EN BANC

[G.R. No. 187317. April 11, 2013.]

CARLITO C. ENCINAS , petitioner, vs . PO1 ALFREDO P. AGUSTIN, JR.,

and PO1 JOEL S. CAUBANG , ** respondents.

DECISION

SERENO , C.J : p

This is a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated 20
November 2008 1 and Resolution dated 30 March 2009 2 issued by the Court of Appeals
(CA). A rming the ndings of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the CA found petitioner
Carlito C. Encinas (petitioner) administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service — offenses proscribed by Section 46 (b) (4) and
(27), Book V of Executive Order No. 292, respectively, or the Administrative Code of 1987
— and affirmed his dismissal.
The relevant facts are summarized as follows:
Respondents were then both holding positions as Fire O cer I in Nueva Ecija. They
claim that on 11 March 2000, at around 9:00 p.m., petitioner — who was then Provincial
Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija — informed them that unless they gave him ve thousand
pesos (P5,000), they would be relieved from their station at Cabanatuan City and
transferred to far- ung areas. Respondent Alfredo P. Agustin (Agustin) would supposedly
be transferred to the Cuyapo Fire Station (Cuyapo), and respondent Joel S. Caubang
(Caubang) to Talugtug Fire Station (Talugtug). Fearing the reassignment, they decided to
pay petitioner. On 15 March 2000, in the house of a certain "Myrna," respondents came up
short and managed to give only two thousand pesos (P2,000), prompting petitioner to
direct them to come up with the balance within a week. When they failed to deliver the
balance, petitioner issued instructions effectively reassigning respondents Agustin and
Caubang to Cuyapo and Talugtug, respectively. 3
Based on the above-narrated circumstances, respondents led with the Bureau of
Fire Protection (BFP) a letter-complaint (BFP Complaint) on 27 March 2000 for illegal
transfer of personnel under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of Interior and
Local Government (DILG) Act of 1990. 4 The record is not clear as to why this Complaint
was later docketed by the BFP for preliminary investigation for violation of R.A. No. 3019
or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 5 The BFP Complaint provides in pertinent
part:
Chief Inspector Carlito C. Encinas relieved us from our present assignment and
transferred us to different far places without any cause and due process of law
based from the BFP Manual (Republic Act 6975)

The reason why he relieved us was due to our failure to give the money he
was asking from both of us in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000) in
exchange for our present assignment to be retained. . . . .

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 On 12 April and 25 April 2000, on the basis of similar facts, respondents likewise
led with the CSC Regional O ce in San Fernando, Pampanga (CSCRO), as well as with the
CSC Field O ce in Cabanatuan City, 6 their Joint A davit/Complaint (CSCRO Complaint). 7
This time, they accused petitioner of violation of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. 6713 or the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public O cials and Employees. The relevant portion
of the CSCRO Complaint provides:
6. That we executed this a davit to le a complaint against C. Insp.
Carlito C. Encinas BFP for violation of Section 4 (C) R.A. 6713, that is "Justness
and sincerity. — Public o cials and employees shall remain true to the people at
all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate
against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all
times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and
public interest."

The CSCRO Complaint erroneously pertained to the above-quoted provision as

Section 4 (c), but it should be denoted as Section 4 (A) (c).
On 27 October 2000, after a fact- nding investigation was conducted in connection
with his alleged extortion activities, petitioner was formally charged with dishonesty, grave
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service. He was required to le
an answer within five (5) days from notice. 8 The Formal Charge specifically reads in part:
WHEREFORE, Carlito C. Encinas is hereby formally charged with the
offenses of Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service. Accordingly, he is given ve (5) days from receipt hereof to
submit to this O ce a written answer under oath, together with the a davits of
his witnesses and documentary evidence, if any, and a statement whether or not
he elects a formal investigation. He is advised of his right to the assistance of his
counsel of his own choice. 9

