G.R. No.

L-28519 February 17, 1968 Settled is the rule that for deprivation of any fundamental or constitutional
rights, lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the sentence, or excessive
RICARDO PARULAN, petitioner, penalty affords grounds for relief by habeas corpus.
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent. The issue, therefore, as posed in the petition is: Was the Court of First
Instance of Manila with jurisdiction to try and decide the case and to impose
Ricardo Parulan for and in his own behalf as petitioner. the sentence upon the petitioner, for the offense with which he was charged
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent. — evasion of service of sentence?
RESOLUTION Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
ANGELES, J.: Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) In all criminal prosecutions
On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, filed by Ricardo Parulan, directed the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality of
to the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, praying that the latter be ordered "to province where the offense was committed or any of the essential ingredients
release immediately and without delay the body of the petitioner from unlawful thereof took place.
and illegal confinement", anchoring the relief prayed for on certain allegations There are crimes which are called transitory or continuing offenses
in the petition, to the effect that petitioner's confinement in the state because some acts material and essential to the crime occur in one province
penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, under the administrative and supervisory and some in another, in which case, the rule is settled that the court of either
control of the respondent Director of Prisons, is illegal, for the reason that the province where any of the essential ingredients of the crime took place has —
sentence of conviction imposed upon said petitioner for the crime of evasion jurisdiction to try the case.1 As Gomez Orbaneja opines —
of service of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code,
was rendered by a court without jurisdiction over his person and of the offense Que habiendo en el delito continuado tantos resultados como hechos
with which he was charged. independientes en sentido natural, el principio del resultado no basta para fijar
el forum delicti commisi, y ha de aceptarse que el delito se comete en
It appears that the petitioner, as alleged in the petition, was confined in cualquiera de los lugares donde se produzca uno de pesos plurales
the state penitentiary at Muntinglupa, Rizal, serving a sentence of life resultados.2
imprisonment which, however, was commuted to twenty (20) years by the
President of the Philippines. In October, 1964, he was transferred to the There are, however, crimes which although all the elements thereof for
military barracks of Fort Bonifacio (formerly Fort Wm. McKinley) situated at its consummation may have occurred in a single place, yet by reason of the
Makati, Rizal, under the custody of the Stockade Officer of the said military very nature of the offense committed, the violation of the law is deemed to be
barracks. In that month of October, 1964, while still serving his prison term as continuing. Of the first class, the crime of estafa or malversation3 and
aforesaid, he effected his escape from his confinement. Petitioner was abduction 4 may be mentioned; and as belonging to the second class are the
recaptured in the City of Manila. Prosecuted for the crime of evasion of service crimes of kidnapping and illegal detention where the deprivation of liberty is
of sentence, penalized under Article 157 of the Revised Penal Code, before persistent and continuing from one place to another 5 and libel where the
the Court of First Instance of Manila, after due trial, petitioner was found guilty libelous matter is published or circulated from one province to another. 6 To
of the offense charged and sentenced accordingly with the imposable penalty this latter class may also be included the crime of evasion of service of
prescribed by law, on August 3, 1966. sentence, when the prisoner in his attempt to evade the service of the
sentence imposed upon him by the courts and thus defeat the purpose of the
Assuming the correctness of the facts as alleged in the petition, and on law, moves from one place to another; for, in this case, the act of the escaped
the basis thereof, we shall proceed to discuss the merits of the case regarding prisoner is a continuous or series of acts, set on foot by a single impulse and
the validity and legality of the decision sentencing the petitioner to a prison operated by an unintermittent force, however long it may be. It may not be
term for the crime of evasion of sentence. validly said that after the convict shall have escaped from the place of his
confinement the crime is fully consummated, for, as long as he continues to
evade the service of his sentence, he is deemed to continue committing the
crime, and may be arrested without warrant, at any place where he may be
found. Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court may be invoked in support of
this conclusion, for, under section 6[c] thereof, one of the instances when a
person may be arrested without warrant is where he has escaped from
confinement. 7 Undoubtedly, this right of arrest without a warrant is founded on
the principle that at the time of the arrest, the escapee is in the continuous act
of committing a crime — evading the service of his sentence.

WHEREFORE, the writ is denied. Without costs.

G.R. No. L-61016 April 26, 1983 such plea, this Court in a resolution en banc dated July 22, 1982 ordered
the City Fiscal of Quezon City to conduct such reinvestigation and at the
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF HORACIO same time appointed him "to act as commissioner of this Court and
R. MORALES, JR., petitioner, receive evidence of the charges made by petitioners before this Court of
vs. alleged torture and violation of their constitutional rights, particularly the
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. right to counsel." On September 28, 1982, the City Fiscal submitted his
GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents. report on the reinvestigation affirming the existence of a prima
G.R. No. L-61107 April 26, 1983 facie case for rebellion against petitioners and several others. And on
February 8, 1983 he submitted to this Court the transcript of the notes
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTONIO taken at the reception of the evidence on the charges of petitioners.
C. MONCUPA, JR. ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner,
vs. 4. If petitioners had been arrested in a communist country, they would
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. have no rights to speak of. However, the Philippines is a republican state.
GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. 1 We have a Constitution framed by a constitutional
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Augusto Sanchez, Jejomar Binay and Antonio convention and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law. We
Quintos for petitioners. believe in human rights and we protect and defend them. Petitioners are
entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And this
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Court stands as the guarantor of those rights.

5. Our Constitution provides:

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
1. The petitions are without merit and are hereby DISMISSED. person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
2. Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
they were riding together in a motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street, shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
Quezon City, by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the Armed Forces shall be inadmissible in evidence. 2
of the Philippines. Since their arrest, they have been under detention.
Petitioner Morales filed his petition for habeas corpus with this Court on 6. After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
July 9, 1982, while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19, 1982. On July confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is
20, 1982 petitioners, together with several others, were charged with brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and
rebellion (Art. 134, Revised Penal Code) before the Court of First Instance cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be
of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and un
City. The trial of the case has yet to be terminated. The continued familiar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him.
detention of petitioners to answer for the offense charged is therefore The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all
legal. the methods and means that experience and study has taught them to extract
the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
3. Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they
that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such
counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights
and the right to bail. They also air the charge that they were subjected to seeks to remedy this imbalance.
maltreatment and torture; that they did not have the opportunity to
present their defense before the inquest fiscal and therefore asked this 7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
Court to order the reinvestigation of the charges against them. Acting on to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent 13. An arrest may also be made without a warrant.
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant — When lawful.— A peace officer or a private
a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the (a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation is about to commit an offense in his presence;
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon (b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
be inadmissible in evidence.
from one confinement to another.7
8. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right to confer with his
14. Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where
counsel at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and
there is no justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable
privately, in the jail or any other place of custody. 3
for arbitrary detention8 or unlawful arrest 9 or for some other offense.
Arrest.
15. The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The
9. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be Memorandum to the President dated April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver,
forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense.4 Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein he reported the
arrest of petitioners, the subversive documents seized from them and the
10. An arrest may be made with or without a warrant. results of the ensuing tactical interrogation, with a recommendation for the
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, was approved by
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature the President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrested without a warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, were already under surveillance on suspicion of committing rebellion. From the
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after results of the said surveillance, the evidence then at hand, and the documents
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he seized from them at the time of their arrest, it would appear that they had
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the committed or were actually committing the offense of rebellion. Their arrest
persons or things to be seized. 5 without a warrant for the said offense is therefore clearly justified.

11. Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of Procedure after Arrest.
arrest and limits them to a "judge, or such other responsible officer as may be 16. After a person is arrested either without a warrant or by virtue of a warrant
authorized by law." It also lays down in unmistakable terms the procedure of arrest issued by a judge or by virtue of a Presidential Arrest and
required before a search warrant or warrant of arrest may issue. Commitment Order, the proper complaint or information against him must be
12. A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued filed with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law, to wit:
by the President of the Philippines. 6 Its issuance must therefore comply with FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to the same AMENDED (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1404)
extent, as a warrant of arrest issued by a judge issuance must therefore
comply with the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to WHEREAS, the periods within which arrested persons shall be delivered to
the same extent, as a warrant of arrest by a judge. the judicial authorities as provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, are on occasions inadequate to enable the government to file
within the said periods the criminal information against persons arrested for of persons arrested for any of the abovementioned offenses against public
certain crimes against national security and public order. order shall continue to be governed by the provisions of General Orders No.
2, dated September 22, 1972 as amended by General Order Nos. 60 and 62,
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic dated September 24, 1977 and October 22, 1977, respectively.
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
and in the interest of national security as well as public safety and order, do SEC 4. This decree shall take effect immediately.
hereby decree and order as part of the law of the land the following
amendment to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: Done in the City of Manila this 9th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-eight."
SECTION 1. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows: 17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would
constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons. -The penalties provided person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas
in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to court.10
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: six
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; Power of the Courts.
nine hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their 18. The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of
equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive liberty. It is the most expeditious way of securing the release of one who has
or capital penalties, or their equivalent; Provided, however, That the President been illegally detained. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
may, in the interest of national security and public order, authorize by suspended, but not the writ itself.
Executive Order longer periods, which in no case shall exceed 30 days, or for
as long as the conspiracy to commit the crime against national security and 19. The Bill of Rights provides:
public order continues or is being implemented, for the delivery of persons
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
arrested for crimes or offenses against public order as defined in Title III, Book
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
11 of this Code, namely: Articles 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146
laws.
and 147, and for acts in violation of Republic Act No. 1700 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 885, taking into consideration the gravity of the 20. In Lansang vs.Garcia, 42 SCRA 448,473,We said:
offense or offenses, the number of persons arrested, the threat to national
security or to public safety and order, and/or the occurrence of a public In our resolution of October 5, 1972, We stated that 'a majority of the court
calamity or other emergency situation preventing the early investigation of the 'had 'tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy
cases and the filing of the corresponding information before the civil courts. itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889A ... and thus determine the constitutional
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1,
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution ...' Upon
at any time with his attorney or counsel, and to be visited by his immediate further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the
relatives. conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual
bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
SEC. 2. All acts, executive order, proclamations, Presidential Decrees,
General Orders, Letters of Instruction, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, 21. We reiterate this doctrine.
inconsistent with the provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. 22. Furthermore, We hold that under the judicial power of review and by
constitutional mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire
SEC. 3. Transitory provision.-Pending the preparation and promulgation by the into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment
President of the Executive Order referred to in Section 1 hereof, the detention petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the
merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that 27. Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the
the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied. privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended "with respect to
persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly
23. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
charges and the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses
against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and does violence to the basic committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident
precepts of human rights and a democratic society. thereto, or in connection therewith," the natural consequence is that the right
The Right to Bail. to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended.
To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore,
24. Next to life a man loves his freedom. Some men love their freedom even where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said
more than their life. offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court.
25. In all criminal prosecutions the accused is presumed innocent. Because of 28. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
this presumption and inasmuch as every man has a natural desire to be free, crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
our Constitution laid down the right to bail in these words: connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State.
SEC. 18. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when 29. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered,
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the
sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required. 11 State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those
persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State's very
26. Although martial law was terminated on January 17, 1981, by virtue of
existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail
Proclamation No. 2045 of the President of the Philippines, the privilege of the
must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses.
writ of habeas corpus continues to be suspended in the two autonomous
regions in Mindanao and in all other places with respect to certain offenses, 30. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive
thus: imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges
already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister
becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom.
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby revoke Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in The Charges of Torture.
the Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the Continuation of
Martial Law) and proclaim the termination of the state of martial law throughout 31. When petitioners charged in their petitions that they had been tortured and
the Philippines; Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines maltreated, the Court decided to appoint the City Fiscal of Quezon City to hear
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion the charges and to receive the evidence. Not because We are an investigating
shall continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in the two body. Nor are We a trier of facts. But because petitioners' charges are material
autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein, and relevant to the petitions before Us.
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall continue; and 32. As mentioned earlier, the Court Commissioner submitted the transcript of
in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also continue the proceedings held before him. We will not pass upon the merits of the
with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may torture charges. However, they should be filed before the body which has
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, jurisdiction over them as provided for in Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822, 1822-
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other A and 1850.
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion
therefore, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. ... (Presidential 33. The present form of our government, to all intents and purposes, merged
Proclamation No. 2045). the executive and legislative branches into one. Members of parliament are at
the same time cabinet ministers. Under the system of checks and balances
ordained by the Constitution, the judiciary serves as the check and balance to
the merged executive and legislative branches. The judiciary is therefore 40. It is undeniable that throughout the length and breadth of our land,
called upon to express its thoughts on areas outside the traditional and narrow lawlessness and disorder have increased and continue to increase to
confines of decision making, with the end in view that together we may explore undesirable proportions. It is wishful thinking to believe otherwise. An efforts
the free market of Ideas and arrive at what is best for our country and our must be exerted now to reverse the trend. We cannot afford any delay. And
people. we should begin by bringing to the bar of justice the culprits in particular who
burned and destroyed public property, and attacked, kidnapped and killed
34. Our people cry out for a better life. They want more food in their stomachs, public functionaries. For the questions may validly be asked: If the government
roofs over their heads, health services for themselves and their families, cannot protect public property, how can it protect private property? If the
education for their children, and other necessities that make life worth living. government cannot guarantee the safety and lives of its officials, how can it
They cannot be denied. They want it and they want it now. Timely indeed are guarantee the safety and lives of private individuals?
the thrusts of the KKK and the BLISS programs.
41. The investigation and prosecution of cases should be further improved so
35. However, we cannot lead them to a truly better life, unless we achieve that only meritorious cases shall reach the courts, thus contributing to the
complete peace in our land; and we cannot have complete peace unless we unclogging of court dockets. Many criminal cases initiated by complainants are
improve the administration of justice. just harassment suits and should never have been filed in court. In the process,
36. It was a wise man who once said: "Tell me how a country's poor receive it is required that all fiscals be appointed in a permanent capacity. Their
their justice and I will tell you how stable its government is." 12 security of tenure is the foundation stone of their independence. Our penal
system should be further updated to make more effective the rehabilitation of
37. Whenever we speak of the administration of justice we refer to four criminals. Let us do away with instances of first offenders who serve sentence
principal areas: the preservation of peace and order which is the primary task in order to be reformed but who come out instead as hardened criminals.
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Integrated Police, both
under the Ministry of Defense; the investigation and prosecution of offenses 42. And with the judicial revamp just effected under B.P. 129, the trial and
and the administration of our penal system which are under the Ministry of decision making process has been modified and vastly improved to achieve
Justice; the application and interpretation of laws and the trial and adjudication better results. But it must be remembered that courts which are not filled are
of cases which fall under the jurisdiction of the courts; and appearance as as good as no courts at all. Therefore, more appointments to the existing
counsel for the government particularly in appealed criminal cases and as vacancies should be made.
counsel for the Commission on Elections, Securities and Exchange 43. One lesson our people have learned-painfully but well-is that politics and
Commission, and others, which is the responsibility of the Office of the Solicitor a good administration of justice-like oil and water-do not mix; that when politics
General. In everyone of these areas much can be done to achieve our ultimate infiltrates the administration of justice, injustice is often the outcome. In some
goal-that in this fair land of ours, no man, no matter how humble, no matter jurisdictions of the United States, there are sheriffs (peace officers) and district
how poor shall thirst for justice. attorneys (prosecutors) who are elected by the voters and who run for office
38. Our machinery of justice should be geared towards helping and protecting as the candidates of a political party. In the Philippines such a system would
the poor among us. Not knowing their rights, not having the means to pay for never work because in our culture we have values peculiarly our own-value
the services of a lawyer, possessing no influence whatsoever, they are like "utang na loob", "compadre", "pakikisama", "tayu-tayo", "bigayan", "bata
invariably the victims of injustice. The affluent can take care of themselves. ko", "amo ko", and the "god- father mentality". Values like these have derailed
They are better aware of their rights, they have influence, and they can engage and may derail the administration of justice. Political followers commit abuses
the services of the best counsel. But the poor can only pray to God and hope in the belief that come what may their political bosses would shield them from
to find relief in the system of justice established by their government. punishment. Can you imagine how criminal cases would be investigated and
prosecuted if fiscals (prosecutors) were chosen by election? How would our
39. We must open all avenues for complaints and keep them open so that the laws be enforced if policemen and members of the Armed Forces were elected
grievance procedure may be made more readily available to the masses of our by the people? And yet the heads of the Ministries of Justice and Defense and
people. Only by knowing their needs can we give them what they rightfully the Office of the Solicitor General are all active politicians.
deserve.
44. The burdens of office fall heavily on their shoulders. Perhaps it is time we 50. While the government should continue to repel the communists, the
relieve them of the additional burdens that being politicians entail. Our subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with all the means at its command, it
Constitution foresaw the need for heads of ministries who are not active should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be
politicians in providing that ". . . . At least a majority of the Members of the within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.
Cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the Regional
Representations of the Batasang Pambansa. . . ." 13 51. When the judgment of history is written, as leaders of our people, we shall
be asked to account not only for what we did, not only for what we did not do,
45. The campaign against venality in office-malfeasance, misfeasance and but also for what visions we have today of our tomorrow.
nonfesance should be pursued with renewed vigor. For graft and corruption
are like termites gnawing away the foundation of government. The harm done 52. What will be our answer?
is sometimes not realized; or even if realized, under- estimated. In the process 53. WHEREFORE, as aforestated, the petitions should be, as they are hereby,
let us remember to stress preventive measures to save public property from DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.
loss.
54. SO ORDERED.
46. The communist threat remains a nagging problem of government. Whether
Marxist, Maoist, Leninist, aided by the New People's Army, rebels, radicals,
and lawless elements, they all have but one aim-one single purpose-one
defined objective: to bring down by violence the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and to forcibly seize political power in order that they may
replace our existing political, social, economic, and legal order with an entirely
new one based on communism.

47. Once before, in the early fifties, communists threatened the established
order. They were driven back by the Armed Forces, mainly because of the
support of our people. We must keep, strengthen and solidify the sympathy,
faith, loyalty, and trust in the government of our brothers in the rural areas.
Guns and bullets alone will not do it. We can accomplish this only by giving
them better government. It is a condition sine qua non to achieve success in
the fight against subversion.

48. By and large, the Armed Forces are composed of good and disciplined
men. However, there are those who are not worthy of the uniforms they wear.
Not a few have enriched themselves by abusing the powers of their position.
Some are involved in extortion, smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom. There
are others who maintain gambling, drug rings, and prostitution dens. And still
others have committed robbery, rape, murder, and other offenses. The
campaign to rid the organization of such misfits should be carried out with
missionary zeal. For indeed victims of abuse are often alienated from the
government.

49. The Filipinos are a God-loving and a God-fearing people. We believe in

peace and freedom. We believe in the family and its strong ties. We can never
willingly accept communism and what it stands for.
G.R. No. L-37007 July 20, 1987 (SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ, petitioners, All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and
vs. pleaded not guilty.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA, On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground
SR., respondents. that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs adduced
at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information.
GANCAYCO, J.: Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an opposition thereto.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be
Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529 charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga
entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.," granting granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973.
the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., herein
respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary Hence, this petition.
detention. Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds,
The facts are as follows: detains a person.1 The elements of this crime are the following:

On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against 1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of First 2. That he detains a person.
Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas
Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan, of The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash
the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as follows: the information which was sustained by respondent Judge, is that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is, that the facts alleged in the
That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.
evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl.
with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr., Bertillo Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the police force of Manaoag,
Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the
of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without legal grounds, municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two elements of the crime
with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional are present.
liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas Mendoza and
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public
Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan
officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority
municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven (11) hours. (Emphasis to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such public
supplied.) officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors. 4
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C. Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as
such public officer when the former made this finding in the questioned order:
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) duties in such barrio;17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio;18 to
hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is not in enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative within the barrio;19 and to
any way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary
that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he who for the maintenance of peace and order within the barrio.20
detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him as a
mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5 In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose
M. Aruego has this to say about the above-mentioned powers and duties of a
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Barrio Captain, to wit:
Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly sustained for the
following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority to make arrest, nor "Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order
jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain;6 (2) That he is neither in the barrio. For public disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.
a peace officer nor a policeman,7 (3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That "In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to
he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez;9 (5) That he is not disturb public order, what can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he first
connected directly or indirectly in the administration of the Manaoag Police resorts to peaceful measures. He may take preventive measures like placing
Force;10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not yet considered as the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where possible, to
persons in authority and that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
Decree No. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of Barangays were decreed
among those who are persons in authority;11 and that the proper charge was "He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in
Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention.12 authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons within legal
limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
We disagree.
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with
(who were later named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime. 22 A perusal of the powers
recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those of a
as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention. barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both must be
Braganza, a municipal councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact
was in his church. They made him pass through the door of the vestry and that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with the aid of his
afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he was rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner
under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public officials Valdez.24
were convicted of Arbitrary Detention.14 From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope at Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was
around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the peace. Sixto was validly granted as the facts and evidence on record show that there was no
detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day when he crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only sought the aid and assistance of
was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not the Manaoag Police Force;26 and that he only accompanied petitioner Valdez
committed any crime, Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention. 16 to town for the latter's personal safety.27
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at
the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look after the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the Information. We have repeatedly
the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary
and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the performance of their to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on the face of the
information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of
the facts alleged in the information.28 Matters of defense cannot be proved
during the hearing of such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit,
such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and former jeopardy. 29 In
the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense cannot allege new
facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the
complaint. This rule admits of only one exception and that is when such facts
are admitted by the prosecution.31 lawphi1

Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the
motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in his favor 32 on the ground
that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.

Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash,

unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is
therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double jeopardy
as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his instance. 33

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED.

The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is hereby
set aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial court for further
proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81567 October 3, 1991 THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MALTRO
ROBERTO UMIL, ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA, AROJADO, respondents.
MANOLITA O. UMIL and NICANOR P. DURAL, FELICITAS V.
SESE, petitioners, Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567 and G. R. No. 83162.
vs.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82
MONTANO, BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents. Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84583-84.
G.R. Nos. 84581-82 October 3, 1991 Potenciano A. Flores, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.
AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners, The Solicitor General for the respondents.
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN, RAMON MONTANO, respondents. RESOLUTION

G.R. Nos. 84583-84 October 3, 1991

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY.

DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE: DOMINGO T. PER CURIAM:p
ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE, petitioners,
Before the Court are separate motions filed by the petitioners in the above-
vs.
entitled petitions, seeking reconsideration of the Court's decision promulgated
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO
on 9 July 1990 (the decision, for brevity) which dismissed the petitions, with
CARIÑO, LT. COL. REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT.
the following dispositive part:
ARNOLD DURIAN, and Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, respondents. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No.
85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is
G.R. No. 83162 October 3, 1991
hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00. No costs.
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF
The Court avails of this opportunity to clarify its ruling a begins with the
VICKY A. OCAYA AND DANNY RIVERA: VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioners,
statement that the decision did not rule — as many misunderstood it to do —
vs.
that mere suspicion that one is Communist Party or New People's Army
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL.
member is a valid ground for his arrest without warrant. Moreover, the decision
NESTOR MARIANO, respondents.
merely applied long existing laws to the factual situations obtaining in the
G.R. No. 85727 October 3, 1991 several petitions. Among these laws are th outlawing the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CPP) similar organizations and penalizing membership therein
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF be dealt with shortly). It is elementary, in this connection, if these laws no
DEOGRACIAS ESPIRITU, petitioner, longer reflect the thinking or sentiment of the people, it is Congress as the
vs. elected representative of the people — not the Court — that should repeal,
BRIG. GEN.ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents. change or modify them.
G.R. No. 86332 October 3, 1991 In their separate motions for reconsideration, petitioners, in sum, maintain:
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO 1. That the assailed decision, in upholding the validity of the questioned arrests
B. NAZARENO: ALFREDO NAZARENO,petitioner, made without warrant, and in relying on the provisions of the Rules of Court,
vs.
particularly Section 5 of Rule 113 (Arrest), disregards the fact that such arrests Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
violated the constitutional rights of the persons arrested; person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

2. That the doctrine laid down in Garcia vs. Enrile 1 and Ilagan vs. Enrile 2 should be (a) When, in his presence, the person to he arrested has committed, is actually
abandoned; committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrest has committed it; and
3. That the decision erred in considering the admissions made by the persons arrested as to their membership in the
Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army, and their ownership of the unlicensed firearms, ammunitions . . . (Emphasis supplied).
and subversive documents found in their possession at the time of arrest, inasmuch as those confessions do not comply
with the requirements on admissibility of extrajudicial admissions; The Court's decision of 9 July 1990 rules that the arrest Rolando Dural (G.R.
No. 81567) without warrant is justified it can be said that, within the
4. That the assailed decision is based on a misappreciation of facts; contemplation of Section 5 Rule 113, he (Dural) was committing an offense,
5. That G.R. No. 81567 (the Umil case) should not be deemed moot and academic.
when arrested because Dural was arrested for being a member of the New
People's Army, an outlawed organization, where membership penalized, 7 and
for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the doctrine of Garcia vs.
Enrile, 8 a continuing offense, thus:

The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to

We find no merit in the motions for reconsideration.
commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance (sic) on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
It can not be overlooked that these are petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus, filed by petitioners under continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
the Rules of Court. 3
The writ of habeas corpus exists as a speedy and effective from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint. 4 Therefore, the function of magnitude. . . .
the special proceedings of habeas corpus is to inquire into the legality of one's
Given the ideological content of membership in the CPP/NPA which includes
detention, 5 so that if detention is illegal, the detainee may be ordered forthwit released.
armed struggle for the overthrow of organized government, Dural did not cease
to be, or became less of a subversive, FOR PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply
because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the St. Agnes Hospital. Dural
In the petitions at bar, to ascertain whether the detention petitioners was illegal or not, the Court before rendering decision
was identified as one of several persons who the day before his arrest, without
dated 9 July 1990, looked into whether their questioned arrests without warrant were made in accordance with law. For,
warrant, at the St. Agnes Hospital, had shot two (2) CAPCOM policemen in
if the arrests were made in accordance with law, would follow that the detention resulting from such arrests also in
their patrol car. That Dural had shot the two (2) policemen in Caloocan City as
accordance with law.
part of his mission as a "sparrow" (NPA member) did not end there and then.
Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other
policemen anywhere as agents or representatives of organized government.
There can be no dispute that, as a general rule, no peace officer or person has the power or authority to arrest anyo It is in this sense that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived
without a warrant of arrest, except in those cases express authorized by law. 6
The law expressly allowing here as a continuing offense. Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e.
arrests witho warrant is found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission,
which states the grounds upon which a valid arrest, without warrant, can be subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels
conducted. the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding
objective of overthrowing organized government is attained.
In the present cases, the focus is understandably on Section 5, paragraphs (a)
and (b) of the said Rule 113, which read:
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the Hospital for a gunshot wound; third — as the records of this case disclosed later, "Ronnie Javellon" and his address

arresting officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on entered in the hospital records were fictitious and the wounded man was in reality Rolando Dural.

"probable cause," as supported by actual facts that will be shown hereafter.

Viewed from another but related perspective, it may also be said, under the
In fine, the confidential information received by the arresting officers merited their immediate attention and action and, in
facts of the Umil case, that the arrest of Dural falls under Section 5, paragraph
fact, it was found to be true. Even the petitioners in their motion for reconsideration, 13
believe that the
(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires two (2) conditions for a valid
arrestt without warrant: first, that the person to be arrested has just committed confidential information of the arresting officers to the effect that Dural was
an offense, and second, that the arresting peace officer or private person has then being treated in St. Agnes Hospital was actually received from the
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested is the attending doctor and hospital management in compliance with the directives
one who committed the offense. Section 5(b), Rule 113, it will be noted, refers of the law, 14 and, therefore, came from reliable sources.
to arrests without warrant, based on "personal knowledge of facts" acquired As to the condition that "probable cause" must also be coupled with acts done
by the arresting officer or private person. in good faith by the officers who make the arrest, the Court notes that the
It has been ruled that "personal knowledge of facts," in arrests without warrant peace officers wno arrested Dural are deemed to have conducted the same in
must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or good faith, considering that law enforcers are presumed to regularly perform
reasonable grounds of suspicion 9 their official duties. The records show that the arresting officers did not appear
to have been ill-motivated in arresting Dural. 15 It is therefore clear that the
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion arrest, without warrant, of Dural was made in compliance with the
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by requirements of paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 5, Rule 113.
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 10
A
reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled Parenthetically, it should be mentioned here that a few day after Dural's arrest,
with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. 11 without warrant, an information charging double murder with assault against
agents of persons in authority was filed against Dural in the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City (Criminal Case No. C-30112). He was thus promptly
placed under judicial custody (as distinguished fro custody of the arresting
These requisites were complied with in the Umil case and in the other cases at bar.
officers). On 31 August 1988, he wa convicted of the crime charged and
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The judgment of conviction is now on appeal
before this Court in G.R. No. 84921.
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil case), military agents, on 1 February 1988, were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA As to Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), Domingo
member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound; that the information further disclosed that Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple (G.R. Nos. 84583-84) and Vicky Ocaya (G.R.
the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered two (2) Capcom mobile No. 83162), their arrests, without warrant, are also justified. They were
patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., searched pursuant to search warrants issued by a court of law and were found
Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City; that based on the same information, the wounded man's name was listed by the hospital wit unlicensed firearms, explosives and/or ammunition in their persons. They
management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna. 12 were, therefore, caught in flagrante delicto which justified their outright arrests
without warrant, under Sec 5(a), Rule 113, Rules of Court. Parenthetically, it
should be mentioned here that a few davs after their arrests without warrant,
Said confidential information received by the arresting officers, to the effect that an NPA member ("sparrow unit") was
informations were filed in court against said petitioners, thereby placing them
being treated for a gunshot wound in the named hospital, is deemed reasonable and with cause as it was based on
within judicial custody and disposition. Furthermore, Buenaobra mooted his
actual facts and supported by circumstances sufficient to engender a belief that an NPA member was truly in the said
own petition fo habeas corpus by announcing to this Court during the hearing
hospital. The actual facts supported by circumstances are: first — the day before, or on 31 January 1988, two (2)
of these petitions that he had chosen to remain in detention in the custody of
CAPCOM soldiers were actually killed in Bagong Bario, Caloocan City by five (5) "sparrows" including Dural; second
the authorities.
— a wounded person listed in the hospital records as "Ronnie Javellon" was actually then being treated in St. Agnes
More specifically, the antecedent facts in the "in flagrante" cases are:
1. On 27 June 1988, the military agents received information imparted by a firearms and communications equipment; third: at the time of their arrests, in their possession were unlicensed firearms,

former NPA about the operations of the CPP and NPA in Metro Manila and ammunitions and/or subversive documents, and they admitted ownership thereof as well as their membership in the

that a certain house occupied by one Renato Constantine, located in the CPP/NPA. And then, shortly after their arrests, they were positively identified by their former comrades in the organization

Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila was as CPP/NPA members. In view of these circumstances, the corresponding informations were filed in court against said

being used as their safehouse; that in view of this information, the said house arrested persons. The records also show that, as in the case of Dural, the arrests without warrant made by the military

was placed under military surveillance and on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a agents in the Constantino safehouse and later in the Amelia Roque house, do not appear to have been ill-motivated or

search warrant duly issued by court, a search of the house was conducted; irregularly performed.

that when Renato Constantine was then confronted he could not produce any
With all these facts and circumstances existing before, during and after the arrest of the afore-named persons (Dural,
permit to possess the firearms, ammunitions, radio and other communications
Buenaobra, Roque, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya), no prudent an can say that it would have been better for the military
equipment, and he admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP. 16 agents not to have acted at all and made any arrest. That would have been an unpardonable neglect of official duty and
a cause for disciplinary action against the peace officers involved.

2. In the case of Wilfredo Buenaobra, he arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the evening of 12 August 1988,
and admitted that he was an NPA courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantine and other members of the
For, one of the duties of law enforcers is to arrest lawbreakers in order to place them in the hands of executive and
rebel group.
judicial authorities upon whom devolves the duty to investigate the acts constituting the alleged violation of law and to
prosecute and secure the punishment therefor. 21
An arrest is therefore in the nature of an
3. On the other hand, the arrest of Amelia Roque was a consequence of the arrest of Buenaobra who had in his
administrative measure. The power to arrest without warrant is without
limitation as long as the requirements of Section 5, Rule 113 are met. This rule
possession papers leading to the whereabouts of Roque; 17 that, at the time of her arrest, the military agents found
is founded on an overwhelming public interest in peace and order in our
subversive documents and live ammunitions, and she admitted then that the documents belonged to her. 18
communities.
4. As regards Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple they were arrested without warrant on 13 August 1988, when
In ascertaining whether the arrest without warrant is conducted in accordance
they arrived at the said house of Renato Constantine in the evening of said date; that when the agents frisked them,
with the conditions set forth in Section 5, Rule 113, this Court determines not
subversive documents, and loaded guns were found in the latter's possession but failing to show a permit to possess
whether the persons arrested are indeed guilty of committing the crime for
them. 19
which they were arrested. 22 Not evidence of guilt, but "probable cause" is the
5. With regard to Vicky Ocaya, she was arrested, without warrant when she arrived (on 12 May 1988) at the premises reason that can validly compel the peace officers, in the performance of their
ofthe house of one Benito Tiamzon who was believed to be the head of the CPP/NPA, and whose house was subject of duties and in the interest of public order, to conduct an arrest without
a search warrant duly issued by the court. At the time of her arrest without warrant the agents of the PC-Intelligence and warrant. 23
Investigation found ammunitions and subversive documents in the car of Ocaya. 20
The courts should not expect of law-enforcers more than what the law requires of them. Under the conditions set forth
in Section 5, Rule 113, particularly paragraph (b) thereof, even if the arrested persons are later found to be innocent and
acquitted, the arresting officers are not liable. 24
But if they do not strictly comply with the said
It is to be noted in the above cases (Roque, Buenaobra, Anonuevo, Casiple and Ocaya) that the reason which compelled
conditions, the arresting officers can be held liable for the crime of arbitrary
the military agents to make the arrests without warrant was the information given to the military authorities that two (2)
detention, 25 for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code 26 and/or for other
safehouses (one occupied by Renato Constantine and the other by Benito Tiamzon) were being used by the CPP/NPA
administrative sanctions.
for their operations, with information as to their exact location and the names of Renato Constantine and Benito Tiamzon
as residents or occupants thereof. In G.R. No. 85727, Espiritu, on 23 November 1988, was arrested without
warrant, on the basis of the attestation of certain witnesses: that about 5:00
And at the time of the actual arrests, the following circumstances surrounded said arrests (of Roque, Buenaobra,
o'clock in the afternoon of 22 November 1988, at the corner of Magsaysay
Anonuevo and Casiple), which confirmed the belief of the military agents that the information they had received was true
Boulevard and Velencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, Espiritu spoke at a gathering
and the persons to be arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain crimes: first: search warrant was duly
of drivers and sympathizers, where he said, among other things:
issued to effect the search of the Constantine safehouse; second: found in the safehouse was a person named Renato
Constantine, who admitted that he was a ranking member of the CPP, and found in his possession were unlicensed Bukas tuloy ang welga natin . . . hanggang sa magkagulona. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
and that the police authorities were present during the press conference held at the National Press Club (NPC) on 22 . . . on 3 January 1989 (or six (6) days after his arrest without warrant), an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil
November 1988 where Espiritu called for a nationwide strike (of jeepney and bus drivers) on 23 November Regala and two (2) others, with the killing of Romulo Bunye II was filed wit the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
1988. 28
Espiritu was arrested without warrant, not for subversion or any Manila. The case is dock eted therein as Criminal Case No. 731.

"continuing offense," but for uttering the above-quoted language which, in the
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail but the motion was denied by the trial court in an order
perception of the arresting officers, was inciting to sedition.
dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted

Many persons may differ as to the validity of such perception and regard the by the same trial court.

language as falling within free speech guaranteed by the Constitution. But, On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso Nazareno and on 13
then, Espiritu had not lost the right to insist, during the pre-trial or trial on the January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, retumable to the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
merits, that he was just exercising his right to free speech regardless of the
of Bifian, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
charged atmosphere in which it was uttered. But, the authority of the peace
officers to make the arrest, without warrant, at the time the words were uttered, At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna
or soon thereafter, is still another thing. In the balancing of authority and issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody
freedom, which obviously becomes difficult at times, the Court has, in this case, of the respondents by reason of an information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila
tilted the scale in favor of authority but only for purposes of the arrest (not which liad taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso Nazareno
conviction). Let it be noted that the Court has ordered the bail for Espiritu's (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
release to be reduced from P60,000.00 to P10,000.00.
This Court reiterates that shortly after the arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno, the corresponding informations against them
Let it also be noted that supervening events have made the Espiritu case moot were filed in court. The arrests of Espiritu and Nazareno were based on probable cause and supported by factual
and academic. For Espiritu had before arraignment asked the court a quo for circumstances. They complied with conditions set forth in Section 5(b) of Rule 113. They were not arbitrary or whimsical
re-investigation, the peace officers did not appear. Because of this arrests.
development, the defense asked the court a quo at the resumption of the
Parenthetically, it should be here stated that Nazareno has since been convicted by the court a quo for murder and
hearings to dismiss the case. Case against Espiritu (Criminal Case No. 88-
sentenced to reclusion perpetua. He has appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals where it is pending
68385) has been provisionally dismissed and his bail bond cancelled.
as of this date ( CA-G.R. No. still undocketed).
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno), the records show that in the morning of 14
Petitioners contend that the decision of 9 July 1990 ignored the contitution requisiteds for admissibility of an extrajudicial
December 1988, Romulo Bunye II was killed by a group of men in Alabang,
admission.
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila; that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 28
December 1988, Ramil Regala, one of the suspects in the said killing, was
arrested and he pointed to Narciso Nazareno as one of his companions during
the killing of Bunye II; that at 7:20 of the same morning (28 December 1988), In the case of Buenaobra (G.R. Nos. 84581-82), he admitted 30
that he was an NPA courier. On the
the police agents arrested Nazareno, without warrant, for investigation. 29 other hand, in the case of Amelia Roque, she admitted 31 that the unlicensed
firearms, ammunition and subversive documents found in her possession
during her arrest, belonged to her.
Although the killing of Bunye II occurred on 14 December 1988, while Nazareno's arrest without warrant was made only
on 28 December 1988, or 14 days later, the arrest fans under Section 5(b) of Rule 113, since it was only on 28 December The Court, it is true, took into account the admissions of the arrested persons
1988 that the police authorities came to know that Nazareno was probably one of those guilty in the killing of Bunye II of their membership in the CPP/NPA, as well as their ownership of the
and the arrest had to be made promptly, even without warrant, (after the police were alerted) and despite the lapse of unlicensed firearms, ammunitions and documents in their possession. But
fourteen (14) days to prevent possible flight. again, these admissions, as revealed by the records, strengthen the Court's
perception that truly the grounds upon which the arresting officers based their
As shown in the decision under consideration, this Court, in upholding the arrest without warrant of Nazareno noted arrests without warrant, are supported by probable cause, i.e. that the persons
several facts and events surrounding his arrest and detention, as follows: arrested were probably guilty of the commission of certain offenses, in
compliance with Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. To note these
admissions, on the other hand, is not to rule that the persons arrested are
already guilty of the offenses upon which their warrantless arrests were
predicated. The task of determining the guilt or innocence of persons arrested
without warrant is not proper in a petition for habeas corpus. It pertains to the
trial of the case on the merits.

As to the argument that the doctrines in Garcia vs. Enrile, and Ilagan vs.
Enrile should be abandoned, this Court finds no compelling reason at this
time to disturb the same, particularly ln the light of prevailing conditions where
national security and liability are still directly challenged perhaps with greater
vigor from the communist rebels. What is important is that everv arrest without
warrant be tested as to its legality via habeas corpus proceeding. This Court.
will promptly look into — and all other appropriate courts are enjoined to do
the same — the legality of the arrest without warrant so that if the conditions
under Sec. 5 of Rule 113, Rules of Court, as elucidated in this Resolution, are
not met, then the detainee shall forthwith be ordered released; but if such
conditions are met, then the detainee shall not be made to languish in his
detention but must be promptly tried to the end that he may be either acquitted
or convicted, with the least delay, as warranted by the evidence.

A Final Word

This Resolution ends as it began, reiterating that mere suspicion of being a

Communist Party member or a subversive is absolutely not a ground for the
arrest without warrant of the suspect. The Court predicated the validity of the
questioned arrests without warrant in these petitions, not on mere
unsubstantiated suspicion, but on compliance with the conditions set forth in
Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court, a long existing law, and which, for stress,
are probable cause and good faith of the arresting peace officers, and, further,
on the basis of, as the records show, the actual facts and
circumstances supporting the arrests. More than the allure of popularity or
palatability to some groups, what is important is that the Court be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the motions for reconsideration of the decision dated 9 July

1990, are DENIED. This denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 101148. August 5, 1992.] DECISION

TERRY LYN MAGNO, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, ANDREA DOMINGO, Chairman, Commission on Immigration
and Deportation, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE, RICHARD DOE and ROBIN PADILLA, J.:
DOE, Respondents.

Nestor P. Ifurung for Petitioner.

Appealed to this Court by way of petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for issuance of a restraining or status quo order is the
denial by the Court of Appeals of a petition for habeas corpus (CA-G.R. SP.
SYLLABUS No. 25442) wherein petitioner challenged as illegal and violative of
constitutional due process her arrest without a warrant by agents of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) and her resultant detention
at the CID Detention Center.
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; HABEAS CORPUS;
PETITION THEREOF BECOMES MOOT AND ACADEMIC WHEN A From the petition and supplemental petition, the relevant facts are:chanrob1es
PERSON IS ALREADY RELEASED FROM DETENTION. — Petitioner’s virtual 1aw library
release from detention has rendered this petition moot and academic insofar
as it questions the legality of her arrest and detention. A habeas In the evening of 17 July 1991, persons claiming to be agents of the CID picked
corpus proceeding." . . shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or up the petitioner from her home at 564 Rotary Circle cor. Bocobo St., Malate,
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty . . . ." (Rule 102, Sec. Manila. She was whisked to the CID Detention Center and there held in
1, Revised Rules of Court). custody without any formal charge.

2. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST; VALIDITY THEREOF CEASED Assailing the warrantless arrest and subsequent arbitrary detention, a petition
TO BE AN ISSUE IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDING; REASON THEREFOR. for habeas corpus was filed before the Supreme Court. Said petition was
— Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue especially because a referred to the Court of Appeals with the directive to decide the case on the
decision in the deportation proceeding will not result in petitioner’s permanent merits.
or prolonged detention but exclusion or departure from this country. Her
subsequent commitment to the custody of the CID, if, after the proceedings Petitioner claimed that there are no charges against her; neither has she
before the proper forum, she is found to be an undesirable alien, will have no committed any offense for which she may be arrested or deprived of her liberty
more connection with the questioned warrantless arrest and subsequent without any formal charge or judicial warrant. She is an American citizen but
detention on the night of 17 July 1991. by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen, she was granted permanent
resident status in the Philippines since 1986.
3. ID.; SUPREME COURT; NOT A TRIER OF FACTS. — Petitioner’s claim to
Filipino citizenship cannot be settled before this Court at this instance. As Before the Court of Appeals, two (2) urgent motions for bail were filed. The first
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General’s rejoinder to petitioner’s reply, one invoked humanitarian considerations while the second feared summary
there are factual issues that make petitioner’s citizenship controversial. The deportation without due process of law. Resolution of the motions was
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; the factual controversies must first be however held in abeyance while hearings on the petition for habeas
resolved before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation. corpus were in progress.

Answering the petition for habeas corpus, the CID thru its then Commissioner
Andrea Domingo averred that on 18 July 1991, a warrant of Arrest/Deportation
was issued in the exercise of the Commissioner’s powers under Sec. 29, par. respondent Commissioner). Furthermore, whatever irregularity in the arrest
(a), sub-par. 17 and Section 37, par. (a), sub-par.(7) of CA No. 613 otherwise might have been committed is deemed waived by the herein petitioner’s
known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, which applications for bail (supra) even if such applications were not granted." (p. 4,
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph par. 3)

"Sec. 29. (a) The following classes of aliens shall be excluded from entry into Despite denial of the petition for habeas corpus, the appellate court’s decision
the Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library decreed that it was without prejudice to the continuation of proceedings before
the Board of Commissioners, CID, to determine the issue of deportability
x x x pursuant to Sec. 103 of the Immigration Rules and Regulations.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision,

"(17) Persons not properly documented for admission as may be required petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari, prohibition,
under the provisions of this Act.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary mandamus, with prayer for a restraining or status quo order.

"Sec. 37. (a) The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Acting on the petition, the Court En Banc in a resolution dated 27 August 1991
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the required herein respondents to comment thereon; further, a temporary
purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration restraining order (TRO) was issued ordering respondents to cease and desist
after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the from causing or allowing the deportation or transportation elsewhere of
ground for deportation as charged against the alien:chanrob1es virtual 1aw petitioner.
library
Prior to the issuance of the TRO on 26 August 1991, petitioner filed with this
x x x Court an Urgent Motion for Bail invoking:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution which guarantees all persons, before
conviction, the right to bail, except those charged with offenses punishable
"(7) Any alien who remains in the Philippines in violation of any limitation or
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong.
condition under which he was admitted as a nonimmigrant."cralaw virtua1aw
library
2. This Court’s resolution in the case of Catherine Siy v. Andrea Domingo,
Commissioner, Commission on Immigration and Deportation (G.R. No. 97152)
Respondent Commissioner revoked the permanent resident status of
and Antonio Siy v. Andrea Domingo (G.R. No. 97159) promulgated on 20
petitioner because of representations by the US Government thru a letter of its
March 1991 which ordered the release from detention of petitioners therein
Consul General Mr. Bruce Beardsley that petitioner’s American passport has
who, like herein petitioner, had permanent resident status, pending termination
been revoked and that she is a fugitive from justice.
of deportation proceedings.
In the now assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 14 August 1991,
3. The fact that deportation proceedings against her have not even
the appellate court upheld the legality of the arrest of the petitioner and her
commenced."cralaw virtua1aw library
continued detention thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Granting the motion for bail, this Court in a resolution dated 29 August 1991
"The irregularity attendant to her arrest on July 17, 1991, as a result of which
held:chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
she was detained even before the warrant of arrest/deportation had been
issued on July 18, 1991 (which is two days later), would seem to have been
"Finding the urgent motion meritorious, and for humanitarian reasons
cured by the issuance of the aforesaid warrant. Her detention has now become
(petitioner being the mother of two (2) minor children, one aged seven (7)
lawful by virtue of the issuance of the warrant based on the Summary
years and the other two (2) years), the Court Resolved to GRANT the motion.
Deportation Order (Annex 6 to the Memorandum of Evidence filed by the
Petitioner is ordered released from her detention by Immigration Authorities, more connection with the questioned warrantless arrest and subsequent
upon her posting of a cash bond in the amount of P5,000.00 or a surety bond detention on the night of 17 July 1991.
in the same amount issued by a reputable and solvent surety company
acceptable to this Court, conditioned upon her appearance before the Petitioner’s claim to Filipino citizenship cannot be settled before this Court at
Deportation Board, whenever required, in relation to the deportation this instance. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General’s rejoinder to
proceedings against her."cralaw virtua1aw library petitioner’s reply, there are factual issues that make petitioner’s citizenship
controversial. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; the factual
Public respondents in their comment thru the Solicitor General pray for the controversies must first be resolved before the Bureau of Immigration and
dismissal of the present petition for certiorari, etc. because:chanrob1es virtual Deportation.
1aw library
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic,
1. By posting a bond to secure provisional liberty, petitioner has waived her without prejudice to the outcome of the deportation proceedings against the
right to question the legality and regularity of her arrest. petitioner.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

2. By opting to pursue relief before the Board of Commissioners, BID, she SO ORDERED.
should be deemed to have abandoned the instant petition because the
Supreme Court would preempt the Board of Commissioners if it resolved
issues pertaining to deportability of petitioner. The Board has jurisdiction in the
first instance to determine said issues.

