Final Examination in Criminal Law Review February 3, 2019 Instruction
Final Examination in Criminal Law Review February 3, 2019 Instruction
Final Examination in Criminal Law Review February 3, 2019 Instruction
PROBLEM No. 1.
At about 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon of June 7, 1999, private
complainant Nelia R. Silvestre (Nelia), together with Maria Viovicente
(Maria) and Veronica Amar (Veronica), boarded a tricycle on their way
to Pembo, Makati City. Upon reaching Ambel Street, Rey Ornopia and
his brother Edwin blocked the tricycle and under their threats, the
driver alighted and left. Rey Ornopia and Edwin at once shouted
invectives at Nelia, saying "Putang ina mong matanda ka, walanghiya
ka, kapal ng mukha mo, papatayin ka namin." Edwin Ornopia added
"Putang ina kang matanda ka, wala kang kadala dala, sinabihan na
kita na kahit saan kita matiempuhan, papatayin kita."
Edwin Ornopia thereafter grabbed Nelia’s 18K gold necklace
with a crucifix pendant which, according to an "alajera" in the
province, was of 18k gold, and which was worth ₱3,500, kicked the
tricycle and left saying "Putang ina kang matanda ka! Kayo mga
nurses lang, anong ipinagmamalaki niyo, mga nurses lang kayo.
Kami, marami kaming mga abogado. Hindi niyo kami maipapakulong
kahit kailan!".
Given the set of facts, granting that you are the prosecutor, what
crime will you charge against Rey and Edwin? Explain your answer.
I will charge Rey and Edwin with the crime of Grave Coercion. Under
the Revised Penal Code, Grave Coercion is committed by any person who,
without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, threats or intimidation,
prevent another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel him
to do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong. The facts
attendant in the present case, which is the taking of Nelia’s necklace, does
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PROBLEM NO. 2.
Seneneng narrated that at around 8:30 a.m. of June 29, 2010, she
was using her cellphone while walking along Jolo
Street, Barangay Barreto, Olongapo City when a motorcycle with two
male persons on board stopped beside her. The backrider then
suddenly grabbed her three necklaces: one big necklace worth
₱43,800.00 and two other necklaces each with pendants worth
₱13,500.00 and ₱12,800.00, respectively, the prices of which were
evidenced by the receipts issued by Eleanor Pawnshop and Jewelry
Store where she bought them. Seneneng further recounted that after
grabbing her necklaces, the two male persons moved a short
distance and then looked back at her to check if all her necklaces
were taken. Recovering from shock, Seneneng managed to shout and
ask for help. A tricycle passed by and so the male persons on board
the motorcycle immediately sped away. Seneneng asked the tricycle
driver to run after the snatchers but he unfortunately missed
them. Thus, Seneneng went to the Police Station to report the
incident.
Question: If you were the police officer, what crime would you
charge for the snatchers of her bag? Explain.
The snatchers should be liable for theft. Under the Revised Penal
Code, theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
the personal property of another without the latter's consent. In this case,
Seneneng's testimony was bereft of any showing that snatchers used
violence or intimidation in taking her necklaces. She merely stated that the
perpetrators grabbed her necklaces without mentioning that the latter made
use of violence or intimidation in grabbing them. Further, she did not
sustain any kind of injury when the necklaces were snatched from her.
Hence, the snatchers should be liable for theft.
PROBLEM NO. 3
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The following are exceptions to the general rule that criminal prosecution may not
be restrained or stayed by injunction, preliminary of final: (1) when the injunction is
necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (2)
when it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or
multiplicity of actions; (3) when there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice; (4)
when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; and (5) when the
prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation.
PROBLEM NO. 4.
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things.
What are these two things?
PROBLEM NO. 5.
In the prosecution of cases involving falsification of daily time records, is it
imperative that there be proof of damage to the government? Explain your
answer.
Yes. There should be proof of damage to the government. This is because the
daily time record that a public official or employee must fill up is a public document
which has characteristics distinct from other public documents. This requirement is
necessary in order to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid accordingly.
