Risk analysis of islanding of

photovoltaic power systems

within low voltage
distribution networks

Task V
Report IEA-PVPS T5-08: 2002
March 2002
 IEA PVPS
International Energy Agency
Implementing Agreement on Photovoltaic Power Systems

TASK V
Grid Interconnection of Building Integrated
and Other Dispersed Photovoltaic Power Systems

Report IEA PVPS T5-08: 2002

RISK ANALYSIS OF ISLANDING OF PHOTOVOLTAIC

POWER SYSTEMS WITHIN LOW VOLTAGE
DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS

March 2002

Authors:

Neil Cullen Jim Thornycroft Alan Collinson

Freelance Consultant Halcrow Group Ltd EA Technology
Hillside House Burderop Park Capenhurst Technology Park
Swindon, UK Swindon, UK Chester, UK
SN1 3QA. SN4 0QD. CH1 6ES.

[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

To obtain additional copies of this report or information on other

IEA-PVPS publications, contact the IEA website: http://www.iea.org
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page i

CONTENTS
FOREWORD................................................................................................................................. II

ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS................................................................................................. II

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.......................................................................................................... III

1 INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................1
1.1 Objectives of the Report.....................................................................................................1

2 PROBABILITY OF ISLANDING.........................................................................................2
2.1 Background ........................................................................................................................2
2.2 The Power Island Zone.......................................................................................................2
2.3 Stability of a Power Island .................................................................................................3
2.4 Load/Generation Match......................................................................................................4
2.5 Loss of Mains Protection and Islanding Detection ............................................................4

3 RISK ASSESSMENT OF ISLANDING USING IEC STD 61508 .......................................5

3.1 Safety Integrity Levels .......................................................................................................6
3.2 PV Risk Analysis ‘Fault Tree’ ...........................................................................................7
4 LV DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS ......................................................................................8
4.1 Types and characteristics of distribution network..............................................................8
4.3 P(LOM) – The Probability of Loss of Mains Supply.........................................................8
4.4 P(Match) – The Probability of Load/Generation Match ....................................................9
5 INVERTER ..........................................................................................................................13
5.1 Inverter Risk Analysis Fault Tree ....................................................................................13
5.2 Protection Failure .............................................................................................................13
5.3 Incorrect Installation.........................................................................................................14
5.4 Islanding Non-Detection Zone (NDZ) .............................................................................14
6 OPERATORS.......................................................................................................................16
6.1 Network Operators ...........................................................................................................16
6.2 Customer ..........................................................................................................................16
7 ISLANDING AND RISK ....................................................................................................17

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS...............................................................21

REFERENCES................................................................................................................................I

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................... II

APPENDIX A: TABLE OF RELATIVE RISK........................................................................... III

LIST OF IEA PVPS TASK V PARTICIPANTS:........................................................................IV

 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page ii

FOREWORD
The International Energy Agency (IEA), founded in November 1974, is an autonomous body
within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) which carries out a comprehensive programme of energy co-operation among its 22
member countries. The European Commission also participates in the work of the Agency.

The IEA Photovoltaic Power Systems Programme (PVPS) is one of the collaborative R&D
agreements established within the IEA, and since 1993 its participants have conducted various
joint projects on the photovoltaic conversion of solar energy into electricity.

The twenty-two members are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, European Commission,
Finland, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.

This report has been prepared under the supervision of PVPS Task V by:

Neil Cullen Jim Thornycroft Alan Collinson

Freelance Consultant Halcrow EA Technology
Hillside House Burderop Park Capenhurst Technology Park
Swindon, UK Swindon, UK Chester, UK
SN1 3QA. SN4 0QD. CH6 5SD.
[email protected] [email protected] [email protected]
Tel: +44 (0) 1793 345 659 Tel: +44 (0) 1793 812 479 Tel: +44 (0) 151 347 2396

in co-operation with experts of the following countries:

Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, United
Kingdom and United States and approved by the Executive Committee of the PVPS programme.

The report expresses as accurately as possible the international consensus of opinion on the
subjects addressed.

ABSTRACT AND KEYWORDS

The purpose of this study was to apply formal risk analysis techniques to the issue of islanding
of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks. The aim was to
perform a first pass calculation to determine the additional level of risk that islanding could
present to the safety of customers and network maintenance staff. In the event of a loss of
mains supply, grid-connected PV systems are required to automatically disconnect from the grid
in order to prevent the network from islanding. This study has identified the reliability required
of the islanding detection and control systems and their installation, based on standard
procedures for developing a safety assurance strategy.

Keywords: Photovoltaics, islanding, risk analysis, probability, safety, low voltage networks,
grid connected, non-detection zone, installation, safety integrity level
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The International Energy Agency (IEA) Implementing Agreement on Photovoltaic Power
Systems (PVPS) Task V Working Group is entitled: “Grid Interconnection of Building
Integrated and Other Dispersed Photovoltaic Power Systems" and since its formation in 1993
has investigated grid interconnection issues through international collaboration. The main
objective was to develop and verify technical requirements which may serve as technical
guidelines for grid interconnection of building integrated and other dispersed PV systems. The
development of technical guidelines will enable safe and reliable interconnection of PV systems
to the utility grid at the lowest possible cost.

It is generally accepted that grid interconnection of photovoltaic (PV) power generation systems
enables effective utilisation of the generated power from PV. However, technical requirements
of both the utility power system grid and the PV system must be satisfied to ensure the safety of
the PV operator and the reliability of the utility grid. Clarifying the technical requirements for
grid interconnection and solving the problems are therefore very important issues for the
widespread application of grid-connected PV systems. The requirements for grid-connected
systems are closely related to the configuration and operational regime of the power distribution
system, which are often country-specific. However, one of the technical issues of concern that
is common to all network operators around the world is that of islanding.

The purpose of this study was to apply formal risk analysis techniques to the issue of islanding
of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks. The aim was to
perform a first pass calculation to determine the additional level of risk that islanding could
present to the safety of customers and network maintenance staff. In the event of a loss of mains
supply, grid-connected PV systems are required to automatically disconnect from the grid in
order to prevent the network from islanding. This study has identified the reliability required of
the islanding detection and control systems and their installation, based on standard procedures
for developing a safety assurance strategy.

