This Content Downloaded From 117.234.207.57 On Tue, 03 Nov 2020 16:31:53 UTC
This Content Downloaded From 117.234.207.57 On Tue, 03 Nov 2020 16:31:53 UTC
This Content Downloaded From 117.234.207.57 On Tue, 03 Nov 2020 16:31:53 UTC
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
and are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Biennial Review of
Anthropology
HISTORICAL ORIENTATION
will never be th
put of the past dozen years, during which analysis has come of age, in
the field of religion as in other fields of social inquiry.
Anthropologists writing about religion either have given their own
definitions of the term and its synonyms or constituents (magic, the
supernatural, ritual and belief systems, etc.) or have had some previous
definition in mind. Now there is a wide chasm between Tylor's defini-
tion of religion as "belief in spiritual beings" and C. Geertz's definition
(see p. 237), just as there is between the early definitions of anthropol-
ogy as "the study of culture" or of "artifacts, socifacts, and mentifacts"
and M. Harris's definition (1964: 169) as "actones, episodes, nodes,
nodal chains, nomoclones, . . . permaclones . . . and many other emic
things." From crudely naive, impressionistic beginnings to the accurate,
largely presupposition-less definitions of our day, we have a gamut of
parallel types of treatment of the subjects involved, so much that we can
almost infer the accuracy and complexity of the whole presentation from
thbe accuracy and complexity of the definitions made.
The anthropological study of religion has, of course, no place for
overt or covert statements about the truth of religion, or of one religion
rather than another. Durkheim stated quite correctly that there is no such
thing as a study of religion-that all such study can only be one of re-
ligions, or of a specific religion. The anthropologist, as anthropologist,
can neither make such statements nor do research with the intention of
finding "truth" in any religion. This reviewer, for example, happens to
be an ordained Hindu monk and regards himself as a committed Hindu,
but he keeps t-his commitment out of his anthropological research on
Hindu society. The late Father Koppers, an ethnological mentor of this
reviewer, said in his lectures around 1947, "Just as a man who can build
a canoe can describe it better as an ethnographer, so a person who is
devoutly religious will be better equipped to talk about the ethnogra-
phy of religion." This statement propounds a grave fallacy, and one, I
suppose, that accounts for the early demise of the Grabner-Schmidt-
Koppers approach to the study of religion by anthropologists. The eleven
volumes of the Origin of the Idea of God (Schmidt and Koppers, Der
Ursprung der Gottesidee, 1920-55) are incredibly erudite-but the
theological underpinnings are so evident at every step that all but the
historians of ethnology can only regret the enormous input of energy
represented.
At the back of the confusion between the anthropological and the re-
ligious or doctrinal approach to religion is what I call the normative
the operation of ritual and belief. The question that seemed to vex the
old masters was that of the connection between religion and magic.
None of them seemed to realize fully that these were semantic problems
at best, or just somewhat trivial terminological recommendations. Rosa-
lie and Murray Wax (1963) showed convincingly that there are two
theoretical alternatives in the magic-religion complex: for Tylor and
Frazer, magic was the manifestation of an early, primitive evolutionary
stage, a stage of erroneous science or prescience; for Durkheim, magic
was immoral and antisocial, since it meant manipulation of individuals
by individuals. Weber thought that Western writers disliked magic be-
cause of the doctrinal Judaeo-Christian disdain for it; the other alter-
native is the one espoused by the Waxes (1963: 495-518), i.e. that the
magical world view is simply a different one, contrasting sharply with
the rational (Hellenic and later) and Judaeo-Christian ideological
basics. By implication, this second, more refined and more tenable view
is held by linguistically oriented anthropologists, this reviewer among
them, who start with what people say rather than with armchair as-
sumptions.
