01 2019

CONTENTS JANUARY - MARCH 2019
VOLUME 32 | ISSUE 1 ON THE COVER

In 2018, the Psychological Operations
ARTICLES Regiment turned 100. In celebration

of that milestone, we put together
10 | Robert Alexis McClure: Forgotten Father of an issue that pays homage to the
Army Special Warfare
past, but more importantly looks to
16 | Black Knights: Back from the Brink the future of the Black Knights of the
PSYOP Regiment.
20 | What Should PSYOP Do Next?
25 | The Next Century of PSYOP
32 | A Mission of Attrition
DEPARTMENTS
16
FROM THE COMMANDANT______ 04
DOCTRINE UPDATE___________ 05
BOOK REVIEW_______________ 39
10 25
32
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“In this war, which
was total in every
from the sense of the word, we

have seen many great
COMMANDANT changes in military
science. It seems to
The John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center has significant ties to the
me that not the least
Psychological Operations Regiment. In 1950, the U.S. Army developed the
of these was the
Psychological Warfare Division of the Army General School at Fort Riley,
development of
Kansas. Two short years later, in April 1952, the PSYWAR training activities were
psychological warfare
transferred to Smoke Bomb Hill at Fort Bragg, as the PSYWAR Center, and in
as a specific and
1956 it was renamed the Special Warfare School. As an institution, the art of
effective weapon.”
PSYOP is one of our cornerstones. — General of the Army,
Dwight D. Eisenhower
The Psychological Operations Regiment celebrated its 100th birthday this
past fall. In this issue, we are looking at not only the history of the PSYOP
Regiment, but also at its future. Of note, is an article we republished from an
earlier Special Warfare that pays tribute to the "Father of Psychological
Operations," Major General Robert McClure. Not only did McClure build the
PSYOP Regiment, he also promoted the use of Civil Affairs and Special Forces,
“selling” the need for an unconventional warfare capability to senior military
and civilian leaders at that time. Even though he faced fierce resistance to the
idea of unconventional warfare he kept pushing. The connection between our
regiments is strong and the historic ties that bind us together can be traced
directly back to the Psychological Operations Regiment.
KURT L. SONNTAG
MAJOR GENERAL, USA
COMMANDING GENERAL
04 Special warfare | HTTPS://WWW.SOC.MIL/SWCS/SWMAG/SWMAG.HTM

[ DOCTRINE UPDATE ]
PSYOP TECHNICAL MANUAL SERIES TO ADDRESS
THE COMPLEXITY OF INFLUENCE BY PATRICK C. MCKINNEY
Lessons learned from military opera-
tions over the past decade and extensive
dialog with the community of interest
identified challenges critical to U.S. Army
and Joint Psychological Operations Forces
in the conduct and assessment of Informa-
tion Operations. The PSYOP Commandant
directed an explorative doctrine review
and concurrent review of lessons learned
to identify gaps and proximate causes for
an inability to adequately assess and report
IO effectiveness. 01 This in-depth critical re-
view resulted in the defining of core tasks
required to accomplish PSYOP, develop-
ment of the Hierarchy of Psychological
Effects Model, a more robust approach to
target audience analysis, and a new ap-
proach to measuring effects attributable to 01
PSYOP efforts. rather by analysis of target audience com- 01
munication preferences and the defined The knight chess piece, part
CATALYST FOR CHANGE desired behavior. of the Psychological Opera-
Initial reviews of IO challenges con- tions branch insignia, is a
traditional symbol of special
ducted by the Psychological Operations PSYOP CORE TASK TECHNICAL operations and signifies the
Commandant’s Office, Doctrine Divi-
MANUAL SERIES ability to influence all types
sion, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special
The review of doctrine resulted in of warfare. Psychological
Warfare Center and School focused on an
a complete revision of the Army’s key- Operations soldiers are
inability to assess effectiveness attributed often referred to as "Black
stone PSYOP manual (Field Manual 3-53,
to PSYOP efforts, with the initial assump- Knights," which embodies
Change 1, 2013) and significant changes
tion that assessment practices were the the complexity and strategy
to the authoritative document for joint of their profession. U.S. NAVY
root cause of PSYOP assessment failures.
psychological operations (Joint Publication PHOTO BY MASS COMMUNICA-
The exploratory research suggested that
3-13.2, 2014). To better describe the pro- TION SPECIALIST 3RD CLASS
the narrow scope of assessment failures
did not adequately define the problem. cess by which practitioners plan, execute GITTE SCHIRRMACHER
Assessment challenges were discovered and assess IO, the decision was made to
to be decidedly an outcome of the broader revise the previous tactics, techniques
problem which is found in the processes and procedures manual into a series of
and practices of how PSYOP are planned technical manuals (for each of the PSYOP
and executed with an inadequate ap- core tasks of analyze, advise, plan, develop,
proach to target audience analysis. deliver and assess. This expansion into a TM
Further, research concluded that cur- series allows for more comprehensive and
rent doctrine did not adequately address detailed descriptions of each task and the
the dynamics of computer mediated overall execution of IO.
communication or multi-channel delivery The PSYOP Core Task Technical
consistent with a single thread narrative. Manual Series incorporates the outcomes
Communicative influence practices must of explorative research and provides
be consistent with target audience media detailed techniques and procedures for
consumption practices and expectations. six core tasks that, in their whole, enable
Media type and channel selection can- the conduct of PSYOP by PSYOP forces.
not be driven by what is most familiar or Each TM in the core task series provides
readily accessible to PSYOP soldiers, but unique content, however the TMs are
JANUARY - MARCH 2019 | special warfare 05

[ DOCTRINE UPDATE ]
MISO interconnected and codependent. TM 53-01, PSYOP
Process, provides an overview and summary of the
though the HPEM is progressive in nature a TA will
likely both progress and digress along the continuum
TECHNICAL interconnectivity between the TMs and higher as the information environment changes.
MANUAL echelon publications. The remaining TMs address Initial assessments determine the step that most
each of the PSYOP Core Tasks: TM 53-01.1, Analyze;
SERIES TM 53-01.2, Advise; TM 53-01.3, Plan; TM 53-01.4,
precisely describes the target audience’s present state,
and assist the PSYOP planner in more accurately direct-
continued from page 05
Develop; TM 53-01.5, Deliver; TM 53-01.6, Assess. ing efforts. Linear models are generally found to account
Note: Initially, analysis was to be nested within the well for psychological data, even when generated from
TM for plan. Research, however, exposed significant gaps multiple sources.07 Initial assessment accuracy is solely
in target audience analysis and specific inadequacies in dependent on the quality of target audience analysis.
the outcome product of TAA in terms of what is required
to accomplish the other PSYOP core tasks. For this reason, TARGET AUDIENCE ANALYSIS REVISITED
Analyze was added as a separate TM in the core task series. Conducting PSYOP is dependent on proficiency
in six core tasks; analyze, advise, plan, develop,
HIERARCHY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS deliver and assess. Of the core tasks, analyze is the
MODEL DEVELOPED one that enables the rest. Analysis, like planning
Following a review of doctrine, practices and and assessment, is a continual process that affects
communicative influence theories, the PSYOP Com- the accuracy and efficiency of all influence activi-
mandant’s Doctrine Division developed a hierarchy ties. Analysis of a particular operational area should
of psychological effects model and formulations be ongoing regardless of whether or not a specific
adapted from expectancy value theory, 02 the exten- program currently exists.
sion of expectancy value theory to include media TM 53-01.1, Information Operations Core Task:
uses and gratification, 03 and the theory of reasoned Analyze establishes techniques and procedures for
action 04 which expands EVT to include a greater em- PSYOP forces conducting analysis of foreign target
phasis on behavior intentions and perceived behav- audiences in relation to commander’s objectives
ioral control. and supporting PSYOP objectives. Analysis pro-
The hierarchy of psychological effects model com- vides requisite information for planners to develop,
plements the seven phase PSYOP process by introduc- deliver and assess series. Series focus on a single
ing a logical framework for PSYOP procedures and desired behavior and TA combination in support
assessments that consider awareness, understanding, of a PSYOP objective. Multiple series support the
attitude, preference, intent and ultimately behavior. This achievement of each PSYOP objective. Multiple
logical HPEM framework enables series of actions PSYOP objectives support a PSYOP program. Analy-
and messages to be tailored to address progressive sis further enables informed advice and increases
intermediate steps between initial assessment and behavior forecast accuracy.
the achievement of the desired behavior. This model An example of how analysis is expanded in the
further shifts the practices of PSYOP away from TM, to make the available material more robust for
more narrowly scoped marketing and sales models, the operational force, is found in the discussion of TA
towards applications consistent with socio-scientific susceptibility and preparing for shaping of the envi-
approaches of communicative efforts to influence ronment. Susceptibility is the likelihood that the TA
broader population behaviors. will be open to influence toward a desired behavior.
The implementation of the hierarchy of psychologi- Initial degree of susceptibility determinations assists
cal effects model is objective behavior-focused through in developing series to shape optimum susceptibil-
each step, and relies heavily on continuous analysis and ity conditions by targeting beliefs, valence toward a
evaluation of conditions. Figure 01 depicts the steps of likely behavior outcome, and perceived credibility.
the hierarchy of psychological effects model applied to This shaping of the environment in support of the
a series toward a PSYOP objective. commander’s objectives ensures greater precision in
The hierarchy of psychological effects model is the PSYOP effort.
linear and progressive in nature, taking into account One of the challenges identified during the research
that a target audience will generally have to meet for developing the TM Series was that of accuracy
thresholds determined by the PSYOP planner in one expectations during various phases of an operation.
step prior to a reasonable expectation of the target PSYOP Forces provide commanders with forecasts
audience achieving subsequent steps.05 For example, of likely TA behavior resulting from various changes
without the target audience having understanding to the TA’s environment. Forecast accuracy increases
and awareness of a desired behavior, the expecta- over time as the analyst gains understanding of the
tion of preferring one behavior over another may be environment and the target audiences. When making
unreasonable. 06 It is important to note, however, that recommendations it is important to convey the current

level of uncertainty and expected level of accuracy. the behavior. Actions and messages that present a de-
Increased accuracy over time is referred to as a cone sired behavior consistent with the TA’s currently held
of uncertainty. Probability estimates may initially be beliefs and values are said to be close to the TA’s an-
based on limited data points and high uncertainty, chor, or within their latitude of acceptance. A desired
but continuing operations will allow for observation behavior that is far from the TA’s anchor is within
and forecast refinements as uncertainty decreases. their latitude of rejection. Between acceptance and
Accuracy over time is where the mutually dependent rejection is a neutral zone of non-commitment where
relationship between analysis and assessment is most the TA is not completely accepting of the behavior but
apparent. Assessment accuracy depends on quality does not outright reject it.
analysis and assessment results provide additional When a desired behavior is inconsistent with
data which enhance analysis. Figure 03 (page 08) a TA’s anchor, a well-planned series will gradually
depicts an applied cone of uncertainty model. move the TA away from their anchor and reinforce
Another area expanded is related to the under- beliefs and values that are consistent with the DB.
standing of the TA’s latitude of acceptance and how This gradual change is accomplished by increas-
PSYOP planners, with greater understanding of a TA’s ingly targeting the non-commitment neutral zone
beliefs and values as related to a desired behavior, can of the TA’s latitude of acceptance with intermediate
target with greater precision. Latitude of acceptance objectives. Series developers and planners deter-
refers to the consistency of a behavior in relation the mine where along this latitude is best for targeting
TA’s beliefs and values anchor. This latitude extends a specific TA. Targeting closer to the latitude of
from acceptance, to non-commitment, to rejection of acceptance may be used to build rapport or increase
FIGURE 01: HIERARCHY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS MODEL

COMMANDER’S OBJECTIVES
Toward MISO Objective
PO(A) PO(U) PO(S) PO(P) PO(I) PO(B)

Awareness Understanding Sentiment Preference Intention Behavior
TA Progression
FIGURE 01 Hierarchy of
Psychological Effects
Model. Depicts the steps of
the hierarchy of the
psychological effects model
Continuum of Psychological Effects Toward Desired Behavior Achievement applied to series toward an
objective.
FIGURE 02 Hierarchy of
FIGURE 02: HIERARCHY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS MODEL (MULTIPLE SERIES) Psychological Effects
Model - Multiple Series.
COMMANDER’S OBJECTIVES Depicts multiple series and
objectives that are collectively
PO(A) PO(U) PO(S) PO(P) PO(I) PO(B) a PSYOP program.
Awareness Understanding Sentiment Preference Intention Behavior
Multiple Series and Objectives
LEGEND
MISO Objective
Desired Behavior
(DB)
Target Audience
(TA)
Series
Threshold
Psychological
Objective (PO)
Supporting
Psychological
Continuum of Psychological Effects Toward Desired Behavior Achievement Objective (SPO)

[ DOCTRINE UPDATE ]
MISO trust and credibility, but since it is where the TA cur-
rently resides cognitively and behaviorally, there will
at preference, intent and behavior. A premature as-
sessment of valance may result in invalid measures of
TECHNICAL be little or no behavior change. Targeting too close an audience’s favorability towards a likely outcome. In
MANUAL to the TA’s latitude of rejection will also likely end in other words, the PSYOP practitioner cannot expect an
no behavior change. Figure 04 depicts the preferred audience to have a stable valance towards an object to
SERIES target range for PSYOP actions and messages. which they are only partially aware.
continued from page 07
Attributable MOE is the ability to evaluate degrees It is important to note that audiences are suscep-
to which a causal link can be drawn between a behavior tible to messages and influences other than those
and the antecedents leading to that behavior. For this delivered as part of the PSYOP effort; therefore this
causal analysis to occur there needs to be a mechanism formulation may assist in not only assessing and re-
in place which specifies which factors are to be mea- fining PSYOP efforts, but also in determining degrees
sured. PSYOP practitioners must employ both art and of external influence, and in assessing measures of
science in determining attribution of effect as evalua- effectiveness attributable to PSYOP efforts.
tions rely on both objective data and the more subjective Degree of susceptibility is equal to the sum total
estimations rendered through experience and intuition. of beliefs (r) held by the TA related to the message or
objective + the evaluated strength of beliefs (Bi ) + the
DEGREES OF SUSCEPTIBILITY FORMULATION evaluated valence, or perceived degree of favorabil-
The following section will discuss in detail a pro- ity, towards the likely outcome (Vi ) + the evaluated
posed degrees of susceptibility formulation adapted perceived credibility of the message or message source
from the formulations of expectancy value theory,08 (Ci ) and divided by the number of all beliefs related
the extension of this formulation to apply expec- to the PSYOP message or external influences (Nr )
tancy value theory to media 09 and the requirements times nine, as three is the highest possible evaluation
of central route processing per elaboration likelihood of each of the three variables.
model.10 Susceptibility of a message is dependent Note: Evaluations of variables are based on PSYOP
on the TA’s motivation and ability to process infor- assessments of the target audience.
mation, followed by the TA’s associated beliefs or • Number of Related Beliefs (Nr )
perceived favorability of outcome towards the mes-
• Beliefs (Bi ) evaluated: 3 strong, 2 neutral, 1 weak
sage, and their perceived credibility of the attributed
• Valence (Vi ) evaluated: 3 positive, 2 neutral, 1 adverse
source of the message.11
If the TA does not have an adequate schema to • Credibility (Ci ) evaluated: 3 high, 2 medium, 1 low
N
which they can associate new information, they will
not likely perceive relevance or value, and will there-
DS = ∑r + Bi + Vi + Ci ÷ 9 (Nr )
fore lack motivation to elaborate.12 In this series, sol- Assessing the likely degree of susceptibility of
diers must ensure that steps of awareness, understand- a series and all known external influences allows
ing and attitude have been achieved by the TA prior to PSYOP planners to more accurately forecast attitude
assessing the TA’s valance towards messages directed change that is predictive of behavior, thereby en-
abling increased accuracy in the advising of com-
FIGURE 03: APPLIED CONE OF UNCERTAINTY MODEL manders. The estimation of susceptibility enables
planners to develop series that target specific
variables of susceptibility. For example, if a positive
Beh correlation is determined between ineffective PSYOP
avio
r Prob efforts and credibility, then the planner may decide
abil
it y F
U ore c
ast A
to change the delivery means or the source attributed
N Analysis ccu r to the message to increase credibility of the PSYOP
C ac y
effort, while simultaneously delivering messages and
E
R executing actions to degrade the credibility of an
T Reporting Operations external influence.
A
I DEGREES OF SUSCEPTIBILITY AND MEASURES
N OF EFFECTIVENESS
Assessment
T
ac y Once degrees of susceptibility are established for
Y
dA ccur
r o ve both the PSYOP series and external influence efforts,
Imp
they can assist in determining whether or not assessed
changes in the target audience can be more or less at-
tributed to PSYOP efforts or external influences. This
Operations Over Time
attribution would be dependent on which message(s) or