Closely adhering to the policy of no work no pay, a daily time record is primarily, if not
solely, intended to prevent damage or loss to the government as would result in
instances where it pays an employee for no work done. The integrity of the daily time
record as an official document, however, remains untarnished if the damage sought to
be prevented has not been produced.
PROBLEM NO. 6.
Juan is the tenant of Pedro. As such he was allowed to plant camote and
harvest coconuts from the plantation of Pedro. In one harvest season, Juan
gathered coconuts from the coconut plantation. He processed it to copra and
sold the same to a copra buyer. The sale amounted to p10,000 but Juan did not
remit it to Pedro.
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Questions: (a)Pedro filed a case for qualified theft against Juan. Is the
charge correct? What do you think should be the proper charge? (b) Does the
Regional trial Court have jurisdiction over the offense? Explain.
PROBLEM NO. 7
Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto Dangal
(Dangal), private complainant Engr. Alejandro Avanzado (Alejandro), and SPO1
Florentino Pahayahay (SPO1 Pahayahay), it appears that at around 11:00 o’clock
in the morning of February 1, 2002, Dangal, the overseer of a one-hectare
unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria, Quezon, and co-owned by
Alejandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting down the
coconut trees on the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into
coco lumber. Dangal did not attempt to stop the men from cutting down the
coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, Dangal left the site and
proceeded to San Pablo City to inform Alejandro about the incident.
On February 3, 2002, Alejandro and Dangal reported the incident to the
police. Thereafter, the two, accompanied by SPO1 Pahayahay, went to the
coconut plantation only to discover that about thirty-three (33) coconut trees
(subject trees) had been cut down. The coco lumber was no longer in the area.
They took photographs of the stumps left by the men.
The defense, on the other hand, presented Durano Avanzado (Durano),
accused Colmenares, petitioner Sumbilon, Barangay Captain Pedro Dagumo
(Brgy. Captain Dagumo) and accused Zanoria, to substantiate its claim of
innocence for all the accused.
Durano testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Alumbro and
Sumbilon, to cut down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property,
which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Alejandro. Durano admitted that he
had never set foot on his property for about 20 years already and that he was not
present when the cutting incident happened.
Defense witness Brgy. Captain Dagumo testified that on January 28, 2002,
Sumbilon, Alumbro, Colmenares, and Zanoria came to his office seeking
permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of Durano.
All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Colmenares
and Sumbilon claimed that only the coconut trees which stood within the land
owned by Durano, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on that
morning of February 1, 2002. Colmenares added that he was a coco lumber trader
and that Durano offered to sell the coconut trees planted on his lot. Sumbilon
claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees but merely
supervised the same. He claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for the
service he rendered or a share from the proceeds of the coco lumbers sale.
Zanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down of the coconut trees but
confirmed the presence of Sumbilon and Alumbro at the site to supervise the
accomplishment of the work being done thereat. Zanoria corroborated the
narration of Sumbilon and Colmenares that all the felled trees were planted inside
the lot owned by Durano. Zanoria intimated that Alejandro included him in the
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complaint for theft due to his refusal to accede to latter’s request for him to
testify against his co-accused in relation to the present criminal charge.
Questions: (a) what crime, if any, is committed by the persons who felled or
cut the coconut trees? (b) The prosecution in the case at bar, charged the
accused of Theft of Damage Property—what are the elements of this charge? (c)
If you wre the judge would you convict the accused based on the above set of
facts? (d) “Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” as a principle of criminal law
was used in this case. Explain its relevance and its meaning. (e) Both the RTC
and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted testimony of Durano
for being unreliable and considered him a biased witness simply because he is
related by affinity to Sumbilon and Alumbro. Is this ruling correct?
A.
There is no crime committed in this case. no concrete and competent evidence
was adduced to substantiate the claims of both parties. The Court cannot determine
with certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of the exact
location of the coconut trees negates the presence of the criminal intent to gain. Even
arguing that the said coconut trees were within Alejandro’s land, no malice or criminal
intent could be rightfully attributed to those accused.
B.
