SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 127406. November 27, 2000.]

OFELIA P. TY , petitioner, vs . THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO

M. REYES , respondents.

Caguioa Law Office for petitioner.

Ceballos & Associates Law Office for private respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Edgardo Reyes (private respondent herein) married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in
a civil ceremony and in a church wedding, both in 1977. In 1980, the then Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court declared their marriage null and void for lack of valid marriage
license. The church wedding was likewise declared null and void. But even before the
decree nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria was issued, Edgardo married Ofelia (herein
petitioner) in civil ceremonies in 1979 and in a church wedding in 1982. In 1991, Edgardo
led a civil case with the Pasig RTC praying for the declaration of his marriage to Ofelia as
null and void. He averred that at the time of his marriage to petitioner the decree of nullity
of his rst marriage had not been issued yet. The Pasig RTC sustained respondent's civil
suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner null and void ab initio. Both parties
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court a rmed the decision of the trial
court. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the rst marriage must rst be secured
before a subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition before the Supreme Court. The principal
issue is whether the decree of nullity of the rst marriage is required before a subsequent
marriage can be entered into validly.
According to the Supreme Court, the provisions of the Civil Code should govern the
rst and second marriages herein having been contracted in 1977 and 1979 respectively.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code
had no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence also appeared to be con icting. But
the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. At the time the
second marriage in this case was entered into, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon cases. The rule therein was that the rst marriage of private
respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. The Court concluded
that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner was valid. The assailed decision
was partially reversed, and, hence, the marriage of Edgardo to Ofelia was declared valid,
and the award of P15,000.00 was rati ed and maintained as monthly support to their two
children for as long as they were of minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; CIVIL CODE; MARRIAGE; JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF

A VOID MARRIAGE; ABSENCE OF EXPRESS PROVISION THEREON RESULTED IN
CONFLICTING JURISPRUDENCE. — At the outset, we must note that private respondent's
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 rst and second marriages contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the
provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs signi cantly from the recent cases of
Bobis v. Bobis and Mercado v. Tan , both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the
bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code, under which
a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required. As to whether a judicial
declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no express
provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be con icting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza , and People v. Aragon , this Court held that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the
same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his
rst marriage. After the death of his rst wife, accused contracted a third marriage during
the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy.
The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been
contracted during the existence of the rst marriage. There is no need for a judicial
declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the
rst one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages.
Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is
not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not. In Gomez v.
Lipana, and Consuegra v. Consuegra , however, we recognized the right of the second wife
who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in
proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
rst marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial declaration of such
nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband supervened before
such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the estate they
acquired, on grounds of justice and equity. But in Odayat v. Amante (1977), the Court
adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the
charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of
1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February
of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was a rmed in Tolentino v. Paras . Yet again in
Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married
another man, Wiegel. Wiegel led a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to
declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The
Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that: There is likewise no need of
introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her rst husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and
purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. In Yap v. Court of Appeals , however,
the Court found the second marriage void without need of judicial declaration, thus
reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings. DTcACa

2. ID.; FAMILY CODE; MARRIAGE; JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF

MARRIAGE, EXPRESSLY REQUIRED; APPLICATION THEREOF. — At any rate, the confusion
under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings in, Gomez,
Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code. Article
40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. See Art. 40:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on
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 the basis solely of a nal judgment declaring such previous marriage void. In Terre v. Terre
(1992) the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra a n d Wiegel, categorically stated that a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer
for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his rst marriage. He
claimed that his rst marriage in 1977 was void since his rst wife was already married in
1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for
purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court
applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993), the Court
held: Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the con icting jurisprudence on
the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as
a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. — However, a recent
case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case. In Apiag v.
Cantero, (1997) the rst wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into
a second marriage. The judge claimed that his rst marriage was void since he was merely
forced into marrying his rst wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the rst
marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza a n d Aragon. We held that since the second
marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before the promulgation of
Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a judicial declaration of
nullity of the rst marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at that time. Similarly, in
the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon.
The rst marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there
was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second
marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second marriage
to petitioner is valid. TAacCE