The main conclusions from the study are:

• The “benchmark” risk that already exists for network operators and customers is of the order
of 10-6 per year for an individual person
• The risk of electric shock associated with islanding of PV systems under worst-case PV
penetration scenarios to both network operators and customers is typically <10-9 per year
• Thus, the additional risk presented by islanding does not materially increase the risk that
already exists as long as the risk is managed properly
• Loss of mains (LOM) protection functionality provides additional safety, up to a point:
• An inverter’s designed safety integrity level (SIL) affects the level of risk
• The quality of the installation and any subsequent maintenance will also affect the risk
• There is a need to inform and educate both network operators and customers about the
implications of the use of PV as an embedded micro-generator, as PV systems become more
widespread.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page iv

It is recommended that:

• Since LOM functionality is included in many PV inverters already, it is appropriate to

maintain this requirement, but emphasis should be put on simple, robust, verifiable and cost-
effective solutions (e.g: software-based).

• The findings of this report should be:

i) incorporated into the training and education programmes of network operators and PV
system installers

ii) reviewed by appropriate interconnection standards working groups

iii) publicised in appropriate professional institutional journals and subjected to thorough

public peer review
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 1

1 INTRODUCTION
Task V is a technical working group of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Implementing
Agreement on Photovoltaic Power Systems (PVPS). The title of the working group is “Grid
Interconnection of Building Integrated and Other Dispersed Photovoltaic Power Systems.”

The main objective of Task V is to develop and verify technical requirements that may serve as
technical guidelines for the network interconnection of building-integrated and other dispersed
photovoltaic (PV) systems. These technical guidelines are intended to ensure the safe, reliable
and low-cost interconnection of PV systems to the electric power network.

It is generally accepted that grid interconnection of photovoltaic (PV) power generation systems
enables effective utilisation of the generated power from PV. However, technical requirements
of both the utility power system grid and the PV system must be satisfied to ensure the safety of
the PV operator and the reliability of the utility grid [1]. Clarifying the technical requirements
for grid interconnection and solving the problems are therefore very important issues for the
widespread application of grid-connected PV systems. The requirements for grid-connected
systems are closely related to the configuration and operational regime of the power distribution
system, which are often country-specific [2]. However, one of the technical issues of concern
that is common to all network operators around the world is that of unintentional power islands,
commonly referred to as islanding [3]. This phenomenon is common to all embedded
generation and not just PV.

It is the role of distribution network operators to provide a reliable, secure and safe power
network that meets certain performance criteria and at a reasonable cost to its customers.
Traditionally, these customers have been almost exclusively “demand” customers. However,
the general liberalisation of the electricity industry which is taking place globally means that
small generators now have certain rights to connect their generators to the distribution network
in many countries. This right normally has to be balanced by the costs associated with
connection.

The occurrence of unintentional power islands within distribution networks is of major concern
to network operators. Islanding impacts on many of the operational and safety requirements of
networks to both network maintenance operations and customers and therefore network
operators are keen to ensure that islanding cannot occur.

1.1 Objectives of the Report

The purpose of this study was to apply formal risk analysis techniques to the issue of islanding
of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks. The aim was to
perform a first pass calculation to determine the additional level of risk that islanding could
present to the safety of customers and network maintenance staff. In the event of a loss of mains
supply, grid-connected PV systems are required to automatically disconnect from the grid in
order to prevent the network from islanding. This study has identified the reliability required of
the islanding detection and control systems and their installation, based on standard procedures
for developing a safety assurance strategy. In addition to design issues, the study outlines other
issues which must be included in system assessment, approval and management in order to
ensure adequate safety.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 2

2 PROBABILITY OF ISLANDING

2.1 Background
Islanding of inverter-connected PV-generator systems means “… any situation where the
source of power from the network operator’s distribution system is disconnected from the
network section in which the generator is connected, and one or more inverters maintain a
supply to that section of the distribution system or consumer’s installation” [4].

Thus, in the event of a loss of mains supply, grid-connected PV systems are required to
automatically disconnect from the grid in order to prevent the power network from islanding.
Many techniques, using either active or passive detection methods, have been developed over
the years. A comprehensive review of loss of mains detection techniques is contained in a
complementary IEA report [5].

This study has considered the risk of islanding to operators as a combination of the probability
of load/generation match combined with the simultaneous loss of mains supply and the failure
of the protection to detect the island on demand, i.e.

• Risk(islanding) = P(match) * P(LOM) * P(protection failure) [2.1]

The probability of the loss of mains supply, P(LOM), can be estimated reasonably accurately
from existing data. In this study, actual data relating to the probability of power outage in
typical UK distribution systems is used in conjunction with estimates for the frequency of
maintenance operations carried out by network maintenance staff.

However, the probability of load/generation match, P(match) is harder to define, therefore more
information is needed. This information has been provided by a parallel study carried out as
part of the co-ordinated IEA PVPS Task V activities in the form of a comprehensive Dutch
study examining probability of load/generation match [6].

The third component in the risk analysis is the failure of the protection. The probability of the
protection failing to detect an island is a function of several factors:

• the islanding detection method (e.g. non-detection zone),

• the inverter designed safety integrity level (SIL), as well as
• the quality of the installation.

Before examining the risk analysis of islanding in detail, it is important to answer some
fundamental questions, such as:

• what is the boundary for a power island?

• how long does islanding have to occur to be a problem?
• how close a match between load & generation is needed to produce an island?
• how can an inverter reduce the risk of islanding occurring to an appropriate level?

2.2 The Power Island Zone

Given the definition of islanding above, power island zones could exist within any of the
domains illustrated in Figure 1, ranging from a single house to a whole section of network up to
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 3

the distribution transformer and including a single phase or multiple phases.

Figure 1: Potential Power Island Zones

However, the boundary for an island is likely to conform to the following constraints:

i) occur under no-fault conditions

ii) every switch/fuse/breaker forms a possible boundary
iii) a ‘single house’ island would not normally concern network operators, since the public
network is not energised, and therefore will not affect network maintenance staff. However,
network operators do have a ‘duty of care’ towards their customers to ensure adequate
provisions for their safe use of the network and so some consideration is required of a power
island consisting of a single house.

Under these constraints, the most likely island boundary on the public network will be at the
distribution transformer fuse (LV side or MV side). For a single house, the most likely island
boundary is at the consumer unit (e.g. cut-out fuse, MCB or main switch).

2.3 Stability of a Power Island

The stability of a power island is governed by how long it is able to sustain itself. For the
purposes of this study we define three states of island stability:

i) unstable island – an island condition that lasts for less than 5 seconds
ii) quasi-stable island – an island condition that lasts for 5 to 60 seconds
iii) stable island – an island condition lasting longer than 60 seconds

In this study, it is assumed that unstable islands (i.e. islands lasting < 5 seconds) do not present a
significant risk, since there is a natural human response time delay between disconnecting an
electrical circuit and performing any manual work on the disconnected circuit.

