India and The War On Terror: University of Delhi

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INDIA AND THE WAR ON TERROR

Presentation for 2nd Annual Conference on Terrorism and Global Security:


The Ongoing Afghanistan War, the War on Terror, and from Clausewitz to Beyond New Centers of Gravity
14-15 September, 2011,International Security Beyond 9/11,Washington DC

SUNIL SONDHI
[email protected]

MAHARAJA AGRASEN COLLEGE


UNIVERSITY OF DELHI
OBJECTIVES

• Nature of Terrorism in India

• Impact of War on Terror in India

• Counterterrorism Strategy for India

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Terrorism in South Asia

• Impetus of global terrorism continues to emanate from South


and West Asia.
• Terrorism in South Asia is for the most part rooted in the
region.
• It has long been used for separatism, right- and left-wing
politics, and religious extremism.
• Lately transnational terrorism is playing a significant role.
• Cross-border ethnic ties, globalized financial networks, and
widely accessible communications technologies used by terrorist
networks.

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Regional Incapacities

• Limited response capacities of governments and law-


enforcement agencies
• Grievances about widespread corruption, underdevelopment,
and socio-economic marginalization.
• Problematic role of the state.
• Relationships among states characterized by suspicion, mistrust,
and, hostility.
• Linkages between terrorism, political violence, development,
governance.

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Impact of War on Terror

• Terrorist networks in India, Pakistan, Sr Lanka, Bangladesh


under pressure.
• Indian efforts to convince US administration about Pak
complicity.
• Ambivalence in US responses, as it needs Pakistan as a
frontline state against terrorism.
• Revived calls from separatist forces for US mediation in
Kashmir.
• Security environment in the Af-Pak region has taken a turn
for the worse.

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Pakistan’s Proxy War in India

• Pakistan has contributed significantly to the ongoing campaign


against al-Qaeda.
• It has been reluctant to eliminate other terrorist groups
operating in India and Afghanistan.
• The protection of the terrorist infrastructure has given fresh
lease of life to terrorism in India
• It has supported extremist groups simply because it is powerless
to prevent it but at other times with full knowledge and consent
• Pakistan is the epicenter for security challenges facing South
Asia, and, the whole world, in the early 21st century.

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Internal Conflicts in India

• Kashmir is the most visible and intense of the conflicts and has
both intrastate and interstate dimensions.
• Insurgency movements in Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura
and Assam.
• India’s response, resorting to coercive military means to quell
the unrest, has not always helped the situation.
• In recent years, a corridor has formed in India’s tribal belts
from the north to the south, under the influence of Naxalites.

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State Weakness in India

• Lack of institutional provision of security, justice and basic


services.
• Lack of territorial consolidation and control over population
groups.
• Lack of coercive power to impose order and to repel challenges
to state authority.
• Lack of agreement on national identity and social purpose.

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Governance Deficit

• Inadequate training for police, judges, prosecutors,


investigators, and other criminal justice officials.
• Incapacity of courts in the country to handle terrorism related
cases in a timely manner.
• Slack regulation of informal money transfer systems such as
hawala or hundi.
• Ineffective interagency coordination mechanisms.
• Lack of national counterterrorism databases to enable law
enforcement officials to remain informed of terrorist events.
• No access to global police communications system at border
crossings in the region.

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Absence of National Strategy

• India’s police and internal security system is highly fragmented


and often poorly coordinated.
• Federal political system leaves most policing responsibilities to
the states.
• Local police and counterterrorism forces are often poorly
trained and equipped.
• Local personnel are frequently hired on the basis of political
patronage and are notorious for high levels of corruption.

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Case of Mumbai and Delhi

• There was significant intelligence suggesting attacks in Mumbai


in 2008 and Delhi in 2011.
• This information was ignored by several key actors because it
was deemed unactionable.
• Even when Mumbai and Delhi police tried to take preventive
action, they lacked the manpower and equipment.
• Inter agency coordination was lacking in both incidents.
• Long response time and the emergence of disastrous siege in
Mumbai.

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For Effective Counterterrorism Strategy

• The first objective of counter-terrorism in India should be to


break the collective mental paralysis that terrorist violence
imposes.
• India needs to increase the rate of terrorist neutralization so
that it should exceed the rate of terrorist recruitment.
• Effective counter-terrorist response is possible only when the
police intelligence and response capabilities have been
strengthened.
• Dramatically bolstering the institutional capacity of India’s
counterterrorism apparatus requires international collaboration.

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Challenges to Counterterrorism

• Lack of political resolve to fight terrorism without making any


compromise.
• Terrorist organizations in India have thrived under political
patronage in the past.
• Lack of political and social consensus on the necessity of
eliminating terrorism.
• Political leadership lacks the will to push past bureaucratic and
state-centric rivalries.
• Political class is focused on the cut-throat electoral competition
that characterizes Indian politics.

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Conclusion

• The global war on terrorism has checked and put the terrorist
networks under pressure in South Asia.
• Thoroughgoing institutional reform is required in India to fight
terrorism effectively.
• More financial and human resources are required as India faces
higher threat level.
• Political elite needs to be focused more on combating terrorism
than on vote bank politics.
• The process of bolstering Indian counterterrorism capabilities
will be long and difficult.

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