Cresciani Book

Although Italians had migrated to
Australia since the middle of the

nineteenth century, it was not until
the 1920s that they became aware that
they were a community in a foreign
land, not just isolated individuals in
search of fortune. Their political,
cultural, economic and recreational
associations became an important
factor.
Many of them, although settled in
Australia, still thought of themselves
as an appendage of Italy, a belief
strengthened by Fascism’s nationalist
propaganda which urged them to
reject alien cultures, customs and
traditions. The xenophobic hostility
shown by some Australians greatly
contributed to the success of these
propaganda efforts. Moreover, the
issue of Fascism in Italy was a
contentious one among Italians in
Australia, a large minority fighting
with courage and determination
against Fascism’s representatives in
Australia.
This broad study of Italian
immigrants before and during World
War II covers not only the effects of
Fascism, but also records the ordeal of
Italian settlers in the cities and the
outback during the Depression and
the difficulties they faced after the
outbreak of the war. It deals with a
subject that has long been neglected
by scholars and is an important
contribution to the history of Italian
migrants in Australia.
Although Italians had migrated to
Australia since the middle of the
nineteenth century, it was not until
the 1920s that they became aware that
they were a community in a foreign
land, not just isolated individuals in
search of fortune. Their political,
cultural, economic and recreational
associations became an important
factor.
Many of them, although settled in
Australia, still thought of themselves
as an appendage of Italy, a belief
strengthened by Fascism’s nationalist
propaganda which urged them to
reject alien cultures, customs and
traditions. The xenophobic hostility
shown by some Australians greatly
contributed to the success of these
propaganda efforts. Moreover, the
issue of Fascism in Italy was a
contentious one among Italians in
Australia, a large minority fighting
with courage and determination
against Fascism’s representatives in
Australia.
This broad study of Italian
immigrants before and during World
War II covers not only the effects of
Fascism, but also records the ordeal of
Italian settlers in the cities and the
outback during the Depression and
the difficulties they faced after the
outbreak of the war. It deals with a
subject that has long been neglected
by scholars and is an important
contribution to the history of Italian
migrants in Australia.
This book was published by ANU Press between 1965–1991.
This republication is part of the digitisation project being carried
out by Scholarly Information Services/Library and ANU Press.
This project aims to make past scholarly works published
by The Australian National University available to
a global audience under its open-access policy.
Fascism, Anti-Fascism
and Italians in Australia
Fascism, Anti-Fascism
and Italians in Australia
1922-1945
Gianfranco Cresciani
Australian National University Press
Canberra, ACT, London, England and Trumbull, Conn. USA
1980
First published in Australia 1980
Printed in Australia for the Australian National University Press,
Canberra
©Gianfranco Cresciani 1980
This book is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of
private study, research, criticism, or review, as permitted under the
Copyright Act, no part may be reproduced by any process without
written permission. Inquiries should be made to the publisher.
National Library of Australia
Cataloguing-in-Publication entry
Cresciani, Gianfranco.
Fascism, anti-fascism and Italians in Australia, 1922-1945
Index
Bibliography
ISBN 0 7081 1158 0
1. Fascism — Australia. I. Title.
320.533’0994
Library of Congress No. 78-73567

United Kingdom, Europe, Middle East, and Africa: Eurospan Ltd,
3 Henrietta St, London WC2E 8LU, England
North America: Books Australia, Trumbull, Conn., USA
Southeast Asia: Angus & Robertson (S.E. Asia) Pty Ltd, Singapore
Japan: United Publishers Services Ltd, Tokyo
To my parents
Foreword
Historians in Australia are divided into two castes. There are
the historians of Australia, and the historians of ‘other places’,
of America, Asia, Africa or Europe. In the common rooms of
academe one caste scorns the other. According to one faction,
devotion to the study of the world outside Australia is really
only a cultural cringe, self-indulgent, irrelevant and somehow
unpatriotic, disloyal to Australia’s values and needs. The other
faction instead derides the primitiveness of Australian
historiography, always ten years behind the times, at best ‘a
subject which can be got up in a week’, with its bizarre or
quaint interest in convicts and governors, or in the dionysian
frenzy of third-rate bush balladeers.
No doubt a society gets the historians which it deserves. A
debate, or rather a division, on whether Australia’s interests
and characteristics are local, parochial, born in the bush and
nurtured in the tyranny of distance, or international, part of
the history of colonialism and capitalism, is central to much
Australian intellectual and political life. As a trained historian
of modern Europe, I have made my own decisions, and
polished my own prejudices. I believe that Australia scarcely
exists, and that I scarcely exist as an Australian. As a resident
of Sydney, a European city, inconveniently placed in the
Pacific, but conveniently part of the international air routes,
and sometimes reached by the international news services, I
look outwards, away from the bush of flies and snakes and
inconvenience, of a cruel dead landscape, sterile, forbidding
and unmastered. In the last decade, I have been to Rome more
vii
viii F oreword
often than I have been to Canberra, let alone to Melbourne. I
seem yet another alienated Australian academic, Australian-
born and therefore unable to slough off a skin made up of
potato scallops, Alan McGilvray and The Potts, but staying in
Australia only because the pay is good and . . . there always (?)
are sabbaticals.
Yet, in so many ways, Australia ought to have changed since
1945, and perhaps it has changed, and perhaps I exaggerate
my alienation. Always an immigrant country, Australia has
stopped being only the venue for Anglo-Saxon or Celtic kith
and kin, and has been enriched by Italians, Greeks, Turks,
Lebanese, Vietnamese and many others. What a joy that in
Sydney I can eat as well or better as in many a European city.
And is it not time that our historians began to recognise that
‘Australian history’ now means not just the derring-do of
Governor Bligh or Colonial Secretary Stephen, but also the
political and social history of Italy, Greece, Turkey, Lebanon,
Vietnam and the rest?
Migration weaves a complex web, not surprising given that
even Robert Bruce’s spider would tire at the labour, the travail
of the migrant, and Australians are only beginning to study it.
Sometimes in such study, there is absurd, if predictable bias.
Some ‘Italo-Australians’ discover only in Australia that they
are or were Italians; when in Italy they were Calabrians or
paesani. Political views or even knowledge of the country of
origin freezes at the moment of departure, and those in the
political leadership of migrant communities go on fighting out
the disputes of 1948 or 1943 or 1922 like flies warring in
amber. Not only Australian historians have been forgetful of
the migrant experience. Italy, that great emigrant country,
has still not produced a serious historical investigation of
emigration, and in fact the best study of Italian emigration in
any language remains R. F. Foerster’s, The Italian Emigration
of our Times, written by an American in 1919.
For all these reasons, Cresciani’s study, despite the
limitations of a monograph, must be welcomed by both castes
in the common-rooms. Cresciani himself is a migrant, although
one not dominated by the passions and ambitions of Italo-
Australian politics. As a Triestine too, he carries the traditions
of Central Europe, the Habsburg Empire as well as those of
F oreword ix
Italy, and can comprehend the fatuity of narrow nationalism.
What the book says must stand for itself, but in introducing it
to its readers, I must acknowledge Cresciani’s achievement.
Cresciani reached Australia already an adult. In completing
this work he has had to master English, and survive the
lottery of under-graduate and post-graduate work as the head
of a household, employed in an Italo-Australian business
concern, and without the luxury of a Ph.D. scholarship or a
university post. Yet no-one could have been more indefatigible
in tracking down lost evidence, more enthusiastic and
judicious in using the new techniques of oral history. Best of
all for the author of this preface, a lecturer in Italian history at
the University of Sydney has been granted an able and
efficient student, and is granted a loyal, stimulating and
independent friend.
