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242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 119599. March 20, 1997.

MALAYAN INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and TKC MARKETING
CORPORATION, respondents.

Insurance; Marine insurance developed as an all-risk coverage

using the phrase “perils of the sea” to encompass the wide and
varied range of risks that were covered.—By way of a historical
background, marine insurance developed as an all-risk coverage,
using the phrase “perils of the sea” to encompass the wide and
varied range of risks that were covered. The subject policies
contain the “Perils” clause which is a standard form in any
marine insurance policy.
Same; Court agrees with the Court of Appeals and the private
respondent that “arrest” caused by ordinary judicial process is
deemed included among the covered risks.—With the
incorporation of subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute War
Clauses, however, this Court agrees with the Court of Appeals
and the private respondent that “arrest” caused by ordinary
judicial process is deemed included among the covered risks. This
interpretation becomes inevitable when subsection 1.1 of Section
1 of the Institute War Clauses provided that “this insurance
covers the risks excluded from the Standard Form of English
Marine Policy by the clause ‘Warranted free of capture, seizure,
arrest, etc. x x x’ ” or the F.C. & S. Clause. Jurisprudentially,
“arrests” caused by ordinary judicial process is also a risk
excluded from the Standard Form of English Marine Policy or the
F.C. & S. Clause.
Same; Any construction of a marine policy rendering it void
should be avoided.—It has been held that a strained
interpretation which is unnatural and forced, as to lead to an
absurd conclusion or to render the policy nonsensical, should, by
all means, be avoided. Likewise, it must be borne in mind that
such contracts are invariably prepared by the companies and
must be accepted by the insured in the form in which they are
written. Any construction of a marine policy rendering it void

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should be avoided. Such policies will, therefore, be construed

strictly against the company in order to avoid a forfeiture, unless
no other result is possible from the language used.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

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VOL. 270, MARCH 20, 1997 243

Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Same; To limit or restrict the operation of the general

provisions of the contract by special proviso, exception, or
exemption, the insurance company should express such limitation
in clear and unmistakable language.—If a marine insurance
company desires to limit or restrict the operation of the general
provisions of its contract by special proviso, exception, or
exemption, it should express such limitation in clear and
unmistakable language. Obviously, the deletion of the F.C. & S.
Clause and the consequent incorporation of subsection 1.1 of
Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses (Cargo) gave rise to
ambiguity. If the risk of arrest occasioned by ordinary judicial
process was expressly indicated as an exception in the subject
policies, there would have been no controversy with respect to the
interpretation of the subject clauses.
Same; Exceptions to the general coverage are construed most
strongly against the company.—Be that as it may, exceptions to
the general coverage are construed most strongly against the
company. Even an express exception in a policy is to be construed
against the underwriters by whom the policy is framed, and for
whose benefit the exception is introduced.
Same; Where restrictive provisions are open to two
interpretations that which is most favorable to the insured is
adopted.—An insurance contract should be so interpreted as to
carry out the purpose for which the parties entered into the
contract which is, to insure against risks of loss or damage to the
goods. Such interpretation should result from the natural and
reasonable meaning of language in the policy. Where restrictive
provisions are open to two interpretations, that which is most
favorable to the insured is adopted.
Same; A contract of insurance being a contract of adhesion,
par excellence, any ambiguity therein should be resolved against
the insurer.—Indemnity and liability insurance policies are

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construed in accordance with the general rule of resolving any

ambiguity therein in favor of the insured, where the contract or
policy is prepared by the insurer. A contract of insurance, being a
contract of adhesion, par excellence, any ambiguity therein should
be resolved against the insurer; in other words, it should be
construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the
insurer. Limitations of liability should be regarded with extreme
jealousy and must be construed in such a way as to preclude the
insurer from noncompliance with its obligations.

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Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

     Quasha, Ancheta, Peña & Nolasco for petitioner.
     Lasam and Associates and Balgos & Perez for private
respondent.