Similarly, the results of the Dutch study has shown that islanding conditions are unlikely to
persist for >60 seconds and so islands of duration longer than one minute are also not considered
in order to simplify the analysis.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 4

Thus, data related to “quasi-stable” islands has been extracted from the Dutch data for the
purposes of this study.

2.4 Load/Generation Match

The probability of load/generation match conditions being met at any time is a function of the
load/generation match criteria. The match criteria depends on the degree of closeness required
to be considered as “matched”. It also depends on the parameters that need to be considered to
be matched, such as load/generation current, real power and reactive power.

2.5 Loss of Mains Protection and Islanding Detection

The risks associated with islanding can be reduced if the inverter has the ability to detect a loss
of mains supply. Many islanding detection methods have been developed, where each method
has its own inherent strengths and weaknesses. However, the detection of a loss of mains
supply can never be absolute. For example, many of the detection methods have a “non-
detection zone” (NDZ), where under certain conditions the loss of mains supply cannot be
detected. In practice, designers strive to make the NDZ as small as practically possible.

There are other factors that also limit the practical ability of the protection to detect loss of
mains. These include the inherent designed safety integrity level (SIL) of the inverter and also
the installation and commissioning procedures for the PV inverter system.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 5

3 RISK ASSESSMENT OF ISLANDING USING IEC STD 61508

An appropriate standard for assessment of risk in this type of system, is the 1998 CEI/IEC
International standard 61508: “Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable
electronic safety-related systems” [7]. This is based on the concept of a ‘Risk Graph’ as
illustrated by Figure 2 of the standard shown below:

W3 W2 W1
cA x1
a --- ---
x2
PA 1 a ---
Starting point for
risk reduction cB FA x3
PB
estimation
FB PA 2 1 a

cC FA PB x4
3 2 1
FB PA
Generalised
arrangement (in
PB x5 4 3 2
practical
implementations
cD FA
the arrangement is PA
specific to the FB
applications to be PB x6 b 4 3
covered by the risk
graph)
a = no special safety requirements
C = Consequence risk parameter --- = no safety requirements
F = Frequency and exposure time risk parameter b = A single E/E/PES is not sufficient
P = Possibility of failing to avoid hazard risk parameter 1,2,3,4 = Safety Integrity Level (SIL)
W = Probability of the unwanted occurrence

Figure 2 ‘Risk graph: general scheme’ from IEC 61508 - 5 Standard (1998) [7]

The decision process starts from the left. Potential consequences are considered (e.g. minor
damage CA to multiple deaths CD). Then the likelihood is assessed of someone actually being
exposed to the risk of these consequences at the time of the failure, either FA for safety or FB for
exposure (e.g. how long does the dangerous condition persist and how likely is it that someone
is working on the system when the fault occurs?). Then the possibility of mitigation or
avoidance (e.g. rubber gloves) is assessed, PA for successful avoidance and PB for ineffective
precautions.

Finally, the user decides on the acceptability of a given frequency of occurrence of the undesired
events. W3 represents a low acceptable frequency, and W1 a relatively higher acceptable
frequency. The table on the right then enables the appropriate safety integrity level (SIL) to be
chosen, from ‘a’, ‘no special safety requirements’, through SIL 1 to 4, to ‘b’ (= think again
about how to ensure acceptable safety).

Other parts of IEC 61508, and comparable documents, sometimes use the same approach but
instead of specifying an SIL and leaving the designer to find a method of achieving it, actually
give a prescriptive method, or choice of methods, by which the SIL can be achieved.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 6

3.1 Safety Integrity Levels

The ‘Safety Integrity Levels’ (SILs) in CEI/IEC 61508 are defined for two modes of operation:

• Continuous or ‘High’ demand operation

• ‘Low’ demand operation

For the continuous or ‘high’ demand mode of operation , the probability of a dangerous failure
is determined on a “per hour” basis. For ‘low’ demand, the probability of a dangerous failure is
determined on the basis of failure ‘on demand’. The probabilities of failure for high demand
and low demand modes of operation are given in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively.

Safety Integrity Level High Demand or Continuous Mode of Operation

(Probability of a dangerous failure per hour)
4 ≥ 10-9 to < 10-8
3 ≥ 10-8 to < 10-7
2 ≥ 10-7 to < 10-6
1 ≥ 10-6 to < 10-5

Table 1: Safety Integrity Level – High Demand or Continuous Mode of Operation

Safety Integrity Level Low Demand Mode of Operation

(Probability of failure to perform its design
function on demand)
4 ≥ 10-5 to < 10-4
3 ≥ 10-4 to < 10-3
2 ≥ 10-3 to < 10-2
1 ≥ 10-2 to < 10-1

Table 2: Safety Integrity Level – Low Demand Mode of Operation

The two measures of reliability are equivalent if the number of demands made on the system is
approximately 1 per year. This can be seen as there are 0.8760 x 104 hours per year. For our risk
study, we have used the data for “performance on demand”.

The actual number of undesired consequences which is considered acceptable will depend on
the severity of the consequences. For instance, if each system failure resulted in multiple deaths,
or even a single death, then a higher SIL would be sought. Conversely, if only minor damage to
inexpensive equipment was the result, a lower SIL might be acceptable.

IEC 61608-5, i.e. Part 5 of the Standard, describes a process of arriving at the appropriate SIL
for a particular system, in accordance with the philosophy illustrated above, with the objective
of achieving a risk which is ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ (ALARP) [8,9]. The same
approach is proposed in a number of related national standards.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 7

3.2 PV Risk Analysis ‘Fault Tree’

The ‘fault tree’ method used to structure the PV risk analysis in this study is based on the IEC
61805 risk graph methodology. In this case we are initially able to consider the distribution
network and the PV inverter separately to identify the potential for islanding and then assess
how this impacts on the risk to operators (i.e. network operator maintenance staff and domestic
customers). This methodology is illustrated in Figure 3.

NETWORK
AND

ISLANDING AND
INVERTER

RISK

OPERATOR

Figure 3: PV Islanding Risk Analysis Fault Tree

• Network – load/generation match and loss of mains supply

• Inverter – inverter protection does not detect loss of mains
• Operator – operator touches conductor

Figure 3 indicates that for an island to occur there has to be a match between load and
generation at the same time as a loss of mains supply occurs. Furthermore, the inverter
protection must fail to detect the loss of mains condition. Finally, for an operator to be at risk,
he must touch the energised live conductor.

