficult to do so
within the constraints of a regular PHA study. Consequently, a SIMOP review should be
performed prior to conducting simultaneous operations, for example, before restarting a
process after shutdown.
Simultaneous operations (SIMOPs) are situations in processes where two or more

operations or activities occur at the same time and place. They may interfere or clash with
each other and may involve risks that are not identified when each activity is considered by
itself. Thus, they can increase the risks of the activities or create new risks.
Simultaneous operations often involve work in the same area by multiple contractors and
subcontractors or multi-disciplinary workers whose work may overlap and/or interact. For
example, construction activities near active equipment such as crane lifts over a storage
tank containing a toxic material may result in a release from dropped objects. Similarly, a
maintenance activity near another process operation such as hot work in the vicinity of a
tank truck unloading a flammable material may result in a fire.
A number of major process industry accidents have involved simultaneous operations.
The situations addressed by SIMOP studies usually are not considered during process
hazards analysis (PHA) studies which focus attention on individual process operation.
Furthermore, PHA teams may not recognize the importance of examining how simultaneous
operations may interfere with each other. Moreover, it is difficult to do so within the
constraints of a regular PHA study.
1 https://drillers.com/simops-simple-definition-explanation/
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A SIMOP review identifies possible interactions between activities that may adversely
impact people, property, or the environment. SIMOP reviews are an important adjunct to the
performance of PHA studies such as hazard and operability (HAZOP) studies 2.
Area classification in Refineries
Refineries and chemical plants are then divided into areas of risk of release of gas, vapor or
dust known as divisions or zones. The process of determining the type and size of these
hazardous areas is called area classification3.
Area classification may be carried out by direct analogy with typical installations described
in established codes, or by more quantitative methods that require a more detailed
knowledge of the plant. The starting point is to identify sources of release of flammable gas
or vapor. These may arise from constant activities; from time to time in normal operation; or
as the result of some unplanned event. In addition, inside process equipment may be a
hazardous area, if both gas/vapor and air are present, though there is no actual release.
Catastrophic failures, such as vessel or line rupture are not considered by an area
classification study. A hazard identification process such as a Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(PHA) or a Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) should consider these abnormal events.
The most commonly used standard in the UK for determining area extent and classification
is BS EN 60079 part 10, which has broad applicability. The current version makes clear the
direct link between the amounts of flammable vapor that may be released, the ventilation at
that location, and the zone number. It contains a simplistic calculation relating the size of
zone to a rate of release of gas or vapor, but it is not helpful for liquid releases, where the
rate of vaporization controls the size of the hazardous area.
Other sources of advice, which describe more sophisticated approaches, are the Institute of
Petroleum Model Code of Practice (Area Classification Code for Petroleum Installations,
2002), and the Institution of Gas Engineers Safety Recommendations SR25, (2001). The IP
code is for use by refinery and petrochemical type operations. The IGE code addresses
specifically transmission, distribution and storage facilities for natural gas, rather than gas
utilization plant, but some of the information will be relevant to larger scale users4.
Hazardous areas are defined in DSEAR as "any place in which an explosive atmosphere
may occur in quantities such as to require special precautions to protect the safety of
workers". In this context, 'special precautions' is best taken as relating to the construction,
installation and use of apparatus, as given in BS EN 60079 -101.
Area classification is a method of analysing and classifying the environment where explosive
gas atmospheres may occur. The main purpose is to facilitate the proper selection and
installation of apparatus to be used safely in that environment, taking into account the
properties of the flammable materials that will be present. DSEAR specifically extends the
original scope of this analysis, to take into account non-electrical sources of ignition, and
mobile equipment that creates an ignition risk.
2 https://process-risk.com/consulting/simultaneous-operations-simops-review/
3 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrical_equipment_in_hazardous_areas
4 http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/techmeasareaclas.htm
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Hazardous areas are classified into zones based on an assessment of the frequency of the
occurrence and duration of an explosive gas atmosphere, as follows:
• Zone 0: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is present continuously or for

long periods;
• Zone 1: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is likely to occur in normal
operation;
• Zone 2: An area in which an explosive gas atmosphere is not likely to occur in normal
operation and, if it occurs, will only exist for a short time.
Various sources have tried to place time limits on to these zones, but none have been
officially adopted. The most common values used are:
• Zone 0: Explosive atmosphere for more than 1000h/yr

• Zone 1: Explosive atmosphere for more than 10, but less than 1000 h/yr
• Zone 2: Explosive atmosphere for less than 10h/yr, but still sufficiently likely as to
require controls over ignition sources.
Where people wish to quantify the zone definitions, these values are the most appropriate,
but for the majority of situations a purely qualitative approach is adequate.
When the hazardous areas of a plant have been classified, the remainder will be defined as
non-hazardous, sometimes referred to as 'safe areas'.
The zone definitions take no account of the consequences of a release. If this aspect is
important, it may be addressed by upgrading the specification of equipment or controls over
activities allowed within the zone. The alternative of specifying the extent of zones more
conservatively is not generally recommended, as it leads to more difficulties with equipment
selection, and illogicalities in respect of control over health effects from vapors assumed to
be present. Where occupiers choose to define extensive areas as Zone 1, the practical
consequences could usefully be discussed during site inspection5.
A hazardous area extent and classification study involves due consideration and
documentation of the following:
• The flammable materials that may be present;

• The physical properties and characteristics of each of the flammable materials;
• The source of potential releases and how they can form explosive atmospheres;
• Prevailing operating temperatures and pressures;
• Presence, degree and availability of ventilation (forced and natural);
• Dispersion of released vapors to below flammable limits;
• The probability of each release scenario.
5 http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/techmeasareaclas.htm
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Ignition sources may be:
• Flames;
• Direct fired space and process heating;
• Use of cigarettes/matches etc;
• Cutting and welding flames;
• Hot surfaces;
• Heated process vessels such as dryers and furnaces;
• Hot process vessels;
• Space heating equipment;
• Mechanical machinery;
• Electrical equipment and lights
• Spontaneous heating;
• Friction heating or sparks;
• Impact sparks;
• Sparks from electrical equipment;
• Stray currents from electrical equipment
• Electrostatic discharge sparks:
• Lightning strikes.
• Electromagnetic radiation of different wavelengths
• Vehicles, unless specially designed or modified are likely to contain a range of
potential ignition sources
Sources of ignition should be effectively controlled in all hazardous areas by a combination

of design measures, and systems of work:
• Using electrical equipment and instrumentation classified for the zone in which it is
located. New mechanical equipment will need to be selected in the same way. (See
above);
• Earthing of all plant/ equipment (see Technical Measures Document on Earthing)
• Elimination of surfaces above auto-ignition temperatures of flammable materials
being handled/stored (see above);
• Provision of lightning protection
• Correct selection of vehicles/internal combustion engines that have to work in the
zoned areas (see Technical Measures Document on Permit to Work Systems);
• Correct selection of equipment to avoid high intensity electromagnetic radiation
sources, e.g. limitations on the power input to fibre optic systems, avoidance of high
intensity lasers or sources of infrared radiation
• Prohibition of smoking/use of matches/lighters
• Controls over the use of normal vehicles
• Controls over activities that create intermittent hazardous areas, e.g. tanker
loading/unloading
• Control of maintenance activities that may cause sparks/hot surfaces/naked flames
through a Permit to Work System
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• Precautions to control the risk from pyrophoric scale, usually associated with
formation of ferrous sulphide inside process equipment.
Area classification methods provide a succinct description of the hazardous material that
may be present, and the probability that it is present, so that the appropriate equipment
may be selected and safe installation practices may be followed. It is intended that each
room, section, or area of a facility shall be considered individually in determining its
classification. Actually determining the classification of a specific location requires a
thorough understanding of the particular site. An exhaustive study of the site must be
undertaken before a decision can be made as to what Class, Zone, and Group is to be
assigned. It is beyond the scope of this paper to engage in a detailed discussion of how a
location is actually classified. The local inspection authority has the responsibility for defining
a Class, Zone, and Group classification for specific areas.
Zone Definitions:
Under the Zone system, equipment is tested and marked in accordance with the type of
protection used by the equipment and not the area in which it can be used, such as the
Class/Division system. It is the responsibility of the user or designer to select and apply the
proper protection for each Zone. However, under the new approach, directive 94/9/EC
requires that additional markings to specify exactly which categories and Zones the product
may be used in.
For all protection methods, the rule applies that parts to which the potentially explosive
atmosphere has unhindered access must not attain unacceptable temperatures. The
temperatures must fall within the temperature class that applies to the particular potentially
explosive atmosphere.
Oil refinery Risks and Hazards
The plant and equipment of refineries are generally modern, and the processes are largely
automatic and totally enclosed. Routine operations of the refining processes generally
present a low risk of exposure when adequate maintenance is carried out and proper
industry standards for design, construction, and operation have been followed. The potential
for hazardous exposures always exists, however. Because of the wide variety of
hydrocarbon hazards and their complexity, it is impossible to identify all of the hazards here
– and impossible for construction crews to know everything they may need for protection
when performing maintenance, repair, or installation work in an oil refinery.
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In a refinery, hazardous chemicals can come from many sources and in many forms. In
crude oil, there are not only the components sought for processing, but impurities such as
sulphur, vanadium, and arsenic compounds. The oil is split into many component streams
that are further altered and refined to produce the final product range.
Most, if not all, of these component stream chemicals are inherently hazardous to humans,
as are the other chemicals added during processing.
Hazards include fire, explosion, toxicity, corrosiveness, and asphyxiation. Information on

hazardous materials manufactured or stored in a refinery should be supplied by the client's
representative when a work permit is issued.
The principal hazards at refineries are fire and explosion.
Refineries process a multitude of products with low flash points. Although systems and
operating practices are designed to prevent such catastrophes, they can occur.
Constant monitoring is therefore required. Safeguards include warning systems, emergency

procedures, and permit systems for any kind of hot or other potentially dangerous work.
These requirements must be understood and followed by all workers.
Care should be exercised at all times to avoid inhaling solvent vapors, toxic gases, and other
respiratory contaminants.
The principal exposures to hazardous substances occur during shutdown or maintenance

work, since these are a deviation from routine operations. Plant turnarounds require careful
planning, scheduling, and step-by-step procedures to make sure that unanticipated
exposures do not occur. Any plant shutdown requires a complete plan in writing to cover all
activities, the impact on other operations, and emergency planning. Plans are normally
formulated by plant personnel in conjunction with contractors.
Hydrogen sulphide is a potential problem in the transport and storage of crude oil. The
cleaning of storage tanks presents a high hazard potential. Many of the other classic
confined-space entry problems can occur here, including oxygen deficiency resulting from
previous inerting procedures, rusting, and oxidation of organic coatings. Carbon monoxide
can be present in the inerting gas. In addition to H2S, depending on the characteristics of
the product previously stored in the tanks, other chemicals that may be encountered include
metal carbonyls, arsenic, and tetraethyl lead.
The lightest fraction from the crude unit is first processed in the gas plant. Some of the liquid
hydrocarbons from the wet gas are run straight to the gasoline blending plant, but others
go through the alkylation process. These light parts are put together using hydrofluoric acid
or sulphuric acid as catalysts.
The main hazards in this process come from possible exposure to the catalysts, hydrofluoric
acid or sulphuric acid, and their dusts, byproducts, and residues as well as hydrogen
sulphide, carbon monoxide, heat, and noise.
Other processes utilize acid catalysts and caustic “washes.” These can lead to hazardous
situations, especially in shutdowns where a contractor's personnel may be exposed to
residues or other contaminants.
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Information is required from refinery personnel and specialized training is required in the
necessary6.
Safety by design
Prevention through design (PtD), also called safety by design usually in Europe, is the
concept of applying methods to minimize occupational hazards early in the design process,
with an emphasis on optimizing employee health and safety throughout the life cycle of
materials and processes.
Prevention through design represents a shift in approach for on-the-job safety. It involves
evaluating potential risks associated with processes, structures, equipment, and tools. It
takes into consideration the construction, maintenance, decommissioning, and disposal or
recycling of waste material.
The idea of redesigning job tasks and work environments has begun to gain momentum in
business and government as a cost-effective means to enhance occupational safety and
health. Many U.S. companies openly support PtD concepts and have developed
management practices to implement them. Other countries are actively promoting PtD
concepts as well. The United Kingdom began requiring construction companies, project
owners, and architects to address safety and health during the design phase of projects in
1994. Australia developed the Australian National OHS Strategy 2002–2012, which set
"eliminating hazards at the design stage" as one of five national priorities. As a result, the
Australian Safety and Compensation Council (ASCC) developed the Safe Design National
Strategy and Action Plans for Australia encompassing a wide range of design areas7.
The intent of Safety by
Design is to:
• Address life-cycle health, safety and environmental risks and environmental aspects
including management of the use of natural resources in development projects.
• Systematically and comprehensively identify and assess hazards and environmental
• challenges, and their associated risk to people, environment, asset and production
loss, and company reputation.
Examine whether actual and potential negative impacts can be entirely avoided, or their
magnitude reduced by design. If this is not possible then appropriate and preferably
engineered controls (ie by isolating people from the hazard by use of enclosures) shall be
put in place to manage the residual risks and environmental impacts.
6 https://www.ihsa.ca/rtf/health_safety_manual/pdfs/locations/Oil_Refineries.pdf
7 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Prevention_through_design
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Safety by design is a five-step process:
1. Define safety goals
Goals will help maintain focus throughout the Safety by Design process. Goals should reflect
regulatory requirements, legislation and project-specific tolerability of risk criteria and
sustainability strategies, as well as project-specific safety and environmental goals
2. Understand hazards & aspects
If hazards to health and safety or the relevant environmental aspects that require
management are not known, they cannot be controlled. The purpose of this step is to identify
and understand project specific health and safety hazards as well as environmental impacts.
3. Implement Inherent Safer Design principles
The intent of Inherently Safer Design is to eliminate a hazard or the use of materials or
energy completely or reduce the magnitude of use sufficiently to eliminate the need for
elaborate safety or environmental management systems. This process of elimination or
reduction is accomplished by means that are inherent to the production process and thus
permanent and inseparable from it and therefore highly reliable.
The implementation of Inherently Safer Design is achieved by adopting a strategy based on
the following principles:
• Eliminate - remove hazardous materials, processes and activities.

