THE CATEGORIES AND THE STATUS OF THE

PHYSICAL WORLD: PLOTINUS AND

THE NEO-PLATONIC COMMENTATORS

RICCARDO CHIARADONNA

Introduction

Plotinus' treatment of Aristotle's categories has been widely discussed in the recent
scholarship. Many publications have been devoted to the tripartite treatise On the genera
of being ( E m . 6.1-3):' I only mention Anthony Lloyd's pioneering articles? Klaus
Wurm's book Substanz und Qualitu? and, more recently, the important works by Christos
Evangeliou? Steven Strange,' Christoph Horn: Margherita Isnardi Parente? Kevin
Corrigan? Michael Wagner: and Frans de Haas." The discussion is still open on several
issues: eg. whether Plotinus rejected completely or accepted (at least in part) Aristotle's
views on categories, whether he conceived of the categories as beings or as semantic
items, whether he conceived of sensible and transcendent genera as homonyms and
irreducible or as analogues and similar, etc. In this paper I will try to clarify Plotinus'
attitude towards Aristotle focusing on three key concepts of his metaphysics, ie.
substance, motion and time. I will show that there are very good reasons to think that
Plotinus rejects Aristotle's views on the categories and the physical world. Therefore, I
disagree with recent attempts to find in Plotinus a more favourable attitude towards
Aristotle." Such aristotelizing interpretations do not focus on Plotinus' polemical

' The title and structure of 6.1-3 are due to Porphyry. In fact Plotinus probably wrote 6.1-3 as a single long
treatise. In his edition of the Enneads Porphyry then cut this treatise up into three parts (nr. 42-44 in
chronological order) (cf. Porph. Vita Plotini 5.51-56; 26.8-13). On the chronological system of Porphyry's Vita
Plotini see Goulet 1982; on Porphyry's edition of the Enneads see Goulet-CazC 1982, 280-325; Mansfeld 1994,
108-16. For a fuller account of the scholarship on 6.1-3 see Chiaradonna 2002, 15-40.
*Lloyd 1955/56. See also Lloyd 1990,85-97.
Wurm 1973.
Evangeliou 1988.
'Strange 1987.
Horn 1995.
'Isnardi Parente 1994.
Comgan 1996.
Wagner 1996b.
de Haas 2001.
'IStrange, Horn, and de Haas are all inclined to defend a (more or less) philo-Aristotelian interpretation of
Plotinus' Genera of Being.

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121
122 GREEK, ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

strategy. It is certainly true that Plotinus discusses and even employs Aristotle’s doctrines
in 6.1-3, but this doesn’t mean that he tries to integrate Aristotle into his Platonism. I
rather think that Plotinus rejects Aristotle’s views in a dialectical way: Plotinus shows the
insufficiencies of Aristotle’s positions starting from Aristotelian principles and developing
an internal analysis of them. According to Plotinus, Platonism is the right answer to
Aristotle’s own philosophical questions (eg. the problem of the ontological priority of the
form; the distinction between motion and energeia, etc.), since it is impossible to give an
adequate solution to such questions within the framework of Aristotle’s philosophy.
Plotinus develops his arguments on substance and motion in the long treatise 6.1-3. In
6.1 Plotinus provides a discussion of Aristotelian and Stoic categories of the corporeal
reality; in 6.2 he develops a theory of the genera of the transcendent Intellect (nous)
starting from the interpretation of Plato’s Sophist; in 6.3 Plotinus comes back to the
corporeal world providing his own theory of the sensible genera. I will focus in this paper
on 6.1 and 6.3, ie. on Plotinus’ account of the physical world, and I will leave out his
treatment of the noetic genera and the interpretation of Plato’s Sophist. As for Plotinus’
discussion of time, we find it outside the treatise On the genera of being, ie. in the famous
treatise On eternity and time (3.7, no. 45). It is very important to notice that 3.7 follows
6.1-3 immediately in chronological order. This close relationship is chronological as well
as philosophical: the discussion of eternity and time can be regarded as the continuation of
the discussion of genera and categories in 6.1-3, since Plotinus’ analysis of Aristotle’s
conception of time displays the same structure that we find in Plotinus’ treatment of
Aristotle’s views on substance and motion. In what follows I will first outline Plotinus’
criticism of Aristotle’s views on substance, motion and time. Then I will focus on the
reception of Plotinus’ critical discussion of Aristotle in later Neoplatonism (especially in
Simplicius)

I. Plotinus

(i) Plotinus’ discussion of Aristotle’s substance is too famous to need a detailed re-
examination. I would nevertheless like to point out one important aspect. I think that
Plotinus rejects Aristotle’s views on substance, but Plotinus’ criticism should be carefully
distinguished from a dogmatic anti-Aristotelianism like, eg., the anti-Aristotelianism of
some Middle Platonic interpreters (Atticus, Lucius, Nicostratus).’* What I want to stress is
that Platonism is not the starting point of Plotinus’ discussion, but it is rather its final
result. Plotinus rebuts Aristotle’s views on substance starting from Aristotelian principles
and showing their weakness through an internal criticism. As for the theory of substance,
it seems to me crucial to clarify the sense of Plotinus’ famous assertion in 6.1.1.28-30 ‘in
their classification they are not speaking about the intelligible beings: so they did not want
to classify all beings, but left out those which are most authentically beings’.I3 As Frans