FIGURE 04: MOVING BEYOND ALL-OR-NONE MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS (MOE)
Latitude of Acceptance
Behavior Change
Target Range
Acceptance Non-Commitment Rejection
Discrepancy between Anchor and Desired Behavior
action(s) likely had the greater influence based on the ence. To overcome barriers of innumerable variables the
assessed degree of susceptibility of the target audience. PSYOP soldier requires doctrine that provides methods
The likely degrees of attribution when report- and practices to ensure the greatest level of accuracy and
ing measures of effectiveness can be evaluated by efficiency, distill the most salient factors, and determine
subtracting the degree of susceptibility of external TA’s most capable of achieving desired behaviors toward
influences from the degree of susceptibility of PSYOP PSYOP objective accomplishment.
influence efforts. MOE (A): Measures of Effectiveness The PSYOP Core Task TM Series does more than
(Attribution) Ie: PSYOP Influence Effort repackage previously developed doctrine. This series
• Ex: External Influences expands the base of applied behavioral and commu-
• DS: Degree of Susceptibility nicative science, provides more granular detail and
MOE(A)= Ie(DS) – Ex(DS) needed clarity, and addresses topics of development
and delivery related to the new media age of computer
The DS formulation gives a more objective means
mediated communications.
of assessing the change in relationship to both PSYOP
The PSYOP Commandant’s Office actively solicits
and external influences. Measures of PSYOP effective-
ness have been historically discussed as an all or none input from the community of interest as we continue
proposition. If assessments could not solely attribute be- to refine, expand and increase the relevance of the
havior change to PSYOP efforts then the change was not total body of materials available to our PSYOP Force.
attributed to PSYOP. Once change in the TA is assessed, Comments and questions can be addressed to the
and DS calculations are complete, it can be attributed to author at [email protected] SW
PSYOP efforts to varying degrees even if external influ-
ences had a greater effect. ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Mr. Patrick McKinney, U.S. Army MSG (Ret), holds a Master
CONCLUSION of Arts Degree in Strategic Communications and is cur-
PSYOP efforts require approaches as current and dy- rently serving as a Doctrine Developer/Analyst for the
namic as the information environment in which they are PSYOP Commandant’s Office. He served as a Senior PSYOP
employed. PSYOP Soldiers operate in an environment NCO and Planner with operational deployments in Kosovo
that is never static and as complex as the human experi- and the Middle East.
NOTES 01. PSYOP Commandant's Office. (2015). Consolidated report of proximate causes of assessment shortfalls. Fort Bragg, NC: USAJFKSWCS. 02. Fishbein, M., & Azjen, I.
(1980). Understanding attitudes and predicting social behavior. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 03. Palmgreen, P. (1984). Uses and gratifications: A theoretical perspective.
In R. N. Bostrom (Ed.), Communication Yearbook (8 ed., pp. 20-55). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 04. Azjen, I. (2000). Theory of Reasoned Action. In Encyclopedia of Psychology (Vol. VIII).
Washington, DC; New York, NY: American Psychological Association. Retrieved April 29, 2015, from PsychBOOKS, EBSCOhost. 05. Hailikari, T., Katajavuori, N., & Lindblom-Ylanne, S.
(2008, October 15). The relevance of prior knowledge in learning and instructional design. American jouranl of pharmaceutical education, 72(5), 113. 06. Berger, C. R. (1997). Planning
strategic interaction: Attaining goals through communicative action. London: Routledge. 07. Busemeyer, J., & Jones, L. (1983). Analysis of multiplicative combination rules when
the causal variables are measured with error. Psychological Bulletin, 549-859. 08. Ibid, 01. 09. Ibid, 02. 10. Petty, R., & Cacioppo, J. (1986). Attitudes and persuasion: Central and
peripheral routes to attitude change. New York: Springer-Verlag. 11. Petty, R., & Cacioppo, J. (1986). The elaboration likelihood model of persuasion. Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 19, 123-205. 12. Wilson, B., & Cole, P. (1992).

ROBERT ALEXIS McCLURE
FORGOTTEN FATHER OF ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE
BY DR. ALFRED H. PADDOCK JR.
Editor's note: This article originally appeared in the Fall 1999 issue of Special Warfare.
Where is the monument to honor the man who "We operate 12 high powered radio stations — 6 of them are
provided the vision and the impetus for establishing U.S. stronger than WLW in Cincinnati. My Psychological Warfare
Army special warfare? Most special operations soldiers staff — radio, leaflet, signals, front line, occupation, domestic
are unfamiliar with his name. Robert Alexis McClure is propaganda personnel, exceed 700. In censorship — troop, mail,
the forgotten father of Army special warfare. and cables, civilian mail, radio, press, cables, telephone for all of
McClure was born March 4, 1897, in Mattoon, Illinois, North & West Africa, Sicily, etc., over 400 personnel & supervis-
After graduating from Kentucky Military Institute in 1915, ing 700 French. Public relations — press and correspondents —
he served with the Philippine Constabulary as a second 150 correspondents — 250 personnel — a total “command” of
lieutenant. On Aug. 9, 1917, he earned a Regular Army 1500 in an organization never contemplated in the Army."
commission and was promoted to first lieutenant. From By the end of the North African and Sicilian cam-
then, until the eve of World War II, he served in a variety paigns, McClure believed that psychological warfare had
of Infantry and service-school assignments in China and in become, for him, the “big job,” and he felt good about its
the United States. During the interwar years, McClure, like contribution: “Our propaganda did a lot to break the en-
other career officers, found promotion excruciatingly slow: emy — as their emissaries admit — now we have to turn
he served in the rank of captain for 17 years. it on the Germans,” he wrote to Marjory. But the “big job”
By 1941, however, McClure was a lieutenant colonel with was to become even bigger.
orders to London, where he was to serve as the assistant In early 1944, General Eisenhower authorized the
military attaché. In swift succession, he earned promotions establishment of the Psychological Warfare Division of the
to colonel and brigadier general, and he became the military Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force, or PWD/
attaché to the American Embassy in London. As an addi- SHAEF, to support the European campaign against Nazi Ger-
tional duty, he served as military attaché to nine European many. McClure, as its director, controlled and coordinated
governments in exile. In September 1942, General Dwight psychological warfare in continental Europe. For years after-
D. Eisenhower appointed McClure to his Allied Forces head- ward, he emphasized that PWD was built upon the trial-and-
quarters as Chief of Intelligence for the European theater of error experience of his ordeal in starting up and running INC
operations. During the next three months, McClure’s career in North Africa — in particular, the Psychological Warfare
took a new direction — one that would immerse McClure in Branch. In North Africa and in Europe, McClure’s definition
a new and different field for most of the rest of his life. of psychological warfare was quite concise, yet inclusive,
In December 1942, from “somewhere in Africa,” by today’s standards: “The dissemination of propaganda
McClure wrote to his wife, Marjory: “My new job — for designed to undermine the enemy’s will to resist, demoralize
which I was called by Ike — very hurriedly — is a con- his forces and sustain the morale of our supporters.”
tinual headache — I have what I call the INC Section — I In Europe, PWD made radio broadcasts from OWI
am just creating it.” In preparation for the North African transmitters and over the British Broadcasting Corporation;
landings, Eisenhower had put McClure in charge of the conducted loudspeaker broadcasts on the front lines; and
Information and Censorship Section, or INC, of the Allied conducted large-scale leaflet operations using specially des-
Forces headquarters. It was McClure’s job to consolidate ignated aircraft squadrons. PWD even provided leaflets to
several functions for which most Army officers had little be dispersed by the then-novel method of specially designed
preparation: public relations, censorship and psychologi- artillery shells. McClure had four deputies, each represent-
cal warfare. As McClure colorfully stated, the job also ing a civilian agency that contributed personnel to PWD:
carried with it a “slop over into Civil Affairs.” OWI, OSS, PWE and the British Ministry of Information. By
The INC was, indeed, an ungainly organization that the end of the war in Europe, PWD controlled the activities
included military and civilian personnel from the U.S. of more than 2,300 military and civilian personnel from
Office of War Information; the U.S. Office of Strategic two countries. As he had in the North African and Italian
Services; the British Political Warfare Executive; and the campaigns, McClure demonstrated his ability to manage
U.S. Army. McClure vividly outlined the scope of his new personnel of quite different backgrounds and tempera-
responsibilities in a September 1943 letter to Marjory: ments. It was one of his most successful leadership traits.

ROBERT ALEXIS McCLURE: FORGOT TEN FATHER OF ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE
But even after V-E day, McClure’s job was far from fin-
PSYOP ISSUE
ished. Eisenhower once again called upon McClure, directing

him to participate in planning for the occupation of Ger-
many. McClure jubilantly wrote to Marjory on May 8, 1945:
The shooting war is over, here! Signed yesterday. Paris is wild
with excitement. … With one phase over I am now up to my neck
on the control phase. We will rigidly control all newspapers, films,
theatre, radio, music, etc., in Germany! My division now pub-
lishes 8 newspapers in Germany with 1,000,000 circulation and
sends 2 million+ language papers each day by air for displaced
persons and POWs. Biggest newspaper enterprise in the world.
Essentially, McClure’s Psychological Warfare Divi-
sion changed names, becoming the Information Control
Division, which took on a new role as a key player in the
reorientation and de-Nazification of Germany. The change
was not totally abrupt — during the combat phase PWD
worked closely in support of Civil Affairs with its “consoli-
dation propaganda,” the purpose of which was both to gain
the cooperation of the German population in restoring es-
sential services, and to create a public opinion favorable to
post-war Allied aims. The division became an integral part
of the U.S. military-government (or Civil Affairs) effort in
the U.S. portion of occupied Germany. McClure reported to
General Lucius D. Clay, the U.S. military governor.
The reorientation of the German population was a for-
midable task. McClure undertook it in three phases: first,
the complete shutdown of all media; second, operation by
U.S. forces of selected instruments of information (radio,
newspapers, etc.); and, third, a gradual turnover of these
instruments, by licensing them to carefully selected Ger- 01
mans. McClure’s aims were to cause individual Germans
controlled all military government in occupied areas. As he
to renounce Nazism and militarism, and to help them take
their place in a democratic society. McClure’s ICD orga- had done in his previous assignment in Germany, McClure
nization mirrored the German media, with five “control” organized the New York field office into sections for press,
branches for radio, press, film, theater and music, and pub- periodicals, motion pictures, radio, theater, music, arts,
lications. A sixth branch, intelligence, focused on public- exhibits, libraries and book rights.
opinion research, with emphasis on German bureaucracies, There was, however, another aspect of McClure’s
youth and the church. ICD had a wide-ranging charter, activities during the postwar period that would prove
indeed, as McClure wrote to his friend and vice-president important to the future of Army special warfare. After
of Time-Life, Inc., C.D. Jackson, in July 1946: the massive demobilization of U.S. military forces during
"We now control 37 newspapers, six radio stations, 314 1945-1946, American concerns about the Soviet Union’s
theatres, 642 movies, 101 magazines, 237 book publishers, intentions grew in intensity, ushering in the Cold War.
7,384 book dealers and printers, and conduct about 15 public For four years, McClure engaged in a dialogue with a
opinion surveys a month, as well as publish one newspaper number of high-ranking officers and civilian officials in
with 1,500,000 circulation, three magazines, run the Associ- an effort to rebuild the military psychological-warfare
ated Press of Germany, and operate 20 library centers. … The capability that had essentially been dissipated during the
job is tremendous." general demobilization. In a letter to the War Department
In the summer of 1948, the Army decided that Mc- in early 1946, McClure advocated the integration of mate-
Clure’s experience could best be used in a similar assign- rial on psychological warfare into service-school curricula,
ment in the U.S. As chief of the New York field office of the stating, “The ignorance, among military personnel, about
Army’s Civil Affairs Division, McClure was responsible for psychological warfare, even now, is astounding.” In June
supporting U.S. reorientation and re-education efforts in 1947, McClure sent a memo to his old boss from World War
the occupied countries of Germany, Austria, Japan and II —now Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower — urging,
Korea. He reported to Major General Daniel Noce, chief “Psychological warfare must become a part of every future
of Civil Affairs in the Pentagon, whose office serviced and war plan.” In November of that year, McClure gave Eisen-
In June 1947, McClure sent a memo to his old boss from World War II —
now Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower — urging, “Psychological
warfare must become a part of every future war plan.”
01
Robert A. McClure as a cadet at
the Kentucky Military Institute in
December 1912.
02
General Dwight D. Eisenhower
presents the Distinguished Service
Medal to Brig. Gen. McClure in
1944. The award recognized
McClure's accomplishments as
chief of psychological warfare,
Supreme Headquarters, Allied
Expeditionary Force.
PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE

USASOC HISTORY OFFICE
02
hower a list of former PWD/SHAEF staff members that he started out with a staff of only five men, that number
recommended for forming a psychological-warfare reserve. eventually grew to more than 100.
McClure continued his correspondence, consultations OCPW’s mission was “to formulate and develop
and exhortations with the War Department, but it was not psychological warfare and special operations plans for
until the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June the Army in consonance with established policy and to
1950 that his efforts bore fruit. Shortly after that shock- recommend policies for and supervise the execution of
ing event, Maj. Gen. Charles Bolte, the Army Staff G3, Department of the Army programs in these fields.” Mc-
requested that McClure report to Washington for a few Clure organized his office into three divisions: Psychologi-
days to help him determine, with respect to psychological cal Warfare, Requirements and Special Operations. The
warfare, “the further organizational steps necessary to latter was particularly significant, because it formulated
meet the operational requirements of the Korean situa- plans for the creation of the Army’s first formal uncon-
tion or of a general war.” The latter contingency was key: ventional-warfare capability: Special Forces.
Even during the Far East crisis, the Army believed that Realizing that his firsthand experience was basically in
the greater threat lay in a potential invasion of Western psychological warfare and Civil Affairs, McClure told his
Europe by the Soviet Union, and it wanted to create an staff early on that he was “fighting for officers with back-
unconventional-warfare capability primarily for the con- ground and experience in special operations.” He brought
duct of guerrilla warfare in Europe in the event of a Soviet into the Special Operations Division several officers who
invasion. Bolte added, “I know of no one better qualified had World War II or Korean War experience either in guer-
to assist us in that respect.” For McClure, “a few days,” rilla warfare or in long-range-penetration units.
became the formative years of Army special warfare. Two officers who played particularly key roles in
On the basis of McClure’s recommendations, the developing the plans for the creation of Special Forces
Army first established a psychological-warfare division in were Col. Aaron Bank and Lt. Col. Russell Volckmann.
the G3, with McClure as its first chief, and then made it Bank had fought with the French Maquis as a member of
a special staff office reporting directly to the Army chief OSS. Volckmann had organized and conducted guerrilla-
of staff. Because of his association with the OSS dur- warfare operations in the Philippines during World War
ing World War II, McClure appreciated the potential of II; during the Korean War, he had planned and directed
unconventional warfare, and he lobbied for, and received, behind-the-lines operations in North Korea.
staff proponency for UW as well. On Jan. 15, 1951, the Volckmann later remembered that McClure had ap-
Army formally recognized the Office of the Chief of proached him in Walter Reed Hospital (where Volckmann
Psychological Warfare, or OCPW — the first organization had been evacuated from Korea) with a request to help
of its type in Army history. Although McClure’s new office organize the Special Operations Division. It was only

ROBERT ALEXIS McCLURE: FORGOT TEN FATHER OF ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE
after being assured that the Army was interested in orga-