Each of the elements of the fault tree are examined in more detail in the following sections.
Section 4 gives individual consideration to distribution networks, Section 5 examines the
inverter aspects and Section 6 looks at the operator issues. The three elements are then brought
together in the full risk analysis in Section 7.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 8

4 LV DISTRIBUTION NETWORKS
This section is based on UK network data as this information was most readily available for this
‘first pass’ calculation.

4.1 Types and characteristics of distribution network

The UK uses a mixture of overhead lines and underground cables to supply customers at low
voltages (i.e. 230 volts). Typically, overhead line networks have slightly different
characteristics to cable networks (in terms of fault levels, types of fault {earth fault, phase-to-
phase fault, etc.} and numbers of faults per customer and duration of fault/outage).

The majority of LV networks in the UK are cable rather than overhead line (approximately 80%
of the UK’s LV network is cable network, measured by distance). As one might expect, LV
cable networks typically have higher customer densities (approximately 85 customers per km of
cable) compared with LV overhead line networks (approximately 22 customers per km of
overhead line). This means that approx 95% of LV domestic customers are supplied by LV
cable, leaving 5% of domestic customers supplied by LV overhead line.

The fault rate for overhead line customers is likely to be higher – say two supply interruptions
per year, against cable customers with typically less than one supply interruption every five
years. Note that the fault rates are not directly applicable to islanding, since a short circuit fault
should mean that the inverter’s overcurrent protection should operate (i.e. does not have to rely
on island detection). However, fault rate can be used as a proxy to indicate the level of
maintenance activity on the network, requiring re-configuration of other sections of the network
where no fault exists, resulting in the potential for loss of supply to other parts of the network.

4.2 Probability of a power island

The probability of a power island can be split into two separate, independent events which need
to occur at the same time, as described previously. These are:

i) P(LOM) - the network zone becomes disconnected from the main network
ii) P(match) - the simultaneous match of load and generation within a network zone

4.3 P(LOM) – The Probability of Loss of Mains Supply

If an approximate value for the potential “exposure rate” for domestic customers is estimated
using network fault rates as a proxy, we have:

• 2 faults per year for a rural overhead line network, leading to a customer exposure rate of

2/(days*hours*minutes*seconds) per second

where

days = days in a year

hours = hours in a day
minutes = minutes in an hour
seconds = seconds in a minute

= 2/(365*24*60*60) = 6.34 x 10-8 per second [4.1]

 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 9

• 0.2 faults per year for a urban cable network leads to a customer exposure rate of

0.2/(days*hours*minutes*seconds) per second

= 0.2/(365*24*60*60) = 6.34 x 10-9 per second [4.2]

For network maintenance staff, if a working year is divided into 250 working days and each day
has two ‘jobs’, each with four switching operations, then a maintenance engineer performs 2000
switching operations per year.

Thus, if an approximate value for the potential “exposure rate” for network maintenance staff
can be estimated on this basis, we have:

• 2000 switching operations per year leads to a network maintenance staff exposure rate of

2000/(days*hours*minutes*seconds) per second

where

days = working days in a year

hours = working hours in a day
minutes = minutes in an hour
seconds = seconds in a minute

= 2000/(250*8*60*60) = 2.78x10-4 per second [4.3]

These values will be used in the Risk Calculation carried out in Section 7.

4.4 P(Match) – The Probability of Load/Generation Match

The characteristics of load and generation have been studied in great detail in the Dutch study
mentioned previously [6]. This study has provided valuable field data related to dynamic
voltages and currents found within a typical Dutch residential network. The absolute values
(real and reactive), the rate-of-change and the probability density functions on a ‘per second’
basis provide necessary and sufficient information to calculate the probability of generation/load
match for a variety of PV penetration levels, load match criteria and power island durations.
First of all, taking idealised daily PV generation and load profiles, as shown in Figure 4, it can
be seen that in principle matches can occur for certain ratios of PV generator power rating and
customer load demand.

Focussing on the points where the two lines meet, the duration of the match is dependent on the
‘margin’ chosen to define matched conditions. Whilst the margin can be set arbitrarily, in
practice a value is chosen to reflect the behaviour of the system. Typical match criteria values
of 2, 5 and 15% were used in the Dutch study to illustrate the sensitivity of the probability of
islanding to the load/generation match criteria.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 10

Load Demand
Margin

Power

M*100Wpk PV
Match Generation

Time of Day

Figure 4: Idealised Load and Generation Profiles, Illustrating ‘Match’ Criteria.

The match criteria also need to take into account real and reactive power flows, as shown in
Figure 5, since both need to be matched for a sustained power island.

Real
Load
lagging PF
Reactive VAr

Inverter
leading PF

Figure 5: Typical relationship between PV inverter and load power factors

Finally, in the real world situation, the Dutch study showed that load and generation profiles are
much more dynamic than the ideal profiles shown above. Also, the rate of change of load is
greater than the rate of change of PV output, therefore, the rate of change of load is the more
significant dynamic factor. This implies that the number of load/generation matches will be
greater in real situations, but load/generation matches are more likely to be due to transient load
changes (i.e. match condition will not last for any significant length of time). Transient load
changes, by definition, do not last very long (i.e. < one second), and so are not relevant to the
analysis of ‘quasi-stable’ power islands (i.e. island duration in the range five to sixty seconds).
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 11

The Dutch study also showed that the probability of load/generation match is a function of PV
penetration which can be characterised by a curve of the form shown in Figure 6. This provides
us with some useful benchmark values for the risk analysis as calculated below:

890Wp
1

0.8
Frequency

0.6

0.4

0.2 400Wp
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
PV Array Size (kWp)

Figure 6: Probability of load/generation match for different PV penetration factors

Using round numbers, if the average uptake of PV within an LV fused zone is less than 400Wp
per house (corresponding roughly to 3 times the minimum demand or 1/3 of the after-diversity
maximum demand, ADMD), the potential for islanding tends to zero as shown in Figure 6. The
worst-case scenario is reached when the PV rating reaches approximately six times the
minimum (night-time) load or 2/3 of the ADMD. In this case, using typical match criteria, the
probability of a load/generation match lasting for one second is in the region of:

10-5 per second. [4.4]

The Dutch study also showed how the stability of a power island has an exponentially decaying
characteristic, similar to that shown in Figure 7.