• Minimise - use smaller quantities of hazardous substances and materials generally;
minimise the number of activities especially hazardous ones.
• Substitute - replace a hazardous, expensive or rare material or activity with one that
is less so.
• Moderate – minimise the potential impact of a release of substances, materials or
energy, eg by changing layout configuration, adopting less hazardous operating
conditions, or by minimising the number of people exposed.
• Simplify – design facilities and plan executions to reduce or eliminate complexity and
minimise the possibility of human error.
4. Manage residual risk If ‘inherent control’ cannot be fully achieved or is perceived to be

inadequate, residual hazards, risks and environmental impacts will remain and their
associated risks and effects will need to be reviewed, and where reasonably possible,
mitigated. Mitigation may require the implementation of additional engineered or procedural
controls.
Controls or safeguards are generally more effective if they prevent a hazardous event or
unnecessary use of materials or energy from occurring by passive means, rather than
reactive means, ie acting on the consequences of events rather than preventing the events.
Engineered controls are generally preferred to administrative controls, as these require no,
or less, human intervention to be effective.
The preferred hierarchy of controls is reflected in Safety by Design process, and
subprocesses that address health & safety and environmental protection & sustainability
issues.
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Various studies can be conducted as part of the residual risk management process, either
in-house or with external support. These studies could include the review of:
• Operability and safety of processes involving hazardous materials.

• Effectiveness of safety instrumented systems as a safeguard.
• Analysis of the possible failure of equipment and the potential impact of this failure
on people and the environment.
• Effects and likelihood of releases of hazardous materials.
• Effects and likelihood of fires, explosions and nuclear radiation, and mechanical
impacts such as dropped objects and collisions.
• The minimisation of the use of resources (eg water) and energy (eg electricity diesel
fuel).
• Human-machine interface and human-friendly design.
• Effects and likelihood of potential human errors.
• Escape, evacuation and rescue process.
• Evaluation of risks to people and the environment, asset-production loss, effects on
community, habitat and natural heritage.
5. Consolidate and communicate
Once the Safety by Design process has been completed as intended, and the goals that
were identified at the outset of the project have been met, the process can be closed.
The findings of the Safety by Design process can be consolidated and communicated to
internal and external stakeholders. Depending on legislative and client requirements, a
dedicated compliance report such as a Case for Safety or an Environmental Impact
Statement is produced8.
8 https://www.amecfw.com/sustainability-reporting/delivery/safe-and-sustainable-design.pdf
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SIMOPS in refinery operations: Fires and Explosion Protection
No work takes place in a refinery without a safe work permit.
A safe work permit is a document issued by an authorized representative of the client

permitting specific work for a specific time in a specific area. Work permits should indicate
the date and time of issue, the time of expiry, a description of the work to be done, and the
name of the company performing the work. Permits also specify any hazards and controlled
products under WHMIS and any protective equipment needed for the job. The permit will
advise you of any steps required to make the area or equipment safe for work, tell you the
results of any gas tests, advise you of any electrical lockouts that have been done, and tell
you of any Identify its location.
Safe work permits are valid only for a limited time and must be renewed following expiry or
normally after any one-hour stoppage, after an emergency warning on the site, or for other
safety reasons. After such an event, any required gas testing or other testing must be
repeated to ensure a safe return to the work.
The hazards of the petrochemical industry are closely related to those of oil refining,
particularly in the raw material stages.
Atmospheric contamination hazards in the petrochemical industry can be complex,

particularly when substances or processes combine. These combined effects are often
much more toxic and dangerous than individual effects.
As they do in oil refineries, construction crews in petrochemical plants must comply with
regulations as well as in-plant procedures. Cooperation between contractor and client is
essential for safe work, from the bidding stage until the contract is completed.
Throughout the life of any project, and more importantly during times of vessel traffic
(operations, drilling, construction, survey, etc….), a study of the schedule should be made
regularly and at every revision to identify any possible SIMOPS along with dates, types of
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vessels, vessel names, vessel duties and vessel durations for all vessels planned to be in
the field and/or work area9.
Typical Refinery Processing Scheme
Workshop: Case Studies & Worked Examples

Planning and Communicating for Conducting Safe SIMOPS-example case will be worked
on trough the presentation.
9 https://dynamic-positioning.com/proceedings/dp2007/simops_ross.pdf
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Day Two SIMOPS Risk Management
Risk Management methodologies
To understand what a risk assessment is and how it can be conducted, it is important to first
distinguish the terms ‘risk’ and ‘hazard’. Risks and hazards often get confused as the same
thing, however, they are not the same. Risk is the likelihood of harm in defined
circumstances while a hazard is an activity with the potential to cause harm.
Hazardous activities are often part of normal business and therefore organizations are
exposed to certain risks. Activities such as flying planes or producing kerosene are typical
hazards. A hazard by itself is not harmful but if there is a loss of control over the hazard (or
hazardous activity) it can become harmful.
To make sure an organization is in control of their hazardous activities and the damage they
can cause, a risk assessment should be conducted. A risk assessment is a procedure where
different risks are reviewed, qualified and clarified in a way that makes it possible to
determine an adequate action or state to prevent or lower the risk. In turn, this makes it
possible to make educated decisions when it comes to risk and risk management.
When evaluating risk by conducting a risk assessment, all influential factors need to be
considered. By doing so, certain questions need to be asked. Some examples are:
• Who could get harmed?

• How might this person get harmed?
• What is the inherent risk for this to happen? (the risk without any implemented
controls or barriers)
• What control measures (also called barriers) are in place or can be put in place to
prevent an event from happening?
• What is the residual risk after the control measures? (the risk with implemented
controls or barriers).
Over time, the need for better visualization of risk scenarios increased. Organizations
wanted more control and oversight which led to the development of the bowtie method as
we know it today. A bowtie often tells the complete story that a more traditional risk register
cannot. In a bowtie diagram all possible scenarios are individually shown, with all relevant
control measures in the right context. This makes it not only possible to intuitively understand
the risks, but also to level with everyone who is reading it, regardless of the reader’s level
of expertise. By nature, the human mind can more easily understand a picture than a
comprehensive spreadsheet10.
Risk management, entails a continuous process of applying a series of mitigating actions—

assessing risk through the evaluation of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences;
responding to risks with appropriate countermeasures; and monitoring risks using quality
information
10 https://www.cgerisk.com/knowledgebase/Risk_assessment
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Elements of Risk Management
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Risk Matrix and the construction of risk matrix
A risk matrix is a matrix that is used during risk assessment to define the level of risk by
considering the category of probability or likelihood against the category of consequence
severity. This is a simple mechanism to increase visibility of risks and assist management
decision making.
Risk is the lack of certainty about the outcome of making a particular choice. Statistically,
the level of downside risk can be calculated as the product of the probability that harm occurs
(e.g., that an accident happens) multiplied by the severity of that harm (i.e., the average
amount of harm or more conservatively the maximum credible amount of harm). In practice,
the risk matrix is a useful approach where either the probability or the harm severity cannot
be estimated with accuracy and precision.
Although standard risk matrices exist in certain contexts (e.g. US DoD, NASA, ISO),
individual projects and organizations may need to create their own or tailor an existing risk
matrix. For example, the harm severity can be categorized as:
• Catastrophic – multiple deaths

• Critical – one death or multiple severe injuries
• Marginal – one severe injury or multiple minor injuries
• Negligible – one minor injury
The probability of harm occurring might be categorized as:
• 'certain',
• 'likely',
• 'possible',
• 'unlikely' and
• 'rare'.
However it must be considered that very low probabilities may not be very reliable11.
Risk matrices are probably one of the most widespread tools for risk evaluation. They are
mainly used to determine the size of a risk and whether or not the risk is sufficiently
controlled. There is still confusion about how they are supposed to be used. This article will
explain their use in the context of the bowtie diagram.
There are two dimensions to a risk matrix. It looks at how severe and likely an unwanted
event is. These two dimensions create a matrix. The combination of probability and severity
will give any event a place on a risk matrix.
11 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Risk_matrix
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Most risk matrices have at least three areas.
The low probability, low severity area (usually green) that indicates the risk of an event is
not high enough, or that it is sufficiently controlled. No action is usually taken with this. If we
talk about risk matrices in a bowtie however, usually bowties are done for major hazards, so
most events are high risk and don’t fall into this category.
The high probability, high severity (ususally red) which indicates an event needs a lot or
more control measures to bring the probability or severity down. Bowties will have a lot of
events that fall into this category.
The medium category (usually yellow) is in between these two areas. Any event that falls in
this area is usually judged to be an area that needs to be monitored, but is controlled as low
as reasonably practicable (or ALARP, a concept that is beyond the scope of this article, but
you can go here and read about it). Essentially it means if we keep the risk at that level, we
accept it.
It’s important to understand that a risk matrix by itself makes for a poor decision-making tool.
It is best suited for ranking events. There is not enough granularity in a risk matrix to use it
for anything other than saying that some events are really bad, and others are less so.
Decisions need to be based on an underlying analysis (like a bowtie diagram) that will tell
you what will cause the unwanted event and what an organization is already doing to control
it. This information will make an informed decision possible.
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Another misconception is that a risk matrix is a quantitative tool. In theory, it can be, but in
practice, it is not. The risk matrix is made up of two ordinal rating scales, with mostly
qualitative descriptions along its axes. This makes it very difficult to assign any real numbers
to a matrix and thus to do calculations with it. It can only give a qualitative score that indicates
in which category an event falls. It won't allow for any sophisticated calculations.
There are different ways of looking at severity. Something can be very severe from the
perspective of human life, or from the perspective of damage to a facility. Usually four
perspectives are used (although more or less is also possible) that form the accronym
PEAR. This stands for People, Environment, Assets and Reputation. Any event can be
judged against these four categories. For instance: a car crash will have an impact on
people, but also on assets. An oil spill might have an impact on the environment and
reputation, and also some asset and people impact.
These different perspectives do make it very difficult to compare two events with each other.
If we have two events, one that scores high on people, and another that scores high on
environment, which one is more severe? This is why aggregating risk matrix scores is
difficult, if not impossible to do. The best way to compare the severity of events is to make
a qualitative judgement.
Up until now, only probability has been discussed. But there are different possibilities. If we
drive to work, and there’s a probability of 0,05 that we’ll crash, we expect for every car that
in 100 workdays, there are 5 crashes. The probability will be the same every time we drive
to work.
Instead of focusing on a single event, we can also say: how often can I drive to work before
I crash? The frequency of a crash will be 1 in 20. This is essentially the same, just written
down differently.
The last category looks at the past and scores higher if the event has occurred more. The
main difference is that probability and frequency tell us something about the future, while
historical scales will only tell us something about the past. If something has not occured yet,
a historical scale will not allow you to make a prediction about how often it might happen in
the future. This is why most risk matrices now use probability or frequency scales.
There is a problem with events that have a very low frequency, but a catastrophic severity.
If the risk matrix categories are not set up correctly, these types of events tend to ‘fall off’
the grid and get less attention than they deserve. This is especially a problem with historical
frequency scales, where an event will get the lowest possible score just because it has never
occurred. A possible solution is to make the worst severity category the highest priority
category, regardless of the probability.
Ranking an event on a risk matrix can be done in three ways:
Worst case scenario. This is done by taking the worst that could happen. For instance in the
case of a car crash, there will be multiple fatalities and it might be likely to occur. Essentially
when looking at the worst case scenario, all Barriers are ignored and only the Hazard, Top
event and Consequences are considered. These types of incidents might occur in reality,
but they will most likely be the exception, not the rule.
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Current situation. The second strategy tries to evaluate the severity and probability of the
average event. So the average severity for a car crash might be a single fatality, and it’s
unlikely to happen. This strategy takes into account all the barriers that are currently
implemented.
Future situation. The last strategy tries to make an estimate of how the risk might go down
after improvements to barriers, or implementation of new barriers. It aims to estimate the
future average of incidents.
Even though the risk matrix has a lot of drawbacks, it has endured the criticism and is still
one of the standard tools used in most risk assessments. If the risk matrix is used in the
correct way, it can add some understanding, although probably the greatest challenge today
is for people to understand its limitations12.
Job Hazard Analysis
A job hazard analysis (JHA), also called a job safety analysis (JSA), is a technique to identify
the dangers of specific tasks in order to reduce the risk of injury to workers.
Once you know what the hazards are, you can reduce or eliminate them before anyone gets
hurt. The JHA can also be used to investigate accidents and to train workers how to do their
jobs safely.
It will take a little time to do your JHAs, but it's time well spent. Be sure to involve employees
in the process --- they do the work and often know the best ways to work more safely.
Instructions for Conducting a Job Hazard Analysis
• Involve employees
o Discuss what you are going to do and why
o Explain that you are studying the task, not employee performance
o Involve the employees in the entire process
• Review your company's accident/injury/illness/near miss history to determine which
jobs pose the highest risk to employees.
• Identify the OSHA standards that apply to your jobs. Incorporate their requirements
into your JHA.
• Set priorities.
• You may want to give priority to:
o Jobs with the highest injury or illness rates;
o Jobs where there have been "close calls" - where an incident occurred but no
one got hurt;
o Jobs where you have identified violations of OSHA standards;
o Jobs with the potential to cause serious injuries or illness, even if there is no
history of such problems;
o Jobs in which one simple human mistake could lead to severe injury;
o Jobs that are new to your operation of have been changed; and
12 https://www.cgerisk.com/knowledgebase/Risk_matrices
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o Jobs complex enough to require written instructions.
How to do it?
1. Break the job task into steps.
• Watch the worker do the job and list each step in order
• Begin each step with a verb, for example, "Turn on the saw."
• Do not make it too broad or too detailed
• You may want to photograph or videotape
• Review the steps with the worker and other workers who do the same job to make
sure you have not left anything out.
2. Identify the hazards of each step. For each hazard, ask:
• What can go wrong?

