Cayetano v.

Monsod

G.R. No. 100113 | September 3, 1991

FACTS:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments.
Petitioner Renato Cayetano opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Monsod
has worked as a lawyer in the law office of his father (1960-1963); an operations officer with the World
Bank Group (1963-1970); Chief Executive Officer of an investment bank (1970-1986); legal or economic
consultant on various companies (1986); Secretary General of NAMFREL (1986); member of
Constitutional Commission (1986-1987); National Chairman of NAMFREL (1987); and member of the
quasi-judicial Davide Commission (1990).

the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
Monsod’s nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent posseses the required qualification of having engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.

HELD: YES

The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Monsod possessed the required qualification.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. “To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered to be in
the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person,
firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies.

Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to
their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. Atty. Monsod’s past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

In general, a practice of law requires a lawyer and client relationship, it is whether in or out of court. As
such, the petition is dismissed.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative
Case No. MDD-1)

FACTS:

Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution in Administrative Case (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for
consideration and approval, pursuant to the By-Laws of the IBP.

the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above;

he submitted his comment reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.

The respondent, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the
Court Rule) — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the
provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws .

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP
By-Laws, whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the
Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default
in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the
Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court
Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter
be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his
status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues,
and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is
admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the
Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but
is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

Issue: WNOT THE provisions of the Court Rule AS TO THE EFFECT OF NON PAYMENT OF DUES IS A
ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys and of the IBP
By-Laws, AS TO THE authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the
removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys are void and of no legal force and
effect.

RULING: the court rule and the IBP BY LAWS ARE VALID.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power
of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If
he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate).

Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive
group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme
Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal
services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring
payment of a membership fee is void.

We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and
duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of
the Philippine Bar— which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of
regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and
purposes of integration.

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to
a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional
rights.

Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder
of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that
under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practice law before the courts of this country
should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as
a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of
a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys,
 it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion.

The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5)

the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is
indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from
bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his
portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an
official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to
all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a
reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member.

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers.

it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and
universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession.

The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public
interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. The practice of law being clothed
with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the
exercise of the police power"

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it
did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State, for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est
supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the
rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all
freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.

But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),
and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the
power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the
practice of law.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial
A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
A.C. No. 5473, January 23, 2018

GENE M. DOMINGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.

A disbarred lawyer who is found to have committed an offense that constitutes another ground prior to
his eventual disbarment may be heavily fined therefor. The Court does not lose its exclusive jurisdiction
over his other disbarrable act or actuation committed while he was still a member of the Law Profession.

The Case

complaint for disbarment instituted by Gene Domingo (complainant) against Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,
Jr. (respondent), alleging that the latter deliberately and feloniously induced and persuaded the former
into releasing almost half a million pesos on the false pretense of having performed and accomplished
legal services for him.

The complainant is an American citizen of Filipino descent. During a visit to the Philippines in 2000, he
sought the services of a lawyer to handle the cases to be filed against his cousin Melchor Arruiza and to
work on the settlement of the estate of his late mother Judith Arruiza. petitioner met respondent, a
lawyer recommended by a friend. Petitioner informed respondent about his need for the services of a
lawyer for the rescission of Melchor Arruiza's adoption and for the settlement of his mother's estate.

The complainant alleged that the respondent represented to him that he would take on the cases in
behalf of the law firm of Agabin Verzola Hermoso Layaoen & De Castro, where he worked as an
associate. He assured petitioner that the law firm was able and willing to act as his legal counsel in the
cases he intended to institute against his adopted brother, and to undertake the transfer of his mother's
properties to his and his children's names. Trusting the representations of respondent, the complainant
agreed to engage respondent and his law firm, and paid the initial amount of P80,000.00.

Being based in the United States of America, the complainant maintained constant communication with
respondent often through electronic mail (e-mail) and sometimes by telephone to get updates on the
cases. The complainant alleged that based on his correspondences with respondent, the latter made
several misrepresentations, as follows:

[a)] He had filed the annulment of adoption of Melchor Arruiza in Abra, stating that the hearing would
commence by the end of May 2000; and that the trial had been brought to completion;

[b)] He was processing the transfer of the titles of the properties [in the names of petitioner and his
children;]

[c)] He processed the cancellation of the adverse claim of Melchor Arruiza annotated on the two titles of
the properties, claiming that he was there at the Land Registration Authority in Quezon City for the final
approval of the cancellation;

[d)] He was processing the payment of taxes and other fees on the properties to be transferred,
including capital gains tax, transfer tax, registration fees and documentary stamp tax;

[e)] That he was negotiating with the Bureau of Internal Revenue to reduce the tax from P80,000.00 to
P10,000.00;

[f)]That the new titles in the names of petitioner's children would be ready by July 20, 2000;
[g)]That the new titles in the children's names were issued;

[h)]That Melchor Arruiza opposed the cancellation of the adoption, and boasted that he knew many big
time politicians in Abra who would help him;

[i)]That the Judge handling the case for the cancellation of the adoption [would] rule in petitioner's favor
only if he would give to the Judge 10% of the value of the property in Better Living Subdivision,
Parañaque City;

[j)]That the Judge agreed on x x x P200,000.00 but he (respondent) needed an additional P50,000.00
"for the boys" in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court;

[k)] That the Judge [already wrote] a decision in petitioner's favor, but [for his protection insisted upon a
kaliwaan of the copy of the decision and the payment;]

[l)] That the Judge received the money and [already promulgated the] decision in petitioner's favor;

[m)] That said decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals and eventually to the Supreme Court
where respondent was working doubly hard to influence [a favourable] outcome;

[n)] That the Supreme Court had to meet en banc on the decision of the Abra Regional Trial Court (RTC)
Judge in petitioner's favor; and

[o)] That in consideration of all the above transactions, he (respondent) needed money [totalling]
P433,002.61 [as payment to the Judge, BIR and related agencies, actual expenses and legal fees], [but
requested] the payment in staggered amounts and on different dates

Based on the respondent's representation as to how justice was achieved in the Philippines, the
complainant was constrained to give to the respondent the requested amounts in the belief that he
had no choice. The complainant would repeatedly request the original or at the very least copies of
the decisions and the titles by e-mail, facsimile (fax) or courier service, but respondent repeatedly
failed to comply with the requests, giving various reasons or excuses. The respondent even
volunteered to meet with the complainant in the United States of America to personally deliver the
promised documents. The respondent never went to the United States of America to meet with the
complainant. He also did not turn over the requested documents to the latter. Even worse, the
respondent ultimately tried to avoid the complainant by cutting off communications between them.