0 5 10 15 20 25
Island Duration (Seconds)
Figure 7: Probability of islanding versus island duration
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 12

Based on the Dutch data, the probability of load/generation match typically reduces by a factor
of ten for island durations > 5 seconds. This reduces the probability of load/generation match
to:

10-6 per second [4.5]

This highlights the appropriateness of the “5 second delay” used in some countries as a safety
precaution following disconnection of the mains supply. This delay allows any unstable island
to decay before any manual operation is carried out on the LV network.

Based on the data from the Dutch Study, it can be concluded that:

• The probability of load/generation match (islanding) conditions is extremely small for PV

penetrations less than a certain level (typically <400Wp/house in the Dutch example) and so
islanding is not an issue at low penetration levels.
• The probability of an island remaining stable for >60 seconds becomes extremely small for
realistic load/generation match criteria and so ‘stable’ power islands are unlikely to occur at
all in practice.
• A reasonable estimate for the probability of load/generation match conditions lasting up to a
second is of the order of 10-5/second.
• The recommended ‘5 second time-delay’ corresponds well with the exponential decay of
unstable island probabilities and so this is an appropriate delay for practical network
maintenance activities, assuming safe working practices are adopted (e.g. “live-line”
working practices) and reduces the probability to <10-6/second.

This information forms the basis for the estimate of load/generation match conditions, which is
one of the key components of the risk analysis. These values will be used in the risk calculation
carried out in Section 7.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 13

5 INVERTER

5.1 Inverter Risk Analysis Fault Tree

For an inverter to detect loss of mains supply, three conditions need to be satisfied. Firstly, the
protection must be designed correctly and be operational. Secondly, the inverter must be
installed correctly (i.e. with the protection enabled and the correct limits set). Thirdly, the
inverter must be operating within its “detection zone”. Thus, failure to meet of any one of these
criteria will lead to the inverter failing to detect loss of mains. This is shown in the inverter risk
analysis fault tree in Figure 8.

PROTECTION
FAILURE
(Design/
Reliability)

INSTALLATION
INCORRECT OR
(Limits set
incorrectly)

NON-
DETECTION
ZONE (NDZ)
(V, F, LOM)

Figure 8: Inverter Risk analysis Fault Tree

5.2 Protection Failure

The success of the protection system will depend on its correct design and the reliability of its
components, often expressed as the ‘availability’ of the protection system. For example, the
islanding software could detect the presence of an island but fail to disconnect the inverter.
Failure modes include either hardware failure or software failure. With hardware failure, it is
important to distinguish between failure of the device (e.g. MTBF 10000 hours of operation)
and failure in an unsafe way. The latter could arise from such things as failure of the control
circuits that normally cause the inverter to shut down or a failure of the disconnect device itself.
Software failure includes the software actually used to detect the island and the software
communicating with the disconnect relay.

Loss of mains supply is an infrequent event. The ‘low demand mode of operation’ means that
‘performance on demand’ is the appropriate assessment criterion. Functional loss of mains tests
have been developed by many countries to provide a measure of this ‘performance on demand’.
A combination of repeat tests and stringent test parameter values provides some indication as to
the safety integrity level of the inverter. We have chosen a value of:

10-3 (boundary between SIL 2 and SIL 3) [5.1]

 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 14

for the SIL level of the inverter protection, based on type testing of inverter loss of mains. This
corresponds to 10 consecutive successful operations when asked to perform on demand (i.e.
(1/2)10 ≈ 10-3).

Note: reliability and safety are not the same: it is possible that the safety of a system with
relatively unreliable components, in a redundant structure, could be higher than the safety of a
system with a simpler structure but with more reliable components (See BE EN 954-1). The
probability of the islanding protection failing to operate could be reduced by:
• Selection of components: the use of accredited suppliers (i.e ISO9001 or similar)
• System structure – design for redundancy
• Self test function within the unit
• Periodic checking (difficult to implement)

5.3 Incorrect Installation

The inverter, although designed and working correctly, could still fail to provide the required
protection if it is installed incorrectly. This could arise from:

• incompetent installation
• vandalism/tampering
• illegal connection (e.g. ‘Guerrilla Solar’)

This could pose a hazard in one of two ways:

i) Use of a non-approved inverter. This may contain ‘sufficient’ islanding protection but
there is no guarantee.
ii) Software settings (protection, voltage/frequency) are incorrect.

The risk can be reduced in three ways:

i) Training of installers (see definition of Competence of persons in IEC 61508 –

awareness of critical failure modes)
ii) Use of a self-testing inverter (see Sunny Boy technical description) i.e. inverter will
disconnect itself unless correctly installed
iii) Protect voltage and frequency setpoints with passwords or other suitable means

5.4 Islanding Non-Detection Zone (NDZ)

The non-detection zone [5], as shown in Figure 9, can be used as a way to visualise the normal
operating ‘envelope’ for the inverter. The NDZ boundaries reflect the match of both real and
reactive power (function of voltage/phase/frequency) sustained for a long enough period to
qualify as an ‘island’ (this is taken as 5 seconds in several countries).
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 15

Loss of mains
Reactive Power (function of time,
(function of match)
frequency)

Real Power (function of voltage)

Figure 9: Islanding Non-Detection Zone

Thus, it can be seen that operation outside the envelope can be detected by the use of
appropriate voltage and frequency limits. Additional ‘active’ methods can be employed, either
to provide additional protection as an independent LOM function or by providing accelerated
operation of the voltage/frequency limits. More data on loss of mains functions can be obtained
from a parallel study which provides comprehensive information on currently available options
[5].
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 16

6 OPERATORS
This section can be divided conveniently into ‘network operators’ and ‘domestic customers’ (i.e.
operators of PV systems). A table of relative risks, derived from readily available publications,
is given in the appendix to put the risk values we have chosen in perspective.

6.1 Network Operators

The nature of the electricity industry means that strict working practices have been developed
over a long period of time to ensure that the working environment is as safe as possible. It is
necessary to establish some form of benchmark for the level of safety within the industry in
order to put the risk analysis of PV islanding in context. Whilst it is a rather crude measure of
safety, the number of deaths per year provides some form of benchmark which can be used in
this study. Exact statistics are hard to establish, but it is generally agreed when performing risk
assessments in the work environment from UK data that a ‘broadly acceptable’ level of risk at
work is in the region of:

10-5 per year [6.1]

Our benchmark of:

10-6 per year [6.2]

for death by electric shock of a UK electricity operative has been derived from available
statistics and confirmed approximately by our specific enquiries in UK electricity distribution
companies.