What seems out of order in this post-Freudian era is the dominant
intellectual motivation shared by the early writers, the quest for the
origin of religion-not of "religions" or of "religion X," for such are, of
course, perfectly permissible themes for historians. Frazer and Tylor
were under the spell of a total conversion to evolutionary theory: all
problems seemed to be either solved or solvable in principle with the
proper application of evolutionary stratagems. Themes that did not
point to questions of origin and teleology, bridged by an evolutionary
answer, they saw as unimportant. Indeed, the enormous aggregation of
ethnographic data that Frazer presented in the Golden Bough, col-
lected from a motley assemblage of reports made by a motley assem-
blage of authors, was meant to prove a point: that Frazer's and Tylor's
own culture was the natural culmination of all possible schemes of cul-
tural evolution. Beattie (1964c: 66) tells us how these writers referred
to the ideas of the primitives as "childish" and therefore easy to compre-
hend; they were thus of little interest to scholars, who must instead turn
their academic attention to origins-to the question of how adult people
came by such childish ideas.
Virtually all anthropologists or sociologists before Durkheim sought
the origins of religion, not in a historical or archaeological way, but by
some sort of ideological speculation. The real breakthrough came only
with the Parisian Annee Sociologique, started by a group of scholars
Hindus. Thus also Father Koppers, marveling at the Bhils' beautiful con-
ception of their all-god "Bhagavan," angrily rejected the suggestion that
"Bhagavan" was a good Sanskrit word used by all Hindus in referring to
divinity in the most general, nontheological terms, and was not at all
the patent of the primitive Bhil tribals.
The early writers' fascination with total solutions of a heuristic kind-
animism (Tylor, Frazer), animatism (Marett), totemism (Durkheim)-had
to do with their semantic naivete. They cannot of course be blamed for
not having read Wittgenstein, Ryle, or even Hayakawa and Korzybski.
Yet, some of these single-shot explications have unaccountably lingered
well into our day, when anthropologists have become more alert to the
trickeries of human language-their own language in particular. Thus,
John V. Ferreira (1966) feels that totemism in the South Asian tribal
society that he discusses is needed for an "integral" understanding of the
people, and Martin Orans's devastating point-by-point review (1968:
397-98) elicits only angry remarks on the overintellectualized approach
of American and British anthropology (Ferreira 1969: 709-10). It seems
to this reviewer that if totemism is to be preserved at all, and not dis-
carded like the physicist's phlogiston or the early psychologist's e'lan
vital, the superhuman reference must be eschewed; for though most
totemic objects have some sort of incidental superhuman connection,
their chief function is surely to represent some social process recognized
by the people in question, to serve as what John Beattie (1964c: 71) calls
"a convenient and comprehensive symbol for ... essential group values."
More than our sister disciplines, we have a tendency to start from the
beginning each time, even if only with a few remarks of the "as Durk-
heim showed" type. Yet to what end, when the level of analysis is deeper
and the tools more precise than Durkheim could have dreamed? Show
me a modern text on cardiovascular surgery that conjures up the spirit
of Paracelsus, or even Virchow. An all-time classic does not mean an
all-time valid. Durkheim has his uses in elementary pedagogy: thus
students can learn from his treatment of animism, totemism, ritual, and
myth how the consequences of his arguments are the obverse of what
their author intended. But fieldwork since Durkheim's death has shown
that few of his categories are applicable in a less literary, more rigorous
analysis of actual empirical situations registered in the field.
Two consistent, ideally exclusive, methodological alternatives seem to
exist with respect to the classics. An anthropologist may build on agnatic
lines, so to speak, by referring to the fathers-Tylor, Frazer, Durkheim,
Spencer-with perhaps the addition of such kindred as Darwin, Marx,
and Freud. He may either fit his own material into the mold they be-
queathed or reject the mold, the rejection in such cases being a substan-
tial part of his contribution. Alternatively, an anthropologist may not use
the fathers at all: thus, whereas ethnosemantically and formalistically in-
clined researchers have an occasional polite word for the old masters, the
two bodies of work are quite irrelevant. The same is true in contemporary
professional philosophy. Either a philosopher still regards his work as
"a series of footnotes to Plato," a matter of accepting, modifying, or re-
futing philosophers from the pre-Socratics to Dewey; or he ignores them
entirely except for an occasional, often sarcastic reference, as do some
Wittgensteinians and many linguistically oriented philosophers. Those
who take the second approach argue that philosophy starts with each
philosopher and that previous productions are at best incidental, at worst
irrelevant, to the process of philosophizing. Both these approaches are
academically respectable, as are both the tradition-inculcating and the
tradition-ignoring analyses of today's anthropological writing.