Petitioner’s reply to the comment, aside from traversing the allegations therein,
asks this Tribunal to divest the BID of jurisdiction and to render judgment
confirming/or declaring that petitioner is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her
marriage to a citizen of this country, dismissing the deportation case,
cancelling the bail bond and forthwith setting her at liberty.

The Solicitor General in his rejoinder reiterates that the petition at bar is
premature and that there are factual issues that render petitioner’s citizenship
controversial. These, he avers, must first be settled in the proper forum.

One of the reliefs prayed for in the main petition has been granted by the 23
August 1991 Resolution (supra) which allowed petitioner to post bail for her
provisional release. Petitioner’s release from detention has rendered this
petition moot and academic insofar as it questions the legality of her arrest and
detention. A habeas corpus proceeding." . . shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty . . . ."
(Rule 102, Sec. 1, Revised Rules of Court).

Validity of the arrest has ceased to be an issue especially because a decision

in the deportation proceeding will not result in petitioner’s permanent or
prolonged detention but exclusion or departure from this country. Her
subsequent commitment to the custody of the CID, if, after the proceedings
before the proper forum, she is found to be an undesirable alien, will have no
G.R. No. 122641 January 20, 1997 1995, amending §4 of P.D. No. 1606, 8 the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction
over both the offense charged and the persons of the accused. They argued
BAYANI SUBIDO, JR. and RENE PARINA, petitioners, that: (1) Arbitrary Detention did not fall within Chapter II, §2, Title VII of the
vs. RPC, but within §1, Chapter 1, Title II (Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE of the State), hence, not covered by R.A. No. 7975 and, therefore, the case
PHILIPPINES, respondents. should have been filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila; (2) R.A.
No. 7975 should be given prospective application and at the time the case was
filed, petitioner Subido was already a private person since he was separated
DAVIDE, JR., J.: from the service on 28 February 1995; while petitioner Parina did not hold a
position corresponding to salary grade "27"; and (3) penal laws must be strictly
In this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the petitioners
construed against the State.
seek to set aside, on ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, the following acts of the respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal In compliance with the order of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed its
Case No. 22825: (a) the Resolution 1 of 25 October 1995 which denied the Opposition to the Motion to Quash 9 on 28 September 1995. It contended that
petitioners' Motion to Quash of 28 August 1995 and Supplementary Motion to it was clear from §4(b) of R.A. No. 7975 that the Sandiganbayan had
Quash of 7 October 1995; (b) the Order 2 of 10 November 1995 which denied jurisdiction over both the offense charged and the persons of the accused
the petitioners' motion for reconsideration; and (c) the Orders 3 of 10 November considering that "the basis of its jurisdiction . . . is the position of the accused
1995 which entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioners and set pre-trial on in the government service when the offense charged was committed and not
12 January 1996. the nature of the offense charged, provided the said offense committed by the
accused was in the exercise of his duties and in relation to his office." The fact
In Criminal Case No. 22825, the petitioners were charged with Arbitrary
then that accused Subido was already a private individual was of no moment.
Detention, defined and penalized by Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), under an information dated 17 July 1995 (but filed on 28 July 1995), In a Supplement to the Motion to Quash 10 filed on 9 October 1995, the
the accusatory portion of which reads as follows: petitioners further asserted that: (1) the allegations in the information were
vague; (2) under §1, Rule VIII of Memorandum Order (MO) No. 04-92 (Rules
That on or about June 25, 1992, or sometime subsequent thereto, in
of Procedure to Govern Deportation Proceedings), the grant or denial of bail
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
to an alien in a deportation proceeding was discretionary upon the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bayani Subido, Jr., being then a
Commissioner, hence could not be subject to a charge of arbitrary detention;
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) and
(3) petitioner Subido was separated from the service before the effectivity of
accused Rene Parina, being then a BID Special Agent, while in the
R.A. No. 7975, hence retroactive application thereof would be prejudicial to
performance of their official functions, and conspiring and confederating with
him; and (4) at the time the information was filed, petitioner Parina was not
each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the
occupying a position corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as
issuance and implementation of a warrant of arrest dated June 25, 1992
prescribed by R.A. No. 6758. 11
against James J. Maksimuk, said accused knowing fully well that the BID
Decision dated June 6, 1991, requiring Maksimuk's deportation has not as yet In its Rejoinder 12 filed on 20 October 1995, the prosecution maintained that
become final and executory considering the pendency of a Motion for with §4 of MO No. 04-92, Salazar v. Achacoso, 13 and Gatchalian v.
Reconsideration, resulting in the detention of the latter for a period of forty- CID, 14 the only instance when an alien facing deportation proceedings could
three (43) days and, thus, causing him undue injury. be arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest was when the Commissioner issued
the warrant to carry out a final order of deportation, which was absent in this
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4
case due to the pendency of the motion for reconsideration timely filed. It
The arraignment was originally set for 28 August 1995. 5 further reiterated that the basis of the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over the
case was the position of the accused when the crime was committed, not when
On 28 August 1995, however, the petitioners filed a Motion to the information was filed; in any event, petitioner Subido's position as a
Quash, 6 contending that in view of the effectivity of R.A. No. 7975 7 on 6 May
Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration was classified even higher than a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
grade "27" under the Compensation and Classification Act of 1989. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
In its Resolution15 of 25 October 1995, the Sandiganbayan denied the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
petitioners' Motion to Quash and the Supplement thereto, ruling: government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
1. [T]he jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan remains not only over the specific the commission of the offense:
offenses enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. 1606 as Amended by R.A. 7975 but (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
over offenses committed in relation to their office, regardless of the penalty and higher, otherwise classified as grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation
provided that the salary of the accused is at Grade 27 under [R.A. 6758] or and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
that he is occupying any of the position described in Sec. 4(a)e of the law, including:
which includes the position of Deputy Commissioner.
xxx xxx xxx
2. [A]t this time the position of the prosecution in response to this Court's
misgivings stated in its Order of August 28, 1995, appears to be that aliens (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher
may not be arrested except upon execution of a deportation order, a matter under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
which can be taken up at further proceedings after the arraignment of the
accused. b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
It likewise set arraignment on 10 November 1995. To abort arraignment, the
petitioners filed on 9 November 1995 a motion for reconsideration 16 and c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
submitted that under the vast power of the Commissioner of the Department Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A..
of Immigration, he could authorize the arrest and detention of an alien even In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions
though a deportation order had not yet become final, in light of the preventive, corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in said Republic
not penal, nature of a deportation order. 17 Act No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of superintendent or higher,
On 10 November 1995, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order 18 denying the or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, and a second Order 19 entering a plea Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, and
of not guilty in favor of the petitioners since they objected to arraignment, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
setting pre-trial on 12 January 1996, and making of record that arraignment jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
was conducted with the reservation of the petitioners to seek redress with this Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not
Court from the denial of their motion for reconsideration. begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
Hence, this special civil action, where the parties, in the main, reiterate the R.A. No. 7975 took effect on 16 May 1995, 20 or one year, ten months and
arguments they raised before the Sandiganbayan. In due time, we resolved to twenty-one days after the alleged commission of the crime charged in Criminal
give clue course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective Case No. 22825 before the Sandiganbayan. The provisions of §4 of P.D. No.
memoranda, which they subsequently complied with. 1606, as amended by E.O. No. 184, but prior to their further amendment by
The petition must be dismissed. R.A. No. 7975, are then the applicable provisions, §4 of P.D. No. 1606 then
pertinently provided as follows:
Sections 2 and 7 of R.A. No. 7975 pertinently provide as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of [P.D. No. 1606] is hereby further amended to read as
follows: (a) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction

in all cases involving:
(1) violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Petitioner Subido never denied the respondents' claim that as "commissioner
Anti-Graft and practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, of Immigration and Deportation [now Bureau of Immigration] at the time of the
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; commission of the crime [he was] classified as having a position even higher
than grade 27." 27 Both parties are, however, agreed that at such time
(2) other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in petitioner Parina was holding a position with a classification much lower than
relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or salary grade "27." There can, therefore, be no doubt that the Sandiganbayan
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where had jurisdiction over the crime allegedly committed by Subido.
the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That petitioner Parina held a position with a salary grade of less than "27" at
that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty the time of the commission of the alleged arbitrary detention is of no moment.
prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment of six He is prosecuted as a co-conspirator of petitioner Subido, a principal accused,
(6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, who held a position higher than grade "27." The following provision of §4 of
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. No. 7975, then applies:

In Aguinaldo v. Domagas, 21 and subsequently in Sanchez v. In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying the positions
Demetriou, Natividad v. Felix, 23 and Republic v. Asuncion, 24 we ruled that
22 corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or Republic Act No. 6758 . . . exclusive jurisdiction therefor shall be vested in the
felonies committed by public officers or employees under the aforementioned proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
§4(a)(2), it was not enough that the penalty prescribed therefor was higher and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
than prision correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
it was likewise necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed in
relation to their office. 25 Finally, the petitioners' invocation of the prohibition against the retroactivity of
penal laws is misplaced. Simply put, R.A. No. 7975 is not a penal law. Penal
The information in Criminal Case No. 22825 before the Sandiganbayan laws or statutes are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts
charged the petitioners with the crime of arbitrary detention which was and establish penalties for their violation; 28 or those that define crimes, treat
committed "while in the performance of their official functions," or, evidently, in of their nature, and provide for their punishment. 29 R.A. No. 7975, in further
relation to their office. As the detention allegedly lasted for a period of 43 days, amending P.D. No. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, mode
the prescribed penalty is prision mayor, 26 with a duration of six years and one of appeal, and other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e., one
day to twelve years. Indisputably, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the which prescribes rules and forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 22825. redress for their invasion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 30 Moreover,
The petitioners, however, urge us to apply §4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended the petitioners even suggest that it is likewise a curative or remedial statute:
by R.A. No. 7975, the law in force at the time of the filing of the information in one which cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing existing
Criminal Case No. 22825. They submit that under the new law, the obligations. 31 As noted by the petitioners, previous to the enactment of R.A.
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the offense charged and their persons No. 7975:
because at the time of the filing of the information, petitioner Subido was
already a private individual, while the classification of petitioner Parina's As before, not [sic] matter what kind of offense, so long as it is alleged that the
position was lower than grade "27." crime is committed in relation to the office of the public official, the
Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try and hear the case, such that in many
We are not persuaded. The petitioners overlook the fact that for purposes of cases accused persons even from the far away parts of the country, Mindanao,
§4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, the reckoning point is the time of the Visayas and the northern parts of Luzon had to come personally to Manila to
commission of the crime. This is plain from the last clause of the opening attend and appear for cases filed against them, considering that the
sentence of paragraph (a), §4 of P.D. No. 1606, as further amended by R.A. Sandiganbayan has its office/court in Manila.
No. 7975.
The said R.A. No. 7975 changed this lamentable situation. For no as so
provided in the said law, there ha[s] been a modification that benefits [the]
accused . . . in the sense that now where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade "27" or higher as prescribed
by Republic Act No. 6758 . . . exclusive jurisdiction there shall be vested now
in the proper Regional Trial and Metropolitan Trial Court and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, as the case may be . . . 32

All told, as a procedural and curative statute, R.A. No. 7975 may validly be
given retroactive effect, there being no impairment of contractual or vested
rights. 33

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned

resolution and orders of the respondent Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121917 March 12, 1997 an "indeterminate penalty from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as
ROBIN CARIÑO PADILLA @ ROBINHOOD PADILLA, petitioner, maximum". 11 Petitioner filed his notice of appeal on April 28, 1994. 12 Pending
vs. the appeal in the respondent Court of Appeals, 13 the Solicitor-General,
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents. convinced that
the conviction shows strong evidence of guilt, filed on December 2, 1994 a
motion to cancel petitioner's bail bond. The resolution of this motion was
FRANCISCO, J.: incorporated in the now assailed respondent court's decision sustaining
petitioner's conviction 14 the dispositive portion of which reads:
On October 26, 1992, high-powered firearms with live ammunitions were found
in the possession of petitioner Robin Padilla @ Robinhood Padilla, i.e.: WHEREFORE, the foregoing circumstances considered, the appealed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and furthermore, the P200,000.00 bailbond
(1) One .357 Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with six (6) live
posted by accused-appellant for his provisional liberty, FGU Insurance
ammunitions;
Corporation Bond No. JCR (2) 6523, is hereby cancelled. The Regional Trial
(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) Court, Branch 61, Angeles City, is directed to issue the Order of Arrest of
short magazine with ammunitions; accused-appellant and thereafter his transmittal to the National Bureau of
Prisons thru the Philippine National Police where the said accused-appellant
(3) One .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and eight (8) ammunitions; shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal, should he
and appeal to the Supreme Court. This shall be immediately executory. The
Regional Trial Court is further directed to submit a report of compliance
(4) Six additional live double action ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver. 1
herewith.
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on December 3, 1992, before the
SO ORDERED. 15
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal possession of firearms
and ammunitions under P.D. 18662 thru the following Information:3 Petitioner received a copy of this decision on July 26, 1995. 16 On August 9,
1995 he filed a "motion for reconsideration (and to recall the warrant of
That on or about the 26th day of October, 1992, in the City of Angeles,
arrest)" 17 but the same was denied by respondent court in its September 20,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
1995 Resolution 18 copy of which was received by petitioner on September 27,
named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
1995. The next day, September 28, petitioner filed the instant petition for
his possession and under his custody and control one (1) M-16 Baby Armalite
review on certiorari with application for bail 19 followed by two "supplemental
rifle, SN-RP 131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short magazines with
petitions" filed by different counsels, 20 a "second supplemental petition" 21 and
ammunitions, one (1) .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson, SN-32919 with
an urgent motion for the separate resolution of his application for bail. Again,
six (6) live ammunitions and one (1) .380 Pietro Beretta, SN-A35723Y with clip
the Solicitor-General 22 sought the denial of the application for bail, to which
and eight (8) ammunitions, without having the necessary authority and permit
the Court agreed in a Resolution promulgated on July 31, 1996. 23 The Court
to carry and possess the same.
also granted the Solicitor-General's motion to file a consolidated comment on
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW. 4 the petitions and thereafter required the petitioner to file his reply. 24 However,
after his vigorous resistance and success on the intramural of bail (both in the
The lower court then ordered the arrest of petitioner, 5 but granted his respondent court and this Court) and thorough exposition of petitioner's guilt
application for bail. 6 During the arraignment on January 20, 1993, a plea of in his 55-page Brief in the respondent court, the Solicitor-General now makes
not guilty was entered for petitioner after he refused, 7 upon advice of a complete turnabout by filing a "Manifestation In Lieu Of Comment" praying
counsel, 8 to make any plea. 9 Petitioner waived in writing his right to be for petitioner's acquittal. 25
present in any and all stages of the case. 10
The People's detailed narration of facts, well-supported by evidence on record
After trial, Angeles City RTC Judge David Rosete rendered judgment dated and given credence by respondent court, is as follows: 26
April 25, 1994 convicting petitioner of the crime charged and sentenced him to
At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of October 26, 1992, Enrique Manarang (10) seconds to cover the distance between their office and the Abacan bridge
and his compadre Danny Perez were inside the Manukan sa Highway (p. 9, ibid).
Restaurant in Sto. Kristo, Angeles City where they took shelter from the heavy
downpour (pp. 5-6, TSN, February 15, 1993) that had interrupted their ride on Another PNP mobile patrol vehicle that responded to the flash message from
motorcycles (pp 5-6, ibid.) along McArthur Highway (ibid). While inside the SPO2 Buan was Mobile No. 7 of the Pulongmaragal Detachment which was
restaurant, Manarang noticed a vehicle, a Mitsubishi Pajero, running fast down then conducting patrol along Don Juico Avenue (pp. 8-9, TSN, March 8, 1993).
the highway prompting him to remark that the vehicle might get into an On board were SPO Ruben Mercado and SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar (p.
accident considering the inclement weather. (p. 7, Ibid) In the local vernacular, 8, ibid). SPO Ruben Mercado immediately told SPO3 Tan to proceed to the
he said thus: "Ka bilis na, mumuran pa naman pota makaaksidente ya." (p. MacArthur Highway to intercept the vehicle with plate number PMA 777 (p.
7, ibid). True enough, immediately after the vehicle had passed the restaurant, 10, ibid).
Manarang and Perez heard a screeching sound produced by the sudden and In the meantime, Manarang continued to chase the vehicle which figured in
hard braking of a vehicle running very fast (pp. 7-8, ibid) followed by a the hit and run incident, even passing through a flooded portion of the
sickening sound of the vehicle hitting something (p. 8, ibid). Danny Cruz, quite MacArthur Highway two (2) feet deep in front of the Iglesia ni Kristo church but
sure of what had happened, remarked "oy ta na" signifying that Manarang had he could not catch up with the same vehicle (pp. 11-12, February 15, 1993).
been right in his observation (pp. 8-9, ibid). When he saw that the car he was chasing went towards Magalang, he
Manarang and Cruz went out to investigate and immediately saw the vehicle proceeded to Abacan bridge because he knew Pulongmaragal was not
occupying the edge or shoulder of the highway giving it a slight tilt to its side passable (pp. 12-14, ibid). When he reached the Abacan bridge, he found
(pp. 9-10, ibid). Manarang, being a member of both the Spectrum, a civic group Mobile No. 3 and SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda watching all vehicles coming
and the Barangay Disaster Coordinating Council, decided to report the incident their way (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). He approached them and informed
to the Philippine National Police of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). He took out his them that there was a hit and run incident (p. 10, ibid). Upon learning that the
radio and called the Viper, the radio controller of the Philippine National Police two police officers already knew about the incident, Manarang went back to
of Angeles City (p. 10, ibid). By the time Manarang completed the call, the where he came from (pp. 10-11; ibid). When Manarang was in front of Tina's
vehicle had started to leave the place of the accident taking the general Restaurant, he saw the vehicle that had figured in the hit and run incident
direction to the north (p. 11, ibid). emerging from the corner adjoining Tina's Restaurant (p. 15, TSN, February
15, 1993). He saw that the license plate hanging in front of the vehicle bore
Manarang went to the location of the accident and found out that the vehicle the identifying number PMA 777 and he followed it (p. 15, ibid) towards the
had hit somebody (p. 11, ibid). Abacan bridge.

He asked Cruz to look after the victim while he went back to the restaurant, Soon the vehicle was within sight of SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda of Mobile
rode on his motorcycle and chased the vehicle (p. 11 ibid). During the chase No. 3 (p. 10, TSN, February 23, 1993). When the vehicle was about twelve
he was able to make out the plate number of the vehicle as PMA 777 (p. 33, (12) meters away from their position, the two police officers boarded their
TSN, February 15, 1193). He called the Viper through the radio once again (p. Mobile car, switched on the engine, operated the siren and strobe light and
34, ibid) reporting that a vehicle heading north with plate number PMA 777 drove out to intercept the vehicle (p. 11, ibid). They cut into the path of the
was involved in a hit and run accident (p. 20, TSN, June 8, 1993). The Viper, vehicle forcing it to stop (p. 11, ibid).
in the person of SP02 Ruby Buan, upon receipt of the second radio call flashed
the message to all units of PNP Angeles City with the order to apprehend the SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted from Mobile No. 3 (P. 12, TSN,
vehicle (p. 20, ibid). One of the units of the PNP Angeles City reached by the February 23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the vehicle with plate number PMA
alarm was its Patrol Division at Jake Gonzales Street near the Traffic Division 777 and instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid). The driver rolled down the
(pp. 5-7, TSN, February 23, 1993). SPO2 Juan C. Borja III and SPO2 Emerlito window and put his head out while raising both his hands. They recognized
Miranda immediately borded a mobile patrol vehicle (Mobile No. 3) and the driver as Robin C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13, ibid). There was
positioned themselves near the south approach of Abacan bridge since it was no one else with him inside the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja noticed
the only passable way going to the north (pp. 8-9, ibid). It took them about ten that Manarang arrived and stopped his motorcycle behind the vehicle of
appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told appellant to alight to which appellant
complied. Appellant was wearing a short leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8,
1993) such that when he alighted with both his hands raised, a gun (Exhibit turned over to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10, TSN, July 13, 1993).
"C") tucked on the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15, TSN, February 23, During the investigation, appellant admitted possession of the firearms stating
1993), its butt protruding (p. 15, ibid). SPO2 Borja made the move to confiscate that he used them for shooting (p. 14, ibid). He was not able to produce any
the gun but appellant held the former's hand alleging that the gun was covered permit to carry or memorandum receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-18,
by legal papers (p. 16, ibid). SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the gun TSN, January 25, 1994).
really was covered by legal papers, it would have to be shown in the office (p.
16, ibid). After disarming appellant, SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run On November 28, 1992, a certification (Exhibit "F") was issued by Captain,
incident which was angrily denied by appellant (p. 17, ibid). By that time, a Senior Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record Branch of the Firearms
crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid). SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder and Explosives Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The Certification stated
of the gun and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20, ibid). that the three firearms confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby armalite rifle
SN-RP 131280, a .357 caliber revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and
While SPO2 Borja and appellant were arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben a .380 Pietro Beretta SN-A35720, were not registered in the name of Robin C.
Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, Padilla (p. 6, ibid). A second Certification dated December 11, 1992 issued by
March 8, 1993). As the most senior police officer in the group, SPO Mercado Captain Espino stated that the three firearms were not also registered in the
took over the matter and informed appellant that he was being arrested for the name of Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid).
hit and run incident (p. 13, ibid). He pointed out to appellant the fact that the
plate number of his vehicle was dangling and the railing and the hood were Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that his arrest was illegal and
dented (p. 12, ibid). Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his misdeed and, consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are
instead, played with the crowd by holding their hands with one hand and inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a
pointing to SPO3 Borja with his right hand saying "iyan, kinuha ang baril ko" confidential agent authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum
(pp. 13-15, ibid). Because appellant's jacket was short, his gesture exposed a Receipt, to carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the penalty for simple illegal
long magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in appellant 's back right, pocket (p. possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the
16, ibid). SPO Mercado saw this and so when appellant turned around as he 1987 Constitution.
was talking and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado confiscated the magazine After a careful review of the records 27 of this case, the Court is convinced that
from appellant (pp. 16-17, ibid). Suspecting that appellant could also be petitioner's guilt of the crime charged stands on terra firma, notwithstanding
carrying a rifle inside the vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2 Mercado the Solicitor-General's change of heart.
prevented appellant from going back to his vehicle by opening himself the door
of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid). He saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is
lying horizontally at the front by the driver 's seat. It had a long magazine filled no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per
with live bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21, ibid). He asked appellant se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan bridge illegal.
for the papers covering the rifle and appellant answered angrily that they were 28
Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the following instances:
at his home (pp. 26-27, ibid). SPO Mercado modified the arrest of appellant by
including as its ground illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid). SPO Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
Mercado then read to appellant his constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid). person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
The police officers brought appellant to the Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid) where appellant voluntarily surrendered a third committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
firearm, a pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit "L") with a single round in its chamber
and a magazine (pp. 33-35, ibid) loaded with seven (7) other live bullets. (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
Appellant also voluntarily surrendered a black bag containing two additional knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
long magazines and one short magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37, ibid).
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
After appellant had been interrogated by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
was transferred to the Police Investigation Division at Sto. Rosario Street
beside the City Hall Building where he and the firearms and ammunitions were
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity. 36 Moreover, when caught
from one confinement to another. in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson)
and ammunition (M-16 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (i) after he has committed as he was again actually committing another offense (illegal possession of
or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, firearm and ammunitions) and this time in the presence of a peace officer. 37
(ii) in the presence of the arresting officer or private person. 29 Both elements
concurred here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be
hit and run — an offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private justified under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There
person, who then sought to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and
that "presence" does not only require that the arresting person sees the run and the actual apprehension. Moreover, after having stationed themselves
offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance created thereby AND at the Abacan bridge in response to Manarang's report, the policemen saw for
proceeds at once to the scene." 30 As testified to by Manarang, he heard the themselves the fast approaching Pajero of petitioner, 38 its dangling plate
screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut vendor), number (PMA 777 as reported by Manarang), and the dented hood and railings
reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase to the erring thereof. 39 These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal
Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After knowledge of the facts indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the
having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to vehicle involved in the hit and run incident. Verily then, the arresting police
the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SPO2 Borja and officers acted upon verified personal knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay
SPO2 Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual information. 40
arrest of petitioner. 31
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his
the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and plea. 41 Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside from his failure to quash
run. 32 We beg to disagree. That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the the information, his participation in the trial and by presenting his evidence,
policemen (who admittedly were nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in placed him in estoppel to assail the legality of his arrest. 42 Likewise, by
effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in any way affect the propriety of the applying for bail, petitioner patently waived such irregularities and defects. 43
apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent action Manarang could have
taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself, inasmuch as policemen are We now go to the firearms and ammunitions seized from petitioner without a
unquestionably better trained and well-equipped in effecting an arrest of a search warrant, the admissibility in evidence of which, we uphold.
suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could have put up a The five (5) well-settled instances when a warrantless search and seizure of
degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to contain property is valid, 44 are as follows:
without endangering his own life. Moreover, it is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration 1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
with private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation, that the offense Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 45 and by prevailing jurisprudence 46,
herein involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list 47
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view", the elements of which are:
of unreported and unsolved crimes.
(a). a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the
It is appropriate to state at this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner herein,
police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
cannot defeat the arrest which has been set in motion in a public place for want
of a warrant as the police was confronted by an urgent need to render aid or (b). the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right
take action. 33 The exigent circumstances of — hot pursuit, 34 a fleeing suspect, to be where they are;
a moving vehicle, the public place and the raining nighttime — all created a
situation in which speed is essential and delay improvident. 35 The Court (c). the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
acknowledges police authority to make the forcible stop since they had more
(d). "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 48
than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the
3. search of a moving vehicle. 49 Highly regulated by the government, the was contemporaneous with the arrest. 62 The products of that search are
vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its admissible evidence not excluded by the exclusionary rule. Another
transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this
activity. 50 case, the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like
4. consented warrantless search, and herein petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the
5. customs search. vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of
some criminal offense. 63
In conformity with respondent court's observation, it indeed appears that the
authorities stumbled upon petitioner's firearms and ammunitions without even Anent his second defense, petitioner contends that he could not be convicted
undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly understood, is a prying of violating P.D. 1866 because he is an appointed civilian agent authorized to
into hidden places for that which is concealed. 51 The seizure of the Smith & possess and carry the subject firearms and ammunition as evidenced by a
Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came within Mission Order 64 and Memorandum Receipt duly issued by PNP Supt. Rodialo
"plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and Gumtang, the deputy commander of Task Force Aguila, Lianga, Surigao del
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he Sur. The contention lacks merit.
raised his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be
to the confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that
apparent to the policemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
said rifle lying horizontally near the driver's seat. 52 Thus it has been held that: corresponding license or permit to possess. 65 The first element is beyond
(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in the commission of a criminal offense, dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions 66 were seized from
the . . . police officers should happen to discover a criminal offense being petitioner's possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in
committed by any person, they are not precluded from performing their duties evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly
as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order and
the, corpus delicti. 53 Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence
for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the
Objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived
view are subject to seizure even without a warrant. 54 and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from
respondent court's incisive observation. Thus:
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted
magazines, petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. 55 This latter Appellant's contention is predicated on the assumption that the Memorandum
gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search Receipts and Mission Order were issued before the subject firearms were
and seizure 56, and that his failure to quash the information estopped him from seized and confiscated from him by the police officers in Angeles City. That is
assailing any purported defect. 57 not so. The evidence adduced indicate that the Memorandum Receipts and
Mission Order were prepared and executed long after appellant had been
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active
apprehended on October 26, 1992.
search done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their
seizure without a search warrant nonetheless can still be justified under a Appellant, when apprehended, could not show any document as proof of his
search incidental to a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was authority to possess and carry the subject firearms. During the preliminary
effected, the police may undertake a protective search 58 of the passenger investigation of the charge against him for illegal possession of firearms and
compartment and containers in the vehicle 59 which are within petitioner's ammunitions he could not, despite the ample time given him, present any
grabbing distance regardless of the nature of the offense. 60 This satisfied the proper document showing his authority. If he had, in actuality, the
two-tiered test of an incidental search: (i) the item to be searched (vehicle) was Memorandum Receipts and Missions Order, he could have produced those
within the arrestee's custody or area of immediate control 61 and (ii) the search documents easily, if not at the time of apprehension, at least during the
preliminary investigation. But neither appellant nor his counsel inform the Order and declared further that he did not authorize anyone to sign in his
prosecutor that appellant is authorized to possess and carry the subject behalf. 69 His surname thereon, we note, was glaringly misspelled as
firearms under Memorandum Receipt and Mission Order. At the initial "Durembes." 70 In addition, only Unit Commanders and Chief of Offices have
presentation of his evidence in court, appellant could have produced these the authority to issue Mission Orders and Memorandum Receipts under
documents to belie the charged against him. Appellant did not. He did not even the Guidelines on the Issuance of MOs, MRs, & PCFORs. 71 PNP Supt.
take the witness stand to explain his possession of the subject firearms. Rodialo Gumtang who issued petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt is neither a Unit Commander nor the Chief of Office, but a mere deputy
Even in appellant's Demurrer to Evidence filed after the prosecution rested commander. Having emanated from an unauthorized source, petitioner's
contain no allegation of a Memorandum Receipts and Mission Order Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are infirm and lacking in force and
authorizing appellant to possess and carry the subject firearms. effect. Besides, the Mission Order covers "Recom 1-12-Baguio City," 72 areas
At the initial presentation of appellant's evidence, the witness cited was one outside Supt. Gumtang's area of responsibility thereby needing prior approval
James Neneng to whom a subpoena was issued. Superintendent Gumtang "by next higher Headquarters" 73 which is absent in this case. The
was not even mentioned. James Neneng appeared in court but was not Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the
presented by the defense. Subsequent hearings were reset until the defense March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense which pertinently
found Superintendent Gumtang who appeared in court without subpoena on provides that:
January 13, 1994. 67 No memorandum receipt shall be issued for a CCS firearms without
The Court is baffled why petitioner failed to produce and present the Mission corresponding certification from the corresponding Responsible Supply Officer
Order and Memorandum Receipt if they were really issued and existing before of the appropriate AFP unit that such firearm has been officially taken up in
his apprehension. Petitioner's alternative excuses that the subject firearms that units property book, and that report of such action has been reported to
were intended for theatrical purposes, or that they were owned by the higher AFP authority.
Presidential Security Group, or that his Mission Order and Memorandum Had petitioner's Memorandum Receipt been authentic, we see no reason why
Receipt were left at home, further compound their irregularity. As to be he cannot present the corresponding certification as well.
reasonably expected, an accused claiming innocence, like herein petitioner,
would grab the earliest opportunity to present the Mission Order and What is even more peculiar is that petitioner's name, as certified to by the
Memorandum Receipt in question and save himself from the long and Director for Personnel of the PNP, does not even appear in the Plantilla of
agonizing public trial and spare him from proffering inconsistent excuses. In Non-Uniform Personnel or in the list of Civilian Agents or Employees of the
fact, the Mission Order itself, as well as the Letter-Directive of the AFP Chief PNP which could justify the issuance of a Mission Order, a fact admitted by
of Staff, is explicit in providing that: petitioner's counsel. 74 The implementing rules of P.D. 1866 issued by the then
PC-INP Chief and Director-General Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos are clear and
VIII. c. When a Mission Order is requested for verification by enforcement unambiguous, thus:
units/personnels such as PNP, Military Brigade and other Military Police Units
of AFP, the Mission Order should be shown without resentment to avoid No Mission Order shall be issued to any civilian agent authorizing the same to
embarrassment and/or misunderstanding. carry firearms outside residence unless he/she is included in the regular
plantilla of the government agency involved in law enforcement and is
IX. d. Implicit to this Mission Order is the injunction that the confidential receiving regular compensation for the services he/she is rendering in the
instruction will be carried out through all legal means and do not cover an agency. Further, the civilian agent must be included in a specific law
actuation in violation of laws. In the latter event, this Mission Order is rendered enforcement/police/intelligence project proposal or special project which
inoperative in respect to such violation. 68 specifically required the use of firearms(s) to insure its accomplishment and
which directive petitioner failed to heed without cogent explanation. that the project is duly approved at the PC Regional Command level or its
equivalent level in other major services of the AFP, INP and NBI, or at higher
The authenticity and validity of the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, levels of command. 75 Circular No. 1, dated January 6, 1986, of the then
moreover, were ably controverted. Witness for the prosecution Police Supt. Ministry of Justice likewise provides as follows:
Durendes denied under oath his signature on the dorsal side of the Mission
If mission orders are issued to civilians (not members of the uniformed service), THIS IS TO CERTIFY that Robin C. Padilla of 59 Labo St., Quezon City is a
they must be civilian agents included in the regular plantilla of the government licensed/registered holder of Pistol Smith and Wesson Cal 9mm with serial
agency involved in law enforcement and are receiving regular compensation number TCT8214 covered by License No. RL M76C4476687.
for the service they are rendering.
Further certify that the following firearms are not registered with this Office per
That petitioner's Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were fabricated verification from available records on file this Office as of this date:
pieces of evidence is accentuated all the more by the testimony and
certification of the Chief of the Records Branch of the firearms and Explosives M16 Baby Armalite SN-RP131120
Office of the PNP declaring that petitioner's confiscated firearms are not Revolver Cal 357 SN-3219
licensed or registered in the name of the petitioner. 76 Thus:
Pistol Cal 380 Pietro Beretta SN-35723
Q. In all these files that you have just mentioned Mr. Witness, what did you
find, if any? However, we have on file one Pistol Cal 380, Beretta with serial number
35723Y, licensed/registered to one Albert Villanueva Fallorina of 29 San Juan
A. I found that a certain Robin C. Padilla is a licensed registered owner of one St., Capitol Pasig, MM under Re-Registered License.
9 mm pistol, Smith and Wesson with Serial No. TCT 8214 and the following
firearms being asked whether it is registered or not, I did not find any records, This certification is issued pursuant to Subpoena from City of Angeles.
the M-16 and the caliber .357 and the caliber .380 but there is a firearm with
FOR THE CHIEF, FEO:
the same serial number which is the same as that licensed and/or registered
in the name of one Albert Villanueva Fallorina. (Sgd.)
Q. So in short, the only licensed firearms in the name of accused Robin C. JOSE MARIO M. ESPINO
Padilla is a pistol, Smith and Wesson, caliber 9 mm with Serial No. TCT 8214? Sr. Inspector, PNP
Chief, Records Branch 78
A. Yes, sir.
In several occasions, the Court has ruled that either the testimony of a
Q. And the firearms that were the subject of this case are not listed in the
representative of, or a certification from, the PNP Firearms and Explosives
names of the accused in this case?
Office (FEO) attesting that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would
A. Yes, sir. 77 suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the second element of illegal
possession of firearm. 79 In People vs. Tobias, 80 we reiterated that such
xxx xxx xxx certification is sufficient to show that a person has in fact no license. From the
And the certification which provides as follows: foregoing discussion, the fact that petitioner does not have the license or
permit to possess was overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution. The
Republic of the Philippines certification may even be dispensed with in the light of the evidences 81 that an
Department of the Interior and Local Government M-16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a .38 caliber pistol, akin to the
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE confiscated firearms, cannot be licensed to a civilian, 82 as in the case of
FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES OFFICE petitioner. The Court, therefore, entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's
Camp Crame, Quezon City conviction especially as we find no plausible reason, and none was presented,
to depart from the factual findings of both the trial court and respondent court
PNFEO5 28 November 1992 which, as a rule, are accorded by the Court with respect and finality. 83
CERTIFICATION Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court "in applying P.D.
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context" and adds
that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal
possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D.
1866 no longer exists. 84 He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months With respect to the penalty imposed by the trial court as affirmed by
to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in respondent court (17 years 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal, as
contravention of the Constitution. 85 minimum, to 21 years of reclusion perpetua, as maximum), we reduce the
same in line with the fairly recent case of People v. Lian 93 where the Court en
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the banc provided that the indeterminate penalty imposable for simple illegal
respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of possession of firearm, without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
appellant's commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only should be within the range of ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve years
by subsequent ones. 86 Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and (12) of prision mayor, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months
apply the law as it stands. 87 And until its repeal, respondent court can not be and one (1) day to twenty (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum. This is
faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted discernible from the following explanation by the Court:
to by petitioner.
In the case at bar, no mitigating or aggravating circumstances have been
Equally lacking in merit is appellant's allegation that the penalty for simple alleged or proved, In accordance with the doctrine regarding special laws
illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of explained in People v. Simon, 94 although Presidential Decree No. 1866 is a
firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum special law, the penalties therein were taken from the Revised Penal Code,
to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous averment. The severity hence the rules in said Code for graduating by degrees or determining the
of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. proper period should be applied. Consequently, the penalty for the offense of
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe simple illegal possession of firearm is the medium period of the complex
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. "The fact that the punishment penalty in said Section 1, that is, 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years.
authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and unusual." (24 This penalty, being that which is to be actually imposed in accordance with the
C.J.S., 1187-1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come rules therefor and not merely imposable as a general prescription under the
under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive", law, shall be the maximum of the range of the indeterminate sentence. The
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral minimum thereof shall be taken, as aforesaid, from any period of the penalty
sense of the community" 88 next lower in degree, which is, prision mayor in its maximum period
It is well-settled that as far as the constitutional prohibition goes, it is not so to reclusion temporal in its medium
much the extent as the nature of the punishment that determines whether it is, period. 95
or is not, cruel and unusual and that sentences of imprisonment, though WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals
perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or unusual if within statutory limits. 89 sustaining petitioner's conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that
burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant petitioner's indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to "ten (10) years and one (1)
which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification day, as minimum, to eighteen (18) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as
of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, maximum.
not a doubtful and argumentative implication, 90 as in this case. In fact, the SO ORDERED.
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. 91 Just
recently, the Court declared that "the pertinent laws on illegal possession of
firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution. . .
" 92 Appellant's grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not
be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or
morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress
which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The
only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
G.R. No. 116720 October 2, 1997 For resolution is the demurrer to evidence dated September 1, 1993 of the
accused, Roel Encinada, praying that he be acquitted of the crime charged on
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, the ground of the inadmissibility of the evidence for the prosecution consisting
vs. of the marijuana (seized) from him by the police. The accused raised the
ROEL ENCINADA, accused-appellant. following issues, to wit: (1) Whether the arrest and search of the accused
without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search as an
incident to a lawful arrest; and, (2) Whether the subject marijuana is admissible
PANGANIBAN, J.: in evidence against the accused.
In acquitting the appellant, the Court reiterates the constitutional proscription xxx xxx xxx
that evidence (in this case, prohibited drugs) seized without a valid search
warrant is inadmissible in any proceeding. A yield of incriminating evidence A scrutiny of the evidence for the prosecution shows that the events leading to
will not legitimize an illegal search. Indeed, the end never justifies the means. the arrest of the accused started when SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia, chief of the PNP
vice control section, received a tip from his informer that the accused, Roel
The Case Encinada would be arriving on board the M/V Sweet Pearl at about seven
o'clock in the morning of May 21, 1992. On cross-examination SPO4 Bolonia
This principle is stressed in this appeal from the Judgment, 1 promulgated on
testified that the information was given to him by his asset at about four o'clock
July 15, 1994 by the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32,2 in
in the afternoon of May 20, 1992. After receiving the tip he relayed the
Criminal Case No. 3668, convicting Appellant Roel Encinada of illegal
information to SPO4 Cipriano Iligan, Jr., PNP chief of intelligence. SPO4
transportation of prohibited drugs under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425,
Bolonia further declared that he would have applied for a search warrant but
as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179.
there was simply no time for it.
An Information,3 dated May 22, 1992, was filed by Third Asst. Surigao City
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor Virgilio M. Egay charging appellant of said crime allegedly
committed as follows: In the later case of People vs. Tangliben (184 SCRA 220) the Supreme Court
modified its ruling in the Aminuddin case when it held that the arrest and
That on or about May 21, 1992, in the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within
search is lawful when the police had to act quickly and there was no more time
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in gross
to secure a search warrant. It is noted that the tip was given to SPO4 Bolonia
disregard of the prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 6425 as
by his informant at about the closing time of the offices of the various courts.
amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179, did then and there willfully,
He still had to inform SPO4 Iligan in order to coordinate with him. The boat
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control dried
carrying the accused was scheduled to dock in Surigao City at seven o'clock
marijuana leaves weighing 800 grams, more or less, which he transported to
the following morning when the courts had not yet opened.
Surigao City from Cebu City aboard a passenger ship, well knowing that such
acts are expressly prohibited by law. It is therefore quite obvious that the police did not have enough time to apply
for a search warrant in the interim. The police cannot be faulted for acting on
Before arraignment, appellant, assisted by Counsel Antonio Casurra, offered
the tip and for stopping and searching the accused even without a warrant.
to plead guilty to a lesser offense, i.e., illegal possession of prohibited
drugs.4 The trial court requested the prosecution to study the offer, 5 but the In the case at bar, the accused was caught in flagrante delicto in actual
records do not show any agreement on such proposal. possession of the marijuana. The search made upon his personal effects falls
squarely under paragraph (a) of Rule 113, Section 5 of the 1985 Rules on
Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. 6 After the
Criminal Procedure which allows a warrantless search as an incident to a
prosecution presented its evidence, the defense filed, with leave of court,7 a
lawful arrest (People vs. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401).
"Demurrer to Evidence" dated September 1, 1993,8 questioning the
admissibility of the evidence which allegedly was illegally seized from xxx xxx xxx
appellant. The court a quo denied the motion, ruling:9
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer to evidence in question is 1993; pp. 4, 5, 15-16 TSN, March 3, 1993; pp. 29-30 TSN, November 27, 1992,
denied for lack of merit. pp. 29-30).

After trial in due course, the assailed Judgment was rendered, the decretal From their various positions, the police officers followed Encinada immediately
portion of which reads: boarded a tricycle at Borromeo Street, still holding the plastic chairs. As the
tricycle slowly moved forward, Bolonia chased it and ordered the driver to stop
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused, Roel after identifying himself as a police officer. When the vehicle stopped, Bolinia
Encinada, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 4, Article identified himself to Encinada and ordered him to alight from the tricycle.
II, of Republic Act No. 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Bilang 179, and Bolonia asked Encinada to hand over the plastic chairs, to which the latter
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a complied (pp. 5, 6, 17 TSN, March 3, 1993, pp. 30-32, 35 TSN, November 27,
fine of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment 1992).
in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
Bolonia noticed that there were two small chairs, one green and the other blue,
The marijuana (Exhibit B) involved in this case is hereby forfeited to the stacked together and tied with a piece of string. Between the stack of chairs,
government to be destroyed or disposed of pursuant to present rules and there was a bulky package. Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the
regulations. The two plastic chairs (Exhibits D and D-1) are also forfeited to peculiar scent of marijuana. Making a small tear in the cellophane cover,
the government. Bolonia could see and smell the what appeared to be "marijuana," a prohibited
The Facts drug (pp. 6-9 TSN, March 3, 1993, Exh. "B", "D" and sub-markings; pp. 32-34,
35-39 TSN, November 27, 1992).
Version of the Prosecution
Encinada was brought to the central police station. Bolonia, in the presence of
The Solicitor General, in the Appellee's Brief, recounts the events leading to one Nonoy Lerio who is a member of the local media and a friend of Encinada,
appellant's arrest, as follows:10 opened the package. It was discovered that indeed, the contents consisted of
dried leaves known as marijuana. In the course of the investigation, Encinada
At around 4 p.m. of May 20, 1992, SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house
surrendered to Bolonia his passenger ticket issued by M/V Sweet Pearl (pp.
when he received a tip from an informant that Roel Encinada would be arriving
9-11 TSN, March 3, 1993, Exh. "E"; pp. 34-35, 39-40 TSN, November 27,
in Surigao City from Cebu City in the morning of May 21, 1992 on board the
1992).
M/V Sweet Pearl bringing with him "marijuana". Bolonia was then Chief of the
Vice Control Squad of the Surigao City Police (pp. 27-29; TSN, November 27, On July 13, 1992, Bolonia brought the package of dried leaves for examination
1992, 34-40; p. 10, TSN, May 14, 1993). at the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City. The
forensic chemist, Inspector Vicente Armada, tested the leaves and confirmed
Bolonia already knew Encinada because the latter previously was engaged in
that they were positive for marijuana. However, the marijuana only weighed
illegal gambling known as "buloy-buloy." After receiving the tip, Bolonia notified
610 grams, which Armada opined to be probably due to shrinkage and
the members of his team — SPO3 Marcial Tiro, SPO3 Glen Abot and SPO3
moisture loss (pp. 12-17, 19-21, 24-40, 41; TSN, November 27, 1992, Exh. "A",
Charlito Duero — as well as his colleague SPO4 Cipriano Iligan, Jr., the chief
"B", "C" and sub-markings.)
of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, of the information he received.
Because the information came late, there was no more time to secure a search Version of the Defense
warrant (pp. 38; TSN, November 27, 1992, May 14, 1993, p. 13; pp. 4, 19;
TSN, March 3, 1993). Appellant sets up denial as his defense. In his brief, he denied ownership and
possession of said plastic baby chairs, as follows:11
In the early morning of May 21, 1992, Bolonia, Iligan and other police officers
deployed themselves in different strategic points at the city wharf to intercept 1) In the morning of May 21, 1992, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, more
Encinada. At about 8:15 a.m. of the same day, the M/V Sweet Pearl finally or less, the accused was seen to have disembarked from MV Sweet Pearl after
docked. The police officers saw Encinada walk briskly down the gangplank, an overnight trip from Cebu City;
carrying two small colored plastic baby chairs in his hand (p. 11 TSN, May 14,
2) The accused proceeded to the Surigao PPA Gate and boarded a motorela continued to board the motorela who directed him to proceed to the residence
bound for his residence at Little Tondo, (within the City Proper), Surigao City. of Baby Encinada to verify whether the person picked up by the police
The Motorela was fully loaded with passengers, with the accused as the fourth authorities was related to the latter;
passenger;
8.b) Josephine Nodalo — testified that she is a beautician, and that she was
3) When the motorela was already able to travel a distance of about ten (10) one of the four (4) passengers of the motorela driven by Ruben Concha, which
meters more or less, the same was forcibly stopped by persons who ordered motorela was forcibly stopped by men who are chasing it after travelling a
the passengers to disembarked (sic). Thereafter, all the (baggage) of the distance of 5 to 10 meters away from its loading area near the PPA Gate.
passengers and the driver were ordered to stand in a line for which a body
search was made individually (sic); All the four (4) passengers were ordered to disembarked (sic) from the
motorela whereupon they were all subjected to body search including their
4) After the search was made, the accused was singled out in the line and (baggage).
ordered to board the service vehicle of the police and was brought to the PNP
Police Station. That it was the male passenger who was sitting at the rear portion of the
motorela who was picked up by the Police Authorities and despite the protests
Before however the accused boarded the jeep, he was openly protesting to made was ordered to board the Police service vehicle.
the action taken by the police authorities and demanded from the
apprehending officers a copy of a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest for Upon learning from the persons who were gathered at the scene, that the one
the search made and for his apprehension; who was picked up was the son of Mr. Encinada, the latter boarded back the
motorela and directed the driver to proceed to the residence of the Encinada's
5) In the police headquarters, the accused was made to undergo custodial at Little Tondo to verify whether it was really their son who was picked up by
investigation for which a plastic bag was presented to him allegedly containing the police authorities. She made this, as Mrs. Encinada, (the mother of the
the subject marijuana leaves. The accused denied that the said plastic bag accused) is his (regular) customer;
belonged to him.
8.c) Mr. Daniel "Nonoy" Lerio, Jr. — testified that, being a member of the Press,
The denial was witnessed by Mr. Daniel "Nonoy" Lerio, Jr. a member of the he was requested by the police authorities to witness the custodial
Surigao City Press, who was invited by the Police Investigators to witness the investigation conducted upon the person of the accused, who, during the entire
presentation of the alleged marijuana leaves, during the said investigation; proceedings of the investigation vehemently denied having any knowledge
about the marijuana leaves placed inside the plastic bag;
6) After the custodial investigation, the accused was placed immediately
behind bars and the Information for Violation of RA 6425 as amended by Batas 8.d) Isabelita Encinada — testified that she was informed by her manicurist
Pambansa Blg. 179 was filed before the Court; (Josephine Nodalo) about the arrest . . . (of) her son, somewhere at the PPA
Port Area and upon being informed, she and her husband immediately went
xxx xxx xxx to the Surigao PNP Headquarters to verify the
Aside from appellant, the defense also presented five (5) other witnesses (news) . . . ;
whose testimony allegedly established the following:12 xxx xxx xxx
8.a) Ruben Concha — the driver of the motorela who testified that he was Ruling of the Trial Court
surprised when the motorela he was driving was forcibly stopped (while
already in motion) by the police authorities while directing his four (4) The trial court rejected appellant's claim that he was merely an innocent
passengers, (3 males and 1 female) to disembarked (sic) together with their passenger and that his package contained mango and otap samples, not
(baggage). marijuana. Emphasizing that the Surigao City Police had no ill motive against
appellant, the trial court gave credence to SPO4 Bolonia's story that he
That after the search was made, the accused was singled out, and despite the actually received from his police asset the information regarding appellant's
protests made, was ordered to board the Police service vehicle, while the 2 arrival in Surigao City. The trial court further emphasized that appellant was
other male passengers just left the scene while the female passenger
caught carrying marijuana in flagrante delicto. Hence, the warrantless search A: A (sic) plastic chairs.
following his lawful arrest was valid and the marijuana obtained was admissible
in evidence. xxx xxx xxx

Assignment of Errors Q: After you saw Roel Encinada disembarked (sic) from the boat, what did you
and your companions do?
In his Brief, appellant submits the following assignment of errors: 13
A: We followed him behind because we posted in the different direction(s) in
I. The lower court erred in finding that the accused was caught the wharf.
in flagranti (sic) delicto in possession of the subject marijuana leaves and is
the one responsible in transporting the same; xxx xxx xxx

II. The lower court gravely erred in finding that search and the arrest of the Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you
accused without a warrant would fall under the doctrine of warrantless search followed him?
as incident to a lawful arrest — A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and
III. The lower court gravely erred in finding that the subject marijuana leaves let him stopped (sic).
is admissible in evidence — xxx xxx xxx
In short, the main issues are (1) the sufficiency of the evidence showing Q: By the way, where was (sic) this (sic) two plastic chairs placed in the
possession of marijuana by appellant and (2) the validity of the search motorize tricycle?
conducted on the person and belongings of the appellant.
A: He was sitting at the back of the motor at the right portion of the seat and
The Court's Ruling the chairs was (sic) placed besides him. ([W]itness indicating that he was
The petition is meritorious. sitting (sic) an imaginary seat at the back of the motor and holding an (sic)
imaginary chairs with his left arm).
First Issue: Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs
Between these two contentions, the choice of the trial court prevails because
Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and this is a matter that involves credibility of witnesses. On this subject of
ownership of the plastic baby chairs. He contends that the testimonies of credibility, the opinion of the trial court deserves great respect as it was in a
Bolonia and Iligan conflicted as to the number of passengers riding better position to observe the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on
the motorela. Such alleged conflict is peripheral and irrelevant. Hence, it the stand;15 hence, it was in a superior situation to assess their testimonies.
deserves scant consideration. Appellant adds that such testimonies also
conflicted as to the place where appellant sat inside the motorela. This claim, Furthermore, proof of ownership of the marijuana is not necessary in the
aside from being flimsy, is also not supported by the transcript of stenographic prosecution of illegal drug cases;16 it is sufficient that such drug is found in
notes. appellant's possession.

