1.Marlyn Monton Nullada vs. The Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila, et. al.

“The letter of the law (Art. 26 par. 2 of the Family Court) does not demand that the alien spouse should
be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.”

CASE: Marlyn Monton Nullada vs. The Hon. Civil Registrar of Manila, Akira Ito, Shin Ito and all persons
who have claim or claim any interest. [G.R. No. 224548, January 23, 2019] PONENTE: Justice Jose C.
Reyes, Jr.

SUBJECT: A. CIVIL LAW: i. Article 26 of the Family Code B. REMEDIAL LAW: i. Rule 108 –
Petitionfor registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and cancellation of entry of
marriage ii. Rules on proof of foreign law iii. Direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the
decisions of the RTC

FACTS: In 1997, Marlyn and Akira (a Japanese national) got married in Japan. The document was
registered with both the Office of the Local Civil Registry of Manila and the then National Statistics
Office, Civil Registry Division. The union of Marlyn and Akira resulted in the birth of a child, Shin Ito.
Their relationship, however, eventually turned sour and so they later decided to obtain a divorce by
mutual agreement. In 2009, Akira and Marlyn secured a divorce decree in Japan. The Divorce Certificate
that was issued by the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines. Marlyn and Akira’s acceptance of the
notification of divorce by agreement was supported by an Acceptance Certificatethat was issued by the
Head of Katsushika-ku in Japan. Hence, Marlyn sought a recognition of the divorce decree in the
Philippines by filing a Petitionfor registration and/or recognition of foreign divorce decree and
cancellation of entry of marriage that was filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code. Akira did not file an Answer to the petition, notwithstanding summons by
publication. The Republic also did not offer any evidence to rebut the case of Marlyn. The RTC rendered
its Decision denying the petition. According to the RTC, the fact that Marlyn also agreed to the divorce
and jointly filed for it with Akira barred the application of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, which would have otherwise allowed a Filipino spouse to remarry after the alien spouse
had validly obtained a divorce. While the intent of the law is to equalize Filipinos with their foreigner
spouses who are free to marry again after the divorce, the Filipino spouse cannot invoke the intention of
equity behind the law when he or she is an initiator or active participant in procuring the divorce.
Dissatisfied, Marlyn moved for reconsideration but her motion was denied by the trial court. This
prompted Marlyn to file the present petition for review on certiorari directly to the Supreme Court (this
Court).

ISSUES: A. Whether Marlyn’s direct recourse to the Supreme Court from the decision of RTC is
proper. B. Whether or not Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code has a restrictive application so
as to apply only in cases where it is the alien spouse who sought the divorce, and not where the divorce
was mutually agreed upon by the spouses. C. Whether there is a need to prove the foreign divorce
decree despite the lack of opposition from the OSG.

RULING: A. The direct recourse is proper. This Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the
decision of the RTC on the ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the proper
application of Article 26 of the Family Code. “Direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved” [Rep. of the Phils. v.
Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378, 384 (2014)]. In this case, the RTC’s resolve to dismiss the petition filed before it
delved solely on its application of the statutory provision to the facts undisputed before it. B. The legal
provision that is pertinent to the case is Article 26 of the Family Code, which states: Art. 26. All
marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), [36, 37] and 38. Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. The facts in Rep. of the Phils. v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo [G.R. No. 221029, April 24, 2018], are
similar to the circumstances in this case. It was held that Article 26 of the Family Code should apply even
if it was Manalo (a Filipino) who filed for divorce. The decree made the Japanese spouse no longer
married to Manalo; he then had the capacity to remarry. It would be unjust to still deem Manalo
married to the Japanese who, in turn, was no longer married to her. The fact that it was Manalo who
filed the divorce was inconsequential. Applying the same legal considerations and considering the
similar factual milieu that attended in Manalo, the present case warrants a reversal of the RTC’s decision
that refused to recognize the divorce decree that was mutually obtained by Marlyn and her foreigner
spouse in Japan solely on the ground that the divorce was jointly initiated by the spouses. When this
Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in
likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the
right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond. Paragraph 2 of Article 26
speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien capacitating him or her to remarry.” Based
on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse
is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is bound by the words
of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of the lawmakers. “The legislature is presumed
to know that meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by
the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of
a statute there should be no departure.” To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a
foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse
is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree
dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same
result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end
of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreing divorce decree on
Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operation of the latter’s national law. C.
While Marlyn and Akira’s divorce decree was not disputed by the OSG, a recognition of the divorce,
however, could not extend as a matter of course. Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the
submission of the decree should come with adequate proof of the foreign law that allows it. The
Japanese law on divorce must then be sufficiently proved. “Because our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven x x x like any other fact” [Ando v. Department of
Foreign Affairs, 742 Phil. 37, 48 (2014)]. In ATCI Overseas Corp., et al. v. Echin, 647 Phil. 43 (2010), the
Court reiterated the following rules on proof of foreign laws: To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it
must present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court which read: Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer
has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or
by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by his seal of office. Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state.
Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of court having a seal, under the seal of such court. Marlyn failed to satisfy the foregoing
requirements. The records only include a photocopy of excerpts of The Civil Code of Japan, merely
stamped “LIBRARY, Japan Information and Culture Center, Embassy of Japan, 2627 Roxas Boulevard,
Pasay City 1300”.This clearly does not constitute sufficient compliance with the rules on proof of Japan’s
law on divorce. In any case, similar to the remedy that was allowed by the Court in Manalo to resolve
such failure, a remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings and reception of evidence on the
laws of Japan on divorce is allowed, as it is hereby ordered by the Court. The fallo: WHEREFORE, the
petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated January 21, 2016 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case No. 14-132832 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the
relevant Japanese law on divorce. SO ORDERED.

