476 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gozo

No. L-36409. October 26, 1973.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

LORETA Gozo, defendant-appellant.

Municipal corporations; Authority to require building permits;

Authority predicated upon general welfare clause.—It would be fruitless for
appellant to assert that local govemment units are devoid of authority to
require building permits. This Court, from Switzer v. Municipality of Cebu,
decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. Even
appellant had to concede in her brief: “If, at all, the questioned ordinance
may be predicated under the general welfare clause x x x.” Its scope is wide,
well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public health, public
morals, public safety, and the well-being and good order of the community.
Same; Same; Authority subject to limitations.—It goes without saying
that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its exercise is
violative of any constitutional right, then

477

VOL. 53, OCTOBER 26, 1973 477

People vs. Gozo

its validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability to the
person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is settled law.
Political law; Philippine sovereignty over American bases; Extent of.
—As was so emphatically set forth in People v. Acierto:“By the Agreement,
it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the
United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. This consent was given
purely as a matter of comity, courtesy or expediency. The Philippine
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over
offenses committed therein. Under the terms of the treaty, the United States
Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive jurisdiction of such
offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights
not granted, but also such ceded rights as the United States Military
authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of.”
Same; Municipal corporation retains administrative jurisdiction.—Can
there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout, unwarranted
and unjustified, from what is settled and orthodox law can lend the slightest
degree of plausibility to the contention of absence of administrative
jurisdiction. If it were otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice
Tuason “as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency” becomes one of
obeisance and submission. If on a concern purely domestic in its
implications, devoid of any connection with national security, the Military-
Bases Agreement could thus be interpreted, then sovereignty indeed
becomes a mockery and an illusion.
Same; Same.—Nor does appellant’s thesis rest on less shaky
foundation by the mere fact that Acierto and Reagan dealt with the
competence of the national government, while what is sought to be
emasculated in this case is the so-called administrative jurisdiction of a
municipal corporation. Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory
powers are vested upon it may be validly exercised. Any residual authority
not therein conferred, whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the
national government, not to an alien country.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Zambales.

Amores, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor
General Jaime M. Lantin and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for
plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T. Nery for defendant-appellant.

478

478 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gozo

FERNANDO, J:

Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance

of Zambales, convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of
Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a permit from the municipal mayor
for the construction or erection of a building, as well as any
modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions
its validity, or
1
at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking
due process, a contention she2 would premise on what for her is the
teaching of People v. Fajardo. If such a ground were far from being
impressed with solidity, she stands on quicksand when she would
deny the applicability of the ordinance to her, on the pretext that her
house was constructed within the naval base leased to the American
armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does
not thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would, in effect,
seek to emasculate our sovereign rights by the assertion that we
cannot exercise therein adminisrative jurisdiction. To state the
proposition is to make patent how much it is tinged with
unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court decision must be
affirmed with the sole modification that she is given thirty days from
the finality of a judgment to obtain a permit, failing which, she is
required to demolish the same.
The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower
court: “The accused brought a house and lot located inside the
United States Naval Reservation within the territorial jurisdiction of
Olongapo City. She demolished the house and built another one in
its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of
Olongapo City, because she was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an
assistant in the City Mayor’s office, as well as by her neighbors in
the area, that such building permit was not necessary for the
construction of the house. On December 29,

_______________

1 According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution: “No person

shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.”
2 104 Phil. 443 (1958).