ROMERO, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the1

decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 43023
which affirmed, with slight modification, the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 15.
Private respondent TKC Marketing Corp. was the
owner/consignee of some 3,189.171 metric tons of soya bean
meal which was loaded on board the ship MV Al Kaziemah
on or about September 8, 1989 for carriage from the port of
Rio del Grande, Brazil, to the port of Manila. Said cargo
was insured against the risk of loss by petitioner Malayan
Insurance Corporation for which it issued two (2) Marine
Cargo Policy Nos. M/LP 97800305 amounting to
P18,986,902.45 and M/LP 97800306 amounting to
P1,195,005.45, both dated September 1989.
While the vessel was docked in Durban, South Africa on
September 11, 1989 enroute to Manila, the civil authorities
arrested and detained it because of a lawsuit on a question
of ownership and possession. As a result, private
respondent notified petitioner on October 4, 1989 of the
arrest of the vessel and made a formal claim for the
amount of US$916,886.66, representing the dollar
equivalent on the policies, for non-delivery of the cargo.

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Private respondent likewise sought the assistance of

petitioner on what to do with the cargo.
Petitioner replied that the arrest of the vessel by civil
authority was not a peril covered by the policies. Private re-

____________________________

1 Penned by Justice Godardo A. Jacinto and concurred in by Justices

Ricardo J. Francisco and Hector L. Hofilena.

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Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

spondent, accordingly, advised petitioner that it might

tranship the cargo and requested an extension of the
insurance coverage until actual transhipment, which
extension was approved upon payment of additional
premium. The insurance coverage was extended under the
same terms and conditions embodied in the original
policies while in the process of making arrangements for
the transhipment of the cargo from Durban to Manila,
covering the period October 4-December 19, 1989.
However, on December 11, 1989, the cargo was sold in
Durban, South Africa, for US$154.40 per metric ton or a
total of P10,304,231.75 due to its perishable nature which
could no longer stand a voyage of twenty days to Manila
and another twenty days for the discharge thereof. On
January 5, 1990, private respondent forthwith reduced its
claim to US$448,806.09 (or its peso equivalent of
P9,879,928.89 at the exchange rate of P22.0138 per $1.00)
representing private respondent’s loss after the proceeds of
the sale were deducted from the original claim of
$916,886.66 or P20,184,159.55.
Petitioner maintained its position that the arrest of the
vessel by civil authorities on a question of ownership was
an excepted risk under the marine insurance policies. This
prompted private respondent to file a complaint for
damages praying that aside from its claim, it be
reimbursed the amount of P128,770.88 as legal expenses
and the interest it paid for the loan it obtained to finance
the shipment totalling P942,269.30. In addition, private
respondent asked for moral damages amounting to
P200,000.00, exemplary damages amounting to
P200,000.00 and attorney’s fees equivalent to 30% of what
will be awarded by the court.

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The lower court decided in favor of private respondent

and required petitioner to pay, aside from the insurance
claim, consequential and liquidated damages amounting to
P1,024,233.88, exemplary damages amounting to
P100,000.00, reimbursement in the amount equivalent to
10% of whatever is recovered as attorney’s fees as well as
the costs of the suit. On private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration, petitioner was also required to further pay
interest at the rate of 12%
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246 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

