Pimentel v. Llorente
Pimentel v. Llorente
Pimentel v. Llorente
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment against respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon for gross misconduct,
serious breach of trust, and violation of the lawyer’s oath in connection with the discharge of their duties as members of
the Pasig City Board of Canvassers in the May 8, 1995 elections. Salayon, then election officer of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), was designated chairman of said Board, while Llorente, who was then City Prosecutor of Pasig
City, served as its ex oficio vice-chairman as provided by law.1 Complainant, now a senator, was also a candidate for the
Senate in that election.
Complainant alleges that, in violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b),2respondents tampered with the votes received by him, with
the result that, as shown in the Statements of Votes (SoVs) and Certificate of Canvass (CoC) pertaining to 1,263 precincts
of Pasig City, (1) senatorial candidates Juan Ponce Enrile, Anna Dominique Coseteng, Gregorio Honasan, Marcelo
Fernan, Ramon Mitra, and Rodolfo Biazon were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually
received while, on the other hand, petitioners votes were reduced; (2) in 101 precincts, Enriles votes were in excess of the
total number of voters who actually voted therein; and (3) the votes from 22 precincts were twice recorded in 18 SoVs.
Complainant maintains that, by signing the SoVs and CoC despite respondents knowledge that some of the entries
therein were false, the latter committed a serious breach of public trust and of their lawyers oath.
Respondents denied the allegations against them. They alleged that the preparation of the SoVs was made by the 12
canvassing committees which the Board had constituted to assist in the canvassing. They claimed that the errors pointed
out by complainant could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.
In his Consolidated Reply, complainant counters that respondents should be held responsible for the illegal padding of the
votes considering the nature and extent of the irregularities and the fact that the canvassing of the election returns was
done under their control and supervision.
On December 4, 1998, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, to which this matter had been referred pursuant to Rule 139-
B, 13, in relation to 20 of the Rules of Court, recommended the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. 3 Petitioner filed
a motion for reconsideration on March 11, 1999, but his motion was denied in a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors
dated April 22, 1999. On June 4, 1999, he filed this petition pursuant to Rule 139-B, 12(c). chanrobles virtual law library
It appears that complainant likewise filed criminal charges against respondents before the COMELEC (E.O. Case No. 96-
1132) for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b). In its resolution dated January 8, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed
complainants charges for insufficiency of evidence. However, on a petition for certiorari filed by complainant,4 this Court
set aside the resolution and directed the COMELEC to file appropriate criminal charges against respondents.
Reconsideration was denied on August 15, 2000.
Considering the foregoing facts, we hold that respondents are guilty of misconduct.
First. Respondent Llorente seeks the dismissal of the present petition on the ground that it was filed late. He contends that
a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B, 12(c)5 and, therefore, the filing of such motion
before the IBP Board of Governors did not toll the running of the period of appeal. Respondent further contends that,
assuming such motion can be filed, petitioner nevertheless failed to indicate the date of his receipt of the April 22, 1999
resolution of the IBP denying his motion for reconsideration so that it cannot be ascertained whether his petition was filed
within the 15-day period under Rule 139-B, 12(c).
The contention has no merit. The question of whether a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading or not under
Rule 139-B, 12(c) has been settled in Halimao v. Villanueva,6 in which this Court held:
Although Rule 139-B, 12(c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests
that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such
motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to
afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a
misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[7
On the question whether petitioners present petition was filed within the 15-day period provided under Rule 139-B, 12(c),
although the records show that it was filed on June 4, 1999, respondent has not shown when petitioner received a copy of
the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors denying his motion for reconsideration. It would appear, however, that the
petition was filed on time because a copy of the resolution personally served on the Office of the Bar Confidant of this
Court was received by it on May 18, 1999. Since copies of IBP resolutions are sent to the parties by mail, it is possible
that the copy sent to petitioner was received by him later than May 18, 1999. Hence, it may be assumed that his present
petition was filed within 15 days from his receipt of the IBP resolution. In any event, the burden was on respondent, as the
moving party, to show that the petition in this case was filed beyond the 15-day period for filing it.
Even assuming that petitioner received the IBP resolution in question on May 18, 1999, i.e., on the same date a copy of
the same was received by the Office of the Bar Confidant, the delay would only be two days. 8 The delay may be
overlooked, considering the merit of this case. Disbarment proceedings are undertaken solely for public welfare. The sole
question for determination is whether a member of the bar is fit to be allowed the privileges as such or not. The
complainant or the person who called the attention of the Court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party,
and generally has no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of
justice.9 For this reason, laws dealing with double jeopardy10 or prescription11 or with procedure like verification of
pleadings12 and prejudicial questions13 have no application to disbarment proceedings.
Even in ordinary civil actions, the period for perfecting appeals is relaxed in the interest of justice and equity where the
appealed case is clearly meritorious. Thus, we have given due course to appeals even though filed six, 14 four,15 and
three16 days late. In this case, the petition is clearly meritorious.