479

VOL. 53, OCTOBER 26, 1973 479

People vs. Gozo

1966, Juan Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City

Engineer’s Office, Olongapo City, together with Patrolman Ramon
Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force apprehended four
carpenters working on the house of the accused and they brought the
carpenters to the Olongapo City police headquarters for
interrogation. * * * After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was
charged with violation of Municipal
3
Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964
with the City Fiscal’s Office.” The City Court of Olongapo City
found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of
1964 and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as
to pay the costs. The Court of First Instance of Zambales, on appeal,
found her guilty on the above facts of violating such municipal
ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay a fine of P200.00
and to demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue the validity
of such an ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least its
applicability to her in view of the location of her dwelling within the
naval base. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals, in a resolution of
Juanuary 29, 1973, noting the constitutional question raised,
certified the case to this Court.
 There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition,
no support in law for the stand taken by appellant. 1. It would be
fruitless for her to assert that local government units are devoid of
authority to require building
4
permits. This Court, f rom Switzer v.
Municipality of Cebu, decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity
of such measures. It is much too late in the day contend that such a

________________

3 Decision, Appendix A to the Brief for the DefendantAppellant, 1A-1B.

4 20 Phil. 111. Cf. People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 25 (1929); Tan Chat v. Municipality of
Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465 (1934); Hipolito v. City of Manila, 87 Phil. 180 (1950); Uy Matiao
and Co. v. The City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300 (1953); University of the East v. City of
Manila, 96 Phil. 316 (1954); Verzosa v. City of Baguio, 109 Phil. 571 (1960); Lopera
v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 549; People v. Soria, L-18982, January
31, 1963, 7 SCRA 242,

480

480 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gozo

requirement cannot be validly imposed. Even appellant, justifiably

concerned about the unfavorable impression that could be created if
she were to deny that such competence is vested in municipal
corporations and chartered cities, had to concede in her brief: “If, at
all; the questioned ordinance
5
may be predicated under the general
welfare clause * * *.” Its scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing,
covering every aspect of public health, public morals,6 public saf ety,
and the well being and good order of the community.
It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations.
Certainly, if its exercise is violative of any constitutional right, then
its validity could be impugned, or at the very least, its applicability
to the person adversely affected could be questioned. So much is
settled law. Apparently, appellant has adopted the view that a due
process question may indeed be raised in view of what for her is its
oppressive character. She is led to such a conclusion,

________________

5 Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 10. She would cite Sec. 2238 of the Revised
Administrative Code, but strict accuracy would demand that she should refer to the
specific provision in the Olongapo city charter.
6 Cf. United States v. Alexander, 8 Phil. 29 (1907): Punzalan v. Ferriols, 19 Phil.
214 (1911); United States v. Espiritusanto, 23 Phil. 610 (1912); United States v. Ten
Yu, 24 Phil. 1 (1912); United States v. Abundan, 24 Phil. 165 (1913) ; Case v. Board
of Health, 24 Phil. 250 (1913); United States v. Hilario, 24 Phil. 392 (1913) ; United
States v. Chan Tienco, 25 Phil. 89 (1913) ; United States v. Joson, 26 Phil. 1 (1913);
Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348 (1916); United States v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 103
(1918) ; Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103 (1920) ; Vinco v. Municipality of
Hinigaran, 41 Phil. 790 (1917) ; People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 24 (1929); Tan Chat v.
Municipality of Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465 (1934); People v. Lardizabal, 61 Phil. 360 (1935);
Malabon Sugar Co. v. Municipality of Malabon, 61 Phil. 717 (1935) ; People v. Chan,
65 Phil. 611 (1938); People v. Sabarre, 65 Phil. 684 (1938); People v. Esguerra, 81
Phil. 33 (1948); Eboña v. Municipality of Daet, 85 Phil. 369 (1950) ; Manila Race
Horse Trainers Asso. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951) ; Vega v. Municipal Board of
the City of lloilo, 94 Phil. 949 (1954); Co Kiam v. City of Manila, 96 Phil. 649
(1955); Physical Therapy Org. of the Phil. v. Municipal Board of Manila, 101 Phil.
1142 (1957); Uy Ha v. City Mayor, 108 Phil. 400 (1960); Gaerlan v. Baguio City
Council, 109 Phil. 1100 (1960); Gerena v. City of Manila, 110 Phil. 958 (1961).