Given the respondent's evasion, the complainant decided to write the law firm of Agabin Verzola
Hermoso Layaoen & De Castro to inform them of the fraudulent actions of the respondent. The
complainant was surprised to be informed by the law firm that he had never been its client. The law
firm also told him that the respondent had been forced to resign from the law office because of
numerous complaints about his performance as a lawyer.

Hence, the complainant terminated the services of the respondent for refusal to respond and to
surrender the alleged documents in his possession. He engaged the services of another law firm to verify
the status of the cases allegedly brought by respondent in petitioner's behalf. The new law firm secured
a certification from the RTC of Abra to the effect that no case against Melchor Arruiza had been filed.
The complainant also discovered that none of the representations of the respondent, had come to
pass because all of such representations were sham and intended to induce him to remit almost half a
million pesos to the respondent.

the complainant filed his complaint for disbarment in this the Court accusing the respondent of
committing acts in violation of Canons 1, 2, 13, 15 & 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

the Court required the respondent to comment. In his comment the respondent denied the accusations,
and countered as follows:

a) Petitioner wanted to have the adoption of Melchor D. Arruiza by his late mother Judith D. Arruiza
granted by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Dolores-San Juan in the Province of Abra annulled
because he had not been informed about the adoption which affected his inheritance, particularly with
respect to the two parcels of land located in Parañaque City. Petitioner related to respondent why he
(petitioner) filed the action for annulment of adoption in the RTC in Parañaque City, but the RTC
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction over the case;

b) Following the dismissal of the case, petitioner desperately wanted to revive it in the RTC in Abra.
Petitioner also wanted the annotation of rights, title and interest of Melchor Arruiza as a legally adopted
son of his late mother on the two titles cancelled, and to have the properties transferred in the names of
petitioner's children;

c) Respondent explained to petitioner that it would be very hard to revive the case because the order of
adoption issued on May 25, 1979 had long become final and executory;

d) It would also be inconvenient for petitioner to pursue the cancellation case considering that he was a
permanent resident of the United States of America and the need for his personal presence at the RTC
in Abra to testify against his adopted brother;

e) Respondent further told petitioner that his law firm at the time did not allow its members to handle
personal cases, especially if the cases were filed in far flung provinces; and that the particular case of
annulment of the judgment of adoption, being a special proceeding, would take years to finish inasmuch
as the losing party would likely elevate the matter up to the Supreme Court and would be very costly in
terms of expenses and attorney's fees;

f) Respondent claimed that petitioner still profusely pleaded with him to pursue the case no matter
how much it would cost him, as long as his adopted brother was prevented from inheriting from the
estate of his mother;

g) Respondent tried to talk some sense into petitioner, particularly that it was only just and fair that his
adopted brother would inherit from their mother, but petitioner could not be swayed;

h) Even though respondent sensed the greediness, wickedness and scheming design of petitioner, he
still accepted the engagement to handle the case of annulment of the judgment of adoption, as well as
to have the annotations at the back of the titles cancelled and eventually have the properties
transferred in the names of petitioner's children;

i) Respondent proposed that petitioner pay P500,000.00, more or less, as the total package of expenses
and attorney's fees; petitioner agreed to the proposal and promised to remit the amount by installment
upon his return to the United States of America, and to send the special power of attorney authorizing
respondent to bring the case against Melchor Arruiza;

j) As a means of protecting the interest of petitioner, respondent offered to issue a check for
P500,000.00 as a security for the amount to be remitted by petitioner from his United States of America
account; his offer of the check was to give a sign of his good faith, because his primary aim was to
provide the best and effective legal services petitioner needed under the circumstances;

k) Respondent then prepared an affidavit of self-adjudication for petitioner respecting the two
properties registered in the name of petitioner's late mother; he caused the publication of the affidavit
in a tabloid;

1) Respondent informed petitioner that there was no way for him to win the annulment case unless he
personally appeared and testified against his adopted brother, but petitioner said that he could not
personally testify because he feared for his life due to Abra being an NPA-infested area;

m) On August 27, 2001, respondent went on and filed the complaint for annulment of the adoption in
the RTC in Abra, even without any firm assurance from petitioner that he would personally appear in
court;

n) After the filing of the case, petitioner started making unreasonable demands, like having an
immediate decision from the RTC in Abra in his favor, the cancellation of the adverse claim of his
adopted brother on the titles of the properties, and transferring the titles in the names of petitioner's
three children;

o) Respondent tried to explain to petitioner that his demands were impossible to meet because civil and
special proceedings cases take years to finish inasmuch as the aggrieved parties would elevate the cases
up to the Supreme Court; and that the cancellation of the adverse claim would depend on the outcome
of the case they filed, but his refusal to appear and testify was still a problem;

p) Petitioner still adamantly insisted that respondent comply with his demands, or else he would sue
him if he did not.

the Court referred the complaint for disbarment and the comment to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.

The IBP's Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation the IBP-CBD found the respondent guilty of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility with respect to negligence in the performance of his duties towards his
client, and recommended the penalty of reprimand with a stem warning that a repetition of the
offense would warrant a more severe penalty. It ruled that the proceeding before it was basically a
disciplinary proceeding; that it could only decide on the fitness of respondent to continue in the practice
of law;that it could not go beyond the sanctions that could be imposed under the Rules of Court; that it
had the power to require the restitution of the client's money as part of the penalty; that it could only
order the restitution of whatever amount that was given by petitioner to respondent but not other
monetary claims of petitioner like travel and plane fare and litigation expenses, which were properly
within the jurisdiction of other authorities; and that, accordingly, it ordered respondent to immediately
deliver to petitioner the amount of P513,000.00, plus interest computed at the legal rate.
In Resolution , the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner.

the complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that Resolution be reconsidered and set
aside, and that the appropriate penalty of disbarment, or, at the very least, suspension be imposed on
the respondent.

the IBP Board of Governors DENIED the complainant's Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that
the Board had no jurisdiction to consider and resolve the matter by virtue of its having already been
endorsed to the Court.

After the IBP denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, the complainant filed his petition.

ISSUE: WNOT IBP Resolution be reconsidered and set aside, and that the appropriate penalty of
disbarment, or, at the very least, suspension be imposed on the respondent.

Ruling of the Court

After reviewing the established circumstances of the case, the Court accepts the findings against the
respondent but modifies the recommended penalty considering that his violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility constituted deliberate defraudation of the client instead of mere
negligence.

Firstly, the respondent misled the complainant into thinking that it would be his law firm that was to
take on the case.

Secondly, despite the fact that he had intimated to the complainant that it would be highly unlikely to
still have the adoption decree nullified due to the decree having long become final and executory, he
nonetheless accepted the case.

