West Coast Life Insurance v. Geo. N. Hurd
West Coast Life Insurance v. Geo. N. Hurd
West Coast Life Insurance v. Geo. N. Hurd
WEST COAST LIFE INSURANCE Co., plaintiff, vs. GEO. N. HURD, Judge of Court of SC – Petition is granted
First Instance, defendant.
FACTS:
This is an action for the issuance of a writ of prohibition against the defendant "commanding the defendant to
desist or refrain from further proceedings in a criminal action pending in that court.
On the 16th of December, 19i2, the assistant prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila filed an information in a
criminal action in the Court of First Instance of that city against the plaintiff corporation, and also against John
Northcott and Manuel C. Grey, charging said corporation and said individuals with the crime of libel. On the 17th
day of December the defendant in his official capacity as judge of the Court of First Instance signed and issued a
process directed to the plaintiff and the other accused in said criminal action.
On the 20th day of December, 1912, the plaintiff, together with the other persons named as accused in said
process, through their attorneys, served upon the prosecuting attorney and filed with the clerk of the court a
motion to quash said summons and the service thereof, on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the
said company, there being no authority in the court for the issuance of the process, Exhibit B, the order under
which it was issued being void. The court denied the motion and directed plaintiff to appear before it on the 28th
day of December, 1912, and to plead to the information, to which order the plaintiff then and there duly
excepted.
The plaintiff filed an action in Court arguing that the Court of First Instance has no power or authority, under the
laws of the Philippine Islands, to proceed against a corporation, as such, criminally, to bring it into court for the
purpose of making it amenable to the criminal laws. It is contended that the court had no jurisdiction to issue the
process in evidence against the plaintiff corporation; that the issuance and service thereof upon the plaintiff
corporation were outside of the authority and jurisdiction of the court, were authorized by no law, conferred no
jurisdiction over said corporation, and that they were absolutely void and without force or effect. The plaintiff,
further attacking said process, alleges that the process is a mixture of civil and criminal process, that it is not
properly signed, that it does not direct or require an arrest; that it is an order to appear and answer on a date
certain without restraint of the person, and that it is not in the form required by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court may, of itself and on its own motion, create not only a process but a
procedure by which the process may be made effective.
HELD:
No. The Court do not believe that the authority of the courts of the Philippine Islands extends so far. While
having the inherent powers which usually go with courts of general jurisdiction, we are of the opinion that, under
the circumstances of their creation, they have only such authority in criminal matters as is expressly conferred
upon them by statute or which it is necessary to imply from such authority in order to carry out fully and
adequately the express authority conferred. We do not feel that Courts of First Instance have authority to create
new procedure and new processes in criminal law. The exercise of such power verges too closely on legislation.
Even though it be admitted, a question we do not now decide, that there are various penal laws in the Philippine
Islands which corporations as such may violate, still we do not believe that the courts are authorized to go to the
extent of creating special procedure and special processes for the purpose of carrying out those penal statutes,
when the legislature itself has neglected to do so. To bring a corporation into court criminally requires many
additions to the present criminal procedure. While it may be said to be the duty of courts to see to it that
criminals are punished, it is no less their duty to follow prescribed forms of procedure and not to go out upon
unauthorized ways or act in an unauthorized manner.
The courts of the Philippine Islands are creatures of statute and, as we have said, have only those powers
conferred upon them by statute and those which are required to exercise that authority fully and adequately. The
courts here have no common law jurisdiction or powers. If they have any powers not conferred by statute,
expressly or impliedly, they would naturally come from Spanish and not from common law sources. It is
undoubted that, under the Spanish criminal law and procedure, a corporation could not have been proceeded
against criminally, as such, if such an entity as a corporation in fact existed under the Spanish law, and as such it
could not have committed a crime in which a willful purpose or a malicious intent was required. Criminal actions
would have been restricted or limited, under that system, to the officials of such corporations and never would
have been directed against the corporation itself. This was the rule with relation to associations or combinations
of persons approaching, more or less, the corporation as it is now understood, and it would undoubtedly have
been the rule with corporations. From this source, then, the courts derive no authority to bring corporations
before them in criminal actions, nor to issue processes for that purpose.