’’On Atticus’ very critical attitude towards Aristotle, see Moraux 1973-2001, vol. 2, 564-82. The case of Lucius
and Nicostratus is more difficult. Some testimonia of their polemical works on the Categories preserved by
Simplicius show a clear rejection of Aristotle’s categories from the point of view of Platonic metaphysics. In
these passages Simplicius compares their discussion of Aristotle to Plotinus’ criticism (see below, section 11).
Other testimonia suggest nevertheless a different attitude, since Aristotle’s views are rejected from a linguistic
point of view. H. Gottschalk’s assessment of Nicostratus’ work is probably correct: ‘a collection of all possible
objections to Aristotle’s teaching on this subject’. See Gottschalk 1987, 1151. On Nicostratus see also the classic
study Praechter 1922 and Moraux 1973-2001, vol. 2,528-63. For a collection of the fragments and testimonia on
Lucius and Nicostratus (with translation and commentary) see now Giob 2002, 119-219. A survey of the Middle-
and Neoplatonic reception of Aristotle’s Categories is provided by Dorrie and Bakes 1993, 62-64, 244-50 (=
Bsr. 84.1-84.4); 66,258-65 (= Bsr. 86.4-86.5).
For Plotinus’ passages, I will always quote Armstrong’s Loeb translation (sometimes with very slight
modifications).
 CHIARADONNA: PLOTINUS ON THE CATEGORIES 123

de Haas rightly notes, Plotinus says that Peripatetic philosophers had ‘no intention to
include intelligible beings, ie. the most authentic beings’. Nevertheless I do not agree with
de Haas’ conclusion that ‘Plotinus may be seen as acknowledging and respecting the fact
that in the Categories Aristotle intended to deal with the sensible realm only’.14 If, as de
Haas assumes, this is Porphyry’s position, Plotinus and Porphyry are - I think -
disagreeing on this point.
Plotinus’ statement seems to me rather the starting-point of his criticism: he emphasizes
that Aristotle’s categories do not include (intentionally) noetic beings and genera. But this
is the very reason why Plotinus thinks that Aristotle’s division of categories is aporetic
and fallacious even if it is regarded as a division of the sensible realm only. We cannot
give an account of the physical world leaving aside its incorporeal, intelligible principles,
since the corporeal world is in itself just an image depending on its extra-physical
causes.15 That’s why Plotinus mentions in 6.1.2-3 the distinctions introduced by Aristotle
in his category of substance. Plotinus mentions these distinctions (the distinction between
first and second ousia, the distinction between form, matter and composite) and he asks
what their common characteristic is (to koinon: 6.1.2.9 and 13). This question has a
polemical purpose: when Plotinus raises the question about the koinon of Aristotle’s
classifications, he intends to suggest that Aristotle’s division of categories is just an
empirical, factual list of disparate items and it lacks any internal principle. As I will show
later, the word koinon refers here to such a principle that Aristotle does not include in his
division. This objection is even clearer at the end of Plotinus’ discussion of substance in
6.1.3.19-23,‘one might say that these are peculiar properties of substances as compared
with other things, and for this reason one might collect them into one and call them
substances, but one would not be speaking of one genus, nor would one yet be making
clear the concept and nature of substance’. It is impossible to grasp this concept and this
nature inside the framework of Aristotle’s conceptions.16
There is one strong objection against my presentation of Plotinus’ criticism: in 6.3
Plotinus seems to do the very thing he had rejected in 6.1, since he develops his own
theory of sensible genera leaving out intelligible beings like soul (my emphasis): ‘we
must, even if it is di,fSicuZt to do so, [...] leave the soul out of the investigation in which we
are at present occupied’ (6.3.1.25-26).Plotinus’ parenthetic clause ei kai chaZepSs should
not be underestimated: he is well aware of the difficulty of such an enterprise.” If we
follow closely Plotinus’ arguments in 6.3 we find moreover that intelligible causes are
introduced, if not directly, at least indirectly, ie. through the internal analysis of sensible
beings. It is the very nature of physical beings that leads us to their extra-physical causes.
Soul and the forms are necessary for the ultimate explanation of things and events in the

de Haas 2001, 505. Although I do not share many of de Haas’ positions, I have profited very much from his
penetrating article. I provide a fuller discussion of it in Chiaradonna 2004.
On Plotinus’ views on the physical world cf. now Wagner 2002 and also the review of this important
collection of articles in Linguiti 2002.
l6 I agree with Kevin Corrigan’s assessment of Plotinus’ discussion: ‘The problem with the theory of categories
in the previous history of interpretation is that it leaves intelligible substance (and this includes soul) out of his
account. One is therefore faced with a de fucto classification, but no principle or intelligible criterion upon which
to ground it’ (Corrigan 1996, 311). I nevertheless do not agree with all of Corrigan’s conclusions: see
Chiaradonna 2002.35-37 and 140 n. 167.
l7 See Chiaradonna 2002,282.
 124 GREEK, ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

corporeal world.I8 That’s why the treatment of substance and quality in 6.3.15 includes
the explicit reference to the logos and to its causal activity:”

And the rational form (logos) of man is the being a ‘something’ ( t i ) , but its product in
the nature of body, being an image of the form, is rather a sort of ‘something like’
(poion t i ) . It is as if, the visible Socrates being a man, his painted picture, being
colours and painted stuff, was called Socrates; in the same way, therefore, since there
is a rational form according to which Socrates is, the perceptible Socrates should not
rightly be said to be Socrates, but colours and shapes which are representations of
those in the form; and this rational form in relation to the truest form of man is
affected in the same way (6.3.15.29-38).

The distinction between the ‘something’ and the ‘something like’ must be traced back to
Plato’s Timaeus (49d-e) and Seventh Letter (343b-c). In these works Plato conceives of
the quality as a category capable of grasping the overall status of the physical world.
Quality is here opposed to the permanent, stable being (the ‘something’). This doctrine is
controversial,” but Plotinus’ way of using it is clear. He associates the ‘something’ with
the logos, ie. with the forming and incorporeal principle of the physical world. According
to Plotinus the logos is an intelligible and extra-physical nature, although it is at the
bottom of the hierarchy of intelligible substances.21This extra-physical forming principle
is the essence. As to the physical embodied form, Plotinus clearly distinguishes its status
(the status of a ‘something like’) from the status of the essence. This implies that there is
no physical embodied and substantial form.
The reasons for such an anti-Aristotelian conclusion emerge after comparing 6.3.15
with 6.1.2-3. In 6.1.2-3 Plotinus maintains that (a) Aristotle’s notion of substance does not
display a genuine unity, but only includes a factual list of disparate characteristics?* (b)
even if Aristotle’s distinctions are right, his philosophy does not provide any foundation
for these distinctions. Aristotle thus maintains that the form is a primary substance
compared with the matter and the composite, and Plotinus agrees, but Aristotle does not
justify the priority of the form:

For they say that all these [matter, form, composite] are substances, but that they are
not equal in respect of substance, when it is said that form is more substance than
matter - quite correctly; but there are those who would say that matter is more
substance (6.1.2.10-12).