In his testimony, appellant vehemently denied possession of the plastic baby Second Issue: Illegal Search and Seizure
chairs, stressing that he was not holding them when the search was conducted. Based on the foregoing discussion, appellant's conviction could have been
However, his denial is easily rebutted by Bolonia's testimony: 14 affirmed by this Court. However, the very evidence implicating him — the
Q: When you saw Roel Encinada who disembarked from M/V Sweet Pearl, prohibited drugs found in his possession — cannot be used against him in this
what did you observe in his person, if any? case or, for that matter, in "any proceeding."

A: He was carrying a (sic) baby chairs. Generally, a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is subject to challenge.17 Section
Q: What kind of chairs? 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, is apropos:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, port area. After appellant disembarked from the ship and rode a motorela,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature Bolonia stopped the motor vehicle and conducted the search. He rummaged
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of through the two strapped plastic baby chairs which were held by appellant and
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by found inserted between them a package of marijuana wrapped in a small
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and plastic envelope.
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. Appellant contended before the lower court that the warrantless search of his
belongings was proscribed by the Constitution. But the trial judge rejected this
Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is legally inadmissible in contention, opining that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at the time of
evidence as a "fruit of the poisonous tree." This principle is covered by this his arrest. Hence, it concluded that the warrantless search conducted after his
exclusionary rule: "lawful arrest" was valid and that the marijuana was admissible in evidence.

Sec. 3. . . . Rule 113, Section 5, discusses the instances when a warrantless arrest may
be effected, as follows:
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
The plain import of the foregoing provision is that a search and seizure is
normally unlawful unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
warrant of arrest. This protection is based on the principle that, between a committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
citizen and the police, the magistrate stands as a mediator, nay, an authority
clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants or (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
arrest.18 knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
The right against warrantless searches, however, is subject to legal and
judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
(5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
search and seizure.19 In these cases, the search and seizure may be made from one confinement to another.
only upon probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term xxx xxx xxx
eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense Surigao City policemen. Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal
with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed an
which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense. The search cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest.
offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought Raw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest.
in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is Bolonia's testimony shows that the search preceded the arrest: 21
in the place to be searched.20
Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you
In this case, Bolonia received at 4:00 p.m. on May 20, 1992 an intelligence followed him?
report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning
A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and
aboard the M/V Sweet Pearl. Although such report could have been the basis
let him stopped (sic).
of probable cause, Bolonia explained that he could not secure a warrant
because the courts in Surigao City were already closed for the day. Thus, he xxx xxx xxx
and the other lawmen had no choice but to proceed the next morning to the
Q: You said you stopped the motor tricycle in which Roel Encinada (sic) riding, 3. Raffling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application
what did you do? for search warrant may be filed directly with any judge in whose jurisdiction the
place to be searched is located, after office hours, or during Saturdays,
A: At first I identified myself to the driver and to some of the passengers. Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required to certify
xxx xxx xxx under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours, or during
Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays; (Emphasis supplied)
Q: And after that, what happened next?
The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No.
A: I requested Reel Encinada to disembark from the motor tricycle because of 19, series of 1987, entitled "Amended Guidelines and Procedures on
that information given to us in his possession. Applications for Search Warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other
Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple
Q: Possession of what?
Salas":
A: Possession of marijuana, Sir.
This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on
Q: And Roel Encinada alighted from the motor vehicle? applications for search warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and
other serious crimes affecting peace and order. There is a need for prompt
A: Yes, Sir. action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these amended
guidelines in the issuance of a search warrant are issued:
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next?
1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried.
subversion Act, crimes against public order as defined in the Revised Penal
Contrary to the trial court's ruling, People vs. Tangliben22 is factually Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunition and
inapplicable to the case at bar. The prosecution's evidence did not show any violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer
suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by
rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and
be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances. Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is
located.
We disagree with the trial court's justification for the search:
2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take
The arrest of the accused without warrant was lawful because there was a cognizance of and personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive
probable cause or ground for his apprehension. The police had received Judge or Vice-Executive Judge, the application may be taken cognizance of
reliable, albeit confidential information from their informant that Roel Encinada and acted upon by any judge of the Court where the application is filed.
would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board the M/V Sweet Pearl.
Unfortunately there was no more time for the police to apply for and secure a 3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays,
search warrant as the information was received late in the afternoon of May shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court
20, 1992 and the accused was expected to arrive at seven o'clock the following having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant
morning. The different courts were closed by then. Nevertheless the police felt shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that
constrained to act on the valuable piece of information. its issuance is urgent.

Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay
1992 at his house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as personally conduct the examination of the applicant and his witnesses to
the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7.00 a.m. the following prevent the possible leakage of information. He shall observe the procedures,
day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows applications for search warrants safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants provided for in
even after court hours: this Court's Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985.
In People vs. Aminnudin, the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the belongings. Appellant's silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such
marijuana found in appellant's possession during a search without a warrant, search.24 The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not
because it had been illegally seized. The Court firmly struck down the have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or
policemen's cavalier disregard for the Bill of Rights, explaining: coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.25 Furthermore, considering that the
The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of search was conducted irregularly, i.e, without a warrant, we cannot appreciate
the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of
could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was duty.
coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had Appellant's alleged acquiescence should be distinguished from the consent
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, appreciated in the recent case of People vs. Lacerna.26 In said case, the
indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was search was conducted at a validly established checkpoint and was made in
made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether the regular performance of the policemen's duty. Although it became intrusive
because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had when the policemen opened his baggage, it was validated by the consent of
determined on his own authority that a "search warrant was not necessary." appellant, who testified in open court that he allowed such search because he
had nothing to hide. In the present case, there was no checkpoint established.
Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce. The policemen stopped the motorela and forthwith subjected the passengers
Bolonia's receipt of the intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity, to a search of their persons and baggage. In contrast to the accused in
the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts Lacerna, herein appellant testified that he openly objected to the search by
underscored the need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But he failed or asking for a warrant.
neglected to do so. Such failure or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a
constitutional right of the appellant. Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellant's conviction cannot
stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence remaining to convict him. That
It is significant that the Solicitor General does not share the trial judge's opinion. the search disclosed a prohibited substance in appellant's possession, and
Taking a totally different approach to justify the search, the Republic's counsel thus confirmed the police officers' initial information and suspicion, did not cure
avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of its patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest
marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search.
the warrantless search. This, he gleaned from Bolonia's
testimony:23 We should stress that the Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law
enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs.
Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next? However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehensions of malefactors do not
A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried. justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights. Law enforcers are required to
follow the law and to respect the people's rights. Otherwise, their efforts
Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs? become counterproductive. We remind them of this recent exhortation by this
Court:27
A: Yes, Sir.
. . . In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right
Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two
to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full
plastic chairs that he carried, what did you do next?
protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend
A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show
two chairs. the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they
were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law
We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system
otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant — based on the transcript of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates
quoted above — did not voluntarily consent to Bolonia's search of his and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve
the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with
deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law.
Truly, the end never justifies the means.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant is ACQUITTED. Unless convicted for
any other crime or detained for some lawful reason, Appellant Roel Encinada
is ORDERED RELEASED immediately.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999 but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed "sign language;" he
motioned with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, apparently understood and acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded
vs. several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances.
CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY HO SAN, accused-appellant. CID then gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished
to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man to follow, but the latter
did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: the man and escorted the latter to the police headquarters.
Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San (hereafter CHUA) prays for his acquitttal and At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial features
the reversal of the judgment of 10 February 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of the man, that he was probably Taiwanese. CID then "recited and informed
(RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 66, finding him guilty of transporting, the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance of
without appropriate legal authority, the regulated substance a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, CID ordered his men to
methamphetamine hydrochloride, in violation of Section 15, 1 Article III of find a resident of the area who spoke Chinese to act as an enterpreter. In the
Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 meantime, BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic
as further amended by R.A. No. 7659,2 and sentencing him to "die by lethal packets containing yellowish crystalline substance which he and CID
injection." In view thereof, the judgement was brought to this Court for suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan, finally arrived,
automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." The police
amended by Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659. authorities were satisfied that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood
each other despite their uncertainty as to what language was spoken. But
In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband,
when the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his
Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID), as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police
obstinate reticence and merely showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San
Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers.
printed thereon. CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime
While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he
Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for
intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan
laboratory examination. In the meantime, CHUA was detained at the Bacnotan
Almoite (hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police
Police Station.1âwphi1.nêt
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted.
According to ALMOITE, the vessel looked different from the boats ordinarily Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa
used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. Ann Bugayong Cid of the Philippine National Police, Region I, received a letter
CID and six of his men led by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua request3 from CID — incidentally her husband — to conduct a laboratory
(hereafter BADUA), proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a multicolored
conferred with ALMOITE. CID then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-025-95,4 she stated that her
male passenger. As it was routine for CID to deploy his men in strategic places qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets,
when dealing with similar situations, he ordered his men to take up positions weighing 28.7 kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
thirty meters from the coastline. When the speedboat landed, the male shabu, a regulated drug.
passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried what appeared a
multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, CHUA was initially charged with illegal possession of methaphetamine
ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the latter two conspicuous in their uniform and hydrochloride before the RTC which docketed the case as Criminal Case No.
issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed 4037. However, pursuant to the recommendation of the Office of the Provincial
direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, Prosecutor, La Union, that the facts of the case could support an indictment
however, prevented the man from fleeing by holding on to his right arm. for illegal transport of a regulated drug, the information was subsequently
Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared amended to allege that CHUA "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously transpor(ted)
impassive. Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, 28.7 kilos of [m]ethamphetamine [h]ydrochloride (shabu) without the
but he seem not to understand. CID thus tried speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano,
necessary permit or authority to transport the same" in violation of Section 15, nary any spoken word, only gestures and hand movements, they escorted him
Article III of R.A. 6425 as amended by R.A. 7659. to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police,
led by an officer who CHUA guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the
At his arraignment on 31 July 1995, CHUA entered a plea of not guilty. The motor engine of the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag to him,
RTC was satisfied that CHUA understood the amended information read to opened it, inspected and weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as
him in Fukien by the Fukien-speaking interpreter, Thelma Sales Go. methaphetamine hydrochloride.
Thereafter, the RTC exerted all efforts to obtain the services of a Taiwanese CHUA denounced the prosecution's story as a distortion of the truth. He denied
Interpreter through the auspices of the Department of Foreign Affairs. However, he was ever favored with an interpreter or informed of his "constitutional
it was only after directing the request to the Taipei Economic and Cultural rights," particularly of his right to counsel. Consequently, his arrest was tainted
Office in the Philippines that interpreters were assigned to CHUA. with illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should
Trial finally ensued. The State presented evidence tending to establish the have been regarded inadmissible as evidence. He also maintained that CID
above narration of facts which were culled chiefly from the testimony of CID, never graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at Tammocalao
its first witness, and whose testimony, in turn, was substantially corroborated beach. BADUA certainly never prevented him from running away, as such
by witnesses BADUA and ALMOITE. thought failed to make an impression in his mind. Most significantly, he denied
ownership and knowledge of the contents of the bag, emphasizing that RONG
Experts witness Theresa Ann Cid, confirmed the entries of her chemistry report alone exercised dominion over the same.
in that the contents of the 29 plastic packets weighing 28.7 kilos sent to her for
chemical analysis were pure, unadulterated methamphetamine hydrochloride Elmer Parong, (hereafter PARONG) a Sangguniang Bayan member, recalled
or shabu. She also explained that they were unwashed, hence they appeared that on the date in question, he arrived at the beach with the police. He saw
yellowish. CHUA standing with a bag beside him. He also remembered hearing from the
people congregating at the beach that CHUA arrived with a companion and a
For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter Steven certain policeman Anneb had chased the latter's car. He additionally claimed
Yu. He disclosed that he hails from Taiwan and was employed in a shipbuilding that when the crowd became unruly, the police decided to bring CHUA to
and repairing company. On 21 March 1995, he was instructed by his employer police headquarters. There, the mayor took charge of the situation — he
Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the latter's 35-tonner ship which opened CHUA's bag with the assistance of the police, he called for a forensic
would embark for Nan Au Port, Mainland China where they would buy fish. chemist surnamed CID to take a sample of the contents of the bag, and he
Upon arrival at their destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the ordered his officials to find an interpreter. Throughout the proceedings,
fish, but with two bags, the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. photographers were busy taking pictures to document the event.
RONG then showed to CHUA a document purportedly granting them authority
to fish on Philippine waters. So they sailed towards the Philippines and Last to testify was Arsenio CRAIG, a farmer and resident of Tammocalao who
reached Dagupan, Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m., they narrated that he was standing with CHUA on the beach when two men and a
disembarked on a small speedboat with the two bags RONG brought with him lady arrived. They were about to get a bag situated near CHUA when they
from China. While, sailing, RONG made several phone calls using his mobile detected the arrival of the local police. They quickly disappeared. CRAIG then
phone. CHUA heard RONG asked the person on the other side of the line if noticed ALMOITE and PARONG at the beach but not CID.
he could see the speedboat they were riding. Apparently, the person on shore In a decision promulgated on 10 February 1997, the RTC found that the
could not see them so they cruised over the waters for about five hours more prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proving that CHUA
when finally, low on fuel and telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA transported 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal
anchored the boat while RONG carried the bags to shore. The tasks completed, authority to do so. Invoking People v. Tagliben5 as authority, the RTC
RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 characterized the search as incidental to a valid in flagrante delicto arrest,
1/2) meters away from one bag. A child thereafter pointed out to him that one hence it allowed the admission of the methamphetamine hydrochloride
bag was missing much to RONG's dismay when he learned of it. When a crowd as corpus delicti. The RTC also noted the futility of informing CHUA of his
started to mill around them, the police arrived. CHUA then realized that RONG constitutional rights to remain silent, and to have competent and independent
was nowhere to be found. The police immediately approached CHUA, and with counsel preferably of his own choice, considering the language barrier and the
observation that such irregularity was "rectified when accused was duly The fiberglass boat with its motor engine is hereby ordered confiscated in favor
arraigned and . . . (afterwards) participated in the trial of this case." The RTC of the government and to be turned over to the Philippine National Police, La
then disregarded the inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonies of Union Command, for use in their Bantay-Dagat operations against all illegal
the prosecution witnesses as these referred to minor details which did not seaborne activities.
impair the credibility of the witnesses or tarnish the credence conferred on the
testimonies thus delivered. SO ORDERED. 6

The RTC also believed that CHUA conspired not only with his alleged Before this Court, CHUA posits that the RTC erred in (1) admitting as
employer RONG and the Captain of the 35-tonner vessel in the illegal trade of competent evidence the 29 plastic packets of methamphetamine
prohibited drugs on Philippine shores, but with several other members of an hydrochloride since they were indubitably "forbidden fruits;" (2) granting weight
organized syndicate bent on perpetrating said illicit traffic. Such predilection and credence to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses despite glaring
was plainly evident in the dispositive portion, to wit: inconsistencies on material points; and in (3) appreciating conspiracy between
him and an organized syndicate in the illicit commerce of prohibited drugs
WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing, as proven and established by since this was not alleged in the information.
convincing and satisfactory evidence that the accused had conspired and
acted in concert with one Cho Chu Rong, not to mention Chen Ho Fa, the The Solicitor General traverses CHUA's contentions by asserting that: (1) the
Skipper of the 35-tonner ship they used in coming to the Country from China search was licitly conducted despite the absence of search and seizure
and Taiwan, this Court finds the accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San guilty warrants as circumstances immediately preceding to and comtemporaneous
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Sec. 15, Art. III of R.A. with the search necessitated and validated the police action; and (2) that there
No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 as charged in the Information, and was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable
considering the provisions of Sec. 20 of R.A. No. 7659 that the maximum searches and seizures since he consented to the search.
penalty shall be imposed if the quantity sold/possessed/transported is "200 We reverse the RTC.
grams or more" in the case of Shabu, and considering, further that the quantity
involved in this case is 28.7 kilograms which is far beyond the weight ceiling Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy home and person.
specified in said Act, coupled with the findings of conspiracy or that accused It explicitly ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons,
is a member of an organized syndicated crime group, this Court, having no houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
other recourse but to impose the maximum penalty to accused, this Court whatever nature and for any purpose.7 Inseparable, and not merely corollary
hereby sentences the said accused Chua Ho San @ Tsay Ho San to die by or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is
lethal injection; to pay a fine of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00); and to pay the exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in
the costs. violation of said right is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceedings. 8

The Court hereby orders Director Ricareido [sic] Sarmiento of the Philippine The Cosntitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures
National Police to immediately form an investigating Committee to be does not, of course, forestall reasonable searches and seizure. What
composed by [sic] men of unimpeachable integrity, who will conduct an constitutes a reasonable or even an unreasonable search in any particular
exhaustive investigation regarding this case to determine whether there was case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
negligence or conspiracy in the escape of Cho Chu Rong and the two (2) or circumstances involved.9 Verily, the rule is, the Constitution bars State
three (3) persons who approached the accused in the seashore of intrusions to a person's body, personal effects or residence except if
Tammocalao, Bacnotan, La Union, and attempted to take the remaining bag conducted by virtue of a valid of a valid search warrant issued in compliance
from accused, as well as the whereabouts of the other bag; and to furnish this with the procedure outlined on the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of
Court a copy of the report/result of the said investigation in order to show Court; "otherwise such search and seizure become "unreasonable" within the
compliance herewith sixty (60) days from receipt hereof. meaning of the aforementioned constitutional provision." 10 This interdiction
against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
The confiscated 28.7 kilograms of Methaphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu is warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
ordered turned over immediately to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction jurisprudence11 in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in
in accordance with the law.
plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consent searches, (5) stop and warrantless arrest should be considered as legally authorized." (emphasis
frisk situations (Terry search),12 and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. supplied)19
The last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuan to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate Guided by these principles, this Court finds that there are no facts on record
if effected with a valid wararnt of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of CHUA's participation in on going
permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) criminal enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the
arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. 13 obtrusive search. The RTC never took the pains of pointing to such facts, but
predicated mainly its decision on the finding that was "accused was caught
This Court is therefore tasked to determine whether the warrantless arrest, red-handed carrying the bagful of [s]habu when apprehended." In short, there
search and seizure conducted under the facts of the case at bar constitute a is no probable cause. At least in People v. Tangliben, the Court agreed with
valid exemption from the warrant requirement. Expectedly and quite the lower court's finding that compelling reasons (e.g., accused was acting
understandably, the prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent suspiciously, on the spot identification by an informant that accused was
versions of the incident. But this Court is certain that CHUA was arrested and transporting prohibitive drug, and the urgency of the situation) constitutive of
his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. probable cause impelled police officers from effecting an in flagrante
delicto arrest. In the case at bar, the Solicitor General proposes that the
In cases of in fragrante delicto, arrests, a peace officer or a private person may following details are suggestive of probable cause — persistent reports of
without a warrant, arrest a person, when, in his presence, the person to be rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, CHUA's
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an watercraft differing in appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly
offense. The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of cruise over the Bacnotan seas, CHUA's illegal entry into the Philippines (he
such facts14 or as recent case law15 adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or lacked the necessary travel documents or visa), CHUA's suspicious
circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. The behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police authorities, and the
term probable cause had been understood to mean a reasonable ground of apparent ease by which CHUA can return to and navigate his speedboat with
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to immediate dispatch towards the high seas, beyond the reach of Philippine laws.
warrant a cautious man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense
with which he is charged.16 Specifically with respect to arrests, it is such facts This Court, however, finds that these do not constitute "probable cause." None
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man of the telltale clues, e.g., bag or package emanating the pungent odor of
to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be marijuana or other prohibited drug,20 confidential report and/or positive
arrested. 17 In People v. Montilla,18 the Court acknowledged that "the identification by informers of courier(s) of prohibited drug and/or the time and
evidentiary measure for the propriety of filing criminal charges, and place where they will transport/deliver the same,21 suspicious demeanor or
correlatively, for effecting warrantless arrest, has been reduced and behavior 22 and suspicious bulge in the waist23 — accepted by this Court as
liberalized." Noting that the previous statutory and jurisprudential evidentiary sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest exists in this case. There was no
standard was "prima facie evidence" and that it had been dubiously equated classified information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach
with probable cause, the Court explained: bearing prohibited drug on the date in question. CHUA was not identified as a
drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that the vessel that ferried
[F]elicitously, those problems and confusing concepts (referring to prima him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not
facie evidence and probable cause) were clarified and set aright, at least on automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. And
the issue under discussion, by the 1985 amendment of the Rules of Court despite claims by CID and BADUA that CHUA attempted to flee, ALMOITE
which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the quantum of evidence required in testified that the latter was merely walking and oblivious to any attempt at
preliminary investigation is such evidence as suffices to "engender as well conversation when the officers approached him. This cast serious doubt on
founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of the crime and the the truthfulness of the claim, thus:
respondent's probable guilt thereof. It has the same meaning as the related
phraseology used in other parts of the same Rule, that is, that the investigating Q: How far were you when the accused put the bag on his sholder?
fiscal "finds cause to hold the respondent for trial," or where "a probable cause
exists." It should, therefore, be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a A: We were then very near him about three meters away from the male person
carrying the bag.
Q: To what direction was he facing when he put the bag on his shoulder? where he might gain possession of a weapon or evidence he can destroy, 26 a
valid arrest must precede the search. The process cannot be reversed.
A: To the east direction.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines
Q: In relation to you, where were you. the validity of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a
A: With the company of Sgt. Reynoso and Maj. Cid we approached the large majority of these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
accused and when Maj. Cid went near him, he spoke in Tagalong, English and pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that there be
Ilocano which accused did not understand because he did not respond. first a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed.27
Q: When Maj. Cid was talking, what was the accused doing at that time?
To reiterate, the search was not incidental to an arrest. There was no warrant
A: He was walking. of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed
by the Rules of Court28 as already shown. Fom all indications, the search was
Q: To what direction he was walking?
nothing but a fishing expedition. It is worth mentioning here that after
A: He was walking to the east direction. (sic) introducing themselves, the police officcers immediately inquired about the
contents of the bag. What else could have impelled the officers from displaying
Q: He was walking away from you or going near you? such inordinate interest in the bag but to ferret out evidence and discover if a
felony had indeed been committed by CHUA — in effect to "retroactively
A: He was going away from us. That is why Sgt. Reynoso held the right arm of
establish probable cause and validate an illegal search and seizure."
the accused.
The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a consented
Q: Was Sgt. Badua able to hold the right arm of the accused?
search, a legitimate waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
A: Yes sir and he stopped.24 searches. It is fundamental, however, that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge,
True, CHUA entered Philippine territory without a visa. This was not obvious actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said
to the police. But gossamer to the officers' sense perception and view were person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 29 CHUA never exhibited
CHUA disembarking from a speedboat, CHUA walking casually towards the that he knew, actually or constructively of his right against unreasonable
road, and CHUA carrying a multicolored strawbag. These acts did not convey searches or that he intentionally conceded the same. This can be inferred from
any impression that he illegally entered Philippine shores. Neither were these the manner by which the search performed, thus:
overt manifestations of an ongoing felonious activity nor of CHUA's criminal
behevior as clearly established in CID's testimony, thus: Q Together with your Chief Investigator, what was the first thing that you did
when you approached him (CHUA)?
Q Was the accused committing a crime when you introduced yourselves:
A We introduced ourselves as police officers, sir.
A No, sir.
Q Okey, in the first place why did you introduce yourselves?
Q No, so there was no reason for you to approach the accused because he
was not doing anything wrong? A That is normal practice in our part, sir.

A No, sir, that is our objective, to approach the person and if ever or whatever xxx xxx xxx
assistance that we can give we will give.25
Q If it is possible. Okey (sic) now, after introducing yourselves what did you
The search cannot therefore be denominated as incidental to an arrest. While do?
a contemporaneous search of a person arrested may be effected to deliver
A He did not answer me and he did not utter any word,
dangerous weapons or proofs or implements used in the commission of the
crime and which search may extend to the area within his immediate control Q When he did not utter any word. What else did he do?
A I asked again a question that if he can open his bag sir. Q Is that the normal duty of a police officer to request a person to open his
bag?
Q And did he understand your question when you requested him to open his
bag? A yes, sir.

A No, sir, there is no answer. Q Okey, (sic) you did not ask the accused, mr. (sic) witness, to open his bag?

Q No answer? A No, sir.

A Yes, sir, no answer. Q But you simply requested him to open the nag?

Q And when there was no answer what did you do next? A Yes, sir.30

A I used sign language sir. CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and
overwhelmed him. The police officers already introduced themselves to CHUA
Q Will you demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you demonstrated that in three languages, but he remained completely deadpan. The police hence
sign language of opening the bag mr. (sic) witness? concluded that CHUA failed to comprehend the three languages. When CHUA
A I pointed to the zipper of the bag and then made an action like this sir. failed to respond again to the police's request to open the bag, they resorted
to what they called "sign language." They claimed that CHUA finally
xxx xxx xxx understood their hand motions and gestures. This Court disagrees. If CHUA
could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could he
SHERIFF:
understand the police's "sign language." More importantly, it cannot logically
The witness demonstrating (sic) by pointing to the straw bag and then be inferred from his alleged cognizance of the "sign language" that he
manifesting a sign to open the zipper of the straw bag moving his right hand deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an
from left to right or from the opening to the end of the zipper. intrusive search. This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of
consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these cases, the police
COURT: From the start of the zipper where you open it up to the end of the officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the
zipper. accused and in such language that left no room for doubt that the latter fully
understood what was requested. In some instances, the accused even
Witness: Yes, sir, and then I made a motion like this.
verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the
(The witness repeating the motion described on record.) nature and consequences of such request.31

COURT: Did you open that personally? It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated subtance.
But this is a trifling matter. If evidence obtained during an illegal search even
WITNESS: if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or suspicion of
felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any
A No, your honor.
proceeding, the same being the fruit of a poisonous trees 32 how much more of
Q Now, mr. (sic) witness, why did you request the accused to open the bag? "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal
enterprise as in this case — because the police admitted that they never
A Because it is our duty also to inspect his belongings sir. harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the regulated substance as
Q Why, why was it — no, I reform my question your honor. Is it normal evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and
procedure for you to examine anybody or to request anybody to open his bag? ineffectual to sustain CHUA's conviction.

A The fact that he was a foreigner, sir, it is also our duty to inspect the baggage, Indeed, the likelihood of CHUA having actually transported methamphetamine
it is our routine duty of a police (sic), sir. hydrochloride cannot be quickly dispelled. But the constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly
disregarded, as overzealous police officers are sometimes wont to do. Fealty
to the Constitution and the rights it guarantees should be paramount in their
minds, otherwise their good intentions will remain as such simply because they
have blundered. "There are those who say that . . . 'the criminal is to go free
because the constable has blundered.'. . . In some cases this will undoubtedly
be the result. But . . . 'there is another consideration — the imperative of judicial
integrity . . . The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him
free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe
its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence."33

As to the averred glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the posecution

witnesses, this Court considers them trivial as they refer to insignificant details
which will not affect the outcome of the case. On a passing note, this Court
calls the attention of the trial court regarding its erroneous appreciation of
conspiracy. This aggravating circumstance is without question unsupported by
the records. Conspiracy was not included in the indictment nor raised in the
pleadings or proceedings of the trial court. It is also fundamental that
conspiracy must be proven just like any other criminal accusation, that is,
independently and beyond reasonable doubt.34

WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 66, San Fernando, La Union in Criminal Case No. 4037 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY
HO SAN is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged, the evidence not being
sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 133917 February 19, 2001 arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came
to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.8
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received
NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ "BOBONG" and GREGORIO MULA y an information that the alleged pusher will be passing at NHA, Ma- a, Davao
MALAGURA @ "BOBOY", accused-appellants. City any time that morning.9 Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the same
day, he called for assistance at the PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: which immediately dispatched the team of SPO4 Dionisio Cloribel (team
To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of leader), SPO2 Paguidopon (brother of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon), and SPO1
protecting the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself Pamplona, to proceed to the house of SPO1 Marino Paguidopon where they
lawless and to subvert those values upon which our ultimate freedom and would wait for the alleged pusher to pass by. 10
liberty depend.1 At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8, 1996, while the team were
For automatic review is theDecision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the
Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96, finding accused-appellants accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to
Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their,
Malagura alias "Boboy," guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section vehicle and overtook the "trisikad."11 SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house,
8,3 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted.12
by Republic Act No. 7659,4 and sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-
of death. appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to accused-
The information against accused-appellants reads: appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a
police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.13 Molina
That on or about August 8, 1996, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within replied, "Boss, if possible we will settle this."14 SPO1 Pamplona insisted on
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, in opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter;
conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.15
feloniously was found in their possession 946.9 grants of dried marijuana
which are prohibited. On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants, through counsel, jointly filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in violation of their
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures.16 The
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996, accused-appellants pleaded not
demurrer was denied by the trial court.17 A motion for reconsideration was filed
guilty to the accusation against them.6 Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution
by accused-appellants, but this was likewise denied. Accused-appellants
presented Police Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1 Leonardo Y. Pamplona,
waived presentation of evidence and opted to file a joint memorandum.
Jr., and SPO1 Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
On April 25, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed decision,18 the decretal
The antecedent facts are as follows:
portion of which reads:
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon, then a member of the
WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of the prosecution alone without any
Philippine National Police detailed at Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
evidence from both accused who waived presentation of their own evidence
received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana
through their counsels, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of both accused
pusher in Davao City.7 The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher
of the offense charged beyond reasonable doubt, pursuant to Sec. 20, sub.
in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then
par. 5 of Republic Act 7659, accused NASARIO MOLINA and GREGORIO
with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the
MULA, are sentenced to suffer a SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH through
motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-
appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the
lethal injection under Republic Act 8176, to be effected and implemented as the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
therein provided for by law, in relation to Sec. 24 of Rep. Act 7659. searched and the persons or things to be seized.21

The Branch Clerk of Court of this court, is ordered to immediately elevate the Complementary to the foregoing provision is the exclusionary rule enshrined
entire records of this case with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, Manila, under Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which bolsters and solidifies the
for the automatic review of their case by the Supreme Court and its appropriate protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.22 Thus:
action as the case may be.
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
SO ORDERED.19 inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised penal Code and Rule 122, Section 10 of Without this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and
the Rules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties;
Accused-appellants contend: so too, without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be
so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the
I. freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court's
THAT THE MARIJUANA IS IN ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR HAVING high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 23
BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without exceptions.
RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained
II. therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to
a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused
HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures;24 and (6)
DOUBT; AND stop and frisk situations (Terry search).25
III. The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid
warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND
which must precede the search. In this instance, the law requires that there be
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF
first a lawful arrest before a search can be made --- the process cannot be
SEC. 8 OF RA No. 7659 (sic), IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY AGGRAVATING
reversed.26 As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with .a valid
CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.20
warrant of arrest. The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible
The Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and MO1ion (In Lieu of Brief), warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without
wherein he prayed for the acquittal of both accused-appellants. warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense
The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and seizures be (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and
carried out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
search warrant predicated upon the existence of a probable cause. The circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected
pertinent provision of the Constitution provides: in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
while being transferred from one confinement to another ( arrest of escaped
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
prisoners ).27
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and In the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its judgment of conviction on a
finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent
search conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants Then, too, in Malacat v. Court of Appeals,34 the trial court concluded that
were caught in flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs.28 This petitioner was attempting to commit a crime as he was "`standing at the comer
brings us to the issue of whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and of Plaza Miranda and Quezon Boulevard' with his eyes 'moving very fast' and
seizure in the present case fall within the recognized exceptions to the warrant 'looking at every person that come (sic) nearer (sic) to them.'" 35 In declaring
requirement. the warrantless arrest therein illegal, the Court said:

In People v. Chua Ho San,29 the Court held that in cases of in flagrante Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding
delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of V u, the
arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. The that a crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to
arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as be committed.36
recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause. As discussed It went on to state that –
in People v. Doria,30 probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person "moving very fast" - an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and
to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely standing at the
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable comer and were not creating any commotion or trouble...
suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good
faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that
petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he
As applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that "reliable information" admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of
alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner,
and within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People not have been visible to Yu.37
v. Aminnudin,31 it was held that "the accused-appellant was not, at the moment
of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two requisites must
or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
of the MN Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a
arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as arresting officer.38
the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject
In the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that
to apprehension."
would justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-
Likewise, in People v. Mengote,32 the Court did not consider "eyes... darting appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have
from side to side :.. [while] holding ... [one's] abdomen", in a crowded street at committed a crime. It matters not that accused-appellant Molina responded
11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse "Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the request of SPO1 Pamplona to open
suspicion and indicative of probable cause. According to the Court, "[b]y no the bag. Such response which allegedly reinforced the "suspicion" of the
stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an arresting officers that accused-appellants were committing a crime, is an
offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed or was at equivocal statement which standing alone will not constitute probable cause
least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence." So also, in People to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
v. Encinada,33 the Court ruled that no probable cause is gleanable from the act Paguidopon (who did not participate in the arrest but merely pointed accused-
of riding a motorela while holding two plastic baby chairs.1âwphi1.nêt
appellants to the arresting officers), accused-appellants could not be the or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant
subject of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. under such bare circumstances."40

While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a Moreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right
surveillance of accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon, however, against unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied acquiescence to the
admitted that he only learned Mula's name and address after the arrest. What search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive
is more, it is doubtful if SPO1 Paguidopon indeed recognized accused- conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus
appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that, before the arrest, he was able to see considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
Mula in person only once, pinpointed to him by his informer while they were on guarantee.41
the side of the road. These circumstances could not have afforded SPO1
Paguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant Mula, considering that the Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall
latter was then driving a motorcycle when, SPO1 Paguidopon caught a under the exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the search conducted on
glimpse of him. With respect to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon their person was likewise illegal. Consequently, the marijuana seized by the
admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest. peace officers could not be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants,
and the Court is thus, left with no choice but to find in favor of accused-
This belies the claim of SPO1 Pamplona that he knew the name of accused- appellants.
appellants even before the arrest, to wit –
While the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against
"Q- When you said that certain Mula handed a black bag to another person drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers
and how did you know that it was Mula who handed the black bag to another towards this drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must
person? not encroach on the fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which protection extends even to the basest
A- Because I have already information from Paguidopon, regarding Mula of criminals.
and Molina, when they pass by through the street near the residence of
Paguidopon. He told that the one who is big one that is Gregorio Mula and the WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch
thin one is Nazario Molina"39 17, in Criminal Case No. 37, 264-96, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For lack
of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-
The aforecited testimony of SPO1 Pamplona, therefore, is entirely baseless appellants Nasario Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and Gregorio Mula y
SPO1 Pamplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from Malagura alias "Boboy", are ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from
SPO1 Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the confinement unless they are validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
surveillance, was not even aware of accused-appellants' name and address
prior to the arrest. SO ORDERED.

Evidently, SPO1 Paguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers,

more so the arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of
accused-appellants' identity, and were, from all indications, merely fishing for
evidence at the time of the arrest.

Compared to People v. Encinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew
appellant Encinada even before the arrest because of the latter's illegal
gambling activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest
effected by the peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court declared in said case
that the warrantless arrest and the consequent search were illegal, holding
that "[t]he prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when
the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act
G.R. No. 116488 May 31, 2001 It was the prosecution's contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused
hatched a conspiracy to kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, detachment headquarters. They allegedly succeeded in their plot and, the
vs. prosecution avers, to this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam.
AARON FLORES @ "RONITO", SULPECIO SILPAO y ORTEGA @ All the accused, however, vehemently denied committing the acts charged.
"SULPING" and EDGAR VILLERAN y MAGBANUA, accused-appellants.
The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: reasonable doubt the existence of a conspiracy among the four accused. More
Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade specifically, the prosecution failed to show an apparent common design by and
detailed at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of among the accused to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus,
the local Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit (CAFGU) under his the trial court proceeded to determine the individual liabilities of the four
supervision, namely, Aaron Flores alias "Ronito", Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega accused based on the degree of their participation in the commission of the
alias "Sulping" and Edgar Villeran y Magbanua, were charged before the offense charged.
Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan, Negros Occidental, Branch 61, with The trial court gave credence to the prosecution's evidence that Samson
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The information charged as follows: Sayam was seen being forcibly dragged out of the store and pulled towards
That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog, the direction of the detachment headquarters by accused Aaron Flores,
Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran. Since Samson Sayam had not been seen
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with high powered nor heard from since then, the trial court held that the three accused were
firearms conspiring, confederating and helping one another, by means of force, responsible for the former's disappearance.
violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead
feloniously take, kidnap, detain and keep under guard one SAMSON SAYAM of the three (3) co-accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the
y GEPANAO from Km 117, Hda. Shangrella (sic), Brgy. Tabu, of the above- disappearance of Samson Sayam. Notably, none of the prosecution witnesses
named municipality, and bring the latter to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, specifically or categorically mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively
under restraint and against his will, without proper authority thereof, thereby participated in bringing Samson Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike
depriving said victim of his civil liberty since then up to the present. his co-accused who are natives of the place of the incident, Wennie Tampioc
CONTRARY TO LAW.1 was newly assigned as Detachment Commander and did not know Samson
Sayam, such that no ill-motive was attributed to him by the trial court. Likewise,
All the four accused pleaded "Not Guilty" when arraigned. Trial ensued and, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Nelson Golez, on the one hand, and
based on the testimonial evidence presented, the trial court found the following that of Carlos Manlangit, on the other hand, conflict as to the kind of firearm
antecedent facts to be undisputed. allegedly carried by Tampioc. While Golez stated that he was armed with an
Armalite rifle,3 Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed with a short
On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking
firearm.4
beer at the store owned by Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog,
Negros Occidental. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one
Edgar Villeran were at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four of the perpetrators of the crime was doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact
accused at their table. Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left the that Nelson Golez knew Wennie Tampioc even before September 29,
store and walked towards the direction of the military detachment 1992,5 the original complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial court of Ilog
headquarters. After the accused left the store with Samson Sayam, witnesses Candoni, dated October 21, 1992, which was based on the affidavits of Golez
heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing coming from the direction of the and Carlito Manlingit, did not mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the
detachment headquarters.2 That was the last time Samson Sayam was seen, respondents. The said affidavits merely mentioned an "unidentified member of
and despite diligent efforts of Sayam's mother and relatives, he has not been the 7th IB, Philippine Army, assigned at Brgy. Tabu, detachment." At the time
found. of the execution of the affidavits, the witnesses could have known that Wennie
Tampioc was a sergeant, and that he was a commander of the detachment.
Finally, the straightforward and emphatic manner in which Wennie Tampioc THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON
testified inspired belief in the trial court's mind.6 FLORES AND EDGAR VILLERAN GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION
On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.
dispositive of which states:
After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron we find that accused-appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged
Flores, Edgar Villeran and Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt against them.
of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and
penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and there being no proof that penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Samson Sayam is dead, they are ordered to pay him jointly and severally, or Republic Act No. 7659. The elements of the offense are:
in the alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as
damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay 1. That the offender is a private individual.
the costs of this suit. 2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the
The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable latter of his liberty.
doubt. 3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.
The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted 4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances
accused ordered confined pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in are present:
accordance with Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated January 20, 1992 of
the Supreme Court. (a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;

SO ORDERED.7 (b) That it is committed simulating public authority;

Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio (c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped
Silpao raised the following errors: or detained or threats to kill him are made; or

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT (d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer. 8
SULPECIO SILPAO OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS
Clearly, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime
ILLEGAL DETENTION, UNDER ARTICLE 267, REVISED PENAL CODE.
of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT crime is that the offender must be a private individual. In the case at bar,
CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO, AS AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY accused-appellants were members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged
BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THE crime was committed.
EVENING OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON
The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose
SAYAM'S DISAPPEARANCE.
of complementing the operations of the regular force formations in a locality.9 It
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT was composed of civilian volunteers who were tasked to maintain peace and
CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF order in their localities, as well as to respond to threats to national security. As
THE OFFENSE CHARGED. such, they were provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or
order detention of individuals.10
On the other hand, accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran
interposed a joint appeal based on the sole error that: The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-
appellants of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the
appellants are not private individuals, but public officers. As such, the Solicitor
General submits that, under the facts alleged, accused-appellants can only be headquarters; and that he went home after he saw Samson Sayam talking to
liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized in Article 124 the accused.17
of the Revised Penal Code. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all
the other elements of Arbitrary Detention were alleged in the criminal It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangit's testimony failed to prove the
information filed against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of stated purpose thereof, i.e., that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the
said crime. detachment headquarters. To be sure, the witness did not state that Samson
Sayam was pulled, dragged, or coerced to go with accused-appellants. Neither
Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without did he say that Samson Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is also no
legal grounds, detains a person.11 Since it is settled that accused-appellants relevant testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam tried his best to free
are public officers, the question that remains to be resolved is whether or not himself from the clutches of accused-appellants. For if that were the truth, the
the evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam was reactions of Carlito Manlangit do not conform to human experience. If he really
arbitrarily detained by accused-appellants. witnessed Samson Sayam being apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to
free himself, it cannot be logically explained why Carlito Manlangit just went
As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag,12 it was held that in the crime of home,18 instead of doing anything to help Samson Sayam. He admitted that
illegal or arbitrary detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or he did not immediately report the incident to the authorities.19 More telling is
restriction of the person of the offended party. The deprivation of liberty must the absence of testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam was being taken to
be proved,13 just as the intent of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty the detachment headquarters against his will, that he was protesting his
must also be established by indubitable proof.14 In the more recent case apprehension, or that he was asking for help, considering that there were other
of People v. Fajardo,15 this Court reiterated the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., people within hearing and seeing distance. Most damaging is Carlito
there must be uncontroverted proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his Manlangit's statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment
liberty, as well as actual confinement or restriction. headquarters with any or all of the accused.20 In fine, Carlito Manlangit's
Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or testimony failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily detained or
in any manner detaining and depriving him of his liberty. 16 A careful review of deprived of his liberty.
the records of the instant case shows no evidence sufficient to prove that Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the prosecution. According to
Samson Sayam was detained arbitrarily by accused-appellants. While the him, he and Samson Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay
prosecution witnesses testified that accused-appellants were seen walking milled on September 29, 1992. At around six in the evening, while on their way
with Samson Sayam toward the direction of the detachment headquarters, home, they passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene. There, he
there is no shred of evidence that he was actually confined there or anywhere saw the four accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home
else. The fact that Samson Sayam has not been seen or heard from since he because he had to show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to
was last seen with accused-appellants does not prove that he was detained accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry Manlangit then proceeded to his
and deprived of his liberty. The prosecution, however, argues that Samson residence in Hacienda Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away from the
Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-appellants forced him to go center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that Samson Sayam stayed
with them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the behind and asked him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he heard
detachment headquarters. gunshots coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters.21
We assayed the testimonies of the prosecution's main witnesses, namely, The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the
Carlito Manlangit and his son Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangit's testimony crime of arbitrary detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the
was offered to prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly taken from the store testimony of his father, Carlito, for they dealt on a different set of facts. Jerry
and that the latter tried his best to free himself from his abductors. And yet, all Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain Samson
that Carlito testified to was that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street Sayam. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the
alone from the store of a certain Moleng; that the four accused, who were residence certificate and barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of
armed, followed Sayam and asked for his residence certificate; that the four his testimony comprised of hearsay evidence,22 which has no probative
accused apprehended Samson Sayam and brought him to the detachment
value.23 In summary, Jerry Manlangit's testimony failed to establish that Court finds the evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient to sustain a
accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention. conviction. Again, the fact of detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not
clearly established by credible evidence. There was no showing that Samson
The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified Sayam was locked up, restrained of his freedom, or prevented from
the four accused as the persons with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store communicating with anyone. Likewise, there was no proof that there was
of Terry Cabrillos. He also stated that following a heated argument, the actual intent on the part of accused-appellants to arbitrarily deprive Samson
accused and Samson Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of Sayam of his liberty. It is necessary that there must be a purposeful or knowing
the detachment headquarters. He said that the accused were "holding and action by accused-appellants to restrain the victim by or with force, because
pulling" Samson Sayam "towards the road." Ten minutes later, Nelson Golez taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary detention.28
heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing. 24
The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though
On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier circumstantial, sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellants. It
statement that the accused and Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated cites the following circumstances:
argument. Rather, he said he did not hear them arguing as they were leaving
the store. Although Nelson Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting 1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, accused-
while the accused were dragging him, he did not do anything to help Samson appellants, together with their companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow
Sayam, who happened to be his cousin.25 CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao, were seen with Samson at the store of Terry Cabrillos.
Accused-appellants were having a drinking spree. Later, they were seen
Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golez's testimony. engaged in a heated argument.
First of all, he was unsure of his assertion that there was an argument. The
mere fact that Samson Sayam was being dragged towards the road does not 2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-
constitute arbitrary detention. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was appellants by holding and pulling him towards the road. From another angle,
completely deprived of his liberty such that he could not free himself from the another prosecution witness saw accused-appellants on the road arresting
grip of the accused, if he was indeed being held against his will. The incident Samson.
transpired in a public place, where there were people milling about, many of
whom were his friends. It is puzzling that Samson Sayam did not cry out for 3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the
help. Nobody bothered to report the incident, if indeed it happened, to the detachment of Brgy. Tabu.
barangay authorities. No one else came forward to corroborate the testimony 4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of
of Nelson Golez. the detachment followed by rapid firing.
The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on 5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard from.29
material points, even as the prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or
corroborative evidence the bare testimony of Nelson Golez. As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not
established by clear and convincing evidence. And even if these acts were
It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may proven to be true, the combination of all these circumstances would still not be
be convicted of a crime, his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. able to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind, the totality
Although the findings of fact made by trial courts are generally not disturbed of these circumstantial evidence do not constitute an unbroken chain pointing
on appeal, if there are substantial facts which were overlooked but which may to the fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellants are guilty of
alter the results of the case in favor of the accused, such facts should be taken the crime charged.
into account by the appellate court.26 And where it appears that the trial court
erred in the appreciation of the evidence on record or the lack of it, the factual For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the
findings of the trial court may be reversed. 27 circumstances must be consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-
appellants are guilty, and inconsistent with the possibility that they are
After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the innocent.30 Thus:
testimonial evidence on the scale of creditworthiness and materiality, this
SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial circumstances leading to the conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty.
evidence is sufficient for conviction if: Since the pieces of circumstantial evidence do not fulfill the test of moral
certainty that is sufficient to support a judgment or conviction, the Court must
a) There is more than one circumstance; acquit the accused.36
b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and In the recent case of People v. Comesario,37 we had occasion to rule that:
c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction Accused-appellant's conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial
beyond reasonable doubt.31 evidence. To validly invoke circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that
The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which there is more than one circumstance and the facts from which the inferences
in complete sequence leads to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt are derived are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
of the accused.32 It is admitted that Samson Sayam was seen drinking with produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must
accused-appellants on that fateful night. However, the circumstances that constitute an unbroken chain of events that can lead reasonably to the
there was a heated argument among them, and that the accused-appellants conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all others as the author
held and pulled Samson Sayam to the road and brought him towards the of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is purely circumstantial that
direction of the detachment headquarters was not sufficiently proven by there should be an even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule
material or relevant testimony. that the prosecution cannot depend on the weakness of the defense and that
any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of the
Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when
relevancy to the case. Even if it were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
came from the direction of the detachment headquarters. The witnesses who upheld only if the circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which
testified that they heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer away from leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
the center of the barangay, while the detachment headquarters itself was also exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
some distance from the barangay. At night, especially in the rural areas when
all is quiet, loud sounds such as gunshots reverberate and would seem to Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is
come from every direction. An ordinary person a kilometer away cannot, with proved. In the case at bar, the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the
certainty, point to the exact location where the gunshots would be coming from. prosecution and the trial court to support a conviction have failed to overcome
That would otherwise be attributing expertise on such matters to the the constitutional precept of the presumed innocence of accused-appellants.
prosecution witnesses. Among other grounds, not only is there a lot of room for reasonable doubt in
regard to their guilt, there is a virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove
That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis that a crime had been committed.
for the trial court to render judgment convicting the accused-appellants. In fact,
it has no bearing in this case because it is not one of the elements of the crime There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the
of arbitrary detention. Consequently, only one relevant circumstance was prosecution bears the onus to distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had
proved, i.e., that accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Samson been committed by accused-appellants.38 It is incumbent upon the prosecution
Sayam. However, said circumstance does not necessarily prove that they to establish its case with that degree of proof which leads to no other
feloniously abducted him, then arbitrarily detained him.33 conclusion but conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits for it cannot be allowed to draw
Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.39 Clearly, the
result of accused-appellants' alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient prosecution in this case has failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellants
to convict them. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the required quantum of beyond reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court has often and
evidence.34 An uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not consistently ruled that it is better to acquit a guilty person than to convict an
sufficient for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. 35 The innocent one.40
prosecution was not able to prove a possible motive why accused-appellants
would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In sum, there is no unbroken chain of
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accused-appellants are ACQUITTED. Unless being held or detained for some
lawful reason, accused-appellants are ORDERED RELEASED immediately.
The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days
from notice, of the date and time when accused-appellants are released
pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 154130 August 20, 2004 penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner,
vs. Costs de oficio.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality on
January 12, 2004.1 Petitioner then filed an "Urgent Motion for Leave to File
RESOLUTION Second Motion for Reconsideration"2 with attached "Motion for
Reconsideration,"3 wherein he makes the following submissions:

1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER FOR THE

PURPOSE OF DETAINING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES;
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS INSISTED
On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming petitioner’s ON LEAVING THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE
conviction by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner DETAINED;
now seeks a reconsideration of our Decision.
3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED THE
The facts are briefly restated as follows: INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONER;
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo 4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEARLY
Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional WANTING IN THE INSTANT CASE.4
Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1, 1997, they, together with Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for
SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine Reconsideration.5
National Police Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram,
Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging The prosecution was required to comment on petitioner’s second Motion for
activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto.
meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration well-
Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, taken.6
who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued
between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited
and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same,
arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s house provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better
in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m. served thereby.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and convicted The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986. On justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in
petition for review, we rendered judgment as follows: the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No., dated July 5, 2001 technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except xxx xxx xxx
a particular case from its operation.7
AJ NARIO:
The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:
q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 o’clock Mayor Astorga
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee. was with you having dinner?

