July - September 2012 | Volume 25 | Issue 3

Cover Story

28
Conflict With China:
Prospects, Consequences
and Strategies for
Deterrence

Pictured is Shanghai, one of the most

populated cities in China with a total
population of more than 23 million.
It’s a multi-cultural metropolis with
both modern and traditional chinese
features. Shanghai serves as the
largest base of Chinese industrial
technology, one of the world’s most
important seaports and boasts
China’s largest commercial and
financial center.

ARTICLES DEPARTMENTS
09 JSOTF-P Uses Whole-of-Nation Approach to Bring Stability 04 From the Commandant
to the Philippines
05 Memorial Page
13 Continuity in the Chinese Mind for War
06 Updates
18 The Challenge of China and ARSOF’s Role
46 Career Notes
21 Leaning to All Sides: What the U.S. May Learn From
49 Training Updates
Chinese Political Warfare in Burma
50 Fitness
24 The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and Special Operations
52 Book Review
37 Real Results: Military Partnerships in the Philippines
53 Opinion
40 Grains of Truth: The Role of the Civil-Military Support
Element in Special Operations

51 Reading About the Asia-Pacific Region

 Special Warfare
U.S. ARMY JOHN F. KENNEDY
SPECIAL WARFARE CENTER AND SCHOOL
MISSION: The JFK Special Warfare Center and School invests in the
Commander & Commandant
development of human capital to produce Civil Affairs, Psychological
Operations and Special Forces Soldiers from recruitment to retirement in Major General Bennet S. Sacolick
order to provide our regiments with a professionally trained and well-
educated force. Editor
Janice Burton
VISION: Professionalism starts here. We are an adaptive institution
characterized by agility, collaboration, accountability and integrity. We promote
life-long learning and transformation. We are THE Special Operations Center of
Graphics & Design
Learning whose credibility in producing the world’s finest special operators is Jennifer Martin
recognized and sustained by every single member of our three regiments.
Webmaster
Dave Chace
SUBMISSIONS
Special Warfare welcomes submissions of scholarly, independent research from
members of the armed forces, security policy-makers and -shapers, defense analysts,
academic specialists and civilians from the United States and abroad.
Manuscripts should be 2,500 to 3,000 words in length. Include a cover letter.
Submit a complete biography with author contact information (i.e., complete mailing Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly publi-
address, telephone, fax, e-mail address). cation of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C. Its mission
Manuscripts should be submitted in plain text, double-spaced and in a digital file. is to promote the professional development of special-
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 FROM THE While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have preoccupied much of the Army’s — and the me-

COMMANDANT dia’s — time and attention over the past 11 years, it has been easy to overlook the fact that Army
Special Operations Forces have been conducting very significant operations in support of our
nation’s defense in regions all over the world.
On Jan. 5, we were reminded of that fact when the new National Defense Strategy was an-
nounced. The new strategy rebalances the nation’s global posture and presence by placing a
greater emphasis on operations in the Pacific. This makes sense.
The Pacific realm is home to more than 3.4 billion people and encompasses about half the
earth’s surface. The region, though plagued with many of the same problems we’ve seen in
Afghanistan and Iraq — violent extremist organizations trying to disrupt the governance of
many countries — has been something of a stabilizing influence in the world. The new strategy
points to the fact that the region is growing in importance to the United States in terms of our
economy and national security, and puts a premium on the use of forces that can build capacity
in our partners and allies.
This is what ARSOF has been doing in the region for a number of years. A lesser publi-
cized, but extremely successful, campaign in the Philippines throughout Operation Enduring
Freedom has led to greater stability in the country as it counters the destabilizing effects of
VEOs like Abu Sayyaf and Jemaah Islamiyah. Working through and with our partner forces in
the Philippines, our Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Soldiers have
built a stronger Philippine force. That sort of deliberate action has been at the base of actions
by ARSOF throughout the region, and underscores the importance of sustained and persistent
cooperation and collaboration.
Even as we build partnerships and maintain relationships, we must be mindful of our largest
adversary in the region: China.
China’s military budget increased by about 11.2 percent this year and stands right around
$106.4 billion. That’s the second largest military budget in the world. As China has increased its
military, it has also increased its global presence, with China’s influence spreading beyond the
Pacific realm into Africa and even own backyard in places like Panama.
In this issue, you will read about our operations in the Pacific realm, but you will also read about
the threat of China to our national defense, and where ARSOF can help minimize that threat.
Special operators like to quote Sun Tzu, and it seems appropriate that I do so here: “It is said
that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles;
if you do not know your enemies but do know yourself, you will win one and lose one; if you do
not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle.”
It is imperative, as our nation’s focus shifts to the Pacific that we understand the threat of
China, but more importantly that we understand the role of ARSOF in combating it.

Major General Bennet S. Sacolick

04 Special Warfare
1st SFG(A) 75th Ranger Regiment
Master Sgt. Mark W. Coleman Sgt. Justin B. Allen
Sgt. Andrew J. Creighton Spc. Ricardo Cerros Jr.
Spc. Joseph W. Dimock II
Sgt. 1st Class Wyatt A. Goldsmith
Sgt. 1st Class Kristoffer B. Domeij
Staff Sgt. Michael W. Hosey Sgt. Tyler N. Holtz
Sgt. 1st Class Dae H. Park Pfc. Christopher A. Horns
Cpt. Joseph W. Schultz Staff Sgt. Jeremy A. Katzenberger
Sgt. 1st Class Benjamin B. Wise Sgt. Ronald A. Kubik
Sgt. Martin A. Lugo
3rd SFG(A) Sgt. Andrew C. Nicol
Sgt. 1st Class Martin R. Apolinar Staff Sgt. Kevin M. Pape
Master Sgt. Benjamin F. Bitner Staff Sgt. James R. Patton
Sgt. Alessandro L. Plutino
Sgt. Aaron J. Blasjo
Sgt. Jason A. Santora
Staff Sgt. Kyle R. Warren
Sgt. 1st Class Lance H. Vogeler
10th SFG(A) Spc. Christopher S. Wright
Master Sgt. Danial R. Adams USASOC
Master Sgt. Benjamin A. Stevenson
20th SFG(A) Master Sgt. Jared N. Van Aalst
Cpt. Waid C. Ramsey 1st. Lt. Ashley I. White

July - September 2012 05

UPDATE
Reeder tapped for command of the Special Warfare Center and School
Brig. Gen. Edward M. Reeder Jr. has been ments, including time spent as a Special Forces
named the new commander of the U.S. Army John Qualification Course student and later as the
F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, aide-de-camp to Brig. Gen. David J. Baratto, the
based out of Fort Bragg, N.C., according to a May SWCS commanding general in the early 1990s.
4 Department of Defense press release. Brig. Gen. Reeder’s combat tours include a
Brig. Gen. Reeder is currently the command- deployment as the National Civil Defense Adviser
ing general of the U.S. Army Special Forces in the Republic of El Salvador in 1988, command
Command (Airborne), also at Fort Bragg, where of a Special Forces detachment in the Republic of
he oversees the Army’s operational Special
Panama in 1989, command of Special Opera-
Forces groups.
tions Task Force 32-Afghanistan during Operation
At SWCS, Brig. Gen. Reeder will command
Enduring Freedom in both 2002 and 2003, com-
the units and directorates that train, educate
mand of the Combined Joint Special Operations
and manage the Army’s three special-opera-
tions regiments: Special Forces, Civil Affairs Task Force in Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007, and
and Psychological Operations. command of CFSOCC-A from 2009 to 2010.
Brig. Gen. Reeder, a 1982 graduate of Maj. Gen. Bennet S. Sacolick’s, the current
Appalachian State University in Boone, N.C., SWCS commanding general, next assignment is
has commanded the Combined Forces Special as the Director of Force Management and De-
Operations Component Command-Afghanistan velopment for the U.S. Special Operations Com-
and the 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) at mand at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla., according IN COMMAND Brig. Gen. Edward M. Reeder will
Fort Bragg prior to its move to Eglin Air Force to the same Department of Defense release. — take command of the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy
Base, Fla. He has two previous SWCS assign- by Dave Chace, SWCS Public Affairs Office. Special Warfare Center and School in August.

OEF Joint SOF Academic Week

U.S. Special Operations Forces are implement- prior to OEF deployment. These new additions SOF operators conduct missions in some of the
ing new approaches as to how they train for foreign enhance an already robust component of the OEF most remote places in Afghanistan, the effects they
internal defense in Afghanistan. One new approach PMT cycle. achieve are often strategic in nature. Therefore, it
is through increased focus on academic training. Second, SOF’s role in the Afghanistan transition is imperative that all operators have some degree
The U.S. Special Operations Command recently is rapidly growing, and the complexity of the tasks of strategic context and higher level understanding
hosted the Operation Enduring Freedom XIX Joint associated with SOF’s role is growing as well. Village related to the stability and partnership missions
Special Operations Forces Academic Week in Or- stability operations and partnerships with Afghan they will execute in Afghanistan. Students hear
lando, Fla. This five-day event was held March 11- SOF have become key lines of effort in the overall opening comments from the commander, US-
16, and included more than 600 key leaders from International Security Assistance Force campaign. SOCOM, commander, ISAF, the U.S. Ambassador
across the joint special-operations community. The Many of the development and governance tasks to Afghanistan, commander, CFSOCC-A, and of
event also included several interagency members inherent to the village-stability operations methodol- course, commander, CJSOTF-A. The strategic context
from U.S. Agency for International Development ogy and the diverse and complex human terrain of provided by these senior officers directly to the
and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, along with Afghanistan require a world-class academic venue joint SOF audiences sets the stage for the more in-
numerous general purpose force members who will for helping SOF frame and think through these tough depth, localized discussions that follow later in the
soon own the battlespace in Afghanistan or serve FID problem sets. small-group sessions.
as security uplift forces with SOF conducting village The purpose for academic week is to establish Follow-on days include a round-robin of small-
stability operations in rural areas. an effective baseline for understanding stability and group sessions. The small-group sessions are
Why start a SOCOM-sponsored academic week partnership challenges that enable SOF leaders to by far the most popular within academic week.
10 years into the OEF Campaign? Although each execute a successful six-month PMT program. The Small-group sessions address the FID knowledge
component has a pre-mission training process, SOF goal is for students to leave academic week ready gaps and topics identified during an Afghanistan
foreign internal defense in OEF is inherently joint, to begin a holistic and focused PMT that adequate- battlefield circulation, and are presented by spe-
in nature. This means there are some Combined ly prepares them for their unique and complex cially selected subject-matter experts and recently
Joint Special Operations Task Force-A FID training mission sets. During academic week, the students returned OEF SOF operators.
gaps that cut across component seams. Col. Mark are presented with FID knowledge gaps, followed by In addition to providing students with the func-
Schwartz, commander, 3rd Special Forces Group, macro-level understanding of potential solutions to tional aspects of security, economic development
and recent CJSOTF-A commander, spearheaded these knowledge gaps. Most importantly, they make and governance, the small-group sessions also
the effort to leverage more joint training events for contacts with subject-matter experts and recently- organize students by regional affiliation. Students
units preparing to deploy under CJOTF-A. These joint returned SOF peers from OEF, who can assist them are separated into Group 1: RC South, Group 2:
events include an academic session at the begin- in further addressing these knowledge gaps during RC North and West and Group 3:RC East. Each
ning of the OEF pre-mission training cycle, joint their own component-level PMT. group attends one campus per day for three days.
mission-readiness exercises across SOF compo- Academic week is a five-day event, broken into This allows SOTFs to conduct team building with
nents to ensure CJSOTF-A interoperability prior to three segments. Day one of academic week is composite forces from other units, they wouldn’t
deployment and a SOF commander’s conference focused on establishing strategic context. Although otherwise see until deployment

06 Special Warfare
 UPDATE
PSYOP VS. MISO: A short usage guide
Over the previous year, the Psychological Operations Branch has faced the complex task of changing its lexicon by renaming the function PSYOP to Military Infor-
mation Support Operations. The change was deemed necessary, and was predicated upon the successes and known reputation of the military information support
teams operating globally for more than 20 years. The Army directed changes to all doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and
facilities functions across the Army, replacing the term PSYOP with MISO in order to comply with the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Special Operations Command and
Army implementation guidance. As part of this change, the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School was tasked as the Army Regulation 5-22
Force Modernization Proponent to recommend a new name for the branch and regiment. After significant consideration, it was decided that the branch and regi-
ment names would both remain Psychological Operations for historic lineage reasons, as allowed by the secretary’s directive. Below you will find the guidance that
governs the usage of old and new terminology.
Background: To differentiate between the manning of the force and the renamed capability/function, use the
• Secretary of Defense guidance (03 DEC 2010) following naming conventions.
followed by Army guidance (191951ZAPR11), • Psychological Operations (PSYOP) – used when referring to the career management field, MOS,
formally changed the name of the function branch, regiment and Soldiers manning the force (e.g., PSYOP sergeant, PSYOP officer, PSYOP Regi-
Psychological Operations to Military Information ment, PSYOP Training).
Support Operations. • Military Information Support (MIS) – used when referring to former Psychological Operations echelons
• Historical references using the terms psychologi- of command that perform the function (e.g., MIS group (MISG); MIS task force (MISTF); MIS battalion
cal operations and PSYOP are authorized and (MISB); MIS company; MIS detachment; MIS team).
will not be required to be changed to the new • Military Information Support Operations (MISO) – used when referring to the function formerly known
terminology. as PSYOP and generic forces/units and personnel performing the function (e.g., MISO forces; MISO
• CG, USAJFKSWCS, AR 5-22-designated Force units; MISO efforts; MISO effects; synchronization and coordination of MISO; MISO products; MISO
Modernization Proponent for Career Manage- staff planner)
ment Field 37, directed the branch and regi-
mental names remain Psychological Operations The revised keystone manual FM 3-53 (formerly FM 3-05.30) incorporates all of the terminology
to preserve the heraldic lineage of the Soldiers changes. FM 3-53 will not only provide updated doctrine for the branch, but will serve as the authoritative
manning the force. reference for the changes in terms and descriptions.

In order to ensure a full-spectrum approach to A staff members. The purpose of this session is environment creates new challenges on the battle-
stability, and meet the CJSOTF-A commander’s in- to ensure all SOTF members fully understand the field that should be incorporated into the next group
tent of high-demand topics not normally addressed CJSOTF-A supporting plan and processes so that of SOF rotating into OEF. This information directly
during component PMT, the small group sessions they can integrate them into their six-month PMT informs the overall academic week curriculum.
are divided into campuses, which comprise the process and collective combat systems. And finally, no stone is left unturned in finding
primary components of stability. The campuses are Overall attendee feedback from academic week the most relevant SMEs possible, along with a large
security, economic development and governance. was very positive, with more than 90 percent of at- number of SOF peers to provide that right balance
Some of the classes include: high-stakes negotia- tendees scoring the event as useful” or “very useful” between academic/technical instruction and tacti-
tions by one of the world’s leading negotiators, Stuart to their understanding of the VSO process. Additional cal reality. All three of these basic academic tenets
Diamond; VSO peer-to-peer panels; agriculture SOF input to course presenters reinforced the utility are then woven into the academic-week architec-
classes by the U.S. Department of Agriculture and in helping SOF prepare for other elements of their FID ture of strategic context, small group, campus-
other agriculture experts; Islam in Rural Afghanistan; mission such as partnership and logistics. Structur- based instruction and SOTF team building.
SOF logistics; and Afghan tribal dynamics. ing academic weeks that are well received by highly In conclusion, Joint SOF Academic Week will
In addition to providing hard-hitting topics, Joint experienced special operators is no easy task. The continue to play a key role for SOF preparing for
SOF Academic Week brings in more than 70 of the experience and tremendous training demand on our OEF. However, as SOF’s role in Afghanistan contin-
best presenters and subject-matter experts from community make them very tough critics. So, why is ues to increase during transition, academic week
across the stability community. They include Rand this event well received by the joint SOF community? must expand to include the two-star Special Opera-
analysts, academic professors, tribal experts, U.S. First, academic training is accountable to the tions Joint Task Force, that will include all three SOF
Government civilians, non-governmental organizations tactical operator, regardless of how much the elements in Afghanistan. Additionally, SOCOM will
and SOF peers just returning from OEF rotations. event grows in popularity. Although academic week need to consider academic training for the poten-
The topics within each campus will change includes more than 600 attendees from a range of tial SOF-enabled contribution to the international
each OEF PMT cycle, based on operator feedback backgrounds, and has visibility of some of the most joint command. If SOF increases its contribution
during battlefield surveys and post-training surveys. senior SOF leaders, the focus remains on tactical at the IJC level, there may likely be a need to work
However, the general construct of campus-based commanders between battalion and team levels. closer in PMT with the conventional security-force
training along security, economic development Second, the curriculum is developed at a grass- adviser brigades from the general purpose forces.
and governance lines is a solid foundation for roots level. In fact, curriculum comes directly from Despite the expansion in SOF OEF activities, and
future academic-week iterations. It allows course SOF operators in Afghanistan and in support of se- the need for increased academic training, SOCOM
designers to provide functional training relevant to nior SOF commanders from CJOSTF-A and CFSOCC- and its components must remain focused on
both stability and partnership, while also providing A. During a SOCOM 45-day battlefield circulation providing grass-roots FID instruction that addresses
relevant geographical orientation as well. by academic week organizers, SOF operators are the most salient knowledge gaps from Afghanistan.
Day five wraps up the event with SOF tactical polled on what stability and partnership issues they Academic week must remain a “world-class event,
leaders converging on the McDill Base Theater for a are facing that they wished they’d been trained on for world-class operators”. — by Lieutenant Colonel
range of operational briefings by current CJSOTF- before deploying. Or in some cases, the dynamic FID Scott Mann, chief, USSOCOM VSO Support Cell.

July - September 2012 07

 ANNOUNCING THE 2012 SPECIAL WARFARE
ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES WRITING COMPETITION
Topic How do I enter?
Over the past 11 years, Army Special Operations Forces have become very • Submit an unclassified, original
tactically proficient. Some would say that proficiency has come at a cost of the research paper examining any aspect
forces’ language and cultural skills. For ARSOF to successfully fulfill its role in — broad or specific — of this theme.
building capacity and shaping the battlefield, the force must maintain a bal- Papers should be between 3,000
ance in its proficiency to conduct lethal and non-lethal operations. and 5,000 words in length, not
The last 10 years have shown that while ARSOF’s tactical and technical counting end notes.
skills dominate on the battlefield, it is often our skills in the human domain
• Previously published papers, or
that have the greatest effect. Working in the human domain, ARSOF’s people-
papers pending consideration else-
centric focus can shape and affect the battlespace. This leads as an introduc-
where for publication, are ineligible.
tion to the 2012 ARSOF Writing Competition topic:
• Papers submitted to other com-
petitions still pending announced
How do we maintain a healthy balance between the tactical decisions are also ineligible. (As
and technical skills needed for lethal operations, while an exception to this rule, U.S. Army
maintaining our unique ability to work in the human domain; Command and General Staff Col-
lege students submitting papers
and how should ARSOF evolve to improve upon its ability to
to the General Douglas MacArthur
operate in the Human Domain as it looks 15 years from now? Military Leadership Writing Compe-
tition may submit the same paper
to the Special Warfare ARSOF
What do winning writers receive? competition. Thus, it is possible for
First Place: a single paper to be recognized by
• Award of $1,000 both competitions.)
• Certificate of recognition signed by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special
Warfare Center School commanding general. How do I submit a paper?
• Essay will be published in Special Warfare, the Professional Journal of • Download and
Army Special Operations Forces. complete an
Second Place: enrollment
• Award of $750 form from the
• Certificate of recognition signed by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Special Warfare
Warfare Center School commanding general. webpage at:
• Essay will be published in Special Warfare. www.soc.mil/swcs/contest
Third Place: • Submit the enrollment form with the
• Award of $500 proposed manuscript via e-mail to
• Certificate of recognition signed by the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Special Warfare at:
Warfare Center School commanding general. specialwarfare@ahqb.soc.mil
• Essay will be published in Special Warfare. • Deadline for submissions:
Friday, October 19, 2012
How will the papers be evaluated and judged?
• Special Warfare will recommend to the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Questions
Warfare Center and School Commander a panel of distinguished judges to If you have questions contact:
evaluate the entries. Editor in Chief of Special Warfare
• General criteria to be used for evaluating papers are on the Special Warfare (910) 432-5703 or via email:
website contest page at www.soc.mil/swcs/contest specialwarfare@ahqb.soc.mil

08 Special Warfare July - September 2012 08

 The whole-of-nation approach and
focus on protecting the population tenets
of this strategy have clearly resonated with
the Philippine populace. As President
Aquino recently noted, “the commander-
in-chief believes that the military functions
best when both the military and civil-
ian leadership share a clear and common
understanding of what is national security,
and accordingly, what threatens it.” Since
implementation of the IPSP, the GRP has
experienced a marked increase in security
gains across the region. These successes
have buoyed the AFP and Philippine Na-
tional Police and reinforced hope that last-
ing peace will be achieved through stability,
development and investment.1

Background
The Philippines is a vast multi-cultural
archipelago consisting of more than 7,000
islands and spanning nearly 1,500 miles north
to south. Although rich in history, culture
and natural resources, it has been plagued
by long-standing internal discord including
a multi-decade communist insurgency and
several Muslim separatist movements. These
JUNGLE WARFARE Philippine Marines practice jungle warfare techniques in Sulu with the advice and as-
challenges are particularly acute in the south-
sistance of Joint Special Operations Task Force’s Special Forces. Photo by Sgt. Matthew Troyer, USMC
ern Philippines, principally throughout the
islands of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.

JSOTF-P Uses Whole-Of-Nation Approach More than 500 miles from the historic seat of
central government in central Luzon, they are

TO BRING STABILITY TO THE PHILIPPINES populated by an exceptionally diverse society

with myriad familial, tribal, ethnic, religious
and linguistic differences. These volatile mixes
BY COLONEL FRAN BEAUDETTE of inhabitants possess few conflict resolution
mechanisms beyond violence, which is often
Introduction a cultural expectation.
Since the introduction of U.S. forces in the southern Philippines in 2002, service mem- Economic stagnation, political discord,
bers with the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines have supported the Philip- cultural conflict and a history of resistance to
pine military and police, with particular emphasis on the Government of the Republic of perceived foreign domination by Spanish, U.S.
the Philippines’ counterterrorism efforts. These combined efforts have resulted in a sig- and Filipinos from northern islands, along with
nificant degradation of transnational and locally inspired terrorist groups such as Jemaah simmering land disputes have long complicated
Islamiyah and the Abu Sayyaf Group, and created a region largely inhospitable to terrorists. life in the southern Philippines. These challeng-
The purpose of this article is to identify focus areas that have been successful in the south- es became acute during the Muslim separatist
ern Philippines for possible application to future operations, in particular those in areas movement in the late 1960s which raged for
where a light footprint, reduced signature and long-standing regional expertise are essential more than 20 years and left tens of thousands
for mission accomplishment. dead. The added economic devastation and
The roots of conflict in the southern Philippines are complex and date back several centuries. degradation of internal stability created an
Efforts to promote internal security and stability have historically been hampered by geography, exploitable area for terrorists seeking safe
a turbulent political landscape, limited material resources and the perception of attempted domi- havens and low-risk operational zones. Large-
nation by foreign actors. In early 2011, the GRP recognized the need for a fundamentally differ- scale training camps in central Mindanao were
ent approach and adopted the Internal Peace and Security Plan-Bayanihan. Although authored established as early as 1979 under the auspices
by the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the plan encompasses a whole-of-nation approach, of the most significant Muslim independence
with a focus on coordinating all efforts under the broad direction of a national internal-security group at the time, the Moro National Libera-
strategy. The importance of this approach is evidenced by the inclusion of an opening message tion Front. These camps facilitated the training
from President Benigno Aquino in which he states, “… the problems confronting our nation are of several thousand Jihadists bound for Paki-
multi-faceted and complex...a military solution is not enough to completely solve them. Efforts to stan and Afghanistan. Many would eventually
achieve genuine peace and security must therefore be supported by all.” return with combat experience.