• What are the consequences?
• How could it happen?
• What are other contributing factors?
• How likely is it that the hazard will occur?
3. Review the list of hazards with employees who do the job. Discuss what could eliminate
or reduce them.
4. Identify ways to eliminate or reduce the hazards.
• Safer way to do the job

• Describe each step
• Be specific - don’t use generalizations like "Be Careful"
• Changes in equipment
• Equipment changes, or engineering controls, are the first choice because they can
eliminate the hazard
• E.g. machine guards, improved lighting, better ventilation
• Changes in work processes
• Administrative controls, or changes in how the task is done, can be used if
engineering controls aren't possible
• E.g. rotating jobs, changing the steps, training
• Changes in personal protective protective equipment
• When engineering and administrative controls aren't possible or don't adequately
protect the workers, use personal protective equipment
• E.g. gloves, hearing protection13
13 https://www.safetyworksmaine.gov/safe_workplace/safety_management/hazard_analysis.html
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SIMOPS Checklist
Permit to Work (PTW) system and issuing process

Permit to Work (PTW) refers to management systems used to ensure that work is done
safely and efficiently. These are used in hazardous industries and involve procedures to
request, review, authorize, document and most importantly, de-conflict tasks to be carried
out by front line workers. Permit to work is an essential part of control of work (COW), the
integrated management of business-critical maintenance processes. Control of work is
made up of permit to work, hazard identification and risk assessment (RA), and isolation
management (IM).
The following aspects should be considered with respect to Permit to Work Systems:
Human factors;
• Management of the work permit systems;
• Poorly skilled work force;
• Unconscious and conscious incompetence;
• Objectives of the work permit system;
• Types of work permits required; and
• Contents of the work permits.
The following issues may contribute towards a major accident or hazard:
• Failing of the site safety management system;

• Failure to recognise a hazard before and during maintenance;
• Failure to comply with the work permit system in hazardous environments; and
• Communication failure during the use of a work permit system.
The Safety Report should address the following points:
• Whether staff have been sufficiently informed, instructed, trained and supervised to
minimise a potential human failing during operation of the work permit system;
• Whether the work permit system includes sufficient safety information, maintenance
instructions, correct PPE and equipment for use;
• Whether the work permit contains sufficient information about the type of work
required (Equipment removal, excavation, hot/cold work, repairing seals, vessel
entry, waste disposal, isolation);
• Whether there is sufficient provision available to fulfil the requirements of the work
permit system;
• Whether the employees responsible for control of the maintenance work are identified
within the work permit system and that the work is properly authorised by a
responsible person;
• Whether the work permit system is managed, regularly inspected and reviewed;
• Whether all work permits are kept on file;
• Human factors (stress, fatigue, shift work, attitude);
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• Whether sufficient precautions are taken prior to initiating a work permit (isolation,
draining, flushing, environmental monitoring, risk assessments, communication, time
allotted for the work);
• Whether staff are aware of the type of environment they are working in during the
operation of a work permit (flammable, corrosive, explosive, zones 0, 1 & 2, electricity
supplies)
• Whether the person responsible for operating the plant is aware of the type of
maintenance involved and how long it is likely to take; and
• Whether the work permit system involves a formal procedure whereby the maintained
plant or equipment is handed back to operation.
Major hazards could arise from the following:
• Wrong type of work permit used;

• Wrong information about work required on the work permit;
• Failure to recognise the hazards where work is carried out (e.g. flammable
substances);
• Introduction of ignition source in controlled flameproof area (e.g. welding, non spark-
proof tools, non-intrinsically safe equipment used in intrinsically safe zones);
• Terms of work permit not adhered to (e.g. failure to isolate plant and/or drain lines of
hazardous substances);
• Failure to hand-over plant in safe condition on completion of work/cancelling of work
permit;
• Unauthorised staff performing work permit functions;
• Poor management of the work permit system; and
• Insufficient monitoring of the work permit system14.

Within the practice we will do a exercise of issuing a Permit To Work.
14 https://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/sragtech/techmeaspermit.htm
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Day Three SIMOPS in Specific Cases

Common Process Hazards
The major hazards with which the chemical industry is concerned are fire, explosion, and
toxic release. Of these three, fire is the most common but, as shown later, explosion is
particularly significant in terms of fatalities and loss.
SIMOPS in construction
Tie-in
Piping tie-ins are unavoidable in plants where expansion is a current or future factor. Steam,
condensate, compressed air, dust collection, vacuum and process lines are just a few types
of plant piping likely to be modified by tie-ins to increase capacity. Here are a few ways to
minimize costly disruption of plant operation when tie-ins are inevitable.
Plan and schedule New piping design should include allowances for future expansion. This
can be accommodated without major expense. Consider the following:
• Increase design pipe sizes to the next larger diameter if velocity limits permit.
• Provide caps or blind flanges at the end of a pipe run where a brief tie-in outage can
be tolerated.
• Provide valves with blind flanges when and where a future tie-in outage cannot be
tolerated.
• Provide adequate access and maintenance space for future connecting piping.
Existing piping design may provide limited flexibility for future piping tie-in accommodations.
However, take advantage of future scheduled outages and add piping flanges and valves
where future tie-ins are inevitable. This will enable future construction to proceed without
disrupting plant and process operations15.
The piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID) is a useful means to define piping tie-ins.
The P&ID does not locate the tie-in physically. However, it defines the functional relationship
of the tie-in within the piping system, which is the initial step in the design process. Establish
a numbering system for tie-ins, i.e., “T-XXX,” which can be used as a reference on design
documents until the project is completed. An indication of “new” and “existing” piping also
provides clarity.
A tie-in list can also be useful for estimating the cost of construction and for scheduling work
well in advance of the actual piping design activity. Often, the list will include details such as
the estimated length, material designation, insulation and coating requirements and
reference drawings. Some level of complexity can be assigned to the length to account for
miscellaneous fittings and related variables in the cost estimate.
Finally, orthographic and isometric piping drawings should indicate the piping, fittings,
valves, material, weld and testing requirements that pertain to the tie-in. Often, the tie-in
references are deleted from the “as-built drawings” at the close-out phase of the project.
15 https://www.plantservices.com/articles/2006/184/
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The plant and process considerations are usually obvious. Immediate or projected increases
in utility or process flow rates are the most frequently cited reasons for tie-in piping.
Accommodating the need for these increased demands often results in additional capital
equipment.
After the process requirements are determined and the tie-in piping sized, consider isolation
provisions. It is rarely feasible economically to shut down the plant or process during tie-in
piping installation. Alternately, a short-term, scheduled outage may be sufficient to break the
line and install a tie-in connection. After the connection is in place, the piping can be
fabricated and connected “off-line” conveniently and economically.
During the interim period, a blind flange can be installed and the process resumed. However,
this will require another brief outage to remove the blind flange and connect the tie-in piping.
This can be avoided by installing a shutoff valve upstream of the blind flange to provide safe,
long-term isolation. Subsequently, the blind flange can be removed, the connecting pipe
installed, and the valve opened after the tie-in is completed.
Pay particular attention to installing a shutoff valve that is adequate for temporary “end-of-
line service” by considering these factors:
• Valve seals must withstand full rated pressure on one side while unpressurized on
the other side in the closed position.
• Valves must withstand a pressure and leak test.
• Valves must be bidirectional so they can be installed with either end open to
atmosphere.
• Valves must be installed with a lockout device and comply with OSHA Zero Energy
requirements.
• The pressure drops across a tie-in valve (in the fully opened position) should not be
excessive.
• Provide a “drainable spool piece” downstream of the shutoff valve.
The purpose of the spool piece is two-fold. First, the drain valve provides a means to check
for leakage of the shutoff valve seals. Second, the drain valve relieves pressure buildup
when the blank is removed in the event the shutoff valve leaks. Provisions can then be made
to deal with the faulty valve. This allows the tie-in piping to be connected safely.
A variety of valves are adaptable to end-of-line shutoff service. These include ball, gate,
butterfly and plug types. Carefully compare the service conditions with the valve
manufacturer’s specifications to determine suitability for both the prolonged shutoff and
open positions.
After determining the tie-in configuration, evaluate the optimum routing of the connecting
piping from a flexibility standpoint. The shortest distance between two points generally
requires the least amount of piping, but this practice may be unwise from a flexibility
standpoint. Added flexibility may be necessary to reduce the pipe loads on sensitive
equipment such as compressors, fans or pumps. A piping jog, loop or flexible connector
may offer a convenient way to reduce stress and deflection at the tie-in point or at the flanges
on installed equipment.
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Available software facilitates analysis of piping systems that are subject to pressure,
temperature and dynamic reaction loads such as those caused by pressure relief valves.
Expansion joints, hangers, anchors and guides can also be evaluated to optimize the piping
support system.
Additional equipment installation
For precautionary reasons, issue a line break permit to address specific details of the
procedure prior to construction. The purpose of the permit is to define:
• Location of the line break.

• Applicable design documents.
• Fluid in the line.
• Safety equipment requirements.
• Hazards associated with handling the materials last in the line.
• Special line washing, purging or flushing requirements.
• Valve locking and tagging requirements.
• All personnel involved or affected by the procedure.
• Installation of the connecting piping is simplified if provisions are made in the piping
for isolating the tie-in point. Piping installation can then occur without disrupting the
process.
When a tie-in point on a line cannot be isolated or the plant or process cannot be shut down
to accommodate the line break, a procedure known as “hot tapping” is required. This is
frequently used to break lines containing steam, natural gas, water or other utilities, which
must flow uninterrupted on a daily basis. This procedure results in the installation of a
lockable tie-in valve while the line is pressurized.
Some essential equipment for the procedure includes hot tap fitting, full open and lockable
gate valve, hot tap machine (hydraulic or air-driven), cutter and pilot assembly, tapping
machine housing, a power unit (hydraulic or air-driven) and hose. Basic hot tapping steps
include:
• Weld the hot tap fitting onto the line.

• Install the full open gate valve on the fitting.
• Inspect and pressure test the valve and fitting.
• Install the hot tap machine on the valve.
• Bore the line.
• Retract the boring bar, then close and lock the valve.
• Depressurize the hot tap machine and remove it.
• Clean the work area.
Following the hot tapping procedure, installation of connecting piping valves and fittings can
proceed in much the same manner as though existing isolation provisions were already in
the line. Once installation is complete, conduct a pressure and leak test of the newly installed
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piping with the tie-in valve remaining in the closed and locked position. With satisfactory
pressure test completion, the new tie-in piping is now ready to be activated by unlocking and
opening the tie-in valve.
SIMOPS in maintenance
Maintenance activities can potentially expose people to all sorts of hazards. There are five
commonly encountered issues that merit particular attention.
• Asbestos
• Falls from height
• Isolation and permits to work
• Falls of heavy items
• Selecting a contractor.
Maintenance safety HSE checklist:
• Do our staff always isolate machines before doing maintenance?
If you aren't sure, you need to watch what happens in practice and speak to the staff
concerned. For basic advice see isolation and permits to work.
• Have all our maintenance staff got their own isolation padlocks and warning
boards?
If you don't know, speak to the staff concerned.

• Do we know if we've got asbestos in the building, and where it is?
Ask to see the relevant plans, drawings or reports. For a step by step guide to managing
asbestos in buildings see HSE's Managing my asbestos web pages. Section 5 in particular
deals with the inspection of buildings.
• Do we use this asbestos information when we plan building maintenance jobs?
For a step by step guide to managing asbestos in buildings see HSE's Managing my
asbestos web pages. Section 6 in particular deals with using the findings to plan
maintenance work.
• Are we thinking about what access equipment is right for the job, or just using
whatever we have to hand?
Use the Step-by-step guide to find the right kind of access equipment for specific
maintenance jobs.
• Are we thinking through proper lifting plans before lifting heavy loads?
• Are any of us competent enough to take charge of non-standard lifting jobs?
• Do we use 'permits to work' properly when we need them?
If you aren't sure, you need to watch what happens in practice and speak to the staff
concerned. For basic advice see isolation and permits to work.
• Do we have any confined spaces?
For basic advice see isolation and permits to work.
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Do our managers and supervisors stop maintenance work if it isn't being done safely? 16
Shutdown and isolation
Oil refineries, oil and gas production installations and chemical processing plants are
characterized by long lengths of continuously welded pipework and pipelines connecting
process vessels, plant and installations. The contents are often hazardous substances,
which may be flammable and/or toxic and are often at high temperatures and/or pressures.
Any intrusive activity could allow the escape of hazardous substances. The implementation
of adequate isolation practices is critical to avoiding loss of containment. You should
minimise isolation requirements, wherever practicable, by planning intrusive maintenance
for shutdown periods. When maintenance work has to be carried out on live plant a high
standard of management will be required.
Release of hazardous substances due to inadequate process isolation may lead to:
• Local immediate effects to people (death or injury) and to the environment.

• Long-term effects to people and the environment may be equally serious; and/or
• Escalation of the initial release, causing wider damage to plant and other systems
(eg damage resulting in further releases of inventory).
Design of new plant should include facilities for positive isolation (including the valved
isolation to install the positive isolation) in the following situations:
• For vessel entry, where a requirement for entry cannot be eliminated by equipment
design;
• For isolation of toxic fluids; or
• To control segregation of parts of the plant which, in alternative operating modes,
might otherwise be exposed to overpressure conditions. This applies where it is not
reasonably practicable for the installed safety systems to protect all foreseeable
operating configurations, for example the separation of a high-pressure plant from its
drainage system.
Pipework layout should minimise trapped inventories and allow easy removal of fluid for
isolation purposes. Ensure that pipework:
• Is of sufficient size and design to minimise the possibility of becoming blocked in

service; and
• Is robust and able, where appropriate, to cope with the repetitive stresses imposed
by vibration, pulsating pressure and temperature cycling.
16 https://www.hse.gov.uk/safemaintenance/checklist.htm
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Unless risk assessment indicates otherwise, isolation and bleed points should be as close
as possible to the plant item. Concentration of maintenance work in one place aids control
of the isolation arrangements and minimises the inventory of fluid to be
depressurised/drained. Ensure that bleeds are:
• Arranged so that their discharge cannot harm personnel or plant, and toxic or
flammable material can be conveyed to a safe place for disposal; and
• Easily accessible for checking17.
Pressure testing
Examples of pressure systems and equipment are:
• boilers and steam heating systems;

• pressurised process plant and piping;
• compressed air systems (fixed and portable);
• pressure cookers, autoclaves and retorts;
• heat exchangers and refrigeration plant;
• valves, steam traps and filters;
• pipework and hoses; and
• pressure gauges and level indicators.
Principal causes of incidents are:
• poor equipment and/or system design;

• poor maintenance of equipment;
• an unsafe system of work;
• operator error, poor training/supervision;
• poor installation; and
• inadequate repairs or modifications.
The main hazards are:
• impact from the blast of an explosion or release of compressed liquid or gas;

• impact from parts of equipment that fail or any flying debris;
• contact with released liquid or gas, such as steam; and
• fire resulting from the escape of flammable liquids or gases.
17 https://www.hse.gov.uk/pUbns/priced/hsg253.pdf
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The level of risk from the failure of pressure systems and equipment depends on a number
of factors including:
• the pressure in the system;

• the type of liquid or gas and its properties;
• the suitability of the equipment and pipework that contains it;
• the age and condition of the equipment;
• the complexity and control of its operation;
• the prevailing conditions (eg a process carried out at high temperature); and
• the skills and knowledge of the people who design, manufacture, install, maintain,
test and operate the pressure equipment and systems18.
Inspection
Workplace inspections help prevent incidents, injuries and illnesses. Through a critical
examination of the workplace, inspections help to identify and record hazards for corrective
action. Health and safety committees can help plan, conduct, report and monitor
inspections. Regular workplace inspections are an important part of the overall occupational
health and safety program and management system, if present.
Inspections are important as they allow you to:
• listen to the concerns of workers and supervisors

• gain further understanding of jobs and tasks
• identify existing and potential hazards
• determine underlying causes of hazards
• recommend corrective action
• monitor steps taken to eliminate hazards or control the risk (e.g., engineering
controls, administrative controls, policies, procedures, personal protective
equipment)
Every inspection must examine who, what, where, when and how. Pay particular attention
to items that are or are most likely to develop into unsafe or unhealthy conditions because
of stress, wear, impact, vibration, heat, corrosion, chemical reaction or misuse. Include
areas where no work is done regularly, such as parking lots, rest areas, office storage areas
and locker rooms19.