THINGS DECIDED: A. This Court explains that it allows the direct recourse from the decision of the
RTC on the ground that the petition raises a pure question of law on the proper application of Article 26
of the Family Code. “Direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be
taken where only questions of law are raised or involved” [Rep. of the Phils. v. Olaybar, 726 Phil. 378,
384 (2014)]. B. When this Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained
by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,
it should not stop short in likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of
absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together
and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the
domestic relation of the former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of “a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien capacitating him
or her to remarry.” Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires that there be a
divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien spouse should be
the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish
whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. C.
The purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the country
where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure
to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a husband or
wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like circumstance
as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision
should not make a distinction. D. Under prevailing rules and jurisprudence, the submission of the
decree should come with adequate proof of the foreign law that allows it. The Japanese law on divorce
must then be sufficiently proved. “Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven x x x like any other fact” [Ando v. Department of Foreign Affairs, 742 Phil.
37, 48 (2014)].

2. [CASE BRIEF NO. 2019-0060] Heirs of Paula C. Fabillar, as represented by Aureo Fabillar vs. Miguel M.
Paller et. al.

Date: April 22, 2020Author: staredecisis 0 Comments CASE BRIEF NO. 2019-0060 “A baptismal certificate
has evidentiary value to prove filiation only if considered alongside other evidence of filiation.”

CASE: Heirs of Paula C. Fabillar, as represented by Aureo Fabillar vs. Miguel M. Paller, Florentina P.
Abayan, and Demetria P. Sagales [G.R. No. 231459, January 21, 2019] PONENTE: Justice Estela Perlas-
Bernabe SUBJECT: A. CIVIL LAW: i. Proof of filiation – Baptismal certificate ii. Article 172 of the
Family Code B. REMEDIAL LAW: i. Special proceedings – Declaration of heirship

FACTS: This case stemmed from a Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession, and Damages
filed by respondents, Miguel Paller et. al., against Spouses Custodio and Paula (collectively, the
Custodios) involving a parcel of agricultural coconut land situated in Sitio Cabotjo-an, Brgy. Parina,
Giporlos, Eastern Samar, with an assessed value of P950.00. Respondents claimed that the subject land
was originally owned by their grandfather, Marcelino Paller (Marcelino). After the latter’s death,
respondents’ father, Ambrosio, was given his share of the subject land. In 1995, respondent Demetria,
daughter of Ambrosio, mortgaged the subject land to Felix R. Aide with right to repurchase. Upon her
return from Manila in 2000, she redeemed the same but discovered that the Custodios took possession
of the land and refused to vacate therefrom despite demands; hence, the complaint. In their Answer,
the Custodios claimed to be legitimate and compulsory heirs of Marcelino. They averred that
respondent’s father, Ambrosio, is not a child of Marcelino and, as such, has no right to claim the subject
land. To support respondents’ claim that Ambrosio is a child of Marcelino and Susana Paller, they
presented a copy of Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate indicating that his father was Marcelino. The issue
of whether or not Ambrosio is one of the children of Marcelino was raised by both parties in their
respective pre-trial briefs. The MCTC declared respondents as the lawful owners of the subject land, and
ordered the Custodios to surrender the ownership and physical possession of the subject land, and to
pay actual damages. It gave weight to the baptismal certificate as sufficient and competent proof of
Ambrosio’s filiation with Marcelino which the Custodios failed to successfully overthrow. Aggrieved, the
Custodios appealed to the RTC, but in a Decision, the RTC affirmed the MCTC ruling. Dissatisfied,
Spouses Custodio and herein petitioners, heirs of Paula, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
(CA), raisingthe defense of failure to state a cause of action for failure to declare heirship prior to the
institution of the complaint in accordance with the case of Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario [363
Phil. 393 (1999)]. The CA affirmed the RTC Decision, finding Marcelino to be the father of Ambrosio,
thereby declaring that respondents, as children of Ambrosio, have a right over the subject land. It
rejected the Custodios’ claim of lack of cause of action for failure to declare heirship prior to the
institution of the complaint for having been raised only for the first time on appeal. Petitioners and
Spouses Custodio filed their motion for reconsiderationwhich was denied; hence, this petition solely
filed by petitioners. Petitioners insist that the filiation of Ambrosio to Marcelino can only be successfully
proved by virtue of declaration of heirship by a competent court in a special proceeding, absent which,
respondents cannot claim any right over the subject land. Moreover, they insist that mere allegations in
the complaint and the presentation of Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate cannot be considered as
competent proof of the claimed filiation.