Thirdly, he told the complainant that he had already instituted the action for the annulment of the
adoption despite not having yet done so.

Fourthly, he kept on demanding more money from the complainant although the case was not
actually even moving forward.

Fifthly, he continued to make up excuses in order to avoid having to furnish to the complainant the
requested copies of court documents that, in the first place, he could not produce. And,

lastly, he claimed that he intended to return the money to the complainant but instead sent the latter
a stale check.

All these acts, whether taken singly or together, manifested the respondent's dishonesty and deceit
towards the complainant, his client, in patent violation of Rule 1.0128 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

We note that the respondent filed the case for the annulment of the adoption decree only on August
27, 2001 after the complainant had sent him the demand letter dated April 10, 2001. Such filing was
already during the pendency of the administrative investigation of the complaint against him in the IBP.
Had the complainant not threatened to charge him administratively, he would not have filed the
petition for annulment of the adoption at all.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

The Court has consistently held, in respect of this Rule, that the mere failure of the lawyer to perform
the obligations due to the client is considered per se a violation.

Despite the fact that the complainant engaged his services and advanced sums of money to cover the
court fees and related expenses to be incurred along the way, the respondent did not file the petition
for annulment. His conduct was reprehensible because it amounted to dishonesty and plain deceit. His
filing of the petition for annulment later on did not mitigate his sin because he did so only because he
had meanwhile received the complainant's demand letter that contained the threat of filing
administrative charges against him. Moreover, he repeatedly did not inform the complainant on the
actual status of the petition although the latter regularly sought to be updated. Instead, the respondent
kept on making up excuses and conjured up pretenses to make it appear that the case was moving
along. His conduct of accepting money for his legal services in handling the annulment of the adoption
decree, and of failing to render the contracted legal services violated Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Also, the highly fiduciary and confidential relation of attorney and client
required that he as the lawyer should promptly account for all the funds received from, or held by him
for, the complainant as the client.

Furthermore, the respondent did not abide by the mandate of Canon 15 that required members of the
Legal Profession to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their
clients.

In their conversations, the respondent told the complainant that the judge handling the case would rule
in their favor only if he would be given 10% of the value of the property at Better Living Subdivision,
Parañaque, and that the handling judge consequently agreed on the fee of P200,000.00 but needed an
additional P50,000.00 "for the boys" in the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. In doing so, the
respondent committed calumny, and thereby violated Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:

Rule 15.06- A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or
legislative body.

Rule 15.07 -A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and principles of fairness.

Members of the Bench are tasked with ensuring that the ends of justice are served. Such negative
imputations against them and the collegial bodies of the Judiciary on the part of the respondent tended
to erode the trust and confidence of the people in our judicial system. The Court should not take such
conduct of the respondent lightly considering that the image of the Judiciary was thereby diminished in
the eyes of the public; hence, the Court must severely reprove the respondent.

The respondent's commission of various offenses constituting professional misconduct only

demonstrated his unworthiness to remain as a member of the Legal Profession. He ought to be
disbarred for such offenses upon this complaint alone.
A review of his record as an admitted member of the Bar shows, however, that in Que v. Revilla, Jr.,the
Court had disbarred him from the Legal Profession upon finding him guilty of violations of the Lawyers
Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12; Rule 19.01, Canon
19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

In view of his prior disbarment, we can no longer impose the appropriate penalty of disbarment as
deserved because we do not have double or multiple disbarments in this jurisdiction.

In the meanwhile, the respondent filed a so-called Most Respectful Motion to Dismiss in which he
adverted to the earlier submission through his Manifestation of the copy of the amicable settlement he
had concluded with the complainant to the effect that, among others, he had already paid back to the
latter, through his lawyer (Atty. Hope Ruiz Valenzuela), the amount of P650,000.00 "as full and
complete settlement of the Complainant's claims against the Respondent." He thereby sought the
dismissal of the complaint out of "justice and fairness."

In the resolution promulgated on September 22, 2015, the Court merely noted without action the
Manifestation dated April 21, 2015.

The Most Respectful Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the amicable settlement between the parties
cannot be granted. Although the amicable settlement obliterated the legal obligation to return to the
complainant the amounts obtained by deceit, the respondent was not entitled to demand the dismissal
of the charges against him for that reason. He ought to have known that his professional responsibilities
as an attorney were distinct from his other responsibilities. To be clear, the primary objective of
administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers but
also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the
misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their
Lawyer's Oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of
the Bar.

Moreover, the practice of law is a privilege heavily burdened with conditions. Every attorney is a
vanguard of our legal system, and, as such, is expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a
very high standard of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing in order that the people's faith and
confidence in the legal system are ensured. He must then conduct himself, whether in dealing with his
clients or with the public at large, as to be beyond reproach at all times. Any violation of the high moral
standards of the Legal Profession justifies the imposition on the attorney of the appropriate penalty,
including suspension and disbarment. Verily, the respondent's deceitful conduct as an attorney rendered
him directly answerable to the Court on ethical, professional and legal grounds despite the fact that he
and the complainant had amicably settled any differences they had that might have compelled the
complainant to bring the complaint against him.

In fine, the gravity of the respondent's professional misconduct and deceit should fully warrant his
being permanently barred from reinstatement to the ranks of the Philippine Bar and from having his
name restored in the Roll of Attorneys.

However, circumstances attendant in his case should be considered and appreciated in mitigating the
penalty to be imposed.
The first of such circumstances related to the context of the engagement between the parties. Upon
reflecting on the adverse effects on his inheritance from his late mother of his cousin's adoption by her,
the complainant had engaged the respondent's legal services and representation for the purpose of
nullifying or undoing the adoption. At the outset, the respondent was candid in explaining to the
complainant that the prosecution of the case would be complicated mainly because the adoption had
been decreed in 1979 yet, and also because the complainant, as a permanent resident of the United
States of America, would be thereby encountering difficulties and high costs, aside from untold
inconvenience due to his physical presence in the country being needed every now and then.45 The
respondent's candid explanations notwithstanding, the complainant persisted in pursuing the case,
impelling the respondent to take on the engagement.

Another circumstance is that the respondent had already returned to the complainant the amount of
P650,000.00 the former had received from the latter on account of the professional engagement. The
returned amount was in full and complete settlement of the latter's claims. Judicial precedents exist in
which the Court treated the return in full of the money the respondent attorneys had received from
their complaining clients as mitigating circumstances that lowered the penalties imposed. For sure, the
voluntary restitution by the respondent herein of the amount received in the course of the professional
engagement, even if it would not lift the sanction meted on him, manifested remorse of a degree on his
part for his wrongdoing, and was mitigating in his favor.