Although it was not speci cally mentioned in the records, the offenses of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service can
be found in Section 46 (b) (1), (4) and (27), Book V, respectively, of the Administrative
Code of 1987. 1 0 The record does not indicate whether petitioner was formally charged
with violation of R.A. No. 6713.
BFP Complaint
In answer to the BFP Complaint against him, petitioner claimed that in an alleged
Con dential Investigation Report dated 31 July 2000 (Con dential Report), no copy of
which was attached to the record, 1 1 the investigating body recommended that charges
against him be dropped for insu ciency of evidence. Instead, it recommended that
respondents be charged with conducting unauthorized re safety inspection and engaging
in the sale of fire extinguishers, both in violation of the rules.
It appears on record that the Internal Audit Services (IAS) of the BFP issued a
Resolution dated 05 July 2005, 1 2 recommending that the administrative complaint
against petitioner be dismissed for insu ciency of evidence. 1 3 The IAS ruled that the
reassignment of respondents was within the ambit of authority of the head of o ce. Thus,
said reassignment may have been ordered as long as the exigencies of the service so
required. 1 4 The Resolution dated 05 July 2005 states in pertinent part:
The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of authority,
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 CSC Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993, the commission ruled as
follows:
"That reassignment may be ordered by the head of o ce of the duly
authority [sic] representative when the exigencies of the service so require but
subject to the condition that there will be no reduction in rank, status or salary,
further on Bongbong vs. Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the supreme court ruled held
[sic] that "on general principle petitioner may be transferred as to the exigencies of
the service require". . . .
In view of the documents on record, the undersigned investigator nds no
su cient ground to warrant the ling of appropriate administrative offense
against the respondent.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this o ce (IAS) most respectfully

recommends that the administrative complaint against C/INSP CARLITO
ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

