(SpringerBriefs in Geography) Elena Pede - Planning For Resilience - New Paths For Managing Uncertainty (2020, Springer International Publishing)

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN GEOGRAPHY
Elena Pede
Planning for
Resilience
New Paths
for Managing
Uncertainty
123
SpringerBriefs in Geography
SpringerBriefs in Geography presents concise summaries of cutting-edge research
and practical applications across the fields of physical, environmental and human
geography. It publishes compact refereed monographs under the editorial super-
vision of an international advisory board with the aim to publish 8 to 12 weeks after
acceptance. Volumes are compact, 50 to 125 pages, with a clear focus. The series
covers a range of content from professional to academic such as: timely reports of
state-of-the art analytical techniques, bridges between new research results,
snapshots of hot and/or emerging topics, elaborated thesis, literature reviews, and
in-depth case studies.
The scope of the series spans the entire field of geography, with a view to
significantly advance research. The character of the series is international and
multidisciplinary and will include research areas such as: GIS/cartography, remote
sensing, geographical education, geospatial analysis, techniques and modeling,
landscape/regional and urban planning, economic geography, housing and the built
environment, and quantitative geography. Volumes in this series may analyze past,
present and/or future trends, as well as their determinants and consequences. Both
solicited and unsolicited manuscripts are considered for publication in this series.
SpringerBriefs in Geography will be of interest to a wide range of individuals
with interests in physical, environmental and human geography as well as for
researchers from allied disciplines.
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10050

Elena Pede
Planning for Resilience

New Paths for Managing Uncertainty
123
Elena Pede
Interuniversity Department of Regional
and Urban Studies and Planning
Politecnico di Torino
Turin, Italy
ISSN 2211-4165 ISSN 2211-4173 (electronic)

SpringerBriefs in Geography
ISBN 978-3-030-17261-9 ISBN 978-3-030-17262-6 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17262-6
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether
the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and
transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar
or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from
the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard
to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Foreword
More than twenty-five years have passed since the publication of Ulrich Beck’s
famous Risk Society, and the role that risk and uncertainty play in our society is now
indisputable. Both the frequency of hazardous processes and disasters and the
magnitude of their resulting damages are increasing due to natural forces and
human activities in mutual interaction.
Given this context, the success of the notion of resilience should not surprise.
The consequences of risks related to climate change, financial crises, terrorist
attacks, etc., are more and more difficult to prevent completely; the ability of
socio-ecological systems to absorb these disturbances—or, even better, to
self-organise in new, stable and more adapted states of equilibrium—therefore
becomes crucial.
In the last decade, the concept of resilience has been the subject of theoretical
redefinitions in many disciplines, according to a complex and co-evolutive per-
spective. This even at the cost of often making it a fuzzy, umbrella term, which may
have limited heuristic significance.
Planning for resilience has the merit to highlight some conditions and approa-
ches that allow to better operationalise the concept of resilience, in the field of urban
and regional planning. One of the key goals of this discipline has always been
anticipating and responding to disasters; but considering this task through the lens
of resilience entails a shift from a “command-and-control” to a “learn-and-adapt”
approach in planning.
Therefore, the book focuses on two main issues that are fundamental to pursue
more resilient cities and territories through dynamic, fluid and interpretive planning:
governance and knowledge. Risk management requires the involvement of a plu-
rality of actors and institutions, which operate in different sectors and on various
scales. At the same time, diverse types and sources of—both explicit and tacit—
knowledge have to be integrated in order to produce a common understanding for
facing risks.
Elena Pede points out how governance and knowledge can mutually reinforce.
The co-production of knowledge through collaborative learning between experts
and users can help create unified knowledge systems, but this requires governance
v
vi Foreword
structures in which hierarchical and bureaucratic interrelations are not barriers to

social learning. Intelligent technologies, and in particular geographical information
systems, are suggested as a resource to support this process, as they allow to
integrate and share spatial data among stakeholders in a collaborative framework.
The experience of the Italian region Umbria in facing seismic risk is finally
analysed to show how this approach can work in practice. This case study profitably
exemplifies how an organisational innovation aimed at improving knowledge
management can enhance vertical and horizontal governance, as well as increase
the adaptive capacity of spatial planning.
This book does not downplay or neglect the “dark side” of resilience, in par-
ticular its controversial relation with neoliberalism and governmentality forms. At
the same time, it shows us how an approach focused on resilience can positively
innovate risk management and spatial planning towards a more flexible and efficient
perspective in facing the uncertainty and complexity of present and future
socio-ecological challenges.
Turin, Italy Luca Staricco

Associate Professor at Interuniversity
Department of Regional and Urban
Studies and Planning
Politecnico di Torino
Acknowledgements
The publication of this research was supported by the Interuniversity Department of

Regional and Urban Studies and Planning (DIST) of Politecnico di Torino. Special
thanks should be given to Profs. Luca Staricco (Politecnico di Torino) and Åke
Sivertun (Swedish Defence University of Stockholm), my research supervisors, for
their professional guidance, encouragement and useful critiques of this research
work.
I would also like to extend my gratitude to my friend and colleague Nadia for her
suggestions, recommendations and patience.
Finally, I wish to thank my parents, my sister and Marco for their support and
encouragement.
vii
Contents
1 Introduction: Planning for Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

1.1 The Book Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 The Promise of Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Living with Perils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Who Is Responsible for Natural Disasters? . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Risk and Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 10
2.3.1 The Uncertainty of Risk in the World Risk Society . . . . . 13
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... . . . . 15
3 Resilience: A Critical Background . . . . . . . . . . ................ 17
3.1 Engineering and Ecological Approaches . . . ................ 17
3.2 System Theories: From the General System Theory
to the Social-Ecological System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.3 The Social-Ecological Paradigm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4 Connecting Resilience Concept to Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.5 Linking Vulnerability and Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.6 Criticism to Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
4 Responding to Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.1 Resilience and Risk Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 The Prevision-Prevention-Response-Recovery Chain . . . . . . . . . . 34
4.3 Disconnected Policies and Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.4 Responsibilities, Institutions and New Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.5 The Cross–Scale Challenge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
4.6 Data, Information, Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.7 Building and Sharing Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.8 Knowledge Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.9 Role of Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
ix
x Contents
4.10 Social Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

4.11 The Public Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.12 Moving Towards a More Desirable Trajectory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
5 Pathways to Operationalise: Umbria Region Case (Italy) . . . . . . . . . 61
5.1 A Fragile Territory: Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5.2 The Institutional Framework in Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5.3 From Resistence to Comprehensive Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.4 A Bridging Tool: Towards a Territorial Knowledge System . . . . 68
5.5 To Cross Knowledge Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
5.6 Combining Expert and Tacit Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.7 A New Role for Spatial Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
5.8 The Community Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
5.9 Elements for a Resilient Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
6 Managing Uncertainty: Remarks for Future Policies
and Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.1 The Promise of Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
6.2 The Meaning of Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
6.3 To Operationalise Resilience Through Knowledge . . . . . . . . . . . 81
6.4 Resilience Is a Long Way . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Chapter 1
Introduction: Planning for Resilience
Abstract The Chapter points out the proposal of the book. Over the last decades, the
society is becoming more interdependent and more complex, and consequently, more
vulnerable to new threats and risks associated. In this scenario, the resilience thinking
is gaining prominence in different fields as an attractive perspective for managing
uncertainty. However, the application of resilience is hard to be operationalized. The
book explores how resilience implies a challenge of flexibility and dynamism in the
knowledge systems and learning processes. This chapter presents the structure, the
key concepts and the contents of the book.
Keywords Resilience · Uncertainty · Planning for resilience · Flexibility ·

Knowledge
Our modern society is becoming ever more interdependent and more complex, and
consequently more vulnerable to threats and risks. The rapid urbanisation, occupa-
tion of unsafe environments, as well as the increased rate of occurrence of climate
events are introducing new elements of uncertainty. Likewise, the unprecedented
connectivity of the globalised world contributes to increasing interdependencies,
and consequently, the risks associated.
Environmental, economic, social, and political problems no longer seem manage-
able by traditional government processes, and the idea of security that was crucial
to risk management in the past has collapsed. The increasing uncertainty and the
emerging of new types of risks require alternative paths of planning practice that
acknowledge and interact with the implications of the risk society (Beck 1992, 2006,
2009).
In recent years, resilience is increasingly becoming a popular term within poli-
cies, programming and thinking as a means of capturing complexity. The concept
of resilience was early adopted in ecologic studies during the 1960s, but resilience
thinking rapidly came to influence many other research fields with various interpre-
tations, ambiguities and a very wide extension of meaning.
Generally, resilience is the capacity of a system to deal with changes and continue
to develop. In the original idea, it referred to dynamics close to equilibrium and,
therefore, is defined as the time required for a system to return to an equilibrium
point following a disturbance event (engineering resilience) (Holling 1973, 1996).
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 1

E. Pede, Planning for Resilience, SpringerBriefs in Geography,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17262-6_1
2 1 Introduction: Planning for Resilience
In the socio-ecological system, it refers to dynamics far from any equilibrium steady
state and is defined as the capacity of a system to adapt, innovate and transform certain
conditions before changing to another stable regime (Holling 1996; Gunderson and
Holling 2002; Walker et al. 2004; Gunderson et al. 2009).
Over the years, resilience has emerged as an attractive perspective, especially,
with regarding complex systems associated with civil contingencies and crisis man-
agement (Godschalk 2003); however, its meaning is far from clear (Restemeyer et al.
2018). On one hand, resilience is something desirable, to aim at; on the other, its
fuzziness makes resilience difficult to measure and to be operationalised (Chandler
and Coaffee 2016).
The intent of this book is to investigate the principal issues related to the opera-
tionalisation of resilience. To do so, the book analyses—regarding emergency plan-
ning—the decision-making process by highlighting scale issues in governance levels
and in knowledge, multiple perspectives, uncertainty and self-organisation.
1.1 The Book Structure
The book is organised in six chapters. The first chapter is an introduction to the
book structure. The second chapter introduces the reader into the complexity of
the world where we now live and the changing promises of security. The first two
paragraphs examine the increase of pressure on territories, the nature of contemporary
risks and the challenges they have created. Subsequently, the chapter problematises
the perspective of risk as unknowable or unpredictable and the consequences on
policy (Sect. 2.3); while the final paragraph looks at the repercussions of the ongoing
changes on the debate in social science.
The concept of resilience as an approach to uncertainty is explored in the following
chapter. Sect. 3.1 introduces the conception of resilience, while Sects. 3.2 and 3.3
analyse its diffusion. Key issues of the chapter are the implication of the social-
ecological paradigm of resilience for complex systems and for planning. Finally, one
of the paragraphs (Sect. 3.4) also investigates the major critiques to resilience such
as the excess positivism and the dominance of the neoliberal approach.
The fourth chapter explores the gap between the theoretical conceptions of
resilience and how it can be utilised in practice in risk cycle management. The
Sect. 4.1 provides the conceptual framework to re-think risk management by draw-
ing on resilience. Section 4.2 analyses the prevision-prevention-response-recovery
chain that is traditionally followed in risk management, highlighting its linearity and
the rigid categorization of actions. Likewise, the multiple levels and sectors of inter-
ventions are analysed (Sects. 4.3 and 4.4), as well as the cross-scale challenges to
face (Sect. 4.5). More in detail, the chapter raises several issues: the temporal, spatial
and jurisdictional scales of risk management, the growing complexity of governance
and the lack of coordination due to heterogeneous expertise.
In light of the findings, the next paragraphs suggest the potential of knowledge
and social learning for resilience. In particular, they argue the need of more attention
1.1 The Book Structure 3
to the roles of production, implementation and dissemination of knowledge with a

better integration of multiple scales, different actors, various knowledge sources,
and diverse disciplines (Sects. 4.6–4.8). They also investigate the application of
technologies, the collaborative production of knowledge through learning processes
and the possibility to engage crowds to improve resilience (Sects. 4.9–4.11).
Chapter 5 provides the experience of Umbria region, in Italy, as an attempt to
operationalise resilience thinking in emergency management and planning practice.
The case illustrates how the integration and the coproduction of knowledge can trig-
ger a process of transformation of planning practice towards a resilience prospective.
The most difficult challenge of all to face in this process was the barriers in commu-
nication among different disciplines which has required a high degree of reflexivity
and social learning. The chapter shows the measures implemented, the strengths and
the weakness of the process.
Chapter 6 concludes the book by drawing key themes. In doing so, it briefly traces
the evolution of the definitions of resilience and outlines the potential of resilience
in renewing and broadening the governance in planning.
References
Beck U (1992) Risk society. Towards a new modernity. SAGE Publications Ltd, London
Beck U (2006) Risk society revisited. The risk society and beyond
Beck U (2009) Critical theory of world risk society: a cosmopolitan vision. Constellations 16:3–22
Chandler D, Coaffee J (2016) The Routledge handbook of international resilience. Taylor & Francis
Godschalk DR (2003) Urban hazard mitigation: creating resilient cities. Nat Hazards Rev 4:136–143
Gunderson LH, Holling CS (2002) Panarchy: understanding transformations in systems of humans
and nature. Island Press, Washington
Gunderson LH, Allen CR, Holling CS (2009) Foundations of ecological resilience. Island Press,
Washington
Holling CS (1973) Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 4:1–23
Holling CS (1996) Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience. Engineering within ecolog-
ical constraints. National Academy Press, Washington, DC, USA, pp 31–34
Restemeyer B, van den Brink M, Woltjer J (2018) Resilience unpacked–framing of ‘uncertainty’and
‘adaptability’in long-term flood risk management strategies for London and Rotterdam. European
planning studies, pp 1–21
Walker B, Holling CS, Carpenter SR, Kinzig A (2004) Resilience, adaptability and transformability
in social–ecological systems. Ecol Soc 9:5
Chapter 2
The Promise of Security
Abstract The chapter is an introduction to the challenging period we live in, charac-
terised by the constant reminder of the unpredictability of catastrophic climate events,
terroristic attacks, economic crisis, or mass failures of infrastructure systems. At the
same time, we are witnessing our planet “shrinking” because of events that generate
consequences that have global impacts (e.g. Chernobyl, global warming, 9/11 ter-
rorist attacks, the financial crisis of 2008, etc.). The nature of contemporary risks is
unprecedented in terms of their spatial, temporal and potential impact and the tradi-
tional categories to control and measure risks are no longer valid. In this context, there
has been an evolution of the terms risk and disaster that has enhanced the interest of
several academic disciplines; in particular, a new debate has challenged the social
science tradition. To face hazards that escape the logic of control, the challenge is to
find new ways of relating risks to decisions and practices. The different paragraphs
explore how disasters have changed over the years, the evolution of the concept of
control embodied in planning for risk in dealing with today’s challenges and the key
issues of the concepts of vulnerability and risk. The last paragraph concludes the
chapter by showing the implications of the world risk society introduced by Ulrich
Beck.
Keywords Natural disasters · Risk · Vulnerability · Uncertainty · World risk

society, disaster risk reduction
2.1 Living with Perils
Disasters have affected people since the beginning of our existence. The term derives
from the Greek negative prefix dis- (“apart”) plus aster, which means “bad star” and
refers to the idea that a catastrophe could be traced to the negative influence of a
star or a planet. The current definition of disaster is no longer linked to the original
meaning of the word. The Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disaster
(CRED) defines a disaster as (Below et al. 2009, p. 16)
a situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a request to a national or
international level for external assistance; an unforeseen and often sudden event that causes
great damage, destruction and human suffering.
6 2 The Promise of Security
Compared to its original meaning, nowadays the main challenge in this field is
the rejection of fatalism and the acknowledgement of disaster as a consequence of
the inappropriate management of the ecosystems and the risks associated within it.
Today, we are living in a challenging period characterised by acceleration and
interconnectedness in every field of human activity. The population growth, the rapid
urbanisation1 and the intensification of agriculture are putting more and more pres-
sure on the natural systems. At the same time, the complexity of the world may make
use more vulnerable than ever. Globalisation has introduced new patterns of expo-
sure and vulnerability, increasing the speed and the consequences of the impacts.
For instance, the financial crisis began in a segment of the US mortgage market, but
within months it affected most of the countries. In the same way, mosquito popula-
tions that are frequently found in tropical areas may easily spread even into Europe
due to global warming. Paradoxically, in recent years the rate of disasters and their
resulting damages have increased regardless of human progress (Smith 2009).
Disasters2 can have many forms and can be categorized in different ways. The main
distinction is based on the presumed cause: the force of nature, human action, or, in
some cases, by the combination of both natural forces and human activities (Vale and
Campanella 2005). The latter is increasing; in fact, human actions are contributing
more and more to hazardous processes due to the increasing interconnection of nature
and society. In other words, all disasters can be seen as being man made, because
we cannot prevent hazards from happening, but we can avoid them from developing
into a disaster. In addition, man-made disasters can also produce cascading effects;
for example, in 1999, the sinking of the Erika tanker off the coast of Brittany caused
the release of thousands of tons of oil into the sea, which devastated marine life.
1 The urban population in 2009 accounted for more than half of the total global population.
2 The terms disaster, hazard, risk and vulnerability will be deeper explored in Sect. 2.3. However,
basic definitions on these concepts developed by UNISDR to promote a common understanding on
the subject for use by the public, authorities and practitioners are provided herein. Some of these
terminologies will also return further on.
Disaster. A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving

widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds
the ability of the affected community or society to cope using its own resources. Disasters
are often described as a result of the combination of: the exposure to a hazard; the conditions
of vulnerability that are present and the insufficient capacity or measures to reduce or cope
with the potential negative consequences.
Hazard. A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity, or condition that may cause
loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services,
social and economic disruption, or environmental damage.
Risk. The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences.
Vulnerability. The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that

make it susceptible to the damaging effects of a hazard (http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/
terminology).
2.1 Living with Perils 7
The fear of man-made disasters rose during the Cold War and has been increasing
since Chernobyl; however, the September 11 attacks have strengthened the risk per-
ception and the public attention to man-made disaster in the issue that is becoming
more salient today than before (Birkland 2004).
Likewise, disasters can be classified both as rapid-onset and slow-onset (or creep-
ing) (UNDP 2004). The former is defined by instantaneous shocks (e.g. flash-floods,
volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, tsunamis, tornadoes, etc.); while the latter may stand
for many days, months or even years (e.g. droughts, climate change, desertification,
soil erosion, and the AIDS epidemic, etc.).
The CRED classified natural disasters into five major groups (Below et al. 2009,
p. 16):
1. Geophysical disasters: events originating from solid earth (e.g. earthquake, vol-
canic eruptions, landslide, avalanche and subsidence);
2. Meteorological disasters: events caused by short-lived (small to mesoscale) atmo-
spheric processes as in the spectrum from minutes to days (e.g. storm, hurricane);
3. Hydrological disasters: events caused by deviations in the normal water cycle
and/or overflow of bodies of water caused by wind setup (e.g. flood, flash-flood,
wet mass movement);
4. Climatological disasters: events caused by long-lived/meso to macroscale pro-
cesses as in the spectrum from intra-seasonal to multi-decadal climate variability
(e.g. extreme temperature, drought, wildfire);
5. Biological disasters: disasters caused by the exposure of living organisms to
germs and toxic substances (e.g. epidemic, insect infestation and animal stam-
pede).
Similarly, man-made disasters are those events caused directly and principally by
one or more identifiable, deliberate or negligent human action, which are classified
into two major groups:
1. Technological disasters: disasters due to engineering failures, transport disasters,
and environmental disasters (e.g. transport accidents, big fire, chemical contam-
ination, nuclear accidents);
2. Sociological disasters: criminal acts, terroristic attacks, riots, war, stampedes,
etc.
Most disasters, whether natural or man-made, can be considered to be a conse-
quence of development failure. For this reason, disasters also affect economic and
social development because the time and resources indispensable for remediation
impair the stability and development of communities. These are commonly called
secondary effects and involve short and long-term impacts of a disaster on the over-
all economy and socio-economic condition (UNDP 2004). They are evaluated both
in terms of human and economic impacts. Human impact refers to the number of
victims which comprehends the number of deaths3 ; the amount of people affected
3 Generally, people killed includes those confirmed dead and those missing and presumed dead.
and requiring immediate assistance during an emergency; the total amount of peo-
ple who report injuries or are homeless. Likewise, the economic impact consists in
direct and indirect consequences on the local economy. The shock of a severe dis-
aster can create a cascade of disruption among interdependent systems, shattering
the functional capacity of the area (Birkland 2004). The direct consequences con-
cern the damage to infrastructures (electric power, communications, transportation,
water, gas and sewage distribution), building and harvest losses; conversely, indi-
rect effects refer to market destabilisation, unemployment, and the loss of revenues.
Consequently, the operational capacity of a complex system can have dysfunctions
and can be affected by new danger for the population. In the same way, disastrous
events can aggravate other stress such as economic weaknesses, social/political con-
flicts, spreading of diseases and environmental degradation (Jha 2010). For instance,
droughts or earthquakes usually have an impact over time and it takes years to get
back to normality. For all these reasons, social-economic consequences are a salient
issue of post-disaster recovery due to the difficulty to overcome them.
In 2016, the Annual Disaster Statistical Review (CRED 2017) reported that the
number of natural disasters during the year was less than the average annual fre-
quency observed from 2006 to 2015 (342 rather than 376.4). Fewer disasters have
corresponded to a decrease in deaths, however, the number of people affected, and
the economic damages reveal an increase to above average levels. It has been esti-
mated that the number of people affected by natural disaster amounted to 1.5 times
the annual average (564.4 million rather than 224 million) in 2016, resulting in the
highest costs since 2006 and the economic damages have been placed as the fourth
most costly since 2006 (US $ 154 billion). Asia has been the continent most often hit
by natural disaster over the last decade, followed by the Americas and Europe, but
all continents have been strongly affected. Usually, poor countries register greater
human impacts, while economic impacts are felt more in rich countries. Table 2.1
compares the top 10 natural disasters in 2016 in terms of deaths, people affected
and economic damages. The former and the second groups are mostly composed by
less developed countries (LDCs), while the ranking of natural disasters by economic
damages concern mainly more developed countries (MDCs). However, it must be
considered that if we compare the economic damages to the countries’ Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP), the impact would be higher with more long-term consequences
in poor countries (CRED 2017).
In addition to human and economic consequences, psychological injuries can be
also profound. This impact is hard to measure since it is not necessarily proportional
to the scale of a disaster and because trauma can persist long after the physical impact
of a disaster. For instance, the trauma of 9/11 terrorist attacks hit all the Western World
and enhanced the sense of fear and the risk perception (Vale and Campanella 2005).
The book focuses mainly on natural disasters, mostly due to the need to restrict
the research field. Specifically, each catastrophic event has different actors involved
according to the type of disaster, and to the spatial, temporal and jurisdictional
extension; for these reasons it is impossible to talk about a unique methodology of
action for natural disasters. However, part of the suggestions that arise can also be
applied to other types of catastrophe, as for instance, the multi-dimension of territorial
2.2 Who Is Responsible for Natural Disasters? 9
Table 2.1 Comparison among the top 10 natural disaster in 2016 by number of deaths, by the total
of people affected and by economic damages
Top 10 natural disasters in 2016
By number of deaths By total people affected By economic damages
Country No. deaths Country Tot. Country (US$
affected billion)
China 1,335 India 333,816,813 China 45,328
India 1,142 United States of 85,123,038 United States of 44,035
America (the) America (the)
Ecuador 686 China 72,387,822 Japan 20,200
Korea (the 612 Ethiopia 10,696,080 Italy 5,300
Democratic
Republic of)
Haiti 599 Malawi 6,702,800 India 4,074
Pakistan 409 Haiti 5,794,943 Canada 4,000
Italy 299 Somalia 4,700,000 France 2,400
Zimbabwe 277 Vietnam 4,567,721 Germany 2,000
Indonesia 270 Philippines 4,416,499 Thailand 1,245
(the)
United States of Zimbabwe 4,302,128 Argentina 1,000
America (the)
Source Annual Disaster Statistical Review 2016 (CRED 2017)
resilience and the sharing of knowledge in order to improve capability in managing

emergencies.
2.2 Who Is Responsible for Natural Disasters?
The awareness of hazards and disasters has changed through history. As Quantarelli
(2000) affirms, it is possible to recognize three main phases in this field. In the past,
when the sources of destruction were largely caused by natural forces, people used to
look at disasters as acts of God. This perspective emphasized the idea of catastrophes
as divine punishments or fate, rather than as the consequence of pressure from human
activities on the ecological systems. This fatalistic attitude consequently implied that
nothing could be done to prevent disasters and it also paralysed the production of
new scientific knowledge for tackling them. The rise of Enlightenment secularism
and the development of the scientific method and thinking contributed to increase
the awareness of the terms hazard and risk and their interdependence with human
activities. The first great step took place between the 19 and 20th centuries, when
science started to consider disasters as acts of nature. This implied the prospect
of working on preventive actions and impact reduction that firstly concerned only
engineering measures. Lastly, at the beginning of the 20th century, two works (Prince
1920; White 1945) led the way to modern hazards and disaster studies exploring the
role of human behaviour and decision-making. Despite these first studies on human
responsibility, it took half a century for disasters to be considered a result of acts of
society. In this third paradigm, disasters are considered social consequences resulting
from inappropriate actions of human beings (Quarantelli 2000). They occur due to
the failure of society that creates vulnerably-built environments that can be impacted
(e.g. non-earthquake proof buildings or urban areas in flood plains, etc.).
The historical evolution of the term disaster—from a conceptualisation as a physi-
cal agent to one which mostly emphasized social features—has enhanced the interest
of several academic disciplines, overcoming the engineering paradigm in this field.
In particular, the claim of the Anthropocene narrative of the human force in shaping
the functioning of the Earth system established challenges that necessarily require
experts, knowledge, theories, approaches, tools and the methods of a variety of aca-
demic disciplines (Dominey-Howes 2018). In the same way, the advancement in
acknowledging the sources of disasters prompts the question concerning the respon-
sibility in taking the risk, in protecting the society, or for what we have not done
(Gunder and Hillier 2007). In our contemporary world where risks are characterised
by a mix of complexity and uncertainty and are not restricted to national borders, the
issue of responsibility should be more debated.
2.3 Risk and Vulnerability
Before going into the content of the book, it is useful to make a brief overview of the
concepts of risk and vulnerability and their evolution over time. The definitions pre-
sented in this paragraph consider several existing sources but also show the dynamic
of these fields and the evolving knowledge over time.
In common acceptance, the concept of risk refers to potential negative (unde-
sirable) consequences that may arise from a future event. Generally, the definition
of risk is the likelihood of an event’s occurrence multiplied by the severity of the
consequences of that event if it occurs.
(a) Risk (R) = Likelihood (L) * Consequence(C)
However, in disaster studies, the most commonly used formulation was defined
by UNESCO in 1972. The definition establishes that risk is the combination of three
components: Hazard (H), Vulnerability (V) and Exposure (E)
(b) Risk (R) = (H) Hazard * (V) Vulnerability * (E) Exposure
(H) the probability of the occurrence of a potentially damaging phenomenon within

a given time period and area.
(V) the degree of loss to a given element or set of elements at risk resulting from
the occurrence of a natural phenomenon of a given magnitude.
2.3 Risk and Vulnerability 11
(E) elements at risk: population, property and economic activity at risk in a given
area.
In short, risk concerns impacts (damages, human injuries and deaths) and it is
linked to hazard and vulnerability. The term hazard is rooted in the concept of
change (Jha 2010) and denotes a danger or a potentially harmful situation. Hazard
is an intrinsic factor or a latent condition that has the potential to damage, harm or
create losses. According to UNISDR hazard is defined as
A potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the
loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental
degradation (2004, p. 4)
and it is associated with a level of risk and the degree of vulnerability of the system.
A hazard per se in not a disaster but a disaster is a social happening, where different
elements can create cascading scenarios. According to the research fields of appli-
cation, several analysis methods are used. For example, in the last decade there has
been an acceleration in the use of a systemic or an all hazard approach, rather than
setting up agent specific entities or functions (e.g. for floods or chemical threats).
As already argued, at the end of the XIX century, weather forecasting scientific
tools and civil structures with the scope of defence were widely diffused since the
main issue of scientific research was how to protect humans, their activities and build-
ings from damaging consequences. During this period, the interactions between envi-
ronmental hazards and human behaviour were underrated; only in the mid-twentieth
century did the behavioural paradigm start to be explored by introducing the role of
people in minimising risk.4
Since the 1990s, the emphasis on mutual interactions between nature and society
has grown; the complicated mix of interaction between human and natural systems
has increased, especially the factors of vulnerability, showing the complexity of the
causes of disaster. More in detail, vulnerability refers to the capacity of a system
to absorb or cope with the consequences of external effects. The Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change since its Second Assessment Report (1995) has declared
that vulnerability is the function of the sensitivity of the system to change, of its
adaptive capacity and of the degree of exposure of the system to hazards. It means that
a system is more vulnerable when modest changes produce harmful consequences.
The concept has been developed since the 1970s and subsequently modified in the
different fields. Over the years the term has conserved as key parameters
the stress to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity and its adaptive capacity (Adger 2006,
p. 269)
but it has also enriched by taking into account more factors such as Eakin and Luers
(2006):
4 The literature related to the influence of human behaviour in the 1970s contemplated a more radical
alternative that focused on the differences between more MDCs and LDCs. This new paradigm put
the development at the centre of its research, in order to investigate in which way a less developed
economy contributes to vulnerability.
• the interactions among stressors;