The crime of theft of damaged property is committed by Any person who, after
having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the
fruits or object of the damage caused by him. To warrant a conviction under theft of
damaged property, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable that the accused
maliciously damaged the property belonging to another and, thereafter, removed or
used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged property
is an intentional felony for which criminal liability attaches only when it is shown that the
malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal intent must be clearly
established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.
C.
I would not convict the accused based on the stated facts. There is no concrete
proof that there was any criminal intent to gain in cutting down the trees due to the
uncertainty as to the exact location of the trees. Absence of any criminal intent does not
warrant a conviction.
D.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea means that there can be no crime when
the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake as to particular
facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception
of course is neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is
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equivalent to criminal intent, for in this instance, the element of malicious intent is
supplied by the element of negligence and imprudence.
E.
No, it is not correct. Family relationship, does not by itself render a witness’
testimony inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight. To warrant rejection of the
testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the
relationship, the testimony was inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or
evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused falsely.
The relationship of Durano to the accused, per se, does not impair his credibility.
It bears stressing that while Sumbilon and Alumbro are Durano’s brothers-in-law,
Alejandro is his cousin. Considering that both the accused and the accuser are
Durano’s relatives, and purportedly both have bearing with regard to his decision, why
would then Durano support one over the other? The logical explanation could only be
that Durano had indeed ordered Sumbilon and Alumbro to cut the trees on his land. The
Court is convinced that Durano was telling the truth.
PROBLEM NO. 8.
The crime committed is qualified theft. For qualified theft to be committed, the
following elements must concur:
1. Taking of personal property; 2. That the said property belongs to another; 3.
That the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. That it be done without the owner's
consent; 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against
persons, nor of force upon things; 6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
This Court has been consistent in holding that "intent to gain or animus
lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of
the thing subject of asportation. Thus, actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain." In this case, it is clear from the established facts that
it was accused-appellant who opened the drawer in the masters' bedroom and took
away the cash and valuables it contained. Therefore, the burden is on the defense to
prove that intent to gain was absent despite accused-appellant's actual taking of her
employer's valuables. It is precisely this burden that the defense failed to discharge.
This Court has explained that while grave abuse of trust and confidence per se does not
produce the felony as an effect, it is a "circumstance which aggravates and qualifies the
commission of the crime of theft"; hence, the imposition of a higher penalty is
necessary. It is not difficult to understand why the character of accused-appellant's work
as a domestic helper qualifies the offense she committed.
PROBLEM NO. 9.
confronted petitioner Shirley Marakoy about the dishonored checks, and the
latter confessed that she did not have enough money to cover the amount of the
checks. Pureza also learned that the pieces of jewelry were pawned to several
pawnshops and private individuals contrary to what they had agreed upon.
Petitioner Shirley Marakoy furnished Pureza with a list of the pawnshops, such
that, the latter was compelled to redeem the pieces of jewelry with her own
money. It appeared in the pawnshop tickets that it was the nephew of Shirley
Marakoy named Frederick San Diego who pledged the pieces of jewelry.
To settle the matter, Pureza asked Shirley Marakoy to return the remaining
pieces of jewelry in her possession but the latter failed to do so, and instead,
offered her house and lot as payment for the pieces of jewelry. Pureza, however,
did not accept the said offer.
A demand letter was then sent by Pureza to Tomales, Shirley Marakoy and
Marissa Marakoy, dated February 16, 2004, asking for the return of the amount of
₱2,292,519.00 as payment for all the pieces of jewelry which were not returned to
her, including the cash given by Pureza for the rediscounting business. The
demand letter was left unanswered.
For her part, Shirley Marakoy, averred that she had no involvement in the
jewelry business of her daughters. Tomales likewise denied having any business
dealings with her sister Marissa Marakoy and with Pureza. While admitting that
there were pieces of jewelry pledged by her cousin, Frederick San Diego, in the
pawnshop where she was the manager, Tomales denied that she knew where
those pieces of jewelry came from.
Question: What crime is committed, if any, by Tomales, Shirley Marakoy
and Marissa Marakoy? Given the set of facts, how did the Supreme Court rule on
the matter? Explain.