In its philosophical ramifications, the anthropology of religion is, to
say the least, classical, even in its most adequate products. Geertz, Spiro,
and a handful of others including this reviewer are a small avant-garde
at this moment who tap the enormous potential of the analytic and the
ordinary-language philosophers of the Wittgenstein-Ryle-Austin con-
tinuum. But otherwise, if anthropologists writing on religion are con-
cerned with philosophy as an outside standard at all, they seem to be
concerned with Hegel, Marx, and the system builders of the nineteenth
century. The title of Leach's important anthology Dialectic in Practical
Religion (1968) exemplifies this philosophically antiquarian attitude.
The book contains straight ethnological accounts like Tambiah's chapter
on practical Thai Buddhism and Obeyesekere's exquisite speculative
analysis of Sinhalese Buddhism, which comes closest to the sober stan-
dards of modern analytic philosophy. Leach's introduction states that
there is a "strong Hegelian strain in the way even the simplest people or-
ganize and utilize categories for the purpose of religious expression"
(1968: 2). Leach shares this dialectic predilection with Levi-Strauss,
without, I think, giving due weight to the possibility that ordinary lan-
guage may be more adequate for analyses of ordinary people's behavior
than dialectic jargon. Also, I do not think that anthropologists can simply
ignore Popper's basic critique of Hegel and Marx (1966, passim).
Among the many hidden aids for anthropologists implicit in the ordi-
nary-language approach, we find that the terms used by the subject him-
self should be given a chance even where an etic strategy is used to
seems best at this point: along with similarly bequeathed terms like
primitive, or structure and function, they may be kept for teaching pur-
poses but should be sparingly used for research, since they are not pre-
cise enough to be operational in the light of work done after the mid-
1960's.
TAXONOMIES
old approach, where words were to be found for things. Moore may not
wish to see that things fitting the (native) terms are the true and only
corpus for analysis, the very "raw data" that she puts between quotation
marks.
* As LaBarre (1970: 345) believes all religions had their origin in crisis or in a
crisis cult, Coult (unpublished ms.) thought all religions had their origin in the psy-
chedelic experience of their founders. "Psychedelic" would of course have to be
broadly defined to include such psychotomimetic processes as fasting, exposure to
heat and cold, prolonged sexual continence, and all sorts of induced sense and body
deprivations, as well as the ingestion of drugs. It might conceivably be argued that
LaBarre and Coult are both right: i.e. that crisis rites are "psychedelic" in their
affective components. It is clear, for example, that Jesus Christ and Handsome Lake
saw the political and social crises around them as cataclysmic, and that they both
sought and found visions and messages through psychedelic procedures (in our
broad sense of the term)-fasting in the desert for forty days, spirit quest, etc.
CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS
Shona of Rhodesia. But like most British authors, he does not seem to
feel the need for emic distinctions or nondistinctions. To be sure, he and
V. Turner (1967, 1969) present native vocabulary; but they fail to dis-
tinguish clearly between their subjects' viewpoints and their own. Par-
ticularly in the case of Turner's contributions, this reviewer was never
quite sure whether he was reading an analysis of minutely tabulated no-
tions that made sense to the Ndembu or speculations of a Freudian, post-
Freudian, humanistic, and literary sort.
A concise attempt at integrating ethnosemantics and the new etbnog-
raphy in the analysis of a ritual complex was made by Ottenberg (1970).
He shows how individually owned sanctuaries in southeastern Nigeria
function as protecting covers throughout the tribal's life. This is a double-
descent society with patrifocal stress, if not a patrilineal setting for the
shrines owned by men. The Afikpo equate a personal shrine with its
resident spirit. There is little interest in symbolization connected with the
oblations and libations at the shrine. This is partcularly revealing: I have
long felt that we might be altogether better off by not postulating our
subjects' interest in or conception of "symbols."" Ottenberg properly in-
vestigates the corpus of things, persons, and acts that fit the terms used
by his subjects; his material is emic, his analysis etic.