And, thirdly, the Court cannot but note the respondent's several pleas for judicial clemency to seek his
reinstatement in the ranks of the Philippine Bar. He has backed up his pleas by adverting to his personal
travails since his disbarment. He claims, too, that his health has been failing of late considering that he
had been diagnosed to be suffering from chronic kidney disease, stage five, and has been undergoing
dialysis three times a week. His advancing age and the fragile state of his health may also be considered
as a mitigating factor. In addition, it is noteworthy that he has been devoting some time to Christian and
charity pursuits, like serving with humility as a Lay Minister at St. Peter Church in Quezon City and as a
regular lecturer on the Legal Aspects of Marriage.

Pleas for judicial clemency reflected further remorse and repentance on the part of the respondent. His
pleas appear to be sincere and heartfelt. In human experience, remorse and repentance, if coupled with
sincerity, have always been regarded as the auspicious start of forgiving on the part of the offended, and
may eventually win even an absolution for the remorseful. The Court will not be the last to forgive
though it may not forget.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, perpetual disqualification from being reinstated will be too
grave a penalty in light of the objective of imposing heavy penalties like disbarment to correct the
offenders. The penalty ought to be tempered to enable his eventual reinstatement at some point in the
future. Verily, permanently barring the respondent from reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by virtue
of this disbarrable offense will deprive him the chance to return to his former life as an attorney.

To start the respondent on the long road to reinstatement, we fine him in the amount of P100,000.00, a
figure believed to be a fair index of the gravity of his misdeeds. Less than such amount might
undeservedly diminish the gravity of his misdeeds. At this juncture, it is relevant to note that he
committed the offense complained of herein before the Court disbarred him in A.C. 7054. Meting the
stiff fine despite his disbarment is a way for the Court to assert its authority and competence to
discipline all acts and actuations committed by the members of the Legal Profession. The Court will not
waver in doing so.

But the fine comes with the stern warning to the respondent that he must hereafter genuinely affirm his
remorse and start to demonstrate his readiness and capacity to live up once again to the exacting
standards of conduct demanded of every member of the Bar in good standing and of every officer of the
Court;55 otherwise, he would be be sanctioned with greater severity.

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS AND DECLARES ATTY. ANASTACIO REVILLA, JR. GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01 of Canon 1, Rules 15.06 and 15.07 of Canon 15, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, but, in view of his continuing disbarment, hereby METES the penalty of FINE
of P100,000.00

This decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to: (a) the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to
all courts throughout the country for their information and guidance; (b) the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines; and (c) the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to the respondent's personal record
as a member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 9000, January 10, 2018

TOMAS P. TAN, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. HAIDE V. GUMBA, Respondent.

This case is an offshoot of the administrative Complaint filed by Tomas P. Tan, Jr. (complainant) against
Atty. Haide V. Gumba (respondent), and for which respondent was suspended from the practice of law
for six months. The issues now ripe for resolution are: a) whether respondent disobeyed a lawful order
of the Court by not abiding by the order of her suspension; and b) whether respondent deserves a stiffer
penalty for such violation.

Factual Antecedents

According to complainant, respondent obtained from him a P350,000.00 loan with 12% interest per
annum. Incidental thereto, respondent executed in favor of complainant an undated Deed of Absolute
Sale over a 105-square meter lot located in Naga City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2055 under the name of respondent's father, Nicasio Vista. Attached to said Deed was a Special Power
of Attorney (SPA) executed by respondent's parents authorizing her to apply for a loan with a bank to be
secured by the subject property. Complainant and respondent purportedly agreed that if the latter
failed to pay the loan in or before August 2000, complainant may register the Deed of Absolute Sale with
the Register of Deeds (RD).

Respondent failed to pay her loan when it fell due. And despite repeated demands, she failed to settle
her obligation. Complainant attempted to register the Deed of Absolute Sale with the RD of Naga City
but to no avail because the aforesaid SPA only covered the authority of respondent to mortgage the
property to a bank, and not to sell it.

Complainant argued that if not for respondent's misrepresentation, he would not have approved her
loan. He added that respondent committed dishonesty, and used her skill as a lawyer and her moral
ascendancy over him in securing the loan. Thus, he prayed that respondent be sanctioned for her
infraction.

In Commissioner's Report, (Commissioner de la Rama) faulted respondent for failing to file an answer,
and participate in the mandatory conference. He further declared that the SPA specifically authorized
respondent to mortgage the property with a bank. He stressed that for selling the property, and not just
mortgaging it to complainant, who was not even a bank, respondent acted beyond her authority. Having
done so, she committed gross violation of the Lawyer's Oath as well as Canon 1, Rule 1.01, and Canon 7
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As such, he recommended that respondent be suspended
from the practice of law for one year.

In the Resolution, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines - Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt
and approve the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner de la Rama.

Action of the Supreme Court

Thereafter, the Court issued a Resolution, which sustained the findings and conclusion of the IBP. The
Court nonetheless found the reduction of the penalty proper, pursuant to its sound judicial discretion
and on the facts of the case. Accordingly, it suspended respondent from the practice of law for six
months, effective immediately, with a warning that a repetition of same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely.

the Court resolved to serve anew the October 5, 2011 Resolution upon respondent because its previous
copy sent to her was returned unserved. In its August 13, 2012 Resolution, the Court considered the
October 5, 2011 Resolution to have been served upon respondent after the March 14, 2012 Resolution
was also returned unserved. In the same resolution, the Court also denied with finality respondent's
motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution.

Subsequently, (Judge Armea) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Naga City, wrote a letter inquiring
from the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) whether respondent could continue representing her
clients and appear in courts. She also asked the OCA if the decision relating to respondent's suspension,
which was downloaded from the internet, constitutes sufficient notice to disqualify her to appear in
courts for the period of her suspension.
According to Judge Armea, her inquiry arose because respondent represented a party in a case pending
in her court; and, the counsel of the opposing party called Judge Armea's attention regarding the legal
standing of respondent to appear as counsel. Judge Armea added that respondent denied that she was
suspended to practice law since she (respondent) had not yet received a copy of the Court's resolution
on the matter.

In her Answer/Comment to the query of Judge Armea, respondent countered that by reason of such
downloaded decision, Judge Armea and (Judge Formaran III) of (RTC) of Naga City disallowed her
appearance in their courts. She insisted that service of any pleading or judgment cannot be made
through the internet. She further claimed that she had not received an authentic copy of the Court's
October 5, 2011 Resolution.

the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) referred the October 5, 2011 Resolution to the OCA for circulation
to all courts.In response, the OCA issued OCA Circular No. 14-201319 addressed to the courts, the Office
of Chief State Prosecutor (CSP), Public Attorney's Office (PAO), and the IBP informing them of the
October 5, 2011 and August 13, 2012 Resolutions of the Court.