Although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed the duration of reclusion
perpetua from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty.
It may, however, be pointed out that although the Revised Penal Code did not
specify the maximum of reclusion perpetua , It is apparent that the maximum period for
the service of this penalty shall not exceed forty (40) years. The sentence to serve 20
years is correct. There is legal basis, both in law and logic, for Presidential Decree No.
818 to declare that any penalty exceeding twenty (20) years, or the maximum duration
of reclusion temporal, is within the range of reclusion perpetua.
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The imputed duration of thirty (30) years for reclusion perpetua, therefore, is only
to serve as the basis for determining the convict's eligibility for pardon or for the
application of the three-fold rule in the service of multiple penalties. Since, however, in
all the graduated scales of penalties in the Code, as set out in Article 25, 70 and
71, reclusion perpetua is the penalty immediately next higher to reclusion temporal, it
follows by necessary implication that the minimum of reclusion perpetua is twenty (20)
years and one (1) day with duration thereafter to last for the rest of the convict's natural
life although, pursuant to Article 70, it appears that the maximum period for the service
of penalties shall not exceed forty (40) years.
(1) Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.
(2) Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by
R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses over which the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime
of estafa. It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII,
Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI
(Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
(3) She also argued that it was President Arroyo, not the government, that
was duped. Even assuming that she received the P15,000,000.00, that
amount came from Arroyo, not from the coffers of the government.
(4) She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive
monies or funds. Such power was vested with the Board of Regents
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(BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was
among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was
committed in connection with her official functions, the same is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller
v. Sandiganbayan.
Question: (a)How did the Supreme Court rule on the above 5 contentions of
Salvanera? (b) Give the jurisprudence laid in Soller v. Sandiganbayan.
A.
1.
The contention of Salvanera is incorrect. The law provides that the
Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in cases
involving, among others, Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations. As she is student regent of UP, which
is an institution maintained by the government and performs a legitimate
governmental function, Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the offense
charged or over her person.
2.
Petitioner’s contention shall fail. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office. Estafa is one
of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials and
employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and
that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
3.
The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the
President and not its then occupant, President Arroyo. Under the information, it is
averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos
(P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter
relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and
delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in
the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)." Again, the Court sustains
the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of
defense that should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant
case.
4.
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to
be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."
5.
B.
The rule is that in order to ascertain whether a court has jurisdiction or not, the
provisions of the law should be inquired into. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of the court
must appear clearly from the statute law or it will not be held to exist. It cannot be
presumed or implied. For this purpose in criminal cases, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the law at the time of the commencement of the action. The bone of
contention here is whether the offenses charged may be considered as committed "in
relation to their office" as this phrase is employed in the above-quoted Section 4. what is
controlling is not whether the phrase "committed in violation to public office" appears in
the information; what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the specific
factual allegation in the information that would indicate close intimacy between the
discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
A complex crime is when a single act produces two or more grave or less grave
felonies or when an offense is necessary means for committing the other. Special
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complex crime is made up of more than one crime but which in the eyes of the law is
only a single indivisible offense.
falsify his PDS. He claimed that it was Editha Mendoza (Mendoza), a member of
his staff, who actually prepared his PDS. According to Sevilla, on July 2, 2001,
since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house. At around two
o’clock in the afternoon, he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to
accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the personnel office of the City of
Malabon before five o’clock that afternoon. He then instructed Mendoza to copy
the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel
office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla
claims that he just signed the same without checking the veracity of the entries
therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer to the question of whether he has
any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box corresponding to the “no”
answer.
The defense likewise presented the testimony of Edilberto G. Torres
(Torres), a former City Councilor. Torres testified that Sevilla was not yet given
an office space in the Malabon City Hall on July 2, 2001; that when the members
of Sevilla’s staff would then need to use the typewriter, they would just use the
typewriter inside Torres’ office. Torres further claimed that he saw Mendoza
preparing the PDS of Sevilla, the latter having used the typewriter in his office.