Live-line working practices are well established in many countries, including the UK. When
following these procedures on LV networks, it is part of the procedure to take all reasonable
steps to make the circuit dead and to check that the circuit is dead and earthed before performing
any activity which could involve touching the conductor. During the maintenance operation, the
conductors are then still treated as if they were live, just in case a mistake is made.

6.2 Customer
Network operators have a duty of care to ensure appropriate safety for its customers, and so
consideration needs to be given to the safety of customers who operate grid-connected PV
systems. The risks associated with electric shock on conventional systems are commonly well
understood by the general public, but we do not have any data readily available on electric shock
in the home. All accidents in the home have an individual risk similar to that for road accidents,
which is relatively high. A better benchmark for this study is perhaps the risk to the general
public from all uses of gas. This is just over

2x10-6/year [6.3]

which is the figure we have used.

 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 17

7 ISLANDING AND RISK

Having analysed the sub-components of the risk analysis, it is now possible to assess the risk of
islanding for network operators and customers.

Based on the data presented in the previous sections, the risk of islanding to network operators
and customers can be examined first using a scenario where there are no safety measures (i.e. no
loss of mains protection, unsafe working practices by the operator, where islands with duration
greater than one second are a cause for concern). The detailed mathematics behind the risk
calculation is contained in Information Box 7.1, whilst the basic framework is illustrated in
Figure 10.

OPERATOR
OPERATOR
Worst AND
WorstCase:
Case: 1.0
-3 1.0
(Typical: 10 )
(Typical: 1.0E-03) RISK
RISK
NETWORK AND 8.3*10
-7
/year (cable)
NETWORK ISLANDING 8.3E-07/year (cable)
ISLANDING 8.3*10
-6
/year (o/h)
(>1 8.3E-06/year (o/h)
Load/Generation
Load/Generation Match
Match (>27 second)
seconds)
-5 1.3*10
1.3E07 seconds/year
10 /sec
1.0E-5/sec -7 seconds/year
xx 8.3*10 /year (cable)
8.3E-07/year (cable)
-6
Network or 8.3*10 /year (o/h)
or 8.3E-06/year (o/h)
NetworkZoneZone--loss
lossofof-9supply
supply
0.2/year (cable) 6.3*10
0.2/year (cable) 6.3E-09/sec /sec
-8
2/year (o/h line) 6.3*10
2/year (o/h line) 6.3E-08/sec /sec

INVERTER
INVERTER
Worst-case
Worst-case-3(no
(noLOM)
LOM)1.0
1.0
(Typical: 10 )
(Typical <1.0E-3)

Figure 10: Risk Calculation with “No Safety Measures”

As described previously, based on equation 2.1, the risk of islanding is calculated as:

Risk(islanding) = P(match) * P(LOM) * P(protection failure)

Using the method described in Information Box 7.1 and the values given in Figure 10, we have:

Cable network, Risk(islanding) = (1.0*10-5) * (6.3*10-9) * (1.3*107) = 8.19*10-7 [7.1]

Overhead line, Risk(islanding) = (1.0*10-5) * (6.3*10-8) * (1.3*107) = 8.19*10-6 [7.2]

From Section 6, the benchmark risk for network operators is 10-6 per year and for a customer is
2x10-6. In this case, we see that the additional risk posed by islanding is of the same order as the
risk that already exits, which is not acceptable. Thus, some additional safety measures are
necessary.

If we first consider the network operator and his network maintenance staff, we have the revised
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 18

scenario, as shown in Figure 11. In this case, we are using a value of 10-3 for the contribution
from the inverter loss of mains protection, with safe working practices providing an additional
improvement in safety of 10-3. In addition, working practices are assumed to be in place such
that only islands of duration >5 seconds are of concern. This gives an additional reduction of
risk by a factor of 10-1. Also, the exposure rate of maintenance staff is higher than the base case,
since they are actually working on networks on a daily basis. This is reflected in the risk
calculation.

OPERATOR
OPERATOR
(Worst AND
(WorstCase:
Case: 1.0)
-3 1.0)
Typical: 10
Typical: 1.0E-03

AND RISK
RISK
NETWORK
NETWORK ISLANDING
ISLANDING -9
(>1 2.0*10 /year
Load/Generation
Load/Generation Match
Match (>26 second)
seconds) 2.0E-09/year
10
-5
/sec 7.2E06 seconds/year
7.2*10 seconds/year
1.0E-5/sec
xx -5
Network 2.0*10 /year
2.0E-05/year
NetworkZoneZone--loss
lossofofsupply
supply
88ops per
per day = 2000/year==
ops -4 day = 2000/year
2.8*10 /sec
2.8E-04/sec X0.1
ISLANDING
ISLANDING
INVERTER (>5
(>5seconds)
seconds)
INVERTER
-6
(Worst-case (no 2.0*10 /year
(Worst-case-3(noLOM)
LOM)1.0)
1.0) 2.0E-06/year
Typical: 10
Typical <1.0E-3

Figure 11: Risk Calculation for Network Maintenance Staff

Thus, the revised calculation for the Risk (islanding) becomes:

= (1.0*10-5) * (2.8*10-4) * (10-3) * (10-3) * (7.2*106) * (10-1) = 2.0*10-9 [7.3]

In this scenario, the additional risk is reduced to 2.0x10-9, which is approximately three orders of
magnitude better than the risk that already exists. This is within the limits of acceptability, since
the additional risk should be more than offset by improvements in safety as a result of greater
awareness of the risk of electric shock in general, brought about by the introduction of grid-
connected PV systems.

Finally, if the scenario for domestic customers is considered, we assume a conservative value
for safe working practices of only 10-1. The exposure rate reverts to the base case model, whilst
the contribution of the LOM protection and the >5 second island duration is the same as in the
network maintenance staff scenario. This scenario is illustrated in Figure 12.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 19

OPERATOR
OPERATOR
(Worst AND
(WorstCase:
Case: 1.0)
-1 1.0)
Typical: 10
Typical: 1.0E-01