July - September 2012 09

 JSOTF-P BRINGS STABILITY TO THE PHILIPPINES

This perceived safe haven led to the influx

of al-Qaeda-related operatives in the late 1980s
when Mohammad Jamal Khalifa, Osama bin
Laden’s brother-in-law, arrived. He was fol-
lowed a few years later by the primary architect
of the World Trade Center bombing, Ramzi
Yousef. A year later, Yousef was joined by his
uncle, Khalid Sheik Mohammad, former sec-
retary to Abu Sayyaf, an Afghan warlord and
namesake of a Filipino terrorist group formed
by returning Jihadists. Soon after, JI began
operating in the Philippines. While al-Qaeda
operatives were flowing into the region, JI and
ASG embarked on a series of deadly bombings
and kidnappings. Recognizing the threats to
international peace and security posed by ter-
rorist operations within their borders, the GRP
and U.S. Government formed a partnership
in 2002, focused on JI and ASG, the greatest
combined terror threat to both nations.
The current evolution of this partnership
is JSOTF-P, and its overarching result has ON AIR A Philippine airman communicates with helicopter crews during an infiltration exercise. Photo
been GRP operational success. A recent re- by MCC Terry Spain, USN
port by the Congressional Research Service
found that “Joint military activities have re- essentially remained unchanged, JSOTF-P efforts have been refined, modified or adapted to
duced the numbers of terrorist fighters in the meet the needs, capabilities and political enthusiasm of the GRP and AFP/PNP. However,
South … [diminished] Abu Sayyaf ’s strength the focus has remained consistent on three key areas.
and presence, [and]… the ASG’s leadership Full Spectrum Embedding and Engagement. JSOTF-P has worked diligently over the years
core reportedly has been reduced by about to establish relationships with members of the local and national government and security forc-
three-fourths...”2 es; effective partnership is the most important thing we do. At the tactical level, these relationships
This continued effort is paying measur- have been greatly facilitated by proper force disposition across a joint operating area containing
able dividends as illustrated by comparing more than 20 million people living on hundreds of islands scattered across 176,000 square miles
this recent report to the Department of of ocean. From the outset of U.S. engagement, leaders determined that U.S. forces would be
State’s assessment in 2004, which found that co-located with Philippine units on Philippine installations. In addition to being critical to the
ASG and JI “continue to threaten the secu- conduct of the mission, this was necessary in order to comply with the Philippine Constitution
rity of the country.”3 Again, as late as 2007, and several U.S./Philippine bi-lateral agreements.6 Also critical to a long-term perspective, the
the Department of State noted that JI in the persistent rotation of forces into the Philippines by the 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) has
Philippines “remained a serious threat to developed regional experts and fostered strong Filipino-American relationships manifested in
Western and regional interests, particularly each entity’s commitment to each other and to lasting operational success.
in Indonesia and the Southern Philippines.”4 Currently, at the request of the GRP, U.S. forces remain collocated with their partners on
For the purposes of this article, it is approximately a dozen Philippine military and police camps. JSOTF-P forces typically liaise
important to acknowledge the uniqueness of at the military-brigade and police-battalion level while maintaining close relationships with
the U.S.-Philippine relationship. Treaty allies subordinate units. There are exceptions to these partnerships that enable operational flex-
for more than 60 years, the history of our ibility and direct engagement in the most appropriate location for mission accomplishment.
interaction since 1898 through World War For example, in one area a U.S. Special Forces operational detachment is directly partnered
II is well known. Although the government with an AFP infantry division headquarters, while another is partnered with a large three-
and much of the population are supportive star operational command. Another ODA serves as a liaison to the AFP Special Operations
of U.S. engagement, national sovereignty Command and its collocated subordinate units, while also maintaining daily active liaison
sensitivities, in particular with regard to U.S. presence with the PNP Special Action Force. Other Green Berets and SEALs from JSOTF-P
forces post Subic-Bay Naval Base, remain are further closely partnered with the SAF at the operational and tactical level, advising and
important. The small and discrete U.S. foot- assisting their police counterparts in their mission of protecting and serving the population.
print of JSOTF-P collocated with Philippine Similarly, the U.S. Army Military Information Support teams and Civil Affairs teams as-
forces and in an advisory and assistance role, signed to each subordinate JSOTF-P Task Force have integrated at the tactical level with impres-
has been optimal. sive results. Developing relationships and conducting subject-matter expert exchanges, the
MIST teams have focused on radio messaging, atmospherics analysis and measures of effective-
Areas of Engagement ness collection, while the CA teams have focused on building a self-sustaining Philippine CA
Since 2002, JSOTF-P has indirectly capacity. As a result of their long term efforts, the AFP now has a CA capability, with associ-
supported thousands of partner-force ated doctrine, that is extremely effective and capable of planning, resourcing and conducting
operations.5 While the overall mission has their own medical civic-action programs, dental civic-action programs, veterinary civic-action

10 Special Warfare
 The comprehensive U.S. country-team
approach found in the Philippines, and neces-
sary for operational success, is perhaps best
embodied in the U.S. Embassy’s Mindanao
Working Group. Established by the ambassa-
dor, this interagency collaborative body plans,
coordinates, monitors and assess U.S. engage-
ment in the southern Philippines in order
to achieve the mission’s goals in support of
U.S. national interests. The MWG consists of
representatives from across the U.S. Mission
and JSOTF-P, and has served to link elements
of the GRP and private sector more closely to
the southern Philippines.
Operations and intelligence fusion. Daily,
the JSOTF-P focuses on supporting the AFP/
PNP lead in deterring remaining terrorist
groups and in permanently securing the se-
curity gains they have earned over the past 10
years. Enabling AFP and PNP operations and
intelligence fusion requirements includes a
wide variety of activities from SMEEs through
HAVING A BLAST An Armed Forces of the Philippines explosive ordinance disposal technician prepares support such as instruction on the military
munitions for detonation after completing a joint AFP and JSOTF-P training class. Photo by Sgt. Shel- decision-making process, use of computer-
don Peters, USMC mapping software or doctrinal construct of a
joint task force. Philippine security forces are
programs and engaging their local populations to great effect. Also, the AFP/PNP now have the
tremendously capable in their understand-
ability to independently design, produce and distribute their own informational products.
ing of local issues, challenges and relation-
The CA/MIST LNOs located in Manila have had similar success through their engage- ships. Synchronizing this understanding with
ments with GRP national-level organizations as well as remaining synchronized with critical purposeful operations intended for a specific
U.S. and GRP development partners. For example, a JSOTF-P CA officer permanently serves desired effect has been critical to recent suc-
as an LNO to the United States Agency for International Development. cesses. They are now very adept at conducting
Another example of close partnership is through the JSOTF-P liaison element partnered specific and focused warrant-based opera-
with the Philippine Air Force. Over time, through subject-matter expert exchanges on many ad- tions against wanted individuals. These are
vanced topics, the Philippine Air Force has also made tremendous progress. Their night-vision, oftentimes terrorists whose crimes against
goggle-qualified helicopter crews are fully operationally capable and their close-air support plat- society are their principle means of funding.
forms are integrated, when needed, into ground operations. These types of partnerships are es- Operations focused on suspected criminals
pecially suited to episodic support from routine theater-campaign plan engagements. Recently, are understood by the local population and
joint combined exchange-training events supporting the military and police have taken place in conveyed to them as occurring specifically
the southern Philippines, fully synchronized with JSOTF-P’s ongoing efforts. It is through these through legitimate legal efforts by the GRP to
components of the TCP that long-term partnerships with the appropriate partner-nation units rid formerly large swaths of the countryside
can eventually and sustainably transition to episodic engagement. of lawlessness and banditry. President Aquino
Select JSOTF-P personnel also meet weekly with senior AFP and PNP commanders at states the concept best, calling it an “all out
the operational and national level. These engagements have engendered the creation of a justice” strategy against criminal elements.
Philippine National Police National Operations Center meeting at the Manila headquarters This explanation resonates well with locals.
for weekly discussions on appropriate topics. JSOTF-P members also attend the weekly AFP These operations have achieved operational
general headquarters J3 and J2 combined fusion meeting, as well as attend similar meetings at effect, and in most cases eliminated internal
displacement of the population, formerly
both regional three-star command headquarters in the southern Philippines, at the AFP Ma-
prevalent during the conduct of ill-defined
rine-led Joint Task Force Sulu and PNP/AFP combined Joint Task Force Zamboanga-Basilan.
large-scale security operations.
A corollary of JSOTF-P’s mission is their support role as a component of the ambassador’s
The AFP and PNP fusing of accurate
“America-in-3D” initiative focusing on diplomacy, development and defense. The JSOTF-P deputy intelligence with the conduct of measured
commander and J9 work in the U.S. Embassy in Manila, maintaining effective relationships with all and appropriate operations is impressive and
critical components of the U.S. country team. Similarly, the JSOTF-P leadership meets weekly with serves as the tactical foundation of support
the ambassador, deputy chief of mission and senior embassy officials. Further, JSOTF-P personnel to the IPSP. Military components, police
of all ranks meet on a weekly basis with representatives from the Departments of State, Justice and elements and local officials now routinely
Treasury, and are co-located at their headquarters with FBI and Department of Justice representa- meet in Sulu, Basilan and Zamboanga, to
tives. At three locations in the southern Philippines, JSOTF-P forces are collocated with members discuss events and share information. This
of the Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program sharing has enabled the formation of a GRP-
who train local law-enforcement officials. This program and the relationship between JSOTF-P and interconnected intelligence and targeting
ICITAP have proven extremely valuable. For instance, in 2011 the program in Sulu alone gradu- network capable of gathering, analyzing,
ated more than 1,600 local police officers in fundamental police professionalism courses. planning and executing operations against

July - September 2012 11

 JSOTF-P BRINGS STABILITY TO THE PHILIPPINES

transnational terrorist threats. Formerly

non-existent, GRP participants now employ
the F3EAD model (find, fix, finish, exploit,
assess, disseminate), conduct joint-training
exercises and routinely conduct joint opera-
tions with AFP and PNP forces focused
and applying their respective strengths in a
permanently self-sustaining manner.
Military transition of internal security
responsibilities to the police. One of the
distinguishing aspects of the Philippines as
an operational theater is the presence of a
fully functioning government and exist-
ing legal framework relative to counter-
terrorism operations. In the case of the
Philippines, although this framework divides
responsibility for CT operations between the
military and police, the police have primacy
while the military maintains responsibility
for counterinsurgency. In addition, the IPSP
calls for an eventual complete transition of
internal security responsibility to the police,
allowing for a more streamlined military to
CIVIL AFFAIRS Philippine Armed Forces deliver books during a civil-military operation. Courtesy photo
then focus on territorial defense. The rela-
tionship between the AFP and PNP remains
tions throughout the country, working closely
critical, and both organizations clearly un-
with counterparts in the military, police and a Notes
derstand that strong and functional mutual
variety of political, religious and civilian lead- 1. Statement of President Benigno Aquino III
support and dialogue strengthen overall
ers. This support is synchronized with the over- during the AFP Change of Command Ceremony on
internal security efforts.
arching U.S. government objectives in country. July 2, 2010 at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo,
Recently, the GRP has announced the cre-
Fundamentally, this complete horizontal and Quezon City, quoted in Internal Peace and Security
ation of Joint Task Force Zamboanga-Basilan,
vertical integration between the comprehen-
an organization designed to align the efforts Plan - “Bayanihan”.
sive U.S. Government team and our respective
of the AFP and PNP. The model leverages 2. Thomas Lum, “The Republic of the Philip-
partners, from the strategic to tactical level, has
the warrant arrest power of the PNP against pines and U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research
been the key to success. While the Philippines
violent extremists and local lawless elements Service (January 3, 2011): 10.
may present a unique operational environment,
while employing AFP soldiers to augment 3. United States Department of State Country
this model — full integration and strategic
their security posture on or near objectives.
focus on the outcome by both U.S. and partner- Reports on Terrorism 2010, Chapter 5A, ac-
This new construct will synchronize AFP and
nation governments — is universal. cessed January 5, 2012, www.state.gov/g/ct/rls/
PNP efforts in the planning and conduct of
As previously noted, transnational terror- crt/45388.htm.
operations by information sharing, advanced
ist organizations have historically been able to 4. United States Department of State Country
skill cross training and combined representa-
thrive in the Southern Philippines due to historic
tion of GRP capacity to protect the population. Reports on Terrorism 2010, Chapter 2, accessed
issues — separatist fighting, frail economy, land
For example, the AFP could provide expertise January 5, 2012, www.state.gov/g/ct/rls/
disputes, uneven central government influence,
and support with navigating through difficult crt/2007/103706.htm.
etc. A long-term solution demands that these
terrain and securing the outer perimeter of a 5. JSOTF-P has partnered with more than
simmering issues be resolved. Such a solution
rural objective, while the PNP conducts a war- 75 units.
also requires continued pressure by our partner
rant-based arrest of a terrorist suspect. In that
nation security forces on terrorist groups despite 6. See for example, The Mutual Defense Treaty
operation, the PNP would also gather evidence
their challenging resource environment and Between the Republic of the Philippines and the
on scene and conduct sensitive site exploitation
competing needs.7 The GRP, with JSOTF-P United States of America (August 30, 1951); The Re-
to complete the requirements for a legal case.
assistance as needed, will attain internal peace public of the Philippines and United States of America
As has been said many times, the AFP is not at
and security in the southern Philippines and
war within the Philippines. They are employ- Visiting Forces Agreement (May 27, 1998); Armed
will continue to deny sanctuary to any remnants
ing their expertise against the myriad internal Forces of the Philippines and United States Pacific
of al-Qaeda affiliated
security challenges and in close concert with Command Kapit Bisig Framework (July 12, 2006).
transnational terrorists
the PNP have made tremendous progress. In 7. United States Department of State
formerly operating freely
the end, the AFP is working itself out of a job Country Reports on Terrorism 2010, Chapter 2,
within its borders.
so that it can regain a focus comparable to
accessed January 5, 2012, www.state.gov/g/
traditional militaries. Colonel Fran Beau- ct/rls/crt/2010/170255.htm (“The Philippine
dette currently com-
Evolution mands the 1st Special government, with U.S. support, has kept constant
On any given day the JSOTF-P supports Forces Group (Airborne) pressure on terrorist groups, even as their security
GRP operations in more than a dozen loca- and JSOTF-P. comment here services were stretched thin by other demands…”)

12 Special Warfare
 BY JEFFREY HASLER

“Let China sleep, for when she awakens

the whole world will tremble.”
— Napoleon Bonaparte
After a decade of large land-power campaigns in southwest Asia and the U.S. Central Command’s area of
operations , the national defense guidance Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for the 21st Century
(2012) has directed that the U.S. security focus “…will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific re-
gion…” and the U.S. Pacific Command area of operations.1 “Shock and awe” and large-scale coun-
terinsurgency will diminish in favor of Asian partner engagement and theater shaping backed up
by air-sea battle. This pivot reflects not only the diminishing preoccupation with 9/11-inspired
counterterrorism, but a renewed emphasis on the growing importance of East Asia in an in-
creasingly globalized world. The most vibrant expanding power and most worrisome potential
adversary in any military conflict in this region is clearly the People’s Republic of China. It
is therefore appropriate to revisit the extremely deep well of Chinese history to consider the
continuity of special-warfare stratagem and will alive in the eternal Chinese military mind.
The Chinese military tradition is especially characterized by an emphasis on indirectness,
multiple paths to an objective, centrality of deception and secrecy and a regard for outright
treachery which is probably counterintuitive to most western readers. This article can’t possibly do
justice to the depth, breadth, richness and implications of this topic. However, a tiny selection of passages from
the Chinese tradition will help to illustrate and inform the above assertions.
There is voluminous comment of the effect of the Confucian tradition throughout all of Chinese (and
east Asian) culture. Such discussions are basically centered on considerations of benevolent and wise
rule achieved by ordered society that is attentive to “correct” understanding, relationships, defini-
tions and rituals. Confucianism provides a paternalistic world dependent on adherence to surface
definitions which order “shallow,” obvious reality. The Chinese Communist Party has always
explained Confucianism as a relic; the justification for China’s feudal past. Although some later
Confucian tradition does include discussion of military affairs — particularly organization —
Confucianism generally eschews a focus on warfare.

July - September 2012 13

 CONTINUITY IN THE CHINESE MIND FOR WAR

More pertinent are other contemporary essential underlying qualities of indirect- on oneself; the enemy’s vulnerability on him….
ancient Chinese classics; Lao Tzu’s Tao Te ness, paradox, deception and quintessence One defends when his strength is inadequate;
Ching, and Sun Tzu’s The Art of War. Tao- are all present in Sun Tzu’s contemporary he attacks when it is abundant….
ism was a metaphysical school of Chinese Lao Tzu. Nor is this an irrelevant academic
quibble over who influenced whom. Notice To foresee a victory which the ordinary man
philosophy generally contemporary with
that it is western thinkers who ascribe “war can foresee is not the acme of skill; to triumph
Confucianism. Unlike Confucianism, Tao-
mind wisdom” to Sun rather than to Lao. in a battle and be universally acclaimed ‘Ex-
ism rejects hard definitions, certainty and pert’ is not the acme of skill, for if to lift an
shallow understanding and has thus always To a Chinese Taoist mind — and as the pas-
sages above suggest — the question “Where autumn down requires no great strength; to
been a philosophical counterpoise to the distinguish between sun and moon is not test
exactly does the “strictly” philosophical end
surface-ordered Confucian world. Take just of vision; to hear the thunderclap is no indica-
and the strictly military begin (?)” is both
three passages from the Tao Te Ching (circa tion of acute hearing.
nonsensical and irrelevant.
6th century B.C.) as an example: Keeping in mind the philosophical drift Anciently those called skilled in war conquered
LXVIII of the above, compare the following passages an enemy easily conquered. And therefore the
“One who excels as a warrior does not appear from Sun Tzu’s The Art of War (circa 6th victories won by a master of war gain him
formidable; One who excels at fighting is never century B.C.). neither reputation for wisdom nor merit for
roused in anger; One who excels in defeating his I valour. For he wins his victories without err-
enemy does not join issue; One who excels in “All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, ing. ‘Without erring’ means that whatever he
employing others humbles himself before them. when capable, feign incapacity; when active, does insures victory; he conquers an enemy al-
This is known as the virtue of non-contention; inactivity. When near, make it appear that you ready defeated.
This is known as making use of the efforts of are far away; when far away, that you are near. Therefore the skillful commander takes up a
others; This is known as matching the sublim- Offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feign disor- position in which he cannot be defeated and
ity of heaven.” der and strike him. When he concentrates, pre- misses no opportunity to master his enemy.
pare against him; where he is strong, avoid him. Thus a victorious army wins its victories before
LXIX
Anger his general and confuse him. Pretend in- seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights
“The strategists have a saying, I dare not play
feriority and encourage his arrogance. Keep him in the hope of winning.
the host but play the guest, I dare not advance
under strain and wear him down. When he is Those skilled in war cultivate the Tao and pre-
an inch but retreat a foot instead.
united, divide him. Attack where he is unpre- serve the laws and are therefore able to formu-
This is known as marching forward when there pared; sally out when he does not expect you. late victorious policies.”
is no road, Rolling up one’s sleeves when there These are the strategist’s keys to victory”
is no arm, Dragging one’s adversary by force XIII
III “Now the reason the enlightened prince and
when there is no adversary, And taking up
“Generally in war the best policy is to take a the wise general conquer the enemy whenev-
arms when there are no arms.
state intact; to ruin it is inferior to this. To cap- er they move and their achievements surpass
There is no disaster greater than taking on an ene- ture the enemy’s army is better than to destroy those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.
my too easily. So doing nearly cost me my treasure. it; to take intact a battalion, a company or a
Thus of two sides raising arms against each other, five-man squad is better than to destroy them. What is called ‘foreknowledge’ cannot be elic-
it is the one that is sorrow stricken that wins.” For to win one hundred victories in one hun- ited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy
dred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue with past events, nor from calculations. It must
LXXVIII be obtained from men who know the enemy
“In the world there is nothing more submissive the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.
Thus, what is of supreme importance in war is situation….
and weak than water. Yet for attacking that which
to attack the enemy’s strategy; next best is to Native agents are those of the enemy’s country
is hard and strong nothing can surpass it. This is
disrupt his alliances: people whom we employ.
because there is nothing that can take its place.
The next best is to attack his army. Inside agents are enemy officials whom we
That the weak overcomes the strong, and the
The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities employ.
submissive overcomes the hard, everyone in the
world knows yet no one can put this knowledge only when there is no alternative…. Doubled agents are enemy spies whom we
into practice. Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s employ.
Therefore the sage says, one who takes on him- army without battle. They capture his cities Expendable agents are those of our own
self the humiliation of the state is called a ruler without assaulting them and overthrow his spies who are deliberately given fabricated
worthy of offering sacrifices to the gods of earth state without protracted operations. information.
and millet; One who takes on himself the ca- Your aim must be to take All-under-Heaven Living agents are those who return with
lamity of the state is called a king worthy of intact. Thus your troops are not worn out and information.
domination over the entire empire. your gains will be complete. This is the art of Of all those in the army close to the com-
Straightforward words seem paradoxical.”2 offensive strategy.” mander none is more intimate than the secret
Most philosophers of war rightly consider IV agent; of all rewards given none more liberal
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War to be one of the “Anciently the skillful warriors first made than those given to secret agents; of all matters
timeless classics of war philosophy. However, themselves invincible and awaited the enemy’s none is more confidential than those relating to
the passages above demonstrate that the moment of vulnerability. Invincibility depends secret operations.

14 Special Warfare
He who is not sage and wise, humane and just, will. Make him generous gifts of pearls and ation. Accept his ideas and respond to his
cannot use secret agents. And he who is not deli- jade, and ply him with beautiful women. affairs as if you were twins. Once you have
cate and subtle cannot get the truth out of them. Speak deferentially, listen respectfully, follow learned everything, subtly gather in his power.
Delicate indeed! Truly delicate! There is no his commands, and accord with him in every- Thus when the ultimate day arrives, it will
place where espionage is not used … thing. He will never imagine you might be in seem as if Heaven itself destroyed him.
conflict with him. Our treacherous measures Eleventh, block up his access by means of
And therefore only the enlightened sovereign will then be settled. the Tao. Among subordinates there is no one
and the worthy general who are able to use the Fifth, treat his loyal officials very gener- who does not value rank and wealth nor hate
most intelligent people as agents are certain to ously, but reduce the gifts you provide to the danger and misfortune. Secretly express great
achieve great things. Secret operations are es- ruler. Delay his emissaries; do not listen to respect toward them, and gradually bestow
sential in war; upon them the army relies to their missions. When he eventually dis- valuable gifts in order to gather in the more
make its every move”3 patches other men, treat them with sincerity, outstanding talents. Accumulate your own
Like the Tao Te Ching, much of the under- embrace and trust them. The ruler will then resources until they become very substan-
lying principles of the Art of War emphasize again feel you are in harmony with him. If tial, but manifest an external appearance of
indirectness, subtlety, secrecy, deviousness you manage to treat his formerly loyal of- shortage. Covertly bring in wise knights, and
and a holistic approach to strategy. Many of ficials very generously, his state can then be entrust them with planning great strategy.
these same treacherous qualities can be found plotted against. Attract courageous knights, and augment
in the “civil offensives” section of another Sixth, make secret alliances with his favored their spirit. Even when they are more than
of the Song Dynasty’s (10th-12th century) ministers, but visibly keep his less-favored out- sufficiently rich and honored, constantly add
so-called “Seven Military Classics,” the Six side officials at a distance. His talented people to their riches. When your faction has been

“All warfare is based on deception. Therefore, when capable, feign

incapacity; when active, inactivity. When near, make it appear that you
are far away; when far away, that you are near.”
Secret Teachings (circa 5th century B.C.) of Tai will then be under external influence, while fully established you will have obtained the
Kong. Ralph Sawyer explains “civil offensives” enemy states encroach upon his territory. Few objective referred to as ‘blocking his access.’ If
thusly: “The civil, as distinguished from the states in such a situation have survived. someone has a state but his access is blocked,
‘martial,’ consisted of diplomatic measures as Seventh, if you want to bind his heart to how can he be considered as having a state?
well as political programs that clearly encom- you, you must offer generous presents. To Twelfth, support his dissolute officials in
passed psychological warfare, disinformation, gather in his assistants, loyal associates, and order to confuse him. Introduce beautiful
spying, and the creation of dissention.”4 loved ones, you must secretly show them the women and licentious sounds in order to
“There are twelve measures for civil gains they can realize by colluding with you. befuddle him. Send him outstanding dogs
offensives. Have them slight their work, and then their and horses in order to tire him. From time to
First, accord with what he likes in order to ac- preparations will be futile. time allow him great power in order to entice
commodate his wishes. He will eventually grow Eight, gift him with great treasures, and him to greater arrogance. Then investigate
arrogant and invariably mount some perverse make plans with him. When the plans are suc- Heaven’s signs, and plot with the world
affair. If you can appear to follow along, you will cessful and profit him, he will have faith in you against him.
certainly be able to eliminate him. because of the profits. This is what is termed as When these 12 measures are fully em-
Second, become familiar with those he ‘being closely embraced.’ The result … is that he ployed, they will become a military weapon.
loves in order to fragment his awesomeness. will inevitably be used by us. When someone Thus when…the proper signs are … visible,
When men have two different inclinations, rules a state but is externally controlled, his ter- attack him.”5
their loyalty invariably declines. When his ritory will inevitably be defeated. The Six Secret Teachings clearly show that
court no longer has any loyal ministers, the Ninth, honor him with praise. Do noth- there is no meaningful conceptual divid-
state will inevitably be endangered. ing that will cause him personal discomfort. ing line between what is considered war;
Third, covertly bribe his assistants, foster- Display the proper respect accruing to a great only that some efforts are done with the
ing a deep relationship them. While they will power, and your obedience will certainly be traditional use of arms and others are done
bodily stand in his court, their emotions will trusted. Magnify his honor; be the first to glori- with appeal to human moral weaknesses.
be directed outside it. The state will certainly ously praise him, humbly embellishing him as a Moreover, as the Seven Military Classics were
suffer harm. sage. Then his state will suffer great loss! compiled as a canon of statecraft in the 11th
Fourth, assist him in his licentiousness and Tenth, be submissive so that he will trust century, it demonstrates cultural continuity
indulgence in music in order to dissipate his you, and thereby learn about his true situ- of regard for treachery, deviousness, secrecy

July - September 2012 15

 CONTINUITY IN THE CHINESE MIND FOR WAR

ANCIENT POWER Marines of the People’s Liberation Army stand at attention as Rear Admiral Gary Roughead, commander of the Pacific Fleet, greets them follow-
ing a demonstration of the brigade’s capabilities. U.S. Marine Corp photo by Lance Corporal J.J. Harper

and the indirect and subtle application of A very brief selection of the stratagems is “Hide a knife behind a smile” (Be treacherous)
lethal coercion. offered as example below. “Charm and ingratiate yourself to your enemy.
Yet another example of such continuity “Besiege Wei to rescue Zhou” (Use an indirect When you have gained his trust, move against
in Chinese grand strategic and philosophi- him in secret.”
approach): “When the enemy is too strong to
cal thought on war is the Secret Art of War: “Entice the tiger to leave its mountain lair”
be attacked directly, then attack something
The 36 Stratagems. As is common in works
which he holds dear. Know that he cannot be (Lure out of a dominant position) “Never di-
informed by such ancient events, it is dif-
superior in all things. Somewhere there is a rectly attack an opponent whose advantage
ficult to be certain of authorship, and the
gap in his armor, a weakness that can be at- is derived from its position. Instead lure him
assertions of authorship stretch all the way
tacked instead.” away from his position thus separating him
back to the same classical period as Sun
from his source of strength.”
Tzu. However, the prevailing view is that “Kill with a borrowed knife” (Use the strength
many of these stratagems are a part of oral of another): “Attack using the strength of an- “Remove the firewood from under the pot”
history handed down over millennia by other. Trick and ally into attacking him, bribe (Destroy the source of strength) “If something
various tellers. There were also more than an official to turn traitor, or use the enemy’s must be destroyed, destroy the source.”
36 such gambits; the 36 being a contrived own strength against him. “Replace the beams with rotten timbers” (Sub-
number in the compilation accorded to the vert the enemy)
“Leisurely await for the labored” (Wait for
late Ming or early Qing Dynasties (circa
your enemy to wear himself out) “Encour- “Make the host and guest exchange roles” (In-
17th century A.D.). The current text was
age your enemy to expend his energy in futile filtrate and take over) Usurp leadership in a
found and reprinted in 1941 but remained
quests while you conserve your strength. When situation where you are normally subordinate.
obscure until promoted by the CCP in
he is exhausted and confused, you attack with Infiltrate your target. Initially, pretend to be a
1961.6 Such a timeline is clear confirma-
tion of the central persuasiveness of these energy and purpose.” guest to be accepted, but develop from inside
ideas in Chinese culture as it reaches all the “Create something from nothing” (Lie) “A plain and become the owner later.”7
way from the classic period of the ancient lie. Make somebody believe there was some- There are many more. The continuing
masters up to China’s present ruling regime. thing when there is in fact nothing.” themes of indirectness, treachery, subver-