QUESTION: With what she did is Sevilla criminally liable? What crime did
she commit if any?
The crime committed by the accused is grave slander by deed. Grave slander by
deed is committed by performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt
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upon another person. The elements are (1) that the offender performs any act not
included in any other crime against honor, (2) that such act is performed in the presence
of other person or persons, and (3) that such act casts dishonor, discredit or contempt
upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed
of a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the
circumstances under which the act was committed, the occasion, etc. Based on the
foregoing facts, all the elements of the crime are present in this case. The slapping
which is an act to discredit and dishonor the pregnant woman and which was done in
the presence of other persons.
The crime committed by Dalila is direct assault. Under the Revised Penal Code,
Direct Assault is committed by any person or persons who, without a public uprising,
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any
of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance. The elements of such common form of assault are the following
1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious
intimidation, or (d) makes a serious resistance.
3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is
engaged in the actual performance of official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by
reason of the past performance of official duties.
4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority
or his agent in the exercise of his duties.
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On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the
performance of her official duties. Gemma being a public-school teacher, belongs to the
class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal
Code, which states that teachers, professors, and persons charged with the supervision
of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in
the actual performance of their professional duties or on the occasion of such
performance shall be deemed persons in authority. Undoubtedly, there is concrete and
clear evidence based on the facts to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of the crime of direct assault.
Atty. Oscar Tabirak and his eight-year-old daughter, Girlie, were shot and
killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 in Manila. The police had no leads
on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron surfaced and
executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain Lucio
Columnas told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tabirak was ordered killed
by respondent Lloyd Manorda and that he (Columnas) was one of those who
killed Atty. Tabirak. He added that he told the Tabirak family what he knew and
that the sketch of the suspect closely resembled Columnas. After conducting a
preliminary investigation and on the strength of Geron's affidavit, the
investigating prosecutor issued a resolution dated December 5, 2003 finding
probable cause against Columnas and three John Does. On February 2, 2004, the
corresponding Informations for murder were filed against them in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of Atty.
Franklin Tabirak, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the minor
Girlie. Columnas was arrested in the province of Cagayan on February 17, 2004
and brought to Manila for detention and trial. On March 8, 2004, Columnas
executed an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during
the shooting and implicated respondent Romano Tawing (alias "Mumoy") as the
gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds respondent
Licerio Manorda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Manorda.The former was the
ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the
killing took place, Licerio Manorda was in detention for a kidnapping case in
which Atty. Tabirak was acting as private prosecutor. Pursuant to this affidavit,
petitioner Harold V. Tabirak (brother of Atty. Tabirak) filed a complaint against
those implicated by Columnas in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. On
April 19, 2004, Columnas affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor
who subjected him to clarificatory questions. Respondents denied any
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involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate for mayor in
Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted
by his political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Manordas
admitted that Atty. Tabirak was their political rival for the mayoralty post of
Buguey. Atty. Tabirak had been defeated twice by Lloyd and once by Licerio.
Before the killing, Atty. Tabirak filed an election case against Lloyd and a
kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However, they claimed
that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections
and Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan. During the preliminary
investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columnas' unsolicited handwritten
letter dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas' jail cell in
Manila. In the letter, Columnas disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004
affidavit and narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial
confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the
killings. Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columnas dated May
25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements in his handwritten
letter. Due to the submission of Columnas' letter and affidavit, the investigating
prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable Columnas to clarify his
contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing held on
October 22, 2004, Columnas categorically admitted the authorship and
voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004 affidavit and
denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the
affidavit from him. Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor
recommended the dismissal of the charges. This was approved by the city
prosecutor.
Question: As the investigating prosecutor, in issuing the Resolution
recommending the dismissal, what grounds or principles would you state in
order to justify your recommendation for dismissal of the case? Granting that the
recommendation was denied by the City prosecutor and that Information for
murder was filed in Court, as Judge, how would you resolve the issue of probable
cause for you to issue or not the warrant of arrest?