• the socioeconomic and biophysical framework;
• the role of equity and accessibility to resources;
• nested scales and scalar dynamics of hazard.
For this reason, it is possible to identify two types of vulnerability: territorial
(physical) and systemic vulnerability. The former refers to spatial factors and char-
acteristics; the latter, instead, indicates the relational characteristics between human
and natural systems.
The literature on vulnerability is characterised by a strong multidisciplinary
approach, fragmentation and lack of dominant paradigms. However, it is possible
to outline three main lines of research (Eakin and Luers 2006):
1. the risk-hazard models: these studies focus on mitigation where vulnerability is
equated with the analysis of stressors and the potential impacts;
2. the pressure and release models: it concerns studies in political-economic and
political-ecological fields, where vulnerability and adaptive capacity are depen-
dent on conditions such as accessibility and fairness in the distribution of oppor-
tunities and resources;
3. ecological resilience studies: risk and vulnerability are interpreted as dynamic
properties of a system where social and environmental dimensions are constantly
changing.
The risk-hazard model has evolved from the natural hazard literature in geography;
the main focuses are the identification of external events and the location where
crises may occur as well as the socio-economic consequences that might be expected
(McCarthy et al. 2001; Cutter and Finch 2008). In this model, vulnerability is the
function of the exposure to hazardous events and the sensitivity of the exposed entity
(Turner et al. 2003), conditions that make people or places vulnerable to hazards. In
this approach the evaluation of vulnerability is an ex post identification and it works
from hazard to impacts. This model does not take into account the ways the systems
amplify or attenuate the impacts of the hazard and the role of social structure and
institutions in managing exposure and consequences (Turner et al. 2003).
In the political-economic approach (PAR), the system exposure to risk and the
adaptation ability to unforeseen consequences is based on social, economic, political,
cultural and biophysical factors (Pelling 1999; Rose and Liao 2005). Risk is explicitly
defined as a function of perturbations, stressors and vulnerability of the exposed
entities. It is characterised by the interaction of scales of causation and the social
differences, as well as by the emphasis on historical processes (Eakin and Luers
2006). The model identifies three categories of components on the social side: root
causes, dynamic pressures and unsafe conditions and one component on the natural
side, the natural hazard itself. The inequities in resource access and opportunities,
the social marginalisation and the institutional framework determinate the state of
vulnerability. Despite the emphasis placed on “social” conditions of exposure,5 the
5 In
this model the livelihood can be defined by drawing upon and combining five types of capital
(Wisner 2004, p. 96):
2.3 Risk and Vulnerability 13
PAR model does not take the vulnerability of biophysical subsystems (Wisner 2004)
enough into account.
The last line of research considers vulnerability as a dynamic property of a system
where human and ecological systems have a continuous interaction. The resilience
paradigm focuses on the evolutionary trajectories of a system according to its ability
to absorb changes and disturbances (Holling 1973). Resilience theory was firstly
applied to ecological systems than to social sciences over time. In this approach,
resilience and vulnerability have their point of contact in the need to change the
response of systems and the role of actors.
Despite the traditional negative conception of vulnerability, the resilient paradigm
emphasizes the capability of the system to absorb disturbances as well as its capacity
to self-organise and to evolve in a new stable-state (Adger 2006).
Finally, Turner et al. (2003) argued that vulnerability concerns the totality of the
system that consists of:
• The components of exposure;
• The human-environment condition of the system that determinates its sensitivity
to any set of exposures;
• Coping, impacts, adjustments, and adaptations. These elements are scale depen-
dent and interactive.
2.3.1 The Uncertainty of Risk in the World Risk Society
Commonly, planning for risk embodies the concept of control, which presumes a
decision-making process based on the idea that risk can be measured, observed and
mapped in order to be governed. Under this perspective, planning has often been
perceived as a scientific process where decision-makers must anticipate what could
happen in the future.
Since the 1990s, a new perspective of risk as unknowable or unpredictable has
come to light. The increase of population density and urbanisation, the expansion
of inter-connectiveness between natural, technical, social and economic risks and
the growing uncertainty about natural hazard patterns and frequencies due to the
global change have made unprecedented challenges arise. The contemporary society
have to face risks as far ranging as degradation to the global ecology, international
terrorism, global health pandemics, or the health consequences feared as a result of
exposure to a myriad of technologies, chemicals, industrial toxins and pollutants and
financial crisis (Jarvis 2007).
1. Human capital (skills, knowledge, health and energy);

2. Social capital (networks, groups, institutions);
3. Physical capital (infrastructure, technology and equipment);
4. Financial capital (savings, credit);
5. Natural capital (natural resources, land, water, fauna and flora).
This changing nature of risk and the different attitudes towards risk triggered the
debate that has changed the social science tradition.
The best known approach is the ‘risk society’ perspective introduced by Ulrich
Beck in 1992. One of the main issues of risk society refers to the concept of risk. In his
work, Beck argued that the speeding up of modernisation has produced a “watershed”
between the world of quantifiable risk, in which decision-makers can think and act
based on calculating risks, and the world of non-quantifiable insecurities that we
are creating. Modern societies are confronted with the principles and limits of their
own development model because the western modernisation and industrialisation has
increased the complexity of risk in the contemporary society. Risks are generated by
society and not by nature. The concept of risk society takes this as its starting point,
in order to articulate systemic and epochal transformation. It particularly argues a
new challenge in the relationship of society to hazards and problems produced by it,
which in turn exceed the societal conceptions of security.
According to Beck, this new period corresponds to a second modernisation—-
called reflexive modernity because it requires a
self-confrontation with the consequences of risk society which cannot adequately be
addressed and overcome in the industrial society system (ibid. p. 28).
This turns traditional assumptions about planning and managing the future into
inappropriate and they are overtaken by their failures to secure any calculable future
(Adam and Adger 2013). This transformation draws the attention to the concept of
uncertainty instead of the risk one. In the reflective of globalisation theme, Beck
(1992) explains that individuals become aware of the contradictions and limitations
of the industrial society. There is not only a “reflexivity matter” but also “boundary”
and “voice” matters (Cantelli et al. 2010). The boundary matter argues that the tradi-
tional categories of nation-state are no longer valid and the governance of uncertainty
and risk involve various sectors and policy fields (cosmopolitanising of risk) (Beck
2009). On the other hand, the voice matter concerns citizens’ participation and inclu-
sion. Nowadays, new roles and identities for citizens, experts and bureaucrats have
evolved and multiple types of knowledge beyond scientific expert knowledge have
emerged and serve as an ongoing resonance body for risk perceptions and governance
requirements.
In this framework characterised by uncertainty, the challenge is to find ways of
relating risks to decisions and practices. Contemporary risks are unprecedented in
terms of impacts and the possibility of their prevention. Beck emphasises that risk
implies decision-making, but in the face of the unknown factor of crisis potential,
decisions are increasingly disabled. The emerging of new types of risk requires
an alternative mode of planning practice that acknowledges the new conception of
security to identify, enable and mobilise the physical, intellectual, social and cultural
elements of society. Nowadays, in the context of a world with increasing uncertainty,
there is the need to bring a new dimension to the long-standing role of planning
in risk management, by shifting the discussion from managing calculated risks to
uncalculated risks.
References 15
References
Adams H, Adger WN (2013) The contribution of ecosystem services to place utility as a determinant
of migration decision-making. Environ Res Lett 8:015006. https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/8/
1/015006
Adger WN (2006) Vulnerability. Glob Environ Change 16:268–281
Beck U (1992) Risk society. Towards a new modernity. SAGE Publications Ltd, London
Below R, Wirtz A, Guha-Sapir D (2009) Disaster category classification and peril terminology for
operational purposes. CRED, Brussels
Birkland TA (2004) Introduction risk, disaster, and policy in the 21st century. Am Behav Sci
48:275–280. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764204268997
Cantelli F, Kodate N, Krieger K (2010) Questioning world risk society: three challenges for research
on the governance of uncertainty. Glob Policy
CRED (2017) Annual disaster statistical review 2016 - the numbers and trends. Center for research
on the epidemiology of disasters (CRED), Brussels
Cutter SL, Finch C (2008) Temporal and spatial changes in social vulnerability to natural hazards.
Proc Natl Acad Sci 105:2301–2306
Dominey-Howes D (2018) Hazards and disasters in the Anthropocene: some critical reflections for
the future. Geosci Lett 5:7
Eakin H, Luers AL (2006) Assessing the vulnerability of social-environmental systems. Annu Rev
Env Resour 31:365–394
Gunder M, Hillier J (2007) Problematising responsibility in planning theory and practice: on seeing
the middle of the string? Prog Plan 68:57–96
Holling CS (1973) Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 4(1):1–23
IPCC (1995) IPCC second assessment - climate change 1995
Jarvis DS (2007) Risk, globalisation and the state: a critical appraisal of Ulrich Beck and the world
risk society thesis. Glob Soc 21:23–46
Jha MK (2010) Natural and anthropogenic disasters – vulnerability, preparedness and mitigation.
Springer, Berlin
McCarthy JJ, Canziani OF, Leary NA, et al (2001) Climate change 2001: impacts, adaptation, and
vulnerability: contribution of working group II to the third assessment report of the intergovern-
mental panel on climate change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Pelling M (1999) The political ecology of flood hazard in urban Guyana. Geoforum 30:249–261
Prince SH (1920) Catastrophe and social change, based upon a sociological study of the Halifax
disaster. Columbia University, New York
Quarantelli EL (2000) Disaster planning, emergency management and civil protection: the historical
development of organized efforts to plan for and to respond to disasters. Preliminary papers 301
Rose A, Liao SY (2005) Modeling regional economic resilience to disasters: a computable general
equilibrium analysis of water service disruptions*. J Reg Sci 45:75–112
Smith K (2009) Environmental hazards: assessing risk and reducing disaster, 5 edn. Routledge,
New York
Turner BL, Kasperson RE, Matson PA et al (2003) A framework for vulnerability analysis in
sustainability science. Proc Natl Acad Sci 100:8074–8079
UNDP (2004) Reducing disaster risk, a challenge for development
UNESCO (1972) Report of consultative meeting of experts on the statistical study of natural hazards
and their consequences
UNISDR (2004) Living with risk. A global review of disaster reduction initiatives
Vale LJ, Campanella TJ (2005) The resilient city: how modern cities recover from disaster. Oxford
University Press, Oxford
White GF (1945) Human adjustment to floods: a geographical approach to the flood problem in the
United States. University of Chicago, Chicago
Wisner B (2004) At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters. Psychology Press
Chapter 3
Resilience: A Critical Background
Abstract The chapter aims to develop a conceptual framework for orienting the
resilience-building challenges in planning. In a world in which the only certainty is
uncertainty, resilience has become one of the most widely used concepts that has
come to prominence in understanding and managing complex systems in the last
decade (Welsh, Geogr J, 180:15–26, 2014). The concept of resilience was firstly
formulated in ecology during the 1960s, but it has influenced many other research
fields. With the advent of the social-ecological perspective, the resilience theory has
also influenced political and human geography and environmental studies, with new
explorations and paradigms (Davoudi et al, Plan Theory Pract 13:299–333, 2012). In
particular, resilience has become a “pillar” of disaster management, climate adapta-
tion, and regional economic development (Davoudi et al, Plan Pract Res, 28:307–322,
2013). However, the widespread use of resilience thinking has not brought any con-
ceptual clarity but has instead contributed to the fuzzy character of the concept. The
chapter firstly traces the conception of resilience and its three main currents: engi-
neering resilience, ecological resilience, and socio-ecological resilience. Secondly,
it presents how resilience can be linked with vulnerability, and finally it outlines the
resilience interpretative approach to emergency management asserted in this work.
The chapter also deals with the criticism to resilience in the literature, such as the
unified positive meaning given to the concept and the devolution involving respon-
sibility.
Keywords Resilience · Social-ecological systems · Panarchy · Adaptive

management · Transformability · Planning
3.1 Engineering and Ecological Approaches
The concept of resilience was borrowed from ecological studies, deriving it from the
way ecological systems cope with stress and disturbances caused by external factors.
Subsequently, the theory has also been applied to the studies on the adaptive complex
systems.

18 3 Resilience: A Critical Background
The father of the modern resilience thinking is the Canadian theoretical ecolo-
gist Crawford Stanley Holling thanks to his studies on population and behavioural
ecology. Before his work, the term resilience was drawn into a linear logic denoting
resilience as a property of materials. In this form, called engineering resilience, the
conceptual emphasis was focused on resistance and stability. Its measurement con-
cerns the qualities inherent to the fabric itself of the object and the magnitude of the
disturbance (Adger 2000; Coaffee et al. 2009); it implies that the faster the system
bounces back, the more resilient it is Davoudi et al. (2012).
In his studies, Holling actualised resilience by applying it not to materials but to
ecosystems and he was the first to introduce the importance of nonlinear dynamics.
He defined stability as
the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state after a temporary disturbance (Holling
1973, p. 17)
where the steady-state becomes systemic recovery rather than material efficiency.
In contrast to engineering resilience, Holling considers resilience in terms of size
of stability domains, or more meaningfully, as the ability to absorb and adapt to a
disturbance, which is not necessarily the capacity to return to the former steady-state.
Consequently, according to Holling
Resilience determines the persistence of relationships within a system and is a measure
of the ability of these systems to absorb changes of state variables, driving variables, and
parameters, and still persist. (Holling 1973, p. 17).
This became known as ecological resilience (Holling 1996; Adger 2000; Walker
et al. 2004). The ecological resilience rejects the existence of a single equilibrium
but suggests that there are multiple equilibria. In other words, it is
the capacity of a system to undergo disturbance and maintain its functions and controls
(Gunderson and Holling 2002; Gunderson et al. 2009)
or the buffer capacity to persist to external disturbances (Folke 2006).

In summary, engineering resilience focuses on efficiency of function and the
vicinity of a stable equilibrium, while ecological resilience focuses on maintaining
the existence of functions and multiple equilibria (Holling in Davoudi et al. 2012;
Folke 2006). Likewise, engineering resilience applies only to the behaviour of a
linear system, where resistance to change is addressed in terms of recovery.
However, reality is different: disturbance events and spatial heterogeneity make
recovery trajectory impossible to predict and the system is never the same but it is
continuously developing (Folke 2006). For this reason, the concept of alternative
stable-states and the ecological resilience perspective were the point of departure for
many scholars linked to complex systems and non-linear dynamics (Folke 2006).
Complex systems are open systems and because of the second law of thermody-
namics, they can change their entropy. This mutation is determined by non-linear
interactions between its elements; it means that interactions in complex systems
can generate reactions unintuitive and apparently accidental (Bertuglia and Staricco
2000). In complex systems the change of an element can trigger breaking reactions
3.1 Engineering and Ecological Approaches 19
(negative feedback) or reinforce reactions that amplify the initial change (positive
feedback).
No-linear interaction means that a local action can have an impact on the whole
system because it has a complex behaviour oriented to stability. Every time the
system overshoots, the steady-state produces a dynamic reaction, after that
the system may look similar but it is not the same system, because like any living system it
is continuously developing (Folke 2006, p. 257).
The result is a continuous process of mutual adaptation and self-organisation of

the components that characterises both the biological and socio-economic systems.
Besides, resilience is not only about resisting disturbance and change but also
includes all the opportunities that disturbances open in terms of re-organisation and
evolution of the structures and processes (Folke 2006). An example would be forest
fires that can play an important role in forest ecosystems because they can regulate
the underbrush, avoiding more destructive fires. It means that the system has a self-
organisation that can clean undergrowth without damaging the older trees through
low-temperature fires. In this case, self-organisation improves the ability to respond
to external stress adapting towards uncertainty and risk (Bertuglia and Staricco 2000).
However, the idea that the nature of the stability domain does not remain fixed
over time was introduced by the socio-ecological approach to resilience with the aim
to include the social sphere in ecosystem analysis.
3.2 System Theories: From the General System Theory

to the Social-Ecological System
As already argued, resilience is a concept rooted in complexity theory. Before con-

tinuing with the analysis of the social-ecological paradigm it is useful to explore the
systems theory more deeply.
In the 1930s, the biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy formulated the General System
Theory (GST) that was relevant for numerous fields of research. The theory argues
that a system is a set of elements that has inter-relationships; consequently, the
understanding of the essential properties of the parts is determined by their relations.
In this first phase, the model only referred to isolated systems based on the second law
of thermodynamics. Afterwards, in 1969, von Bertalanffy implemented the systems
theory with the theory of open systems: systems that can also be influenced by external
events. In other words, in contrast to isolated systems that contain limited energies,
in open systems the energy amount can be altered. In the beginning, the open systems
theory was applied only to natural sciences; the concept then also had applications
in social sciences. Other scholars, mostly related to the Santa Fe Institute, linked
von Bertalanffy‘s theories to the notion of complex systems (Bertuglia and Staricco
2000). The system’s complexity refers to the multiple non-linear interactions and
feedback loop and casual chain relations that link system components. It means that
phenomena have multiple and dispersed causes that cannot be solved only through
scientific solutions organised on traditional disciplinary lines (Berkes et al. 2003).

The complexity is related to the system behaviour that is oriented to stability but
can reach multiple equilibria. Non-linear interactions between elements mean that
most of them are unpredictable and unintuitive and when conditions change there
can be positive or negative feedbacks. Through element interaction, systems can
self-organise, novel configurations can emerge, and adaptation is made possible.
This means that a disturbance can create the challenge for new opportunities for
recovering or reorganising (Resilience Alliance 2010). This capacity is related to the
maintenance of the diversity and individuality of its components and the localised
interactions among those components. A complex adaptive system has four basic
properties: aggregation, non-linearity, diversity, and flows (Folke 2006).
Natural and social systems are complex adaptive systems in themselves. Theoris-
ing the idea of a new geological epoch called Anthropocene, the Nobel Prize winning
chemist, Paul Crutzen (2002) argued that today it is impossible to understand nature
without society and vice versa (Jahn et al. 2009). In this geological time the influence
of human behaviour on the Earth’s atmosphere is so significant that human impacts
are comparable to those of geological forces (see Chap. 1). Human-nature interac-
tions have increasingly spread the social-ecological system (SES) concept in several
research areas with different theoretical backgrounds. It has also contributed to the
diffusion of multi—inter—and transdisciplinary researches. For instance, since the
fifth Framework Programme, the EU cross-disciplinary objective claims to over-
come the traditional structure of research organisations based on sectorial research
communities (European Commission 2005).
Nowadays social-ecological systems are the core cognitive interest of different
fields of research, especially for sustainable development. More in detail, it is cen-
tral in resilience thinking because natural resource management issues are the sum
of multiple ecological and social integrated elements. SES is the combination of
ecological, cultural, political, social, economic, technological components.
Social-ecological systems are complex, adaptive and delimited by spatial or func-
tional boundaries. SES theory was defined the integration of the parts (Holling 1996;
Glaser et al. 2008) and its main tendencies are:
1. the evolutionary ecological orientation, focusing on adaptive renewal cycles in
multi-scale, panarchical structures;
2. the complexity theory, focusing on non-linear dynamic systems and the transfer
of system expertise to strategic planning and adaptive management;
3. the quantitative/formal approaches.
As already discussed, systems can change and may shift into a different state;
this transition can be slow and gradual but also sudden. Understanding how systems
change over time and which are the critical thresholds can potentially provide advance
warning or changes to avoid undesirable shifts in system states. Thus, resilience can
represent the distance between a system state and a critical threshold.
3.3 The Social-Ecological Paradigm 21
3.3 The Social-Ecological Paradigm
In the social-ecological approach, the concept of resilience is about the opportunities

that emerge in terms of adaptation, learning and self-organisation in addition to the
ability to resist disturbances (Berkes and Folke 1998; Folke 2006; Walker et al. 2004).
Social–ecological resilience argues that
social and ecological systems are themselves linked […] to synergistic and co-evolutionary
relationships (Adger 2000, p. 350).
This means understanding how ecosystems are structured and behave and how
institutions and the people associated with them are organised and act. The volume
Barrier and Bridges to the Renewal of Ecosystems and Institutions (Gunderson et al.
1995) argues that social-ecological resilience is linked to the necessity to learn to
manage by change, rather than simply react to it; it can be likened to bouncing forward
in place of bouncing back (Folke 2006; Folke et al. 2010). This is an optimistic view
of change that sees the empowerment of agencies but also individuals, small groups
or teams of individuals.
In summary, according to Folke (2006) and Gotts (2007), the social-ecological
resilience conceptual framework includes:
1. Multiple equilibria: Rather than a single equilibrium point, complex systems
generally have multiple metastable regimes;
2. Disturbance:
“[..] the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure
by changing the variable and process that control behaviour” (Gunderson and Holling 2002,
p. 4);
3. Multiple distinctive scales with cross-scale interactions. Gunderson and Holling