CSCRO Complaint
In his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service, 1 5 petitioner claimed that the CSCRO Complaint
was an offshoot of the reassignment of respondents. He alleged that they were
reassigned after it was discovered that they had conducted a re safety inspection of
establishments within Nueva Ecija without any mission order. In relation to this operation,
they supposedly sold re extinguishers to the owners of the establishments they had
inspected. 1 6 He cited the alleged Con dential Report in which the investigating body
recommended the dropping of charges against him. 1 7 He further added that, in view of his
exemplary and faithful service, the then-incumbent governor even requested the
continuance of his stint as Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija. 1 8 In his Position Paper,
1 9 petitioner claimed that respondents' transfer had been made in compliance with the
directive of Supt. Simeon C. Tutaan (Supt. Tutaan) and pursuant to law. 2 0
CSCRO Ruling
Subsequently, the CSCRO issued its Decision dated 30 July 2004, 2 1 nding
petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of service, and ordered his dismissal from service.
The CSCRO ruled that respondents, through their respective testimonies, were able
to establish the fact that petitioner demanded from them the amount of P5,000 in
exchange for their non-reassignment to far- ung re stations. 2 2 The fact that they did not
present any document to show that petitioner received P2,000 did not preclude a nding
of administrative liability. 2 3 The consistency of their oral testimonies already constituted
substantial evidence. Granting that they committed illegal acts prior to their reassignment,
this allegation nevertheless did not rebut their claims that petitioner had extorted money
from them. The admission of Supt. Tutaan that he gave instructions for their reassignment
did not disprove the accusation of extortion, but merely established that there was indeed
an order to reassign them. 2 4
Petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration. 2 5 He argued that the Sworn
Statements of his witnesses should have been given weight instead of respondents'
testimonies. He explained that Mrs. Angelina Calanoc (Mrs. Calanoc), owner of Reynand
Gas Dealer, con rmed that respondents had conducted a physical inspection of her
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 establishment, after which they recommended that she pay conveyance permit fees as a
requisite for the issuance of a Fire Safety Certi cate. 2 6 Also, Carlito Umali con rmed that
he had indeed accompanied petitioner when the latter investigated the Complaint led by
Mrs. Calanoc against respondents. 2 7 Furthermore, Myrna Villanueva — the owner of the
house where respondents supposedly paid petitioner P2,000 — claimed that she did not
know them personally or recall either petitioner or respondents ever visiting her house. 2 8
Likewise, Supt. Tutaan con rmed that he had instructed petitioner to cause the transfer of
respondents. 2 9 The latter also argued that the BFP Complaint had already been dismissed
by virtue of the Con dential Report, and that the dismissal had already served as a bar to
the further prosecution of any administrative charge against him. 3 0
The Motion, however, was subsequently denied by the CSCRO in its Order dated 19
May 2006. 3 1 It a rmed its previous ruling that the statements of petitioner's witnesses
were incompetent and immaterial, having failed to disprove that petitioner had indeed
extorted money from respondents. 3 2 It likewise rejected the argument of res judicata
proffered by petitioner and ruled that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint by virtue of the
Con dential Report was not a judgment on the merits rendered by a competent tribunal.
Furthermore, the Con dential Report was the result of the recommendation of a fact-
nding committee formed to determine the veracity of the Complaint charging petitioner
with extortion, unjusti ed transfer of BFP personnel, and malversation of funds. 3 3 Res
judicata cannot be raised as a defense, since the dismissal of the BFP Complaint did not
constitute a bar by former judgment. 3 4
Aggrieved, petitioner led an Appeal Memorandum 3 5 with the CSC main o ce. In
his Appeal, he argued that respondents were guilty of forum-shopping for having led two
(2) separate administrative Complaints before the CSCRO on the one hand, and before the
BFP/DILG on the other. 3 6 Petitioner argued that respondents failed to attach a certi cate
of non-forum shopping to either Complaint. 3 7 Moreover, the CSCRO should not have
entertained the Complaint led before it, considering that it already knew of the then-
pending investigation conducted by the BFP/DILG. 3 8
Petitioner further argued that the CSCRO only had appellate jurisdiction or authority
to decide cases brought before it by the head of agency or, in this case, the BFP. 3 9 He
explained that the administrative Complaint was investigated and heard by the BFP/DILG.
The BFP department head or re director, Rogelio F. Asignado, by virtue of the Resolution
dated 05 July 2005, dismissed the complaint for insu ciency of evidence. 4 0 On the basis
of the dismissal of the case, and there being no appeal or petition led pertaining thereto,
the CSCRO Complaint should have been dismissed as well. 4 1 Petitioner further argued
that the CSCRO erred in concluding that the resolution of the fact- nding committee was
not a judgment on the merits. 4 2 The BFP being an agency of the government, any decision
or resolution it arrives at is also a judgment on the merits. 4 3
Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous arguments on the appreciation of the
testimonies of his witnesses. 4 4 He alleged that on 09 June 2006, respondent Agustin
executed an A davit of Desistance in the former's favor and was no longer interested in
pursuing the case against him. 4 5
In answer to the Appeal Memorandum, the CSCRO argued that there was no forum-
shopping, considering that the BFP Complaint was based on a different cause of action. 4 6
The Complaint, which pertained to the alleged illegal transfer of personnel under R.A. No.
6975, was dockted for preliminary investigation of the alleged violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act or R.A. No. 3019. 4 7 The CSCRO further argued that there could
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 be no res judicata, since the dismissal of the BFP Complaint by virtue of the Resolution
dated 05 July 2005 4 8 was not a judgment on the merits rendered by a competent tribunal.
The dismissal was, instead, the result of the recommendation of the preliminary
investigators of the Internal Audit Service (IAS) of the BFP. 4 9
CSC Ruling
Petitioner's appeal was subsequently denied by CSC in its Resolution No. 080941
dated 19 May 2008 (CSC Resolution). 5 0 It ruled that there was no forum-shopping
committed by respondents, and that substantial evidence existed to hold petitioner
administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service.
The CSC explained that the CSCRO Complaint was for violation of R.A. No. 6713,
while the BFP Complaint was for violation of R.A. No. 6975. 5 1 It further ruled that, although
both Complaints were anchored on a similar set of facts, there was no identity of causes
of action: thus, even if they were successively led before different fora, no forum-
shopping existed. 5 2 Although an investigation was then ongoing at the BFP when the
CSCRO took cognizance of the case, no forum-shopping resulted. A perusal of the
proceedings conducted at the BFP shows that only a preliminary investigation was
initiated by the IAS-BFP, a fact- nding committee that recommended the dismissal of the
case, which was accordingly approved by the re director. The approval of this
recommendation cannot be regarded as one based on merits. Otherwise, it would bar the
filing of another case, particularly, with the CSCRO. 5 3
With regard to petitioner's administrative liability, the CSC found that because of the
nature of the case — extortion of money — hardly any documentary evidence could be
gathered to prove the act complained of. As expected, the CSCRO based its ndings on
the written and oral testimonies of the parties and their witnesses, as well as on the
circumstances surrounding the incident. Respondents clearly established that petitioner
had demanded P5,000 in exchange for their reassignment. 5 4 The CSC further ruled that it
was contrary to human nature for respondents, who were merely rank-and- le employees,
to impute such a grave act to their boss. Their disparity in rank would show that
respondents could not have fabricated their charges. 5 5 It further ruled that the withdrawal
of the complaint would not result in their outright dismissal or absolve the person
complained of from administrative liability. 5 6
Aggrieved yet again, petitioner led a Rule 43 Petition with the CA. His main
argument was that the CSC erred in not dismissing respondents' Complaint despite the
absence of a certification of non-forum shopping and respondent's actual forum-shopping,