IBP's Report and Recommendation

Meanwhile, in its Notice of Resolution, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the Report and
Recommendation of (Commissioner Cachapero) to dismiss the complaint against respondent. According
to Commissioner Cachapero, there is no rule allowing the service of judgments through the internet;
and Judge Armea and Judge Formaran III acted ahead of time when they implemented the suspension of
respondent even before the actual service upon her of the resolution concerning her suspension.

Statement and Report of the OBC

In its Statement,the OBC stressed that respondent received the August 13, 2012 Resolution (denying her
motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011 Resolution) per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365.
Thus, the effectivity of respondent's suspension was from November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013. The
OBC also pointed out that suspension is not automatically lifted by mere lapse of the period of
suspension. It is necessary that an order be issued by the Court lifting the suspension to enable the
concerned lawyer to resume practice of law.

The OBC further maintained in its Report that respondent has no authority to practice law and appear in
court as counsel during her suspension, and until such time that the Court has lifted the order of her
suspension. Thus, the OBC made these recommendations:

1. Respondent be REQUIRED to file a sworn statement with motion to lift order of her suspension,
attaching therewith certifications from the Office of the Executive Judge of the court where she
practices[h]er profession and IBP Local Chapter of which she is affiliated, that she has ceased and
desisted from the practice of law from 12 November 2012 to 12 May 2013, immediately; and
2. The IBP be REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within 72 hours why they should not be sanctioned for disciplinary
action for issuing said Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-359, dated 21 March 2013, purportedly
dismissing this case for lack of merit.

the Court noted the OBC Report, and directed respondent to comply with the guidelines relating to the
lifting of the order of her suspension.

Upon the request of respondent, the OBC issued a Certification, which stated that respondent had been
ordered suspended from the practice of law for six months, and as of the issuance of said certification,
the order of her suspension had not yet been lifted.

Complaint against the OCA, the OBC and Atty. Paraiso

respondent filed with the RTC a verified Complaint for nullity of clearance, damages, and preliminary
injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order against the OCA, the OBC, and Atty.
Paraiso).

Essentially, respondent accused the OCA and the OBC of suspending her from the practice of law even if
the administrative case against her was still pending with the IBP. She likewise faulted the OBC for
requiring her to submit a clearance from its office before she resumes her practice of law after the
suspension. In turn, she argued that Atty. Paraiso benefited from this supposed "bogus suspension" by
publicly announcing the disqualification of respondent to practice law.

In its Answer, the OCA argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, which seeks reversal,
modification or enjoinment of a directive of the Court. The OCA also stressed that respondent should
raise such matter by filing a motion for reconsideration in the administrative case, instead of filing a
complaint with the RTC. It also stated that the issuance of OCA Circular No. 14-2013 was in compliance
with the Court's directive to inform all courts, the CSP, the PAO, and the IBP of the suspension of
respondent.

For its part, the OBC declared in a Report that during and after the period of her suspension, without the
same having been lifted, respondent filed pleadings and appeared in courts in the following cases:

The OBC likewise confirmed that as of the time it issued the March 24, 2015 Report, the Court had not
yet lifted the order of suspension against respondent. The OBC opined that for failing to comply with the
order of her suspension, respondent deliberately refused to obey a lawful order of the Court. Thus, it
recommended that a stiffer penalty be imposed against respondent.

the OBC reported that the RTC dismissed Civil Case for lack of jurisdiction, and pending resolution was
respondent's motion for reconsideration.

Issue

Is respondent administratively liable for engaging in the practice of law during the period of her
suspension and prior to an order of the Court lifting such suspension?
Our Ruling

Time and again, the Court reminds the bench and bar "that the practice of law is not a right but a mere
privilege [subject] to the inherent regulatory power of the [Court], It is a "privilege burdened with
conditions. As such, lawyers must comply with its rigid standards, which include mental fitness,
maintenance of highest level of morality, and full compliance with the rules of the legal profession.

With regard to suspension to practice law, the Court laid down the guidelines for the lifting of an order
of suspension, to wit:

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall
render a decision imposing the penalty;

2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and executory;

3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the
Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the
practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;

4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;

5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent's compliance with the order of
suspension;

6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground
for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

Pursuant to these guidelines, in this case, the Court issued a Resolution dated October 5, 2011
suspending respondent from the practice of law for six months effective immediately. Respondent filed
her motion for reconsideration. And, on November 12, 2012, she received the notice of the denial of
such motion per Registry Return Receipt No. 53365.

While, indeed, service of a judgment or resolution must be done only personally or by registered mail,
and that mere showing of a downloaded copy of the October 5, 2011 Resolution to respondent is not a
valid service, the fact however, that respondent was duly informed of her suspension remains
unrebutted. Again, as stated above, she filed a motion for reconsideration on the October 5, 2011
Resolution, and the Court duly notified her of the denial of said motion. It thus follows that respondent's
six months suspension commenced from the notice of the denial of her motion for reconsideration on
November 12, 2012 until May 12, 2013.

in this case, the Court notified respondent of her suspension. However, she continued to engage in the
practice law by filing pleadings and appearing as counsel in courts during the period of her
suspension.
It is common sense that when the Court orders the suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law,
the lawyer must desist from performing all functions which require the application of legal knowledge
within the period of his or her suspension. To stress, by practice of law, we refer to "any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and
experience. It includes performing acts which are characteristic of the legal profession, or rendering any
kind of service which requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.” In fine, it will amount to
unauthorized practice, and a violation of a lawful order of the Court if a suspended lawyer engages in
the practice of law during the pendency of his or her suspension.

As also stressed by the OBC in its March 24, 2015 Report, during and even after the period of her
suspension and without filing a sworn statement for the lifting of her suspension, respondent signed
pleadings and appeared in courts as counsel. Clearly, such acts of respondent are in violation of the
order of her suspension to practice law.

Moreover, the lifting of a suspension order is not automatic. It is necessary that there is an order from
the Court lifting the suspension of a lawyer to practice law. To note, in Maniago, the Court explicitly
stated that a suspended lawyer shall, upon the expiration of one’s suspension, file a sworn statement
with the Court, and that such statement shall be considered proof of the lawyer’s compliance with the
order of suspension.