per annum on all amounts due and owing to the private

respondent by virtue of the lower court decision counted
from the inception of this case until the same is paid.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the lower court stating that with the deletion of Clause 12
of the policies issued to private respondent, the same
became automatically covered under subsection 1.1 of
Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses. The arrests,
restraints or detainments contemplated in the former
clause were those effected by political or executive acts.
Losses occasioned by riot or ordinary judicial processes
were not covered therein. In other words, arrest, restraint
or detainment within the meaning of Clause 12 (or F.C. &
S. Clause) rules out detention by ordinary legal processes.
Hence, arrests by civil authorities, such as what happened
in the instant case, is an excepted risk under Clause 12 of
the Institute Cargo Clause or the F.C. & S. Clause.
However, with the deletion of Clause 12 of the Institute
Cargo Clause and the consequent adoption or institution of
the Institute War Clauses (Cargo), the arrest and seizure
by judicial processes which were excluded under the former
policy became one of the covered risks.
The appellate court added that the failure to deliver the
consigned goods in the port of destination is a loss
compensable, not only under the Institute War Clause but
also under the Theft, Pilferage, and Non-delivery Clause
(TNPD) of the insurance policies, as read in relation to
Section2 130 of the Insurance Code and as held in Williams
v. Cole.
Furthermore, the appellate court contended that since
the vessel was prevented at an intermediate port from
completing the voyage due to its seizure by civil
authorities, a peril insured against, the liability of
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petitioner continued until the goods could have been

transhipped. But due to the perishable nature of the goods,
it had to be promptly sold to minimize loss. Accordingly,
the sale of the goods being reasonable and justified, it
should not operate to discharge petitioner from its
contractual liability.

____________________________

2 16 Me. 207.

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Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Hence this petition, claiming that the Court of Appeals

erred:

1. In ruling that the arrest of the vessel was a risk

covered under the subject insurance policies.
2. In ruling that there was constructive total loss over
the cargo.
3. In ruling that petitioner was in bad faith in
declining private respondent’s claim.
4. In giving undue reliance to the doctrine that
insurance policies are strictly construed against the
insurer.

In assigning the first error, petitioner submits the

following: (a) an arrest by civil authority is not
compensable since the term “arrest” refers to “political or
executive acts” and does not include a loss caused by riot or
by ordinary judicial process as in this case; (b) the deletion
of the Free from Capture or Seizure Clause would leave the
assured covered solely for the perils specified by the
wording of the policy itself; (c) the rationale for the
exclusion of an arrest pursuant to judicial authorities is to
eliminate collusion between unscrupulous assured and civil
authorities.
As to the second assigned error, petitioner submits that
any loss which private respondent may have incurred was
in the nature and form of unrecovered acquisition value
brought about by a voluntary sacrifice sale and not by
arrest, detention or seizure of the ship.
As to the third issue, petitioner alleges that its act of
rejecting the claim was a result of its honest belief that the
arrest of the vessel was not a compensable risk under the
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policies issued. In fact, petitioner supported private

respondent by accommodating the latter’s request for an
extension of the insurance coverage, notwithstanding that
it was then under no legal obligation to do so.
Private respondent, on the other hand, argued that
when it appealed its case to the Court of Appeals,
petitioner did not raise as an issue the award of exemplary
damages. It cannot now, for the first time, raise the same
before this Court. Likewise, petitioner cannot submit for
the first time on appeal

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Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

its argument that it was wrong for the Court of Appeals to

have ruled the way it did based on facts that would need
inquiry into the evidence. Even if inquiry into the facts
were possible, such was not necessary because the coverage
as ruled upon by the Court of Appeals is evident from the
very terms of the policies.
It also argued that petitioner, being the sole author of
the policies, “arrests” should be strictly interpreted against
it because the rule is that any ambiguity is to be taken
contra proferentum. Risk policies should be construed
reasonably and in a manner as to make effective the
intentions and expectations of the parties. It added that the
policies clearly stipulate that they cover the risks of non-
delivery of an entire package and that it was petitioner
itself that invited and granted the extensions and collected
premiums thereon.
The resolution of this controversy hinges on the
interpretation of the “Perils” clause of the subject policies
in relation to the excluded risks or warranty specifically
stated therein.
By way of a historical background, marine insurance
developed as an all-risk coverage, using the phrase “perils
of the sea” to encompass
3
the wide and varied range of risks
that were covered. The subject policies contain the “Perils”
clause which is a standard form in any marine insurance
policy. Said clause reads:

“Touching the adventures which the said MALAYAN

INSURANCE CO., are content to bear, and to take upon them in
this voyage; they are of the Seas; Men-of-War, Fire, Enemies,
Pirates, Rovers, Thieves, Jettisons, Letters of Mart and Counter
Mart, Suprisals, Takings of the Sea, Arrests, Restraints and