481

VOL. 53, OCTOBER 26, 1973 481

People vs. Gozo
7
relying on People v. Fajardo. A more careful scrutiny of such a
decision would not have led her astray, for that case is easily
distinguishable. The facts as set forth in the opinion follow: “It
appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of def
endant-appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of
Baao, Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed the ordinance in
question providing as follows: ‘* * * 1. Any person or persons who
will construct or repair a building should, before constructing or
repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. * * *
2. A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building
permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued. * * * 3. [Penalty]—
Any violation of the provisions of the above, this ordinance, shall
make the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than P25 nor more
than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than 24
days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys
the view of the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall
be removed at the expense of the owner of the building or house. * *
* .” Four years later, after the term of appellant Fajardo as mayor
had expired, he and his son-in-law, appellant Babilonia, filed a
written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of
land registered in Fajardo’s name, located along the national
highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek * * *. On
January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the reason among
others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty
of the public plaza * * *. On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated
their request for a building permit * * *, but again the request was
turned down by the mayor. Whereupon, appellants proceeded with
the construction of the building without a permit, because they
needed a place of residence very badly, their former house having
been destroyed by 8
a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on
leased property.” Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance
to Fa-
________________

7 104 Phil. 443 (1958).

8 Ibid, 444–445.

482

482 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gozo

jardo was oppressive. A conviction therefore for a violation thereof

both in the justice of the peace court of Baao, Camarines Sur as well
as in the Court of First Instance could not be sustained. In this case,
on the contrary, appellant never bothered to comply with the
ordinance. Perhaps aware of such a crucial distinction, she would
assert in her brief: “The evidence showed that even if the accused
were to secure a permit from the Mayor, the same would not have
been granted. To require the accused to obtain a permit before
constructing her house would be an exercise in futility. The law will
not require anyone
9
to perform an impossibility, neither in law or in
fact: * * *.” It would be from her own version, at the very least
then, premature to anticipate such an adverse result, and thus to
condemn an ordinance which certainly lends itself to an
interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable.
That kind of interpretation suffices to remove any possible question 10
of its validity, as was expressly announced in Primicias v. Fugoso.
So it appears from this portion of the opinion of Justice Feria,
speaking for the Court: “Said provision is susceptible of two
constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested
with unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in
the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the
other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be
granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter’s reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be
used for the purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by
overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to
minimize the risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have
arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second
construction, that is, construe the provisions of the said ordinance to
mean that it does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to
grant the

________________

9 Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 11.

10 80 Phil. 71 (1948).

483
 VOL. 53, OCTOBER 26, 1973 483
People vs. Gozo

permit, but only the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or

specify the streets or public places where
11
the parade or procession
may pass or the meeting may be held.” If, in a case affecting such a
preferred freedom as the right to assembly, this Court could construe
an ordinance of the City of Manila so as to avoid offending against a
constitutional provision, there is nothing to preclude it from a
similar mode of approach in order to show the lack of merit of an
attack against an ordinance requiring a permit. Appellant cannot
therefore take comfort from any broad statement in the Fajardo
opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context, considering the
admitted oppressive application of the challenged measure in that
litigation. So much then for the contention that she could not have
been validly convicted for a violation of such ordinance. Nor should
it be forgotten that she did suffer the same fate twice, once from the
City Court and thereafter from the Court of First Instance. The
reason is obvious. Such ordinance applies to her. 2. Much less is a
reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather novel
concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part of Olongapo City.
Nor is novelty the only thing that may be said against it. Far worse is
the assumption at war with controlling and authoritative doctrines
that the mere existence of military or naval bases of a foreign
country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two leading cases
may be cited to show how offensive is such thinking12
to the juristic
concept of sovereignty, People v.13 Acierto, and Reagan v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. As was so emphatically set
forth by Justice Tuason in Acierto: “By the Agreement, it should be
noted, the Philippine Government merely consents that the United
States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given
purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine
Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part
of the Philippine territory or divested itself completely of
jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under the terms