Highly formalized apparatus is brought into play for the analysis of
myth by the inseparable Buchler and Selby (1968)-another piece of
admirable teamwork. Although some analysts might come away with the
impression that the book contains more tools than topics, there can be
no doubt that it sets new standards in the formal analysis of a religious
corpus. Buchler and Selby make use of graph theory, information theory,
recursive function theory, and generative grammar, all of which they
modestly style "some formal extensions of Levi-Strauss' mythological
studies" (p. iv).
* This reviewer feels that "symbol" might well be ignored whenever it does not
translate a single indigenous term. I am reminded of a belief of my Hindu friend:
"The linga (phallus) is not the symbol of ?iva. It is siva."
niques are the ultimate resort; since they are the most expensive, they
are reserved for instances of crisis. The manipulability of the super-
natural beings with whom the Subanum populate their surroundings re-
flects other (natural) interpersonal types of manipulation in that society.
Although less formalistic or more intuitive methods might have led to
the same conclusions, this important piece, presented in an important
book, provides guidelines for the sort of analytically radical probing
that students of religious behavior should learn to do.
Another excellent book, Charlotte Johnson Frisbie's study of Navaho
girls' puberty rites (1967), achieves minute analysis without radical
formalization, although the approach is informed by the ethnosemantic
style. In addition to straight rites of passage information, Frisbie sup-
plies interesting ethnomusicological data, with staff notations; this, I
believe, is the first musicological aside on the Blessing Way complex, at
least in anthropological literature.
When the findings of the "new ethnography" are ignored rather than
rejected, not even the most famous in the profession are safe from the
ad hominem slanting to which new ethnographers object, as when Meyer
Fortes (Leslie 1960: 39) claims that "not fear, ignorance, or superstition,
but the moral bonds of the filio-parental relationship are the springs of
Tallensi ancestor worship." As Charles Leslie points out in his introduc-
tion (1960: xv), Fortes wants to convince his students of the ethical
rightness of the people he studied, in addition to assuming the correct-
ness of his report. Statements of value and statements of fact should not
be confused-this warning, as old as the social sciences, is too general
to be of much help in this age of ruthless analysis. What it means in
analytic terms is that the social scientist must declare his axioms rather
than letting the reader guess what his ideological or axiomatic bases
might be. A senior student of E. V. Evans-Pritchard told me, without
meaning any disrespect for the master, that the latter's positive assess-
ment of the Nuer and his older, negative assessment of the Azande were
due to his preference for the sort of things the Nuer say, think, and wor-
ship. I am told that Evans-Pritchard has pointed this out himself some-
where, but I do not know where.
As we have seen, there is a cumulative move toward case studies in
the anthropology of religion, just as there is (according to Moore) in
the anthropology of law. The constantly growing Holt, Rinehart & Win-
ston series edited by the Spindlers has become a sine qua non for stu-
dents and instructors. Some thirty items listed in this bibliography are
self-declared case studies, and perhaps an equal number are case studies
stresses; when du
the Pai turned to
sion of the ghost dance. Etlnohistorians must no doubt avail themselves
of all possible instruments, but the reductionism inherent in any such
generic approach as that of Dobyns and Euler leads to an unsolvable
problem: whatever such explanations may clarify, they are ultimately
unsatisfactory because they cannot be disproved in theory.
RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS
Brahman/n
half of tod
only natura
tradition an
(Bharati 196
etic strateg
tic religious
tural but ar
object is ass
ultimately
spokesmen
great and li
strictly loca
deity to the
some of the
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
encylopedic humanist, th
great written cultures fro
well be the most knowled
terica; but only three of ten
of religion at major Amer
listed Eliade's magnum opus Shamanism (1964) as a recommended
text, and none as a required text-this despite the fact that shamanism
was expressly mentioned in eight of these ten course descriptions. His
equally important, earlier book on yoga (1958) was not listed anywhere.