PROBLEM NO. 18
The petitioner herein, Jimmy Angara, was a former civilian employee
of the Navy Exchange, Sangley Point, Cavite City, whose services were
terminated on May 6, 1961. In the afternoon of June 6, 1961, be led a group
of about 20 to 30 persons in a demonstration staged in front of the main
gate of the United States Naval Station at Sangley Point. They carried
placards bearing statements such as, "Romy, mamatay ka;" "To, alla boss
con Nolan;" "Frank do not be a common funk;" "Romy, mamamatay ka rin;"
"Romy, Nolan for you;" "Romy, alla bos con Nolan;"
"Romy, dillega el dia di guide rin bo chiquiting;" and others. The base
commander, Capt. McAllister, called up Col. Patricia Zuno, who as
Philippine Military Liason Officer at Sangley Point was in charge of
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I will acquit the accused. Under the Revised Penal Code, the crime of grave
threats is committed (1) that the offender threatened another person with the infliction
upon his person of a wrong; (2) that such wrong amounted to a crime; and (3) that the
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threat was not subject to a condition. Hence, petitioner could have been convicted
thereunder. It is to be noted that under the aforementioned provision the particular
manner in which the threat is made not a qualifying ingredient of the offense, such that
the deletion of the word "orally" did not affect the nature and essence of the crime as
charged originally. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution that the
accused threatened to kill Rosauro Reyes so as to require the petitioner to undergo any
material change or modification in his defense.
The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the words,
"Agustin, putang ina mo". This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is
often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. It is
seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the
virtues of a mother. In the instant case, it should be viewed as part of the threats voiced
by appellant against Agustin Hallare, evidently to make the same more emphatic.
PROBLEM NO. 19
The damages on crimes to include civil indemnity, exemplary
damages, moral damages, and temperate damages are already fixed
in such a way that a judge need not even bother to compute the same.
Questions:
(1) What criminal case in particular can you cite as
jurisprudence? (2) Who is the ponente of the case?
(3) When was this case decided?
(4) As an example what damages will you award in
(a) homicide where no receipts for damages are presented
(b) rape with homicide
(c) murder where receipts of hospitalization amounting to
P100,000 was proved in court;
(e) robbery with Intentional Mutilation?
(f) reckless imprudence resulting to homicide?
1. The case of People of the Philippines vs. Ireneo Jugueta with GR No.
202124.
4.
PROBLEM NO. 20
The Acao family is composed of Acao San (father), Chua Ong Ping Sim
(mother), Robert and Raymond (children), Lenny (daughter-in-law, wife of Robert),
Matthew and Charlene (grandchildren), and Jona Lugatiman and Josephine Ortea
(housemaids). The Acao family owns and operates a poultry farm in Barangay
Santo Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.On 16 July 1999, at about 11:00 p.m.,
the Acao family, on board a Mazda MVP van, arrived at their poultry farm in
Barangay Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. Acao San alighted from the
van to open the gate of the farm. At this juncture, appellant Dalman and a certain
Juanito Caturayon (Caturayon) approached, poked their guns at Acao San, and
dragged him inside the van. Appellant Dalman and Caturayon also boarded the
van. Thereupon, appellants Romualdo and Abuhan, with two male companions,
all armed with guns, arrived and immediately boarded the van. Appellant Abuhan
took the driver's seat and drove the van. Appellants Dalman and Romualdo and
their cohorts then blindfolded each member of the Acao family inside the van
with packaging tape. After about 30 minutes of traveling on the road, the van
stopped. Per order of appellants and their cohorts, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Jona Lugatiman (Lugatiman) stepped out of the van with
appellants Dalman and Romualdo, Caturayon and one of their male companions.