16 Special Warfare
sion, infiltration and manipulating one’s force, military and non-military, and lethal not just in one country but throughout the
opponent into ambushes set for him are ob- and non-lethal means to compel the enemy to world, not just temporary peace but perpetual
vious. That the CCP rescued this collection accept one’s interests.’” peace. To achieve this aim we must wage a
from obscurity and published it is indicative “This kind of war means that all means will life-and-death struggle, be prepared for any
of the party’s regard for its profundity and be in readiness, that information will be om- sacrifice, persevere to the end and never stop
utility. Why then should the reader not be- nipresent and the battlefield will be every- short of the goal. However great the sacrifice
lieve that the party sees profundity and util- where. It means that all weapons and tech- and however long the time needed to attain it,
ity in (1999), the work of two PLA Colonels, nology can be superimposed at will, it means a new world of perpetual peace and bright-
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. It is not that all the boundaries lying between the two ness already lies clearly before us. Our faith
credible that this work would have been al- worlds of war and non-war, of military and in waging this war is based upon the new
lowed to be published without some level of China….”9 — Mao Zedong
non-military, will be totally destroyed, and it
official sanction. Given the length of Chinese The Chinese have a long tradition of very
also means that many of the current principles
history and tradition, this work is essentially intelligent, focused and patient indirect-
of combat will be modified, and even that the
the current state of Chinese philosophy. A ness, deviousness, imagination, ruthlessness,
rules of war may need to be rewritten.”
tiny sample follows. treachery, guile and deceit in their “mind for
“The new concept of weapons is a view of warfare.” Every special operations Soldier is
“The first rule of unrestricted warfare is there weapons in the broad sense, which views as obliged to focus on the challenge the PRC
are no rules, with nothing forbidden.” weapons all means which transcend the mili- presents to American interests and has a
“Strong countries make the rules while rising tary realm but which can still be used in com- duty to study and understand these Chi-
ones break them and exploit loopholes.” bat operations. In its eyes, everything that can nese traditions. Naysayers, defenders and
“Faced with political, economic, cultural, dip- benefit mankind can also harm him. That is apologists with vested interests in the PRC
lomatic, ethnic and religious issues etc, that to say that there is nothing in the world to- will challenge or downplay the signifi-
are more complex than they are in the minds day that cannot become a weapon, and this cance of this tradition. Armed with these
of most of the military men in the world, the requires that our understanding of weapons examples you may
limitations of the military means, which had must have an awareness that breaks through judge for yourself.
heretofore always been successful, suddenly be- all boundaries.”8 As he smiles and
come apparent.” There is much more than these few charms you to your
quotes. To the extent that U.S. policy is face with his many
“When people begin to lean toward and rejoice
“pivoting” to East Asia, every western heads, don’t forget
in the reduced use of military force to resolve
policy maker, war fighting leader and the poisoned spikes
conflicts, war will be reborn in another form
special-operations Soldier should study the of the dragon’s long
and in another arena, becoming an instrument
of enormous power in the hands of all those full work. Not only is Unrestricted Warfare tail. comment here
who harbor intentions of controlling other completely consistent with the Chinese Mr. Jeffrey Hasler is a retired Special
countries or regions. In this sense, there is rea- tradition of holistic, indirect, imaginative Forces warrant officer and lifelong student of
son for us to maintain that the financial attack and deviousness in war philosophy, it is China. Educated at Indiana and the Naval
by George Soros on East Asia, the terrorist at- essentially a bold pronouncement that this Postgraduate School, he graduated with “hon-
tack on the U.S. embassy by Osama bin Laden, unrestricted, “lawless” view of war is avail- ors” in Chinese Mandarin from the Defense
the gas attack on the Tokyo subway by Aum able to the PRC right now. Language Institute, and has studied and
ShinriKy, and the havoc wreaked by the likes of “Our war is sacred and just, it is progres- travelled widely in the PRC. He is currently a
Morris Jr. on the Internet, in which the degree sive and its aim is peace. The aim is peace doctrine writer and analyst in USAJFKSWCS.
of destruction is by no means second to that of
a war, represent semi-warfare, quasi-warfare Notes
and sub-warfare, that is, the embryonic kind
1. Department of Defense. (JAN 2012). “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership; Priorities for the 21st Century.” Washing-
of another warfare.”
ton D.C. p. 2.
“Even in the so-called post-modern, post- 2. Lao Tzu. (1963). Tao Te Ching.Tr. D.C. Lau.Penguin Classics, N.Y. pp. 130-1, 140.
industrial age, warfare will not be totally dis- 3. Sun Tzu. (1976). The Art of War. Tr. Samuel B. Griffith.Forward by B. H. Liddell Hart. Oxford University Press,
mantled. It has only re-invaded human society London. pp. 66-70, 77-79, 85-88, 144-149.
in a more complex, more extensive, more con- 4. Sawyer, Ralph. (1993). The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China. Westview Press, Boulder. p. 404.
cealed and more subtle manner.” 5. Sawyer, pp. 56-57.
“While we are seeing a relative reduction in 6. Liu Yi, Tr. (1992). 36 Stratagems: Secret Art of War. Asiapac Press, Singapore. Foreward p.1; and “Chinese Military
military violence, at the same time we definite- texts/Thirty-Six Stratagems” downloaded 15FEB12 from Wikipedia
ly are seeing an increase in political, economic 7. “Chinese Military texts/Thirty-Six Stratagems,”Wikipedia
and technological violence.” 8. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. (1999). Unrestricted Warfare. PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, Beijing. pp.
“The new principles of war are no longer 1,3,4,8,15. Excerpts taken from Foreign Broadcast Information Service selection downloaded 8FEB12 from http://www.
‘using armed force to compel the enemy to terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf
submit to one’s will,’ but rather are ‘using all 9. Mao Tse Tung. (1938) “On Protracted War,” in Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse Tung. Foreign Languages
means, including armed force or non-armed Press, Peking, 1968. p. 224.

July - September 2012 17

 THE CHALLENGES OF CHINA
AND ARSOF’S ROLE
BY COLONEL MIKE LWIN

China looms large, not just in the minds of leaders and manage.”1
the foreign-policy community in America, but also in The latest
Asia and around the globe. While China’s economy has National
grown remarkably over the last two decades, its long- Security Strategy
term strategic intentions remain unclear. As the collapse states that the U.S.
of the Soviet Union, Japan’s previously predicted economic “will continue to pursue
supremacy and the Arab Spring demonstrate, strategic fore- a positive, constructive and
casting is a tricky business. In this period of uncertainty when comprehensive relationship
it is unclear whether China will act as a responsible power or as with China.”2 It goes on to state “More broadly, we will encour-
an aggressive regional hegemon, it is certain that China presents a age China to make choices that contribute to peace, security and
range of challenges for the U.S. and other nation states. This essay prosperity as its influence rises.”3
considers the question of “What is the role of Army special-opera- The Defense Strategic Guidance released earlier this year
tions forces in meeting the challenges of China?” identifies the methods the U.S. will use to maintain stability and
To answer this question, this article is divided into three sections. growth in the Asia-Pacific region. The guidance states, “We
First, this article identifies current U.S. policy and strategy. Second, will emphasize our existing alliances…” and “...expand our
the article examines the economic, military and influence domains networks of cooperation with emerging partners.”4 This method
where China strategically challenges the U.S. Finally, the article seeks to ensure an end state with “a rules-based international
identifies the opportunities where ARSOF can achieve the desired order that ensures underlying stability and encourages the
outcomes of U.S. national strategy. peaceful rise of new powers, economic dynamism and construc-
tive defense cooperation.” 5
U.S. Policy
Whether China will ultimately partner with or struggle against China’s Challenges
the U.S. is unclear. As our Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has Some consider China to be an adversary like the Soviet Union
written, “China represents one of the most challenging and conse- was during the Cold War. This is an imperfect comparison. Dur-
quential bilateral relationships the United States has ever had to ing the Cold War, the world was largely divided between two blocs

18 Special Warfare
with separate economies, military alliances and ideological outlooks; Military Challenge
today, no simple division exists. Like the Soviet Union, the scope of As mentioned previously, China’s economic growth has allowed
China’s challenge extends to the economic, military and influence it to steadily increase its military capabilities. The role of China’s
realms. The nature of China’s challenges in these realms, however, People’s Liberation Army has traditionally been oriented on Taiwan
is fundamentally different than that of the Soviet Union. China has to deter any moves toward independence and respond with force if
significant economic ties to the U.S. and the rest of the globe; the So- necessary. Some of the PLA’s existing and emerging capabilities such
viet Union did not. China does not currently array its military forces as conventional missile forces and submarines are especially trou-
directly against the U.S., as the Soviet Union did in Europe. China bling, as they could also be used for anti-access/area denial to push
does not offer a clear ideological alternative to other nations, as did U.S. naval and air forces out of the Western Pacific in a time of crisis.
the Soviet Union with Communism. Presently, however, Taiwan’s role as a flashpoint for military conflict
has been diminished given stable relations and growing economic
Economic Challenge ties between the mainland and Taiwan.
China’s growing economic strength is the first challenge. Although As China continues to consume oil, metals and other resources
the economic domain is typically viewed as a separate realm from to feed its industries and meet the demands of its growing consumer
military strategy, it is essential to understand the strategic implica- class, it is also developing military capabilities to project power far-
tions of China’s economic growth. What is clear is that China has ther from home. Last year in Libya, the Chinese military conducted
maintained sustained economic growth over the last two decades and its first noncombatant evacuation operation. China has participated
is now the world’s second largest economy. Forecasts differ on when, in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Beyond more
or if, the Chinese economy will surpass the U.S. Regardless of the benign uses of its military power, however, China is also building up
actual answer to that question, China’s economic growth has critical capabilities that could be used to coerce its neighbors.

“While U.S. presence is not designed to ‘contain’ China, it does serve

to constrain China from adopting and pursuing overly aggressive
actions against its neighbors.”
strategic implications. China and its neighbors have a range of resource and sovereignty
Economic growth increases China’s resources available to disputes, which are prominently on display in the South China Sea.
modernize its military. Even if China were to maintain its defense Some of China’s emerging military capabilities do not directly threat-
spending at a level of 2 percent of its gross-national product, its en the U.S., but appear to be a signal to smaller regional nations not
defense budget would still steadily grow. Economic strength also to challenge China. For example, the Chinese aircraft carrier that had
provides a source of global influence for China through the provi- its maiden voyage last year with great fanfare is nothing more than
sion of aid, loans, trade and investment. Some have even argued an old, reconditioned ex-Soviet vessel that poses little direct threat
that China’s ownership of U.S. debt could allow it to coerce or to the U.S. The carrier’s purpose seems more intended as a display of
compel the U.S. to do its bidding. Others, however, point out that military might to cower smaller regional nations into acquiescence
China’s holding of U.S. bonds creates a “financial balance of ter- with China’s desires. Additionally, should China’s leadership ever feel
ror.” If China were to dump U.S. bonds, it would hurt the U.S., but that its sovereignty is challenged by other regional nations, the PLA
would also inflict great damage on China. could be used in short violent strikes for psychological effect as they
Perhaps the greatest strategic implication, however, is that were against India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979.
China’s economic growth and role as Asia’s economic hub has The present limitations of China’s military might; however, must
made it deeply linked to both the U.S. and other countries re- also be recognized. The PLA has not fought since its 1979 war; during
gionally and around the globe. Boeing sells billions of dollars of that conflict its performance was extremely costly and not overly mas-
U.S. aircraft and General Motors is the largest foreign automaker terful. China’s neighbors are also increasingly investing in building up
in China. Apple and other U.S. companies have supply chains their own military capabilities. China’s economic growth and integra-
that originate out of China. On the opposite side, the Chinese tion with other countries have given it the same sort of vulnerabilities
economy depends on access to the world for raw materials to that Chinese military theorists posited about the U.S. in the widely
feed and power its factories as well as access to U.S. and West- publicized 1999 book Unrestricted Warfare. More than 80 percent of
ern markets to sustain its growth. These economic relationships Chinese oil imports now transit the Strait of Malacca, a geographic
place strong incentives for the U.S., China and other countries chokepoint. Insurgents in Pakistan and Sudan have kidnapped Chi-
to avoid any break in relations or military conflict that could nese engineers and workers. China still faces a range of internal unrest
cause these vital economic linkages to be severed. including separatist movements in Tibet and Xinjiang provinces.

July - September 2012 19

 THE CHALLENGES OF CHINA AND ARSOF’S ROLE

Influence Challenge are scalable to the mission and have proven their ability for a quiet
The last realm where China challenges the U.S. is in the realm of but effective presence in places like the Philippines.
influence. One side of influence is “soft power,” the positive side of influ- ARSOF typically have extensive joint-intergovernmental-inter-
ence based on attraction and persuasion. China is weak in soft power agency-multinational experience. This aptitude allows ARSOF to
despite the prominence of its traditional culture and global public diplo- fully nest with whole-of-government approaches. The range of capa-
macy efforts. Chinese political values and ideology are in flux and are no bilities in Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces
longer a source of global inspiration; given its embrace of state-directed allows ARSOF to work with partner nations to respond to non-
capitalism, China no longer can export Maoist ideology to Communist traditional security challenges such as disaster relief. These activities
revolutionary groups. Given that China is still struggling to define its are not focused on China, but allow the U.S. to build a shared level of
own internal political ideology, it lacks a coherent narrative to share with trust and respect necessary for effective networks of cooperation.
the rest of the globe. China’s policies of non-interference and economic Given ARSOF’s capabilities in building and reinforcing networks
development appeal to authoritarian governments but not many others. of cooperation, it may be time to modify U.S. policy to expand AR-
China’s weak soft power, however, does not mean it has no influ- SOF’s scope of engagement. Given the prominent role that militar-
ence. China’s geographic centrality, historic role as the Middle King- ies, especially armies, play in the social and political fabric of many
dom, rising military power and role as the regional economic hub Asian nations, ARSOF could be utilized to engage with more than
and global economic powerhouse provide it other effective tools for just partner-nation SOF. ARSOF could leverage its SOF contacts to
influence. Countries in Africa and the Caribbean desire relationships help the larger military institutions in partner nations professionalize
with China for trade and investment. Countries in the Asia-Pacific and transform to meet tomorrow’s challenges. ARSOF may even have
region increasingly see their prosperity tied to economic relations additional roles in support of partner-nation paramilitary and law-
with China. China has also expanded its military engagement region- enforcement forces that are increasingly facing powerful transnation-
ally and globally with training, arms sales and even military hospital al-criminal organizations. Expanded engagement holds the potential
ships providing humanitarian aid. for building increased resilience in partner nations against a range of
In this period with great uncertainty about China’s intentions, the threats that make them susceptible to less benign external influence.
desire of many nations is to maintain diplomatic and economic links to Finally, in the unfortunate event conditions in the Asia-Pacific
China. Given these desires, the development of a formal alliance struc- region ever devolve into outright military conflict, ARSOF has obvious
ture in the Asia-Pacific region like NATO would be premature, unwar- roles in providing strategic reconnaissance and direct-action capabili-
ranted and counterproductive. Long-standing interests and relationships ties to support air-sea battle or other operational concepts designed
in the region already require U.S. presence. China will continue to ex- to mitigate an adversary’s anti-access/area-denial capabilities. ARSOF
pand its economic and diplomatic relations as a by-product of its growth. foreign internal defense and military-information support capabilities
While U.S. presence is not designed to “contain” China, it does serve would be leveraged to support our allies and partners in any regional
to constrain China from adopting and pursuing overly aggressive ac- conflict. ARSOF’s unconventional warfare capabilities allow it to play a
tions against its neighbors. As China’s power rises, nationalist attitudes range of roles depending on the type and scale of future conflicts.
from within could possibly lead to miscalculation by the Chinese Hopefully, conditions in the region never come to the point of
leadership to pursue hegemony over the region. U.S. presence tied military conflict. China’s internal workings are opaque, but it is not
into “networks of cooperation” possesses sufficient mass to provide inconceivable that the overall U.S.-Chinese relationship could posi-
alternatives to China’s influence. U.S. presence also serves a balancing tively develop to a point where someday ARSOF and PLA forces
function to deter China from following its own internal nationalist have exchanges and engagements with each other. Until we reach
sentiments and aggressively seeking to dominate the region. that point, ARSOF has a critical role to play
in our nation’s strategy to build networks
Roles for ARSOF of cooperation to keep peace, stability and
In this period of uncertainty with each nation making a compli- prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region.
cated calculus of economic, military and influence concerns, the Colonel Mike Lwin has recently completed
U.S. must seek to form, reinforce and enhance its existing alliances a Senior Service College Fellowship at the
and partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region. ARSOF forces are the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He is
right forces for the mission. As the Commandant of the U.S. Army a Psychological Operations officer with a long-
John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Maj. Gen. time regional focus on the Asia-Pacific region. comment here
Bennet Sacolick, stated in a previous issue, the ARSOF schoolhouse
builds “a force specifically designed to shape foreign political and
military environments in order to prevent war.”
Notes
Countries in the Asia-Pacific region want reassurance against 1. Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, November 2011, 56-63.
China’s military growth, but they generally desire a quiet U.S. pres- 2. Barack Obama, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, May
ence because of political sensitivities, concerns about legitimacy 2010) 43.
and sovereignty, as well as their own internal strategic calculations. 3. Ibid.
ARSOF is the best force for this quiet engagement. Hallmarks of this 4. Leon E. Panetta, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century
force are “a capability that works with host nations, regional partners Defense (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2012), 2.
and indigenous populations in a culturally attuned manner.” ARSOF 5. Ibid.

20 Special Warfare
LEANING TO ALL SIDES
What the United States May Learn From Chinese Political Warfare in Burma
BY DONOVAN C. CHAU, PH.D.

“You lean to one side … To sit on the fence approach. In the mean time, other countries may have been more interested in what lay
is impossible; a third road does not exist…. are given the opportunity for more direct beyond Burma. Indeed, China’s strategic
Not only in China but also in the world, strategic influence. For over half a century, purposes have been manifold in Burma,
without exception, one either leans to the one country has followed such a tangible, generally falling into economic and mili-
side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. strategic approach in Burma — the People’s tary categories.
Neutrality is mere camouflage and a third Republic of China. As a result, China has Cross-border, overland caravan trade on
road does not exist.”1 gained influence with the junta and the hill both sides of the Chinese-Burmese border
Burma today is a country with little tribes and, to a lesser extent, the Burmese has been in existence since at least the 15th
public infrastructure, institutions or civil population. But why has China desired century. Indeed, the vast majority of Chinese
society. Fractures and fissures within the strategic influence in Burma? And how has it in modern-day Burma migrated into the
society are widespread: between the military gained a foothold in the country? An exami- country over land.3 What this demonstrates
junta and the ethnic hill tribes, the junta nation of both China’s strategic intentions is a long-held view of Burma as a place of
and the general populace, the hill tribes and and strategic actions in Burma holds much economic enterprise as well as an economic
the general populace and amongst the hill insight as the United States seeks to act more outlet. Since China’s economic rise began in
tribes themselves. In political circumstances prudently across the Asia-Pacific region in the mid-1980s, it should come as no surprise
such as this, the United States has generally the 21st century. that China would consider the possibility
followed the same policy formula: non-mil- of opening a more permanent trade route
itary pressure through economic sanctions Strategic aims through Burma.
coupled with incessant calls for democratic In October 1989, a high-level Burmese With a burgeoning civilian economy in
changes (including the refrain of multi-party military delegation paid a 12-day visit to the late-1980s, China’s southwest province
elections and respect for human rights), all China. Reports later indicated that China of Yunnan was conducting informal foreign
the while providing moral support to the and Burma signed an arms deal worth trade and commercial interaction with
pro-democracy or moderate elements of the approximately $1.2 billion.2 Although the neighboring Southeast Asian countries. A
political establishment within the country. two countries shared similar repressive, lucrative market in smuggling and narco-
In other words, the U.S. takes a wait-and-see anti-Western authoritarian regimes, China trafficking was also taking place. In 1993, for

July - September 2012 21

 LEANING TO ALL SIDES

example, trade between China and Burma for the past three decades led breakneck eco- Through new and updated construction,
was estimated at $1 billion, not including nomic development amidst generally peace- roads became an important line of commu-
illegal activities.4 To facilitate a more inter- ful surroundings. In order to continue its nication for China in Burma.
national movement of goods and people, drive at world-power status, China requires China took a similar route in develop-
China desired the establishment of a trading Burma as a strategic ally or, in the very least, ing additional lines of communication
port for its landlocked provinces, especially not a strategic nuisance. Part and parcel of through Burma. In December 1993, China
Yunnan. The Chinese press reported that the this interest is China’s foreign policy views sold railroad equipment to Burma’s railway
route through Burma would be 5,800 kilo- on sovereignty and territorial integrity. In agency.11 Within its own borders, China
meters shorter than the route from Yunnan’s the case of Burma, China has historically constructed a railway from Kunming to
capitol, Kunming, to the nearest seaport viewed significant portions of its territory as Xiaguan, near Dali. The third component of
(Shanghai).5 The economic imperative was belonging to China, including Burma north the transportation link between China and
a historical consideration that became a of Myitkyina and the Shan and Wa States Burma was the river line of communication.
modern imperative. east of the Salween River, as far south as In March 1997, a Sino-Burmese study group
China also desired influence in Burma about 22°N.8 Taken together, China has a investigated the possibility of water trans-
because of its geographic location along multitude of strategic aims in Burma — local, portation from Yunnan into the Irrawaddy
the Bay of Bengal region, astride the Indian regional and global. River Valley. The plan connected Bhamo, the
Ocean, and neighboring India. Since at least northernmost port on the Irrawaddy River,
the 19th century, Burma had been viewed Strategic actions to Minhla, 1,000 kilometers down the river.
as a buffer state between India and China.6 Through the lens of political warfare, From Minhla, a road would be built across
Thus, either country with predominant one may understand China’s strategic ac- the Arakan Yoma mountain range, running
strategic influence in Burma necessarily tions in Burma and how it has developed via An to Kyaukpyu.12 Through a combina-
complicated the other’s security calculations. relationships with the junta and the hill tion of infrastructure development projects,
Since the end of the Cold War, China’s pres- tribes. Overt and covert, political warfare is China developed strategic lines of communi-
ence along Burma’s coast has raised India’s a non-lethal instrument of grand strategy. cation through Burma to the Indian Ocean.13
suspicions. A naval position on the Burma Targeting groups and individuals, it com- The development of Burma’s transporta-
coastline could afford China the opportunity prises activities that are tangible with direct tion infrastructure gave China access to
to monitor India’s movements, over land effects on peoples’ lives. Political-warfare assist in Burma’s naval infrastructure. Chi-
and sea. Such strategic positioning could be operations include targeted economic aid, nese technicians helped the Burmese navy
designed for a 21st century competition-in- development projects, exchange visits, pub- upgrade facilities and build bases. China also
the-making over the Indian Ocean between lic pronouncements, as well as the train- provided tangible assistance with the instal-
the world’s two largest populations.7 ing, arming and equipping of military or lation of surveillance and communications
Yet, China’s intentions in Burma go other forces. Political warfare’s purpose is equipment. Since 1998, four electronic lis-
beyond regional strategic competition. determined by the user’s intent; its success, tening posts were strategically placed along
China also desires influence in Burma based on the extent to which it is based the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea.14
because of greater Chinese interests in sea on detailed and factual information of the Two posts were located on the Coco Islands,
lines of communication. Among the world’s target group or individual.9 Even before its close to the Andaman Islands, and on Za-
most important shipping lanes, the Strait of formal establishment, China used political detkyi Island, near the mouth of the Strait of
Malacca connects the broader Indian Ocean warfare prominently in Burma. Malacca.15 The other two posts were located
with the Asia-Pacific region. With a foothold To accommodate the growing trade in Man-aung, along the northwestern coast-
in Burma, China would be in a favorable with Burma, China undertook several line, and in Hainggyi, near the southwestern
strategic position vis-à-vis the strait in times infrastructure development projects in the tip of Burma. Chinese engineers, techni-
of crisis. China’s position and activities in 1990s. These projects demonstrated China’s cians, instructors and naval officers were
the waters off the southeastern Burmese awareness of the need to develop a strategic spotted at nearly all of the facilities. Clearly,
coastline are particularly disconcerting to line of communication through Burma. In China had developed tangible relations with
its traditional Asian rival, Japan, which is October 1992, Chinese engineers completed Burma’s navy.16
heavily dependent on the strait for strategic a bridge over the Shweli River. The bridge Another example of China’s strategic
resources from the Middle East and Africa. connected the Chinese border town of Ruili actions in Burma involved two separate but
Thus, China’s development of naval power and the town of Muse in Burma. In addition, related naval incidents. In August 1994, the
coincides with its strategic interests in influ- the Chinese upgraded the World War II-era Indian coast guard caught three boats fishing
encing key sea lines of communications. Burma Road, which connected Lashio in close to the Andaman Islands. Although the
A final strategic aim of China in Burma is northeastern Burma with Yunnan Prov- trawlers were flying Burmese flags, the crew
central to its overall world view — to return ince. Furthermore, the Chinese promised of 55 was Chinese. Moreover, no fishing
to a place of centrality in international to build three new roads linking Yunnan equipment was discovered on board, only
politics. The Communist Party of China has with Burma’s northernmost state, Kachin.10 radio communication and depth-sounding

22 Special Warfare
equipment. Three years later, reports revisiting old ties with the anti-government
Notes
1. Mao Zedong’s 1949 On the People’s Demo-
revealed that two Chinese radar specialists elements, which demonstrates pragmatic, cratic Dictatorship quoted in Conrad Brandt, Benja-
had visited Burma’s southeastern seaboard. long-term actions to further China’s stra- min Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank, A Documentary
Accompanied by officers from the Burmese tegic goals, regardless of changing policies History of Chinese Communism (Cambridge, MA:
army engineering corps, the specialists spent of the Burmese government. Through the Harvard University Press, 1952), 453-454.
two weeks at a radar station in the Mergui use of multiple forms of political warfare 2. Bertil Lintner, “Allies in Isolation: Burma and
Archipelago, a similar facility at Zadetkyi, with the government and anti-government China Move Closer,” Jane’s Defence Weekly 14, no.
and a naval base on Saganthit Island near forces, China has achieved a strategic posi- 11 (September 15, 1990), 475.
Mergui.17 In addition to these naval inci- tion in Burma, unlike the United States. 3. A distinction between “Mountain Chinese”
dents, China signed a 30-year agreement and “Maritime Chinese” in Burma may be made. Vic-
with Burma in March 1997, allowing more Continued moves tor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia (London:
than 200 Chinese fishing boats to operate in China has exploited the divisions and Oxford University Press, 1966), 49.
4. Bertil Lintner, “Rangoon’s Rubicon,” Far
Burmese waters, a culmination of concerted fissures within Burma for short- and long-
Eastern Economic Review 156, no. 6 (February 11,
Chinese political warfare targeting Burma’s term strategic benefit. Through the historical
1993), 28.
strategic position along the Indian Ocean. use of political warfare, it has divided its 5. Xinhua News Agency cited in Bertil Lintner,
China has also long used political- efforts, interacting with Burma’s military “Burma Road,” Far Eastern Economic Review 160, no.
warfare efforts to expand ties beyond the government as well as the anti-government 45 (November 6, 1997), 17.
state in Burma. Early on after Burma gained elements among the hill tribes. This has 6. Ross Munro, “China’s Waxing Spheres of Influ-
independence in January 1948, elements demonstrated a strategic understanding of ence,” Orbis 38, no. 4 (Fall 1994), 590.
within the Burmese Communist Party began the landscape in the country, where stability 7. For a full-length explication, see Robert
to reach out to their Communist allies in is nonexistent and ethnic rights and the bal- Kaplan, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future
China. In the early 1950s and again in the ance of ethnic power are critical, given the of American Power (New York: Random House, 2010).
late 1960s, China provided direct support to country’s more than 60 years of civil strife. 8. “A Communist ‘Mistake,’” The Times (Lon-
what was known as the White Flag faction of The extent to which the United States com- don), January 6, 1955, 6.
9. Donovan C. Chau, “Political Warfare – An
the BCP. Training and arms were provided prehends these facts and nuances in Burma
Essential Instrument of U.S. Grand Strategy Today,”
first to Burmese Communists, Sino-Burmese is unclear, as nothing clear is demonstrated
Comparative Strategy 25, no. 2 (April-June 2006):
and Burmese-speaking Chinese in Yunnan.18 in U.S. policy, recent changes included. 114-115.
Later, the reconstituted BCP was comprised The U.S. government would be wise to 10. Lintner, “Rangoon’s Rubicon,” 28.
of Shan, Kachin, Wa and other ethnic tribes think and act beyond the persistent calls for 11. Munro, 590.
from both sides of the border. By the early multi-party elections and human rights. In- 12. Lintner, “Burma Road,” 17.
1970s, the anti-government forces controlled stead, the U.S. should nurture its newfound 13. In September 2009, the construction of oil
a strip of Shan State east of the Salween ties with the military junta while, at the same and gas pipelines began from Kyaukpru Port, Arakan
River along the Chinese border and forged time, explore strategic ties with the hill tribes State, in Burma to Ruili, Yunnan, in China. U Tun
alliances with other separatist groups among and their armies. Placing all U.S. hopes in Kyaw, “Sino-Burma Oil and Gas Pipelines to be Con-
the Kachin and Shan.19 While ties with the the personage of Aung San Suu Kyi and the structed in September,” Narinjara, August 22, 2009.
BCP were reportedly broken in 1981, China indigenous pro-democracy forces is narrow- 14. Ibid.
15. Bertil Lintner, “…But Stay on Guard,” Far East-
continued to exert influence with anti-gov- minded and, more to the point, ignorant of
ern Economic Review 161, no. 29 (July 16, 1998), 21.
ernment elements in Burma.20 the overall local conditions within Burma.
16. The People’s Liberation Army Navy made its first
More recently, since 2008, it has been Strategic influence in Burma is too impor- port call visit to Burma in late August 2010. “Chinese
reported that Chinese intelligence person- tant to leave to hopes and wishful thinking Navy’s Escort Formation Arrives in Burma for Friendly
nel have begun operating with the anti- of politicians and policymakers in Washing- Visit,” Xinhua Domestic Service, September 4, 2010.
government hill tribes and their armies ton, D.C. Concrete U.S. strategic actions are 17. Ibid.
in Burma. These represent similar groups needed now to compensate for more than a 18. Harold Hinton, China’s Relations with Burma
previously supported by China: the Karen half a century of uncreative and ineffective and Vietnam: A Brief Survey (New York: Institute of
and Shan in Burma’s east as well as the U.S. policy toward Burma. Such a policy Pacific Relations, 1958), 42.
Chin and Arakanese, in the west.21 Perhaps starts on the ground, in the jungles and vil- 19. Melinda W. Cook, “National Security,” in
not coincidentally, the ceasefire between lages of Burma’s borderlands, leaning on all Burma: A Country Study, ed. Frederica M. Bunge,
the anti-government tribal forces unraveled sides, not unlike the (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1984), 223-224.
more completely in summer 2011, with the Chinese.
20. Shelby Tucker, Burma: The Curse of Indepen-
failure of the government’s border guard Dr. Donovan C. dence (London: Pluto Press, 2001), 227.
force initiative despite China’s call for con- Chau, Ph.D., is an 21. Robert D. Kaplan, “Lifting the Bamboo
tinued negotiations between all parties.22 assistant professor Curtain,” The Atlantic Monthly (September 2008), 88.
The exact nature and extent of China’s of political science 22. Phil Thornton, “Uncertain Futures,” Bangkok
political-warfare operations among Burma’s at California State Post, August 7, 2011; and “Mongla: China Wants A
tribes remains unclear. But, given the University, San Ber- Negotiated Settlement,” Shan Herald Agency for News,
historical experience, the Chinese may be nardino, Calif. comment here June 30, 2010.