2. That he detains a person. a Yes Your Honor.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.8 q You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the foresters,
the complainants here?
The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual
physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we a I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing.
find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended
parties. xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo AJ PALATTAO:
Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their q And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of this
mission. On the contrary, what appears is that petitioner, being then a laughter?
municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR
Team in his house. SPO1 Capoquian testified thus: a Probably they were talking of something humorous.9

ATTY. JUMAMIL: The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint
imposed on the private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that
q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in Daram? they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore,
a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way we he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner
saw a boat being constructed there so we proceeded to Barangay Lucodlucod prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to
(sic). travel by boat.

q And you arrived at 5:00 o’clock? ATTY. JUMAMIL:

a Yes sir. q It was raining at that time, is that correct?

q And you left at 2:00 o’clock in the morning of September 2? a Yes sir it was raining.

a Yes sir. q And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular time
that you were in Lucoblucob, Daram?
q And you ate dinner between 5:00 o’clock to 2:00 o’clock in the morning
of September 2, is that correct? a I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.

a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner. q What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in
Lucoblucob?
q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had dinner?
a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves at
a Yes sir. that time.

q And of course you also partook of wine? q But it was raining the whole day?

a I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir. a It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.
q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 o’clock in the morning q Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the case
is that correct? of those I have enumerated they cannot, why?

a A little bit hard I don’t know when the rain stopped, sir. a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.10

q It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00 o’clock in the morning Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness stand
of September 2? on August 16, 2000 but did not complete his testimony-in-chief due to lack of
material time. His testimony only covered preliminary matters and did not touch
a I don’t remember sir. on the circumstances of the alleged detention.11
xxx xxx xxx On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E. Simon,
AJ PALATTAO: Moises de la Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and Wenefredo Maniscan,
executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance stating, in pertinent part:
q Were you told not to go away from the place?
xxx xxx xxx;
a No Your Honor.
6. That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation
q Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented to go aggravated by the exhaustion of the team in scouring the shores of the small
somewhere? islands of Samar for several days. Mayor Benito Astorga may have also been
confronted with the same predicament, hence our confrontation resulted to a
a They did not say anything sir.
heated argument and the eventual misunderstanding;
q Where did you go after that?
7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality of Daram,
a Just down until it rained. Samar our respect for him prevailed when he ordered us to take dinner with
him and other local residents thereat, so we capitulated whose invitation was
q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your part, misinterpreted by us;
was there somebody prevented you to go to another place?
8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the team
a I don’t know Your Honor. and the group of Mayor Astorga during the dinner and we were eventually
allowed to leave Daram, Samar;
q But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will prevent
you to go somewhere else? 9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported the
incident to our supervisors who required us to submit our affidavit;
a What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told not to
leave the barangay. 10. That at present our differences had already been reconciled and both
parties had already express apologies and are personally no longer interested
q In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not
to pursue the case against the Mayor, hence, this affidavit of desistance;
supposed to leave that barangay, is this Barangay Daram?
xxx xxx xxx.12
a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.
Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court to
q On your part according to you you can go places if you want although in
testify. This notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the
your impression you cannot leave the barangay. How about the other
crime of Arbitrary Detention on the basis of the testimonies of SPO1
companions like Mr. Simon, Cruz and Maniscan, can they leave the place?
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the police escorts of the DENR Team.
a No Your Honor.
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquian’s testimony negate the element of
detention. More importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily
subjective.13 Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 is REVERSED. Petitioner Benito
by any hard-and-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the crime.14 As such, SPO1 reasonable doubt.
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not competent to testify
on whether or not fear existed in the minds of the private offended parties No pronouncement as to costs.
herein. It was thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their SO ORDERED.
testimonies in convicting petitioner.
\\\\\
Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a
reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against
their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two
interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended
parties were taken to petitioner’s house and prevented from leaving until 2:00
a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner
extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at his house.
He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was
rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with the private offended
parties and even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This
scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the parties.
Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at
all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.15 He is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.16

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven
with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be
sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For the
prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.17 Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecution is concededly
weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must be duly
accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence that an accused enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of
two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better
to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man.18

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1, 2003

is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The appealed judgment of the
G.R. No. 154130 August 20, 2004 penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and
eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
BENITO ASTORGA, Petitioner,
vs. Costs de oficio.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied with finality on
January 12, 2004.1 Petitioner then filed an "Urgent Motion for Leave to File
RESOLUTION Second Motion for Reconsideration"2 with attached "Motion for
Reconsideration,"3 wherein he makes the following submissions:

1. THE ARMED MEN WERE NOT SUMMONED BY PETITIONER FOR THE

PURPOSE OF DETAINING THE PRIVATE OFFENDED PARTIES;
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
2. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS INSISTED
On October 1, 2003, we rendered a Decision in this case affirming petitioner’s ON LEAVING THE PLACE WHERE THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO BE
conviction by the Sandiganbayan of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. Petitioner DETAINED;
now seeks a reconsideration of our Decision.
3. THE SUPPOSED VICTIMS THEMSELVES HAVE DECLARED THE
The facts are briefly restated as follows: INNOCENCE OF THE PETITIONER;
Private offended parties Elpidio Simon, Moises de la Cruz, Wenefredo 4. CRIMINAL INTENT ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED IS CLEARLY
Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias are members of the Regional WANTING IN THE INSTANT CASE.4
Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, Tacloban City. On September 1, 1997, they, together with Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Second Motion for
SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian of the Philippine Reconsideration.5
National Police Regional Intelligence Group, were sent to the Island of Daram,
Western Samar to conduct intelligence operations on possible illegal logging The prosecution was required to comment on petitioner’s second Motion for
activities. At around 4:30-5:00 p.m., the team found two boats measuring 18 Reconsideration and the Supplement thereto.
meters in length and 5 meters in breadth being constructed at Barangay We find the grounds raised by the second Motion for Reconsideration well-
Locob-Locob. There they met petitioner Benito Astorga, the Mayor of Daram, taken.6
who turned out to be the owner of the boats. A heated altercation ensued
between petitioner and the DENR team. Petitioner called for reinforcements While a second motion for reconsideration is, as a general rule, a prohibited
and, moments later, a boat bearing ten armed men, some wearing fatigues, pleading, it is within the sound discretion of the Court to admit the same,
arrived at the scene. The DENR team was then brought to petitioner’s house provided it is filed with prior leave whenever substantive justice may be better
in Daram, where they had dinner and drinks. The team left at 2:00 a.m. served thereby.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, petitioner was charged with and convicted The rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
of Arbitrary Detention by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986. On justice. They were conceived and promulgated to effectively aid the court in
petition for review, we rendered judgment as follows: the dispensation of justice. Courts are not slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering justice, courts have always been, as
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The they ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that on the balance,
Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No., dated July 5, 2001 technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the around. Thus, if the application of the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than
crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
promote justice, it is always within our power to suspend the rules, or except xxx xxx xxx
a particular case from its operation.7
AJ NARIO:
The elements of the crime of Arbitrary Detention are:
q While you were taking your dinner from 7 to 8:00 o’clock Mayor Astorga
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee. was with you having dinner?

2. That he detains a person. a Yes Your Honor.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.8 q You did not hear the conversation between the Mayor and the foresters,
the complainants here?
The determinative factor in Arbitrary Detention, in the absence of actual
physical restraint, is fear. After a careful review of the evidence on record, we a I could not hear anything important because they were just laughing.
find no proof that petitioner instilled fear in the minds of the private offended
parties. xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, we fail to discern any element of fear from the narration of SPO1 Rufo AJ PALATTAO:
Capoquian, the police officer who escorted the DENR Team during their q And then according to you there was laughter what was the cause of this
mission. On the contrary, what appears is that petitioner, being then a laughter?
municipal mayor, merely extended his hospitality and entertained the DENR
Team in his house. SPO1 Capoquian testified thus: a Probably they were talking of something humorous.9

ATTY. JUMAMIL: The testimonial evidence likewise shows that there was no actual restraint
imposed on the private offended parties. SPO1 Capoquian in fact testified that
q After Bagacay you arrived in what barangay in Daram? they were free to leave the house and roam around the barangay. Furthermore,
a We were on our way to Barangay Sta. Rita in Daram but on our way we he admitted that it was raining at that time. Hence, it is possible that petitioner
saw a boat being constructed there so we proceeded to Barangay Lucodlucod prevented the team from leaving the island because it was unsafe for them to
(sic). travel by boat.

q And you arrived at 5:00 o’clock? ATTY. JUMAMIL:

a Yes sir. q It was raining at that time, is that correct?

q And you left at 2:00 o’clock in the morning of September 2? a Yes sir it was raining.

a Yes sir. q And the weather was not good for motorized travel at that particular time
that you were in Lucoblucob, Daram?
q And you ate dinner between 5:00 o’clock to 2:00 o’clock in the morning
of September 2, is that correct? a I know it is raining but I could not say that you could not travel.

a Yes sir. Mayor Astorga told us let us have dinner. q What was the condition of the sea at that time when you were in
Lucoblucob?
q And Mayor Astorga brought you to a house where you had dinner?
a The sea was good in fact we did not get wet and there were no waves at
a Yes sir. that time.

q And of course you also partook of wine? q But it was raining the whole day?

a I know they had wine but with respect to us we had no wine sir. a It was not raining at the day but after we ate in the evening it rained.
q It was raining hard in fact after 8:00 p.m. up to 1:00 o’clock in the morning q Why are you very positive that in your case you can leave but in the case
is that correct? of those I have enumerated they cannot, why?

a A little bit hard I don’t know when the rain stopped, sir. a If only in that barangay we can leave, Your Honor.10

q It is possible that it rain.. the rain stopped at 1:00 o’clock in the morning Mr. Elpidio Simon, one of the private offended parties, took the witness stand
of September 2? on August 16, 2000 but did not complete his testimony-in-chief due to lack of
material time. His testimony only covered preliminary matters and did not touch
a I don’t remember sir. on the circumstances of the alleged detention.11
xxx xxx xxx On August 23, 2000, all the private offended parties, namely, Elpidio E. Simon,
AJ PALATTAO: Moises de la Cruz, Renato Militante, Crisanto Pelias and Wenefredo Maniscan,
executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance stating, in pertinent part:
q Were you told not to go away from the place?
xxx xxx xxx;
a No Your Honor.
6. That what transpired may have been caused by human limitation
q Up to what point did you reach when you were allegedly prevented to go aggravated by the exhaustion of the team in scouring the shores of the small
somewhere? islands of Samar for several days. Mayor Benito Astorga may have also been
confronted with the same predicament, hence our confrontation resulted to a
a They did not say anything sir.
heated argument and the eventual misunderstanding;
q Where did you go after that?
7. Considering that he is the local Chief Executive of the Municipality of Daram,
a Just down until it rained. Samar our respect for him prevailed when he ordered us to take dinner with
him and other local residents thereat, so we capitulated whose invitation was
q If you want to go, let us say, you want to leave that place, on your part, misinterpreted by us;
was there somebody prevented you to go to another place?
8. That thereafter, a natural and spontaneous conversation between the team
a I don’t know Your Honor. and the group of Mayor Astorga during the dinner and we were eventually
allowed to leave Daram, Samar;
q But on your part can you just leave that place or somebody will prevent
you to go somewhere else? 9. That upon our return to our respective official stations we reported the
incident to our supervisors who required us to submit our affidavit;
a What I felt I will not be able to leave because we were already told not to
leave the barangay. 10. That at present our differences had already been reconciled and both
parties had already express apologies and are personally no longer interested
q In other words, you can go places in that barangay but you are not
to pursue the case against the Mayor, hence, this affidavit of desistance;
supposed to leave that barangay, is this Barangay Daram?
xxx xxx xxx.12
a Barangay Lucoblucob, Your Honor.
Thereafter, the private offended parties did not appear anymore in court to
q On your part according to you you can go places if you want although in
testify. This notwithstanding, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the
your impression you cannot leave the barangay. How about the other
crime of Arbitrary Detention on the basis of the testimonies of SPO1
companions like Mr. Simon, Cruz and Maniscan, can they leave the place?
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, the police escorts of the DENR Team.
a No Your Honor.
The quoted portions of SPO1 Capoquian’s testimony negate the element of
detention. More importantly, fear is a state of mind and is necessarily
subjective.13 Addressed to the mind of the victim, its presence cannot be tested Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986 is REVERSED. Petitioner Benito
by any hard-and-fast rule but must instead be viewed in the light of the Astorga is ACQUITTED of the crime of Arbitrary Detention on the ground of
perception and judgment of the victim at the time of the crime.14 As such, SPO1 reasonable doubt.
Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, not being victims, were not competent to testify
on whether or not fear existed in the minds of the private offended parties No pronouncement as to costs.
herein. It was thus error for the Sandiganbayan to have relied on their SO ORDERED.
testimonies in convicting petitioner.

Verily, the circumstances brought out by SPO1 Capoquian created a

reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner detained the DENR Team against
their consent. The events that transpired are, to be sure, capable to two
interpretations. While it may support the proposition that the private offended
parties were taken to petitioner’s house and prevented from leaving until 2:00
a.m. the next morning, it is equally plausible, if not more so, that petitioner
extended his hospitality and served dinner and drinks to the team at his house.
He could have advised them to stay on the island inasmuch as sea travel was
rendered unsafe by the heavy rains. He ate together with the private offended
parties and even laughed with them while conversing over dinner. This
scenario is inconsistent with a hostile confrontation between the parties.
Moreover, considering that the Mayor also served alcoholic drinks, it is not at
all unusual that his guests left the house at 2:00 a.m. the following morning.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.15 He is entitled to an acquittal unless his guilt is shown
beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean
such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute
certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.16

As held in several cases, when the guilt of the accused has not been proven
with moral certainty, the presumption of innocence of the accused must be
sustained and his exoneration be granted as a matter of right. For the
prosecution’s evidence must stand or fall on its own merit and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.17 Furthermore, where the evidence for the prosecution is concededly
weak, even if the evidence for defense is also weak, the accused must be duly
accorded the benefit of the doubt in view of the constitutional presumption of
innocence that an accused enjoys. When the circumstances are capable of
two or more inferences, as in this case, one of which is consistent with the
presumption of innocence while the other is compatible with guilt, the
presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. It is better
to acquit a guilty man than to convict an innocent man.18

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 1, 2003

is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The appealed judgment of the
G.R. No. 159085 February 3, 2004 They came in the middle of the night. Armed with high-powered ammunitions
and explosives, some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the
SANLAKAS, represented by REP. J.V. Bautista, and PARTIDO NG Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere
MANGGAGAWA, represented by REP. RENATO MAGTUBO petitioners, apartments in Makati City in the wee hours of July 27, 2003. Bewailing the
vs corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, GENERAL resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the
NARCISO ABAYA, DIR. GEN. HERMOGENES EBDANE, respondents. Philippine National Police (PNP).1
x------------------------x In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day
G.R. No. 159103 February 3, 2004 Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring "a state of
rebellion" and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) OFFICERS/MEMBERS namely, Proclamation No. 427 reads in full:
SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, ED VINCENT S. ALBANO, RENE B. GOROSPE,
EDWIN R. SANDOVAL and RODOLFO D. MAPILE, petitioners, PROCLAMATION NO. 427
vs DECLARING A STATE OF REBELLION
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HON.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE SIMEON DATUMANONG, HON. SECRETARY WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ANGELO REYES, and HON. SECRETARY JOSE with high-powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and
LINA, JR., respondents. command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building
in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support
x------------------------x for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to
G.R. No. 159185 February 3, 2004 rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to
the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
REP. ROLEX T. SUPLICO, REP. CARLOS M. PADILLA, REP. CELSO L. Philippine National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the
LOBREGAT, REP. HUSSIN U. AMIN, REP. ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA, Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute
REP. EMMYLOU J. TALINO-SANTOS, and REP. GEORGILU R. YUMUL- the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
HERMIDA, petitioners, as amended;
vs
PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO; and EXECUTIVE WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, respondents. are being supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders,
conspirators and plotters in the government service and outside the
x------------------------x government;
G.R. No. 159196 February 3, 2004 WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever
it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR. as a Member of the Senate, petitioner,
Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress
vs
the rebellion;
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY;
SECRETARY ANGELO REYES, AS SECRETARY OF NATIONAL NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the
DEFENSE; GENERAL NARCISO ABAYA, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE powers vested in me by law, hereby confirm the existence of an actual and on-
ARMED FORCES; SECRETARY JOSE LINA, et al., respondents. going rebellion, compelling me to declare a state of rebellion.
DECISION In view of the foregoing, I am issuing General Order No. 4 in accordance with
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, calling out the Armed Forces of the
TINGA, J.:
Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out the
necessary actions and measures to suppress and quell the rebellion with due By the evening of July 27, 2003, the Oakwood occupation had ended. After
regard to constitutional rights. hours-long negotiations, the soldiers agreed to return to barracks. The
President, however, did not immediately lift the declaration of a state of
General Order No. 4 is similarly worded: rebellion and did so only on August 1, 2003, through Proclamation No. 435:
GENERAL ORDER NO. 4 DECLARING THAT THE STATE OF REBELLION HAS CEASED TO EXIST
DIRECTING THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE WHEREAS, by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, a state of
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE TO SUPPRESS REBELLION rebellion was declared;
WHEREAS, certain elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, armed WHEREAS, by virtue of General Order No. 4 dated July 27, 2003, which was
with high-powered firearms and explosives, acting upon the instigation and issued on the basis of Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, and pursuant
command and direction of known and unknown leaders, have seized a building to Article VII, Section 18 of the Constitution, the Armed Forces of the
in Makati City, put bombs in the area, publicly declared withdrawal of support Philippines and the Philippine National Police were directed to suppress and
for, and took arms against the duly constituted Government, and continue to quell the rebellion;
rise publicly and show open hostility, for the purpose of removing allegiance to
the Government certain bodies of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the WHEREAS, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National
Philippine National Police, and depriving the President of the Republic of the Police have effectively suppressed and quelled the rebellion.
Philippines, wholly or partially, of her powers and prerogatives which constitute
the crime of rebellion punishable under Article 134 et seq. of the Revised Penal NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the
Code, as amended; Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law, hereby declare that
the state of rebellion has ceased to exist.
WHEREAS, these misguided elements of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
are being supported, abetted and aided by known and unknown leaders, In the interim, several petitions were filed before this Court challenging the
conspirators and plotters in the government service and outside the validity of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4.
government; In G.R. No. 159085 (Sanlakas and PM v. Executive Secretary, et al.),2 party-
WHEREAS, under Section 18, Article VII of the present Constitution, whenever list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that
it becomes necessary, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of all Armed Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a
Forces of the Philippines, may call out such Armed Forces to suppress the state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. 3 They further submit that,
rebellion; because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient
factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an
NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, by virtue of the indefinite period.4
powers vested in me by the Constitution as President of the Republic of the
Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the Philippines Petitioners in G.R. No. 159103 (SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
and pursuant to Proclamation No. 427 dated July 27, 2003, do hereby call Secretary, et al.) are officers/members of the Social Justice Society (SJS),
upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police "Filipino citizens, taxpayers, law professors and bar reviewers."5 Like Sanlakas
to suppress and quell the rebellion. and PM, they claim that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not
authorize the declaration of a state of rebellion.6 They contend that the
I hereby direct the Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Chief declaration is a "constitutional anomaly" that "confuses, confounds and
of the Philippine National Police and the officers and men of the Armed Forces misleads" because "[o]verzealous public officers, acting pursuant to such
of the Philippines and the Philippine National Police to immediately carry out proclamation or general order, are liable to violate the constitutional right of
the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and quell private citizens."7 Petitioners also submit that the proclamation is a
the rebellion with due regard to constitutional rights. circumvention of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII,
commanding the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from
the proclamation of martial law.8 Finally, they contend that the presidential
issuances cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as exercise of the President's calling out power, the mootness of the petitions
Congress has not delegated any such power to the President.9 notwithstanding.

In G.R. No. 159185 (Rep. Suplico et al. v. President Macapagal-Arroyo and Only petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of
Executive Secretary Romulo), petitioners brought suit as citizens and as Congress, have standing to challenge the subject issuances. In Philippine
Members of the House of Representatives whose rights, powers and functions Constitution Association v. Enriquez,22 this Court recognized that:
were allegedly affected by the declaration of a state of rebellion. 10 Petitioners
do not challenge the power of the President to call out the Armed To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
Forces.11 They argue, however, that the declaration of a state of rebellion is a member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise
"superfluity," and is actually an exercise of emergency powers.12 Such of the powers of that institution.
exercise, it is contended, amounts to a usurpation of the power of Congress An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a
granted by Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution.13 derivative but nonetheless substantial injury, which can be questioned by a
In G.R. No. 159196 (Pimentel v. Romulo, et al.), petitioner Senator assails the member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a
subject presidential issuances as "an unwarranted, illegal and abusive resort to the courts.
exercise of a martial law power that has no basis under the Constitution." 14 In Petitioner Members of Congress claim that the declaration of a state of
the main, petitioner fears that the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the rebellion by the President is tantamount to an exercise of Congress'
door to the unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the emergency powers, thus impairing the lawmakers' legislative powers.
crime of rebellion.15 Petitioners also maintain that the declaration is a subterfuge to avoid
Required to comment, the Solicitor General argues that the petitions have congressional scrutiny into the President's exercise of martial law powers.
been rendered moot by the lifting of the declaration.16 In addition, the Solicitor Petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS Officers/Members, have no legal
General questions the standing of the petitioners to bring suit.17 standing or locus standi to bring suit. "Legal standing" or locus standi has
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the issuance of Proclamation been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
No. 435, declaring that the state of rebellion has ceased to exist, has rendered party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental
the case moot. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power act that is being challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is whether
being limited to the determination of "actual controversies."18 Nevertheless, a party alleges "such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
courts will decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is "capable of repetition yet assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
evading review."19 The case at bar is one such case. upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions."23
Once before, the President on May 1, 2001 declared a state of rebellion and
called upon the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion through Petitioners Sanlakas and PM assert that:
Proclamation No. 38 and General Order No. 1. On that occasion, "'an angry 2. As a basic principle of the organizations and as an important plank in their
and violent mob armed with explosives, firearms, bladed weapons, clubs, programs, petitioners are committed to assert, defend, protect, uphold, and
stones and other deadly weapons' assaulted and attempted to break into promote the rights, interests, and welfare of the people, especially the poor
Malacañang."20 Petitions were filed before this Court assailing the validity of and marginalized classes and sectors of Philippine society. Petitioners are
the President's declaration. Five days after such declaration, however, the committed to defend and assert human rights, including political and civil rights,
President lifted the same. The mootness of the petitions in Lacson v. Perez of the citizens.
and accompanying cases21 precluded this Court from addressing the
constitutionality of the declaration. 3. Members of the petitioner organizations resort to mass actions and
mobilizations in the exercise of their Constitutional rights to peaceably
To prevent similar questions from reemerging, we seize this opportunity to assemble and their freedom of speech and of expression under Section 4,
finally lay to rest the validity of the declaration of a state of rebellion in the Article III of the 1987 Constitution, as a vehicle to publicly ventilate their
grievances and legitimate demands and to mobilize public opinion to support That petitioner SJS officers/members are taxpayers and citizens does not
the same.24 [Emphasis in the original.] necessarily endow them with standing. A taxpayer may bring suit where the
act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds
Petitioner party-list organizations claim no better right than the Laban ng derived from taxation.28 No such illegal disbursement is alleged.
Demokratikong Pilipino, whose standing this Court rejected in Lacson v. Perez:
On the other hand, a citizen will be allowed to raise a constitutional question
… petitioner has not demonstrated any injury to itself which would justify the only when he can show that he has personally suffered some actual or
resort to the Court. Petitioner is a juridical person not subject to arrest. Thus, threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government;
it cannot claim to be threatened by a warrantless arrest. Nor is it alleged that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to
its leaders, members, and supporters are being threatened with warrantless be redressed by a favorable action.29 Again, no such injury is alleged in this
arrest and detention for the crime of rebellion. Every action must be brought in case.
the name of the party whose legal rights has been invaded or infringed, or
whose legal right is under imminent threat of invasion or infringement. Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues
they raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions must fail.
At best, the instant petition may be considered as an action for declaratory
relief, petitioner claiming that it[']s right to freedom of expression and freedom It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution
of assembly is affected by the declaration of a "state of rebellion" and that said does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion.
proclamation is invalid for being contrary to the Constitution. Section 18, Article VII provides:

However, to consider the petition as one for declaratory relief affords little Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces
comfort to petitioner, this Court not having jurisdiction in the first instance over of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
such a petition. Section 5 [1], Article VIII of the Constitution limits the original such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
jurisdiction of the court to cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers rebellion. In case of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it,
and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ
warranto, and habeas corpus.25 of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law.
Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
Even assuming that petitioners are "people's organizations," this status would of the writ of habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or
not vest them with the requisite personality to question the validity of the in writing to the Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a
presidential issuances, as this Court made clear in Kilosbayan v. Morato:26 majority of all its Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
The Constitution provides that "the State shall respect the role of independent proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the
people's organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the President. Upon the initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same
democratic framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations manner, extend such proclamation or suspension for a period to be
through peaceful and lawful means," that their right to "effective and determined by the Congress, if the invasion or rebellion shall persist and public
reasonable participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision- safety requires it.
making shall not be abridged." (Art. XIII, §§15-16) The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
These provisions have not changed the traditional rule that only real parties in proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without need
interest or those with standing, as the case may be, may invoke the judicial of a call.
power. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
questions, is limited by the "case and controversy" requirement of Art. VIII, §5. citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis for the proclamation of martial law
This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the extension
differentiates decisionmaking in the courts from decisionmaking in the political thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its
departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any filing.
party.27
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor Section 2. 1. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor Navy of the United States. . . .
authorize the conferment of the jurisdiction on military courts and agencies
over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend ....
the privilege of the writ. Section 3. … he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed…. [Article
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially II – Executive Power]
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion. Recalling in historical vignettes the use by the U.S. President of the above-
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or quoted provisions, as juxtaposed against the corresponding action of the U.S.
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be Supreme Court, is instructive. Clad with the prerogatives of the office and
released. [Emphasis supplied.] endowed with sovereign powers, which are drawn chiefly from the Executive
Power and Commander-in-Chief provisions, as well as the presidential oath of
The above provision grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a office, the President serves as Chief of State or Chief of Government,
"sequence" of "graduated power[s]."30 From the most to the least benign, these Commander-in-Chief, Chief of Foreign Relations and Chief of Public Opinion.33
are: the calling out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the power to declare martial law. In the exercise of the First to find definitive new piers for the authority of the Chief of State, as the
latter two powers, the Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions, protector of the people, was President Andrew Jackson. Coming to office by
namely, an actual invasion or rebellion, and that public safety requires the virtue of a political revolution, Jackson, as President not only kept faith with
exercise of such power.31 However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the the people by driving the patricians from power. Old Hickory, as he was fondly
Philippines v. Zamora,32 "[t]hese conditions are not required in the exercise of called, was the first President to champion the indissolubility of the Union by
the calling out power. The only criterion is that 'whenever it becomes defeating South Carolina's nullification effort.34
necessary,' the President may call the armed forces 'to prevent or suppress The Federal Tariff Acts of 1828 and 1832 that Congress enacted did not pacify
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.'" the hotspurs from South Carolina. Its State Legislature ordered an election for
Nevertheless, it is equally true that Section 18, Article VII does not expressly a convention, whose members quickly passed an Ordinance of Nullification.
prohibit the President from declaring a state of rebellion. Note that the The Ordinance declared the Tariff Acts unconstitutional, prohibited South
Constitution vests the President not only with Commander-in-Chief powers but, Carolina citizens from obeying them after a certain date in 1833, and
first and foremost, with Executive powers. threatened secession if the Federal Government sought to oppose the tariff
laws. The Legislature then implemented the Ordinance with bristling punitive
Section 1, Article VII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: "The executive laws aimed at any who sought to pay or collect customs duties.35
power shall be vested in the President…." As if by exposition, Section 17 of
the same Article provides: "He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully Jackson bided his time. His task of enforcement would not be easy.
executed." The provisions trace their history to the Constitution of the United Technically, the President might send troops into a State only if the Governor
States. called for help to suppress an insurrection, which would not occur in the
instance. The President could also send troops to see to it that the laws
The specific provisions of the U.S. Constitution granting the U.S. President enacted by Congress were faithfully executed. But these laws were aimed at
executive and commander-in-chief powers have remained in their original individual citizens, and provided no enforcement machinery against violation
simple form since the Philadelphia Constitution of 1776, Article II of which by a State. Jackson prepared to ask Congress for a force bill.36
states in part:
In a letter to a friend, the President gave the essence of his position. He wrote:
Section 1. 1. The Executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United ". . . when a faction in a State attempts to nullify a constitutional law of
States of America . . . . Congress, or to destroy the Union, the balance of the people composing this
Union have a perfect right to coerce them to obedience." Then in a
.... Proclamation he issued on December 10, 1832, he called upon South
Carolinians to realize that there could be no peaceable interference with the
execution of the laws, and dared them, "disunion by armed force is treason. declaration were illegal. By a 5 to 4 vote, the Supreme Court upheld Lincoln's
Are you ready to incur its guilt?"37 right to act as he had.43

The Proclamation frightened nullifiers, non-nullifiers and tight-rope walkers. In the course of time, the U.S. President's power to call out armed forces and
Soon, State Legislatures began to adopt resolutions of agreement, and the suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without prior legislative
President announced that the national voice from Maine on the north to approval, in case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion came to be recognized
Louisiana on the south had declared nullification and accession "confined to and accepted. The United States introduced the expanded presidential powers
contempt and infamy."38 in the Philippines through the Philippine Bill of 1902.44 The use of the power
was put to judicial test and this Court held that the case raised a political
No other President entered office faced with problems so formidable, and question and said that it is beyond its province to inquire into the exercise of
enfeebled by personal and political handicaps so daunting, as Abraham the power.45 Later, the grant of the power was incorporated in the 1935
Lincoln. Constitution.46
Lincoln believed the President's power broad and that of Congress explicit and Elected in 1884, Grover Cleveland took his ascent to the presidency to mean
restricted, and sought some source of executive power not failed by misuse or that it made him the trustee of all the people. Guided by the maxim that "Public
wrecked by sabotage. He seized upon the President's designation by the office is a public trust," which he practiced during his incumbency, Cleveland
Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, coupled it to the executive power sent federal troops to Illinois to quell striking railway workers who defied a court
provision — and joined them as "the war power" which authorized him to do injunction. The injunction banned all picketing and distribution of handbills. For
many things beyond the competence of Congress.39 leading the strikes and violating the injunction, Debs, who was the union
Lincoln embraced the Jackson concept of the President's independent power president, was convicted of contempt of court. Brought to the Supreme Court,
and duty under his oath directly to represent and protect the people. In his the principal issue was by what authority of the Constitution or statute had the
Message of July 4, 1861, Lincoln declared that "the Executive found the duty President to send troops without the request of the Governor of the State. 47
of employing the war power in defense of the government forced upon him. He In In Re: Eugene Debs, et al,48 the Supreme Court upheld the contempt
could not but perform the duty or surrender the existence of the conviction. It ruled that it is not the government's province to mix in merely
Government . . . ." This concept began as a transition device, to be validated individual present controversies. Still, so it went on, "whenever wrongs
by Congress when it assembled. In less than two-years, it grew into an complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in respect of
independent power under which he felt authorized to suspend the privilege of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care of the Nation and
the writ of habeas corpus, issue the Emancipation Proclamation, and restore concerning which the Nation owes the duty to all citizens of securing to them
reoccupied States.40 their common rights, then the mere fact that the Government has no pecuniary
Lincoln's Proclamation of April 15, 1861, called for 75,000 troops. Their first interest in the controversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the Courts, or
service, according to the proclamation, would be to recapture forts, places and prevent it from taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitutional
property, taking care "to avoid any devastation, any destruction of or duties."49 Thus, Cleveland's course had the Court's attest.
interference with property, or any disturbance of peaceful citizens."41 Taking off from President Cleveland, President Theodore Roosevelt launched
Early in 1863, the U.S. Supreme Court approved President Lincoln's report to what political scientists dub the "stewardship theory." Calling himself "the
use the war powers without the benefit of Congress. The decision was handed steward of the people," he felt that the executive power "was limited only by
in the celebrated Prize Cases42 which involved suits attacking the President's the specific restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution, or
right to legally institute a blockade. Although his Proclamation was impleaded by Congress under its constitutional powers."50
subsequently validated by Congress, the claimants contended that under The most far-reaching extension of presidential power "T.R." ever undertook
international law, a blockade could be instituted only as a measure of war to employ was his plan to occupy and operate Pennsylvania's coal mines
under the sovereign power of the State. Since under the Constitution only under his authority as Commander-in-Chief. In the issue, he found means
Congress is exclusively empowered to declare war, it is only that body that other than force to end the 1902 hard-coal strike, but he had made detailed
could impose a blockade and all prizes seized before the legislative
plans to use his power as Commander-in-Chief to wrest the mines from the States president because he is given by express provision of the constitution
stubborn operators, so that coal production would begin again.51 control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices.55

Eventually, the power of the State to intervene in and even take over the The esteemed Justice conducted her study against the backdrop of the 1935
operation of vital utilities in the public interest was accepted. In the Philippines, Constitution, the framers of which, early on, arrived at a general opinion in
this led to the incorporation of Section 6,52 Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, favor of a strong Executive in the Philippines."56 Since then, reeling from the
which was later carried over with modifications in Section 7, 53 Article XIV of aftermath of martial law, our most recent Charter has restricted the President's
the 1973 Constitution, and thereafter in Section 18,54 Article XII of the 1987 powers as Commander-in-Chief. The same, however, cannot be said of the
Constitution. President's powers as Chief Executive.

The lesson to be learned from the U.S. constitutional history is that the In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into
Commander-in-Chief powers are broad enough as it is and become more so jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin, upheld the President's
when taken together with the provision on executive power and the power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the
presidential oath of office. Thus, the plenitude of the powers of the presidency majority's ruling rested on the President's
equips the occupant with the means to address exigencies or threats which
undermine the very existence of government or the integrity of the State. … unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive
power and which are necessary for her to comply with her duties under the
In The Philippine Presidency A Study of Executive Power, the late Mme. Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly
Justice Irene R. Cortes, proposed that the Philippine President was vested enumerated in the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
with residual power and that this is even greater than that of the U.S. President. provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of
She attributed this distinction to the "unitary and highly centralized" nature of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of
the Philippine government. She noted that, "There is no counterpart of the the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for
several states of the American union which have reserved powers under the the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those
United States constitution." Elaborating on the constitutional basis for her relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a diminution of the general
argument, she wrote: grant of executive power.57 [Underscoring supplied. Italics in the original.]

…. The [1935] Philippine [C]onstitution establishes the three departments of Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the
the government in this manner: "The legislative power shall be vested in a main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of from her Commander-in-Chief powers. Indeed, as the Solicitor General
Representatives." "The executive power shall be vested in a President of the accurately points out, statutory authority for such a declaration may be found
Philippines." The judicial powers shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in in Section 4, Chapter 2 (Ordinance Power), Book III (Office of the President)
such inferior courts as may be provided by law." These provisions not only of the Revised Administrative Code of 1987, which states:
establish a separation of powers by actual division but also confer plenary
legislative, executive, and judicial powers. For as the Supreme Court of the SEC. 4. Proclamations. – Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
Philippines pointed out in Ocampo v. Cabangis, "a grant of legislative power status or condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which
means a grant of all the legislative power; and a grant of the judicial power the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
means a grant of all the judicial power which may be exercised under the promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive order.
government." If this is true of the legislative power which is exercised by two [Emphasis supplied.]
chambers with a combined membership [at that time] of more than 120 and of The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a
the judicial power which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally if not declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. 58 At most, it only gives
more appropriately apply to the executive power which is vested in one official notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be
– the president. He personifies the executive branch. There is a unity in the called to prevent or suppress it.59 Perhaps the declaration may wreak
executive branch absent from the two other branches of government. The emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire
president is not the chief of many executives. He is the executive. His direction nation. But this Court's mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences
of the executive branch can be more immediate and direct than the United
of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any Sec. 23. (1) ….
legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written.
(2) In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may, by law,
Should there be any "confusion" generated by the issuance of Proclamation authorize the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as
No. 427 and General Order No. 4, we clarify that, as the dissenters it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
in Lacson correctly pointed out, the mere declaration of a state of rebellion declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
cannot diminish or violate constitutionally protected rights. 60 Indeed, if a state Congress, such powers shall cease upon the next adjournment thereof.
of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution or
automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, 61 then it is The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted
with more reason that a simple declaration of a state of rebellion could not to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as
bring about these conditions.62 At any rate, the presidential issuances Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in
themselves call for the suppression of the rebellion "with due regard to calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief
constitutional rights." Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII,
For the same reasons, apprehensions that the military and police authorities as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23
may resort to warrantless arrests are likewise unfounded. In Lacson vs. Perez, (2), Article VI.
supra, majority of the Court held that "[i]n quelling or suppressing the rebellion,
the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED.
rebellion, as provided under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,63 if the SO ORDERED.
circumstances so warrant. The warrantless arrest feared by petitioners is, thus,
not based on the declaration of a 'state of rebellion.'"64 In other words, a person
may be subjected to a warrantless arrest for the crime of rebellion whether or
not the President has declared a state of rebellion, so long as the requisites
for a valid warrantless arrest are present.

It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to call out the
armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
While the Court may examine whether the power was exercised within
constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none
of the petitioners here have, by way of proof, supported their assertion that the
President acted without factual basis.65

The argument that the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a

declaration of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report
requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that military tribunals have
replaced civil courts in the "theater of war" or that military authorities have
taken over the functions of civil government. There is no allegation of
curtailment of civil or political rights. There is no indication that the President
has exercised judicial and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration
that the President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial law
powers.