(2002) argue that systems form a multilevel hierarchical structure with different
degrees of self-organisation.
Therefore, social—ecological resilience is not a return to normalcy (Pendall et al.
2010, p. 76) but the ability of complex social-ecological systems to change, adapt
or transform into response to stress and strains (Folke et al. 2005). For example, the
strong shock caused by hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005, has not only caused
severe damages and losses to the system but has also revealed several conditions as
unsustainable. Instead of returning to the prior equilibrium, the shock showed the
need to reformulate new order in terms of society, economy and policies: for instance,
some neighbourhoods were not rebuilt because they were placed in unsafe areas.
The multiple distinctive scales with cross-scale interactions is described by Gun-
derson and Holling (2002) with the concept of panarchy,1 preferred to the idea of
1 The term Panarchy firstly coined by Paul Emile de Puydt in 1860, referring to a specific form of
inclusive, universal system of governance that includes all other forms of governance. Panarchy with
this acceptation is used in international relations to describe global governance (Edson 2010). At a
later stage, the term Panarchy was introduced in systems theory. Holling and Gunderson referred
REORGANIZATION CONSERVATION
PHASE PHASE
Κ
α
r Ω
GROWTH CREATIVE
PHASE DESTRUCTION
Fig. 3.1 Panarchy, adaptive cycle and change. Source elaboration by the author, primary source
Gunderson and Holling (2002)
hierarchy. Panarchy describes the cyclical and organisational attitude of systems:

how an ecosystem organises itself and how it changes and responds to external
disturbances and to changes in the world. With the term panarchy, Holling (2004)
described the way living systems both persist and innovate at the same time and show
how fast or slow, events and processes can transform ecosystems into an evolutionary
way, giving changes for learning to their societies.
With the metaphor of the adaptive cycle (Fig. 3.1), Gunderson and Holling (2002)
suggest that complex systems follow a four-phase cycle of (1) growth or exploration
(r); (2) conservation (k); (3) release or creative destruction () and (4) reorganisation
(α). Each phase of the cycle creates the condition for the next phase and every phase
entails the loss of resilience and the consequent vulnerability of the system. The
cycle is composed by two phases of growth—called forward loop—and two phases
of reorganisation (back loop).
Therefore, the adaptive cycle primarily focuses attention on the function of pro-
cesses and dynamics rather than on states and structure (Pickett et al. 2004). Thus,
adaptive cycles and their interactions are not limited to the dynamics of ecosystems,
but they similarly occur in societies. This means that individuals, societies, groups,
and institutions play a strong role in many ecosystems. Frequently, the influence is in
the form of past activities that have a persistent effect on soils, plants, or other major
components of ecological systems. Figure 3.1 shows a stylised representation of the
four system steps and the flow of events among them. The connections between the
different levels of panarchy explain how even small and fast cycles can affect larger
the term to the mythological figure of Greek god Pan, the paradoxical spirit of nature. They joined
the idea of Pan to the dynamic reality of hierarchies across scales and to the interactions among
them that can influence the phase cycles of one another (Holling 2004). In systems theory the term
was coined as an antithesis to the word hierarchy in order to describe the framework of nature’s
rules.
3.3 The Social-Ecological Paradigm 23
and slower ones (revolt) or when large and slow ones can control the renewal of
smaller and faster ones (memory).
External events can start unpredictable reactions. During such times, uncertainty
is high, and control is weakened, but it does not mean that it will result in part of the
system collapsing. Indeed, the cross-scale interactions can create space for innovation
and reorganisation that means there are opportunities for change and evolution of
the system. This concept enlarged the application of panarchy as a framework for
different research fields. Panarchy and adaptive cycles are also applied in policy
and institution (Ostrom 1990), economic geography (Simmie and Martin 2010),
decision-making (Westley 1995) and knowledge systems (Berkes and Folke 1998).
If we look at complex natural systems, we can easily find a front-loop phase of slow,
incremental growth and accumulation that is more predictable and a back-loop stage
of rapid reorganisation leading to renewal or to collapse characterised by a higher
uncertainty (Holling 2004). The instability can be part of a process of transformation
that can lead to a new phase of opportunity. For a better understanding of cross-scale
interactions and their consequences we can look at Arab Spring. The revolutionary
wave of demonstrations, riots and civil wars is creating change not only at national
levels; since protests began, the flows of immigrants to Europe have changed and
economic consequences have been registered by the geopolitical instability in oil
mining countries.
The idea of a transforming system has also been interpreted with an evolutionary
perspective in planning by Davoudi et al. (2012). In this context, the emphasis is not
on the return to normality but—on the contrary—on the research of a new normality
(Pendall et al. 2010; Davoudi et al. 2012).
3.4 Connecting Resilience Concept to Planning
Historically, planning is open to absorb new concepts and translate them into its
theories and practices (Davoudi et al. 2012). Several terminologies, approaches and
metaphors have been rapidly becoming part of planning theories and practices, some
of them with solid roots, others with uncritical acceptance—resilience also not being
an exception.
During the last decade, as discussed in the previous part, the concept of resilience
has increased its scope. It emerged as a fusion of ideas from multidisciplinary tra-
ditions e.g. ecosystem, engineering infrastructure, psychology, behavioural sciences
and disaster risk reduction. The multiple concepts and approaches to resilience have
been widespread in a wide range of research fields also thanks to its fuzzy character.
As Keith Shaw highlights
much of the appeal of the term lies in it being sufficiently malleable (ibid., 2012, p. 308)
which makes it a versatile umbrella term (Fünfgeld and McEvoy 2012). It stands to
reason that the current context characterised by crisis, uncertainty, complexity and
interdependencies may be easily interpreted by the resilience approach that
appears to have the potential to play a critical role (Teigão dos Santos and Partidário 2011,
p. 1519).
However, several authors have grounds to fear that resilience could be the buz-
zword of the moment, replacing other commonly used terminologies as sustainability
and adaptation (Teigão dos Santos and Partidário 2011; Porter and Davoudi 2012;
Davoudi et al. 2013). To contextualise the concept of resilience, it is therefore impor-
tant to analyse its relationship with sustainability and adaptation and its implications.
Sustainability and sustainable development were born as a concept in 1987
(Brundtland and Khalid 1987), indicating the capability to
[…]ensure the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations
to meet their own needs (art.27)
and they rapidly became the most relevant keywords of political action of the contem-
porary society. The success of the sustainability concept in the past two decades has
overwhelmed most research fields, from economy to ecology to the idea of sustain-
able development as an oxymoron to underline the need of a sustainable de-growth.
Sustainable development focuses on the future and, as Teigão dos Santos and Par-
tidário (2011) argued, it could be considered a precautionary principle that turns its
attention to avoid negative consequences of contemporary development in the world
of tomorrow. In the same way, the two authors underlined the current increase of
instability, crises and pressure on ecosystems that need new and rapid solutions, in
a more adaptive way, due to their stronger and faster cascading effects. Therefore,
resilience offers something in reaction to the uncertainty and insecurity of contem-
porary context (Shaw 2012).
In this framework, resilience appears to be a key condition to effectively pursue
sustainable development (Lebel et al. in Teigão dos Santos and Partidário 2011).
Somehow, resilience could be considered as included in the concept of sustainability,
where sustainability is the ability to maintain the functionality of the system when it
is disturbed.
Specifically, resilience and its cross-scale interaction play a fundamental role in
managing a transition towards more sustainable development. Several authors (Gun-
derson and Holling 2002; Lambin 2005) recognised that the organisational attitude of
the systems in the resilience approach is a fundamental issue of sustainability. In an
uncertain and unpredictable reality, looking at social-ecological systems through the
lens of resilience enables the consideration of a world where the capacity of its multi-
stakeholders’ (such as scientists, policy-makers, practitioners, private entrepreneurs
and citizens) interaction across scales is fundamental in determining the dynamics of
the system. Thus, resilience implies a change in the way of policy-making, planning
and governance, it provides a common language across different sectors and disci-
pline (Wilkinson 2012). Resilience implies different assumptions and approaches,
meaning a change in processes that go from being essentially rationalist, reactionary
or bureaucratic, to becoming more adaptable, anticipative, flexible, collaborative and
co-accountable.
In the same way, the issues that link resilience to sustainable development are
also in relation to the adaptation concept. Translated into the context of climate
3.4 Connecting Resilience Concept to Planning 25
change, adaptation can be explained as vulnerability, exposure, sensitivity, adaptive

capacity, but also resilience. Commonly, adaptation to climate change refers to the
engineering resilience concept. Similarly, when climate change adaptation examines
a vulnerability of a species or habitat, the ecological resilience approach seems most
appropriate and can provide a framework for identifying critical thresholds (Fünfgeld
and McEvoy 2012).
Traditionally, the goal of risk mitigation is the protection of people, of proper-
ties and of the environment from the destructive force of catastrophic events (see
Sect. 2.2). Nevertheless, building a resilient city does not only concern the use of
land and structural engineering, but must also provide the capability to anticipate
and respond to disasters. Static engineering-based conceptualisation of resilience
has been embraced for a long time by disaster studies and the focus has been on
recovery in quantitative terms. On the contrary, the metaphor of social-ecological
resilience helps to synthesise the integration between ecology and social sciences
due to the central role of the human ecosystem framework in multiple scale.
Going back to planning, we could identify three characteristics that allow the use
of the social-ecological resilience concept for urban and territorial systems:
• humans are part of the ecosystems.
The models derived from the human ecosystem framework are not a matter of humans
versus nature, but humans and ecological processes combined into a reciprocally interactive
network (Pickett et al. 2004, p. 378)
• territorial systems are complex systems. They are the sum of several interacting
subsystems.
• a territorial system is characterised by adaptive cycles. The ecological, social
and economic processes permit the continued adjustment and self-organisation of
urban systems.
Thus, in the planning process, resilience highlights the need to be more flexible.
It considers transformation as normal, and dynamism is an intrinsic factor of how
systems act. For this reason, a deep affinity appears with governance theory and
social learning, co-management and participation.
As Godschalk (2003) argued
a resilient city is a sustainable network of physical systems and human communities (ibid.,
p. 137).
In this metaphor, the physical systems are the constructed and natural environmen-
tal components of the city, whereas human communities concern all the actors that
live, work and act in that space. The physical systems include structural engineering
like road networks, energy facilities or infrastructure and building, as well as natural
systems as topography, geology and soils. For Godschalk, the physical system is the
body of the city, its bones, arteries, and muscles. As a result, the physical systems
must work in order to guarantee a proper and effective functioning under extreme
stress during a disaster, otherwise a city would be extremely vulnerable to disasters
without a persistent and resilient physical system.
In the same way, a body without a brain directing its activities, responding to
its needs, and learning from its experience is likewise fragile and vulnerable. The
metaphor of the brain refers to the human communities with the social and institu-
tional components of the city.
They include the formal and informal, stable and ad hoc human associations, that operate
in an urban area: schools, neighbourhoods, agencies, organisations, enterprises, task forces,
and the like. (…) During a disaster, the community networks must be able to survive and
function under extreme and unique conditions (ibid., p. 137).
Social and institutional networks have varying degrees of organisation, identity

and cohesion. During a disaster they must be able to handle emergency. Their absence
or inefficiency undermines the capability to find solutions.
If we take on Beck’s notion of reflexivity in risk society it could be very close to the
meaning of resilience (Sapontzaki 2007, see Sect. 2.4). Despite the growing interest
among the politicians, and practitioners to use community resilience as a means
of confronting the response to local disasters (McAslan 2010), resilience remains
a difficult concept to practice, thus, achieving a tangible outcome is challenging
compared, for instance, with the risk management concept (Mitchell and Harris
2012). Nowadays most of the actions in this context are focused only on making the
system physically resistant to the force of disaster (Godschalk 2003), but there are
not enough programs for community preparedness, forecasting and warning (Pearce
2003). If community resilience is improved, it would be more responsible for building
ultimate urban resilience.
The key challenge should be built in knowledge, learning ability and adaptation
of institutions that manage ecosystems at different levels, to improve the resilience of
natural and human systems and to contrast their vulnerability in the present context
of uncertainty.
The adaptive cycle—as defined by Holling– concerns the characteristics of being
a systemic process of complex environmental systems, characterised by high levels
of uncertainty, and affected by potential ecological social and economic impacts, due
to different management options. This process must continually improve its man-
agement skills, to constantly learn and adapt.2 The ability to learn is related to the
cyclical approach that manages the effects of policies and/or actions and includes the
results in subsequent decisions with the integration of different knowledge. One use-
ful outcome of the resilience method is exactly the ability to link together phenomena
that in mainstream planning approaches remain firmly separated.
In this view, an alternative theoretical perspective of a more dynamic, fluid and
interpretive planning that requires a shift of methodology from command-and-control
to learn-and-adapt is drawing (Davoudi et al. 2013). For this purpose, planning as
learning is fundamental to align ideas and goals, to shape leaderships and achieve
a shared vision instead of acting as a bureaucratic process (Teigão dos Santos and
2 Pickett et al. (2004) use the concept learning loop to define the need of long-term dialogue among
different institutions and community in order to ensure the monitoring and implementation of
knowledge.
3.4 Connecting Resilience Concept to Planning 27
Partidário 2011).3 Stakeholders must create new relationships to enhance multidi-

rectional information flows to learn from each other and to develop together flexible
ways of managing their environments. In the same way, planning also as communi-
cation is crucial to enhance information flows and to build relationships. Planning
should be a process of communication with its regulations, orientations and actions,
but in reality, the information displayed at the end of the planning process often
disregards the different capacities and needs of the potential end-users. Therefore,
planning for resilience could be considered as more perspective to foster adaptive
capacities. The different stakeholders as well as the citizens and the decision-makers
are central in this process.
In this research, social-ecological resilience is defined, hence, as the social capac-
ity to respond to disturbances and changes. The analysis is further oriented to organ-
isational and institutional dynamics underling ecosystem management.
3.5 Linking Vulnerability and Resilience
Though related, vulnerability and resilience are different concepts in the field of
the contemporary challenges posed by environmental changes, social context or
global economy. Usually, the terms vulnerability and resilience refer to two different
approaches to the problem world of today: the former is more related to the ecological-
biophysical dimension, whereas the latter focuses more on the social political issues
(see Sect. 2.3). As Miller et al. (2010) argued, the epistemological tension between
the two terms is mostly caused by the research communities related to these terms and
how either communities conceptualise systems and changes. Miller also theorised
that vulnerability and resilience are complementary, exploring the need of integration
between the two terms to reach a set of common conceptual and methodological
principles able to guide new claims for future management and governance.
The term vulnerability has been theorised in hazard studies and in response capac-
ity in regional sciences (Eakin and Luers 2006; Smith 2009; Simmie and Martin
2010). On the other hand, the epistemic and academic contributions to resilience
theory primarily come from natural sciences (Holling 1973; Pendall et al. 2010;
Simmie and Martin 2010), but nowadays it is spread also to social sciences (Berkes
and Folke 1998; Folke 2006; Gunderson and Holling 2002). Vulnerability is seen as a
3 Teigãodos Santos and Partidário identified four different characteristics that planning processes
should adopt to be resilient: anticipation, innovation, learning and communication.
(a) Planning as anticipation is important to perceive emergent disturbances and to identify early
signals and possible solutions.
(b) Planning as innovation is needed to be more flexible and dynamic in generating better solutions,
instead of repetitive processes.
(c) Planning as learning is fundamental to knowledge, to produce consensus and co-accountability.
(d) Planning as communication is decisive to raise consciousness, to bring support and build
relationships.
condition related to exposure, susceptibility, sensitivity, coping and adaptive capac-

ity related to calculated risks. Therefore, differently by resilience, vulnerability is
shaped by dynamic historical processes, differential entitlements rather than being a
direct outcome of a perturbation or stress (Eakin and Luers 2006; Miller et al. 2010).
Resilience, instead, includes different critical features as persistence, adaptability
and transformability to uncalculated risks (Resilience Alliance 2010). The core of
resilience lies in the interactions among system components and consequently in the
institution role, in social capital, in leadership and learning. In risk management,
the resilience approach has increased, and it is always more applied to institutional
responses to climate change solutions in livelihood transformations.
To summarise, there is a common ground between vulnerability and resilience
that concerns the way systems respond to stress or perturbations, while the differ-
ence can be found in the way each community considers systems. Vulnerability
focuses on the understanding of ecological and biophysical processes—in particular
the distribution of costs, risks and benefits—in order to anticipate, adapt to and man-
age change. Resilience instead emphasises system dynamics and interconnections,
social-ecological relations and feedback.
However, the many definitions and approaches to vulnerability and resilience
reveal the multifaceted nature of the problems under examination. Because of this
multidisciplinary and fragmented nature of the topic and the absence of a dominant
paradigm within the literature, the following chapter is not meant to be exhaustive,
but aims to define the theoretical framework of this research.
In particular, this research suggests maintaining the essential role of planning
as decision-making activity in managing the future of a society. Nonetheless, the
shifting paradigm in risk perspective requires an alternative path of planning to
maintain its role; a path that acknowledges the implications of social security where
the assumption is not to control a defined and measurable risk, but to make an
uncertain future manageable.
3.6 Criticism to Resilience
Just like its success, the resilience concept is also the subject of widespread crit-
icism. Its elusive character has given the opportunity to widely use it in different
disciplines with varying degrees of success, but at the same time its attractiveness
risks its incorrect usage for scientific justification of particular policies, projects and
practices (Olsson et al. 2015). There are several criticisms to resilience including
its excessive positive connotation, the potential implicit devolution of responsibility
and the implications for more vulnerable and poor communities.
Firstly, there is a tendency to understand resilience as positive (Meerow et al.
2016). Both ecological and socio-ecological currents often suggest a positive mean-
ing that implying that resilience is desirable and good (Chandler and Coaffee 2017).
But resilience has both dark and bright sides; it contains some contradictory and
even negative aspects because resilience reveals itself only after failures of develop-
3.6 Criticism to Resilience 29
ment and policies. Similarly, if we look to the semantics of the resilience concept,
being resilient might also mean being an obstacle to positive change, however, it is
often employed to describe the capacity to react to disaster, terrorist attacks, mar-
ket shocks or sexual abuse. The positive connotation turns these policy failures into
learning opportunities.
Another oversimplification is the tendency to see resilience in a binary way as a
concept that there is or there is not, without any scaling understanding (Bourbeau
2013). This contradicts the complexity of the world to which resilience applies. For
example, resilience might be dependent also on time and type of disturbances; a
society may be able to deal with certain adversities but not with others.
However, the most famous critique on resilience refers to the relationship between
resilience subjects and neoliberal forms. This especially characterised the literature
of political science and international relations that look at resilience as a form of
governmentality. This paradigm suggests the potential close connection between the
rise of resilience and the dominance of the neoliberal approach, according to the
Foucauldian-inspired interpretation. In modern neoliberalism, there is a shift from
the state as provider to the state as enabler and promoter of self-reliance (Chandler
2014). The government encourages the civil society to be free to take the initiative
and responsibility in the areas of risk and security. Self-awareness, reflexivity and
learning of resilience thinking are considered ways to encourage the idea of active
citizenship in a liberal form of governance. Furthermore, neoliberalism scholars
argue that resilience expresses a change in the political strategy: from a centralised
prevention to an individual or a community scale (Reghezza-Zitt et al. 2012). It is
also being argued that international agencies have contributed to promoting the need
of responsibility of local governments as well as individuals, with a radical change
in the approach to disaster management.
Finally, the shift of scale in disaster management introduces a third critique. In
resilience literature, the adaptive capacity of social systems seems to be dependent
on the nature of their institutional entities and their capabilities to deal with shocks;
this can be considered as an intrinsic property of the system that may differ from
context to context or it can refer to how well a society is navigating through some past
adversity. This shift of scale that puts responsibility mainly on the local stakeholders,
penalises those communities that are more vulnerable and are not able to organise
themselves or to take action.
References
Adger WN (2000) Social and ecological resilience: are they related? Prog Hum Geogr 24:347–364
Berkes F, Folke C (1998) Linking social and ecological systems for resilience and sustainability.
Link Soc Ecol Syst Manag Pract Soc Mech Build Resil 1–25
Berkes F, Colding J, Folke C (2003) Navigating social-ecological systems: building resilience for
complexity and change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Bertuglia CS, Staricco L (2000) Complessità, autoorganizzazione, città. Franco Angeli, Milano
Bourbeau P (2013) Resiliencism: premises and promises in securitisation research. Resilience

1:3–17
Brundtland G, Khalid M (1987) UN Brundtland commission report “Our Future”
Chandler D (2014) Beyond neoliberalism: resilience, the new art of governing complexity.
Resilience 2:47–63
Chandler D, Coaffee J (2017) The Routledge handbook of international resilience. Routledge, New
York
Coaffee J, Wood DM, Rogers P (2009) The everyday resilience of the city: how cities respond to
terrorism and disaster. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke [England]; New York
Crutzen P (2002) Geology of mankind. Nature 415:23. https://doi.org/10.1038/415023a
Davoudi S, Shaw K, Haider LJ et al (2012) Resilience: a bridging concept or a dead end? “Refram-
ing” resilience: challenges for planning theory and practice interacting traps: resilience assessment
of a pasture management system in Northern Afghanistan urban resilience: what does it mean in
planning practice? Resilience as a useful concept for climate change adaptation? The politics of
resilience for planning: a cautionary note. Plan Theory Pract 13:299–333
Davoudi S, Brooks E, Mehmood A (2013) Evolutionary resilience and strategies for climate adap-
tation. Plan Pract Res 28:307–322
Eakin H, Luers AL (2006) Assessing the vulnerability of social-environmental systems. Annu Rev
Env Resour 31:365–394
Edson MC (2010) Group development: a complex adaptive systems perspective. In: Proceedings
of the 54th annual meeting of the ISSS-2010, Waterloo, Canada
European Commission (2005) Frontier research: the European challenge. High level expert group
report Brussel
Folke C (2006) Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems analyses.
Glob Environ Change 16:253–267
Folke C, Carpenter SR, Walker B et al (2010) Resilience thinking: integrating resilience, adaptability
and transformability. Ecol Soc 15:20
Folke C, Hahn T, Olsson P, Norberg J (2005) Adaptive governance of social-ecological systems.
Annu Rev Environ Resour 30:441–473
Fünfgeld H, McEvoy D (2012) Resilience as a useful concept for climate change adaptation? Plan
Theory Pract 13:324–328. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2012.677124
Glaser M, Krause G, Ratter B, Welp M (2008) Human/nature interaction in the anthropocene. GAIA
17(1):77–78
Godschalk DR (2003) Urban hazard mitigation: creating resilient cities. Nat Hazards Rev 4:136–143
Gotts NM (2007) Resilience, panarchy, and world-systems analysis. Ecol Soc 12:24
and nature. Isl Wash
Gunderson LH, Holling CS, Light SS (1995) Barriers and bridges to the renewal of ecosystems and
institutions. Columbia University Press
Gunderson LH, Allen CR, Holling CS (2009) Foundations of ecological resilience. Island Press
Holling CS (1973) Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 1–23
Holling CS (1996) Engineering resilience versus ecological resilience. Engineering within ecolog-
ical constraints. National Academy Press, Washington, DC, USA, pp 31–34
Holling CS (2004) From complex regions to complex worlds. Ecol Soc 9
Jahn T, Becker E, Keil F, Schramm E (2009) Understandind social- ecological systems: frontier
research for sustainable development. Implication for European Research Policy
Lambin EF (2005) Conditions for sustainability of human–environment systems: Information, moti-
vation, and capacity. Glob Environ Change 15:177–180
McAslan A (2010) Community resilience. Understanding the concept and its application. Torrens
Resilience Institute, Australia
Meerow S, Newell JP, Stults M (2016) Defining urban resilience: a review. Landsc Urban Plan
147:38–49
References 31
Miller F, Osbahr H, Boyd E et al (2010) Resilience and vulnerability: complementary or conflicting

concepts. Ecol Soc 15:11
Mitchell T, Harris K (2012) Resilience: a risk management approach. ODI Backgr Note January
Lond Overseas Dev Inst
Olsson L, Jerneck A, Thoren H et al (2015) Why resilience is unappealing to social science:
theoretical and empirical investigations of the scientific use of resilience. Sci Adv 1:e1400217.
https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.1400217
Ostrom E (1990) Governing the commons: the evolution of institutions for collective action. Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge
Pearce L (2003) Disaster management and community planning, and public participation: how
to achieve sustainable hazard mitigation. Nat Hazards 28:211–228. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:
1022917721797
Pendall R, Foster KA, Cowell M (2010) Resilience and regions: building understanding of the
metaphor. Camb J Reg Econ Soc 3:71–84
Pickett STA, Cadenasso ML, Grove JM (2004) Resilient cities: meaning, models, and metaphor for
integrating the ecological, socio-economic, and planning realms. Landsc Urban Plan 69:369–384
Porter L, Davoudi S (2012) The politics of resilience for planning: a cautionary note. Plan Theory
Pract 13:329–333. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2012.677124
Reghezza-Zitt M, Rufat S, Djament-Tran G et al (2012) What resilience is not: uses and abuses.
Cybergeo Eur J Geogr
Resilience Alliance (2010) Assessing and managing resilience in social-ecological systems: a prac-
titioner’s workbook, Version 2.0
Shaw K (2012) “Reframing” resilience: challenges for planning theory and practice. Plan Theory
Pract 13:308–312
Simmie J, Martin R (2010) The economic resilience of regions: towards an evolutionary approach.
Camb J Reg Econ Soc 3:27–43
Smith K (2009) environmental hazards: assessing risk and reducing disaster, 5 edn. Routledge, New
York
Teigão dos Santos F, Partidário MR (2011) SPARK: strategic planning approach for resilience
keeping. Eur Plan Stud 19:1517–1536
Welsh M (2014) Resilience and responsibility: governing uncertainty in a complex world. Geogr J
180:15–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/geoj.12012
Westley F (1995) Governing design: the management of social systems and ecosystems manage-
ment. In: Barriers and bridges to the renewal of ecosystems and institutions
Wilkinson C (2012) Urban resilience: what does it mean in planning practice? Plan Theory Pract
13:319–324. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2012.677124
Chapter 4
Responding to Disasters
Abstract The chapter critically examines the contemporary structure of risk man-
agement by drawing on resilience perspective. Usually, disaster risk studies and emer-
gency management are rooted in the PPRR chain (prevision, prevention, response
and recovery) in which each step includes several actions, and competences are laid
down by law. Its emphasis is on identifying exposure and vulnerability to risk and
on bouncing back to normalcy. The result is a rigid process in which there is great
attention given to the more predictable types of events and impacts, while less con-
sideration is given to the interactions among actors across multiple scales and time
frames. Network and cooperative relationships are taken for granted, even if they
include a large number of actors with different skills. The central argument of the
chapter is the key role that knowledge production, implementation and dissemination
and the learning processes have in building resilience. The first part of the chapter
analyses the multiple levels and sectors of interventions of the PPRR chain, illustrat-
ing the cross-scale challenges; while the second part problematises the integration
of diverse disciplines knowledge and the role of collaborative knowledge production
in a resilience approach.
Keywords PPRR chain · Emergency management · Competences · Knowledge

systems · Collaborative knowledge production · Social learning
4.1 Resilience and Risk Management
This chapter aims to develop a conceptual framework that helps to re-think risk
management by drawing on the three distinct perspectives on resilience (engineering,
ecological, social-ecological or evolutionary), which are discussed in Chap. 3.
Usually, disaster studies largely embrace the engineering-based conceptualisa-
tion of resilience that is dominated by an emphasis on bounce back to normalcy.
This approach works to make the system robust through an already stable physical
infrastructure and pre-defined allocation of responsibility. It seeks resilience largely
in the form of persistence, while social dimension seems to have a limited influence
in enhancing or diminishing resilience.