PSYOP ISSUE
nized behind-the-lines operations that Volckmann agreed

to take the job. Bank later gave Volckmann considerable
credit for the “development of position, planning and
policy papers that helped sell the establishment of Special
Forces units in the active Army.”
McClure assumed a leading role in “selling” the need for
an unconventional-warfare capability to the senior mili-
tary and civilian leadership. In the face of fierce resistance,
not only within the Army but also from the CIA, Special
Forces became a reality largely through the persistence of
McClure and through the efforts of Bank and Volckmann.
With personnel spaces available from disbanding the Rang-
er companies in Korea, the Army chief of staff approved
the activation of Special Forces in early 1952.
Creating an unconventional-warfare capability was
not the only challenge on OCPW’s plate. When the Korean
War broke out in June 1950, the Tactical Information
Detachment at Fort Riley, Kansas, was the only opera-
tional psychological-warfare troop unit in the Army. After
its deployment to Korea, the detachment became the 1st
Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company, and it served as the
8th Army’s tactical-propaganda unit throughout the con-
flict. By April 1951, McClure had requested the activation 01
of the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group to assist
board (to test materiel, doctrine, techniques and tactics
the Far East Command, in conducting strategic propa-
for psychological warfare and for Special Forces), and
ganda; the 2nd L&L company at Fort Riley, a prototype
the 10th Special Forces Group. Colonel Charles Karlstad,
unit; the 5th L&L Company at Fort Riley, scheduled to be
sent to FECOM); and the 301st (Reserve) RB&L Group, former chief of staff of the Infantry Center at Fort Ben-
to be trained at Fort Riley and then shipped to Europe. ning, Georgia, was the first to serve as commander of the
Thus, while he was in the process of staffing his own Center and Commandant of the Psychological Warfare
unprecedented office —OCPW — McClure moved quickly School. The Psychological Warfare School’s organization
to assist FECOM in its organization and conduct of both reflected the Center’s mission. It consisted of a head-
psychological warfare and unconventional warfare, while quarters staff and two instructional divisions — one for
he concurrently helped the European Command prepare psychological warfare, the other for Special Forces.
for the employment of both capabilities in the event of a Initially, the 6th RB&L Group was the largest unit in
war with the Soviet Union. the center’s force structure. Formed at Fort Riley and then
One other part of McClure’s vision remained to be shipped to Fort Bragg in June 1952, the 6th consisted of
accomplished — centralizing the functions of what he a headquarters company, the 7th Reproduction Company,
called, “the whole field of OCPW.” Psychological warfare the 8th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company and the 2nd
possessed a formal lineage and a tradition in the Army, L&L Company. In May 1953, OCPW activated the 12th
which unconventional warfare did not, and McClure be- Consolidation Company under the 6th RB&L Group. The
lieved that the two capabilities should be combined under organizational concept of the 6th RB&L Group, the fore-
a single headquarters. runner of today’s psychological operations group, was first
During that period of postwar budgetary austerity, Mc- employed in Korea. The ancestry of the mobile radio com-
Clure encountered considerable resistance to this idea, but pany, however, can be traced to McClure’s PWD/SHAEF,
01 he was able to convince the Army chief of staff, General J. which used several such companies to support frontline
As a brigadier Lawton Collins, that a central organization was necessary combat forces in Europe during World War II.
general, McClure for consolidating the training activities for psychological McClure selected Col. Bank from the OCPW staff to
was assigned as command the 10th Special Forces Group. Bank’s “com-
warfare and Special Forces. Accordingly, in May 1952, the
military attache mand” in June 1952 consisted of seven enlisted men and
Army formally announced the activation of the Psycho-
to the American one warrant officer — a rather inauspicious beginning.
logical Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its
Embassy in
mission was: But by April 1953, with the aid of vigorous OCPW recruit-
London. Here, he
"To conduct individual training and supervise unit ing efforts throughout the Army, the 10th had increased
stands outside
No. 10 Downing training in Psychological Warfare and Special Forces to 1,700 officers and enlisted men.
Street, next to Operations; to develop and test Psychological Warfare Essentially, the 10th Special Forces Group represented
British Prime and Special Forces doctrine, procedures, tactics, and tech- a pool of trained man-power from which units or combina-
Minister Winston niques; and to test and evaluate equipment employed in tions of units could be drawn to execute specific unconven-
Churchill. Psychological Warfare and Special Forces Operations. tional-warfare missions. At the heart of the group’s organiza-
PHOTO COURTESY As it was originally established, the Psychological tion was the operational detachment, or “team,” established
OF THE USASOC Warfare Center consisted of the Psychological Warfare along the same lines as the OSS operational group. Com-
HISTORY OFFICE School, the 6th RB&L Group, a psychological-warfare manded by a captain, the team, with a first lieutenant execu-

McClure assumed a leading role
in “selling” the need for an
unconventional-warfare capability
to the senior military and civilian
leadership. In the face of fierce
resistance, not only within the
Army but also from the CIA,
Special Forces became a reality
largely through the persistence
of McClure and through the
efforts of Bank and Volckmann.
tive officer and 13 noncommissioned officers, was capable of role has gone largely unrecognized. Robert A. McClure re-
infiltrating behind enemy lines to organize, train and direct mains the forgotten father of U.S. Army special warfare.
friendly resistance forces in guerrilla warfare. Early train- Author’s note: I first read about Major General Robert A.
ing focused on the individual skills of the various members McClure during the 1970s, while I was conducting research in
of the team: operations and intelligence, light and heavy the National Archives for my Ph.D. dissertation on the origins
weapons, demolitions, radio communications and medical. of the Army’s special-warfare capability. Having served sev-
Each man trained thoroughly in his particular specialty, eral tours with Special Forces during the 1960s without ever
then participated in cross-training to learn the rudiments of reading or hearing about him, I was amazed to discover the
the other skills. central role that McClure played in the creation of a perma-
By early 1953, most of McClure’s major programs had nent psychological- and unconventional-warfare capability.
been launched; nevertheless, he was surprised to learn This article is drawn from that dissertation in history at Duke
that he was being assigned to Iran as chief of the U.S. University; from my subsequent book, U.S. Army Special
Military Mission. The rationale was that he had been in a Warfare: Its Origins (National Defense University Press,
specialized activity too long. The Army chief of staff, Gen- 1982); and from my more recent research in General McClure’s
eral Collins, implied that McClure’s chances for promo- personal papers. I am deeply indebted to Colonel Robert D.
tion would be enhanced by the new assignment.
McClure, U.S. Air Force (Ret.), and his wife, Betty Ann, for
In Iran, McClure formed close associations with the
giving me complete access to General McClure’s papers. SW
Shah and the Iranian senior military leaders. As Collins
had predicted, McClure was promoted to major general.
In 1956, McClure retired from the Army, ending more
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Alfred H. Paddock Jr. completed his 31-year Army
than 39 years of continuous active service. While driv-
ing cross-country with Marjory to San Clemente, Calif., career as a colonel in October 1988. His military career in-
where they planned to build their dream home, McClure cluded command and staff assignments in Korea, Laos, Oki-
became seriously ill. He died of a heart attack at Fort nawa, Vietnam and the U.S. He served three combat tours
Huachuca, Ariz., on Jan. 1, 1957, two months prior to his with SF units in Southeast Asia. Among his varied assign-
60th birthday. ments, Paddock was an instructor of strategic studies at the
Robert A. McClure’s position as the founder of Army U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; he served
special warfare seems indisputable. Over a critical period in the Politico-Military Division of the Army Staff in Wash-
of 10 years, he made vital contributions to psychological ington, D.C.; he commanded the 6th PSYOP Battalion and
warfare, to Civil Affairs, and to the creation of Army Spe- the 4th PSYOP Group at Fort Bragg; and he was the military
cial Forces, but his most important legacy may have been member of the Secretary’s Policy Planning Staff, Depart-
the establishment of the Psychological Warfare Center. ment of State. Paddock completed his military career as
From its humble beginning, that institution grew, becom- the Director for PSYOP, Office of the Secretary of Defense.
ing the Special Warfare Center in 1956 and later evolving A graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff
into the U.S. Army Special Operations Command and the College and the U.S. Army War College, he earned a B.A. in
U.S. Army Special Warfare Center and School. Yet despite political science from Park College. Paddock also holds M.A.
the fact that McClure made all these things possible, his and Ph.D. degrees in history from Duke University.

I think we can all agree that the
profession of influence has suffered a
considerable degradation of perceived
efficacy on the modern and future
battlefield, while the threats psychologi-
cal warfare would hope to combat have
lately become profoundly salient. Russia,
China, Iran and many others have long
realized that they must use asymmetric
means to oppose our will on the global
stage, and few capabilities are more
asymmetric than those which directly
affect an adversary’s will to fight.
In this light, it is more important
than ever that we do whatever it takes
to make the regiment as effective as
possible. But what perceptions and
skills must change and how can we
address them? As supposed brand-
ing experts, we have taken very little
proactive interest in how our customers
perceive us, and seemingly even less
interest in the quality of support they
receive. This vacuum of direction and
concerted effort has left us open to
hostile takeover by leaders from outside
our community who have limited vested
interest in the quality of our wares and
the future of what we offer. Inevitable
discussions of adding us as generalists
to the Special Forces military occupa-
tional specialty toolkit have become
commonplace in a time when the tech-
nical tools of influence become shock-
01
—BLACK KNIGHTS—
ingly more specialized by the day.
Rather than rehashing the woes of the
past, I would like to concentrate on some
general modifications our community
BACK FROM THE BRINK

might undertake in order to structure a
way forward in service to the demands of
quickly changing global challenges. In my
opinion, a good start would be to focus on
four specific pillars of change: knowledge,
specialization, structure and semiotics.
A potential approach to redefining
the profession of Psychological Operations.
KNOWLEDGE
BY LIEUTENANT COLONEL TRENT HICKMAN It is consistently evident from newly
minted practitioners attending train-
ing at the Joint Readiness Training
“If everyone is thinking alike, then somebody isn't thinking.” Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana, that
the primary (if not singular) skill be-
— General George S. Patton, Commander,
ing taught to both special operations
First United States Army Group forces and conventional forces support
01 elements at the schoolhouse is the oft
Soldiers interact with indigenous role players during exercise Black Knight, the culmination exercise for the lauded Seven Step Psychological Opera-
Psychological Operations Qualification Course. Students must demonstrate interpersonal adaptability , interact tions (PSYOP) Process. This process is
and negotiate effectively with diverse individuals and cultures. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY SGT 1ST CLASS JACOB BRAMAN extremely important to understand and

practice; however, it is also critical that about problems concerning behavior with a targeted eye on simply solv-
we as practitioners, and leaders, fully ing them. The Seven Step PSYOP Process can be used to leverage product and
understand the context which fostered information tools into that framework, but that process is far from the only
its genesis in the first place: way to influence. With a robust understanding of this methodology, we al-
This process was created in order to low ourselves to apply influence in any environmental context, regardless of
protect a commander from the risks posed by tools or authorities available. We allow ourselves the freedom to see beyond
injecting products into an environment that a prescribed process designed to limit our exposure to risk to a place where
endure beyond his/her tenure. we may use all resources immediately available to influence behavior on the
What this means is the process is battlefield. Instead of sending out radio messages, leaflets and whispers to
meant to govern our activities and miti- keep a population from using a bridge, maybe just build a new one and blow
gate risk where pear-shaped products the old one up, for example.
may pop up later requiring defense. To their credit, the curriculum developers at the John F. Kennedy Special
The process does not actually teach us Warfare Center and School’s 5th Battalion are working to incorporate this
how to influence a target audience’s science of influence back into their curriculum. In addition to Lewin’s Equa-
behavior, because it does not begin and tion, they should bring back studies on the Theory of Planned Behavior (for
end with behavior. It begins and ends long-term effects) and Social Judgement Theory (for dialectic and rhetorical
with dialectic and rhetorical product product focused work). Those changes cannot happen quickly enough.
and therefore lends itself to measures
of performance with less regard to mea-
surable outcomes. But how do we fix SPECIALIZATION
this without throwing the baby (seven- For decades, we have treated and trained our practitioners as general-
steps) out with the bath water?
ists, despite the unassailable assertion that the tools available to influence
We need to take our Black Knights back
a TA have broadened to the point we can scarcely any longer enumerate
to the basics of influence psychology in order
them. Only one other branch has as few career fields as we do (Armor)
to make them better.
and they really only have one tool to work with — tanks. In nearly every
In 1936, a German-American analytic
other field, from Special Forces, Infantry, Aviation, Medical Service, and
psychologist named Kurt Z. Lewin found
Logistics, to Artillery, Air Defense, Intelligence, etc., new technology and
that he could analyze two virtually identi-
capabilities have always required specialization.
cal patient personalities that manifested
To that end, what sorts of tools are available? Today, a 37F must learn
with vastly different behaviors. In discov-
how to operate tactically, in an embassy, and as a planner from various
ering why that was, Lewin came up with
tactical and operational contexts, all the way to the strategic. The tools out
what became “Lewin’s Heuristic Equa-
there to influence various targets are no longer limited to loudspeakers,
tion” and the founding principles of social
face to face, print and broadcast media. Perhaps we should consider new
psychology were born. It reads as follows:
career structures to match new approaches and capabilities of influence.
B = f (P,E)…where, Behavior is a
For example: a 37B to operate tactically, a 37C to conduct cyber attacks and
Function of the Person/Population and
social media injects, a 37E to fabricate special effects for deception, a 37F to
the Environment.
analyze human factors for consumption, a 37M for graphics design, a 37V
In other words, if we are talking
for audio and visual effects. Of course, these are just spitballs. The point
about psychological operations, we first
must fully define our TA behavior to the is to have a baseline understanding of influence and deception for each to
binary level in order to fully define our apply using their various tools and within their respective sub-disciplines.
measures of effectiveness into a “Yes” or This would create a critical level of flexibility on the modern battlefield
“No” answer. Once defined, we can change necessary for what I will discuss below.
one of the two functions above in order to
affect behavioral change. Since often we
cannot feasibly change a person/popula- STRUCTURE
tion without time, trust and probably a In 2008, the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and its two attached battal-
couch, we have to focus our activities and ions controlled Mosul, the second largest city in Iraq. Strategists based the
the activities of our supported units on size of the elements required to control that area on the space they needed
what we have available to inject into the to control. Just like any maneuver unit might, they considered how many
environment. We do this, however, with a boots were required to control how many square miles of ground. Doctrin-
clear understanding of the population we ally, in parallel to the two battalions fielded, their support requirement
intend to influence. This is the foundation
of our profession and craft. We need to take our black knights back
Notice, I mentioned nothing of “mes-
saging” or “products” or “loudspeakers”, to the basics of influence psychology in
or “radios”, or “social media”, or “SOF/
CF”, etc. This is a method for thinking order to make them better.
BL ACK KNIGHTS: BACK FROM THE BRINK
from PSYOP was no more than two Tactical PSYOP Teams. The problem
PSYOP ISSUE
with this was that maneuver and PSYOP each has a completely different
focus. Maneuver focuses on geography, while PSYOP focuses efforts against
population concerns and demographics. This left six personnel (only two
above the rank of E5) responsible for manipulating the behavior of 2.3 mil-
lion people, basically door-to-door under often intense fire. Effects were
difficult to achieve.
Recently, delayed force-design upgrade plans sought to answer this glaring
shortfall in coverage by increasing the level of support from a detachment to a
company of PSYOP for a Brigade Combat Team. Although notionally a step in
the right direction, effectively quadrupling the support level from before, it too
02
The moves toward selectivity when

choosing future Black Knights is a
success story of fairly recent changes;
however, running a selection process
alone is only half the equation. The
other half is drawing enough candidates
to the selection process to actually be
selective against force generation needs.
In this regard, our Special Forces broth-
ers again outperform us. Psychologi-
cal Operations formations recognize
the need for something to signal its
identity, but also fear ridicule, because
deep down, whether we are willing to
admit it or not. Soldiers fear being seen
as frauds in a SOF community most
view as experts. And if we are really
honest with ourselves and each other,
01 we actually will be seen that way… for
would have inevitably fallen far short of success, because it still fails to consider a while. Ask any Security Force Assis-
the things that PSYOP does. Doctrine needs to change fundamentally to accept tance Brigade soldier. The trick is to
eventually back it up with quality, and
models such as that outlined in Michael Aquino’s Mind War or as practiced in
to ensure that everyone who completes,
Russia’s Gerasimov Doctrine. We need to practice influence nested with, but
has completed or will ever complete the
apart from, force of arms in terms of planning considerations, where manning
qualification pipeline receives the tab/
is concerned. We need to become modular.
hat/whatever. All must have that expert
If we develop the capacity to tailor the level of support to consider things
image, whether active or reserve, even
like population dynamics, demographics, level of information sophistication,
us “paper tabber” dinosaurs before we
literacy, mission parameters and other TA characteristics, we can influence
are out to pasture. Building unity and
the modern battlefield far more efficiently. Our structure must consider these posterity through legacy is another
effects and behavioral objective based attributes of mission sets in order to tried and true path to legitimacy.
maximize the results from influence efforts. Fortunately, the fix will not be too Ostensibly, Black Knights are
much of a challenge, once the other three pillars are implemented. experts at the marketing and brand-
ing skills used to change images and
behaviors. Branding is something with
SEMIOTICS which we should be intimately familiar,
A pathological sense of humility has not served us well; we have been yet we have seemed unconcerned with
the Quiet Professionals since the term was coined and exceedingly too our own, time and time again. When-
quiet, long enough. ever any organization makes sweeping