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Detainments of all Kings, Princess and Peoples, of what Nation,

condition, or quality soever, Barratry of the Master and Mariners,
and of all other Perils, Losses, and Misfortunes, that have come to
hurt, detriment, or damage of the said goods and merchandise or
any part thereof. And in case of any loss or misfortune it shall be
lawful to the ASSURED, their factors, servants and assigns, to
sue, labour, and travel for, in and about the defence, safeguards,
and recovery of the said goods and merchan-

____________________________

3 R. Keeton & A. Widiss, Insurance Law, 467 (1988).

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Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

dises, and ship, & c., or any part thereof, without prejudice to this
INSURANCE; to the charges whereof the said COMPANY, will
contribute according to the rate and quantity of the sum herein
INSURED. And it is expressly declared and agreed that no acts of
the Insurer or Insured in recovering, saving, or preserving the
Property insured shall be considered as a Waiver, or Acceptance
of Abandonment. And it is agreed by the said COMPANY, that
this writing or Policy of INSURANCE shall be of as much Force
and Effect as the surest Writing or Policy of INSURANCE made
in LONDON. And so the said MALAYAN INSURANCE
COMPANY, INC., are contented, and do hereby promise and bind
themselves, their Heirs, Executors, Goods and Chattel, to the
ASSURED, his or their Executors, Administrators, or Assigns, for
the true Performance of the Premises; confessing themselves paid
the Consideration due unto them for this INSURANCE at and
after the rate arranged.” (Italics supplied)

The exception or limitation to the “Perils” clause and the

“All other perils” clause in the subject policies is specifically
referred to as Clause 12 called the “Free from Capture &
Seizure Clause” or the F.C. & S. Clause which reads, thus:

“Warranted free of capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment,

and the consequences thereof or of any attempt thereat; also from
the consequences of hostilities and warlike operations, whether
there be a declaration of war or not; but this warranty shall not
exclude collision, contact with any fixed or floating object (other
than a mine or torpedo), stranding, heavy weather or fire unless
caused directly (and independently of the nature of the voyage or
service which the vessel concerned or, in the case of a collision,
any other vessel involved therein is performing) by a hostile act
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by or against a belligerent power and for the purpose of this

warranty ‘power’ includes any authorities maintaining naval,
military or air forces in association with power.
Further warranted free from the consequences of civil war,
revolution, insurrection, or civil strike arising therefrom or piracy.
Should Clause 12 be deleted, the relevant current institute war
clauses shall be deemed to form part of this insurance.” (Italics
supplied)

However, the F.C. & S. Clause was deleted from the

policies. Consequently, the Institute War Clauses (Cargo)
was
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Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

deemed incorporated which, in subsection 1.1 of Section 1,

provides:

“1. This insurance covers:

1.1. The risks excluded from the standard form of English
Marine Policy by the clause warranted free of capture, seizure,
arrest, restraint or detainment, and the consequences thereof of
hostilities or warlike operations, whether there be a declaration of
war or not; but this warranty shall not exclude collision, contact
with any fixed or floating object (other than a mine or torpedo),
stranding, heavy weather or fire unless caused directly (and
independently of the nature on voyage or service which the vessel
concerned or, in the case of a collision any other vessel involved
therein is performing) by a hostile act by or against a belligerent
power; and for the purpose of this warranty ‘power’ includes any
authority maintaining naval, military or air forces in association
with a power. Further warranted free from the consequences of
civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, or civil strike arising
therefrom, or piracy.”