R. J. B. Bosworth
Abbreviations
AA Australian Archives
ACS Archivio Centrale dello Stato
APC Italian Communist Party Archives
CPA Communist Party of Australia
DDI Documenti Diplomatici Italiani
JAMP Jesuit Archives, Modotti Papers
USNAID United States National Archives, Italian
Documents
x
Preface
D uring the years between the two World W ars, Italian

m igrants in A ustralia, for the first tim e in their history in this
country, organised them selves in political associations and
carried out political activities. Undoubtedly, one of the main
m otives which prom pted them to become involved in politics
was the F ascist P a rty ’s coming to power in Italy. Their
a ttitu d e s of support or opposition to the new Italian regime
were dictated by the same political as well as social, economic
and em otional reasons which divided Italians a t home and in
other countries.
This stu d y aims at illustrating the a ttitu d e s of the
m igrants tow ards the Fascist phenomenon and at
dem onstrating th at, contrary to the claims of the Fascist
authorities of those years and of some Italians still living in
A ustralia, Fascism was a dividing force which split the Italian
com m unity. The existence of a small bu t determ ined anti-
Fascist m ovem ent dem onstrates th a t this was the case. For
this reason, research on the m ig ran ts’ opposition, on their
achievem ents and failures, fills a serious gap in inform ation on
the history of Italian anti-Fascism in A ustralia. Evidence
shows also th a t this opposition was expressed a t a personal
level as well as through political bodies; to this purpose, a
chapter has been dedicated to Omero Schiassi, who represents
the epitom e of the middle-class Italian who fought the
dictatorship with his teaching, his w ritings, his close
association w ith m igrant workers, in addition to playing an
im portant p a rt in the leadership of the anti-Fascist movement.
xii Preface
In addition, this study em phasises th a t the popularity of

Fascism am ongst Italians in A ustralia (as in Italy) varied
according to the international and dom estic success or failure
of the initiatives taken by the regime, w ith high levels of
acceptance, as during the years 1929-36, and periods of crisis,
as between 1924-7 and 1937-40. This p a tte rn was nevertheless
influenced by the socio-economic conditions peculiar to
A ustralia, which conditioned the political behaviour of Italian
m igrants who, generally, reacted more favourably to the
regim e’s policies than did their brothers a t home.
This book does not aim a t being a history of Italians, nor a
history of A ustralian political attitu d e s tow ards Fascism and
Italians between 1922 and 1945, although these two aspects
are an essential p a rt of it; furtherm ore, it does not claim to be
the definitive account of this fascinating episode in Italian and
A ustralian political history. A g reat deal of docum entary
inform ation in A ustralian and Italian archives is still
restricted, preventing historians from giving a picture
conclusive in all its details.
It is only to be hoped th a t people who have the history of
Italians in A ustralia a t heart will continue in this effort; now,
by recording the recollections of those who w itnessed the
events, before tim e obliterates their memories and the facts
pass unrecorded into the grave, and later, by retrieving and
disclosing the evidence stored in private and sta te archives in
Italy and A ustralia.
W inston Hills, 1978 G.C.

Acknowledgments
In completing what has turned out to be a six-year research
project, I wish to express my deepest appreciation to the
Literature Board of the Australia Council for having awarded
me a Special Purpose Grant which has enabled me to study
this hitherto unresearched field of Australian history.
I am indebted to many people for help in writing this book.
Dozens of institutions, associations and individuals have been
consulted or interviewed to gather and corroborate facts. It is
not possible to pay an adequate tribute here to all concerned.
It would be very remiss of me, however, if I failed to
acknowledge with my warm thanks the following sources of
assistance, advice, information and kindness.
First and foremost I am grateful to Dr R. J. B. Bosworth,
University of Sydney, for suggesting this study and for
constructive and perceptive criticism of the draft manuscript.
Thanks are also due to Mr A. E. Cahill, University of Sydney,
who offered some useful suggestions. I also want to thank F.
Battistessa, O. Brida, F. Carmagnola, Prof. A. R. Chisholm, N.
Costantino, M. Cristofaro, P. De Angelis, E. Del Pin, R.
Gibson, V. E. Giuffre, F. La Rosa, F. Rando, T. Saviane, Dr P.
Sonnino, L. Stellato, B. Walker, J. Waten and G. Zammarchi,
who not only graciously consented to permit me to tape record
interviews with them, but allowed me, in some cases, to see
and retain their personal papers.
Thanks are also due to Dr L. Cleland and Mrs L. E.
MacKnight of the Australian Archives in Canberra and to the
staff of the Australian Archives in Melbourne, Brisbane and
xiii
xiv Acknowledgments
Adelaide; to Dr C. Casucci of the Italian Archivio Centrale
dello Stato, Rome; to Dr C. Colombo of the Istituto Gramsci in
Rome; to the officers of the Biblioteca della Camera del
Deputati in Rome, of the United States National Archives in
Washington, of the New York Public Library, of the State
Library of Western Australia and of the Archives of the Jesuit
Provincial House in Melbourne, for allowing me to have copies
of the documents relevant to the history of Italians in
Australia. Also, officers of the Mitchell Library in Sydney and
of the State Library of Victoria, Melbourne, afforded me their
customary courteous assistance.
I am also indebted to the Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation for allowing me to use some still classified
material.
All photographs are reproduced by courtesy of the Mitchell
Library, Sydney, with the exception of the photograph of
Battistessa in 1927, which was supplied by Mr Battistessa; of
the Italian anti-Fascists in Melbourne in 1927, supplied by Mr
P. De Angelis; of Carmagnola’s address to a political rally at
the Matteotti Club, made available by the New York Public
Library; of an anti-Fascist poster on a lorry in Melbourne,
made available to me by Mr O. Brida; of Francesco Fantin,
made available by Mr L. Stellato; of the members of Italia
Libera marching in Melbourne, kindly donated by Mr O. Brida;
of the members of Italia Libera in Melbourne crating clothes,
supplied by Mr L. Stellato.
Finally, my thanks are due to Miss Linda Paoloni for her
patience and hard work in deciphering and typing my
manuscript.
Contents
Page
Foreword vii
Abbreviations x
Preface xi
Acknowledgments xiii
1 The Advent of Fascism in Australia: 1922-1927 1
2 Fascism Consolidates: 1928-1932 23
3 Dissident Fascism 53
4 The Years of Fascist Imperialism: 1932-1940 67
5 The Anti-Fascists 97
6 Anti-Fascism and Communism before World War 11 117
7 Fascist Propaganda in Australia: 1922-1940 137
8 The War Years 171
9 The Italia Libera Movement 197
10 Omero Schiassi 223
Conclusion 245
Bibliography 249
Index 255
xv
Plates
Between pages 1 1 4 a n d ll5

I Italians giving the Fascist salute
II A nti-Fascist Italians of the Italia Libera m ovem ent
III Omero Schiassi
IV Carosi and the leaders of the Italian associations in
Sydney
V F ather Ugo M odotti
VI Consul-General Paolo Vita-Finzi
V II Frank Carmagnola
V III Franco B a ttiste ssa
IX The founders of the first unofficial Fascist Branch in
M elbourne
X Consul-General Amedeo M ammalella
XI Consul-General Agostino Ferrante
X II M embers of the Italia Libera in M elbourne crating
clothes
X III A nti-Fascist Italians of the M atteo tti Club in
Melbourne
XIV Italian children of the Balilla and Piccole Italiene
organisation in Sydney
XV F irst issue of II Risveglio
XVI Consul-General A. Grossardi
XV II Italian ex-servicemen m arching during Anzac Day in
Sydney
X V III Francisco F antin
xvii
1
The Advent of Fascism
in Australia, 1922-1927
Emigration is an evil, because it pauperises the nation of

active elements which go abroad to become the red
globules of anaemic foreign countries. This evil can be
minimised by organisation and converted into a weight in
our favour in the international scale.
(From Mussolini’s preface to the Report of the Italian
Commissioner-General for Emigration for the years 1924-
1925.)