Shamanism is a mine of diffuse and extensive information about shamans
everywhere, and one would expect such a cross-cultural compendium
to be seen as a godsend in all types of anthropological teaching, shaman-
ism being one of the curricular universals. But Eliade simply knows too
much, and what he knows is on the whole too far from the concerns
of the workaday anthropologist.
Although humanistic encylopedists are not accepted into the fold,
psychological and other reductionists are, though I have my doubts
about whether they should be. A typical psychological reductionist,
Lommel ( 1967 ), axiomatically identifies the shaman as a psychopat-h-a
superior one, to be sure, since he has channeled his skills toward his own
cure. He first controls his pathogenic forces by conferring symbolic forms
and organization upon them-an artistic process, which accounts for
Lommel's title, Shamanism: The Beginnings of Art. This psychodynamic
sequence, combined with "animistic" beliefs (obsolete, unanalyzed, and
uncriticized terms abound throughout the work), animal imagery, and
the dominant concern with hunting success, constitutes the essence of
primitive hunting religion.
Several other reductionist books deserve comment. R. Ekvall (1964)
lists a number of "universals" in Tibetan religion, among them faith, cir-
cumambulation, oracles, and incantation. That circumambulation cannot
possibly be on a par, hierarchically, with faith he does not say; one gets
the feeling he does not want to establish a hierarchy, though he could
readily have done so by the sound emic strategy of asking one of his lama
informants. Such ungraded taxonomies falsify the issue; for, of course,
the relationship of faith to circumambulating (a shrine) is analogous to
the relationship between a Catholic's belief in the divinity of Christ and
his belief in the efficacy of dipping his right hand into holy water upon
entering the church-both are universals, but the comparison is so trivial
as to make no sense. Where subjects have their own hierarchy of impor-
tance, ranking their beliefs and their observances, these have to be re-
ported. If th
plicit-hierarc
solemn postures.
Castaneda's Teachings of Don Juan: A Yaqui Way of Knowledge
(1968) is one of the rare books written by anthropologists to reach a
large lay audience; I have even seen it prominently displayed on airport
and bus station newsstands. Anthropologists who have not read it should
do so after first reading Spicer's review (1969). This book is not about a
Yaqui, nor is the wisdom experienced and the wisdom shared Yaqui
wisdom. Yet wisdom it is-the book belongs to the late Allen Coult's
realm of "psychedelic anthropology." The things Castaneda saw are im-
portant, humanly relevant things; that they are of doubtful significance
anthropologically is a minor matter. Don Juan is a Yaqui much the way
Lama Lobsang Rampa is a Tibetan-but whereas The Third Eye is a
well-written hoax, Don Juan is a well-written psychedelic report.
The exaggerated claims for psychedelic wisdom, together with those
for yoga, made by their respective converts, have been solidly dissected
by a psychologist (T. X. Barber, 1970) and are dealt with in a more an-
thropological vein by Bharati (1971). Briefly, psychotomimetic experi-
ence, including the wide range of yogic enstasy-a felicitous term cre-
ated by Eliade to replace the cognitively inaccurate "ecstasy" (1958)-
increases a person's self-respect and reinforces his ego-image, or, to use
religious expressions, redeems him, liberates him, effects his salvation.
The notion that these experiences improve other skills, or that they en-
hance his discursive, artistic, or moral qualifications, is quite false, albeit
extremely old and pervasive. Since factually false claims are valid an-
thropological subject matter when they are emic claims to veracity, fu-
ture anthropological research on religion will have to heed such experi-
ences. But we must feel reasonably certain that these are modal quests
and experiences, like the Plains Indians' spirit quest of introductory an-
thropology texts or the drug-supported ritual of Aberle's peyote people.
Given this caveat, Castaneda's Don Juan may be not only a very good
book, which it is, but potentially a good anthropological study as well.
Weston LaBarre (1970) has supplied the best example known to me
of a well-informed and sophisticated reductionism (1970). Taking the
ghost dance as a paradigm, he shows that the normal childhood crises,
transmuted into magic and religion through modal interiorization by the
members of a society, reflect their unfulfillable craving for power and
security. The psychologically operative elements of the ghost dance were
shared by the Hellenic and Judaeo-Christian traditions in that they all
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aberle, D. F. 1966a. The Peyote religion among the Navaho. Chicago: Aldine.
1966b. Religio-magical phenomena of power, prediction, and con-
trol. Sthwest. J. Anthrop. 22: 221-30.
1967. The Navaho singer's "fee": Payment or prestation? In D. H.
Firth, R. 1955. The fate of the soul. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
1966. Twins, birds, and vegetables: Problems of identification in
primitive religious thought. Man 1: 1-17.
1967a. The spirits depart. New Society 241: 683-85.
1967b. Tikopia ritual and belief. Boston: Beacon Press.
1967c. The work of the gods in Tikopia. New York: Humanities
Press.
Fischer, H. 1965. Studies on conceptions of soul in Oceania (in German).
Munich: Klaus Renner Verlag.
Flattery, P. 1968. Aspects of divination in the northern Philippines. Chicago:
Univ. Chicago Press.
Fogelson, Raymond D. 1965. Psychological theories of Windigo "psychosis"
and a preliminary application of a "models" approach. In Melford Spiro,
ed., Context and meaning in cultural anthropology. New York: Free Press,
pp. 74-99.
Forde, C. D. 1958. The context of belief: A consideration of fetishism among
the Yako. Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press.
Fortes, Meyer. 1959. Oedipus and job in west African religion. Cambridge:
Cambridge Univ. Press.
1962. Ritual and office in tribal society. In M. Gluckman, ed., Essays
on the ritual of social relations. Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press.
1966. Totem and taboo. Presidential address-Proceedings of the
Royal Anthrop. Inst. of Great Britain and Ireland for 1966, pp. 5-22.
Fortes, M., and G. Dieterlen, eds. 1965. African systems, of thought. Oxford
Univ. Press for the Internat. African Inst., London.
Fortune, R. F. 1963. Sorcerers of Dobu. London: Routledge.
Frake, C. 1969. A structural description of Subanum "religious behavior." In
S. A. Tyler, ed., Cognitive anthropology. New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston.
Freed, Ruth S., and Stanley A. Freed. 1966. Unity in diversity in the celebra-
tion of cattle-curing rites in a north Indian village. A study in the resolution
of conflict. Amer. Anthrop. 68: 673-92.
Freed, Stanley A., and Ruth Freed. 1964. Spirit possession as illness in a north
Indian village. Ethnology 3: 152-71.
Freeman, John F. 1965. The Indian convert: Theme and variation. Ethno-
history 12: 113-28.
Freeman, Susan Tax. 1968. Religious aspects of the social organization of a
Castilian village. Amer. Anthrop. 70: 34-49.
Frisbie, Charlotte Johnson. 1967. Kinaalda-A Study of the Navaho girls'
puberty ceremony. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan Univ. Press.
Fuchs, Stephen, 1965. Rebellious prophets: A study of messianic movements
in Indian religions. New York: Asia Publishing House.
Galanter, Marc. 1965. Secularism East and West. Comp. Stud. Soc. & Hist.
7: 133-59.
Gebauer, P. 1964. Spider divination in the Cameroons. Milwaukee: Public
Museum.
Geertz, C. 1957. Ritual and social change: A Javanese example. Amer. An-
throp. 59: 23-54.
Horowitz, M. M., and M. Klass. 1961. The Martiniquan East Indian cult of
Maldevidan. Soc. Econ. Stud. 10: 93-100.
Hortoh, W. R. G. 1956. God, man, and the land in a northern Ibo village
group. Africa 26: 17-26.
Horton, R. 1960. A definition of religion and its uses. J. Roy. Anthrop. Inst.
90: 201-26.
Hostetler, J. A. 1967. The Hutterites in North America. New York: Holt,
Rinehart & Winston.
Hostetler, J. A., and Gertrude Endus Huntington. 1968. Communal socializa-
tion patterns in Hutterite society. Ethnology 7: 331-55.
Hoult, T. 1958. The sociology of religion. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Win-
ston.
Howells, W. W. 1960. The heathens. Primitive man and his religions. New
York: Doubleday.
Hsu, Francis L. K. 1967. Christianity and the anthropologist. Int. J. Comp.