Nor by any stretch of the imagination can the declaration constitute an indirect
exercise of emergency powers, which exercise depends upon a grant of
Congress pursuant to Section 23 (2), Article VI of the Constitution:
G.R. No. 176735 June 26, 2008 (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3)
centigrams (0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, positive to the test for methylamphethamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
vs. drug, in violation of the said law.6 (Emphasis ours).
JERRY SANTOS y MACOL and RAMON CATOC y PICAYO, accused-
appellants. During their arraignment on 19 May 2003, appellants Santos and Catoc
pleaded not guilty to the above-mentioned charges.7
DECISION
On 3 June 2003, the Pre-Trial Conference of the cases was terminated without
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: the prosecution and the defense agreeing to any stipulation of facts. 8
Assailed before Us is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 29 On 5 August 2003, the parties, however, agreed to re-open the Pre-Trial
November 2006 in CA-G.R. C.R.-HC No. 01291 which affirmed the Conference and they entered into a stipulation of facts as to the testimony to
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 70, in be given by the first prosecution witness, Forensic Chemist Police Inspector
Criminal Cases No. 12193-D and No. 12194-D, finding accused-appellants (P/Insp.) Lourdeliza Cejes.9 As contained in the Pre-Trial Order dated 5 August
Jerry Santos y Macol and Ramon Catoc y Picayo guilty of illegal sale of 2003, the parties stipulated on: (1) the due execution and genuineness of the
methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly known as shabu, and Request for Laboratory Examination dated 8 March 2003, and the stamp
finding accused-appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo guilty of illegal possession showing receipt thereof by the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime
of the said prohibited drug, respectively. Laboratory; (2) the due execution, genuineness and truth of the contents of
On 10 March 2003, two Informations were filed against appellants Jerry Santos Physical Science Report No. D-405-03E issued by Forensic Chemist P/Insp.
y Macol and Ramon Catoc y Picayo before the RTC of Pasig City, for violating Lourdeliza Cejes, the finding or conclusion appearing on the report, and the
the provisions of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous signature of the forensic chemist over her typewritten name appearing therein;
Drugs Act of 2002. and (3) the existence of the plastic sachets, but not their source or origin,
contained in a brown envelope, the contents of which were the subject of the
In Criminal Case No. 12193-D, appellants Santos and Catoc allegedly violated Request for Laboratory Examination.10
Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 91653 in the following manner:
Thereafter, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly. 11
On or about March 8, 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and confederating together and The prosecution presented two witnesses: (1) Police Officer (PO)3 Carlo
both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully Luna12 and (2) Senior Police Officer (SPO)3 Leneal Matias,13 both members
authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU)14 of the Pasig City Police Station.
deliver and give away to PO3 Carlo Luna, a police poseur buyer, one (1) The defense, on the other hand, presented (1) appellant Jerry Santos y
heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing three (3) centigrams Macol15; (2) appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo16; (3) Maria Violeta
(0.03 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to Catoc,17 sister of appellant Catoc; and (4) Eric Santos,18 brother of appellant
the test for methylamphethamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in Santos.
violation of the said law.4 (Emphasis ours).
The People's version of the facts shows that on 8 March 2003, the SDEU
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 12194-D, appellant Catoc was operatives of the Pasig City Police conducted a buy-bust operation in a
additionally charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of the same residential area along Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City, on
law,5 committed as follows: the basis of reports that a certain alias Monching Labo was selling illegal drugs
On or about March 8 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this in the said locality.19 Accompanied by a confidential informant, the police team
Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess composed of PO3 Carlo Luna, SPO3 Leneal Matias, PO1 Michael Espares
any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and and PO1 Michael Familara, proceeded to the target area at around 1:15 to
feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control one 1:20 a.m. on the above-mentioned date. PO3 Carlo Luna was to act as the
poseur-buyer, whereas the other members of the team were to serve as his xxxx
backup.20
FINDINGS:
Upon reaching the designated place, PO3 Luna and the informant alighted
from their vehicle, while the rest of the team were left inside. 21 The informant Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave [a]
then pointed to two persons standing along the target area, one of whom was POSITIVE result to the tests for Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
Monching Labo, later identified as appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo. 22 After dangerous drug. x x x
approaching, the informant introduced PO3 Luna as a shabu customer to one CONCLUSION:
of the persons, later identified as appellant Jerry Santos y Macol. Appellant
Santos then asked PO3 Luna how much worth of shabu he was buying and Specimens A and B contains (sic) Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a
asked for the money. PO3 Luna gave appellant Santos the buy-bust money dangerous drug.
consisting of a pre-marked P100.00 bill.23 Appellant Santos handed this
As expected, the appellants offered a version of the facts that was diametrically
money to appellant Catoc, who took out from his pocket a sealed transparent
opposed to that of the prosecution. According to them, there was no buy-bust
plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance, 24 which he handed
operation to speak of and that prior to their arrests, they were literally strangers
back to appellant Santos. When appellant Santos gave the plastic sachet to
to each other.
PO3 Luna, the latter nabbed the former and introduced himself as a
policeman.25 Appellant Jerry Santos y Macol testified that on 8 March 2003, at around 12:00
midnight to 1:00 a.m., while he was watching television at their house at 151
At that point, the other members of the team arrived and likewise held and
Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Barangay (Brgy.) Rosario, Pasig City, and was
arrested appellant Catoc. SPO3 Matias then ordered appellant Catoc to empty
about to sleep, five male persons in civilian clothing suddenly entered and
the contents of his pockets. After having done so, another plastic sachet
handcuffed him.34 Santos claimed that he voluntarily went with the men when
containing a similar crystalline substance26 was recovered from appellant
they tried to arrest him because his ailing mother, who was then awakened,
Catoc, together with the marked P100.00 buy-bust money.27 Immediately
was already becoming nervous.35 Santos was brought outside and placed in a
thereafter, the policemen marked the two plastic sachets.28 The sachet
tricycle, and the entire group left for the police station. There, Santos was
handed by appellant Santos to PO3 Luna was marked with the latter's initials
detained and questioned about the marked money, which he said he knew
"CEL," his signature, and appellant Santos's initials "JMS."29 On the other
nothing about. Santos was then charged with the offense of selling illegal drugs
hand, the sachet recovered from appellant Catoc by SPO3 Matias was marked
in violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.36 It was also at that
with the latter's initials "LTM," his signature and appellant Catoc's initials
time in the police station where he first met appellant Catoc.37
"RPC."30 The policemen then informed the appellants of their violations and
apprised them of their constitutional rights.31 Afterwards, appellants Santos For his part, appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo narrated that on 8 March 2003,
and Catoc were brought to the Pasig City Police Station at Pariancillo Park, between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 midnight, he awoke to a loud sound
Pasig City, for proper investigation. at the door of their house at 125 Dr. Sixto Antonio Avenue, Brgy. Rosario,
Pasig City.38 When Catoc opened the door, five male persons with guns
PO3 Luna submitted the two plastic sachets containing the white crystalline
entered their house.39 The men frisked Catoc and searched his house. After
substance to the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Eastern Police District in
being likewise awakened, Catoc's mother asked the men what his son's fault
Mandaluyong City for an examination of the contents thereof.32 The laboratory
was. They replied that they were looking for the drugs that Catoc was
test results as contained in Chemistry Report No. D-405-03E33 stated the
selling.40 When their search yielded nothing, the men mauled Catoc.
following:
Afterwards, Catoc was placed in a tricycle and the group headed for a gasoline
SPECIMEN SUBMITTED: station along J. E. Manalo Street. There, Catoc was transferred to a parked
van; inside the vehicle was appellant Jerry Santos y Macol, whom the former
Two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings "CEL/JMS saw for the first time.41 The men took the appellants to the police station in
030803 and RPC/LTM 030803" containing 0.03 gram of white crystalline Pariancillo Park where they were again mauled. The policemen who arrested
substance and marked as A and B respectively. the appellants produced two plastic sachets of shabu and a P100.00 bill and
alleged that the same were taken from Catoc's possession. The appellants
were then charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act [No.] 9165 (illegal sale of shabu) and are hereby sentenced to LIFE
Act No. 9165.42 IMPRISONMENT and to solidarily pay a Fine of Five Hundred Thousand
Pesos (PHP500,000.00).
On 4 May 2005, the trial court rendered its decision, the pertinent portion of
which states: In Criminal Case No. 12194-D, accused RAMON CATOC y PICAYO is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of
The Court is more inclined to give credence to the testimonies of the Section 11, Article II, Republic Act [No.] 9165 (illegal possession of shabu) and
prosecution witnesses given the presumption of regularity in the performance is hereby sentenced to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day to Twenty (20)
of official duty accorded to them by law and jurisprudence vis-à-vis the self- Years and to pay a Fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (PHP
serving disclaimers of the herein accused whose version of the incident as 300,000.00).
narrated above hardly inspires belief.
Considering the penalty imposed by the Court, [t]he immediate commitment of
It has been clearly established from the evidence adduced by the State that at accused Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc to the National Penitentiary, New
around 1:00 in the morning of March 8, 2003, accused Jerry Santos and Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City is hereby ordered.
Ramon Catoc, in conspiracy with one another, sold or traded and delivered, to
PO3 Carlo Luna, in a buy-bust operation, one transparent plastic sachet Pursuant to Section 20 of Republic Act [No.] 9165, the amount of PHP 100.00
of shabu containing white crystalline substance (Exh. "C-1") in consideration recovered from accused Ramon Catoc representing the proceeds from the
of the amount of PHP 100.00 (Exh. "D"). x x x illegal sale of the transparent plastic sachet of shabu is hereby ordered
forfeited in favor of the government.
That there was [a] conspiracy between the two accused as alleged in the
information in Criminal Case No. 12193-D, is evident. The transaction was Again, pursuant to Section 21 of the same law, representatives from the
successfully consummated between the poseur buyer PO3 Luna, on the one Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) is (sic) hereby ordered to take
hand, and the accused Ramon Catoc, together with his co-accused, Jerry charge and have custody over the sachets of shabu subject of these cases,
Santos, on the other, with accused Santos receiving the marked money from for proper disposition.43
the poseur buyer and thereafter handing the same to his co-accused Catoc
who, thereafter, took out from his right pocket a plastic sachet of shabu which In an Order dated 21 June 2005, the trial court elevated the entire records of
he gave to Santos, and which the latter in turn handed to PO3 Luna. There the case to the Court of Appeals for automatic review in accordance with our
can be no other conclusion that can be drawn from the above concerted ruling in People v. Mateo.44
actions of both accused, but that they were bound by a common purpose and On 29 November 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the
community of interest, indicative of conspiracy, in committing the offense dispositive portion of which reads:
charged against them.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
On the same occasion of the buy-bust operation, the police officers were also
able to recover from the possession of accused Ramon Catoc another sachet In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals ruled that the buy-bust
of shabu weighing 0.03 grams (Exh. "C-2") which is in violation of Section 11 operation conducted by the SDEU operatives was legitimate and
(Possession of Dangerous Drugs), Article II of the same law, subject of regular.45 Furthermore, the testimonies of the appellants and their witnesses
Criminal Case No. 12194-D, which penalizes the mere possession of were said to have contained irreconcilable inconsistencies and that no ill
dangerous drugs w/o (sic) being authorized by law. motive for the alleged frame-up was put forth by the appellants.46

xxxx Appellants Santos and Catoc filed a Notice of Appeal assailing the appellate
court's decision before the Supreme Court.47
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
In a Resolution48 dated 4 June 2007, the Court required the parties to file their
In Criminal Case No. 12193-D, both accused, JERRY SANTOS y respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired, within 30 days from notice.
MACOL and RAMON CATOC y PICAYO are hereby found GUILTY beyond The parties manifested their intention not to file their supplemental briefs
reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic
anymore, as their respective Briefs already encapsulated all the matters and In the present case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently
arguments that support their positions.49 established. The prosecution witnesses PO3 Luna and SPO3 Matias
consistently testified that a buy-bust operation did indeed take place, and
In pleading for their innocence, appellants assign the following errors: the shabu subject of the sale was presented and duly identified in open court.
I. PO3 Luna, being the poseur-buyer, positively identified appellants Santos and
Catoc as the persons who sold the sachet containing a white crystalline
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED- substance,53 which was later confirmed by a chemical analysis thereof to
APPELLANTS OF VIOLATION OF SECTIONS 5 AND 11, ARTICLE II, OF be shabu.54
THE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, WHEN THE LATTER'S GUILT WERE NOT
PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. The relevant portions of PO3 Luna's testimony that detailed the events leading
to the arrests of appellants are as follows:
II.
Q: Do you remember having been assigned as a poseur buyer on said date,
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING [THAT] THE ACCUSED- March 8, 2003?
APPELLANTS CONSPIRED IN COMMITTING ILLEGAL SELLING AND
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS. A: Yes, sir.

Appellants contend that the trial court erred in convicting them, as their guilt Q: Against whom was supposed to be the task that you are going to perform
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, considering that the prosecution as a poseur buyer?
failed to prove that a buy-bust operation took place and that their arrests A: Against Monching Labo, sir.
without warrant were not legally effected. Appellants also maintain that there
was no basis for the trial court's conclusion that a conspiracy existed between xxxx
them.
Q: What was the basis of this planned operation against Monching Labo?
The arguments put forth by the appellants fail to persuade.
A: Because we have been receiving reports that this certain Monching Labo
Fundamental is the principle that findings of the trial courts which are factual has been selling illegal drugs along Dr. Sixto Avenue in Pasig, sir.
in nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect
when no glaring errors; gross misapprehension of facts; and speculative, Q: Are you trying to say that March 8 was not the first time that you received
arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. information regarding Monching Labo?
The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the A: Yes, sir.
credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even Q: But it was only March 8 that you decided to conduct a buy-bust operation
more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of against Monching Labo?
Appeals.50
A: Yes, sir.
After a careful evaluation of the entire records of the instant case, we find no
Q: Were there preparations made by your office or by you regarding this
error in the trial and the appellate courts' factual findings and conclusions.
plan, buy-bust operation, to be conducted against Monching Labo?
For the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs
A: Yes, sir, we contacted an informant to confirm where Monching Labo
under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the following elements
sells illegal drugs.
must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment xxxx
therefor.51 What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous
drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with Q: What are you going to use in buying?
the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.52
A: Marked money, sir. A: According to the informant, he is Monching Labo, sir.

Q: Did you prepare for that also? Q: Meaning, one of them is Monching Labo?

A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: Were there other police personnel that were assigned, aside from you, Q: After one of them has been identified by your informant, what else did
to conduct this buy-bust operation against Monching Labo? you do if any, mr. (sic) witness?

A: Yes, sir, SPO3 Leneal Matias, PO1 Michael Espares and PO1 Michael A: The informant and I approached them, and I was introduced by the
Familara. informant, sir.

xxxx Q: How were you introduced?

Q: What were supposed to be the role of these other police officers that A: That I was a customer for shabu, and that I wanted to buy, sir.
were going to accompany you particularly, Matias, Espares and Familara?
Q: To whom did he tell from these two persons that you were interested to
A: They will act as back-up, sir. buy?

Q: You said you prepared for a buy-money, how much was this? A: I was introduced to Jerry Santos, sir.

A: One Hundred (PHP 100.00) Peso bill, sir. Q: In other words, the other person is a certain Jerry Santos?

xxxx A: Yes, sir.

Q: Did you proceed, as plan, to the target area? xxxx

A: Yes, sir. Q: After you were introduced as [an] interested buyer to said Jerry Santos,
what else happened after that?
Q: And where was this, mr. (sic) witness?
A: He asked me how much would I buy, and he asked me for the money.
A: Along Dr. Sixto Antonio, Brgy. Rosario, Pasig City, sir. And then, I told him just PHP100.00, sir.
Q: What time did you reach that place? Q: And when Jerry Santos asked you for the money, did you give him the
A: About 1:15 to 1:20, sir. money?

Q: Of? A: Yes, sir.

A: In the early morning of 1:15 to 1:20 a.m., sir. Q: And after you gave him the money, what happened next?

Q: What else happened after you reached the place? A: I saw Jerry handed the money to the other person, sir.

A: When we were ten (10) meters away from the designated area, the Q: When you say other person, this is Monching Labo?
informant pointed to us to two persons who were standing along Dr. Sixto A: Yes, sir.
Antonio Avenue, Rosario, Pasig City, sir.
Q: And after Jerry Santos handed the One Hundred (PHP100.00) Peso bill
xxxx to Monching Labo, what else happened, if any?
Q: Who are these two persons, if you know? A: Monching Labo took the PHP100.00 bill. After that, he put it inside his
pocket, and then, he got something from his pocket and handed it to Jerry, sir.
Q: And after this something was handed to Jerry Santos, what else Q: How about the two plastic sachets, the first one that was sold and the
happened? other one that was recovered by SPO3 Matias, what was your disposition
about it?
A: Jerry Santos gave to me what was given to him by Monching, sir.
A: Right there and then at the place, we already placed the markings on the
Q: And to your personal knowledge, what is that something that was given sachets, sir.
by Monching to Jerry Santos who, Jerry Santos in turn handed to you?
Q: After that, what else did you do with these two sachets?
A: That was the shabu I was buying which was contained in a plastic sachet,
sir. A: We submitted the same to the laboratory for examination, sir.

Q: When you say contained in a plastic sachet, you mean there is only one Q: Do you remember who delivered it personally?
(1)?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who?
Q: After you received this one alleged plastic sachet of shabu from Jerry
Santos, what else did you do, if any? A: I did, sir.

A: I held Jerry Santos and introduced myself as a police officer, sir. Q: Did you come to know later the true identity of Jerry Santos and Monching
Labo to whom you have transaction?
Q: After that, what happened next, if any?
A: Yes, sir.
A: My companions arrived and then, they also held Monching Labo sir.
Q: Would Jerry Santos [be] the true name of this Jerry Santos you mentioned
Q: What else happened after that, mr. (sic) witness? earlier?

A: Police Officer Matias ordered Monching Labo to empty the contents of A: Yes, sir.
his pocket, sir.
Q: How about this Monching Labo, did you come to know what is his true
Q: And did Monching Labo comply? name?

A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir. After we have brought him to the police station, that's when we
discovered his real name, sir.
Q: Would you know what Matias discovered after Monching Labo complied
with his order to empty his pocket? Q: And what is his real name?

A: Yes, sir, because he also recovered another plastic sachet, sir. A: Ramon Catoc, sir.55

Q: Who recovered? The testimony of SPO3 Matias on the conduct of the buy-bust operation
corroborated the above testimony of PO3 Luna on all material points and was
A: SPO3 Matias, sir. equally clear and categorical.
Q: Which came from the pocket of Monching Labo? Also proven from the testimonies of both PO3 Luna and SPO3 Matias is the
A: Yes, sir. charge against appellant Catoc in Criminal Case No. 12194-D for violation of
Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal possession of dangerous
Q: After this, what did you do or, your team do to the two persons? drugs). It was shown that appellant knowingly carried with him the plastic
sachet of shabu without legal authority at the time he was caught during the
A: We brought them to our office at the Headquarters for proper investigation,
buy-bust operation.
sir.
On the other hand, the appellants' contention that no buy-bust operation took Appellant Ramon Catoc, on the other hand, gave an entirely contradictory
place was plainly anchored on the testimonies of both appellants, who both account of the said events. Catoc narrated in his direct testimony that after the
gave different versions of what transpired during the time and date in question; men took him and placed him in a tricycle, he was taken to a gasoline station
of Maria Violeta Catoc, sister of appellant Ramon Catoc; and of Eric Santos, along J. E. Manalo Street and was transferred to a parked van. Aboard the
the brother of appellant Jerry Santos. Both appellants chorused a single line - vehicle, he said, was appellant Santos, whom he claimed he saw and came to
alibi. They strongly insisted that they were in their respective houses during know for the first time.63
the alleged operations.
Even the testimony of defense witness Eric Santos, the brother of appellant
The singular reliance of the appellants on their alibis to argue their cases was Jerry Santos, contained some noticeable incongruity with the appellants'
misplaced. As observed by the trial court, the self-serving disclaimers of the narration of events. As remarked upon by the Court of Appeals,64 Eric Santos
appellants inspired less belief than the testimonies of the prosecution testified that the arrest of his brother was made at 8:00 p.m. on 8 March
witnesses, who had in their favor a presumption of regularity accorded to them 2003.65 The timeline of both the prosecution and the defense, however, puts
by law.56 The respective alibis of appellants and their witnesses also contained the occurrence of the events in question between the hours of 11:00 p.m. and
irreconcilable inconsistencies that only weakened their worth. 1:00 a.m.66

We uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. The testimonies of Maria Violeta Catoc, sister of appellant Catoc, and Eric
This presumption in favor of PO3 Luna and SPO3 Matias was not overcome. Santos, brother of appellant Santos, are also suspect. Without clear and
As testified to by the appellants, they did not know any of the policemen who convincing evidence, no credence can be accorded them.
arrested them, and it was only during the trial in open court that they came to
know of the identities of the above-mentioned policemen.57 Thus, there was In all of the above instances, no satisfactory explanation was offered by
no indication that the police were impelled by any improper motive in making appellants to resolve the conflicting accounts. No other evidence was likewise
the arrests. offered to buttress these testimonies, thereby weakening appellants' alibis, as
against the candid and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution
In appellant Jerry Santos's testimony on the events leading to his arrest, he witnesses.
repeatedly changed his answer upon being asked why he voluntarily went with
the five men who entered his house on the night in question. In his direct As consistently enunciated by this Court, the established doctrine is that, for
testimony, appellant Santos testified that he went with the men so that his the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was
mother's nervousness would not be further aggravated.58 During his cross- at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but also that it
examination, he then stated that he voluntarily went with the men so as not to was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis or within its
awaken his sleeping mother.59 Upon being confronted with these statements, immediate vicinity. The defense of alibi must be established by positive, clear
Santos then changed his answer again and stated that his mother was already and satisfactory evidence, the reason being that it is easily manufactured and
awake at the time he went with the policemen.60 usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given credence. This is especially
true in case of positive identification of the culprit by reliable witnesses, which
More glaring than the above-mentioned inconsistencies, however, are the renders their alibis worthless. Positive identification prevails over denials and
discrepancies in the testimonies of appellants Jerry Santos and Ramon Catoc alibis.67
on the manner in which they were taken to the police station and the
circumstances of their first meeting. The very premise of their defense is that What is quite important to note at this point is the fact that the defense failed
they were total strangers to each other; thus, they could not have been to point out any single mistake or inconsistency in the testimonies of either
together at the time when they were arrested, much less were they in policeman. Consequently, the respective rulings of the trial court and the Court
conspiracy with each other in the alleged commission of the crimes charged. of Appeals upholding the regularity and the legitimacy of the conduct of the
buy-bust operation in this case are hereby affirmed.
Appellant Jerry Santos testified that after he was brought out of his house, he
was placed in a tricycle and was then taken straight to the police station in The claim of appellants that their warrantless arrests were illegal also lacks
Pariancillo Park, Pasig City.61 While in detention, he allegedly met Ramon merit. The Court notes that nowhere in the records did we find any objection
Catoc for the first time.62 by appellants to the irregularity of their arrests prior to their arraignment. We
have held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a revealed a common purpose and a community of interest indicative of a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient conspiracy between the appellants.74
complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity
of the conviction of the accused. It is much too late in the day to complain In light of the foregoing, we rule that the guilt of appellants Santos and Catoc
about the warrantless arrest after a valid information has been filed, the has been established beyond reasonable doubt. A determination of the
accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of appropriate penalties to be imposed upon them is now in order.
conviction rendered against him.68 Under the law, the illegal sale of shabu carries with it the penalty of life
Nevertheless, our ruling in People v. Cabugatan 69 provides that: imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), regardless of the
The rule is settled that an arrest made after an entrapment does not require a quantity and purity of the substance involved or shall act as a broker in any
warrant inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest pursuant to such transaction.75 On the other hand, the illegal possession of less than five
Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of Court, which states: (5) grams of said dangerous drug is penalized with imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from three
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to four hundred thousand pesos
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (P400,000.00).76
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually In accordance with Section 98, Article XIII of Republic Act No. 9165, the
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. provisions of the Revised Penal Code find limited applicability with respect to
As we have already declared the legality of the buy-bust operation that was the provisions of the said Act. Section 98 reads:
conducted by the police, it follows that the subsequent warrantless arrests Sec. 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - Notwithstanding
were likewise legally effected. Furthermore, any search resulting from the any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal
lawful warrantless arrests was also valid, because the appellants committed a Code (Act No. 3815), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act,
crime in flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested committed a crime in except in the case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the
the presence of the arresting officers.70 penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided herein shall
As for appellants' contention that the trial court erred in finding the existence be reclusion perpetua to death.
of a conspiracy, the same should also fail. Contrary to appellants' Thus, in determining the imposable penalty, Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal
assertions,71 the findings of the trial court that they conspired with each other Code shall not be applied. Under this article, in all cases in which the law
is limited only to the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs in Criminal Case prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty
No. 12193-D, and does not pertain to the crime of illegal possession of shall be applied when there are neither mitigating nor aggravating
dangerous drugs in Criminal Case No. 12194-D. circumstances.77 Since Section 98 of the Drugs Law contains the word "shall,"
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement the non-applicability of the Revised Penal Code provisions is mandatory,
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The same subject to exception only in case the offender is a minor. 78
degree of proof necessary to prove the crime is required to support a finding In the imposition of the proper penalty, the courts, taking into account the
of criminal conspiracy. Direct proof, however, is not essential to show circumstances attendant in the commission of the offense, are given the
conspiracy.72 It need not be shown that the parties actually came together and discretion to impose either life imprisonment or death, and the fine as provided
agreed in express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. Proof of for by law. In light, however, of the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled,
concerted action before, during and after the crime, which demonstrates their "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the
unity of design and objective is sufficient.73 As correctly held by the trial court, imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Consequently,
the act of appellant Santos in receiving the marked money from PO3 Luna and the penalty to be meted out to appellant shall only be life imprisonment and
handing the same to appellant Catoc, who in turn gave a sachet fine.79 Hence, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 were
containing shabu to appellant Santos to give the policeman, unmistakably
properly imposed on appellants Jerry Santos y Macol and Ramon Catoc y
Picayo in Criminal Case No. 12193-D for illegal sale of shabu.

Likewise, the conviction of appellant Ramon Catoc y Picayo and the imposition
of the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fifteen (15) years
imprisonment and the fine of P300,000.00 meted out by the trial court with
respect to Criminal Case No. 12194-D for illegal possession of shabu, are
affirmed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 29 November 2006

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01291, affirming in toto the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 70, in Criminal Case
No. 12193-D and Criminal Case No. 12194-D, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174659 July 28, 2008 When the woman instructed her to immediately board a ship for Mindanao,
Teresa reasoned that she had not raised the ransom money yet. They then
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, agreed to conduct the pay off in the morning of April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s
vs. Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte.
RAGA SARAPIDA MAMANTAK and LIKAD SARAPIDA
TAURAK, Accused-appellants. Teresa sought the help of the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF). A team was formed and Police Officer (PO)3 1 Juliet Palafox was
DECISION designated to act as Teresa’s niece.
CORONA, J.: Together with the PAOCTF team, Teresa left for Mindanao on April 4, 2001.
There are people who are simply incapable of feeling pity or compassion for On April 7, 2001, they arrived in Iligan City and proceeded to the designated
others. meeting place.1awphi1

Ma. Teresa Basario must have felt a dagger deep in her heart when she lost At around 8:30 a.m., while Teresa and PO3 Palafox were waiting at Pitang’s
her two-year old son, Christopher, two weeks before Christmas on December Carinderia, two women came. They were Raga Sarapida Mamantak and Likad
13, 1999. And again upon being reunited with him some 16 months later when Sarapida Taurak. Mamantak approached Teresa and PO3 Palafox and asked
he could neither recognize her nor remember who he was. who they were waiting for. Teresa replied that they were waiting for a certain
Rocma Bato, the name written at the back of the picture she received in Jalal
Justice demands that those responsible for this cruel and agonizing separation Restaurant in Manila. She showed the photo to Mamantak who stated that she
of mother and child be punished to the full extent of the law. knew Bato. Mamantak then told Teresa that she would ask a cousin of Bato if
the latter was already in Kapatagan. Mamantak turned to Taurak, supposedly
At about 3:00 p.m. on December 13, 1999, Teresa went with Christopher and
the cousin of Bato. Taurak came near Teresa and PO3 Palafox and informed
her elder sister Zenaida to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP Tower in Juan Luna
them that she had Christopher. Taurak asked Teresa and PO3 Palafox to
St., Binondo, Manila. Teresa and Christopher looked for a vacant table while
come with her but they refused. Taurak reluctantly agreed to leave Mamantak
Zenaida proceeded to order their food. Shortly after Teresa took her seat,
with them while she fetched Christopher.
Christopher followed Zenaida to the counter. Barely had Christopher gone
from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had disappeared. She and Several hours later, in the afternoon of the same day, Taurak returned and told
her sister frantically looked for him inside and outside the premises of the Teresa that Christopher was in a nearby ice plant. She asked Teresa to go
fastfood outlet, to no avail. As their continued search for the child was futile, with her but the latter insisted on their agreement that the boy be handed over
they reported him missing to the nearest police detachment. at the carinderia. Taurak relented, left and came back after several minutes
with Christopher.
The following day, Teresa went to several TV and radio stations to inform the
public of the loss of Christopher and to appeal for help and information. Despite Upon seeing her son, Teresa cried and embraced him. However, the child was
the publicity, however, Teresa received no word about Christopher’s unmoved. He no longer recognized nor understood her for he could only speak
whereabouts. Worse, pranksters were gleefully having a field day aggravating in the muslim dialect. When asked who he was, the boy gave a muslim name
her misery. with "Taurak" as surname.
On February 25, 2001, Teresa received a call from a woman who sounded like Mamantak and Taurak interrupted Teresa and demanded the ransom money.
a muslim. The caller claimed to have custody of Christopher and asked for She answered that her niece had it and pointed to PO3 Palafox. Thereafter,
₱30,000 in exchange for the boy. Mamantak and PO3 Palafox boarded a jeepney which was parked outside,
under Taurak’s watchful eyes. Inside the jeepney, PO3 Palafox handed the
On March 27, 2001, the same muslim-sounding woman called and instructed
ransom money to Mamantak. At this juncture, PO3 Palafox gave the pre-
Teresa to get a recent photo of her son from the Jalal Restaurant at the Muslim
agreed signal and the PAOCTF team then closed in and arrested Mamantak
Center in Quiapo, Manila. True enough, when Teresa went there, someone
and Taurak.
gave her a recent picture of Christopher. She then contacted the mysterious
woman through the cellphone number the latter had previously given her.
Christopher relearned Tagalog after a month and gradually began to forget the Mamantak corroborated her sister Taurak’s testimony. She claimed that she
incident. On the other hand, Teresa almost lost her sanity. At the time was at Nunungan, Lanao del Norte on December 13, 1999. At that time, she
Christopher was kidnapped, she was pregnant with her third child. The child, did not know the exact whereabouts of Taurak who was in Manila and whom
born very sickly, eventually died. she had not seen for some time. They met again on April 7, 2001 at Pitang’s
Carinderia but only by chance. She happened to be there when Taurak came.
The sisters Mamantak and Taurak were charged with kidnapping for ransom When Teresa arrived later, Taurak talked to her and then left, returning after a
under the following Information: few hours with Christopher whom Mamantak saw for the first time. Taurak told
That on December 13, 1999 in Binondo, Manila and within the jurisdiction of her that she had found the boy and was returning him to his mother. Mamantak
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating stayed in the carinderia all the while, waiting for her ride home at 4:00 p.m.
and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves together, did then She was stunned when PAOCTF members suddenly arrested her and her
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive sister as she had not committed any crime and there was no warrant for her
Christopher Basario, a two-year old minor of his liberty against his will for the arrest.
purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand for ransom was made as a After evaluating the respective evidence of the parties, the trial court rendered
condition for his release amounting to THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS a decision2 on November 30, 2004 finding Taurak and Mamantak guilty as
(₱30,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Christopher Basario in said charged:
amount and such other amount as maybe awarded to him under the provisions
of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding both accused LIKAD
SARAPIDA TAURAK and accused RAGA SARAPIDA [MAMANTAK] GUILTY
CONTRARY TO LAW. beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom as amended
Mamantak and Taurak pleaded not guilty when arraigned. After pre-trial, trial by RA No. 7659 and both are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
ensued and the parties presented their respective evidence. of RECLUSION PERPETUA. Both accused are hereby jointly and severally
ordered to pay the Christopher Basario represented by the mother, [Ma.]
In defense, Mamantak and Taurak denied the charges against them. Taurak Teresa Basario the amount of PHP50,000.00 as compensatory damages and
testified that at the time and date of the alleged kidnapping, she was peddling PHP50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs against the accused.
wares in Divisoria market, Manila. When she saw Christopher wandering
about aimlessly, she talked to him but he did not seem to understand her. She Both accused are given credit for the preventive imprisonment undergone by
took the boy under her care and waited for someone to come for him. No one them during the pendency of this case.
did. As it was already 7:00 p.m., she brought the boy home with her to the SO ORDERED.3
Muslim Center in Quiapo.
Taurak and Mamantak appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a decision4 dated
The next day, she and her husband took the boy to the nearest police outpost March 31, 2006, the appellate court ruled that the trial court erred in not
but no one was there so they just brought the boy to their stall. They opted to considering the demand for ₱30,000 as a demand for ransom. Such
keep the boy until his parents could claim him. circumstance required the imposition of the death penalty. Thus, the appellate
On February 17, 2001, Taurak brought the child to Maganding, Sultan court affirmed the conviction of Taurak and Mamantak with modification
Kumander, Lanao del Sur. Sometime later, Teresa contacted her and asked amending the penalty from reclusion perpetua to death.5 Pursuant to Section
for Christopher’s picture for confirmation. It was at this point that Taurak 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC, the
arranged a meeting at Pitang’s Carinderia in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte on appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the
April 7, 2001. She did not bring the boy at first as a precautionary measure. elevation of the records.6
Only after confirming that Teresa was the boy’s mother did she relinquish We affirm the Court of Appeals, with a modification of penalty.
custody to her. However, she was shocked when members of the PAOCTF
suddenly arrested her. She protested because she was innocent. There were Kidnapping is defined and punished under Article 267 of the Revised Penal
no charges against her nor was there a warrant for her arrest. Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) 7659:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual the imprisonment of a person but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever
who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his form and for whatever length of time.11 And liberty is not limited to mere
liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. physical restraint but embraces one’s right to enjoy his God-given faculties
subject only to such restraints necessary for the common welfare. 12
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
The two-year-old Christopher suddenly disappeared in Binondo, Manila and
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. was recovered only after almost 16 months from Taurak and Mamantak (both
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person of them private individuals) in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte. During the entire
kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. time the boy was kept away from his mother, he was certainly deprived or
restrained of his liberty. He had no means, opportunity or capacity to leave
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the appellants’ custody and return to his family on his own. He had no choice but
accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. to stay with total strangers, go with them to a far away place and learn a culture
and dialect alien to him. At such a very tender age, he was deprived of the
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed
liberty to enjoy the company and care of his family, specially his mother.
for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even
if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission Taurak unlawfully kept the child under her control and custody and even
of the offense. brought him to Lanao del Norte. She demanded ₱30,000 in exchange for his
return to his mother. On the other hand, Mamantak’s actions (e.g., her
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped,
presence in the carinderia and her acceptance of the ransom) showed without
or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be
doubt that she was aiding her sister and was acting in concert with her. These
imposed.
were the identical factual findings of both the trial and appellate courts. There
The crime has the following elements: is no reason to disturb them as they are sufficiently supported by evidence.

(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim7 or Taurak’s story that she merely gave Christopher refuge was incredible. It was
a public officer who has a duty under the law to detain a person; 8 like the apocryphal tale of a man accused of theft of large cattle; his excuse
was that he saw a piece of rope and brought it home not knowing that there
(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his was a cow tied to the other end. She never even tried to bring the boy to the
liberty; proper authorities or surrender him to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development’s social workers in her barangay or in the city hall at any time
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal and
during the 16 months he was with her. And how could Teresa have initiated
(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is her phone conversations with Taurak when they were total strangers to each
present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is other?
committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are
Similarly, Mamantak’s account that she was at Pitang’s Carinderia only by
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made
coincidence and that it was only there that she first saw Christopher invites
or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.
nothing but disbelief. The unequivocal testimonies of the prosecution
If the victim is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if witnesses on her role in arranging for the payment of ransom and the release
the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting of the kidnap victim (e.g., confirming the identity of Teresa and demanding and
ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is receiving the ransom money) showed otherwise. The evidence clearly
qualified and becomes punishable by death even if none of the circumstances established that Mamantak was a principal in the kidnapping of Christopher.
mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code is
Evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
present.9
witness but must be credible in itself.13 The trial and appellate courts correctly
The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s ruled that the statements of Taurak and Mamantak did not deserve credence.
liberty coupled with the intent of the accused to effect it. 10 It includes not only Moreover, factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses and the probative weight thereof, are accorded damages and ₱100,000 exemplary damages to their young victim Christopher
great, if not conclusive, value when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 14 Basario.

The Court of Appeals considered the demand for ₱30,000 as a qualifying Costs against appellants.
circumstance which necessitated the imposition of the death penalty. On the
other hand, the trial court deemed the amount as too measly, compared to SO ORDERED.
what must have been actually spent for the care and subsistence of
Christopher for almost two years. It therefore treated the amount not as
ransom but as a reimbursement of expenses incurred for taking care of the
child. (Kidnappers in Mindanao today call it reimbursement for "board-and-
lodging.")

Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the

redemption of a captured person that will release him from captivity. 15 No
specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping for
ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange
for the victim’s freedom.16 The amount of and purpose for the ransom is
immaterial.

In this case, the payment of ₱30,000 was demanded as a condition for the
release of Christopher to his mother. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly
considered it as a demand for ransom.

One final point of law. While the penalty for kidnapping for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code17 is death, RA 934618 has banned the death penalty and
reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Pursuant to this law, we reduce the penalty imposed on appellants from death
to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the award of ₱50,000 civil

indemnity19 was proper. Pursuant to People v. Garalde,20 the award of
₱50,00021 moral damages is increased to ₱200,000 considering the minority
of Christopher. Moreover, since the crime was attended by a demand for
ransom, and by way of example or correction, Christopher is entitled to
₱100,000 exemplary damages.22

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The March 31, 2006 decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00729
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Raga Sarapida Mamantak
and Likad Sarapida Taurak are hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of kidnapping for ransom for which they are sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. They are further
ordered to pay, jointly and severally, ₱50,000 civil indemnity, ₱200,000 moral
G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948 courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order
the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having
MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners, committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior
vs. courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL Constitution.)
JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners. of the old Penal Code formerly in force of these Islands, which penalized a
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Nañawa and D. public officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a
Guinto Lazaro for respondents. person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the
FERIA, J.: judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt
that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary
committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city fiscals or any
Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204,
against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the which complements said section 202, of the same Code provided that "the
petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was heard, the petitioners were penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed
still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period
against them an information with the proper courts justice. prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail
to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a
written order containing a statement of the grounds upon which the same is
sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be
based."
transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for
deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as to Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has
the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the not been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said words
Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the action taken judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by
by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case in order to lay the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information and guidance
in the future of the officers concerned. Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of
the people to be secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure shall
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue
whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty, is but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the examination
the following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce."
of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code? Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty,
except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in
judge after examination of the complainant and his witness. And the judicial
the next proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
authority to whom the person arrested by a public officers must be surrendered
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to
can not be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six
warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested pending
hours."
the trial of the case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment,
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted the detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in
article, the precept of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the violation of our Constitution.
provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court,
opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the
which, referring to the duty of an officer after arrest without warrant, provides
that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay, the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place, are the
and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest
arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for they may deem proper of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108,
to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal
the defendant and his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the may conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the
complaint or information filed against him. He shall also informed of the proceeding paragraph.
substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he
desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he may be Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an
allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or
writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do
him. not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must
be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the
the Rules of Court. According to the provision of said section, "a writ of habeas arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary
corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or detention information against the accused if the result of the investigation so warrants,
by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue or person making the arrest should, as abovestated, without unnecessary
the process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed. delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time
"Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction
the person detained shall be released. to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109);
and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it
not be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other city, is a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction, and then transfer
because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions
confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person of section 13, Rule 108.
arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off.
Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal
1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making the arrest
makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in section 11, without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal,
Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper,
by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but it is a mere the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the
investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for
information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of the temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants
First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially impossible for
to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest
provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary without warrant is in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately
investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious prosecution, since after the investigation, either release the person arrested or file the
defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability
not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation. of the defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file
the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary should release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that
investigation in case of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace and prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to making or continuing the
investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the
court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the
purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for
more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of
communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such
as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to make the
investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.

To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person
arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without
any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may
not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or
prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been
illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or
judge.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant

upon complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those
cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such
case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the
justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If
the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he
finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been
committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a police officer has no
authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint
of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he
becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.

In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the

responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners,
for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a
clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the
mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office
of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners
were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint
against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being illegally
restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are
now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent court of justice. So
ordered.

Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-9805-06 March 29, 1957 The law indeed provides that a public officer or employee who shall detain any
person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver him to the proper judicial
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, authorities within the period of eighteen (18) hours if the crime for which he is
vs. detained calls for an afflictive or capital penalty, may be held amendable to
DIONISIO MABONG, defendant-appellant. criminal prosecution, but there is nothing said therein that the charge fro which
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Antonio A. Torres he has been detained and for which he has been properly indicted, becomes
for appellee. invalid or nugatory. While public may be held criminally liable, the proceeding
Cipriano C. Alviso for appellant. taken against him for the act he has committed remains unaffected, for the two
acts are distinct and separate. As a matter of fact, such an act on the part of
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: the public officer is not considered as one of the grounds on which one can
predicate a motion to quash the complaint or information under Rule 113,
In the afternoon on May 20, 1955, in the barrio of Rizal municipality of Lianga,
section 2, of the Rules of Court.
province of Surigao, Rufo Verano, who was a rural policeman, heard some
people shouting that one Dionisio Nabong went berserk. Verano went out of It is true that the accused was detained in the municipal jail of Lianga for more
his house armed with a club and saw Mabong stab one Cipriano Tabel with a than thrree (3) days before criminal charges were preferred against him before
bolo. After pursuing and attacking his victim, Mabong faced Verano who told the justice of the peace court, and that since his detention no warrant of arrest
him to drop his bolo, and when he refused, Verano clubbed him on the face has been issued by the court as a result of said charges, but the absence of
which caused him to stumble to the ground. Thereupon, Verano grabbed the such warrant can have no legal consequence it appearing that when the
bolo of the accused, tied him with a rope and brought him on a small boat to charges were filed he was already under the custody of local authorities. As
Lianga where he delivered him to the chief of police. the Solicitor General well observes, "no practical good will come out of
quashing the information presented and setting the appellant free. That will
On May 23, 1955, after proper investigation, Mabong was charged with murder
only mean a complaint will have to be filed anew against him, that the justice
in two separate informations by the chief of police before the Justice of the
of the peace of Lianga would issue a warrant for his arrest and start all over
Peace of Lianga. When the, latter conducted the corresponding preliminary
again with the case. In any event, . . . with the filing on May 23, 1955 of the
investigation, Mabong pleaded guilty, whereupon the Justice of the Peace
corresponding criminal complaints against appellant, the detention there after
forwarded the two cases to the court of first instance. In due time, the provincial
of the accused became legal and justified; and that the issuance of an of
fiscal filed against the accused the informations required by law, and when the
formality and had already become functus oficio."
court set the same for arraignment, the accused filed a motion to quash and a
petition for habeas corpus alleging as main ground that his detention by the The case of Gunable vs. Director of Prisons, 77 Phil., 993, is on all fours with
local authoritieds illegal upon the expiration of the period of eighteen (18) hours the present case. There, two of the petitioners were arrested in July, 1942
without having been proceeded with in accordance with law, and that the filing while the third petitioner was arrested in October, 1942. In November ofthe
later on of the two criminal complaints against him by the chief of police did same year, the three were charged with murder and frustrated murder before
not have the effect of validating his detention. From the denial of said motion the Court of First Instance of Manila. In a petition for habeas
and petition, the accused took the present appeal. corpus subsequently filed in behalf of the petitioners, it was alleged, among
other things, that their detention for periods varying from one to four months
The law on which the accused relies in claiming the illegality of his detention
following their arrests was unlawful as it violated their right to be brought before
is article 125 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
proper judicial authorities within six (6) hours after their apprehension. This
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial cour denied the petition, saying:
authorities. The penalties privided in the next preceeding article shall be
With respect to the first ground, it is sufficient to state that the alleged failure
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any persons to
of the authorities (who arrested or are detaining the petitioners) to deliver the
the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours, for crimes or
latter to the judicial authorities within six-hours — which may of course be the
offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and eighteen
subject of criminal prosecution under article 125 of the Revised Penal Code —
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or
cannot affect the legality of the confinement of the petitioners which is
their equivalent.
admittedly under subsisting process, issued by a competent court. Indeed, if it
appears that the persons alleged to be restrained of their liberty are in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge having
jurisdication to issue the process, the writ of habeas corpus shall not be
alllowed. (Rules of Court No. 102, section 4.)

Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, without costs.

G.R. No. L-26723 December 22, 1966 was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first office
day following arrest.2
ARTHUR MEDINA Y YUMUL, petitioner,
vs. 2. Nor could discharge from custody, by now, be justified even on the
MARCELO F. OROZCO, JR., Acting City Warden of Caloocan assumption that detention was originally arbitrary.
City, respondent.
Petitioner at present is jailed because of the court's order of commitment of
Federico Magdangal for petitioner. November 10, 1965 upon a murder indictment. No bail was provided for him,
Francisco A. Garcia for respondent. because he is charged with a capital offense. Such detention remains
unaffected by the alleged previous arbitrary detention. Because, detention
SANCHEZ, J.: under a valid information is one thing, arbitrary detention anterior thereto
On application for habeas corpus. The facts are: another. They are separate concepts. Simply because at the inception
detention was wrong is no reason for letting petitioner go scot-free after the
At about 12:00 p.m. on November 7, 1965, petitioner Arthur Medina y Yumul serious charge of murder has been clamped upon him and his detention
was arrested and thereafter incarcerated in the Caloocan City jail, allegedly as ordered by the court. The first is illegal; but the second is not. 3 Thus, the
one of those responsible for the death of one Marcelo Sangalang y Diwa which petition for habeas corpus came too late. 4
occurred on October 31, 1965 in said city. At about 9:00 o'clock in the morning
of the same day, November 7, 1965, the case against Medina and two others 3. As unavailing is petitioner's claim that no preliminary investigation was
for Sangalang's murder was referred to a fiscal, who forthwith conducted a conducted by the fiscal before the criminal charge against him was registered
preliminary investigation in petitioner's presence. At about 3:40 p.m. on in court. Other than that averment in the petition herein, petitioner has nothing
November 10, 1965, an information for murder was filed against petitioner whatsoever to show for it. Upon the other hand, the assertion that such
Arthur Medina y Yumul, and Antonio Olivar y Flores and Alexander Enriquez investigation was made on the very day of petitioner's arrest and in his
y Raginio in the Caloocan branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, presence, is confirmed by the fact that on November 12, 1965 he moved the
docketed as Criminal Case No. C-1197 of said court. By court order, they were office of the city fiscal for a reinvestigation of his case. And that reinvestigation
promptly committed to jail. Arraigned, Medina and his co-accused stood trial was held on December 1, 1965. Thereafter, the case against him proceeded
— which has not yet terminated. to trial. Add to all of these the legal presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties,5 and the question of lack of preliminary
1. First to be considered is the charge of arbitrary detention. Petitioner claims investigation is well nailed down.
violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. The crime — for which
petitioner is detained — is murder, a capital offense. The arresting officer's 4. Besides, the proper forum before which absence of preliminary investigation
duty under the law1 was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities should be ventilated is the Court of First Instance, not this Court. Reason is
within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not not wanting for this view. Absence of preliminary investigation does not go to
released. From the time of petitioner's arrest at 12:00 o'clock p.m. on the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings. It
November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him could even be waived. Indeed, it is frequently waived.6 These are matters to
for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed. be inquired into by the trial court, not an appellate court.