34 4 Responding to Disasters
This is in contrast with the concepts of flexibility, adaptability and transformability

that are promoted by social-ecological and evolutionary resilience (Davoudi et al.
2013). From this perspective, human and nature are interdependent systems (Folke
et al. 2010), and people can intervene through their technologies and innovations to
adapt and transform towards a more desirable trajectory. In particular, the flexible
use of resources, including social capital, and the cooperative network at different
scales are considered main levers for building resilience.
This does not imply that persistence is not important. It remains essential for
managing risks, particularly during and shortly after a disaster, but is not exhaustive,
especially in today’s world of uncertainty. For this reason, the social-ecological
resilience framework overlaps the human component to persistence. We understand
that humans operate directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously creating
unexpected outcomes, options and opportunities, thus increasing their capacity to
become more or less resilient.
The first section of the chapter explores the Prevision-Prevention-Response-
Recovery chain to present a critique of the current approach to risk management
highlighting its limitations by drawing on the four-dimensional framework for build-
ing evolutionary resilience as suggested by Davoudi et al. (2013).
From this perspective, resilience should be a dynamic interplay among persis-
tence, adaptability, transformability and preparedness across multiple scales and time
frames. Persistence is the main component of engineering resilience and it refers to
the robustness of a system. Adaptability is drawn from ecological resilience and
indicates the ability to adapt to new circumstances by enabling different resources.
Finally, transformability and preparedness represent the quality of social-ecological
and evolutionary resilience. The former implies the possibility to change path in
development; the latter links the previous three: it harmonizes the different policies
and practices outside the sectorial boundaries. This requires, not only technical and
scientific knowledge, but also stakeholders and public engagement, including new
actors and informal knowledge. The chapter problematises the importance of the
institutional governance across scales and time frames, the role of knowledge and
learn-and-adapt capacity in enhancing resilience. Its aim is to reference resilience,
cross-scale and risk management literature, while also including additional knowl-
edge management literature that is not commonly found in public policies.
4.2 The Prevision-Prevention-Response-Recovery Chain
Extreme events can involve several temporal, spatial and jurisdictional scales and
consequently an enormous number of actors with different values, levels of knowl-
edge and practice (Adger 2006; McEvoy et al. 2013). There is a great variety in the
way risk management is organised in different countries, however, the common view
considers risk management as being the result of several consequential steps that
cover prevision actions to recovery ones, working as a unique cycle (Smith 2009).
When we talk about extreme events, we usually refer to three distinct times (before,
4.2 The Prevision-Prevention-Response-Recovery Chain 35
RECOVERY PREVISION
LEARNING REVIEW RISK ASSESSMENT

Education teachers and
builders Database assembly
Train volunteers Vulnerability mapping
Inform politicians Loss estimation
RECONSTRUCTION MITIGATION
Permanent rebuilding Protective structure
Improved design Insurance
Avoid hazard zones Land planning use
REHABILITATION PREPAREDNESS
Debris removal Forecasting systems
Restore public services Warning schemes
Temporary housing Safe refuges
Stockpile aid
RELIEF EMERGENCY PLANS

Search and rescue Evacuation routes
Medical aid Practice drills
Food and shelter First aid supplies
RESPONSE PREVENTION
Fig. 4.1 PPRR—chain and its activities. Source Figure of the author first publish in Pede (2018)
during and after the event) with different phases in each. Firstly, there is the ordi-
nary time, during which actors are involved to avoid or mitigate the possibility of an
emergency situation, or however, to be prepared to deal with it. Then, when the event
occurs the emergency phase starts. That is what we call the golden hours, referring
to the ones immediately before and after and emergency relief operations. Finally,
after a catastrophic event there is the time dedicated to the activities necessary to
return to normality.
In order to categorise the treatments that can be deployed, Smith (2009) had
subdivided each of these three phases into different steps that together constitute the
PPRR (prevision—prevention- response—recovery) chain (Fig. 4.1):
Before the event
• Prevision: it includes the actions for evaluating and ranking the risks and for iden-
tifying areas that may be affected. It concerns the collection and processing of
such data, determining the likelihood and consequence of each risk. In this phase,
different professional competences—according to the risk to be analysed—work
to understand the elements that compose hazard and the vulnerability of a specific
area. Besides, it is decided whether the risk is acceptable or whether it is serious
enough to warrant treatment. Usually, the competent authorities are the Environ-
ment, Infrastructure, Housing and Planning and Civil Protection Departments and
Agencies, at diverse levels.
• Prevention: it is about all the interventions aiming to reduce or avoid potential
damage due to an extreme event. They cover mitigation works, preparedness activ-
ities and the drawing-up of emergency plans. Concerning mitigation actions, they
include both land-use planning measures and engineering works. In this stage, the
actors deal with vulnerability and exposure modification of the territory. Regard-
ing preparedness actions, community education and information are defined as
crucial tasks. However, in most of the cases these activities concern what to do
during the emergency (how to find safe refuges during earthquakes or floods or
escape routes) rather than mitigation actions to reduce or eliminate long-term risk.
Besides, hazard warning and emergency plans are elaborated to manage in the best
way a contingent emergency (evacuation procedures as well as the stockpiling of
supplies).
Generally, local authorities are responsible for what concerns land use and plan-
ning, whereas fire fighters, Health Department and volunteer groups deal with com-
munity preparedness and emergency plans.
During the event
• Response: it covers relief and rehabilitation actions to secure and to keep people
safe after the event. It includes rescuing survivors and distributing basic supplies
(food, water, medical care). The response depends on the magnitude of the disaster
and possible cascade effects; it also relates to the flow of resources, equipment,
information and knowledge that involved actors can deploy (Comfort et al. 2004).
Commonly, if the event is not considered critical, fire fighters are the main depart-
ment involved; otherwise, civil protection, specific police forces (e.g. forest service
in case of forest fire events), volunteer services or even military defence are involved.
The coordination during this phase is not limited to the horizontal interaction among
the forces involved, but it should also affect the competent authorities of previous
steps of prevision and prevention.
After the event
• Recovery: it combines the first activities destined to re-enable the fundamental
functions (e.g. removal of debris, reactivation of power and water supplies as
well as infrastructure), to the reconstruction, where long-term actions are taken
to support a return to normality after the devastation of the communities affected.
This phase does not concern only physical activities but also includes psychological
counselling.
4.2 The Prevision-Prevention-Response-Recovery Chain 37
If we examine the PPRR chain from a resilience perspective, its implicit view of
resilience veers between the ecological and the more rigid engineering interpreta-
tion (see Sect. 3.1). The approach is dominated by an emphasis on bounce back to
normalcy: prevision and prevention phases focus on risk assessment, vulnerability
and exposure to the main risks. Most of the prevention actions are planned in terms
of persistence to potential perturbations (through protective structure, safe refuges,
or stockpile) or in preparation to overcome the events in the shortest possible time
(forecasting systems and emergency plans).
The temporal order of interventions is characterised by rigid categorization of
actions and linearity. On one hand, the pre-defined rigidity of competences helps to
identify responsibilities especially during the short-term post-disaster responses; on
the other, it can limit adaptability, resourcefulness and innovation.
However, it should be stressed that the PPRR chain is defined as a cycle, thus
it foresees interventions aim to change the trajectory. Ideally, the recovery phase is
defined as a moment to review the arranged risk management, to find out what has
gone wrong and which measures need to be improved. It applies, to a certain extent,
a learn-and-adapt methodology with an attempt to building a dynamic planning
in which the different stages of the PPRR-chain are part of a continuous adaptive
cycle. With respect to the social-ecological resilience concept, the reconstruction step
could represent the “reorganisation” phase of the adaptive cycle in which changes
and transformations occur in response to the unsustainable previous conditions that
had co-determined the breakdown of the system.
[…] effective risk resolution depends on the implementation of a sequential series of actions.
The individual stages often overlap but it is crucial that they operate as a closed loop in order
to draw benefits from experience and feedback (Smith 2009, p. 67).
In the practice, there is a limited attention to the adaptive dimension. One of

the reasons could be rooted in the poor consideration to the social process and to
the interconnections between the phases at multiple scales and time frames. The
coordination is provided by the law, but it is underestimate. The emphasis is placed
in the temporal order of interventions that must be consequential rather than their
interconnection. Cooperation is mostly based on exchanges of information among
institutions without an effective process of stakeholder engagement.
4.3 Disconnected Policies and Actors
As explained above, the PPRR chain involves a great many actors and covers a wide
range of policies. As the phases, also the engaged responsibilities and competences
overlap. Consequently, resolving risk problems requires dialogue and coordination
among experts to allow stages to operate as a closed loop.1
1 Also European Communities (2009) put linking the different actors throughout the disaster cycle
as a key issue in the Commission’s point of view. The environmental issue is maybe the first one
that integrates the multidisciplinary approach as the only way to find long-lasting solutions.
Nowadays, even if there is progressive awareness of the need of collaboration

among the actors and stakeholders of all phases, a fully integrated approach to disaster
reduction is rarely achieved. There is a wide range of aspects that should be certainly
considered in this regard: the number of actors, the complexity of risks, institutional
weakness or fragmentation as well as the lack of technical expertise.
Generally, the risk management framework is set by government regulations oper-
ating at local, regional, national and even international levels. If we consider the EU
context, most of the activities are usually fulfilled by civil protection. At the European
level, the EU Civil Protection legislation was revised at the end of 2013 to increase
the security of citizens through pre-planned and effective manners to respond to nat-
ural and man-made disasters. The new legislation places more emphasis on disaster
prevention, risk management and disaster preparedness. It asks the Member States
to share a summary of their risk assessments and to refine their risk management
planning as well as to share the best practices (ECHO 2014).
Generally, the primary responsibility for dealing with a disaster lies with the
country in which it occurs. But when the scale of emergency overwhelms national
response capabilities, the EU Civil Protection Mechanism enables a coordinated
assistance from the participating States. Each country has its own legislation on
risk management and civil protection, however, most of the countries are based
on the principle of vertical subsidiarity within the institutional level of power. At
the same time, there is also horizontal interaction within the public and the private
sector as well as the inclusion of volunteer organisations. At the national level,
the relevant activity is usually quartered in a formal governmental agency mostly
with policy and programmatic directive responsibilities. At other levels, the civil
protection arrangements are very heterogeneous, mostly complex with problems of
integration between higher and lower levels. However, the lower governmental levels
are the most important actors,2 with the support of external civil protection groups
composed mainly by semi-volunteers.
Risk mismanagement can be affected by missing or failed institutions, or by
scale mismatches among institutions (Costanza et al. 1993). These can be related to
ineffective connections between scales or because decisions are based on information
aggregated at the wrong scale. It should be considered that decision-making on risk is
made more difficult by the very nature of risk: risks are combinations of complexity,
uncertainty and ambiguity (Renn 2015). Complexity is given by external factors
that can affect the casual relationship between cause and effect. Equally, uncertainty
refers to the levels of confidence in available knowledge that stakeholders can have
at their disposal in the process of decision-making. In other words, stakeholders act
between a lower and an upper limit of what can reasonably be expected. Finally,
ambiguity is related to the interpretative meaning of knowledge that each actor has,
due to his background. This is one of the hardest obstacles to overcome. The gaps in
2 In most of the countries there is an evolution to a de-centralized civil protection system (especially
in Europe where the subsidiarity has had great influence), but there are still very centralized national
level systems such as in Japan.
4.3 Disconnected Policies and Actors 39
understanding exist between most professional areas, but can be exemplified by the
following relationships (Lindberg and Sundelius 2012):
• Between security and safety professionals;
• Between different civil authorities;
• Between public authorities and the private sector;
• Between levels of authorities;
• Among individuals.
All these groups have the necessity to cooperate and coordinate, before, during
and after a catastrophic event in common. Some key factors contributing to the
misunderstanding and to the lack of or inefficient cooperation are rooted in the
different terminologies, ways of organizing and finally in the procurements of sector-
specific technological solutions that each category has. Not surprisingly, they have
problems in understanding each other and the way their sectors/competences interact.
As Folke (2006) argued, the biggest change in this context must be built in the
knowledge and learning capacities of institutions and organizations. In this respect,
effective communication is the prerequisite for efficient and fair risk governance
because it provides the knowledge base on which dialogue among stakeholders can
be productive (Comfort et al. 2004; Renn 2015). Likewise, resilience thinking con-
siders knowledge and learning capacity key elements in the process of continuously
improving management skills and adaptation (the adaptive cycle, see Sect. 3.3). The
role played by humans and their interaction is what makes the process more dynamic
and holistic.
4.4 Responsibilities, Institutions and New Actors
As set out in Sect. 3.2, following resilience theory, we know that social-ecological
systems (SESs) are open systems where all cultural, political, social, ecological,
technological and other components interact at multiple levels (Resilience Alliance
2010). The two subsystems (ecological and social) can be seen as being composed
of a spectrum of interconnected exogenous, slow, and fast3 variables with a direct
impact on the people (Chapin et al. 2006). According to Anderies et al. (2004), several
entities are involved in social-ecological system interaction: the resources (territory),
the resource users (citizens), the public infrastructure providers (institutions), the
public infrastructure (engineering works and social capital), the institutional rules
and the external environment (weather, economy, political system). The evolution
of system elements has different speeds, but the system approach is holistic because
it does not focus on a detailed understanding of parts, but on how key components
contribute to the dynamics of the whole system. Through these interactions, social-
ecological systems can self-organise, bringing out new configurations and making
3 Slow and fast variables are strongly linked. The former refers to environmental capital and gov-
ernment, whereas the latter concerns ecosystem users. Usually, the dynamics of fast variables, such
as crop production, are shaped by slow variables, such as soil organic matter (Walker et al. 2012).
possible adaptations. Hence, SESs are suitable for resilience assessment due to their
capacity to self-recover or self-reorganise in response to disturbances.
People respond to social, environmental, and ecological changes of the system
through a complex network of institutions,4 which in turn affect slow and fast vari-
ables of the system. Institutions involve multiple sectors and scales and the interac-
tions among these actors; in the same way, organizations and rules determine how
people make decisions, and exercise responsibility.
In a resilient approach the main aim of institutions should be the protection and
the well-being of the community, which is achieved by controlling the use of land
and organizing and directing social behaviour. Understanding the behaviour and
interactions of institutions, therefore, is crucial for understanding social-ecological
interactions in SES and for reorganizing in favour of a more sustainable development
(see Sect. 3.3).
The institutional configurations of the systems concern several and different types
of actors and tools and depend on the structure of the social system governing and
managing the SES. Following Chapin et al. (2006), it is possible to recognize different
categories of institutions that directly or indirectly affect ecosystems:
i. Resource-harvest institutions: include the sectorial actors that are focused
mainly on the management of goods (e.g. agriculture, forest, water, etc.). They
usually include regulatory tools;
ii. Resource-conservation institutions: which administer choices to conserve and
protect the ecosystem. The focus is on long-term conditions.
iii. Hazard-reduction institutions: which govern choices for reducing the societal
impacts of natural hazards.
iv. Ecological externality-producing institutions: refer to heterogeneous social eco-
nomic sectors pursuing development goals. These institutions have indirect
effects on the ecosystem (industrial activities, construction of infrastructure).
Management and governance process among different institutions can actually
be difficult to achieve because institutions have different perspectives in recognizing
and solving problems (Schön 1983). Thus, to address contemporary environmental
problems, it is important to understand how barriers to collaboration can be overcome.
Public management of risk is mostly a multi-discipline and multi-sector policy
field characterized by a wide range of actors from civil protection to sectorial and
spatial planning. The coordination is not only an inter-sector issue but it involves
different jurisdictional, institutional and temporal scales among the different stages
of the PPRR chain (Wilbanks 2006; Bignami 2010; Sapountzaki et al. 2011). The
number and type of actors involved concern the type of disaster (e.g. forest fire,
earthquake, floods, landslide, etc), the spatial extension and the type of damages on
4 In resilience and SES literature, the term institutions refers both formal and informal statements.
Formal institutions are codified rules such as constitutions, law, and property rights. On the other
hand, informal institutions include social and behavioural norms typical of a specific community.
This chapter is mainly focused on formal institutions and the way they cooperate together. Informal
institutions will be explored later, with focus on the possibility to promote collaborative behaviour
in risk situations including citizens during emergencies.
4.4 Responsibilities, Institutions and New Actors 41
people and goods. In most countries, risk management is entrusted to a variety of

institutions, which operate on different spatial scales, from national to local level,
covering the different stages of the PPRR chain. Some actors work during all stages
of the PPRR, others are involved only in few of them. In the same way, some insti-
tutions are directly involved in the crisis (e.g. emergency management activities);
others indirectly affect the pressures on the territory and consequently influence its
vulnerability (e.g. territorial strategic development).
The proof of this complex situation, characterized by the overlap of responsibili-
ties, is demonstrated by the general lack of a cohesive policy able to provide a suite
of strategies that could be integrated. Despite the circularity of the activities provided
for in the PPRR chain, reality shows us situations where the respective information,
knowledge and policy actions run parallelly without any linkages, feedback, and
mutual interaction.
It does not mean that all the PPRR-chain is characterized by malfunctions, but in
most of the cases the ability in coordination is linked to the individuals’ will rather
than to procedures and tools. Therefore, the analysis of the risk governance can
provide a clearer understanding of power dynamics and conflicts among stakeholders
and their ability either to promote or to undermine the resilience of the system
(Resilience Alliance 2010). Obviously, there is nothing such as a one optimal risk
management structure for all, but adequate network characteristics can facilitate or
impede processes such as information sharing and collaboration opportunities. In
analysing the network, it is important to take into account the number of relations
between actors, the degree of centrality of actors within the network, the existence
of cohesive subgroups and their degree of isolation (Resilience Alliance 2010).
4.5 The Cross–Scale Challenge
In addition to stakeholders’ coordination, the multiscale nature of the problems

related to risk management demands attention. Generally, we are all aware that the
causes, the dynamics and the consequences of extreme events can be measured at dif-
ferent scales, whereas it is less clear the importance of scales in the decision-making
process. Usually, we use the term scale to refer to the spatial, temporal, quantita-
tive, or analytical dimensions used by scientists to measure and study objects and
processes (Gibson et al. 2000, p. 219)
Furthermore, when we use scales for analysing, their extent and resolution could
also be explicit. The former indicates the size of the spatial, temporal, quantitative, or
analytical dimensions of a scale; the latter refers to the precision used in measurement.
In connection to the concept of scales, there is the notion of levels that indicates
the units of analysis that are located along a scale. Commonly, levels have a spatial
feature (e.g. small, medium or large-sized phenomena) and can also be related to
time (durations, frequencies or effects).
Closely related to spatial scales are jurisdictional scales defined as clearly bounded
and organized political units (e.g. municipality, regions, provinces, nations, etc.). In
the same way, jurisdictional characteristics are linked to institutional arrangements

that also have fitting inner hierarchy (Cash et al. 2006). Following the classifica-
tion of hierarchy defined by Gibson et al. (2000), there are two types of hierarchy:
inclusive and constitutive where inclusive refers to levels with no cross-interaction
and organization, whereas, constitutive hierarchy adverts to levels that can interact
as in a complex system. In such systems, phenomena occurring at any one level are
affected by mechanisms occurring both at the same level as by levels below and
above.5 Thus, it is fundamental to examine complex systems and their disturbances
from a multilevel perspective because they depend on understanding the constraints
at all levels.
Choosing the scale or the level for studying phenomena in such systems may
cause different problems. Specifically, there is not an optimal scale or level, but at
each scale/level there are different pattern identifications, problems, explanations of
phenomena or questions to be asked. For instance, phenomena that appear at one level
of resolution may be lost at lower or higher levels. It comes to light how the scaling
problems can be related to issues of scale and/or level as well as to hierarchies and
players involved. Also the debate on resilience highlights this issue: in ecological and
socio- ecological resilience systems can have multiple stable states that implies that
system, redefines its structure by changing the variables and processes that control
behaviour.
Moreover, if most of the attention given to scale in studies of human-environment
interactions has focused on spatial, temporal and jurisdictional issues, there are also
some topics not conventionally framed as a scale problem, but in which scale can
affect policy processes (Cash et al. 2006; Kok and Veldkamp 2011). Knowledge is
one of them.
If describing and explaining phenomena depends on scale, it means that knowl-
edge is also related to scale; thus we can talk of knowledge as a scale (Cash et al.
2006) or of knowledge limited to scale. In other words, knowledge can be defined as
a system of progressive embedding (Koraeus 2008) of data and information. It means
that data is created at different scales and is linked and interpreted by different actors
(at different levels) to support decisions. For instance, in planning, plans and actions
are grouped into hierarchical set ranking in which data and models are combined at
different spatial and temporal scales, or in which information is extrapolated between
scales and levels.
Cash et al. illustrates how fuzzy and, at the same time, complex the definition of
knowledge is in relation to the level of the analysis. It is difficult to identify the scales
of knowledge, but it is undeniable that knowledge has to do with scale. By its nature,
focus on a single geographic scale tends to emphasize processes operating at that scale,
information collected at that scale, and parties influential at that scale – raising the possibility
of misunderstanding cause and effect by missing the relevance of processes that operate at
a different scale (Wilbanks and Kates 1999, p. 608).
5 It was the Panarchy theory of Gunderson and Holling (2002) to add to hierarchy theory the concept
that all levels are considered as influencing each-other in a top-down and bottom-up hierarchy.
4.5 The Cross–Scale Challenge 43
For this reason, decision-makers should be sensitive to the knowledge of multiple

scales; as well as, in building knowledge, there should be different types of interaction
between the owner of the data or information and the last user.
Generally, planning theory focuses its attention on phenomena that encompass
many scales and many levels; terms as multilevel, interdisciplinary and integrated
approach are crucial but there are misunderstandings in the role of scale in the
decision-making process (see Sect. 3.4). There is a particular lack of consideration
in the cross-level or cross-scale interaction, in which cross-scale refers to interactions
across different scales (e.g. between spatial domains and jurisdictions) that can result
in nonlinear dynamics. Changes in cross-scale may arise from the consequences of
interactions or be caused by other variables (Cash et al. 2006).
The cross-level and cross-scale interactions especially emerge from planning prac-
tice—considering climate change—posing formidable challenges for understanding
and forecasting system dynamics. To be able to come to terms with cross-scale and
cross-level dynamics, it is also crucial in governing ecological-social problems (Cash
et al. 2006; Buizer et al. 2011). A hot spot of the social ecological system literature is
the management of them, in particular referring to adaptive management. As Buizer
et al. (2011) explained
rather than focusing on discovering reality, attention is shifted to developing methods that
could facilitate the analysis of complex SESs (ibid, p. 5).
Scale is not a new subject in planning; actually, it has always had a key role.
The issue of scale and level interaction is usually considered in term of governance
(Termeer et al. 2010; Kok and Veldkamp 2011): to identify and assess the influ-
ence and importance of key actors (stakeholder analysis) or to analyse the stake-
holder relationship management. Over the years, several methods have been studied
to understand stakeholders’ behaviour (e.g. actor network analysis; social network
analyses; system dynamic models) and all those works that acknowledge the idea
that scales and levels must be considered as co-produced in processes in which insti-
tutions work together. Furthermore, in the literature and the practice related to scale
and governance, there is a growing focus on the collaboration and integration among
scales and levels that includes not only scientists, policy makers and shareholders
but has an increasing interest in citizens and society.
In the governance debate, there seem to be two separate communities of study
on the scale-related issue: the former mostly analyses the role of temporal and juris-
dictional scales with a strong spatial perspective; whereas the latter focuses more
on the role of networks and information flows released from spatial issue (Kok and
Veldkamp 2011). Despite all commonalities, the proposed solutions differ consider-
ably. The former approaches are more related to the polity dimension focused on the
norms that allow the action of actors and that contribute to the multilevel governance
effectiveness. The latter focuses more on communication claims and emphasize the
way of policy making. However, most governance analyses focus only on a part of
the policy processes. For instance, there is a lack of interest in exploring problems of
horizontal and vertical interplay that concern building knowledge. In this case, the
knowledge issue is not interpreted as the recognition and discussion of knowledge but
more related to the sharing and interaction of data and information at different scales
that are fundamental for comprehension (Buizer et al. 2011). More in detail, gover-
nance implies that many actors in different institutions contribute to policy develop-
ment and implementation. Each of them has different knowledge claims but mutual
interdependences that require cooperation and coordination among actors located at
different levels. It means that knowledge produced at one level influences processes
at another level, but it should be considered that actors have different knowledge sys-
tems due to their discipline background (Pahl-Wostl 2009). The domain of disciplines
and their constituent parts affects the building knowledge processes. The plurality of
views renders knowledge understanding and sharing complex and overflowing with
obstacles. Consequently, these gaps in knowledge systems can compromise or create
incongruences in cross-level interactions (Young 2006).
The implementation of integrated knowledge systems has a crucial role in effec-
tively responding to the challenge of managing complex social-ecological systems.
Therefore, the alignment and cooperation of capabilities to create, verify, absorb,
share and, apply new knowledge can be one of the crucial issues to improve the
resilience of complex systems to natural hazards (Roux et al. 2006).
4.6 Data, Information, Knowledge
Knowledge has always been implicated in all policy processes; decisions depend on
the knowledge resources that are at the disposal of policy makers. The uncertainty
and unpredictability of the society today stresses the limits of knowledge and con-
sequently the limits of prediction in a world of complexity (Rothe 2017). Despite
the unpredictability of the world, the primary task of planning is still addressing,
overcoming or, at least, reducing uncertainty and in doing so it requires, more than
ever, knowledge resources for developing effective responses to unexpected events.
To examine how knowledge management can be applied, it is firstly crucial to explain
what knowledge means.
Generally, a distinction is made between three/four main components: data, infor-
mation, knowledge, and sometimes wisdom. Commonly, the terms data and infor-
mation are incorrectly considered to be exchangeable with knowledge. As Koraeus
(2008) argued
A common trait in defining these concepts is to use a system of progressive embedding,
where each step adds a layer of interpretation and contextualisation, but where each such
addition also increases the level of cognitive complexity (ibid, p. 33).
Data can be considered as raw facts, the basic unit in the knowledge process.
When data is organized in a given context, it creates information. In the same way,
when information is interpreted, we obtain knowledge. Polanyi (1966, 2009) was the
first to define knowledge as the process of interpreting and understanding data and
information in order to take the right decision and to implement the right actions.
Knowledge could be considered as data and information combined with context,
4.6 Data, Information, Knowledge 45
interpretation and reflection. Additionally, it is possible to identify one more category:

wisdom that is the utilisation of accumulated knowledge.
Data is a set of values of qualitative or quantitative variables. It refers to the
measuring and the collection of numbers or characters, but it does not concern their
analysis and interpretation. On the contrary, information refers to organized and
interpreted data. The information process includes human participation but the out-
come is explicit and can be readily transferred to another entity without any loss of
meaning (Roux et al. 2006).
Finally, knowledge is a mix of experiences and contextual information that pro-
vides the basis for the decision-making processes. It means that knowledge is a
cognitive process where users have a crucial role in determining the outcomes. But
the human factor is crucial in building knowledge as well as in knowledge sharing.
Knowledge is influenced not only by creators but also by users because they are the
ones that must interpret the meaning.
As it highlights by social-ecological resilience, the human factor is not a second
issue. Also in the field of computer system development, users are included in the
information system. Langefors in Essays on Infology (Langefors 1996) introduced
the infological equation to define process (i) where data (D) is a set of data that,
depending on the pre-knowledge (S) a human experiences during her/his life and the
time (t) available, is produced as information (I) (knowledge).
I i (D, S, t)
D the sets of data
S the user and her/his pre-knowledge
t the time available to the user for interpreting the data D
i the information conveyed by the data D
I the information function (knowledge)
(Langefors 1979, pp. 22)
The equation demonstrates that data sharing is successful only if users of the
intended information system are included in the design process. If the users are
neglected in the data definition phase there is a risk of data misinterpretation or
wrong inferences could be drawn.
Also in relation to human agent, Polanyi classified knowledge into two types:
explicit and tacit. The former is knowledge that can be captured in a database (know-
ing what). The latter is much more difficult to formalize, and it is linked to knowing
how. More in detail, explicit knowledge refers to information and it can only partially
represent what we know, because it cannot express the knowledge of experience.
Contrary to explicit, tacit knowledge is much less concrete and is non-codifiable
(Tsoukas 2005); it is rooted in practice but it interacts the norms of the disciplines
and the knowledge for the practice. It is the knowledge that practitioners have but
may not be able to describe and for this reason it is difficult to formalize and share
with other people (Roux et al. 2006). Explicit and tacit knowledge are popular terms
in management studies (Ambrosini and Bowman 2001; Nonaka 2008; Wenger 1998),
but they are now spreading to geography and urban studies.
They both refer to different knowledge systems that are widespread in decision-
making and governance processes. Generally, scientific (explicit) knowledge is con-
sidered the dominant lens through which decisions are taken. However, tacit knowl-
edge is always present because it is related to stakeholders’ skills. Usually, prac-
titioners have to combine the knowledge resources at disposal with their intuitive
understanding gathered from years of experience and practice. In the same way,
the collective memory also should be considered as useful for the process of social
learning. It concerns the knowledge hold by the community that usually is strongly
rooted in a particular place and it can improve the scientific basis and fairness of
community-based decisions.
4.7 Building and Sharing Knowledge
As mentioned above, in risk management diverse types and sources of knowledge are
shared by diverse actors. This plurality of views can be problematic because there are
differences in how people from different knowledge systems perceive and address
conflicts and solutions (Zaucha et al. 2016). Identifying opportunities to bridge dif-
ferent knowledge systems can make important contributions towards understanding,
governance and learning. In this respect, Renn (2015) recognized diverse typologies
of knowledge that correspond to different types of knowledge creators (Roux et al.
2006):
• Systematic knowledge provided by fundamental or basic researchers: knowledge
is systematized according to disciplinary lines. The main aim is the progress of
understanding rather than the response to specific problems.
• Experiential knowledge that could come from:
– applied researchers: knowledge creation is driven by practical problems. The
knowledge product is shaped on the potential users’ needs.
– policy-makers: this knowledge requires inputs from different fields to support
decisions for solving problems in practice.
– operational managers: they use both explicit and tacit knowledge for organi-
zational issues. The explicit knowledge comes from policy-makers’ products;
indeed, tacit knowledge is based on experiential learning and acquisition of
good practices.
• Local and circumstantial knowledge provided by communities: this knowledge is
based on traditions and experiences and it is transferred in social memory.
Risk problems require deliberation among knowledge holders able to produce a
common understanding for facing indeterminacy, complexity and uncertainty of the
real world. As Crosta argued
building and processing the useful knowledge for policies can be divided between different
workers but it cannot be separated (1998, p. 15 own translation).
4.7 Building and Sharing Knowledge 47
This means knowledge in action is the result of different knowledge. Professional

pluralism poses the predicament for the practitioners who must devise their own
way of combing the different knowledge. Usually institution sectors and levels are
interlinked by rules, procedures, organizational forms and technologies, which does
not necessarily imply full interaction. For instance, in the field of risk management,
it is not easy to describe the dynamic relationship among actors because each of them
generate different types of demands that lead to the formation of as many types of
response patterns based on diverse capacities (Comfort et al. 2004).
For example, if we consider planning practice, the plan process should be the field
of interaction among actors but this does not necessarily imply an interactive process
(Crosta 1998).6 Planning is an interactive process when it combines shared proce-
dures and norms with a common significance framework and with the practitioners’
willingness to learn.
In his studies on reflective practice, Donal Schön analyses knowledge in practice,
the nature of learning systems and the relevance of creating learning society. With
the term knowledge-in-practice, Schön problematizes the complexity of knowledge
useful for planning. In practice, planning knowledge involves the theory and the
norms for planning practice, but it also has to deal with the objectives and goals of the
practice, the values, the interests and the know-how by which planners contextualise
the situations (Schon 1982). What stands out is the ever-changing and dynamic nature
of knowledge according to the contexts.
In the same way, the changing world we are living in adds complexity to the
practices and institutions must learn to become capable of learning, transforming
and adapting themselves in response to changing situations and requirements. Con-
sequently, institutions must become learning systems, systems capable of bringing
about their continuing transformations.
The loss of the stable state means that our society and all of its institutions are in continuous
processes of transformation. (…) We must learn to understand, guide, influence and manage
these transformations. We must make the capacity for undertaking them integral to ourselves
and to our institutions. (…) We must, in other words, become adept at learning. We must
become able not only to transform our institutions, in response to changing situations and
requirements; we must invent and develop institutions which are ‘learning systems’, that is
to say, systems capable of bringing about their own continuing transformation (Schön 1971,
p. 28–29).
In Schön’s learning systems, we can recognize the same significance of flexibility,

feedback and organisational transformation that is assumed in the adaptive cycle of
social-ecologic system resilience. Moreover, his work contributes to drawing atten-
tion on learning as a social action rather than individual, in which the government
acquires new capacity by interacting among stakeholders building incrementalistic
models of practices. Therefore, the challenge is how to share knowledge among
stakeholders and the potential role of local communities as knowledge holders.
6 The notion of interactive knowledge emerged not like a positivist paradigm but more like a strategic
paradigm oriented to consensus building (Palermo and Ponzini 2014).