as well as the lack of substantial evidence to hold him administratively liable. 5 7
In his Rule 43 Petition, petitioner claimed that a certi cate of non-forum shopping
attached to a complaint is a mandatory requirement as stated in Section 8, Rule I of the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases. 5 8 He argued that the causes of action in the two
Complaints were similar. With regard to the proceedings before the CSC, aside from
respondents' sole charge of violation of R.A. No. 6713, also included were charges of
dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of service.
Petitioner reasoned that the additional offenses charged were equivalent to a violation of
R.A. No. 6975, so the issues investigated were substantially the same. 5 9
In relation to his administrative liability, petitioner argued that the testimonies of
respondents should not be given weight, as their credibility had been rendered
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 questionable by their dismissal from the service. 6 0 Also, they had already withdrawn their
Complaints against him, as stated in their A davit of Desistance (A davit), 6 1 in which
they admitted that the cases were led out of a misapprehension of facts and a
misunderstanding between the parties. 6 2
Signi cantly, respondent Caubang denounced the supposed execution of the
A davit. He claimed that he did not sign it, and that his purported signature therein was a
forgery. 6 3
CA Ruling
Subsequently, the CA, in its assailed Decision, 6 4 denied petitioner's appeal. The CA
ruled that it was not the letter-complaint led by respondents that commenced the
administrative proceedings against petitioner; instead, it was the formal charge led by
Atty. Marasigan-De Lima. The letter-complaint merely triggered the CSCRO's fact- nding
investigation. Considering that the Complaint was initiated by the proper disciplining
authority, it need not contain a certification of non-forum-shopping. 6 5
The CA similarly ruled that respondents' act of simultaneously ling Complaints
against petitioner both at the CSC and the BFP did not constitute forum-shopping. While it
was conceded that the two Complaints were founded on the same set of facts involving
the same parties, they were nonetheless based on different causes of action — more
speci cally, the BFP Complaint was for alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019, while the CSC
Complaint was for violation of the provisions of R.A. No. 6713. 6 6 Furthermore, the
doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers. 6 7
With regard to the administrative liability of petitioner, the CA found that substantial
evidence supported the CSC's ndings. 6 8 It likewise ruled that the testimonies of the
witnesses of petitioner were incompetent and immaterial, as these could prove something
else entirely, but did not disprove petitioner's extortion. 6 9 Also, the withdrawal of a
complaint does not result in outright dismissal or discharge a person from any
administrative liability. 7 0
Petitioner led a Motion for Reconsideration, 7 1 but the CA denied it in its assailed
Resolution dated 30 March 2009. 7 2
Petitioner is now before this Court arguing the following: (1) the CA erred in
a rming the CSC Resolution and in ruling that respondents were not guilty of forum-
shopping; and (2) substantial evidence does not exist to hold petitioner administratively
liable for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
In their Comment, respondents counter that a certi cate of non-forum shopping is
not required if the one who les the formal charge is the head of agency. 7 3 They further
argue that the case led with the BFP was in the nature of violation under R.A. No. 3019,
whereas the case led before the CSC was in violation of R.A. No. 6713. A single act may
result in two or more unlawful transgressions punishable under different laws. 7 4 As to the
matter of administrative liability, the CSC's ndings, especially when a rmed by the CA,
are binding upon this Court. 7 5
Issues
Based on the submissions of both parties, the following main issues are presented
for resolution by this Court:
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 I. Whether or not respondents are guilty of forum-shopping.
II. Whether the CA erred in ruling that substantial evidence exists to hold
petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit. We rule that petitioner is administratively liable for
grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service under the
Administrative Code of 1987; thus, we affirm his dismissal from service.
Discussion
I.
Respondents are not guilty of forum-shopping.
Petitioner argues that respondents are guilty of forum-shopping for ling two
allegedly identical Complaints in violation of the rules on forum-shopping. 7 6 He explains
that dishonesty, grave misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service — charges included in the CSCRO Complaint — were charges that were equivalent
to the BFP Complaint, the subject of which was his alleged violation of R.A. No. 6975 or
illegal transfer of personnel. 7 7
We do not agree with petitioner. In Yu v. Lim, 7 8 this Court enumerated the requisites
of forum-shopping as follows:
Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a nal judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis
pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) identity of
parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two
preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that
may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case. 7 9
(Emphasis supplied)
Applying the foregoing requisites to this case, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP
Complaint does not constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there
is no forum-shopping on the part of respondents.
Res judicata means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a
thing or matter settled by judgment." It lays down the rule that an existing nal judgment or
decree on the merits, rendered without fraud or collusion by a court of competent
jurisdiction upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties
or their privies in all other actions or suits, in the same or any other judicial tribunal of
concurrent jurisdiction, on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. 8 0
In order that res judicata may bar the institution of a subsequent action, the
following requisites must concur: (a) the former judgment must be nal; (b) it must have
been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (c) it
must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be between the rst and the second
actions (i) identity of parties, (ii) identity of subject matter, and (iii) identity of cause of
action. 8 1
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 A judgment may be considered as one rendered on the merits "when it determines
the rights and liabilities of the parties based on the disclosed facts, irrespective of formal,
technical or dilatory objections;" or when the judgment is rendered "after a determination
of which party is right, as distinguished from a judgment rendered upon some preliminary
or formal or merely technical point." 8 2
In this case, there is no "judgment on the merits" in contemplation of the de nition
above. The dismissal of the BFP Complaint in the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 was the
result of a fact- nding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal charge
for an administrative offense should be filed. Hence, no rights and liabilities of parties were
determined therein with finality.
The CA was correct in ruling that the doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings, and not to the exercise of administrative powers. 8 3
Administrative powers here refer to those purely administrative in nature, 8 4 as opposed to
administrative proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character. 8 5
In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves (a) taking and evaluating
evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an
order or decision supported by the facts proved. 8 6 The exercise of quasi-judicial functions
involves a determination, with respect to the matter in controversy, of what the law is; what
the legal rights and obligations of the contending parties are; and based thereon and the
facts obtaining, the adjudication of the respective rights and obligations of the parties. 8 7
In Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 8 8 this Court declared:
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the
power of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It
is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and administering
the same law. The administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it
performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or
reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty
entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
o cers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis
for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.

