Game Theory

Mixed strategy

Section 02 Eng. Ibrahim Ghonimi

 Decision Making

Under Under
Under Risk Certainity Uncertainity

Non Competitive situations

Competitive
Situations (Games Theory)

Pure Strategy Mixed Strategy

(Saddle Point exist)

Algebraic Arithmetic Graphical

Method Method Method
 Mixed Strategy Game “Algebraic Method”

 Example 1
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.

Player 2
A B
A 5 2
Player 1
B 3 4
 Mixed Strategy Game “Algebraic Method”
Example 1

Player 2 Minimum
Of rows
A B
A 5 2 2
Player 1
B 3 4 3 Maximin

Maximum
Of Columns 5 4
Minimax

4 = 3 There is no Saddle Point

 Mixed Strategy Game “Algebraic Method”
Example 1

Player 2
A B
P A 5 2 1/4
Player 1
1-P B 3 4 3/4
𝑝∗5+ 1−𝑝 ∗3=𝑝∗2+ 1−𝑝 ∗4=𝑉
1 1 3
P= 1-P = 1 − =
4 4 4
1 3 7
Game Value = 5 * ( )+3 * ( ) =
4 4 2
𝟏 𝟑
Optimum Strategy for Player 1 is ( , ) , Player 1 should play strategy A = 25% and B = 75%
𝟒 𝟒
 Mixed Strategy Game “Algebraic Method”
Example 1
Player 2
1-
A B
Player A 5 2
1 B 3 4
1/2 1/2
𝑞∗5+ 1−𝑞 ∗2=𝑞∗3+ 1−𝑞 ∗4=𝑉
1 1 1
=
2
1- = 1 − =
2 2
1 1 7
Game Value = 5 * ( )+2 * ( ) =
2 2 2
𝟏 𝟏
Optimum Strategy for Player 2 is ( , ) , Player 2 should play strategy A = 50% and B = 50%
𝟐 𝟐
 Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”

 Example 2
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.

Player 2
A B
A 5 2
Player 1
B 3 4
 Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 2

Player 2 Minimum
Of rows
A B
A 5 2 2
Player 1
B 3 4 3 Maximin

Maximum
Of Columns 5 4
Minimax

4 = 3 There is no Saddle Point

 Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 2

Player 2
Oddments
A B
Neglect negative sign
P A 5 2 3-4= -1
Player 1
1-P B 3 4 5-2= 3

1 1
P= = 1
1-P = 1 − =
3
1+3 4 4 4

1 3 7
Game Value = 5 * ( )+3 * ( ) =
4 4 2
𝟏 𝟑
Optimum Strategy for Player 1 is ( , ) , Player 1 should play strategy A = 25% and B = 75%
𝟒 𝟒
 Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 2
Player 2
1-
A B
Player A 5 2
1 B 3 4
2 1
q= =
2+2 2
Oddments
2 – 4 = -2 5–3=2
1 1
1-q = 1 − =
Neglect negative sign 2 2

1 1 7
Game Value = 5 * ( )+2 * ( ) =
2 2 2
𝟏 𝟏
Optimum Strategy for Player 2 is ( , ) , Player 2 should play strategy A = 50% and B = 50%
𝟐 𝟐
 Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”

 Example 3
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.

Player 2
A B
A 2 -1
Player 1
B -1 0
 Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 3

Player 2 Minimum
Of rows
A B
A 2 -1 -1
Player 1 Maximin
B -1 0 -1
Maximum
Of Columns 2 0
Minimax

0 = -1 There is no Saddle Point

 Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 3

Player 2
Oddments
A B
Neglect negative sign
P A 2 -1 -1 -0 = -1
Player 1
1-P B -1 0 2- (-1)= 3

1 1
P= = 1
1-P = 1 − =
3
1+3 4 4 4

1 3 1
Game Value = 2 * ( )+ -1 * ( ) =
4 4 4
𝟏 𝟑
Optimum Strategy for Player 1 is ( , ) , Player 1 should play strategy A = 25% and B = 75%
𝟒 𝟒
 Mixed Strategy Game “Arithmetic Method”
Example 3
Player 2
1-
A B
Player A 2 -1
1 B -1 0
2 1
q= =
2+2 4
Oddments
-1 – 0 = -1 2 – (-1) = 3
1 3
1-q = 1 − =
Neglect negative sign 4 4

1 3 1
Game Value = 2 * ( )+ -1 * ( ) =
4 4 4
𝟏 𝟑
Optimum Strategy for Player 2 is ( , ) , Player 2 should play strategy A = 25% and B = 75%
𝟒 𝟒
 Mixed Strategy Game
 Example 4
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.

Player 2
A B
A 9 7
Player 1
B 5 11
 Dominance Property In Game Theory
 Example 5
Find the value of the game for this payoff matrix.

Maximin

2
2≠4
0

Minimax 5 6 5 4

There is no saddle point in this game and each player has more than two strategy.
Elimination By Dominance

R≤R
C≥C
 Player B
q 1-q
3 4

P 2 2 4
Player A
1-P 4 5 2

Probability of player A Probability of player B

𝑝∗2+ 1−𝑝 ∗5=𝑝∗4+ 1−𝑝 ∗2 𝑞∗2+ 1−𝑞 ∗4= 𝑞∗5+ 1−𝑞 ∗2

2
P=
3 q=
5
5
2 1
1-p = 1 − =
3 2 1-q = 1 − =
3 5
5 5

2 1
V=
3
∗2
2
+ ∗ 5 = 3.2 V = ∗ 2 + ∗ 4 = 3.2
5 5
5 5
3 2 2 3
The strategy of player A =[0, ,0 ] The strategy of player B = [0,0 , ]
5 5 5 5
 Thank You!

Section 02 Eng. Ibrahim Ghonimi