4.8 Knowledge Management
Usually, knowledge is created, stored and comprehended differently at different lev-

els and without a cross-level framework. In the same way, the flow of knowledge
among stakeholders is far from optimal; synergy among all parties is frequently
poor, characterized by misunderstandings, conflicts and inefficiency. Misinterpreta-
tions characterize all the knowledge systems. Although, most of the attention focuses
on the shift between scientists and managers, conflicts still persist also inside single
scientific fields as well as among management sectors (Rogers 1998). The result is
fragmented knowledge that is of little or no use to respond to complex problems.
The increasing complexity of problems to be faced has created a strong need for
deliberate and systematic approaches to cultivating and sharing knowledge. Despite
knowledge flows being the subject of many debates in planning, especially regard-
ing governance, knowledge management as organizational innovation is not widely
debated. The concept of knowledge management (KM), as a framework for creat-
ing, using and managing the knowledge, information of an organization, is, instead,
widely used in the private sector. The present section suggests the use of knowledge
management as a path to increase the learning capacities of stakeholders in a resilient
perspective.
Knowledge management was theorized by Ikujiro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi
in 1995 as an enhancement and extension of the existing theories of organizational
learning. However, before it had been practiced for a long time, mostly in an infor-
mal manner rather that in a deliberate and systemic manner (Cong and Pandya 2003;
Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2003). Knowledge management refers to a set of manage-
ment activities aimed to maximise the process of knowledge creation and integration,
including processes of sharing knowledge (Bowditch and Buono 2005). The main
goal of knowledge management should be to optimize resources that already exist
in an organization or institution so that its members will be able to seek out, utilize
and enhance their activities and processes and increase their performance. Its added
value is related to the possibility to reduce time, expense and error as well as to avoid
overlapping in information creation. Following this premise, KM in institutions can
be seen as the ability to use collective knowledge through a process of knowledge
generation, sharing and exploitation.
The core of managing knowledge is concerned with deciding with whom to share,
what is to be shared, how it is to be shared, and ultimately sharing and using it Cong
and Pandya (2003).
The knowledge management process involves both explicit and tacit knowledge
and improves the capabilities to create an interactive learning environment, where
members are encouraged to readily transfer and share what they know, internalize it,
and apply it to create new knowledge. As referred to above, it is false to believe that
exchanging explicit knowledge among diverse units is easy because several problems
can affect this process. But it is undeniable that the transfer of tacit knowledge is
even harder because it requires a much higher intensity of interaction.
4.8 Knowledge Management 49
Fig. 4.2 Knowledge—knowing -learning matrix. Source Figure of the author
Knowledge sharing should consider four different concepts: organizational learn-

ing, organizational management, learning organization and knowledge management.
They all refer to the process of creating, retaining and transferring knowledge but
with different focuses and approaches. Easterby-Smith and Lyles (2003) summarized
the distinctions among the four topics in relation to their attention on theory, process,
content and practice issues (see Fig. 4.2). Organizational learning refers to the study
of the learning processes of and within organizations, largely from an academic point
of view, meanwhile, learning organization theory generally aims to understand how
to create and improve this learning capacity. In the same way, the term organizational
knowledge works for understanding and conceptualizing the nature of knowledge,
whereas the knowledge management approach focuses on creating ways of dissem-
inating and leveraging knowledge to improve the action.
In other words, KM is based on three key elements: people, processes and tech-
nology. People are the most important component, because managing knowledge
depends on the individual’s willingness to share knowledge with others. Generally,
people tend to resist sharing their knowledge because creating knowledge is onerous
in terms of time and money. Secondly, processes are the way to create, locate and
share knowledge. Knowledge implementation should use systematic approaches so
that organization can use what it knows to learn and create value. Finally, technology
allows knowledge to be more accessible to people (Cong and Pandya 2003).
There are many benefits to be reaped from KM. In organizational settings, benefits
can occur both at individual and organizational level. At the individual level, KM
provides opportunities to enhance skills and experience by working together and
sharing people’s knowledge by learning from each other. This aspect is obviously
crucial for the sharing of tacit knowledge, which is usually difficult to communicate
and which requires extensive personal contact and trust to be effectively shared.
At the organizational level, KM provides two major benefits: it improves the
organization’s performance through increased efficiency, quality and reduction of
time, and, at the same time, it enables better decision making thanks to the higher
data integrity and greater collaboration between different sectors. Alongside this,
the management of knowledge across government departments can also create new
challenges for the retention of knowledge and the preservation of institutional mem-
ory.
Over the last decades, knowledge management has emerged as one of the most
influential new organizational practices that has had wide diffusion especially in
the private sector (Koraeus 2008). Despite the relevant literature for the private sec-
tor, there is a lack of analysis about KM in the public sector (Cong and Pandya
2003). There are several reasons accounting such low interest like the differences
in human resource management and decision processes. Public institutions are tra-
ditionally compartmentalized structures in which the different departments comply
with specific political priorities. The lack of knowledge management processes is the
evidence of the inadequate integration among policies; and this attitude can create
mismatching in the elaboration of the meaning of information and can hamper the
sharing of knowledge across different units and levels.
As already mentioned, the obstacles to knowledge sharing concern how knowl-
edge is generated, validated and stored. Contrary to traditional roles of knowledge
provider and knowledge consumer that work through the unidirectional transfer of
information, in sharing knowledge, knowledge should be “co-produced” through
collaborative learning between experts and users creating unified learning systems.
[…]this requires a shift from a view of knowledge as a “thing” that can be transferred, to
one of a “process of relating” that involves careful negotiation of meaning among partners”
(Roux et al. 2006, p. 1).
The processes and techniques for managing knowledge should follow different
stages: from the identification of the knowledge domain and the gap between the
existing and needed knowledge, to the selection of knowledge that seems appropriate,
the consequent classification and storage of the filtered knowledge, and finally the
review and the constant update to make it available to users. However, it involves not
only the technical knowledge, but also requires political will and mobilization.
4.9 Role of Technology
As mentioned above, information technologies (IT) facilitate the creation, codifi-

cation, transfer and integration of information. Before looking at the potential role
of technology in more detail, it is important to underline such information technol-
ogy can support KM but does not determine its success. Technology is a supporting
4.9 Role of Technology 51
innovation for people and processes; the three elements are interdependent parts of
a whole and only the interaction between technology, techniques, and people, allow
knowledge to be managed effectively. For instance, the conversion between data and
information is efficiently handled through information technology, but IT is not able
to turn information into knowledge. Information is interpreted into knowledge only
through people.
Certainly, including technology has multiple benefits; first and foremost, the effi-
ciency of data processing and data mining. IT can capture, store and distribute infor-
mation quickly. However, information technology does not simply automate existing
tasks but often helps to redefine them, even opening new possibilities (Kallinikos
2001). For example, building up a data infrastructure requires firstly a reflection on
what kind of data is critical and should be collected and how. Then, data must be
validated and evaluated.
Another benefit of using technology concerns standardization and control. The
information produced by a computer-based information system is characterized by
uniqueness, meaning it is expressed in a language of description that is intrinsic to
such system and that should be common to all the actors who have access to it. To this
aim information must be standardized and obey certain rules, otherwise, the systems
might not be able to recognize or understand it.
However, the problem of interpretation still remains. Scientists interpret data based
on the relevant experience and knowledge they have acquired; thus, different sci-
entists can interpret the same data in different ways. Data interpretation involves
constructing a logical scientific topic able to explain data, methods and techniques
used to measure; otherwise, information can seem in contradiction if scientists do
not share a common base line.
Over the last decade, the use of information technology in managing knowledge is
constantly evolving. Before mass use of Internet, spatial data were stored in different
physical locations, mostly using different standards or formats. Usually, one authority
develops some spatial data content, while, all the other data that the authority needs
comes from external sources. The amount of spatial data available and the usage of
GIS have boosted more and more public and private organizations in sharing data
both internally and with other organizations. In particular, the advent of the Internet
and digitalisation have opened considerable new possibilities for users to access and
utilize the data. In risk management, large interest has been focussed on the Spatial
Data Infrastructures (SDIs): infrastructures, or basic physical and organizational
structures, needed to facilitate efficient and effective use of spatial data for multiple
users (Hendriks et al. 2012). SDIs work with spatial data from many sources to
support a broad range of applications; SDIs potentially deliver products or support
communication and cooperation processes. In other words, an SDI interconnects
multiple GISs via web integrating their respective spatial data in a collaborative
framework.
To interconnect several GISs, spatial information and relationships must be
encoded in structured formal representations. This formal encoding makes these
infrastructures inherently well suited to facilitate collaboration among technicians
and experts from different fields but with common aims. Data harmonization and
integration basically face two types of heterogeneity: data heterogeneity and seman-
tic heterogeneity. The former refers to differences of data in terms of data type and
formats, whereas, the latter refers to the meaning of the data according to the specific
context. The transfer of data from one system to another does not guarantee that data
has a meaning to the new user; it requires the sharing of meaning between the two
users and furthermore that the two sets of meanings are identical.
Nowadays, geographic information systems are adopted widely but often indepen-
dently. As a result, it is very difficult for different systems to share data. The effective
integration of data systems is one of the key challenges of governing dynamic and
socioecological systems. This requires more than just institutional relationship; it
should be based on strong relationship-building and participatory process of stake-
holder engagement able to activate process of social learning.
4.10 Social Learning
In the literature on resilience, the increase of uncertainties, the rapid dynamics of

socioeconomic development and globalization have often been discussed as needing
more adaptive and flexible policies able to integrate the capacities of many stake-
holders. The mutual dependence between groups of experts has modified the govern-
ment’s notion, in favour of multi-scale and polycentric governance approaches where
different stakeholders collaborate in the formulation and implementation of public
policy (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007b). Several authors have embraced the importance of
the human dimension and the necessity of an adaptive form of governance that is
operationalised through adaptive co-management emphasizing the role of networks,
leadership, diversity, collective memory and trust. A central concept in such adaptive
management is social learning (Folke 2006).
The social learning theory emphasizes both issues of knowing and issues of being
part of and becoming. Originally, social learning was studied in psychology and
sociology (Bandura 1977), focusing on how we learn. Later, it became a promising
frame for understanding governance (Folke et al. 2002; Berkes et al. 2003). At its first
conceptualization, social learning referred to the individual process of learning that
takes place in a social context, but it did not consider group processes according to the
consideration that learning process starts with the living experience and its cognitive
processes. The second school of thought is rooted in the works on7 and influenced
by social theories of learning (Argyris and Schön 1978; Lave and Wenger 1991;
Wenger 1998). This literature defines social learning as a process determined by
groups interaction across scales and times (Reed et al. 2010). The aim is a multiparty
collaboration embedded in a specific context and leading to specific outcomes. It
should rely on a feedback loop between outcomes and context. In social-ecological
7 Sociallearning theory in organizational learning literature has been coined under several names
such as situated learning (Brown and Duguid 1991), as practice based learning (Argyris and Schön
1978; Gherardi 2000), and learning as cultural process (Cook and Yanow 1993; Yanow 2000).
4.10 Social Learning 53
systems, the context of social learning includes the governance structure (all the
actors, institutions and stakeholders) and the environment; practices that facilitate
flows of ideas and resources are essential factor for adaptability. The governance
structure has a strong influence on the nature of multiparty cooperation because it
influences access to information that can impede social learning. The multiparty
interactions regard two different aspects: (1) the processing of factual information
about a problem and (2) the solution of the problem (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007a). The
issue of management is a core aspect of participatory processes because it makes the
problem definition, the direction setting, its implementation, the type of ground rules
and the negotiation strategies chosen and the leadership in the process, explicit and
shared. Likewise, the development of shared meaning for a joint action is facilitated
by relational practices (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2007a). These may take different forms,
such as joint field visits or common training sessions. Benefits of social learning
refer both to the measures deployed to deal with problems and to the capacity of the
stakeholder group to face problems. Social learning can foster flexibility through an
efficient use of resources and cultivating diversity of views. It a resilient perspective,
it may be useful to consider the theory of Communities of Practice (CoP) developed
by Wenger (1998) that explores the links between knowledge, learning and com-
munities within organizations. Communities of practice are people as a concern for
something they do and how they learn to do it better as they interact regularly in
the process.8 Wegner emphasizes learning as participative process: learning can be
the reason the community comes together or the outcome of members’ interactions.
Thus, it can be also an unintentional outcome of the multiparty interaction. Not all
the communities are communities of practice. Two main elements define a commu-
nity of practice:(1) the identity is defined by a shared domain of interest; and (2)
its members are practitioners (Wenger 2000). In CoP, members are engaged in joint
activities and discussions and share information but do not necessarily work together
on a daily basis. In the same way, past experiences and ways of addressing recurring
problems are recognised as crucial resources.
As mentioned above, communities of practice can be created intentionally with
the goal of gaining knowledge or unintentionally; in any case, they take time and
sustained interaction. Members learn from each other through sharing information
and experiences and developing shared meaning. The communities of practice can
be understood as forms used by actors’ networks to manage and generate knowledge.
This is of particular interest to those fields in which there are different sources of
knowledge and a continuous process of learning. As Pahl-Wostl, Craps et al. argue
this leads as well to a different interpretation of the role of information and the ability of an
actor network to use new information in social learning processes [..]. Such understanding
of knowledge has implications for the role of information and communication (IC) tools,
8 Communities of practice can exist in any organization both private and public. The members of
these communities are not bound by organizational affiliations; they can span institutional structures
and hierarchies. They are crucial to those institutions and organizations that recognize knowledge
as a key asset. They fulfil a number of functions regarding the creation, accumulation and diffusion
of knowledge. They are a node for the exchange and interpretation of information because they
allow information to be moved across organizational boundaries.
which range from simple graphical devices to GIS maps as integrated simulation models[..]”
(ibid, 2007, p. 7).
Moreover, a CoP added value concerns the integration of both tacit and explicit
knowledge, because it preserves the tacit aspects of knowledge that formal systems
cannot capture.
Despite the collaborative nature of social learning processes, strong leadership
is required. It does not mean imposing a view, however, there is a need to provide
guidance to facilitate and to take away ambiguities due to the complexity of problem
domains, asymmetries among the actors in power, resources and expertise members.
Hence, the CoP needs a collaborative leadership able to reframe perspectives to shared
values and goals. In particular, it is important to determine how actors give meaning
to information to categorise the issues in the problem. Differences in contextualising
derive from diversity in scientific disciplines and backgrounds. This means that social
learning processes are strongly influenced by the governance structure in with actors
are embedded, thus rigid hierarchical and bureaucratic structures can become barriers
to social learning.
To promote the capacity to create and retain knowledge, institutions should build
processes where learning communities can evolve and interact. In doing so, it is
necessary to build organizational and technological infrastructures that recognize,
support and leverage the learning communities but it even more depends largely on
the political will and mobilization.
4.11 The Public Participation
Due to the growing complexity of systems and the increasing role of non-structural
measures in tackling risks, new forms of horizontal and vertical collaboration among
actors have been arising over the past two decades. This has led to changing the
distribution of responsibilities among the parties involved, not only including a mul-
tiplicity of public actors but also engaging citizens and the private sector (Kuhlicke
and Steinführer 2013).
Traditionally, risk management has had a paramilitary approach (Scanlon 1982).
The citizen was considered the core element, who had to be protected, safeguarded
from or assisted in a set of adverse events. In the same way, all the activities of PPRR
chain were pursued for, rather than with, the community (Laughy 1991). On the con-
trary, the adaptive management paradigm of social-ecological resilience recognizes
the need to forge new relationships to enhance multidirectional information flows.
The concept of the evolutionary prospective of resilience also highlights how much
social systems (also through individual or collective agency) can adapt or search for
alternative development trajectories (Davoudi et al. 2012). This paradigm shift opens
risk management out to a new role of the community (Scott 2013).
Citizens, advocacy groups, private organizations, non-profit and public organizations from
various backgrounds are part of the system, which adds complexity while providing a larger
4.11 The Public Participation 55
amount of opportunities for public managers to use in the effective management of emer-
gencies (Kapucu 2012, p. s42).
This means that people at risk are no longer simply exposed to risks, but they can
be gradually transformed into active individuals; citizens are no longer objects, but
they become new subjects in risk management.
Several issues have contributed to this evolution. First of all, the growing risk
perception that is crucial in risk management. Over recent years, there has been
a general awareness about the rising number of sources of hazards. An example
are floods. In the past, floods had a sole focus on rivers and seas but, in the last
decades, new events are continually arising due to climate change and flash floods.
Furthermore, there is a more sophisticated view of causality that allows to recognize
artificial flood sources and the potential for cascading events that can widen the
impact beyond those immediately affected (White 2013).
The Information Age is a contributing factor to this awareness; today people can
access information, knowledge and news easily. At the same time, this does not mean
only benefits. The large amount of information, in fact, contributes also to increase
the uncertainty in understanding real risks; furthermore, media can contribute to fal-
sifying reality, emphasizing drama beyond scientific evidence. In addition, it should
be stressed that the information about risks that institutions share with the public is
related to the credibility and trust that citizens attribute to those institutions (Baggett
et al. 2006). Lastly, the different attention in the PPRR chain can also influence risk
perception. For instance, Swedish society trusts more in the prevention stage to avoid
the emergency; on the contrary, the Italian society is more prepared in emergency
response rather than in prevention.
A second aspect has contributed to citizens participation; it is the emerging interest
of citizen groups to be engaged in disaster planning. It initially emerged with the
risks associated to nuclear power during the 1970s, and it has expanded to include
environmental issues such as natural hazards and disasters (Quarantelli 2000). People
have started to have a proactive attitude in handling risks, searching information and
warnings of danger. Bottom-up activities of communicating advice, education and
information are continuously growing.
Finally, but maybe most importantly, there is a growing willingness of people to
act collaboratively with authorities. Bottom-up experiences in which people share
information on different platforms are on the increase. In particular, there is a shift
from an emotional participation (persons who upload photos and videos during dis-
astrous events), to a conscious participation, where information is shared with a
community to solve a problem.
The spread of Web 2.0 in which users become active participants rather than
observers has largely contributed (Pearce 2003). Web 2.0 has suggested a reconcep-
tualised World Wide Web (O’Reilly 2005; Hagemann et al. 2007), characterized by
a decentralized mode of production, role of servers as accumulators of content from
distributed sources, and exchange of content among users (Surowiecki 2004).
Similar evolution has characterized cartography. Usually, reading a map requires
some training but today the diffusion of Google Maps and navigators make users
more familiar with maps and geographical data than before. The increase in geo-
graphical applications has improved people’s capability to understand information
and has hopefully reduced the number of map-blind people with severe problems
in understanding what maps describe. The Google map tools let the user know and
perceive physical aspects of land in a real image that is easy to understand.9
At the same time, nowadays data is or could be acquired easily from citizens or
through collaborations between citizens and authorities; there is an impressive spread
of geographic information creation, sharing, dissemination, and use in the form of
user-generated web content (crowd-sourced spatial data) (Elwood 2010).
Today, several Apps allow to images, graphics and maps to be transmitted directly
to users. Many experts think geographical information science has much to offer to the
development of collaborative technologies in terms of managing teams’ knowledge
and coordinating teams’ actions (Cai et al. 2005). For example, sharing information,
by geographical information system support, can be used to assist people in case of
danger or accident in choosing an alternative route to their destination.
When the public is at risk of real or potential threats, treatment options may be
limited, direct interventions may take time to be organised and resources may be
few. In this context, more widespread communication could provide individuals and
communities with information needed to survive an emergency.
Similarly, people may act collaboratively with authorities. Web and mobile plat-
forms are of increasing importance for data collection. They help greatly in collecting
accurate geospatial data, as well as delivering helpful location-aware applications that
can be easily used by everyone.
New trends show how social networking is supposed to improve interactivity
between a local government and the public. In some cases, the local government
can release information to the population; in other cases, citizens create and share
geographical information with other people or authorities following a collaborative
approach. However, the main problems in using data provided by common people are
data quality, accuracy and integrity. Also, the process of involving people should be an
interactive learning process which needs to take into consideration past experiences,
feedback loops and interaction with others.
4.12 Moving Towards a More Desirable Trajectory
Social-ecological resilience can be used as a conceptual framework for re-thinking

risk management in a more dynamic and holistic way. While it is true that persistence
is a crucial dimension of risk management, some other issues are commonly over-
9 At the same time, we should be aware of the limits of web cartography diffusion. Usually, people
that use freely available geo-web tools are much more focused on where to go and how to get
there, while the question of “what is it?” and “which are the components of the land?” are not
considered due to the lack of interpretative information provided by the web. A deeper knowledge
of the landscape elements requires a thorough interpretation of the objects in an area and a merging
with data from already measured roads, catastrophes, vegetation, soil, map (Salvemini et al. 2011).
4.12 Moving Towards a More Desirable Trajectory 57
looked. These concern mostly the human action and the capacity of the governing
bodies.
Emergency management, indeed, is affected by a deep complexity in terms of
uncertainty, number of stakeholders involved, extension in space and time and poten-
tial damages. Managing an emergency means identifying and contextualizing the
crisis, taking decisions under pressure, organizing individuals and sources, but also
improving management skills from one crisis to the next, as well as studying and
working to avoid or mitigate new crises (Koraeus 2008). Therefore, besides persis-
tence it requires adaptation to change, preparedness, flexibility and rapidity to find
alternative paths in facing problems. In resilience literature these abilities are strongly
interconnected to governance institutions and their learning capacity. But how this
challenge can be fostered and addressed?
As it was mentioned, in practice, problems do not present themselves as given, but
they require an amount of different knowledge coming from professional pluralism
that characterizes the PPRR chain. What stands out is a cross-scale claim character-
ized by interactions of scales and levels in the knowledge system, where the term
knowledge refers to the process of interpreting and understanding data that should
support actors in taking the right decisions.
Working on knowledge creation, implementation and sharing could be a way for
improving the quality of public engagement and consequently the system’s resilience.
This means not only an enlargement in the use of technology but it especially implies
a greater attention to people and processes that requires time and political will. It
should build communities of interest that step outside the boundaries of existing
governance structure but that can critically assess the scales and time of interventions.
In the next chapter, it will be analysed a case study in which the reconfiguration of the
knowledge sharing infrastructure was the opportunity to straighten the cooperation
among stakeholders (including new actors and citizens), to activate resourcefulness
and to introduce innovations into risk management processes.
References
Adger WN (2006) Vulnerability. Glob Environ Change 16:268–281