01 03
Soldiers prepare for an early morning challenge as part of the Students work through a PSYOP planning
Psychological Operations Assessment and Selection course at Fort exercise during the PSYOP Support to
Bragg, North Carolina. The course assesses Candidates through Interagency phase of the Qualification Course.
psychological, intellectual, physical and problem-solving (dilemma- This phase immerses students in the military
based) team events. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY SGT 1ST CLASS JACOB BRAMAN information support operations mission of
02 interagency-intergovernmental support efforts
Psychological Operations Qualification Course Students review to shape and influence foreign decision-making
messaging products with indigenous role players during exercise and behaviors in support of U.S. regional
Black Knight. U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY SGT 1ST CLASS JACOB BRAMAN objectives and interests. U.S. ARMY PHOTO
changes, if they fail to change the se-

miotics of that organization or product
offering, the changes will be unsustain-
able. They fall flat and flaccid, because
consumers cannot see the hallmarks of
changes in the offering. Said organiza-
tions are also unable to be as selective
within their ranks without a necessar-
ily larger pool of recruits required to
sustain the changes in their value offer-
ing. We need to differentiate ourselves
among SOF capabilities with a visible
and easily recognizable representation
of our capability, especially once we 03
begin making changes in the knowledge
and skills Black Knights possess. in order for us to reach a level of quality and sophistication within those
This, for good or ill, means a change ranks required to organically maintain and perpetuate that education and
in the accoutrements of our daily training, we need to become more selective. Selection is a first step, but
uniform. The regiment goes back over we need a robust pool of candidates with breadth of experience and depth
the span of a century of warfare and of sheer numbers to close the equation. That requires us to showcase our
includes such storied units as the 23rd brand in ways we have failed thus far to do. We need to more appropri-
HQ Special Troops Ghost Army among its ately structure our force for the flexible nature of a very complex world,
legacy. Give us some kind of hat or tab but in order to do that, we need to specialize that force in such a way as to
or heck, make us the only capability that modularize it, equipped with the vast number of tools with which we might
requires no hat, at all! It does not mat-
influence variable TA sets in mind. Changing any one of these pillars will
ter. But potential recruits for selection
result in a negligible improvement at best and more likely no sustainable
should all be able to see Black Knights
improvement over the long haul. If we truly care about the future of the
apart from other Quiet Professionals at a
regiment, each one of these problems must be considered, regardless of how
glance, or why would the highest quality
recruits choose to become one of us over we address them. SW
the prestige of the Green Beret. Why
would supported units put us to good ABOUT THE AUTHOR
use if they cannot understand us and we Lt. Col. Trent Hickman has a master's in human behavioral psychology special-
demonstrate no mystique to make them izing in deception psychology, and is currently the Chief of SOF and CF PSYOP
want to? Surely, there is something in for USASOC at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Ft. Polk, LA. He has
our history we can hang our metaphori- numerous combat deployments running various special access programs,
cal and literal hat upon. and nearly 15 years of experience in the community. Additionally, he was an
In conclusion, we must do a better advanced PSYOP skills instructor and doctrine writer at the U.S. Army John F.
job educating all our Black Knights, but Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

mensurate requirement to be proficient
or risk falling behind in society. This
was especially evident in developed
nations with robust IT infrastructure
where business made a rapid transition
to the online space. The developing
world was similarly impacted, with
people and business gaining rapid
WHAT SHOULD
access to markets and information
outside of their immediate spheres. The
Internet café was a ubiquitous symbol
of connectivity in the United States,
Canada and Europe by the mid-1990s,
PSYOP
and central African nations before the
end of the decade.
Serious discussion of the changing
information environment must also
include the role of the democratiza-
tion of technology. Consumer access to
DO NEXT?
technology, in terms of both availabil-
ity and price-fueled significant changes
in the digital landscape, affording the
'everyman' an ability to be an influential
communicator. Manufacturers, com-
peting to connect the world, introduced
computers with annually declining
prices and expanding capabilities.
BY ERINN McQUAGGE, SHAWN CHENOWETH
Email supported fundamentally new
AND RUSS CHADICK pathways to share multimedia content.
Complementary tech developments in
digital cameras and scanners appeared
With the first 100 years of psychological operations officially in the history on shelves, and prices continued to de-
books, it is a suitable time to ask, “What do we do next?” Revolutionary events cline while increasing content genera-
within the past 20 years and their follow-on effects have fundamentally tion capabilities in the digital space.02
Average people could take digital
altered the information environment, giving an asymmetric advantage to photos or scan their traditionally de-
small networks (e.g. extremist organizations), and competitor states (e.g. veloped photographs. Before the end of
Russia). The pace of these alterations is blindingly fast, and larger democratic the 20th Century, people could create
their own magazine 03 or web page on a
hierarchies struggle to contest the information space while balancing home computer; at the beginning of the
legitimacy, transparency, responsiveness and volume. 21st Century, the same person could
edit movies, create computer graphic
are significant because they enabled effects, and distribute them on DVDs
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES IN THE state and non-state actors to challenge or CDs. Not only could people com-
U.S. influence. municate across the world, they could
INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT The Internet Revolution of the also create and distribute more content
Five revolutionary changes over late 1990s connected average citi- than ever.
the past 20 years have fundamentally zens across the globe in real time — a After 9/11, Islamic terrorism
altered the information environment. phenomenon in communication.01 The expanded into the cyber realm, creat-
Understanding these changes is neces- advent of email and chat rooms are ing the third revolutionary event. The
sary to provide a prescriptive conclu- memorable products of these early expansion allowed al-Qaeda to move
sion (i.e. what should PSYOP do next?) days, connecting geographically dispa- bin Laden’s influence further and faster
because PSYOP functions within this rate peoples in an unprecedented way. through the Internet and the increase
medium. For this article, a revolution- As the capabilities expanded, global in technological consumer peripherals.
ary change is defined as an event that trade migrated to the digital space, The 2003 invasion of Iraq advanced the
upends the status quo or introduces an bringing finances into the picture. The usage of another step with insurgent
unprecedented method of information combination ushered in an ability to groups filming their attacks on digital
exchange. These revolutionary changes interact on a global scale and a com- cameras and exploiting the imagery to

5
build material and financial support,
and communicate tactics to global
REVOLUTIONARY CHANGES
audiences. Finally, the most recent step
is inspiring people abroad, with little
in the Information Environment
to no physical connection to a terror-
ist group, to conduct attacks wherever
over the last 20 years
they are and against whomever they
have access. Individuals or small
groups, who are ideologically aligned,
51%
are replacing the close-knit terrorist
cells of the pre-9/11 era.
The rise of social media (YouTube, of the world’s poplution
Facebook, Twitter, etc.) is the fourth has an internet connection
revolutionary event. Unlike email
that moves from point to point, social 01 as of December 2018 #ITUdata
media is network-based, media heavy

and interactive. It created a virtual en-
Late 1990s
vironment for like-minded individuals
to exchange ideas while transcending
Internet Revolution Democratization
national borders and time zones. Any- Connected average citizens of Technology
one or group could organize for action across the globe. Consumer access
online. The most visible impact was the to technology
2011 Arab Spring where bands of activ-
ists traded information and organized
afforded
everyman the
02
events largely via social media across ability to be an
North Africa and the Middle East. Expansion of influential
Finally, Russia’s reemergence communicator.
Terrorism to the
into influence operations altered the
Cyber Realm
information environment, because
they have a formidable history of the 03
craft, significant national assets and Islamic terrorists
critically, a willingness to aggressively leveraged
participate at a scale that dominates technology to
enough of the media share to have spread their
measurable effects. Russia’s long his- message around
tory of influence operations, known as the world.
maskirovka,04 began well before their
October 1917 Revolution.05 Russian
influence operations took a hiatus after
Social Media
the collapse of communism but they
Created a virtual
are a focal point of contemporary Rus-
environment for
sian national strategy. Russian Infor-
like-minded
mation Operations strategy is generally
indviduals to
focused on undermining institutions
exchange ideas and
and fostering divisions to weaken
transatlantic partnerships and con-
organize action
across borders and
04
solidate Russian geopolitical gains.06
time zones.
Furthermore, Russian IO campaigns Maskirovka
are coordinated to degrade or deny Russia reemerged
56%
decision-making through frequent use into influence
of disinformation. Russia fuels debate operations, or
amongst western populations that Maskirovka, after a
inhibits risk-adverse western leaders of Russian’s polled
hiatus following
from taking decisive actions. Russia’s said they fully
the collapse of
concerted efforts to manipulate cyber-
space and enthusiastic usage of troll
or mostly believe
Russian news. 05 communisum.
The Washington
farms to shape social media platforms Post
have produced outsized results.
WHAT SHOULD PSYOP DO NEXT?
PSYOP ISSUE
01
extensive time and experimenting to observe. Maintaining continuity on

WHAT SHOULD PSYOP DO NEXT? learn techniques. There is no guaran- deployments maximizes the use of the
tee that the techniques are correct. A limited time to gain experience. Under
Initiate change at the soldier could become proficient with the current model, entire detachments
detachment level. ineffective techniques. rotate out requiring a couple months
Change should originate at the PSYOP is comprised of social sci- of on the ground experience before the
detachment level to influence the ences, marketing and some statis- incoming detachment is familiar with
current information environment, tics, thus ongoing education within the situation. The initial months are
since they are the building blocks of the regiment should include these lost. To remedy the issue, PSYOP could
PSYOP. Planning and implementing fields. Each supports the overall adopt an overlapping deployment
PSYOP occurs within detachments mission, meaning as skills in each model- eliminating the need for Relief
and feeds upwards to higher eche- field increase, there should be a cor- in Place. Individuals or small groups
lons. Changing the building block and responding increase in effectiveness. could intersperse their deployment
allowing the shift to flow upwards The Target Audience Analysis Work- dates while still maintaining 179 days.
is more effective than starting at sheet draws on political science, The difference is that experienced sol-
the top and implementing change sociology, economics and psychology diers would always outnumber newly
downward. to develop a concise understanding arriving ones. This would assist in
of the target audience. Series and continuity and allow the soldiers with
Become better at the craft
product development is marketing greater time on the ground to assist
of PSYOP.
renamed, but with a couple differ- newer ones, instead of spending the
Improving at the craft of PSYOP
ences. Evaluation is heavily reliant first two months becoming situated. 08
requires a combination of education
and experience. Education alone on statistical data to test effec- Expand the MTOE at the
produces a soldier without practi- tiveness. These fields are common detachment level to Cyber and
cal skills. Experience alone requires courses at local community colleges, Intelligence soldiers.
making access easy for any soldier. PSYOP occurs mostly at the de-
01, 02 Gaining experience is more dif- tachment level, with higher echelons
Psychological operations teams pitch civic engagement ficult than education given dwell maintaining the force and directing
plans to role-players during Operation Warrior Anvil, a time requirements and limits on aggregate efforts. Aggregate efforts
validation exercise held in Key West, Florida, by 7th Military deployment lengths (179 days). Both are only as good as the detachments’
Information Support Battalion, 4th Military Information
contribute to continuity issues be- operations. Thus, improving the
Support Group. The exercise validated teams through
unparalleled training with joint, inter-agency, and civic cause PSYOP officers 07 can only deploy ability to execute operations will pay
partners in real-world urban environments that reinforced at the detachment level for a limited dividends to higher echelons.
PSYOP fundamentals, fostered teamwork, and strengthened time and short deployments limit the While the PSYOP soldier can im-
character. U.S. ARMY PHOTOS BY CAPT. STEPHEN VON JETT amount of change a detachment can prove their ability at the craft, there

Improving at the craft
of PSYOP requires a
combination of education
and experience. Education
alone produces a soldier
without practical skills.
Experience alone
requires extensive time
and experimenting to
learn techniques.
02
is a distinct need for more specialized Match competitors on the ideology who was less trained, but
skills due to technological advance- the Internet. inside the West. 15
ments and demands on the regiment The Internet is a terrain greater Conversely, competitor nation
as a whole. Internet access and social than air and land for PSYOP, yet states utilize synchronous efforts in
media are expanding in Africa and PSYOP has not ventured into it with the digital environment to frame in-
other regions that were previously persistence. Competitor states, such formation for global audiences. Com-
as Russia, along with non-state actors petitors desire a sort of ‘tactical par-
disconnected. The result is an infor-
(e.g. ISIS, al-Qaeda), are en route to ity’ in cyberspace, to counterbalance
mation landscape unlike any other
dominating cyber terrain. the overwhelming lethal superiority
media that PSYOP employs. While of the U.S. Frustratingly, this arena
Al Qaeda was an analog organiza-
the potential and capabilities are is comparatively uncontested by U.S.
tion before 9/11. Osama bin Laden’s
substantial, the technical knowledge 1996 and 1998 11 fatwas, where he PSYOP forces, with regard to counter-
required to navigate the Internet 09 declared and justified war against ing malign state actors' storylines and
and social media requires a special- the U.S., were originally published in narrative. Whether due to inexperi-
ized set of skills. Adding MTOE 10 a small London newspaper. 12 CNN's ence, apathy or misplaced concern
slots at the detachment level for a Peter Arnett was the first Western over the sensitivity of IO in the dip-
cyber operations specialist (MOS journalist to interview bin Laden lomatic space, in general, U.S. PSYOP
17C) meets that requirement with an and introduce the English-speaking forces have not implemented effective
existing pool of soldiers. world to him in 1997.13 When the U.S. strategies for countering competitor
Second is greater fusion of opera- military eliminated his safe haven in states messaging in cyberspace.
Afghanistan, the simultaneous loss To match competitors online,
tions and intelligence at the detach-
of physical space, and rise of cyber- PSYOP will need to have a long-term
ment level. Historically, detachments
space, provided a venue to continue presence. Although conventional
rely on Intelligence soldiers at the
their jihad. Al-Qaeda did not conduct means (e.g. TV, radio, leaflets) remain
battalion or company level, but effective, the Internet and social me-
cyber terrorism, but information
they often lack familiarity with the dia now dominate how many people
operations where bin Laden’s mes-
unique requirements of PSYOP and receive and pass information. Allow-
sages could be disseminated to mil-
the specific needs of the detachment. ing any competitor to propagate their
lions in chat rooms (the precursor to
Consequently, intelligence assets modern social media) that connected agenda and recruit to their cause
are often unused for operations. ideas across physical space. 14 The without opposition is foolhardy.
Assigning Intelligence soldiers to recruit who had to be found, vetted Master the Relief in Place.
detachments alleviates this problem. and transported to training camps in The majority of PSYOP missions are
Like Cyber, this is a field best left to Afghanistan was dying. In his place long-term efforts with a sizable invest-
already existing practitioners. was a loosely connected adherent to ment in time to produce results. The