Prepare and conduct SIMOPS for tie-in operation
18 https://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg261.pdf
19 https://www.ccohs.ca/oshanswers/prevention/effectiv.html
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Day Four PTW Procedure and SIMOPS
PTW system
A permit-to-work system is a formal written system used to control certain types of work that
are potentially hazardous.
A permit-to-work is a document which specifies the work to be done and the precautions to
be taken. Permits-to-work form an essential part of safe systems of work for many
maintenance activities. They allow work to start only after safe procedures have been
defined and they provide a clear record that all foreseeable hazards have been considered.
A permit is needed when maintenance work can only be carried out if normal safeguards
are dropped or when new hazards are introduced by the work.
Information
• Is the permit-to-work system fully documented, laying down:

- how the system works;
- the jobs it is to be used for;
- the responsibilities and training of those involved; and
- how to check its operation?
• Is there clear identification of who may authorise particular jobs (and any limits to
their authority)?
• Is there clear identification of who is responsible for specifying the necessary
precautions (eg isolation, emergency arrangements, etc)?
• Is the permit form clearly laid out?
• Does it avoid statements or questions which could be ambiguous or misleading?
• Is it designed to allow for use in unusual circumstances?
• Does it cover contractors?
Selection and training:
• Are those who issue permits sufficiently knowledgeable concerning the hazards and
precautions associated with the plant and proposed work?
• Do they have the imagination and experience to ask enough ‘what if’ questions to
enable them to identify all potential hazards?
• Do staff and contractors fully understand the importance of the permit-to-work system
and are they trained in its use?
Description of the work:
• Does the permit clearly identify the work to be done and the associated hazards?
• Can plans and diagrams be used to assist in the description of the work to be done,
its location and limitations?
• Is the plant adequately identified, eg by discrete number or tag to assist issuers and
users in correctly taking out and following permits?
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• Is a detailed work method statement given for more complicated tasks?

• Hazards and precautions
• Does the system require the removal of hazards and, where this is not reasonably
practicable, effective control?
• Are the requirements of The Control of Substances Hazardous to Health Regulations
(COSHH) and other relevant legislation known and followed by those who issue the
permits?
• Does the permit state the precautions that have been taken and those that are
needed while work is in progress? For instance, are isolations specified and is it clear
what personal protective equipment should be used?
• Do the precautions cover residual hazards and those that might be introduced by the
work, eg welding fume and vapour from cleaning solvents?
• Do the Confined Spaces Regulations 1997 apply? If so, has a full risk assessment
identified the significant risks and identified alternative methods of working or
necessary precautions?
Procedures:
• Does the permit contain clear rules about how the job should be controlled or
abandoned in the case of an emergency?
• Does the permit have a hand-back procedure incorporating statements that the
maintenance work has finished and that the plant has been returned to production
staff in a safe state?
• Are time limitations included and is shift changeover dealt with?
• Are there clear procedures to be followed if work has to be suspended for any
reason?
• Is there a system of cross-referencing when two or more jobs subject to permits may
affect each other?
• Is the permit displayed at the job?
• Are jobs checked regularly to make sure that the relevant permit-to-work system is
still relevant and working properly?
The permit-to-work form must help communication between everyone involved. It should be
designed by the company issuing the permit, taking into account individual site conditions
and requirements. Separate permit forms may be required for different tasks, such as hot
work and entry into confined spaces, so that sufficient emphasis can be given to the
particular hazards present and precautions required20.
20 https://antarisconsulting.com/docs/guides/unit_igc1/Permit%20to%20work%20systems%20indg98.pdf
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SIMOPS assessment review
A meeting of all the parties involved in the SIMOPS should be set up to enable a review to
be undertaken of each party’s work-specific dossier in a systematic manner.
Appropriate tools should be used to clearly identify all the risks in conducting SIMOPS
contained in each party’s dossier and the review meeting should agree the required specific
mitigation measures to be implemented to allow SIMOPS to proceed. Methodology/tools
which can be used to identify the risks are:
• Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA);

• Clash analysis;
• Interdependency analysis.
SIMOPS interface document
It is important that SIMOPS/interface documentation be developed for the SIMOPS

activities.
Depending on the scope of the SIMOPS activities, this could comprise one document
covering all the work or alternatively could comprise several documents, covering specific,
clearly identified SIMOPS activities. Each interface document should:
• Set out the activities covered by the document and should be applicable to all parties’
operations for the specified activity. A SIMOPS matrix, where appropriate, may be
developed to identify which activities are permissible when conducted simultaneously
• Be developed on a discrete basis for various phases of work within the SIMOPS to
prevent this becoming an unwieldy document
• Contain a validation exercise to be carried out against original SIMOPS assessment
review to ensure that all mitigation and controls are in place
• The SIMOPS interface document should cover the following:
o Purpose and scope
o Glossary of terms
o Roles and responsibilities, including organisation and reporting
lines/requirements
o SIMOPS operations – description of scope of work to be covered by the
specific document
o Procedures and controls
o SIMOPS risk and mitigations
o Contingency plans
o Change control – deviation requests
o Establishment of who has primacy (who is in overall charge of
communications, PTW and operations)
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SIMOPS flowchart
SIMOPS Flowchart – Life Cycle Model for SIMOPS:
SIMOPS Toolbox Talk
Once a SIMOPS has been identified, a kick-off meeting should be arranged for all parties to
the SIMOPS and the client so that the scope of work for the operations can be drawn up.
The party in overall charge (for example client, OIM or master of a specific vessel) should
be identified.
The kick-off meeting should identify all the SIMOPS activities to be carried out. A risk
assessment of all the anticipated operations should be undertaken to:
• Identify constraints and hazards associated with all the activities;

• Draw up a checklist of the corresponding mitigation measures.
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Each party to the SIMOPS activities should draw up a dossier which is intended to provide
a work-specific summary identified by that party for their part in the SIMOPS activities.
In order that each party can draw up their work-specific SIMOPS dossiers, the kick off
meeting should:
• define the responsibilities and nominate the responsible person for each party;
• identify the input required from each party; and
• identify the time frame for each part of the SIMOPS work, including timings of pre-
operations meetings and the actual SIMOPS activities themselves.

Prepare and conduct a SIMOPS toolbox talk
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Day Five Refinery Specific Risks and SIMOPS
Risk Management
In the petroleum refining industry, considerable effort has been made over the past decades
to provide a proactive safety management system, in order to prevent accidents from
happening and/or to mitigate accident escalation. Intermittently, lessons have been learnt
from major accidents in the petroleum refining industry, recommendations have been
provided based on knowledge and lessons learnt from investigation of the past catastrophic
accidents by organizations such as the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board
(US CSB), the UK Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE), the U.S Occupational Safety and
Health Administration, EU commission, America Petroleum Institute (API), Centre for
Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) and other independent investigation panels that express
more opinion on the need to strengthen risk controls in order to prevent the release of
hazards that can lead to major accidents. However, significant effort has been made by the
aforementioned organizations to develop and publish a comprehensive guidance and
regulations for refiners in the petroleum industry, in order to manage process units risk and
prevent unintentional loss of hazardous materials (OGP, 2011). Various regulations and
guidelines in relation to environmental health and safety, to prevent foreseeable future
accidents in the petroleum refining industry.
Due to the complexity and sizes of most refineries, it is nearly impossible for operators to
eliminate all the risks associated with the operations of such facilities. In such
circumstances, it is obvious that every refinery is required to have a reliable and consistent
risk management process that can be implemented to deal with events and other latent
condition that can create a potential pathway to accidents. Various reports on major
accidents in the petroleum refining industry emphasized the failure in risk management,
leading to systematic causes of accidents. Based on the summary from various cases of
accidents, the following risk management failures are identified:
Inadequate attention or awareness of management to significance of a hazard that

can trigger an accident.
• Failure in hazard/risk identification and risk assessment of major hazard resulting in

poor assessment of hazards and associated risks
• Failure to conduct adequate risk analysis prior to management of change process
(i.e. Failure of operator to conduct risk assessment prior to any change event or lack
of recognition for need to carry out risk assessment before any change)
• Failure to conduct adequate risk analysis for planning inspections (i.e. lack of
appropriate risk assessment to identify latent degradation threat to process
equipment and control systems in refinery process units)
• Other issues relating to uncertainty of risk management information in terms of its
application in risk assessment and decision making process
• Lack of interest or negligence in acquisition of new knowledge and technology to
tackle emerging risks from high degree of complexity of refinery process operations.
• Application of risk analysis method with limited ability to provide valuable safety
information to support complex decision making
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• Lack of dynamic update on vital changes in safety parameters or technical conditions

which are utilised on a continuous basis for risk management of operations
• Tacit knowledge and experience gain by operators from operating a refinery process
unit is not explicitly utilized in risk management process, rather, such knowledge and
experience is overshadowed by company procedures and governing documentation
for handling major accident risks (Andersen and Mostue, 2012)21.
Management of change
Management of Change (MOC) is a best practice used to ensure that safety, health, and
environmental risks and hazards are properly controlled when an organization makes
changes to their facilities, operations, or personnel. Having a properly implemented MOC
policy in place when implementing changes can help ensure that new hazards aren’t
introduced and the risk levels of existing hazards aren't being increased. Inadequate MOC
on the other hand has the potential to increase risks to the health and safety of employees
and the environment.
Effective MOC involves review of all significant changes to ensure that an acceptable level
of safety will be maintained after the change has been implemented. From this evaluation,
the proposed change can either be set for implementation, amended to make it more safe,
or rejected entirely. Should the change be implemented, personnel should be informed
about the change and how to maintain a safe workspace in this new environment.
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA's) Process Safety
Management (PSM) standard, performing MOC is required when making changes that could
affect the safety of a facility. This can include changes in process chemicals, technology,
equipment, procedures, and the number of employees involved in a process.
While MOC is generally used to examine the effects of a proposed permanent change to a
facility, temporary changes should not be overlooked. A number of catastrophic events have
occurred over the years due to temporary changes in operating conditions, staffing, etc. For
this reason, an effective MOC program should address all changes that could affect the
safety of a facility or personnel, regardless of whether or not it is permanent22.
Long-term structural transformation has four characteristics: scale (the change affects all or
most of the organization), magnitude (it involves significant alterations of the status quo),
duration (it lasts for months, if not years), and strategic importance. Yet companies will reap
the rewards only when change occurs at the level of the individual employee.
Many senior executives know this and worry about it. When asked what keeps them up at
night, CEOs involved in transformation often say they are concerned about how the work
force will react, how they can get their team to work together, and how they will be able to
lead their people. They also worry about retaining their company’s unique values and sense
of identity and about creating a culture of commitment and performance. Leadership teams
21 http://researchonline.ljmu.ac.uk/id/eprint/7984/1/2017Isholaphd.pdf
22 https://inspectioneering.com/tag/management+of+change
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that fail to plan for the human side of change often find themselves wondering why their
best-laid plans have gone awry.
1. Address the “human side” systematically. Any significant transformation creates “people
issues.” New leaders will be asked to step up, jobs will be changed, new skills and
capabilities must be developed, and employees will be uncertain and resistant. Dealing with
these issues on a reactive, case-by-case basis puts speed, morale, and results at risk. A
formal approach for managing change — beginning with the leadership team and then
engaging key stakeholders and leaders — should be developed early, and adapted often as
change moves through the organization. This demands as much data collection and
analysis, planning, and implementation discipline as does a redesign of strategy, systems,
or processes. The change-management approach should be fully integrated into program
design and decision making, both informing and enabling strategic direction. It should be
based on a realistic assessment of the organization’s history, readiness, and capacity to
change.
2. Start at the top. Because change is inherently unsettling for people at all levels of an
organization, when it is on the horizon, all eyes will turn to the CEO and the leadership team
for strength, support, and direction. The leaders themselves must embrace the new
approaches first, both to challenge and to motivate the rest of the institution. They must
speak with one voice and model the desired behaviors. The executive team also needs to
understand that, although its public face may be one of unity, it, too, is composed of
individuals who are going through stressful times and need to be supported.
Executive teams that work well together are best positioned for success. They are aligned
and committed to the direction of change, understand the culture and behaviors the changes
intend to introduce, and can model those changes themselves. At one large transportation
company, the senior team rolled out an initiative to improve the efficiency and performance
of its corporate and field staff before addressing change issues at the officer level. The
initiative realized initial cost savings but stalled as employees began to question the
leadership team’s vision and commitment. Only after the leadership team went through the
process of aligning and committing to the change initiative was the work force able to deliver
downstream results.
3. Involve every layer. As transformation programs progress from defining strategy and
setting targets to design and implementation, they affect different levels of the organization.
Change efforts must include plans for identifying leaders throughout the company and
pushing responsibility for design and implementation down, so that change “cascades”
through the organization. At each layer of the organization, the leaders who are identified
and trained must be aligned to the company’s vision, equipped to execute their specific
mission, and motivated to make change happen.
A major multiline insurer with consistently flat earnings decided to change performance and
behavior in preparation for going public. The company followed this “cascading leadership”
methodology, training and supporting teams at each stage. First, 10 officers set the strategy,
vision, and targets. Next, more than 60 senior executives and managers designed the core
of the change initiative. Then 500 leaders from the field drove implementation. The structure
remained in place throughout the change program, which doubled the company’s earnings
far ahead of schedule. This approach is also a superb way for a company to identify its next
generation of leadership.
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4. Make the formal case. Individuals are inherently rational and will question to what extent
change is needed, whether the company is headed in the right direction, and whether they
want to commit personally to making change happen. They will look to the leadership for
answers. The articulation of a formal case for change and the creation of a written vision
statement are invaluable opportunities to create or compel leadership-team alignment.
Three steps should be followed in developing the case: First, confront reality and articulate
a convincing need for change. Second, demonstrate faith that the company has a viable
future and the leadership to get there. Finally, provide a road map to guide behavior and
decision making. Leaders must then customize this message for various internal audiences,
describing the pending change in terms that matter to the individuals.
A consumer packaged-goods company experiencing years of steadily declining earnings

determined that it needed to significantly restructure its operations — instituting, among
other things, a 30 percent work force reduction — to remain competitive. In a series of offsite
meetings, the executive team built a brutally honest business case that downsizing was the
only way to keep the business viable, and drew on the company’s proud heritage to craft a
compelling vision to lead the company forward. By confronting reality and helping
employees understand the necessity for change, leaders were able to motivate the
organization to follow the new direction in the midst of the largest downsizing in the
company’s history. Instead of being shell-shocked and demoralized, those who stayed felt
a renewed resolve to help the enterprise advance.
5. Create ownership. Leaders of large change programs must overperform during the
transformation and be the zealots who create a critical mass among the work force in favor
of change. This requires more than mere buy-in or passive agreement that the direction of
change is acceptable. It demands ownership by leaders willing to accept responsibility for
making change happen in all of the areas they influence or control. Ownership is often best
created by involving people in identifying problems and crafting solutions. It is reinforced by
incentives and rewards. These can be tangible (for example, financial compensation) or
psychological (for example, camaraderie and a sense of shared destiny).
At a large health-care organization that was moving to a shared-services model for

