British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3
British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3
British Aerospace Nimrod AEW3
Nimrod AEW3
Nimrod AEW3
Introduction 1984
Retired 1986
Produced 11
Number built 3 prototype
8 production
Contents
1Development
o 1.1Background
o 1.2Development issues
1.2.1Aircraft
1.2.2Avionics
o 1.3Cancellation
o 1.4Potential future use
2Operators
3Aircraft on display
4Specifications (Nimrod AEW3)
5See also
6References
o 6.1Notes
o 6.2Bibliography
Development[edit]
As an interim measure during the development of the Nimrod AEW, surplus Shackletons were fitted with
equipment from ex-Royal Navy Gannets.
Background[edit]
In the mid 1960s, following the development of the Grumman E-2 Hawkeye carrier-
borne AEW aircraft and its associated systems, the British government began looking
for a radar system that could provide airborne early warning for the United Kingdom. At
the time, the only recognised AEW aircraft in British service was the Fairey
Gannet aircraft used by the Fleet Air Arm on board Royal Navy aircraft carriers. These
were fitted with the AN/APS-20 Radar, which had been developed during World War II
and was rapidly becoming obsolete.[3] Work had been started in the early 1960s on a
brand new AEW platform for the Royal Navy to replace the Gannet that would
encompass both a new type of radar system mounted on a new aircraft, the P.139.
While the defence cuts of the mid-1960s led to the cancellation of the P.139, work
continued on a British designed radar system. Meanwhile, it was decided that the RAF
needed an AEW aircraft to operate as part of the national air defence strategy. [4]
To fulfill the planned requirements for a new AEW aircraft, the government had a
number of factors to consider:
The decision was taken to procure the aircraft fitted with a pulse-Doppler radar system,
which then proceeded to a range of options: [1]
A Comet 4 was fitted with a nose radome for initial aerodynamic flight testing
The complexity of the AEW requirement proved too much for British industry to
overcome by itself. A major project management issue was the appointment of British
Aerospace (BAe) and GEC Marconi as joint programme leaders. This meant in practice
that as development issues arose, the companies had a distressing tendency to blame
each other for the problem rather than try to resolve it; while BAe was able to fulfil its
part of the contract by delivering the aircraft on time (the first was due to be delivered in
1982, with full delivery by 1984), GEC was unable to solve the difficulties in developing
the avionics.[8]
In 1977 an RAF Comet 4 was modified for flight testing with the nose radome and
conducted a series of trials, the results of which proved promising enough for an order
for three prototype Nimrods to be built using redundant MR1 airframes. [9] The first of
these was rolled out in March 1980 and flew for the first time in July, and was intended
to test the flight characteristics, with the second airframe planned to carry out trials of
the Mission Systems Avionics (MSA) package.[1]
Despite the problems, the project continued, and 8 production aircraft were ordered
(which would also come from spare MR1 airframes). The first of these flew in March
1982.[9] Even while the technical problems were being worked on, the aircraft was
delivered to the RAF's No 8 Squadron in 1984 to begin crew training.[9] The technical
problems proved insurmountable for the Nimrod AEW to be deployed in the Falklands
War.[10] To provide some degree of cover, several Nimrod MR.2 were quickly modified to
undertake the airborne surveillance role for the task force however. [11]
Aircraft[edit]
The choice of the Nimrod airframe proved to be the wrong one, as it was too small to
accommodate the radar, electronics, power generation and cooling systems needed for
a system as complex as the one required[12] – at just over 38.5 m (126 ft), the Nimrod
was close to 8 m (26 ft) shorter than the Boeing 707 aircraft that formed the basis of the
E-3 Sentry, with the planned all-up weight around half that of the American aircraft, but
was expected to accommodate sufficient crew and equipment to perform a similar
function.[1] Nimrod was designed to have a total of six operator consoles (4 for the radar,
one for ESM and one for communications), which was less than the nine stations fitted
aboard the E-3A. The size of the Sentry also meant there was room to increase the
number of operators.[1] Having the Sentry's radar in the rotodome above the aircraft
allowed for cooling to be undertaken directly by the airflow, with cooling doors mounted
in the installation, while the transmitter had a separate liquid cooling system, and the
avionics in the main section were sufficiently cooled by a conventional air
cycle environmental system.[13] This was in contrast to the Nimrod's "heat sink" design
that dispersed the heat through the fuel system, and which needed the fuel tanks to be
at least half-full to work efficiently when the aircraft's system operated at full power. [1]
Avionics[edit]
Even getting the radar scanners mounted on the Nimrod's nose and tail to synchronise proved problematic
The MSA was based around a GEC 4080M computer, which was required to process
data from the two radar scanners, the ESM system, IFF and inertial navigation systems.
