Application Note TAN 1004: Surge Protection For Intrinsically Safe Systems
Application Note TAN 1004: Surge Protection For Intrinsically Safe Systems
Application Note
June 96
TAN 1004
Synopsis
This publication discusses the
nature of the threat to intrinsically
safe instrumentation in hazardous
areas from voltage surges induced
by lightning or other causes. The
practical application of surge
protection devices (SPDs) taking
into account the certification/
approvals requirements is also
considered.
About Telematic
Telematic Limited is a company with a well-established reputation for the design and manufacture of surge protection devices and with
considerable experience of successful installation practices. A consultancy service is available to advise customers on the selection and
location of devices for particular applications. If you have any specific enquiries, please contact Telematic directly at the address on the back
cover or contact your local MTL group company whichever is most convenient.
Telematic is a member of the MTL Instruments group and is therefore in a unique position to make good use of Measurement Technologys
leading position as a supplier of intrinsically safe interfaces to provide the best possible choices of equipment for hazardous-area applications.
The principal author of this publication is Mike ONeill, BSc, CEng, MInstMC, Director of Telematic Limiteds US operation, who acknowledges
with thanks the comments of colleagues and customers. If you have any comments (preferably constructive) on this document, please make
them to the author so that the document can be amended and made even more useful.
CONTENTS PAGE
1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 2
1.1 General ............................................................................................................................................ 2
1.2 The need for surge protection ............................................................................................................... 2
2
Hazardous location Safe location Hazardous Safe location
location
SPDs IS barriers
SPDs IS barriers
Segration
problems
the input terminals. This is rarely effective and should either be re-
placed or augmented by a separate SPD such as the Telematic TP48.
This incorporates a full hybrid circuit (GDT and semiconductor) and
can be fitted to any transmitter with a spare conduit entry port. It 300V
incorporates a high level of protection with a uniquely practical design 2µS
concept for easy attachment to the transmitter case (see figure 3). Note 60V
that there are various versions of the TP48 for different applications, all L1
of which look alike and it is therefore essential to check that the identifi-
cation for any individual unit is appropriate for the purpose. TP48-*-I indi-
cates intrinsic safety and TP48-*-D indicates flameproof; the * indicates the L2
thread type and can be N (for 1/2"NPT), I (for 20mmISO) or P (for Pg13.5). Instrument 60V 60V
The TP48-ND is approved for use with American explosion proof housings. housing 60V
3.1 Introduction
Figure 3: Transmitter-mounted TP48 SPD
Earthing/grounding in intrinsically safe systems is often (mistakenly)
thought to be very difficult. However, the basic rules are reasonably conflict between the two requirements installing an intrinsically-safe
simple (see MTL Application Note AN9003) and incorporating SPDs system based on safety barriers compels the designer to consider earth-
into IS circuits makes little difference. What extra needs must be con- ing in reasonable detail which generally means it is relatively easy to
sidered are dependent upon the type of IS interface used by the circuit take account of SPD earthing at the same time.
and also the location of SPDs. See:-
a) Section 3.2 Earthing in IS circuits equipped with galvanic The best method is to mount the barriers and the SPDs in parallel as
isolating interfaces shown in figure 2. Figure 4 illustrates a complete IS system showing
b) Section 3.3 Earthing in IS circuits equipped with shunt-diode ideal earthing arrangements for both barriers and SPDs. (In this exam-
safety barriers ple both the barriers and the SPDs are shown earthed through DIN-
c) Section 3.4 Earthing with SPDs located at both ends of an IS rails but they can equally well be earthed through busbars or by
loop other reliable means).
3.2 Earthing in IS circuits equipped with In figure 4, the IS earth route is C to G1 and the SPD earth route E to
galvanic isolating interfaces G2. The functions of individual components are:-
Galvanically isolated IS interfaces do not normally need a high-integ- a) A-B maintains control system 0V/PSU common at the IS earth
rity earth connection so the SPD earth can be provided as recom- potential.
mended by the SPD manufacturer. If the isolator is being used with a b) C-D maintains the IS ground at the SPD earth potential and
sensor that is also grounded, the earthing considerations are as for a provides the first link in the IS earth bond.
system with SPDs at both ends of a loop (see section 3.4). c) E-F terminates the SPD earth at the main electrical system earth
bar and can be tied to a local lightning ground mat at G2 (if
one is installed) as well as being part of the IS bond.