Since Aristotle does not explain the nature and the concept of substance, his distinction of
form and matter is vulnerable and its internal hierarchy can be reversed, thus conceiving

Is Cf. Lee 2002. According to Lee, Plotinus nevertheless admits that ‘there is a properly physical drscribing of
the sensible world which can proceed without any overt such appeals to soul or the intelligible’ (38, my italics). I
am inclined to disagree with such a conclusion.
l9 For a detailed commentary of this passage see Chiaradonna 2002, 121 ff. Another crucial reference to the
logos is placed by Plotinus in his discussion of Aristotle’s distinction of first and second substances (cat. 5,
3all-15): see 6.3.9.30-36. I discuss this passage in Chiaradonna 2004.
2o For a balanced account of Plato’s distinction of touto and toiouton in the Timaeus see Brisson 1998, 178-197.
2’Several studies have been devoted to the nature of Plotinus’ logos: see eg. Fattal 1998. The final mention of
the ‘truest form (logos) of man’ in 6.3.15.37 refers to a higher logos in the hierarchy in intelligible substances
(see 2.7.3.14-15).
22In 6.1 Plotinus associates the notion of ‘category’ to such de fact0 collections. On Plotinus’ distinction
between genus and category see de Haas 2001,507ff. and Chiaradonna 2002,SO-89.
 CHIARADONNA: PLOTINUS ON THE CATEGORIES 125

of the matter as ‘more substance’ than the form.” Enn. 6.3.15 answers to this dilemma:
the form is substance in that it is identified with the incorporeal logos, ie. with an extra-
physical substance. The form is therefore substance in that it is not the Aristotelian form.
The physical embodied form is engendered by the logos and it is just an inauthentic being
deprived of substantiality. According to Plotinus, the problem with Aristotle’s theory of
substantial form is that he rightly assumes that the form is substance, but he wrongly
assumes that the substantial form is the physical enmattered form. He does not refer to the
most authentic beings: therefore his own distinctions lack any ground. It is very important
to note that Plotinus does not provide a foundation for Aristotle’s theory in 6.3.15.
Plotinus does not say that if Aristotle’s physical substantial form is conceived of as an
image of the incorporeal logos, then this form can be accepted into the Platonic hierarchy
of beings.% The argument of 6.3.15 runs exactly the other way round: Plotinus explains
why the physical and embodied form cannot be conceived of as substance and is only a
‘something like’, a non-substantial (and not quasi-substantial) image of the real ousia. The
reference to the logos does not provide a Platonic justification for the peripatetic notion of
the physical substantial form, but provides a Platonic ground for rejecting this notion.
In 6.1 Plotinus points out the internal difficulties of Aristotle’s notion of substance. In
6.3 these difficulties are solved through the reference to the logos, ie. outside the
framework of Aristotle’s philosophy. Therefore I think that the logos of 6.3.15 answers
the polemical question of 6.1.2 about the koinon of Aristotle’s divisions of substance.
There is an obvious objection to this interpretation: the forming principle cannot be
conceived of as a common characteristic (a koinon) predicated of matter, embodied form,
and composite, since the logos is different and ontologically prior to all of them.
Therefore 6.3.15 does not answer the questions of 6.1.2. This objection can nonetheless be
easily dismissed in that it does not take account of Plotinus’ polemical strategy. It is
crucial to understand that in 6.1 Plotinus aims at developing an internal criticism of
Aristotle’s categories starting from Aristotelian principles. Therefore Plotinus introduces
his own criticism using Aristotelian notions and terms. This explains why the criticism
about the foundation of substance is expressed in Aristotelian language. Such language
does not explicitly refer to intelligible forming principles, but points to the lack of a
genuine universal capable of including Aristotle’s divisions of substance. It might be true
that in 6.1 ‘the term “genus” is used in the same Aristotelian sense, not in the sense of the
Platonic genus’, but this does not imply that ‘the entire discussion in 6.1 is a serious
attempt to reach an interpretation of the division of beings into ten that accords with
Aristotle’s naming practice in both the Categories and the M e t ~ p h y s i c s ’ . ~ ~
In my opinion Plotinus’ use of Aristotelian concepts in 6.1 is much better understood as
a serious attempt to show Aristotle’s internal contradictions and difficulties in genuine
Aristotelian terms. The answer to such difficulties and contradictions involves the
reference to non-Aristotelian concepts. We find this answer in 6.3. Plotinus takes up again
in 6.3.7 the question about the koinon of matter, form and composite and the answer given
to this problem now clearly leads from the framework of Aristotle’s ontology to the
Platonic-Plotinian theory of vertical causation and degrees of being: ‘For each [of the
three, matter, form and composite] is different as a whole [...I. So here also being is

”Such a conclusion was apparently drawn by the Peripatetic commentator Boethus of Sidon (upud Simpl. In
Cat. 78.18-19).
24Such a position is held eg. by Porphyry who relies on the aristotelizing Middle Platonic tradition. See Zambon
2002, 295-338. In his early treatises Plotinus himself tries to conceive of the Aristotelian embodied substantial
form as the effect of the Platonic logos (see 2.6.2.20 ff). This position is explicitly revised in 6.2.14.14f f see
Chiaradonna 2002, 140.
de Haas 2001,506-07.
 126 GREEK, ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

different in matter and in form, and both together come from one which flows in all sorts
of different ways’ (11 26-30). The mention of the logos at 6.3.15 is a further explanation of
this new doctrinal framework since the logos is explicitly conceived of as the essential
cause of the physical beings%.