The integration of all of these systems into a single package proved too difficult for the
underpowered computer, which had an ultimate data storage capacity of 2.4 MB.[1] By
the time of the project's cancellation, the mission system mean time between failure was
around two hours, yet it took around two and a half hours to load all the mission data via
a tape system.
What mission performance there was largely due to the Cossor IFF interrogator which
complemented the radar system: with the addition of IFF data, the system could
successfully track aircraft carrying IFF transponders, but when the IFF was switched off,
radar tracks would rapidly be lost. This meant that the system would successfully track
civil and 'friendly' military aircraft, but would not reliably detect Warsaw Pact aircraft
which did not carry a compatible IFF system – detection of which was the whole point of
the project.
The mission system electronic racks were earthed to different points on the airframe,
which led to differences in earth potential and the introduction of short-lived, random
track information which added to the computer overload. Finally, the advanced design of
the radar proved difficult – the FASS method to gain full 360° radar coverage was
problematic, involving as it did the scanner in the nose making a left to right sweep, with
the signal then immediately passed to the scanner in the tail, which would sweep right
to left.[14] However, getting the two scanners to synchronise proved difficult, resulting in
poor all-round surveillance capability. [1] The system also split incoming raw radar
information into upper and lower beams, each of which was then further split into in-
phase and quadrature-phase channels. Each of these 4 channels contained identical
individual elements (such as a spectrum analyser), which in theory should have been
entirely interchangeable between locations.
Joint Trials Unit (JTU) testing showed that in fact the system would only work with a
particular device in a particular place in the system: putting the same device in one of
the other 3 channels would not give a serviceable system. The consequence of this was
that the JTU trials aircraft would fly loaded with spare electronic devices so that when
system failure occurred, there was a better chance of finding a particular combination of
system elements which would work. This would not have been a sustainable practice
had the aircraft entered service. The reason for this issue was never resolved: the JTU
suspicion was that tolerances in transmitting information through each channel were too
loose, so that as the processed information emerged from each channel to be
correlated back into a coherent picture, such correlation was in fact impossible since
each channel was offering up a different 'time slot' to the others.
Cancellation[edit]
"...The choice of national procurement rather than the available US alternative, involved not only higher costs for
Britain but also the lack of an adequate system in-service when needed... It appears that buying British was given a
high priority than having a system available to meet the assessed Soviet threat"
Historians Ron Smith and Jacques Fontanel, discussing the procurement process.[7]
At the time that the first production Nimrods were being delivered to the RAF,
the MoD decided to conduct a complete review of the AEW programme. The result of
this was the start of a bid process to supply AEW aircraft for the RAF that began in
1986, with a number of different options put forward, including the E-2C Hawkeye, E-3
Sentry, P-3AEW&C Orion, a proposal from Airship Industries, and the Nimrod.
[6]
Eventually, the Best and Final Offers were sought from GEC Marconi with the Nimrod,
and Boeing with its Sentry. In December 1986, the Sentry was finally chosen and the
Nimrod AEW programme was cancelled.[9][8] In spite of the project's difficulties, India
expressed interest in procuring the Nimrod AEW3; these investigations continued even
after the British government's eventual cancellation of the project. [15]
The E-2 Hawkeye, P-3 Orion AEW&C and E-3 Sentry were all considered as alternatives to the Nimrod
The MoD's review of the AEW programme eventually led to Boeing's E-3 Sentry being chosen instead of the
Nimrod.
The Nimrod programme had cost in the region of £1 billion up to its cancellation,
contrasting with manufacturer claims in 1977 that the total cost of the project would be
between £200–300 million.[7][16] The unused airframes were eventually stored and used
as a source of spares for the Nimrod R1 and MR2 fleets, while the elderly Shackleton
aircraft that had been commissioned in 1971 as a "stop-gap" measure for AEW cover
until the planned entry of the Nimrod were forced to soldier on until 1991 when they
were replaced by the Sentry. The scandal over the collapse of the Nimrod AEW project
was a major factor in Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's stance to open up the UK
defence market to competition.[17]
Potential future use[edit]
Following the cancellation of the Nimrod AEW programme, BAe began looking at ways
that the now redundant airframes could be re-used, and commenced studies looking at
the potential use of the Nimrod as a missile carrying strike aircraft. This would have
seen the AEW modifications, primarily the FASS scanners, and the fuel and cooling
systems installed in the weapons bay, removed. The Searchwater radar, at the time
fitted to the Nimrod MR.2, would have been installed in a nose installation, and the
weapons bay outfitted to accommodate up to six Sea Eagle anti-ship missiles.
[18]
However, this did not go beyond the study phase, and the airframes were eventually
scrapped during the 1990s.[19]
Operators[edit]
United Kingdom
Aircraft on display[edit]
No complete Nimrod AEW3 survive fully intact, however 3 cockpits/ fuselages are intact
General characteristics
Crew: up to 12
Length: 137 ft 8.5 in (41.974 m)
Wingspan: 115 ft 1 in (35.08 m)
Height: 35 ft 0 in (10.67 m)
Wing area: 2,121 sq ft (197.0 m2)
Empty weight: 86,000 lb (39,009 kg)
Max takeoff weight: 187,800 lb (85,185 kg)
Powerplant: 4 × Rolls-Royce RB 168-
200 turbofan engines, 12,140 lbf (54.0 kN) thrust
each
Performance
See also[edit]
Aviation portal
Related development
BAE Systems Nimrod MRA.4
British Aerospace Nimrod MR.2
Hawker Siddeley Nimrod MR.1
Hawker Siddeley Nimrod R.1
Aircraft of comparable role, configuration, and era
References[edit]
Wikimedia Commons has
media related to Nimrod
AEW3.
Notes[edit]
1. ^ Jump up to: "BAe Nimrod AEW3". The Spyflight
a b c d e f g h
Retrieved 11 May 2011.
10. ^ Braybrook 1982, p. 9.
11. ^ Braybrook 1982, p. 40.
12. ^ Kopp, C (March–May 1989). "AEW and
AWACS". Australian Aviation. Air Power
Australia. 1989 (May/June). Retrieved 12 May 2011.
13. ^ "Boeing E-3A Sentry". Virtual Aircraft Museum.
Retrieved 11 December 2013.
14. ^ Hewish, Mark (1981). "Britain's air defences grow new
teeth". New Scientist. Reed Business Information. 89 (1244):
682–684.
15. ^ Smith 1994, p. 125.
16. ^ "Could Nimrod Clip AWACS Wings?" New Scientist,
73(1042), 10 March 1977. p. 586.
17. ^ Chin 2004, p. 156.
18. ^ Gibson, Chris (2011). Vulcan's Hammer: V-Force Projects
and Weapons Since 1945. Manchester: Hikoki Publications.
p. 181. ISBN 978-190210917-6.
19. ^ Hastings, David (4 March 2013). "Nimrod
Production". Target Lock. Archived from the original on 24
September 2015. Retrieved 10 June 2013.
Bibliography[edit]
Bellany, Ian and Tim Huxley. (Ed.) "New Conventional Weapons
and Western Defence". Routledge, 1987. ISBN 0-7146-3310-0.
Braybrook, Roy. Battle for the Falklands: Air Forces. London, UK:
Osprey Publishing, 1982. ISBN 0-85045-493-X.
Chin, Warren. "British Weapons Acquisition Policy and The Futility
of Reform". Ashgate Publishing, 2004. ISBN 0-7546-3121-4.
Conner, Steve. "Nimrod Reaches to the End of the Runway". New
Scientist, 111(1519), 31 July 1986, pp. 33–36.
Smith, Chris (1994). India's Ad Hoc Arsenal: Direction Or Drift in
Defence Policy?. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-829168-X.
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