The successful bid for power of Mussolini’s Fascist movement
on 28 October 1922 stirred the political emotions of those
Italians who, at home or abroad, had witnessed the
tumultuous events of World War I and its aftermath. At
home, many, although disturbed by the squadrists’ violent
methods, saw in the Fascist victory a return to law and order, a
reaffirmation of the values of patriotism, property and pride in
the bourgeois social order, which they saw threatened by the
‘anti-national’ forces of Socialism and Communism. On the
other hand, many Italians abroad welcomed Mussolini because
they believed that in future their interests would be protected
better by this ‘man of the people’ who had himself been a
migrant and who had already manifested his concern for their
welfare.1 Perhaps more significantly, they accepted Fascism
1
2 Fascism, Anti-Fascism and Italians in Australia
enthusiastically, even in its most irrational and chauvinist
aspects, because they saw in it a weapon of defence against the
discrimination of which they were often victims, and because
Fascism was certainly not widely seen initially as a different
ideology from liberalism.
Support for Fascism was so spontaneous abroad that by
February 1923 over 150 Fascist Party branches had been
opened in many countries.2 Naturally the Fascist government
saw with pleasure the growth of party organisations among its
migrants. Mussolini himself in November 1922 declared in an
interview to Roberto Cantalupo that he intended to
disseminate abroad in successive phases his own political and
social ideas, by way of the Italian emigrants.3 Yet during the
early 1920s this plan was not pursued vigorously, mainly
because Fascism had not worked out the details of a
systematic policy of expansion, nor created the instruments
and the organisation able to carry it out. Even the
strengthening of the Press Secretariat of the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs, one of whose tasks was to cast a favourable
image of Fascism abroad, was a step dictated rather by
reasons of internal politics than by the need to attract the
migrant masses abroad to Fascism.4 Mussolini needed time to
consolidate his position at home, to persuade his opponents
that he would govern within the political framework of the
liberal state, and was concerned that the other European
governments, already alarmed by the revolutionary impact of
Communism, would see in the spreading of Fascism and of its
violent means another threat to their democratic institutions.
In order to allay their fears, in November 1922 Mussolini
declared that Italian Fascism, although pleased by the birth of
similar movements in other countries, had no intention of
creating another International.5 The Fascist Grand Council of
February 1923 carried a motion which instructed the Fascist
branches abroad to observe the laws of the host countries and
to avoid creating incidents which could mar the relations
between Italy and these countries.6 The diffusion of Fascism
differed according to the socio-political conditions peculiar to
the Italian communities in different countries. For instance,
while in the United States, owing to the size of the Italian
settlement and to the political climate, Fascism was quick in
The Advent of Fascism in Australia 3
establishing itself and in being widely accepted,7 in far away
countries with small Italian communities of recent migration,
the movement was slow in making headway.
Australia was one such country. Italian migrants had not
been attracted to this continent in large numbers: the census of
1921 showed that there were only 8,135 Italians in Australia, a
very small increase in comparison with the previous census of
1911 (6,719 Italians) and of 1901 (5,678 Italians).8 Nor were
they organised to any appreciable extent. There are many
reasons, before World War I, for their not having created
state-wide or nation-wide institutions which would promote
their interests. The size of the Italian settlement worked
against the creation of solid political organisations with a large
following. Moreover, most Italians were scattered in the
countryside, on the goldfields, in the mines, as agricultural
workers, fruit pickers, farmers, tobacco growers, canecutters.
The distance and the lack of means of communication
prevented them from organising themselves. Those in the
cities, mainly greengrocers, market gardeners and labourers,
because of a sheer lack of interest and capacity to understand
the advantages that a political organisation would bring, kept
themselves aloof from any active role in politics and from the
people who were advocating it. Also, many migrants were
seasonal workers, never stopping for long at any one place,
thus making it difficult for them to take part in social or
political activities. The economic conditions of the period must
also be borne in mind: the sheer poverty of most members of
the Italian community did not allow for much time to engage
in new activities; the effort of keeping themselves just above
the bread line, by working long hours under harsh conditions,
deterred the great majority of Italians from any organised
attempt to keep abreast with the cultural and political life of
Italy and from trying to set up in their new homeland the
leagues, the co-operatives, the unions and the political parties
which had played an important role in their lives in Italy.
The lack of political sophistication was also due to the nature
of Italian immigration in this country. Many migrants were
illiterate peasants or uneducated agricultural workers; there
was no articulate middle class, no intellectual 61ite which could
express the variety of ideas that are the necessary ferment for
a positive political action. In addition to their small numbers,
their isolation, their economic plight, their lack of education
and of leadership, Italians had to cope with the prejudice and
even the hostility of those Australians who discriminated
against them out of ignorance and racial hatred. Many mig
rants were afraid of expressing their own views and were
inhibited from joining any political association; this fear,
which was greater in inverse proportion to the number and to
the strength of the scattered migrant settlements, was a
further reason for the majority of Italians to withdraw into the
secluded life of the family nuclei. Many migrants, as they
became alienated from the social environment in which they
lived, were strengthened in their allegiance to the culture,
traditions and history of their country of origin, and afforded
their passive support to anyone who was praising or defending
their nation and themselves. Nationalism was therefore an
element of reaction to the existing situation; it was, among the
Italians in Australia, an ideology of defence.
This nationalism caused by fear was noticed by attentive
Australian observers. Major-General G. Ramaciotti, an expert
on Italian affairs, pointed out that:
the Italian abroad, with very few exceptions, always
keeps a warm corner of his heart for his Mother Country,
even in the rare case of having no family ties there. The
War Loan issued by Italy in 1916 was subscribed for in
the Commonwealth to a considerable extent. And
Fascismo had not been born in those days.9
When, in 1922, Fascism came to power in Italy, it found fertile

ground among Italians in Australia. If, as acutely pointed out
by Hugh Trevor-Roper, ‘Fascism, as an effective movement,
was born of fear’,10the basic ingredient for the advancement of
the new political credo from Italy was already present within
the Italian community in Australia. Fascism became popular
among its members, isolated as they were from the active
political life of Australian society, fearful of the xenophobia
shown by sections of the Australian community, strongly
nationalist in order to conceal their inferiority complex. To
them Fascism represented from the beginning the voice of the
Fatherland, the guardian of the integrity of the national
dignity, the power which showed determination in defending
the Italian honour either at home, against the threat of alien
ideologies, or abroad, as they believed it had been proven by
the Corfu incident in 1923, when Italy occupied militarily this
island in reprisal for the murder of an agent of Italian military
mission on the Greek-Albanian border. For these reasons
Fascism was identified with the Fatherland; ‘It is obvious’,
wrote the Italo-Australian in one of its first issues, ‘that
Fascism had prevailed and today we can say indeed that it is
synonymous with Italy’.11 From now on, patriotism,
nationalism and Fascist principles became the artfully ent
wined and inseparable elements of the ideology which
motivated the emotional behaviour of Italian migrants with
respect to their situation.
The advent of Fascism in Australia highlighted the existing
political and social problems at the time when, between 1922
and the end of 1927, the character of Italian settlement
underwent a deep change. Owing to the introduction of the
quota system by the United States, Italian immigration to
Australia increased dramatically during these years. The net
immigration statistics for the period 1922 to 1925 show that
12,536 Italians settled in Australia, while during the period
1926 to 1930 a further 11,975 arrived, most of them in the
years 1926 and 1927 since, in July 1928, the Italian and the
Australian governments came to a gentleman’s agreement
which drastically reduced Italian migration to Australia.12
This significant inflow of newcomers changed considerably the
pattern of settlement of Italian migrants and created the
conditions necessary for the development of political
activities. More Italians settled in the cities and in the large
industrial centres, thus making possible the founding of
newspapers, the opening of clubs and the establishing of
Fascist branches.