(ii) Plotinus’ discussion of Aristotle’s motion displays the same dialectical structure.
Motion plays a crucial role in Plotinus’ division of intelligible and physical genera.
Plotinus’ discussion of noetic motion in 6.2 is based upon Plato’s Sophist and I will not
dicuss it here. Here I aim at clarifying Plotinus’ notion of physical movement in 6.1 and
6.3 and its relation to Aristotle’s Physics. Plotinus explicitly rejects Aristotle’s views:
motion is not homonymous and distributed among the categories, but it is a single,
common genus in the physical world (6.1.15.13 ff.; 6.3.22.35 ff.). The crucial point in
Plotinus’ discussion is - I think - the criticism of the concept of motion as incomplete
actuality (energeia atele^s).n In 6.1.16 Plotinus maintains that motion is in itself a
complete and recursive energeia. Motion as such is outside time and it should be strongly
distinguished from the extended process accomplished by the moving object.=
It is interesting to see how Plotinus comes to this conclusion. He starts from Aristotle’s
concept of motion as incomplete actuality and he then goes on to say that nothing prevents
us from considering actuality as the genus of motion and incomplete as a particularising
difference. In other words, he employs two Aristotelian notions: the account of motion as
energeia ate1C.s and the theory of genus and differentia. Through these notions he
introduces his own conception of movement and the crucial distinction between the
motion in itself, which is a complete actuality and is independent of time, and the
quantitative motion. Quantitative, extended motion is in time, that is, it is dependent and
subsequent: ‘For the incomplete is said about it [ie. about motion], not because it is not
also actuality, but it is altogether actuality, but has also the over and over again, not that it
may arrive at actuality - it is that already, but that it may do something, which is another
thing subsequent to itself [. ..I’ (6.1.16.5-8).
Plotinus’ theory of physical motion is based upon an internal criticism of Aristotle’s
theory of motion and energeia.” This criticism closely resembles the criticism against
substance. Plotinus aims at showing (a) that some basic Aristotelian distinctions lack any
ground and (b) that we can give a satisfying foundation to these distinctions only from
outside the framework of Aristotle’s philosophy, ie. through the reference to the extra-
physical principles of the corporeal world. In Metaph. 9.6 and in Eth. Nic. 10.3 Aristotle
sharply distinguishes the status of kin6seis and the status of energeiai. Energeiai (eg.
pleasure, life and sight) d o not need completion: they are perfect in their nature at every
moment and they do not depend on time. As A. Kosman says, ‘It is [...I because an
actuality is perfectly what it is at each and every moment of its being, that is, does not
need to await any further development to perfect or complete its being, that is perfect at

26 Klaus Wunn and, more recently, Michael Wagner have rightly emphasized this crucial point: ‘For Plotinus,
something’s real existence may be genuinely assured and sufficiently explained only by relating it to his system
of real causes proceeding from his One. The notion of substance - and especially the Aristotelian notion of
substance - is by itself insufficient to do this. For this, the pivotal notion in Plotinus’ understanding of physical
reality isforming principle (logos)’ (Wagner 1996b, 136).
”See Arist. Phys. 3.2, 201b31-32.
28Some studies have been recently devoted to Plotinus’ theory of motion and energeia in 6.1: see Wagner
1996b; Taormina 1999, 101-32; Linguiti 2000.71-76; Natali 1999,211-29. See also O’Meara 1985.
*’Plotinus’ arguments are surprisingly similar to John Ackrill’s famous discussion of Aristotle’s energeiu. This
similarity has often been noticed by recent scholars (eg. Natali 1999, 220 n. 20).
 CHIARADONNA: PLOTINUS ON THE CATEGORIES 127

every present moment’?’ Kingsis (eg. walking) is quite different. It aims at a completion
outside itself, ‘a completion whose realization means the death of that very motion whose
purpose is to bring it about’.31
In 6.1.16 Plotinus replaces Aristotle’s distinction between energeia and kingsis with his
own distinction between the movement in itself (which is energeia and does not need time
in that it is outside time) and movement to a certain extent (which is in time).
Unfortunately this text is rather complex:

And just as what is called actuality does not need time (i), so neither does movement,
but [only] movement to a certain extent (fi EIS TOCJOOTOV K ~ ~ U L Sand ) ; if actuality
is in timelessness (ii), so is movement in that it is in a general way movement. But if
it must be in every way in time because it has acquired the character of continuity,
then sight which does not interrupt its seeing would be in continuity and in time (iii)
(6.1.16.14-19).

Let’s try to clarify this passage. Plotinus seems to maintain that (i) an Aristotelian
energeia does not need time to be completed; (ii) an energeia is timeless (en achrondi);
(iii) Aristotle’s energeia is nevertheless extended in time just as much as motion is
extended. These assumptions lead obviously to the conclusion that Aristotle’s notion of
energeia is contradictory and must be dismissed: it is timeless and in time; it is opposed to
motion and nevertheless shares with motion the same characteristics. Therefore another
distinction emerges in this passage, ie. the Plotinian distinction between the motion in
itself and the extended, empirical motion. Motion is in itself a complete actuality; it does
not need time and is timeless; it is without extension; it is the causal principle (cf.
6.1.16.8) of the phenomenal motion extended in the continua of time and space. Plotinus
suggests that this distinction can replace Aristotle’s notions of kingsis and energeia.
This argument is complicated and controversial. Plotinus finds no difficulty in moving
from (i) (an Aristotelian energeia does not need time) to (ii) (an Aristotelian energeia is
timeless). Such a move is obviously wrong: what does not need time is not necessarily
timeless. Moreover Aristotle does not say that energeiai are outside time; his notion of
actuality only implies that an energeia is what it is independently of the time in which it
takes place?’ Furthermore, there is a patent contradiction between (ii) and (iii)
(timelessness vs. being in time), but not between (i) and (iii) (independence of time vs.
being in time). One can plainly say that something does not need time although it takes
place over a certain extent of time: and that is precisely the case of an Aristotelian
energeia. Plotinus’ polemics seems thus to be based upon a fallacious and captious
inference.
I think that Plotinus’ criticism can be rescued in two ways. (1) Although Aristotle never
says that actualities are ‘in timelessness’, this position is defended in some passages of
Alexander of Aphrodisias’ corpus.33 Plotinus could well base his discussion upon
Alexander’s commentarie~?~ This solution is historically a plausible one, but it does not
properly solve the problem with Plotinus’ argument: one could say that Plotinus bases his

Kosman 1984, 125.