In this case, the Court directed respondent to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the
suspension order against her by filing a sworn statement on the matter. However, respondent did not
comply. Instead, she filed a complaint (Civil Case No. 2015-0007) against the OCA, the OBC and a
certain Atty. Paraiso with the RTC. For having done so, respondent violated a lawful order of the
Court, that is, to comply with the guidelines for the lifting of the order of suspension against her.

To recapitulate, respondent's violation of the lawful order of the Court is two-fold:

1) she filed pleadings and appeared in court as counsel during the period of her suspension, and prior to
the lifting of such order of her suspension; and

2) she did not comply with the Court's directive for her to file a sworn statement in compliance with the
guidelines for the lifting of the suspension order.

Under Section 27,Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended
from practice of law for willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, among other
grounds. Here, respondent willfully disobeyed the Court's lawful orders by failing to comply with the
order of her suspension, and to the Court's directive to observe the guidelines for the lifting thereof.
Pursuant to prevailing Jurisprudence, the suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law against
respondent is in order.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Haide V. Gumba is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for an additional
period of six (6) months (from her original six (6) months suspension) and WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Haide V. Gumba is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of her receipt of this Decision, to
determine the reckoning point when her suspension shall take effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to
append a copy of this Decision to the record of respondent as member of the Bar.

SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 5161

RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S. TORRES AS A MEMBER OF
THE PHILIPPINE BAR.

ROLANDO S. TORRES, Petitioner

For resolution is the Petition filed by Rolando S. Torres (Torres) who seeks judicial clemency in order to
be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys.

Records show that in a Resolution dated April 14, 2004 in Ting-Dumali v. Torres, the Court meted the
supreme penalty of disbarment on Torres for "presentation of false testimony; participation in,
consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant's signature in a purported Deed
of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from
such forgery," thereby committing gross misconduct and violating Canons 1 and 10 the Code of
Professional Responsibility thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the legal
profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is ordered stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.

Aggrieved, Torres twice moved for reconsideration, both of which were denied with finality by the
Court, which then stated that "no further pleadings will be entertained." This notwithstanding, Torres:
(a) filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Lift Disbarment dated January 26, 2006 begging for compassion, mercy,
and understanding; and (b) wrote letters to former Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and former
Associate Justice Dante 0. Tinga reiterating his pleas for compassion and mercy. However, these were
ordered expunged through the Court's Resolutions considering the previous directive that no further
pleadings will be further entertained in this case. Still undaunted, Torres continued to file numerous
submissions either seeking his reinstatement to the bar or the reduction of his penalty of disbarment to
suspension, ll of which were either expunged from the records or denied by the Court.

More than ten (10) years from his disbarment, Torres filed a Petition seeking judicial clemency from
the Court to reinstate him in the Roll of Attomeys. In a Resolution (August 25, 2015 Resolution), the
Court denied the petition, holding that Torres had failed to provide substantial proof that he had
reformed himself, especially considering the absence of showing that he had reconciled or attempted
to reconcile with his sister-in-law, the original complainant in the disbarment case against him; nor
was it demonstrated that he was remorseful over the fraudulent acts he had committed against her.

Despite the foregoing, Torres filed the instant petition, again seeking judicial clemency from the Court
to reinstate him in the Roll of Attorneys.
The Court's Ruling

The petition is not meritorious.

The principle which should hold true for lawyers, being officers of the court, is that judicial clemency, as
an act of mercy removing any disqualification, should be balanced with the preservation of public
confidence in the courts. Thus, the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof
of reformation and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable. In Re: The Matter of the
Petition for Reinstatement of Rolando S. Torres as a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court laid down
the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will
give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him
that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other
relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.

In support of the instant petition for reinstatement, Torres merely rehashed all the several testimonials
and endorsements which he had already attached to his previous petitions, in addition to another
endorsement, this time coming from the incumbent Secretary of Justice, stating that Torres "is a person
of good moral character and a law abiding citizen." However, these testimonials and endorsements do
not prove whatsoever that Torres had already successfully reformed himself subsequent to his
disbarment. Neither do they exhibit remorse towards the actions which caused his delisting from the
Roll of Attorneys, i.e., the fraudulent acts he committed against his sister-in-law. In this regard, it is
noteworthy to point out that since the promulgation of the Court's August 25, 2015 Resolution, there
was still no showing that Torres had reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with his sister-in-law
so as to show remorse for his previous faults.

Moreover, Torres also failed to present any evidence to demonstrate his potential for public service or
that he - now being 70 years of age - still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use
by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

In sum, Torres failed to comply with the guidelines for the grant of judicial clemency; hence, the instant
petition must necessarily be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

PIMENTEL vs. LEB G.R. NO. 230642 & 242954. September 10, 2019

FACTS:

Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal Education Reform Act of
1993 which creates the Legal Education Board. Petitioners particularly seek to declare as
unconstitutional the creation of LEB itself, LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law practice
internship as a requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting a system of
continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and establishing and
implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission
Test or the PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s power to “prescribe the minimum standards for law admission”
under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662.

Petitioners principally grounded the petitions on LEB’s alleged encroachment upon the rulemaking
power of the Court concerning the practice of law, violation of institutional academic freedom, and
violation of law school aspirant’s right to education under the Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court.

2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA
7662 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently exercised by
the political departments. The historical development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the
consistent exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and
areas of education, including legal education. Legal education is but a composite of the entire Philippine
education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity,
however, is no reason in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and
supervisory powers of the political branches.
Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the regulation and supervision
of legal education:

First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as
a necessary consequence of its power to regulate admission to the practice of law. This assumption,
apart from being manifestly contrary to the history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise
devoid of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate upon itself a
power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and
place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a highly
improper form of judicial activism.

As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution covers the practice of law
and not the study of law. The present rules embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not support the
argument that the Court directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely provides academic
competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar. Furthermore, it is the State in the
exercise of its police power that has the authority to regulate and supervise the education of its
citizens and this includes legal education.

Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate
rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto. The jurisdiction to determine whether an
applicant may be allowed to take the bar examinations belongs to the Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power
of the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education but now dabbles on the
requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to
promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as
unconstitutional.

Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant
to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly give the LEB the power to
supervise the legal education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is
authorized to compel mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration
as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s power to promulgate rules
concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of Lawyer-professors as the teaching of law
is considered the practice of law.
Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA 7662
is unconstitutional.

5. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter to prescribe
minimum standards for law admission. The PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to
guide law schools in measuring the applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such
other admissions policy that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard.
However, the PhilSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for
law school. The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the
examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhilSAT is used to exclude,
qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design mandates, the PhilSAT goes
beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes
unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional.