ISSUES: A. Whether filiation of Ambrosio to Marcelino can only be made in a special proceeding for
declaration of heirship. a. Whether there is a need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
declaration of Ambrosio’s heirship. B. Whether Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate can be considered as
competent proof of the claimed filiation with Marcelino. a. What are proofs of filiation? b. Who
has the burden of proof in establishing filiation?

RULING: A. A special proceeding for declaration of heirship is not necessary in the present case,
considering that the parties voluntarily submitted the issue of heirship before the trial court. Although
the principal action in this case was for the recovery of ownership and possession of the subject land, it
is necessary to pass upon the relationship of Ambrosio to Marcelino for the purpose of determining
what legal rights he may have in the subject land which he can pass to his heirs. Notably, the issue of
whether or not Ambrosio is one of the children of Marcelino was squarely raised by both parties in their
respective pre-trial briefs. Hence, insofar as the parties in this case are concerned, the trial court is
empowered to make a declaration of heirship, if only to resolve the issue of ownership. To be sure,
while the Court, in Yaptinchay ruled that a declaration of heirship can only be made in a special
proceeding inasmuch as what is sought is the establishment of a status or right, by way of exception, the
Court, in Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte [713 Phil. 570 (2013)], declared that “the need to institute a separate
special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality,
as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already
presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship,” and “the trial court had consequently
rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial,” as in this case. Indeed, recourse to
special proceedings to determine who the heirs are is sanctioned only if there are good and compelling
reasons for such recourse, which is absent herein, as both parties voluntarily submitted the issue of
Ambrosio’s heirship with Marcelinobefore the trial court. Thus, the case falls under the exception, and
there is no need to institute a separate special proceeding for the declaration of Ambrosio’s heirship. B.
Ambrosio’s baptismal certificate cannot be considered as competent proof of the claimed filiation with
Marcelino. In the absence of the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article 172of the
Family Code (Code) provides that filiation shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. Such other proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Rules).Article 175of the same Code also allows illegitimate children to
establish their filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children.
However, it is jurisprudentially settled that a baptismal certificate has evidentiary value to prove filiation
only if considered alongside other evidence of filiation (Heirs of Roldan v. Heirs of Roldan, G.R. No.
202578, September 27, 2017). Because the putative parent has no hand in the preparation of a
baptismal certificate, the same has scant evidentiary value if taken in isolation; while it may be
considered a public document, “it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on
the date specified, but not the veracity of the entries with respect to the child’s paternity.” As such, a
baptismal certificate alone is not sufficient to resolve a disputed filiation, and the courts must peruse
other pieces of evidence instead of relying only on a canonical record. In this case, the MCTC, the RTC,
and the CA did not appreciate any other material proof related to the baptismal certificate of Ambrosio
that would establish his filiation with Marcelino, whether as a legitimate or an illegitimate son. Contrary
to the ruling of the said courts, the burden of proof is on respondents to establish their affirmative
allegation that Marcelino is Ambrosio’s father [Go Kim Huy v. Go Kim Huy, 417 Phil. 822 (2001)], and not
for petitioners to disprove the same, because a baptismal certificate is neither conclusive proof of
filiation /parentage nor of the status of legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person baptized. Further, the
Court finds that respondents failed to establish the identity of the land they were seeking to recover, in
the first place. Related Case Briefs: a) Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario, 363 Phil. 393 (1999) b)
Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte 713 Phil. 570 (2013) c) Heirs of Roldan v. Heirs of Roldan, G.R. No. 202578,
September 27, 2017 d) Go Kim Huy v. Go Kim Huy, 417 Phil. 822 (2001)
————————————————-

THINGS DECIDED: A. While the Court, in Yaptinchay ruled that a declaration of heirship can only be
made in a special proceeding inasmuch as what is sought is the establishment of a status or right, by
way of exception, the Court, in Heirs of Ypon v. Ricaforte [713 Phil. 570 (2013)], declared that “the need
to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for
the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the
trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship,” and “the trial court had
consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial”. B. In the absence of
the record of birth and admission of legitimate filiation, Article 172of the Family Code (Code) provides
that filiation shall be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. Such
other proof of one’s filiation may be a baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which
his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
(Rules).Article 175of the same Code also allows illegitimate children to establish their filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. C. A baptismal certificate has
evidentiary value to prove filiation only if considered alongside other evidence of filiation (Heirs of
Roldan v. Heirs of Roldan, G.R. No. 202578, September 27, 2017). Because the putative parent has no
hand in the preparation of a baptismal certificate, the same has scant evidentiary value if taken in
isolation; while it may be considered a public document, “it can only serve as evidence of the
administration of the sacrament on the date specified, but not the veracity of the entries with respect to
the child’s paternity.”

3. http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/10658/

4. http://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63112

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