31 Kosman 1984, 127.
3f See Linguiti 2000.61 n. 156.
33 See Alex. Aphr. M a t . 143.31-33.Cf.Christensen de Groot 1983.
34 Plotinus’ use of the Peripatetic and Platonic commentators is confirmed by a famous passage of Porphyry’s
Vita Plotini (14.10-13). The presence of Alexander of Aphrodisias in the Enneads is ubiquitous, see Corrigan
1996.
128 GREEK, ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

polemics upon a wrong interpretation of Aristotle’s energeia defended by someone else.

Another response (2) can nevertheless be found in Plotinus’ polemical strategy.
According to such an interpretation the move from (i) to (ii) does not imply that a genuine
Aristotelian energeia is timeless, but it does imply that an Aristotelian energeia should be
timeless in order to be sufficiently distinguished from motion. In this interpretation
Plotinus’ argument would run as follows. Of course, Aristotle’s energeia does not need
time to attain its perfection, and that’s why it is different from motion. An Aristotelian
energeia takes nevertheless place in time as well as motion. From this point of view
motion and energeia operate at the same level: their distinction is empirical, de facto.
Aristotle simply classifies different empirical phenomena, but he does not give any reason
for his classification. Such a foundation involves a metaphysical difference between the
complete energeia and the incomplete motion: to be prior and complete, energeia must
thus be outside the phenomenal continuum of time where the extended motion takes place.
In order for an Aristotelian energeia to be what it ought to be in a proper sense, it should
be independent of time and timeless: it should be what Plotinus refers to as motion ‘in a
general way’ ( h o i ~ s ) . ~ ~
As before, Plotinus’ position in 6.1 is further developed in 6.3, where the metaphysical
implications of his polemics emerge. At 6.3.23 Plotinus asserts that physical movements
depend on an extra-physical, invisible power or force (dynamis aoratos). Plotinus follows
his own recommendation of 6.3.1.25 and does not mention the soul in his treatment of
physical motion. Nevertheless, in Plotinus’ philosophy the mention of an extra-physical
principle of the phenomenal motion clearly refers to the causative power of In fact,
the absence of an explicit mention of the soul strengthens Plotinus’ polemics. He does not
say that Aristotle’s analysis of the physical motion is wrong because it does not include
the causality of the Platonic soul. This would be a very weak and dogmatic argument.
Instead Plotinus tries to show that the very analysis of physical motion (and substance)
starting from Aristotelian principles leads to the (anti-Aristotelian) assumption of an
extra-physical cause. Soul and logos3’ are thus the Platonic response to genuine
Aristotelian difficulties.

(iii) If Plotinus’ discussion of Aristotle’s view on motion has often been neglected by
modern scholars, the situation is quite different with the discussion of time in 3.7. Despite
the numerous and extensive commentaries on this treatise, the close relation between

35 These remarks clarify the mention of sight in 6.1.16.18. Sight is, in fact, the standard example for an
Aristotelian energeia. But sight is also in continuity and in time. If motion is continuous and is in time (cf. Phys.
6). then also energeia, as Aristotle conceives it, must share the same characteristics. According to Plotinus,
Aristotle’s distinction between energeia and kinesis requires further development. Such a development leads
outside the framework of Aristotle’s theory and is based upon the notion of two movements, the movement in
itself (a complete actuality outside the phenomenal continuum of time) and the empirical movement.
36Cf. O’Meara, 1985. Michael Wagner has recently given an excellent account of Plotinus’ theory of physical
motion. He shows the crucial role played by potency and power in this context: ‘all productive movement is in
reality soul-like movement, Any physical substance which (unlike an artefact, eg., a statue) may causatively or
productively involve itself in actual coming-to-be may do so, in other words, only because it or some part of it
has the requisite essential potential, which [...I is indeed apotency, or power’ (Wagner 1996b. 155).
37 In 6.2.5.12 Plotinus defines soul as the ‘sum’ (kephalaion) of logoi. The ultimate ‘source’ for Plotinus’
distinction between the causative motion of soul and the empirical, corporeal motion is obviously Plato (see esp.
Leg. 10.895e-896b). It is nevertheless very important to notice that Plotinus’ distinction is based upon an internal
criticism of Aristotle’s views: as far as I can see there is no explicit reference to Plato’s L a w s in the analysis of
motion of 6.1 and 3. I agree completely with O’Meara’s assessment of Plotinus’ discussion: ‘Plotinus uses
Aristotle’s distinction between actuality and change in order to express the difference Plato suggests in the Laws
between the primary activities or motion of soul and the secondary corporeal changes that they produce’ (cf.
O’Meara 1985,261).
 CHIARADONNA: PLOTINUS ON THE CATEGORIES 129