WHAT SHOULD PSYOP DO NEXT?
transition to the incoming unit is the ity in understanding that they will to strategic-level discussions within
PSYOP ISSUE
most critical event of a deployment. not “win the war” during their de- the military. As more PSYOP soldiers
During this period, the gains of the ployment, but rather make progress become the source of discourse, the
outgoing unit (normally six months) toward long-term goals; and respect overall regiment increases its control
can either be passed to the incoming for the programs and progress made over the PSYOP narrative.
unit or lost in transition.16 A success- by the outgoing unit. Done right, the
ful transition bolsters continuity and incoming unit assumes control of
makes use of gains from the outgoing established plans and programs. Any CONCLUSION
unit’s deployment at no cost to the gains from the outgoing unit trans- Psychological Operations has
incoming. In contrast, an unsuccessful fers to the incoming unit, who then progressed a long way since its
transition wastes the gains from the continues progress before their own beginnings. As we continue to move
outgoing unit and leaves the incoming transition out of theater. forward, it is always prudent to ask,
with little understanding of their situ- Read and Write. “What should we do next?” Continual
ation and disposition. As a result, the PSYOP should reinvigorate profes- improvement, with debate involved, is
incoming unit may waste time figuring sional reading to increase comprehen- crucial to progress. Not everyone will
out and recreating the gains. sion, critical thinking and writing agree with the prescriptive conclu-
From observing transitions be- skills. The Army in general lost a lot of sions, but the larger debate of what
tween PSYOP units, two factors influ- analytical prowess due to the past 17 to improve, how and why should be
enced the success: the total time of the years of constant combat and increas- brought to the forefront. SW
transition and the attitude of the in- ing reliance on PowerPoint.17 Training
coming unit. The time of the transition for deployment, combat operations and ABOUT THE AUTHORS
should consist of regular communica- redeployment occupied a lot of previ- Erinn McQuagge is a former U.S. Army
tion between units, while the incoming ously free time.18 Combined with in- infantry and psychological operations
unit is preparing for deployment. Regu- creasing hardware capabilities to create officer stationed at Fort Bragg, NC. He
lar communication ensures that the in- and distribute PowerPoint briefs, the served in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghani-
coming unit understands the situation bullet point replaced the paragraph. stan throughout his career. Currently,
before it deploys. Once the unit deploys Distilling complex ideas into single he works as a site lead for Northrop
and begins the RIP, it can focus its time sentences makes an efficient brief, but Grumman at 3rd Psychological Opera-
on minute details required for success, on that is missing pertinent details. tions Battalion.
versus understanding a complex situ- Writing is the desired result of
ation. At a minimum, RIPs should be professional reading; regular contribu- Shawn Chenoweth is a current U.S.
two weeks, allowing the incoming unit tions to professional journals reflect Army Reserve PSYOP Company Com-
to observe and lead with a counterpart the regiment’s intellectual health. mander and a Strategic Communica-
from the outgoing. Better techniques Writing requires research, organi- tions consultant as a civilian. He has
for RIP include redeploying key lead- zation of thought and analysis of served in and out of uniform in the
ers to assist the incoming unit with evidence to produce. All of these are CENTCOM, AFRICOM and EUCOM
pre-mission training and having some vital skills that benefit PSYOP soldiers AORs on multiple deployments sup-
key leaders remain with the incoming regardless of rank or time-in-service. porting Conventional, Special Opera-
unit for one to two months in theater. Additionally, the regular rotation of tion, and Special Mission Units.
As overlap increases between units, so troops in and out of jobs limits conti- Russ Chadick is a former U.S. Army
does continuity, making a long-term nuity. Writing and publishing experi- Reserve Psychological Operations
effort achievable. ences, within the limits of security officer. He currently works as a Stra-
The second factor, the attitude of classifications, ensures one’s experi- tegic Communications consultant
the incoming unit, is abstract by com- ence can become another’s knowledge. servicing U.S. Combatant Commands.
parison to transition time. The best Finally, publishing in professional Previously he worked in the U.S.
attitude for incoming units is humil- journals makes PSYOP a contributor Energy sector.
NOTES 01. Micha Kaufman, "The Internet Revolution Is the New Industrial Revolution," Forbes Magazine, 5 Oct 2012. 02. Moore's Law, "Moore's Law or How Overall Processing
Power for Computers with Double Every Two Years," Moore's Law, http://www.mooreslaw.org. 03. “Desktop publishing” was the term where a consumer could create multi-page
documents. 04. Brian D. Bailey and Patrick J. Parker, Soviet Strategic Deception, 1st edition ed. (U.S. and Canada: Lexington Book, 1987). 05. Ladislav Bittman, The Kgb and Soviet
Disinformation: An Insider's View (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1985). 06. The Economist, "Russian Disinformation Distorts American and
European Democracy," The Economist, 22 Feb 2018. 07. PSYOP NCOs have more deployment opportunities at the detachment level, especially when arriving as a junior NCO, compared
to officers. Captains move into staff positions about 12-18 months in detachments. 08. SGM Rob Weel (8th MISG S-3 SGM) came up with the idea of an overlapping deployment model
in 2012 during the shift from nine to six month deployments, which were expected to create continuity problems in MISTs. 09. Including surface, deep, and dark web platforms. 10.
Modified Table of Organization and Equipment. 11. Usama bin Laden, 1998 Fatwa (Al Quds Al Arabi: World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, 1998), Islamic Fatwa. 12.
"Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places," Al Quds Al Arabi (1996). 13. Interview by Peter Arnett, 1997, Video. 14. P.W. Singer and Allan
Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2014), Non-fiction. 15. Ibid. 16. David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2010). 17. Elisabeth Bumiller, "We Have Met the Enemy and He Is Powerpoint," New York Times, 26 April 2010 2010. 18. Other issues such as skyrocketing
divorce rates, domestic issues, mental health issues, and more also contributed to the decline in professional reading and writing during this period.

02
THE NEXT CENTURY OF PSYOP organize state and society. And they placed the ideas
Psychological Operations and the of liberty and liberal democracy in all of its various
types in direct conflict with the totalitarian ideas
21st Century Operating Environment. 01
of fascism on the extreme right and communism on
the extreme left. Just as different forms of liberal
BY ADAM L. SILVERMAN, PhD democracy would develop, so to would different
variations of fascism and communism. These clashes
of ideas, of how states, societies, and even the global
As Psychological Operations enters its second century, the global system,
system should best be structured, would lead to
international relations, foreign affairs, the global operating environment
both World War II, a long Cold War, the Korean and
and the U.S. standing in the world are vastly different than they were in
Vietnam Wars, and a number of conflicts fought by
1918. In the post 9/11 era, the U.S. remains the sole superpower in a global
the proxies of the two post World War II superpow-
system that is in many ways a legacy of the Cold War world. Its two clos-
ers. That Psychological Operations as a military
est great power challengers are an aspirant to that status in China, and the
occupational specialty would grow up and mature in
claimant to the Soviet Union’s legacy in Russia. Neither China nor Russia
currently have the capabilities to militarily challenge the U.S. for hegemony. this war of ideas is not surprising. As fighting bad
And there are a number of non-state actor threats that, while they certainly ideas with better ones is part of the core mission of
present a nuisance to the U.S., its allies and its partners, do not actually Psychological Operations.
present an existential threat. ISIS or al-Qaeda do not now, and never had,
02
the capabilities to bring down the U.S.
Given that so many of the dangers and threats that we face in the
There is, however, one constant between 1918 and today. As World War 21st Century Operating Environment are asymmetric, irregular
I was ending, or perhaps, more accurately transforming into a series of low and unconventional attempts to leverage terrorism and offensive
intensity conflicts that would simmer until reigniting into World War II,02 cyber operations to convey information for effect, the 21st Century
the great power competition was changing. Specifically it was adding a major should be the new Psychological Operations’ century.
new complication: a clash of ideas. These ideas were about how to better U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY STAFF SGT. CHAD MENEGAY

THE NEXT CENTURY OF PSYOP
PSYOP ISSUE
As Psychological Operations enters its second

century, the world is once again faced with a war of
ideas. The ideas of liberty and its expression in the
different types of liberal democracy are once again
facing off against totalitarian ideas from both state
and non-state actors. Vladimir Putin challenges the
U.S. and its European Union and NATO allies and
partners with his promotion of managed democracy as
a façade for the kleptocratic organized crime state he
has created in Russia.03 Xi Xinping, recently declared
as President for Life, promotes his fusion of Maoism,
state-controlled capitalism, and Chinese nationalism
through his One Belt and One Road Initiative.04 ISIS
continues to promote an extreme version of tawheed,
the Islamic theological understanding of the unity of
the Deity, which includes violently imposing its doc-
trine on believers and unbelievers alike.05 There is one
major difference, however, between the 20th Century
02
the relations in the global system as being part of the

interactions between the U.S. as the legacy superpow-
er from the Cold War, China as a rising and emerging
power, and the attempts of Russia to function as the
great power legacy of the Soviet Union despite not
actually having the capacity to do so aside from its
nuclear arsenal. The National Security Strategy, by us-
ing this characterization of the 21st Century Operat-
ing Environment as both a return to an earlier period
of great power competition melded to 21st Century
concerns, such as the abuse, manipulation and wea-
ponization of the Cyber Domain, provides us with a
01 good starting point for considering where Psychologi-
war of ideas that stretched from World War II through cal Operations should go in its second century.
the post-Cold War period. In the 21st Century Operat- The great power competition that The National
ing Environment, the theater of operations is as likely, Security Strategy delineates is not simply a recre-
if not more likely, to be the cyber domain than the ation of the late 19th and early 20th centuries’ great
Land, Sea, or Air domains. The Cyber Somain, which game. Rather it recognizes that America’s competi-
is everywhere and nowhere, exists within and without tors are approaching this competition, and will
the continental United States at the same time, is per- continue to do so, through asymmetric, irregular
fectly suited for Psychological Operations. As a result, and unconventional means; though not always in
the 21st Century Operating Environment should be the way that we doctrinally define these terms. In
the new Psychological Operations century. many ways, just as the core of the 20th Century’s
dispute was a battle of ideas — between liberty and
totalitarianism on both the right (Fascism) and
THE 21ST CENTURY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT left (Communism) extremes, between democracy in
The National Security Strategy06 released in Decem- its different variations, Fascism, and Communism
ber 2017, focused on a return to great power competi- — so too, is the 21st Century Operating Environ-
tion as the core of instability in the global system and ment a war of ideas. A war of ideas between the real
the 21st Century Operating Environment. Without liberal democracies, whether a Republic like the
always being explicit, it conceptualizes a great deal of U.S. and France or parliamentary democracies like

This new form of great power
competition for the 21st Century is
primarily unconventional ... It leverages
other forms of national power to
achieve its strategic objectives. It is
also primarily non-lethal.
as their own internal limitations, America’s great
power competitors are both unable and/or unwilling
to challenge the U.S. using lethal means. They are
also unable and/or unwilling to challenge using con-
ventional means. China is not yet prepared, despite
naval challenges in the South China Sea, to actually
challenge the U.S. for the role of military hegemon
in the Asian-Pacific area of operations. The People’s
Liberation Army’s Navy is still not ready for that 01, 02
confrontation. Nor is China ready for, let alone Road development in
trusted by its neighbors to, secure the sea lines of Nepal is a major concern
communication and commerce. This has resulted in for the underdeveloped
China continuing its long-term strategy of heav- nation as it seeks to meet
ily investing in building up the PLAN while also the need for connectivity,
funding the U.S., through the purchase of about 8 creating employment and
to 11 percent of our foreign-held debt, so that the increasing trade.
the United Kingdom and many of the EU and NATO A 2017 memorandum of
member states, Putin’s idea of managed democ- U.S. will have the funding to continue in this role
understanding between
racy — a democratic facade running in front of a until China is ready to challenge it for that role. Nepal and China helped
kleptocratic organized crime state, China’s blend of The One Belt and One Road initiative is also part of fill the financial and
Maoist Communism and state controlled capital- this strategy. One of the objectives of the initiative material void the nation
ism, or ISIS’s extremist understanding of tawheed is an attempt to generate good will within China’s faced in bridging the
— the radical unity of the Deity. The major differ- neighbors and partners, through investment and infrastructure gap and
ence, however, is our technological advances have development, 08 which will be needed in order for will ultimately connect
moved ever more of these battles from the physical China to one day challenge the U.S. The attempt by Nepal to China, Central
battlefield into the Cyber Domain. The campaigns China to change the attitudes and feelings towards Asia and Eastern Europe
it through the Belt and Road initiative is a good as part of China's One Belt
in the 21st Century war of ideas will not be fought
example of the Psychological Operations’ effects and One Road Initiative.
at the Somme, Belleau Wood, Normandy, Remagen,
The U.S. National Security
Pelilue, Guadalcanal, Cho Sin, Khe Sanh, Tora Bora they have built.
Strategy recognizes that
or Ramadi. Rather, more and more of them will be Russia, as the other great power challenger, is
America's competi-
fought on Facebook and Twitter, 4Chan and Reddit. simply unable to challenge the U.S. directly. Rus- tors, such as China, are
And unlike people, ideas are almost impossible to sia isn’t even in the top 10 largest economies in the approaching the power
kill; especially so with weapons. Bad ideas can only world.09 Even if we don’t count individual U.S. states competition through
be killed with better ones. As Bernard Fall stated in as independent economies. Both California and Texas asymmetric, irregular and
The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterin- have larger economies than Russia’s, and unlike Rus- unconventional means.
surgency (emphasis mine): sia’s, theirs’ are more diversified and growing. Russia’s As a long-term strategy,
One can’t fight an ideology; one can’t fight a military, despite Putin’s buildup over the past several China is using Psycho-
militant doctrine with better privies. Yet this is done years,10 is still a pale shadow of the Soviet military. logical Operations by
constantly. One side says, “land reform,” and the other Russia’s one aircraft carrier, after a month’s long leveraging this initiative
deployment in support of Russian interests and opera- to generate good will
side says, “better culverts.” One side says, “We are going
with it's neighbors and
to kill all those nasty village chiefs and landlords.” The tions in Syria, is now in dry dock for refit,11 where it
partners, through invest-
other side says, “Yes, but look, we want to give you prize will remain until 2024. While China is not yet ready to ment and development,
pigs to improve your strain.” These arguments just do challenge the U.S. military, Russia is not able to. This achieving it's strategic
not match. Simple but adequate appeals will have to be has led to the development of a different strategy: the objectives through non-
found sooner or later.07 weaponization of the Cyber Domain for psychological, lethal means.
Because of the improvements of technology and information and cyber warfare, as well as a return to U.S. ARMY PHOTOS BY
their effects on great power competition, as well classic Soviet-style wetwork. JENNIFER G. ANGELO

This new form of great power competition for the Specifically, so that there would be restrictions on
PSYOP ISSUE
21st Century is primarily unconventional, but not taking in refugees from ISIS’s war in the Levant and
necessarily how we define unconventional warfare. to crackdown on immigration from Muslim majority
It leverages other forms of national power to achieve countries. The goal was to collapse one’s citizenry or
its strategic objectives. It is also primarily non-lethal. resident legal immigrant or refugee status into the
Or it is non-lethal in how we usually and doctrinally binary of Muslim versus non-Muslim. ISIS targeted St.
define lethal action. For instance, it was reported Michael in the attempt to demonstrate to the Mus-
that Russia’s cyber operators hacked into, and inter- lims it seeks to influence that even a welcoming place
fered with, the operations of Saudi petroleum facili- like St. Michael was not Dar al Islam — the House of
ties in March 2018.12 Russia didn’t put steel on steel, Peace, but actually Dar al Harb — the House of War.
but they achieved a physically lethal result — taking And, as a result, they had to either flee to the caliphate
down Saudi petroleum operations — by leveraging or fight. The targeting of St. Michael was also in-
expertise in the cyber domain. The Russian cyber at- tended to convey to their non-Muslim fellow citizens
tack on Saudi Arabia leveraged expertise in the Cyber that their Muslim neighbors cannot be trusted; that
Domain, just as it leveraged that same expertise in any one of them could be an ISIS sleeper agent. ISIS
pursuit of its psychological operations against the pursues this strategy for its terrorist operations in the
U.S., the EU and NATO. These operations are esti- U.S., EU and NATO member states because it doesn’t
mated to have cost Russia approximately 1 percent of have the ability to achieve its objectives directly. So
its military budget.13 it uses terrorism as a tactic in a psychological opera-
The 21st Century Operating Environment is tions strategy that uses the information conveyed by
not simply one of great power competition. We still the terrorist attacks in St. Michael, Florence, London,
face ongoing threats from non-state actors. These New York, etc., for effect against the French, the Brit-
threats are, as they have been since before 9/11, ish, Americans and other EU and NATO partners and
both asymmetric and irregular. As an example, the allies so they will provide ISIS with outcomes that it
ISIS attack on the Paris suburb of St. Michael in has no ability to achieve on its own.16
late 2015 used the irregular, low-intensity warfare
tactic of terrorism in pursuit of what is actually
a psychological operations strategy. 14 St. Michael
is known for being the suburb for immigrants in
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND THE
Paris. In the 1920s and 1930s it welcomed and 21ST CENTURY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
integrated Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese immi- Given that so many of the dangers and threats that
grants into the political, social, and economic life of we and our allies and partners face in the 21st Century
the community. It did the same thing for Algerian Operating Environment are asymmetric, irregular and
immigrants in the 1950s and 1960s. More recently unconventional attempts to leverage terrorism and
it has done it for immigrants from the Middle East, offensive cyber operations to convey information for
Central and Southeast Asia — all predominantly effect, the 21st Century should be the new Psychologi-
Muslim. St. Michael was not picked by ISIS because cal Operations century. Whether it is aspiring or fad-
it was a particularly soft target, or a softer target ing great powers, like China and Russia, or non-state
than others in/around Paris in 2015, it was picked actors like ISIS, al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, etc., using the
in an attempt to achieve specific psychological op- non-military elements of national power, weaponizing
erations effects as a result of the attack. 15 the Cyber Domain or utilizing terrorism and other
ISIS’s stated strategic goals include forcing Mus- forms of low-intensity warfare to convey information
lims to make a choice between ISIS’s understanding of for effect, part of the solution to these challenges is
Islam, which requires all Muslims to either relocate to more Psychological Operations.
the caliphate or fight against non-Muslims and apos- Psychological Operations professionals will need
tates where they reside outside the caliphate, and to to be proficient in offense, defense and maintenance
force non-Muslim majorities to turn on their Muslim operations to provide the U.S. with a robust resource
minorities. The intention of the attack was to turn the against these state and non-state threats in the 21st
other residents of St. Michael, as well as the French, Century Operating Environment. The Psychological
other Europeans and Americans against Muslims. Operations community must continue to engage in
And this strange new war we find ourselves in will not be won,
because it cannot be won, simply through hacking, planting
viruses and malware, and tightening down cyber security
protocols to make American and allied systems more secure and
resilient. It can only be won by utilizing Psychological Operations.
proactive Psychological Operations, but these cannot real change. This is not to diminish the importance
simply be transplanting the existing and historical of both offensive cyber operations that do damage to
capabilities and trying to apply them to these newer Putin and his inner circle of oligarchs, intelligence and
threats. For instance, it was reported in October foreign affairs leadership, and organized crime lead-
2018 that U.S. Cyber Command was going on the of- ers — often the same people fit into more than one of
fensive against the Russian cyber operators — mili- those categories — and defensive cyber operations to
tary, civilian and contract — who have been target- harden targets thereby reducing the ability of Putin to
ing the U.S. and our EU and NATO allies.17 The report- achieve his goals. These are all exceedingly important.
ing indicated that our cyber operators have been However, the reality is that these cyber operations
sending direct messages to the Russians we seek to cannot and will not resolve the problem. What will is
check, letting them know that we know who they Letting Psychological Operators do what they do best
are. While this is an important action to take, just as will have the biggest impact. In this case, leveraging
other more offensive and defensive cyber operations the Cyber Domain to deliver information for effect to
are and will continue to be, it is simply insufficient to change the attitudes of Russians themselves so that
successfully deal with the problem. Russia’s weapon- the corrupt, kleptocratic, organized crime state they
ization of the Cyber Domain to attack the U.S. and are living in, as well as Putin’s leadership of it, become
our EU and NATO allies is not the key center of gravi- intolerable to them. This is what Putin fears. It is why
ty in this new type of 21st Century warfare. And this he has destroyed a free press. It is why he has invested
strange new war we find ourselves in will not be won, so much in his attempts to demonize the promotion of
because it cannot be won, simply through hacking, civic society and good government development with-
planting viruses and malware, and tightening down in the former Soviet states that Putin claims as his
cyber security protocols to make American and allied sphere of influence and near abroad, often centered
systems more secure and resilient. It can only be won around non-government organizations leveraged by
by utilizing Psychological Operations. U.S. Agency for International Development. 01
The key centers of gravity in this new form of war To hearken back to some of the doctrinal Soldiers participate in the
are not Russia’s computers or the Internet or social language that General Odierno liked to use when third annual AvengerCon,
media. These are the theaters of operations. Rather he was the Chief of Staff, part of Psychological a hacker-style training
the key centers of gravity are Russia’s leadership — Operations role will need to be using information event, at Fort Meade,
Maryland. Psychological
specifically Vladimir Putin; the leaders of Russia’s for effect to shape the 21st Century Operating
operators must lever-
co-mingled intelligence, organized crime and wealthy Environment to prevent conflict whenever possible,
age the Cyber Domain
oligarchs that both support his actions who are under and when that fails to leverage that shaping to win as a means to deliver
his control; and the Russian citizenry. If we want when it is necessary to fight in the and, Sea and/or information for effect to
Russia to stop what it is doing, then eroding support Air domains. While we normally, especially within change the attitudes and
for the kleptocratic organized crime state that Putin the conventional force, talk about and understand perceptions of targeted
is running under the label of managed democracy is setting the theater in terms of the physical and geo- populations. DoD PHOTO
both a necessary and a sufficient condition to seeing graphic theater; where camps, bases, and outposts, BY STEVEN STOVER
01