The Court has laid down the test for determining whether an administrative body is
exercising judicial or merely investigatory functions: adjudication signi es the exercise of
the power and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties.
Hence, if the only purpose of an investigation is to evaluate the evidence submitted to an
agency based on the facts and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not
authorized to make a nal pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence
of judicial discretion and judgment. 8 9
In this case, an analysis of the proceedings before the BFP yields the conclusion that
they were purely administrative in nature and constituted a fact- nding investigation for
purposes of determining whether a formal charge for an administrative offense should be
filed against petitioner.
It can be gleaned from the Resolution dated 05 July 2005 itself that the purpose of
the BFP proceedings was to determine whether there was su cient ground to warrant the
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 ling of an appropriate administrative offense against petitioner . To recall, the
Resolution dated 05 July 2005 states:
The re-assignment of the complainants is within the ambit of authority,
CSC Resolution No. 93402 dated 11 February 1993, the commission ruled as
follows:

"That reassignment may be ordered by the head of o ce of the

duly authority [sic] representative when the exigencies of the
service so require but subject to the condition that there will be no
reduction in rank, status or salary, further on Bongbong vs.
Paracaldo (57 SCRA 623) the supreme court ruled held [sic] that
"on general principle petitioner may be transferred as to the
exigencies of the service require". . . .
In view of the documents on record, the undersigned investigator
nds no su cient ground to warrant the ling of appropriate
administrative offense against the respondent.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this o ce (IAS) most
respectfully recommends that the administrative complaint against
C/INSP CARLITO ENCINAS, BFP be dismissed for insu ciency of
evidence. 9 0 (Emphases supplied)

The proceedings before the BFP were merely investigative, aimed at determining the
existence of facts for the purpose of deciding whether to proceed with an administrative
action. This process can be likened to a public prosecutor's preliminary investigation,
which entails a determination of whether there is probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty, and whether a crime has been committed.
The ruling of this Court in Bautista v. Court of Appeals 9 1 is analogously applicable
to the case at bar. In that case, we ruled that the preliminary investigation conducted by a
public prosecutor was merely inquisitorial and was de nitely not a quasi-judicial
proceeding:
A closer scrutiny will show that preliminary investigation is very different
from other quasi-judicial proceedings. A quasi- judicial body has been
de ned as "an organ of government other than a court and other than a
legislature which affects the rights of private parties through either adjudication
or rule-making."
xxx xxx xxx
On the other hand, the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not exercise
adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation is
merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the
persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime and to enable
the scal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not a trial of
the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the scal
makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-
court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal. (Emphases supplied)
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 This principle is further highlighted in MERALCO v. Atilano, 9 2 in which this Court
clearly reiterated that a public prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary investigation, is not
exercising a quasi-judicial function. In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor
inspects the records and premises, investigates the activities of persons or entities
coming under the formers' jurisdiction, or secures or requires the disclosure of information
by means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of witnesses, and
production of documents. In contrast, judicial adjudication signi es the exercise of power
and authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned parties, viz.:
This is reiterated in our ruling in Spouses Balangauan v. Court of Appeals,
Special Nineteenth Division, Cebu City, where we pointed out that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi judicial proceeding, and the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial
agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the ndings of a
public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. A quasi-judicial
agency performs adjudicatory functions when its awards determine the rights of
parties, and its decisions have the same effect as a judgment of a court." [This] is
not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary investigation to
determine probable cause to le an information against a person charged with a
criminal offense, or when the Secretary of Justice [reviews] the former's order[s] or
resolutions" on determination of probable cause.
In Odchigue-Bondoc, we ruled that when the public prosecutor conducts
preliminary investigation, he thereby exercises investigative or inquisitorial
powers. Investigative or inquisitorial powers include the powers of an
administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and
investigate the activities of persons or entities coming under his
jurisdiction, or to secure, or to require the disclosure of information by
means of accounts, records, reports, statements, testimony of
witnesses, and production of documents. This power is distinguished
from judicial adjudication which signi es the exercise of power and
authority to adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of concerned
parties. Indeed, it is the exercise of investigatory powers which sets a
public prosecutor apart from the court. (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, the public prosecutor exercises investigative powers in the conduct of a