AND RISK
RISK
NETWORK
NETWORK ISLANDING
ISLANDING -12
(>1 8.3*10 /year (cable)
Load/Generation
Load/Generation Match
Match (>27 second)
seconds) 8.3E-12/year
-11 (cable)
-5 1.3*10 seconds/year 8.3*10 /year (o/h)
8.3E-11/year (o/h)
10 /sec
1.0E-5/sec 1.3E07 -10 seconds/year
xx 8.3*10 /year (cable)
8.3E-10/year (cable)
-9
Network 8.3*10
8.3E-09/year(o/h
/year (o/hline)
line)
NetworkZone Zone--loss
lossofof-9supply
supply
0.2/year (cable) 6.3*10
0.2/year (cable) 6.3E-09/sec /sec
-9
2/year
2/year(o/h
(o/hline)
line)6.3*10
6.3E-08/sec/sec X0.1
1
ISLANDING
ISLANDING
INVERTER (>5
(>5seconds)
seconds)
INVERTER
-11
(Worst-case 8.3*10 /year (cable)
(Worst-case-3(no
(noLOM)
LOM)1.0)
1.0) 8.3E-11/year
-10 (cable)
Typical: 10 8.3*10
8.3E-10/year (o/h
/year (o/h line)
line)
Typical <1.0E-3

Figure 12: Risk Calculation for a Customer with PV system

In this case, the calculation for Risk(islanding) in overhead line networks becomes:

= (1.0*10-5) * (6.3*10-8) * (10-3) * (10-1) * (1.3*107) * (10-1) = 8.3*10-11 [7.4]

In this case, the additional risk is calculated at better than 10-10, which is four orders of
magnitude better than the risk that already exists, which is well within the limits of acceptability.

The additional risk that grid-connected PV systems may pose can be addressed by the use of
suitable warning signs at the main locations where the additional danger may be present. Indeed,
the use of warning labels at the consumer unit is recommended practice in many countries. A
method of confirmation that the circuit is dead before manual work commences also forms part
of recommended practices in many countries as well.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 20

Information Box 7.1

Converting ‘per second’ risk into ‘per year’ risk

If the risk of a dangerous occurrence in a time interval is p, then the probability that the operator
will be safe during that time interval is (1-p). The probability that the operator will be safe
during both the first time interval and the second time interval as well is (1-p)*(1-p) = (1-p)2 .

In general, the probability that the operator will remain safe during n successive time intervals is
the result of multiplying together the probability that he will be safe during each single interval,
i.e. (1-p)n. The expression (1-p)n can be expanded to {1 - np …. + higher order terms … + (-p)n}

The probability that there will be at least one dangerous occurrence during n time intervals is
given by P(dangerous) = {1-P(safe)}, or P(dangerous) = {1 - (1-p)n}. When p is small, this
reduces to P (dangerous) = {1 - (1-np)} = np, because the higher order terms can be neglected.

In the specific case when we know the risk p of a dangerous event during one second, the risk of
at least one dangerous event during a ‘year’ consisting of 10-hour ‘days’ {as in the study in
Ref [6]} is np = (365*10*60*60)*p = (1.314 * 107 ) * p
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page 21

8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

• The “benchmark” risk that already exists for network operators and customers is of the order
of 10-6 per year for an individual person
• The risk of electric shock associated with islanding of PV systems under worst-case PV
penetration scenarios to both network operators and customers is typically <10-9 per year
• Thus, the additional risk presented by islanding does not materially increase the risk that
already exists as long as the risk is managed properly
• Loss of mains (LOM) protection functionality provides additional safety, up to a point:
• An inverter’s designed safety integrity level (SIL) affects the level of risk
• The quality of the installation and any subsequent maintenance will also affect the risk
• There is a need to inform and educate both network operators and customers about the
implications of the use of PV as an embedded micro-generator, as PV systems become more
widespread.

It is recommended that:

• Since LOM functionality is included in many PV inverters already, it is appropriate to

maintain this requirement, but emphasis should be put on simple, robust, verifiable and cost-
effective solutions (e.g: software-based).

• The findings of this report should be:

i) incorporated into the training and education programmes of network operators and PV
system installers

ii) reviewed by appropriate interconnection standards working groups

iii) publicised in appropriate professional institutional journals and subjected to thorough

public peer review
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page i

REFERENCES
1 IEA Task V: report IEA-PVPS V-1-04: ‘Information on electrical distribution systems in
related IEA countries (revised version)’, March 1998.

2 IEA Task V: report T5-01:1998: ‘Utility aspects of grid connected photovoltaic systems’,
December 1998.

3 IEA Task V: “Proceedings of the Task V Workshop on Islanding”, Zurich, September

1997.

4 UK Electricity Association, “Recommendations for the connection of inverter-connected

single-phase photovoltaic (PV) generators up to 5kVA to public distribution networks”,
UK Engineering Recommendation G77, 2000.

5 Ward Bower and Michael Ropp: “Evaluation of Islanding detection methods for
photovoltaic utility-interactive power systems”, Task V Report, January 2002.

6 Bas Verhoeven: “Probability of Islanding in utility networks due to grid connected

photovoltaic power systems”, Task V Report, January 2002.

7 Risk Standard IEC 61508: “Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable

electronic safety-related systems”, 1998.

8 The Tolerability of Risks from Nuclear Power Stations. UK Health and Safety Executive
publication. HSE Books 1992. ISBN 0 11 88368 1

9 Reducing Risks, Protecting People - HSE’s decision-making process. UK Health and

Safety Executive publication. HSE Books 2001. ISBN 0 7176 2151 0. {Discussion
Version (DV)was published in 1999}

10 Godfrey PS. Control of Risk: A Guide to the Systematic Management of Risk from
Construction. UK Construction Industry Research and Information Association (CIRIA)
Special Report SP 125, 1996.

11 Hambly EC. Risk evaluation and Realism. In Proceedings of UK Institution of Civil

Engineers, Civil Engineering, Vol 102 Issue 2, May 1994.

12 UK Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1999 Edition, HMSO

 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to acknowledge the IEA PVPS Programme for providing the
international collaborative framework for this project and the other related complementary
studies. Thanks are also due to the members of the IEA PVPS Task V Working Group, for
providing invaluable peer review of this report, with special thanks to Bas Verhoeven (KEMA),
without whose data on the Dutch islanding study this risk analysis report would not have been
possible. In addition, thanks are also due to the DTI, through ETSU, for supporting this work.