July - September 2012 23

 THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION ARMY
AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
BY DEAN CHENG

Since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army has steadily
evolved its view of how future wars will be fought. Where the PLA had originally expected to fight
with massed air, land and sea forces in “local wars under modern conditions,” it shifted, first to
preparing for “local wars under modern, high-tech conditions,” and now “local wars under infor-
mationized conditions,” where quality and technology play an ever greater role.
In order to fight such wars, the PLA has placed much greater • Special strikes, including at enemy strategic and operational
emphasis on the ability to conduct joint operations. At the same time, command posts and key personnel, as well as countering
it is an article of faith that the human factor will continue to play enemy deep penetration forces;
a key role in any future war; therefore, the PLA has also remained • Disruption of enemy facilities, including transportation and
interested in the conduct of “political warfare” (zhengzhi zhanzheng; logistics sites; ambushes and other hit-and-run attacks; and
政治战争), which roughly correlates with the American concept of • Special technical combat, including various forms of com-
“psychological warfare.” These Chinese approaches have important puter network attacks, broadcasting propaganda and disrup-
implications for the American special-operations community. tion of enemy navigation and positioning systems.2
The Chinese view of the role of special operations and special-
How the PLA Defines Special-Operations Forces operations forces has been influenced, in part, by the evolving
Chinese discussion of special-operations forces seem to resem- PLA concept of how future wars will be fought.
ble American and western concepts. Special operations (tezhong
zuozhan; 特种作战), for example, are described as the use of Evolution of Chinese Concept of Warfare
specially organized, trained and equipped elite units to achieve Since at least the end of the Cold War, the PLA has been a
particular operational and strategic goals, through the conduct careful student of foreign, and especially American, military
of unconventional or irregular warfare means.1 Chinese concepts developments. As the PLA has not fought a war since concluding
of special-operations forces’ missions appear to closely resemble the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, it has necessarily had to rely upon
the SOF core activities as enumerated by U.S. Special Operations close observation and analysis of foreign military experience to
Command. They include: help shape its own preparations for future conflict. From these
• Special reconnaissance missions (strategic or operational analyses, the PLA appears to have concluded that future wars will
reconnaissance deep in an opponent’s territory); be marked by several characteristics.

24 Special Warfare
 One key conclusion is that future wars will require joint assume that they would be at a significant disadvantage), but
operations, i.e., cooperation by forces drawn from all the services also how the two sides fight. That is, far from the two sides
(which in the case of the PLA includes not only land, sea and grappling head-on in battle, with similar forces using similar
air forces, but also the Second Artillery, which is responsible tactics, each will instead seek out the other’s weak spots and
for missile operations). This marks an enormous shift for the try to exploit them. The two sides are not only likely to deploy
PLA. Prior to the first Gulf War, the PLA was focused on ground different forces, but are also likely to employ different tactics,
forces, and engaged in learning how to perform combined arms exhibit different operational patterns and pursue different
operations, i.e., the ability to have various branches interoperate. strategies in the process. Chinese writings suggest that they see
The PLA Navy and PLA Air Force seemed to be relegated mainly the 2003 Iraq War as embodying many of these aspects, as the
to supporting roles. With the conclusion of the first Gulf War, United States employed various forms of operations, engaging
however, the PLA concluded that it had not understood the im- on land, sea, air, outer space and cyber-space in order to utterly
pact of modern technology on warfare, and the resulting global overwhelm the Iraqis.5
military transformation. The third conclusion seems to be that political warfare will
After extensive debate in the 1990s, the PLA moved from fo- play a growing role in future conflicts. Political warfare (zhengzhi
cusing on combined arms operations from a ground force-centric zuozhan; 政治作战) or wartime political work (zhanshi zhengzhi
perspective towards a concept of joint gongzuo; 战时政治工作), according
operations, where the various services to both the 2003 and revised 2010
were at least more nominally equal. Chinese People’s Liberation Army
This shift was codified in the 1999 Political Work Regulations, includes
New Generation Operations Regula- public-opinion warfare, psycho-
tions. Under these new regulations, logical warfare, legal warfare and
the PLA made joint operations the other measures to undermine the
basis for operational thinking by all enemy’s will and morale. Political
parts of the PLA. Service campaigns, warfare, in this context, strikes at
whether by the ground forces, navy, an opponent’s psychology and is
air force or second artillery (respon- equated with Western concepts of
sible for missile operations) were psychological warfare.6
subordinated to joint campaigns, In some ways, one might consid-
PATCHWORK Opposite page, emblem of the People’s Liberation
which are seen as more important, er political warfare an extension of
Army. Above, the PLA special-operations Ffrces ensign. Wiki
and more decisive. Creative Commons images the “three nons.” It employs politi-
In addition, PLA analysts ap- cal means (including legal, public
pear to have concluded that future wars will be marked by the opinion and psychological elements) to attack an opponent
“three non” warfares: non-contact (fei jierong; 非接融) warfare, non-symmetrically and in a non-lethal manner at a remove from
non-linear (fei xianshi; 非线式) warfare and non-symmetric (fei their physical location. The goal of political warfare is to sap
duicheng; 非对称) warfare. Wars will be non-contact, in that the an opponent’s will to fight, both in the military and the larger
more advanced side will tend to remain out of reach of the major- population, thereby shortening a conflict and reducing the cost,
ity of the other side’s weapons, while itself retaining the ability especially to one’s own side.
to engage the enemy. The emphasis will be on concentrating
firepower from a variety of sources, rather than massing troops.3 Impact on the Chinese View of Special Operations
Moreover, it may employ not only very long-range, precision Each of these conclusions has an impact on special operations.
munitions capable of covering the entire strategic depth, but also A recent assessment of the Iraq War noted the importance of in-
exploit “soft-kill” methods (e.g., computer-network attacks) that corporating special operations in joint operations, alongside land,
will effectively nullify an opponent’s forces without having to sea, air, space and cyber operations.7 Similarly, a Chinese volume
directly confront or engage them. on the role of mobilization in modern warfare notes that “unified
Wars will be non-linear, both physically and temporally. In the joint operations,” entails melding special-operations capabilities
physical aspect, given the non-contact nature of future wars, the with other, more conventional-warfare forces.8
battlefield will not have many set battle-lines. Instead, opposing Meanwhile, Chinese writings about the “three nons” of future
forces are likely to find themselves intermingled. Moreover, given wars also often refer to special-operations forces and missions.
the vulnerability of concentrated forces to modern precision Non-linear warfare, for example, is likely to involve airborne in-
munitions, each side is likely to field smaller forces that will oper- sertion of special-operations forces throughout the enemy’s strate-
ate in a more dispersed fashion throughout the strategic depth of gic depth. These forces will reconnoiter enemy transportation and
the theater. In the temporal aspect, operations are likely to occur energy infrastructure, communications nodes and command and
simultaneously, rather than sequentially.4 control systems once thought safely distant behind the lines, and
Wars will be non-symmetric, not only in terms of the quality either attack them directly or else provide targeting information
of the forces involved (where Chinese analysts have tended to for other weapons systems.9

July - September 2012 25

 CHINESE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY

In addition, special operations are likely to occur on a non-lin- leaflet drops, but also actions with more operational and strategic
ear timeline. Chinese analyses note, for example, that allied SOF impact, such as Arabic language broadcasts by EC-130 Com-
deployed to Iraq long before the commencement of hostilities in mando Solo aircraft. Another major contribution attributed to
March 2003. As important, special operations are likely to occur special-operations units were computer network attacks, includ-
simultaneously with each other, and ing hacking into Iraqi computer
in close synchronization with con- systems. Undertaken in coordina-
ventional forces, further jettisoning tion with more lethal actions, the
concepts of linear time. result was an undermining of Iraqi
In terms of non-symmetric will and the inducement of “psycho-
warfare, SOF, by their nature logical shock and awe.”15
small, elite and flexible, can have a Special operations are not solely
disproportionate effect on an op- worrisome for their propaganda
ponent. Indeed, successful special activities, however. PLA writings
operations deep into an opponent’s have also expressed concern about
territory, eliminating key targets the ability of technologically more
and key personnel, are seen as advanced opponents to employ
the embodiment of asymmetric special operations to weaken their
application of force. 10 U.S. and opponent’s confidence. SOF are able
allied special operators’ ability to to observe closely the enemy’s stra-
provide targeting information on tegic targets, identify hidden sites
key Ba’athist leaders during the such as underground facilities and
2003 Iraq War, and the seizure of provide better targeting information
key airfields by U.S. Special Forces, for key command and communica-
exemplify the asymmetric impact tions centers, as well as essential
of special operations. The suc- personnel. Moreover, SOF can also
cessful conduct of these actions potentially strike at targets that are
had a major affect on the effort to hidden or otherwise protected from
overwhelm Iraqi defenses. 11 precision-guided munitions.16 In
so doing, they can help demoralize
Political Warfare and PSYOP A Vintage Chinese propaganda poster, showing the enemy forces by creating a sense
Special Operations PLA. The caption reads, “An Army of the People is Invincible.”
The soldier on top is shown to be holding a copy of Quotations of vulnerability and making their
It is the political warfare aspect, from Chairman Mao Zedong. Wiki Creative Commons photo resistance appear futile.
though, and especially the Chinese This combination of tactical,
conception of psychological warfare (which is seen as a subset of operational and strategic effects took its toll in Iraq, influencing
political warfare), that would seem to most touch upon special not only Iraqi military commanders, but the broader Iraqi public,
operations. Psychological warfare, according to the PLA, is the Iraqi leaders and global public opinion. “Because of the develop-
employment of psychology, through such means as propaganda, ment of techniques, broadening of efforts and intensification of
to sap the will of an opponent’s military and civilian populace, methods, psychological offensives have already been elevated to
as well as to counter an opponent’s effort to do the same.12 The the national strategic level, and become a vital aspect of strategic
advent of modern information technology provides many new activity which will affect the entire military strategic picture.”17
avenues for conducting psychological-warfare operations. At the Not surprisingly, given the concerns about psychological war-
same time, it demands a more careful planning and execution fare and the potential role of special operations in that context,
effort; as the PLA notes, many nations, especially the U.S., have the PLA has shown great interest in defensive measures against
created dedicated psychological-warfare operations units in part them. Given the political nature of psychological operations, the
for this reason.13 foremost concern is to strengthen the morale, will and political
From the PLA’s vantage point, observing foreign wars, the abil- support of both the military and the civilian populace. Bolstering
ity of SOF to wage political warfare, including psychological war- troop and public morale, in turn, highlights the saliency of the
fare, has become a major potential threat. The advent of so much public-opinion warfare (or media warfare) component of politi-
information technology, and its permeation of modern society, cal warfare. In the PLA’s view, western military operations, often
allows psychological-warfare activities to reach an unprecedented broadcast globally, are fundamentally shaping global perceptions
audience and generate widespread effects. PLA assessments of of western (and especially American) military capability, creat-
the 2003 Iraq War, for example, highlight the role of dedicated ing psychological pressures on potential adversaries and directly
psychological-warfare units. These were observed conducting a influencing their views and decisions. This was a major technique
large-scale and intense effort to comprehensively undermine Iraqi employed in the Iraq conflict, with the U.S. orchestrating a global
resistance.14 This included not only tactical activities, such as media campaign to highlight the forces arrayed against Saddam

26 Special Warfare
Hussein, and the hopelessness of the Iraqi cause.18 Countering the Notes
perception that the war is lost before it is even fought is an essen- 1. Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC:
tial task for political warfare operations. National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 196.
To this end, one essential task is to remove or at least limit 2. Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC:
doubts among officers and troops. This is likely to be especially National Defense University Press, 2006), pp. 199-200.
difficult, from the Chinese perspective, given the likely techno- 3. Fan Gaoyue, Fu Linguo, The Iraq War: The First Implementation of an
logical disparity between the Chinese military and their likely Informationized Form of War (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press,
opponents. A more technologically sophisticated enemy will 2008), p. 165.
appear to be capable of striking apparently at will. Increased 4. Wang Baocun, “An Analysis of the ‘Three Non’ Warfares,” National
political indoctrination efforts by party cadre are useful, but more Defense Newspaper (July 12, 2004). http://www.pladaily.com.cn/gb/de-
concrete measures are also necessary, such as displays of prisoners fence/2004/07/12/20040712017055.html
or downed aircraft.19 Indeed, a key responsibility for the joint- 5. Fan Gaoyue, Fu Linguo, The Iraq War: The First Implementation of an
operations headquarters is to counter enemy special operations. Informationized Form of War (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press,
It is therefore likely that enemy SOF will be especially targeted, 2008), p. 138.
both in order to limit their effectiveness, and to provide concrete 6. Fan Gaoyue, Fu Linguo, The Iraq War: The First Implementation of an
evidence that the opponent is not “running the table.” Informationized Form of War (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press,
One method to achieve this is for the joint operations head- 2008), p. 147.
quarters to consider what objectives special-operations units 7. Fan Gaoyue, Fu Linguo, The Iraq War: The First Implementation of an
are likely to have, and what methods they are likely to employ Informationized Form of War (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press,
to achieve them. By effectively “reverse engineering” what SOF 2008), p. 139.
might be trying to achieve, it may then be possible to counter 8. Ren Min, The Science of National Defense Mobilization (Beijing, PRC:
those forces, or otherwise frustrate their ability to achieve objec- Academy of Military Science Press, 2008), p. 471.
tives. This can include mobilizing rear area security, heightening 9. Fan Chengbin, The Study of Hi-Tech Campaign Paralyzation (Beijing, PRC:
the alert level of local security forces and deploying one’s own National Defense University Press, 2003), pp. 47, 140.
special-operations units to ambush them. It is suggested that PLA 10. PLA Academy of Military Sciences, Foreign Studies Office, First Section
psychological-warfare units would be armed for self-protection, Director, “’Three Nons’ Warfare Guides Modern Conflict,” Global Times (Decem-
but would rely on evasion if they are discovered.20 It may be that ber 8, 2003). http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/2237719.html
the PLA expects similar behavior on the part of foreign SOF. 11. He Zhu, Experts Discuss the Iraq War (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military
In addition, some units such as psychological-warfare units Sciences Press, 2004), p. 103.
may also be targeted with strike assets, if and when they are
12. Guo Yanhua, Chief Editor, Study Volume on Psychological Warfare (Bei-
identified on the battlefield, in order to disrupt their activities.21
jing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2005), p. 1.
Ground-based units may be subjected to concentrated artillery
13. Guo Yanhua, Chief Editor, Study Volume on Psychological Warfare (Bei-
shelling, while aerial forces would likely suffer the attention of
jing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2005), p. 4.
various air defenses.22
14. Fan Gaoyue, Fu Linguo, The Iraq War: The First Implementation of an
Conclusion Informationized Form of War (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press,
The PLA clearly sees SOF as occupying an essential role in 2008), p. 153.
any future conflict. In future “local wars under informationized 15. Fan Gaoyue, Fu Linguo, The Iraq War: The First Implementation of an
conditions,” special operations are likely to be called upon to Informationized Form of War (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press,
undertake a range of activities, including mounting direct attacks, 2008), pp. 147, 148.
providing targeting information to enhance the effect of other 16. Zhang Yuliang, Chief Editor, The Science of Campaigns (Beijing, PRC:
forces and affecting not only the materiel but information avail- National Defense University Press, 2006), p. 196.
able to enemy forces. In particular, SOF are seen as an integral 17. Fan Gaoyue, Fu Linguo, The Iraq War: The First Implementation of an
part of any political warfare effort; countering foreign SOF are Informationized Form of War (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military Sciences Press,
therefore also likely to be a major concern. 2008), p. 153.
18. He Zhu, Experts Discuss the Iraq War (Beijing, PRC: Academy of Military
Dean Cheng is a Research Fellow at the Asian Studies Center, Sciences Press, 2004), pp. 86-87.
The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. 19. Guo Yanhua, Chief Editor, Study Volume on Psychological Warfare (Bei-
Cheng focused on Chinese political and se- jing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2005), p. 222.
curity affairs. In particular, he focuses on the 20. Guo Yanhua, Chief Editor, Study Volume on Psychological Warfare (Bei-
relationship between China’s military and for- jing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2005), pp. 210-211.
eign policy as it relates to the rest of Asia and 21. Guo Yanhua, Chief Editor, Study Volume on Psychological Warfare (Bei-
the United States. Cheng earned a bachelor’s jing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2005), p. 206.
degree in politics from Princeton University in 22. Guo Yanhua, Chief Editor, Study Volume on Psychological Warfare (Bei-
1986 and studied for a doctorate at MIT. comment here jing, PRC: National Defense University Press, 2005), pp. 222-223.

July - September 2012 27

 CHINA QUICK FACTS
Size/Population
» China is the fourth largest country in the world (after Russia, Canada, and the U.S.). It has an area of 3,719,275 square
miles (slightly smaller than the U.S.)
» One in every five people in the world is Chinese. China’s population was estimated to have reached a whopping
1,338,612,968 in July 2009. China’s population is four times that of the United States.
» China’s “one child” policy has contributed to female infanticide and has created a significant gender imbalance. There
are currently 32 million more boys than girls in China.

Literacy/Education
» Before the Communist party took power in 1949, about 80 percent of China’s population was illiterate.
» By 2008, the adult illiteracy rate in China dropped to only 3.58 percent.
» Today, Chinese youth (15-24-years-old) have a 99 percent literacy rate.
» Since 1998, China has invested in a massive expansion of education, nearly tripling the share of GDP devoted to it.
» The number of higher-education institutions in China has more than doubled in the past decade, from 1,022 to 2,263.
» More than 60 percent of high-school graduates in China now attend a university, up from 20 percent in the 1980s.
» The number of students in China enrolled in degree courses has risen from 1 million in 1997 to 5 million today.

28 Special Warfare
 COVER
STORY

CAPITOL CITY Beijing, capitol of the People’s Republic of China, is the nation’s political,
economic, cultural, educational and international trade and communication center.

Economy/Labor
» By the end of 2011, the population at working age (15-64 years) was an estimated 1.0024 billion and the unemploy-
ment rate was around 6.5 percent.
» China is the world leader in gross value of agricultural and industrial output.
» China has more than 1,200,000 IT professionals and is adding 400,000 technical graduates each year. China ranks
number1 in the world for tech jobs (followed by India and the U.S.).
Military
» Defense spending is 2.3 percent of Gross National Product (compared to 25.5 percent in North Korea, 3.8 percent in
the United States and 0.6 percent in Ghana).
» China has the world’s largest armed forces, with 2.3 million troops (1.7 million in the army. 220,000 in the navy and
420,000 in the air force) in 2007. By contrast the United States has 1.45 million troops; Russia, 1.24 million troops;
and Argentina, 65,000 troops.
» China has said its defense budget for 2010 will be 532.1 billion yuan ($77.95 billion), an increase of 37.1 billion yuan
over what was actually spent in 2009. Many analysts believe real military spending is much higher. The U.S. military
budget is still higher, with a record $708 billion proposed for fiscal year 2011.
» About 35 percent of the Chinese defense budget is spent on personnel costs.

July - September 2012 29

 CONFLICT WITH CHINA

Over the next 20 years, China’s gross confused. Hundreds of thousands, perhaps meaningful progress has been made on the
domestic product and defense budget millions, of civilians would migrate toward key issue between the two states, which
could exceed those of the United States.1 North Korea’s borders in search of food is if, when and how the island’s ultimate
If it chose, China could therefore become and safety from clashes between rival status — as an independent polity or as
a more capable opponent than either the armed groups. Collapse of central control part of a reunified China — will be deter-
Soviet Union or Nazi Germany at their would also jeopardize the security of the mined. The chance of conflict across the
peak. Yet China is seeking neither territo- North’s weapons of mass destruction and Taiwan Strait will remain so long as this
rial aggrandizement nor ideological sway missile assets. China might fully mobilize fundamental disagreement persists.
over its neighbors. It shows no interest in the Shenyang Military Region, and A cross-strait conflict could take many
in matching U.S. military expenditures, could well send sizable forces across the forms, from a Chinese blockade of Tai-
achieving a comparable global reach or Yalu in an effort to sort out refugee flows wanese ports, to varied levels of bombard-
assuming defense commitments beyond on the Korean side of their border. ment of targets on Taiwan, to an outright
its immediate periphery. Such intentions The immediate operational concerns invasion attempt.
might change, but if so, the United States for United States Forces–Korea/Com- Should the U.S. engage directly in any
would probably receive considerable bined Forces Command would be to such contingency, its goals would be to
warning, given the lead times needed to secure ballistic missile launch and WMD prevent Chinese coercion or conquest of
develop such capabilities. sites. If any coherent North Korean army Taiwan and limit to the extent possible
Despite cautious and pragmatic Chinese remained, neutralizing Korean People’s the damage inflicted on Taiwan’s military,
policies, the risk of conflict with the Unit- Army long-range artillery threatening economy and society. Core missions for
ed States remains, and this risk will grow Seoul could also be needed. For these the U.S. would include preventing China
in consequence and perhaps in probability missions, special-operations forces, forced from gaining air and sea dominance, and
as China’s strength increases. Below we entry and airlift capabilities will be at a limiting the impact of Beijing’s land-attack
review the sources of conflict we believe premium. China meanwhile would view missiles, all achieved through flexible
most likely to occasion a China-U.S. mili- the insertion of U.S. and Republic of Korea combinations of active and passive defense
tary clash over the next 30 years, arrayed forces north of the demilitarized zone with and offensive action, including the pos-
in descending order of probability. concern, and might move its own forces sibility of U.S. strikes on mainland targets
All are on China’s immediate periphery, in, if it had not already begun to do so, associated with the offensive against
where we believe Chinese security inter- both to contain the disorder and preempt Taiwan, with all the attendant risks of
ests and capabilities will remain focused. a ROK/U.S. takeover of the entire country. further escalation. Indeed, China might
We do not believe a China-U.S. military While the ROK would provide sizable well anticipate and seek to preempt such
conflict to be probable in any of the cases, forces and capabilities for these missions, U.S. actions with attacks of its own on U.S.
but that judgment is based on the view they would be inadequate to deal with assets in the region.3
that the United States will retain the ca- the scope and complexity of a complete As China’s military modernization pro-
pacity to deter behavior that could lead to DPRK collapse. gresses, the ability of the U.S. to confident-
such a clash throughout this period. Substantial and extended commitments ly accomplish these missions is eroding. In
After reviewing the plausible sources of of U.S. ground forces would be required to the near term, China is deploying capabili-
conflict, we turn to the operational impli- rapidly seize and secure numerous loca- ties that threaten U.S. land and sea power
cations these scenarios might present the tions, some with vast perimeters. SOF and projection platforms — air bases and
United States and the resultant require- dedicated chemical, biological, radiological, aircraft carriers — as well as Taiwan’s own
ments for defense and deterrence. nuclear and high-yield explosives units will defenses. Absent an unlikely reversal in
We examine the capabilities the United be insufficient to deal with the situation. the ongoing rebalancing of military power
States will need to maintain to ensure that The likelihood of confrontations, ac- in the area, and even recognizing the very
a conflict with China does not occur, and cidental or otherwise, between U.S. and considerable difficulties in mounting an
conclude with thoughts on America’s long- Chinese forces is high, with significant po- amphibious assault against determined
term strategy for dealing with the chal- tential for escalation. Beyond the pressures local resistance, a direct defense of Taiwan
lenges posed by a rising China. to intervene and deal with the immediate has already become a challenge and is
consequences of a failed DPRK, the U.S. likely to become increasingly difficult in
Occasions for Conflict will be forced to confront the thorny issue coming years.
of the desired end-state: unification (the
North Korea Cyber-Space
preferred outcome of our ally, the ROK) or
A North Korean collapse could emanate Sino-U.S. cyber-war could be an aspect
the continued division of Korea (China’s
from a failed economy, a contested power of — or prelude to — armed hostilities.
strong preference).
transition. Following the death of Kim Or it could begin and stay in cyber-space.
Jong-il or defeat in a war with the South. Taiwan This case is confined to that domain,
In any such scenario, the situation in While relations between China and though with some danger of triggering
North Korea would likely be chaotic and Taiwan are improved and improving, no armed conflict.