preliminary investigation to determine whether, based on the evidence presented, further
action should be taken through the ling of a criminal complaint in court. Similarly, in the
instant case, the BFP exercised its investigative or fact- nding function to determine
whether, based on the facts and the evidence presented, further administrative action — in
the form of a formal charge — should be taken against petitioner. In neither instance is
there an adjudication upon the rights, obligations, or liabilities of the parties before them.
With the above disquisition, we rule that the dismissal of the BFP Complaint cannot
operate as res judicata. Therefore, the argument of forum-shopping is unavailing in this
case.
II.
The CA was correct in ruling that there was substantial evidence to hold
petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
On the substantive issue, petitioner claims that the ndings are based on a
misapprehension of facts. The dismissal of respondents from service allegedly placed
their credibility in question. 9 3
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 We do not agree. We nd petitioner administratively liable for his act of demanding
P5,000 from respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment.
At the outset, we stress the settled rule that the ndings of fact of administrative
bodies will not be interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the former, or unless the aforementioned ndings are not supported by
substantial evidence. 9 4 These factual ndings carry even more weight when a rmed by
the CA, in which case they are accorded not only great respect, but even nality. These
ndings are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body has
arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before the latter to such an extent as
to compel a contrary conclusion, had the evidence been properly appreciated. 9 5 This rule
is rooted in the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts. 9 6 By reason of the special
knowledge and expertise of administrative agencies over matters falling under their
jurisdiction, they are in a better position to pass judgment on those matters. 9 7
This Court will not disturb the factual ndings of both the CSC and the CA, absent
any compelling reason to do so. The conclusion reached by the administrative agencies
involved — after their own thorough investigations and hearings, as well as their
consideration of the evidence presented before them and their ndings thereon, especially
when a rmed by the CA — must now be regarded with great respect and nality by this
Court.
We rule that the alleged dismissal of respondents from the service would not suffice
to discredit them as witnesses. In People v. Dominguez, 9 8 this Court had occasion to rule
that even a prior criminal conviction does not by itself su ce to discredit a witness; the
testimony of that witness must be assayed and scrutinized in exactly the same way the
testimonies of other witnesses must be examined for their relevance and credibility. 9 9 In
Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, 1 0 0 this Court echoed its previous pronouncement that even
convicted criminals are not excluded from testifying as long as, having organs of sense,
they "can perceive and perceiving can make known their perceptions to others." 1 0 1
This pronouncement is even more signi cant in this case, as what petitioner is
alleging is not any past criminal conviction of respondents, but merely their dismissal from
service. 1 0 2 Scrutinizing the testimonies of respondents, we nd, as did both the CSC and
the CA, that these testimonies carry more weight than petitioner's self-serving statements
and blanket denials.
Respondents, through their testimonies, were able to establish that petitioner told
them that unless they paid him P5,000, they would be re-assigned to far- ung areas. The
consistency of their testimonies was further bolstered by the fact that they had been
cross-examined by petitioner's counsel. Petitioner was unable to rebut their claims other
than by mere denials. Even the admission of Supt. Tutaan that he gave the instructions to
reassign respondents cannot disprove the latter's claims. As regards the testimonies of
the witnesses of petitioner, we hold that even these testimonies are irrelevant in disproving
the alleged extortion he committed, as these were mainly related to respondents'
supposed illegal activities, which are not the issue in this case.
Even assuming that an A davit of Desistance was indeed executed by respondents,
petitioner is still not exonerated from liability. The subsequent reconciliation of the parties
to an administrative proceeding does not strip the court of its jurisdiction to hear the
administrative case until its resolution. Atonement, in administrative cases, merely
obliterates the personal injury of the parties and does not extend to erase the offense that
may have been committed against the public service. 1 0 3 The subsequent desistance by
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 respondents does not free petitioner from liability, as the purpose of an administrative
proceeding is to protect the public service based on the time-honored principle that a
public o ce is a public trust. 1 0 4 A complaint for malfeasance or misfeasance against a
public servant of whatever rank cannot be withdrawn at any time for whatever reason by a
complainant, as a withdrawal would be "anathema to the preservation of the faith and
con dence of the citizenry in their government, its agencies and instrumentalities." 1 0 5
Administrative proceedings "should not be made to depend on the whims and caprices of
complainants who are, in a real sense, only witnesses therein. 1 0 6
In view of the foregoing, we rule that petitioner's act of demanding money from
respondents in exchange for their non-reassignment constitutes grave misconduct. We
have defined grave misconduct as follows:
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and de nite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
o cer; and the misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements
of corruption, such as willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. 1 0 7 (Emphasis
supplied)