The first Italian newspaper to appear during the Fascists’
bid for power was the I talo-Australian, which began
publishing in Sydney on 9 August 1922. Its owner, Francesco
Lubrano, and its editor, Antonio Folli, showed from the first
issue where their sympathies lay. This weekly, together with
the monthly Italian Bulletin of Australia, the official organ of
the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Australia, which
appeared in Sydney in November 1922, were, between 1922
and the end of 1924, the principal — if not the only — channels
through which Fascism was made known to Italians in
Australia. In every issue they gave ample and sympathetic
cover to the history and the doctrine of the movement and
reprinted editorials from Italian papers favourable to Fascism
or articles from foreign papers praising it. Their support for
Mussolini’s policies was unreserved; not only did they approve
of the use of violence, both physical and political, which was
killing Italian democracy,13 but also they looked with favour
on an aggressive Fascist foreign policy. For instance,
Mussolini’s dealing with the Corfu incident was welcomed
since it was believed that as a consequence of it the European
powers would respect and fear Italy more and that Italians
abroad would also benefit by it.14 The pursuit of an imperial
policy was advocated openly by the Italo-Australian. Folli
wrote:
Italy has no imperialist ideals, excepting that she must
endeavour to keep her trade routes clear and well
protected, and the desire for further markets where her
manufactured goods could be disposed of, and nations
ready to welcome her overabundant population.15
It became clear at this time that the Fascist government
wanted not only to influence the political thinking of
individuals, but also aimed at conditioning all aspects of their
cultural, economic and social life. Italians abroad were urged
to show their patriotism and their sense of discipline in
everything they did; every public meeting was meant to be a
manifestation of nationalism and, as such, of support of
Fascism. This all-pervasive influence extended even to
religion; as the Italo-Australian remarked, ‘religious
ceremonies abroad often become manifestations of italianita ’16
since ‘those priests who arrive frequently in Australia are
missionaries not only of religious faith, but often are apostles
of healthy patriotism’.17 Even the murder of Socialist leader
Giacomo Matteotti by a gang of Fascist thugs, some days
after he had courageously spoken in parliament against
Mussolini’s rigging of the 1924 elections, was exploited by the
Italian press in Australia to stir up support for Mussolini’s
government. Reporting the assassination as an event which
had ‘nothing whatever to do with the aims of Fascism’,18 but
which was used to instil hatred against the regime and
therefore against Italy, the Italo-Australian warned its readers
that to plot ‘against the stability of the Government. . . at this
time is tantamount to plot against the Fatherland’.19 There
was no possible alternative: either to stand by Fascism or to
understand and accept the fact that ‘the fall of Mussolini
would mean chaos, Communism . . .’.20
If the supporters of Fascism in Australia feared a political
backlash among the migrants, such fears were unfounded. For
the reasons mentioned, the majority of migrants remained
indifferent, or unaware, or apathetic to the political events
taking place in Italy during 1924. Also, the early settlers had
not experienced the class struggle of 1919-21 and had not lived
the dramatic months of the civil war and of the March on
Rome when columns of armed Fascists converged on the
capital and King Victor Emmanuel III handed power to
Mussolini; to them the word Fascism meant next to nothing,
or only what the Italian press wanted them to believe.
Absent from the Australian scene were the first-hour
Fascists, the arditi, the squadristi, the sansepolcristi, the
diciannovisti; that is, those people personally involved with
the rise of Fascism: they began arriving in Australia only at
the end of 1924, and with them migrated many of their
enemies. Because of this, the struggle between Fascism and
anti-Fascism, momentarily abated in Italy, continued in
Australia after this year, fanned by some of the most recent
arrivals. This struggle, and the strengthening of the anti-
Fascist opposition, accelerated the formation of Fascist
organisations.
The birth of a Fascist movement in Australia depended also
on other causes. In the first place, before 1925 an active policy
in support of Fascism could not be carried out by the Italian
diplomatic representatives for the simple reason that, with the
exception of the consul-general, there were no other consuls de
carriere in Australia. Besides, the consul-general, Grossardi,
could not, and perhaps was not willing, to carry out such policy
owing to his personal political beliefs and to his relations with
the Italian community.
Antonio Grossardi was born in Parma of an aristocratic
family. Antonio, who had a brother a General of the
Carabinieri, distinguished himself in politics at an early age.
He became mayor at twenty-three and was a member of the
Provincial Council of the Democratic Party for four years.21At
the 1919 elections he was defeated by the Socialist candidate
and retired from politics. Soon after, he asked the Italian
Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a posting abroad, and in
January 1920 was appointed consul-general in Melbourne.22
Soon he became a controversial figure within the Italian
colony in Australia. It was rumoured that Grossardi was a
supporter of the reformist Socialists and a friend of one of their
leaders, Bissolati, and in 1922 the rumours became so
persistent that he was compelled to release a statement to the
press denying the accusation.23 His rash methods in dealing
with the representatives of the Italian Establishment in
Australia antagonised many of them.24 For instance, he
dismissed Dr V. Marano, who had been honorary consular
agent in Sydney for 42 years, for no apparent reason other
than of appointing to this position his friend Luigi
Buoninsegni Vitali.25 To complicate the picture further, the
Italo-Australian from 1922 to 1928 carried on a violent
campaign against the consul-general, accusing him of anti-
Fascism, of protecting people who, during World War I, had
incited Italians not to return to Italy to serve in the army and,
generally, of abusing his powers and authority.26 The paper
even ventured to publish an open letter to Mussolini appealing
for his intervention to recall Grossardi on grounds of his
political ideas and character.27 Undoubtedly, a great deal of
this hostility can be explained by the fact that the wife of the
owner of the I talo-Australian, Lubrano, had been seduced by
Buoninsegni Vitali and that, as a result, Lubrano had
instigated legal proceedings against Grossardi and Vitali.28
The trial of the consular agent ended with the victory of
Lubrano, who was granted a divorce, but scorn was added to
injury when he was awarded damages of one farthing.29 After
this, it was not surprising that Lubrano was behind every
fronde against the consular authorities.
Although these conflicts caused by political, economic and
personal reasons precluded, during the period between 1922
and 1924, the possibility of political collaboration between the
consul-general and the leaders of the Italian community, the
situation improved at the end of 1924 mainly because
Fascism’s astonishing political recovery after the Matteotti
crisis convinced all parties that there was no room for major
personal divisions. By this time Fascism had become an
institution well entrenched in the political life of the Italian
nation and, in all aspects, seemingly strong enough to remain
entrenched for a long while. The stability of Fascism made a
favourable impression upon the Italians abroad, who were
eager, in view of the prevailing hostile environment in which
they lived, to afford their support to a government which was
very vocal in its claims of defending their interests. Therefore,
they were ready to pay the price of discipline, obedience and
conformism which was exacted from them; many preferred,
because they sincerely believed in Fascism, out of
opportunism, or simply for the sake of conformism, to accept
the new reality and became part of that group of the vocal
supporters, or of the silent doubtful, or of the indifferent, who
subscribed to the opinion that Fascism was Italy, and Italy
Fascism. This consensus created the proper conditions for the
setting up of institutions through which Fascism would
exercise its influence and pow’er also among Italians in
Australia. These institutions were mainly social clubs and
associations of a cultural or recreational nature. Although a
few of these clubs existed before World War I30 and some had
been established soon after it,31 only after 1924 were many of
them opened under the general political pretext of protecting
the migrants’ interests, of promoting the cause of italianita
amongst the foreigners, of keeping the Italians united and
mindful of their country of origin, and of combating anti-
Fascist propaganda and activities.