Appellant Abuhan, with the other male companion, drove the van with the
remaining members of the Acao family inside the vehicle. Later, the van stopped
again. Appellant Abuhan and his male companion told Acao San to produce the
amount of five million pesos (P5,000,000.00) as ransom in exchange for the
release of Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert, Raymond and Lugatiman. Thereafter,
appellant Abuhan and his male companion left the van and fled; while Acao San,
Lenny, Matthew, Charlene and Josephine remained inside the van. Upon sensing
that the kidnappers had already left, Acao San drove the van towards the poultry
farm and sought the help of relatives. Meanwhile, Chua Ong Ping Sim, Robert,
Raymond and Lugatiman were taken on foot by appellants Dalman and
Romualdo, Caturayon and one male companion to a safe-house situated in the
mountainous part of San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan where they spent the whole
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night. On the morning of the following day, at around 4:00 a.m., appellants and
their cohorts tried to contact Acao San regarding the ransom demanded, but the
latter could not be reached. Thus, appellants instructed Lugatiman to look for
Acao San in the poultry farm. Appellants Dalman and Romualdo and one male
companion escorted Lugatiman in proceeding to the poultry farm. Upon arriving
therein, Lugatiman searched for Acao San, but the latter could not be found.
Appellants Dalman and Romualdo told Lugatiman to remind Acao San about the
ransom demanded. Thereafter, appellants Dalman and Romualdo and their male
companion left Lugatiman in the poultry farm and went back to the safe-house. In
the safe-house, appellants told Robert that they would release him so he could
help Lugatiman in locating Acao San. Robert and appellants left the safe-house,
and after 30 minutes of trekking, appellants abandoned Robert. Robert then ran
towards the poultry farm. Upon arriving at the poultry farm, Robert found Acao
San and informed him about the ransom demanded by the appellants. Robert also
told Acao San that Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were still held by appellants
and their cohorts. On 18 July 1999, appellants called Acao San through a cellular
phone and demanded the ransom of P5 million for Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond. Acao San acceded to appellants' demand. Appellants allowed Acao
San to talk with Chua Ong Ping Sim. On the morning of 19 July 1999, appellants
again called Acao San via a cellular phone and threatened to kill Chua Ong Ping
Sim and Raymond because of newspaper and radio reports regarding the
incident. Acao San clarified to appellants that he did not report the incident to the
police and also pleaded with them to spare the life of Chua Ong Ping Sim and
Raymond. Appellants then instructed Acao San to appear and bring with him the
ransom of P5 million at 3:00 p.m. in the Usan dumpsite, Litex Road, Fairview,
Quezon City. Acao San arrived at the designated place of the pay-off at 4:00 p.m.,
but none of the appellants or their cohorts showed up. Acao San waited for
appellant's call, but none came. Thus, Acao San left. On 23 July 1999, the corpses
of Chua Ong Ping Sim and Raymond were found at the La Mesa Dam, Novaliches,
Quezon City. Both died of asphyxia by strangulation.
Question: On the basis of the above facts, if you were the prosecutor, what
crime would you charge to the suspects? What elements of the offense will you
prove in court?
The crime that the suspects committed is kidnapping for ransom with homicide.
Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of kidnapping is committed with
the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act
of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than
three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries
are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. All of the
foregoing elements were duly establish by the testimonial and documentary evidences
for the prosecution in the case at bar. First, appellants and their cohorts are private
23
individuals. Second, appellants and their cohorts kidnapped the Yao family by taking
control of their van and detaining them in a secluded place. Third, the Yao family was
taken against their will. And fourth, threats to kill were made and the kidnap victims
include females.
Republic Act No. 7659 provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if any of
the two qualifying circumstances is present in the commission of the kidnapping: (1) the
motive of the kidnappers is to extort ransom for the release of the kidnap victims,
although none of the circumstances mentioned under paragraph four of the elements of
kidnapping were present. Ransom means money, price or consideration paid or
demanded for the redemption of a captured person that would release him from
captivity. Whether or not the ransom is actually paid to or received by the perpetrators is
of no moment. It is sufficient that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of
exacting ransom; and (2) the kidnap victims were killed or died as a consequence of the
kidnapping or was raped, or subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts. Both of these
qualifying circumstances are alleged in the information and proven during trial. The
death penalty cannot be imposed on the appellants in view of the passage of Republic
Act No. 9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty in the
Philippines. In accordance with Sections 2 and 3 thereof, the penalty that should be
meted out to the appellants is reclusion perpetua without the possibility of parole.