Sociol. 8: 1-19.
Huber, H. 1965. A diviner's apprenticeship and work among the Bayaka.
Man 65: 46-47.
Hubert, H., and M. Mauss. 1964. Sacrifice: Its n-ature and function. Trans.
from the French by W. D. Halls. Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press.
Hultkrantz, Ake. 1966. An ecological approach to religion. Ethnos 31: 131-50.
1969. Review of C. Levi-Strauss, Mythologiques. Amer. Anthrop. 71:
735-37.
Huxley, Francis. 1969. The invisibles. Voodoo gods in Haiti. New York:
McGraw-Hill.
Hyman, S. E. 1955. The ritual view of myth and the mythic. In Sebeok 1955:
84-94.
Jachmann, F. 1969. Seelen und Totenvorstellungen bei drei Bevolkerungs-
gruppen in Neuguinea. Weisbaden: Steiner.
Jacobs, M., and J. Greenway, comps. and eds. 1966. The anthropologist looks
at myth. Austin: Univ. Texas Press.
Jarvie, I. C., and Joseph Agassi. 1967. The problem of the rationality of magic.
Brit. J. Sociol. 18: 55-74.
Jayarvardena, Chandra. 1966. Religious belief and social change. Aspects of
the development of Hinduism in British Guiana. Comp. Stud. Soc. & Hist.
8: 211-40.
Journal of the Scientific Study of Religion. Official journal of the Society for
the Scientific Study of Religion. Quarterly, started 1962. Berkeley: Univ.
California Press.
Keesing, Roger M. 1967. Christians and pagans in Kwaio, Malaita. J. Polynes.
Sci. 76: 82-100.
1970. Shrines, ancestors, and cognatic descent: The Kwaio and Tal-
lensi. Amer. Anthrop. 72: 755-75.
Kennedy, J. G. 1967a. Mushahara: A Nubian concept of supernatural danger
and the theory of taboo. Amer. Anthrop. 69: 685-702.
1967b. Nubian Zar ceremonies and psychotherapy. Hum. Organiz.
26: 185-94.
McFarland, H. N. 1967. The rush hour of the gods: A study of new religious
movements in Japan. New York: Macmillan.
Madsen, William. 1966. Anxiety and witchcraft in Mexican-American accul-
turation. Anthrop. Quart. 39: 110-27.
Mair, L. P. 1959. Independent religious movements in three continents. Comp.
Stud. Soc. & Hist. 1: 113-36.
1969. Witchcraft. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Mandelbaum, D. G. 1959. Social uses of funeral rites. In H. Feifel, ed., The
meaning of death. New York: McGraw-Hill, pp. 189-217.
1966. Transcendental and pragmatic aspects of religion. Amer. An-
throp. 68: 1174-91.
Marett, R. R. 1914. The threshold of religion. 2d ed. London: Methuen.
Mathur, K. S. 1964. Caste and ritual in a Malwa village. New York: Asia Pub-
lishing House.
May, L. C. 1956. A survey of glossolalia and related phenomena in non-Chris-
tian religions. Amer. Anthrop. 58: 75-96.
Mendelson, E. M. 1961. A messianic Buddhist association in upper Burma.
Bull. Sch. Oriental & African Studies (Univ. London) 24: 560-80.
1964. Buddhism and the Burmese establishment. Arch. sociol. reli-
gions 9: 85-95.
Messing, S. D. 1958. Group therapy and social status in the Zar cult of Ethio-
pia. Amer. Anthrop. 60: 1120-47.
Metraux, A. 1957. Dramatic elements in ritual possession. Diogenes 11:
18-36.
1959. Voodoo in Haiti. New York: Oxford Univ. Press.
Metzer, D., and G. William. 1963. Tenejapa medicine. I, The curer. Sthwest.
J. Anthrop. 19: 216-34.
Middleton, John. 1960. Lugbara religion. London: Oxford Univ. Press.
, ed. 1963. Witchcraft and sorcery in East Africa. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul.
, ed. 1967a. Gods and ritual: Readings in religious beliefs and prac-
tice. New York: Natural History Press (Doubleday).