According to petitioner, the automatic incorporation of

subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses
(Cargo), among others, means that any “capture, arrest,
detention, etc.” pertained exclusively to warlike operations
if this Court strictly construes the heading of the said
Clauses. However, it also claims that the parties intended
to include arrests, etc. even if it were not the result of
hostilities or warlike operations. It further claims that on
the strength of jurisprudence on the matter, the term
“arrests” would only cover those arising from political or
executive acts, concluding that whether private
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respondent’s claim is anchored on subsection 1.1 of Section

1 of the Institute War Clauses (Cargo) or the F.C. & S.
Clause, the arrest
4
of the vessel by judicial authorities is an
excluded risk.
This Court cannot agree with petitioner’s assertions,
particularly when it alleges that in the “Perils” Clause, it
assumed the risk of arrest caused solely by executive or
political acts of the government of the seizing state and
thereby ex-

____________________________

4 Petition, pp. 13-14, Rollo.

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cludes “arrests” caused by ordinary legal processes, such as

in the instant case.
With the incorporation of subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of
the Institute War Clauses, however, this Court agrees with
the Court of Appeals and the private respondent that
“arrest” caused by ordinary judicial process is deemed
included among the covered risks. This interpretation
becomes inevitable when subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the
Institute War Clauses provided that “this insurance covers
the risks excluded from the Standard Form of English
Marine Policy by the clause ‘Warranted free of capture,
seizure, arrest, etc. x x x’ ” or the F.C. & S. Clause.
Jurisprudentially, “arrests” caused by ordinary judicial
process is also a risk excluded from the Standard Form of
English Marine Policy by the F.C. & S. Clause.
Petitioner cannot adopt the argument that the “arrest”
caused by ordinary judicial process is not included in the
covered risk simply because the F.C. & S. Clause under the
Institute War Clauses can only be operative in case of
hostilities or warlike operations on account of its heading
“Institute War Clauses.” This Court agrees with the Court
of Appeals when it held that “x x x. Although the F.C. & S.
Clause may have originally been inserted in marine
policies to protect against risks of war, (see generally G.
Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, Sections 2-9, at
71-73 [2d Ed. 1975]), its interpretation in recent years to
include seizure or detention by civil authorities seems 5
consistent with the general purposes of the clause, x x x.” In
fact, petitioner itself averred that subsection 1.1 of Section
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1 of the Institute War Clauses included “arrest” even 6if it

were not a result of hostilities or warlike operations. In
this regard, since what was also excluded in the deleted
F.C. & S. Clause was “arrest” occasioned by ordinary
judicial process, logically, such “arrest” would now become
a covered risk under subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of

_______________

5 Blaine Richards & Co. v. Marine Indem., Ins., Co., 653 F. 2nd 1051
(1980).
6 Petition, p. 13, Rollo.

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252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

the Institute War Clauses, regardless of whether or not

said “arrest” by civil authorities occurred in a state of war.
Petitioner itself seems to be confused about the
application of the F.C. & S. Clause as well as that of
subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses
(Cargo). It stated that “the F.C. & S. Clause was “originally
incorporated in insurance policies to eliminate the risks of
warlike operations.” It also averred that the F.C. & S.
Clause7 applies even if there be no war or warlike operations
x x x.” In the same vein, it contended that subsection 1.1 of
Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses (Cargo) “pertained
exclusively to warlike operations” and yet it also stated that
“the deletion of the F.C & S. Clause and the consequent
incorporation of subsection 1.1 of Section 1 of the Institute
War Clauses (Cargo) was to include “arrest, etc. even 8
if it
were not a result of hostilities or warlike operations.”
This Court cannot help the impression that petitioner is
overly straining its interpretation of the provisions of the
policy in order to avoid being liable for private respondent’s
claim.
This Court finds it pointless for petitioner to maintain
its position that it only insures risks of “arrest” occasioned
by executive or political acts of government which is
interpreted as not referring to those caused by ordinary
legal processes as contained in the “Perils” Clause; deletes
the F.C. & S. Clause which excludes risks of arrest
occasioned by executive or political acts of the government
and naturally, also those caused by ordinary legal
processes; and, thereafter incorporates subsection 1.1 of
Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses which now includes
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in the coverage risks of arrest due to executive or political

acts of a government but then still excludes “arrests”
occasioned by ordinary legal processes when subsection 1.1
of Section 1 of said Clauses should also have included
“arrests” previously excluded from the coverage of the F.C.
& S. Clause.