3.3 Earthing in IS circuits equipped with
shunt-diode safety barriers Typically, the SPD earth connection will be made with an 8 to 10AWG
Safety barriers must be connected to the main electrical system earth wire, leading to a very low connection resistance for E-F, typically less
or potential equalizing system with a dedicated conductor of at least than 0.5 ohms. The overall IS bond, C-G1 is therefore less than 1 ohm
4mm2 cross-sectional area (12AWG) and a total connection resistance and better than 12AWG. Earth wiring should be labelled distinctly to
not exceeding 1 ohm. SPDs also need effective earthing and there is no deter unauthorised removal and made with reliable connectors.
3
Provided these requirements are followed, the needs of both IS and define the maximum stress that can be applied to the protection compo-
SPD earthing are satisfied without compromise. nents, diodes and fuses. Some applications are potentially exposed to
higher ac power supply voltages, eg, some delta ac supplies, and sys-
Note that the usual link between the control system and the main elec- tems including CRTs and other high voltage devices. Suitable SPDs can
trical earth should be removed. If present, it acts as a parallel path to be installed on the safe-area side of IS interfaces to prevent the inter-
earth through which excess current through the SPDs can be routed faces being subjected to voltages higher than their Um rating.
back into the system I/O, precisely the consequence the SPDs are
fitted to prevent! Some system installers insist on maintaining this link, The protection of mining machinery is an example. Sensors tied to the
in which case it is best provided through a large inductor/coil such coal-face (hazardous area) are preferably IS for ease of replacement
that under normal operating conditions a dc connection exists but which and use but the power supply to the hydraulic systems within the ma-
provide an inductive impedance against fast rise-time transients which chinery is 500V dc. Fitting separate isolation transformers for the
diverts them back to the SPD earth path. This coil is sometimes aug- sensors and instrumentation is prohibitively expensive making SPDs
mented by a gas-discharge tube (GDT) connected in parallel. How- the ideal economic choice to guarantee that under fault conditions the
ever, the actual contribution of the GDT is little understood and it may IS interfaces are not exposed to the full 500V dc supply or to signifi-
simply be black magic. cant transients from other sources that are potential hazards.
3.4 Earthing with SPDs located at both 4.2 Zone 0 special considerations
ends of an IS loop The draft IEC Code of Practice requires that circuits which cross bounda-
ries between Zone 0 and Zone 1 and which may be subjected to
If surge protection is applied to both ends of an intrinsically safe loop,
there are two indirect circuit earths indirect in the sense that SPDs significant voltage transients are bonded at the crossing points to elimi-
only earth lines through surge diodes/gas-tube arrestors or MOVs. nate the possibility of Zone 0 being invaded by lightning or stray fault
currents. In figure 6, an isolating interface connected to a Zone 0
Requirements for intrinsic safety installations usually specify circuits
capable of withstanding a 500V insulation test to earth throughout the sensor experiences a temporary voltage differential caused by a nearby
loop except at one nominated point, usually the safety barrier. If lightning strike. Flashover between the high local earth and the re-
motely earthed or floating sensor wiring inside Zone 0 is likely to be
the sensor connection is also earthed, galvanic isolators are usually
specified. Because of the way they operate, SPDs cannot withstand a hazardous similar events are believed to have caused many fires,
500V insulation test - hence installing SPDs at both ends of a loop particularly in oil storage tank farms. Installing an SPD at the Zone 0
boundary prevents flashover in this most hazardous part of the circuit.
represents a deviation from recommended IS installation practice.
This does not however, protect the loop isolator which is still exposed
Individual countries have differing views on the effect of multiple earths.
to the high transient voltage and may well be damaged or destroyed.
In the UK, potential equalizing conductors (4mm2 minimum conductors A second SPD is recommended at that point (shown dotted in figure 6).
between the two earth points) have often been specified as shown in While the loss of one isolator may not itself be a direct cause of igni-
figure 5. German practice is similar in principle, except that the com-
tion, consequential damage in the DCS or ESD system may well lead
mon bonding is made to the plant potential equalization network. In to a dangerous plant condition and prove expensive, either directly or
the USA, multiple earths are permitted, though users are cautioned through a spurious plant shutdown.
about possible earth loop interference problems.