- ed. 1967b. Magic, witchcraft, and curing. New York: Natural His-
tory Press (Doubleday).
, ed. 1967c. Myth and cosmos. Readings in mythology and symbol-
ism. New York: Natural History Press (Doubleday).
Miller, Robert J. 1961. Buddhist monastic economy and the Jisa mechanism.
Comp. Stud. Soc. & Hist. 3: 427-38.
Mitchell, R. C., and H. W. Truner, comps. 1966. A bibliography of modern
African religious movements. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern Univ. Press.
Moerman, M. 1966. Ban Ping's temple: The center of a loosely structured so-
ciety. Anthropological studies in Theravada Buddhism, Culture Report
Series No;. 13, Southeast Asian Studies. New Haven: Yale Univ. Press.
Mooney, J. 1965. The ghost dance religion and the Sioux outbreak of 1890.
Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press.
Moore, Sally Falk. 1970. Law and anthropology, in B. J. Siegel, ed., Biennial
review of anthropology, 1969. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, pp.
252-300.
Wax, M., and R. Wax. 1962. The magical world view. J. Sci. Study Relig.
1: 179-88.
Wax, R., and M. Wax. 1963. The notion of magic. Current Anthrop. 4: 495-
518.
Wax, R. H. 1969. Magic, fate, and history: The changing ethos of the Vik-
ings. Lawrence, Kansas: Coronado Press.
Weber, Max. 1930. The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Trans-
lated by Talcott Parsons. London: Allen & Unwin.
1951. The religion of China. New York: Free Press.
1958. The religion of India. New York: Free Press.
1963. The sociology of religion. Boston: Beacon Press.
Wertheim, W. F. 1961. Religious reform movements in south and southeast
Asia. Arch. Sociol. Religion 12: 53-62.
White, C. M. N. 1961. Elements in Luvale beliefs and rituals. Manchester:
Manchester Univ. Press.
Whiteman, J. 1966. Magic in Saragum. Oceania 37: 60-63.
Whiting, B. 1950. Paiute sorcery. Viking Fund Pub. Anthrop. 15: 1-110.
Whiting, J. W. M., R. Kluckhohn, and A. Anthony. 1958. The function of
male initiation ceremonies at puberty. In E. E. Maccoby, T. M. Newcomb,
and E. L. Hartley, eds., Readings in Social Psychology. New York: Holt,
pp. 359-70.
Willis, R. G. 1968a. Changes in mystical concepts and practices among the
Fipa. Ethnology 7: 139-57.
1968b. Kamcape: An anti-sorcery movement in southwest Tanzania.
Africa 38: 1-15.
Wilson, B. R., ed. 1967. Patterns of sectarianism: Organization and ideology
in social and religious movements. London: Heinemann.
Wilson, M. 1957. Rituals of kinship among the Nyakyusa. London: Oxford
Univ. Press.
1959. Communal rituals of the Nyakyusa. Oxford: Oxford Univ.
Press.
Worsley, P. 1957. The trumpet shall sound: A study of "cargo" cults in Mela-
nesia. London: MacGibbon & Kee.
Wyllie, R. W. 1966. Some notes on the Effutu deities. Anthropos 61: 477-80.
1968. Ritual and social change: A Ghanaian example. Amer. Anthrop.
70: 21-33.
Wyman, L. C. 1957. Beautyway: A Navaho ceremonial. New York: Pantheon.
Yalman, Nur. 1962. The ascetic Buddhist monks of Ceylon. Ethnology 3:
315-28.
Yang, C. K. 1967. Religion in Chinese society: A study of contemporary social
functions of religion and some of their historical factors. Berkeley: Univ.
California Press.
Yinger, Milton J. 1970. The scientific study of religion. New York: Macmillan.
Yoshida, Teigo. 1967. Mystical retribution, spirit possession and social struc-
ture in a Japanese village. Ethnology 6: 237-62.
Young, F. 1965. Initiation ceremonies. Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs Merrill.
Zaretsky, I. I. 1966. Bibliography on spirit possession and spirit mediumship.
Berkeley: Univ. California Press.