administrative support, the first department to create detailed designs for the new
organization was human resources. Its personnel worked with advisors in cross-functional
teams for more than six months. But as the designs were being finalized, top departmental
executives began to resist the move to implementation. While agreeing that the work was
top-notch, the executives realized they hadn’t invested enough individual time in the design
process to feel the ownership required to begin implementation. On the basis of their
feedback, the process was modified to include a “deep dive.” The departmental executives
worked with the design teams to learn more, and get further exposure to changes that would
occur. This was the turning point; the transition then happened quickly. It also created a
forum for top executives to work as a team, creating a sense of alignment and unity that the
group hadn’t felt before.
6. Communicate the message. Too often, change leaders make the mistake of believing
that others understand the issues, feel the need to change, and see the new direction as
clearly as they do. The best change programs reinforce core messages through regular,
timely advice that is both inspirational and practicable. Communications flow in from the
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bottom and out from the top, and are targeted to provide employees the right information at
the right time and to solicit their input and feedback. Often this will require
overcommunication through multiple, redundant channels.
In the late 1990s, the commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service, Charles O. Rossotti,
had a vision: The IRS could treat taxpayers as customers and turn a feared bureaucracy
into a world-class service organization. Getting more than 100,000 employees to think and
act differently required more than just systems redesign and process change. IRS leadership
designed and executed an ambitious communications program including daily voice mails
from the commissioner and his top staff, training sessions, videotapes, newsletters, and
town hall meetings that continued through the transformation. Timely, constant, practical
communication was at the heart of the program, which brought the IRS’s customer ratings
from the lowest in various surveys to its current ranking above the likes of McDonald’s and
most airlines.
7. Assess the cultural landscape. Successful change programs pick up speed and intensity
as they cascade down, making it critically important that leaders understand and account
for culture and behaviors at each level of the organization. Companies often make the
mistake of assessing culture either too late or not at all. Thorough cultural diagnostics can
assess organizational readiness to change, bring major problems to the surface, identify
conflicts, and define factors that can recognize and influence sources of leadership and
resistance. These diagnostics identify the core values, beliefs, behaviors, and perceptions
that must be taken into account for successful change to occur. They serve as the common
baseline for designing essential change elements, such as the new corporate vision, and
building the infrastructure and programs needed to drive change.
8. Address culture explicitly. Once the culture is understood, it should be addressed as

thoroughly as any other area in a change program. Leaders should be explicit about the
culture and underlying behaviors that will best support the new way of doing business, and
find opportunities to model and reward those behaviors. This requires developing a baseline,
defining an explicit end-state or desired culture, and devising detailed plans to make the
transition.
Company culture is an amalgam of shared history, explicit values and beliefs, and common
attitudes and behaviors. Change programs can involve creating a culture (in new companies
or those built through multiple acquisitions), combining cultures (in mergers or acquisitions
of large companies), or reinforcing cultures (in, say, long-established consumer goods or
manufacturing companies). Understanding that all companies have a cultural center — the
locus of thought, activity, influence, or personal identification — is often an effective way to
jump-start culture change.
A consumer goods company with a suite of premium brands determined that business
realities demanded a greater focus on profitability and bottom-line accountability. In addition
to redesigning metrics and incentives, it developed a plan to systematically change the
company’s culture, beginning with marketing, the company’s historical center. It brought the
marketing staff into the process early to create enthusiasts for the new philosophy who
adapted marketing campaigns, spending plans, and incentive programs to be more
accountable. Seeing these culture leaders grab onto the new program, the rest of the
company quickly fell in line.
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9. Prepare for the unexpected. No change program goes completely according to plan.
People react in unexpected ways; areas of anticipated resistance fall away; and the external
environment shifts. Effectively managing change requires continual reassessment of its
impact and the organization’s willingness and ability to adopt the next wave of
transformation. Fed by real data from the field and supported by information and solid
decision-making processes, change leaders can then make the adjustments necessary to
maintain momentum and drive results.
A leading U.S. health-care company was facing competitive and financial pressures from its
inability to react to changes in the marketplace. A diagnosis revealed shortcomings in its
organizational structure and governance, and the company decided to implement a new
operating model. In the midst of detailed design, a new CEO and leadership team took over.
The new team was initially skeptical, but was ultimately convinced that a solid case for
change, grounded in facts and supported by the organization at large, existed. Some
adjustments were made to the speed and sequence of implementation, but the
fundamentals of the new operating model remained unchanged.
10. Speak to the individual. Change is both an institutional journey and a very personal one.
People spend many hours each week at work; many think of their colleagues as a second
family. Individuals (or teams of individuals) need to know how their work will change, what
is expected of them during and after the change program, how they will be measured, and
what success or failure will mean for them and those around them. Team leaders should be
as honest and explicit as possible. People will react to what they see and hear around them,
and need to be involved in the change process. Highly visible rewards, such as promotion,
recognition, and bonuses, should be provided as dramatic reinforcement for embracing
change. Sanction or removal of people standing in the way of change will reinforce the
institution’s commitment.
Most leaders contemplating change know that people matter. It is all too tempting, however,
to dwell on the plans and processes, which don’t talk back and don’t respond emotionally,
rather than face up to the more difficult and more critical human issues. But mastering the
“soft” side of change management needn’t be a mystery23.
Integrated SIMOPS tool
The use of a visual reference for each activity taking place improved the team’s
understanding of potential risks and hazards. It also provided a clear identification of the
limits of each work scope within the work area, as well as detailed information by clicking on
the activity (colour coded by function).
BP and partners are currently investing at significant levels in the ETAP life extension project
(ELXP) to secure the future of the field until 2030 and beyond. The safe and effective
management of simultaneous operations (SIMOPS) between the ELXP project and the
ETAP asset was a critical part of project delivery. To assist with this, the team introduced a
new software system called ‘Blue-Beam™’ which allowed the project to introduce multi-layer
PDFs showing work activities by function. They also utilised ‘Return to Scene’ (R2S)
technology – a virtual ‘Google-style street view’ survey of the plant – which allowed functions
to survey and tag sections of the asset that were planned to be addressed during the
23 https://www.strategy-business.com/article/rr00006?gko=dab72
SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

49
intervention, whilst also enabling participants at SIMOPS sessions to visualise the worksite
in 3D24.
Ensuring contractor alignment with safety culture
The condition where appropriate project participants are working within acceptable
tolerances to develop and meet a uniformly defined and understood set of project objectives.
Conducive cultures can be the most effective tool in achieving safety results. High-
performance organizations realize alignment of safety cultures is becoming the core
responsibility of not just the contractor, but those engaging them as well.
In this time of strategic outsourcing, many companies utilize contractors to support various
business operations. Whether short- or long-term, in several companies these contractors
are a business necessity. As these organizations bring groups together representing
different cultures around safety, new risks emerge. How well the cultural risks are identified
and mitigated, and desired beliefs and behaviors improved, will be the new competitive
advantage in safety performance.
Organizational culture can be either a powerful tool or a hindrance to the results

organizations need from their contractors. A contractor's culture not only influences the
beliefs and behaviors of their employees, but the client's employees as well. When the
behavior of contractor personnel is observed by client employees, over time, this has an
impact on the beliefs, decisions and behaviors of client employees and the stories they tell
one another. With recent unfortunate media-worthy events, it is hard to argue with the fact
that contractor and client cultures affect one another.
24 https://oilandgasuk.co.uk/bp-integrated-simops-tool-improves-understanding-of-risks/
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50
Organizations leveraging contractors require a culture-conversation framework that initiates

dialogue with both short- and long-term contractors, creating clarity around what safety
excellence looks like in knowledge, beliefs and behaviors, not just results. Safety roles,
responsibilities and results need to be collaboratively developed and a positive and
proactive accountability system established to influence and achieve excellence in
outcomes25.
Human factor and ergonomics, behavioral based safety
Various approaches have had reasonable success in reducing unsafe behaviours in the
workplace.
Some involve penalties; others involve surveillance; others involve guidance, codes and
procedures to follow; others still are supportive and training-oriented.
Some initiatives come from the employer, from the social partner organisations, from state
regulatory bodies, and some worthwhile initiatives come from individual employees’ own
insights, ideas, training and development activities around health and safety.
Most employers and employees in the area of safety will agree that the ultimate aim of a
safety initiative is a “total safety culture”; however, this concept is rarely defined. A total
safety culture is a culture in which:
• individuals hold safety as a ‘value’ and not just a priority;

• individuals take responsibility for the safety of their co-workers in addition to
• themselves; and
• all level of employee are willing and able to act on their sense of responsibility – they
can go ‘beyond the call of duty’ (Perdue, 2000)
A BBS approach is one which:
• Is based on solid principles about engaging, motivating, assisting, reinforcing, and

sustaining safe behaviours
• Takes a systematic approach, examining the motivation underlying behaviours, in
order to increase safe behaviour
• Is an ongoing effort; not ‘once-off’ provisions, but a new way of working that the safety
leader must continually promote for sustainable, positive results
• Takes time to achieve; however, results can be observed immediately due to the
nature of measurement involved
• Emphasises increasing safe behaviours rather than focusing on length of time without
injury. BBS programmes do not depend solely on ‘lagging indicators’ (after the fact),
and instead shift the focus to ‘leading indicators (preventative)
• Is not a substitute for an already existing comprehensive health and safety
programme; it is a supplementary tool that will enhance the effect of already existing
practices, and will allow for an objective measurement system.
25 https://proactsafety.com/articles/cleint-and-contractor-aligning-safety-cultures
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51
• Aims to understand causes of incidents and near misses and correct them through
the behaviour of relevant people. For example, reducing hazards often requires
behavior change of managers and frontline workers, and equipment redesign
involves behavior change of engineers26.

Plan for BBS, where behaviour is explained in terms of the ABC model (Antecedent,
Behaviour, Consequence).
26
https://www.hsa.ie/eng/Publications_and_Forms/Publications/Safety_and_Health_Management/behaviour_b
ased_safety_guide.pdf
SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

Simultaneous Operations (SIMOPS)
SIMOPS
12 - 16 January 2020
Alexandria, Egypt
Middle East Oil Refinery (Midor)
Presented by:
Sasa Kocic MSc.
Senior Consultant
Administrative Points
• PetroKnowledge Welcomes you

• Fire Alarms & Emergency Exits
• Please put mobile phones to silent
• Complete the course registration form – this is for your certificate
• Any questions before we start?
2 SIMOPS
1
Course Outline
Day One Day Two
SIMOPS Introduction SIMOPS Risk Management
• SIMOPS process • Risk Management methodologies
• Area classification in refineries • Risk Matrix and the construction
• Oil refinery risks and hazards of risk matrix
• Safety by design • Job Hazard Analysis
• SIMOPS in refinery operations: • SIMOPS Checklist
Fires and Explosion Protection • Permit to Work (PTW) system
• Workshop: Case Studies & and issuing process
Worked Examples • Workshop: Case Studies &
Worked Examples
3 SIMOPS
Course Outline
Day Three Day Four
SIMOPS in Specific Cases
PTW Procedure and SIMOPS
• Common Process Hazards
• PTW system
• SIMOPS in construction
• SIMOPS assessment review
– Tie-in
– Additional equipment installation • SIMOPS interface document
• SIMOPS in maintenance • SIMOPS flowchart
– Shutdown and isolation • SIMOPS Toolbox Talk
– Pressure testing • Workshop: Case Studies & Worked
– Inspection Examples
• Workshop: Case Studies & Worked
Examples
4 SIMOPS
2
Course Outline
Day One
Refinery Specific Risks and SIMOPS
• Risk Management
• Management of change
• Integrated SIMOPS tool
• Ensuring contractor alignment with
safety culture
• Human factor and ergonomics,
behavioral based safety
• Workshop: Case Studies & Worked
Examples
5 SIMOPS
Section One
SIMOPS Introduction
3
SIMOPS process
7 SIMOPS
SIMOPS is an
abbreviation of
‘simultaneous operations’
8 SIMOPS
4
Can Execute
Identify Operations
SIMOPS operations
to be executed as be separately at
SIMOPS avoided? different times
Check for pre-

requested items
and conditions
implementation
All of the following should be in place:

• PTW issued
• Personnel adequately rested
• PPE use
• Procedure for each operation Assess SIMOPS Are all risks
Issue and review
• Adequate number of people for joint taken into
SIMOPS plan
• Backup plan available hazards/risks account?
• Roles and responsibilities understood
• Communication plan checked
• Risk Assessment for each operation
conducted
9 SIMOPS
Definition
SIMOPS is the performance of potentially conflicting operations at the

same time, in the same location.
Both jobs may be done safely, but without coordination, one act could
have a dangerous consequence to other.
Example:
• Commissioning work in Construction areas
• Production activities in Commissioning areas
• Construction work in drilling areas
• Hot work going on during break of containment in process area.
10 SIMOPS
10
5
To avoid
incident • Adequate
Provision
during
SIMOPS • Strict safety
procedures and
you supervision
need
11 SIMOPS
11
SIMOPS • A general actual test of the installation

Safety systems such as Fire water
safety system and Gas detection system has
to be done prior to start of
systems Simultaneous operations.
• Isolation Systems : Isolation system
specific such as isolation valves and shutdown
tests and system to be installed and identified to
operate in case of any leakage
monitoring • Specific provisions for SIMOPS
12 SIMOPS
12
6
SIMOPS requirements:
• Training to be conducted for all personnel involve in SIMOPS

• Safety equipment such as Gas tester, Radios, etc to be check for
operability
• Personnel Access Control: Access between areas will be
controlled by badges, manned security , the permit to work system
• All personnel should be familiar and trained with alarm tone
• Escape ways and Muster Points to be clearly marked and access
free
• Fire-fighting facilities to be ready
• Clinic, Ambulance and Search and Rescue team to be ready and
on-call
• Security personnel to be trained in order to cooperate with HSE
personnel in case of emergency and control the access to
restricted areas.
13 SIMOPS
13
SIMOPS Safety-General operating philosophy
• No Hot Permit to Work is allowed in the vicinity of operations inducing

hazard of hydrocarbon release such as: Welding, Spray painting, etc.
• Only Authorized personnel to be allowed to enter SIMOPS area that
will be restricted by fence and Tag System
• Keeping as low as reasonably practical the number of persons on site
during activities, Numbers must be controlled and monitor by Tag
system
• Full compliance of the activity with the permit to work
• Pre-check of Plant and Equipment such as Vehicles, Electrical and
power tools, IS communication devices, Anti spark equipment
• Personal protective equipment and escape equipment must be
suitable for use within a sour (H2S ) service environment
• Adequate Signs to be installed according to the nature of the job
• Continuous safety surveillance of the SIMOPS Area to check any
anomaly
14 SIMOPS
14
7
Area classification in refineries
15 SIMOPS
15
A hazardous area can be defined as any

location where there is risk of an
explosion.
But every hazardous area is different and

each has specific requirements depending
on the nature of the atmosphere and the
elements that are present.
16 SIMOPS
16
8
An industrial area is
considered a hazardous area
Hazardous Area Classification
when it contains three
fundamental components:
A flammable substance
(which can be a gas, liquid,
or solid),
an oxidizer, and
a source of ignition.
17 SIMOPS
17
18 SIMOPS
18
9
Oil refinery risks and hazards
19 SIMOPS
19
National Fire Protection Association System

for Classification of Hazards
20 SIMOPS
20
10
Because of their inherent hazards, especially from