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVISIONS THEREOF HAS RETROACTIVE EFFECT; EXCEPTION;

APPLICATION IN CASE AT BAR. — Moreover, we nd that the provisions of the Family
Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the
vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals , the
Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the
present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court's nding that
despite private respondent's "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he
could benefit from her silence on the issue.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE LICENSE; WHEN USED LEGALLY IN THE CIVIL
CEREMONY DOES NOT DETRACT FROM THE CEREMONIAL USE THEREOF IN THE
CHURCH WEDDING OF THE SAME PARTIES TO THE MARRIAGE; CASE AT BAR — Thus,
coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner married private
respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony, we
nd that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as
untruthful private respondent's allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage
license. Indeed we nd there was a marriage license, though it was the same license
issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church
ceremony was con rmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate
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 court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary effects of said canonical
marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this matter as a rmative
defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate court from
giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in
protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such
technicality. In our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the
essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid
license in the rst of the two ceremonies. That this license was used legally in the
celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial use thereof in the
church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites served
not only to ratify but also to fortify the rst. The appellate court might have its reasons for
brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could
have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial
court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of
letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls "his own deceit and perfidy."
6. ID.; DAMAGES; MAY NOT BE AWARDED TO THE HUSBAND OR WIFE FOR
BREACH OF A MARITAL OBLIGATION; CASE AT BAR. — Like the lower courts, we are also
of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another
reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She
is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for ling a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage
which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and
alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where
the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such
incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between
husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. There are other
remedies.

DECISION

QUISUMBING , J : p

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. — G.R. CV 37897, which a rmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo
M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private
respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes and
Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and
void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies o ciated by
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 the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in
Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent led a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of
Pasig, Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He
alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at
the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the
time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been
issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4,
1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his
claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted
their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11,
12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence.
Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna
Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said
Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial
and, according to petitioner, are therefore deemed su cient proof of the facts therein. The
fact that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979,
before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also
appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding
ceremony on April 4, 1982. 1
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent's civil suit and declared his marriage to
herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both
parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court
a rmed the trial court's decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the rst
marriage (to Anna Maria) must rst be secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendant's counsel
that 'no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.'
It does not say, however, that a second marriage may proceed even without a
judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and void ab initio, there is
in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether
a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself —
for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second
marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree of nullity of his
first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least, and could not
have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code
on marriage.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed
Decision in this wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private
respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein
petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly
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 support in the amount of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise
Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991; and
3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED. 2

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition
asserting that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE
VALIDITY OF PETITIONER'S MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE
NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF
APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL
EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE
LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this
question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the
assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner
to private respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the
marriage between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected
petitioner's claim that People v. Mendoza 3 and People v. Aragon 4 are applicable in this
case. For these cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial
decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases,
decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No.
227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the
provisions of law previously obtaining. 5
In refusing to consider petitioner's appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory
precedent for this case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts
situate it within the regime of the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in
the instant case.
xxx xxx xxx

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a

second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void
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 ab initio is essential . . . . 6
At the outset, we must note that private respondent's rst and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code. The present case differs signi cantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis 7 and
Mercado v. Tan , 8 both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage
was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code 9 under which a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required. ISCHET

Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
ARTICLE 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person
during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than
such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The rst spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present
having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has
been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and
before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of
contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed
dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall
be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the

Civil Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter,
however, appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza , 1 0 and People v. Aragon , 1 1 this Court held that no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved
the same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of
his rst marriage. After the death of his rst wife, accused contracted a third marriage
during the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for
bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void,
having been contracted during the existence of the rst marriage. There is no need for a
judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void,
and the rst one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid
marriages. Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases,
saying that it is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or
not.
In Gomez v. Lipana, 1 2 and Consuegra v. Consuegra , 1 3 however, we recognized the
right of the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their
acquired estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the rst marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial
declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband
supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the
estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity. 1 4
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977), 1 5 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as
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 precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that
his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already
previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held that
no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was
affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras. 1 6
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986), 1 7 the Court held that there is a need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In
1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel led a petition with the Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid
marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that: 1 8
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior
marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a
marriage though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration
(citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would
still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and
respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Italics supplied).