Plotinus’ analysis of Aristotle’s theories in 6.1-3 and in 3.7 has not often been noticed.38
Plotinus maintains in 3.7 that eternity is the life of the transcendent Intellect and time is
the life of the hypostasis of soul. Time is subordinate to eternity just as soul is subordinate
to the transcendent Intellect in the hierarchy of beings. Time is therefore an image of
eternity (3.7.1, 19; 3.7.11, 20; 3.7.11, 29; 3.7.13, 24). This famous theory has its source in
Plato’s Timaeus (37 d), although Plotinus’ relation to Plat0 is extremely contro~ersial.~~
Enn. 3.7 contains a long excursus devoted to the previous theories of time (ch. 7-10).
The discussion of Aristotle’s definition of time as number or measure of the physical
motion (Phys. 4.11, 219b2) takes a large part of this excursus and is also developed in
chapters 12 and 13. Plotinus clearly thinks of Aristotle as his major philosophical
opponent. Obviously, Plotinus does respect Aristotle, but this does not imply that he (at
least partially) accepts Aristotle’s views: the role played by Aristotle in Plotinus’
discussions seems rather the role of a privileged polemical target. Through the criticism of
Aristotle’s views on the physical world Plotinus develops something like an indirect and
elenctic proof of his Platonism. He proves Platonism through the refutation of Plato’s
major opponent.
I will try to show that the discussion about time is closely linked to the treatment of
substance and motion in 6.1 and 3. In 3.7.9 and 13 Plotinus maintains that Aristotle does
not manage to grasp the real concept of time, since he only focuses on its empirical,
factual manifestation. Although such a manifestation is linked to physical motion, time is
in itself outside motion. Once again, Aristotle does not satisfy his own criterion for
scientific research, ie. the search for causes. He only describes the world of phenomena,
but he does not recognize the true causes of it: ‘if it is a measure of this kind, then it has
been said what time is a measure of, that it is a measure of movements, but we have not
yet been told what it is in itself‘ (3.7.9.1 1-13).”’’This is the same polemical remark as the
one that Plotinus addresses against Aristotle’s substance in 6.1.3 and against the
distinction of energeia and kin8sis in 6.1.16: Aristotle does not clarify the nature of the
concepts that he introduces!’ In fact, Aristotle makes time depend on an heterogeneous
reality as it is physical movement. Since time is only explained as the measure of
something else, ie. physical motion, and physical motions are different in kind, time will
also be a heterogeneous magnitude without any internal unity (3.7.9.2 ff)?*

38Themost important exception is Wagner 1996a.

39 See Brague 1982,24.
40
See Wagner 1996a. 87: ‘it does not follow that, because the temporal comparability of movements
presupposes time and because it also presupposes that their temporal existence(s) is measurable, therefore time is
(temporal) measurement. For, a temporal measurement is itself a temporally existent phenomenon, and so it also
presupposes time’.
41There is a very difficult point in Plotinus’ polemic: he thinks of Aristotelian time as an abstract measure of
motion and maintains that Aristotle doesn’t explain the nature of such a measure. Aristotle’s view of time is
nonetheless different in a crucial point: time is not an abstract number of motion but is the numbered aspect of
motion. It is therefore not an abstract but a concrete number (see the distinction between numbered number and
number by which we number at Phys. 4.1 1, 219b7-8: time is number in the former sense). Once again, Plotinus
can be defended in two ways: (1) some Aristotelian commentators (esp. Aspasius) emended the text of
Aristotle’s Physics and conceived of time as a numbering number (see Simpl. I n Phys. 714.31-34); (2)
apparently Plotinus thinks that Aristotle’s distinction between numbered and numbering number cannot be
applied to time. I cannot develop this point here; see Gerson 1994,266 n. 49 and Chiaradonna 2003.
42A traditional response to this objection applies the concept of time as measure of motion primarily to the
uniform celestial motion. Plotinus knows this solution but he nevertheless rejects it: even if the heavenly sphere
would come to a stop, ‘we shall measure the duration of its stop by the activity of soul, as long as soul is outside
eternity’ (3.7.12.17-19).
130 GREEK, ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

In 6.1 Plotinus sharply distinguishes motion in itself from motion in extension. The
analysis of time provides a similar distinction. According to Plotinus Aristotle’s notion of
time as measure (or number) of movement fits at best the extended quantitative time, but
not time in itself ‘even if one does discover how it can [measure], one will not discover
time measuring but a certain length of time; and this is not the same thing as time. It is
one thing to say time and another to say a certain length of time; for before saying a
certain length of time one ought to say what it is that is of a certain length’ (3.7.9.46-51).
In 3.7.13.13-23Plotinus notes that the concept of measure is not part of the nature of time.
What we can say is that time (an extra-physical nature) is measured (and thus manifested)
by the physical motion, but such a relation does not work the other way round.
Let’s come back to the distinction between motion and motion in extent. In 6.1.16
motion in itself is conceived of as timeless and without extension. Only quantitative,
phenomenal motion is continuous and in time. This apparently contradicts 3.7, where
motion makes time quantitative. Still I think that it is possible to reconcile Plotinus’
assertions on motion and time in 3.7 and 6.1. When Plotinus says that time in itself is not
the measure of motion, and that the measure of motion only shows a certain length of
time, he refers to the extended motion of 6.1.16 and not to motion in itself. Motion and
time are by nature outside quantitative extension: as Plotinus makes clear in 3.7, both
belong to the hypostasis of ~ 0 ~ 1Only. 4 ~ their phenomenal, empirical manifestations are
quantitative.
In treatises 42-45 Plotinus gives a coherent Platonic account of the physical world. Its
basic phenomena are explained via the reference to their extra-physical causes, ie. logos
and soul. The polemic against Aristotle plays a crucial role in Plotinus’ account of
physical reality. As has often been noticed, Plotinus never proves his Platonic principles:
they are something primitive and explain the world of phenomena. Although this is surely
true, we have in these treatises, esp. in 6.1. something like a dialectical proof of Platonism
through the refutation of Aristotle. For a Platonist there is a crucial move from the
analysis of the corporeal world to the assumption of extra-physical, incorporeal causes.
The refutation of Aristotle starting from Aristotelian principles provides the explanation
for such a move: Platonism thus solves the inconsistencies of a doctrine where intelligible
causes are not included in the explanation of physical reality.