Furthermore, petitioner's acts likewise constitute conduct prejudicial to the best

interest of the service. In Philippine Retirement Authority v. Rupa 1 0 8 this Court elaborated
on the speci c acts that constitute the grave offense of conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, considering that no concrete description is provided under the Civil
Service Law and rules. The Court outlined therein following acts: misappropriation of
public funds, abandonment of o ce, failure to report back to work without prior notice,
failure to keep in safety public records and property, making false entries in public
documents, and falsification of court orders. 1 0 9
Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that petitioner's offense is of the
same gravity or odiousness as that of the aforementioned acts and would likewise amount
to conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
As to the imposable penalty, grave misconduct is a grave offense punishable by
dismissal even for the rst offense. 1 1 0 The penalty of dismissal includes forfeiture of
retirement bene ts, except accrued leave credits, and perpetual disquali cation from
reemployment in government service and bar from taking civil service examinations. 1 1 1
On the other hand, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service is likewise a grave
offense, but with a less severe penalty of suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to
one (1) year for the first offense and dismissal for the second offense. 1 1 2
Considering that petitioner was found guilty of two (2) offenses, then the penalty of
dismissal from the service — the penalty corresponding to the most serious offense —
was properly imposed. 1 1 3
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated 20 November 2008 and the Resolution dated 30 March 2009 issued by the CA in
CA-G.R. SP No. 104074 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama,
Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes and Leonen, JJ., concur.

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 Bersamin and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., took no part.

Footnotes
**Should be designated as Fire Officer (FO)1 Alfredo P. Agustin and FO1 Joel S. Caubang.

1.Rollo, pp. 24-35 In the case entitled "Carlito C. Encinas v. FO1 Alfredo P. Agustin and FO1 Joel
S. Caubang," docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 104074.
2.Id. at 37.

3.Id. at 39-40.

4.CA rollo, pp. 79-81.

5.Resolution dated 05 July 2005; Id. at 82.

6.Id. at 28.
7.Rollo, pp. 38-40.

8.Rollo, pp. 41-42.

9.Id. at 42.
10."Section 46. Discipline: General Provisions. — (a) No officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due
process.

(b) The following shall be grounds for disciplinary action:

(1) Dishonesty;

xxx xxx xxx

(4) Misconduct;

xxx xxx xxx

(27) Conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; . . ."

11.Rollo, p. 43, petitioner referred to the Confidential Report in his Answer dated 11 December
2000, but a copy of this report was not attached to the rollo or CA rollo.

12.CA rollo, pp. 82-84.

13.Id. at 83-84.

14.Id. at 84.

15.Rollo, pp. 43-44.

16.Id. at 43.

17.Id. at 43.
18.Id. at 44.

19.CA rollo, pp. 46-49.

20.Id. at 49.
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 21.Id. at 35-38.

22.Id. at 37.
23.Id.

24.Id.
25.Rollo, pp. 45-55.

26.Id. at 48, 57.

27.Id. at 47, 58-59.

28.Id. at 47-48, 60.

29.Id. at 48.
30.Id. at 52-53.

31.Order dated 19 May 2006; CA rollo, pp. 33-34.

32.Id. at 33.
33.Id. at 34.

34.Id.
35.Id. at 64-78.

36.Id. at 65.

37.Id.
38.Id. at 67.

39.Id.

40.Id. at 65.
41.Id. at 68.

42.Id. at 69.
43.Id. at 70.

44.Id. at 70-76.

45.Id. at 76.
46.Id. at 27.

47.Id.
48.Rollo, p. 27; CSC Resolution erroneously quoted the date as "July 5, 2006."