The Dante Alighieri Society was by far the most important
cultural institution. On 15 January 1925 some Italians, among
whom was the future president, Antonio Baccarini, met in
Sydney to set up its first branch in Australia.32 After formal
recognition from the Rome headquarters was received, the
society was declared officially formed on 28 May 1925, when
Mussolini sent a telegram of congratulations.33 From the
outset the Dante Alighieri Society carried out cultural
activities in favour of Fascism, by arranging lectures or
issuing statements in support of the regime.34 Among the
associations which sprang up at the time were La Rinascenza
(The Rebirth), a youth club which was officially opened in
Sydney in July 1925, whose aim was to instil Fascist ideals
in the younger generations35 and the I talo-Australian
Association, which was formed in Brisbane in June 1925 by
Mons. Ernesto Coppo36 and which, although a religious
organisation, was closely linked with the Fascist authorities
and their political programs. The I talo-Australian Association
opened branches in Sydney and Melbourne, and in both cities
presidents of those branches became people who were or would
have been trustees of the Fascist Party in Australia: Virgilio
Lancellotti in Sydney and Mario Melano in Melbourne.37 Clubs
were also opened in areas where anti-Fascist activities were
conspicuous; for instance, in November 1926, a new club, the
Club Italia, was inaugurated at Lithgow, New South Wales, a
mining centre where many Italian anti-Fascists worked, by the
Sydney vice-consul, Carosi, who declared that its purpose was
to spread there the principles of patriotism, brotherhood and
assistance.38
By far the most important political event which took place in
1925-26 was the creation in Australia of overseas branches of
the National Fascist Party. This was made possible by three
political initiatives taken by the Fascist government with
respect to Italian settlement in Australia: the renewed concern
shown at the end of 1924 for the problems of migration, the
determination to extend its political influence over its
nationals, and the strengthening of its diplomatic represen
tation.
Although Mussolini in 1922 believed that Australia was an
outlet too distant for Italian migration,39, the restrictions
imposed by the United States and the increase in Italian
migration to Australia during 1923 and 1924 prompted the
Fascist government to reassess its policy on migration. Italian
emigration had been administered by an independent
government department up to 18 January 1923, when it was
brought under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Office, and a
Commissariat-General for Emigration was formed. The new
commissariat, responsible to the Prime Minister, developed
into a very important and well organised administrative unit,

branching out in all directions regardless of the ministerial
departments whose activities it often took charge of.40In 1924,
in order to find a solution to the problem of disposing of Italy’s
surplus population, the commissariat called for an in
ternational conference on migration, to be held in Rome. The
conference was opened on 15 May 1924 by Mussolini, who in
his speech declared that Italy ‘must follow the fate of its sons
beyond the Frontier’.41 As a result, it was decided to send to
Australia a Commissioner for Emigration, whose duty it was
to assist and protect the Italian migrants, to establish liaison
with the Australian authorities and to report to Rome on the
local situation. The commissioner, Virgilio Lancellotti, arrived
in Melbourne in November 1924.24
Lancellotti was a romantic adventurer. Born at Carpi, in the
Emilia, in his youth he sailed to see the world and worked,
among other things, as a mechanic in New York, a miner in
West Virginia, a gold prospector in Alaska, a salesman in
Ecuador, a labourer in Arizona. He fought with the peasants in
Mexico, against the dictatorship of Diaz, for the movement
Land and Freedom, and in 1914 returned to Italy. He took part
as a Lieutenant in World War I, and at the birth of Fascism
was the founder of the Fascist branch at Carpi. Lancellotti
performed his duty well and after ten months in Australia, in
August 1925, went back to Rome to report personally to
Mussolini on the situation of the Italian colony.43 While in
Rome, he also attended the first Congress of the Overseas
Branches of the Fascist Party, which began meeting in
October 1925.44 The congress was a resounding victory for the
Secretary-General of the Fasci Abroad, Bastianini, and for the
secretariat itself, which aimed at assuming greater prominence
by increasing the party’s control of all Fascist groups outside
Italy and at placing greater emphasis on a concerted action of
Fascism abroad, where, as Mussolini said, ‘the method will
be different in different countries, but the spirit will be the
same’.45 However, at the beginning of 1926 there were no
official branches of the party in Australia, and Lancellotti,
upon his return in January,46became actively involved in their
formation until June, when he was appointed vice-consul in
Perth.47
During this period Italy upgraded its diplomatic
representations in Australia. Together with the Perth vice
consulate, other vice-consulates de carriere were opened in
Sydney in August 1925, in Brisbane in November 1926 and in
Townsville in July 1927.48 The appointed vice-consuls were
respectively Mario Carosi, Count Gabrio di San Marzano and
Francesco Pascale.49
The consul-general, the new consular authorities and
migrants who were members of the Italian Fascist Party
began forming official branches at the end of 1926. During the
previous years several attempts had been made by some
sympathisers to set up party branches without obtaining
beforehand Grossardi’s or Rome’s approval. Already in
February 1923 there were rumours that Italians in Australia
were forming local Fascist branches,50 and in March 1923 an
attempt to open one in Sydney actually took place, but was
unsuccessful.51 These rumours alerted some Australian
newspapers such as Truth, and the Australian Labor Party, to
the impending danger of Fascism establishing itself in
Australia, to the point that some delegates to the Australian
Labor Party’s Victorian Annual Conference, held in Melbourne
during Easter 1923, asked the federal government to expel all
Fascists and to take steps to prevent the landings in Australia
of other Italian supporters of that doctrine.52 Uncorroborated
evidence shows that an unofficial Fascist branch was formed
in Adelaide on 15 November 1923 (or 1925; there are
conflicting reports on the year), with a male membership of
eighty-five and a female one of twenty, but it must have had a
short life, since the official Fascist Section was established
only in 1927.53
Although Rome early in 1924 appointed Buoninsegni
Vitali54 and in 1925 Virgilio Lancellotti55 trustees of the
Fascist Party in Australia, to promote the cause of Fascism,
there were other serious difficulties, hindering the formation of
official Fascist branches. Rome and its representatives in
Australia did not want to afford formal recognition to party
branches set up by people who were rebellious to the authority
of the consuls, while rivalry between officials of the party and
of the government delayed the birth of official sections.
Typical is the case of the Fascio which was opened in
Melbourne on 17 October 1925 by a group of sympathisers led
by Eustacchio Del Pin, who was at that time interim delegate
for the Fasci in Australia.56 Del Pin, a personal friend of
Lubrano, having been denied official support by Grossardi,
interpreted the behaviour of the consul-general as being hostile
towards Fascism and sent a report to the Secretariat-General
of the Fascist Branches Abroad in Rome, illustrating what he
believed to be the negative attitude of the Italian diplomat.57
The Secretariat-General, obviously pleased to receive evidence
in support of its claim that it was the party’s and not the
Ministry for Foreign Affairs’ task to ensure that Italian
diplomats abroad would also be fervent Fascists, backed Del
Pin’s allegations58 and sent the report to Dino Grandi. The
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs did not accept the
accusations against Grossardi nor the suggestions that the
Fasci abroad should oversee the conduct of the diplomatic
representatives; as Grandi noted on the report, ‘Nonsense. It is
the Government which fascistizza the Consulates’.59
Nevertheless the report caused some concern in Rome about
the political situation in the community and in August 1926
Mussolini asked Grossardi to send a report on the activities of
the Fasci in Australia and on the men who were at the head of
the movement.60Apparently he was unaware of the fact that at
that time there was not a single official Fascist branch in
Australia. In his telegram, the Duce outlined clearly the
subordinate position of the Fascist branches with respect to
the diplomatic authorities and, consequently, the ultimate
moral and political responsibility of the consuls. Mussolini
wired Grossardi:
Naturally, it must be clear that the Fasci are an
organisation of private citizens who, if they are worthy,
must be supported and assisted by the Government
Representative without the least interference on their
part in the attributes and therefore the responsibilities of
the consular authorities.61
Mussolini’s and Grandi’s emphasis on the pre-eminent role of
the representatives of the Italian state reflected their
preoccupation with the then raging conflict for political
supremacy between the state bureaucracy and the new arising
party bureaucracy; as Lancellotti well put it:
we Fascists, who hold an official position abroad, are
resented by all the personnel of the Commissariat also
because we have been imposed upon them by the Party
and even more because somehow we are in control of
[their political activities].62
The consequences of this conflict of interests were felt also in
Australia. For instance, while, according to Lancellotti, the
Secretariat-General of the Fascist Branches Abroad was
anxious to see party branches opened in Australia and was
supporting men such as Del Pin,63 the representatives of the
Italian state were not. In January 1926 Lancellotti warned Del
Pin to be careful in speaking with the Inspector-General of
Migration, Rostagno, then visiting Australia, because ‘he is a
confidant of the Commissioner-General De Michelis who does
not favour the expansion of Fascism abroad’.64
Nevertheless, Mussolini’s support for Consul-General
Grossardi was the deciding factor which cleared the way for
the creation of party sections in Australia. The first one was
opened in Melbourne on 31 October, 1926. On this occasion the
consul-general seized the opportunity to tell the two hundred
and fifty Italians assembled at his residence that it was their
duty to pay unquestioned obedience to the representatives of
Italy in Australia and to avoid being involved in Australian
politics in order not to cause conflicts. ‘Abroad’, stressed
Grossardi, ‘there are no administrations to conquer nor a
policy to carry o u t. . . Fascism’s objectives are merely cultural
and sentimental’.65
Soon after, official Fascist branches appeared in other parts
of the Commonwealth. In Sydney, a Fascio was already
established by March 1927,66 when its president, Napoleone
Costantino, commemorated the foundation of the Italian
Fasci, while in May 1927 a Women’s Branch of the Fascist
Party was founded in Sydney.67 On 5 June, 1927 a Fascist
branch was opened in Adelaide, where the consular agent, G.