This particular application is covered in much greater detail in
Telematics view, expressed through the IEC working group on harmo- TAN1005.
nization of installation practices, is that the SPD acts as a deliberate
and controlled breakdown path capable of repeated operation with-
out degradation under severe stress. In preventing open (hazardous)
4.3 Overall system considerations
sparkover at some other uncontrolled point, SPDs make the installation The system documentation should indicate what form of protection is
safer. If 10kA surges or 10kV transients are being transmitted round used on each loop. Where certified or approved SPDs are used,
the plant, it is better to control them with respect to local plant earth in certificates should be collated or (in North America) entity parameters
a predictable and reliable manner than to permit random flashover at established and appropriately referenced on the installation drawings.
uncontrolled points. If uncertified or non-approved SPDs are used, it is normally sufficient to
provide a common reference document detailing the reasons why
the chosen SPDs are considered safe for that application signed by a
4 MISCELLANEOUS ASPECTS competent authority.
4.1 Power supply voltage limitations Process control systems (DCS, ESD, etc) are likely include additional
connections to other devices or systems such as local area networks,
A requirement for intrinsically safe certification is the necessity to limit telephone modems and, of course, ac power supplies. The surge pro-
the normal power supply voltage (Um), usually to 250V rms or dc, to tection process is not complete until all cabled connections into and out
Outgoing Outgoing
surge surge
Figure 4: Recommended earthing system for loops including IS barriers and SPDs
4
of protected systems have, at least, been considered. Figure 6 illus- 1) Simple apparatus shall not achieve safety by the inclusion of
trates a comprehensive solution for a typical installation. voltage and/or current limiting and/or suppression devices.
2) Simple apparatus shall not contain any means of increasing
the available voltage or current, eg, circuits for the generation
APPENDIX: SIMPLE APPARATUS of ancillary power supplies.
3) Where it is necessary that the simple apparatus maintains the
The following requirements for simple apparatus are extracted from integrity of the isolation from earth of the intrinsically-safe
EN50020: 1994. The references in bold are to sections of the stand- circuit, it shall be capable of withstanding the test voltage to
ard not reproduced here. earth in accordance with 6.4.12. Its terminals shall conform
to 6.3.1.
5.4 Simple apparatus 4) Non-metallic enclosures and enclosures containing light met-
als when located in the hazardous area shall conform to 7.3
The following apparatus shall be considered to be simple apparatus:
a) passive components, eg, switches, junction boxes, and 8.1 of EN50014.
potentiometers and simple semi-conductor devices; 5) When simple apparatus is located in the hazardous area it
shall be temperature classified. When used in an intrinsically
b) sources of stored energy with well-defined parameters, eg,
capacitors or inductors, whose values shall be considered when safe circuit within their normal rating switches, plugs and sock-
determing the overall safety of the system; ets and terminals are allocated a T6 temperature classification
for Group II applications and considered as having a maxi-
c) sources of generated energy, eg, thermocouples and photo-
cells, which do not generate more than 1.5V, 100mA and mum surface temperature of 85°C for Group I applications.
25mW. Any inductance or capacitance present in these sources Other types of simple apparatus shall be temperature classi-
fied in accordance with clause 4 and 6 of this standard,
of energy shall be considered as in b).
Simple apparatus shall conform to all relevant requirements of this stand- Where simple apparatus forms part of an apparatus containing other
electrical circuits the whole shall be certified.
ard but need not be certified and need not comply with clause 12. In
particular the following aspects shall always be considered.
Distribution
Hazardous location Safe location transformer
Safe area
equipment
Hazardous area
equipment incapable
of withstanding
insulation test
Structural earth
60V
Signal suppressor
Data link
Mains supply
Mains filter
suppressor
5
6/96. Printed in the EU.
Telematic Limited
Alban Park, Hatfield Road, St Albans, Herts AL4 0XY
Telephone +44 (0)1727 833147 Fax +44 (0)1727 850687
E-mail: [email protected]
Telematic
A member of The MTL Instruments Group plc