30 Special Warfare
 NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH China’s relations with its neighbors could potentially impact the U.S.

Having conducted repeated intrusions escalation, the United States might retali- defenses are of limited value against such
into U.S. networks to exfiltrate sensitive ate against networks that support Chinese large and sophisticated attacks, both sides
data without U.S. reprisal, the People’s transport systems, including commercial might resort to counterattacks in hopes of
Liberation Army might seek and receive shipping as well as military logistics. The restoring deterrence.
authority to interfere with U.S. intelligence impact on Chinese trade could be immedi- In the ensuing escalation, both China
collection and dissemination on China’s ate. In addition, because the U.S. ability to and the United States could suffer tempo-
strategic-nuclear programs. Chinese civil- observe Chinese forces had been impaired, rary but major disruptions of critical net-
ian leaders might not grasp that such op- Pacific Command might be told to increase works, precipitating shocks in stock, cur-
erations would be defined as a cyber-attack the readiness of its forces. While China rency, credit and trade markets. Although
by the U.S., and thus lead to retaliation. The does not want armed conflict, it could both sides avoid escalation to armed force,
attack could disrupt systems the United respond by conducting “soft-kill” attacks economic damage would be considerable.
States relies on for critical intelligence, in- (e.g., link interference) on U.S. satellites Sino-U.S. cooperation on Iran would likely
cluding warning. If confident that the PLA that serve the Pacific command, control, come to a halt, and the situation in Korea
was the attacker, the United States might communications, computer, intelligence, could heat up. There are no lives lost—just
decide to retaliate. Given that correspond- surveillance and reconnaissance grid, to extensive harm, heightened antagonism
ing PLA intelligence networks are not easily which the United States responds in kind. and loss of confidence in network security.
accessed, and choosing to signal dangers of Because both Chinese and U.S. network There would be no “winner.”

July - September 2012 31

 CONFLICT WITH CHINA

South China Sea operate efficiently so far from home. This as- tion in Japan’s own self-defense capabilities,
There are numerous potential flash sessment will change if China builds aircraft however, direct defense of Japan should re-
points in the South China Sea region. carrier and air refueling capabilities in the main a credible — if increasingly challeng-
China’s assertion of some degree of sover- coming years. Direct defense in the South ing — strategy for the next 20 to 30 years.
eignty over virtually the entire area rubs up China Sea and Southeast Asia should remain
against the rival claims of numerous other a viable strategy for the next 20 years. India
states, and the areas around the Paracel and Conflict between China and India,
Spratly islands in particular have witnessed Japan which view each other as geostrategic rivals
limited clashes since the mid-1970s. A Sino-Japanese relations are conten- on the Asian landmass, could be triggered
confrontation at sea could lead to a broader tious for at least two reasons. First, on the by an incident along their long-contested
conflict if, for example, an oceanic dispute Chinese side, anger, fear and resentment common border or a dispute over how to
between Vietnam and China escalated into over Japanese actions from the last years respond to a failing neighboring state such
a land war between the two. The presence of the 19th century until 1945 remain alive as Burma/Myanmar. Above and beyond
of a U.S. treaty ally, the Philippines, may and are not-infrequently exacerbated by the dangers posed by a clash between the
elevate the stakes for Washington if some what China sees as insensitive or insulting world’s two most populous countries, the
deep crisis arises in or around the South Japanese behavior. Second, an ongoing ter- presence of nuclear weapons on both sides
China Sea. China’s recent claims that the ritorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu creates substantial escalatory risks.

“ ...the United States needs a wide range of advanced military

capabilities to deter or prevail, and in any case to preserve
stability and exert influence in regional affairs despite China’s
growing power and reach.”
region is part of its exclusive economic islands and overlapping claims to exclusive In either circumstance the United States
zone, and therefore subject to Chinese con- economic zones in the East China Sea would probably seek to stay out of the con-
trol, represent a test to global norms of free are persistent irritants to the relation- flict, with its chief immediate concern being
navigation and are a direct challenge to U.S. ship. Conflict could arise from an at-sea the safety of tens of thousands of U.S. civil-
interests in East Asia. incident in the East China Sea, or from the ians in the region and the potential need
Depending on the nature and severity escalation of a war of words amplified by for large-scale and complex noncombatant
of a conflict, U.S. objectives could range some sort of maritime encounter. evacuation operations in one or more of the
from enforcing freedom of navigation U.S. goals in the event of a Sino- affected states. The political hurdles will be
against a Chinese effort to control mari- Japanese dispute would be to help defend complicated and the operational challenges
time activities in the South China Sea, to Japan and, not incidentally, make the daunting; significant air and naval compo-
helping the Philippines defend itself from case that the United States remains the nents along with ground forces would be
an air and maritime attack, to supporting preferred security partner in Asia despite required. The United States would likely
Vietnam and shielding Thailand — an- China’s rise. Doing so would require help- extend overt diplomatic support for India
other treaty ally — in the event of a land ing limit damage to Japan and its military as well as quietly provide New Delhi with
war in Southeast Asia. and regaining control of the pertinent air intelligence and military equipment. U.S.
Any likely contingency in the South and maritime domains. This might require strategic goals would be to prevent a Chi-
China Sea or Southeast Asia will make consideration of U.S. as well as Japanese nese victory and avoid vertical escalation
demands on U.S. air and naval power to strikes on mainland targets, with all the (i.e., the use of conventional or nuclear-
assure friendly dominance of the bat- attendant concerns for escalatory risk. armed ballistic missiles) or horizontal
tlespace. A war on land could create a Growth in China’s military capabili- escalation (e.g., involvement of Pakistan).
demand for U.S. land forces — especially ties, particularly its naval, air, and missile
SOF and forced-entry capabilities. power projection forces, will steadily Operational Implications
China’s current ability to project substan- increase the costs of dealing with a con- The above cases represent the range of
tial power into the South China Sea region tingency of this kind. plausible military contingencies involving
is limited; in particular, the PLA’s land-based Absent a general U.S. withdrawal from China that the United States could face in
combat aircraft lack adequate range to the Western Pacific or a dramatic reduc- and beyond the next decade. They dem-

32 Special Warfare
onstrate that while Sino-U.S. hostilities In sum, forward operating U.S. forces for U.S. forces and C4ISR, it will not be
may be unlikely, the United States needs a could become more vulnerable, precisely possible or affordable for the United States
wide range of advanced military capabili- the top priority of China’s military invest- to buck these trends. As the defense of
ties to deter or prevail, and in any case to ments and deployments. Taiwan is already becoming problematic
preserve stability and exert influence in re- The difficulties of direct defense could for U.S. forces (e.g., carriers and nearby
gional affairs despite China’s growing pow- be greatly accelerated by Chinese develop- air bases), so will U.S. operational options
er and reach. This need is shaped by an in- ment and use of cyber-attack and ASAT in the event of a confrontation with China
creasingly capable PLA and by the diverse weapons, given the dependence of U.S. over North Korea’s collapse and a crisis
circumstances, geography and domains forces and operating concepts on comput- in Southeast Asia. Over time, the United
— land, sea, air, space, cyber — in which er-networked and space-based C4ISR. For States will feel the need to rely increasingly
conflict could occur. In North Korea, U.S. this reason, the PLA appears to think that on its more distant and less vulnerable
ground, tactical air, strike and SOF could hostilities in space and cyber-space would capabilities. As U.S. forward operating
be needed; in Taiwan, a full array of naval favor China, and so might initiate them. survivability declines, strike range must
and air forces; in the South China Sea, U.S. At the same time, as China extends the increase. U.S. military-operational empha-
blue-water superiority. In addition, these reach of its own forces and C4ISR into sis in the Western Pacific will thus shift
contingencies could place heavy demands the Pacific, they will become vulnerable from geographically limited direct defense
on U.S. command, control, communica- to U.S. cyber-attack and ASAT. In any to more escalatory responses and eventu-
tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance case, any Sino-U.S. armed conflict will ally, when even these will not suffice, from
and reconnaissance capabilities (largely be increasingly affected if not decided by deterrence based on denial to deterrence
space-based), given the distances, possible warfare in these new domains. based on the threat of punishment, with
intensity and U.S. concepts of operations. The erosion of capabilities for direct the speed of the shift varying from, first
Other than Korea, the contingencies do defense will push the United States toward of all, Taiwan, then Northeast Asia, then
not call for sizable U.S. ground forces. U.S. enhanced weapons, ranges, geography and Southeast Asia at a somewhat later date.
involvement in large-scale land warfare targets both to regain survivability and to This will move the United States toward
anywhere in East Asia other than Korea strike Chinese forces, launchers, sensors and a choice between escalation — and deter-
is especially improbable. The Korean other capabilities on the mainland (or else- rence based on Chinese fear of escalation
collapse scenario, judged the most likely, where in the region outside of the immediate — and noninvolvement in hostilities near
could well involve some competition but theater). In addition, as the PLA develops China that could bring about direct armed
probably not open conflict with China, but cyber and ASAT capabilities but also comes conflict. Escalation can take several paths.
would in either case call for a significant to rely more on advanced C4ISR, the United Starting with the most severe, the United
ground force contribution. States will have to consider striking Chinese States can make more explicit what has
Generally speaking, direct defense by satellites and computer networks. These been only faintly implicit in its strategy
U.S. forces as an operational option is trends will thus lead both sides to widen toward China: the threat to use nuclear
feasible at present, though confidence their choice of targets in order to achieve weapons if conventional defense fails, if
in this varies from the South China Sea dominance over any particular geographic U.S. forces face defeat, and/or if vital U.S.
(high) to North Korea (medium) to objective, however limited. interests in the region could be harmed.
Taiwan (medium-low). This is the result The increasing difficulty in ensuring Yet in none of the above cases are U.S.
of the geographic orientation to date of direct defense can be consequential even vital interests at stake. Moreover, however
improvements in Chinese anti-access, if Sino-U.S. hostilities are unlikely, for low the credibility of a U.S. nuclear threat
area-denial and limited power-projection they could stimulate Chinese risk-taking, may be today, it will be lower in the future
capability — e.g., short-range missiles increase U.S. inhibitions and weaken the because of China’s clear determination and
— which is especially pronounced along resolve of U.S. allies and China’s neigh- sufficient capacity to have a survivable
China’s eastern coast and toward Taiwan. bors in facing a China more insistent on second-strike deterrent force able to defeat
For the next few years, China would find settling disputes on its terms. These trends U.S. missile defense (e.g., through mobile
it difficult to exploit these advantages in a are the result of underlying general tech- intercontinental ballistic missiles, subma-
Korean contingency, and the South China nological progress, sustainable growth in rine-launched ballistic missiles, multiple
Sea lies outside the reach of Chinese sen- military spending, PLA reform and doc- re-entry vehicles/multiple independent
sors, communications and missiles, much trinal adaptation and geographic distances re-entry vehicles and penetration aids).
less power projection. Over time, China for China and the United States. On the Two more plausible and proportional
will be able both to increase its anti-access other hand, most of China’s neighbors are escalation paths for the United States are
advantage where it currently exists and growing economically and in technologi- to disable Chinese satellites and computer
to expand it into the Pacific, to Northeast cal sophistication, and some may choose networks, starting with those that enable
Asia and eventually to Southeast Asia. In to keep pace in quality if not quantity with Chinese forces to operate. In both ASAT
addition, Chinese cyber and anti-satellite Chinese advances in the military field. and cyber-war, it is easier to imagine
capabilities may in time be able to disrupt Barring unforeseen technological how hostilities would start than how they
U.S. C4ISR and thus impair direct defense. developments that assure survivability would end — very likely with attacks by

July - September 2012 33

 CONFLICT WITH CHINA

both sides on critical civilian and eco- CHINA PRIORITY CAPABILITIES

nomic space systems and networks. The
main reason for this is the dual-use nature Priority Direct Defense Escalation
of much of the space and cyber infrastruc-
ture on which the U.S. military, and in due Surface fleet X
course the PLA, rely.
Compounding the problem is that both Submarine (attack) X
escalatory domains are offense-dominant,
in that both satellites and computer net- Submarine (strike) X
works are exceedingly hard and costly to
protect against very capable attackers. Even
Tactical air X
with superior ASAT and cyber-war capa-
Long-range airstrike X
bilities, the United States stands to suffer at
least as much as China in space and cyber Long-range missiles X
escalation, given its greater reliance on
these domains for military and intelligence Heavy land forces X
missions and for its economic health.
Perhaps the most promising military es- Heavy mobility X
calation path for the United States — most
credible, least dangerous and most one- Light expeditionary land forces X X
sided in its effects — is that of convention-
al precision strikes against Chinese war- Fast mobility X X
fighting and war-supporting targets on the
mainland or wherever else they might be. SOF X X
To the extent such strikes can be carried
out from survivable platforms and/or be- Unmanned platforms X
yond the range of China’s medium-range
missiles, the United States can recover
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) X
both technological (in targeting at any dis-
Cyber-war (offense and defense) X
tance) and geographic advantages. It could
also halt or reverse the growing vulner- ASAT X
ability of U.S. C4ISR to Chinese cyber and
ASAT attacks. How long such advantages,
if recovered, could be extended beyond capabilities associated with the threat of percent of GDP — would also be devas-
another decade or so depends on how long escalation. The above chart indicates the tating and lasting. Economic war against
it takes China to extend the reach of its capabilities that are currently important China would more accurately be described
surveillance, targeting and strike capabili- and those that may become more relevant as economic war with China, America’s
ties. Given China’s economic and techno- in the future. principal creditor and source of manufac-
logical potential, the answer might not be tured goods. Such war would likely lead to
comforting for long-term U.S. planning. In Economic Warfare a global contraction much worse than the
any case, U.S. conventional escalation, and Sanctions have typically been an option one of 2008–2009.
thus deterrence based on the threat of it, of choice for the United States when the Thus, the question — a very fate-
risks Chinese escalation, including cyber risks, poor cost-effectiveness and lack of ful question — for the United States is
and ASAT — risks that may be mitigated support associated with military force are whether it could design economic mea-
but not eliminated by careful choice of tar- too great. But China is far from typical, sures that could hit China disproportion-
gets (avoiding strategic locations, civilians, given the scale and intensity of Sino-U.S. ately hard, even while acknowledging the
economic and leadership targets), but will economic interdependence. It is true impact on the U.S. and world economies.
nonetheless grow over time. Conventional that for China the loss of export revenue, One such measure would be interference
threats to the command and control of interest and liquidity of credit, investment with seaborne oil shipments to China
Chinese nuclear forces could even prompt returns and critical imports (oil, food (food presumably being off-limits even
a Chinese nuclear response. and commodities) would have a calami- in war). However, oil-transport routes
tous effect on its economic and possibly and arrangements are such that the entire
Priority Capabilities domestic stability. However, the effects on region, including Japan, would suffer some
As Chinese anti-access and area- U.S. equity and credit markets, the value of level of disruption as a result of a distant
denial enhancements improve, the United the dollar, inflation, investment, consump- U.S. blockade of Chinese trade.
States will become more dependent on tion and employment — while less as a Of course, China would consider such

34 Special Warfare
an action to be a major escalation aimed Taiwan or in the South China Sea. Apple of disputes, from maritime and territorial
at crippling its economy and endangering is not going to be shipping iPads from its questions up to and including the fate of
domestic stability and the regime itself. factories in China. Markets will anticipate North Korea and Taiwan.
China has been expanding its strategic oil widespread disruption in U.S.-Chinese and
reserve and building oil and gas pipelines world trade, and advance the consequenc- Building Partner Capacity
to Central Asia in order to mitigate such es, however much Beijing and Washington Avoidance of direct military defense
dangers and would likely retaliate by seek to limit the damage. and escalation does not equate to U.S.
other means. As is the case with MAED, even the passivity in particular contingencies or
weaker party gains deterrent benefit in regional security generally. The United
Strategic Alternatives from the mutual, if unevenly distributed, States has very capable allies in the region
America’s capacity to ensure the de- destruction. The point could be reached in Japan, South Korea and Australia, as
fense of its friends and allies on China’s sometime in the next few decades, how- well as other existing and prospective part-
periphery will diminish over the next ever, when the balance of dependency had ners that are already bristling at China’s
several decades. This can be offset by a shifted so far against the United States growing power and assertiveness, as the
U.S. willingness to employ horizontal and that it no longer represented an effective developments of the last year suggest. To
vertical escalation. China also has options deterrent to Chinese advances against date, there is no indication of diminishing
in this regard, however. For the United important if not vital American interests resolve on the part of China’s neighbors.
States, a strategy based upon escalation in East Asia. Whether this pattern continues, strength-
and ultimately on deterrence by punish- This is not an argument for seeking to ens or is reversed by increased Chinese
ment means assuming greater risks in the decouple the U.S. economy from the Chi- capability to overcome U.S. direct defense
future than in the past to achieve the same nese economy, as that would simply be to and neutralize U.S. escalation threats
objectives. Some American interests in dispense with the existent deterrent effect depends on how the United States encour-
the region may not justify such increased while it still has great force. It is a reason ages regional states to “stand up” to China,
risks. This suggests the need to supple- to ensure that the balance of dependency politically and materially.
ment military deterrence with other forms does not shift too heavily against the In seeking to stimulate greater local
of dissuasion, resistance and persuasion. United States. It is often said that a strong self-reliance, the United States will need
economy is the basis of a strong defense. to avoid two possible pitfalls. First it will
In the case of China, a strong U.S. want to avoid extending guarantees that
Mutual Assured Economic economy is not just the basis for a strong it may not wish to deliver on, and in so
Destruction (MAED) defense, it is itself perhaps the best defense doing actually decrease incentives for
Short of a nuclear exchange, the great- against an adventurous China. great local defense efforts. Second, were
est damage from any conflict with China the United States to be seen trying to align
is likely to come in the economic realm. Reliance on Diplomacy East Asia against China — something
Massive and mutual economic harm would If U.S.-localized direct defense is en- it has so far been careful not to do — it
indeed result from any significant Sino- dangered by Chinese anti-access capabili- could stimulate an arms race with China
U.S. armed conflict, even if the two sides ties in the near term, and U.S. escalation which, at least locally, it would be hard
eschewed employment of economic weap- is constrained by growing risks and pressed to win.
ons. The two economies are linked with growing Chinese military reach in the If instead the United States follows a
each other and with the rest of the world mid- to long-term, the United States may dual strategy of engaging China, includ-
in a manner unparalleled in history. This be increasingly left without good mili- ing in regional security cooperation, while
mutual dependency can be an immensely tary operational alternatives in regional backing and enabling China’s East Asia
powerful deterrent, in effect a form of contingencies involving Chinese forces. neighbors, it might be able to contribute
mutually assured economic destruction. As several of these cases suggest, this may to regional stability, sustain U.S. influence
At the moment the balance of advantage weigh against U.S. involvement in contin- and at least protect if not advance U.S.
rests with the United States, but even the gencies where important U.S. interests are interests in the region. Enabling allied and
winner in such a contest will wish it had not at stake. Unless China commits naked partner military capabilities, thus increas-
been avoided. and large-scale aggression — which, to be ing the costs of Chinese aggression, could
The operation of MAED is somewhat clear, is not indicated by its current pattern have two basic components: (1) provid-
different from classic mutual assured of use of force — this may involve greater ing critical capabilities (e.g., surveillance
destruction. It is at least theoretically pos- reliance on U.S. diplomacy and attempts and targeting) that only the United States
sible to limit the escalation of a military to head off conflict by accommodating can provide and (2) deterring China’s
clash to the subnuclear level. It is not pos- Chinese interests, especially if they have own escalatory options by the threat of
sible to so limit the economic consequenc- merits. Of course, the declining efficacy of counter-escalation, including in space and
es. China is not going to continue buying direct defense and increasing riskiness of counter-space, as well as nuclear deter-
U.S. Treasury notes while the American escalation (and thus of deterrence) would rence in those rare instances where U.S.
and Chinese navies clash somewhere off deplete U.S. influence over the outcome vital interests are truly engaged.

July - September 2012 35

 CONFLICT WITH CHINA

Shifting the U.S.-China nese mainland, China will develop escala- U.S. economy is the best way of ensuring
Relationship tion options of its own, including ASAT that the balance of interdependence and
A climate of mutual distrust and suspi- and offensive cyber-warfare capabilities, of the associated deterrence does not shift
cion clouds the U.S.-China relationship, thus increasing U.S. risks in escalation. dangerously against the United States
producing a potent security dilemma. If Chinese strategic nuclear force improve- over the next several decades.
ignored this dynamic could spiral out of ment, and the limited stakes in the most While the risk of conflict with China
control. Altering it will require both the plausible scenarios for Sino-American cannot be ignored, neither should it be
United States and China to fundamentally conflict, will reduce the credibility of any exaggerated. Any number of other conflicts
rethink their national-security goals and U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons. are more likely, some in places we cannot
strategic assumptions in Asia and beyond. One means of improving the prospects even vaguely foresee at present, just as no
The U.S.-China competition should not for direct defense and reducing the risk one foresaw our engagement in the Balkans
be viewed as a zero-sum game; indeed, of escalation is for the United States to in 1989, our invasions of Afghanistan and
the United States has a strong interest enable the capabilities and buttress the Iraq or our current commitment in Libya
in changing these perceptions. As China resolve of China’s neighbors. as recently as six months ago. These more
becomes a true peer competitor, it also Such a strategy should be designed likely conflicts will be with opponents
becomes potentially a stronger partner to raise the costs of Chinese use of force quite different from China and will call
in the defense as well as economic field. and to check Chinese assertiveness at for capabilities quite dissimilar from those
At present, the United States, as the the expense of regional stability and U.S. required to deal with a real peer competi-
world’s only superpower, bears a dis- interests. Such a strategy should not be — tor. Individually, these contingencies will
proportionate burden for policing the or be seen as — a U.S. attempt to encircle be less consequential than a conflict with
global commons, protecting international or align the region against China, lest it China, but collectively they will shape the
commerce and travel, and maintaining produce greater Chinese hostility. Indeed, international environment in which both
international security. China, like most of a parallel effort should be made to draw countries interact and will fundamentally
the world, is a free rider on these efforts. China into cooperative security endeav- influence Chinese perceptions of American
Even as the United States seeks over the ors, not only to avoid the appearance of power and determination. Coping success-
next several decades to sustain its defense an anti-China coalition but also to obtain fully with these smaller challenges may be
commitments and advance its interests in greater contributions to international one of the best ways to ensure that we never
East Asia, it will also have an interest in security from the world’s second stron- have to fight the larger conflict.
encouraging the world’s other emerging gest power. The United States should also
superpower to assume greater responsi- continue to explore cooperative solu- This article is reprinted with permission
bilities for international peace and secu- tions to some of the above-cited sources from the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica,
rity. China’s efforts to combat piracy in of conflict. For instance, the collapse of Calif. Conflict With
the Indian Ocean and its growing interest North Korea could become an opportu- China: Prospects, Con-
in UN peacekeeping should, thus, become nity for U.S.-Chinese collaboration. sequences and Strate-
the basis for enhanced U.S.-Chinese The economic consequences of a Sino- gies for Deterrence by
cooperation. In the long term, the United American conflict could be historically James Dobbins, David
States will want to look for other ways to unparalleled, even if both sides avoid C. Gompert, David A.
leverage Chinese power as well as restrain economic warfare. This is a powerful Shlapak and Andrew
it. This will be easier and safer to do from mutual deterrent, one marginally in the Scobell. Copyright 2011
a position of relative strength, which ar- U.S. favor at present. Strengthening the RAND Corporation. comment here
gues for starting this process of coopera-
tion sooner rather than later. Notes
1. China’s economy is expected to grow at roughly twice the rate of the American over the next fifteen years. At market
Conclusion exchange rates, China’s GDP is about 40 percent of the U.S. GDP, and RAND estimates that by 2025 it will be about half.
With the passage of time and improve- 2. China currently commits about 2.5 percent of its GDP to defense expenditures, roughly half the current
ment of Chinese capabilities, the United American rate.
States will find itself forced to shift from 3. Although Chinese defense spending has risen significantly in recent years, keeping pace with and even exceeding
deterrence by denial, based on direct overall economic growth, the U.S. defense budget has, since 2001, grown even faster. Thus in 2000 the U.S. defense bud-
defense of its interests and allies in the get was seven times that of China, and in 2010 it was ten times bigger. As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan wind down, the
U.S. rate of spending is likely to decrease, although probably not to Chinese levels. By 2025, RAND estimates that Chinese
Western Pacific, to deterrence by punish-
defense spending will probably be somewhat more than half of America’s. Of course, all Chinese defense spending will be
ment, based on the threat of escalation,
focused on the Western Pacific, whereas only a fraction of America’s will be relevant to that region.
using longer-range weapons and more 4. These figures are much disputed in both the academic and intelligence communities. They rest on the somewhat
survivable platforms. Although the Unit- shaky foundation of current trends extrapolated far into the future. Using purchasing power parity rather than market
ed States can have escalation dominance exchange rates, China catches up to and surpasses the United States much more quickly. Purchasing power parity is a
for some time, assuming it is prepared to better reflection of personnel costs, while market exchange rates better capture equipment costs, particularly high-tech
conduct conventional strikes on the Chi- equipment, which tends to be the area of U.S.-Chinese competition of most concern to the United States.