_______________

11 Ibid, 77.
12 92 Phil. 534 (1953).
13 L-26379, Dec. 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 968.

484

484 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gozo

of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential

but not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine
Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted, but
also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities
for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first proposition
is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over 14
the bases; the
second from the express provisions of the treaty.” There was a
reiteration of such a view in Reagan. Thus: “Nothing is better settled
than that the Philippines being independent and sovereign, its
authority may be exercised over its entire domain. There is no
portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees
are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and
everyone to whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the
extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. Necessarily,
likewise, it has to be exclusive.15
If it were not thus, there is a
diminution of its sovereignty.” Then came this paragraph dealing
with the principle of auto-limitation: “It is to be admitted that any
state may, by its consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction
of its sovereign rights. There may thus be a curtailment of what
otherwise is a power plenary in character. That is the concept of
sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of
Jellinek, ‘is the property of a state-force due to which it has the
exclusive capacity of legal self-determination and self-restriction.’ A
state then, if it chooses to, may refrain
16
from the exercise of what
otherwise is illimitable competenee.” The opinion was at pains to
point out though that even then, there is at the most diminution of
jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. The words employed
follow: “Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory
no longer control. Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded
from allowing another power to participate in the exercise of
jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory, If it does so,
it by no means follows that such

_______________

14 92 Phil. 534, 542.

15 30 SCRA 968, 973.
16 Ibid.

485

VOL. 53, OCTOBER 26, 1973 485

People vs. Gozo

areas become impressed with an alien character. They retain their

status as .native soil. They are still subject to its authority. Its
jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is
with the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of
the military bases17 agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be
foreign territory.”
Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a
turnabout, unwarranted and unjustified, from what is settled and
orthodox law can lend the slightest degree of plausibility to the
contention of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were
otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason “as a matter
of comity, courtesy, or expediency” becomes one of obeisance and
submission. If on a concern purely domestic in its implications,
devoid of any connection with national security, the Military-Bases
Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty indeed
becomes a mockery and an illusion. Nor does appellant’s thesis rest
on less shaky foundation by the mere fact that Acierto and Reagan
dealt with the competence of the national government, while what is
sought to be emasculated in this case is the so-called administrative
jurisdiction of a municipal corporation. Within the limits of its
territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may be
validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred,
whether expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government,
not to an alien country. What is even more to be deplored in this
stand of appellant is that no such claim is made by the American
naval authorities, not that it would do them any good if it were so
asserted. To quote from Acierto anew: “The carrying out of the
provisions of the Bases Agreement is the concern of the contracting
parties alone. Whether, therefore, a given case which by the treaty
comes within the United States jurisdiction should be transferred to
the Philippine authorities is a matter about which the accused has
nothing to do or say. In other words, the rights granted to the United
States by the treaty insure solely to that country and can not be
raised

_______________

17 Ibid, 973–974.

486

486 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Gozo
18
by the offender.” If an accused would suffer from such disability,
even if the American armed forces were the beneficiary of a treaty
privilege, what is there for appellant to take hold of when there is
absolutely no showing of any alleged grant of what is quaintly
referred to as administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is more
than enough, to make manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is
affirmed insofar as it found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of a violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 14,
series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of P200.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar
as she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of
the case, she being given a period of thirty days from the finality of
this decision within which to obtain the required permit. Only upon
 her failure to do so will that portion of the appealed decision
requiring demolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar,

Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.

Decision affirmed with modification.

Notes.—a) Validity of municipal ordinance.—For a municipal

ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the powers of the
council but also ;not in conflict with or repugnant to general law
(Chua Lao vs. Raymundo, L-12662, August 18, 1958). Although the
presumption is always in favor of the validity or reasonableness of
the ordinance, such presumption must nevertheless be set aside
when the invalidity or the unreasonableness is apparent in the
ordinance itself or is established by proper evidence (Gerena vs.
City of Manila, L-16505, January 28, 1961).

LEGAL RESEARCH SERVICE

See SCRA Quick Index-Digest, volume one, page 375 on

Constitutional Law.

________________

18 92 Phil. 534, 542.

487

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