I n Yap v. Court of Appeals , 1 9 however, the Court found the second marriage void
without need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon
rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family
Code. Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40
of the Family Code. 2 0 Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage —
ARTICLE 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.

I n Terre v. Terre (1992) 2 1 the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel,
categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary.
Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence
of his rst marriage. He claimed that his rst marriage in 1977 was void since his rst wife
was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have known that the
prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to
contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the rst marriage was null and void
ab initio is essential."
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals
(1993), 2 2 the Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting
jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of
the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a
final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See
also Arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148). 2 3

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances
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 of the case. In Apiag v. Cantero , (1997) 2 4 the rst wife charged a municipal trial judge of
immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his rst marriage
was void since he was merely forced into marrying his rst wife whom he got pregnant. On
the issue of nullity of the rst marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held
that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born before
the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of the rst marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence at
that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was
entered into in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. The rst marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's
second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we nd that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied to the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner
and of her children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals , 2 5 the Family Code has retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of
vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite
prepared to give assent to the appellate court's nding that despite private respondent's
"deceit and per dy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could bene t from her
silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein
petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in
the civil ceremony, we nd that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier
petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent's allegation that he wed petitioner but
they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we nd there was a marriage license, though it was
the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church rites.
Obviously, the church ceremony was con rmatory of their civil marriage. As petitioner
contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and salutary
effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise
this matter as a rmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not
prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She
adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and
social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private
respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage,
including the requirement of a valid license in the rst of the two ceremonies. That this
license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we
hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the rst. The appellate
court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant
below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely
interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to
the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer pro t from what the CA calls "his
own deceit and perfidy."

On the matter of petitioner's counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.

Although the appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted
"duplicitously and craftily" in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages because
the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim. 2 6 Like the lower courts, we are
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 also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case, but for another
reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting. She
is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for
damages from her husband for ling a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage
which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and
alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer, we would have a situation where
the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense, militates against such
incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages between
husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation. 2 7 There are other
remedies. 2 8
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed
partially, so that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M.
Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of
P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye
Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise
legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. See also Tison vs. CA, 276 SCRA 582, 593 (1997); Quebral vs. CA, 252 SCRA 353, 365
(1996); Son vs. Son, 251 SCRA 556, 564 (1995); re proof of facts cited.
2. Rollo, pp. 48-52.
3. 45 Phil. 739(1954).

4. 100 SCRA 1033(1957).

5. Rollo, p. 47.
6. Rollo, p. 49.
7. G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000.
8. G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000. In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Vitug
opined that the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the
purpose of remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a
marriage, at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in
his view, should still be deemed essential when the "marriage," for instance, is between
persons of the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the
marriage. Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and
intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36,
37, 38 and 53 thereof.
9. E.O. No. 209, which took effect on August 3, 1988.

10. 45 Phil. 739 (1954).

11. 100 SCRA 1033 (1957).
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 12. 33 SCRA 614 (1970).
13. 37 SCRA 315 (1971).
14. See also Lao v. Dee, 45 Phil. 739 (1924) and Pisalbon v. Bejec, 74 Phil. 88 (1943).
15. 77 SCRA 338 (1977).
16. 22 SCRA 525 (1983).

17. 143 SCRA 499 (1986).

18. Id. at 501.
19. 145 SCRA 229 (1986).
20. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
21. 211 SCRA 7 (1992).

22. 226 SCRA 572 (1993).

23. Id. at 579.
24. 268 SCRA 47 (1997).
25. 286 SCRA 495, 530 (1998).
26. Rollo, p. 51.
27. Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. 1, Manila: 1990, p. 223.
28. Among them legal separation, or prosecution for adultery and concubinage.

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