49.Id. at 27.

50.Id. at 25-32.
51.Id. at 30.

52.Id.
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 53.Id.

54.Id. at 31.

55.Id.
56.Id. at 32.

57.Id. at 13.
58.Id. at 14.

59.Id. at 15.

60.Id. at 18.
61.Id. at 88.

62.Id. at 19, 88.

63.Id. at 95-98.

64.Rollo, pp. 24-35.

65.Id. at 29.
66.Id. at 30.

67.Id.
68.Id. at 31.

69.Id. at 33.

70.Id.
71.CA rollo, pp. 149-158.

72.Rollo, p. 37.

73.Id. at 75.
74.Id.

75.Id.
76.Id. at 16.

77.Id.

78.G.R. No. 182291, 22 September 2010, 631 SCRA 172.

79.Id.

80.Selga v. Brar, G.R. No. 175151, 21 September 2011, 658 SCRA 108.
81.Chu v. Sps. Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185, 12 September 2011, 657 SCRA 379.

82.Cabreza v. Cabreza, G.R. No. 181962, 16 January 2012, 663 SCRA 29.

83.Heirs of Derla v. Heirs of Derla, G.R. No. 157717, 13 April 2011, 648 SCRA 638.
84.Montemayor v. Bundalian, 453 Phil. 158 (2003).
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 85.See United Pepsi-Cola Supervisory Union (UPSU) v. Laguesma, 351 Phil. 244, 260 (1998),
Executive Judge Basilia v. Judge Becamon, 487 Phil. 490 (2004); Atty. De Vera v. Judge
Layague, 395 Phil. 253 (2000); Salazar v. De Leon, G.R. No. 127965, 20 January 2009;
National Housing Authority v. Pascual, G.R. No. 158364, 28 November 2007, DOLE Phil.,
Inc. v. Esteva, G.R. No. 161115, 30 November 2006.
86.Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000, 379 Phil. 165 (2000).
87.Doran v. Executive Judge Luczon, Jr., G.R. No. 151344, 26 September 2006, 503 SCRA 106.

88.G.R. No. 179830, 03 December 2009, 606 SCRA 554.

89.Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, 18 January 2000, 379 Phil. 165 (2000),
citing Ruperto v. Torres [100 Phil. 1098 (1957), unreported].
90.CA rollo, p. 84.

91.G.R. No. 143375, 6 July 2001, 413 Phil. 159 (2001).

92.G.R. No. 166758, 27 June 2012, 675 SCRA 112.

93.Rollo, p. 18.

94.Catmon Sales International Corporation v. Yngson, Jr., G.R. No. 179761, 15 January 2010,
610 SCRA 236.

95.Id.

96.Raniel v. Jochico, G.R. No. 153413, 02 March 2007, 517 SCRA 221.
97.Sps. Ricardo, Jr. v. Cinco, G.R. No. 174143, 28 November 2011, 661 SCRA 311.

98.G.R. No. 100199, 18 January 1993, 217 SCRA 170.

99.Id.

100.G.R. No. 156284, 06 February 2007, 514 SCRA 475.

101.Id. at 511.
102.See Gomez v. Gomez-Samson, G.R. No. 156284, 06 February 2007, 514 SCRA 475.

103.Flores v. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499 & A.M. No. P-03-1752, 06 October 2008, 567 SCRA
342.
104.See Flores v. Garcia, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1499 & A.M. No. P-03-1752, 06 October 2008, 567
SCRA 342.

105.Guro v. Doronio, 444 Phil. 827 (2003) citing Esmeralda-Baroy v. Peralta, 350 Phil. 431
(1998).
106.Guro v. Doronio, 444 Phil. 827 (2003) citing Reyes-Domingo v. Morales, 396 Phil. 150
(2000).

107.Re: Complaint of Mrs. Corazon S. Salvador against Spouses Noel and Amelia Serafico,
A.M. No. 2008-20-SC, 15 March 2010, 615 SCRA 186, 203-204.
108.415 Phil. 713 (2001).

109.Id.

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 110.Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 52 (A) 3 [Sec. 4 (A) (3) of
the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil service dated 18 November 2011
(Revised Rules)].

111.Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 58 (Sec. 52 of the Revised
Rules).

112.Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 52 (A) 20 [Sec. 46 (B) (8) of
the Revised Rules].
113."If the respondent is found guilty of two or more charges or counts, the penalty to be
imposed should be that corresponding to the most serious charge or count and the rest
shall be considered as aggravating circumstances." [Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service, Sec. 55 (Sec. 50 of the Revised Rules)].

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