Quinto v Andres

GR No. 155791, 16 Mar 2005

FACTS:
 Around 7:30am on 13 Nov 1995, 11-yr. old Edison Garcia and his playmate, Wilson Quinto (also
11y/o) saw respondents Andres and Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert.
 Andres and Pacheco invited the two to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. Wilson
agreed while Edison remained outside after he saw that it was dark inside.
 The 3 went inside the culvert. Only Pacheco had a flashflight.
 After a while, Pacheco came out with a fish and left without saying a word. Andres also came out
but went again inside. When he went out again, he was already carrying the dead body of Wilson.
 Shocked, Garcia fled from the scene while Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto
(Wilson’s mother) informing her that her son died. Petitioner then rushed to the drainage culvert.
 2 weeks after, NBI took the sworn statements of Pacheco, Andres and petitioner. NBI also
performed an autopsy and it was found that Wilson’s cause of death was Asphyxia by drowning;
traumatic head injuries, contributory.
o With this, a criminal complaint for homicide was filed by the NBI against the respondents
after they found probable cause for homicide by dolo against the two.
 An information was also filed with RTC of Tarlac charging the respondents with homicide.
 The prosecution presented both Garcia and Dr. Aguda who performed the autopsy while
respondents filed a demurrer to evidence which the court granted.
o RTC also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the
absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson’s death.
 Petitioner appealed but CA affirmed RTC’s decision. It ruled that the acquittal in this case is not
merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the accused-appellees did not
commit the criminal acts complained of.
 Hence, this petition alleging that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and
speculations when it held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head hitting the
stones in the drainage system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by
a snake which he thought was the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit hard on the top of the
culvert; or (c) he could have lost consciousness due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. She also
alleged that the trial court erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive on the
part of the respondents to kill the victim, and in considering that respondent Andres even
informed her of Wilson’s death.

ISSUE: WON respondents should be held liable for homicide. NO

RULING:
A person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. “Natural” refers to an
occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while “logical” means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed
must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.

There must be a relation of “cause and effect,” the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the effect
being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The felony committed is not the proximate cause of
the resulting injury when:
a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and
the active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.
Here, respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. As ruled in People v Delim, the prosecution was
burdened to prove the guilt of the accused. Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the
prosecution or the private complainant is burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior
weight of evidence. Although the evidence adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the
defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action.

As held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the
facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action
against the respondents for damages. It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective
testimonies of Garcia, who was not an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda. However, the court gave credence to
the testimony of Dr. Aguda that (a) the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument
applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object.

The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the respondents hit
the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object or instrument that
might have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased.

It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all.
However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to
prove that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to
adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the
latter was invited to join them in fishing.

Petitioner testified that when her son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres who
brought out the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son’s death. Even after informing the
petitioner of the death of her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy
area where the deceased was.

On the Extinction of Criminal Liability

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The civil liability of such person established
in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the RPC includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal
action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. With the implied institution of the civil action in the
criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the criminal action
predominating the civil.

The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order. The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused. While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of the private
complainant against the accused for damages and/or restitution.

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil
action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist.