IAEA-TECDOC-1788

IAEA-TECDOC-1788
IAEA TECDOC SERIES

IAEA-TECDOC-1788

Criteria for Radionuclide

Activity Concentrations for
Food and Drinking Water

International Atomic Energy Agency

Vienna
ISBN 978–92–0–103816–6
ISSN 1011–4289

@
16-14751_TE-1788_cover.indd 1-3 2016-04-19 10:15:18
 IAEA SAFETY STANDARDS AND RELATED PUBLICATIONS

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16-14751_TE-1788_cover.indd 4-6 2016-04-19 10:15:19

 CRITERIA FOR RADIONUCLIDE
ACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS FOR
FOOD AND DRINKING WATER
The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the IAEA held at
United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The Headquarters of the Agency are
situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace,
health and prosperity throughout the world’’.
 IAEA-TECDOC-1788

CRITERIA FOR RADIONUCLIDE

ACTIVITY CONCENTRATIONS FOR
FOOD AND DRINKING WATER

PREPARED BY THE:
JOINT FAO/IAEA DIVISION OF NUCLEAR TECHNIQUES IN FOOD AND AGRICULTURE,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

VIENNA, 2016
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For further information on this publication, please contact:

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© IAEA, 2016
Printed by the IAEA in Austria
April 2016

IAEA Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Names: International Atomic Energy Agency.

Title: Criteria for radionuclide activity concentrations for food and drinking water /
International Atomic Energy Agency.
Description: Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 2016. | Series: IAEA
TECDOC series, ISSN 1011–4289 ; no. 1788 | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: IAEAL 16-01036 | ISBN 978–92–0–103816–6 (paperback : alk. paper)
Subjects: LCSH: Radioisotopes — Safety measures. | Radioisotopes — Health
aspects. | Radioactive contamination of food. | Drinking water — Contamination.
 FOREWORD

Requirements for the protection of people from the harmful consequences of exposure to
ionizing radiation, for the safety of radiation sources and for the protection of the environment
are established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, Radiation Protection and
Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards. GSR Part 3 requires that
the regulatory body or other relevant authority establish specific reference levels for exposure
due to radionuclides in commodities, including food and drinking water. The reference level
is based on an annual effective dose to the representative person that generally does not
exceed a value of about 1 mSv.

International standards have been developed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations/World Health Organization (FAO/WHO) Codex Alimentarius Commission
for levels of radionuclides contained in food traded internationally that contains, or could
potentially contain, radioactive substances as a consequence of a nuclear or radiological
emergency. International standards have also been developed by the WHO for radionuclides
contained in drinking water, other than in a nuclear or radiological emergency.

These international standards provide guidance and criteria in terms of levels of individual
radiation dose, levels of activity concentration of specific radionuclides, or both. The criteria
derived in terms of levels of activity concentration in the various international standards differ
owing to a number of factors and assumptions underlying the common objective of protecting
public health in different circumstances.

This publication considers the various international standards to be applied at the national
level for the assessment of levels of radionuclides in food and in drinking water in different
circumstances for the purposes of control, other than in a nuclear or radiological emergency.
It collates and provides an overview of the different criteria used in assessing and controlling
the radionuclide content of food and drinking water for radiation protection purposes in
circumstances. The approach used to derive reference levels of radionuclide activity
concentration in food and in drinking water as criteria for use in particular circumstances is
also considered.

This publication is intended for the use by regulatory bodies, policy makers and interested
parties with responsibilities in relation to the management of various situations where
radionuclides are, or could be, present in food and in drinking water, other than in a nuclear or
radiological emergency. It could be considered by Member States in developing national
standards for radionuclide activity concentrations for food and drinking water. The TECDOC
could also be considered as an input in any future review of the relevant international
standards.
This publication was developed in collaboration with the FAO and the WHO. The IAEA
gratefully acknowledges the contribution of experts from the FAO and the WHO and from
several IAEA Member States to the drafting and review of the text. The IAEA officers
responsible for this publication were T. Colgan and I. Gusev of the Division of Radiation,
Transport and Waste Safety.
 EDITORIAL NOTE

This publication has been prepared from the original material as submitted by the contributors and has not been edited by the editorial
staff of the IAEA. The views expressed remain the responsibility of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the
IAEA or its Member States.

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infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.

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publication and does not guarantee that any content on such web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
 CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 1
1.1. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................ 1
1.2. OBJECTIVE ....................................................................................................... 2
1.3. SCOPE ................................................................................................................ 2
1.4. STRUCTURE ..................................................................................................... 3

2. KEY RADIATION PROTECTION CONCEPTS RELATING TO

RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD AND DRINKING WATER ........................................... 3
2.1. THE SYSTEM OF RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION .................................... 4
2.2. APPLICATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN DIFFERENT
SITUATIONS ..................................................................................................... 5

3. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD AND

DRINKING WATER ....................................................................................................... 9
3.1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 9
3.2. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS ................................................................. 10
3.2.1. WHO guidelines for drinking water quality ......................................... 10
3.2.2. Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission guidelines for
radionuclides in food ............................................................................ 13

4. THE CONTROLLABILITY OF RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD AND

DRINKING WATER IN AN EXISTING EXPOSURE SITUATION .......................... 17
4.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 17
4.2. RADIONUCLIDES OF NATURAL ORIGIN................................................. 17
4.3. RADIONUCLIDES OF ARTIFICIAL ORIGIN ............................................. 20
4.4. SPECIAL SITUATIONS ................................................................................. 21

5. SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... 24

REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 26

ANNEX I. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS IN RELATION TO RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD
AND DRINKING WATER ................................................................................ 28

ANNEX II. METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING RADIONUCLIDE

CONCENTRATIONS IN FOOD FOR SPECIAL SITUATIONS ..................... 34

ANNEX III. EXAMPLES OF NATIONAL APPROACHES FOLLOWING A

NUCLEAR ACCIDENT .................................................................................. 39

ANNEX IV. FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS .......................................................... 43

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ...................................................................................................... 47

CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW ............................................................. 49

C-40 (May
13)
 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

Food and drinking water may contain both radionuclides of natural origin and radionuclides
of artificial origin. The sources of these radionuclides include:
(1) Radionuclides of natural origin, particularly radionuclides in the uranium and thorium
decay series and 40K, all of which are present throughout the environment;
(2) Authorized discharges from nuclear facilities and other licensed facilities: these are
primarily of artificial origin, but may also be of natural origin, particularly in the case of
uranium mining and processing activities;
(3) Fallout from the testing of nuclear weapons, which occurred primarily in the 1950s and
1960s — the main radionuclides of interest being 90Sr and 137Cs;
(4) Accidental releases of radionuclides, such as occurred following the Windscale nuclear
reactor fire in 1957, the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident in 1986 and, more
recently, the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in 2011. While
accidental releases normally consist of radionuclides of artificial origin, some of these
radionuclides, such as 3H, 14C and 210Po, also occur as radionuclides of natural origin in
the environment.
The presence of radionuclides in food may be as a result of root uptake from the soil, direct
deposition from the atmosphere onto crops or transfer through aquatic pathways. In the case
of drinking water, those radionuclides that are soluble may be dissolved as water passes over
or through rocks and soils. Direct deposition onto water bodies may also occur.
There are several international standards1 relating to radionuclides in food and drinking water.
Specifically, requirements for the control of exposure of the public in all exposure situations
have been established in IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3 [1]. In addition,
international standards have been published on the derivation and use of activity
concentrations of radionuclides in food, milk and drinking water for use following a nuclear
or radiological emergency [2, 3]; for radionuclides in drinking water other than in an
emergency [4]; and for food being traded internationally [5].
These international standards provide guidance in terms of individual radiation dose2, activity
concentrations of specific radionuclides, or both. The activity concentrations derived in the
various international standards differ owing to a number of factors and assumptions
underlying the common objective of protecting the public under different circumstances.
Following the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in Japan in 2011, it
became apparent that the circumstances in which these international standards apply are not
always clear. This lack of clarity can result in misinterpretation and misapplication of the
international standards developed for specific circumstances.
The IAEA Radiation Safety Standards Committee (RASSC) discussed this issue and
suggested that the Secretariat develop a discussion paper on the existing international
standards for the control of radionuclides in food and drinking water, the radiation protection
criteria on which they are based and the circumstances in which they are intended to be used.

1
Throughout this publication, the term ‘standards’ is used in a general sense when referring to the various
publications of the FAO, IAEA and WHO dealing with radionuclides in food and drinking water and containing
quantitative criteria. These quantitative criteria are normally expressed in terms such as individual dose (mSv in
a year), or activity concentration (Bq/kg or Bq/L). These quantitative criteria (‘standards’) provide guidance for
Member States and are not legally binding.
2
Throughout this publication, the term ‘dose’ is used to mean ‘effective dose’.

1
A Working Group, comprising representatives of the European Commission, the Secretariat
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO), the IAEA, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) and the World Health
Organization (WHO), with the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP)
as an observer, was established to undertake this work in cooperation with invited experts.
Following a review of the various international standards, the Working Group concluded that
there were no major gaps in these standards. However, some areas were noted for which steps
could be taken by international organizations and national authorities to facilitate a better
understanding of which standards apply in different situations and how they are used.
Furthermore, it was considered useful that a method be developed to assist national authorities
derive levels of activity concentrations of radionuclides in food and drinking water in
situations where only sub-groups of the population are likely to be affected, using the same
approach as that used for the international standards.
In September 2014, a Technical Meeting on Harmonization of Reference Levels for
Foodstuffs and Drinking Water Contaminated Following a Nuclear Accident was held at the
IAEA Headquarters in Vienna. The meeting was attended by 45 experts from 37 Member
States of the IAEA, with observers from FAO and WHO. The meeting considered several
issues relating to the establishment of levels of radionuclide activity concentrations that could
be used for the control of food and drinking water other than in a nuclear or radiological
emergency. The meeting discussed an approach to be used by national authorities in
establishing activity concentrations of radionuclides in food and drinking water in special
situations where only sub-groups of the population are likely to be affected. This TECDOC is
based on the outcome of that meeting.

1.2. OBJECTIVE

This TECDOC considers the various international standards designed for application at the
national level for the assessment of levels of radionuclides in food and in drinking water in
different circumstances for purposes of control.
The objectives of this TECDOC are to collate and provide an overview of:
(1) the different radiation protection criteria used for assessing and controlling the
radionuclide content of food and drinking water for radiation protection purposes; and
(2) the approach used to derive reference levels for radionuclide activity concentration for
food and drinking water for existing exposure situations, as criteria for use in exceptional
circumstances.
This TECDOC is intended for use by regulatory bodies, policy makers and interested parties
with responsibilities in relation to the management of various situations where radionuclides
are or could be present in food and in drinking water.

This overview could be considered by Member States in developing national standards for
radionuclide activity concentrations for food and drinking water.

1.3. SCOPE

This TECDOC considers the various international standards relating to the assessment of
levels of radionuclides in food and drinking water to be applied at the national level for
purposes of control, that have been developed by the FAO, IAEA and WHO. Based on these
international standards, an approach that can be used to derive reference levels of radionuclide
activity concentrations for food and drinking water, other than in a nuclear or radiological

2
emergency, for situations in which only sub-groups of the population are likely to be affected
is considered. The TECDOC specifically addresses existing exposure situations.

1.4. STRUCTURE

Section 2 summarizes the key radiation protection concepts relating to radionuclides in food
and drinking water. Section 3 explains the current international standards relating to food and
drinking water focusing in particular on those standards developed by the FAO, IAEA and the
WHO. Section 4 considers the controllability of radionuclides of both natural origin and
artificial origin present in food and drinking water in existing exposure situations and
proposes an approach to their management. A condensed summary of key points raised in the
TECDOC is provided in Section 5.

The roles and responsibilities of various international organizations in relation to

radionuclides in food and drinking water are summarized in Annex I. Annex II contains a
methodology, based on that developed by the Codex Alimentarius Commission for foodstuffs
in international trade, by which the reference levels of activity concentrations for specific
radionuclides can be calculated. Examples of approaches by Member States to the control of
specific foods in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident are contained in Annex III.
Annex IV provides answers to some frequently asked questions.

2. KEY RADIATION PROTECTION CONCEPTS RELATING TO

RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD AND DRINKING WATER

This section summarizes those components of the system of radiological protection that are
relevant to managing exposure due to radionuclides in food and drinking water.
RADIATION UNITS
Radioactivity is the process by which atoms randomly undergo spontaneous
disintegration, usually accompanied by the emission of radiation. Radioactivity is
measured in units called becquerels (Bq) – one becquerel corresponds to one
radioactive disintegration per second. The number of disintegrations per second for a
particular radionuclide is directly proportional to the amount of that radionuclide that
is present.

For food and drinking water, activity concentrations of a radionuclide are reported in
units of becquerels per kilogram (Bq/kg) or becquerels per litre (Bq/L).

Effective dose is a measure of the energy deposited in a tissue or organ, and is

therefore a measure of the biological harm that may be caused. Effective dose is often
referred to simply as ‘radiation dose’ or ‘dose’. Effective dose is measured in units
called sieverts (Sv). The sievert is a large unit, and so it is common to speak in terms of
fractions of a sievert, such as the millisievert (mSv) or microsievert (µSv).
1 sievert = 1 000 millisievert (mSv)
= 1 000 000 microsievert (µSv)

3
2.1. THE SYSTEM OF RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION

The IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, Radiation Protection and Safety of
Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards3 [1] establishes safety requirements
that apply to all situations involving exposure to ionizing radiation that are amenable to
control. It also applies to all facilities and all activities that give rise to radiation risks, whether
as a result of natural sources or artificial sources of radiation.
Based on the principles established in the Safety Fundamentals [6], GSR Part 3 establishes
requirements for the three principal tenets of radiation protection, namely:
(i) The justification of facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks such that they
yield an overall benefit, i.e. the benefits exceed the costs, including those associated with
any radiological detriment that may result.
(ii) Optimization of protection such that the highest level of safety can be achieved under the
circumstances. This involves balancing the various levels of protection that might be
achieved against the costs of achieving those levels in order to identify the ‘best’
available option, and
(iii) The limitation of risks to individuals such that no individual bears an unacceptable risk of
harm.
Application of the requirements in relation to all of these principles involves judgement and
the decisions to be taken depend on the particular circumstances. In order to facilitate the
making of that judgement and thereby establishing requirements for protection and safety,
GSR Part 3 distinguishes between three different types of exposure situation: planned
exposure situations, emergency exposure situations and existing exposure situations.

Planned exposure situations

A planned exposure situation is a situation of exposure that arises from the planned operation
of a source or from a planned activity that results in an exposure due to a source. There are
many examples of such situations; one important example is the situation involving the
operation of a nuclear power plant. Even though some radiation exposure may occur as a
consequence — to workers and to the public, the latter as a consequence of any necessary
discharges of radionuclides to the environment — such exposures can be restricted from the
outset by good design of facilities and equipment, use of appropriate operating procedures and
appropriately trained staff.

Emergency exposure situations

An emergency exposure situation is a situation of exposure that arises as a result of an
accident, a malicious act or any other unexpected event and requires prompt action in order to
avoid or reduce adverse consequences. Once an emergency arises, radiation exposures can
only be reduced by taking protective actions.

Existing exposure situations

An existing exposure situation is a situation of exposure that already exists when a decision
on the need for control needs to be taken. Existing exposure situations include, but are not

3
GSR Part 3 is jointly sponsored by the European Commission, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, the IAEA, the International Labour Organization, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, the Pan
American Health Organization, the United Nations Environment Programme and the World Health
Organization.

4
limited to, situations involving exposure to natural background radiation that is amenable to
control. For example, exposure due to radionuclides of natural origin in food and drinking
water is considered an existing exposure situation regardless of the activity concentrations of
the radionuclides concerned. Existing exposure situations also include situations of exposure
due to residual radioactive material that derives from past practices that were never subject to
regulatory control or residual radioactive material deriving from a nuclear or radiological
emergency after an emergency has been declared to be ended.

2.2. APPLICATION OF THE REQUIREMENTS IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS

General considerations
The distinction between the exposure situations is necessary because the degree of control,
and the way in which that control can be exercised in each situation, vary significantly. In
particular, in planned exposure situations, direct control can be exercised over the source of
radiation right from the start. In emergency exposure situations and existing exposure
situations, no such direct control over the source of radiation can be exercised. However,
action can be taken over the exposure pathways (e.g. by restricting the sale of a particular
food) and over the behaviour of the exposed individuals (e.g. by limiting access to areas
where wild foods with relatively high contents of a radionuclide might be present and could
be gathered).
While the requirements for justification require the balancing of the costs, including those
associated with any radiological detriment, against the benefits to individuals and society as a
whole, their application in the three types of exposure situation operates differently.
Often, in a planned exposure situation, such as the construction and operation of a nuclear
power plant, consideration of costs and benefits goes far beyond the radiological detriment
that may be caused. This is not, of course, unique to radiation safety as many decisions
concerning the adoption of a particular human activity involve a balancing of costs — which
may include possible detriments to health — and benefits [7, 8]. On the other hand,
justification of whether or not to institute a protective measure in an emergency exposure
situation or in an existing exposure situation is more straightforward: it is directly related to
what can be achieved in terms of protection and safety, reduction in exposure being the
primary objective.
Once a particular planned exposure situation or a protective measure to reduce exposure has
been considered justified, application of the requirements for optimization of protection in the
three exposure situations is more analogous, the aim being to do the best that can be done
under the prevailing circumstances. But even then, it can be seen that much tighter constraints
can be applied in a planned exposure situation, simply because direct control can be exercised
over the source of the exposure.

5
Planned exposure situations
Unless exempted from regulatory control, GSR Part 3 requires facilities and activities that are
considered to be justified and give rise to planned exposure situations to be authorized by the
regulatory body. In particular, any discharges of radionuclides to the environment are required
to be authorized. Authorized discharge limits are required, among other things, to correspond
to doses below the dose limits with account taken of the results of optimization of protection
and safety (Ref. [1], para. 3.123 (b)). In addition, the possible accumulation in the
environment of radioactive substances from discharges over the lifetime of the facility needs
to be taken into account (Ref. [1], para. 3.126 (c)).
Guidance on setting a discharge authorization is given in the Safety Guide, Regulatory
Control of Radioactive Discharges to the Environment [9] (under revision at the time of
finalizing this publication). Generally, the focus in setting such authorizations is on the so-
called ‘representative person’, an individual who receives a dose that is representative of the
doses to the more highly exposed individuals in the population. The number of these more
highly exposed individuals is generally quite small. Further information in relation to how
doses to the representative person can be assessed can be found in Ref. [10].
Reference [9] provides a review of international practices relating to the control of discharges
and indicates that many States have already set maximum levels of individual exposure that
effectively restrict the optimization of protection for various sources. These restrictions are
referred to as ‘dose constraints’4. Regulatory bodies apply a relatively narrow range of annual
effective doses as dose constraints of between 0.1 and 0.3 mSv for nuclear fuel cycle
facilities, including reactors. Higher or lower values of dose constraints may be appropriate
for other facilities and in other circumstances, subject to the requirement that the total dose to
an individual from all planned exposure situations does not exceed 1 mSv in a year.
In summary, for planned exposure situations there is no need for generally applicable
radionuclide activity concentrations for food or drinking water for the control of public
exposure because, in these situations, controlling discharges ensures that doses to members of
the public from all exposure pathways do not exceed 1 mSv. Furthermore, monitoring
programmes are implemented to ensure compliance with authorized discharge limits and to
assess actual doses received.

Emergency exposure situations

In the context of a nuclear or radiological emergency, a different approach is used. In these
circumstances the radiation exposure cannot be controlled at the source and therefore
exposures are managed by using reference levels5. A reference level is defined in GSR Part 3
as “the level of dose, risk or activity concentration above which it is not appropriate to plan to
allow exposures to occur and below which optimization of protection and safety would
continue to be implemented”. The value chosen for a reference level will depend upon the
prevailing circumstances for the exposure under consideration. The establishment of reference
levels can be regarded as the first step in the optimization process.
For a nuclear or radiological emergency, GSR Part 3 [1] and GSR Part 7 [2] require
governments to ensure that protection strategies are developed, justified and optimized at the
preparedness stage. Protection strategies need to include pre-established criteria for taking

4
A dose constraint is defined in GSR Part 3 as a prospective and source related value of individual dose that is
used in planned exposure situations as a parameter for the optimization of protection and safety for the source,
and that serves as a boundary in defining the range of options in optimization.
5
Reference levels are also used in existing exposure situations, as described in subsequent sections.

6
emergency response actions including those related to food, milk and drinking water.
References [2, 3] provide such criteria for use in preparedness and response for a nuclear or
radiological emergency. This includes both generic criteria (e.g. in terms of radiation dose)
and operational criteria (e.g. in terms of activity concentration) for assessing radionuclide
concentrations in food, milk and drinking water in an emergency. References [2, 3] are
cosponsored by a number of international organizations, including FAO and WHO.
First, Ref. [3] recommends that the food, milk or drinking water that are potentially with
contamination should be screened over a wide area and analysed to determine the gross alpha
and gross beta activity concentrations, if this can be done more promptly than assessing the
concentration of individual radionuclides. Operational intervention levels (OILs) for both
gross alpha activity and gross beta activity, i.e. OIL5, are provided in Ref. [3]. If the measured
gross alpha activity and gross beta activity do not exceed the OIL5, consumption of food,
milk and drinking water during the emergency phase need not be restricted.
If, however, one or other of these OILs is exceeded, the next step is to determine the
radionuclide specific concentrations in the food, milk or drinking water. OILs for activity
concentrations in food, milk and drinking water, i.e. OIL6 in Ref. [3], have been developed
for a large number of radionuclides. If the measured activity concentrations in food, milk and
drinking water exceed the OIL6, it is recommended that consumption of non-essential food,
milk or drinking water be stopped and essential food, milk and drinking water be replaced, or
people should be relocated if replacement food, milk and drinking water are not available. As
examples, the OIL6 for 131I and 137Cs are 3 000 and 2 000 Bq/kg, respectively.
OIL5 and OIL6 are derived on the basis of a generic criterion of 10 mSv projected dose6 in a
year and the conservative assumptions that (i) all of the food, milk and drinking water are
initially with contamination and are consumed throughout a full year and (ii) the most
restrictive age-dependent dose conversion factors and ingestion rates (i.e. those for infants)
apply. Reference [3] recommends that the guidance given by the Codex General Standard [5]
be used as soon as possible to determine whether food and milk is suitable for international
trade, and that the WHO guidance [4] be used for drinking water. The guidance given by
these bodies is discussed in the next section.
References [2, 3] emphasize the need for immediate restrictions to prevent inadvertent
ingestion and to restrict the consumption of food, milk and drinking water that could undergo
direct contamination, following a significant release of radioactive material to the
environment, and then be consumed. These immediate restrictions are intended to be effected
before any sampling and analysis of food, milk and drinking water is carried out. Operational
criteria such as emergency action levels and operational intervention levels for ambient dose
rates as established in Ref. [3] are to be used for food and drinking water restriction.

Existing exposure situations

In the context of public exposure in existing exposure situations, GSR Part 3 requires the
protection strategy to be commensurate with the associated radiation risks (Ref. [1],
para. 5.7). Furthermore, “reference levels shall typically be expressed as an annual effective
dose to the representative person in the range 1–20 mSv or other equivalent quantity, the
actual value depending on the feasibility of controlling the situation and on experience in
managing similar situations in the past” (Ref. [1], para. 5.8). This reference level applies to all
exposure pathways from a given source of exposure, i.e. it includes the contributions from
external exposure, inhalation and ingestion.

6
Projected dose is the dose that would be expected to be received if planned protective actions were not taken.

7
Thus, as with emergency exposure situations, reference levels are required to be established
for optimization of protection and safety in existing exposure situations. The value chosen for
the reference level will depend on the prevailing circumstances for the exposures under
consideration. The optimized protection strategies are intended to keep doses below the
reference level.
Requirement 51 of GSR Part 3 specifically relates to exposure due to radionuclides in
commodities. It requires the regulatory body or other relevant authority to establish reference
levels “for exposure due to radionuclides in commodities such as construction materials, food
and feed, and in drinking water, each of which shall typically be expressed as, or be based on,
an annual effective dose to the representative person that generally does not exceed a value of
about 1 mSv” (Ref. [1], para. 5.22). This reference level applies only to the dose from
exposure due to radionuclides in the commodity in question and the contributions to dose via
any other exposure pathway do not therefore need to be taken into account. The role that this
reference level plays in the derivation of radionuclide specific activity concentrations in food
and drinking water is discussed in the next section.
When establishing reference levels for the control of food and drinking water, para. 5.23 of
GSR Part 3 [1] states that “the regulatory body or other relevant authority shall consider the
guideline levels for radionuclides in food traded internationally that could contain radioactive
substances as a result of a nuclear or radiological emergency, which have been published by
the Joint Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations/World Health
Organization Codex Alimentarius Commission” [5] and that “the regulatory body or other
relevant authority shall consider the guideline levels for radionuclides contained in drinking
water that have been published by the World Health Organization” [4]7.
What is important to note here is that the dose limits for planned exposure situations do not
apply in either emergency exposure situations or existing exposure situations. Although the
level of dose chosen as the reference level for commodities in existing exposure situations is
numerically equal to the dose limit for planned exposure situations, the circumstances are
conceptually different, because the controllability of the exposures is entirely different.
Paragraph 1.21 of GSR Part 3 [1] notes that “The descriptions that are given in para. 1.20 of
the three types of exposure situation are not always sufficient to determine unequivocally
which type of exposure situation applies for particular circumstances. For instance, the
transitions from an emergency exposure situation to an existing exposure situation may occur
progressively over time”. In this TECDOC and consistent with the requirements in
GSR Part 3, an existing exposure situation — the main subject of this TECDOC — is taken to
begin when the emergency, and therefore also that transition phase, has been declared to be
ended. Determination of the end of a nuclear or radiological emergency is a matter for the
national authorities.
The approach outlined in this TECDOC will be of use to regulatory bodies, policy makers and
interested parties managing all existing exposure situations involving food and drinking water
and not just existing exposure situations that follow the termination of an emergency.
Furthermore, planned exposure situations and emergency exposure situations are not directly
relevant to this TECDOC. They are discussed here only to put into context discussions about
radionuclides in food and drinking water.

7
The WHO Drinking Water Guidelines use the specific term ‘guidance levels’ rather than ‘guideline levels’
These have been derived for a range of common radionuclides of natural origin and radionuclides of artificial
origin. It is important to note that these values are advisory in nature and are not limits.

8
The roles and responsibilities of various international organizations, including the three
international organizations with responsibilities for the establishment of standards in relation
to radionuclides in food and drinking water — FAO, IAEA and WHO — are summarized in
Annex I.

3. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR RADIONUCLIDES IN

FOOD AND DRINKING WATER

3.1. INTRODUCTION

International organizations have developed reference levels, in terms of both individual dose
and activity concentrations of specific radionuclides, for food and drinking water, for
emergency exposure situations and existing exposure situations. Table 1 indicates the
international organizations that have established standards or guidance relating to emergency
exposure situations and existing exposure situations. Figures 1 and 2 indicate the stage in an
emergency exposure situation at which these standards apply or guidance applies.

TABLE 1. ORGANIZATIONS PUBLISHING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS OR PROVIDING

GUIDANCE FOR RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD AND DRINKING WATER

International organization
Reference levels or other
guidance Emergency exposure Existing exposure
situations situations

Food
Individual dose IAEA [2, 3] IAEA [1]
Activity concentrations IAEA [3] FAO and WHO [5]*
FAO and WHO [5]*

Drinking water
Individual dose IAEA [2, 3] IAEA [1]
Activity concentrations IAEA [3] WHO [4]
* The activity concentrations (guideline levels) established by the Joint FAO/WHO Codex
Alimentarius Commission were developed for use in international trade following a nuclear or
radiological emergency.

While GSR Part 3 provides the basic international standards for radiation protection and
safety, the FAO and the WHO have developed international guidance specifically relating to
radionuclides in food and drinking water. These are summarized in the following sections.

9
FIG. 1. The stage at which international standards or guidance for radionuclides in food and drinking water
apply on the basis of individual doses.

FIG. 2. The stage at which international standards or guidance for radionuclides in food and drinking water
apply on the basis of radionuclides.

3.2. INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

3.2.1. WHO guidelines for drinking water quality

Chapter 9 of the WHO Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality [4] provides criteria with which
to assess the safety of drinking water with respect to its radionuclide content. Guidance is also
provided on reducing health risks by taking measures to reduce radionuclide concentrations,
and therefore radiation exposures and doses, in situations where this is considered necessary.
For the WHO Guidelines, which apply only in situations involving prolonged exposure, a
consumption rate of two litres of drinking water per day is assumed.

The WHO Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality have been developed primarily for
radionuclides of natural origin, but also apply to radionuclides of artificial origin. This is
because, in principle, “human-made radionuclides are often controllable at the point at which

10
they enter the water supply” and “naturally occurring radionuclides in drinking water are
often less amenable to control”. The WHO uses an ‘individual dose criterion’ (IDC) of 0.1
mSv from one year’s consumption of drinking water, regardless of whether the radionuclides
are of natural origin or artificial origin. Experience has shown that the majority of drinking
water supplies comply with this dose criterion.

In assessing compliance with the IDC, initial screening measurements of gross alpha and
gross beta activity of the drinking water supply are carried out. If the measured activity
concentrations are below the screening levels of 0.5 Bq/L for gross alpha activity and 1 Bq/L
for gross beta activity, no further action is required. If either of the screening levels is
exceeded, the concentration of individual radionuclides needs to be determined. This will
allow the contribution from each radionuclide to the IDC to be calculated. Priority is to be
given to identifying those radionuclides of natural origin since radionuclides of artificial
origin are normally not present, or are present at concentrations that are too low to be of
significance for public health.

Based on the IDC, the WHO has developed guidance levels in terms of activity concentrations
for a range of common radionuclides of natural origin and of artificial origin. If more than one
radionuclide is identified in the drinking water supply, the individual doses due to each need
to be added to confirm whether or not the IDC is exceeded. The WHO notes that “guidance
levels are conservative and should not be interpreted as limits. Exceeding a guidance level
should be taken as a trigger for further investigation but not necessarily as an indication that
the drinking-water is unsafe”. In particular, if a guidance level is exceeded in an individual
sample, the IDC will only be exceeded if the same measured concentrations were to persist
for a full year. Hence the need for further investigation to determine whether the sample taken
is indeed representative of the situation at other times of the year. The WHO guidance levels
for radionuclides in drinking water are summarized in Table 2.

TABLE 2. WHO GUIDANCE LEVELS FOR RADIONUCLIDES IN DRINKING WATER

Radionuclide* Guidance level (Bq/L)

3
H 10 000
14
C** 100
90
Sr,131I**, 134Cs, 137Cs, 238U*** 10
226
Ra,228Th, 230Th, 232Th,234U, 239Pu, 241Am 1
210
Pb, 210Po, 228Ra 0.1
40
* K, a radionuclide that occurs naturally in a fixed ratio to stable potassium, is not
included. This is because potassium is an essential element for humans and its concentration
in the body is controlled by metabolic processes. If the screening level of 1 Bq/L for gross
beta activity concentration is exceeded, a separate determination of total potassium is made
and the contribution of 40K to beta activity is subtracted.
** 3H and 131I will not be detected by standard gross alpha or gross beta activity
measurements. Separate analyses are necessary only if there is reason to believe that these
radionuclides may be present.
*** Uranium is normally controlled on the basis of its chemical toxicity.

11
Sometimes the situation may arise where the WHO guidance levels are consistently exceeded
for one or a combination of radionuclides. National authorities will then need to make a
decision regarding the need to implement measures to reduce the radionuclide concentration
in that drinking water supply or place some restriction on the continued use of the water
supply for drinking purposes.
In considering the need for further measures, the WHO Guidelines refer to the requirement in
GSR Part 3 to establish a reference level for drinking water that generally does not exceed a
value of about 1 mSv in a year. The WHO Guidelines note that “this should not be regarded
either as an ‘acceptable’ dose or as a dose limit, and all reasonable efforts should be made to
minimize the doses received. Each situation will be different, and non-radiological factors,
such as the costs of remediation and the availability of other drinking water supplies, will
need to be taken into account in reaching a final decision”.
The WHO guidance levels do not apply in a nuclear or radiological emergency, but they do
apply once the relevant authorities have declared the emergency to be ended. The
applicability of the WHO Guidelines is summarized in Table 3.

TABLE 3. SUMMARY OF WHO GUIDELINES FOR RADIONUCLIDES IN DRINKING WATER

International standard WHO Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality [4]

• For use for an existing exposure situation

• Not for use for an emergency exposure situation
Application
• Applies to radionuclides of both natural origin and
artificial origin

• 0.1 mSv in a year from ingestion of drinking water

• The GSR Part 3 dose criterion of 1 mSv in a year is
Individual dose criterion quoted as guidance on assessing the need for remedial
measures in situations where the 0.1 mSv in a year
dose criterion is consistently exceeded

• Screening levels, based on measurements of gross

Assessment framework alpha activity and gross beta activity
• Guidance levels for specific radionuclides

• A consumption rate of 2 litres/day is assumed

• If the screening level for gross beta activity is
exceeded, the contribution from 40K should be
subtracted
Key issues to note • Consistently exceeding screening or guidance levels
does not mean that the drinking water supply is unsafe
• Uranium in drinking water is controlled for its
chemical toxicity rather than its radiological toxicity
— the guidance level is 30 µg/L

12
3.2.2. Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission guidelines for radionuclides
in food
The Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed (CGSCTFF) [5]
published by the Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission, contains ‘guideline
levels’8 for “radionuclides in foods destined for human consumption and traded
internationally” following a nuclear or radiological emergency. These are summarized in
Table 4.

TABLE 4. CODEX GUIDELINE LEVELS FOR RADIONUCLIDES IN FOODS WITH

CONTAMINATION FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR OR RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY FOR USE
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE [5]

Guideline level
Product name Representative radionuclides
(Bq/kg)

238
Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Am 1

90
Sr, 106Ru, 129l, 131l, 235U 100
Infant foods*
35
S**,60Co, 89Sr, 103Ru, 134Cs, 137Cs, 144Ce, 192Ir 1 000

3
H***, 14C, 99Tc 1 000

238
Pu, 239Pu, 240Pu, 241Am 10

90
Sr, 106Ru, 129l, 131l, 235U 100
Foods other than
infant foods 35
S**,60Co, 89Sr, 103Ru, 134Cs, 137Cs, 144Ce, 192Ir 1 000

3
H***, 14C, 99Tc 10 000

* When intended for use as such.

** Represents the value for organically bound sulphur.
*** Represents the value for organically bound tritium.

The Codex guideline levels were developed in the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident in
1986 at a time when no comprehensive guidance on international trade in food and feed
containing radionuclides had been established. The radionuclides included are those important
for uptake into the food chain and most likely to be present following a nuclear or radiological
emergency. For that reason, radionuclides of natural origin are generally excluded from
consideration.

8
The CGSCTFF defines a guideline level (GL) as “The maximum level of a substance in a food or feed
commodity which is recommended by the Codex Alimentarius Commission to be acceptable for commodities
moving in international trade. When the GL is exceeded, governments shall decide whether and under what
circumstances the food should be distributed within their territory or jurisdiction. National governments may
wish to adopt different values for internal use within their own territories where the assumptions concerning food
distribution that have been made to derive the guideline levels may not apply e.g. in the case of widespread
radioactive contamination.”

13
The guideline levels are based on a dose criterion9 of 1 mSv in a year and the assumption that
10% of the diet is of imported food, all of which has contamination at the guideline level
throughout the year. The guideline levels have been developed for 20 radionuclides divided
into four groups according to their radiotoxicity (i.e. in terms of the radiation dose they
deliver following ingestion). Two categories of foods are considered (‘infant foods’ and
‘foods other than infant foods’), giving a total of eight guideline levels. For foods that are
eaten in small quantities, such as spices or food additives, which represent a small percentage
of the total diet and hence a small addition to the total dose, the guideline levels may be
increased by a factor of 10.
As far as radiological protection is concerned, when radionuclide levels in food do not exceed
the corresponding Codex guideline levels, the food is considered radiologically safe for
human consumption. Reference [5] also advises that:
“If radionuclide concentrations above the Guideline Levels are identified, this does not
necessarily imply that the food is unsafe for human consumption; the Guideline Levels
have been derived with large safety margins using specific assumptions and national
governments shall decide whether and under what circumstances food with higher
activity concentrations should be distributed within their territory or jurisdiction”.
This is discussed further in the next section.
The Codex guideline levels have been developed with the understanding that there is no need
to sum contributions from radionuclides in different groups: each group is treated
independently. Within each of the groups, the guideline level applies to the sum of the activity
concentrations of the radionuclides in the group. Hence, when more than one radionuclide in
the group is present, then the activity concentrations of each radionuclide in the same group
are added together. For example, if both 134Cs and 137Cs are present in a particular food, the
guideline level of 1 000 Bq/kg would apply to the sum of the activity concentrations for the
two radionuclides.
The applicability of the Codex general standard is summarized in Table 5.
Tables 6 and 7 summarize the terminology used in the various international standards that
deal with radionuclides in food and drinking water.

9
The term used in the Codex [5] is ‘intervention exemption level’, a term used prior to the publication of GSR
Part 3 [1]. This term may now be treated as effectively equivalent to the currently used term of ‘reference level’.

14
TABLE 5. SUMMARY OF CODEX GUIDELINES FOR RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in

International standard
Food and Feed [5]

Application • applies only to food with contamination following a nuclear or

radiation emergency
• applies only to international trade
• applies to food ‘as consumed’

Dose criterion 1 mSv in a year from ingestion

Assessment framework Codex guideline levels are defined in terms of four radionuclide
groups (20 radionuclides) for two categories of foods — ‘infant
foods’ and ‘non-infant foods’.

Applicability to drinking water Drinking water is not included in this standard. However, the
Codex General Standard for Bottled/Packaged Drinking Waters
(Other than Natural Mineral Waters) [11] states that the water
“shall comply with the health-related requirements of the most
recent Guidelines for Drinking Water Quality published by the
World Health Organization”.

Key issues to note • Activity concentrations are derived by assuming 10% of the diet
is imported food, all of which has contamination throughout the
year at a level that would be equivalent to a 1 mSv ingestion
dose. The remaining 90% is assumed not to have
contamination.
• An adult consumption rate of 550 kg per year and an infant
consumption rate of 200 kg per year are assumed.
• The resulting activity concentrations (equivalent to an ingestion
dose of 1 mSv in a year) are rounded down to an appropriate
order of magnitude in deriving the guideline levels.
• Guideline levels may be increased by a factor of 10 for food
consumed in small quantities that represent only a small
percentage of the total diet (e.g. spices).
• The standard does not deal with bottled water but this is
covered in a separate Codex standard that refers to the WHO
Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality. As regards (bulk)
drinking water, this is not specifically included, primarily
because it is normally not traded internationally. The guideline
levels apply to food after reconstitution or as prepared for
consumption.

15
TABLE 6. TERMINOLOGY USED IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR FOOD

Individual dose Activity concentrations Responsible international

Food
in a year (Bq/kg) organization

Reference level 1 mSv NO IAEA [1]

Intervention Joint FAO/WHO Codex

1 mSv YES — guideline levels
exemption level Alimentarius Commission [5]

Developed separately for Joint FAO/WHO Codex

Guideline levels —
infants and non-infants Alimentarius Commission [5]

TABLE 7. TERMINOLOGY USED IN INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR DRINKING

WATER

Individual dose Activity concentrations Responsible international

Drinking water
in a Year (Bq/L) organization

Reference level 1 mSv NO IAEA [1]

Indicative dose 0.1 mSv YES — guidance levels WHO [4]

Developed primarily for

Guidance level — radionuclides of natural WHO [4]
origin

16
 4. THE CONTROLLABILITY OF RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD AND DRINKING
WATER IN AN EXISTING EXPOSURE SITUATION

4.1. INTRODUCTION

GSR Part 3 applies “to all situations involving radiation exposure that is amenable to control”,
and “Exposures deemed to be not amenable to control are excluded from the scope of these
Standards” (Ref. [1], para. 1.42). As already noted, the controllability of radiation exposures
depends very much on the type of exposure situation of interest. In this TECDOC, the
concern is with residual activity concentrations of radionuclides in food and drinking water,
and therefore with existing exposure situations. These radionuclides may originate from
unregulated past practices, from fallout from the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere
and, most importantly, from releases of radionuclides to the environment in a nuclear or
radiological emergency. There is also a need to consider whether radionuclides of natural
origin that may be present in food and drinking water are amenable to control and, if so,
whether such control is justified.
The fundamental quantity in which radiation protection criteria, particularly those given in
GSR Part 3, are expressed is individual dose within a specified time period. For the purpose
of providing a practical quantity for measurement, such criteria need to be expressed in terms
of activity concentrations of relevant radionuclides. Often, however, the measurement of
activity concentration will not differentiate between the different origins of a given
radionuclide, unless that radionuclide is specific to a particular source. For example, a
radionuclide such as 137Cs that is present in a particular sample of food may include
contributions from a number of different sources. In general, the concentrations of
radionuclides in food and water that originate from sources such as authorized discharges may
be significant only in the region close to the installation from which they have been
discharged. In a nuclear or radiological accident, however, radionuclides may be more widely
dispersed, and thus potentially could be found in food and drinking water over a much larger
area.

4.2. RADIONUCLIDES OF NATURAL ORIGIN

The WHO guidelines specify guidance levels for water that are primarily focused on
radionuclides of natural origin. On the other hand, the Codex General Standard [11] notes
that:
“Radionuclides of natural origin are ubiquitous and as a consequence are present in all
foodstuffs to varying degrees. Radiation doses from the consumption of foodstuffs
typically range from a few tens to a few hundreds of microsieverts in a year. In
essence, the doses from these radionuclides when naturally present in the diet are
unamenable to control; the resources that would be required to affect exposures would
be out of proportion to the benefits achieved for health. These radionuclides are
excluded from consideration in this document as they are not associated with
emergencies.”
Concentrations of radionuclides of natural origin in different foods can vary because of
different environmental conditions, agricultural practices and other factors affecting their
transfer from the environment to crops and animal products. In addition, doses due to
consumption of food vary depending on the types of food that are consumed in any particular
State.

17
The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR)
has reviewed the available scientific data on the doses from ingestion of radionuclides of
natural origin in food and drinking water [12]. Table 8 provides ‘reference values’ of activity
concentrations of these radionuclides for use in the assessment of dose.

TABLE 8. REFERENCE VALUES 10 FOR CONCENTRATIONS OF RADIONUCLIDES IN THE

URANIUM AND THORIUM SERIES IN FOODS AND DRINKING WATER [12]

Concentration (Bq/kg) × 10-3

Product 238 230 226 210 210 232 228 228 235
U Th Ra Pb Po Th Ra Th U

Milk products 1 0.5 5 15 15 0.3 5 0.3 0.05

Meat products 2 2 15 80 60 1 10 1 0.05

Grain products 20 10 80 50 60 3 60 3 1

Leafy vegetables 20 20 50 80 100 15 40 15 1

Roots and fruits 3 0.5 30 30 40 0.5 20 0.5 0.1

Fish products 30 10 100 200 2 000 10 ND* 100 ND*

Drinking water 1 0.1 0.5 10 5 0.05 0.5 0.05 0.04

* ND indicates that no published data are available.

When the values in Table 8 are combined with typical consumption rates for each food group
(these are also presented in reference [12]), the annual individual doses from radionuclides in
the uranium and thorium series in the total diet (food and drinking water together) are 0.26
mSv, 0.2 mSv and 0.11 mSv for infants, children and adults, respectively, with a weighted
mean value of 0.14 mSv. The bulk of this dose comes from the food component of the diet,
with the consumption of drinking water representing about 6% of the total (see Table 9). The
annual individual dose due to drinking water alone is of the order of 0.01 mSv, i.e. ten times
lower than the WHO guidance level of 0.1 mSv [4]. The radionuclides which contribute the
bulk of this dose are 210Po, 210Pb and, to a lesser extent, 228Ra.

10
The concentrations of radionuclides of natural origin in food vary widely. Reference values have been derived
from the most widely available and representative data. Reference values are designed for use in generic dose
assessments but may not be fully representative of the situation in a particular country owing to differences in
diet, climate and agricultural practices.

18
TABLE 9. ANNUAL EFFECTIVE DOSES FROM RADIONUCLIDES OF THE URANIUM AND
THORIUM SERIES IN FOOD AND DRINKING WATER [12]

Committed effective dose (mSv)*

Age-
Infants Children Adults
weighted**

Total diet (EDfdw) 0.26 0.20 0.11 0.14

Drinking water (EDdw) 0.012 0.012 0.007 0.009

Relative contribution to dose

of drinking water to food 4.8% 6.1% 6.1% 6%
(EDdw/EDfdw)

* The committed effective dose is the dose from one year’s intake, not all of which will be received
in the first year. At equilibrium, it is equivalent to the annual dose.
** Age distribution for weighted values: infants 5%, children 30%, adults 65%.

All components of the diet also contain the radionuclide of natural origin 40K. Potassium is a
key element in regulating many body functions such as digestion and heart rate and the
potassium content of the body is kept constant by metabolic processes. Potassium naturally
contains 0.12% by weight of 40K, and so the content of 40K in the body is also regulated
naturally. UNSCEAR [12] has estimated that the annual effective dose due to the presence of
40
K in the body is typically about 165 × 10-3 mSv for adults and 185 × 10-3 mSv for children.
No control can reasonably be exercised over the dose from 40 K in the diet11. It is for this
reason that WHO has not provided a guidance level for this radionuclide in drinking water;
following a measurement of gross beta activity concentration that exceeds the screening level,
the 40K content is determined so that the contribution from that radionuclide can be
subtracted.
It can be concluded, therefore, that people typically receive a total radiation dose of about
0.3 mSv each year due to radionuclides of natural origin in the diet. Somewhat higher doses
are received by infants and children and somewhat lower doses are received by adults. This
represents typically 10% of the average annual radiation dose of 3 mSv from all sources
received by an individual [12].
Much of the data on activity concentrations in food reviewed by UNSCEAR span an order of
magnitude, so that certain individuals, depending on their preferences, may receive higher
radiation doses from their diet. For example, shellfish contain higher concentrations of 210Po
than most other foodstuffs and individuals that consume large quantities of shellfish will
receive a higher radiation dose than others [13]. UNSCEAR has indicated that the typical
range of individual doses from ingestion of radionuclides of natural origin is 0.2 to 1 mSv in a
year [14]. Short of limiting the consumption of particular foods with higher than average
activity concentrations, there is little that can be done to control public exposure from this
source. This is consistent with the view expressed in the Codex General Standard [5].

11
Footnote 8 of GSR Part 3 [1] states that “it is generally accepted, for example, that it is not feasible to control
40
K in the body”.

19
4.3. RADIONUCLIDES OF ARTIFICIAL ORIGIN

The Codex guideline levels relating to foods destined for human consumption and traded
internationally were originally developed for the first year following a nuclear or radiological
emergency. In 1991 the Codex Alimentarius Commission decided that the applicable time
span should be extended for an indefinite period following an emergency [15]. The guideline
levels are based on a dose of 1 mSv in a year and cautious assumptions regarding the
percentage of foods imported from regions with contamination (the percentage chosen was
10%) and the dose conversion factors. The radionuclides included are those that (1) are
important for uptake into the food chain; (2) are usually present and contained in nuclear
installations or used as a radiation source in large enough quantities to be significant potential
contributors to levels in foods; and (3) could be released to the environment from typical
installations in an accident or might be employed in malicious acts.
There is an element of caution included in the assumptions used in deriving the Codex
guideline levels. As an example, in developing the guideline levels, the Codex Alimentarius
Commission considered one of the important radionuclides that has been released to the
environment in a nuclear or radiological emergency and is subsequently found in foods,
namely 137Cs. The doses to adults and infants during the first year after contamination with
this radionuclide, assuming that 10% of food contains such radionuclides at the guideline
level for the whole year, were calculated to be 0.7 mSv and 0.4 mSv, respectively, i.e.
significantly less than 1 mSv.
As noted in the Codex General Standard [5], beyond one year after the emergency, the
fraction of food containing such radionuclides placed on the market will generally decrease.
As a general rule, the activity concentrations of the radionuclides of interest will also decrease
with time as a result of radioactive decay and natural processes — washing into and
immobilization of radionuclides in the soil. The guidelines go on to state that:
“Experience has shown that in the long term the fraction of imported contaminated
food will decrease by a factor of a hundred or more. Specific food categories, e.g. wild
food products, may show persistent or even increasing levels of contamination. Other
categories of food may gradually be exempted from controls. Nevertheless, it must be
anticipated that it may take many years before levels of individual exposure as a result
of contaminated food could be qualified as negligible.”
The conclusion that can be drawn from this is that use of the guideline levels is in general
sufficient for the purpose of controlling the long term activity concentrations of radionuclides
of artificial origin in food that result from a nuclear or radiological emergency and is traded
internationally.
The fact that the activity concentrations of these radionuclides in the food supply are likely to
decrease with time has been used as an argument to reduce the reference levels. In particular,
it might be argued that optimization of protection needs to be carried out below the reference
level and this would indicate the need to establish lower levels. However, as noted in
GSR Part 3 (Ref. [1], para. 1.15), this principle requires consideration of “economic, societal
and environmental factors”. National authorities may feel that by reducing permissible levels,
they are acting in the interests of the public. However, maintaining public confidence is
important, and a major consequence of reducing levels used for controls is likely to be that the
public will then regard the previous levels as unsafe. As an example, considerable public
concern was caused by the use of different standards for and approaches to the protection of
the public in the various European States affected following the Chernobyl accident [16].

20
In the interests of harmonization of approaches — an important aspect of the establishment of
safety standards by the IAEA — and to avoid creating additional anxiety among the public, it
would seem appropriate to make use of the Codex guideline levels by adopting them as
reference levels on a long term basis, including for nationally produced and consumed foods.
The exposure of the population would then be reduced naturally without further intervention
by national authorities. It is difficult to see what might be achieved by adopting national
reference levels that are lower than the activity concentrations specified in Codex standards.

4.4. SPECIAL SITUATIONS

Specific foods within a State that has been significantly affected by a nuclear or radiological
emergency may continue to accumulate radionuclides over long periods, even after an
emergency has been declared ended. The same may be true in some neighbouring States that
were also affected. This has been shown to be the case with 137Cs following the Chernobyl
accident. The following is taken from a report by UNSCEAR [17]:
“The level of radiocaesium in mushrooms in forests is often much higher than that in
forest fruits such as bilberries. This is reflected in the aggregated transfer coefficients
for forest berries, which range from 0.02 to 0.2m2/kg [18]. Owing to the generally
lower levels of radiocaesium and to the lower masses eaten, exposure due to
consumption of forest berries is smaller than that due to consumption of mushrooms.
However, both products contribute significantly to the diet of grazing animals and,
therefore, provide a second route of exposure to humans via game consumption.
Animals grazing in forests and other semi-natural ecosystems often produce meat with
high activity concentrations of radiocaesium. Such animals include wild boar, roe
deer, moose and reindeer, but also domestic animals such as cows and sheep, which
may graze marginal areas of forests.”
UNSCEAR also noted “high concentrations of radiocaesium in fish occurred in lakes with
slow or no turnover of water, particularly if the lake was also shallow and poor in mineral
nutrients.”
In general, levels of 137Cs in mushrooms and in the meat of wild animals many years after the
Chernobyl accident ranged up to a few, even several, thousand becquerels per kilogram (see,
for example, Refs [19–23]). In cases such as these, where the activity concentration of a
radionuclide is persistently above the relevant Codex guideline level, the national authority
will need to determine whether any restrictions on specific foods are necessary to prevent
them entering the food supply. Various courses of action may be feasible, the most obvious
being prohibition of marketing of a particular food or limitation of access to areas from which
mushrooms and game might be obtained. Following the Chernobyl accident in 1986, a
number of actions were taken to reduce the activity concentrations of 137Cs in sheep and
animal products: sheep were moved from mountain pastures to lowland pastures with lower
activity concentrations prior to marketing while cows were administered Prussian Blue
(hexacyanoferrate compounds) to reduce transfer of 137Cs from the stomach to the animals’
flesh [17].
Such situations could occur from time to time, and there may be a number of reasons why
national authorities may accept higher activity concentrations than those given in the Codex
General Standard. These include:

21
1. The amount of food with higher activity concentrations that is consumed is relatively
small, much less than the 10% assumed in the Codex calculations (this might, for
example, be the case with game or wild mushrooms). It is noted that the Codex guidelines
indicate “for foods that are consumed in small quantities, such as spices, that represent a
small percentage of total diet and hence a small addition to the total dose, the guideline
levels may be increased by a factor of 10”.
2. Alternative sources of food are not available, or are unduly expensive, so that people
would suffer malnutrition, possibly severe.
3. Societal considerations, such as the preserving of a particular lifestyle or certain religious
beliefs, may mean that actions to reduce radiation doses are not justified.
For these sorts of reason, it would be desirable for the national authority to be able to accept
higher levels than those given in the Codex guidelines [5]. As noted in section 2, for
commodities, GSR Part 3 [1] requires the annual effective dose to the representative person
generally not to exceed a value of about 1 mSv. If the same approach is used as in the Codex
guidelines, the activity concentrations could be derived from this dose using the following
equation:
( )= ( )× ( )×
(1)

Where:
GL(A) is the guideline level (Bq/kg);
E is the annual effective dose to the representative person (in this case, 1 mSv);
M(A) is the age-dependent mass of food consumed per year (kg);
eing(A) is the age-dependent ingestion dose coefficient (mSv/Bq); and
F is the assumed contamination fraction (dimensionless).
In the case of extensive contamination, then a higher level of dose might be used. This would
still be consistent with the requirements of GSR Part 3, as the more general criterion for
existing exposure situations is that the “reference levels shall typically be expressed as an
annual effective dose to the representative person in the range 1–20 mSv” [1, para. 5.8].
Concerning water, UNSCEAR notes the following in relation to the Chernobyl accident:
“Initial concentrations in river water in parts of Belarus, the Russian Federation and
Ukraine were relatively high, compared both to those in other European rivers and to
the standards for radionuclides in drinking water, owing to direct deposition onto river
surfaces and to transport of radionuclides in run-off water from the catchment area.
During the first few weeks after the accident, the activity concentrations in river waters
rapidly declined, because of the physical decay of the short-lived radionuclides and as
catchment soils and bottom sediments absorbed the radionuclides. In the longer term,
the long-lived 137Cs and 90Sr became the dominant radionuclides in aquatic ecosystems.
Although the levels of these radionuclides in rivers in the long term were low,
temporary increases in the activity concentrations during flooding of the Pripyat caused
serious concern in areas using water from the Dnieper cascade.
“Lakes and reservoirs had increased levels of radioactivity due to direct deposition of
radionuclides onto the water surface and transfers of radionuclides onto the water
surface and transfers of radionuclides in run-off water from the deposited material on
the surrounding catchment area. The radionuclides concentrations in water declined
rapidly in reservoirs and in those lakes with significant inflow and outflow of water
(“open” lake systems). In some cases, however, the activity concentrations of

22
 radiocaesium in lakes remained relatively high because of run-off from organic soils in
the catchment. In addition, internal cycling of radiocaesium in “closed” lake systems
(i.e. lakes with little inflow and outflow of water) led to much higher activity
concentrations in their water and aquatic biota than were typically seen in open lakes
and rivers.”
It may be concluded from this that the activity concentration in drinking water supplies of the
longer lived radionuclides such as 137Cs might still need to be considered after an emergency
has been declared ended. However, it is noted that the WHO guidelines include a guideline
level of 10 Bq/L for 137Cs; values are also given for a number of other radionuclides of
artificial origin. In certain circumstances it may be necessary to develop guidance levels for
additional radionuclides, other than those already published by the WHO. These can be
calculated using the equation given in Ref. [4]:

= (2)
×

Where:
GL is the guidance level of radionuclide in drinking water (Bq/L);
IDC is the individual dose criterion, equal to 0.1 mSv in a year;
hing is the dose coefficient for ingestion by adults (mSv/Bq); and
q is the annual ingested volume of drinking water, assumed to be 730 litres in a
year (equivalent to the standard WHO drinking water consumption rate of 2 litres
per day).
In some circumstances, national authorities may wish to consider the implications of
amending either the guideline level or the reference level expressed in terms of individual
dose in a year for food in advance of making a decision. This is discussed, together with some
examples in Annex II, while some examples of national approaches in the aftermath of the
Chernobyl accident are given in Annex III.

23
 5. SUMMARY

1. Food and drinking water may contain radionuclides of natural origin or residual amounts
of radionuclides of artificial origin after an emergency has been declared ended. The
requirements for existing exposure situations in GSR Part 3 apply when the exposures
from these radionuclides are considered amenable to control.

2. For the purpose of decision-making, GSR Part 3 [1] requires that reference levels,
typically based on as an annual effective dose to a representative person, be in the range
1–20 mSv. Specifically for commodities, which include food and drinking water,
reference levels are based on a value of 1 mSv.

3. All components of diet, food and drinking water, contain the radionuclide of natural origin
40
K. The other principal radionuclides of natural origin that may be present in diet are
those in the uranium decay series and the thorium decay series, the most important being
isotopes of radium and 210Po and 210Pb. No control can reasonably be exercised over the
exposure from 40K whether present in food or drinking water. Furthermore, while there
will be some variation in exposure between individuals from the other radionuclides of
natural origin, depending on the type of food they consume, no control can reasonably be
exercised over this exposure. However, some control can be exercised over the exposure
due to the presence of radionuclides in the uranium and thorium decay series in drinking
water.

4. The WHO, in its Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality [4], uses an individual dose
criterion of 0.1 mSv from one year’s consumption of drinking water and on this basis has
developed a procedure for screening water supplies. Guidance levels for both
radionuclides of natural origin (other than 40 K) and radionuclides of artificial origin are
given in terms of activity concentrations based on the individual dose criterion. If these
concentrations are consistently exceeded, national authorities will need to make a decision
on the need to implement remedial measures or restrictions on use. In considering this, the
Guidelines refer to the requirement in GSR Part 3 relating to the reference level of 1 mSv
in a year.

5. The Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission has established guideline levels
(activity concentrations) for radionuclides contained in foods destined for human
consumption and traded internationally, following a nuclear or radiological emergency.
They are based on a dose criterion of 1 mSv in a year and use cautious assumptions
particularly regarding the percentage of food with contamination that is consumed. They
were developed with the first year following an emergency in mind but are also applicable
on a permanent basis. In subsequent years, the assumptions underpinning the guideline
levels would become even more cautious.

6. In view of the caution used in the derivation of the activity concentrations given in the
Codex guidelines, it would appear that they would also be appropriate for use within
States that have been significantly affected by a nuclear emergency once the emergency
has been declared ended. The use of one set of values, for international trade and in the
long term within any affected State, has considerable benefit in terms of international
harmonization and reassurance of the public.

24
7. In exceptional circumstances, national authorities may wish to accept higher activity
concentrations than those given in the WHO or Codex guidelines. Formulas for deriving
higher levels, on the basis of the approaches used in the relevant guidelines, are given in
the text and in Annex II.

8. While the Codex General Standard [5] includes only radionuclides that are of artificial
origin, there are radionuclides of natural origin that could potentially be used in malicious
acts, thereby leading to contamination of the food chain and drinking water supplies. Such
radionuclides include 210Po and 226Ra. It is envisaged that these would have only localized
impacts and it is suggested that national authorities could deal with these situations on a
case-by-case basis.

9. In developing appropriate and reference levels of activity concentration for radionuclides

in food and drinking water, interested parties could be consulted and their views taken into
account as part of the decision making process.

25
 REFERENCES

[1] EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF

THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY
AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Radiation
Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, IAEA
Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna (2014).
[2] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, INTERPOL, OECD NUCLEAR
ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR THE COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-
BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD
METEOROLOGICAL ORGANIZATION, Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or
Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 7, IAEA, Vienna
(2015).
[3] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a
Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-2, IAEA,
Vienna (2011).
[4] WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality — 4th
Ed., WHO, Geneva (2011).
[5] JOINT FAO/WHO FOOD STANDARDS PROGRAMME, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
COMMISSION, Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and
Feed, Schedule 1 — Radionuclides, CODEX STAN 1931995, CAC, Rome (2006).
[6] EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY
AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIROMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Fundamental
Safety Principles, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. SF-1, IAEA, Vienna (2006).
[7] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Justification of Practices,
including Non-Medical Human Imaging, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-5,
IAEA, Vienna (2014).
[8] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, The 2007
Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection,
Publication 103, Elsevier Science, Oxford and New York (2007).
[9] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulatory Control of Radioactive
Discharges to the Environment, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. WS-G-2.3, IAEA,
Vienna (2000) (A revision of this publication is in preparation).
[10] INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Assessing
Dose of the Representative Person for the Purpose of the Radiation Protection of the
Public, Publication 101a, Elsevier Science, Oxford and New York (2006).

26
[11] JOINT FAO/WHO FOOD STANDARDS PROGRAMME, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
COMMISSION, General Standard for Bottled/ Packaged Drinking Waters (Other than
Natural Mineral Waters), CODEX STAN 2272001, CAC, Rome (2001).
[12] UNITED NATIONS, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Volume I Scientific
Annex B: Exposures from Natural Radiation Sources; United Nations Scientific
Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, UNSCEAR 2000 Report, UN, New
York (2000).
[13] ALAM, L., MOHAMED, C.A.R., A mini review on bioaccumulation of 210Po by
marine organisms, International Food Research Journal, 18 (2011) 110.
[14] UNITED NATIONS, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Volume I: Report to
the General Assembly (A/63/46); United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation, UNSCEAR 2008 Report, UN, New York (2008).
[15] CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION, Nineteenth Session Rome, 1–10 July 1991
- Report Of The Twenty-Third Session Of The Codex Committee On Food Additives
And Contaminants, CAC, Rome (1991).
[16] OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, Chernobyl: Assessment of Radiological and
Health Impacts
[17] UNITED NATIONS, Sources and Effects of Ionizing Radiation. Volume II Scientific
Annex D - Health effects due to radiation from the Chernobyl accident; United Nations
Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, UNSCEAR 2008 Report, UN,
New York (2008).
[18] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Handbook of parameter values for
the prediction of radionuclide transfer in terrestrial and freshwater environments
TECDOC 364, IAEA, Vienna (2009).
[19] SKUTERUD, L., GAARE, E., EIKELMANN, I.E., HOVE, H, STEINNES, E.,
Chernobyl radioactivity persists in reindeer, J. Environ. Radioactivity, 83 2 (2005) 231–
252.
[20] BERESFORD, N.A., MAYES, R.W., BARNETT, C.L., MACEACHERN, P.J.,
CROUT, N.M.J., Variation in the metabolism of radiocaesium between individual
sheep. Radiation and Environmental Biophysics, 37 4 (1998) 277281.
[21] HEINRICH, G., Uptake and transfer factors of 137Cs by mushrooms, Radiation and
Environmental Biophysics 31 1 (1992) 3949.
[22] SEMIZHON, T., PUTYRSKAYA, V., ZIBOLD, G., KLEMT, E.: Time-dependency of
the 137Cs contamination of wild boar from a region in Southern Germany in the years
1998 to 2008 J Environ. Radioact. 100 11 (2009) 98892.
[23] DER SPIEGEL, A Quarter Century after Chernobyl: Radioactive Boar on the Rise in
Germany (2010).

27
 ANNEX I.
ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
IN RELATION TO RADIONUCLIDES IN FOOD AND DRINKING WATER

I-1. INTRODUCTION

Apart from the three principal international organizations with mandates for setting standards
(FAO, IAEA and WHO), other international organizations play an important role in the
development and implementation of these standards. Such organizations include the European
Commission and the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (NEA). In addition, the International Commission on Radiological
Protection (ICRP) develops recommendations for the overall ICRP System of Radiological
Protection. The roles and responsibilities of the abovementioned international organizations in
relation to the development of standards (FAO, IAEA and WHO), legislation (European
Commission) and general advice (NEA and ICRP) in relation to radionuclides in food and
drinking water are described below.

I-2. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

European Commission

The European Commission has particular responsibilities with regard to the placing of food
and feedstuffs on the European Union market in the event of a radiological emergency. If the
Commission receives information on an accident or any other radiological emergency, and if
the circumstances so require, it will adopt a Regulation rendering the pre-established
maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs and feedstuffs
applicable in the European Union Member States. The pre-established maximum permitted
levels are given in Council Regulation 3954/87/Euratom [I-1], as amended by Council
Regulation 2218/89/Euratom [I-2], and supplemented by Commission Regulations
944/89/Euratom [I-3] and 770/90/Euratom [I-4]. European Union Member States have the
obligation and responsibility to implement the Community foodstuffs and feeding stuffs
regulations in emergency situations.

The Commission has specific responsibilities in monitoring the implementation of the

European Union law on radioactivity in drinking water. The Euratom Drinking Water
Directive 2013/51/Euratom [I-5] provides a framework for controlling radioactivity in
drinking water and the radiation dose received from the consumption of different forms of
drinking water. The Directive applies to tap water and to water in bottles or containers
intended for human consumption. It does not apply to natural mineral waters and to small
private supplies. The Directive deals with radionuclides of natural origin as well as with
radionuclides of artificial origin. It lays down general principles for monitoring and gives
technical details (frequencies of sampling, analysis methods, measuring methods, etc.). The
Directive lays down values for radon, tritium, and the so-called "indicative dose", which
covers many other radionuclides. The values have an indicative function, they are not limits.
Exceeding a value should not be regarded as a health risk without having a closer look at the
situation. A thorough investigation may – if warranted – lead to remedial action. In such an
event, the public has to be informed.

28
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

The constitution12 of the FAO states that the organization “shall collect, analyse, interpret, and
disseminate information relating to nutrition, food and agriculture”13. In addition, the FAO
“shall promote and, where appropriate, shall recommend national and international action
with respect to: scientific, technological, social, and economic research relating to nutrition,
food and agriculture; the improvement of education and administration relating to nutrition,
food and agriculture, and the spread of public knowledge of nutritional and agricultural
science and practice; the conservation of natural resources and the adoption of improved
methods of agricultural production; the improvement of the processing, marketing, and
distribution of food and agricultural products; the adoption of policies for the provision of
adequate agricultural credit, national and international; the adoption of international policies
with respect to agricultural commodity arrangements”. Furthermore, it is also the function of
the FAO to “furnish such technical assistance as governments may request; organize, in
cooperation with the governments concerned, such missions as may be needed to assist them
to fulfil the obligations arising from their acceptance of the recommendations of the United
Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture”; and generally to take all necessary and
appropriate action to implement the purposes of the organization as set forth in the preamble
of the constitution.

The FAO works in partnership with the IAEA and other United Nation Agencies through the
Joint FAO/IAEA Division on Nuclear Techniques in Food and Agriculture (Vienna) in
preparing for and responding to nuclear or radiological emergencies affecting food,
agriculture, forestry and fisheries. This includes the application of FAO capabilities as a
critical counterpart in defining and implementing agricultural countermeasures and
remediation strategies in response to such emergencies. The FAO has statutory functions that
are relevant to preparing for, responding to, and providing assistance in the event of a nuclear
or radiological emergency. It collects, analyses, interprets and disseminates information
relating to nutrition, food and agriculture (including fisheries, marine products, and forestry
and primary forestry products). It also promotes and where appropriate, advises national and
international action with respect to the improvement of the processing, marketing, and
distribution of food and agricultural products and the adoption of international policies with
respect to agricultural commodity arrangements. The Joint FAO/IAEA Division is the FAO
focal point under the cooperative arrangements between the FAO and the IAEA for
information exchange and technical support in relation to food and agriculture in the case of a
nuclear or radiological emergency, in line with the Joint Radiation Emergency Management
Plan of the International Organizations14 [I-6].

International Atomic Energy Agency

The IAEA is a forum for cooperation in the nuclear field. It was set up as the world’s ‘Atoms
for Peace’ organization in 1957 within the United Nations system. The IAEA Secretariat
works with Member States and multiple partners worldwide to promote safe, secure and
peaceful nuclear technologies.

