MVRS Publication V Islamic Da'wah

127 MVRS Publication v Islamic Da’wah (2003) [Special Torts]
MVRS Publication v Islamic Da’wah
G.R. No. 135306
Facts: Islamic Da’wah council of the Philippines filed for a complaint for damages in their own behalf and
a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS Publication arising from an article
they published in Bulgar, a daily tabloid which reads:
"ALAM BA NINYO?
Na ang mga baboy at kahit anong uri ng hayop sa Mindanao ay hindi kinakain ng mga Muslim?
Para sa kanila ang mga ito ay isang sagradong bagay. Hindi nila ito kailangang kainin kahit na sila pa ay
magutom at mawalan ng ulam sa tuwing sila ay kakain. Ginagawa nila itong Diyos at sinasamba pa nila
ito sa tuwing araw ng kanilang pangingilin lalung-lalo na sa araw na tinatawag nilang 'Ramadan'."
They alleged that the libelous statements was insulting and damaging to the Muslim; that these
words alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but
with intent to hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this
country, in violation of law, public policy, good morals and human relations, that on account of these
libelous words Bulgar insulted not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world,
especially every Muslim individual in non-Muslim countries.
MVRS in their defense stated they did not mention Islamic Da’wah as the object of said article
and therefore not entitled to damages, and that such article is an expression of belief or opinion and was
published without malice or intention to cause damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims. The trial court
dismissed the said complaint for failure to establish a cause of action since the persons allegedly
defamed by the article were not specifically identified. As the statement referred to a larger collective of
Muslims makes the readers not readily identify the personalities of the defamed. Thus, it is difficult to
prove that such remarks apply to them. Court of appeals reversed said decision stating that it was clear
from the disputed article that the defamation was directed to all adherents of the Islamic faith. It stated
that pigs were sacred and idolized as god by members of the Muslim religion. This libelous imputation
undeniably applied to the Islamic Da’wah who are Muslims sharing the same religious beliefs. It added
that the suit for damages was a class suit and that Islamic Da’wah’s religious status as a Muslim umbrella
organization gave it the requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims. Hence, the
instant petition for review.
Issue: WON the MVRS should be liable for the libelous article published.
Held: No the court held that MVRS is not liable, It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting
are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-
natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in
the absence of an allegation for special damages.
The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or
identifiable individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a
class, no member of such class has a right of action without at all impairing the equally demanding right of
free speech and expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.
However the court concludes that the statements published by MVRS in the instant case did not
specifically identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged
libelous publication. Islamic Da’wah can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure
pointedly resulting in damages.
A contrary view is expressed that what is involved in the present case is an intentional tortious act
causing mental distress and not an action for libel. That opinion invokes Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire where the U.S. Supreme Court held that words heaping extreme profanity, intended merely to
incite hostility, hatred or violence, have no social value and do not enjoy constitutional protection;
and Beauharnais v. Illinois where it was also ruled that hate speech which denigrates a group of persons
identified by their religion, race or ethnic origin defames that group and the law may validly prohibit such
speech on the same ground as defamation of an individual.
However the courts do not agree to the contrary view articulated. Primarily, an emotional distress
tort action is personal in nature, it is a civil action filed by an individual to assuage the injuries to his
emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no application in the instant case
since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the purported damage
caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm, which includes
harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from the
principle of reactive harm, which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of
an infliction of emotional distress. In their complaint, respondents clearly asserted an alleged harm to the
standing of Muslims in the community, especially to their activities in propagating their faith in Metro
Manila and in other non-Muslim communities in the country. It is thus beyond cavil that the present case
falls within the application of the relational harm principle of tort actions for defamation, rather than
the reactive harm principle on which the concept of emotional distress properly belongs.
Citing the first amendment principals in the Cohen case the American courts no longer accept the view
that speech may be proscribed merely because it is "lewd," "profane," "insulting" or otherwise vulgar or
offensive. No specific individual was targeted in the allegedly defamatory words printed on Cohen's
jacket.
They ruled when it comes to religious matters if only to affirm the neutrality principle of free
speech rights under modern jurisprudence where "all ideas are treated equal in the eyes of the First
Amendment even those ideas that are universally condemned and run counter to constitutional
principles." Under the right to free speech, "there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the
competition of other ideas."

MVRS Publication V Islamic Da'wah

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

MVRS Publication V Islamic Da'wah

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

MVRS Publication V Islamic Da'wah

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

127 MVRS Publication v Islamic Da’wah (2003) [Special Torts]

MVRS Publication v Islamic Da’wah

G.R. No. 135306

You might also like