11. Simplicius

In order to assess correctly Plotinus’ place in the ancient commentary tradition, some
supplementary remarks should be devoted to his sources. As for the criticism of
Aristotle’s substance, Simplicius explicitly mentions Plotinus along with the Middle
Platonic philosopher Nicostratus (In Cat. 76.14).As for Plotinus’ criticism of movement,
Simplicius (who is here quoting Iamblichus’ lost commentary on the Categories) ascribes
to the Stoics the same notion of motion as recursive energeia that Plotinus maintains
against Aristotle (In Cat. 307.2 ff.). Finally, in a recent paper Steven Strange has shown
the sources of Plotinus’ discussion of time in the previous commentary tradition on
Aristotle’s Physics.4 It is at least possible that some Plotinian objections go back to
Galen’s arguments against Aristotle opposed by Alexander of Aphrodisias in his short
treatise On Time.45 Despite their different sources, Plotinus’ arguments show an
impressive coherence: Plotinus employs his sources within an unitary framework, ie. his

43 See 3.7.11.15ff.
44 Cf. Strange 1994,23-53. See also Chiaradonna 2003.
45 Cf. Sharples 1982.
 CHIARADONNA: PLOTINUS ON THE CATEGORIES 131

dialectical defence of Platonism against Aristotle’s physicalist view of the corporeal

world.
It is interesting to compare Plotinus’ arguments against Aristotle with the treatment of
these arguments in Simplicius’ commentaries On Categories and On Physics ZV. In his
response to Plotinus, Simplicius certainly exploits the previous Neoplatonic commentary
tradition, especially the monumental (and now lost) commentaries written by Porphyry
and Iamblichus. Concetta Luna has recently provided an outstanding analysis of
Simplicius’ relation to the ancient commentary tradition on the Categories.&Many points
are controversial (eg. the difference between Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’ exegetical
methods, the reliability of Simplicius’ assessment of the other Neoplatonic
commentator^^^ the identification of Simplicius’ sources, etc.). These important points
fall outside the scope of this paper. As I have tried to show elsewhere, there seems to be a
coherence in the basic principles of the Neoplatonic post-Plotinian exegesis of Aristotle.
In my opinion this unity depends on Porphyry’s effort to harmonize (against Plotinus’
polemics) Aristotle’s doctrines into the corpus of Platonism.@ Of course, such an
integration was pursued in very different ways by the post-Plotinian commentators, and
this depends eg. on the differences between Porphyry’s and Iamblichus’ exegetical
methods. I nevertheless think that the common effort to build up a platonizing image of
Aristotle (or at least of Aristotle’s views on the physical world) clearly distinguishes the
Neoplatonic commentators from Plotinus. If, as R. Sorabji has pointed out, ‘the harmony
of Plato and Aristotle was accepted to a larger or smaller extent by all commentators in
the Neoplatonist traditi~n’,~’ Plotinus does not share this common attitude. That is the
reason why I fully agree with H. D. Saffrey’s masterly interpretation of the history of
Later Platonism.MFocusing on the exegesis of the Chaldean Oracles, Saffrey notes that
Plotinus is ‘une ile dans le courant de la tradition plat~nicienne’~’and it is reasonable to
conceive of post-Plotinian Platonism as a unity. The reception of Aristotle’s views on the
categories and the physical world provides a further proof for this historical hypothesis.”
In the short overview that follows I will deliberately focus on Simplicius, and I will leave
out eg. Porphyry’s and Dexippus’ extant commentaries on Categories, since Simplicius
provides the clearest account of a common exegetical tendency. This obviously does not
mean that we find the same arguments in Porphyry, Dexippus and Simplicius.a
Simplicius’ responses to Plotinus (whatever their sources may be) display the same
coherence that we find in Plotinus’ objections. While Plotinus points to the internal
difficulties of Aristotle’s position and comes through this criticism to a Platonic solution,
Simplicius reaffirms the theories that Plotinus rebuts. Of course, this Peripatetic account
of the physical world should be integrated into the wider framework of Neoplatonic
metaphysics. Simplicius thinks that Aristotle’s theories are perfectly valid in their own
domain and they also agree with Platonism, if they are understood correctly. As

Cf. Luna 2001.

47The question about the reliability of Simplicius’ assessment of the previous commentators has been raised by
de Haas 200 1.
See Chiaradonna 1998 and 2002.
49 Sorabji 1990b, 3.
so See Saffrey’s two fundamental collections of papers, Saffrey 1990 and 2000.
Cf. Saffrey 1988, p. 29 in the reprinted version.
’*Saffrey 1992 tackles the problem of the disagreement between Plotinus’ and Porphyry’sviews on Cutegorib
According to Hadot 1974 the differences between Dexippus’ and Simplicius’ commentaries should be traced
back to the lost big commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories by Porphyry (the source of Dexippus) and
Iamblichus (the source of Simplicius). This hypothesis has been recently challenged by Luna 2001,768-74.
132 GREEK, ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

Simplicius says in his famous introduction to his commentary on the Categories, in

dealing with Aristotle’s attacks on Plato one should not consider only the philosopher’s
language and complain about their discord, but rather one should concentrate on their
thought and seek out their accord on most matters (7.29-32).%That’s the reason why
Simplicius often criticizes Plotinus for misunderstanding the genuine sense of Aristotle’s
assertions.
As for the discussion of substance, Simplicius begins his attack on Nicostratus and
Plotinus reaffirming that ‘the discussion is about sensible and natural substance and about
the [substance] in it which is apprehensible by discursive reasoning’ (76.18-20).” After a
quotation from Archytas, Simplicius adds that ‘to raise the problems about the substance
common to intelligible and sensible substances has no place in the present discussion’
(76.22-23). This preliminary assertion does not prevent Simplicius (or his source) from a
long development concerning the hierarchy of sensible and intelligible substances in the
following lines. Such a hierarchy is Platonic as well as Aristotelian, and can be seen as a
good example of Iamblichus’ intelligible exegesis (noera thedria) of Aristotle.%
Simplicius’ response to Plotinus’ remark on the nature and concept of the substance is
very instructive. As we have seen at the beginning of this paper, Plotinus says in 6.1.3 that
the peculiar properties of the Aristotelian sensible substance do not make clear the
concept and nature of substance. Simplicius’ response is simple: Plotinus is wrong
because he demands a definition of a summum genus, ie. ousia: ‘one must know this, that
it is not possible to provide accurate definitions of the highest genera, but the statements
about them rather resemble a suggestion (hupomn2sis) and description (hupographg) [...].
So it suffices also to give some distinguishing feature concerning them from which it is
possible to know what they are’ (119.26-30). Plotinus was nevertheless well aware that a
summum genus cannot be properly defined in Aristotelian terms (cf. 6.3.22.18-20).
Simplicius here employs a scholastic argument against Plotinus. He does not grasp the
meaning of Plotinus’ criticism and its wider implications (or he is not interested in it), but
is content with a scholastic response which reaffirms the good Peripatetic position against
Plotinus’ misunderstanding.
We find the same attitude in Simplicius’ treatment of motion. Simplicius quotes a long
passage from Iamblichus where Plotinus’ conception of motion as complete energeia is
rejected on Aristotelian grounds. Iamblichus emphasizes the incomplete character of
motion and radically opposes kingsis and energeia: ‘If, therefore, movement strives
towards its goal because it comes into being for the sake of that, and does not yet possess
it within itself, and [if], on the other hand, operation [energeia] stands fast at the goal,
being full of itself and its own perfection, then what is entirely perfect will not have any
community of nature with what strives towards perfection’ (304.2-6).” As Irma Croese
has shown in her dissertation, Iamblichus seems to ascribe in this passage the peculiarities
of the Platonic intelligible being to the Aristotelian energeia.= This attitude fits well with
Iamblichus’ platonizing exegetical methods. His defence of Aristotle against Plotinus can
nevertheless also be seen as a mere reaffirmation of the Peripatetic orthodox views on
motion against Plotinus. As we have seen in the case of substance, Plotinus’ arguments
are rejected rather than discussed. Iamblichus does not pick up the dialectical criticism of