Second. The IBP recommends the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of the following: (1) respondents had no
involvement in the tabulation of the election returns, because when the Statements of Votes (SoVs) were given to them,
such had already been accomplished and only needed their respective signatures; (2) the canvassing was done in the
presence of watchers, representatives of the political parties, the media, and the general public so that respondents would
not have risked the commission of any irregularity; and (3) the acts dealt with in R.A. No. 6646, 27(b) are mala in se and
not mala prohibita, and petitioner failed to establish criminal intent on the part of respondents. 17 chanrobles virtual law
library
The recommendation is unacceptable. In disciplinary proceedings against members of the bar, only clear preponderance
of evidence is required to establish liability. 18 As long as the evidence presented by complainant or that taken judicial
notice of by the Court19 is more convincing and worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto,20 the
imposition of disciplinary sanction is justified. chanrobles virtual law library
In this case, respondents do not dispute the fact that massive irregularities attended the canvassing of the Pasig City
election returns. The only explanation they could offer for such irregularities is that the same could be due to honest
mistake, human error, and/or fatigue on the part of the members of the canvassing committees who prepared the
SoVs. chanrobles virtual law library
This is the same allegation made in Pimentel v. Commission on Elections.21 In rejecting this allegation and ordering
respondents prosecuted for violation of R.A. No. 6646, 27(b), this Court said: chanrobles virtual law library
There is a limit, We believe, to what can be construed as an honest mistake or oversight due to fatigue, in the
performance of official duty. The sheer magnitude of the error, not only in the total number of votes garnered by the
aforementioned candidates as reflected in the CoC and the SoVs, which did not tally with that reflected in the election
returns, but also in the total number of votes credited for senatorial candidate Enrile which exceeded the total number of
voters who actually voted in those precincts during the May 8, 1995 elections, renders the defense of honest mistake or
oversight due to fatigue, as incredible and simply unacceptable.[22 chanrobles virtual law library
Indeed, what is involved here is not just a case of mathematical error in the tabulation of votes per precinct as reflected in
the election returns and the subsequent entry of the erroneous figures in one or two SoVs23 but a systematic scheme to
pad the votes of certain senatorial candidates at the expense of petitioner in complete disregard of the tabulation in the
election returns. A cursory look at the evidence submitted by petitioner reveals that, in at least 24 SoVs involving 101
precincts, the votes for candidate Enrile exceeded the number of voters who actually voted in the said precincts and, in 18
SoVs, returns from 22 precincts were tabulated twice. In addition, as the Court noted in Pimentel, the total number of
votes credited to each of the seven senatorial candidates in question, as reflected in the CoC, markedly differ from those
indicated in the SoVs.24Despite the fact that these discrepancies, especially the double recording of the returns from 22
precincts and the variation in the tabulation of votes as reflected in the SoVs and CoC, were apparent on the face of these
documents and that the variation involves substantial number of votes, respondents nevertheless certified the SoVs as
true and correct. Their acts constitute misconduct. chanrobles virtual law library
Respondent Llorentes contention that he merely certified the genuineness and due execution of the SoVs but not their
correctness is belied by the certification which reads: chanrobles virtual law library
WE HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Statement of Votes by . . . [p]recinct is true and correct. IN WITNESS
WHEREOF, we sign these presents at the City/Municipality of ___________ Province of ____________ this
_______ day of May, 1995. (Emphasis added) chanrobles virtual law library
Nor does the fact that the canvassing was open to the public and observed by numerous individuals preclude the
commission of acts for which respondents are liable. The fact is that only they had access to the SoVs and CoC and thus
had the opportunity to compare them and detect the discrepancies therein. chanrobles virtual law library
Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official.25 However, if the misconduct also constitutes a violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility or the lawyers oath or is of such character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows
moral delinquency on his part, such individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such
misconduct.26 chanrobles virtual law library
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code
which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. By express provision
of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the government service. In addition, they likewise violated their oath of
office as lawyers to do no falsehood. chanrobles virtual law library
Nowhere is the need for lawyers to observe honesty both in their private and in their public dealings better expressed
in Sabayle v. Tandayag27 in which this Court said: chanrobles virtual law library
There is a strong public interest involved in requiring lawyers . . . to behave at all times in a manner consistent with truth
and honor. It is important that the common caricature that lawyers by and large do not feel compelled to speak the truth
and to act honestly, should not become a common reality. . . .[28 chanrobles virtual law library
It may be added that, as lawyers in the government service, respondents were under greater obligation to observe this
basic tenet of the profession because a public office is a public trust. chanrobles virtual law library
Third. Respondents participation in the irregularities herein reflects on the legal profession, in general, and on lawyers in
government, in particular. Such conduct in the performance of their official duties, involving no less than the ascertainment
of the popular will as expressed through the ballot, would have merited for them suspension were it not for the fact that
this is their first administrative transgression and, in the case of Salayon, after a long public service. 29 Under the
circumstances, a penalty of fine in the amount of P10,000.00 for each of the respondents should be sufficient. chanrobles
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Antonio M. Llorente and Ligaya P. Salayon GUILTY of misconduct and
imposes on each of them a FINE in the amount of P10,000.00 with a WARNING that commission of similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. chanrobles virtual law library