This case brief summarizes the ruling of the Supreme Court concerning the
constitutionality of the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) in the
case of Oscar B. Pimentel, et al. v. Legal Education Board and Jose Lean L.
Abayata, et al. v. Hon. Salvador Medialdea and Legal Education Board.[1]
On September 10, 2019, the Supreme Court en banc in Pimentel v. LEB struck
down Sec. 9 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016, as void and unconstitutional.

Specifically, the majority opinion penned by Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., the
Honorable Supreme Court ruled that when the PhiLSAT is used
to exclude, qualify and restrict admissions to law schools, the PhiLSAT goes
beyond mere supervision and regulation and violates institutional academic
freedom for being unconstitutional. Hence, in the dispositive portion of the
ponencia, Sec. 9 of LEBMO No. 7, Series of 2016:[2]
“The PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s
aptitude for law school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law
schools who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When
the PhiLSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law
schools, as its present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere
supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes
unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional. In strking down these
objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the State’s inherent power to protect
public interest by improving legal education is neither emasculated nor
compromised. Rather, the institutional academic freedom of law schools to
determine for itself who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions
policies is merely protected. In turn, the recognition of academic discretion
comes with the inherent limitation that its exercise should not be whimsical,
arbitrary, or gravely abused.
In similar vein, certain LEB issuances which exceed the powers granted under
its charter should be nullified for being ultra vires.” (Underscoring and
emphasis supplied)
The body of the decision indicates that the PhiLSAT excludes, qualifies, and
restricts admission to law schools, which is violative of academic of freedom.
The ponencia, however, is silent as to whether the taking of the PhiLSAT
should be mandatory and therefore, integral to admission. If the taking of the
Philsat is integral to admission then this would clearly be violative of
institutional academic freedom.
A careful reading of the separate opinions of Senior Associate Justice Estela
Perlas-Bernabe, Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, who is joined by
Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justices Benjamin S. Caguioa,
Alexander G. Gesmundo, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr., taken together with the
majority opinion, reflect the view that the PhiLSAT is an optional law
admission test. Thus, any government regulatory agency which prescribes
minimum standards for admission to law school cannot be arbitrary and
unreasonable in its issuances relating to admission since they are required to
show a compelling State interest to do so, which must be reasonable, and for a
public purpose. Any form of government regulation must therefore pass the
constitutional test of reasonableness, as measured against the four principles of
academic freedom, specifically, the freedom of law schools to determine who to
admit for the study of law.
To ensure that institutional academic freedom is preserved and protected, the
Honorable Supreme Court recognizes the right of an institution of higher
learning to have the exclusive prerogative to admit students and provide that
“atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation, experiment and creation.
It is an atmosphere in which there prevails the ‘four essential freedoms’ of a
university — to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what
may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.”[3]
Law schools play a major role in the sphere of legal education within the
structure of institutions of higher learning. In their exercise of academic
freedom, law schools must have the liberty to decide for themselves their “aims
and objectives and how best to attain them”. They must be “free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls
for some restraint, and a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students.” Academic freedom, as held by this Honorable Court, “is not
to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion, for that would
be to frustrate its purpose, or nullify its intent.”[4]
The relevant portions of the following separate opinions in Pimentel v. Legal
Education Board are reproduced to show that the PhiLSAT is optional, because
to consider it mandatory would make law school
admissions exclusionary, qualifying and restrictive, and thus, contrary to the
academic freedom of law schools to determine who to admit for the study of law
in our respective institutions.
Senior Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe, in her separate concurring
opinion, succinctly discusses why the provisions of Legal Education Board
(LEB) Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2016 (LEBMO No. 7-2016) that
mandatorily require the passing of the Philippine Law School Admission Test
(PhiLSAT) as a pre-requisite for admission to any law school violate
institutional academic freedom and hence, unconstitutional:[5]
“In this case, while the policy of the State to ‘uplift the standards of legal
education’ may be characterized as a compelling State interest, the means of
achieving this goal, through the PhiLSAT, together with its mandatory and
exclusionary features as above-discussed, do not appear to be narrowly tailored
or the least restrictive means for achieving this interest. There is no concrete
showing why the implementation of a standardized but  optional State aptitude
exam, which schools may freely adopt in their discretion as a tool for their
own determination of who to admit (such as the National Medical Aptitude Test
for medical schools or the Law School Admission Test in the United States of
America), would be less of a “sifting” measure than a mandatory and
exclusively State-determined one (such as the PhiLSAT). This is especially so
since, as conceded by LEB Chairperson Emerson B. Aquende during the oral
arguments in this case, there is no statistical basis to show the propensity of the
PhiLSAT to improve the quality of legal education. Furthermore, no other study
or evaluation regarding the viability of the PhiLSAT was shown to this effect. It
is true that in a general sense, the PhiLSAT operates as a basic aptitude exam
which seeks to test skills that have rational connection to the field of law, i.e.,
communications and language proficiency, critical thinking, and verbal and
quantitative reasoning. However, because the test was solely crafted by the
LEB, it completely excludes the law schools’ input and participation, and worse,
even puts their very existence in jeopardy should there be non-subservience.
Verily, an absolutist approach in any facet of academic freedom would not only
result in an overly restrictive State regulation, it would also be practically
counterproductive because law schools, being at the forefront, are the
quintessential stakeholders to the mission of improving legal education. Again,
by constitutional fiat, the State’s role is limited to reasonable supervision, not
control. For these reasons, the provisions of LEBMO No. 7-2016 on the
PhiLSAT clearly transgress institutional academic freedom.” (Underscoring and
emphasis supplied)
In his dissenting and concurring opinion, Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen is clear
and categorical that all aspects of the Philippine Law School Admission Test,
and for that matter, any national admission test – even if not made mandatory,
is unconstitutional for being an infringement of academic freedom. Justice
Leonen’s opinion, joined by no less than Chief Justice Lucas P. Bersamin,
further makes a distinction between the Philippine Law School Admission Test
and the National Medical Admission Test:[6]
“The Philippine Law School Admission Test is an unwarranted intrusion into
this essential freedom. The government’s imposition of a passing score as a bar
to admission violates the educational institutions’ academic freedom to
determine who to admit to study. The existence of the Legal Education Board,
on the other hand, interferes with the right of academic institutions with respect
to how to teach and who to teach.” (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
...