But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; 5. The cry of deprivation of a speedy trial merits but scant consideration. The
November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) arraignment of petitioner set for December 1, 1965 was postponed to
was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy December 20, 1965, thence to February 28, 1966, to March 14, 1966, all on
matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information petition of counsel for the accused, including petitioner. Then, on April 14, 1966,
and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to petitioner's counsel moved to reset the date of hearing on the merits. And
open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment again, the hearing scheduled on July 26, 1966 was transferred to September
prepared. And then, where to locate and the certainty of locating those officers 6, 1966 on motion of defendant Alexander Enriquez with the conformity of
and employees could very well compound the fiscal's difficulties. These are petitioner's counsel. Finally, on motion of petitioner's counsel, the hearing on
considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina September 6, 1966 was recalendared for December 6, 1966. In this factual
environment, we do not see denial to petitioner of the right to speedy trial.
Delay of his own making cannot be oppressive to him.7

For the reasons given, the petition herein to set petitioner Arthur Medina y
Yumul at liberty is hereby denied. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
[G.R. No. L-27331 : July 30, 1981.] witnesses for the prosecution) all of whom are residents of Agusan. In an
amended complaint, the two arresting policemen, the Chief of Police, and the
ELISEO ALIMPOOS, CIRIACA ALIMPOOS, SGT. MILLARDO M. PATES, Municipal Judge were added as co-defendants.
PEDRO BACLAY, CATALINO YAMILO, RAFAEL CAPANGPANGAN,
DALMACIO YGOT and EUFROCINA ESTORES, Petitioners, vs. THE The Complaint of the Accused was premised on the alleged violation of Article
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE JUDGE MONTANO A. 32 cranad(4), cranad(8), cranad(15), cranad(16), cranad(17) and cranad(19)
ORTIZ, REYNALDO MOSQUITO and MATILDE ABASTILLAS MOSQUITO, of the Civil Code, and Article 269 of the Revised Penal Code, by defendants
Respondents. therein who were said to have been instrumental in causing the detention and
arrest of the Accused. It prayed for the Accused’s release from detention, as
well as for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the
DECISION Offended Parties and the Witnesses, and the Municipal Judge and/or their
representatives, from proceeding with the Criminal Case. Actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs were also prayed for.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: The Offended Parties and the Witnesses, except Sgt. Pates, were represented
by the law firm of Seno, Mendoza and Associates, with offices located in Cebu
City. They contended that they had nothing to do with the Accused’s detention
Petitioner-spouses, Eliseo Alimpoos and Ciriaca Alimpoos, shall hereinafter and arrest. The Municipal Judge, the Chief of Police, and Patrolmen Libres
be called the Offended Parties. Petitioners Pedro Baclay, Catalino Yamilo, and Galimba, who were represented by the Acting Provincial Fiscal of Butuan
Rafael Capangpangan, Dalmacio Ygot, Eufrocina Estores and Sgt. Millardo M. City, alleged that the Warrant of Arrest was validly issued. Sgt. Pates was
Pates may hereinafter be referred to as the Witnesses. represented by Capt. Igualdad Cunanan, and reiterated substantially the same
defense.
Respondent Reynaldo Mosquito will hereinafter be called the Accused.
Respondent Matilde A. Mosquito is the Accused’s wife. Respondent Court of After due hearing in the Habeas Corpus case, respondent Trial Judge issued
Appeals will be termed the Appellate Tribunal; respondent Judge Montano A. the appealed Order cranad(the ORDER, for short), dated March 26, 1966,
Ortiz, as respondent Trial Judge, and the Municipal Judge, as such. declaring the detention of the Accused illegal and granting the Writ of Habeas
Corpus as well as the Preliminary Injunction prayed for upon the filing of the
In this Petition for Certiorari, the Offended Parties and the Witnesses seek the required bond. The dispositive portion of the ORDER reads:
reversal of the Decision of the Appellate Tribunal, upholding the disallowance
of the Offended Parties’ appeal by the Court of First Instance of “WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring illegal the detention of
Agusan cranad(the Trial Court, for short) in Civil Case No. 1088, entitled plaintiff Reynaldo Mosquito by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued without the
“Reynaldo Mosquito, et al. vs. Eliseo Alimpoos, et al,” wherein respondent Trial observance of the fundamental legal requirements prior to the issuance of said
Judge granted the Accused’s petition for Habeas Corpus and declared his Writ. The petition for habeas corpus is therefore granted and it is hereby
detention illegal. He also enjoined the prosecution of Criminal Case No. 458 ordered that said detention prisoner be forthwith released from custody, and
of the Municipal Court of Bayugan, Agusan cranad(hereinafter called Criminal set at liberty and that upon the filing of the bond in the amount of P1,000.00 a
Case) where the Accused had been arrested. writ of preliminary injunction issue restraining the Municipal Judge of Bayugan,
Agusan, defendant Vicente Galicia and the rest of the defendants, their
The Accused was detained by the Chief of Police of Bayugan, Agusan, by attorneys, agents or representatives from proceeding with Criminal Case No.
virtue of a Warrant of Arrest issued by the Municipal Judge in the Criminal 458 entitled ‘The People of the Philippines versus Reynaldo Mosquito et als.’,
Case, which was a prosecution for Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries. for the crime of Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries, with costs against
The place allegedly robbed belonged to the Offended Parties. Contending that the defendants in these habeas corpus and preliminary injunction proceedings.
the Warrant was issued without the observance of the legal requirements for
the issuance thereof, the Accused, then detained, and his wife instituted the SO ORDERED.” 1
Habeas Corpus case before the Trial Court. Named as defendants in the
original complaint were the Offended parties and the Witnesses cranad(as
The Acting Provincial Fiscal of Agusan received copy of said ORDER on We gave due course to the Petition on March 31, 1967, and after the filing of
March 31, 1966, and on April 1, 1966, moved for extension of time within which the respective Briefs, the case was considered submitted for decision on April
to appeal, but eventually desisted from doing so. 19, 1968.

On April 4, 1966, counsel for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses mailed The Offended Parties and the Witnesses pose the following Assignments of
from Cebu City a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals stating that: Error:

“Undersigned counsel received a copy of the order only today cranad(April 4, “I

1966) which copy was handed to him by defendant cranad(petitioner) Eliseo
Alimpoos.” The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that ‘counsel,’ however, has
not presented a shred of proof to bolster his claim of actual receipt of the order,
The appeal was opposed by the Accused on the ground that it was filed Annex ‘B’ on April 4, 1966, save of his own self-serving assertions, which
beyond the 48-hour reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal in cannot prevail over the court record, cranad(Annex 1 of Answer) certified to by
Habeas Corpus proceedings. the Clerk of Court, bearing the true actual date when the parties and counsel
herein received their corresponding copies. The same certified true copy of
On April 23, 1966, over the Offended Parties’ objections, respondent Trial the order shows that the law office of herein counsel received its copy on
Judge dismissed their appeal thus: March 30, 1966 not on April 4, 1966;
“The notice of appeal of the Provincial Fiscal or of Atty. Seno for the II
defendants, having been filed out of time the Order of March 26, 1966 granting
the habeas corpus is now final and executory. The urgent ex-parte motion to The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in holding that ‘respondent Judge was
grant extension to file notice of appeal does not interrupt the running of the fully justified in relying on its own record to determine the date on which
period fixed by law for filing an appeal which is forty-eight hours from receipt petitioners’ counsel received copy of the order, without any proof thereof,
of the order.” 2 because courts will take judicial notice of its records and of the facts which the
same records establish and which are known to judges by reason of their
No reconsideration was prayed for by the Provincial Fiscal. judicial functions.’
The Offended Parties, however, resorted to a Mandamus proceeding before III
the Court of Appeals seeking to compel respondent Trial Judge to give due
course to said appeal. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that ‘as the records show that
copy of the questioned order was received by counsel on March 30, 1966, the
On January 11, 1967, the Appellate Tribunal, 3 in CA-G.R. No. 37781-R, notice of appeal was not filed within the 48-hour limit.’
denied Mandamus stating in part:
IV
“As the records show that copy of the questioned Order was received by
counsel on March 30, 1966, the notice of appeal was not filed within the 48- The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that ‘petitioners’ appeal was,
hour limit. Petitioners’ appeal was therefore filed out of time and the judgment therefore, filed out of time and the judgment has become final.’
has become final.
V
“In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby denied. Costs against
petitioners.” The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration without requiring the adverse party to answer the said Motion
Hence, this Petition for Certiorari, filed on March 13, 1967, praying that the for Reconsideration.
Decision of the Appellate Tribunal be set aside and the appeal interposed by
the Offended Parties in the Habeas Corpus case be allowed. VI

The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in failing to pass upon the issues raised
in the lower court and in the Court of Appeals.”
The technical issue of timeliness of the appeal will first be considered. Counsel
for the Offended Parties alleges that he received a copy of the ORDER only
on April 4, 1966 from the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, who handed him MAO-bb.
the copy in Cebu City. The latter had received it on March 31, 1966. Counsel Recd.
contends that the reglementary period to appeal can not be reckoned from the
latter date because, under the Rules, when a party is represented by counsel, 31/3/66 cranad(initial)
notice should be sent, not to the party, but to his counsel of record. Counsel
for the Offended Parties and the Witnesses further maintains that the period
from which to reckon the period of appeal should actually be April 14, 1966 Received:
when he actually received, through the mails, his copy of the ORDER, as
shown by the rubber stamp of his office appearing on the upper right hand (Sgd.) Illegible Mun. Judge cranad(Sgd.) Illegible 3/30/66 7:00 evening
corner of a duplicate copy of the ORDER. 4
3/31/66 cranad(Sgd.) B. Galimba 3/30/00 7:00
Respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal alike found the foregoing
cranad(Sgd.) Eliseo Alimpoos
assertion self-serving and relied instead on the last page of the ORDER, 5
purportedly showing that the law office of counsel for the Offended Parties and
the Witnesses received its copy on March 30, 1966 and not on April 4, 1966,
hence the disallowance of the appeal by respondent Trial Judge, and its Received copy March 31, 1966 8:00 A.M.
affirmance by the Appellate Court.
Ciriaco Alimpoos
The crucial last page is reproduced hereunder exactly as it appears:
Pedro Baklay
“CIVIL CASE NO. 1088
Catalino Yamilo

Rafael Capangpangan
ORDER
Dalmacio Ygot

Eufrocina Estores
—5—

By: cranad(Sgd.) Eliseo Alimpoos

and preliminary injunction proceedings.
March 31, 1966

(Sgd.) Illegible
SO ORDERED.
cranad(Sgd.) Illegible

Done this 26th day of March, 1966 at the City of Butuan.

For the Chief of Police 3-30-66

TO ATTYS. SENO, MENDOZA,

(SGD.) MONTANO A. ORTIZ
RUIZ & ASS. & CAPT. CUNANAN
JUDGE
BY REG. MAIL #11633 & #11634 March 31, 1966

A certified true copy: “CEBU CITY

(s) MACARIO C. CONDE

(t) MACARIO C. CONDE Received

Clerk of Court” 6 cranad(emphasis supplied) April 11, 1966

Obviously, copies of the ORDER intended for “Attys. Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz & Philippines
Ass. & Capt. Cunanan” were sent by registered mail with Receipts Nos. 11633
and 11634. Receipt No. 11633 is the registry number corresponding to the Since the registered mail was received in Cebu City only on April 11, 1966, it
copy for the law office, and Receipt No. 11634 that for Capt. Cunanan. This is is not unlikely that the law office and addressee, as alleged by it, received the
borne out by the envelope 7 from the “Office of the Clerk of Court Butuan City” mail only three days after, or on April 14, 1966.
addressed to “Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz and Associates, Cor. Magallanes-D The notation
Jakosalem Sts., Aboitiz Bldg., Cebu City” with the following markings:
“(Sgd.) Illegible
On the face of the envelope lower left hand corner:
3-30-66”
“REGISTERED
appearing above the following note:
CITY OF BUTUAN
“To Attys. Seno, Mendoza, Ruiz & Ass. &
PHILIPPINES
Capt. Cunanan by reg. mail #11633 & #11634”

can not refer to personal receipt by the said law office for the obvious reason
March 31, 1966 that its office being at Cebu City, personal service would not have been
possible in Agusan.

Superimposed on it in ink is “No. 11633” It is apparent then that both respondent Trial Judge and the Appellate Tribunal
committed error in holding that the Offended Parties’ appeal was interposed
beyond the reglementary period. Service on the Offended Party, Eliseo
Alimpoos, on March 31, 1966 cannot be deemed as notice in law to his counsel.
On the back of the envelope appears a big diagonal stamp “FOR OFFICIAL 8 Under the circumstances, therefore, reliance may be placed on the assertion
USE ONLY” and two post office stamp marks: of counsel that the Offended Party, Eliseo Alimpoos, had given him a copy of
the ORDER only on April 4, 1966, which must be deemed as the date of notice
to said counsel of the ORDER. Counsel lost no time in mailing his Notice of
“REGISTERED Appeal on the same day, April 4, 1966 from Cebu. 9 Procedurally, the appeal
was seasonably filed.
CITY OF BUTUAN
Although the Appellate Tribunal had committed error in its appreciation of the
PHILIPPINES
date when the lawyers of the Offended Parties were served notice of the
ORDER, we believe it would not be justifiable to reverse and to direct (a) That the person in whose behalf the application is made is imprisoned or
respondent Trial Judge to allow the Offended Parties to appeal. Instead, we restrained of his liberty;
are opting to render a practical judgment.
(b) The officer or name of the person by whom he is so imprisoned or
1. The original and amended complaints filed by the Offended Parties with the restrained; or, if both are unknown or uncertain, such officer or person may be
Trial Court contained three causes of action, principally for Habeas Corpus described by an assumed appellation, and the person who is served with the
and for damages. However, the proceedings were conducted purely as a writ shall be deemed the person intended;
Habeas Corpus case. The original complaint was filed on February 22, 1966,
and resolved on March 26, 1966, in keeping with the “speedy and effectual” (c) The place where he is so imprisoned or restrained, if known;
character of Habeas Corpus proceedings. 10 (d) A copy of the commitment or cause of detention of such person, if it can be
The ORDER treated the case as exclusively a Habeas Corpus proceeding, procured without impairing the efficiency of the remedy; or, if the imprisonment
ignoring the Accused’s prayer for damages. The lawyers of the Offended or restraint is without any legal authority, such fact shall appear.”
Parties attempted to appeal from the ORDER in accordance with Section 19 The Accused’s allegation as to, and prayer for, damages was out of place. In
of Rule 41, captioned “who may appeal in Habeas Corpus cases.” The Habeas Corpus cases, the judgment in favor of the applicant cannot contain a
Appellate Tribunal resolved in the mandamus case as relating to a Habeas provision for damages. It has to be confined to what is provided for in Section
Corpus case. 15, Rule 102, which reads:
2. Because the proceedings before the trial Court was a Habeas Corpus case, “SEC. 15. When prisoner discharged if no appeal. — When the court or Judge
the complaint filed was obviously defective. A Habeas Corpus proceeding is has examined into the cause of caption and restraint of the prisoner, and is
not a suit between parties. satisfied that he is unlawfully imprisoned or restrained, he shall forthwith order
“Not a suit between the parties. — While the issuance of the writ is to all intents his discharge from confinement, but such discharge shall not be effective until
and purposes the commencement of a civil action, a suit, yet technically the a copy of the order has been served on the officer or person detaining the
proceedings by Habeas Corpus is in no sense a suit between private parties. prisoner. If the officer or person detaining the prisoner does not desire to
It is an inquisition by the government, at the suggestion and instance of an appeal, the prisoner shall be forthwith released.”
individual, most probably, but still in the name and capacity of the sovereign. It will be observed that there is no provision for serving copy of the discharge
It may be analogized to a proceeding in rem and instituted for the sole purpose on any other private party defendant, nor for an award of damages.
of fixing the status of a person. The person restrained is the central figure in
the transaction. The proceeding is instituted solely for his benefit. As it is not As it has been held:
designed to obtain redress against anybody, and as no judgment can be
“The sole function of the writ is to relieve from unlawful imprisonment, and
entered against anybody, and as there is no real plaintiff and defendant, there
ordinarily it cannot properly be used for any other purpose. Thus it has been
can be no suit in the technical
held that the writ cannot properly be used: To enforce a right to service; to
sense.” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Extraordinary Legal Remedies, Forrest G.
determine whether a person has committed a crime; in determine a disputed
Ferris & Forrest G. Ferris, Jr., p. 28)
interstate boundary line; to punish respondent or to afford the injured person
The Accused, therefore, should have limited his complaint against the Chief of redress, for the illegal detention; to recover damages or other money
Police of Bayugan, the person having him in alleged illegal custody. That is award; . cra .” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(emphasis supplied) cranad(Vt — In
the clear implication in the following provisions of Section 3, Rule 102, which re St. Onge, 108 A203, 93 Vt. 373; NY — People vs. Prior, 182 NYS 577, 112
enumerates what should be set forth in a petition for Habeas Corpus: Misc. 208 [39 C.J.S. 430]).

“SEC. 3. Requisites of application therefor. — Application for the writ shall be 3. The Accused has challenged the personality of the Offended Parties to
by petition signed and verified either by the party for whose relief it is intended, interpose the appeal, premised on Section 19 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court,
or by some person on his behalf, and shall set forth: which provides:
SEC 19. Who may appeal in habeas corpus cases. — The appeal in habeas When a preliminary investigation is not held, or is improperly held, the
corpus cases may be taken in the name of the person detained or of the officer procedure is not to dismiss the case, or enjoin its prosecution, but to have the
or person detaining him. But if the detention is by reason of civil proceedings preliminary investigation conducted. As stated in People v. Figueroa, 27 SCRA,
the party in interest or the person who caused the detention shall be entitled 1239, 1247 cranad(1969):
to control the appeal; and if, by virtue of criminal proceedings, the provincial
fiscal or the city fiscal as the case may be, is entitled to control the appeal on “Assuming that the trial court felt that the accused should have been given
behalf of the government, subject to the right of the Solicitor General to more ‘ample chance and opportunity to be heard in the preliminary
intervene” chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Rule 41). investigation,’ then what it could properly have done, since in its own Order it
recognized that Fiscal Abaca had conducted a preliminary investigation
It is indisputable that the Habeas Corpus case arose by virtue of criminal although ‘hurriedly’ in its opinion, was not to dismiss the information but to hold
proceedings in the Criminal case. Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, the case in abeyance and conduct its own investigation or require the fiscal to
therefore, it was the Provincial Fiscal who was entitled to control the appeal on hold a reinvestigation. This Court, speaking through now Mr. Chief Justice
behalf of the Government. In this case, although the Provincial Fiscal of Concepcion in People vs. Casiano, had stressed this as the proper procedure,
Agusan, filed a “Motion for Extension of Time to Perfect Appeal” on April 1, pointing out that ‘the absence of such investigation did not impair the validity
1966, he had nevertheless abandoned the same. Neither did he take steps for of the information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the
the reconsideration of respondent Trial Judge’s Order of April 23, 1966 jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the present case.’“
dismissing the appeal. The inaction of the Fiscal may be deemed to have been
an admission on his part of the unmeritoriousness of an appeal. As in criminal 5. As a matter of fact, Habeas Corpus was not the proper remedy for the
proceedings, his sound discretion on the matter should be deemed controlling, Accused. In a case where a warrant of arrest was assailed for an alleged
and it has to be held that the Offended Parties were bereft of personality to improper preliminary examination, this Court, in Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA, 310,
prosecute the appeal. 323 cranad(1968), said:

Noteworthy is the fact that in the instant case, the Offended Parties had alleged “At any rate, we believe that, if at all, the remedy available to the petitioner
in their Answer 11 that they were not detaining the Accused and had nothing herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a
to do with the Warrant of Arrest issued against him. With all the more reason writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition
then that they had no personality to interpose an appeal from a judicial Order for reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the
granting the Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordering the release of a person Provincial Fiscal.”
detained. It is the general rule that Habeas Corpus should not be resorted to when there
4. It has been noted that the ORDER contains a provision enjoining the is another remedy available.
prosecution of the Accused in the Criminal Case. That is error. If the Accused “As a general rule, a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where relief may
was illegally detained because he was arrested without a preliminary be had or could have been procured by resort to another general remedy, such
examination, what should have been done was to set aside the warrant of as appeal or writ of error. But the existence of another remedy does not
arrest and order the discharge of the Accused, but without enjoining the necessarily preclude a resort to the writ of habeas corpus to obtain relief from
Municipal Judge from conducting a preliminary examination and afterwards illegal detention, especially where the other remedy is deemed not to be as
properly issuing a warrant of arrest. Habeas Corpus proceedings are not effective as that of habeas corpus.” 12
meant to determine criminal responsibility. This principle was enunciated in
Lee Ching v. Collector of Customs, 33 Phil. 329 cranad(1916) where it was Time and again, it has been explained that Habeas Corpus cannot function as
said: a writ of error. 13

“Proceedings in habeas corpus are separate and distinct from the main case 6. It has further been noted that respondent Trial Judge erred in adjudging
from which the proceedings spring. They rarely, if ever, touch the merits of the “costs” against defendants in the Habeas Corpus case. “When a person
case and require no pronouncement with respect thereto.” confined under color of proceedings in a criminal case is discharged, the costs
shall be taxed against the Republic” 14
7. The Accused was charged with Robbery with Less Serious Physical Injuries
in early 1966. Through the error of the Municipal Judge in issuing the warrant
of arrest without conducting a preliminary examination, the Accused was able
to institute the Habeas Corpus case which has pended to this date, or for
fifteen years. The error of the Municipal Judge has considerably retarded the
turning of the wheels of justice. It should be meet to reiterate the following
admonition made in the aforecited Luna-Plaza case:

“We wish to stress, however, that what has been stated in this opinion is
certainly not intended to sanction the return to the former practice of municipal
judges of simply relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to
accompany the complaints that are filed before them, in determining whether
there is a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. That practice
is precisely what is sought to be voided by the amendment of Section
87 cranad(c) of Republic Act 296 cranad(Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires
that before a municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy
himself that there is a probable cause by examining the witnesses personally,
and that the examination must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form
of searching questions and answers. It is obvious that the purpose of this
amendment is to prevent the issuance of a warrant of arrest against a person
based simply upon affidavits of witnesses who made, and swore to, their
statements before a person or persons other than the judge before whom the
criminal complaint is filed. We wish to emphasize strict compliance by
municipal or city judges of the provision of Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of
1948, as amended by Republic Act 3828, in order to avoid malicious and/or
unfounded criminal prosecution of persons.”

In view of the foregoing considerations, it should be practical to resolve this

case in a manner that will not further protract the matter brought to this
instance. It will not do merely to reverse and set aside the appealed decision
of the Appellate Tribunal, for it will leave the ORDER of respondent Trial Judge
outstanding with its injunction against the further prosecution of the Criminal
Case.

WHEREFORE, in the distinct understanding that this Court has not acted in a
proper Habeas Corpus proceeding, the Warrant of Arrest issued against
Reynaldo Mosquito in Criminal Case No. 458 of the Municipal Court of
Bayugan, Agusan, the Order of March 26, 1966 issued in Civil Case No. 1088
of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, as well as the Decision of the Court
of Appeals in its case CA-G.R. No. 37781-R, are hereby set aside; and the
proceedings in the last two cases mentioned are invalidated.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.\\\\\\\\\\\
G.R. No. L-61016 April 26, 1983 such plea, this Court in a resolution en banc dated July 22, 1982 ordered
the City Fiscal of Quezon City to conduct such reinvestigation and at the
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF HORACIO same time appointed him "to act as commissioner of this Court and
R. MORALES, JR., petitioner, receive evidence of the charges made by petitioners before this Court of
vs. alleged torture and violation of their constitutional rights, particularly the
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. right to counsel." On September 28, 1982, the City Fiscal submitted his
GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents. report on the reinvestigation affirming the existence of a prima
G.R. No. L-61107 April 26, 1983 facie case for rebellion against petitioners and several others. And on
February 8, 1983 he submitted to this Court the transcript of the notes
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ANTONIO taken at the reception of the evidence on the charges of petitioners.
C. MONCUPA, JR. ANTONIO C. MONCUPA, JR., petitioner,
vs. 4. If petitioners had been arrested in a communist country, they would
MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER and COL. have no rights to speak of. However, the Philippines is a republican state.
GALILEO KINTANAR, respondents. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them. 1 We have a Constitution framed by a constitutional
Lorenzo M. Tañada, Augusto Sanchez, Jejomar Binay and Antonio convention and duly ratified by the people. We subscribe to the rule of law. We
Quintos for petitioners. believe in human rights and we protect and defend them. Petitioners are
entitled to the full enjoyment of all the rights granted to them by law. And this
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Court stands as the guarantor of those rights.

5. Our Constitution provides:

CONCEPCION, JR., J.:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
1. The petitions are without merit and are hereby DISMISSED. person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force,
2. Petitioners were arrested on April 21, 1982 at about 9:45 a.m. while violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
they were riding together in a motor vehicle on Laong-Laan Street, shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section
Quezon City, by elements of Task Force Makabansa of the Armed Forces shall be inadmissible in evidence. 2
of the Philippines. Since their arrest, they have been under detention.
Petitioner Morales filed his petition for habeas corpus with this Court on 6. After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a
July 9, 1982, while petitioner Moncupa filed his on July 19, 1982. On July confrontation arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is
20, 1982 petitioners, together with several others, were charged with brought to an army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and
rebellion (Art. 134, Revised Penal Code) before the Court of First Instance cross-examined not only by one but as many investigators as may be
of Rizal in Criminal Case No. Q-21091 filed by the City Fiscal of Quezon necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself in a strange and un
City. The trial of the case has yet to be terminated. The continued familiar surrounding, and every person he meets he considers hostile to him.
detention of petitioners to answer for the offense charged is therefore The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all
legal. the methods and means that experience and study has taught them to extract
the truth, or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are
3. Petitioners allege that they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; unlettered and are not aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they
that their constitutional rights were violated, among them the right to were, the intimidating and coercive presence of the officers of the law in such
counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial, an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence. Section 20 of the Bill of Rights
and the right to bail. They also air the charge that they were subjected to seeks to remedy this imbalance.
maltreatment and torture; that they did not have the opportunity to
present their defense before the inquest fiscal and therefore asked this 7. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer
Court to order the reinvestigation of the charges against them. Acting on to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent 13. An arrest may also be made without a warrant.
and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against
him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant — When lawful.— A peace officer or a private
a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means-by telephone person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility of the (a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation is about to commit an offense in his presence;
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon (b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable
petition either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it;
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
be inadmissible in evidence.
from one confinement to another.7
8. During the period of his detention, he shall have the right to confer with his
14. Care should be exercised in making an arrest without a warrant. Where
counsel at any hour of the day or, in urgent cases, of the night, alone and
there is no justification for the arrest, the public officer could be criminally liable
privately, in the jail or any other place of custody. 3
for arbitrary detention8 or unlawful arrest 9 or for some other offense.
Arrest.
15. The petitioners claim they were arrested without a warrant. The
9. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be Memorandum to the President dated April 21, 1982 from Gen. Fabian C. Ver,
forthcoming to answer for the commission of an offense.4 Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, wherein he reported the
arrest of petitioners, the subversive documents seized from them and the
10. An arrest may be made with or without a warrant. results of the ensuing tactical interrogation, with a recommendation for the
SEC. 3. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, issuance of a Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order, was approved by
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature the President only on April 23, 1982. Indeed, therefore, petitioners were
and for any purpose shall not be violated, and no search warrant or warrant of arrested without a warrant. However, months before their arrest, petitioners
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, were already under surveillance on suspicion of committing rebellion. From the
or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after results of the said surveillance, the evidence then at hand, and the documents
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he seized from them at the time of their arrest, it would appear that they had
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the committed or were actually committing the offense of rebellion. Their arrest
persons or things to be seized. 5 without a warrant for the said offense is therefore clearly justified.

11. Our Constitution clearly defines the persons who may issue a warrant of Procedure after Arrest.
arrest and limits them to a "judge, or such other responsible officer as may be 16. After a person is arrested either without a warrant or by virtue of a warrant
authorized by law." It also lays down in unmistakable terms the procedure of arrest issued by a judge or by virtue of a Presidential Arrest and
required before a search warrant or warrant of arrest may issue. Commitment Order, the proper complaint or information against him must be
12. A Presidential Arrest and Commitment Order is a warrant of arrest issued filed with the courts of justice within the time prescribed by law, to wit:
by the President of the Philippines. 6 Its issuance must therefore comply with FURTHER AMENDING ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AS
the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to the same AMENDED (PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1404)
extent, as a warrant of arrest issued by a judge issuance must therefore
comply with the requirements of the Constitution, in the same manner and to WHEREAS, the periods within which arrested persons shall be delivered to
the same extent, as a warrant of arrest by a judge. the judicial authorities as provided in Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, are on occasions inadequate to enable the government to file
within the said periods the criminal information against persons arrested for of persons arrested for any of the abovementioned offenses against public
certain crimes against national security and public order. order shall continue to be governed by the provisions of General Orders No.
2, dated September 22, 1972 as amended by General Order Nos. 60 and 62,
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Republic dated September 24, 1977 and October 22, 1977, respectively.
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution,
and in the interest of national security as well as public safety and order, do SEC 4. This decree shall take effect immediately.
hereby decree and order as part of the law of the land the following
amendment to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended: Done in the City of Manila this 9th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen
hundred and seventy-eight."
SECTION 1. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows: 17. Failure of the public officer to do so without any valid reason would
constitute a violation of Art. 125, Revised Penal Code, as amended. And the
ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons. -The penalties provided person detained would be entitled to be released on a writ of habeas
in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or corpus, unless he is detained under subsisting process issued by a competent
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to court.10
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: six
hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; Power of the Courts.
nine hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their 18. The writ of habeas corpus has often been referred to as the great writ of
equivalent; and eighteen hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive liberty. It is the most expeditious way of securing the release of one who has
or capital penalties, or their equivalent; Provided, however, That the President been illegally detained. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
may, in the interest of national security and public order, authorize by suspended, but not the writ itself.
Executive Order longer periods, which in no case shall exceed 30 days, or for
as long as the conspiracy to commit the crime against national security and 19. The Bill of Rights provides:
public order continues or is being implemented, for the delivery of persons
SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
arrested for crimes or offenses against public order as defined in Title III, Book
due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
11 of this Code, namely: Articles 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146
laws.
and 147, and for acts in violation of Republic Act No. 1700 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 885, taking into consideration the gravity of the 20. In Lansang vs.Garcia, 42 SCRA 448,473,We said:
offense or offenses, the number of persons arrested, the threat to national
security or to public safety and order, and/or the occurrence of a public In our resolution of October 5, 1972, We stated that 'a majority of the court
calamity or other emergency situation preventing the early investigation of the 'had 'tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy
cases and the filing of the corresponding information before the civil courts. itself of the existence of the factual bases for the issuance of Presidential
Proclamations Nos. 889 and 889A ... and thus determine the constitutional
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his sufficiency of such bases in the light of the requirements of Article III, sec. 1,
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer par. 14, and Article VII, sec. 10, par. 2, of the Philippine Constitution ...' Upon
at any time with his attorney or counsel, and to be visited by his immediate further deliberation, the members of the Court are now unanimous in the
relatives. conviction that it has the authority to inquire into the existence of said factual
bases in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof.
SEC. 2. All acts, executive order, proclamations, Presidential Decrees,
General Orders, Letters of Instruction, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, 21. We reiterate this doctrine.
inconsistent with the provisions of this decree are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly. 22. Furthermore, We hold that under the judicial power of review and by
constitutional mandate, in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire
SEC. 3. Transitory provision.-Pending the preparation and promulgation by the into every phase and aspect of petitioner's detention from the moment
President of the Executive Order referred to in Section 1 hereof, the detention petitioner was taken into custody up to the moment the court passes upon the
merits of the petition. Only after such a scrutiny can the court satisfy itself that 27. Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the
the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied. privilege of the writ of habeas corpus remains suspended "with respect to
persons at present detained as well as other who may hereafter be similarly
23. The submission that a person may be detained indefinitely without any detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
charges and the courts cannot inquire into the legality of the restraint goes proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses
against the spirit and letter of the Constitution and does violence to the basic committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident
precepts of human rights and a democratic society. thereto, or in connection therewith," the natural consequence is that the right
The Right to Bail. to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses is also suspended.
To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore,
24. Next to life a man loves his freedom. Some men love their freedom even where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said
more than their life. offenses he has no right to bail even after the charges are filed in court.
25. In all criminal prosecutions the accused is presumed innocent. Because of 28. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such
this presumption and inasmuch as every man has a natural desire to be free, crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in
our Constitution laid down the right to bail in these words: connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State.
SEC. 18. All persons, except those charged with capital offenses when 29. Just as an individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered,
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient so does the State. The suspension of the privilege of the writ is to enable the
sureties. Excessive bail shall not be required. 11 State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending investigation and trial those
persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the State's very
26. Although martial law was terminated on January 17, 1981, by virtue of
existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail
Proclamation No. 2045 of the President of the Philippines, the privilege of the
must also be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses.
writ of habeas corpus continues to be suspended in the two autonomous
regions in Mindanao and in all other places with respect to certain offenses, 30. However, there is a difference between preventive and punitive
thus: imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such charges
already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President/Prime Minister
becomes punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom.
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do
hereby revoke Proclamation No. 1081 (Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in The Charges of Torture.
the Philippines) and Proclamation No. 1104 (Declaring the Continuation of
Martial Law) and proclaim the termination of the state of martial law throughout 31. When petitioners charged in their petitions that they had been tortured and
the Philippines; Provided, that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines maltreated, the Court decided to appoint the City Fiscal of Quezon City to hear
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion the charges and to receive the evidence. Not because We are an investigating
shall continue to be in force and effect; and Provided that in the two body. Nor are We a trier of facts. But because petitioners' charges are material
autonomous regions in Mindanao, upon the request of the residents therein, and relevant to the petitions before Us.
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall continue; and 32. As mentioned earlier, the Court Commissioner submitted the transcript of
in all other places the suspension of the privilege of the writ shall also continue the proceedings held before him. We will not pass upon the merits of the
with respect to persons at present detained as well as others who may torture charges. However, they should be filed before the body which has
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, jurisdiction over them as provided for in Presidential Decrees Nos. 1822, 1822-
subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other A and 1850.
crimes and offenses committed by them in furtherance of or on the occasion
therefore, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith. ... (Presidential 33. The present form of our government, to all intents and purposes, merged
Proclamation No. 2045). the executive and legislative branches into one. Members of parliament are at
the same time cabinet ministers. Under the system of checks and balances
ordained by the Constitution, the judiciary serves as the check and balance to
the merged executive and legislative branches. The judiciary is therefore 40. It is undeniable that throughout the length and breadth of our land,
called upon to express its thoughts on areas outside the traditional and narrow lawlessness and disorder have increased and continue to increase to
confines of decision making, with the end in view that together we may explore undesirable proportions. It is wishful thinking to believe otherwise. An efforts
the free market of Ideas and arrive at what is best for our country and our must be exerted now to reverse the trend. We cannot afford any delay. And
people. we should begin by bringing to the bar of justice the culprits in particular who
burned and destroyed public property, and attacked, kidnapped and killed
34. Our people cry out for a better life. They want more food in their stomachs, public functionaries. For the questions may validly be asked: If the government
roofs over their heads, health services for themselves and their families, cannot protect public property, how can it protect private property? If the
education for their children, and other necessities that make life worth living. government cannot guarantee the safety and lives of its officials, how can it
They cannot be denied. They want it and they want it now. Timely indeed are guarantee the safety and lives of private individuals?
the thrusts of the KKK and the BLISS programs.
41. The investigation and prosecution of cases should be further improved so
35. However, we cannot lead them to a truly better life, unless we achieve that only meritorious cases shall reach the courts, thus contributing to the
complete peace in our land; and we cannot have complete peace unless we unclogging of court dockets. Many criminal cases initiated by complainants are
improve the administration of justice. just harassment suits and should never have been filed in court. In the process,
36. It was a wise man who once said: "Tell me how a country's poor receive it is required that all fiscals be appointed in a permanent capacity. Their
their justice and I will tell you how stable its government is." 12 security of tenure is the foundation stone of their independence. Our penal
system should be further updated to make more effective the rehabilitation of
37. Whenever we speak of the administration of justice we refer to four criminals. Let us do away with instances of first offenders who serve sentence
principal areas: the preservation of peace and order which is the primary task in order to be reformed but who come out instead as hardened criminals.
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National Integrated Police, both
under the Ministry of Defense; the investigation and prosecution of offenses 42. And with the judicial revamp just effected under B.P. 129, the trial and
and the administration of our penal system which are under the Ministry of decision making process has been modified and vastly improved to achieve
Justice; the application and interpretation of laws and the trial and adjudication better results. But it must be remembered that courts which are not filled are
of cases which fall under the jurisdiction of the courts; and appearance as as good as no courts at all. Therefore, more appointments to the existing
counsel for the government particularly in appealed criminal cases and as vacancies should be made.
counsel for the Commission on Elections, Securities and Exchange 43. One lesson our people have learned-painfully but well-is that politics and
Commission, and others, which is the responsibility of the Office of the Solicitor a good administration of justice-like oil and water-do not mix; that when politics
General. In everyone of these areas much can be done to achieve our ultimate infiltrates the administration of justice, injustice is often the outcome. In some
goal-that in this fair land of ours, no man, no matter how humble, no matter jurisdictions of the United States, there are sheriffs (peace officers) and district
how poor shall thirst for justice. attorneys (prosecutors) who are elected by the voters and who run for office
38. Our machinery of justice should be geared towards helping and protecting as the candidates of a political party. In the Philippines such a system would
the poor among us. Not knowing their rights, not having the means to pay for never work because in our culture we have values peculiarly our own-value
the services of a lawyer, possessing no influence whatsoever, they are like "utang na loob", "compadre", "pakikisama", "tayu-tayo", "bigayan", "bata
invariably the victims of injustice. The affluent can take care of themselves. ko", "amo ko", and the "god- father mentality". Values like these have derailed
They are better aware of their rights, they have influence, and they can engage and may derail the administration of justice. Political followers commit abuses
the services of the best counsel. But the poor can only pray to God and hope in the belief that come what may their political bosses would shield them from
to find relief in the system of justice established by their government. punishment. Can you imagine how criminal cases would be investigated and
prosecuted if fiscals (prosecutors) were chosen by election? How would our
39. We must open all avenues for complaints and keep them open so that the laws be enforced if policemen and members of the Armed Forces were elected
grievance procedure may be made more readily available to the masses of our by the people? And yet the heads of the Ministries of Justice and Defense and
people. Only by knowing their needs can we give them what they rightfully the Office of the Solicitor General are all active politicians.
deserve.
44. The burdens of office fall heavily on their shoulders. Perhaps it is time we 50. While the government should continue to repel the communists, the
relieve them of the additional burdens that being politicians entail. Our subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with all the means at its command, it
Constitution foresaw the need for heads of ministries who are not active should always be remembered that whatever action is taken must always be
politicians in providing that ". . . . At least a majority of the Members of the within the framework of our Constitution and our laws.
Cabinet who are heads of ministries shall come from the Regional
Representations of the Batasang Pambansa. . . ." 13 51. When the judgment of history is written, as leaders of our people, we shall
be asked to account not only for what we did, not only for what we did not do,
45. The campaign against venality in office-malfeasance, misfeasance and but also for what visions we have today of our tomorrow.
nonfesance should be pursued with renewed vigor. For graft and corruption
are like termites gnawing away the foundation of government. The harm done 52. What will be our answer?
is sometimes not realized; or even if realized, under- estimated. In the process 53. WHEREFORE, as aforestated, the petitions should be, as they are hereby,
let us remember to stress preventive measures to save public property from DISMISSED. With costs against the petitioners.
loss.
54. SO ORDERED.
46. The communist threat remains a nagging problem of government. Whether
Marxist, Maoist, Leninist, aided by the New People's Army, rebels, radicals,
and lawless elements, they all have but one aim-one single purpose-one
defined objective: to bring down by violence the Government of the Republic
of the Philippines and to forcibly seize political power in order that they may
replace our existing political, social, economic, and legal order with an entirely
new one based on communism.

47. Once before, in the early fifties, communists threatened the established
order. They were driven back by the Armed Forces, mainly because of the
support of our people. We must keep, strengthen and solidify the sympathy,
faith, loyalty, and trust in the government of our brothers in the rural areas.
Guns and bullets alone will not do it. We can accomplish this only by giving
them better government. It is a condition sine qua non to achieve success in
the fight against subversion.

48. By and large, the Armed Forces are composed of good and disciplined
men. However, there are those who are not worthy of the uniforms they wear.
Not a few have enriched themselves by abusing the powers of their position.
Some are involved in extortion, smuggling, and kidnapping for ransom. There
are others who maintain gambling, drug rings, and prostitution dens. And still
others have committed robbery, rape, murder, and other offenses. The
campaign to rid the organization of such misfits should be carried out with
missionary zeal. For indeed victims of abuse are often alienated from the
government.

49. The Filipinos are a God-loving and a God-fearing people. We believe in

peace and freedom. We believe in the family and its strong ties. We can never
willingly accept communism and what it stands for.
G.R. No. 134503 July 2, 1999 authority within thirty-six (36) hours from September 7, 1997."5 Private
respondents did not act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner.6
JASPER AGBAY, petitioner,
vs. On September 12; 1997, the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro
THE HONORABLE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY, SPO4 Cebu issued an order, denominated as "Detention During the Pendency of the
NEMESIO NATIVIDAD, JR. and SPO2 ELEAZAR M. Case", committing petitioner to the jail warden of Cebu City.7 Five (5) days
SOLOMON, respondent. later, or on September 17, 1997, petitioner was ordered released by the said
court after he had posted bond.8

On September 26, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: detained persons against herein private respondents SPO4 Nemesio
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolution of the Deputy Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M. Salomon and other unidentified police officers
Ombudsman for the Military dated 19 January 19981 which recommended the stationed at the Liloan Police Substation, before the Office of the Deputy
dismissal of the criminal complaint filed by petitioner against herein private Ombudsman for the Visayas.9
respondents for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code for delay in Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A. 7610, it is alleged by petitioner
the delivery of detained persons, and the Order of April 13, 19982 which denied that on November 10, 1997, the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a
his motion for reconsideration. resolution containing the following dispositive portion:
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows: WHEREFORE, finding probable cause for the crime in Violation of Republic
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, Act 7610, it is hereby recommended that an INFORMATION be filed against
was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an the two aforenamed accused.
alleged violation of R.A. 7610, the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Forward the record of this case to the Provincial Fiscal's Office for appropriate
abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."3 The following day, or on action.10
September 8, 1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against
petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1995, dated 10 October
Metro Cebu by one Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter Gayle 4 . 1995 of the Office of the Ombudsman,11 the case for delay in delivery filed by
The complaint, insofar as pertinent, reads as follows: petitioner against herein private respondents before the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military for
That on the 7th day of September 1997 at Sitio Bonbon, Brgy. Catarman, its proper disposition. Thus, it was this office which acted on the complaint,
Liloan, Metro Cebu, Philippines and within the Preliminary Jurisdiction of this now denominated as OMB-VIS-CRIM-97-0786, and which issued the
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, questioned Resolution dated January 19, 1998 recommending its dismissal
feloniously and unlawfully, conspiring, confederating, helping with one another, against herein private respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of
while accused JASPER AGBAY manipulating to finger the vagina of GAYLE this Resolution but this motion was denied in an Order dated April 13, 1998.
FATIMA AMIGABLE GICAYARA, his companion block the sight of the Private
Complainant, Mrs. JOAN A. GICAYARA, while on board a tricycle going their Hence, this petition for certiorari.
destinations. Upon initial investigation of the Bgy, Captain of Bgy. Catarman,
accused SHERWIN JUGALBOT was released and accused JASPER AGBAY The grounds relied upon in the present petition12 are as follows:
is presently detain Liloan Police Station Jail. Medical Certificate issued from I.
Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, Cebu City is hereto attached.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of RELYING ON MEMORANDUM CIRCULAR NO. 14, SERIES OF 1995,
Liloan demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering that the DATED 10 OCTOBER 1995, OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN IN
latter had "failed to deliver the detained Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial HOLDING THAT IT HAS COMPETENCE TO ACT ON THE ABOVE-
ENTITLED CASE BEFORE IT, THE SAID CIRCULAR BEING There is no dispute as to the civilian character of our police force. The 1987
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL, HENCE, NULL AND VOID. Constitution, in Section 6, Article XVI, has mandated the establishment of "one
police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian character (emphasis
II. supplied)." Likewise, R.A. 697513 is categorical in describing the civilian
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT character of the police force.14 The only question now is whether
HOLDING THAT IT IS BEYOND ITS COMPENCE TO DETERMINE Memorandum Circular No. 14, in vesting the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
WHETHER OR NOT THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT OF LILOAN- for the Military with jurisdiction to investigate complaints against members of
COMPOSTELA HAS IN FACT NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE CASE FILED the PNP, violates the latter's civilian character.
AGAINST HEREIN PETITIONER. As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment dated 7
III. December 199815, the issue as to whether the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military has the authority to investigate civilian personnel of the government
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT was resolved in the affirmative in the case of Acop v. Office of the
HOLDING THAT THE MCTC, WHILE HAVING AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT Ombudsman.16 In that case, the petitioners, who were members of the
A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, IS NOT THE "PROPER JUDICIAL Philippine National Police questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy
AUTHORITY " CONTEMPLATED IN ARTICLE 125 OF THE REVISED PENAL Ombudsman to investigate the alleged shootout of certain suspected
CODE AND, HENCE, THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT BEFORE IT FOR members of the "Kuratong Baleleng" robbery gang; this Court held that:
THE PURPOSE OF CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION DID
NOT INTERRUPT THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED BY ART. 125. The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield
conclusive evidence that such deputy is prohibited from performing other
IV. functions or duties affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a review
of the relevant Constitutional provisions reveal otherwise.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
HOLIDING THAT THE ISSUE OF THE VALIDITY OF THE ORDER OF As previously established, the Ombudsman "may exercise such other powers
DETENTION IS IRRELEVANT TO THE ISSUE OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF or perform such functions or duties" as Congress may prescribe through
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED legisiation. Therefore, nothing can prevent Congress from giving the
PERSONS. Ombudsman supervision and control over the Ombudsman's deputies, one
being the deputy for the military establishment. In this light, Section 11 of R.A.
V.
No. 6770 provides:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
Sec. 11. Structural Organization. — The authority and responsibility for the
HOLDING THAT THE DUTY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO FILE THE
exercise of the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge
NECESSARY COMPLAINT IN COURT WAS FULFILLED WHEN THEY
of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have
FILED A FORMAL COMPLAINT ON 8 SEPTEMBER 1997 WITH THE 7TH
supervision and control of the said Office.
MCTC OF LILOAN-COMPOSTELA.
While Section 31 thereof declares:
On the first issue, petitioner argues that due to the civilian character of the
Philippine National Police, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, Sec. 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman
by virtue of the description of the Office, has no competence or jurisdiction to may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal,
act on his complaint against private respondents who are members of the PNP. state prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.
Petitioner also questions the constitutionality of Memorandum Circular No. 14 Those designated or deputized to assist him herein shall be under his
insofar as it purports to vest the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Military supervision and control.
Affairs with jurisdiction to investigate all cases against personnel of the
Philippine National Police.1âwphi1.nêt Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military
personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. In these cases at
bench, therefore, no irregularity attended the referral by the Acting
Ombudsman of the Kurutong Baleleng case to respondent Casaclang who, in It must be borne in mind that the Office of the Ombudsman was envisioned by
turn, created a panel of investigators.17 the framers of the 1987 Constitution as the "eyes and ears of the people"21 and
"a champion of the citizen.22" Sec. 12, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution
The cited case is determinative of the issue. However, petitioner, in his Reply describes the Ombudsman and his deputies as "protectors of the people."
to Comment dated February 1, 1999, argues that the ruling in the Acop case Thus, first and foremost, the Ombudsman and his deputies, including the
is not on all fours with the case at bar18. Petitioner states that the doctrine laid Deputy Ombudsman for the Military owe their allegiance to the people and
down in the said case is simply that "the Ombudsman may refer cases ordinary citizens, it is clearly not a part of the military. We fail to see how the
involving non-military personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military assumption of jurisdiction by the said office over the investigation of cases
Affairs. This doctrine, petitioner argues, "applies only to isolated or individual involving the PNP would detract from or violate the civilian character of the
cases involving non-military personnel referred by the Ombudsman to the police force when precisely the Office of the Ombudsman is a civilian office.
Deputy for Military Affairs" and does not apply when, as in this case, there is a
wholesale or indiscriminate referral of such cases to the Deputy Ombudsman The other issues raised by petitioner concerns the application of Art. 125 of
for Military Affairs in the form of an Office Memorandum Circular. the Revised Penal Code which provides as follows:

Petitioner's arguments do not convince as there is no basis for the distinction. Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities. — The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be
There is no basis in the above-cited decision to limit the referral of cases imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
involving non-military personnel to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person for the proper judicial
to isolated or individual cases. The Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
Memorandum Circular No. 15, is simply exercising the power vested in the punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for
Ombudsman "to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent;
any fiscal, state prosecutor or the or lawyer in the government service to act and thirty-six hours (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive
as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
prosecution of certain cases." This Court, absent any grave abuse of discretion,
may not enterfere with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his power of In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
supervision and control over the said Office. detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer
at any time with his attorney or counsel.
Petitioner further argues that Memorandum Circular No. 14 violates the clear
intent and policy of the Constitution and of R.A. 6975 to maintain the civilian In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police
character of the police force and "would render nugatory and meaningless the Station on 7 September 1997 for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, specifically
distinction between cases involving civilian and military personnel and the section 5 (b) thereof23. This crime carries a penalty of reclusion temporal in its
creation of separate divisions of the Ombudsman."19 medium period to reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty. Under these
circumstances, a criminal complaint or information should be filed with the
Said contentions are misplaced. proper judicial authorities within thirty six (36) hours of his arrest.
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, despite his designation as such, is As borne by the records before us the mother of private complainant, Joan
by no means a member of the military establishment. The said Office was Gicaraya, filed a complaint on 8 September 1997 against petitioner for
established "to extend the Office of the Ombudsman to the military violation of R.A. 7610 before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan,
establishment just as it champions the common people against bureaucratic Metro Cebu.
indifference". The Office was intended to help the "ordinary foot soldiers" to
obtain redress for their grievances against higher authorities and the drafters Petitioner contends that the act of private complainant in filing the complaint
of the Constitution were aware that the creation of the Office, which is before the MCTC was for purposes of preliminary investigation as the MCTC
seemingly independent of the President, to perform functions which has no jurisdiction to try the offense. This act of private complainant petitioner
constitutionally should be performed by the President, might be in derogation argues, was unnecessary, a surplusage which did not interrupt the period
of the powers of the President as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces20. prescribed by Art. 12524 considering that under the Rules it is the Regional
Trial Court which has jurisdiction to try the case against him. As such, upon of Manila, 80 Phil. 862, that the city fiscal is not the proper judicial authority
the lapse of the thirty-six hours given to the arresting officers to effect his referred to in Art. 125 is applicable.
delivery to the proper Regional Trial Court, private respondents were already
guilty of violating Art. 125. Thus, petitioner argues, when the Judge-Designate Petitioner's reliance on the cited cases is misplaced. The cited cases of
of the 7th MCTC issued a Commitment Order on September 12, 1997, he was Sangguniang Bayan and Castillo dealt with the issue of whether or not the
acting contrary to law since by then there was no basis for the continued findings of the Municipal Court Judge in a preliminary investigation are subject
detention of petitioner.25 to review by provincial and city fiscals. There was no pronoucement in these
cases as to whether or not a municipal trial court, in the exercise of its power
In addressing the issue, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military to conduct preliminary investigations, is a proper judicial authority as
in its 13 April 1998 Order, stated that the duty of filing the corresponding contemplated by Art. 125.
complaint in court was "fulfille by respondent when the formal complaint was
filed on September 8, 1997 with the 7th MCTC of Liloan-Compostela, barely Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine enunciated in Sayo vs. Chief of
20 hours after the arrest of herein complainant of September 7, 1997." 26 The Police, supra, since the facts of this case are different. In Sayo, the
Solicitor General, for his part, argues that while a municipal court judge may complainant was filed with the city fiscal of Manila who could not issue an order
conduct preliminary investigations as an exception to his normal judicial duties, of release or commitment while in the instant case, the complaint was filed with
he still retains the authority to issue an order of release or commitment. As a judge who had the power to issue such an order. Furthermore, in the
such, upon the filing of the complaint with the MCTC, there was already Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Sayo case 31, this
compliance with the very purpose and intent of Art. 12527. Court even made a pronouncement that the delivery of a detained person "is
a legal one and consists in making a charge or filing a complaint against the
The core issue is whether the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial prisoner with the proper justice of the peace or judge of Court of First Instance
Court constitutes to a "proper judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 in provinces, and in filing by the city fiscal of an information with the
of the Revised Penal Code. corresponding city courts after an investigation if the evidence against said
person warrants."
Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting
from confining a person without informing him of his offense and without The power to order the release or confinement of an accused is determinative
permitting him to go on bail28. More specifically, it punishes public officials or of the issue. In contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court
employees who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct preliminary
deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the periods investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment 32.
prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the
upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such intent behind art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained
detainee having been delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities 29. person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application
with the court, he may be released on bail33. Petitioner himself acknowledged
The words "judicial authority" as contemplated by Art. 125 mean "the courts of this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was
justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the granted his release upon posting bail34. Thus, the very purpose underlying
temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC.
committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other such inferior We agree with the postion of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint
courts as may be established by law.30" with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that when a municipal trial court judge, Finally, we note that it was the mother of private complainant who filed the
as in the instant case, conducts a preliminary investigation, he is not acting as complaint against petitioner with the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu. If tere
a judge but as a fiscal. In support, petitioner cites the cases of Sangguniang was any error in this procedure, private respondents should not be held liable.
Bayan ng Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Albano, 260 SCRA 561, and Castillo vs. In the same manner, petitioner's argument that the controversial orders issued
Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39, where it was held that "when a preliminary investigation by the MCTC are contrary' to law does not give rise to criminal liability on the
is conducted by a judge, he performs a non-judicial function as an exception part of the respondents. Respondent police officers may have rendered
to his usual duties." Thus, petitioner opines, the ruling in Sayo v. Chief of Police
themselves open to sanctions if they had released petitioners without the order
of the court, knowing fully well that a complainant was a already filed with it.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the

assailed January 19, 1998 Resolution and the April 13, 1998 Order of the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, the Court resolves to
DISMISS the petition. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. P-01-1472 June 26, 2003 Having no other recourse to regain his liberty, the accused filed a petition for
habeas corpus on March 15, 1999, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
ADRIANO V. ALBIOR, Complainant, Branch 52. During the habeas corpus proceedings,8 the respondent testified
vs. that this was not the first time he issued a detention order without a warrant of
DONATO A. AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court arrest. He testified that he has done this action "many times already" 9 in the
(MCTC), Talibon-Getafe, Bohol, Respondent. past, upon the request of the Chief of Police of the Philippine National Police
RESOLUTION in Talibon. He reasoned out that it was in the best interest of the detainees to
be transferred from the PNP jail to the BJMP because the former did not have
PER CURIAM: meal provisions for detainees.
Respondent Donato Auguis, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Circuit Trial After due hearing, the RTC Judge Zeta V. Villamayor issued an order 10 on
Court, Branch 4, Talibon-Getafe1 , Talibon, Bohol, is charged by Adriano Albior, March 25, 1999, finding that the accused was being illegally restrained of his
of usurpation of judicial function and negligence in the performance of official liberty and ordering his immediate release from confinement. On the same day,
duties. According to complainant, respondent usurped judicial functions when the MCTC conducted a preliminary examination of the prosecution’s witnesses
he issued the order for the detention of one Edilberto Albior, the son of and issued an Omnibus Order11 confirming the arrest of the accused.
complainant. Further, complainant alleged that respondent committed
negligence when he failed to inform Acting Presiding Judge Avelino N. On April 12, 1999, counsel for the accused filed a motion for
Puracan of that court regarding the filing of cases that necessitated issuance reinvestigation12 with the Department of Justice, assailing the validity of the
of the detention order. Omnibus Order. He maintained that no warrant of arrest was ever issued
against his client and as such, no confirmation of such arrest may be
The antecedent facts of this administrative matter are as follows: undertaken.
On January 25, 1999, two complaints for rape2 were filed against Edilberto On June 2, 1999, the father of the accused, herein complainant Adriano Albior,
Albior before the MCTC, Branch 4 in Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol. As clerk filed a letter-complaint13 with the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.
of court of the said court, respondent Auguis received and filed the complaints Complainant charged respondent of usurpation of judicial functions and
which were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9144 and 9145. The following negligence in the performance of duties, in connection with the detention of his
day, respondent issued a detention order3 to the Bureau of Jail Management son, Edilberto Albior.
and Penology (BJMP) in San Jose, Talibon, Bohol, for the commitment of the
accused Edilberto Albior. On January 27, 1999, the BJMP duly issued a receipt In a resolution dated June 3, 1999,14 the Deputy Ombudsman referred the
of detainee4 for the person of the accused. letter-complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate
action. On May 8, 2000, the Ombudsman issued a resolution 15 dismissing the
According to complainant, said order was issued without a prior preliminary criminal complaint for usurpation of judicial function as defined under Article
investigation and without a warrant of arrest. Neither was there any record in 241 of the Revised Penal Code.16 However, he recommended the filing of an
the Police Blotter of the accused’s apprehension, or of his surrender. Nor was information with the proper court for violation of Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft
there proof that he signed a waiver for his detention. What’s more, the and Corrupt Practices Act.17
respondent failed to inform Acting Municipal Judge Avelino Puracan regarding
the filing of the complaints for rape before his sala. 5 Acting on the letter-complaint, the OCA required respondent to file a comment
to the complaint. Respondent filed his counter-affidavit.18 Respondent claims
On February 23, 1999, counsel for the accused then filed an urgent motion to that he issued the detention order only after the PNP Chief and PNP Trial
release the accused.6 Two days later, respondent issued a subpoena, Officer of Talibon repeatedly requested him to do so. The respondent asserts
directing the accused to submit counter-affidavits for the preliminary that it was out of honest conviction that he was only helping the accused and
investigation of the charges of rape. But no further action was taken by the his relatives. He was merely sparing them the trouble of having to bring meals
court. Accused through counsel filed a second motion7 on March 1, 1999. to the accused, as the municipal jail where the latter was detained did not serve
Again, the motion was not acted upon. food to its prisoners.
Respondent also appended the affidavit19 of Police Senior Inspector Lecarion Indeed nowhere in the Rules is the clerk of court authorized to issue an order
P. Torrefiel, the PNP Chief of Police of Talibon. In it the Police Chief stated of detention, as such function is purely judicial. In fact, we already had
that he personally requested the respondent to immediately issue a detention occasion to rule that a clerk of court, unlike a judicial authority, has no power
order in order to transfer the accused to the BJMP jail, where he is ensured of to order the commitment of a person charged with a penal offense.23
three square meals a day. The Chief explained that the municipality did not
have a budget for meals of detainees at the PNP jail, hence, it is alleged that The Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas aptly pointed out that where a judge
respondent’s action was intended purely for humanitarian reasons. Nothing is is not available, the arresting officer is duty-bound to release a detained person,
said, however, why the local government unit allows this inhumane practice. if the maximum hours for detention provided under Article 125 of the Revised
The Chief of Police himself appears blissfully ignorant of the human rights Penal Code had already expired. Failure to cause the release may result in an
aspects of the matter for which his command could be held accountable. offense under the Code, to wit:

On January 29, 2001, the OCA issued its report. 20 It found respondent’s ART. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
defense unconvincing and held him administratively liable for issuing the said authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding articles shall be
detention order prior to a preliminary investigation conducted by a judge and imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for
before a warrant of arrest was issued against the accused. It recommended some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
that the case be re-docketed as an administrative matter and that a fine in the authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses
amount of P3,000.00 be imposed upon respondent with a warning that the punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for
commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent;
severely. and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or
capital penalties, or their equivalent.
We then required the parties to manifest if they were willing to submit the case
for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed.21 The respondent subsequently Respondent might have been motivated by a sincere desire to help the
manifested his conformity.22 accused and his relatives. But as an officer of the court, he should be aware
that by issuing such detention order, he trampled upon a fundamental human
The main issue for our resolution is whether the respondent should be held right of the accused. Because of the unauthorized order issued by respondent,
administratively liable for the issuance of a detention order resulting in the the accused Edilberto Albior was deprived of liberty without due process of law
actual detention of the accused under the abovementioned circumstances. for a total of 56 days, counted from his unlawful detention on January 27, 1999
until the issuance of the appropriate order of commitment by the municipal
The OCA report stresses that respondent clerk of court is not empowered to judge on March 25, 1999.
issue the questioned detention order. The duties of a clerk of court in the
absence of the judge are defined under Section 5, Rule 136 of the Rules of Thus, the Court cannot condone nor take lightly the serious violation
Court: committed by the respondent. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution
mandates:
SEC. 5. Duties of the clerk in the absence or by direction of the judge. - In the
absence of the judge, the clerk may perform all the duties of the judge in No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
receiving applications, petitions, inventories, reports, and the issuance of all law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
orders and notices that follow as a matter of course under these rules, and (Underscoring ours)
may also, when directed so to do by the judge, receive the accounts of
executors, administrators, guardians, trustees, and receivers, and all evidence Once again, it bears emphasizing that the behavior of everyone connected
relating to them, or to the settlement of the estates of deceased persons, or to with an office charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge
guardianships, trusteeships, or receiverships, and forthwith transmit such to the clerk of lowest rank, should be circumscribed with a high degree of
reports, accounts, and evidence to the judge, together with his findings in responsibility.24 Their conduct at all times must not only be characterized by
relation to the same, if the judge shall direct him to make findings and include propriety and decorum, but above all else must be in accordance with the
the same in his report. Constitution and the law. A clerk of court, such as herein respondent, is a
ranking and essential officer in the judicial system. His office is the hub of
activities. He performs delicate administrative functions essential to the prompt In a previous case, we found the respondent guilty of grave misconduct for
and proper administration of justice.25 issuing a Release Order without the knowledge and signature of the Presiding
Judge concerned.30 In another, we ruled that the respondent was guilty
Respondent needs no reminder that as an important officer in the dispensation of grave misconduct warranting dismissal from the service when he issued a
of justice, one of his primary duties is to uphold the fundamental law of the warrant of arrest without any order coming from the court that caused the
land. His defense that he is not a lawyer or law graduate and so is excusably accused to be illegally confined for three (3) days.31 In both cases we held that
ignorant of the legal implications of his detention order, deserves scant though the respondents might have been moved by compassion and might
consideration. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith, have acted in good faith, the respondent’s actuations could not be condoned,
especially a clerk of court who ought to know better than an ordinary layman. for the committed acts constituted a serious infringement of, and
This Court has assiduously condemned any omission or act which tends to encroachment upon, judicial authority.
undermine the faith and trust of the people in the judiciary.26 The Court cannot In our view, the present case cannot be treated with leniency, especially in
countenance any act or omission on the part of all those involved in the light of the fact that respondent herein admitted he issued detention orders
administration of justice which would violate the norms of public accountability countless times in the past. In accordance with precedents and Civil Service
and diminish or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary. 27 Commission Memorandum Circular No. 19, series of 1999,32 the appropriate
The respondent’s issuance of the detention order not only deprived the penalty to be imposed on respondent is dismissal from the service.
accused of liberty, it also considerably diminished the people’s faith in the WHEREFORE, respondent DONATO AUGUIS, Clerk of Court II, MCTC,
judiciary. For the very officer of the court on whom they depended to safeguard Branch 4 at Talibon-Getafe, Talibon, Bohol, is hereby found administratively
their human and constitutional rights was also the one who violated these liable for issuing the assailed detention order without lawful authority, as well
rights. Respondent should be mindful of his ineluctable duty, as a ranking as failing to inform the Presiding Judge of that court regarding such order, thus
officer in the judicial system, to ensure that basic rights are protected. committing GRAVE MISCONDUCT in the discharge of official functions. He is
In conclusion, we agree with the findings of the OCA that respondent is liable hereby DISMISSED from the service, with FORFEITURE of all benefits and
as charged administratively. But we disagree with its recommendation that privileges, except earned leave credits if any, and with prejudice to
respondent be merely meted out the penalty of a fine. We cannot treat lightly reemployment in the government including government owned and controlled
the actions of the respondent for he has admitted doing them repeatedly, in corporations.
fact many times in the past. The implication of his action as an official of the SO ORDERED.
court is not only disturbing but shocking, for it involves no less than a violation
of the constitutional right to liberty. We hold that respondent’s unauthorized
issuance of the detention order and his failure to inform the Presiding Judge
about said order constitute not merely gross neglect of duty but outright grave
misconduct.

Misconduct is a violation of some established and definite rule of action, more

particularly unlawful behaviour as well as gross negligence by the public officer.
To warrant dismissal from the service, the misconduct must be serious,
important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. It must also have direct relation
to, and connected with the performance of official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect or failure to discharge the duties
of the office.28 Because of the order for the arrest of the accused and resultant
confinement in police custody, the respondent unduly usurped the judicial
prerogative of the judge, and such usurpation is equivalent to grave
misconduct.29
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1437 August 20, 2003 ignorance of the law and is a willful abdication of a duty imposed by law.
Complainant further avers that Judge Monserate erred in relying upon Section
PROSECUTOR JAIME E. CONTRERAS, Complainant, 7,3 Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as said provision applies
vs. only to cases where it is the offended party, peace-officer, or the prosecutor
JUDGE EDDIE P. MONSERATE, MCTC-Magarao, Camarines who files a case before a court of competent jurisdiction, i.e., the RTC. Hence,
Sur, Respondent. according to complainant, said rule does not apply to cases filed before the
DECISION MTC for the sole purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, the results
of which shall then be forwarded to the prosecutor who will then determine
QUISUMBING, J.: whether or not an information must be filed with the RTC.
Charges of "gross ignorance of the law" and "gross neglect of duty" were filed In his Letter-Comment dated July 17, 2001, respondent judge vehemently
by the Provincial Prosecution Office of Camarines Sur, signed by 2nd Asst. denies the material allegations in the complaint. In justifying his actions,
Provincial Prosecutor and approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, against respondent judge insists that what really happened in Criminal Case No. 3222
respondent Judge Eddie P. Monserate, of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of is as follows:
Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur.
The stabbing incident occurred November 25, 2000 at around 10:00 P.M.
Specifically, respondent is charged of forwarding Criminal Case No. 3222, Several hours after, the accused voluntarily gave himself up to the police at
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Mario Zabaldica y Morandarte," to the their residence. Since November 25, was a Saturday, the following day
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor without first conducting the requisite (Sunday) a complaint for frustrated homicide was made duly subscribed on
preliminary investigation. that day but was officially filed [i]n Court on November 27, 2000. On November
28, 2000 the accused filed a motion to fix bail which the Court granted the very
It appears that on November 27, 2000, SPO4 Prudente A. Belleza of Philippine
same day. On December 5, 2000, the records of the case was forwarded to
National Police (PNP) filed a criminal complaint for frustrated homicide,
Provincial Prosecution Office for the filing of an information without the Court
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3222, against one Mario Zabaldica with the
conducting the preliminary investigation for failure of the accused to avail of
MCTC of Magarao-Canaman. The next day, accused through counsel, filed an
his right pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. On January 19,
Ex Parte Motion to Fix Bail, which the respondent judge granted.
2001, the records of the case was returned to the Court with an Order from
On December 5, 2000, Judge Monserate ordered the release of Zabaldica Prosecutor Contreras [for Judge Eddie P. Monserate] to conduct a preliminary
from PNP custody for having posted corporate bond. That same day he also investigation and at the same time threatening the Presiding Judge that he will
issued the following order: file an administrative charge for gross ignorance of the law if he will refuse. In
spite of the threat, [Judge Monserate] returned the records of the case to the
It appearing from the complaint that the accused was lawfully arrested without Provincial Prosecution Office for reason that preliminary investigation is not
a warrant for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, and that necessary under the rules and that accused himself has not requested for a
accused failed to avail of his right to a preliminary investigation pursuant to preliminary investigation despite his knowledge that a complaint was filed
Sec. 7 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, the information may now be filed with against him....4
the proper court.
Relying on the above narration, respondent judge contends that he committed
Send the records of this case to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office for the filing no error since pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112, an accused's failure to avail of
of information.1 his right to preliminary investigation could be deemed a waiver thereof. In view
of said "waiver," respondent judge concluded, it was but logical that he should
Complainant laments that said order of respondent judge violated Section
forward the records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for
3,2 Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which requires that in
the filing of the necessary information.
all criminal cases cognizable by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), but filed before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the latter must always conduct a preliminary In its Evaluation, Report and Recommendation dated April 11, 2002, the Office
investigation to determine probable cause. According to complainant, of the Court Administrator found that respondent judge erred in invoking
respondent's failure to conduct a preliminary investigation manifests his gross Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. According to
the OCA, despite an accused's failure to insist on his right to preliminary municipal court judge, like herein respondent, is a "proper officer" authorized
investigation, the respondent judge was still mandated to examine the to conduct a preliminary investigation. Further, a preliminary investigation is
complainant and his witnesses under oath to determine whether they had not a judicial function, and as such the findings of the investigating judge are
voluntarily appeared before him. If statements were given to a police subject to the oversight powers of the public prosecutor. Thus, in Cabarloc v.
investigator, he should examine the affiants personally to determine whether Cabusora,12 we held that:
the evidence presented sufficed to engender a well-founded belief as to the
fact of the commission of the crime, and that the accused is probably guilty When a municipal judge conducts a preliminary investigation, he performs a
thereof. After the conclusion of the preliminary investigation, the municipal non-judicial function. His function is merely executive in nature. As such, the
judge is tasked with preparing a resolution, stating briefly the findings of facts findings of an investigating judge are subject to review by the Provincial Fiscal
and the law supporting his action, which together with the entire records should whose findings in turn may also be reviewed by the Secretary of Justice in
then be forwarded to the prosecutorial arm, according to OCA. appropriate cases.

We agree with the OCA's findings and observations. Respondent judge's Clearly, therefore, Provincial Prosecutor Agapito B. Rosales, 13 through his
reliance on Section 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure 5 to Second Asst. Provincial Prosecutor, had the authority to compel respondent
justify his refusal to conduct a preliminary investigation is misplaced. Under judge to conduct a preliminary investigation in Criminal Case No. 3222.
the similarly entitled section now of Rule 112 already effective December 1, Respondent's failure to conduct a preliminary hearing is further compounded
2000, just before the December 5, 2000 Order of respondent judge was by his order granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. 3222, without
issued6 , the only instance where an information for an offense which requires the requisite hearing. In this jurisdiction, an application for bail requires that a
a preliminary investigation may be filed directly with the court is when an reasonable notice of hearing be given to the public prosecutor or, at least, he
accused is lawfully detained without a warrant and he expressly refuses to must be asked for his recommendation.14 As a judge, respondent is expected
waive in writing the provisions of Art. 125 7 of the Revised Penal Code.8 If the to comply with this elementary requirement.1âwphi1
accused refuses or fails to sign the requisite waiver, an information shall
forthwith be filed against him, subject to his right to move for reinvestigation Gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, and inefficiency are characteristics
within five (5) days from the time he learns of the filing of said information. The impermissible in a judge.15 This Court has exhorted judges to possess more
right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over than a cursory knowledge of the rules on preliminary investigation, on bail, and
for trial for a criminal offense and hence at the risk of incarceration or some the law governing the jurisdiction of the court.16 Failure to observe the basic
other penalty is not a mere formal or technical right but a substantive laws and rules is not only inexcusable, but also renders a judge susceptible to
right.9 Hence, any exception to the enjoyment of said right must be strictly administrative sanction for gross ignorance of the law. In Arcilla v.
construed. In the instant case, nowhere is it shown or indicated in the assailed Palaypayon,17 we imposed a fine upon respondent judge for conducting a
order that the accused in Criminal Case No. 3222 refused to waive, expressly preliminary investigation and for issuing a warrant of arrest without notifying
and in writing, the provisions of Art. 125. Moreover, that said accused did not the accused. In Padua v. Molina,18 a judge was fined by this Court for flouting
resist arrest is immaterial, as voluntary surrender is not among the exceptions the laws and rules governing preliminary investigation. And, in Dizon v.
to the mandatory requirement of preliminary investigation in criminal Calimag,19 the respondent judge was found liable for gross ignorance of the
prosecution. Respondent judge, therefore, had no valid reason to refuse law and fined in the amount of ₱2,000.00
conducting the preliminary investigation.
As to the penalty, the OCA recommends that Judge Monserate be
Respondent judge asserts that the Provincial Prosecution Office has no reprimanded with a warning that the commission of a similar act would be dealt
authority to order him to conduct a preliminary investigation inasmuch as the with more severely. We note that the administrative offense took place before
court's primary duty is to hold trial and render decisions, and not to conduct the amendment of Rule 140, Rules of Court, by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC on
preliminary investigations. His assertion is far from accurate. Respondent September 11, 2001. However, in view of the nature of respondent's infraction
judge must be reminded of the duty imposed upon him by Section 1(a),10 Rule which prejudiced the prosecution as well as the accused, and considering
110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Said provision speaks of the further his disregard of a legally mandated duty, a fine of ₱2,000.00 is
"proper officer" who shall conduct the "requisite preliminary investigation." appropriate.
Under Section 211 , Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, a
WHEREFORE, respondent JUDGE EDDIE P. MONSERATE of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Magarao-Canaman, Camarines Sur, is found LIABLE for
manifest gross ignorance of the law and neglect of duty. He is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE of Two Thousand (₱2,000.00) Pesos, with a
WARNING that a repetition of the same or a similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150735 March 15, 2004 proceeded to the Shell gasoline station near the Dau bus terminal station.
Except for PO2 Ubias and the civilian informant who waited for the suspect
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, near the San Trans bus terminal,5 the other members of the team positioned
vs. themselves in such a way that they would be able to observe the transaction.
STEPHEN CADLEY y CIANO, appellant.
After waiting for more or less 25 minutes, the civilian informant called PO2
DECISION Ubias’ attention to a man wearing a "blue or green t-shirt" who directly
CARPIO-MORALES, J.: approached them. The man, later identified as Stephen Cadley, herein
appellant, showed a rectangular object wrapped in newspaper, with a hole
On appeal is the November 5, 2001 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of through which the contents could be seen,6 and informed the two that he had
Angeles City, Branch 59, in Criminal Case No. 597 finding Stephen Cadley y left 70 kilos of marijuana with his companion.7 PO2 Ubias took a sample of the
Ciano (appellant) guilty of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. contents of the rectangular object and once he was convinced that it was
6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. marijuana,8 he wiped his face with a face-towel several times, the pre-
arranged signal for the rest of the team members to approach them.
The accusatory portion of the Information2 charging appellant for violation of
Republic Act No. 6425 reads: Appellant was at once arrested and the rectangular object was brought to the
PNP Regional Crime Laboratory where laboratory tests conclusively proved
That on or about 11th day of June, 2000, in the municipality of Mabalacat,
that it contained marijuana weighing 790.7421 grams.9
province of Pampanga, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, STEPHEN CADLEY y CIANO, without Hence, the indictment of appellant.
having been lawfully and permitted and authorized, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously deliver and/or give away to a poseur buyer SEVEN In defense, appellant, who gave his occupation as a vegetable vendor at La
HUNDRED NINETY GRAMS and SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED Trinidad, Benguet, claimed as follows:
TWENTY ONE TENTH THOUSANDTHS OF A GRAM (790.7421 g) of dried A certain Binyang who hails from Angeles City goes to his stall at least once a
marijuana leaves, a prohibited drug. month to buy vegetables during which she would ask him if he knows of any
Contrary to law. marijuana for sale to which he would always respond in the negative.
Sometimes, Binyang would also offer to sell him shabu.
Appellant pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on June 27, 2000. 3
On June 9, 2000, appellant informed Binyang that he was going down to
As culled from the records of the case, the prosecution established the Manila with his friends the following day, or on June 10, 2000, at 10:00 p.m.,
following facts: to buy spare parts for his vehicle, and they would stop-over in Tarlac.
In May 2000, following information received from a female civilian informant Appellant left for Manila as planned and while on a stop-over at the Victory
that a certain "Steve" was a supplier of marijuana, team leader SPO4 Venusto Bus Terminal in Tarlac, he saw Binyang and went to talk to her while his
Jamisolamin of the PNP Narcotics Group at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, companions went to the comfort room. While he was talking to her, somebody
Pampanga instructed his men to conduct surveillance and intelligence approached him and poked a gun at him, saying, "NARCOM ito, huwag
investigation at Aguso, Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.4 gagalaw." More persons, who later arrived, along with the persons who
identified himself as a "NARCOM," forcibly dragged him inside a vehicle. Inside
On June 10, 2000, PO2 Luisito Ubias who was designated as poseur-buyer
the vehicle, the persons mauled him, poked a gun at him, and demanded that
and the civilian informant arranged with "Steve" by telephone for the sale of 50
he show them where the marijuana was and give the names of the persons in
kilos of marijuana to be made on June 11, 2000, at 4:00 a.m., at the Dau bus
Benguet engaged in selling the same. He, however, denied having brought
terminal station in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga.
any marijuana or knowing any such persons.10
As scheduled, the buy-bust team composed of SPO4 Jamisolamin, PO2 Ubias,
He was later brought to Camp Olivas, Pampanga where the police confiscated
PO1 Avelino Lopez, Jr., four other police officers, and the civilian informant
his personal belongings without issuing him a receipt therefor. PO2 Ubias then
told him that he would be set free if he could produce ₱60,000.00. Using PO2 THE APPEALED DECISION WAS RENDERED BY A NEWLY APPOINTED
Ubias' cellphone, he thus called his brother McCoy11 and uncle Sgt. Efren JUDGE WHO HAS NOT PERSONALLY HEARD ANY OF THE WITNESSES
Aberin who repaired to Manila from Baguio City with the said amount. PRESENTED AND, THEREFORE, HAD NO OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE
THEIR DEMEANOR VIS-A-VIS THE TRUTHFULNESS OF THEIR
Despite giving money to the police, he was not released and his brother and VERSIONS.
uncle were even charged with attempted bribery.12
II.
With respect to the marijuana brick allegedly taken from him, appellant denied
any knowledge thereof, he claiming that the purpose of his arrest was to extort THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN:
money from him.
A. BEING PARTIAL, BY TOTALLY BELIEVING THE INCREDIBLE VERSION
Testifying for appellant, his uncle Sgt. Aberin declared that he and McCoy, OF THE PROSECUTION; BY NOT APPRECIATING THE MAJOR
bringing with them ₱60,000.00, left Baguio City and arrived at Camp Olivas, INCONSISTENCIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES' TESTIMONIES
Pampanga in the early morning of June 12, 2000. They refused to part off with AND THEIR LACK OF PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT THE DETAILS OF
the money, however, as appellant was not being released. They were then told THE ALLEGED BUY-BUST OPERARATION; BY TOTALLY IGNORING THE
to return on June 13, 2000, June 12, 2000 being a holiday. They thus returned EXCULPATORY FACTS IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED; AND BY NOT
to the camp on June 13, 2000 and which McCoy turned over the money to a APPRECIATING THE CREDIBLE VERSION OF THE DEFENSE.
certain SPO1 Gamit, upon which he (Sgt. Aberin) and McCoy were handcuffed
and charged with attempted bribery.13 He further declared that despite their B. RELYING ON SURMISES AND CONJECTURES.
delivery of ₱60,000 to the police, the police reported receiving only ₱10,000. C. NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
Testifying for the defense, Larry Pantig who, together with Benigno Guillermo, GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT A QUO
accompanied appellant to Manila, declared that while they were on a stop-over HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT CASE, IT GRAVELY ERRED IN
at the Victory Bus Station in Tarlac, they saw appellant talking to a lady after NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED.
which five men held appellant at gunpoint and forced him to board a red vehicle D. NOT APPRECIATING THAT THE ACCUSED'S DETENTION, INQUEST
with white stripes; and they (Pantig and Guillermo) thereupon boarded their CONDUCTED, AND INFORMATION FILED WERE LEGALLY
own vehicle and followed the red vehicle bearing appellant and the five men FLAWED/INFIRMED FROM THE VERY START AMOUNTING TO BLATANT
until the gate of Clark, Pampanga, but were forced to return to Baguio when VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS OF
the vehicle stopped and one man got out cocking his firearm.14 THE ACCUSED WHICH SHOULD ENTITLE THE LATTER FOR (sic) HIS
The case was heard by different judges.15 IMMEDIATE RELEASE.

As stated early on, the trial court convicted appellant by the assailed Appellant draws attention to the fact that the judge who wrote the decision did
decision,16 the dispositive portion17 of which reads: not hear the case, hence, did not have the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses. That a judge did not hear a case does not
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused STEPHEN CADLEY y CIANO guilty necessarily render him less competent in assessing the credibility of witnesses.
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 4, Article II of He can rely on the transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and
Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and hereby sentences him to suffer a calibrate them in accordance with their conformity to common experience,
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does not violate
(₱500,000.00) and to pay the costs. substantive and procedural due process of law.18

SO ORDERED. Appellant goes on to call the buy-bust operation a fabrication in light of the lack
of surveillance conducted on him, the admission of the prosecution that no
Appellant assails the decision on the following grounds: buy-bust money was involved or used in the operation, and his immediate
I. arrest after his alleged production of only one brick of marijuana even if PO2
Ubias and the civilian informant were allegedly offered 70 kilos. He posits that
no seller of marijuana would openly carry a brick thereof under his arm and As to why the police arrested appellant after receiving only one brick of
negotiate its sale in the open. And he contends as denting the case for the marijuana instead of waiting for the receipt of the rest of the 70 kilos offered
prosecution its failure to present the confidential informant as a witness, and for sale, PO2 Ubias explained that his instructions were to effect the pre-
the inconsistency of statements of its witnesses. arranged signal once he had determined that what appellant was offering was
indeed marijuana, and there was no instruction for him to try to recover the
In another vein, appellant argues that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the rest of the marijuana. Moreover, he proffered that when appellant was asked
offense as the incident actually occurred in Tarlac City, and not in Dau, where the remainder of the marijuana was, appellant responded that "the other
Pampanga. And he questions his warrantless arrest and his detention as 70k were in the possession of his companion."26
violative of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, he not having waived its
provision, and of Department of Justice Circular No. 61, September 21, 1993 Neither is it improbable for appellant to deal in drugs openly in a public place
on New Rules on Inquest. to persons he hardly knew, for drug dealers are known to sell their goods even
to strangers. They ply their wares wherever prospective customers may be
Appellant’s appeal does not lie. found. They have indeed become increasingly daring and openly defiant of the
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or law.27
buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has no rigid or textbook As for the non-presentation by the prosecution of the confidential informant, it
method.19 Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However the police carry out is well-settled that except when the appellant vehemently denies selling
its entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in the testimonies of
been violated in the process,20 the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers
Neither is the fact that no money changed hands a critical factor that affects had motives to testify falsely against appellant, or that only the informant was
the outcome of the case at bar. There is no rule of law which requires that in the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony
buy-bust operations there must be a simultaneous exchange of the marked of the informant may be dispensed with as it would merely be corroborative of
money and the prohibited drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.21 the apprehending officers' eyewitness testimonies.28

Moreover, Article II, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 punishes not only the sale In the case at bar, the presentation of the confidential informant, whose identity
but also the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after the offer to buy by must be hidden to preserve his invaluable service to the police, 29 the sale
the entrapping officer has been accepted by the seller of prohibited drugs. 22 having been adequately proven by prosecution witnesses.30

As the information reflects, appellant was charged with the unlawful delivery Like alibi, frame-up as a defense has invariably been viewed with disfavor as
and/or giving away to a poseur buyer of 790.7421 grams of dried marijuana it is a common and standard line of defense in most prosecutions arising from
leaves. Since the prosecution has discharged its onus of proving the violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. Clear and convincing evidence is
accusation as in fact it presented the prohibited drug and identified appellant required to prove the defense of "frame-up" which appellant has failed to
as the offender,23 it is immaterial that no payment was made to appellant. proffer.

As for the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO2 Lopez and SPO4 If the only reason appellant was brought to the police station was, as he claims,
Jamisolamin, the same are minor and do not detract from the veracity and to extort money, why did he fail to file charges — administrative or criminal —
weight of the salient points thereof. against the policemen, especially in light of the fact that his uncle who came
to his rescue is a military sergeant and, therefore, ought to have been aware
What is important is that the testimonies are supported by the physical and knowledgeable of appellant’s rights in the premises.
evidence consisting of the marijuana block presented before the court in its
original newspaper wrapper (bearing the initials of the arresting officers), and Neither is there any basis for appellant’s contention that the incident occurred
Chemistry Report No. D-0592-200024 "the genuineness, due execution and in Tarlac City, Tarlac, and not in Dau, Pampanga. The policemen were clear
the truth of the contents" of which were admitted by appellant during the pre- and straightforward in furnishing details of their location, whereas the
trial on July 26, 2000 as shown by the Pre-Trial Order dated July 27, 2000.25 description made by appellant and the witnesses for the defense as to the
place of the alleged arrest is bereft of details determinative of the exact location
of the arrest.

Parenthetically, albeit appellant had manifested that he had an independent

witness who would testify to the occurrence of the incident in Tarlac City, no
such witness was presented.

Finally, appellant's challenge on his warrantless arrest fails. When an accused

is apprehended in flagrante delicto, under Section 5, Rule 113, paragraphs (a)
and (b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as a result of a buy-bust
operation, as in appellant’s case, the police are not only authorized but duty-
bound to arrest him even without a warrant.31

As for appellant’s contention that his detention was unlawful because there
was no waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, the
same likewise fails.

While a public officer who thus detains a person beyond the legal period may
be held criminally liable, the proceeding taken against him for the act he has
committed remains unaffected, for the two acts are distinct and
separate.32 (Underscoring supplied)

It is gathered that after appellant was arrested on June 11, 2000, and the
Iinformation indicting him was prepared by the Provincial Prosecutor on June
13, 2000 (the day before was a holiday), and was filed before the trial court on
June 14, 2000. Assuming arguendo that the delay in the filing of the
Information was intentional, appellant should have taken steps to report or file
charges against the officers, failing which he cannot now rely on administrative
shortcomings of police officers to get a judgment of acquittal.33

At all events, appellant’s entry of a valid plea34 and active participation in the
trial cured any defect in his arrest.35

In fine, the trial court did not err in rendering the appealed decision.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles
City finding appellant, STEPHEN CADLEY y CIANO, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 153524-25 January 31, 2005 4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos
Sur, Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was
RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, petitioners, identified by one of the police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for
vs. violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office of the of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy
Ombudsman for Military, P/INS. JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election
ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. day), petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor
LAZARO, PO2 FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a "Joint-Affidavit" against
SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL, respondents. them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the
arresting officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor’s Office
DECISION in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at about 6:00 p.m. the "Joint-Affidavit" was filed
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: and docketed;

Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the 6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner
Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary Soria was released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the
investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non- requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and
interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of
bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on their part. petitioner Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22)
hours had already elapsed;
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the
public respondents herein – officers of the Office of the Ombudsman – gravely 7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was
abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 brought before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of
of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order
private respondents herein, members of the Philippine National Police of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;
stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos Sur. 8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with
From the respective pleadings2 of the parties, the following facts appear to be petitioner Bista’s arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in
indubitable: the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No.
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day 4413-S, was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial
before the 14 May 2001 Elections3 ), petitioners were arrested without a Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in the afternoon, informations for Illegal
warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal possession of Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article 261 par. (f) of
firearms and ammunition; the Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328,
docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal.
filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
revolver (a crime which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus 9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in
Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
(which carries the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not
more than six [6] years); 10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine Penal Code against herein private respondents.
pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;
11. After considering the parties’ respective submissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January
2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal 125,9 hence, the arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the
Code for lack of merit; and allowable time.

12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to
which was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 petitioner Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court
March 2002. against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The information
was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his release were
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states: issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan,
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that based on law and
authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period fixed by
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for law, the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with
some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial violation of Article 125.10 Public respondents countered that the duty of the
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses arresting officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the proper
punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12
and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that
capital penalties, or their equivalent. public respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his probable cause the complaint against private respondents.
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of
at any time with his attorney or counsel. judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was excess or lack of jurisdiction.1awphi1.nét The abuse of discretion must be so
arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of
proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by
that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable reason of passion or hostility.13
by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public
detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been respondents. Their disposition of petitioners’ complaint for violation of Article
filed with the proper judicial authorities. 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12- thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public
18-36 periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria respondents ratiocinated thus:
which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo
construing Article 1254 as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in Soria is concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election
the computation of the periods prescribed within which public officers should day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the
deliver arrested persons to the proper judicial authorities as the law never period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in
makes such exception. Statutory construction has it that if a statute is clear cases of warrantless arrests, it being a "no-office day." (Medina vs. Orosco,
and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears that the complaints against
attempts at interpretation.5 Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC Resolution
the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila7 and No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of
on commentaries8 of jurists to bolster their position that Sundays, holidays and Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already
election days are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in Article been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the
respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there
could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and
Code to speak of.14 COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes "G"
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,15 that — and "I", Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from
. . . The arresting officer’s duty under the law was either to deliver him to the detention only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan,
proper judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact Ilocos Sur (Annexes "J" and "K", Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the
however is that he was not released. From the time of petitioner’s arrest at delivery of detained person to the proper judicial authorities under the
12:00 o’clock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The complaints against him
information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour
elapsed. period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers
is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further action, like
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People v.
November 8 was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).17
was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy
matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
and search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to Military,18 wherein we ordained that –
open the courthouse, docket the case and have the order of commitment . . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court,
prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of locating those the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained
officers and employees could very well compound the fiscal’s difficulties. person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application
These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged
Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was
very first office day following arrest. granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila16 -- Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC.
We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint
. . . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrest and other All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no
circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for choice but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsman’s determination that the
the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised
must be taken into consideration. Penal Code.l^vvphi1.net

As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information As we have underscored in numerous decisions --
has already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well within their We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and
discretion in ruling thus: prosecutorial powers of the Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical considerations. We
Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the
(36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers,
from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to
has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on insulate it from outside pressure and improper influence. Moreover, a
May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of
Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention. when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to
order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using professional
judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such
findings, unless clothed with grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions
assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same
way, the courts will be swamped with cases if they will have to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time
the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a
private complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is

hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January
2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the Ombudsman are
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 157399 November 17, 2005 use of the said falsified commercial documents, accused succeeded in
diverting, collecting and receiving the total amount of ONE HUNDRED
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO
vs. HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS
JOSE TING LAN UY, JR. (Acquitted), ERNESTO GAMUS y SOTELO, (P183,805,291.75), Philippine Currency from the National Power Corporation,
JAIME OCHOA, all of the National Power Corporation, and RAUL which they thereafter malverse, embezzle, misappropriate and convert to their
GUTIERREZ alias Raul Nicolas, Alias George Añonuevo, alias Mara own personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the National
Añonuevo (At large), Accused. JAIME OCHOA, Appellant. Power Corporation in the aforementioned sum.
DECISION CONTRARY TO LAW.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Upon arraignment, Gamus, Uy and Ochoa pleaded not guilty to the charge,
For allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the National Power Corporation while Gutierrez has remained at large.
(NPC) intended for the purchase of US Dollars from the United Coconut On pre-trial, the prosecution and the defense stipulated –
Planters Bank (UCPB), Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., Ernesto Gamus, 1 Jaime Ochoa
and Raul Gutierrez were indicted before the Sandiganbayan for the complex 1. That accused Uy at the time stated in the information was a Treasurer at
crime of Malversation through Falsification of Commercial Documents defined the NPC;
and penalized under Articles 217 and 171 (8), in relation to Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, in an amended Information,2 docketed as Criminal Case 2. That accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time mentioned in the information
No. 19558, which alleges – was (sic) the Manager of Loan Management and Foreign Exchange Division
(LOMAFED);
That sometime in July 1990, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, 3. That accused Jaime Ochoa was the Senior Financial Analyst, LOMAFED,
accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr., a public accountable officer, being the at the time mentioned in the information;
Treasurer of National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR), Ernesto Gamus and 4. That accused Gamus does not have any custody to (sic) public funds;
Jaime Ochoa, both public officers being the Manager of the Loan Management
and Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED) and Foreign Trader Analyst, 5. That accused Ochoa’s position as Sr. Financial Analyst did not require him
respectively, also of NAPOCOR, and accused Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul to take custody or control of public funds;
Nicolas, alias George Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo, a private individual
6. That the application forms for cashier’s check or Manager’s check are not
being a foreign exchange trader, said public officers taking advantage of their
accountable forms of the NAPOCOR.3
official positions, with grave abuse of authority and committing the offense in
relation to their office, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one Trial on the merits thereafter ensued. On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan
another, with their private co-accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully rendered its Decision,4 the dispositive portion of which reads:
and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the NPC’s application for
managers checks with the Philippine National Bank (PNB), NPC Branch in the WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Jaime B. Ochoa is hereby
total amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation thru
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS and falsification of Commercial Document and is sentenced to suffer the
TWENTY FIVE CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25), Philippine Currency, penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine equal to the amount malversed
intended for the purchase of US dollars from the United Coconut Planters Bank which is ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE
(UCPB), by inserting the account number of Raul Gutierrez SA-111-121204-4, THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE
when in truth and in fact as the accused well knew that the Payment CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, Jr.
Instructions (PI) when signed by the NAPOCOR authorities did not indicate Accused Ochoa shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification.
the account number of Raul Gutierrez, thereby making alteration or Costs against the accused.
intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning, and with the
On the ground of reasonable doubt, accused JOSE TING LAN UY, Jr. is mere arrival of which would trigger the above-mentioned procedure,
hereby ACQUITTED of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of culminating in the payment to ADB of the NPC obligation in the foreign
Commercial Document. However, because of preponderance of evidence, currency agreed upon.
he is CIVILLY LIABLE for the damages suffered by the NPC in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FIVE On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank)
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE PESOS AND TWENTY FIVE remitted Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch.
CENTAVOS (P183,805,291.25) solidarily with accused Jaime Ochoa. The Likewise, per routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was supposed to
Hold Departure Order against the accused embodied in this Court’s Resolution have remitted on said value date the amount of US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M.
dated April 18, 2002 is recalled. Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the PNB had already issued two (2)
manager’s/cashier’s checks ("Manager’s check" for brevity) for such purpose,
Let an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Raul Gutierrez, alias Raul did not make the agreed remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit Lyonnais
Nicolas, alias George Añonuevo, alias Mara Añonuevo with last known received no payment for the funds it had remitted to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo.
address at 1348 A. Mabini Street, Ermita, Manila or Suite 603 VIP Building, Both the State and the accused have offered explanations for the failure of
Roxas Boulevard, Manila. UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of P183,805,291.25
to Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations, naturally, were diametrically opposed. 7
SO ORDERED.5
The prosecution theorizes that the accused diverted the funds covered by the
Aggrieved, Ochoa interposed this appeal alleging that the Sandiganbayan two PNB Manager’s checks by falsifying a commercial document called an
erred in – "Application for Cashier’s Check" (ACC) by inserting an account number (A/C
1. convicting him based on the allegations in the information; #111-1212-04) of a private individual after the name of the payee, UCPB, T.M.
Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not authorize the insertion considering
2. admitting and considering his alleged sworn statements; that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC instructing PNB to prepare a
Manager’s check to be charged to NPC’s savings account did not contain any
3. considering the alleged transcripts of stenographic notes and the NBI
account number. Through the insertion, the accused allegedly succeeded in
Report.6
diverting the funds from the UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul
The factual antecedents of the case, as summed by the Sandiganbayan, are Gutierrez @ Raul Nicolas @ George Añonuevo @ Mara Añonuevo, who is still
not disputed by the parties: at large.