• explosion,
• fire, and
• chemicals,
oil refineries are tightly regulated places in which to

work
Hazards include also

• toxicity,
• corrosiveness, and
• asphyxiation
21 SIMOPS
21
The principal hazards at refineries are fire and explosion.
• Refineries process a multitude of products with low flash

points.
• Although systems and operating practices are designed to
prevent such catastrophes, they can occur.
• Constant monitoring is therefore required.
• Safeguards include
• warning systems,
• emergency procedures, and
• permit systems for any kind of hot or other potentially
dangerous work.
These requirements must be understood and followed by all
workers.
22 SIMOPS
22
11
Major potential air contaminents
23 SIMOPS
23
Safety by design
24 SIMOPS
24
12
ANSI/AIHA Z-10 Standard Elements
Safety and health needs are addressed in the design and redesign processes.
Hazards are identified and analyzed, and risks are assessed and prioritized.
A prescribed hierarchy of controls is used to reduce risks to an acceptable

level.
A management-of-change procedure is implemented so that hazards and risks

are properly considered when changes are made.
Safety and health specifications are included in purchasing documents and

contracts to avoid bringing hazards and risks into the workplace.
SIMOPS
25
Why Focus on Safety through Design?
Anticipate
The design
stage offers the
Control greatest Analyze
hazards opportunity and
most cost-
effective time to
Eliminate
SIMOPS
26
13
What is Safety through Design?
Safety through design is defined as the integration of

hazard analysis and risks assessment methods early in
the design and engineering stages and the taking of the
actions necessary so that the risks of injury or damage
are at an acceptable level.
SIMOPS
27
Design Diagram
SIMOPS
28
14
Design Diagram
SIMOPS
29
Benefits of Safety through Design
Significant reductions in injuries and illnesses, damage to the environment and costs
Productivity increase
Reduced operating costs
Retrofitting costs avoided
SIMOPS
30
15
SIMOPS in refinery operations: Fires and Explosion
31 SIMOPS
31
32 SIMOPS
32
16
Section Two
SIMOPS Risk Management
33
Risk Management methodologies
34 SIMOPS
34
17
What is risk management?
Risk Analysis
• Source Identification
• Risk Estimation
Risk Treatment
• Avoidance
• Optimization
• Transfer
• Retention
Risk Acceptance
Risk Communication
SIMOPS
35
Definition of Hazard and Risk
Hazard:
• the property of a substance or situation with the
potential for creating damage
Risk:
• the likelihood of a specific effect within a specified
period
• complex function of probability, consequences and
vulnerability
SIMOPS
36
18
Risk Management Process
ISO 31000 ISO 17776:2000(E)
Establish The Context

Step 1
Identify Hazards
Communicate and consult
Identify Risks
Monitor and Review

Step 2 Screening
Evaluate Risk
Criteria
Analyze Risks
Identify Risk
Evaluate Risks reduction Measures
Step 3
Threat Risks Set Functional

Requirements
SIMOPS
37
Risk Management Process
Uncertainty Less focus Reduced trust Reduced

loyalty
SIMOPS
38
19
Risk Assessment
SIMOPS
39
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment and risk analysis of

technical systems can be defined as a
set of systematic methods to:
• Identify hazards
• Quantify risks
• Determine components, safety measures and/or
human interventions important for plant safety
SIMOPS
40
20
Risk Analysis – Main Steps

Risk Analysis • ”What if”
• Checklists
Hazard Identification • HAZOP
• Task analysis
Hazard & Scenario Analysis • Fault tree analysis

• Event tree analysis
• Bowties
Likelihood Consequences • Barrier diagrams
Risk
SIMOPS
41
Risk management
Risk management must

have its Return On
Investment
Investment Waste
If the value of investment

overcomes the value of
the risk, management will
usually not invest the
money in Risk
Management
SIMOPS
42
21
Risk acceptance
For society’s acceptance the following factors play a role:
• Risk aversion
• “Cost/benefit” and ALARA principle
• The source of the risk: fatality risk in apartments is a factor 150 less
acceptable than in traffic (Swedish study)
Existing risk criteria are founded on comparison with general

fatality risk (ca. 10-4 per year for young people) and the costs,
society is willing to pay for saving a human life
SIMOPS
43
SIMOPS
44
22
SIMOPS
45
Risk Matrix and the construction of risk matrix
46 SIMOPS
46
23
Risk matrix
Consequences Code
Minor Severe
OK = acceptable risk
Likely
? x
Likelihood
? = doubtful
CONSIDER THE OPTIONS
Unlikely OK ?? x = unacceptable risk

DON’T DO IT!
SIMOPS
47
Risk control Hierarchy of options:
elimination
substitution
isolation
engineering
administration
personal protective equipment
SIMOPS
48
24
Multi-level scale of consequences
Level 1 : first
aid treatment
(Minor)
Level 2:
treatment by (Moderate)
a doctor
Level 3:
immediate
hospitalization
(Severe)
or death
SIMOPS
49
Multi-level scale of likelihood
Level 1: known to commonly occur; not unexpected

• (Likely)
Level 2: uncommon, rare, but sufficiently frequent to have

been witnessed by self or a known person
• (Unlikely)
Level 3: very rare; have heard of it happening; may

possibly have been witnessed by self or a known person
• (Very unlikely)
SIMOPS
50
25
Risk matrix
Consequences Code
Minor Moderate Severe
OK = acceptable risk
Likely (low risk)
OK x x ? = doubtful
CONSIDER OTHER
Likelihood
OPTIONS
Unlikely OK ? x ?? = very doubtful
Either DON’T DO IT or
PROCEED WITH GREAT CARE
Very
unlikely OK OK ?? x = unacceptable risk
DON’T DO IT!
SIMOPS
51
Risk matrix
SIMOPS
52
26
Job Hazard Analysis
53 SIMOPS
53
Hazard identification is part of the process used to evaluate if any particular

situation, item, thing, etc. may have the potential to cause harm.
The term often used to describe the full process is risk assessment:
• Identify hazards and risk factors that have the potential to cause harm (hazard identification).
• Analyze and evaluate the risk associated with that hazard (risk analysis, and risk evaluation).
• Determine appropriate ways to eliminate the hazard, or control the risk when the hazard cannot be
eliminated (risk control).
Overall, the goal of hazard identification is to find and record possible hazards that
may be present in your workplace. It may help to work as a team and include both
people familiar with the work area, as well as people who are not – this way you
have both the experienced and fresh eye to conduct the inspection.
54 SIMOPS
54
27
Hazard identification can be done:

• During design and implementation
• Designing a new process or procedure
• Purchasing and installing new machinery
• Before tasks are done
• Checking equipment or following processes
• Reviewing surroundings before each shift
• While tasks are being done
• Be aware of changes, abnormal conditions, or sudden emissions
• During inspections
• Formal, informal, supervisor, health and safety committee
After incidents
• Near misses or minor events
• Injuries
55 SIMOPS
55
What is Job Hazard Analysis (JHA)?
It is a method for
systematically identifying
and evaluating hazards
associated with a particular
job or task.
It is also called “job safety
analysis (JSA)”.
SIMOPS
56
28
Why conduct a job hazard analysis?
A job hazard analysis can prevent work-

related death, injuries or illnesses by
eliminating or controlling identified hazards.
It is a means to ensure that workers have

the training, equipment and supplies to do
their jobs safely.
Note: The general
method can be used in
It will help you in developing your accident other loss prevention
efforts such as
prevention program (APP), an L & I safety environmental pollution
requirement for all employers. prevention or fire
protection.
SIMOPS
57
Hazard Awareness
Accepting a risk or hazard is not the
same as eliminating or controlling it.
When conducting a job hazard analysis, you may need to take a fresh
look at the way things are done at your workplace.
Even though you may hear “we’ve been doing it that way for 20 years
and nothing happened”, it doesn’t mean a hazard doesn’t exist.
You should take a comprehensive look at all possible hazards with an

open mind.
SIMOPS
58
29
How to conduct a JHA?

Identify the job or task to be analyzed.
Break the job or task into key components.
Identify the hazards found in each key component.
Identify ways to eliminate or control these hazards.
Eliminate the hazard or install controls.
Keep a record of the hazards identified and steps taken to eliminate or control them.
Periodically assess controls to ensure they are working correctly.
SIMOPS
59
Identifying the job for analysis

Any job or task that meets any of the following conditions
should have a JHA conducted for it:
Jobs or tasks with a history of injuries

or near misses.
Jobs with catastrophic potential – fire,

explosion, large chemical releases,
massive equipment failure.
Tasks in which one simple human

error could lead to serious injury.
SIMOPS
60
30
Identifying the job for analysis

Any job or task that meets any of the following conditions should also have a JHA
conducted for it:
New people doing the task,
Tasks that have changed,
Rarely performed jobs,
Any job done under a “safety permit” - confined

space permit, hot work permit, etc.
SIMOPS
61
Identifying jobs for a JHA
Look at jobs where workers have been injured

using existing information from:
• Your accident or incident reports
• Your worker compensation claims
• Industry or trade association data
Conduct a preliminary worksite walk-around to

observe or identify hazardous jobs or tasks.
SIMOPS
62
31
Walk-around Observations
Watch workers doing their jobs to identify potential hazards that may lead
to an injury, paying attention to the amount of time the worker is exposed
to the hazard.
Talk with workers to find out what they think is the most hazardous part of
their job.
Ask them if what you observe them doing is typical.
SIMOPS
63
Once you
have • Involving employees and/or foreman
identified or supervisors in the JHA process
allows them to bring their insights
jobs needing about the jobs to the process.
a JHA, then • They can help identify hazards and
they will have ownership of the JHA
it is time to and will often more readily accept
start the findings and the hazard controls
conducting selected.
the JHA
SIMOPS
64
32
Break job down into key components
Once a job is identified, you will need to break it into key components or
sub-tasks and list all the hazards associated with each sub-task.
Too much detail makes the JHA cumbersome, but too little detail may
omit hazards.
The correct amount of detail breaks the job into components that make
sense in terms of the overall job.
Generally, limit the number of components to 10 or less.
SIMOPS
65
Breaking job into key components - example

Changing a light bulb
Too Much Detail Too Little Detail Right Amount of Detail
Get ladder from storage. Get a ladder and new Get ladder and new light
Get new light bulb from storage. light bulb. bulb.
Carry ladder and light bulb to light
Change bulb. Turn light switch off
needing changing.
Place ladder under light to be changed. Put ladder away and Place ladder under light to
Ensure light switch is in the off position. throw out old light bulb. be changed.
Climb ladder.
Remove light cover. Using ladder, change bulb.
Twist light bulb in a counter clock-wise
Put ladder back in storage.
direction until it is free of the socket.
Remove old light bulb.
Insert new light bulb into socket.
Turn in a clock-wise direction until
tightened.
Replace light cover.
Descend ladder.
Carry ladder back to storage.
SIMOPS
66
33
Job Hazard Analysis

Example form
Date of analysis: _____________________ People who participated:
_________________________________
_________________________________
__________________________________
__________________________________
Job or task where injuries occur, or can occur
How people get hurt What causes them to What safe practices or
get hurt? PPE are needed?
SIMOPS
67
Small Business Job Hazard Analysis

(General Example)
Date of analysis: ________________________ People who participated:
_________________________________
__________________________________
Tasks/jobs where injuries occur, or can occur
How people get hurt What causes them to get hurt? What safe practices or PPE are
needed?
Ladders tipping over ▪ Ladder was not on a level ▪ Set ladder feet on solid level
surface surfaces.
▪ Ladder was on soft ground and ▪ When reaching out, keep belt
the leg sunk in buckle between the side rails of
▪ The person reached out too far the ladder.
▪ The ladder wasn’t high enough ▪ Do not stand on the top of a
to reach up safely – the person stepladder or on the first step
stood up near the top of it down from the top.
▪ Ladder broken or damaged ▪ Replace or repair ladder
Lifting heavy objects ▪ Trying to lift too heavy objects ▪ Use proper lifting practices
▪ Bending over at the waist when (bend knees, don’t twist)
lifting ▪ For very heavy objects, use
▪ Turning (twisting) back while mechanical devices or get
lifting another person to help.
Slipping on the floor ▪ Spilled liquids not cleaned up ▪ Wipe up all spills, and pick up
▪ Small objects are dropped on dropped items, immediately.
the floor and left there ▪ Wear sturdy shoes with slip-
▪ People wear the wrong type of resistant soles;
shoes for conditions
Using the bench grinder ▪ Flying particles get in eyes ▪ Wear safety glasses and
▪ If grinder wheel breaks, large earplugs when using grinder.
chunks fly off at high speed ▪ Keep tongue guards adjusted
▪ High noise level can injure properly (see sticker on grinder
hearing for spacing).
SIMOPS
68
34
Ranking Hazardous Tasks

Once you have identified
jobs or tasks that have the One method for ranking
potential to or are in fact tasks considers the
probability that the hazard
injuring workers, you will will cause an injury and
need to rank these tasks an estimate of the severity
and start addressing the of that injury.
most serious first.
The method can help you

These are not precise decide which is more
predictions of when or important – an infrequent
how severe an injury may job that has the potential
be, they are only to kill a worker, or
estimates. frequent job that causes
less severe injuries.
SIMOPS
69
Consider the severity of the Severity Table

injury of something may go
Score Classification Description
wrong while doing the task in the
severity table.
4 Catastrophic May cause death
Next, think about how often the 3 Critical May cause severe injury or illness
worker is exposed to the hazard
in the probability table. 2 Marginal May cause minor injury or illness
1 Minor Will not cause injury or illness
Multiply the severity rank by the Probability Table

probability rank. Score Classification Description
5 frequent Very likely to occur frequently

4 probable Probably will occur at some time
Address the highest scored 3 Occasional May occur infrequently
tasks first. 2 Remote Unlikely, but possible
1 Improbable So unlikely, it is assumed it will not occur
SIMOPS
70
35
After you have identified the jobs and evaluated its

sub-tasks and hazards, you will need to identify
ways to eliminate or control these hazards.
• The best method is eliminate the hazard at the source.
• If elimination is not possible, control the hazard at its source
with engineering controls or limit worker exposure using
administrative controls.
• If those two methods are not enough to remove or reduce the
worker exposure to acceptable levels, then personal
protective equipment must be used.
• Personal protective equipment can also be used temporarily
while engineering controls are installed.
SIMOPS
71
Reviewing a Job Hazard Analysis