36 Special Warfare
 TEAM EFFORT Armed Forces of the Philippines litter teams transport wounded Philippine Marines from a helicopter-landing zone at Camp Bautista, Jolo
Island to an ambulance receiving point with the assistance of U.S. Forces. U.S. Army photo

Real Results: Military Partnerships in the Philippines

BY MAJOR MATTHEW J. GOMLAK AND MAJOR STEPHEN FENTON
In the May-June 2010 edition of Foreign Affairs, the former Sec- of the number of wounded sustained in a short period of time and
retary of Defense, Robert M. Gates, wrote an article entitled “Help- the successful treatment and evacuation of the patients through the
ing Others Defend Themselves,” wherein he emphasized that “the combined efforts of the U.S. military and AFP organizations.
effectiveness and credibility of the U.S. will only be as good as the All U.S. forces supporting Operation Enduring Freedom-Philip-
effectiveness, credibility and sustainability of its local partners.” He pines operate under the Kapit Bisig Framework, a mutually agreed U.S.
also wrote that, “well-integrated training and assistance efforts can and Government of the Republic of the Philippines accord by which
achieve real results.” The recent actions of a small special-operations JSOTF-P accomplishes its mission through and with its partner forces.
task force working with Marines from the Armed Forces of the The task force does not engage in combat operations and does not
Philippines on a very remote island in the Sulu Archipelago illustrate operate from independent locations — they advise and assist Philip-
what Gates meant by real results. pine security forces where they are — on Philippine government bases,
On July 28, 2011, two platoons of AFP Marines infiltrated into compounds and outposts in jungle, village and urban areas. Their ef-
an historical Abu Sayaaf Group encampment located on Jolo Island forts include intelligence sharing, support for mission preparations and
that held an estimated 100 ASG and Jemiah Islamiah members and rehearsal, civil-military and military-information support operations,
affiliates. In the darkness of the early morning, the marines observed casualty evacuations and logistics. Through this framework, JSOTF-P
several men walking with flashlights. Both the darkness and terrain personnel successfully executed the mass casualty through and with
hid a series of tarps and prepared defensive positions along the high partner-nation forces. The outcome was a tremendous success, result-
ground to the left and right flanks of the AFP Marines. At approxi- ing in the evacuation of 16 patients, the performance of two life-saving
mately 4:20 a.m. the AFP initiated contact, focusing their fire on the surgeries and one limb-sparing surgery.
activity to the front. The marines immediately took heavy automatic Thirteen kilometers separated the WIAs from the nearest AFP trau-
rifle fire and 40mm grenades from both flanks. The initial exchange ma center on Camp Bautista, the main Filipino military base on Jolo
killed two marines and wounded several others; both AFP corpsman, Island. Units from the Philippine Air Force evacuated all 21 patients
the only medics in the formation, were among the fallen. One heroic from the encounter site to the Helicopter Landing Zone on Camp
platoon commander directed both platoons into a dry creek bed and Bautista in a period of four hours. Once the patients reached the HLZ,
then maintained a forward perimeter with four others to cover their AFP and U.S. advisers facilitated transportation to the local treatment
withdrawal. After the firefight these five men were found dead and center, where Filipino doctors and five members of a U.S. Air Force
decapitated. The remaining elements of the two platoons suffered Forward Surgical Team conducted triage, treatment and in some cases
two killed in action and 21 wounded in action — most of them with surgery. From the trauma center, both PAF and U.S. aviation assets
gunshot wounds. By 8:30 a.m., the AFP Sulu Island Command and moved the critically injured patients to two different medical centers in
American advisers from Joint Special Operations Task Force – Philip- Zamboanga City, 155 kilometers north of Camp Bautista.
pines began responding to a mass-casualty situation. JSOTF-P’s efforts on July 28 provide a snapshot of what Gates meant
In previous operations on Jolo Island, the AFP suffered heavy by “real results” from well-integrated training and assistance efforts to
casualties. In August 2007, for example, they sustained 25 KIA from a partner-nation forces. Medical training between U.S. and AFP personnel
roadside ambush. The events on July 28, however, stand out because provided the requisite individual and collective skills for casualty treat-

July - September 2012 37

 MILITARY PARTNERSHIPS IN THE PHILIPPINES

STATE OF EMERGENCY Above, Philippine and U.S. medical personnel work

together to provide medical care in the field and in the trauma bay to evalu-
ate and manage critical casualties. U.S. Army photos

ment and evacuation. Overall command and control executed by Task eration against the ASG on Sulu, the FST assisted the AFP trauma cen-
Force Sulu, the subordinate JSOTF-P element in charge at Camp Bautista ter in erecting two triage tents. Additionally, they presented classes on
ensured that all U.S. and AFP non-medical personnel contributed in es- the tenets of adequate triage. FST personnel also instructed the trauma
sential supporting roles. It also facilitated a collaborative medical evacua- center staff on how to properly stock their emergency rooms, operating
tion/casualty evacuation plan that incorporated both AFP and JSOTF-P rooms and trauma stations. This prevented the large volume of casual-
rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft. Finally, the extraordinary perfor- ties from overwhelming the AFP trauma center staff and facilities.
mance of the forward surgical team provided order to patient treatment Unilateral efforts by the partner-nation force also contributed to
and increased the treatment capability of the AFP trauma clinic. the overall success. On July 28, after the initial notification of Marine
Special Forces detachments have been living and working with the casualties, the AFP generated a list of potential casualties by blood type
Filipino forces on Jolo Island since 2003. Part of this relationship has and obtained type-specific whole blood from a “walking blood bank”
been consistent training on first aid, self-care, buddy aid and patient of AFP Marines on the base camp. Marines on Camp Bautista manned
triage. The results of this exchange were evident on July 28 when all 21 ambulances, litter teams, patient prep and ground movement teams for
wounded Marines arrived at the Camp Bautista landing zone. All AFP all wounded personnel. They also handled the remains of the five KIA
wounded arrived with the majority of their wounds dressed. Several and conducted mortuary affairs on site.
had pressure dressings and those with more severe extremity wounds Another factor in the success of the MASCAL was Task Force Sulu’s
had a tourniquet applied. Many of the dressings and tourniquets were orchestration of all AFP and U.S. military and medical assets during the
makeshift out of ripped cloth and sticks, and the soldiers with severe event. Immediately after notification of friendly casualties, the task force
wounds also had Quickclot within the wound itself. Despite the loss of promptly organized and assigned non-medical personnel at the arrival
their organic corpsman in the initial encounter, AFP Marines demon- landing zone, within the triage tents and inside the trauma bay. Every
strated proficiency in first aid and their unilateral efforts saved lives. uniformed member of the task force had a designated role prior to the
Additionally, technical exchanges between the TF Sulu Forward arrival of the first casualty. They promptly organized combined AFP
Surgical Team and the AFP military staff of the Camp Bautista trauma and U.S. litter teams, triage support teams, landing zone security and
center set the conditions for an unusually efficient and successful placed liaison elements in the trauma center, SIC headquarters and TF
MASCAL. One month prior to the start of this ongoing offensive op- Sulu operations center. On-scene Special Forces and special-operations

38 Special Warfare
 BETTER TOGETHER Center, AFP Marines load patients in an aircraft while
U.S. advisers assist. Above, Civil Affairs and Special Forces Soldiers pro-
vide aid to AFP patients in the trauma center. U.S. Army photos

trained medics ensured the simultaneous passing of nine line MEDE- Dr. Stephen Fenton, U.S. Air Force major, AFST general surgeon and
VAC requests through both AFP and JSOTF-P channels. This facilitated co-author of this article stated that, “the MASCAL was conducted as
the integration of JSOTF-P contract aircraft into the CASEVAC plan well as those in which I have participated at Combat Surgical Hospitals
when PAF assets proved unable to handle the volume of patients and the in Afghanistan and stateside Level I trauma centers.” This was a joint,
severity of the injuries. combined, special-operations effort with both U.S. and Filipino medical
Finally, the extraordinary performance of the AFST in providing and non-medical personnel. Due to the interoperability of U.S. and AFP
timely and appropriate medical care to 21 patients saved lives and forces and the constant communication and coordination by the SOTF,
strengthened the relationship between TF Sulu and their Philippine all AFP casualties who arrived at the trauma center survived. On Jolo
counterparts. The AFST at Camp Bautista has the mission of provid- Island, the effects of “well-integrated training and assistance efforts”
ing routine and emergency medical care to U.S. personnel on the base. at the tactical level achieved “real results” by saving Philippine Marine
However, they are always willing to assist with AFP casualties, at the lives. AFP actions at the point of injury and during CASEVAC to Camp
request of the AFP trauma center commander. On the morning of the Bautista illustrate the long-term effects of consistent medical training by
encounter, the FST emergency department physician assistant worked U.S. SOF. The collaboration that took place at the HLZ and at the trauma
jointly with the trauma center commander at the arrival HLZ in order center shows the synergistic results of combined efforts by U.S. and
to ensure proper initial triage. The PA then returned to the hospital partner-nation military forces. Finally, the precise application of profes-
to continue evaluation and care for the casualties as they arrived. The sional U.S. military capability in the OR and
orthopedic PA worked at the triage tents and trauma bay for evalua- during MEDEVAC for the critically wounded il-
tion and treatment of the casualties. The lead trauma surgeon, nurse lustrates how U.S. efforts can make our partners
anesthetist and operating room technician remained in the trauma bay stronger.
and within the operating room once the surgical patients arrived. With
support from the AFP doctors, they performed surgery on three of five Maj. Matthew J. Gomlak was the Task Force
surgical candidates. Furthermore, they stabilized two additional surgi- Sulu Commander and Maj. Stephen Fenton,
cal candidates and facilitated their transport on the first MEDEVAC to U.S. Air Force, served as a general surgeon on
Zamboanga City for follow-on surgical care. Task Force Sulu Forward Surgical Team. comment here

July - September 2012 39

 GRAINS OF TRUTH:
THE ROLE OF CIVIL-MILITARY SUPPORT
ELEMENTS IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS
BY MAJOR JEFFREY S. HAN AND MAJOR BRION D. YOUTZ

Purpose and mission of Civil-Military Engagement A typical CMSE deployment would seem to be very routine and
The recently published national defense strategic guidance bland in its lack of notable controversies and standout achievements,
states, “Whenever possible, we will develop innovative, low-cost, and especially if viewed from standard weekly reports that describe in-
small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying teragency coordination meetings, key leader engagements, site visits
on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities.1 Small, and opening ceremonies for humanitarian assistance construction
flexible and centripetal forces by nature, special-operations Civil projects. What these reports do not capture, however, are subtle and
Affairs teams fit the bill for this strategy. CA elements plan and ex- unquantifiable measures of effectiveness such as the rapport and en-
ecute CA operations that range from integration into tactical mis- during relationships that SOF CA teams build with key host-nation
sions with other special-operations forces to strategic deployment officials, nongovernmental organizations and other international
within a foreign country at the direction of a U.S. Ambassador. It is organizations which facilitate the achievement of the United States’
the latter scenario that will be the focus of this article. foreign policy and security goals. Maintaining a persistent presence
U.S. Special Operations Command deploys civil-military in a country, a CMSE team becomes a highly effective tool for the
support elements that are “SOF CA teams who plan, coordinate, Defense and State Departments and USAID, able to quickly respond
facilitate, manage and lead programs and projects that sup- to emerging situations while contributing to the effectiveness of long-
port U.S. and host-nation objectives” under the Civil-Military term U.S. Government strategies.
Engagement Program.2 This program allows global combatant Along with its subordinate teams, the company responsible for
commanders to deploy, with the approval and endorsement this mission collectively achieves a great deal without extraordinary
of U.S. Ambassadors, small SOF CA teams to U.S. Embassies fanfare. The purpose of this article is to highlight the achievements
to conduct operations that are concurrently beneficial to U.S. of our unit after returning from a CMSE deployment which can
defense, diplomacy and development objectives. The types of and should be considered routine. While we did have a successful
operations vary by region and country but FM 3-57, Civil Affairs rotation that can be lauded for several significant and unprecedented
Operations, offers a succinct summary: accomplishments, these were nothing more than what should be the
baseline for every mission set with the outlook of increasing our SOF
Best described as nation assistance, CME operations
identify and address critical civil vulnerabilities in brethrens’ understanding of SOF CA, standardizing our support re-
undergoverned and ungoverned areas or high-threat gardless of the theater of operations and reinforcing our value-added
environments where indigenous authorities or the to country team goals and objectives.
interagency (specifically the country team and especially
U.S. Agency for International Development) cannot How is this done?
engage…CME as a concept is USSOCOM’s contribu- The mission of CA forces is to support commanders by engaging
tion, and part of the Department of Defense’s strategy, the civil component of the operational environment to achieve CMO
to building partner capacity in a preventive, population- or other stated U.S. objectives and ensure the sustained legitimacy
centric and indirect approach to enhance the capability, of the mission and the transparency and credibility of the military
capacity and legitimacy of partnered indigenous govern- force before, during or after other military operations. Regardless of
ments. The successful execution of CME identifies the the setting in which they are assigned, whether it is a combat zone
causes or drivers of instability or popular grievances of or a U.S. Embassy conference room, SOF CA teams provide a criti-
the indigenous population that violent extremist organi- cal capability for combatant and special operations commanders.
zations can exploit by destabilizing the civil component In order to make commanders cognizant of and more comfortable
of the operational environment.3 with employing this tool, teams must first and foremost build cred-

40 Special Warfare
ibility with military leaders. SOF CA personnel are not intended to ers must ensure “ARSOF personnel undergo careful selection processes
be “door-kickers” by trade; there are units with far greater means to or mission-specific training beyond basic military skills to achieve
achieve success with such skill sets. Our branch would not exist if entry-level SOF skills. Being proficient in these skills makes rapid
its purpose was to merely compete with other elite organizations on replacement or generation of personnel or capabilities highly unlikely”
these terms. High standards of fitness, discipline and individual and and that “mature, experienced personnel” must “maintain a high level
team force-protection capability are fundamental in ARSOF and SOF of competency in more than one military specialty.”6 These descrip-
CA personnel and elements have all three. However, our greatest tions apply to the process for selecting and manning SO CA teams. It
asset is the ability to gain access to, engage, understand and influence is far from adequate to devise a “cookie-cutter” training plan with a
key areas and relevant individuals, groups and populations in full random group of assigned individuals. For this reason, the chemistry
disclosure, thus enabling our military commanders and civilian lead- that develops at the company level and the leadership that fosters this
ers to achieve their objectives. camaraderie and shared sense of purpose are critical to mission suc-
cess. Leaders who are able to influence the manning of CA teams will
How do we gain this credibility? benefit from being able to devote more time to mission analysis and
Perhaps one of the most important capabilities that trained SOF accomplishment rather than to building the necessary unit cohesion.
CA Soldiers have is to quickly and effectively establish relation- Understanding the dynamics of special operations encompasses much
ships with the interagency in order to collaborate, synchronize and more than simply understanding and executing the mission.
ultimately achieve unity of effort with other branches of the U.S.
Government. This characteristic is specifically highlighted in FM Formula for Success
3-57, which states “CME more directly supports a broader host-na- The CMSE is task organized from the CA regionally aligned bat-
tion internal defense and development strategy through its support talions of the USASOC-assigned CA brigade … Upon deployment, the
of the American Embassy, country team.” While the representatives CMSE falls under OPCON of the TSOC and provides direct support to
of other government agencies usually cannot be tasked for support the American Embassy of the country of employment.7
in military operations, their resources are extremely valuable and The company assembled for our recent Pacific Command CMSE
relationships are often mutually beneficial. In an era of increasingly mission is an example of an ideal balance of experience and raw tal-
ambiguous threats and corresponding unprecedented employment ent that SOF CA units need to accomplish the objectives described
of the elements of national power as a counter, the promotion of earlier. Seventy-five percent of our company had successful overseas
military and interagency collaboration and unity of effort is critical. SOF CA experience. Successful is the operative word here because
In addition to fostering collaboration between U.S. Government experience without proven results would only replicate mediocre
entities, SOF CA teams are adept at seeking and capitalizing on oppor- performance. A poor performer can be especially detrimental on a
tunities to promote relations between the United States and countries small team in the high-profile working environment of an embassy
in which we have a diplomatic or military presence. We are trained to or sensitive meetings with foreign-government officials. Successful
gain the trust of host-nation representatives by becoming cultural and team members, however, can build on their experiences and expo-
regional experts. However, speaking a certain language or studying a nentially advance sophisticated initiatives that serve to advance stra-
certain culture do not make one an expert in a country or region. The tegic U.S. interests according to the supported commander and U.S.
ability to quickly adapt to customs and courtesies, to respect taboos, to Ambassador’s intent. Many of our “repeat offenders,” as they are af-
appreciate sources of pride: these are the skills that enable a commander fectionately known at Special Operations Command Pacific, reestab-
to achieve his or her objectives. SOF CA personnel are screened and se- lished relationships and continued to develop relationships that had
lected to ensure they have the aptitude, endurance and character for SOF started in previous deployments. Our Civil Information Management
CA. They develop their skills through a rigorous qualification course and noncommissioned officer-in-charge continued a mutually beneficial
comprehensive pre-mission training that enables them to tailor what and productive professional collaboration with SOCPAC’s National
they have learned for a particular area of operations and mission. Geospatial Agency liaison that began during a previous deployment.
Reports from our teams provided up-to-date information for NGA’s
What it Takes mapping database while we gained exposure to highly sophisticated
“Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of geospatial analysis tools. Team members who returned to a country
physical and political risk, operational techniques, modes of employ- after a previous rotation or visit were welcomed enthusiastically by
ment … SOF are conducted in all environments, but are particularly local U.S. Embassy staff members who looked forward to working
well suited for denied and politically sensitive environments. SO can with known, friendly personalities.
be tailored to achieve not only military objectives through application Complementing this experience was a group of individuals who
of SOF capabilities for which there are no broad conventional-force demonstrated the potential to perform well based on their skill sets
requirements, but also to support the application of the diplomatic, in- and demeanor. A rigorous screening process throughout the Civil Af-
formational and economic instruments of national power.”5 The latter fairs Qualification Course pipeline continues to graduate only those
part (application of DIME) is especially true for CMSEs because they officers and noncommissioned officers best suited for our line of
act as bridges between other SOF elements and the U.S. country team work. Through the course of our pre-mission training cycle, informal
and strive to identify, implement and transition enduring interagency vetting based on interactions with experienced members validated
mitigating solutions to address underlying civil vulnerabilities the selection of these individuals. The new members of the team also
In order to ensure that missions are compatible with the capabilities brought experience from their backgrounds or previous military oc-
of SOF, FM 3-05: Army Special Operations Forces states that command- cupational specialties to the table.

July - September 2012 41

 GRAINS OF TRUTH

Chemistry was critical to bringing these individuals together this lesson in their interactions with Indonesian government officials,
into a cohesive, productive organization. The company’s leadership significantly enhancing their credibility among seasoned diplomats.
planned several informal social events that included family members. The end result was an organization composed of professional,
These events were combined with internal team-building activities highly skilled, yet personable SOF CA personnel who could easily
designed to build and reinforce camaraderie and trust throughout counter typical stereotypical prejudices about military personnel which
the company. We enjoyed spending time together, but worked to often negatively influences civilian-military interactions. In order to
avoid the potential for group-think or an overly casual command challenge these stereotypes, SOF CA teams must be as personable and
climate with the appropriate distinction between personal and pro- transparent as possible. Throughout our pre-mission training, teams
fessional lives. The comfort level we had with one another at home went out of their way to successfully interact with civilians, demon-
served us very well during the deployment, resulting in an informal strating that members could relate very effectively to people outside of
communication and support network that spanned seven countries the military. From the simplest of interactions such as a transaction at
across the Asia-Pacific region. Our families back home also came to a hardware store to more sophisticated meetings with North Carolina
instinctively turn to one another for assistance when they needed county managers and planners, teams demonstrated their approach-
help during the deployment. There were several occasions when fam- ability and tact. The interpersonal skills teams honed during training
ily members had medical emergencies that required transportation set them up for success in dealing deftly with host-nation, international
to the hospital or child care and immediately turned to other families and non-governmental civilian officials in their assigned countries.
within the company for assistance. These incidents were a testament
to the extent of trust and mutual support within the company. The organizational glue: the CMOC
The Civil-Military Operations Center is a standing capability
Training to fit the mission formed by all CA units from the company level to the CACOM level.
Training for any mission starts with the basics. During our pre- Army CA units are organized to provide the supported commander
deployment training cycle, advanced rifle and pistol marksmanship, the manpower and equipment, to include a robust communications
fitness and survivability training were routine. When individuals strug- package, to form the nucleus of the CMOC. A CMOC is tailored to the
gled with certain events, there was more than enough expertise within specific tasks associated with the mission and normally augmented by
the company to ensure that all members met the requirements. With assets (engineer, medical, transportation) available to the supported
this proactive and cooperative approach, these training events were commander … The CMOC is the operations and support element of the
almost effortless, because, as true professionals, our Soldiers understand CA unit as well as a mechanism for the coordination of CAO.8
them to be fundamental requirements and execute them as such. For the CMSE mission, the Civil-Military Operations Center
After achieving an adequate baseline of ARSOF standards, we were organic to the company evolves into the theater civil-military support
able to progress to the implementation of more unorthodox ideas. This element, the operations and support element that supports the for-
type of training was enhanced through the camaraderie we had within ward-deployed teams. The TCMSE consisted of our assigned CMOC
the company. Teams were able to progress to more advanced training personnel and an augmentation of members of the CMSE teams that
such as an unanticipated, mentally and physically challenging urban did not deploy forward initially. Having these team members (who
evasion and survivability exercise that tested team members’ trust in became “desk officers”) working with the CMOC facilitated communi-
their leadership and one another as well as their dedication to the mis- cation with their team leaders and team sergeants. An indication of the
sion. That almost all of the members of the company appreciated the success of this task-organized element was the fact that every member
exercise and considered it the best part of pre-mission training spoke of the TCMSE traveled to a country in the region in support of a team.
to team members’ level of dedication and the cohesion within the unit. These trips were not only seamless but mission enhancing. Typical
Furthermore, the ability to complete this type of exercise significantly issues faced by new personnel integrating with an existing team were
increased team members’ confidence in working in uncertain environ- nonexistent due to the strong foundation of camaraderie and trust
ments. As a result, teams were able to not only operate in unfamiliar that existed within the organization. The camaraderie the company
areas but excel in them as well. developed during pre-mission training made it very easy for team lead-
Another positive outcome of training flexibility was the teams’ ers and team sergeants to contact the TCMSE and vice versa to obtain
engagement with non-traditional outlets for training. Along with clarification or make requests. We maintained a connection with the
the skills developed through advanced training exercises, the teams’ forward-deployed teams on almost a daily basis through traditional
increasing confidence led them to take calculated risks to further and non-traditional communications means and continued to gain
expand their knowledge base and ultimately make the mission more excellent situational awareness of their activities and issues.
successful. The Cambodia CMSE reached out to a diaspora commu- This ease of working with teams empowered the CMOC to accom-
nity through the University of Hawaii in order to learn more about plish its primary task, which is to facilitate civil-information manage-
Cambodian culture and gain perspectives about the country outside of ment for the company. “CIM is the process whereby civil information is
standard academic research. The Indonesia team reached out to the In- collected, entered into a central database and internally fused with the
donesian Embassy in Washington, D.C. In this case, the team learned supported element, higher headquarters, and other U.S. Government
a valuable lesson in official coordination because the U.S. Embassy in and Department of Defense agencies, intergovernmental organiza-
Jakarta was unaware of the engagement and made a query that came tions and non-governmental organizations. This process ensures the
down through our chain of command. Team members learned that timely availability of information for analysis and the widest possible
a simple courtesy notification to the U.S. Mission in Jakarta would dissemination of the raw and analyzed civil information to military and
have avoided any misunderstandings. They were later able to apply nonmilitary partners throughout the area of operations.”9 In practice,

42 Special Warfare
the information takes the form of geospatial information systems files, into a semi-formal relationship that involved periodic discussions on
Excel spreadsheets and online databases on both classified and unclas- potential training for our personnel and opportunities to participate
sified portals. The CMOC takes the raw products that teams produce in major disaster preparedness exercises and similar events within
and consolidates them, editing them for content and fusing them with countries in the region. Maintaining these types of relationships will
information available from the supported command headquarters in or- enable great cross-pollination and collaboration with one of the most
der to create a civil common operating picture that the commander, his prominent agencies within the DoD.
staff and subordinate units can use to make key decisions. During our The COE provided seats for our deputy CMOC chief and a CMSE
rotation, the TCMSE was fully engaged in this process and worked ex- team member to attend a Humanitarian Assistance Response Train-
tensively with the SOCPAC staff with accurate and up-to-date situational ing course. The primary instructor for the course was the PACOM
awareness of the PACOM region. As a theater composed of mostly Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance representative. Through this
permissible environments and countries, civil information was a critical training, we came to better understand our role as military repre-
component of the COCOM and TSOC commanders’ information set. sentatives during foreign-disaster situations and more about our
interaction with the OFDA. We were able to exercise this training
Execution when Thailand declared a disaster due to heavy flooding at the end
Conduct humanitarian, disaster relief and other operations. The of our rotation. When SOCPAC began planning a potential response,
nation has frequently called upon its Armed Forces to respond to a the OFDA representative became a conduit of information from a
range of situations that threaten the safety and well-being of its citizens key-interagency partner and enabled us to provide informed, timely
and those of other countries. U.S. forces possess rapidly deployable updates to the SOCPAC commander.
capabilities, including airlift and sealift, surveillance, medical evacua- Our teams set out with clear objectives as determined by SOCPAC
tion and care, and communications that can be invaluable in supple- and the country teams of the U.S. Embassies to which they were

“Training for any mission starts with the basics. During the pre-
deployment cycle, advanced rifle and pistol marksmanship, fitness and
survivability training were routine.”

menting lead relief agencies, by extending aid to victims of natural or assigned. They developed civil-military engagement plans based on
man-made disasters, both at home and abroad. DoD will continue to these objectives that consisted of innovative programs to influence
develop joint doctrine and military response options to prevent and, if key areas and relevant populations via building partner capacity,
necessary, respond to mass atrocities. U.S. forces will also remain ca- facilitating PACOM component events and increased engagements
pable of conducting non-combatant evacuation operations for Ameri- with host nation militaries. Two of the teams’ most notable accom-
can citizens overseas on an emergency basis.10 plishments were theater security-cooperation plan event support and
In addition to coordination with teams, the TCMSE leveraged multiple build partner capacity initiatives.
access to resources at our supported theater special operations com-
mand (SOCPAC) and combatant command (PACOM) headquarters. Theater Security Cooperation Plans
Building rapport with the representatives of civilian agencies working CME’s population-centric and indirect approach is manifested in
within these headquarters proved to be an especially valuable asset. three lines of effort: Enable partners to combat violent extremist orga-
We leveraged relationships with PACOM officials to gain seats at nizations; deter tacit and active support of violent extremist organiza-
the Pacific Command Security Assistance Conference (PACSAC), tions; Erode support for extremist ideologies.11
a high-profile planning forum with wide-ranging implications for As noted in FM 3-57, CA contributions to the TSCP can include
SOF CA missions. PACOM, DoD and Department of State officials liaison and coordination, education and training and area assessments.12
learned about CMSEs, often for the first time, and their direct inter- Inevitably, TSCP support can be a double-edged sword and draw a
actions with team leaders piqued interests and spurred ideas for the significant amount of criticism, primarily from a TSOC that is hesitant
innovative application of SOF CA capabilities. Discussions generated to have a SOF element tasked to support non-SOF programs for the
unprecedented ideas for new regional initiatives, including requests Office of Defense Coordination. In our case, supporting TSCP events
for support from security cooperation officials in countries that cur- was not a burden, rather a means of gaining access to previously denied
rently do not have SOF support. geographic areas. Each of our teams was able to leverage one or several
One of our desk officers took the initiative to contact the Center TSCP events into a TSOC named area of interest and provide persistent
for Excellence in Disaster Management when the team in Indonesia U.S. access and influence. The partnership is mutually beneficial —
requested some updated disaster-management handbooks for a pro- equally important to the component executing the event. Our teams
gram in which the team was involved. This initial outreach evolved provided initial site scoping of any project or CA program sites, coordi-

July - September 2012 43

 GRAINS OF TRUTH

The DoD Irregular Warfare:

Countering Irregular Threats
Joint Operating Concept 2010
identifies foreign internal
defense as one of the ways or
actions or operations designed
to address irregular threats in
irregular warfare and defines ir-
regular warfare as “a contest for
legitimacy and influence over
the relevant populations.” A
simple conclusion is that among
other grievances, the ability,
inability or simply the popula-
tion’s expectation of a govern-
ment or government apparatus
to execute some of their implied
or specific duties can serve as
the wedge for violent extrem-
ists organization introduction.
While traditional military BPC
initiatives focus on military
units, SOF CA BPC initia-
tives may equally involve local
government units where no
MEDICAL ASSESSMENT Civil Affairs Soldiers, along with a Navy medical team, conduct a key-leader engagement and military CA or CMO units exist.
site assessment at a prenatal clinic in Bangladesh in order to discuss future medical seminars. Courtesy Photo During this rotation, one
of our major BPC campaigns
nation and approval with local governments, and local knowledge when worked solely with a military unit, the Cambodian Royal Gendar-
the advance and main parties arrive, thus ensuring optimal results. merie, while our medical BPC initiative in Sri Lanka focused on both
During our rotation, there were two examples of TSCP coordina- military and civilian partners. Regardless of the partner, both clearly
tion that illustrate the value of SOF CA involvement in component fall under the umbrella of FID and exemplify the statement that CME
events. In Cambodia, the execution of Operation Pacific Angel was a as a concept is USSOCOM’s contribution, and part of DoDs’ strategy,
tremendous success and provided positive public relations for both the to building partner capacity in a preventive, population-centric, and
U.S. Pacific Air Force and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces as cited indirect approach to enhance the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of
in several local news outlets.13 In Indonesia, the CMSE team supported partnered indigenous governments.15
site surveys in advance of the visit of the hospital ship, the USS Mercy. The Royal Gendarmerie in Cambodia is a great example of this
The team was able to direct the event to North Sulawesi for the first core mission. A 2006 U.S. PACOM Strategic Study of the Royal Cam-
time and serve the interests of both Indonesian and U.S. governments. bodian Armed Forces recommended the development of a civil-mil-
Without the assistance of the CMSE, the U.S. Pacific Fleet would likely itary capability within the Royal Gendarmerie. For five years this was
have conducted the event in a convenient area based on historical a neglected opportunity until our CMSE team conducted a capabili-
precedent, rather than contemporary needs. As planning for Opera- ties assessment and designed a multi-year BPC campaign that gradu-
tion Pacific Angel 2012 is underway in Nepal and a newly established ally introduces new concepts starting with humanitarian assistance
CMSE there supports PACAF and the ODC in site scoping and local and disaster response and culminates with evolving the gendarmerie
coordination, yet another example of mutually beneficial and valuable into a fully capable CMO organization with a similar force structure.
CMSE support to TSCP is taking shape. The initial unit assessment is a cross-domain systems analysis similar
to the DOTMLPF in the military but based upon the 15 emergency
Building Partner-Capacity Initiatives support functions as designated in the national response framework.
Provide a Stabilizing Presence. U.S. forces will conduct a sus- These are 15 functions that apply in a disaster regardless of country
tainable pace of presence operations abroad, including rotational and can be used as an initial and subsequent assessment.
deployments and bilateral and multilateral training exercises. These In Sri Lanka, the CMSE conducted a number of key-leader en-
activities reinforce deterrence, help to build the capacity and com- gagements that pointed to the need for particular types of medical
petence of U.S., allied and partner forces for internal and external events such as eyeglass distribution and behavioral seminars covering
defense, strengthen alliance cohesion and increase U.S. influence. A topics such as post-traumatic stress disorder. The 30-year war with
reduction in resources will require innovative and creative solutions the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam took a tremendous toll on the
to maintain our support for allied and partner interoperability and emotional and mental health of people in affected areas in addition
building partner capacity.14 to the physical damage and trauma from which the country is still

44 Special Warfare
recovering. As the medical planners at SOCPAC sought to plan a number of individuals amplify their actions through surgically pre-
high-impact, low-resource event for engagement, the CMSE was able cise impact. While the CME program is relatively new, CMSE teams
to provide detailed assessments toward the effort. Sri Lanka has one of have cumulatively demonstrated their ability to achieve operational
the best health systems in South and Southeast Asia, as indicated in the and strategic successes. During our rotation, teams were able to capi-
World Health Organization’s profile of the country.16 This caused the talize on the foundation of their predecessors to further a number of
planners to tailor medical programs accordingly rather than to apply U.S. defense and foreign policy goals.
the rudimentary MEDCAP model to a country with an already robust In order to preserve SOF CA as an effective tool, it is critical
basic healthcare infrastructure. As a result, these programs were very to maintain the most important element: the men and women in
well received by the Ministry of Health, National Center for Disaster our ranks. The SOF Truth that “Humans are more important than
Management and other key government agencies. The representatives hardware” could not be more relevant to SOF CA. As debates carry
of these agencies appreciated the conscientious effort on the part of on among our government’s leadership regarding budgets for various
U.S. Government representatives to take the time to understand their weapon systems and the size of personnel, we submit CMSE teams
needs and provide assistance accordingly. The favorable relationships as examples of low-cost but highly perishable assets that must be
that the team developed with these representatives also provided ample carefully preserved to maintain their capabilities. This requires not
opportunities for the ambassador and other country team officials to an investment in financial resources as much as dedicated time and
maintain their engagements with the host nation. attention to recruiting and retaining the best possible people for
In Bangladesh, multipurpose cyclone shelters and coastal crisis the job. Such an effort offers unlimited potential to address some of
management centers are yet another example of partnership the most confounding national security challenges we face today.
capacity-building through infrastructure development. Cyclone However, the failure to recognize and respond to this necessity will
Sidr in 2007 was a terrible tragedy for the country but it provided ultimately destroy the capabilities we have
an opportunity for the U.S. Government to demonstrate its commit- developed over the past several years.
ment to the people of Bangladesh with not just short-term assistance Major Jeffery S. Han is the Civil-Military
but investment in sustainable infrastructure development. SOF CA Operations chief assigned to 96th Civil Affairs
personnel were among the first international response teams on Battalion, 95th Civil Affairs Brigade.
the ground after the cyclone struck. There has been a CMSE rota-
Major Brian D. Youtz is the executive of-
tion in the country ever since, complementing the Government of ficer at the 92nd Civil Affairs Battalion, 95th
Bangladesh’s efforts to deter violent extremist organizations from Civil Affairs Brigade. comment here
gaining footholds in the country through improved infrastructure
and services. The MPCS and CCMC programs have been at the fore-
front of this effort. Sound, durable structures provide the people of NOTES
Bangladesh with the means to mitigate the effects of disasters as well 1. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, 3.
as inviting community and education centers that foster cooperation 2. Statement of Admiral Eric T. Olson, Commander United States Special Operations
and learning.17 The site selection and construction of these structures Command before the Senate Armed Services committee on the posture of Special Opera-
depends on CMSE teams venturing into remote areas and identifying tions Forces, March 4, 2008.
suitable locations while gaining the buy-in and trust of key leaders at 3. FM 3-57 paragraphs 3-125 and 3-127.
the local level. A team member’s native Bengali fluency was critical to 4. Ibid, paragraph 1-1.
rapidly building rapport with local officials and key leaders. 5. FM 3-05, pg ix.
6. Ibid, paragraph 1-60.
Looking Forward 7. FM 3-57, paragraph 3-131.
Conduct stability and counterinsurgency operations. In the af- 8. Ibid, paragraph 2-3.
termath of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States will 9. Ibid,
emphasize non-military means and military-to-military cooperation 10. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, 6.
to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. force 11. FM 3-57 paragraph 3-129.
commitments to stability operations. U.S. forces will nevertheless be 12. Ibid, paragraph 2-134.
ready to conduct limited counterinsurgency and other stability opera- 13. “Operation Pacific Angel 11-1 Treats near 5,000 Cambodian,” Agence Kampuochea
tions if required, operating alongside coalition forces wherever possible. Presse, 21 April 2012: http://www.akp.gov.kh/?p=9282. “U.S. airmen commence civil-
Accordingly, U.S. forces will retain and continue to refine the lessons military assistance activities in Koh Kong province,” Nokorwat News Daily, 9 August 2011:
learned, expertise, and specialized capabilities that have been devel- http://www.nokorwatnews.com/detailnews.php?lng=en&newsid=13326&mnu=2. “U.S.,
oped over the past 10 years of counterinsurgency and stability opera- Cambodia partner for civil military assistance mission,” The Official Web Site of the U.S.
tions in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, U.S. forces will no longer be Air Force, 9 August 2011: http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123267268.
sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.18 14. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, 6.
With the size and resource constraints once again affecting the 15. FM3-57, paragraph 3-127.
kinds of missions we conduct as a military force, the CME program 16. The World Health Organization website: http://www.who.int/countries/lka/en/
and CMSE teams stand out as an extremely small footprint, cost- 17. “Reduced death rates from cyclones in Bangladesh: what more needs to be
effective “bang-for-the-buck” for not only military commanders but done?” Bulletin of the World Health Organization: http://www.who.int/bulletin/vol-
ambassadors and other civilian U.S. Government officials as well. umes/90/2/11-088302/en/
SOF CA personnel are a highly skilled, select group in which a small 18. Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, 6.

July - September 2012 45

CAREER NOTES
Fourth-quarter selection-board schedule ARSOF
DATE BOARD ARSOF Captain’s Career Course
Army Special Operations Forces Command Beginning in October, the U.S. Army
11 October 2012
Sergeant Major Command Select List John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center
U.S. Army Reserve/Active Guard Reserve Mas- and School, in conjunction with the
17 October 2012 School of Advanced Leadership and
ter Sergeant Board
Tactics, will conduct a pilot course of
18 October 2012 Army Major Board the Captain’s Career Course Common
Core. Upon successful completion and
18 October 2012 Active Component Master Sergeant Board
accreditation of the pilot, SWCS will con-
Maneuver, Fires and Effects Command duct Phase 1 (common core) and Phase
29 November 2012
Lieutenant Colonel Board 2 (branch technical/tactical qualification
course) for future Civil Affairs, Psycho-
logical Operations and Special Forces of-

ENLISTED ficers, with SWCS gaining recognition as

a fully accredited institution for awarding
Military Education Level F (MEL F) credit.
Army implements new career retention programs
The Army is implementing new programs to improve noncommissioned grade/
military-occupational specialty readiness levels, retain NCOs with the greatest
potential for future contributions and support viable career paths for all MOSs WARRANT OFFICER
and grades. MILPER Message 12-089 announced the inclusion of the Qualita- Advanced Civil Schooling for
tive Service Program into the FY12 Sergeant Major Training and Selection Board. Special Forces warrant officers
The MILPER also expands the Qualitative Management Program applicability to There are myriad options for lifelong
all SFCs and above with a minimum of 19 years active federal service. This will learning and obtaining an advanced
also incorporate the enlisted Over-Strength Qualitative Service Program and the degree while serving as an SF warrant
Promotion Stagnation Qualitative Service Program Board for consideration of pos- officer. Several options worthy of your
sible DA involuntary separation from active duty. consideration include:
• Self study on your own time (tuition as-
Sergeant Major nominative and personnel coding sistance/GI Bill)
The Army G1 has recently approved a request initiated by the Office of the • ILE/SAMS (Fully Funded)
Sergeant Major of the Army to revise the Command Sergeant Major/Sergeant
• Naval Post Graduate School (Fully Funded)
Major nominative position and personnel coding conventions, Revision of the
• National Defense University FBNC
Command Sergeant Major (CSM) and Staff Sergeant Major (SGM) Nominative
(Fully Funded)
Position and Personnel Coding Convention. The actions transfer all nominative
SGM positions and personnel to MOS 00Z (retitled to sergeant major nomina- • National Intelligence College (Fully Funded)
tive) and revises the following: • Norwich University (Fully Funded)
The primary requirements for these
A. Professional Development Profi- B. PDPC to limit utilization/positions
educational opportunities are: completion
ciency Code to limit utilization/ and personnel associated with of a bachelor’s degree program, support
positions and personnel associ- principal NCO adviser/senior staff from the first O6 in your chain of com-
ated with the following; NCO with the following: mand and promotion potential.
1. ASI 8C/BG level CSM 1. ASI 8S/BG level CSM These focused degree programs provide
2. ASI 8D/MG level CSM 2. ASI 8T/MG level CSM a win-win opportunity for the Soldier and the
3. ASI 8E/LTG level CSM 3. ASI 8U/LTG level CSM Army. At a time when the Army is downsiz-
ing, higher education will also keep Soldiers
4. ASI 8F/GEN level CSM 4. ASI 8V/GEN level CSM
competitive for promotion when combined
Implementation for these revisions will be FY13 for active component and with superior performance. ACS opportuni-
FY15 for reserve component. Details will be announced and reflected in DA PAM ties come with a 3:1 ADSO that begins
611-21, Smartbook. upon completion of the course. In most sit-
uations, returning to an affiliated SF group
Sergeants First Class board set after graduation from a master’s program
Sergeants first class need to ensure that supporting documents and enlisted is very likely and some positions within the
records are up to date, reviewed and validated for the October 2012 DA Central- groups will count as a utilization tour.
ized Master Sergeant Promotion Board. The active component master sergeant/ For more information contact the
Qualitative Service Program is scheduled to convene on Oct. 18. All documents USAJFKSWCS Special Warfare Educa-
for consideration by the board must be received at Army Human Resources tion Group, or visit the AKO SF Branch
Command no later than Sept. 14. Specific information concerning eligibility, Page at: https://www.us.army.mil/suite/
procedures for nomination, declination and requirements will be outlined in an page/666441
upcoming MILPER message.

46 Special Warfare
 CAREER NOTES
ADMIN OFFICER
Notes from iPERMS on Broadening Opportunity Programs for officers
OMPF documents Every fiscal year, the Army offers the opportunity for the officer corps to apply
1. iPERMS files all unit awards au- for Broadening Opportunity Programs, formerly Non-MEL IV Fellowships, Scholar-
thorized for permanent wear in Soldiers ships and Internships. These programs offer a wide range of graduate degrees,
commendatory section of their perfor- some of which require utilization commencing upon graduation. They range in
duration from 12-60 months. Majors through lieutenant colonels are encouraged to
mance folder.
read the MILPER messages for each of the identified programs to determine their
2. iPERMS does not restrict or mask
interest and eligibility. Officers should not exclude themselves from these opportu-
enlisted courses that can be taken as nities for lack of knowledge or a belief that they are not competitive. ARSOF com-
an officer (Airborne, Air Assault, etc.). petes very well for all of these programs. The application window for this year is
3. Course completion certificates closed. Officers should consult their assignment’s officer to plan for the next cycle.
are authorized even if there is a DA BOPs that offer graduate degrees:
Form 1059 in the Soldier’s record for • Arroyo Center Fellowship (MILPER 11-362)
that same course. • Congressional Fellowship (MILPER 11-363)
4. Certificates of achievement are • General Wayne A. Downing Scholarship (MILPER 11-364)
authorized awards and won’t be moved • Joint Chief of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department
to the restricted file, masked or deleted. of the Army Staff Intern Program (MILPER 11-366)
5. The correct procedure for handling • Olmsted Scholarship (MILPER 11-367)
erroneous orders is for the S1 or G1 to • Strategic Education and Development Program (MILPER 11-369)
produce an amendment or revocation • Army Cyber Command Scholarship Program (MILPER 11-365)
order so that it can be added to the BOPs that DO NOT offer graduate degrees:
• Regional Fellowship Program –LTC-level (MILPER 11-368)
Soldier’s performance folder. iPERMS
• White House Fellowship (MILPER 11-295)
cannot restrict or delete orders unless • Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA-SCFP)
they are an exact duplicate or directed BOP Website:
by the Army Board for Correction of https://www.hrc.army.mil/OFFICER/Broadening%20Opportunity%20Programs
Military Records.
School of Advanced Military Studies
Human Resources Command The Advanced Military Studies Program at SAMS is a great professional op-
Points of Contact portunity for field-grade officers whether their next assignment is Intermediate
Level Education, are enrolled in ILE or are coming out of a key and developmental
ARSOF Branch assignment. The regiments have a priority on utilizing and building SAMS capabil-
ity within the SOF community.
Branch Chief: LTC George “Mick” McGrath SAMS confers a master’s degree in military art and science upon gradua-
502-613-5700 (DSN 983) tion. It is a one-year program that focuses on military leadership, conceptual and
george.mcgrath@us.army.mil detailed planning, critical thinking and staff support to decision making at the op-
Branch SGM: SGM Sergio Pruneda erational level. For more information about SAMS, visit the Special Forces Branch
502-613-5700 (DSN 983) x5699 website (regardless of your branch) at https://www.hrc.army.mil/site/protect/
serjio.pruneda@us.army.mil branches/officer/MFE/SpecialForces/MAJs-Assignments-Officer.htm
1. Pre-ILE Selection - Selection for AMSP prior to attending ILE at Fort Leaven-
CA Officer Branch worth, Kan., is similar to the Post-KD Field Nomination, with the same application
CA Branch Chief: LTC Tony Thacker requirements. If accepted, officers will serve a two year tour at Fort Leavenworth
502-613-5700 (DSN 983) x6184 (ILE and AMSP).
tony.thacker@us.army.mil 2. Apply while attending ILE (including sister-service ILE schools, Western
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and foreign staff colleges). Officers
PO Officer Branch applying during ILE can do so in two windows, corresponding with the two AMSP
PO Branch Chief: LTC Alexander Simmons classes: Applications to Class-01 occur in September-October each year, while
alexander.v.simmons.mil@mail.mil applications to Class-02 occur in February-March each year. Announcement of ap-
plication periods and requirements are made by MILPER message, posted to the
SF Officer Branch SAMS website and disseminated through Command and General Staff College.
SF Branch Chief: LTC Dennis Heaney Each officer must coordinate with his HRC branch before applying to AMSP.
502-613-5700 (DSN 983) x6122 3. Post-Key and Developmental (KD) Qualification Field Nomination. Officers
dennis.s.heaney@us.army.mil applying from the field who are Post-KD-qualified, are eligible and must complete all
AMSP selection requirements, including examination and submission of a supervisor
assessment and recommendation from a lieutenant colonel or colonel-level supervi-
For a complete sor, using the supervisor evaluation form from the SAMS website.
list of HRC Branch All officers who graduate from AMSP owe an AMSP utilization tour. ARSOF offi-
cers will be utilized in accordance with manning priorities and the U.S. Army John F.
POCs visit Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School’s AMSP Program Management Policy.
Special Warfare If you have any questions about SAMS and the AMSP program, contact LTC
Eric Walker, the SOF adviser to SAMS, via email at eric.laird.walker@us.army.mil,
online. or by phone at 913-758-3289.

July - September 2012 47

CAREER NOTES
Army Officers Strive to Join Army Accession to
Special Operations Forces Ranks CA, PO or SF Branches
Each year, more than 800 officers from throughout the Army compete to join Officers interested in the Army Special Opera-
the Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations and Special Forces regiments, collec- tions Forces branches often have little information
tively known as Army Special Operations Forces. The first step for these officers about the ARSOF-board process, eligibility windows
is selection by the ARSOF Officer Accession Board, which is conducted by the and what they can do before entering the applica-
Department of the Army Secretariat of the Human Resources Command at Fort tion window. The following is a listing of some of
Knox, Ky. In spite of more than a decade of continual conflict, ARSOF remains the common questions:
extremely popular among junior officers, which makes the selections process very I want to apply to CA, PO or SF, but my branch is
competitive. The Directorate of Human Resources at the United States Army John fenced off from applying, what can I do?
F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School oversees the selection process. No branch is fenced off from applying to the AR-
The rigorous accession process begins with the submission of a compre- SOF board. Any officer from any branch in the eligi-
hensive application packet to the Special Operations Recruiting Battalion by bility window can submit a packet to the SORB.
interested officers. The SORB stands ready to assist all interested officers
I want to apply to CA, PO or SF, but my battalion
with the process, which includes a thorough physical exam, the Defense Lan- commander told me to wait until after I have
guage Aptitude Battery, an Army Physical Fitness Test and security-clearance completed company/battery command because
review. The SORB ensures each officer meets the prerequisites, including at- that is what his friend did when he was a captain.
tendance at assessment and selection and attendance at requisite qualifica- There is only one window to apply for an
tion courses within the approved officer-career timeline. Once the SORB has ARSOF branch. Officers have to apply while they
completed its work, the packet is sent to HRC for review and input into the are first lieutenants.
Army Selection Board System. Do I need a letter of recommendation for my
Each April, the ARSOF Board convenes at HRC. The ARSOF board is con- application packet?
ducted to the same high standards of all Army selection boards, ensuring the There is no requirement for officers to submit
integrity and fairness of the process to each candidate. The center of gravity letters of recommendation. The application
for the board is its membership. The board is comprised by senior leaders process is also anonymous to prevent a poten-
from throughout the Army special-operations community. For the FY12 board, tial bias against officers desiring to become
membership consisted of a colonel, who served as president of the board, ARSOF. Once the board results are released,
three lieutenant colonels (one from each of the ARSOF branches), a chief war- all officers, selected and non-selected, will be
rant officer 5 and a command sergeant major. This cross-section of leaders contacted via email from their branch of choice.
from within all three ARSOF branches provides the best possible review of an Can I make another deployment and apply to
officer’s potential for service in special operations. the ARSOF Board next year, as an out-of-year
The board members review each applicant’s file, which consists of the DA group officer?
photo, officer record brief, officer evaluation reports, college transcripts, Army No.
physical-fitness test scorecard and a resume. The resume provides insight into How do I begin the process of becoming an
the individual’s character and an initial view of the level of which they possess ARSOF officer?
the ARSOF attributes. In the resume, the officer has an opportunity to indicate This is the most common question, and
their preference in regards to which regiment they wish to serve. The resume also every assignment officer knows to direct the
outlines the experiences and accomplishments the officers views as the most officer to the SORB. If the officer does not have
significant of their career. The resume also allows the officer to explain to the a SORB recruiter at his location or on his base,
board, in their own words, why they want to serve in Army special operations. the SORB website (www.bragg.army.mil/sorb)
At the close of each board, officers are rated on an order-of-merit list, from provides information needed for an application
which the requirements for each branch are filled. Several officers will get packet and will provide contact information to a
their second or possibly even their third choice depending on their preferenc- recruiter in their region.
es and where they fall in the OML. Contrary to popular belief, the board does I saw the ARSOF Board Announcement MILPER,
not force an officer into a branch in which they have not requested to serve. and I am not eligible for another year, what can I
Following the placement by OML, officers will either receive a letter of do to get ready?
acceptance or rejection. The acceptance letter is only the first step in the Contact the SORB, they will begin the pro-
journey to becoming an ARSOF officer. cess with you. Officers should take the Defense
The ARSOF community can take pride in knowing the next generation of Language Aptitude Battery and have the score up-
SOF officers is identified by today’s SOF leaders, who use the highest stan- dated on their ORB (the minimum score required
dards of board conduct. is 85). Officers who fail to achieve the minimum
of 85 must reschedule the test. Officers who al-
ready know a language and who have a proficien-
Additional ARSOF recruiting information and cy of 1/1 or higher, should schedule a Defense
Language Proficiency Test. The test must be taken
local Special Operations Recruitng Battalion within a year of the projected ARSOF Board.
contact information can be found online at: Do I need a DA photo for the ARSOF Board?
www.bragg.army.mil/sorb Yes! Deployed officers can request a waiver
for the DA photo, but they must submit a photo in
lieu of the DA Photo to complete their packet.

48 Special Warfare
 TRAINING UPDATE
SPECIAL FORCES CIVIL AFFAIRS
Special Forces Communication Sergeant (18E) Course redesign U.S. Army Reserve Integration
The pilot redesigned 18E course is underway. The addition of two weeks to the course cur- D Company, 3rd Battalion, 1st SWTG(A)
riculum allows for the advanced training of the PRC-150 HF/ALE 3G radio set, integration of the implemented several changes to the exist-
SDN-L(VX) with the PRC-117G BGAN and COMP TIA Certification Preparation instruction. The ing 29-day course including five days of
near-term goal is to integrate these systems and training through the 18E FTX, Max Gain and classroom work, ruck marches, single-day
Robin Sage exercises. Two additional weeks of training will be added to extend the course to a
training lanes, one day of small-unit tactics
total of 18 weeks once the necessary equipment and trained instructors are introduced to the
and 11 days for Operation Sluss-Tiller.
18E course (goal of fourth quarter, Fiscal Year 2012).
These changes enhanced training while
Small Unit Tactics (SUT) challenging students, thus producing a
The SUT Phase of the Special Forces Qualification Course has undergone major changes since greater quality Soldier for the regiment. The
transitioning to 4th Battalion, 1st SWTG (Airborne). Cadre now instruct their squads in a small- reserve students were fully integrated with
classroom setting with a 2:15 teacher to student ratio versus a 1:180 ratio that was formerly active-duty students for mission planning
used in a large-classroom setting. This has significantly improved the professionalism of the and Operation Sluss-Tiller.
classes and, more importantly, removed the communication barriers between the instructors and The company completed the scope,
students. Instructors are viewed more as mentors and coaches than they were previously, creat- concept plans, lesson plans and redesign
ing a more conducive learning environment. concept for the 10-week distance learning
SUT has also increased the use of rotary-wing assets in order to make training more realistic way-ahead. The new plan increases student
through increased complexity of air insertions and the use of air assets to support simulated and instructor interaction throughout the
combat operations. The SUT committee is working with multiple Army aviation units to provide 10-weeks, consisting of homework as-
rotary-wing support for MEDEVAC training, air insertion for field-training exercises and, eventually, signments, forums on blackboard, reading
using air assets during patrol simulations. assignments, CA Core Tasks, Pineland Area
The most significant change for SUT is the culmination exercise. The students transition from
Study and a final examination. Included in
squad operations to a training setting where they must train a partner-nation force on the skill
the distance-learning homework assign-
sets they have learned in the first six weeks of SUT. As trainers, they must overcome the chal-
ments are the “Glean Aspects of Culture
lenges of working with a partner-nation force in a foreign-internal defense environment and uti-
through Tactical” video simulations and
lize their language skills while fine tuning their fundamentals and principles of patrolling. Initial
VCATs from the different regions (South
results of the SUT changes have been extremely positive and will prepare SFQC students for the
challenges they will face in the regiment as a member of a team. America, Northern Africa, Afghanistan and
Horn of Africa). Special emphasis was
placed on ensuring students’ basic knowl-
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS edge of the material and that an earlier
integration with the active-component
Interagency Planning Exercise students could be achieved. The earlier
5th Battalion, 1st SWTG(A) conducted its first full-scale interagency planning exercise for the integration timeline will allow the reserve
Psychological Operations Qualification Course at Hoffman Elementary School in Hoffman, N.C. students to receive classes otherwise not
The exercise was designed to simulate a diverse embassy environment, exposing students to the offered to them.
various agencies of a typical post, as the cadre reinforced learning objectives and individual/
Pre-Deployment Agricultural
collective PSYOP critical tasks. The intent to simulate a real-world environment by exposing
students to the various agencies and positions of a typical U.S. Embassy, while allowing them Training for Soldiers deploying
to experience the effects of their decisions was met; ultimately increasing their capability to to Afghanistan
conduct MISO in varying operational environments. Through realistic urban facilities, handpicked United States Department of Agriculture
role-players and Department of State officials, the cadre was able to teach, coach and mentor and a consortium of American universities
in an interactive “live” environment, as they developed students while expanding their working are delivering a curriculum of agricultural
knowledge in this strategic setting. training that will meet the needs of all
Glen Davis, the State Department’s Public Diplomacy Desk Officer for Afghanistan, provided deploying United States Government
support to the IAPX as both the public affairs officer role-player and adviser to our Comprehen- personnel in support of the USG Agriculture
Strategy in Afghanistan. The training will
sive Training Environment role-players. He provided specific knowledge of Military Information
take place in Fresno and San Luis Obispo,
Support Operations from his time in Colombo, Sri-Lanka, where he worked closely with the
California on the following dates during
embassy’s Military Information Support Team. Students concluded the exercise with an Ambas-
CY12: Aug. 13-17, Sept. 24-28, Oct. 08-
sador-series concept brief to James Moore, the deputy assistant secretary for public diplomacy 12, Nov. 12-16 and Dec. 17-21. Partici-
South and Central Asia, and Raymond Maxwell (deputy assistant secretary of state in the Bureau pants will be enrolled on a first come, first
of Near Eastern Affairs). Each Military Information Support Team briefed its mission-support pro- served basis. Contact Ryan Brewster, U.S.
gram as coordinated/synchronized with country team goals and ground combatant command- Department of Agriculture, at ryan.brews-
ers/theater special-operations command objectives to the U.S. Ambassador. ter@fas.usda.gov for further information.