In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation ("NPC") became embroiled in In his defense, appellant asserts that there was no evidence that he committed
a controversy involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25 of its funds any of the acts alleged in the information, particularly the intercalation on the
which were originally on deposit with the Philippine National Bank, NPC ACC; that he deposited the checks subsequently issued or that he received
Branch ("PNB") but were subsequently used to purchase two (2) the proceeds thereof; or that he conspired with any of his co-accused. He
managers’/cashier’s checks (the first check was in the amount of claims that his conviction was based on the alleged sworn statement and the
P70,000,000.00 while the second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to comply transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with appellant by the
with its loan obligations to the Asian Development Bank ("ADB"). As NPC’s NPC personnel and the report of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
debt in favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was obligated to follow an intricate and Appellant maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined at the
circuitous procedure of buying US dollars from a local bank (in this case, Philippine Heart Center and upon assurance that it would not be used against
United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch), which local bank him. He was not assisted by counsel nor was he apprised of his constitutional
was supposed to remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This off-shore bank rights when he executed the affidavit.
(in this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then supposed to remit the
To be found guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following
yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this case, the Bank of Japan,
essential elements:
Tokyo Branch) which would then credit the funds to the account of the ADB.
The contracts of NPC with the concerned banks (embodied in three [3] a.] The offender is a public officer;
"Payment Instructions") included a "value date" (which was July 13, 1990), the
b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we
of his office; held in Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace of Bacolor, … but a distinct crime in
itself, designated as a quasi offense in our Penal Code, it may however be
c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is said that a conviction for the former can be had under an information
accountable; and exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that
d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or the greater includes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the
through abandonment or negligence, permitted the taking by another person present case. Appellant was charged with willful falsification but from the
of, such funds or property.8 evidence submitted by the parties, the Court of Appeals found that in effecting
the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question,
Appellant insists that he could not be convicted under the allegations in the appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and
information without violating his constitutional right to due process and to be adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an
informed of the accusation against him. He points out that the information ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts
alleges willful and intentional commission of the acts complained of while the which charge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but
judgment found him guilty of inexcusable negligence amounting to malice. negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between
the allegation and proof, and is similar to some of the cases decided by this
Appellant’s contention lacks merit. Malversation may be committed either
Tribunal.
through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property or
passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such ....
misappropriation.9 To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be
criminal intent or criminal negligence10 and while the prevailing facts of a case The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was
may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not committed with imprudence is of no moment for here this deficiency appears
preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and the result has
because both are equally punishable in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has
been willful, it would be incongruous to allege at the same time that it was
More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public trust, and whether it is committed with imprudence for a charge of criminal intent is incompatible with
committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and the concept of negligence.
prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges
willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may still In People v. Consigna, et al.,14 we ruled that the afore-stated rationale also
be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of the applies to the felony of malversation, that is, that an accused charged with
offense.11 Explicitly stated – willful malversation, in an information containing allegations similar to the
present case, can be validly convicted of the same offense of malversation
Even on the putative assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded through negligence where the evidence sustains the latter mode of
a case of malversation by negligence but the information was for intentional perpetrating the offense.
malversation, under the circumstances of this case his conviction under the
first mode of misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed Appellant next claims that he should be acquitted since his conviction was
either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the based on his sworn statement, transcript of stenographic notes from which the
offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode sworn statement was taken and the NBI Report, which are incompetent
charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of malversation is evidence. He contends that his sworn statement was taken without the benefit
involved and conviction thereof is proper.12 of counsel, in violation of his constitutional right under Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.
The question of whether or not an information charging the commission of the
crime by means of deceit will preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence Paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that –
is neither novel nor of first impression. In Samson v. Court of Appeals, et Section 12. (1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an
al.,13 we ruled that an accused charged with willful or intentional falsification offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
can validly be convicted of falsification through negligence, thus:
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the Along the same vein, we held that a videotaped interview showing the accused
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. unburdening his guilt willingly, openly and publicly in the presence of newsmen
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. is not covered by the provision although in so ruling, we warned trial courts to
take extreme caution in further admitting similar confessions because we
The "investigation" under the above-quoted provision refers to a "custodial" recognized the distinct possibility that the police, with the connivance of
investigation where a suspect has already been taken into police unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize coerced
custody15 and the investigating officers begin to ask questions to elicit extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by
information and confessions or admissions from the suspect. 16 More having an accused admit an offense on television. 25
specifically –
Neither does the constitutional provision on custodial investigation extends to
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities,
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused orally admits having
freedom of action in any significant manner. And, the rule begins to operate at committed the crime,26 nor to a person undergoing an audit examination
once as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an because an audit examiner is not a law enforcement officer.27
unsolved crime and direction is then aimed upon a particular suspect who has
been taken into custody and to whom the police would then direct interrogatory Thus, the flaw in appellant’s argument in this regard becomes immediately
question which tend to elicit incriminating statements.17 apparent vis-à-vis the foregoing legal yardsticks, considering that his
statement was taken during the administrative investigation of NPC’s audit
Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage team28 and before he was taken into custody. As such, the inquest was still a
when the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime general inquiry into an unsolved offense at the time and there was, as yet, no
but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.18 Such a situation specific suspect.
contemplated has been more precisely described thus where –
Much less can appellant claim that he was in police custody because he was
After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation confined at the time at the Philippine Heart Center and he gave this statement
arises which at best may be termed unequal. The detainee is brought to an to NPC personnel, not to police authorities.29 Appellant can hardly claim that,
army camp or police headquarters and there questioned and cross-examined under the prevailing circumstances at the time, whatever degree of compulsion
not only by one but as many investigators as may be necessary to break down may have existed went beyond the borders of the unobjectionable where
his morale. He finds himself in a strange and unfamiliar surrounding, and every impermissible levels of duress would force him into making false and
person he meets he considers hostile to him. The investigators are well-trained incriminating declarations against his interest. While he may have been
and seasoned in their work. They employ all the methods and means that persuaded into doing so, he cannot feign that he was intimidated in such a way
experience and study has taught them to extract the truth, or what may pass as to bring his statements within the ambit of the exclusionary constitutional
for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not aware of provision.
their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them The fact that an NBI investigation was being contemporaneously conducted at
into silence....19 the time the sworn statement was taken will not extricate appellant from his
predicament. The essence of the constitutional safeguard is protection from
Clearly, therefore, the rights enumerated by the constitutional provision coercion. The interview where the sworn statement is based was conducted
invoked by accused-appellant are not available before government by NPC personnel for the NPC’s administrative investigation. Any
investigators enter the picture.20 Thus we held in one case21 that admissions investigation conducted by the NBI is a proceeding separate, distinct and
made during the course of an administrative investigation by Philippine Airlines independent from the NPC inquiry and should not be confused or lumped
do not come within the purview of Section 12. The protective mantle of the together with the latter.
constitutional provision also does not extend to admissions or confessions
made to a private individual,22 or to a verbal admission made to a radio Appellant invokes Galman v. Pamaran30 in insisting that the constitutional
announcer who was not part of the investigation,23 or even to a mayor safeguard should have been applied notwithstanding that he was not yet
approached as a personal confidante and not in his official capacity. 24 arrested or under detention at the time. He also invites our attention to the
pronouncements of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas31 that "the right to counsel is respect to its execution, as well as the statements and the authenticity of the
available if a person is in custody, even if he is not a suspect; or even if not yet signatures thereon, stand.42
in custody but he is a suspect."
In disclaiming the authenticity of his sworn statement, appellant insists that at
The contention is tenuous. Although we held in Galman that the constitutional the time he signed the document, he was confined in the hospital and therefore
protection covers not only confessions but admissions as well, we qualified the not physically and mentally fit to assess the significance of his signature. This
ruling with the statement that what is being eschewed is the evil of "extorting" pretext however collides with the testimony of his own witness, Dr. Teresita
a confession from the mouth of the person being interrogated. As defined, Sadava, who stated that appellant was confined for three days and, who, when
"extortion" is an act or practice of taking or obtaining anything from a person queried whether "ischemic heart disease" had any emotional or psychological
by illegal use of fear, whether by force, threats or any undue exercise of effect, gave the inconclusive reply that it "may or may not." Moreover, as aptly
power.32 In the context of obtaining an admission, "extorting" means observed by the Sandiganbayan, although supposedly violated and repulsed
"compelling or coercing a confession or information by any means serving to as he was by the alleged falsity of the affidavit, it is strange that appellant, who
overcome his power of resistance, or making the confession or admission is supposedly astute in business matters as he then occupied the position of
involuntary."33 In this case, we find nothing on record to support appellant’s Foreign Trader Analyst of the NPC, nevertheless felt it unnecessary to execute
claim that his statements were extorted from him. another affidavit retracting the same after his recovery from illness. Verily,
evidence to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
Furthermore, while indeed Galman taken together with the 1986 deliberations witness, but must be credible in itself – such as the common experience and
on what was later to become Section 12 (1) of the 1987 Constitution may lead observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.43
to the conclusion that the rights are available when the person is already in
custody as a suspect, or if the person is a suspect even if he is not yet deprived Appellant finally contends that both the NBI Investigation Report and the
in any significant way of his liberty, Fr. Bernas34 qualified this statement by transcript of stenographic notes are hearsay for having been made extra-
saying that "[J]urisprudence under the 1987 Constitution, however, judicially. The record, however, shows that the prosecution presented the team
has consistently held, following Escobedo, the stricter view, that the rights leader of the NBI investigators who conducted the investigation, although his
begin to be available only when the person is already in custody."35 testimony was dispensed with as the parties stipulated on the existence and
due execution of the NBI Investigation report albeit without admitting the truth
Appellant next advances the argument that even if his sworn statement were of its contents. If at all, the admission of the report’s existence is an
admissible in evidence, the contents thereof may not be sufficient to sustain a acknowledgment that it is neither spurious nor counterfeit.
conviction. He contends that although his statement was supposedly gathered
from the transcript of stenographic notes of the conversation between him and All told, given the paucity of substance in the arguments advanced by appellant
Atty. Bagcal, neither Atty. Bagcal nor the person who actually prepared the to prop up his cause, his appeal must fall.
sworn statement was presented. Therefore, the sworn statement is hearsay.
WHEREFORE, the May 28, 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan is
The argument is puerile. It bears stressing that the prosecution presented as hereby AFFIRMED in all respects.
witness Atty. Lamberto P. Melencio who saw appellant at the hospital to show
him the prepared statement and to verify from him the truth of its SO ORDERED.
contents.36 Atty. Melencio testified that he asked appellant to go over the
document before affixing his signature thereto.37 He also inquired whether or
not appellant was coerced or intimidated by anybody when the statement was
taken.38 Appellant denied that he was coerced or intimidated,39 affirmed the
contents of the document as a true reflection of his
statements,40 and signed the same.41 It need not be overemphasized that the
sworn statement is a duly notarized document which has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and, thus, it can be contradicted only by clear and
convincing evidence. Without that sort of evidence, the presumption of
regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with
G.R. No. 182677 August 3, 2010 inhibition of Judge Alameda with prayer to defer action on the admission of the
Amended Information.11
JOSE ANTONIO C. LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs. The trial court nonetheless issued the other assailed orders, viz: (1) Order of
HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, HON. EMMANUEL February 7, 200712 that admitted the Amended Information13 for murder and
Y. VELASCO, HEIRS OF THE LATE RAFAEL DE LAS ALAS, Respondents. directed the issuance of a warrant of arrest; and (2) Order of February 8,
200714 which set the arraignment on February 13, 2007. Petitioner questioned
DECISION these two orders via supplemental petition before the appellate court.
CARPIO MORALES, J.: The appellate court dismissed petitioner’s petition, hence, his present petition,
Jose Antonio C. Leviste (petitioner) assails via the present petition for review arguing that:
filed on May 30, 2008 the August 30, 2007 Decision1 and the April 18, 2008 PRIVATE RESPONDENT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO CAUSE THE
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 that affirmed the REINVESTIGATION OF THE CRIMINAL CASE BELOW WHEN THE
trial court’s Orders of January 24, 31, February 7, 8, all in 2007, and denied CRIMINAL INFORMATION HAD ALREADY BEEN FILED WITH THE LOWER
the motion for reconsideration, respectively. COURT. HENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE
Petitioner was, by Information3 of January 16, 2007, charged with homicide for ERROR IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT ACT WITH
the death of Rafael de las Alas on January 12, 2007 before the Regional Trial GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN GRANTING SUCH REINVESTIGATION
Court (RTC) of Makati City. Branch 150 to which the case was raffled, presided DESPITE HAVING NO BASIS IN THE RULES OF COURT[;]
by Judge Elmo Alameda, forthwith issued a commitment order4 against RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
petitioner who was placed under police custody while confined at the Makati ADMITTING STATE PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S AMENDED
Medical Center.5 INFORMATION, ISSUING A WARRANT OF ARREST, AND SETTING THE
After petitioner posted a ₱40,000 cash bond which the trial court approved,6 he CASE BELOW FOR ARRAIGNMENT, CONSIDERING THAT THE VALIDITY
was released from detention, and his arraignment was set on January 24, 2007. AND LEGALITY OF HIS ORDERS DATED 24 AND 31 JANUARY 2007,
WHICH LED TO THE QUESTIONABLE REINVESTIGATION AND ILLEGAL
The private complainants-heirs of De las Alas filed, with the conformity of the AMENDED INFORMATION[,] ARE YET TO BE RESOLVED BY THIS
public prosecutor, an Urgent Omnibus Motion 7 praying, inter alia, for the HONORABLE COURT (sic); [AND]
deferment of the proceedings to allow the public prosecutor to re-examine the
evidence on record or to conduct a reinvestigation to determine the proper CONSIDERING THAT PROSECUTOR VELASCO’S FINDINGS IN HIS
offense. RESOLUTION DATED 2 FEBRUARY 2007 ARE BLATANTLY BASED ON
MERE SPECULATIONS AND CONJECTURES, WITHOUT ANY
The RTC thereafter issued the (1) Order of January 24, 2007 8 deferring SUBSTANTIAL OR MATERIAL NEW EVIDENCE BEING ADDUCED
petitioner’s arraignment and allowing the prosecution to conduct a DURING THE REINVESTIGATION, RESPONDENT JUDGE SHOULD HAVE
reinvestigation to determine the proper offense and submit a recommendation AT LEAST ALLOWED PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A HEARING FOR
within 30 days from its inception, inter alia; and (2) Order of January 31, JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.15 (emphasis in the
20079 denying reconsideration of the first order. Petitioner assailed these original omitted)
orders via certiorari and prohibition before the Court of Appeals.
Records show that the arraignment scheduled on March 21, 2007 pushed
Meantime, petitioner filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation and Motion before through during which petitioner refused to plead, drawing the trial court to enter
the trial court to defer acting on the public prosecutor’s recommendation on a plea of "not guilty" for him.
the proper offense until after the appellate court resolves his application for
injunctive reliefs, or alternatively, to grant him time to comment on the Prior thereto or on February 23, 2007, petitioner filed an Urgent Application for
prosecutor’s recommendation and thereafter set a hearing for the judicial Admission to Bail Ex Abundanti Cautela16 which the trial court, after hearings
determination of probable cause.10 Petitioner also separately moved for the thereon, granted by Order of May 21, 2007,17 it finding that the evidence of
guilt for the crime of murder is not strong. It accordingly allowed petitioner to rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with,
post bail in the amount of ₱300,000 for his provisional liberty. and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the
particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. 20
The trial court, absent any writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate court,
went on to try petitioner under the Amended Information. By Decision of From the given circumstances, the Court cannot reasonably infer a valid
January 14, 2009, the trial court found petitioner guilty of homicide, sentencing waiver on the part of petitioner to preclude him from obtaining a definite
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision resolution of the objections he so timely invoked. Other than its allegation of
mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. active participation, the OSG offered no clear and convincing proof that
From the Decision, petitioner filed an appeal to the appellate court, docketed petitioner’s participation in the trial was unconditional with the intent to
as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, during the pendency of which he filed an urgent voluntarily and unequivocally abandon his petition. In fact, on January 26,
application for admission to bail pending appeal. The appellate court denied 2010, petitioner still moved for the early resolution of the present petition.21
petitioner’s application which this Court, in G.R. No. 189122, affirmed by
Decision of March 17, 2010. Whatever delay arising from petitioner’s availment of remedies against the trial
court’s Orders cannot be imputed to petitioner to operate as a valid waiver on
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) later argued that the present petition his part. Neither can the non-issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction be
had been rendered moot since the presentation of evidence, wherein petitioner deemed as a voluntary relinquishment of petitioner’s principal prayer. The non-
actively participated, had been concluded.18 issuance of such injunctive relief only means that the appellate court did not
preliminarily find any exception22 to the long-standing doctrine that injunction
Waiver on the part of the accused must be distinguished from mootness of the will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution.23 Consequently, the trial of the case
petition, for in the present case, petitioner did not, by his active participation in took its course.
the trial, waive his stated objections.
The petition is now moot, however, in view of the trial court’s rendition of
Section 26, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides: judgment.
SEC. 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
preliminary investigation. – An application for or admission to bail shall not bar controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
the accused from challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the would be of no practical use or value.24
warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or questioning the
absence of a preliminary investigation of the charge against him, provided that The judgment convicting petitioner of homicide under the Amended
he raises them before entering his plea. The court shall resolve the matter as Information for murder operates as a supervening event that mooted the
early as practicable but not later than the start of the trial of the case. present petition. Assuming that there is ground25 to annul the finding of
probable cause for murder, there is no practical use or value in abrogating the
By applying for bail, petitioner did not waive his right to challenge the regularity concluded proceedings and retrying the case under the original Information for
of the reinvestigation of the charge against him, the validity of the admission homicide just to arrive, more likely or even definitely, at the same conviction of
of the Amended Information, and the legality of his arrest under the Amended homicide. Mootness would have also set in had petitioner been convicted of
Information, as he vigorously raised them prior to his arraignment. During the murder, for proof beyond reasonable doubt, which is much higher than
arraignment on March 21, 2007, petitioner refused to enter his plea since the probable cause, would have been established in that instance.
issues he raised were still pending resolution by the appellate court, thus
prompting the trial court to enter a plea of "not guilty" for him. Instead, however, of denying the petition outright on the ground of mootness,
the Court proceeds to resolve the legal issues in order to formulate controlling
The principle that the accused is precluded after arraignment from questioning principles to guide the bench, bar and public. 26 In the present case, there is
the illegal arrest or the lack of or irregular preliminary investigation applies compelling reason to clarify the remedies available before and after the filing
"only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without of an information in cases subject of inquest.
previously invoking his objections thereto."19 There must be clear and
convincing proof that petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish his right to
question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention
After going over into the substance of the petition and the assailed issuances, determining whether said persons should remain under custody and
the Court finds no reversible error on the part of the appellate court in finding correspondingly be charged in court.31
no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the four trial court Orders.
It is imperative to first take a closer look at the predicament of both the arrested
In his first assignment of error, petitioner posits that the prosecution has no person and the private complainant during the brief period of inquest, to grasp
right under the Rules to seek from the trial court an investigation or the respective remedies available to them before and after the filing of a
reevaluation of the case except through a petition for review before the complaint or information in court.
Department of Justice (DOJ). In cases when an accused is arrested without a
warrant, petitioner contends that the remedy of preliminary investigation BEFORE THE FILING OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IN COURT, the
belongs only to the accused. private complainant may proceed in coordinating with the arresting officer and
the inquest officer during the latter’s conduct of inquest. Meanwhile, the
The contention lacks merit. arrested person has the option to avail of a 15-day preliminary investigation,
provided he duly signs a waiver of any objection against delay in his delivery
Section 6,27 Rule 112 of the Rules of Court reads: to the proper judicial authorities under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
When a person is lawfully arrested without a warrant involving an offense For obvious reasons, this remedy is not available to the private complainant
which requires a preliminary investigation, the complaint or information may since he cannot waive what he does not have. The benefit of the provisions of
be filed by a prosecutor without need of such investigation provided an inquest Article 125, which requires the filing of a complaint or information with the
has been conducted in accordance with existing rules. In the absence or proper judicial authorities within the applicable period,32 belongs to the
unavailability of an inquest prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the arrested person.
offended party or a peace officer directly with the proper court on the basis of The accelerated process of inquest, owing to its summary nature and the
the affidavit of the offended party or arresting officer or person. attendant risk of running against Article 125, ends with either the prompt filing
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a of an information in court or the immediate release of the arrested
preliminary investigation in accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a person.33 Notably, the rules on inquest do not provide for a motion for
waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, reconsideration.34
in the presence of his counsel. Notwithstanding the waiver, he may apply for Contrary to petitioner’s position that private complainant should have appealed
bail and the investigation must be terminated within fifteen (15) days from its to the DOJ Secretary, such remedy is not immediately available in cases
inception. subject of inquest.
After the filing of the complaint or information in court without a preliminary Noteworthy is the proviso that the appeal to the DOJ Secretary is by "petition
investigation, the accused may, within five (5) days from the time he learns of by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
its filing, ask for a preliminary investigation with the same right to adduce prescribe."35 The rule referred to is the 2000 National Prosecution Service
evidence in his defense as provided in this Rule. (underscoring supplied) Rule on Appeal,36 Section 1 of which provides that the Rule shall "apply to
A preliminary investigation is required before the filing of a complaint or appeals from resolutions x x x in cases subject of preliminary investigation/
information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four reinvestigation." In cases subject of inquest, therefore, the private party should
years, two months and one day without regard to fine. 28 As an exception, the first avail of a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation, if any, before
rules provide that there is no need for a preliminary investigation in cases of a elevating the matter to the DOJ Secretary.
lawful arrest without a warrant29 involving such type of offense, so long as an In case the inquest proceedings yield no probable cause, the private
inquest, where available, has been conducted. 30 complainant may pursue the case through the regular course of a preliminary
Inquest is defined as an informal and summary investigation conducted by a investigation.
public prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and detained ONCE A COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION IS FILED IN COURT, the rules yet
without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the court for the purpose of provide the accused with another opportunity to ask for a preliminary
investigation within five days from the time he learns of its filing. The Rules of
Court and the New Rules on Inquest are silent, however, on whether the of the court. Interestingly, petitioner supports this view. 45 Indeed, the Court
private complainant could invoke, as respondent heirs of the victim did in the ruled in one case that:
present case, a similar right to ask for a reinvestigation.
The rule is now well settled that once a complaint or information is filed in court,
The Court holds that the private complainant can move for reinvestigation, any disposition of the case, whether as to its dismissal or the conviction or the
subject to and in light of the ensuing disquisition. acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Although
the prosecutor retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be cases even when the case is already in court, he cannot impose his opinion
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 37 The upon the tribunal. For while it is true that the prosecutor has the quasi-judicial
private complainant in a criminal case is merely a witness and not a party to discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court,
the case and cannot, by himself, ask for the reinvestigation of the case after once the case had already been brought therein any disposition the prosecutor
the information had been filed in court, the proper party for that being the public may deem proper thereafter
prosecutor who has the control of the prosecution of the case.38 Thus, in cases
where the private complainant is allowed to intervene by counsel in the criminal should be addressed to the court for its consideration and approval. The only
action,39 and is granted the authority to prosecute,40 the private complainant, qualification is that the action of the court must not impair the substantial rights
by counsel and with the conformity of the public prosecutor, can file a motion of the accused or the right of the People to due process of law.
for reinvestigation.
xxxx
In fact, the DOJ instructs that before the arraignment of the accused, trial
prosecutors must "examine the Information vis-à-vis the resolution of the In such an instance, before a re-investigation of the case may be conducted
investigating prosecutor in order to make the necessary corrections or by the public prosecutor, the permission or consent of the court must be
revisions and to ensure that the information is sufficient in form and secured. If after such re-investigation the prosecution finds a cogent basis to
substance."41 withdraw the information or otherwise cause the dismissal of the case, such
proposed course of action may be taken but shall likewise be addressed to the
x x x Since no evidence has been presented at that stage, the error would sound discretion of the court.46 (underscoring supplied)
appear or be discoverable from a review of the records of the preliminary
investigation. Of course, that fact may be perceived by the trial judge himself While Abugotal v. Judge Tiro47 held that to ferret out the truth, a trial is to be
but, again, realistically it will be the prosecutor who can initially preferred to a reinvestigation, the Court therein recognized that a trial court
determine the same. That is why such error need not be manifest or evident, may, where the interest of justice so requires, grant a motion for reinvestigation
nor is it required that such nuances as offenses includible in the offense of a criminal case pending before it.
charged be taken into account. It necessarily follows, therefore, that the Once the trial court grants the prosecution’s motion for reinvestigation, the
prosecutor can and should institute remedial measures[.]42 (emphasis former is deemed to have deferred to the authority of the prosecutorial arm of
and underscoring supplied) the Government. Having brought the case back to the drawing board, the
The prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive department of the prosecution is thus equipped with discretion – wide and far reaching –
government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws regarding the disposition thereof,48 subject to the trial court’s approval of the
are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our resulting proposed course of action.
laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The right to prosecute vests the Since a reinvestigation may entail a modification of the criminal information as
prosecutor with a wide range of discretion – the discretion of what and whom what happened in the present case, the Court’s holding is bolstered by the rule
to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which on amendment of an information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of
are best appreciated by prosecutors.43 Court:
The prosecution’s discretion is not boundless or infinite, however. 44 The A complaint or information may be amended, in form or in substance,
standing principle is that once an information is filed in court, any remedial without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his plea.
measure such as a reinvestigation must be addressed to the sound discretion After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with
leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights More importantly, reinvestigation is required in cases involving a substantial
of the accused. amendment of the information. Due process of law demands that no
substantial amendment of an information may be admitted without conducting
However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the another or a new preliminary investigation. In Matalam v. The 2nd Division of
offense charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, the Sandiganbayan,54 the Court ruled that a substantial amendment in an
can be made only upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended information entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation, unless the
party and with leave of court. The court shall state its reasons in resolving the amended information contains a charge related to or is included in the original
motion and copies of its order shall be furnished all parties, especially the Information.
offended party.
The question to be resolved is whether the amendment of the Information from
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in homicide to murder is considered a substantial amendment, which would
charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or make it not just a right but a duty of the prosecution to ask for a preliminary
information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in investigation.
accordance with section 11, Rule 119, provided the accused would not be
placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the witnesses to give bail for The Court answers in the affirmative.
their appearance at the trial. (emphasis supplied)
A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the
In fine, before the accused enters a plea, a formal or substantial amendment offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All
of the complaint or information may be made without leave of court. 49 After the other matters are merely of form. The following have been held to be
entry of a plea, only a formal amendment may be made but with leave of court mere formal amendments: (1) new allegations which relate only to the range
and only if it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. After arraignment, a of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of conviction; (2) an
substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same is beneficial to the amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct from
accused.50 that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter
the prosecution’s theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused
It must be clarified though that not all defects in an information are curable by and affect the form of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment
amendment prior to entry of plea. An information which is void ab initio cannot which does not adversely affect any substantial right of the accused; and (5)
be amended to obviate a ground for quashal.51 An amendment which operates an amendment that merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
to vest jurisdiction upon the trial court is likewise impermissible. 52 information and not to introduce new and material facts, and merely states with
Considering the general rule that an information may be amended even in additional precision something which is already contained in the original
substance and even without leave of court at any time before entry of plea, information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
does it mean that the conduct of a reinvestigation at that stage is a mere charged.
superfluity? The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether
It is not. a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after
the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
Any remedial measure springing from the reinvestigation – be it a complete would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other.
disposition or an intermediate modification53 of the charge – is eventually An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the
addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, which must make an crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause
independent evaluation or assessment of the merits of the case. Since the trial surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet the new averment
court would ultimately make the determination on the proposed course of had each been held to be one of form and not of substance. 55 (emphasis and
action, it is for the prosecution to consider whether a reinvestigation is underscoring supplied)
necessary to adduce and review the evidence for purposes of buttressing the
appropriate motion to be filed in court. Matalam adds that the mere fact that the two charges are related does not
necessarily or automatically deprive the accused of his right to another
preliminary investigation. Notatu dignum is the fact that both the original
Information and the amended Information in Matalam were similarly charging respondent as long as efforts to reach him were made and an opportunity to
the accused with violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt controvert the complainant’s evidence was accorded him.62
Practices Act.
In his second assignment of error, petitioner basically assails the hurried
In one case,56 it was squarely held that the amendment of the Information from issuance of the last two assailed RTC Orders despite the pendency before the
homicide to murder is "one of substance with very serious appellate court of the petition for certiorari challenging the first two trial court
consequences."57 The amendment involved in the present case consists of Orders allowing a reinvestigation.
additional averments of the circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation,
and cruelty, which qualify the offense charged from homicide to murder. It The Rules categorically state that the petition shall not interrupt the course of
being a new and material element of the offense, petitioner should be given the principal case unless a temporary retraining order or a writ of preliminary
the chance to adduce evidence on the matter. Not being merely clarificatory, injunction has been issued.63 The appellate court, by Resolution of February
the amendment essentially varies the prosecution’s original theory of the case 15, 2007,64 denied petitioner’s application for a temporary restraining order
and certainly affects not just the form but the weight of defense to be mustered and writ of preliminary injunction. Supplementary efforts to seek injunctive
by petitioner. reliefs proved futile.65 The appellate court thus did not err in finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when it proceeded with the
The Court distinguishes the factual milieus in Buhat v. CA58 and Pacoy v. case and eventually arraigned the accused on March 21, 2007, there being no
Cajigal,59 wherein the amendment of the caption of the Information from injunction order from the appellate court. Moreover, petitioner opted to forego
homicide to murder was not considered substantial because there was no real appealing to the DOJ Secretary, a post-inquest remedy that was available after
change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged as alleged in the the reinvestigation and which could have suspended the
body of the Information, as the allegations of qualifying circumstances were 66
arraignment. 1avvphi1
already clearly embedded in the original Information. Buhat pointed out that
the original Information for homicide already alleged the use of superior Regarding petitioner’s protestations of haste, suffice to state that the pace in
strength, while Pacoy states that the averments in the amended Information resolving incidents of the case is not per se an indication of bias. In Santos-
for murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original Concio v. Department of Justice,67 the Court held:
Information for homicide. None of these peculiar circumstances obtains in the Speed in the conduct of proceedings by a judicial or quasi-judicial officer
present case. cannot per se be instantly attributed to an injudicious performance of functions.
Considering that another or a new preliminary investigation is required, the fact For one’s prompt dispatch may be another’s undue haste. The orderly
that what was conducted in the present case was a reinvestigation does not administration of justice remains as the paramount and constant consideration,
invalidate the substantial amendment of the Information. There is no with particular regard of the circumstances peculiar to each case.
substantial distinction between a preliminary investigation and a The presumption of regularity includes the public officer’s official actuations in
reinvestigation since both are conducted in the same manner and for the same all phases of work. Consistent with such presumption, it was incumbent upon
objective of determining whether there exists sufficient ground to engender a petitioners to present contradictory evidence other than a mere tallying of days
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is or numerical calculation. This, petitioners failed to discharge. The swift
probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. 60 What is essential is that completion of the Investigating Panel’s initial task cannot be relegated as
petitioner was placed on guard to defend himself from the charge of shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular performance of
murder61 after the claimed circumstances were made known to him as early not just one but five state prosecutors.68
as the first motion.
There is no ground for petitioner’s protestations against the DOJ Secretary’s
Petitioner did not, however, make much of the opportunity to present sudden designation of Senior State Prosecutor Emmanuel Velasco as Acting
countervailing evidence on the proposed amended charge. Despite notice of City Prosecutor of Makati City for the present case69 and the latter’s conformity
hearing, petitioner opted to merely observe the proceedings and declined to to the motion for reinvestigation.
actively participate, even with extreme caution, in the reinvestigation. Mercado
v. Court of Appeals states that the rules do not even require, as a condition In granting the reinvestigation, Judge Alameda cannot choose the public
sine qua non to the validity of a preliminary investigation, the presence of the prosecutor who will conduct the reinvestigation or preliminary
investigation.70 There is a hierarchy of officials in the prosecutory arm of the prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
executive branch headed by the Secretary of Justice 71 who is vested with the cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
prerogative to appoint a special prosecutor or designate an acting prosecutor crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
to handle a particular case, which broad power of control has been recognized such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
by jurisprudence.72 criminal case must be filed in court. Whether that function has been correctly
discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether he has made a correct
As for the trial court’s ignoring the DOJ Secretary’s uncontested statements to ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that
the media which aired his opinion that if the assailant merely intended to maim the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.77
and not to kill the victim, one bullet would have sufficed — the DOJ Secretary
reportedly uttered that "the filing of the case of homicide against ano against The judicial determination of probable cause is one made by the judge to
Leviste lintek naman eh I told you to watch over that case… there should be a ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused.
report about the ballistics, about the paraffin, etc., then that’s not a complete The judge must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is
investigation, that’s why you should use that as a ground" — no abuse of necessity for placing the accused under custody in order not to frustrate the
discretion, much less a grave one, can be imputed to it. ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the judge cannot be
forced to issue the arrest warrant.78 Paragraph (a), Section 5,79 Rule 112 of
The statements of the DOJ Secretary do not evince a "determination to file the the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed by the RTC.
Information even in the absence of probable cause."73 On the contrary, the
remarks merely underscored the importance of securing basic investigative To move the court to conduct a judicial determination of probable cause is a
reports to support a finding of probable cause. The original Resolution even mere superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to
recognized that probable cause for the crime of murder cannot be determined personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting
based on the evidence obtained "[u]nless and until a more thorough evidence. In fact, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed
investigation is conducted and eyewitness/es [is/]are presented in with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence
evidence[.]"74 of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.80

The trial court concluded that "the wound sustained by the victim at the back What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility
of his head, the absence of paraffin test and ballistic examination, and the of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
handling of physical evidence,"75 as rationalized by the prosecution in its But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and
motion, are sufficient circumstances that require further inquiry. his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
That the evidence of guilt was not strong as subsequently assessed in the bail the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis
hearings does not affect the prior determination of probable cause because, thereof, he may already make a personal determination of the existence of
as the appellate court correctly stated, the standard of strong evidence of guilt probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may
which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the disregard the prosecutor’s report and require the submission of supporting
standard of judicial probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence
case.76 of probable cause.81 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In his third assignment of error, petitioner faults the trial court for not The rules do not require cases to be set for hearing to determine probable
conducting, at the very least, a hearing for judicial determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused before any warrant
cause, considering the lack of substantial or material new evidence adduced may be issued.82 Petitioner thus cannot, as a matter of right, insist on a hearing
during the reinvestigation. for judicial determination of probable cause. Certainly, petitioner "cannot
Petitioner’s argument is specious. determine beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the [judge's] examination of
the records should be [since t]he extent of the judge’s examination depends
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and on the exercise of his sound discretion as the circumstances of the case
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during require."83 In one case, the Court emphatically stated:
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
The periods provided in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
are mandatory, and as such, the judge must determine the presence or
absence of probable cause within such periods. The Sandiganbayan’s
determination of probable cause is made ex parte and is summary in nature,
not adversarial. The Judge should not be stymied and distracted from his
determination of probable cause by needless motions for determination
of probable cause filed by the accused.84 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

Petitioner proceeds to discuss at length evidentiary matters, arguing that no

circumstances exist that would qualify the crime from homicide to murder.

The allegation of lack of substantial or material new evidence deserves no

credence, because new pieces of evidence are not prerequisites for a valid
conduct of reinvestigation. It is not material that no new matter or evidence
was presented during the reinvestigation of the case. It should be stressed that
reinvestigation, as the word itself implies, is merely a repeat investigation of
the case. New matters or evidence are not prerequisites for a reinvestigation,
which is simply a chance for the prosecutor to review and re-evaluate its
findings and the evidence already submitted.85

Moreover, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be
raised in, and be subject of, a petition for review on certiorari since this Court
is not a trier of facts. The Court cannot thus review the evidence adduced by
the parties on the issue of the absence or presence of probable cause, as
there exists no exceptional circumstances to warrant a factual review.86

In a petition for certiorari, like that filed by petitioner before the appellate court,
the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only
errors of jurisdiction.1avvphi1 It is not to stray at will and resolve questions and
issues beyond its competence, such as an error of judgment.87 The court’s
duty in the pertinent case is confined to determining whether the executive and
judicial determination of probable cause was done without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Although it is possible that error
may be committed in the discharge of lawful functions, this does not render
the act amenable to correction and annulment by the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction.88

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97761 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919 The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women
were landed and receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial
ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL., petitioners, governor of Davao, and by Feliciano Yñigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor
vs. and the hacendero Yñigo, who appear as parties in the case, had no previous
JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL., respondents. notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled from the
Alfonso Mendoza for petitioners. city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges
City Fiscal Diaz for respondents. growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential
to the disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the
MALCOLM, J.: women married, others assumed more or less clandestine relations with men,
others went to work in different capacities, others assumed a life unknown and
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the
disappeared, and a goodly portion found means to return to Manila.
one which this application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While
hardly to be expected to be met with in this modern epoch of triumphant To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and
democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great difficulty if there is kept the Negros were putting in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends
in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular government, and if of a considerable number of the deportees presented an application
we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the
independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the
question is — Shall the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions
government of laws to be set up in the Philippine Islands? concerned them all, the application will be considered as including them. The
application set forth the salient facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged
Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but
that the women were illegally restrained of their liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor
which might prove profitable reading for other departments of the government,
of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, and
the facts are these: The Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best
by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full court.
of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women
The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted
of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in the city of
certain facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ
Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were
should not be granted because the petitioners were not proper parties,
kept confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during
because the action should have been begun in the Court of First Instance for
this period, the city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau
Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the respondents did not
of Labor for sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some
have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their
government office for the use of the coastguard cutters Corregidor and Negros,
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila.
and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate, about midnight
According to an exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women
of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
were destined to be laborers, at good salaries, on the haciendas of Yñigo and
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended
Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal admitted, in answer to question of a
upon the houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed
member of the court, that these women had been sent out of Manila without
them aboard the steamers that awaited their arrival. The women were given
their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that
no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently were under the
directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of
impression that they were being taken to a police station for an investigation.
police of the city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao,
They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They
and Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the
had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither
persons therein named, alleged to be deprived of their liberty, on December 2,
directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary
1918.
guests were received on board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau
of Labor and a detachment of Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their
their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao during the night of October 25. own expense. On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken
before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day
named in the order, December 2nd, 1918, none of the persons in whose behalf fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that despite all
the writ was issued were produced in court by the respondents. It has been efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners
shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila through and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally
their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear asked the court to find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton
before the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando
comprehensively, reiterated the stand taken by him when pleading to the Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Feliciano Yñigo,
original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the city of Manila to the an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of
provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that had Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The
passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply
Davao, and offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained to respondents' memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the
with their life in Mindanao and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents record.
Sales answered alleging that it was not possible to fulfill the order of the
Supreme Court because the women had never been under his control, In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the
because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had writ of habeas corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
married or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yñigo answered alleging One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled — these one hundred and
that he did not have any of the women under his control and that therefore it seventy women were isolated from society, and then at night, without their
was impossible for him to obey the mandate. The court, after due deliberation, consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or to defend their
on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second order, which related that the rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation to regions
respondents had not complied with the original order to the satisfaction of the unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left voluntarily
court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the
the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, presence of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that
Hohmann, Sales, and Yñigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, these officers of the law chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and
in written statements voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact impossible to refute and practically admitted
Davao or the clerk of that court, renounce the right, or unless the respondents by the respondents.
should demonstrate some other legal motives that made compliance
impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question — By
were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in
announced in the final decision. deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality
within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes and we find —
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the
women, of certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with
Davao, was taken before the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as an Act of congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of
commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Davao acting in undesirable aliens after a hearing from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the
the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents technically Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised Ordinances of the city
presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of justice of any
their own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any
respondents. Attorneys for the respondents, by their returns, once again citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the
recounted the facts and further endeavored to account for all of the persons homeland. New York and other States have statutes providing for the
involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the commitment to the House of Refuge of women convicted of being common
respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health authorities compel vaccination,
bringing from Davao with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the Culion leper colony,
were found in Davao who, on notice that if they desired they could return to it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for any
Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through sworn statements; that law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city
of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine
Islands — and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this
are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why
constitutional guaranties as are other citizens — to change their domicile from we said in the very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts
Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically should permit a government of men or a government of laws to be established
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or in the Philippine Islands.
regulation, compels any person to change his residence.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed remedies of the citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and
so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the (3) habeas corpus.
American constitutional system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply
imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party
even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the may recoup money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to
Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been pursue such an action, but it was never intended effectively and promptly to
said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary meet any such situation as that now before us.
prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these
of a municipality, who acts within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor Islands provides:
and the chief of police could, at their mere behest or even for the most
praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so insecure, then the Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general
presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the character in force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place
Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves more than two hundred kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by
such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official can virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be punished by a fine of not less than
exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three thousand two hundred
And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one and fifty pesetas.
locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation
over the head of any citizen.
of a general character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that — "No freeman to change his domicile or residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a
shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or fine of not less than six hundred and twenty-five and not more than six
free customs, or be outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his peers or by
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper
the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not deny or defer to any man
prosecuting officers find that any public officer has violated this provision of
either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1 eng. stat.
law, these prosecutors will institute and press a criminal prosecution just as
at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are
vigorously as they have defended the same official in this action. Nevertheless,
the forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official
that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be
transgressors. "The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the
proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of
Supreme Court of the United States, "is the only supreme power in our system
Judge Cooley in a case which will later be referred to — "It would be a
of government, and every man who by accepting office participates in its
monstrous anomaly in the law if to an application by one unlawfully confined,
functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to
ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient answer that the confinement
observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority
was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until the guilty party
which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said
was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure."
Justice Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may
(In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas
be compelled to hold his life, or the means of living, or any material right
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve
essential to the enjoyment of life, at the mere will of another, seems to be
persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of
intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being the essence of
personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet.
decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at liberty. When the writ was prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was
asked were under no restraint; the women, it is claimed, were free in Davao,
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of police did not extend beyond
three specific objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer examination,
(l) that there is a defect in parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of
not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that the person in question are not restrained the writ of habeas corpus.
of their liberty by respondents. It was finally suggested that the jurisdiction of
the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only extends to the city A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint
limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao. of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which
were relatives and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women
conducted by the city officials made it impossible for the women to sign a from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to other parties,
petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper for the writ to be who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78; locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal without either money or personal belongings, they were prevented from
liberty, even makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas exercising the liberty of going when and where they pleased. The restraint of
corpus if there is evidence that within the court's jurisdiction a person is liberty which began in Manila continued until the aggrieved parties were
unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty, though no application be made returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived his right.
therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had standing in
court. Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean.
The chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the
of First Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could
court. It is a general rule of good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that
and inconvenience, petitions for habeas corpus should be presented to the he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the
nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a hard and fast rule. true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the
The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any judge court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo
thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the
Procedure, sec. 79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
be made returnable before the Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not
in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is dependent on the particular issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law,
circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of First Instance could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials
of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila.
advance their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain
petitioners with their attorneys, and the two original respondents with their a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow
attorney, were in Manila; it was shown that the case involved parties situated the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright
in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the women might still be of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be
imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ was easily evaded.
to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided
immediately by the appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the
the application and then to grant the writ would have amounted to a denial of courts for decision. Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination
the benefits of the writ.
of the authorities fails to reveal any analogous case. Certain decisions of free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to release his
respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature. constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he
fails to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early fine and imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any
date as to whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the other means are resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are
Supreme Court to a person within the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the usual. The place of confinement is, therefore, not important to the relief, if the
State a minor child under guardianship in the State, who has been and guilty party is within reach of process, so that by the power of the court he can
continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the Michigan be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording redress is not
Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as
justice, and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of
presented the court was equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred control exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of
Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416.)
distinguished American judges and law-writers, with whom concurred
Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other
Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English courts. (Rivers vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911],
decisions, and since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
contrary view, only the following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice
Cooley are quoted: The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a
child had been taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas
I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue corpus was issued by the Queen's Bench Division upon the application of the
the present writ on the petition which was laid before us. . . . mother and her husband directing the defendant to produce the child. The
judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the child,
It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the
centuries and a half have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers writ had been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his
of blood shed for its establishment; after its many confirmations, until Coke custody or control, and that it was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was
could declare in his speech on the petition of right that "Magna Charta was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the court, through Lord Esher, M. R.,
such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its said:
benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas
corpus acts, it should now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22.
the protection of personal liberty, which is the life and soul of the whole That writ commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a
instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is important that it be judge in chambers at the Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt
determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper remedy, of the writ, together with the cause of her being taken and detained. That is a
as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . . command to bring the child before the judge and must be obeyed, unless some
lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it could
The second proposition — that the statutory provisions are confined to the be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of
case of imprisonment within the state — seems to me to be based upon a the child before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to
misconception as to the source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in produce the child, that might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful
England that the court of king's bench derived its jurisdiction to issue and reason he is bound to produce the child, and, if he does not, he is in contempt
enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed to give the right, of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful excuse. Many efforts have
but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . . been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some anterior
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to
this writ is, that it is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but the writ cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done
his jailor. It does not reach the former except through the latter. The officer or before the issue of the writ. The question is whether there has been a contempt
person who serves it does not unbar the prison doors, and set the prisoner in disobeying the writ it was issued by not producing the child in obedience to
its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B. D., 305. See also to For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses
the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N. S.], were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according
233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.) to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on
account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
corpus was directed to the defendant to have before the circuit court of the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of
District of Columbia three colored persons, with the cause of their detention. Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons
Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he had purchased the in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of
negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were performance; and they did not present writings that waived the right to be
removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to
of habeas corpus, and that they were then beyond his control and out of his show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of which
custody. The evidence tended to show that Davis had removed the negroes have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That
because he suspected they would apply for a writ of habeas corpus. The court through ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty,
held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was bound to could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the
produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to municipality of Davao, and that about this number either returned at their own
produce them, ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall expense or were produced at the second hearing by the respondents.
until he should produce the negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course
of law. The court afterwards ordered that Davis be released upon the The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been
production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run away and warranted summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court,
been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the
day of the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. non-production of the persons were far from sufficient. The, authorities cited
No. 14926. See also Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate with what
Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.) exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's
case, supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said:
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense "We thought that, having brought about that state of things by his own illegal
offered by the respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the act, he must take the consequences; and we said that he was bound to use
writ of habeas corpus. every effort to get the child back; that he must do much more than write letters
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if necessary
orders of the Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the
found that they did not, whether the contempt should be punished or be taken matter; and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute
as purged. impossibility by way of excuse." In other words, the return did not show that
every possible effort to produce the women was made by the respondents.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action was because it did
Francisco Sales, and Feliciano Yñigo to present the persons named in the writ not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between
before the court on December 2, 1918. The order was dated November 4, executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the
1918. The respondents were thus given ample time, practically one month, to respondents another chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate
comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the city of their wrong.
Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the
provincial governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have
Bureau of Labor to the telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women become more zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were
who desired to return to Manila, but who should not be permitted to do so dispatched to Mindanao, placards were posted, the constabulary and the
because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted effort naturally resulted municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a steamer with free
in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the day transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges in
named. such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading
of the record might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we made arrangements for the steamers and the constabulary, who conducted
come to conclude that there is a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and who later, as the head of the
this effect may be influenced somewhat by our sincere desire to see this city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of the
unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being perpetrated in Davao, unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of
it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual is still Manila. His intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His
restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas methods were unlawful. His regard for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the
corpus proceedings. court was only tardily and reluctantly acknowledged.

Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil
compliance with it, nothing further in this connection remains to be done. Procedure, which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in
pursuance thereof to require respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would reach to many thousands of
Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some members of
of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that
of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the Bureau of Labor, since respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the
Feliciano Yñigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz, Fiscal of the city court, he has purged his contempt of the first order. Some members of the
of Manila. court are inclined to this merciful view. Between the two extremes appears to
The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban to obey the first
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of
court invoke its inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as
administration of justice must falter or fail. Nevertheless when one is extenuating his conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect
commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and does not without being unduly oppressive — such an amount is P100.
offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the In resume — as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is
respondent to be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or necessary. The respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yñigo,
fined. An officer's failure to produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ and Diaz are found not to be in contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found
of habeas corpus when he has power to do so, is a contempt committed in the in contempt of court and shall pay into the office of the clerk of the Supreme
face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In re Patterson [1888], Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos (P100). The motion of
99 N. C., 407.) the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al
With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible be taxed against respondents. So ordered.
exception of the first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to
opposition to its authority. Respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and express the hope that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of
Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while, under the law of an orderly government of laws and to protect individual liberty from illegal
public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a encroachment.
powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yñigo appears to have been
drawn into the case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic Arellano, C.J., Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
communications. The city fiscal, Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no
more than to fulfill his duty as the legal representative of the city government.
Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his counter-motion to strike
from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners, which brings
him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done,
as far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for
the unlawful deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who