Periodically reviewing your job hazard analysis ensures that it remains current and
continues to help reduce workplace accidents and injuries. Even if the job has not
changed, it is possible that during the review process you will identify hazards that were
not identified in the initial analysis.
It is especially important to review your job hazard analysis if an illness or injury occurs on
a specific job. Based on the circumstances, you may determine that you need to change
the job procedures or provide additional controls to prevent similar incidents in the future.
This is also true in a close call, or near miss situation where an injury was barely avoided.
Any time you revise a job hazard analysis, it is important to train all employees affected by
the changes in the job methods, procedures, or protective measures adopted.
SIMOPS
72
36
SIMOPS Checklist
73 SIMOPS
73
SIMOPS Checklist
The checklist is provided to use as a tool to

ensure ongoing compliance with
the SimOps plan.
It is to be completed by
the SimOps Controller
74 SIMOPS
74
37
75 SIMOPS
75
A manual of permitted operations (MOPO), also referred

to as a matrix of permitted operations, is a visually
coded manual used to define whether a work activity
can be conducted safely within a given condition
A particularly common area of concern that is addressed by

MOPOs is whether two activities can be conducted safely at
the same (referred to as simultaneous operations, or
SIMOPs)
76 SIMOPS
76
38
Permit to Work (PTW) system and issuing process
77 SIMOPS
77
Work with a valid work permit when required
The Objective of the Permit To Work (PTW) system is “To provide a system which ensures
that work activities can be carried out in a safe manner”.
The PTW System Corporate Custodian is the Production Function Permit to Work System
Manager who is responsible for providing steering / direction to ensure that the PTW System
meets the needs of the company.
The PTW Training Custodian is employee who is responsible for the content and suitability of
PTW training.
Asset Directors are responsible for the implementation of the PTW System, and for
appointing Focal Points for the PTW System in each Area.
SIMOPS
78
39
A Permit is required
For any work carried out
• Inside a process or hydrocarbon area
• On an electrical installation
• When entering a Confined Space
• When other Supplementary Certificates are required to carry out the work i.e.
Isolation (Mech. or Elect.) and Gas Testing
• Work within emergency planning zone of a critical sour area
A Permit is also required when

• The work is not familiar to the Work Force
• The work is not carried out by competent staff
• An approved procedure is not in force for the work
SIMOPS
79
• Red Edged Permits - Class A Permits are required for high risk work. This is
work that could lead to major consequences such as fire, explosion, or loss of
Class A life.
Example: Hot work in a Process Area
Class B • Blue Edged Permits - Class B Permits are required for medium risk work.
Example: Hot Work in a Hydrocarbon area
No Permit • Jobs that have been determined as no Permit Jobs need to be discussed,
agreed and authorised as such. These still need to be risk assessed
Example: Entry into Well Cellars or Cosasco pits by Area Authority to carry
Job out Operational Tasks to an approved procedure
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All work undertaken using the PTW system requires to be Hazard Assessed and controls put
in place to enable the work to be done safely.
Hazard Assessment is accomplished using the Job HSE Plan.
In addition to the Job HSE Plan, the PTW Holder shall conduct a TRIC The TRIC is not a
repeat of the Job HSE Plan but a location specific Risk Assessment, which will focus on the
hazards at the worksite at the time the work is to be carried out.
The TRIC shall be carried out at the Worksite immediately prior to the activity start.
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Tips for supervisors
Pose Question to your group
Allow 5 minutes for discussion on each Question
Summarize what you have heard before moving to the next Question
Split big groups up into smaller discussion teams
Take your time
Encourage everyone to take part
Look for real examples from your own workplace
Find and use real examples of incidents related to this rule from your site
Link the discussion to real work on site involving the people in the tool box talk
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41
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Section Three
SIMOPS in Specific Cases
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42
Common Process Hazards
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A common way to classify hazards is by category:

• biological – bacteria, viruses, insects, plants, birds, animals,
and humans, etc.,
• chemical – depends on the physical, chemical and toxic
properties of the chemical,
• ergonomic – repetitive movements, improper set up of
workstation, etc.,
• physical – radiation, magnetic fields, temperature extremes,
pressure extremes (high pressure or vacuum), noise, etc.,
• psychosocial – stress, violence, etc.,
• safety – slipping/tripping hazards, inappropriate machine
guarding, equipment malfunctions or breakdowns.
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Process safety hazards are issues that could result in equipment

failure or large scale accidental damage to equipment or
personnel.
Process safety accidents happen less frequently than personal

accidents, but have a far greater impact.
Process safety hazards typically include dust, gas or vapor

contamination in processing plants, potential detonation of
energetic materials and runaway exothermic chemical processes.
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Process Safety Hazards: Hazards associated with the loss

of primary containment of a hazardous substance.
Process Hazards include:

• fire,
• explosion, and
• toxic release.
These hazards are associated with incidents which occur at

low frequencies, but can have catastrophic consequences.
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The major hazards with which the

chemical industry is concerned are fire,
explosion, and toxic release.
Of these three, fire is the most common

but, explosion is particularly significant
in terms of fatalities and loss.
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Factors that determine the scale of the hazard are as follows:

• The Inventory
• The most fundamental factor that determines the scale of the hazard is the inventory
of the hazardous material.
• The larger the inventory of material, the greater the potential loss.
• The Energy Factor
• For an inventory of hazardous material to explode inside the plant or to disperse in
the form of a flammable or toxic vapor cloud, there must be energy.
• In most cases, this energy is stored in the material itself.
• The Time Factor
• Another fundamental factor is the development of the hazard in time.
• The time factor affects both the rate of release and the warning time.
• The Intensity/Distance Relationship
• An important characteristic of the hazard is the distance over which it may cause
injury and/or damage.
• In general, fire has the shortest potential range, then explosion, and then toxic
release.
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Factors that determine the scale of the hazard are as

follows:
• The Exposure Factor
• A factor that can greatly mitigate the potential effects of an incident is
the reduction of exposure of the people who are in the affected area.
• This reduction of exposure may be due to features that apply before the
hazard develops or to emergency measures that are taken after the
hazard is recognized.
• The Intensity/Damage and Intensity/Injury Relationships
• The range of the hazard depends also on the relationships between the
intensity of the physical effect and the proportion of people who suffer
injury at that level of the effect.
• The annular zone within which injury occurs is determined by the
spread of the injury distribution.
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Relationships between flammability characteristics and

flammable range
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Representation of overpressure contours and flame spread in a refinery explosion (image

courtesy of Gexcon AS)
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3-D representation of the impact of a carbon monoxide release in a refinery (image courtesy
of Gexcon AS)
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‘Onion’ representation of LOPA
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Summary of hazardous substances, consequences and impacts with barriers as controls
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SIMOPS in construction
o Tie-in
o Additional equipment installation
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During each SIMOPS workshop the below steps were undertaken

under the guidance of the SIMOPS facilitator:
• Identification of the SIMOPS scenarios, means identification of the concurrent
activities to be carried out
during tie-in;
• Identification of the related hazards;
• Evaluation of the risk of simultaneous execution of the activities;
• Identification of control measures and/or operating procedures already planned and
consequent
assignment of the responsibility for their implementation;
• Evaluation of the residual risk with risk control measures already in place;
• Identification of additional risk control measures, if required;
• Assignment of responsible person for the implementation of identified
countermeasure.
• Updated schedule of construction, pre-commissioning, commissioning and start-up
activities;
• Process Flow Diagrams (PFD) and Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (PID);
• Plant layouts and equipment layouts;
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Tie-in Preliminary works

• Notification from Company
• Nondestructive evaluation (NDE)
• Pre-fabrication of Tie-in spool
• Hydrotest for Tie-in spool
• Testing for existing Tie-in line
• Excavation for foundation (if required)
• Foundation installation (if required)
• Scaffolding installation
• Structure, Platform, Support installation
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Tie-In execution works

• Positive Isolation from Company
• Blinding (Gas free line)
• Cold cutting
• Installation of tie-in spool
• Welding
• NDT (Non Destructive Testing)
• Hydrotest
• Line Blowing and Drying
• De-Blinding and client handover
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For precautionary reasons, issue a line break permit to address

specific details of the procedure prior to construction.
The purpose of the permit is to define:

• Location of the line break.
• Applicable design documents.
• Fluid in the line.
• Safety equipment requirements.
• Hazards associated with handling the materials last in the line.
• Special line washing, purging or flushing requirements.
• Valve locking and tagging requirements.
• All personnel involved or affected by the procedure.
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Basic hot tapping steps include:

• Weld the hot tap fitting onto the line.
• Install the full open gate valve on the fitting.
• Inspect and pressure test the valve and fitting.
• Install the hot tap machine on the valve.
• Bore the line.
• Retract the boring bar, then close and lock the valve.
• Depressurize the hot tap machine and remove it.
• Clean the work area.
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Installing new
equipment, whether in a
brand-new production
line or an existing line,
can be challenging.
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1. First, be sure to talk to your supplier’s project manager before

starting preparation for the installation. He may have information
that will affect your preparation. He also will be your main contact
for questions regarding delivery of the project, and will give you an
idea of what you need to have on hand and what you need to
accomplish before equipment is delivered.
2. Ask your supplier about electrical requirements and other

necessities that need to be on-site for proper installation.
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Perform engineering study
Prepare area reservation plan
Prepare lift plan (if needed)
Prepare SIMOPS plan

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SIMOPS in maintenance
o Shutdown and isolation
o Pressure testing
o Inspection
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Before any plant is inspected, maintained, cleaned or repaired, where

practicable, it must be shut down and its energy sources locked out
and tagged as part of an isolation procedure (often called Lockout
Tagout) to ensure the safety of those doing the work.
The aim of an isolation procedure is to:
• isolate all forms of potentially hazardous energy to ensure that an accidental release
of hazardous energy does not occur
• control all other hazards to those doing the work
• ensure that entry to a restricted area is tightly controlled.
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The risks associated with any plant or equipment undergoing

inspection, maintenance, cleaning, repair or construction should
be assessed and appropriate control measures put in place.
Before work commences the plant should be stopped,

appropriately isolated/locked and danger tagged, and any
stored energy should be dissipated.
Separate controls away from the plant operator or immediate

work area must also be isolated or locked and danger tagged.
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The following lock-out process is the most effective

isolation procedure:
• shut down the machinery and equipment
• identify all energy sources and other hazards
• identify all isolation points
• isolate all energy sources. In the case of electrical equipment
‘whole current isolation’, such as the main isolator, should be used
instead of ‘control isolation’ by way of the stop button on a control
panel
• control or de-energise all stored energy
• lock-out all isolation points, using padlocks, multi- padlock hasps
and danger tags
• danger Tag machinery controls, energy sources and other hazards.
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Pressure tests are performed to ensure the safety, reliability, and leak
tightness of pressure systems.
A pressure test is required for a new pressure system before use or an

existing pressure system after repair or alteration.
There are two methods for pressure tests:
• hydrostatic and
• pneumatic.
A hydrostatic test is performed by using water as the test medium,
whereas a pneumatic test uses air, nitrogen, or any non-flammable
and nontoxic gas
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Pressure Test is performed or conducted

when there are new or old operating
equipment like Boilers, Heat Exchangers,
Pipe Connections and other pressure
vessels installed.
• All pressure vessels must go through the
pressure test before they are permitted to
operate.
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The steps below are typical procedures while other may have added
requirements:
• 1 Bolts together the 2 pipes.

• 2 Connect the elbow casting simplifies the end of the pipelines. The
fitting of the elbow casting simplifies the process of filling the
pipeline with water.
• 3 Bolt a flange fitted with a shut off valve to the other end of the
pipe.
• 4 Close the shut off valve and fill the pipeline with water until the
water start to flow through the elbow.
• 5 Bolt a flange with a pressure gauge connection to the elbow
casting
• 6 Connect the test pump to the shut off valve
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The steps below are typical procedures while other may have added
requirements:
• 7 Open the shut off valve and operate the test pump until water
overflows from the pressure gauge connection (BLEEDING
PROCESS).
• 8 Fit the pressure gauge.
• 9 Operate the test pump until the pressure gauge indicates the
specified test pressure.
• 10 Inspect for leaks in the pipeline at the flange joint, as well as the
pipe system in general.
• 11 Release the pressure from the pipeline through the test pump
discharge valve.
• 12 Disconnect the test pump and drain the pipeline through the
shut off valve.
• 13 Remove the blank flanges and dismantle the pipe joints.
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Pipeline inspection is a part of the pipeline integrity management for

keeping the pipeline in good condition.
The rules governing inspection are the pipeline safety regulations.
In most cases the pipeline is inspected regularly.
The pipeline safety regulations require that the operator shall insure
that a pipeline is maintained in an efficient state, in efficient working
order and in good repair.
The pipeline inspection includes external inspection and internal
inspection.
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60
Section Four
PTW Procedure and SIMOPS
121
PTW system
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61
Permit To Work refers to management

systems used to ensure that work is done
safely and efficiently.
These are used in hazardous industries

and involve procedures to request, review,
authorize, document and most importantly,
de-conflict tasks to be carried out by front
line workers.
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A permit-to-work system is a formal written system used to control certain types

of work that are potentially hazardous.
A permit-to-work is a document which specifies the work to be done and the
precautions to be taken.
Permits-to-work form an essential part of safe systems of work for many
maintenance activities.
Permit-to-work systems form an essential part of the task risk assessment
process.
When a task is identified an appraisal should be carried out to identify the
nature of the task and its associated hazards.
Next, the risks associated with the task should be identified together with the
necessary controls and precautions to mitigate the risks.
The extent of the controls required will depend on the level of risk associated
with the task and may include the need for a permit-to-work.
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62
A permit-to-work is not simply permission to carry out a dangerous job.
It is an essential part of a system which determines how that job can be carried
out safely, and helps communicate this to those doing the job.
It should not be regarded as an easy way to eliminate hazard or reduce risk.
The issue of a permit does not, by itself, make a job safe - that can only be
achieved by those preparing for the work, those supervising the work and
those carrying it out.
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Essential features of permit-to-work systems are:
• clear identification of who may authorise particular jobs (and any

limits to their authority) and who is responsible for specifying the
necessary precautions;
• training and instruction in the issue, use and closure of permits;
• monitoring and auditing to ensure that the system works as
intended;
• clear identification of the types of work considered hazardous;
• clear and standardised identification of tasks, risk assessments,
permitted task duration and supplemental or simultaneous activity
and control measures.
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127 SIMOPS
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64
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SIMOPS assessment review
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65
Purpose of the Assessment Review