Amerio, became also Fascio Secretary.68 In August 1927, the
Women’s Group of the Fascio was formed in Melbourne under
the Presidency of Mrs Fornari.69The opening of these branches
was accompanied by the Fascist rituals, the flags, the songs,
the raised arms, which prompted the Italo-Australian to
comment with emphatic pleasure, although with exaggeration,
that ‘Fascism is not a Party any longer, but a religion which
inspires faith and dignity to the creative and united citizens of
our Fatherland’.70
By 1927 the Fascist movement in Australia was getting
considerable support from the Italian community71 as well as
from the Catholic Church and from some Australian
sympathisers. Brisbane’s Archbishop Duhig was one of the
most outspoken defenders not only of Italians’ civil rights but
also of Fascism as a social doctrine,72 and Italian priests were
invariably present at Fascist rallies and spoke in favour of the
regime. Also Australian supporters of Fascism began
organising themselves. On 2 November 1925, Capt. James O.
Hatcher announced the formation in Melbourne of an
Australian Fascist branch which was in close liaison with the
British Union of Fascists in London, while another branch
opened at the same time in Hobart.73 Yet another branch was
established in Adelaide in April 1926 under the leadership of
F.W. Darley.74 These branches, which continued to exist up to
the outbreak of World War II, were formed mainly by
individuals or small units of two or three persons at most, and
were closely watched by the Australian Security Service
which, during the 1930s, checked their correspondence and
screened their courier with the BUF British Headquarters, a
stewardess on the Oronsay, who was in touch with the leaders
of the movement in England, particularly Beckett and Joyce
(the celebrated Lord Haw-Haw during World War II). After
1936 the Australian Fascist branches were linked with Nazism
through German connections and also through their
association with the resident chief of the NSDAP (Nazi Party)
in Australia.75
There is no evidence that during the years 1925-7 the British
Union of Fascists branches in Australia were co-ordinating
their activities with the Italian Fasci; the only contact between
British Fascist sympathisers and Italian Fascists took place in
1927 on the occasion of the series of lectures on Fascism given
in Sydney and Melbourne by Brigadier-General Charles
Rudkin, the commander of the British artillery during the
defence of the Piave River in 1917 and a member of the House
of Commons who, after the war, settled in Italy and became an
ardent admirer of Mussolini after meeting him.76
Interest in Fascism was not restricted to Australian
sympathisers, who, by the end of 1924, wrere so numerous as to
attract Mussolini’s attention.77 The federal government also
was thoroughly informed on all aspects of Italian public life
during the period 1920-27. In March 1920 Prime Minister W.
M. Hughes entrusted Major-General G. Ramaciotti with a
voluntary mission of inquiry in connection with trade matters
and relationships between Australia and Italy, a mission
which developed to all intents into an honorary trade
commissionership.78 Ramaciotti, until his return to Australia
in November 1927,79 kept the federal government abreast of
the political developments taking place in Italy. In his
frequent reports he made no attempt to hide his sympathies
for Fascism, although he never concealed the negative sides of
the movement. Perhaps his views on the regime were best
expressed in his Second Confidential Report on Italian Affairs
when he argued that:
the outpourings of a nation, great in tradition, inspired
by a strong leader, fearless and ambitious to restore the
glories of the Roman Empire, who aims to make Italy not
only strong but feared, and who, deprecating war,
prepares for it, merit, in my opinion, serious attention.
Fascismo is well led and organised. Its ramifications
extend the world over, wherever Italians are to be found.
Its patriotism is kept at constant white heat. Its methods
may not be all we could wish, but it has saved Italy from
chaos, restored its finances, and given it unbounded faith
in the future. It has the Church of Rome on its side.80
There is no doubt that Ramaciotti’s reports contributed
decisively to the formation of the Hughes and Bruce
governments’ attitudes towards Italian Fascism. Both
governments preferred to listen to the reassuring aspects of
the reports and to ignore the more disturbing references to the
anti-democratic, expansionist and violent nature of Fascism.
Ramaciotti’s emphasis on Fascism as the party of law and
order convinced — if need there was — the federal government
that indeed, as the Italo-Australian put it, ‘Italy . . . has no
desire to export to Australia or any other part of the British
Empire the Fascism which has made the Italy of today’,81 but
instead that ‘the goals of the Fascio are peace, tranquillity,
work and law-abidingness’.82
By the end of 1927, the birth of an anti-Fascist movement
among Italian migrants, the forming of a Fascist dissident
faction, and the concern expressed by some Australian
intellectuals and by the Australian labour movement for the
expansion of Fascism in Australia,83 compelled the Fascist
authorities to adopt a hard line in order to overcome the rising
hostility. More propaganda in favour of the regime was made,
more statements identifying Italians with Fascism were
released, more appeals to unity were launched, and more
orders to follow the party line were given. The Italo-Australian
exhorted; ‘Let not a single opportunity go by defending
Mussolini against the vilification of ignorant or half formed
writers . . . for this manufactured distrust of Mussolini finds
an echo in the distrust of and hostility to Italian migrants and
traders.’84
As it turned out, this militant attitude generated further
hostility against Fascism and Italian migrants. It was a
vicious circle which would not be broken during the entire
period of existence of Italian Fascism in Australia.
Notes
1 On this, see Giorgio Rumi, Alle origini della politica estera
fascista 1918-1923, Bari, 1968, pp. 120-5.
2 I talo-Australian, 24 Feb., 7 April 1923. Fascist branches had
been opened in Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Belgium, France,
Great Britain, Spain, United States, Argentina, Switzerland,
Ireland, Panama, Egypt, Albania, Canada and in Italy’s African
colonies.
3 Mussolini believed that this process of penetration would take
place in three stages: ‘First, a general campaign would be
undertaken to stimulate a sense of national sentiment in all the
emigrant masses . . . and a strengthening of their ties with the
Mother Country’, but this would be done while ‘avoiding
conflicts with foreign governments and peoples’. Stage two
would see a shift to emphasis on the ‘new generations’ of
emigrants. In the third phase there would be a further
concentration on a minority of young emigrants ‘to achieve the
spiritual and cultural penetration of other countries . . . to found,
that is, a policy of prestige, and to entrust it to new organisms to
be created, suitable for diffusing Italian culture and civilisation,
commensurate with our increased influence in the world’ (Alan
Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, Princeton, 1970, p. 195).