12
http://www.fao.org/docrep/x5584e/x5584e0i.htm
13
The term ‘agriculture’ and its derivatives include fisheries, marine products, forestry and primary forestry
products.
14
The Joint Plan describes the inter-agency framework for preparedness for and response to an actual, potential
or perceived radiation incident or emergency independent of whether it arises from an accident, natural disaster,
negligence, a nuclear security event or any other cause.

29
The IAEA is authorized to establish or adopt, in consultation and, where appropriate, in
collaboration with the competent organs of the United Nations and with the specialized
agencies concerned, standards of safety for protection of health and minimization of danger to
life and property and to provide for the application of these standards (IAEA Statute,
Article 3, para. 6 of Ref. [I-7]).

The IAEA safety standards reflect an international consensus on what constitutes a high level
of safety for protecting people and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing
radiation. The safety standards establish fundamental safety principles, requirements and
measures to control the radiation exposure of people and the release of radioactive material to
the environment, to restrict the likelihood of events that might lead to a loss of control over a
nuclear reactor core, nuclear chain reaction, radioactive source or any other source of
radiation, and to mitigate the consequences of such events if they were to occur.

The standards apply to facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks, including
nuclear installations, the use of radiation and radioactive sources, the transport of radioactive
material and the management of radioactive waste.

International Commission on Radiological Protection

The ICRP was established to advance the science of radiological protection for the public
benefit, in particular by providing recommendations and guidance on all aspects of radiation
protection [I-8]. In preparing its recommendations, the Commission considers the
fundamental principles and quantitative bases upon which appropriate radiation protection
measures can be established, while leaving to the various national radiation protection bodies
the responsibility of formulating the specific advice, codes of practice, or regulations that are
best suited to the needs of their individual countries. ICRP provides recommendations and
guidance on all aspects of protection against ionizing radiation, including the management of
radionuclide activity concentrations in food and drinking water.

Joint FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission

The Codex Alimentarius Commission is an intergovernmental body established by the FAO

Conference (1961) and the World Health Assembly (1963) to implement the Joint FAO/WHO
Food Standards Programme. The main objective of the Commission is to protect the health of
consumers and to ensure fair practices in the food trade by setting international standards and
other related texts (e.g. guidelines, codes of practice, principles, etc.). These are developed for
voluntary application by governments.

The Commission may establish subsidiary bodies for the accomplishment of its work, one of
this being the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF). The Terms of Reference
of the CCCF includes the establishment, revision or endorsement of maximum levels and
guideline levels for contaminants and naturally occurring toxicants in food and feed,
identification of methods of analysis and elaboration of sampling plans for the determination
of contaminants and naturally occurring toxicants in food and feed, amongst other matters
related to contaminants and naturally occurring toxicants in food and feed. The term
“contaminants and naturally occurring toxicants” also applies to contamination with
radionuclides following a nuclear or radiological emergency or from natural sources.

The Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and Feed [I-9] contains
guideline levels for radionuclides in food following a nuclear or radiological emergency. They

30
were formulated for use in international trade as values below which no food control
restrictions need to be applied.

Codex standards and related texts contribute to the safety, quality and fairness of the
international food trade. They are based on the best available science as assisted by
independent FAO/WHO risk assessment bodies or ad-hoc expert consultations organized by
FAO and WHO, and depending on the nature of the issue, in coordination with other relevant
international organizations and United Nations Agencies such as the IAEA.

The Codex Alimentarius Commission is specifically mentioned in the Agreement on the

Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures of the World Trade Organization
(WTO/SPS Agreement) as the relevant international organization for establishing
international food safety standards. While they have been developed for voluntary application
by Codex members, Codex standards have been used by WTO in trade disputes as benchmark
standards against which national food safety measures are evaluated, meaning that Codex has
far reaching implications for resolving trade disputes. WTO members may however introduce
or maintain food safety measures which result in a higher level of protection than would be
achieved by Codex standards if there is a scientific justification, or as a consequence of the
level of protection members determine to be appropriate taking into account the objective of
minimizing negative trade effects.

Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and

Development

The NEA is a specialized agency within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development, an intergovernmental organization of industrialized countries with aims
including assisting its Member States in maintaining and further developing, through
international co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe,
environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. While
the NEA has no statutory operational role in the response to a nuclear or radiological
emergency, it has, for many years, been actively involved in efforts to improve nuclear
accident emergency planning, preparedness and management at the international level.

The NEA has a number of specialized standing technical committees and the Committee on
Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH) works primarily in the field of radiation
protection to provide timely identification of new and emerging issues, to analyse their
possible implications and to advise or take action to address these issues to further enhance
radiation protection regulation and implementation. The regulatory and operational consensus
developed by the CRPPH on these emerging issues supports policy and regulation
development in Member States, and disseminates good practice. At the March 2012 meeting
of the CRPPH, it was agreed that an important question arising from the Fukushima Daiichi
accident in 2011 was the difficulty in using radiological protection criteria for the import and
export of commodities and food. CRPPH assigned this task to its Expert Group on the
Radiological Protection Aspects of the Fukushima Accident (EGRPF) and the EGRPF Sub-
Group on Trade in Commodities and Food was created in 2012.

The NEA’s Expert Group identified several general considerations that will affect the
selection of criteria for managing trade in food and drinking water with contamination after an
accident. Accidents are rare, each is different, and it is likely that only a limited number of
food products will be regularly exported from any affected area. As such, the NEA Expert
Group felt that generic, a priori criteria would not necessarily address a specific situation at

31
hand. It was also recognized that export criteria are a matter of national choice and will evolve
with the specific circumstances due to aspects such as increasing knowledge and certainty of
the situation, the effective organization of measurement and management approaches for
trade, and the decreasing contamination levels as a result of decontamination actions,
radioactive decay, and environmental processes over the long-term.

Taking these general considerations into account, the NEA Expert Group felt that a
framework for developing accident-specific criteria could be developed a priori, but without
including specific criteria. It was noted that as an early protective action it is most likely that
food will be banned/restricted during the emergency phase, and trade will be resumed only
after a measurement/certification process has been established. As such, there will be time to
develop criteria that is specific to the situation at hand. National criteria for the consumption
of food from areas with contamination will be situation-based to protect the most exposed
group – those living in the affected area. For a national government, it will be ethically
difficult to use different criteria for its population living in areas with contamination, for its
population living in the parts of the State that are outside the areas with contamination, and
for export. As such, national governments will most likely establish export criteria that would
adequately protect its own population living in affected areas, and it is likely that by the time
trade is re-established it will be possible to use a criteria that maintains residual doses from
ingestion of food with contamination to less than 1 mSv in a year. However, as stated above,
criteria will most likely evolve with the situation and may begin higher than 1 mSv in a year,
and finish lower than 1 mSv in a year. In any case, the NEA Expert Group felt that the criteria
should be situation-specific, and needed to be developed at the time of an accident.

In addition to this more recent work, the NEA issued various discussion documents [I-10–I-
13] to assist national authorities in the development of policies and criteria for the
management of the consequences of a nuclear emergency, including the management of food
with contamination.

World Health Organization

The WHO is the directing and coordinating authority for health within the United Nations
system. It is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health
research agenda, setting norms and standards, articulating evidence-based policy options,
providing technical support to States and monitoring and assessing health trends.

Within the area of food and drinking water, WHO is the authoritative source of health-based
water quality information, for use by water and health regulators, policy-makers, their
advisors, and other stakeholders including practitioners and non-governmental organizations.
This includes the provision of information and health-based assessments on the various
human health hazards that may be present in the water cycle, including radioactivity, and the
approaches to manage the associated risks as described in the WHO Water Quality and Health
Strategy 20132020 [I-14]. The WHO also produces international norms on water quality and
human health in the form of guidelines that are used as the basis for regulation and standard
setting in developing countries and developed countries worldwide [I-15].

32
 REFERENCES TO ANNEX I

I-1. COUNCIL REGULATION (EURATOM) No 3954/87 laying down maximum

permitted levels of radioactive contamination of foodstuffs (1987).
I-2. COUNCIL REGULATION (EURATOM) No 2218/89 amending Regulation (Euratom)
No 3954/87 laying down maximum permitted levels of radioactive contamination of
foodstuffs (1989).
I-3. COMMISSION REGULATION (EURATOM) No 944/89 laying down maximum
permitted levels of radioactive contamination in minor foodstuffs, European
Commission, Brussels (1989).
I-4. COMMISSION REGULATION (EURATOM) No 770/90 laying down maximum
permitted levels of radioactive contamination of feedingstuffs, European Commission,
Brussels (1990).
I-5. COUNCIL DIRECTIVE (EURATOM) No. 2013/51 laying down requirements for the
protection of the health of the general public with regard to radioactive substances in
water intended for human consumption (2013).
I-6. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Joint Radiation Emergency
Management Plan of the International Organizations EPR JPLAN 2013, IAEA, Vienna
(2013).
I-7. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Statute of the IAEA, IAEA,
Vienna (1956).
I-8. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, ICRP
Constitution: Constitution of the International Commission on Radiological Protection.
Approved at a meeting of the Commission at Como, Italy in September 1987. Amended
at a meeting of the Commission at Albuquerque, NM, USA in October 2002.
I-9. JOINT FAO/WHO FOOD STANDARDS PROGRAMME, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
COMMISSION, Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and
Feed, Schedule 1 — Radionuclides, CODEX STAN 1931995, CAC, Rome (2006).
I-10. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency, Publications Related
to the Chernobyl Accident. COMMITTEE ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND
PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLICATIONS. Item 25. Nuclear Accident - Intervention Levels
for Protection of the Public, OECD/NEA, Paris (1989).
I-11. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency Publications Related to
the Chernobyl Accident. COMMITTEE ON RADIATION PROTECTION AND
PUBLIC HEALTH PUBLICATIONS. Item 24. Protection of the Population in the
Event of a Nuclear Accident, OECD/NEA, Paris (1990).
I-12. OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, Evolution of the System of Radiological
Protection. Implementing the 2007 ICRP Recommendations - Fifth Asian Regional
Conference, Chiba, Japan, 3–4 September 2009.
I-13. OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, Framework for the Post-accident
Management of Contaminated Food, OECD/NEA, Paris, (2014).
I-14. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Water Quality and Health Strategy 20132020,
WHO, Geneva (2013).
I-15. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality — 4th
Ed., WHO, Geneva (2011).

33
 ANNEX II.
METHODOLOGY FOR CALCULATING RADIONUCLIDE
CONCENTRATIONS IN FOOD FOR SPECIAL SITUATIONS

In special situations, national authorities may wish to consider the adoption of a reference
level different to 1 mSv in a year. Alternatively, there may be reasons why radionuclide
concentrations higher than those established in the Codex Alimentarius Standard [II-1] need
to be considered for specific foods and/or population groups. It is also possible that reference
levels may need to be calculated for radionuclides not included in the Codex Alimentarius
standard. Factors to be considered in making such decisions include the need to maintain the
food supply, national food consumption patterns, the fraction of the food supply expected to
have contamination, cultural and socio-economic factors, potential vulnerable populations and
the need to minimize the generation of food with contamination or soil waste, among others.
The approach described below, which is based on that used in deriving the Codex guideline
levels, allows national authorities to investigate the implication of changing either the
reference level or the activity concentration of radionuclides in a particular food, or in the
entire diet. The impact of different values for annual food consumption and changes in the
percentage of the food supply that has contamination can also be investigated.
It is stressed that, apart from during an emergency, the Codex guideline levels are
considered appropriate for almost all situations. Higher values can be adopted for
national use, but only when justified.
National reference levels, in terms of radionuclide activity concentrations, can be calculated
using the formula:
( )= (3)
( )× ( )×

where:
NRL(A) is the national reference level (Bq/kg) for age group A
E is the national dose criterion for ingestion (mSv/y)
M(A) is the age-dependent mass of food consumed per year (kg/y)
eing(A) is the age-dependent dose coefficient for ingestion (mSv/Bq)
F is the assumed contamination fraction (dimensionless).
Each of the terms in the above equation is discussed in more detail below.
E: National dose criterion for ingestion
This will depend on the circumstances of the situation. Normally it will be 1 mSv in a year,
but in exceptional circumstances it may be appropriate to adopt a different (normally higher)
value.
M(A): Food consumption rate
The typical mass (kg) of food consumed by adults/infants may be available from national
nutrition surveys. Alternatively, regional (clusters of countries) dietary information is
available from the WHO Global Environment Monitoring System (GEMS/Food)
consumption database [II-2]. Alternatively, the following global averages adopted by the
Codex Alimentarius can be used:

34
 • Assumed annual food consumption for infants: 200 kg/y.

• Assumed annual food consumption for adults: 550 kg/y.

eing(A): Dose coefficient for ingestion

The ingestion dose coefficient represents the dose (mSv) per unit intake (Bq) of a
radionuclide. The dose coefficient varies with radionuclide and with the age group of the
person ingesting the radioactivity. The ICRP reviews, collates and publishes compendia of
dose coefficients for different radionuclides and age groups. Ingestion dose coefficients are
also provided in GSR Part 3 [II-3].
It is imporant to note that the above publications quote the dose coefficient in units of Sv/Bq.
To use these in Equation 3, the dose coefficient must be converted to mSv/Bq by multiplying
the published value by 1 000.
The dose coefficients include consideration of the different rates of metabolism for the
different radionuclides and age groups, as well as other factors including radioactive decay of
radionuclides in the body. As such, once the correct dose coefficient is chosen for the
radionuclide/age group of interest, it can be used directly without need for additional
corrections.
F: Contamination fraction
This represents the fraction of nationally produced food consumed in a year that has
contamination at the national reference level (NRL(A)).
The chosen value of F is used to determine the maximum radionuclide concentration that
would be acceptable, on the assumption that all that fraction of the food has contamination at
a uniform level for one year. The value of F needs to be realistic, for example in the Codex
Alimentarius standard (which deals with internationally traded food) this fraction is the
import/production factor (IPF) and Codex uses an IPF = 0.1. This is because the mean
fraction of major foodstuffs imported by all the States worldwide is 0.1, according to FAO
statistical data.
When considering the national level (not international trade), F is analogous to the IPF.
Therefore, it is necessary to calculate or estimate F based on national data. This may be
difficult because it is likely that some parts of the State are affected and other parts are not.
Someone living in an area affected could reasonably source much of their food from areas
with relatively high levels of radionuclides. In contrast, someone living a long way from an
affected area is unlikely to eat a large amount of food produced in affected areas. But each
State is different, and local production and consumption patterns need to be considered.
Therefore a State may choose to use a value for F that is representative of the most affected
group of people rather than an average of the national population.
Once comprehensive data on radionuclide levels in food on the market are available, a
realistic value of F can be calculated. Otherwise, this can be estimated based on knowledge of
the food distribution patterns (where food is sourced from), predicted contamination levels or
other relevant data.
Past experience has shown that only a fraction of food will have contamination at the national
reference level NRL(A), even if all food is sourced from the area with contamination. This
can be seen in Figure II.1, which shows the distribution of radiocaesium activity
concentrations in several thousand samples of vegetables measured in Japan in the 12 months

35
following the Fukushima Daiichi accident15. What is clear is that, as would be expected, the
measured activity concentrations follow a log-normal distribution, with a large percentage of
the samples showing activity concentrations at the lower end of the range. Thus, once a
reference level is established and, provided that any food that exceeds the reference level does
not reach the market, the average activity concentration in what is sold and consumed will be
very much lower than the reference level.

100000

10000
Number of vegetable sample

1000

100

10

1
20
60
100
140
180
220
260
300
340
380
420
460
500
540
580
620
660
700
740
780
820
860
900
940
980
More
Measured activity concentration in vegetables (Bq/kg)

FIG. II.1. Frequency distribution of measured radiocaesium activity concentrations in vegetables in the
Japanese Prefectures affected by the Fukushima Daiichi accident (March 2011 to March 2012).
Furthermore, there is strong scientific evidence indicating that the actual doses received by
individuals are considerably less than those predicted by models. While models are designed
to provide a good estimate of real conditions, in practice they tend to be based on conservative
assumptions that overestimate actual radiation doses [II-4, II-5].
While national authorities can choose the optimal value depending on the situation in the
State, it is advisable that, in the absence of other information, a contamination fraction of
F=0.1 be chosen. If a large portion of people’s food is sourced from the affected area, a higher
assumed contamination fraction might be more suitable as a starting point. However,
experience has shown that even 10% of nationally produced food with contamination at the
maximum concentration is a highly conservative estimate. For example, in April 2012 the
Japanese authorities established activity concentrations for food and drinking water, based on
a reference level of 1 mSv and assuming that 50% of the food supply had contamination [II-
6].
Data have been published on the doses received by the local population from food
consumption following the Fukushima Daiichi accident [II-7]. These data were collected by
whole body counters installed at 50 locations within the Fukushima Prefecture. In a study on
around 10 000 individuals age 13 years and older, very few persons received a committed

15
The data are taken from the FAO/IAEA Food database.

36
effective dose16 of more than 0.3 mSv in the early stage after the accident. It was also
observed that those individuals with the highest body burden of radiocaesium were likely to
regularly eat wild products, which they harvested or caught themselves.
During its International Mission to Japan in late 2013 [II-8], the IAEA was informed that a
whole body counting survey, involving 149 592 residents of the Fukushima Prefecture, was
carried out in the period between June 2011 and August 2013. The committed effective doses
due to radiocaesium intake were 1 mSv or less for 149 580 people. Of the remaining
12 individuals, ten received doses of the order of 2 mSv and the other two received doses of
around 3 mSv.
Data have also been provided by Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare17, indicating
the number of food samples exceeding the national reference level of 100 Bq/kg for general
foods in each of the three years since April 2012. These are summarized in Table II-1 below.
Data are presented separately for Japan (all prefectures) and for Fukushima Prefecture and
refer to samples collected and analysed mainly before shipment. Foods which exceeded the
national reference level were not shipped. The number of samples exceeding the national
reference level is seen to reduce with time following the accident.

TABLE II-1. NUMBER OF FOOD SAMPLES EXCEEDING THE NATIONAL REFERENCE

LEVEL IN EACH OF THE THREE YEARS SINCE APRIL 2012.

Year 2 Year 3 Year 4

All Prefectures

Total Number of Samples 278 275 335 860 314 216

Number of Samples > 100 Bq/kg* 2 372 1 025 565

Ratio (all samples) 0.009 0.003 0.002

Fukushima Prefecture

Number of samples 34 857 42 199 39 525

Samples > 100 Bq/kg * 1 375 647 289

Ratio (Fukushima samples) 0.039 0.015 0.007

These data all underline the relatively low doses received in Japan from food consumption in
the aftermath of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and highlight the cautionary approach that
was taken at the time.

16
The dose is integrated over 50 years for adults and 70 years for children
17
Personal communication

37
 REFERENCES FOR ANNEX II
II-1. JOINT FAO/WHO FOOD STANDARDS PROGRAMME, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
COMMISSION, Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and
Feed, Schedule 1 — Radionuclides, CODEX STAN 1931995, CAC, Rome (2006).
II-2. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Global Environment Monitoring System
(GEMS/Food), WHO, Geneva (2012).
II-3. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF
THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY,
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY
AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS
ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Radiation
Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards IAEA
Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna (2014).
II-4. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Validation of Models using
Chernobyl Fallout Data from the Central Bohemia Region of the Czech Republic:
Scenario CB. First report of the VAMP Multiple Pathways Assessment Working Group,
IAEA-TECDOC 795, IAEA, Vienna (1995).
II-5. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Validation of Models using
Chernobyl Fallout Data from Southern Finland: Scenario S. Second Report of the
VAMP Multiple Pathways Assessment Working Group, IAEA-TECDOC 904, IAEA,
Vienna (1996).
II-6. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, LABOUR AND WELFARE, New Standard Limits for
Radionuclides in Food, Tokyo (2012).
II-7. MIYAZAKI, M., OHTZURU, A., ISHIKAWA, T., (2014) An overview of internal
dose estimation using whole-body counters in Fukushima Prefecture, Fukushima, J.
Med Sci. 60(1) (2014) 95100.
II-8. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, The Follow-up IAEA
International Mission on Remediation of Large Contaminated Areas Off-Site the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant, Tokyo and Fukushima Prefecture, Japan 14–
21 October 2013, Final Report, IAEA, Vienna (2014).

38
 ANNEX III.
EXAMPLES OF NATIONAL APPROACHES FOLLOWING A NUCLEAR
ACCIDENT

This annex provides two examples of approaches taken for the control of food in affected and
importing States following a nuclear accident. The various examples demonstrate the
approaches taken within affected States which had to control domestically produced food for
people living in areas with contamination. For the affected States, the basis on which their
strategy was based (including the criterion for radiation dose from ingestion) is provided.

At the time of the Chernobyl accident, few international standards applied.

APPROACH TAKEN IN SWEDEN TO THE CONTROL OF RADIONUCLIDE ACTIVITY

CONCENTRATION IN FOODS FOLLOWING THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT

As a result of the Chernobyl accident, an estimated 4.25 PBq of 137Cs was deposited across
Sweden (Fig. III-1), with a maximum deposition of radiocaesium (134Cs + 137Cs) of about
200 kBq/m2.

Food consumption habits were used by the Swedish authorities to identify the groups most at
risk. This assessment showed that the estimated average dose for reindeer farmers was two
orders of magnitude higher than the estimated average dose for city dwellers outside the most
affected areas (Figure III.1) [III-1]. This was due to high radiocaesium concentrations in a
number of specific foods, in particular reindeer meat, wild berries and wild mushrooms. For
most of the population in Sweden, these foods constitute a small fraction of their annual food
intake though for one population group, the Sami reindeer herders, such foods are a
significant part of their diet as well as being of important cultural significance.

Effective dose (mSv)

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16

City dweller Göteborg

City dweller Skåne

City dweller Stockholm

Country dweller Norrbotten

Cs-134
Hunters Dalarna

Country dweller Gävle CS-137

Country dweller Västerbotten

Farmers Gävle

Hunters Västmanland

Sami people Norrbotten

Hunters Gävle

Sami people Västerbotten

FIG. III.1. Estimated effective dose from food with contamination by fallout from Chernobyl for Swedish adults
between 1986 and 2036 (reproduced courtesy of author [Ref. III-1]).

While a reference level of 1 mSv in a year was established for the general population, it was
decided that individual effective doses of up to 10 mSv in a year could be acceptable provided

39
that those individuals (excluding children and pregnant women) are informed about the
additional risks. An initial limit for 137Cs in all food was set at 300 Bq/kg. This meant that
about 75% of all reindeer meat produced in Sweden in the year following the accident was
rejected because of their radioactive caesium concentrations [III-2]. In May 1987 a higher
limit for 137Cs in foods not regularly consumed by the general public was introduced; the food
limits for reindeer meat, game meat, fish from inland lakes, wild berries, mushroom and nuts
were increased to 1 500 Bq/kg.

Together with this step, dietary advice was provided to the public on how often it was
appropriate to eat different types of food with differing levels of 137Cs content (see Table III-
1). In parallel, data from food monitoring were made available to the public and measurement
capabilities were made available in those local municipalities where there was high
consumption of the foods with higher 137Cs levels. The levels were chosen so that, based on
typical consumption patterns, food products in commercial shops would give a dose of no
more than 1 mSv in a year and only those eating large amounts of wild foods or reindeer meat
might get doses exceeding 1 mSv in a year.

TABLE III-1. DIETARY ADVICE GIVEN TO PEOPLE IN SWEDEN FOR REINDEER MEAT
AND OTHER SPECIFIC FOODSTUFFS

Caesium-137 concentration of food Advice to consumers

below 300 Bq/kg Food can be consumed as normal

Do not consume the food more often than

between 300 and 1 500 Bq/kg
once a week

Do not consume the food more than a

between1 500 Bq/kg and 10 000 Bq/kg
couple of times per year

above 10 000 Bq/kg Do not consume the food at all

Reindeer meat was also identified as an important source of dietary radiocaesium in Norway
and countermeasures were applied to reduce doses, in particular to Sami reindeer herders [III-
3, III-4]. Monitoring of 137Cs in reindeer herders and in reindeer meat also took place in
Finnish Lapland where individual doses were assessed as being well below 1 mSv [III-5].

APPROACH TAKEN IN THE UNITED KINGDOM TO THE MANAGEMENT OF SHEEP

GRAZING UPLAND PASTURES

Widespread monitoring following the Chernobyl accident in the UK identified potential food
safety concerns due to levels of 137Cs in the meat of sheep grazing a number of upland areas
of the UK. Normally 137Cs attaches itself to the clay mineral fraction of agricultural soils and
quickly becomes unavailable for transfer to vegetation. However, upland areas in the UK are
dominated by poor quality peat soils with a low content of clay minerals. These soils are also
deficient in potassium, a chemical analogue of caesium. For these two reasons, 137Cs is readily
taken up by the vegetation that characterizes upland pastures. As a result, high 137Cs
concentrations were observed in the flesh of sheep grazing these pastures and such elevated
concentrations were expected to be maintained over several years. To manage this issue,
restrictions were placed on the movement of sheep from around 9 800 UK farms, affecting
more than four million sheep.

40
Between 1986 and 2012, the UK authorities monitored the levels in sheep from the affected
areas, managed controls on the movement of sheep to protect consumers and gradually
removed controls where they were no longer required to protect food safety. A maximum
permitted limit of 1 000 Bq/kg of radiocaesium was applied to sheep meat.

Under powers provided by the Food and Environment Protection Act (FEPA), emergency
orders were used to impose restrictions on the movement and sale of sheep exceeding the
limit in parts of Cumbria (in north-west England), North Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland. The emergency orders defined geographical areas, termed “restricted areas”, within
which the controls must be followed. Under the FEPA orders, sheep with levels of
contamination above the limit were not allowed to enter the food chain.

A management system known as the “mark and release” scheme operated in the restricted
areas. Under this scheme, a farmer wishing to move sheep out of a restricted area could have
them monitored to determine the level of radiocaesium. A live monitoring technique was used
at farm level. Any sheep that exceeded the monitoring pass mark were marked with a dye and
not released from restrictions for three months. Those that passed were allowed to enter the
food chain. For sheep assessed to be above 1 000 Bq/kg, there was a prohibition on going to
slaughter for a minimum of three months — such sheep were identified by a coloured paint
mark — and the animals were transferred to clean feed for this time.

The restrictions were gradually removed over the years where full flock surveys demonstrated
that all sheep were below 1 000 Bq/kg (from around 10 000 farms in 1987 to fewer than 1 000
farms in 1990). By 2011, there were 338 farms still subject to restrictions. The UK’s Food
Standards Agency then performed an assessment of the doses to an adult frequent buyer, who
purchases meat every two weeks direct from the farm or farm shop which sources all its meat
from the monitored farm, and who consumes at the 95th percentile consumption rate (20 kg
per year) at the 97.5th percentile of the radiocaesium (137Cs) distribution in their sheep meat
intake. For this person, and even for people with assumed more extreme consumption habits,
it was shown that their annual doses were below 1 mSv in a year (less than 0.21 mSv in a
year). Based on this, on an assessment that the controls were not providing a meaningful
reduction in dose and that there was no evidence that alternative protective actions would
achieve a further reduction in dose, the controls were lifted in June 2012. This was done
following a programme of stakeholder engagement and public consultation.

Further information on this process is available in reference III-6.