• A meeting of all the parties involved in the SIMOPS
should be set up to enable a review to be
undertaken of each party’s work-specific dossier in
a systematic manner.
• Appropriate tools should be used to clearly identify
all the risks in conducting SIMOPS contained in
each party’s dossier and the review meeting should
agree the required specific mitigation measures to
be implemented to allow SIMOPS to proceed.
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Methodology/tools which can be

used to identify the risks are:
• Hazard identification and risk
assessment (HIRA);
• Clash analysis;
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66
During the SIMOPS assessment

review, the roles and responsibilities
of each of the parties within the
SIMOPS are identified and a
hierarchy of control established for
each work-specific SIMOPS activity.
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The roles and responsibilities for all parties and individuals who have authority within
the SIMOPS should be established.
This should cover reporting lines in normal and emergency modes and hierarchy of
controls for the different phases of operations.
Management hierarchy should identify authorisations required for work to proceed.
An authorisation control system should be established which also clearly identifies

controls that would stop the SIMOPS, e.g.:
• weather limits,
• change in another party’s SIMOPS activities,
• vessel loss of position,
• vessel loss of anchor,
• loss of communications,
• incident or near-miss stopping an operation.
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SIMOPS interface document
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It is important that SIMOPS/interface documentation

be developed for the SIMOPS activities.
Depending on the scope of the SIMOPS activities, this

could comprise one document covering all the work or
alternatively could comprise several documents,
covering specific, clearly identified SIMOPS activities.
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68
Each SIMOPS interface document should:

• Set out the activities covered by the document and should be
applicable to all parties’ operations for the specified activity.
• A SIMOPS matrix, where appropriate, may be developed to
identify which activities are permissible when conducted
simultaneously;
• Be developed on a discrete basis for various phases of work
within the SIMOPS to prevent this becoming an unwieldy
document;
• Contain a validation exercise to be carried out against original
SIMOPS assessment review to ensure that all mitigation and
controls are in place.
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The SIMOPS interface document should cover the following:

• Purpose and scope;
• Glossary of terms;
• Roles and responsibilities, including organisation and reporting
lines/requirements;
• SIMOPS operations – description of scope of work to be covered by the
specific document;
• Procedures and controls;
• SIMOPS risk and mitigations;
• Contingency plans;
• Change control – deviation requests;
• Establishment of who has primacy (who is in overall charge of
communications, PTW and operations);
• Authorizations to proceed process (PTW);
• Communication plan
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SIMOPS flowchart
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Kick-off Each party Develop

Identify SIMOPS
meeting prepares work SIMOPS
assessment
SIMOPS identifying the specific interface
review
scope of work dossiers document
Purpose
Review risks-
identify
Identified SIMOPS
specific Procedures and controls
mitigation Risk and mitigation
measures Reporting lines
Contingency plans
Develop
hierarchy of Primacy
controls Authorization/PTW
Communications plan
Is there a need
Carry out Preparation
for
SIMOPS for SIMOPS
Change/Deviation
Meetings Roles and responsibilities

Close out Communications Validate communications
Authorization/PTW
Lessons Change control
learned
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SIMOPS assessment Develop SIMOPS

review interface document
Purpose
Identified SIMOPS
Review risks-identify
specific mitigation Procedures and controls
measures
Risk and mitigation
Reporting lines
Contingency plans
Develop hierarchy of
controls
Primacy
Authorization/PTW
Communications plan
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Is there a
need for Carry out Preparation
Change/ SIMOPS for SIMOPS
Deviation
Meetings Roles and

Close out Communications responsibilities
Authorization/PTW Validate
Change control communications
Lessons learned
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72
It is important that SIMOPS are identified at an early stage

before the work commences.
SIMOPS may come about as the result of the following

issues:
• Schedule clashes, e.g. activities in same area at same time;
• Physical clashes, e.g. anchor patterns, loss of position;
• Failure impacts, e.g. explosions, leakage, gas etc.;
• Interference between platform operations and vessel operations;
• Contracts and third party interfaces, e.g. liabilities, risk/insurance;
• Environmental impacts, e.g. currents, icebergs, weather limitations;
• Territorial clashes, e.g. 500m zone, existing infrastructure;
• Any other combined/simultaneous activity in the area of operation which
could compromise project success criteria.
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SIMOPS Toolbox Talk
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73
A meeting of all the parties involved in the SIMOPS should be

set up to enable a review to be undertaken of each party’s
work-specific dossier in a systematic manner.
• Appropriate tools should be used to clearly identify all the risks in
conducting SIMOPS contained in each party’s dossier and the review
meeting should agree the required specific mitigation measures to be
implemented to allow SIMOPS to proceed.
Methodology/tools which can be used to identify the risks are:
• Hazard identification and risk assessment (HIRA);

• Clash analysis;
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What is Toolbox Talk (TBT)?
Short talks that focus on a specific job/topic carried

out by the supervisor or the senior person.
e.g. High pressure testing, manual handling, lifting

…
• TBT is a two way communication responsibility.
• Help inform inexperienced workers and provide reminders to
experienced workers of correct control measures.
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74
Why TBT is important?

• Determine the responsibilities of
employees & supervisors.
• Allow supervisor and workers to
explore the risks of specific HSEQ
issues and think about ways to deal
with them.
• Encourage worker engagement.
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How to deliver a TBT Top Tips?

• Know your material.
• Do not get side tracked by other topics.
• Make eye-contact.
• Make sure your voice carries to the back of the room.
• Involve staff using open questions.
• Summarise key points.
• Do not speak too quickly or too slowly.
• Keep an eye on your timings.
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151 SIMOPS
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Section Four
Refinery Specific Risks and SIMOPS
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76
Risk Management
153 SIMOPS
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• The Risk Management

What is the Process consists of a
series of steps that, when
Risk
undertaken in sequence,
Management enable continual
process? improvement in decision-
making.
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155 SIMOPS
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Step 1.Communicate and consult
-Communication and
consultation aims to identify
who should be involved in
assessment of risk (including
identification, analysis and
evaluation) and it should
engage those who will be
involved in the treatment,
monitoring and review of risk.
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Step 2. Establish the context

provides a five-step process to assist with
establishing the context within which risk will be
identified.
1-Establish the internal context
2-Establish the external context
3-Establish the risk management

context
4- Develop risk criteria
5- Define the structure for risk analysis
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Step 3. Identify the risks
Risk cannot be managed

unless it is first identified.
Once the context of the

business has been defined, the
next step is to utilize the
information to identify as many
risks as possible.
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Step 4. Analyze the risks

During the risk identification
step, a business owner may
have identified many risks and
it is often not possible to try to
address all those identified.
The risk analysis step will

assist in determining which
risks have a greater
consequence or impact than
others.
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Step 5. Evaluate the risks
Risk evaluation involves comparing the level of

risk found during the analysis process with
previously established risk criteria, and deciding
whether these risks require treatment.
The result of a risk evaluation is a prioritized list

of risks that require further action.
This step is about deciding whether risks are

acceptable or need treatment.
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80
Step 6. Treat the risks
Risk treatment is about considering options

for treating risks that were not considered
acceptable or tolerable at Step 5.
Risk treatment involves identifying options

for treating or controlling risk, in order to
either reduce or eliminate negative
consequences, or to reduce the likelihood
of an adverse occurrence.
Risk treatment should also aim to enhance

positive outcomes.
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Step 7. Monitor and review
Monitor and review is an essential

and integral step in the risk
management process.
A business owner must monitor risks

and review the effectiveness of the
treatment plan, strategies and
management system that have been
set up to effectively manage risk.
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Summary of risk management steps
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82
• During normal operations hazards are
contained and the operation is usually within
the safe margin
Changes Either:
• Shift the bounds of “Normal Operation” or
• Put the facility into an “Abnormal Situation”
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Definition: Change - Any

addition, process modification,
or substitute item
(e.g., person or thing)
that is not a replacement-in-
kind
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83
There are many types of changes, such as:

• Equipment changes
• Procedural changes
• Chemical changes
• Process changes
• Control / limit changes
• ITM changes
• Personnel changes
• Infrastructure changes
All must be managed !
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To manage change
successfully and safely, you
must have:
• A robust management-of-change
program in place
• Clear ownership of the program and
its constituent parts
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84
Essential elements of a robust MOC

program:
• Agree on the technical justification for the
change at the appropriate management level
• Risk-assess the proposed change.
• Using a multi-disciplined team of competent
people
• Including specialists and vendors when
needed
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Definition:
• A change that is implemented for a short,
Temporary predetermined, finite period
change
Definition: • A change needed in a situation where the time

required for following the normal MOC
Emergency procedure could result in an unacceptable
safety hazard, a significant environmental or
change security incident, or an extreme economic loss.
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173 SIMOPS
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Integrated SIMOPS tool
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SIMOPS inherently require a

centralized management and
coordination system to integrate and
visualize distributed data points and to
enable communication and
collaboration between disparate teams,
departments, and even companies to
optimize multiple operations.
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SIMOPS operations management

system.
• 1. Centralized system with real-time data feeds
• 2. Visualization linking space and time
• 3. Infrastructure to communicate and
collaborate, both onshore and offshore
• 4. Post mission playback and analysis for
future improvement.
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Ensuring contractor alignment with safety culture
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The contractor ratio within the oil and

gas extraction industry has increased
significantly over the past two decades.
With this rise in the number of

contractors, the frequency of injury has
also increased.
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HSE culture ladder
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Human factor and ergonomics, behavioral based safety
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What is Behaviour Based Safety?
Behaviour based safety (BBS) creates a safety culture that helps to

identify safe behaviour
For BBS to work, all levels of the company must work together
BBS looks at how three things interact to improve safety

• Person
• Work Environment
• Behaviour
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The Safety Triad

Actively improve
environment and
workplace conditions Three
elements of
Acknowledge & the safety
motivate safe workers
triad:
Reduce at-risk • Environment
behaviours • Persons
• Behaviour
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Principles of BBS
Behaviour causes accidents

• Observe – measure – manage
• Feedback is essential to improvement
Consequences motivate behaviour
Communication is the key
Participation creates ownership
Continuous improvement happens when we work together
Be proactive rather than reactive
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Behaviour VS Attitude
Behaviour: • what you do
Attitude: what • A bad attitude may result in

you think, committing an unsafe act or
feel, or believe failing to prevent an incident
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Barriers to safe behavior:

• Untrained or unskilled workers
• Complacency
• Personal choice
• Culture
• Ineffective management systems
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Why At-Risk Behaviors?

Jobs get done faster
Perception that risk is low
“Nothing is going to happen to me” attitude
At-risk behavior is reinforced
Lack of awareness that behavior is risky
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95
ABC Model
One way to look at how changing your behavior can improve
safety is the ABC Model:
A = Activator: triggers behavior
B = Behavior: what we do
C = Consequence: reinforcement or punishment
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Attitude & Consequences
Your attitude (the activator) affects how you

behave
Your behaviour has consequences

• Consequences can either reinforce or deter a behavior
• Positive reinforcement enforces safe behavior
• Negative reinforcement deters unsafe behavior
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BBS training attempts to reduce work-

related injuries by creating a culture of
safe behavior through
• Observation
• Feedback
• Positive intervention
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Building a BBS Program

Four Key Components to BBS Programs
• Correct behavior
• Determine the safe way to do the job
• Observation card
• Observe and record unsafe behaviors
• Feedback process
• Deliver feedback immediately following an observation
• Measurement tool
• BBS is an ongoing process
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97
Observation Process
Observe
• Observe the job to make sure you understand what the worker is doing
and provide necessary feedback
Understand
• Communicate effectively; make sure the workers understand why their
behavior is unsafe
Identify alternate behavior
• Coach the worker in the correct, safe behavior and allow change for
safer way of getting the job done
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Observation Process
Clarify commitment
• Make it clear that workers are committed to doing the job safely
through feedback and positive intervention
Obtain agreement
• Workers must agree to change unsafe behavior to an alternate safe
behavior
Observe to follow-up
• Observe workers at a later date to make sure they are using the
safe behavior; reinforce the safe behavior with positive feedback
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98
Feedback Process
Deliver feedback immediately following an
observation:
• Safe behavior observed
• Feedback should acknowledge and reinforce it
• Unsafe behavior observed
• Identify cause of unsafe behavior
• Explain why the behavior was unsafe
• Offer an alternative safe behaviour
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Measurement Tool
BBS must be an ongoing process
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Companies that see results from BBS

• Keep up data entry
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198
99
Motivation or “buy in”
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Key motivational points include:

• providing employees with the sense of “value”
• recognizing employees for good work
• fostering a sense of community
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199
Positive Reinforcement
Getting what you want
Acknowledgement, recognition, better work assignments
Maintains or increases desired behavior
Gives discretionary effort (more than asked)
Behaviour occurs more frequently
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200
100
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202 SIMOPS
202
101
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Simultaneous

PetroKnowledge is a global learning services

PetroKnowledge offers an extensive range of training seminars, courses North America

Our professional training courses, designed to provide organizations Middle East

Mr. Sasa Kocic MSc

Why choose this training course? ................................................ 4

Day One SIMOPS Introduction ...................................................... 9

Day Two SIMOPS Risk Management .......................................... 22

Day Three SIMOPS in Specific Cases ......................................... 31

SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

Day Four PTW Procedure and SIMOPS ...................................... 38

Day Five Refinery Specific Risks and SIMOPS .......................... 43

SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

Why choose this training course?

Simultaneous operations are usually defined as independent operations in which the

Before SIMOPS start, company is required to analyze the potential risks by

Participants on the SIMOPS training course will become versatile in:

• Identifying most common simultaneous operations in refineries

What are the goals?

By the end of this training course, participants will learn to:

• Apply techniques to handle effectively the simultaneous operations (SIMOPS)

SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

How will this Training Course be Presented?

SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

Day Two SIMOPS Risk Management

• Risk Management methodologies

Day Three SIMOPS in Specific Cases

• Common Process Hazards

Day Four PTW Procedure and SIMOPS

Day Five Refinery Specific Risks and SIMOPS

SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

Sasa Kocic is a Senior Consultant with PetroKnowledge specializing in Data

Senior Consultant with 18 years’ experience in working with the government,

Participated in negotiation for implementation of a new legal requirements with

Consultancy and training for multinational, international and national oil

Highly valued and recommended by the delegates, as well as peers and

SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

SUBJECT MATTER EXPERT IN:

• Root Cause Analysis

EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS

• PhD candidate focusing on applying machine learning to predict human

• Energy Institute UK-Certified Trainer

SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

Day One SIMOPS Introduction

Here are some examples of SIMOP situations:

• Well integrity factors

SIMOPS Sasa Kocic

• Clashes between decision makers at the same hierarchy, on each operation

Typical action steps might include:

• The substitution of fluid, equipment or personnel for more compatible solutions.

SIMOPS Sasa Kocic