_______________

7 p. 13, supra.
8 Supra.

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Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

It has been held that a strained interpretation which is

unnatural and forced, as to lead to an absurd conclusion or
to render9
the policy nonsensical, should, by all means, be
avoided. Likewise, it must be borne in mind that such
contracts are invariably prepared by the companies and
must be accepted
10
by the insured in the form in which they
are written. Any construction11
of a marine policy rendering
it void should be avoided. Such policies will, therefore, be
construed strictly against the company in order to avoid a
forfeiture, unless
12
no other result is possible from the
language used.
If a marine insurance company desires to limit or
restrict the operation of the general provisions of its
contract by special proviso, exception, or exemption, it
should express
13
such limitation in clear and unmistakable
language. Obviously, the deletion of the F.C. & S. Clause
and the consequent incorporation of subsection 1.1 of
Section 1 of the Institute War Clauses (Cargo) gave rise to
ambiguity. If the risk of arrest occasioned by ordinary
judicial process was expressly indicated as an exception in
the subject policies, there would have been no controversy
with respect to the interpretation of the subject clauses.
Be that as it may, exceptions to the general coverage
14
are
construed most strongly against the company. Even an
express exception in a policy is to be construed against the
underwriters by whom the policy is 15
framed, and for whose
benefit the exception is introduced.

____________________________

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9 Importers’ & Exporters’ Ins. Co. v. Jones, 1924, 266 S.W. 286, 166
Ark. 370.
10 General Accident, Fire & Life Ass. Corp. v. Louisville Home
Telephone Co., 1917, 193 S.W. 1031.
11 The J.L. Luckenbach, C.C. A.N.Y. (1933), 65 F. 2d 570.
12 Wheeler v. Aetna Ins. Co., D.C.N.Y. (1933), F. Supp. 820.
13 Rosen Reichardt Brokerage Co. v. London Assur. Corp. (1924), 264
S.W. 433.
14 Quinlinan v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., D.C.N.Y. (1929),
31 F. 2d 149.
15 Dole v. New England Mut. Marine Ins. Co. (1863) 88 Mass. 373.

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254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Malayan Insurance Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

An insurance contract should be so interpreted as to carry

out the purpose for which the parties entered into the
contract which is, to insure against risks of loss or damage
to the goods. Such interpretation should result from the 16
natural and reasonable meaning of language in the policy.
Where restrictive provisions are open to two
interpretations,
17
that which is most favorable to the insured
is adopted.
Indemnity and liability insurance policies are construed
in accordance with the general rule of resolving any
ambiguity therein in favor of the insured, 18
where the
contract or policy is prepared by the insurer. A contract of
insurance, being a contract of adhesion, par excellence, any
ambiguity therein should be resolved against the insurer;
in other words, it should be construed liberally in favor of
the insured and strictly against the insurer. Limitations of
liability should be regarded with extreme jealousy and
must be construed in such a way as to preclude
19
the insurer
from noncompliance with its obligations.
In view of the foregoing, this Court sees no need to
discuss the other issues presented.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and
the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

     Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza and Torres,

Jr., JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

____________________________

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8/20/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 270
16 Cherokee Brick Co. v. Ocean Accident & Guaranty Corp., Limited,
(1918), 94 S.E. 1032, Ga. App. 702.
17 Rosen-Reichardt Brokerage Co. v. London Assur. Corporation,
(1924), 264 S.W. 433.
18 Vol. II, G. Couch, Cyclopedia of Insurance Law, pp. 524-525, (1963).
19 Fortune Insurance and Surety Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 244
SCRA 308 (1995).

255

VOL. 270, MARCH 20, 1997 255

Jariol vs. Commission on Elections

Note.—A policy or insurance contract is to be

interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly
against the company. (Geagonia vs. Court of Appeals, 241
SCRA 152 [1995])

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