54Cf. Blumenthal 1976, p. 306 in the reprinted version. On Simplicius’ harmonizing exegesis of Plato and
Aristotle see Hadot 1990.
’’I am quoting from de Haas and Fleet 2001.
56 Cf. Dillon 1997; Cardullo 1997.
57 I am quoting from Gaskin 2000
See Croese 1998, 134.
 CHIARADONNA: PLOTINUS ON THE CATEGORIES 133

the Aristotelian distinction between kingsis and energeia. He reaffirms the position
criticized by Plotinus without engaging in a real discussion with Plotinus’ arguments.”
In his commentary on Physics ZV, Simplicius gives a short response to Plotinus remarks
at 3.7.9. As we have seen in the previous section, one objection raised by Plotinus
concerns the existence of different kinds of physical motion (regular, irregular, quick and
slow). Time cannot be therefore conceived of as the measure of motion, because no
unitary measure can number these different kinds of motion. These remarks lead
immediately to Plotinus’ main point: time cannot be conceived of as the measure of
motion, because we don’t make clear through this definition what it is in itself, but only
what it is the measure of (3.7.9.10-12).Time is in itself independent of all kinds of
physical motion (also of celestial regular motion: cf. 3.7.12.15ff). As Werner Beierwaltes
rightly notes, Simplicius replies to Plotinus ‘im Sinne des Aristoteles’.60 He does not
discuss Plotinus’ objection about the nature of time, but maintains that time measures
primarily uniform change: ‘Perhaps, as uniform, continuous and ordered change has a pre-
eminent existence, from which irregular and disorganised change is derivative, so uniform
change is measured pre-eminently by time and irregular change in a secondary sense’
(769.11-15).6’

111. Conclusion

This short overview should make clear the difference between Plotinus’ and Simplicius’
treatment of Aristotle. Plotinus develops a dialectical defence of Platonism against
Aristotle. He exploits the internal difficulties of the Aristotelian positions and provides a
Platonic solution for these difficulties. He replaces Aristotle’s theory of the sensible
substance with his theory of the substantial logos; he replaces the aporetic kingsis-
energeia distinction with his theory of motion as complete actuality and with the crucial
distinction between motion and motion in extent; he replaces Aristotle’s account of time
as number of motion with his conception of time in itself as the life of the soul. According
to Plotinus Aristotle’s theories are simple de fact0 descriptions of the physical world
without. any real principle. We can find such principles outside the framework of
Aristotle’s theories, ie. in the Platonic theory of intelligible causes. It is important to
notice that such principles do not justify Aristotle’s distinctions, but only make clear why
they are incomplete and fallacious. Simplicius and his sources rebut Plotinus’ arguments.
Aristotle’s views on the categories and the physical world are part of their Platonism.
Their reply to Plotinus is nevertheless a mere reaffirmation of the Aristotelian theories
rather than a true discussion of Plotinus’ criticism.
I have pointed to the difference between Plotinus and Neoplatonic commentators. There
seems nonetheless to be an analogy between Plotinus’ discussion and John Philoponus’
rejection of Aristotle. It is extremely interesting to notice that Simplicius reacts in the
same way to the arguments of Plotinus and Philoponus. Michael Wolff‘s assessment of
Simplicius’ polemics against Philoponus fits in fact very well with the general character
of the arguments against Plotinus: ‘Philoponus [as well as Plotinus, I would say] is fully

59 See the penetrating remarks of Brthier 1963, 25: Iamblichus’ objections to Plotinus ‘contiennent seulement
I’tnonct des thbses aristottliciennes discuttes par Plotin et ne visent pas du tout les objections qu’il y afaites’.
Beienvaltes 1981,230.
I am quoting from Urmson 1992. Simplicius’ discussion of Plotinus’ 3.7 in the Corollarium de tempore
displays the same intention to harmonize Aristotle with Platonic metaphysical principles: see eg. the remark
concerning the - according to Simplicius - similar role played by soul in Aristotle’s and Plotinus’ theories of
time (InPhys. 792.13-15).
134 GREEK, ARABIC, AND LATIN COMMENTARIES

aware that his own presuppositions diverge from Aristotle’s’. He ‘shows that in his
opinion these presuppositions can be defended with arguments against Aristotle, whereas
Simplicius does not seem even to notice them, much less attack them’.62 A detailed
comparison of Plotinus’ and Philoponus views on the physical world is a desideratum for
future scholarship.a I am inclined to think that a detailed investigation on this topic could
provide new insights into the history of Later Ancient Philosophy.

CNR Rome

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