4 Italo-Australian, 30 Dec. 1922.
5 Ibid., 25 Nov. 1922.
6 Ibid., 7 April 1923.
7 On this, see J. P. Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism: the View from
America, Princeton, 1972, pp. 86-95.
8 Department of Immigration, Australian Immigration —
Consolidated Statistics, Canberra, 1973, p. 12.
9 Australian Archives (hereafter AA) CRS A981, item Italy 28, pt
III, Ramaciotti, Sixth Report, 30 Sept. 1926, pp. 14-15.
10 ‘The phenomenon of Fascism’, in S. J. Woolf (ed.) European
Fascism, London, 1968, p. 23.
11 I talo-Australian, 28 Oct. 1922.
12 On this, see W. D. Borrie, Italians and Germans in Australia,
Melbourne, 1954, p. 55. Also, AA, CRS A461, item Q349/3/5, pt
I. At the end of 1925 there were 24,781 Italians in Australia (AA,
CRS A981, item Migration 48, British Embassy, Rome, to
Chamberlain, 14 Jan. 1927).
13 See I talo-Australian, 16 Dec. 1922 and 19 May 1923.
14 Ibid., 22 Sept. 1923.
15 Ibid., 31 May 1924.
16 Ibid., 12 May 1923.
17 Ibid., 15 Nov. 1924.
18 Ibid., 30 Aug. 1924.
19 Ibid., 13 Dec. 1924.
20 Ibid., 13 Sept. 1924. See also Italian Bulletin of Australia, 15
Dec. 1924.
21 This information was given by Grossardi during his press
conference as reported by the Daily Telegraph on 28 Aug. 1922.
It is not clear to which party Grossardi is referring, since there
was no Democratic Party in Italy at that time. Most probably he
wanted to convey the impression that he had belonged to a
democratic party, which could well have been the Liberals, the
Partito Popolare or even the reformist Socialists. It is indicative
that he replied to the accusation that he had supported the
Australian Labor Party during the 1919 federal elections by
saying that he had arrived in Australia after the elections and
thus could not have spoken either for or against that party.
22 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 158, Prime Minister’s Dept
Memorandum, 15 Jan. 1920.
23 Daily Telegraph, 28 Aug. 1922.
24 In September 1923 Grossardi refused to forward for approval to
the Italian government the list of the Councillors of the Italian
Chamber of Commerce in Australia unless Dr Tommaso Fiaschi,
one of its most respected members, withdrew from it. His
opposition to Fiaschi was dictated by reasons of a personal

nature. Fiaschi was thus excluded from the council (Italo-
Australian, 8 Sept. 1923). Also, during a meeting in Melbourne,
Grossardi, contested by some Italian leaders, lost control of
himself, threw a glass of water at Count Pietro Lalli and was
alleged to have shouted ‘Kick him out! Throw him out of the
window!’ (ibid., 1 Sept. 1923).
25 Italo-Australian, 2 Sept. 1922; Sun, Sydney, 22 Aug. 1922. Also,
AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 161, letter by Marano to Prime
Minister Hughes, dated 22 Aug. 1922, which reveals that
reasons of economic rivalry between Marano, import and export
agent, and Buoninsegni Vitali, Director of the Lloyd Sabaudo,
were at the roots of the conflict.
26 Italo-Australian, 30 Sept, and 25 Nov. 1922.
27 Ibid., 9 Dec. 1922. The letter remained unanswered.
28 Ibid., 9 June 1923 and 27 Sept. 1924.
29 Ibid., 8 March and 19 April 1924.
30 The Circolo Isole Eolie had been founded in Sydney in 1903,
while the Club Italia was opened in 1915. In Melbourne before
World War I there were the Circolo Cavour and the Circolo Duca
degli Abruzzi, and in Geelong the Circolo Savoia (AA, CRS
A981, item Italy 28, pt III, Ramaciotti, Seventh Report, 31 Dec.
1927, p. 15).
31 The Lega Italiana was opened in Sydney on 20 September 1923
(Italo-Australian, 23 Sept. 1923), while the Club Concordia was
founded in Brisbane in September 1924 (ibid., 4 Oct. 1924).
32 Italo-Australian, 24 Jan. 1925. See also Italian Bulletin of
Australia, 15 Feb. 1925, p. 3.
33 Italo-Australian, 6 June 1925.
34 For instance, at a monthly meeting of the society, Consul-
General Grossardi declared that ‘both the Government and its
programme are guided by Mussolini, the man endowed with a
special equilibrium, the man who guided the revolution and
whose permanency at the head of the Government is a prolonged
national necessity’ (Italo-Australian, 12 Sept. 1925). On 27 May
1927, the society gave a party in honour of General Rudkin, a
British sympathiser with Fascism, who had lectured in Sydney
on the regime (ibid., 9 May 1927).
35 Italo-Australian, 23 May and 1 Aug. 1925.
36 Ibid., 27 June 1925.
37 Ibid., 4 July and 1 Aug. 1925.
38 Ibid., 6 Dec. 1926.
39 AA, CRS A981, item Italy 28, pt I, Ramaciotti, Ninth Report, 22
Nov. 1922, p. 3.
40 Ibid., pt III, Ramaciotti, Ninth Report, 30 June 1927, pp. 5-6. On
24 May 1927 the Commissariat-General for Migration was
suppressed and a General Direction of Italians Abroad was
20 Fascism, A nti-Fascism and Italians in A ustralia
established, as an integral part of the Italian Ministry for

Foreign Affairs.
41 Ibid., pt I, Ramaciotti, Fifteenth Report, 30 June 1924, p. 6.
42 Italo-Australian, 15 Nov. 1924.
43 Ibid., 8 Aug. 1925.
44 Del Pin Papers, Lancellotti to E. Del Pin, 25 Oct. 1925. The
papers are held by the author.
45 Cassels, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, pp. 379-80.
46 I talo-Australian, 9 Jan. 1926.
47 Ibid., 26 June 1926.
48 Ibid., 12 Sept. 1925; 1 Nov. and 6 Dec. 1926; 13 July 1927.
49 Mario Carosi was born at Colenzo (Umbria) in 1899. During
World War I he commanded a battalion of arditi in France,
where he was awarded by the French Army with the Croix de
Guerre. After the armistice he served with the Allied occupation
armies in Belgium and in Germany. In 1920 he returned to Italy
where he obtained a diploma in business administration at
Rome. In 1921 he entered the Italian Diplomatic Service. Sydney
was his first posting (Italo-Australian, 12 Dec. 1925). Also,
Carosi had been a leading member of the Fascist bands which
sowed terror and destruction among the Socialist organisations
in Tuscany in 1921-22. It was alleged that he was responsible for
several murders and that he was so cynical and boastful about it
that, during the civil war days, he was introducing himself as
‘Carosi, thirteen murders’ {La Liberia, Paris, 29 March 1930; La
Riscossa, 20 May 1930).
Gabrio Asinari, Count of San Marzano, was born in 1898 at
Turin. He fought in World War I and later graduated in law.
From 1922 to 1925 he was political secretary of the Fascio in
London, and from August 1925 National Delegate for the
Fascist Branches in the United Kingdom (Italian Bulletin of
Australia, 15 Oct. 1926, p. 26).
Of Francesco Pascale little is known, except that he had a
degree in law, had served during World War I in the Artillery
Corps and that he was a student of ballistics. In 1928 he returned
to Italy for health reasons, and wrote a book on his Australian
experience, Tra gli Italiani in Australia (Italo-Australian, 13 July
1927).