REFERENCES TO ANNEX III

III-1. RÄÄF, C., Radioaktivt cesium i kroppen – stråldoser och risker, Strålskyddsnytt,
1 (2006).
III-2. ÅHMAN, G., ÅHMAN, B., Axel RYDBERG, A., Consequences of the Chernobyl
accident for reindeer husbandry in Sweden, Rangifer 10 (3) (1990) 8388.
III-3. MEHLI, H., SKUTERUD, L., MOSDØL, A, TØNNESSEN, A., The impact of
Chernobyl fallout on the southern Saami reindeer herders of Norway in 1996, Health
Phys. 79 (2000) 682690.
III-4. SKUTERUD, L., THØRRING, H., Averted doses to Norwegian Sámi reindeer herders
after the Chernobyl accident, Health Phys. 102 (2012) 208216.

41
III-5. LEPPÄNEN, A.-P., MUIKKU, M., JAAKKOLA, T., LEHTO, J., RAHOLA, T.,
RISSANEN, K., TILLANDER, M., Effective half-lives of 134Cs and 137Cs in reindeer
meat and in reindeer herders in Finland after the Chernobyl accident and the ensuing
effective radiation doses to humans, Health Phys. 100 (2011) 468481.
III-6. FOODS STANDARDS AGENCY, Post-Chernobyl Monitoring and Controls Survey
Reports.

42
 ANNEX IV.
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

Q1: Do the guidance levels in the WHO Guidelines on Drinking-water Quality apply
during an emergency?

No. The WHO guidelines were established for lifetime consumption and they are not
applicable in an emergency. Instead, in an emergency exposure situation the generic criteria
and the Operational Intervention Levels (OILs) established by the IAEA [IV-1] are used.
Once the emergency is declared to be ended, the WHO guidelines should be used.

Q2: If the guidance levels for radionuclides in drinking water are exceeded are
restrictions to be put on use of the water supply?

Not necessarily. As stated in the WHO Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality (page 207 of
Ref. [IV-2]): “screening levels and guidance levels are conservative and should not be
interpreted as mandatory limits. Exceeding a guidance level should be taken as a trigger for
further investigation, but not necessarily as an indication that the drinking water is unsafe.”

Q3: What is the relationship between the 0.1 mSv in a year guidance level for drinking
water recommended by the WHO and the 1 mSv in a year reference level in GSR Part 3
in the WHO Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality?

The two approaches have different purposes. The WHO value was prepared with
radionuclides of natural origin in water being very much in mind – most waters contain these
radionuclides and experience has shown that the vast majority of drinking water supplies can
meet this dose criterion. Therefore, using the WHO screening levels allows one to identify, in
a fast and cost-effective manner, only those waters that had elevated levels and need to be
further investigated.
Occasionally, the situation may arise where the guidance levels are consistently exceeded for
one or a combination of specific radionuclides. National authorities will then need to make a
decision regarding the need to implement remedial measures or to place some restriction on
the continued use of the water supply for drinking purposes.
For such drinking water supplies, the quality of the water supply needs to be evaluated in
comparison with the 1 mSv reference level. If the dose assessment indicates that individual
doses in a year are below 1 mSv, the water can be considered fit for human consumption but it
is still necessary to apply optimization. If the dose assessment indicates that individual doses
are likely to exceed 1 mSv in a year, discontinuing the use of the water for drinking purposes
is justified in terms of overall benefit. Factors to be taken into account in making such a
decision include the extent to which the reference level is exceeded, the costs of remediation
and the availability of other drinking water supplies.
Even if a water supply is not considered fit for human consumption it may still be suitable for
use for other purposes such as washing and cleaning.

Q4: Why is drinking water considered separately from other beverages?

Bulk drinking water is not covered by the Codex Alimentarius standards, as in general it is
not traded internationally. Bottled water is traded internationally and is covered by the Codex
Alimentarius guidelines.

43
There are a number of factors why it is appropriate to consider drinking water separately. The
most important consideration is that drinking water is essential for human health and is
consumed by all age groups. It is the basis of other drinks, such as carbonated drinks and fruit
juices. Water is also drunk, in some form, on a daily basis.

However, the Codex General Standard for Bottled/Packaged Drinking Waters (Other than
Natural Mineral Waters) [IV-3] states that the water “shall comply with the health-related
requirements of the WHO Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality” [IV-2]. Thus, the 1 mSv
per year reference level applies to bottled water in international trade. Consumers can
therefore expect that imported bottled water will meet the same criteria as the drinking water
from their tap.

Q5: When using the various international standards, do the reference levels need to be
adjusted for food to be used by children or pregnant women?

No. The international standards already consider the need to protect the most vulnerable
groups in the population, normally children. In the case of the Codex Alimentarius guidelines
[IV-4], separate guideline levels are provided for infant foods.

Q6: Why do we apply reference levels of 1 mSv to food and drinking water when the
doses received from their consumption are normally much lower?

An individual normally receives doses of less than 0.1 mSv in a year from the consumption of
drinking water. In the case of food, the typical individual annual dose is of the order of a few
times this, but in the case of heavy consumers of foods with a higher than average
concentration of radionuclides (such as 210Po in shellfish), the individual dose will be
somewhat higher. However, GSR Part 3 applies only to those exposures that can be
controlled.

But reference levels are not based on the doses we receive routinely. In the case of food and
drinking water, they are established on the basis of ensuring that the food and drinking water
does not represent a radiologically significant public health risk and can be considered as fit
for consumption. The international consensus is that a dose of 1 mSv in a year, as established
in GSR Part 3 [IV-5], is an appropriate criterion.
In practice, individual annual doses will be well below this value and the activity
concentrations of individual radionuclides in food will be considerably less that those
established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission [IV-4]. However, situations have arisen
in the past, and may arise in the future, where activity concentrations in foods may be
elevated. Having values agreed in advance of such situations can assist with public confidence
that the food can be eaten.
The use of the guideline levels established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission for food
that is produced and consumed nationally in normal situations will generally ensure that no
individual receives a dose greater than 1 mSv in a year. As discussed in Section 4, situations
may arise where it is appropriate to permit higher concentrations in particular foodstuffs for
selected population groups. If the contamination fraction (F) exceeds 0.1, national authorities
can choose optimal activity concentrations depending on the situation that applies in the State
at the time. In an emergency, different international standards apply to food produced for
national consumption. Reference levels in terms of activity concentrations are likely to
become de facto limits if incorporated into national legislation. However, consumption by

44
some individuals of some food that exceeds the reference level is to be expected and is
normally not a matter for concern.

Q7: For foods that are sold dried/powdered but then diluted or soaked in water before
consuming (e.g. tea), what do I compare against the Codex guidance level: the (as sold)
dried product or the product as prepared for consumption?

What is important is the dose received by those consuming the food and this is determined by
the radionuclide concentration in the food as consumed (Bq/kg) and the amounts consumed
per year. The Codex guideline levels and the national reference levels are designed to be
applied to the product as consumed.

This means that the product either needs to be reconstituted before testing or else a correction
factor applied to allow for the dilution by water (or other relevant preparation technique) in
the final consumed product.

Q8: Some foods (e.g., fruit) are sold and eaten dried rather than fresh: this means that
the Codex Alimentarius guideline levels will be more restrictive for the dried than fresh
version of the same food. Is this correct?

It is true that the dried foods may exceed the guidance level in cases where the fresh food
would not. For foods that are consumed in small quantities, that represent a small percentage
of total diet and hence a small addition to the total dose, the guideline levels may be increased
by a factor of 10. In the case of dried fruits, which are generally eaten in relatively small
amounts, this may be appropriate.

In the case of national production and consumption of fruit, national authorities are free to
establish different reference levels, in terms of activity concentration, to fresh and dried fruits
that takes the concentration factor into account.

REFERENCES TO ANNEX IV

IV-1. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANIZATION, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, WORLD
HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Criteria for Use in Preparedness and Response for a
Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSG-2, IAEA,
Vienna (2011).
IV-2. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Guidelines for Drinking-water Quality — 4th
Ed., WHO, Geneva (2011).
IV-3. JOINT FAO/WHO FOOD STANDARDS PROGRAMME, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
COMMISSION, General Standard for Bottled/ Packaged Drinking Waters (Other than
Natural Mineral Waters), CODEX STAN 227-2001, CAC, Rome (2001).
IV-4. JOINT FAO/WHO FOOD STANDARDS PROGRAMME, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS
COMMISSION, Codex General Standard for Contaminants and Toxins in Food and
Feed, Schedule 1 — Radionuclides, CODEX STAN 193-1995, CAC, Rome (2006).

45
IV-5. EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY, FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, OECD
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION,
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD HEALTH
ORGANIZATION, Radiation Protection and Safety of Radiation Sources: International
Basic Safety Standards IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GSR Part 3, IAEA, Vienna
(2014).

46
 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

TECHNICAL MEETING ON THE HARMONIZATION OF REFERENCE LEVELS

FOR FOODSTUFFS AND DRINKING WATER CONTAMINATED FOLLOWING A
NUCLEAR ACCIDENT

IAEA Headquarters, Vienna, Austria

8 to 12 September 2014

Abdelaal, H. Supreme Council of Health, Qatar

Addas, Y. Saudi Food & Drug Authority, Saudi Arabia
Ahmed, M. Qatar General Electricity & Water Corporation, Qatar
Alhajri, M. Supreme Council of Health, Qatar
Al-Zubaidi, I. Ministry of Science and Technology, Iraq
Balanov, M. St. Petersburg Scientific Research Institute of Radiation Hygiene
after Prof. P.V. Ramzaev, Russian Federation
Blackburn, C. Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food and
Agriculture
Castro Reyes, J.L. Servicio Nacional de Sanidad, Inoculidad y Calidad
Agroalimentaria, Mexico
Cessac, B. Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire, France
Chabi Sika, K. Laboratoire Central de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Benin
Chen, J. Radiation Protection Bureau, Health Canada, Canada
Cucu, A. National Institute of Public Health, Romania
Durecova, A. Regional Institute of Public Health, Slovakia
El-Fouly, H. Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority, Egypt
Faanu, A. Ghana Atomic Energy Commission, Ghana
Fathabadi, N. Iran Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Iran
Fernandez Gomez, I.M. Centro de Protección e Higiene de las Radiaciones, Cuba
Gunes, S. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority, Turkey
Ghrairi, H. Ministry of Science and Technology, Iraq
Fawell, J. United Kingdom
Hamitouche, N. Centre de Recherche Nucléaire d'Alger, Algeria
Hussain, M.S. Karachi Nuclear Power Plant, Pakistan
Iskandar, D. Center for Radiation Safety and Metrology Technology,
Indonesia
Ji, Y. National Institute for Radiological Protection, China
Johansson, J. Swedish Radiation Safety Authority, Sweden
Jovanovic, S. University of Montenegro, Montenegro
Kamenova-Totzeva, R. National Center of Radiobiology and Radiation Protection,
Bulgaria
Kovendine Konyi, J. ‘Frederic Joliot-Curie’ National Research Institute for
Radiobiology and Radiohygiene, Hungary
Ladygiene, R. Radiation Protection Centre, Lithuania
Maina, J. Radiation Protection Board, Kenya
McMahon, C. EPA Office of Radiological Protection, Ireland
Mishevska, A. Radiation Safety Directorate, The Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia
Navarro, E. Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire, France
Osanai, M. Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, Japan

47
Paci, R. Radiation Protection Office, Albania
Perez, M. World Health Organization
Petikyan, A National Center of Disease Control and Prevention, Armenia
Petrova, K. State Office for Nuclear Safety, Czech Republic
Poirson, J-M. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Rome
Pungut, N. Atomic Energy Licensing Board, Malaysia
Repin, V. St. Petersburg Scientific Research Institute of Radiation Hygiene
after Prof. P.V. Ramzaev, Russian Federation
Sadler Veiga, L.H. Instituto de Radioprotecao e Dosimetria, Brazil
Singh, R. Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India
Skotniczna, M. Radiation Emergency Centre, Poland
Spiegel, S. Federal Ministry of Health, Austria
Tarbiah, M. Hamad Medical Corporation, Qatar
Theriault, B. Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission, Canada
Thomas, C. Food Safety Policy, Food Standards Agency, United Kingdom
Udomsomporn, S. Office of Atoms for Peace, Thailand
Yamaguchi, I. National Institute of Public Health, Japan

48
 CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW

Blackburn, C. Joint FAO/IAEA Division of Nuclear Techniques in Food

and Agriculture
Brisco Lopez, G. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
Bruno, A. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
Byron, D. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
Carolissen-Mackay, V. Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
Clement, C. International Commission of Radiological Protection
Colgan, T. International Atomic Energy Agency
Cooper, M. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
Gusev, I. International Atomic Energy Agency
Herzeele, M. European Commission, Luxembourg
Homma, T. Japan Atomic Energy Agency, Japan
Kenigsberg, J. National Commission of Radiation Protection, Belarus
Lazo, E. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
Lecomte, J-F. Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire, France
McMahon, C. EPA Office for Radiological Protection, Ireland
Nestoroska Madjunarova, S. International Atomic Energy Agency
Okyar, B. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
Perez, M. World Health Organization
Titov, A. Burnasyan Federal Medical Biophysical Center of the Federal
Medical Biological Agency of Russia, Russian Federation
Suzuki, T. OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
Wrixon, A. Consultant, Austria
Yamada, Y. Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Japan

Consultants Meetings

Vienna, Austria: 6–10 May 2013

Vienna, Austria: 7–11 October 2013
Vienna, Austria: 6–9 May 2014
Vienna, Austria: 8–10 October 2014

Technical Meeting

Vienna, Austria: 8–12 September 2014

49
@ No. 24

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 IAEA-TECDOC-1788
IAEA-TECDOC-1788
IAEA TECDOC SERIES

IAEA-TECDOC-1788

Criteria for Radionuclide

Activity Concentrations for
Food and Drinking Water

International Atomic Energy Agency

Vienna
ISBN 978–92–0–103816–6
ISSN 1011–4289

@
16-14751_TE-1788_cover.indd 1-3 2016-04-19 10:15:18