PSYOP ISSUE
01
phase lines and main supply routes will be placed for ISIS to both utilize terrorist attacks as part of
and situated, we need to broaden that understand- a Psychological Operations strategy to get the U.S.,
ing for the 21st Century Operating Environment. the EU, and NATO to change their own policies,
Psychological Operations continues to have a major but also to utilize information for effect to prevent
role to play in understanding the social behav- ISIS from radicalizing parts of the Muslim minor-
ioral nuances of both potential, actual and virtual ity communities in the U.S. and our EU and NATO
theaters of operation. It must also continue to used partners into weapons.
to leverage the traditional Information Domain, as The Psychological Operations community also
01 well as the informational components of the cyber has an important defensive role to play. The nebu-
Brig. Gen. Khalil Essam domain, to actively set the socio-cultural and social lous nature of this 21st Century theater of opera-
Mohamed Elsayed, com- behavioral aspects of that theater. tion requires senior leaders in the U.S. military and
mander, Egyptian Human
This is especially important given the type of the Interagency to engage with the Psychological
Development and Be-
conflict that has emerged over the past several Operations community to develop a 21st Century
havioral Sciences Center,
listens intently as a 4th years. So much of it is not taking place on regular form of counter-Psychological Operations. As
Psychological Operations battlefields or even by adversaries utilizing what important as it is for the U.S. military to be expe-
Group Soldier explains is traditionally considered weaponry. The key ditionary, to be out in the world engaging with our
the capabilities of the battlefield of the 21st Century operating environ- allies and partners and peer competitors, it is as im-
group’s graphics section ment is the Cyber Domain and one of the two major portant to respect the Posse Comitatus Act and lim-
during a visit to Fort weapon systems is Psychological Operations. If we it U.S. military operations within the U.S. to times
Bragg, North Carolina. want Russia to stop trying to rip American, British, of genuine emergency, much of the conflict so far
Information exchange, French, German, Austrians, Greeks, Spanish and in the 21st Century Operating Environment cannot
in order to coordinate many other of our allies and partners civil societies be neatly divided into continental versus outside
training programs and apart, then they cannot just be deterred through the continental U.S. New rules of engagement and
synchronize efforts with
offensive and defensive cyber operations. These accommodations for how, when, and where Psycho-
NATO allies and other
informational threats have to be countered through logical Operations, as a weapons system to counter
partners is an important
factor that will help offensive Psychological Operations delivered these 21st Century threats, must be developed. The
shape the battlefield of through the various information systems of the members of the Psychological Operations commu-
the 21st Century operat- Cyber Domain. There is a need for offensive Psy- nity are the American subject-matter experts on
ing environment. chological Operations to deliver information that using information for affect in order to influence
U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY STAFF effects actual change to Chinese and North Korean the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and
SGT. KISSTA DIGREGORIO behavior. This also applies to countering the ability ultimately the behavior of foreign governments,

The expertise-based contributions of the Psycho-
logical Operations community extend beyond just
offensive and defensive operations. It is also neces-
sary to leverage the power of providing information
for effect to maintenance of the steady state in the
21st Century Operating Environment so that it does
not become an overgrown garden. As Hannah Arendt
explained in The Origins of Totalitarianism:
The ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the con-
vinced Nazi or the dedicated Communist, but people for
whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e. the
reality of experience) and the distinction between true
and false (i.e. the standards of thought) no longer exist.19
In the 21st Century Operating Environment,
especially in this new 21st Century War of Ideas,
Psychological Operations are a powerful tool in both
shoring up the distinction between fact and fiction,
between true and false, as well as ensuring that we 02
can all tell the difference. SW A Solider monitors
exercise progress during
ABOUT THE AUTHOR a cyberspace training
scenario. One of the key
Adam L. Silverman has a doctorate of philosophy in 21st Century theaters of
political science and criminology from the University operation is cyber-
of Florida (2002) and is currently a National Security space. Unlike the more
02 Consultant with Helios Global, Inc (2015-Present). He traditional theaters of
operations, cyberspace is
has previously been a Senior Fellow at JSOU (2015), a
organizations, groups and individuals. 18 There is no everywhere and nowhere
one better to turn to now than the Psychological subject matter expert with the Office of the Secretary all at the same time. The
Operations community to combat both the great of Defense for Security Dialogue and U.S. Army Eu- nebulous nature of this
power and non-state threats that seek to leverage rope (2014), the Cultural Advisor (TACON) at U.S. Army 21st Century theater of
operation requires senior
both the cyber and terrestrial domains to deliver Europe (2013-2014), the Cultural Advisor (TACON) at CA
leaders in the U.S. mili-
information to effect American behavior, as well Branch (2014), the Cultural Advisor (TACON) III Corps tary and the Interagency
as of our EU and NATO allies and partners. Your (2012), the Cultural Advisor at U.S. Army War College to engage with the
expertise in developing and delivering those simple
(2010-2014), and the Cultural Advisor for the 2nd Bri- Psychological Operations
appeals, to use Fall’s formulation, to increase our community to develop
gade Combat Team/1st Armored Division (2007-2008)
resiliency to withstand and ward off the signals and a 21st Century form of
messages and ideas directed at us and our allies is deployed with the BCT in Iraq in 2008. Dr. Silverman
counter-Psychological
essential to successfully emerging from this new era has also provided support for numerous Army, DoD, Operations. U.S. ARMY
of great power and non-state actor competition. and Interagency elements. PHOTO BY BILL ROCHE
NOTES 01. This essay is adapted from the keynote address delivered at the Psychological Operations Regiment’s 100th anniversary regimental dinner, November 3, 2018. 02.
Robert Gerwarth, The Vanquished: Why the First World War Failed to End (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2017). 03. Karen Darwisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (Simon and
Schuster, 2015). 04. James A. Schnell, “Attributing Strategic and Global Reach Within a Cross-Cultural Understanding of the Chinese ‘Belt and Road Initiative,’” Fudan Journal of the Hu-
manities and Social Sciences, 17 FEB 2018. 05. Adam L. Silverman, The Need to Revisit U.S. Policy in the Middle East: The Islamic State’s Doctrine and its Use of Terrorism as Psychologi-
cal Operations, Helios Global Analytical Report prepared for MG A. Ray Royalty, Headquarters Department of the Army, G34/Force Protection, December 2015. 06. The National Security
Strategy of the United States, The White House, December 2017. 07. Bernard Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Naval War College Review, Winter
1968, reprinted in Military Review, September-October 2015, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20151031_art009.pdf.
08. Schnell, February 17, 2018. 09. “World’s Largest Economies,” CNN Money, January 18, 2018, https://money.cnn.com/news/economy/world_economies_gdp/index.html. 10. Ivana
Kottasova, “Russian Military Spending Drops for the First Time in 10 Years,” CNN Money, May 2, 2018, https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/02/news/russia-defense-spending-plunge/index.
html. 11. David Mujamdar, “Russia’s Only Aircraft Carrier Will Get New MiG-29s,” The National Interest, August 18, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russia%E2%80%99s-on-
ly-aircraft-carrier-will-get-new-mig-29s-28097. 12. David Sanger, “Hack of Saudi Petrochemical Plant Was Coordinated From Russian Institute,” The New York Times, October 23, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hackers-saudi-chemical-plant.html. 13. Luis Gomez, “Exactly How Much Russians Spent on Twitter, Facebook Ads During
Election,” The San Diego Union Tribune, September 28, 2017, http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/opinion/the-conversation/sd-how-much-money-russians-spent-twitter-facebook-
ads-20170928-htmlstory.html. 14. Gregg Miller and Soaud Mekhennet, “Inside the World of the Islamic State’s Propaganda Machine,” The Alaska Dispatch News, November 20, 2015,
http://www.adn.com/article/20151120/inside-surreal-world-islamic-state-s-propaganda-machine. 15. Melissa K. Byrnes, “Solidarity and ‘Je Suis Paris,’” Lawyers, Guns, and Money,
November 15, 2015, http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2015/11/solidarity-and-je-suis-paris. 16. Silverman, December 2015. 17. Julia Barnes, “U.S. Begins First Cyberoperation
Against Russia Aimed at Protecting Elections,” The New York Times, October 23, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/russian-hacking-usa-cyber-command.html.
18. Joint Publication 1-02: Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. 19. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1973).

former rebels now live peacefully among the very
people they once abused. All of this was completed
by executing a mixed approach of lethal military
operations with non-lethal appeals for defection,
blended with a political strategy of local recon-
ciliation. Praise of the U.S. mission’s success has
included articles from national publications, public
recognition by U.S. Africa Command's commanders,
and invitations to speak on the subject at the annual
Association of the United States Army conference.02
But what made PSYOP so effective in this instance? 03
ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

The war that became known as the “LRA Con-
flict” in the western world began as a series of insur-
gencies against the current government of Uganda.
The state of Uganda, a former British colony, was
divided for decades by regional and ethnic rival-
ries.04 Since its independence in 1962, All of the
former presidents of Uganda, from Milton Obote to
the infamous Idi Amin, were from Uganda’s north.
The northern ethnic groups were genetically, cultur-
ally and linguistically distinct from Ugandans of
01 other regions. Northerners dominated not only the
administrative government, but also the military
and police ranks. Among these ethnic groups (or
tribes, as they are known in Uganda), is the Acholi,
01
who formed the core of the LRA. When current
A MISSION
president, and western Ugandan, Yoweri Museveni
and his National Resistance Army, composed pri-
marily of westerners and southerners, seized power
in 1986 he upended the status quo. The economy of
underdeveloped northern Uganda depended heavily
OF ATTRITION on revenues from the government bureaucracy,

and many northern Ugandans feared retribution
from Museveni’s NRA.05 During the Bush War that
preceded Museveni’s rise to power, the previous
regime had been responsible for the killing of an
The 7th Psychological Operations Battalion's PSYOP estimated 300,000 civilians in the Luwero Triangle
of southwestern Uganda.06
Campaign against the Lord's Resistance Army. In response to these fears, the Uganda People’s
Defense Army was formed in August 1986 by former
BY MAJOR JONATHAN EASTER Uganda National Liberation Army officers. The UPDF
launched a guerrilla war against Museveni’s new
regime that was soon joined by other groups, includ-
The U.S. Army Psychological Operations community, particularly 4th Psy- ing Joseph Kony’s followers in 1987. In 1988, the
chological Operations Group (A), has received considerable acclaim for its role government of Uganda offered amnesty to any rebel
in the campaign against the Lord’s Resistance Army in central Africa as part of who would lay down arms. The NRA conducted talks
Operation Observant Compass from 2012-2017. This effort was an effective, yet with the UPDA leadership and signed the Gulu Peace
humanitarian, approach to a complex conflict by pursuing the objective of deplet- Accord on June 3, 1988.07 During the peace talks,
ing the rebels’ strength through surrender rather than solely by killing them. This government representatives brought the northern-
emphasis on defection was largely due to the LRA’s use of abducted child soldiers ers to the capital of Kampala to see the development
to fill its ranks, along with the recognition that these same child soldiers were taking place. They showed them new hotel buildings
trapped within the organization by the brutal indoctrination methods of the and the airport at Entebbe, in an effort to persuade
LRA’s leader, Joseph Kony. These defection efforts contributed to reducing the them that the north could be similarly developed if
LRA’s strength from roughly 400 fighters in 2011, to fewer than 80 in 2017 when the rebels would stop fighting.08 Kony and his LRA
U.S. forces withdrew.01 The overall result was highly successful from the Ugan- rejected amnesty and the results of the peace talks,
dan perspective. The LRA was effectively isolated from the local population and taking refuge across the border in Sudan where they
forced to flee far from Uganda; former insurgent activity has vanished. Uganda’s received material support and training from the
amnesty policy toward the former LRA rebels also continues, and thousands of Sudanese government.