Ambrosini V, Bowman C (2001) Tacit knowledge: some suggestions for operationalization. J Manag
Stud 38:811–829
Anderies JM, Janssen MA, Ostrom E (2004) A framework to analyze the robustness of social-
ecological systems from an institutional perspective. Ecol Soc 9:18
Argyris C, Schön DA (1978) Organizational learning; a theory of action perspective. Wesley, Read-
ing
Baggett S, Jeffrey P, Jefferson B (2006) Risk perception in participatory planning for water reuse.
Desalination 187:149–158
Bandura A (1977) Self-efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. Psychol Rev 84:191
Berkes F, Colding J, Folke C (2003) Navigating social-ecological systems: building resilience for
complexity and change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Bignami DF (2010) Protezione civile e riduzione del rischio disastri. Metodi e strumenti di governo
della sicurezza territoriale e ambientale. Maggioli Editore
Bowditch JL, Buono AF (2005) A primer on organizational behavior. Wiley, New York
Brown JS, Duguid P (1991) Organizational learning and communities-of-practice: toward a unified
view of working, learning, and innovation. Organ Sci 2:40–57
Buizer M, Arts B, Kok K (2011) Governance, scale and the environment: the importance of recog-
nizing knowledge claims in transdisciplinary arenas. Ecol Soc 16:18
Cai G, MacEachren AM, Brewer I et al (2005) Map-mediated geocollaborative crisis management.
In: Intelligence and security informatics. Springer, Berlin, pp 429–435
Cash DW, Adger WN, Berkes F et al (2006) Scale and cross-scale dynamics: governance and
information in a multilevel world. Ecol Soc 11:8
Chapin FS, Lovecraft AL, Zavaleta ES et al (2006) Policy strategies to address sustainability
of Alaskan boreal forests in response to a directionally changing climate. Proc Natl Acad Sci
103:16637–16643
Comfort L, Ko K, Zagorecki A (2004) Coordination in rapidly evolving systems: the role of infor-
mation. Am Behav Sci 48:295–313
Cong X, Pandya KV (2003) Issues of knowledge management in the public sector. Electron J Knowl
Manag 1:25–33
Cook SD, Yanow D (1993) Culture and organizational learning. J Manag Inq 2:373–390
Costanza R, Wainger L, Folke C (1993) Modeling complex ecological economic systems. Bio-
science 43:545–555. https://doi.org/10.2307/1311949
Crosta P (1998) Politiche. Quale conoscenza per l’azione territoriale. FrancoAngeli, Milan
Davoudi S, Brooks E, Mehmood A (2013) Evolutionary resilience and strategies for climate adap-
tation. Plan Pract Res 28:307–322
Davoudi S, Shaw K, Haider LJ et al (2012) Resilience: a bridging concept or a dead end? “reframing”
resilience: challenges for planning theory and practice interacting traps: resilience assessment of
a pasture management system in northern Afghanistan urban resilience: what does it mean in
planning practice? Resilience as a useful concept for climate change adaptation? the politics of
resilience for planning: a cautionary note. Plan Theory Pract 13:299–333
Easterby-Smith M, Lyles MA (2003) The Blackwell handbook of organizational learning and knowl-
edge management. Blackwell Pub., Malden
ECHO (2014) EU civil protection legislation - ECHO factsheet
Elwood S (2010) Geographic information science: emerging research on the societal implications
of the geospatial web. Prog Hum Geogr 34:349–357
European Communities (2009) Communication from the commission to the european parliament,
the council, the european economic and social committee and the committee of the regions—a
community approach on the prevention of natural and man-made disasters
Folke C (2006) Resilience: the emergence of a perspective for social–ecological systems analyses.
Glob Environ Change 16:253–267
Folke C, Carpenter S, Elmqvist T et al (2002) Resilience and sustainable development: building
adaptive capacity in a world of transformations. AMBIO J Hum Environ 31:437–440
Folke C, Carpenter SR, Walker B et al (2010) Resilience thinking: integrating resilience, adaptability
and transformability. Ecol Soc 15:20
Gherardi S (2000) Practice-based theorizing on learning and knowing in organizations. Organization
7:211–223
Gibson CC, Ostrom E, Ahn TK (2000) The concept of scale and the human dimensions of global
change: a survey. Ecol Econ 32:217–239
and nature. Island, Washington
Hagemann S, Letz C, Vossen G (2007) Web service discovery-reality check 2.0. In: Third interna-
tional conference on next generation web services practices, 2007. NWeSP 2007, pp 113–118
Hendriks PH, Dessers E, Van Hootegem G (2012) Reconsidering the definition of a spatial data
infrastructure. Int J Geogr Inf Sci 26:1479–1494
Kallinikos J (2001) The age of flexibility: managing organizations and technology. Academia
Adacta, Lund, Sweden
References 59
Kapucu N (2012) Disaster and emergency management systems in urban areas. Cities 29:S41–S49
Kok K, Veldkamp TA (2011) Scale and governance: conceptual considerations and practical impli-
cations. Ecol Soc 16:23
Koraeus M (2008) Who knows? The use of knowledge management in crisis. CRISMART, National
Defence College
Kuhlicke C, Steinführer A (2013) Searching for resilience or building social capacities for flood
risks? Plan Theory Pract 14:103–140
Langefors B (1996) Essays on infology. Chartwell-Bratt
Laughy L (1991) A planner’s handbook for emergency preparedness. Centre for human settlements.
University of British Columbia, Vancouver
Lave J, Wenger E (1991) Situated learning: legitimate peripheral participation. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge
Lindberg H, Sundelius B (2012) Whole of society disaster resilience: the swedish way. In: The
McGraw-Hill homeland security handbook. strategic guidance for a coordinated approach to
effective security and emenrgency management, 2nd edn. McGraw-Hill, New York, pp 1295–1319
McEvoy D, Fünfgeld H, Bosomworth K (2013) Resilience and climate change adaptation: the
importance of framing. Plan Pract Res 28:280–293
Nonaka I (2008) The knowledge-creating company. Harvard Business Review Press
O’Reilly T (2005) What is web 2.0
Pahl-Wostl C (2009) A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and multi-level learn-
ing processes in resource governance regimes. Glob Environ Change 19:354–365
Pahl-Wostl C, Craps M, Dewulf A, et al (2007a) Social learning and water resources management.
Ecol Soc 12:5
Pahl-Wostl C, Sendzimir J, Jeffrey P et al (2007b) Managing change toward adaptive water man-
agement through social learning. Ecol Soc 12:30
Palermo PC, Ponzini D (2014) Inquiry and design for spatial planning. Three approaches to planning
research in late modern cities. In: Research methods in spatial and regional planning. Routledge
1022917721797
Pede E (2018) Improving resilience through cross-scale knowledge sharing. In: Brunetta G, Cal-
darice O, Tollin N et al (eds) urban resilience for risk and adaptation governance. Theory and
practice. Springer, Berlin
Polanyi M (2009) The tacit dimension. University of Chicago Press, Chicago
Quarantelli EL (2000) Disaster planning, emergency management and civil protection: the historical
development of organized efforts to plan for and to respond to disasters. Preliminary, p 301
Reed MS, Evely AC, Cundill G et al (2010) What is social learning? Ecol Soc 15:11
Renn O (2015) Stakeholder and public involvement in risk governance. Int J Disaster Risk Sci
6:8–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13753-015-0037-6
Resilience Alliance (2010) Assessing and managing resilience in social-ecological systems: a prac-
titioner’s workbook, Version 2.0
Rogers K (1998) Managing science/management partnerships: a challenge of adaptive management.
Conserv Ecol 2:R1
Rothe D (2017) Climate change and security: from paradigmatic resilience to resilience multiple.
In: Chandler D, Coaffee J (eds) The Routledge handbook of international resilience. Routledge,
New York
Roux DJ, Rogers KH, Biggs HC, et al (2006) Bridging the science–management divide: moving
from unidirectional knowledge transfer to knowledge interfacing and sharing. Ecol Soc 11:4
Salvemini M, Vico F, Iannucci C (2011) Plan4all project. Interoperability for spatial planning.
Plan4all Consortium
Sapountzaki K, Wanczura S, Casertano G et al (2011) Disconnected policies and actors and the miss-
ing role of spatial planning throughout the risk management cycle. Nat Hazards 59:1445–1474
Scanlon J (1982) The roller coaster story of civil defence planning in Canada. Emerg Plann Dig 6
Schön D (1971) Beyond the stable state. Random House

Schön DA (1982) Some of what a planner knows a case study of knowing-in-practice. J Am Plann
Assoc 48:351–364
Schön DA (1983) The reflective practitioner: how professionals think in action. Basic Books, New
York
Scott M (2013) Living with flood risk. Plan Theory Pract 14:103–140
Smith K (2009) Environmental hazards: assessing risk and reducing disaster, 5th edn. Routledge,
New York
Surowiecki J (2004) The wisdom of crowds: why the many are smarter than the few and how
collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies and nations. Doubleday, New York
Termeer CJAM, Dewulf A, Lieshout M van (2010) Disentangling scale approaches in governance
research: comparing monocentric, multilevel, and adaptive governance. Ecol Soc 15:29
Tsoukas H (2005) Complex knowledge: studies in organizational epistemology. Oxford University
Press, Oxford
Walker BH, Carpenter SR, Rockstrom J et al (2012) Drivers, “slow” variables, “fast” variables,
shocks, and resilience. Ecol Soc 17:30
Wenger E (1998) Communities of practice: learning, meaning, and identity. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge
Wenger E (2000) Communities of practice and social learning systems. Organization 7:225–246
White I (2013) The more we know, the more we know we don’t know: reflections on a decade of
planning, flood risk management and false precision. Plan Theory Pract 14:103–140
Wilbanks TJ (2006) Chapter 2 how scale matters: some concepts and findings. In: Bridging scales
and knowledge systems, pp 22–35
Wilbanks TJ, Kates RW (1999) Global change in local places: how scale matters. Clim Change
43:601–628
Yanow D (2000) Seeing organizational learning: a cultural’ view. Organization 7:247–268
Young O (2006) Vertical interplay among scale-dependent environmental and resource regimes.
Ecol Soc 11:27–43
Zaucha J, Davoudi S, Slob A et al (2016) State-of-the-lagoon reports as vehicles of cross-disciplinary
integration. Integr Environ Assess Manag 12:690–700
Chapter 5
Pathways to Operationalise: Umbria
Region Case (Italy)
Abstract This chapter unpacks the experience of the Italian region Umbria in facing
seismic risk, according to the notion of resilience. This provides how resilience has
been variously imagined, shaped and transformed in terms of discourses, values
and actions in a practical experience. Umbria is one of the most seismic areas in
the centre of the country. After the 1997 earthquake, the authorities started a long-
term process, firstly, of re-thinking the response activities of civil protection, and,
subsequently, of how the territory relates to a natural hazard in term of capacities of
resilience. The reshape started with an organisational innovation aimed at improving
the acquisition and transfer of knowledge. Over the years, it has caused the growth of
social interaction of involved actors and has led to the reorganisation of governance
structures and institutions accordingly to make them more responsive and relevant
in the PPRR chain. The results are not limited to civil protection and the response
phase, but also affect other sectors, in particular spatial planning. Finally, the call
for resilience has also involved the community that, on one hand, wants to be more
informed and, on the other, has become part of the response system.
Keywords Umbria · Italy · Emergency management · Knowledge system ·

Explicit and tacit knowledge · Learning process
5.1 A Fragile Territory: Italy
Italy is one of the most densely inhabited European territories, and one of the coun-
tries at greater risk for natural disasters. The country is prone to natural hazards of
many kinds with vast economic, social and environmental costs. Its vulnerability
is amplified by high density, weak enforcement of building restrictions, the exten-
sive historical heritage and the increasing abandonment of many territories (Bignami
2010; Meloni 2015).
Hydro-geological risks are the most frequent and the damages caused results
both in terms of economic costs and deaths. For instance, over the last 50 years
(1966–2015), landslides and floods have caused 1,947 deaths, 69 missing and 2,534
injured (ISPRA 2018).

62 5 Pathways to Operationalise: Umbria Region Case (Italy)
Table 5.1 List of major earthquakes in Italy between 1900–2018

Data Region Magnitude Deaths
1908 Messina (Sicily) 7.2 75,000–200,000
1915 Avezzano (Abruzzo) 7.0 29,978–32,610
1930 Irpinia 6.6 1,404
1976 Friuli 6.5 900–978
1980 Campania, Basilicata 6.9 2,483–4,900
1990 Sicily 5.6 19
1997 Umbria 6.4 11
2002 San Giuliano di Puglia 5.9 30
(Molise)
2009 L’Aquila (Abruzzo) 6.3 309
2012 Emilia-Romagna 5.8 20
2016 Lazio, Marche, Umbria 6.2 299
Source Own elaboration on data of INGV (https://emidius.mi.ingv.it)
Likewise, numerous seismic faults cover the territory. Up to 40% of the Italian
population is estimated to live in highly seismic areas (zone 1 and 2)1 where 60% of
buildings are not constructed according to seismic codes (OECD 2010). The most
exposed areas are the Apennine Mountains, the Calabrian Arc, Eastern Sicily and
in the north east of the Friuli Region. Furthermore, most of the territory is affected
by multiple risks that can create cascade effects. For instance, three active volcanoes
(Etna, Stromboli and Vesuvius) contribute to increase the seismic risk; one of which,
Vesuvius, is estimated as the most densely populated volcanic region in the world.
Natural risks, more than elsewhere, determinate high exposure not only due to
the geological and hydrogeological features but, even more, to its historical poly-
centric structure of settlement characterized by a dense urban network. However, the
earthquakes that have occurred in the last 30 years have shown the low resilience
of the territories involved. Despite the forecasting of the seismic hazard through the
recognition of the seismic-prone areas, indeed, the number of deaths and building
damages still registers substantial losses (see Table 5.1).
Largely driven by emotional reactions in response to disasters,2 Italian risk man-
agement system first started to evolve in the 20th century and has continued to do so
1 The first laws in this field were established in 1971 and 1974. Nowadays the Italian territory is
zoning in 4 zones according to their seismic risks classified by the Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA)
and by the frequency of events. The classification is continuously updating because there are still
analyses in progress in all the country. Each zone is divided in subzones for a better evaluation
at different scales. Nowadays the Italian territory is composed of 175 seismic districts (sea areas
are also included), characterised by high or medium risk. These subdivisions allow to identify the
different earthquakes and organise the rescue activities.
2 Italy is not the only country where the evolution of the emergency system is a consequence of
calamitous events (Bignami 2010). For instance, the EU directives related to chemical and industrial
risks and to hydrogeological risk were issued in response to accidents.
5.1 A Fragile Territory: Italy 63
up into the present For this reason, in the Italian prevision-prevention-response and
recovery chain (PPRR chain, see Sect. 4.2), attention has been mostly focused on
extraordinary interventions and emergencies with a limited time horizon, while pre-
vention and prevision have been underestimated or limited to land use or to structural
resistance of building and infrastructure to threats of hazards (Bedini and Bronzini
2018). This lack of importance affects, in particular, the transition between response
and prevention in which there has never been a real reflection on the relationship
between planning and seismic risk, but only a bounce back to normalcy (Galuzzi
2014; Alexander 2018a).
Examining the literature on risk management, even the research appears to be
polarized between the engineering- technical side and the social studies side (Menoni
2014).3 The former is dominated by hazard analysis, building technical structural
component and, especially in the last decade, early warning systems to limit cascading
effects. The latter, instead, has been mostly focused on risk perception, the impacts
of disaster on the communities and the preparedness of citizens (Mela et al. 2017).
Despite the increasing interest in disaster studies, few projects and researches have
considered the comprehensive approach that risk management requires—which is to
recognise the importance of cultural, social and economic aspects in response and
recovery (Di Giovanni 2016). The low priority given to the implication of planning in
risk management resolutely affects the general effectiveness of PPRR chain; in Italy,
this aspect is even more critical. For instance, the absence of managerial transparency
and the widespread corruption in procurement tends to cause a waste of time in
reconstruction; this can last decades without a reflection on the conditions that had
co-determined the breakdown of the system in the first place.4
The present chapter explores how an evolutionary resilience approach (see Chap.
4) can be introduced in a system that has traditionally had an engineering interpreta-
tion of risk management (Campos Venuti 2014; Oliva 2014). It critically examines
the approach used to deal with the aftermath of the 1997 earthquake in the Umbria
region. Although not as well known, this case is considered to be a milestone because
it represents a new approach to risk management in Italy, which has now led the way
to a comprehensive rethinking of the process of interaction among multiple levels
of organizations. The process has amplified the approach to risk management from
the dimension of persistence to the concepts of adaptability and transformability
across multiple scales and time frames (Davoudi et al. 2016). It has succeeded in this
doing, especially through a closer connection between risk management and spatial
planning based on knowledge sharing, social learning and stakeholder engagement.
This chapter will, firstly, give a concise reconstruction of the normative framework
about risk management, spatial planning and the allocation of responsibilities in
Italy. Successively, it will explore the process that has been set in Umbria region:
3 Over the last years, a new topic is increasing its popularity, disaster insurance.
4 It
must be said that the long term of reconstruction also impacts on academic production. There-
fore, scholars give a limited consideration to reconstruction and recovery phases by favoring first
emergency phase. The result is a lack of dissemination of the planning practices in recovery and reor-
ganization of the urban structure and risk management chain that some territories are experiencing
(Menoni 2017).
the organizational innovation, the connection between critical sectors, the balance
between planned and self-organized actions and the stakeholder engagements. The
aim is to illustrate the transformation of a system with a formally rigid structure
to a more comprehensive and integrated one. Building resilience not only involves
planning for shock recoveries, but also cultivating stakeholders’ involvement, which
takes effect by integrating the diverse disciplines and linking these into the policy
process.
5.2 The Institutional Framework in Italy
The legal framework and the political-administrative system significantly determine

how flexible the risk management structure is and how inclined it is to be not
only comprehensive, but also integrated and subsequently what the obstacles are
to strengthen the resilience of a community.
In the last two decades, five earthquakes of considerable size have struck Italy
(Umbria and Marche 1997, San Giuliano di Puglia 2002, L’Aquila 2009, Emilia-
Romagna 2012, Lazio-Marche-Umbria 2016) causing 669 deaths.5 Over time, both
legislation and practices have sought to improve the approach to disasters with mixed
results: successful in the cases of Umbria, Marche and Emilia-Romagna, decidedly
less so in the historical centre of L’Aquila.
In order to analyse the organizational structures of the PPRR chain, attention has
to be paid to how long-term and short-term measures are combined, in the integration
of emergency management measures with spatial planning and territorial strategies
(Prenger-Berninghoff et al. 2014).
In general, the Italian risk management approach tends to be disaster reactive,
meaning that it is based on resistance to change (Di Giovanni 2016). Hydrogeo-
logical and seismic risk of the territory are, therefore, treated in terms of reduction
of exposure and vulnerability, increasing the structural resistance of the buildings
and infrastructures, or, when possible, intervening in the unstable areas. There is
an overreliance on engineering technologies, standards of conformity to respect and
strict regulations, all of which can be partially related to the Italian urbanism tra-
dition dominated by a conformative model of the planning system (Janin Rivolin
2008). Likewise, some cultural references influence the system. In Italy, the relation
between emergency management and spatial planning appears to be strongly focused
on emergency management. This attitude is also asserted by the governmental bud-
gets that are largely dedicated towards emergency response and recovery activities
rather than spatial planning and risk prevention (Paleari 2018), demonstrating an
implicit view that is the more rigid engineering interpretation of resilience.
5 The earthquake that struck L’Aquila and 57 other municipalities in the Region of Abruzzo on April
6, 2009 had probably the largest media resonance at the international level because its epicenter
was in a city of 73,000 people and destroyed most of the historical center and damaged seriously
the cultural and monumental heritage (Oliva 2014).
5.2 The Institutional Framework in Italy 65
In further detail, the main actor, in regards to emergency preparedness and

response, is the Protezione Civile (civil protection) while prevention and recovery
are mostly driven by spatial planning authorities. The legislation determines which
institutions are responsible for each activity and what the requirements are for coor-
dination; this is why a synthesis of the legal framework of civil protection and spatial
planning is put forward to better understand the Italian approach to risk cycle.
As in other countries, civil protection has developed from the fire brigade at the
local level; but, unlike most European Countries, Italian civil protection involves the
whole State organisation, including a civil society that is involved through voluntary
organisations. The reasons are rooted in the decentralised territorial system, as well
as in the wide range of possible risks.
The National Civil Protection Service (NCPS) consists of the Regions, the
Provinces, the Municipalities, the national and local institutions and all other rel-
evant public and private organisations which are designated by law. Law 225/1992
defines civil protection as a structure based on the principle of subsidiarity6 in which
the emergency response depends on the magnitude of disaster and the degree of
cascade effects, as well the relationship to the capacity flow of resources, equipment
information and knowledge among the involved actors.
Usually, the first level which is responsible for civil protection is the local one, it is
the mayor who that has to organise municipal resources according to pre-established
plans. This level also has to coordinate civil protection with structural planning, espe-
cially, in regard to land use and housing regulations. In case of serious situations,
Provinces, Regions and every State administrations, all co-ordinated by the Prefects,
have to guarantee their support. This coordination should not be limited to the hori-
zontal interaction among the forces that are involved, but it also need to include the
authorities that had previously acted in the forecasting and prevision and prevention
steps (Table 5.2).
The main task of the Provinces is to put into action the Provincial Emergency
Plan—an organizational plan of the available manpower and equipment—into action.
Regions are generally responsible for civil protection, and particularly for risk assess-
ment, emergency forecasting and prevention programmes. In addition, they also have
indirect powers in risk management, due to their authority in transportation, educa-
tion and environment. The national level lays down general guidelines and provides
coordination; however, its operative role through the military force is only employed
in serious situations.
Additional authorities—fire brigades, police forces, health facilities, public utili-
ties, telephone companies and local volunteer forces—are also involved before and
during emergencies, adding complexity to the network of actors.7 Furthermore, min-
6 Law 225/1992 established the National Civil Protection Service, defined the typology of interven-
tion, responsibilities and the types of activities: prevention, prevision, response and reconstruction.
7 Depending on the type of disaster, even more institutions and organisations can be involved includ-
ing: National Alpine Rescue and Speleology Corps, Ministry of Work, Health and Social Policies,
ENAC, ENAV (Italian Company for Air Navigation Services, Electrical Power Service Compa-
nies), GSE (Gestore Servizi Elettrici), Electrical Power Service Companies Terna, ANAS (Azienda
Nazionale Autonoma delle Strade Statali-Auto-routes of Italy) and AISCAT (Associazione Italiana
Table 5.2 Involved actors in the different steps of risk cycle

Actors/Agencies Prevision Prevention Response Recovery
National Government x x x
Civil protection x x x
department
Prefect x
Scientific research groups x
Region x x x x
Province x x
Municipality x x x x
Volunteer service x x x
Fire-fighters Corp x x
Source Table of the author
istries, universities, public administrations and public research institutes and centres,
all have different forms of cooperation, agreements, understandings and working
teams with the DCP in order to define both prevention and forecasting measures for
the different types of risk.
Finally, volunteer organisations represent an important resource in the Italian
emergency management. Indeed, as many as 50% of the personnel involved in an
operational response to a disaster may be volunteers.
As already mentioned, the national law 225/1992 and the recent reform of Civil
Protection System (L.100/2012) stresses the need of the relationship and coordination
between spatial planning and the activities of prevention and emergency manage-
ment. Despite the fact that spatial planning should be one of the major contributors
to the PPRR chain, in Italy its importance is generally rather low. It is mostly put
into effect in terms of prohibiting new construction in hazard-prone areas.
As in the case of the civil protection system, the planning legislative framework
has been also strongly influenced by the emotional reaction after disasters especially
related to landslides and earthquakes. The current national law on urban planning
was promulgated in 1942 (L.1150/42) and was modified in 1967 (L.765/1976) as a
result of the catastrophic events of 1966.8 Subsequently, between the ‘70 s and ‘90 s,
several technical standards for building in seismic zones were introduced along with
hazard plans (e.g. basin management plans). This resulted in the management of
seismic risk policies that were merely focused on the resistance of buildings or their
protection without any correlation among the different parts of an urban area or the
Società Concessionarie di Autostrade e Trafori), State Railway—RFI (Italian Rail Network) and
Trenitalia, Fixed line Telephone and mobile phone Companies, RAI (Radiotelevisione Italia), the
Italian Postal system, ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi—Oil and Gas production).
8 The landslide in Agrigento (Sicily) and the floods in the northern and central Italy.
5.2 The Institutional Framework in Italy 67
mutual influences that each element has on the urban system (Olivieri 2004).9 Only
after the earthquake in Umbria and Marche in 1997, and in Molise in 2002, did the
anti-seismic prevention extend from single buildings to urban centres, along with
the improvement of the national seismic zoning of the territory. This process has led
to the guidelines for the seismic micro-zoning that has become to be used, not only
as a post-event tool, but also as a prevision tool (Bramerini 2013; Dolce 2013). The
Umbria and Marche earthquake signified a crucial point in the relationship between
emergency management and planning. It also led to the introduction of Minimal
Urban Structure (SUM) into urban planning in order to ensure and maintain the
economic, social and relational activities after the earthquake (see Sect. 5.7).
Another step forward was achieved through the analysis of Limit Conditions for
Emergency (CLE) that became compulsory in 2013, after the earthquake in Abruzzo.
This sets forth the minimum conditions of accessibility and connection of the territory
for the functions that are strategic for emergency operations. Both SUM and CLE10
encouraged the relationship between civil protection and spatial planning in adopting
the systemic resilience approach (Fabietti 2013; Olivieri 2013).
5.3 From Resistence to Comprehensive Approach
Umbria is one of the smallest Italian regions for dimension and population.11 It is
located in the centre of the country and most of its territory is classified within zone 1
and 2 (high and medium hazard level) of the seismic classification hazard. In general,
the east part of the region is characterised by high/medium-high seismic phenomena
while the west part has a medium-low/low hazard.
On 26 September 1997, at 2.33 a.m., a first foreshock rated 5.7 on the Richter
Scale followed by a second one rated at 6.1 at 11.42 a.m. hit the Umbria region. The
two foreshocks left enormous damage, especially to the cultural heritage, and 11
dead. The seismic season of 1997, lasting more than six months, forced the region
to rethink its system for handling earthquakes, especially by reason of its historical
heritage and urban centres. As in most of the Italian earthquakes, the damage suffered
by buildings were the main source of losses with consequences on the whole system
and its functions.
Since 1998, and in particular after 2006, the Umbria region has started a process
for increasing the resilience of the system to seismic events. The challenge has been
met through a reorganization of the PPRR chain able to improve the integration of
the crucial sectors and to enhance the relationship-building among stakeholders.
9 The concept of prevention based on building resistance was declared in the national law n.64/1974
Provvedimenti per le costruzioni con particolari prescrizioni per le zone sismiche.

10 The Minimal Urban Structure and the Limit Condition for the Emergency are complementary.
The first specifically pertains to the planning aspects and the second is mainly linked to the essential
emergency conditions.
11 From the administrative point of view, the Region is composed by two Provinces (Perugia and
Terni) and 92 municipalities.