July - September 2012 49

HUMAN PERFORMANCE
Interval Training For Improved Performance and Health BY STEPHEN M. MANNINO
Many people believe that adding miles to their endurance training routine will improve their run times. According to research, this
“more is better” approach simply does not work. In fact, research shows us that Soldiers who ran between 34-44 miles per week
had slower two-mile run times than those who ran between 26-39 miles per week. More notable, Soldiers in the higher mileage
group had 10 percent more injuries than those who ran fewer miles. What this tells us is higher mileage produced more injuries
and slower runners. Furthermore, excessive long, slow, distance training has been shown to compromise strength and power;
qualities vital to the special-operations Soldier. So how can the special-operations Soldier improve endurance without sacrificing
strength and power while minimizing the risk of overuse injuries? The answer may be interval training.

What is interval training? Structuring an Interval Training Program

Interval training is a method of exercise that uses There are two methods to design interval training programs. The first is
alternating periods of work and rest. The Soldier the heart-rate method. The second is the work-to-rest method. The heart-rate
exercises at a relatively high intensity for a speci- method is slightly more complicated than the work-to-rest method. It requires
fied distance or time and then recovers for a time a heart-rate monitor and knowledge of your max heart rate. For these reasons,
appropriate to the work performed. There are many a complete description of how to use the heart-rate method is beyond the
ways interval training can be implemented. It can be scope of this article.
done by running, biking or rowing, just to name a With the work-to-rest method the amount of rest time is dictated by the
few. Because it is so versatile, interval training can be amount of work time. Generally speaking, shorter (and by default more intense)
done anywhere and because workouts are shorter, intervals require a longer ratio of rest to work when compared to longer, less in-
they are not as monotonous as long, slow distance tense intervals. When implementing the work-to-rest method, the following chart
training. Also, because intervals are performed at can be used when structuring an interval training program.
a faster pace than can be maintained over longer
distances, speed, as well as endurance is improved. WORK-TO-REST INTERVAL TRAINING PROGRAM
Benefits of interval training Rest Total Training
Interval training has many benefits when com- Work
pared to traditional long, slow, distance. Some of Novice Advanced Distance
these benefits include:
15 seconds 45 seconds 30 seconds
• Faster development of VO2 Max (a measure 600-1200 meters
of aerobic fitness) 30 seconds 90 seconds 60 seconds
• Increased testosterone levels
60 seconds 120 seconds 105 seconds
• Decreased body fat 900-1800 meters
• Increased lean mass 75 seconds 150 seconds 130 seconds
• Improved buffering mechanisms
90 seconds 160 seconds 135 seconds
• Increased glucose storage and utilization 1200-2400 meters
• Shorter training sessions 120 seconds 210 seconds 180 seconds
• Improves insulin action, thus may be a viable
way of preventing Type-2 diabetes
150 seconds 225 seconds 190 seconds
1600-3200 meters
What this means is you will spend less time 180 seconds 270 seconds 225 seconds
exercising, yet you will be more aerobically fit, burn
more fat and maintain/increase your lean muscle The number of intervals performed will depend on your fitness level. In
mass. One of the reasons for this is because of excess general the total amount of distance covered during an interval workout should
post-exercise oxygen consumption. Because interval be between 600 and 3,200 meters (depending on the length of each interval) and
training is performed at a higher intensity than long, should not increase by more than 20 percent per week. Also, it is recommended
slow, distance training it takes your body longer to that prior to each interval-training session an adequate movement-prep session is
return to its pre-exercise state. This means that your performed and that you allow 48 hours between each session. Incorporate interval
metabolism remains elevated for a longer period training sessions once or twice a week for six weeks to increase in aerobic capacity,
of time after interval training. Some research has decrease training time and improve overall health.
shown that interval training can elevate metabolism
for up to 38 hours after exercise. This means your Stephen M. Mannino, MEd, CSCS is the Human Perfor-
body continues to burn extra calories even when mance Program Coordinator for the THOR3 Program at the
you aren’t working out! U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School.

50 Special Warfare
Reading about the Asia-Pacific Region BY COLONEL MIKE LWIN
The scope of the Special Operations The second recommendation deals with affect the interaction between people, non-
Command-Pacific’s area of responsibility is China, a rising power and the topic of state groups and nation-states.
enormous both in terms of size and diversity. much commentary. China’s long-standing Where China Meets India also includes
This area, referred to here as the Asia-Pacific civilization, geographic prominence and economic considerations — not only at the
region, is more than one coherent grouping growing economic and military power give macro level of nation-states and multinational
of nations. The region is best conceived as a it a role in Asia that is essential to grasp. corporations, but also of the micro-level mer-
series of interlinked sub regions extending Given such prominence, China deserves chants, traders and others who flow across
from India east into the Pacific Ocean. Each coverage by at least one book in a short list borders to make their living. His descriptions
sub-region has a different set of dominant of three. Among the many excellent books show both the challenges and opportunities
cultures, key languages and strategic outlooks. on China, Dr. Henry Kissinger’s On China for unconventional warfare and counter-
Reading, combined with education and expe- meets the requirement. insurgency in the region. For example, in a
rience, is one route to help the Army special- On China combines history, current affairs description of a region in India, he writes,
operations forces’ professional begin to and strategic analysis. Kissinger provides “To make a long and complex story short,
understand the scope of the region’s diversity insight into how China’s leadership decision- in this little corner of the republic, with only
and the implications for ARSOF operations. making combines aspects of Sun Tzu, Con- about two and a half million people, there are
Just as no single language covers the re- fucius, Mao’s ideology and China’s lengthy no fewer than 40 different insurgent militias.
gion, no single volume provides a full range historical experience. He explains why Some fight the Indian state; nearly all fight
of understanding of the Asia-Pacific area China has engaged in what Americans might each other.”
of operations. The three recommendations consider “irrational” wars in Korea, India and These three recommendations can help
below cover both the strategic issues resident Vietnam. Kissinger’s book is backed up by his the SOF professional begin to understand
in the region and help to explain the cultural first-person observations as the principal ar- the complexity, diversity and dynamics of the
and human fabric that shapes relationships, chitect of the reestablishment of U.S. relations region. As with any short list of books on the
threat perceptions and strategic decisions. with China during the Cold War. Among the Asia-Pacific region, some key topics remain
This list is not intended to be the final word many good and great works on China, if you uncovered. For those with the time and moti-
on the Asia-Pacific region; instead, it is can only read one, this is it.
vation to gain a wider grasp of the region, the
designed as a list of recent, accessible books The last recommendation is not as well
to cover the broadest range of strategically reader may want to focus next on the topics of
known as Kaplan’s Monsoon or Kissinger’s On
relevant dynamics today in Asia in the short- the Korean peninsula, the large Muslim popu-
China. Where China Meets India: Burma and
est amount of words and time. lations stretching from India to Indonesia,
the New Crossroads of Asia is more than just
The first recommendation is a book by Australia and the Pacific Island nation.
a book about Burma. Thant Myint-U’s book
Robert Kaplan. Kaplan has a long track discusses the ebb and flow of civilizations Colonel Mike Lwin has recently completed
record of penning of strategically relevant great and small in south and southeast Asia a Senior Service College Fellowship at the
writings for military and special-operations over a period of centuries. He provides much Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. He is
professionals. In February 1994, he wrote more than just a historical overview. The a Psychological Operations officer with a long-
a prescient article, “The Coming Anarchy,” author shows how these and other dynamics time regional focus on the Asia-Pacific region.
in the Atlantic magazine that predicted
many of the complex and unconventional Three Recommendations
challenges we now face. His book from the
same year, Balkan Ghosts, gained fame dur-
ing the military interventions in Bosnia and
Kosovo in the 1990s. His most recent book
and one that is recommended is: Monsoon:
The Indian Ocean and the Future of Ameri-
can Power.
In Monsoon, Kaplan’s topic is actually
broader than just the Asia-Pacific region; the
book covers the Indo-Pacific, the connec-
tions between the land masses in the Indian
Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Monsoon
contains insight into not only large swaths
of South and Southeast Asia and China,
but also on Pakistan, Oman and the eastern
coast of Africa. While it reads like a travel- MONSOON ON CHINA WHERE CHINA MEETS INDIA
ogue, Kaplan’s book fuses geography, history, The Indian Ocean and the By Henry Kissinger Burma and the New Cross-
culture, literature, strategy and interviews Future of American Power New York: The Penguin Press, roads of Asia
with key figures throughout the region. By Robert D. Kaplan 2011 By Thant Myint-U
While you might not agree with all of his New York: Random, 2010 New York: Farrar, Straus and
strategic recommendations, his observa- Giroux, 2011
tions and analysis will stimulate you to think The U.S. Pacific Command also has a more expansive reading list available online at:
deeply about the region and its internal and
www.pacom.mil/web/site_pages/uspacom/Reading%20List.shtml
external linkages.

July - September 2012 51

BOOK REVIEW

WHITE TIGERS:
MY SECRET WAR IN NORTH KOREA
The scene: a lone American adviser strategic utilities in a tightly controlled
with more than 100 partisans raiding and denied territory. The partisans
an enemy stronghold deep behind en- were considered to be ragtag units
emy lines. The raid is carried out under operating on “the fringes of the war”
a barrage of artillery shells and aerial by the South Koreans and the U.S.
bombs. This image conjures up the Army because they were ill-equipped,
men of the World War II-era Office of untrained and only able to conduct
Strategic Services conducting clandes- small raids using guerrilla tactics. After
tine operations in German-occupied a quick assessment of the partisans,
territories, or U.S. and Filipino guer- Malcom realized basic infantry tactics
rillas fighting against Japanese invad- would enhance their combat capabili-
ers or even Special Forces operational ties without sacrificing the essence of
detachments in Iraq and Afghanistan. small-unit operations and the funda-
However, this image is of then-1st mentals of guerrilla operations which
Lt. Ben S. Malcom leading the famed are a must for survival behind enemy DETAILS
White Tigers, a North Korean partisan lines. After a few months of rigorous By Ben S. Malcom
unit, against a heavily fortified coastal training and planning, Malcom and the Washington D.C..:
artillery gun position off the west coast White Tigers successfully executed a Brassey’s Inc., 1996.
of North Korea during the Korean War. raid with combined fire support on the ISBN: 978-1574880168
Commissioned in 1950 through North Korean People’s Army coastal (hardcover). 241 pages. $27.95.
North Georgia College Reserve Officer artillery, boosting the lethality and ca-
Training Corps program, the author pabilities of the partisans. According to Reviewed by:
was assigned to Fort Knox, Ky., as a Malcom, the key to the success of the MAJ Dave (Young Min) Cho
training officer for new recruits for a partisans in his area of operations was USAJFKSWCS, 1st SWTG (A)
year before deploying to Korea in early that the partisans were recruited from
1952. In Korea, without any formal the areas in which they were to operate.
training on unconventional warfare This gave the partisans an edge over Korean security apparatus brutally
and special operations, he was assigned the North Korean’s People Army in policed and controlled its population’s
to a top-secret special-operations unit terms of safe areas, intelligence, knowl- movement making it difficult for the
known as the Guerrilla Division of the edge of the terrain and the support of partisans to garner popular support;
8240th Army. Here, Malcom experi- the local population. However, this anyone who was not from the area was
enced the difficulties and hardships of was not the case for all UW operations easily identified and captured.
UW as well as its strategic utilities. In conducted in the North. One of the Regardless of the difficulties of
this memoir of his firsthand experi- most notably failed operations in the conducting UW, the intended strategic
ence of UW with the White Tigers, North is known as the Baker Section, objectives set by the U.S. Far Eastern
Malcom sheds light on this almost-for- which was a covert operation with the Command were met by countless
gotten chapter in the history of special mission of parachuting the partisans operations conducted by the partisans.
operations, in an effort to teach the and their American advisers deep in On the operational front, the NKPA
U.S. Army, not just special-operations enemy territories, establishing guerrilla doubled its strength in the partisan ar-
forces, what he learned about the chal- bases and collecting intelligence. How- eas of operations, forcing the enemy to
lenges of UW. ever, these operations resulted in heavy divert its resources and troops from the
Through Malcom’s journey with the casualties and failures. Malcom attri- front. On the intelligence front, vast
White Tigers, readers can appreciate butes their failures to the insertion of amounts of intelligence was collected
UW from the perspectives of guerril- partisans into areas of which they had by the partisans enabling the U.S. to
las who fought against well-organized no familiarity. These partisans did not target key areas for aerial bombings
and superiorly equipped conventional know the terrain and could not solicit and strategic exploitation. Thirty-one
forces. These perspectives reveal the support from the locals without being percent of the downed U.S. pilots were
hard realities of conducting UW and its exposed. Also, the effective North rescued by the partisans.

52 Special Warfare
 OPINION

IS CHINA A THREAT? BY MAJOR KIRK WINDMUELLER

F=ma (Force = mass x acceleration) — Second Law of Motion, Sir Isaac Newton
Even though China continues to emphasize its peaceful in- nese defense budget is averaging more than 10 percent a year,
tent, the current trajectory of its military growth and econom- while the U.S. defense budget is predicted to begin shrinking
ic expansion inevitably causes alarm. A host of internal and in the near future. Moreover, Chinese defense spending repre-
external drivers will pressure China in the coming years, so sents only 1.3 percent of its gross domestic product (compared
current intentions are a poor guide to predicting future actions to the U.S.’s 4.7 percent), thus suggesting much greater room
as China’s strategic environment evolves. China’s sovereignty for continued growth. 4
and territorial issues, as well as “mission-creep” concerning Concern about the economic and military rise of China is
its interests abroad, could create many friction points with the causing a reassessment of the U.S. National Security Strategy.
United States. Combined with an improving military capac- The latest Defense strategic guidance issued in January 2012
ity these friction points could create significant threats to U.S by the President and the Secretary of Defense calls for a pivot
military forces and regional interests. towards the Asia Pacific region as the U.S. military draws
down from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 5 That this
China’s “Mass” and “Acceleration” “rebalance” of effort is focused towards the most economically
While geographically China is roughly the size of the dynamic region in the world is hardly surprising. Growing
United States, it is the world’s most populous country with economic might combined with ambition is the foundation of
more than 1.34 billion people. To put it another way, one out power and power is what matters: F=ma.
of every five people on the planet is Chinese. In addition to its
sheer size, the International Monetary Fund’s “World Eco- Chinese vs. U.S. Military Power
nomic Output” from April 2011 predicts that China will over- There is much debate and analysis about China becoming a
take the U.S. as the world’s largest economy by 2016.1 While military threat to U.S. interests by achieving a “peer” or “near-
there is disagreement between economists on this forecast, peer” status with American military might. China is not likely
the quibbling is primarily over the date this happens, not if to be able to project significant military capability beyond its
this will happen. 2 As for military power, the People’s Libera- regional interests, nor to close the overall gap with American
tion Army is the largest in the world with an active force of 2.3 defense technology in the near to mid future. This, however,
million. Moreover, China’s Communist Party is currently pre- is not grounds for optimism. China can already exert signifi-
siding over the world’s largest military buildup and is rapidly cant military power in the Western Pacific region; an area of
modernizing its forces. 3 China already has the second largest strategic interest to the United States and home to a number of
defense budget in the world. While the U.S. defense spending important U.S. allies. As Chinese military capability improves
remains greater by a factor of nine, the growth rate of the Chi- and as it presses territorial claims and other interests in the

White Tigers continued from page 52

Conversely, Malcom states that more unconventional nature of the Vietnam the reality of today’s war speaks other-
could have been done by the partisans War. Exacerbating the matter, con- wise. The army as a whole is engaged in
if strategic utilities of UW and the ventional forces with limited training an unconventional war.
lessons learned from the successful on UW were used to fight an uncon- White Tigers is not an in-depth
operations of the OSS could have been ventional war. One can argue that the analysis of UW nor special operations
learned by the U.S. Army. Without an U.S. Army created the Special Forces but rather it is a memoir of a personal
understanding of UW, the U.S. Army units, learning from the previous wars; experience of special operations. It
failed to properly support the partisans however, Malcom’s emphasis on learn- provides enough history of SOF during
who constantly suffered from lack of ing the lessons of UW is not limited to the Korean War for general readers to
supplies, weapons, food, transporta- a select portion of the U.S. Army but comprehend the basic concepts of UW
tion, etc. He extends his argument it extends itself to the U.S. Army as a during the war and for Asia-Pacific
to the Vietnam War, stating that UW whole. SOF has come a long way, still oriented readers to further drill down
lessons learned in the Korean War were the concept of UW is yet to be under- on the details of UW in Asia-Pacific
not adopted by the U.S. Army. Malcom stood and accepted by everyone in the region. It is a straightforward read that
supports this argument stating that U.S. Army. There is a misconception is recommended to those interested in
the U.S. Army failed to recognize the that UW is reserved only for SOF, but UW during the Korean War.

July - September 2012 53

OPINION
area, its abilities in this region will only make the U.S.’s strate- over the Scarborough Shoal. Maritime claims concerning re-
gic position more difficult. sources in the South China Sea also mar China’s relations with
Those within the special-operations community are no Vietnam and the Philippines. China views these territorial
stranger to the concept of an asymmetric fight and an inferior disputes as a core interest, and will become increasingly asser-
force defeating a superior one. What matters is the relative tive in the air and maritime domain as it aggressively attempts
capabilities at a particular time and place. 6 China’s military to establish its perceived seabed rights on oil, gas and fisher-
modernization has been focused on exactly the kind of high ies. Finally, China is also committed to support its client state,
leverage capabilities needed to blunt America’s power projec- North Korea, on the Korean Peninsula. Since these situations
tion in the region. Their anti-access/area-denial approach are all geographically close to China and very distant from the
includes investing in capabilities such as a fleet of modern United States, our new strategy means the U.S. military will
submarines (conventional and nuclear-powered), modern jets be swimming in China’s lake, and the potential for military
with anti-ship missiles, thousands of land-based ballistic and miscalculations on both sides will be high.
cruise missiles, as well as cyber operations and anti-satellite
weapons systems designed to “blind” American forces.7 Problems within China
In addition to their acquisition of high-leverage technology, China’s rise depends on its ability to address a number of
China has a “first-strike” doctrine based on avoiding direct internal challenges. The country is, for example, managing
force-on-force confrontation with a superior adversary. In several separatist movements. Tibet is struggling for inde-
order to prevail, Chinese strategists believe they must use sur- pendence, and Uyghur separatists (ethnic Muslims in the

“ It is important to understand China’s drivers and challenges in

order for the U.S. to navigate the changing geopolitical landscape
over the coming decades.”
prise and a first blow against the U.S. military before allowing Xinjianc province of China) have been conducting a campaign
a complete deployment and buildup of forces. No principle is of violent attacks in their attempt at sovereignty, forcing the
more routinely emphasized in Chinese writing as the need for Chinese government to crack down on the Uyghurs in its own
the PLA to seize the initiative from the outset of the conflict in “War on Terror.” The threat of Islamic terrorism against China
the case of high-technology local war. 8 will only increase as China expands trade and influence in
This particularly applies to the Taiwan Strait and a potential Muslim countries where the potential for blowback against
invasion and occupation of Taiwan by mainland China. Dr. these practices is high.
Thomas J. Christensen, professor and director of the China More importantly, three decades of China’s One-Child
and the World Program at Princeton University states: Policy (implemented in 1979) has left the country a demo-
“If Beijing elites become convinced that relatively limited graphic mess. First created to alleviate overpopulation as well
military capabilities and coercive tactics might allow for the as social, economic and environmental problems, the One-
politically effective use of force against Taiwan and, if neces- Child Policy has had negative effects that may very well be
sary, American forces, then war between the United States and worse than the original problems it was intended to solve. One
China becomes a very real possibility.”9 such effect is an aging population with upside-down fam-
The combination of their anti-access technology and their ily trees, where four grandparents produce two parents and
preemptive doctrine could impede U.S. military responses to one grandchild (called the “4-2-1 Problem”). This places an
crises situations and could limit the locations from which U.S. increasing burden on the younger generation to care for their
forces can effectively operate. Unless we are willing to accept aging families. Another One-Child Policy side effect is an in-
more risk, this would force the U.S. to operate from locations crease in female infanticide and selective abortions as sons are
that are further from the conflict. culturally preferred over daughters to work farms and provide
financial support for the parents in retirement. This has left
China’s Territorial Disputes a massive gender imbalance; China now has 32 million more
While Taiwan’s independence may be the most pressing males than females under the age of 20.10 It is not entirely clear
territorial issue for China, many other disputes and potential what the social implications of this policy will be, but tens of
conflicts exists. The Chinese Communist Party and Japan millions of Chinese men will be unable to find a wife in their
contest sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands in the East China own country.
Sea. Likewise, China has territorial disputes with Vietnam Other issues, such as pollution and air quality, human
over the northeastern Spratly Islands and with the Philippines rights and treatment of political dissidents will put increas-

54 Special Warfare
 OPINION
ing pressure on the regime for reform. The wealth disparity construction. If you are afraid of war day in day out, what
between the poor, rural peasant class and the rich urban will you do if war eventually comes? First, I said that the East
elites will become more precarious as the “have-nots” be- Wind is prevailing over the West Wind and war will not break
come more aware of their situation relative to the “haves.” out, and now I have added these explanations about the situa-
Any challenges that threaten the CCP’s power and status tion in case war should break out. Both possibilities have thus
could lead to unpredictable and heavy-handed responses, been taken into account.”
both inside the country and externally to deflect attention — Mao Tse Tung, Speech at the Moscow Meeting of Commu-
from internal problems. Whether China is too big to fail, nist and Workers’ Parties (November 18, 1957), quoted in
or too big to succeed remains to be seen, but either scenario “Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government”
could produce equally sobering results. (September 1, 1963).
Between China and the U.S. there will be many friction
China, Imperialism and Global Presence points and conflicts of interest (as there tends to be between
Unlike the Soviet Union, China has no overt ambitions to
great powers). While the possibility of armed conflict will exist,
spread a competing ideology. China has a stake in the world
it is not inevitable. It is important to understand China’s drivers
economic order, and the CCP’s legitimacy depends on its abil-
and challenges in order for the U.S. to navigate the changing
ity to honor its promise of prosperity for the Chinese people.
With this in mind, current intentions are often poor predictors geopolitical landscape over the coming decades. The way China
of future behavior. pursues its interests, exerts global influence and deals with its
China’s continued economic growth will necessitate internal challenges will perplex U.S. foreign policy-makers and
expanding trade and investments and searching abroad for strategists in the coming years. However, instead of spending
new suppliers of raw materials, energy and food. This expan- an inordinate amount of effort attempting to interpret China’s
sion of interests will inevitably result in a reliance on cheap strategic intentions, time is better spent understanding China’s
external commodities to fuel their internal growth. But the rapidly evolving strategic environment. This is where China’s
problem with cheap commodities is that they are often located mass and acceleration will apply its force.
in places that are politically unstable, unreliable and are prone
MAJ Kirk Windmueller is a Special Forces officer and Army
to social unrest, insurgency, crime and other conditions that
Research Fellow at the RAND Arroyo Center in Santa Monica,
cause disruptions in supplies and price fluctuations. This will
CA. He is a graduate of the Citadel and the Naval Postgradu-
lead China to invest more in delivery systems (rail, ship and
ate School.
aircraft) and the necessary supporting infrastructure (roads,
railways, seaports and airports).
In many cases, they will also be compelled to help improve Notes
stability by offering aid, economic development and improv- 1. International Monetary Fund World Economic Outlook Data Mapper, April
ing governance in order to protect their investments with 2011 available online at www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php
their trading partners. China’s resource nations will turn 2. China’s per capita income for 2011 is $8400 (compared to $48,100 in the
into de facto protectorates. China will have to patrol expand- U.S) and is projected to remain low, which has significant implications for China’s
ing sea lanes with their navy (anti-piracy), and in extreme internal stability
situations, they will have to send in troops if local forces are 3. “The Dragon’s New Teeth,” The Economist, p. 27, April 7, 2012
insufficient to secure their investments. China could wake up 4. Statistics taken from the 2011 and 2012 editions of the “The Military Bal-
one morning and find that it is “doing empire duty” whether
ance,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
it wants to or not.
5. “Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,”
China already has an unfortunate stake in the preserva-
January 2012, available online at www.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strategic_
tion of regimes on the lower spectrum of the Failed States In-
Guidance.pdf
dex, including Chad, Sudan, Zimbabwe and the Democratic
6. Thomas J. Christensen, “Posing Problems without Catching Up: China’s Rise
Republic of the Congo.11 Economic commitments with other
and Challenges for U.S. Security Policy,” The MIT Press Journals, available online
unstable countries like Angola, Guinea and Turkmenistan
may have been a cheap date initially, but the economic and at http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals, p. 6-7.
political costs will continue to mount. One day you are look- 7. “Chinas Military Rise,” The Economist, p. 13, April 7, 2012
ing for people to trade with, the next day you are policing 8. Cliff, Roger, Mark Burles, Michael S. Chase, Derek Eaton, and Kevin L.
third-world basket cases. China’s behavior in the future will Pollpeter, Entering the Dragon’s Lair, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation,
change out of necessity. 2007, pp. 28-29.
9. Christensen, p.10
China and the US: Navigating the Way Ahead 10. Teri Schure, “China’s Gender Imbalance,” January 6, 2011, available online
“We desire peace. However, if imperialism insists on fight- at http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/3676.cfm
ing a war, we will have no alternative but to take the firm 11. Ely Ratner, “The Emergent Security Threats Reshaping China’s Rise,” Winter
resolution to fight to the finish before going ahead with our 2011, The Washington Quarterly, p. 32

July - September 2012 55

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