Uganda’s forces launched a deliberate counterin- and some were escaping. So, in [the] 1990s he started abducting young
surgency campaign against the LRA in 1991. Initially, people that he could train in his own way.”13 Thousands of children were
many local Acholi were arrested under suspicion of abducted in northern Uganda; the LRA rousted them from their homes
aiding the LRA and there were many allegations of during hours of darkness. The abductions of Acholi alone occurred at such
abuse. Despite this, the local population began to side high rates that, by 2008, 48.8 percent of the residents of Acholi communi-
more and more with the government. Northern lead- ties surveyed by Pham, Vinck and Stover reported having been abducted by
ers encouraged participation in local defense units the LRA, including at least 25,000 children.14
to assist the NRA against the rebels and there was a The Acholi people, having lost so many children to the LRA, had
high rate of participation.09 Local Acholi were placed a strong interest in seeing them safely returned. This, combined with
in positions of authority in the government and in the Acholi cultural practices of reconciliation, motivated a grassroots political
NRA units assigned there. The NRA made deliberate appeal to the Government of Uganda to grant amnesty to the LRA. The
efforts to improve its relationship with the Acholi, residents of other parts of Uganda sympathized with the Acholi for the
including civic action projects such as drilling wells.10 loss of their children and use of their youth as child soldiers, which made
The LRA’s support from the Acholi began to wane. gaining political support from their fellow Ugandans a feasible goal.15
According to one former LRA commander: The concept of granting amnesty to the LRA rebels was rooted in tradi-
"In the early days, the population was very support- tional Acholi customs. The ritual of mato oput provided for complete forgive-
ive of the LRA and leaked information until the UPDF ness for an offender and reconciliation with the community, regardless of
[NRA at the time] began apologizing and showing that the severity of the crimes committed.16 Children, in Acholi tradition, are not
it wanted peace with the north, to rebuild, and then the held fully responsible for their deeds. Children are only considered odoko dano
population started changing its mind. Then the popula- (‘morally and socially mature persons’) when they are old enough to contrib-
tion’s information to the LRA was cut and turned against ute to society and have children of their own.17 Thus, the availability of rites of
the LRA due to the approach the government used. Then reconciliation, along with general condemnation of the LRA’s use of child sol-
they joined hands with the UPDF to bring peace to north- diers, combined to make amnesty an attractive option for Acholi Ugandans.
ern Uganda. The civilian population turned against Kony Perhaps due to a long history of warfare between neighboring villages,
and he took revenge. The UPDF provided real information the Acholi had elaborate systems of conflict resolution to contain violence
to the population and the people tired of the war and and prevent costly acts of retribution. They had many customs of recon-
realized that the UPDF could end it."11 ciliation, of which the most widely known is mato oput. This was a ritual
One UPDF veteran of this period, who was a performed by an elder with spiritual authority in which two parties, with
platoon commander in Gulu from 1989 until 1995, a mediator, met together and shared a bitter drink made from the bark of
described the discipline of the NRA troops as a ma- the oput tree. During the ritual, both parties agreed to forgive one another.
jor factor in winning the support of the population: This ritual culminated in an oath called gomo tong, or ‘bending the spear’,
"The most important weapon is the discipline of the in which both parties agreed never to turn weapons on each other again.
forces formed by political education. The soldiers are These rituals, along with the underlying acceptance of reconciliation, played
taught the history of Uganda, of the kingdoms, of the a significant role in the conflict between the LRA and the Ugandan govern-
tribal structures, and even the LRA were using it. So you ment forces and was further exploited by RPTs to promote defections.
cannot only use the tribal thing; you will fail. You cannot The NRA/UPDF disseminated amnesty leaflets and pamphlets begin-
punish one who is opposed [insurgent] and the entire tribe ning in the year 2000. Many viewed them as effective, since some rebels
with him. You must punish individually. So these tactics reported to the NRA with the amnesty literature in hand.18 The prominent
and strategies were applied, but the important one is the Acholi radio personality John Baptist “Lacambel” Oryema reported that
discipline. They [soldiers] must be considerate of the vic-
tims. Our conduct turned the people against Kony. Kony
wanted to start an Acholi war. He wanted a Luo republic,
wanted it to go to the Nile. People turned against him.
When they said ‘no’, he punished them. He said, ‘these
ones are contaminated. Now they are no longer Acholi’." 12
Following its loss of popular support, the LRA be-
gan to rely on a new form of recruitment: the abduc-
tion of children. Kony had never been comfortable
with LRA troops who had previous military experi-
ence. According to one former LRA commander, “For-
mer military men were not easy for him to control
because they knew more than him about the military
01
A U.S. Army Psychological Operations Soldier drops leaflets over
the Lord's Resistance Army's area of operations. The leaflets
announced amnesty would be granted to any rebel who would
lay down arms. U.S. ARMY PHOTO
02
The Lord's Resistance Army's primary areas of operation from
2002-2014 in central Africa.
02

A MISSION OF AT TRITION
he prepared leaflets to advertise the Amnesty Statute and the subsequent

PSYOP ISSUE
Amnesty Act and carried them to rallies in northern Uganda. He also ac-
companied NRA military convoys into the bush to personally disseminate
the leaflets. He took other initiatives as well:
"I had a small office of information and it would also assist the army. I
encouraged them to approach the rebels in a spirit of forgiveness. I opened a
small place with some of my colleagues close to the barracks [NRA 4th Division]
to take in the defectors. We would train those boys on what amnesty was all
about. There were no NGOs in those days so we did this our own way. I would
go to the market and say, ‘how many of you have met your children in the bush?
I want to see you, one by one.’ So, I would give them this small piece of paper
called ‘Amnesty’ and told them ‘this is something very important and do not
share it with anyone you do not trust.’ They would give these leaflets to the
youth in the bush. I started talking to wives of those UPDF fighters and started
drilling them on what to say to their husbands to tactfully sensitize them. They
reported back to me and then I reported back to the government." 19
One former senior LRA commander describes the effects of amnesty
this way:
"What the Ugandan Government did was very effective. It almost coincides
with what was said in the Bible ‘feed your enemy.’ Those that left the bush and
those that remained, their minds were changed to support the government.
Those that left, they forgot the LRA with all their hearts." 20
In 1996, Lacambel approached UPDF spokesman Colonel Bantariza
and asked him for access to the government radio station. Bantariza gave
Lacambel one hour of airtime per day. Lacambel used a cassette player
to transmit pre-recorded messages designed for the LRA rebels and their
family members. “That hour was like gold. We were limited by the Min-
01
istry of Information to the time they gave us. They [local people] used to
call it Radio Lacambel. Then we asked for two hours.” The program began and the difficulties of life in displaced persons camps.
airing interviews with former rebels, as well as family members of the ab- However, after 2009, they advocated for U.S. military
ducted. Lacambel named it “Amnesty” around the time that the Amnesty intervention as the only realistic means of stopping
Statute was passed to promote awareness. He noticed that LRA defections Kony and the LRA.26 These advocacy campaigns includ-
increased in response to the program. Lacambel also interviewed UPDF ed the viral “Kony 2012” social media campaign, and
officers so that they could tell their story to the local population and the ultimately resulted in Operation Observant Compass.
rebels, confronting Kony’s propaganda directly. “So the truth came out,” The objectives of the operation were simple:
one source said.21 The UPDF also began leaving small radios in places for 1. Increase the protection of civilians.
the LRA to find so that they could tune into the programming. 2. Apprehend, or remove from the battlefield,
Lacambel’s radio program, later called Dwog Paco (‘come home’), began Joseph Kony and his senior commanders.
broadcasting messages to individual LRA fighters by name. These mes- 3. Promote the defection, disarmament, demo-
sages made use of family members or former rebel comrades to increase bilization, and reintegration of remaining
credibility and arouse a sense of nostalgia. One former LRA commander LRA fighters.
responded to these messages directly, stating: 4. Increase humanitarian access and provide
"These [messages] shook the foundation of the LRA and these commanders continued relief to affected communities.27
started to wonder if they should come out. The minds of many people, even the
The advantage of these objectives was that they
troops, started to change. We started hearing of many escapes. Those that came
could be validated; they were clearly measurable
before me were calling my name. I called and did the same thing when I came out
and attainable through quantifiable means, not as
[in 2004] and called Sam Kolo22 and told him, he was a brigadier at the time, and
qualitative abstractions. Their progress was tracked
he came out. That is the thing, the friend calls you and you believe him."23
throughout the life of the mission, especially on
By the middle of 2004, more than 5,000 former LRA fighters had de-
promoting defections and removing senior leaders
fected and applied for amnesty.24 The Ugandans’ three-pronged approach
from the battlefield, and demonstrable results en-
to the insurgency was yielding results: political appeals and reconstruc-
couraged continued support from AFRICOM, even
tion for northern Uganda, amnesty for rebels willing to surrender, and
though the ultimate objective of removing Kony
“military pressure” to pursue the rebels and deny them safe haven.25
from the battlefield was never realized.
SOCAFRICA established a joint special operations
task force (later called SOCFWD-CA) in Entebbe,
U.S. INTERVENTION Uganda to command and control the operation that
International awareness of the situation in northern Uganda built slowly stretched from Uganda, through the eastern Demo-
in the 1990s and early 2000s and increased greatly after the advent of advo- cratic Republic of Congo, into the Central African
cacy campaigns launched by NGOs such as Resolve Uganda (later called the Republic, and across South Sudan. SFODAs served as
Resolve), the Enough Project, and Invisible Children in 2007. These groups ini- advisors to African Union Regional Task Force part-
tially focused on the suffering of northern Ugandans as a result of the conflict ners at locations throughout the area, approximately

01
Former Lord's Resistance Army fighters provide feedback on PSYOP products in Gulu, Uganda, in order to
help create effective products to encourage more fighters to seek amnesty. U.S. ARMY PHOTO
02
A community bulletin board promotes acceptance of defectors in Nabanga, South Sudan. U.S. ARMY PHOTO
02
the size of California. The Regional PSYOP Teams became the mission’s primary measure of success. The role of PSYOP (also
deployed to the mission designed products, advised called MISO) in the operation grew more involved as time went on. As suc-
partner forces, liaised with IGOs and NGOs, planned cesses mounted, the Ugandan and U.S. field commanders grew more confi-
operations and augmented the ODAs. dent in employing PSYOP against the LRA in innovative ways. This led them,
U.S. forces routinely had problems understand- the U.S. Embassy - Kampala, and even the partner NGOs to develop a steady
ing the environment in central Africa in contrast to stream of activities based on an understanding of the indigenous popula-
more familiar, recent operational settings such as tions. These activities can be synthesized into five general lines of effort:
Iraq or Afghanistan. The densely-forested terrain, 1. Broad messaging to LRA fighters to promote defection.
biological threats, distances between resupply points, 2. Broad messaging to surrounding civilian populations to promote
obscure languages and cultures and lack of a common the peaceful acceptance of LRA defectors.
information infrastructure (such as cellular phone 3. Tailored messaging to promote internal divisions within the LRA.
towers) challenged the tried-and-true model of find, 4. Targeted messaging to promote the defection or surrender of spe-
fix, and finish. The LRA did not routinely use conven- cific members of the LRA.
tional communications systems such as cell phones
5. The development of improved dissemination channels and methods
or satellite phones. When they did, they used them
appropriate for the target audiences and the operational environment.
sparingly and observed strict discipline to avoid detec-
tion of their radio signals; their communications were The first line of effort was already being conducted through several
conducted in short bursts of coded language within media, but required reinforcement. The UPDF had conducted operations to
promote defection as early as 1988 to reduce the strength of Kony’s forces
prescribed windows defined by cryptic SOPs. The
and weaken the morale of those fighters who remained. These efforts were
rainforest also provided two or three canopies of cover
largely supported by regional FM radio stations which still broadcasted
that made aerial surveillance difficult. Inhabitants of
testimonials by former abductees and fighters, as well as appeals by fam-
the region were sparse and those who lived there often
ily members of those who were still assumed to be fighting for the LRA.
spoke languages unknown to the SOF linguists. To
In 2012, the same original radio stations, Mega FM and UBC, were still
reach these villages after LRA attacks took as long as
involved in broadcasting defection messages, but the broadcasts were made
nine hours based on the distances and aircraft avail-
over shortwave frequencies so that they could be received by LRA members
able. Finding the LRA was difficult. Fixing them was
hundreds of miles from Uganda. To refine these efforts, the RPT worked
unlikely. Finishing them appeared nigh impossible.
with the most recent defectors to develop radio messages and interviews
with their voices used as proof of life to detractors still within the LRA.
The team developed print products from these same defectors using their
THE INDIGENOUS APPROACH names and recent photographs on small, laminated leaflets and disseminat-
Once killing or capturing Joseph Kony proved ed them by air over known LRA trails. Whenever a new defector reported
a more difficult task than initially expected, OOC’s to the AU-RTF or UN, the team repeated this process to demonstrate that
objective of promoting defections of LRA combatants the defector had reached safety and that the opportunity remained for oth-

ers to follow. The teams even went so far as to disseminate pictures of the Several of the partner NGOs were involved in
PSYOP ISSUE
defectors feasting or enjoying simple treats they could not get in the bush, sensitization efforts, to try to help the communi-
such as traditional foods and soda. The LRA by this time was such a small ties to understand the value of receiving defectors.
organization that any Ugandan LRA member was well-known to the others, This was especially true of Invisible Children, which
and news of a successful defection spread rapidly.28 sought to convey that by receiving defectors, villages
This effort wasn’t only conducted by the U.S. military, but also by the would encourage further defections, which would
UN Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Invisible weaken the LRA and reduce its ability to fight and
Children. Both organizations conducted independent leaflet drops from their sustain itself through pillaging. The coalition of mili-
own aircraft and made efforts to synchronize their targeting and messages tary forces and NGOs called the villages that joined
with USSOF. The RPT and Invisible Children, in particular, shared photo- this initiative “safe reporting sites” or SRS, and they
graphs of defectors and concepts for messages, to include the leaflets them- were usually co-located with AU-RTF contingents
selves, with Invisible Children often providing assistance with graphic design or the COFCs. The RPT advertised the location of
and translation. Throughout the course of OOC, the U.S. disseminated more these SRS through leaflets, radio and loudspeaker
than one million leaflets.29 One U.S. veteran of the operation described this messages broadcast from helicopters. The AU-RTF
as a “massive littering campaign,” but qualified that statement further: provided security details to prevent the SRS from be-
"The goal wasn’t just to litter, it was to send a signal to the LRA. Where the ing attacked in reprisals. Invisible Children provided
leaflets dropped, and we started using crossing points, watering holes, tradi- a network of high-frequency radio transmitters to
tional rat lines, etcetera, either the foraging [LRA] group commanders had to the SRS villages and neighboring settlements to both
avoid the area or risk their troops learning of the [defection] program… and if provide early warning of attacks and to alert the
they avoided the traditional places, their soldiers knew something [was differ- community when LRA defectors arrived.
ent] just by that avoidance. [LRA] commanders had to decide whether to inform Once defectors arrived at the SRS, the local
Kony and company [that] there were flyers [leaflets] in the area and risk him volunteers (civilian villagers) would contact AU-RTF
having them killed for exposure to those things. [LRA] commanders had to de- and U.S. Special Operations security forces, who
cide what to tell their people, and even when they didn’t tell their people [about would debrief them. NGOs would provide medi-
the leaflets], info leaked… and [LRA] commanders had to decide for themselves cal aid and counseling, as well as help to locate the
We heard many messages ... we heard voices of different

people who were with us before, we even saw pictures which
were dropped using the helicopter. All of them were telling
us to come home. Others asked us to put our weapons down.
For me, I heard my mother’s voice and saw her picture, too.
what to do with the information they had about the defection from these leaf- defectors’ places of origin and families. The entire
lets… to take advantage of it or risk losing more than they already had." 30 process was decentralized and ran delicately; it
Another technique the U.S. employed was the use of aerial loudspeak- was dependent on the goodwill and shared objec-
er systems. These loudspeakers were mounted on helicopters and flown tives of all parties involved. If a group of villagers
over the bush to broadcast messages over a range of approximately one attacked defectors in retaliation for their past acts,
mile on either side of the aircraft. These systems were used to broadcast the attack would have the potential to stifle further
pre-recorded messages as well as live broadcasts from well-known com- defections for months. The system was admittedly
municators such as Lacambel and former LRA commander Caesar Acel- fragile, but functioned very effectively.
lam. One former LRA fighter recalls: Promoting internal divisions within the LRA
"We heard many messages. Since we were in Garamba [National Park, DRC] served two purposes. The first is that it weakened
we could listen to radios and Dwog Cen Paco [‘Come Home’] program. Then on the effectiveness of the LRA as an organization
helicopter we heard voices of different people who were with us before, we even by undermining the morale of its leadership. The
saw pictures which were dropped using the helicopter. All of them were telling second is that it created additional internal pres-
us to come home. Others asked us to put our weapons down. For me, I heard my sures on its members that could lead to additional
mother’s voice and saw her picture, too." 31 defections or the loss of manpower to internal
This second line of effort was perhaps more challenging. To get a conflict.32 The RPT worked toward these ends by
formerly victimized village to the point of willingly, and peacefully, ac- disseminating certain types of information to the
cepting former LRA defectors was a complex task and required a series of LRA. The most prominent was the advertisement of
preparatory measures. The first step in sensitizing populations to the idea cash rewards programs. Because Kony and his most
of receiving LRA defectors was to identify which villages were the most notorious officers had been indicted by the Inter-
supportive of the idea and also identifiable by the LRA as landmarks. It is national Criminal Court, the Department of State’s
no small thing to ask a population to receive a former fighter with open War Crimes Rewards Program offered a reward of
arms when those same fighters likely maimed, raped and killed members up to $5 million for information leading to their
of that village in the very recent past. capture. The U.S. Department of Defense also had