The initial element of this change was the sharing of the different knowledge
relating to the multiple sectors (see Sect. 4.7) through a database implementable and
accessible by the different authorities. Over the years, the database has also become
a bridging tool from emergency to spatial planning. Indeed, the construction of a
common conceptual space for the different domains has contributed to the governance
with inclusive decision-making processes in the realm of planning, accountability
and collaboration. In addition, procedures and studies have been included to improve
the urban design and the qualities of urban form against catastrophic events. Umbria
region has worked on the idea that overcoming a catastrophic event does not imply
only to protect buildings and guarantee their reconstruction, but also to include the
urban structure in a more complex, broader operative system, with a multi-scale
perspective (SUM, minimal urban structure). This approach introduced the concept
of complex system and it shows that spatial planning and emergency management
are closely related not only for forecasting but also in preventive activities that can
have consequences during the emergency (Olivieri 2004, see Sect. 5.7),
Between the summer and autumn of 2016, a new seismic season hit the centre of
Italy. On 24 August, the first 6.1-rated foreshock had its epicentre in Accumoli, in the
Lazio region, in an area near the borders of the Umbria, Abruzzo and Marche regions.
The earthquake injured 365 and caused 297 deaths, mostly located in the epicentre.
On 30 October, a new shock of a magnitude rated at 6.6 struck Norcia in the Umbria
region. This second shock was the largest earthquake since the 1980s in Irpinia; it
mostly caused heavy damage to some structures and to cultural heritage, while no
deaths caused by the structural collapse of buildings were recorded. It is hard to draw
any comparison between earthquakes because several elements influence the impact
of a seismic event; however, the response capacity of Umbria was considered positive
compared to the past, especially, thanks to the reshaping process of the disaster risk
management cycle and the reconstruction quality after 1997.
5.4 A Bridging Tool: Towards a Territorial Knowledge

System
As mentioned above, the project can be summarized as a combination of a techno-

logical innovation (hardware) and social capital and learning processes (software).
The hardware is the database called AZIMUT: a geographic information system for
developing local and provincial emergency plans able to integrate the essential data
and information created by the different authorities involved in the rescue service.
It was born of the need to better integrate information and knowledge in order to
support decision making and coordinated the actions of the risk cycle. In 1998, the
degree of data integration was still poor and most of the plans were available only on
paperback; however, the information technology was starting to show its potential.
AZIMUT has been designed to be a dynamic tool that is easy to update, be imple-
mented, and be used by different authorities at the same time. It was created with a
5.4 A Bridging Tool: Towards a Territorial Knowledge System 69
twofold purpose: to build a unique integrated database and to have a flexible tool in
responding to different needs caused by calamitous events or unforeseen situations.
The AZIMUT technology is based on geographical information system (GIS) that
enhanced the availability and usability of existing information. During the peace time,
data are collected to include all the useful elements for forecasting, prevention and
emergency response. At the beginning, the project seemed more like an organisational
knowledge storage (see Sect. 4.8) to combine the useful data to respond to the sense
of urgency of a crisis in which decisions must be made under time pressure.
Over time, in 2012, AZIMUT evolved into a new system called SRD (data collec-
tion system).12 that allows the creation and direction of data georeferencing through
the new Data Entry (SRD), which can be consulted by a WebGIS without the need of
GIS desktop software. Data sharing via Web-GIS technology provides end-users to
simultaneously access multiple data sources that are continuously updated. This can
also be used during fieldworks: rescuers can share real-time information (through
PDA13 with wi-fi) with the Municipal Operations Centre about injuries, damages,
broken roads, as well as require the intervention of fire fighters and 118 or it can
analyse alternative routes to the assembling or meeting points.
Thus, the system has evolved into a dynamic and effective tool for all the phases of
the risk cycle. Sharing several data elements in the same space has allowed, indeed,
a better planning of the activities from ordinary planning to emergency activities, as
well as it has contributed to enhance the relationship between stakeholders improving
decision-making. The AZIMUT information system includes a large network of
actors: all the Municipalities,14 the Region, the Prefecture, the Provinces and the
Fire Fighters.
The database has been designed not to be a container of information, but to allow
municipalities to contribute directly to its implementation in order to have continuous
data updates, to increase the quality of information but also to reorient the trajectories
of development introducing new knowledge for supporting innovation.
The data flow contributes to identify responsibilities. The system is composed by
several parts and actors are providers or applicants according to their own responsi-
bilities. Most of the data are created at local level, but there are also data showing
non-local values that are provided by the Provinces (e.g. hospitals, stock areas, etc.)
that play a central role in assisting and coordinating the other institutions or also in
including other authorities in the network. Finally, the Region, the Prefecture, and
Fire Fighters are merely applicants of the information during the events. This allows
a flexible use of resources also for different purposes: data can be used at municipal
scale, upper scale or can have a cross-scale use at once.
12 Usually the new system is also called Azimut-SRD.

13 Personal Digital Assistant, palmtop computer.
14 The Municipalities are divided into area manager municipalities and afferent municipalities. The
area manager municipalities have the responsibilities of the data integration for all their afferent
municipalities. In the Umbria Region, there are only 11 municipalities with more than 20,000
inhabitants, whereas, most of the municipalities have small dimensions and they do not have enough
technicians with the right skills to deal with this kind of technology. In these cases, the cooperation
with a larger municipality can help the agents of small municipalities to satisfy all the requests.
Despite the initial aim concerned the growing need of up-to-date information dur-
ing rescue operations, the project was able to evolve into a wider engagement process
able to enhance the relationship among stakeholders and to integrate their knowl-
edge to meet the challenges. The added value of this technological innovation was
the creation of common meaning of the knowledge among the different stakeholders
(policy makers, practitioners and citizens) who interact across the scales. Working
towards a common vocabulary was essential to overcome the boundaries between
the various discipline involved. It has required a long social learning process. This
can be considered as the software of the project, an essential part for the effective
operation of the AZIMUT system.
5.5 To Cross Knowledge Boundaries
The main challenge in building the AZIMUT system was the integration of scientific
knowledge in order to create an interdisciplinary tool in which various disciplines
are involved in understanding and describe the territorial system behaviour against
shocks. Besides the organizational innovation, therefore, the experience of AZIMUT
was crucial because it allowed to work on network skills of the stakeholders involved.
Due to the cultural differences between disciplines, one of the core challenges was
to overcome the boundaries between the various disciplines involved (Zaucha et al.
2016). Therefore, a first step in creating the AZIMUT database was to choose which
data to integrate defining a common meaning. The priority was given to data that
must be included in the Local Emergency Plan (Piano Comunale di Emergenza), the
main tool of emergency planning. Its main objectives are: to analyse risk scenarios;
to elaborate risk cartographies concerning elements at-risk and useful resources for
overcoming the crisis; to provide behavioural guidelines for rescuers and the popu-
lation. In addition, the plan includes an operative part that identifies the assembling
points, the strategic buildings (e.g. hospital, fire stations, etc.) and the resources
available during the emergency.
There are different reasons why the Local Emergency Plan was chosen to be the
basis of the database. Above all, the plan is compulsory for all municipalities and it
must be consistent to regional guidelines; therefore, the structure of the plan—and
consequently the required data—are the same for all the municipalities.
At the same time, the plan is elaborated at local scale, but it has several end-users
with diverse skills at different levels; consequently, the plan represents a coordination
tool in which the problem of knowledge as a scale (Cash et al. 2006, see Sect. 4.5)
is evident. It simultaneously covers all types of risks, it includes different resources
and the knowledge required is characterised by cross-scale interaction, especially in
terms of jurisdictional scale as well as in terms of time scale.15
15 The time scale corresponds to the PPRR chain, otherwise, it can also be considered as divided
into before, during and after the event.
5.5 To Cross Knowledge Boundaries 71
Having defined the data to insert, a thorough standardisation in collecting data

was defined in order to support the collaboration between actors, to improve the
manageability of the information and to facilitate data acquisition. Each raw data
has had a univocal definition and specific symbols has been established in arrange-
ments between the different scientific disciplines. This has provided the foundation
for dialogue building commitment. It has helped to avoid misunderstanding and to
strengthen relationship between decision- makers and technicians at different scales.
Even if the network enhancement was one of the aims of the project, only practice
has caused a real improvement of the coperative ability of the actors. Initially, the
AZIMUT system was mostly a top-down operation drove by a strong political willing
and also supported by significant financial resources.
Therefore, the framework laid down by the regional authorities underestimated
a few issues, requiring a change in the pathway. For instance, lots of municipalities
did not have specific technicians for risk management as well as technicians did not
have appropriate informatic expertise. For this reason, experts16 were engaged in the
project to support and improve the skills of the technicians of the municipalities. This
long process—that took five years to include all the Municipalities—has contributed
to the success of the AZIMUT project. The unexpected barrier in skills showed the
institutional willingness and the preparedness to transform and reorient the project
looking for solutions to achieve the objective.
At the same time, the social learning process that led to this result has improved the
empowerment of the municipalities and has increased confidence among the actors
and mutual confidence. Firstly, it has improved the skills of the persons in charge.
Secondly, the collection phase and continuous updating has demanded incentivisa-
tion to create specific local and provincial offices, dedicated to this task. Finally, the
usage of a unique tool throughout the Region—in which data are codified in the same
way and with a univocal meaning—has improved the cooperation among people that
usually work in different places, but have the same job assignments. This represents
a benefit during the emergencies because every technician is trained to work every-
where: in each plan the contents are different, but the working methodology is the
same; it means that if a municipality has an emergency it is easier to give support.
Therefore, over the years, the actors’ interaction has produced a genuine commu-
nity of practice (Wenger 2000, see Sect. 4.10). Actually, the community of practice
was intentionally planned to gain the knowledge for the Emergency Local Plan and
with the support of technological infrastructure; however, its success is based on
the trust building process between involved actors that has established vertical and
horizontal linkages. It has taken a long time, but it has been crucial for the success
of the whole project.
16 The specialists of ANCI Umbria (Association of Italian Municipalities) had the role to support
local technicians in data collection and in the use of AZIMUT (ANCI Project for municipalities’
support). Each municipality has a referenced specialist of ANCI who helps the municipal technicians
to satisfy all the requests of the Province and Region for civil protection.
5.6 Combining Expert and Tacit Knowledge
Further attempts in overcrossing boundaries between the different levels and the
various disciplines involved stand out. Besides the codification of explicit scientific
knowledge, the project has also contributed to combine the scientific with the tacit
knowledge (see Sect. 4.6). The first element that recalls the tacit knowledge concept
is the strong link with practice (Schon 1982; Nonaka 2008; Polanyi 2009) that the
AZIMUT project mostly aims to improve. In this framework, municipalities have
been considered the main holders of knowledge not only because of the better data
resolution at local scale, but especially because they are the holders of knowledge due
to experience (tacit knowledge). Tacit knowledge concerns the collective memory,
the knowledge acquired over years by who lives in those territories or by who has had
practical experience and expertise in that specific territory during the past emergen-
cies. Especially in small municipalities, people in charge in operational roles have
a deep knowledge of the territory that can be integrated to the standard operating
procedures.
Likewise, a second element referable to tacit knowledge concerns interpersonal
activities. The technical support team have played a key role in the translation and
mediation between municipalities and upper levels. They have acted as mediator of
the scientific and tacit knowledge that is usually held, stored, and perceived differ-
ently at different levels. Cash et al. (2006) defined this type of actors as boundary
organisations or bridging organisations because
they play an intermediary role between different arenas, levels, or scales and facilitate the
co-production of knowledge (ibid, pp. 8).
They do not only combine knowledge, but also interpret and make knowledge acces-
sible in the local context. Throughout their role they can synthesise and remove
shifts of knowledge between the different levels and scales. They establish func-
tional links within and between levels and facilitate the flow of information and
knowledge in the local system. Their role is characterised by: accountability to all
stakeholders involved; trust building; translation; coordination and complementary
expertise; mediation; leadership.
It must be said that this was an unexpected effect of the project; a lesson learned
that allowed to move from single-loop to double and triple-loop learning (Argyris
and Schön 1978). Municipalities are more aware now of emergency planning than
they were before. The project has improved the technicians’ skills, because together,
they work, interact and create a new network.
5.7 A New Role for Spatial Planning
As set out in Sect. 5.2, Italy’s approach to planning has played a crucial role in
reducing vulnerability to natural hazards mainly through the implementation of land-
use management and building design codes to regulate development in hazard prone
5.7 A New Role for Spatial Planning 73
areas. However, limiting the actions at the building scale is not sufficient enough.
Urban environments are vulnerable as a system, thus, the structural component of the
single buildings has to be considered in relation to the others (D’Amico and Currà
2018). Ideally, the building would be integrated in its block, as well as in the urban
structure; likewise, the city should be considered as part of the broader scale.
In this regard, the approach followed by the Umbria region has given important
inputs to cross-sector collaboration between emergency and spatial planning that
have now been followed in other regions and also influenced the national legislation.
The Umbria regional authority was, indeed, the first region who introduced by law
(L.R. 11/2005) the obligation of the minimal urban structure in the urban structural
plans. The concept of minimal urban structure includes all the functions, itineraries,
strategic places and buildings that must be preserved during a crisis in order to best
implement the response and the recovery after the event. It considers the interrelations
of the elements and evaluates the direct or indirect relationship of vulnerability among
the elements and the effects that the fragility of a node could produce in the overall
functioning of the whole system.
It is incorrect to think that the minimal urban structure only reduces the vulnera-
bility to risk. Although, at the beginning, the aim of the SUM was mostly related to
the management of rescues; over the years, the focus has changed to the other critical
elements for the recovery. SUM can, indeed, acts as a strategic tool in preserving
the vitality of the urban system. Besides the key elements for dealing with the emer-
gencies (main communication routes and nodes, the escape routes, the secure open
and closed spaces, the key buildings), SUM includes those aspects that are crucial
for resuming the economic, social and relational activities (public services, relevant
economic activities and also the places where the local community identifies itself
with), after the earthquake (Corradi and Fabietti 2017).
Generally, one of the indirect consequences of earthquake is the depopulation
of the territories and the economic losses in term of employers and number of
enterprises; this is mostly due to the long amount of time it takes for reconstruc-
tion (Alexander 2018b). For instance, according to ISTAT (www.istat.it), the Italian
national statistical agency, the registered, resident population of L’Aquila city was
72,696 on 31 December 2009 and only 69,439 on 31 December 2018.
In some Italian regions, the introduction of SUM has represented the basis for
promoting recovery strategies able to reprogram the development trajectories of the
territories struck by catastrophic events. For instance, the use of SUM has influenced
the successful response to the aftermath of the 2012 earthquake in Emilia Romagna17
and the dynamic economy that characterises the was preserved (Bedini and Bronzini
2018).
Likewise, SUM can be highly suitable for sparsely populated areas characterised
by polycentric system. In these cases, SUM is used at urban and territorial levels
17 The experience in Emilia-Romagna represents the most Italian successful case in dealing with the
earthquake. It was developed from a complex bottom-up process for relaunching the a very large
territory (Bedini and Bronzini 2018).
involving several municipalities with the scope to ensure services in collaboration

and avoiding the abandonment of the territories.
Finally, SUM cannot be fixed in time, but has to remain flexible, able to adapt
according to the transformation of the trajectories of development. In this sense,
it should not only be viewed as part of the structural planning aimed to improve
the robustness of the system, but also utilised as a monitoring and assessment tool
for the development strategies of the planning (Corradi and Fabietti 2017; Menoni
2017). It is for this reason why it is important to understand by which means SUM
intends to connect and to influence its policies (e.g. structural plan, local emergency
plans but also strategic plans). Planning should not limit its role to prevision and
prevention, rather, in order to be most effective, it must also expand its flexibility to
facing hazards.
5.8 The Community Engagement
Working on urban vulnerability also means acting on all the elements of the urban
system including citizens; people have their own dynamism that can influence the
resilience of the system (Kapucu 2012; Kuhlicke and Steinführer 2013; Pearce 2003).
In Italian law 112/1998, the involvement of the population is required but usually
the concept of commander and control—in which people are passive actors to take
care of—is still in use. Furthermore, the most common actions about citizens’ par-
ticipation in rescue services concern education and information activities, especially
in schools or for public officials and technicians.
In this field, the Umbria region has introduced important innovations toward the
proactive role of citizens. Beside the reorganisation of the PPRR chain, two projects
have contributed to implementing citizens’ participation.
Concerning information activities, beside the education projects in schools, activ-
ities on the web have been introduced. Social networks and mobile apps have several
benefits: they are channels that customers can access at a time and place of their
choice, which they easily understand and are comfortable with, which can offer a
more open and transparent relationship between customers and authorities offering
new ways of access to information. The information can be useful for citizens in
ordinary time because they can have a better knowledge of the risks of the territory
where they live, as well as during emergencies.
Through a website and an app for mobiles, citizens have access to the information
related to a specific area and can receive alerts of risks present in the zone of interest.
The online platform is used to share the emergency local plan, where data is made
available for locals showing the main information of the Emergency Local Plan
structured in layers showing points (e.g., assembling points) linear (e.g. roads with
flood risk) and polygonal zones (e.g. hydraulic hazard areas). It also shows the
territorial information about each municipality and the news about risks, reporting the
daily Regional Civil Protection centre warning on risk levels for each zone. Finally,
it includes videos and links on the weather forecast and educational material.
5.8 The Community Engagement 75
Likewise, the Region has also experienced an innovative methodology for boost-
ing the proactive role of citizens and the image of the citizen as the first rescuer,18
in order to increase the awareness of citizens about the degree of vulnerability of the
urban system and/or allows them to act as first rescuers.
The concept of citizen as first rescuer aims to improve the self-protection measures
of the community. The main aim is to increase the sense of responsibility of the
population and proactive behaviours, which vary in range from awaiting rescue to
a leading role in action. This innovation is based on the collaboration of selected
citizens (called capozona) that have to ensure a safe and proper evacuation of the
population in their assigned area. The capozona also has the responsibility to share
information (through PDA with wi-fi and connection to the Azimut geodatabase)
with the Municipal Operations Centre. In this way, the Municipal Operations Centre
can receive and give real-time information in terms of injuries, damages, broken
roads, as capozona can require intervention of fire fighters and the 118 service.
This project has shown the potential of the web and smartphones in the rescue
field. However, it is important to underline that such innovations have many problems
in terms of data quality and accuracy. Nevertheless, this methodology has shown the
potential application of these technologies in small municipalities with few inhabi-
tants, whereas, it is more difficult to support the same approach in a city. This is a
limit but at the same time, an opportunity for marginalised areas, in which rescue
activities are slower and more difficult and where the community is used to having
better interaction.
5.9 Elements for a Resilient Approach
This chapter attempts to apply the social-ecological and evolutionary resilience

concepts to the experience of the Umbria region, in Italy. As discussed in Chaps. 3
and 4, within this framework, resilience is not only about persistence, robustness and
the return to normalcy; but also about adapting to change and, more importantly,
being prepared to change trajectories of development or ways to act (Davoudi et al.
2016).
Seismic risk management is characterized by many interdependencies, the diver-
sity of stakeholder interests, and multiple views of the problem. To deal with this
complexity, we need a better integration of the diverse scientific knowledge, the
stakeholder involvement and social and political mobilization (see Chap. 4).
As illustrated in Sect. 5.2, the Italian legislation system is still suffering from a
fuzzy framework, characterized by an overreliance on standards of conformity and
regulations that make the risk management system disaster reactive, i.e. one that is
based on resistance to change.
18 The trial of this method, called S.I.S.M.A. project (System Integrated for Security Management
Activities), was part of the INTERREG-CADES in 2010.
However, after the 1997 earthquake the Umbria region initiated a process of
rethinking, which introduced technological and process innovations that can be asso-
ciated with the principles of persistence, flexibility and preparedness of evolutionary
resilience (see Sect. 4.1).
Persistence remains essential in all the resilience interpretations, even when we
refuse a simple engineering interpretation of the concept (see Chap. 3). Persistence
must, however, be accompanied by flexibility of choice over the crucial features of the
system to be made robust according to the vision of development that a community has
chosen for itself (Davoudi et al. 2016). In the Italian system, the introduction of SUM
can be regarded as a step towards this approach. With SUM the focus on robustness
has been changed from the building scale to the systemic scale in which relations
between elements are as important as the building resistance. Furthermore, priority is
given, not only to buildings and infrastructure, but also to functions and identity. This
change of paradigm has led to deeper integration between emergency planning and
ordinary planning. The key challenge of governing this integration is how to promote
networking and, especially, how to overcome the barriers in communication between
different disciplines.
Initially, the Umbria region made use of organisational concepts and arrangements
that promoted knowledge creation and knowledge transfer that were typical of the
knowledge management approaches (Easterby-Smith and Lyles 2003, see Sect. 4.8),
such as the standard definition of the data to be collected and the strict definition of
data providers and users. These days, the database AZIMUT provides the backbone
of the project, but its success has depended on the quality of the public engagement
and the process of social learning in which stakeholders have been involved. This
approach has demonstrated that working towards a common meaning is essential to
develop a shared understanding. Barriers to knowledge sharing and communication
have been identified in the process and discussions made to eliminate them. This has
been the most difficult challenge of all, as they have been resources intensive and
time consuming and require a high degree of social learning, drawing on all forms
of knowledge including the tacit knowledge embedded in collective memory. In the
meantime, preparedness has developed, not only in term of awareness of risks and
their related preventative and responsive actions, but also in terms of building trust
among stakeholders and through a participatory process that has also involved the
community.
The result has been a knowledge management system that combines human
resources (intellectual capital, explicit and tacit knowledge and social learning), tech-
nological aspects (digital data storage and retrieval system, policies and procedures)
and urban forms that greatly enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of resilience
in the region.
References 77
References
Alexander D (2018a) Civil protection in Italy-coping with multiple disasters. Contemp Ital Polit
10:393–406
Alexander DE (2018b) L’Aquila, central Italy, and the “disaster cycle”, 2009–2017. Disaster Prev
Manag Int J
Argyris C, Schön DA (1978) Organizational learning; a theory of action perspective. Wesley, Read-
ing
Bedini MA, Bronzini F (2018) The post-earthquake experience in Italy. Difficulties and the pos-
sibility of planning the resurgence of the territories affected by earthquakes. Land Use Policy
78:303–315
Bignami DF (2010) Protezione civile e riduzione del rischio disastri. Metodi e strumenti di governo
della sicurezza territoriale e ambientale. Maggioli Editore
Bramerini F (2013) Una strategia di prevenzione del rischio sismico per gli insediamenti. Urban
Doss 130:5–7
Campos Venuti G (2014) Terremoti, Urbanistica e Territorio. 154:53–68
Corradi E, Fabietti V (2017) La ricostruzione come metodo, Cosa insegna la storia recente degli
eventi sismici in Italia. Urban Inf 272:773–777
D’Amico A, Currà E (2018) Urban resilience in the historical centres of Italian cities and towns.
Strategies of preventative planning. TECHNE-J Technol Archit Environ 257–268
Davoudi S, Zaucha J, Brooks E (2016) Evolutionary resilience and complex lagoon systems. Integr
Environ Assess Manag 12:711–718
Di Giovanni G (2016) Cities at risk: status of Italian planning system in reducing seismic and
hydrogeological risks. Tema J Land Use Mobil Environ 9:43–62
Dolce M (2013) Politiche di prevenzione del rischio sismico a scala nazionale. Urban Doss 130:3–4
Easterby-Smith M, Lyles MA (2003) The Blackwell handbook of organizational learning and knowl-
edge management. Blackwell Pub., Malden
Fabietti V (2013) Dalla CLE alla SUM: i contenuti urbanistici della protezione dai rischi. Urban
Doss 130:38–39
Galuzzi P (2014) I rischi e la cura. Urbanistica 154:4–7
ISPRA (2018) Dissesto Idrogeologico in Italia: pericolosità e indicatori di rischio. Roma
Janin Rivolin U (2008) Conforming and performing planning systems in Europe: an unbearable
cohabitation. Plan Pract Res 23:167–186
Kapucu N (2012) Disaster and emergency management systems in urban areas. Cities 29:S41–S49
Kuhlicke C, Steinführer A (2013) Searching for resilience or building social capacities for flood
risks? Plan Theory Pract 14:103–140
Mela A, Mugnano S, Olori D (2017) Territori vulnerabili: verso una nuova sociologia dei disastri
italiana. Franco Angeli, Milano
Meloni B (ed) (2015) Aree Interne e progetti d’area. Rosenberg & Sellier
Menoni S (2014) Urbanistica e rischio sismico: appunti per uno stato dell’arte a livello inter-
nazionale. 154:74–82
Menoni S (2017) Ricostruzione post-sisma nel Centro Italia: la sintesi urbanistica tra esigenze
sociali, aspetti ambientali e fisici, la prevenzione dei rischi. Urban Inf 272:763–767
Nonaka I (2008) The knowledge-creating company. Harvard Business Review Press
OECD (2010) OECD reviews of risk management policies: Italy 2010. OECD Publishing
Oliva F (2014) La difficile ricostruzione dell’Aquila. Urbanistica 154:39–52
Olivieri M (2004) Dalla prevenzione edilizia alla prevenzione urbanistica. Urban, Quad, p 44
Olivieri M (2013) Dalla SUM alla CLE: strategie a confronto per la sicurezza degli insediamenti.
Urban Doss 130:34–37
Paleari S (2018) Natural disasters in Italy: do we invest enough in risk prevention and mitigation?
Int J Environ Stud 75:673–687
1022917721797
Polanyi M (2009) The tacit dimension. University of Chicago Press
Prenger-Berninghoff K, Cortes VJ, Sprague T et al (2014) The connection between long-term and
short-term risk management strategies for flood and landslide hazards: examples from land-use
planning and emergency management in four European case studies. Nat Hazards Earth Syst Sci
14:3261–3278
Schon DA (1982) Some of what a planner knows a case study of knowing-in-practice. J Am Plann
Assoc 48:351–364
Zaucha J, Davoudi S, Slob A et al (2016) State-of-the-lagoon reports as vehicles of cross-disciplinary
integration. Integr Environ Assess Manag 12:690–700
Chapter 6
Managing Uncertainty: Remarks
for Future Policies and Practices
Abstract The chapter summarises the various elements of the changing period we
are live in, giving some reflections regarding how to deal with the increasing risks. In
the current context characterised by uncertainty, complexity and interdependencies,
the concept of resilience has come to prominence in understanding and managing
complex systems and its success has enhanced the interest of several research fields.
However, the popularity of resilience thinking has not brought any conceptual clarity
and, especially, any operational paradigm. For policy makers and practitioners, it is
often not clear how to translate into practice the notions of resilience thinking. This
chapter identifies some key implications of resilience thinking for management of
hazards.
Keywords Disaster risk management · Uncertainty · Resilience · Practices ·

Knowledge · Learning process
6.1 The Promise of Resilience
Over the last decades, there has been an increase of uncertainty in the context of world
“risk society” (Beck 1996, 2009) where society is becoming more interdependent and
more complex, and consequently, more vulnerable to new threats and risks associated
(see Chap. 2).
There is a global recognition that more concerted efforts are needed to reduce the
numbers and effects of natural and anthropogenic disasters. Since the 1990s with the
proclamation by the United Nations (UN) of the International Decade for Natural
Disaster Reduction, which was followed by the International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction in 2000, there has been a growing interest in the international agenda
on disaster reduction and planning for anticipating and mitigating the impacts of
catastrophic events. Subsequently, long-term agreements have worked for a holis-
tic approach that integrates multiple levels of analysis and intervention; multiple
time-scales (prevision, response and reconstruction) and multiple sectors of interven-
tion (Chandler and Coaffee 2017). Thus, resilience has gained substantial success,
becoming a key factor for many international initiatives (Bourbeau 2015): the Hyogo