Finally, the authors would also like to express thanks for the assistance of several UK network
operators who kindly supplied information related to network performance and operational
practices for this study.
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page iii

APPENDIX A: TABLE OF RELATIVE RISK

Relative Risk (in orders of magnitude)

Values
R
Source of Information
a Risk Description [D] = Derived by authors
Individual Relative
n (Death unless otherwise stated) Numbers refer to
risk, likelihood, References Section
k per year 1 in
-2
1 UK population, 1993 1.14 * 10 1 [9, DV, Table 1]

Injury only, -3
2 1.64 * 10 7 [9, App 4, Table 4]
from burn or scald in the home
-3
3 Women, UK, aged 35-44 1.10 * 10 10 [9, DV, Table 1]

Upper limit of tolerability for -3

4 1.00 * 10 11 [9, Box in Para 128]
workers
-4
5 All accidents, UK 2.46 * 10 46 [9, App 4, Table 2]

-4
6 Boys, UK, aged 5-14 2.00 * 10 57 [9, DV, Table 1]

Upper limit of tolerability for

[9, Box in Para 128]
members of the public who have a -4
7 1.00 * 10 114 &
risk 'imposed' on them
[ 9, Para 132]
'in the wider interest of society'
less than
8 All accidents at home -5 130 [D] from [11, Table 1]
8.76 * 10
-5
9 All road accidents, UK 5.95 * 10 191 [9, App 4, Table 2]

-5
10 Construction Worker 4.66 * 10 244 [9, Box in Para 128]

All deaths in electricity, gas and

less than
11 water supply -5 1,136 [12, Tables 9.8 and 7.5]
1.00 * 10
(2 p.a. for over 200,000 employees)

-6
12 Service Sector Worker 3.00 * 10 3,784 [9, App 4, Table 3]

General Public from all uses of gas -6

13 1.96 * 10 5,795 [9, Box in Para 128]
(fire, explosion, poisoning)
Derived from [12] using:
1/20 of construction deaths
Electric shock to electricity -6
14 1.00 * 10 11,364 are by electric shock [10], but
distribution operative
only 50% of workers are at
risk [D]
Lightning -8
15 5.35 * 10 212,500 [9, App 4, Table 2]
(England and Wales)
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page iv

LIST OF IEA PVPS TASK V PARTICIPANTS:

AUSTRALIA AUSTRIA
Mr. Phil GATES Mr. Christoph PANHUBER
Energy Australia Fronius International GmbH
L14 570 George St. Gunter-Fronius-Strasse 1
Sydney, New South Wales Wels-Thalheim
2000 A-4600
+612-9269-7366 +43-7242-241-199
+612-9269 7372 +43-7242-241-224
email: [email protected] email - [email protected]

AUSTRIA DENMARK
Dr. Gerd SCHAUER Mr. Arne Faaborg POVLSEN
Verbundplan Elsam A/S
Parkring 12 M. SC. Elec. Eng.
Wien Overgade 45
A-1010 DK-7000 Fredericia
+43-1-53113-52439 +45-7622-2408
+43-1-53113-52469 +45-7522-2450
email: [email protected] email - [email protected]

GERMANY ITALY
Mr. Hermann LAUKAMP Mr. Francesco GROPPI
Fraunhofer Institut fuer Solare Energiesysteme CESI S.p.A.
Heidenhofster. 2 Via Rubattino, 54,
Freiburg, D-79770 Milano
+49-761-4588-5275 20134
+49-761-4588-9000 +39-(0)2-2125 5686
email – [email protected] +39-(0)2-2125 5626
email: [email protected]

JAPAN JAPAN
Mr. Tadashi KANBAYASHI (TaskV Mr. Tadao ISHIKAWA (Task V Chairman)
Operating Agent) CRIEPI Customer Systems Department
NEDO, New Energy Promotion Dept. 2-11-1 Iwado-kita,
Sunshine 60, 29F; 1-1,3-Chome Komae-shi
Higashi-Ikebukuro, Toshima-ku Tokyo
Tokyo, 170-6028, 201-8511
+81-3-3987-9367 +81-3-3480-2111
+81-3-3590-5803 +81-3-3480-3866
email – [email protected] email: [email protected]
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page v

JAPAN JAPAN
Mr. Hiromu KOBAYASHI Mr. Hiroaki MIZUNAGA
CRIEPI Customer Systems Dept., NEDO, New Energy Promotion Dept.
2-11-1 Iwado-kita, Komae-shi Sunshine 60, 27F; 1-1,3-Chome
Tokyo, 201 Higashi-Ikebukuro, Toshima-ku
+81-3-3480-2111 Tokyo, 170-6028,
+81-3-3430-4014 +81-3-3987-9319
email - [email protected] +81-3-3590-5803
email – [email protected]

JAPAN NEDO, MEXICO

Mr. Masaki HOSODA Mr. Oscar ARTEAGA
New Energy Promotion Dept. Institudo de Investigationes Electricas (IIE)
Sunshine 60, 27F; 1-1,3-Chome Non Conventional Energies Unit
Higashi-Ikebukuro, Toshima-ku Av. Reforma No. 113,
Tokyo, 170-6028, Temixco Morelos,
+81-3-3987-9319 62490
+81-3-3590-5803 +13 18 38 11 Ext. 7244,
email – [email protected] +13 18 24 36,
email: [email protected]

NETHERLANDS PORTUGAL
Mr. Bas VERHOEVEN Mr. Petro Sassetti PAES
KEMA EDP-Electriciadade de Portugal, S.A.
Utrechtseweg 310 Gabinete de Investigacao e Desenvolvimento
Arnhem Av. Infante Santo, 17-6
6812 AR Lisbon, 1350
+31-263-56-3581 +351-1-395-5900
+31-263-51-3843 +351-1-390-2531
email: [email protected] email: [email protected]

SWITZERLAND SWITZERLAND
Mr. Sergio TAIANA Mr. Daniel RUOSS
ewz Enecolo
Tramstrasse 35 Lindhofstrasse 52
Postfach, Zurich Mönchaltorf
8050 CH-8617
+31-1-319-44-55 +41-(0)1-994-9001
+31-1-319-41-97 +41-(0)1-994-9005
email: [email protected] email: [email protected]
 Risk analysis of islanding of photovoltaic power systems within low voltage distribution networks Page vi

UNITED KINGDOM UNITED KINGDOM

Dr. Alan COLLINSON Mr. Harry EDWARDS,
EA Technology AEA Technology
Capenhurst Harwell, Didcot, Oxfordshire
Chester OX11 0RA
CH1 6ES +44 1235-436457
+44-151-347-2396 +44-1235-432331
+44-151-347-2135 e-mail - [email protected]
email: [email protected]

USA UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Ward BOWER Mr. James THORNYCROFT
Sandia National Laboratories Halcrow, Ltd.
Photovoltaic System Applications, MS0753 Burderop Park, Swindon
Albuquerque, NM Wiltshire SN4 0QD
87185-0753 +44-793-814756
+1-505-844-5206 +44-793-815020
+1-505-844-6541 e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]