03
a rewards program in place. By advertising these rewards for the capture

of an LRA member or information on their whereabouts, the AU-RTF
could effectively motivate thousands of people in the area of operations
who were familiar with the territory. This was intended to convey a sense
of area denial to Kony. It was also a potential means to motivate indi-
viduals within Sudan who had access to Kony to give him up.
With the aid of local partners, the RPT translated messages advertis-
ing these programs into seven languages (Acholi, Arabic, French, Lingala,
Pazande, Songo and Swahili) and used leaflets, radio and loudspeakers
for dissemination throughout the LRA’s range.33 These messages were in-
tended to increase the psychological pressure on Kony and his command-
ers, to convey the sense that he was being hunted and make him feel that
01 he could trust no one; for instance, even the Sudanese might give him
up for a handsome reward. Interviews with one former LRA commander
indicated that Kony was aware of these rewards as early as 2005, and that
they caused him to be increasingly concerned over his security and dimin-
ished his trust in subordinates.34
These efforts were very successful in many respects. Reports from
defectors indicated that the LRA were concerned by “bounties” for Kony,
and residents of surrounding areas sought additional details from the US-
SOF advisers. In October 2013, a rural hunter in the DRC, motivated by
rumors of these cash rewards, shot and killed an LRA commander whom
he caught at a river crossing. The RPT subsequently broadcast the death of
this commander over partner radio stations and over Voice of America’s
Africa shortwave network, which led to yet another defection from the
deceased LRA commander’s group.35
The fourth line of effort, which employed precision targeting for
defection of specific members of the LRA, was perhaps the most complex.
Crafting effective messages for individuals with whom the outside world
02 has had no contact for 5-15 years took a great deal of time and consider-
ation. The RPT conducted basic character studies of these targets based on
01
A solar-powered FM radio station constructed in the Central
known family members or childhood histories and make an inventory of all
African Republic. Radio stations like this were established in available media to which the target would be susceptible. For instance, did
remote villages to extend the range of clear signals that could the target have a wife or mother left behind or who had already returned to
reach the Lord's Resistance Army. Uganda? Was there someone in Uganda whom he trusted? Did he have a fa-
vorite musician or teacher? Did he join the LRA for political reasons or had
02
he been abducted? Essentially, the driving question was, what vulnerabili-
A United Nations mobile radio team in Bangadi, Democratic
ties did the target have that could be exploited to leverage his defection?
Republic of Congo, promotes defection through broadcasts
These improved, targeted messages resulted in several successful defec-
aimed at armed rebels.
tions, including that of Michael Omona, Kony’s signaler,36 who defected
03 in response to a series of messages crafted specifically for him in 2016.37
A Soldier from the 7th Psychological Operations Battalion drops Omona may have defected in part thanks to his privileged access to radio
leaflets into the dense jungles where the LRA operated. broadcasts given his proximity to Kony, but, according to interviews,
U.S. ARMY PHOTOS Omona credits the content of the messages with influencing his defection.38

NOTES 01. Ledio Cakaj, “$800 Million Later, Joseph Kony is
Still a Threat,” Foreign Policy, June 28, 2017: https://foreignpolicy.
The fifth line of effort was the expansion of media infrastructure
PSYOP ISSUE
com/2017/06/28/800-million-later-joseph-kony-is-still-a-threat/ 02.
and access. In the parts of central Africa where the LRA operated, Michael M. Phillips, “U.S. to Rebels: Listen to Mom – Commandos Wage
there is very little in the way of civilian technological infrastructure Psychological Battle to Draw Last of Joseph Kony’s Troops out of African
and most villages in the area did not even have cellular phone service. Bush,” Wall Street Journal, March 11, 2017; Patrick Tucker, “How US
The RPT identified which media the LRA were most susceptible to, Special Operators Helped Take Down Joseph Kony’s Army with Tailored
and found through interviews with former LRA members that radio Messages, Defense One, October 17, 2017: https://www.defenseone.com/
remained a highly effective medium. However, Kony feared his rank- technology/2017/10/how-4-green-berets-took-down-joseph-konys-
army-tailored-messages/141851/ ; USAFRICOM posture statements
and-file troops hearing radio messages, and only allowed his officers
2014-2017. 03. Much of this research was conducted as part of the
to listen to radio programs.39 Despite LRA leaders’ overall wariness author’s master’s thesis at Naval Postgraduate School with Major
of messages from the Ugandan government, they would still listen to Benon Hatangimana of the Uganda People’s Defense Force. It includes
the radio for information about the outside world and for the occa- interviews with veterans of the conflict from both sides, interviews with
sional bit of music once they had camped for the night or before they other witnesses and experts on the LRA, and the author’s own experi-
began moving early in the morning. Many of them still listened to ence as a participant in the campaign. The identity of the majority of
Lacambel’s program, Dwog Paco, despite Kony’s prohibitions.40 these interviewees, with few exceptions, remains confidential by mutual
agreement. 04. Fredrick Odoi-Tanga, “Politics, Ethnicity, and Conflict in
With this in mind, the RPT sought to improve broadcast radio
Post-Independence Acholiland, Uganda 1962–2006,” Ph.D. Dissertation
network coverage to reach LRA-occupied areas and increase access to (Pretoria: University of Pretoria, 2010), 11. 05. Caroline Lamwaka, The
shortwave frequencies that could penetrate the entire continent of Raging Storm :A Reporter’s Inside Account of the Northern Uganda War
Africa. Thanks to the assistance of U.S. Embassy - Kampala, Voice of 1986-2005, Kampala, Uganda: Fountain Publishers, 2016: 50-51. 06.
America granted access to the programming editors for its Africa divi- Ruddy Doom and Koen Vlassenroot, “Kony’s Message: A New Koine? The
sion. The RPT then began providing VOA with scripts that conveyed Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda.” African Affairs 98 (1999):
messages meant for Kony, the LRA and surrounding populations in the 9, 13. 07. Doom and Vlassenroot, 15. 08. Author Interview with John
Baptist “Lacambel” Oryema, Gulu, Uganda, July 13, 2017. 09. Doom and
DRC, CAR, and South Sudan. VOA broadcasted these messages over its
Vlassenroot, 23. 10. Lamwaka, 104. 11. Author Interview with a former
four shortwave frequencies in English, French, Arabic and Swahili. LRA commander, Gulu, Uganda, July 11, 2017. 12. Author Interview with
The SOCFWD also built new FM radio stations in the Central Afri- an UPDF Officer, Gulu, Uganda, July 10, 2017. 13. Author interview with a
can Republic to extend the range of clear, FM radio signals that could former LRA commander, Gulu, Uganda, July 11, 2017. 14. Phuong Pham,
reach the LRA. These stations were established in remote villages and Patrick Vinck, and Eric Stover, “The Lord’s Resistance Army and Forced
all of the materials were flown in by air for assembly. Local operators Conscription in Northern Uganda,” Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008):
in these villages were identified and trained by NGO partners on how 404. 15. Author Interview with the Uganda Amnesty Commission, Gulu,
Uganda, July 12, 2017. 16. Ibid. 17. Sverker Finstrom. Living with Bad
to run a solar-powered radio station, including developing content in
Surroundings. Durham: Duke University Press, 2008: 225. 18. Author
the recording studio and how to manage and implement the defec- Interview with an UPDF Officer, Gulu, Uganda, July 10, 2017. 19. Author
tion messaging effectively on the stations’ computerized scheduling Interview with Lacambel. Lacambel also served as a mediator in the talks
systems. Existing FM radio stations in CAR, previously established between the UPDA and the NRA according to Lamwaka, 146. 20. Author
by NGOs, were repaired or enhanced. The UN managed two radio sta- interview with a former LRA commander, Gulu, Uganda, July 11, 2017. 21.
tions in the DRC, supported by the NGO the Voice Project. The Voice Author Interview with an UPDF Officer, Pader, Uganda, July 11, 2017. 22.
Project provided FM stations with programming content and training Sam Kolo was formerly the LRA’s spokesman. 23. Author interview with
a former LRA commander, Gulu, Uganda, July 11, 2017. 24. Janine Clark,
for the stations’ operators.41 The RPT coordinated directly with these “The ICC, Uganda, and the LRA: Re-Framing the Debate,” African Studies,
NGOs, and with MONUSCO, in the effort to synchronize program- 2010: 145. 25. Author Interviews with an UPDF Officer, Gulu, Uganda, July
ming and share supporting programming content across the AO. 10, 2017. 26. Jonathan Fisher, “Framing Kony: Uganda’s War, Obama’s
Advisers, and the Nature of ‘Influence’ in Western Foreign Policy Making,”
Third World Quarterly, 2014: 692–3. 27. White House Office of the Press
Secretary, “Fact Sheet: Mitigating and Eliminating the Threat to Civilians
CONCLUSION Posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army, April 23, 2012. 28. David Ocitti,
The effectiveness of U.S. PSYOP efforts in OOC were due to interview with group of former LRA combatants, Gulu, Uganda, transcript
deliberate, and dedicated efforts to understand the operational provided by correspondence, October 11, 2017. 29. Author Interview
environment and apply influence through an indigenous approach. with AFRICOM Staff, Stuttgart, Germany, October 19, 2017. 30. Author
The techniques employed by the RPTs were not necessarily new to the Interview with USSOF Operator, Monterey, CA, September 12, 2017. 31.
conflict, but many had been forgotten by the operational UPDF of the David Ocitti, Interview with Group of Former LRA, Gulu, Uganda, Provided
by Correspondence, October 11, 2017. 32. Initial defections provided
day or were out of their reach. By reincorporating and amplifying the
what psychologists call “social proof” that encouraged later defections.
kinds of appeals that the Ugandans had effectively employed in the 33. For more information see Scott Ross, “Encouraging Rebel Demobiliza-
previous 20 years of the conflict, U.S. Army Special Operations Forces, tion by Radio in Uganda and the DR Congo: the Case of ’Come Home’
assisted by local partners and a dedicated group of civilian volunteers, Messaging,” African Studies Review, 2016:38. 34. Author Interview
improved the overall effectiveness of the combined counter-LRA ef- with a Former LRA Commander, Gulu, Uganda, July 11, 2017. 35. See
fort and effectively neutralized Kony’s forces. SW Voice of America, “Aiding Those Who Defect from the LRA,” September
3, 2013: https://editorials.voa.gov/a/aiding-those-who-defect-from-
the-lra/1742782.html. 36. A signaler in the LRA is the equivalent of a
ABOUT THE AUTHOR radio-telephone operator (RTO) communications specialist in the U.S.
Maj. Jonathan Easter deployed in support of Operation Observant Army. 37. Author Interview with USSOF Operator, Fort Bragg, NC, June 14,
Compass in 2013. In 2017, he traveled to Uganda to conduct research for 2017. 38. David Ocitti, Interview with former LRA members, transcript
his master's thesis on the lessons learned from the combined Ugandan/ provided by personal correspondence, October 11, 2017. 39. Ledio
U.S. campaign against the LRA, published later that year by Naval Cakaj, When the Walking Defeats You: One Man’s Journey as Joseph
Kony’s Bodyguard, London: Zed Books, 2016: 355. 40. Ibid. 41. Author
Postgraduate School. MAJ Easter is currently the commander of A/7th
interview with Staff of the Voice Project, September 15, 2017.
POB (A), 4th POG (A), 1st SFC (A) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

[ BOOK RE VIEW ]
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WAR FOR VIETNAM, 1960-1968
The Vietnam War is arguably one of the most heav- Operationally, Dr. Roberts describes how hit-or-miss
ily covered conflicts in American history. However, techniques of previous warfare changed to more refined
within that war is the little known story of psychological and accurate as phenomenal changes forced improve-
operations. A trained practitioner himself and a profes- ments in tactics, techniques and procedures. He also was
sor of history, Dr. Myevyn Roberts discusses PSYOP in a clear in outlining impediments that prevented PSYOP
clear, concise manner. He begins with the struggle of the from being as effective as it could have been. Many of
state to contend with a low-level insurgency that quickly those impediments are familiar to the current genera-
deteriorated into a full-blown war. tion of practitioners and point to
Hostile neighbors infiltrated forces the necessity of heeding the lessons
and materiel in an attempt to forc-
of history.
ibly unite North and South Vietnam
At the conclusion of the book,
under a Marxist regime.
Dr. Roberts clearly states the overall
Dr. Roberts begins his in-depth
success of both U.S. and South
study by placing the emerging
Vietnamese PSYOP in undermin-
conflict in the context of post-World
ing Marxist efforts to bring down
War II and post-French withdrawal
and how the international commu- the southern government as well as
nity supported a temporary divi- significantly eroding any support
sion of Vietnam into northern and among the southern population for
southern states, pending eventual North Vietnamese goals and objec-
unification. However, the key to the tives. The reasons he cited for the
impending conflict was that the free- eventual collapse of the southern
world powers envisioned a peaceful, government and state were sol-
democratic, united Vietnam while idly political in that U.S. President
the Soviet Bloc sought a Marxist Lyndon Johnson’s political consid-
united Vietnam. So the spark of war erations overshadowed military
rapidly flared into an active insur- requirements, severely inhibiting
gency where North Vietnam sought U.S. ability to not only conduct mili-
BOOK DETAILS
to cause the collapse of the south tary operations, but to support and
By Dr. Mervyn Edwin Roberts III
without risking active U.S. interven- University Press of Kansas develop South Vietnam. This lack of
tion. Dr. Roberts traces U.S. PSYOP 2018, 432 pages; U.S. fundamental support for the
participation in the southern Repub- ISBN 978-0-7006-2583-3; southern state eroded its strength,
lic of Vietnam from its earliest days Price: $39.95 morale and eventually its ability to
in 1956 with the establishment of defend itself, and no PSYOP effort,
the PSYWAR Center in Saigon until REVIEWED BY
Ian J. Courter , B.A., M.A., however well executed, could save it.
just after the Tet Offensive of 1968.
a prior service PSYOP soldier and The only real criticism leveled
The author describes the start
now a doctrine writer for the against this book would be a lack of
of U.S. efforts with the formation
PSYOP Commandant’s Office at any indication of a follow-on work
of a Vietnamese capability from
the U.S. Army John F. Kennedy that would cover 1968-1975 and the
virtually nothing in a special op-
Special Warfare Center and School. fall of South Vietnam. The lessons
erations advise and assist role to a
progressively more active role that and other information this book
increasingly consisted of operations with conventional provides seems incomplete and not the whole story as it
forces. In the later years covered in this book, he relates relates to PSYOP in Vietnam. However, as a stand-alone
how the organization of PSYOP forces changed from work, this book is very well written and documented. Most
only a few units to battalions, then to the creation of importantly, it covers an overlooked part of one of the
the 2nd, 4th, and 7th PSYOP Groups in 1965 and 1967, most contentious conflicts this nation experienced — the
showing how that brief period saw explosive demand for role of psychological operations and what the soldiers
the capability, which led to the creation of much of the did to fight a determined and formidable enemy. It is well
structure that exists today. worth the read. SW

Department of the Army
JFK Special Warfare Center and School
ATTN: AOJK-PAO
3004 Ardennes Street, Stop A
Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9610
This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited • Headquarters, Department of the Army • PB 80-19-2
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS BLACK KNIGHT CULMINATION EXERCISE
U.S. ARMY PHOTO BY SGT. 1ST CLASS JACOB BRAMAN | PIN: 107222-000

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CONTENTS JANUARY - MARCH 2019

VOLUME 32 | ISSUE 1 ON THE COVER

ARTICLES Regiment turned 100. In celebration

25 | The Next Century of PSYOP

from the sense of the word, we

Regiment, but also at its future. Of note, is an article we republished from an

earlier Special Warfare that pays tribute to the "Father of Psychological

“selling” the need for an unconventional warfare capability to senior military

idea of unconventional warfare he kept pushing. The connection between our

directly back to the Psychological Operations Regiment.

04 Special warfare | HTTPS://WWW.SOC.MIL/SWCS/SWMAG/SWMAG.HTM

JANUARY - MARCH 2019 | special warfare 05

06 Special warfare | HTTPS://WWW.SOC.MIL/SWCS/SWMAG/SWMAG.HTM

FIGURE 01: HIERARCHY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS MODEL

PO(A) PO(U) PO(S) PO(P) PO(I) PO(B)

JANUARY - MARCH 2019 | special warfare 07

08 Special warfare | HTTPS://WWW.SOC.MIL/SWCS/SWMAG/SWMAG.HTM

Acceptance Non-Commitment Rejection

Discrepancy between Anchor and Desired Behavior

JANUARY - MARCH 2019 | special warfare 09

JANUARY - MARCH 2019 | special warfare 11

ished. Eisenhower once again called upon McClure, directing

PHOTOS COURTESY OF THE

JANUARY - MARCH 2019 | special warfare 13

after being assured that the Army was interested in orga-

nized behind-the-lines operations that Volckmann agreed

14 Special warfare | HTTPS://WWW.SOC.MIL/SWCS/SWMAG/SWMAG.HTM

JANUARY - MARCH 2019 | special warfare 15

BACK FROM THE BRINK

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The moves toward selectivity when

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changes, if they fail to change the se-

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media is network-based, media heavy

extensive time and experimenting to observe. Maintaining continuity on

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As Psychological Operations enters its second

the relations in the global system as being part of the

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ORIGINS OF THE CONFLICT

OF ATTRITION on revenues from the government bureaucracy,

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he prepared leaflets to advertise the Amnesty Statute and the subsequent

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We heard many messages ... we heard voices of different

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a rewards program in place. By advertising these rewards for the capture

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