80 6 Managing Uncertainty: Remarks for Future Policies and Practices
Framework for Action 2005–2015 (UNISDR 2005) and its successor instrument, the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (UNISDR 2015), the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2018) and the United Nations
Development Program on human resilience (2011). Undoubtedly, the topic is part of
the larger challenge of sustainable development that requires a multidisciplinary or
interdisciplinary approach, able to consider environmental, human and technological
factors and their interdependence.
However, this application of resilience is hard to be operationalised at the different
scales. Some of the obstacles are: (1) the pluralistic meanings and interpretations of
resilience; (2) the identification of resilience of what to what.
6.2 The Meaning of Resilience
While the resilience concept is gaining prominence in different fields, its concep-
tualisations leave fuzziness and ambiguity (Restemeyer et al. 2018). Chapter 3 has
debated the diffusion and the multiple definitions of resilience. Its first use in ecolog-
ical literature was related to the ability of a system to bounce back to an equilibrium
point after disturbance. In this meaning, resilience was related to persistence and the
capacity to absorb the change of the systems and was called engineering resilience
(Holling 1973). Subsequently, the conceptualisation of resilience was influenced by
the theory on complex adaptive systems and has been defined as the magnitude of
disturbance that can be absorbed before the system changes its structure (Gunderson
and Holling 2002; Walker et al. 2004). This interpretation—that was born to describe
important changes in ecosystem dynamics, focuses on three characteristics (Brand
and Jax 2007):
• the amount of disturbance that the system can absorb;
• the capacity for self-organisation of the system;
• the ability of the system for learning and adaptation.
Subsequently, the concept has been applied to social systems in which the focus
concerns communities; but the meaning that has had wider diffusion is resilience with
respect to the social-ecological system in which the human system and the natural
system are treated together (Folke et al. 2002; Walker et al. 2004). This conceptuali-
sation has brought a new narrative, especially in governmental thinking (Restemeyer
et al. 2018) and its application has become very popular in geography and environ-
mental studies and particularly in disaster management, climate adaptation, regional
economic development and strategic planning.
Several theoretical elements contribute to the implementation of social-ecological
resilience in urban systems:
• humans as part of the ecosystems;
• the urban system as a complex system because of the sum of several subsystems
in interaction;
6.2 The Meaning of Resilience 81
• the ecological, social and economic processes as adaptive cycles that permit adjust-
ment and self-organisation of the systems to find new orders.
In social-ecological systems, resilience has its core in the capacity to cope with,
adapt to and shape change. Therefore, social-ecological resilience analyses how
ecosystems are structured and behave and how institutions and the individuals asso-
ciated with them are organised and act. Concerning the adaptive cycle in particular,
the resilience concept focuses attention on the function of processes and dynam-
ics where individuals, groups, and institutions play a crucial role. Social-ecological
resilience is linked to the necessity to learn how to manage uncertainty through
change rather than simply to react; the bounce back quality, in fact, is undesirable
because it will go back to the pre-disaster conditions of vulnerability while the system
should evolve in a less vulnerable one.
In this scenario, two main issues emerge: (a) panarchy: no system can be under-
stood by focusing at a single scale. All systems function at multiple scales with
cross scale interactions, (b) individuals, groups and institutions are responsible for
the interactions. In this way, resilience implies a change in policy design, because it
highlights the need for flexibility, moving from being rationalist or bureaucratic to
becoming more adaptable, collaborative and open to find alternative paths in facing
problems. The resilience concept considers dynamism as an intrinsic factor of how
the system acts and for this reason it draws an alternative perspective of planning,
as more dynamic, fluid and interpretive—because it is partially structured by shared
procedures and norms—that are adaptable to changes or uncertainty and help manage
them.
6.3 To Operationalise Resilience Through Knowledge
The increasing environmental problems and the many interdependencies with the
human activities, the diversity of stakeholder interests and, consequently, the many
different view on the risk consequences make resilience an attractive perspective in
risk cycle management (see Chap. 1). Studying resilience in emergency planning has
several elements of interest: (a) it has to deal with uncertainty; (b) it covers all the
disaster life cycle, from prevision to recovery; (c) it bases on a well-defined shar-
ing of power and responsibility among actors. Risk management is recognised as
a cross-scale issue including a pluralism of professions working at different levels
along different times (Smith 2009, see Chap. 4). The interaction between scales is
intrinsic both in theory and in practice. Nevertheless, in the field of practices, the tools
(norms, procedures, plans) that should support interaction suffer from several lim-
its that mostly affect the co-management among different actors and, consequently,
the knowledge system. Regarding disaster risk reduction, it seems that the knowl-
edge available is not applied or not used effectively to reverse the upward trend
in catastrophic events (Weichselgartner and Pigeon 2015). Most of the time, inter-
action underestimates the need of a common significant framework among actors
with different backgrounds, as well as there being difficulties in having feedback

loops between different levels. This has raised questions about the effective use of
knowledge.
Generally, the challenge of flexibility that the changing period we live in requir-
ing policy, sets also a challenge of dynamism in the knowledge systems and learning
processes that support planning, and in particular, risk management. We need a new
approach that is aimed at the integration of diverse disciplines knowledge, stakeholder
integration, collaborative knowledge production and inclusion of tacit knowledge.
Despite the growing uncertainty, decisions have to be made and knowledge is the
basis for making it. There is an international recognition of this crucial role; the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 addresses knowledge-
related issues and highlights the critical role of knowledge in disaster risk reduc-
tion and the importance of its co-production and sharing. However, implementation
gaps between research and practice persist and the debate on how to operationalise
resilience through an effective use of knowledge is ongoing.
As Sect. 4.5 showed, there are different qualitative levels of understanding: data,
information, knowledge. Knowledge is created by organising and by interpreting
information. Knowledge is dynamic and is built through social interaction and expe-
rience. It can come from different sources (databases, less documents, co-production)
or it can have different forms (explicit or tacit) (Cash et al. 2006; Polanyi 2009).
Usually, knowledge is scattered among various actors with limited coordination,
sharing and coherence. Therefore, the core challenges concern knowledge produc-
tion processes. Working towards a common vocabulary is considered to be crucial
for bridging gaps between the different knowledge producers or users. If knowledge
production and learning have become central issues to deal with uncertainty and
complexity, can they be the pathway for increasing the resilience of the systems?
6.4 Resilience Is a Long Way
The Umbria region (Italy), over the years, has worked to ensure a more effective
use of knowledge in facing seismic risk (see Chap. 5). The case illustrates how the
integration and the coproduction of knowledge can trigger a process of transformation
of planning practice towards a resilience prospective.
The Umbria experience started with the reshaping of the data management system
of emergency planning, but the results have also had consequences on spatial planning
and governance over the course of time. At the beginning, the resilience aim was not
explicit in the project. Also because of the popularity of the term, the concept has
started to be used in the process only in recent years. However, resilience thinking
could be a useful analytical framework for understand some key elements of the case
study which have determinate its success.
The willingness of the individuals to cooperate emerges as essential. A reflexive
approach and high degree of social learning—main components of social-ecological
resilience (see Sect. 3.3)—are crucial for creating a constructive dialogue across
6.4 Resilience Is a Long Way 83
disciplines able to generate new and useful insights for the risk management. Con-
structing an effective collaborative process is also a matter of building trust between
the parties and social capital in general. Only, the creation of communities of practice
(Wenger 2000, see Sects. 4.10 and 5.5) can enhance the knowledge system, increasing
the shareable know-how, because it incentives the union of tacit knowledge and prac-
tical experience, otherwise unexpressed. Likewise, the creation of formal/informal
communities of practice clarifies and makes the different roles and responsibilities
explicit, due to stronger accountability and self-awareness. Social capital is impor-
tant because it triggers a learning-loop. Learning-by-doing has introduced new actors
into the practical example, in order to ensure the success of the activities.
Technology can be a helpful tool for supporting the development in information
and knowledge management, but it is not the solution (see Sect. 4.9). Initially, the
Umbria experience was driven by the technological push of the information tech-
nologies and the spatial data infrastructures; however, in short time, it was clear
that technology only allows knowledge to be more accessible to people but it needs
stakeholder engagement and common vocabulary to be effective (see Sects. 5.4, 5.5).
The benefits of using technology concern the possibility of having a knowledge cod-
ification through rigid definition of the information. In the same way, it allows to
add or simplify complexity according to the scales of analysis, with a major flexi-
bility according to different situations. Nevertheless, codification presupposes that
actors have agreed on the meanings and the management rights. Only an extensive
deliberation can avoid misunderstanding.
Finally, citizens can play a new important role in the resilience approach: they
can have a proactive role and there is growing interest to be involved from the base.
On the contrary, the case has also shown the limit of the resilience approach based
on knowledge sharing and learning processes. Firstly, building a solid knowledge
system concerning both a database and strong actors’ network requires time; time
for collecting and building a database, as well as time for accountability and building
trust with all stakeholders involved. Stakeholders and actors have been working on
their own system for at least ten years and in the future a number of improvements
must be made (data updating and enlargement of database). Thus, even if sharing
knowledge is a desirable approach, it cannot be the only one. Nowadays, territories
are exposed to increasing pressures, in many cases there are territories suffering
permanent hazards that need solutions in shorter times. Building a solid knowledge
system able to produce self-learning processes can be a long-term strategy, but it is
not acceptable in the short term.
Lastly, also the citizens’ involvement shows some limits. Generally, citizens can
be mostly involved to give or to be educated on how to handle risk. It is much
harder to gather information in terms of data quality, accuracy and integrity. How-
ever, it is a field in continuous expansion, whereas crowd-sourced spatial data has just
started. However, the Umbria case demonstrates the potential of using data collected
from people in small towns or remote areas. Nevertheless, another limit of citizens’
involvement concerns how to attract their attention, especially in those areas charac-
terised by hazards with a long-time return.
References
Beck U (1996) Risk society and the provident state. In: Risk, environment and modernity: towards
a new ecology. SAGE Publications, London
Bourbeau P (2015) Resilience and international politics: Premises, debates, agenda. Int Stud Rev
17:374–395
Brand FS, Jax K (2007) Focusing the meaning (s) of resilience: resilience as a descriptive concept
and a boundary object. Ecol Soc 12
Chandler D, Coaffee J (2017) The Routledge handbook of international resilience. Routledge, New
York
Folke C, Carpenter S, Elmqvist T et al (2002) Resilience and sustainable development: building
adaptive capacity in a world of transformations. AMBIO: A J Hum Environ 31:437–440
and nature. Island, Washington
Holling CS (1973) Resilience and stability of ecological systems. Annu Rev Ecol Syst 1–23
IPCC (2018) Global Warning of 1.5 °C (SR15). Summary for Policymakers
Polanyi M (2009) The tacit dimension. University of Chicago Press
Restemeyer B, van den Brink M, Woltjer J (2018) Resilience unpacked–framing of ‘uncertainty’and
‘adaptability’in long-term flood risk management strategies for London and Rotterdam. Eur Plan
Stud 1–21
Smith K (2009) Environmental hazards: assessing risk and reducing disaster, 5°edn. Routledge,
New York
UNDP (2011) Towards human resilience: sustaining MDG program in an age of economic uncer-
tainty
UNISDR (2005) Hyogo framework for action 2005-2015. ISDR International strategy for disaster
reduction; building the resilience of nations and communities to disasters
UNISDR (2015) Sendai framework for disaster risk reduction 2015–2030. In 3rd United Nations
World Conference on DRR
Weichselgartner J, Pigeon P (2015) The role of knowledge in disaster risk reduction. Int J Disaster
Risk Sci 6:107–116
Index
A Community of practice, 53, 71

Abruzzo, 62, 64, 67, 68 Complexity, 1, 2, 6, 10, 11, 14, 19, 20, 23, 29,
Act of nature, 9 38, 44, 46–48, 54, 57, 65, 75, 79, 82, 83
Act of society, 10 Complex system, 2, 2, 8, 17–19, 21, 22, 25, 42,
Adaptability, 28, 34, 37, 53, 63 44, 68, 79, 80
Adaptation, 12, 17, 19–21, 24–26, 39, 57, 80 Complex system theory, 20, 80
Adaptive cycle, 22, 26, 37, 39, 47, 81 Conformative, 64
Adaptive system, 20, 80 Cooperation, 37, 39, 44, 51, 53, 57, 66, 69, 71
Annual disaster statistical review, 8, 9 Coordination, 2, 36, 37, 40, 41, 44, 65, 66, 70,
Anthropocene, 10, 20 72, 82
Assessment, 11, 40, 74 Cosmopolitanising of risk, 14
AZIMUT, 68–72, 75, 76 Crisis, 2, 5, 6, 13, 14, 23, 41, 57, 69, 70, 73
Cross-interaction, 42
B Cross-level, 43, 44, 48
Back to normalcy, 33, 37, 63 Cross-scale, 2, 21, 23, 24, 33, 34, 43, 57, 69,
Barriers, 3, 21, 40, 54, 71, 76 70, 81
Biological disasters, 7
Bottom-up, 42, 55, 73 D
Bounce back, 33, 37, 63, 80, 81 Data, 36, 42–45, 50–52, 56, 57, 62, 68–72,
Boundary organisations, 72 74–76, 82, 83
Bridging organisations, 72 Database, 45, 68–70, 76, 83
Deaths, 7–9, 11, 61, 62, 64, 68
C Development, 7, 9, 11, 14, 17, 24, 29, 34, 40,
Calculated risks, 14, 28 41, 44, 45, 52–54, 56, 69, 72–76, 80, 83
Capozona, 75 Disaster, 5–11, 25, 26, 29, 33, 34, 36–38, 40,
Citizens, 14, 24, 27, 38–40, 43, 54–57, 63, 70, 55, 61–66, 68, 75, 79, 81
74, 75, 83 Disaster management, 17, 29, 80
Civil protection, 36, 38, 40, 61, 65–67, 71, 74 Disaster risk reduction, 23, 80–82
Climate change, 7, 11, 25, 28, 43, 55, 80 Disciplines, 3, 5, 10, 24, 28, 33, 40, 44, 45, 54,
Climatological disasters, 7 64, 70–72, 76, 82, 83
Collective memory, 46, 52, 72, 76 Disturbances, 1, 13, 17–22, 27, 29, 40, 42, 80
Communication, 3, 8, 27, 39, 43, 51, 53, 56,
73, 76 E
Community-based, 46 Earthquake, 7, 10, 40, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 73, 76
Community engagement, 74 Ecological resilience, 12, 17, 18, 21, 25, 34, 42

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-17262-6
86 Index
Ecological system, 2, 9, 13, 17, 20–22, 24, 39, Irpinia, 62, 68

43, 44, 52, 53, 81 Italy, 3, 9, 61–66, 68, 72, 75, 82
Economic damages, 8, 9
Emergency management, 3, 17, 33, 41, 57, 64, K
66–68 Knowledge, 2, 3, 9, 10, 13, 14, 23, 26, 27, 33,
Emergency plan, 65, 70 34, 36, 38, 39, 41–51, 53–57, 61, 63, 65,
Emilia-romagna, 62, 64 68–72, 74, 76, 81–83
Emotional participation, 55 Knowledge coproduction, 3, 82
Engineering resilience, 1, 17, 18, 25, 34, 80 Knowledge creators, 46
Escape routes, 36, 73 Knowledge management, 34, 44, 48–50, 76, 83
Evolutionary resilience, 34, 63, 75, 76 Knowledge system, 57, 68, 81, 83
Experiential knowledge, 46 Knowledge users, 45
Explicit knowledge, 45, 46, 48, 54
Ex post, 12 L
Exposure, 6, 7, 10–13, 25, 28, 33, 36, 37, 62, Landslides, 7, 40, 61, 66
64 L’Aquila, 62, 64, 73
Learn-and-adapt, 26, 34, 37
F Learning, 3, 21, 22, 26–29, 33, 39, 46–50,
Feedback loop, 19, 52 52–54, 56, 57, 68, 72, 80, 82, 83
First rescuer, 75 Learning capacities, 39, 48
Flexibility, 34, 47, 53, 57, 74, 76, 81–83 Learning organization, 49
Flood, 7, 10, 55, 74 Learning society, 47
Learning systems, 47, 50
G Levels, 2, 5, 8, 11, 22, 23, 26, 33, 34, 36, 38,
Geographical Information System (GIS), 51, 39, 41–44, 47–50, 57, 63, 65, 67, 69, 70,
54, 69 72–74, 79, 81, 82
Geophysical disasters, 7 Likelihood, 10, 36
Globalisation, 6 Limit conditions for emergency, 67
Governance, 2, 3, 14, 21, 24, 25, 27, 29, 34,
39–41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 52–54, 57, 61, 68, M
82 Magnitude, 10, 18, 21, 36, 62, 65, 68, 80
Man-made disaster, 7
H Marche, 62, 64, 67, 68
Hazard, 5, 6, 9–14, 36, 40, 44, 55, 61–63, 66, Mediator, 72
67, 72, 74, 79, 83 Meteorological disasters, 7
Hazard studies, 27 Minimal urban structure, 67, 68, 73
Holling, 1, 2, 13, 18, 20–24, 26, 27, 42, 80 Misunderstanding, 39, 42, 71, 83
Human ecosystem, 25 Mitigation, 12, 25, 36
Hydrogeological disasters, 7 Multidisciplinary, 12, 23, 28, 37, 80
Multilevel, 21, 42, 43
I Multiple equilibria, 18, 20, 21
Impacts, 5–9, 11–14, 19, 20, 26, 33, 39, 40, 55, Municipalities, 41, 64–67, 69–72, 74, 75
63, 68, 79
Information, 27, 36–38, 41–45, 48, 50–56, 65, N
68–72, 74, 75, 82, 83 Natural disaster, 7–9, 61, 79
Innovation, 23, 27, 34, 37, 48, 51, 57, 61, 64, Networking, 56, 76
68–70, 74–76 Non-linear interactions, 18–20
Institutions, 12, 13, 21, 22, 26, 37–41, 43, 44,
47, 48, 50, 53–55, 57, 61, 65, 69, 81 O
Integration, 3, 20, 25–27, 33, 38, 43, 48, 50, Organizational learning, 48, 49, 52
52, 54, 64, 67–70, 75, 76, 82 Organizational management, 49
Interactive process, 47 Oriented to stability, 19, 20
Index 87
P Robustness, 34, 74–76

Panarchy, 21–23, 42, 81
Paramilitary, 54 S
Participation, 14, 25, 45, 54, 55, 74 Scale, 2, 8, 13, 20, 25, 29, 38, 41–43, 52,
Persistence, 18, 28, 33, 34, 37, 56, 57, 63, 75, 67–70, 72, 73, 76, 81
76, 80 Scenario, 81
Pluralism, 47, 57, 81 Scientific knowledge, 9, 34, 70, 72, 75
Policy-makers, 24, 46 Secondary effects, 7
Post-event, 67 Sectors, 2, 14, 24, 33, 38–40, 47, 48, 50, 54,
PPRR chain, 33, 37, 40, 41, 54, 55, 57, 61, 63, 61, 64, 67, 68, 73, 79
64, 66, 67, 70, 74 Security, 1, 2, 14, 28, 29, 38, 39, 75
Practice, 1–3, 5, 14, 23, 26, 28, 34, 37, 38, 43, Seismic risk, 61–64, 66, 75, 82
45–47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 57, 64, 71, 72, 79, Self-organisation, 2, 19, 21, 25, 80, 81
81–83 Self-protection, 75
Practitioners, 6, 24, 26, 45–47, 53, 70, 79 Sensitivity, 11–13, 25, 28
Preparedness, 26, 34, 36, 38, 57, 63, 65, 71, 76 Sharing, 9, 41, 44–46, 48–53, 56, 57, 63, 68,
Prevention, 2, 14, 29, 33–38, 55, 63–67, 69, 74 69, 76, 81–83
Prevision, 2, 33–37, 63, 65–67, 74, 79, 81 Shocks, 7, 8, 21, 29, 64, 68, 70
Process, 1–3, 6, 7, 12, 13, 19, 21–28, 33, Skills, 13, 26, 33, 39, 46, 49, 57, 69–72
37–54, 56, 57, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68, 70, 71, Social-ecological resilience, 21, 25, 27, 34, 37,
73, 76, 81–83 45, 54, 56, 80–82
Protezione civile, 65 Social-ecological system, 19–21, 24, 39, 44,
Province, 41, 65, 66, 69, 71 52, 80, 81
Social learning, 2, 3, 25, 46, 52–54, 63, 70, 71,
R 76, 82
Reactive, 64, 75 Sociological disasters, 7
Reconstruction, 36, 37, 63, 65, 68, 73, 79 Spatial data infrastructures, 51, 83
Recovery, 2, 8, 18, 25, 33–37, 63–66, 73, 81 Spatial planning, 40, 61, 63–68, 72, 73, 82
Reflective of globalisation, 14 Spatial scales, 41
Reflexivity, 3, 14, 26, 29 Stable regime, 2
Region, 3, 41, 61–69, 71, 73–76, 82 Stakeholders, 24, 27, 29, 34, 37–39, 41, 43,
Regulations, 27, 38, 64, 65, 75 46–48, 52, 53, 57, 63, 64, 67, 69, 70, 72,
Resilience, 1–3, 9, 13, 17–29, 33, 34, 37, 75, 76, 81–83
39–42, 44, 47, 52, 54, 57, 61, 62, 64, 67, Steady state, 2
74–76, 79–83 Sustainability, 24
Resilience theory, 13, 17, 27, 39 Sustainable development, 20, 24, 40, 80
Resilience thinking, 1, 3, 17, 18, 20, 29, 39, 79,
82 T
Resourcefulness, 37, 57 Tacit knowledge, 45, 46, 48, 50, 72, 76, 82, 83
Response, 2, 13, 21, 26–28, 33–38, 40, 44, 46, Technicians, 51, 69, 71, 72, 74
47, 55, 61–66, 68, 69, 73, 79 Technological disasters, 7
Risk, 1, 2, 5, 6, 9–14, 19, 25, 28, 29, 33–41, Technology, 3, 13, 34, 47, 49–51, 56, 57, 64,
45, 46, 54–56, 61, 62, 64–66, 70, 73, 74, 68, 69, 75, 83
76, 79, 81, 83 Territory, 36, 39, 41, 61, 62, 64, 67, 72–74
Risk assessment, 37, 65 Transformability, 28, 34, 63
Risk cycle, 2, 65, 66, 68, 69, 81
Risk management, 1, 2, 14, 26, 28, 33, 34, 37, U
38, 41, 46, 47, 51, 54–57, 62–65, 68, 71, Umbria, 3, 61–64, 67–69, 71, 73–76, 82, 83
75, 81–83 Uncalculated risk, 14, 28
Risk perception, 7, 8, 55, 63 Uncertainty, 1, 2, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, 23, 24, 26,
Risk society, 1, 5, 13, 14, 26, 79 34, 38, 44, 46, 55, 57, 79, 81, 82
88 Index
Urbanism tradition, 64 Vulnerability, 5, 6, 10–13, 17, 22, 25–28, 33,

Urgency, 69 36, 37, 41, 61, 64, 72–75, 81
V W
Vitality, 73 Wisdom, 44, 45
Volunteers, 36, 38, 65, 66

(SpringerBriefs in Geography) Elena Pede - Planning For Resilience - New Paths For Managing Uncertainty (2020, Springer International Publishing)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

(SpringerBriefs in Geography) Elena Pede - Planning For Resilience - New Paths For Managing Uncertainty (2020, Springer International Publishing)

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

(SpringerBriefs in Geography) Elena Pede - Planning For Resilience - New Paths For Managing Uncertainty (2020, Springer International Publishing)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN GEOGRAPHY

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10050

Planning for Resilience

ISSN 2211-4165 ISSN 2211-4173 (electronic)

structures in which hierarchical and bureaucratic interrelations are not barriers to

Turin, Italy Luca Staricco

The publication of this research was supported by the Interuniversity Department of

1 Introduction: Planning for Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

4.10 Social Learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52

Keywords Resilience · Uncertainty · Planning for resilience · Flexibility ·

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 1

1.1 The Book Structure

to the roles of production, implementation and dissemination of knowledge with a

Keywords Natural disasters · Risk · Vulnerability · Uncertainty · World risk

2.1 Living with Perils

Disaster. A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving

Vulnerability. The characteristics and circumstances of a community, system or asset that

resilience and the sharing of knowledge in order to improve capability in managing

2.2 Who Is Responsible for Natural Disasters?

2.3 Risk and Vulnerability

(a) Risk (R) = Likelihood (L) * Consequence(C)

(b) Risk (R) = (H) Hazard * (V) Vulnerability * (E) Exposure

(H) the probability of the occurrence of a potentially damaging phenomenon within

• the interactions among stressors;

2.3.1 The Uncertainty of Risk in the World Risk Society

1. Human capital (skills, knowledge, health and energy);

Keywords Resilience · Social-ecological systems · Panarchy · Adaptive

3.1 Engineering and Ecological Approaches

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 17

or the buffer capacity to persist to external disturbances (Folke 2006).

The result is a continuous process of mutual adaptation and self-organisation of

3.2 System Theories: From the General System Theory

As already argued, resilience is a concept rooted in complexity theory. Before con-

scientific solutions organised on traditional disciplinary lines (Berkes et al. 2003).

3.3 The Social-Ecological Paradigm

In the social-ecological approach, the concept of resilience is about the opportunities

3. Multiple distinctive scales with cross-scale interactions. Gunderson and Holling

hierarchy. Panarchy describes the cyclical and organisational attitude of systems:

3.4 Connecting Resilience Concept to Planning

change, adaptation can be explained as vulnerability, exposure, sensitivity, adaptive

Social and institutional networks have varying degrees of organisation, identity

Partidário 2011).3 Stakeholders must create new relationships to enhance multidi-

3.5 Linking Vulnerability and Resilience

condition related to exposure, susceptibility, sensitivity, coping and adaptive capac-

3.6 Criticism to Resilience

Bourbeau P (2013) Resiliencism: premises and promises in securitisation research. Resilience

Miller F, Osbahr H, Boyd E et al (2010) Resilience and vulnerability: complementary or conflicting

Keywords PPRR chain · Emergency management · Competences · Knowledge

4.1 Resilience and Risk Management

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 33

This is in contrast with the concepts of flexibility, adaptability and transformability

4.2 The Prevision-Prevention-Response-Recovery Chain

LEARNING REVIEW RISK ASSESSMENT

RELIEF EMERGENCY PLANS

In the practice, there is a limited attention to the adaptive dimension. One of

4.3 Disconnected Policies and Actors

Nowadays, even if there is progressive awareness of the need of collaboration

4.4 Responsibilities, Institutions and New Actors

people and goods. In most countries, risk management is entrusted to a variety of