“As found by the majority, the Philippine Law School Admission Test, unlike
the National Medical Admission Test, violates institutional academic freedom
insofar as it prescribes a passing score that must be followed by law
schools. Failure to reach the passing score will disqualify the examinee from
admission to any Philippine law school. This is because a Certificate of
Eligibility is necessary for enrollment as a first year law student. Respondent
Legal Education, which administers the test, only allows law schools to impose
additional requirements for admission, but passing the test is still mandatory.
The failure of law schools to abide by these requirements exposes them to
administrative sanctions.
In contrast, failure to achieve a certain score in the National Medical Admission
Test no longer disqualifies an examinee from applying to all medical schools.
For one, test scores are reported with a corresponding percentile rank that
ranges from 1 to 99+. It “indicates the percentage of [National Medical
Admission Test] examinees who have [test] scores the same as or lower than the
examinee. This percentile rank is evaluated by the medical schools against the
cutoff grade that they themselves determine. Hence, the percentile rank cutoff is
only a “minimum score that qualfies an examinee as a bonafide applicant for
admission into his/her preferred medical school. The test score only determines
the available medical schools where a person may apply; the higher the score,
the more options the applicant has.

Thus, I agree with the majority’s characterization that the Philippine Law
School Admission Test employs a “totalitarian scheme” that leaves the actions
of law schools entirely dependent on the test results. It usurps the right of law
schools to determine the admision requiremens for its would-be students –
ulitmately infringing on the institutional academic freedom they possess, as
guaranteed by the Constitution.”

Upon closer inspection, Justice Leonen observes that “the Philippine Law
School Admission Test does not merely recommend, but dictates on law
schools who are qualified to be admitted. By prescribing a passing score and
predetermining who may enroll in law schools, the State forces its judgment on
the institutions, when it has no business doing so. Any fovernmental attempt to
dictate upon schools the composion of their studentry undermines their
institutional academic freedom.”[7]
In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa states
that the PhiLSAT is violative of academic freedom, and that the State’s power
over law schools is limited to supervision and regulation, not control:[8]
“With respect to the academic freedom aspect of who may be admitted to the
schools, I reiterate my position that the ponencia is correct in holding that
the PhiLSAT is violative of academic freedom. Mandating legal education
institutions to reject examinees who failed to obtain the prescribed passing score
amounts to a complete transfer of control over student admissions from the law
schools to the LEB. To emphasize, the permissible power of the State over
institutions of higher learning is limited to supervision and regulation, not
control.” (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)
In finding that the PhiLSAT should be set aside, Justice Alexander G.
Gesmundo further explains his view in his separate concurring and dissenting
opinion:[9]
“I concur with the ponencia that the LEB Memorandum Orders and
Circular, requiring the PhiLSAT as mandatory and exclusionary, are
unconstitutional.
Institutions of higher learning have academic freedom, under the Constitution,
and this includes the freedom to determine who may be admitted to study. Such
freedom may only be limited by the State based on the test of reasonability. In
this case, however, the assailed Memorandum Orders fail to provide a
reasonable justification for restraining the admission of students to law schools
based on the following reasons:

First, by making the PhiLSAT mandatory and exclusionary, the LEB

significantly restricts the freedom of law schools to determine who shall be
admitted as law students. Only those who pass the said examination shall be
considred for admission to these institutions of higher learning. Consequently,
the LEB, through the PhiLSAT, first chooses the potential law students, and
only afterwards, shall the law schools be allowed to choose their students from
the limited pool of student-passers. The said institutes of higher learning are
barred from considering those students who failed the examinations, regardless
of their previous academic grades and achievements.
Second, the LEB does not give any justification for the required passing score of
55% and the format of the examinations. The studies cited by the LEB were
conducted by different organizations, for different professions, and for foreign
jurisdictions. Indeed, no concrete study conducted in the Philippines for the
legal profession was provided to substantiate the passing score and the test
format. It is not even clear whether the consensus of the law schools in the
country was secured before the LEB imposed the PhiLSAT. Without any
concrete basis for the conduct of the examination, it would be unreasonable to
impose the same mandatorily and without exemption to the institutes of higher
learning.
Third, law schools are given no option other than to follow the LEB
Memorandum Orders and Circular. Failure to comply with these shall result
in administrative sanctions, ranging from closure of the law school, phase-out
of the law program, provision cancellation of its recognition and/or liailityto pay
a fine of P10,000.00 for each infraction. Even without a valid reason for the
impostion of the PhiLSAT requirement, the LEB completely restricts the law
schools from accepting students who did not pass the said examination. The
schools’ exercise of academic freedom to choose their students is restricted by
the threat of administrative and pecuniary sanctions.
Assuming arguendo that the LEB Memorandum Orders and Circular were
issued under the exercise of police power of the State to regulate the rights of
certain institutions, it does not justify the unreasonable restriction on the
academic freedom of institutes of higher learning. Notwithstanding its extensive
sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome
consequences, it may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise,
and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is exercised, that is to
advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private
interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power.
Here, the LEB failed to establish the reasonable means to limit the academic
freedom of the institutes of higher learning. Again, there is no valid explanation
provided on the mandatory and exclusionary requirement of the PhiLSAT, its
passing grade, and format of examinations. Manifestly, to impose a penalty on
law schools based on an unreasonable policy that restricts academic freedom
would be an invalid exercise of police power.” (Undescoring and emphasis
supplied)

In his separate concurring opinion, Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. [10] agreed

with the ponencia in striking as unconstitutional LEBMO No. 7, and all its
adjunct orders, for being violative of the institutions’ and students’ academic
freedom, emphasizing that
“. . . it becomes all too apparent that LEBMO No. 7, insofar as it imposes the
PhiLSAT, is a constricting regulation that binds the hands of the schools from
choosing who to admit in their law program. The LEB thrusts upon the law
schools a pre-selected roster of applicants, and effectively deprives them of the
right to select their own students on the basis of factors and criteria of their own
choosing. Consequently, the law schools are left with no choice but to elect
from this limited pool. Worse, they are forbidden from admitting those who
failed to comply with the LEB’s requirements, under pain of administrative
sanctions.
Undoubtedly, the imposition of the PhiLSAT is
an oppressive and arbitrary measure. The LEB is bereft of power to substitute
its own judgment for that of the universities’. Rather, the universities should be
free to consider other criteria (aside from the PhiLSAT) in determining their
prospective students’ aptitude and ability to survive in law school. In fact,
during the Oral Arguments held on March 5, 2019, amicus curiae Dean Sedfrey
Candelaria revealed that passing the law entrance exam is not a guarantee that
the student will survive through law school . . .
Indeed, the level of supervision and regulation granted unto the State must
be reasonable. This “reasonableness” in no way grants a warrant for the State to
exercise oppressive control over the schools.” (Underscoring and emphasis
supplied)
At present, the case is still pending final resolution of the motions for
reconsideration that have been filed by the petitioners who are law professors,
and the respondent Legal Education Board.