50 I talo-Australian, 24 Feb. 1923.
51 Ibid., 31 March and 30 June 1923; Truth, 25 March 1923.
52 I talo-Australian, ibid., 14 April 1923.
53 A A, AP538/1, item SA 3074 pt V, Report, Adelaide Fascio
Secretary to M. Miserocchi, Royal Commissioner, MV Esquilino,
9 Nov. 1938.1talo-Australian, 15 Dec. 1928.
54 I talo-Australian, 8 March 1924.
55 Italian Bulletin of Australia, 15 Aug. 1927, p. 21.
56 I talo-Australian, 15 Dec. 1928.
57 Eustacchio Del Pin, interview, 19 March 1972.
The A dvent of Fascism in A ustralia 21
58 Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (hereafter DDI), Series VII, vol.

IV, p. 301, Document 389, dated 10 Aug. 1926, footnote. The
Vice-Secretary of the Secretariat-General of the Fascist
Branches Abroad, Guido Sollazzo, remarked that ‘the part of the
report concerning the relations between the Melbourne Fascists
and that Consul-General leads us to sad considerations on the
way in which our Royal Representative interprets and applies
the instructions received by the Ministry’.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62 Del Pin Papers, Lancellotti to Del Pin, letter, undated.
63 Ibid., 25 Oct. 1925.
64 Ibid., letter, undated.
65 Italo-Australian, 8 Nov. 1926; Italian Bulletin of Australia, 15
Nov. 1926, p. 28; Argus, 1 Nov. 1926.
66 Italo-Australian, 28 March 1927.
67 Ibid., 6 June 1927; Italian Bulletin of Australia, 15 July 1927, p.
26.
68 I talo-Australian, 13 July 1927. Also Italian Bulletin of Australia,
15 July 1927, p. 26. G. Amerio was perhaps the epitome of the
parvenu Fascist official who outlasted all his colleagues for no
other reason than his mediocrity. A police report, probably
written in 1940, portrays Amerio as follows: ‘Amerio is a slight
man who has not visited his native country for fourteen years.
His enthusiasm for the Fascist Regime seems to increase in
proportion to the length of his absence from Italy. His home and
birth-place, San Marzano, is in the mountains near Asti (Prov.
Turin) where the inhabitants are not renowned for their good
nature; their blood is very mixed. Strong Provencal
(Mediterranean French) Swiss and Genoese elements make
themselves felt. He is an enthusiastic Fascist, and would
possibly be dangerous were it not for the fact that his eagerness
far outweighs his intelligence. It would not be an exaggeration to
state that he suffers from Italomania. Italy and things Italian
are constantly in his thoughts and on his lips. He laments the
fact that Italians in this country are so easily Anglicised, but he
recognises that such is the case. ’
‘His social standing is doubtful, his Italian being very
indifferent. His vocabularly is rich in abstracts such as “glory”
“dignity” “duty” etc. which mean little, as a rule, to people of
British race. “Honour” weighs more heavily with such in
dividuals, as a general rule, than honesty.’
‘He is typical of a Continental Government servant whose
official position gives him more authority than his social stan
ding would allow him to expect’ (AA, AP 538/1, item 3074,
Fascism in Australia pt I, Police Report, undated).
69 I talo-Australian, 7 Sept. 1927.
70 Ibid., 2 Nov. 1927.
71 The support was not only political, but financial as well. The
Sottoscrizione nazionale del dollaro (National Appeal for the
Dollar), launched by the Italian government in order to pay the
war debts to the United States, collected in Sydney US$632.60
(Italo-Australian, 5 June 1926), while the Italians of Melbourne
donated US$1,587.11 (Italo-Australian, 15 Nov. 1926). Similarly,
the Prestito del Littorio (Lictors’ Loan) in 1927 raised in
Melbourne alone 511,400 lire (Italo-Australian, 11 April 1927). It
is difficult to ascertain how much of this enthusiastic response
was motivated by support for Fascism, by nationalism or by
simple patriotism.
72 Upon his return from a trip to Italy where he had been received
by Mussolini (Argus, 19 Nov. 1927), Archbishop Duhig stated
publicly in 1927 that Fascism ‘was not understood outside
Italy’; that ‘many condemned it as a species of tyranny’, but
‘that it would be wise for those responsible for such statements,
before passing judgement, to put themselves in possession of the
fullest facts, and endeavour to understand how much the
movement was needed in Italy, and how successful it had been’
(Italo-Australian, 24 Dec. 1927; Argus, 14 Dec. 1927).
73 Argus, 3 and 4 Nov. 1925; Italo-Australian, 7 Nov. 1925.
74 News, Adelaide, 22 April 1926.
75 AA, AP 538/1, item SA19070, British Union of Fascists and
Australian Fascist Movement, 1926-44.
76 Argus, 24 May and 6 June 1927: Italian Bulletin of Australia, 1
May 1927, p. 4; Italo-Australian, 9 May 1927.
77 In October 1924, Mussolini said in Milan that ‘the social
legislation of Fascism . . . has made it a world-wide topic in the
last two years, drawing many from as far as China, Japan and
Australia to study it’ (Argus, 7 Oct. 1924).
78 AA, CRS A981, item Italy 28, pt I, Ramaciotti to Prime
Minister, 30 June 1922; AA, CRS A981, item Italy 28, pt II,
Prime Minister to Ramaciotti, 28 April 1925.
79 Ibid, pt III, Ramaciotti to Prime Minister’s Dept, 30 Sept. 1927.
80 Ibid., pt II, Ramaciotti, Second Report, 30 Sept. 1925, p. 3.
82 Ibid., 20 June 1927.
83 Argus, 6 Nov. 1925, 30 April 1928. Italo-Australian, 27 March
and 11 Sept. 1926; 17 Aug. 1927.
2
Fascism Consolidates,
1928-1932
In the period since 1929 Fascism has changed from an

Italian phenomenon into a universal phenomenon . . .
(Benito Mussolini, speech at the Rome Royal Opera
Theatre on 18 March 1934)
From 1928 to 1932, Fascism in Australia became an
established political force, aware of its influence over the
majority of the Italian community. Its immediate goal was to
rally as many Italians as possible behind those organisations
which would preserve their italianitä and their political,
cultural and emotional links with the Fatherland.
The feeling of growing confidence by the Italian community
leaders can be attributed in part to their realisation that the
Fascist government had by now silenced its opponents at
home and won control of the state. Encouraged by the interest
shown for Fascism by similar movements in other countries,
the regime was at last beginning to consider the potential
influence of its doctrine abroad. The expansion of Fascist
ideals outside Italy had been to a certain extent a constant of
Mussolini’s foreign policy, but it was only at the end of 1925
that a Fascist civilising mission was clearly postulated by the
23
Duce when he spoke of Italy’s need to acquire an empire. The
kind of imperialism which he wanted to promote at this stage
was based mainly on culture and trade, and aimed at im
proving Italy’s position alongside the world’s imperialist
powers by gaining a material and moral parity with them by
means of friendly international relations.1
Moreover, the confidence of Fascists in Australia was
boosted by the concern which the Italian government showed
early in 1928 in the problems connected with the organisation
of Italians abroad. In January Cornelio di Marzio resigned
from his position of General Secretary of Fascist Branches
Abroad and was succeeded by the younger and more ambitious
Piero Parini.2 In February a new Statute of the Fascists
Abroad was issued, aiming at preserving and strengthening
the national consciousness of Italian migrants and at
discouraging their desire to apply for naturalisation.3
The statute warned those abroad who had already joined the
Fascist party that they had a special responsibility to help the
regime to fulfil its policy of achieving total control of migrant
communities; they were ordered to make ‘obedience to the
Duce and to the laws of Fascism the governing principle of
their private and civil lives’.4 They had to accept
unquestioningly the discipline of the Fascist party as the
supreme arbiter of all their personal and political rivalries,
which ought to be settled within the party organisation. Their
duty, as Fascists, consisted not only in giving an example to
the Italian community of how the ‘new Italians’ should
behave, politically and socially: they were also entrusted with
the task of persuading their co-nationals to support Fascism.5
One way to reach this goal, the statute ruled, was to
discourage all attempts at political participation and social
assimilation by Italians to their foreign environment.6Only by
maintaining Italian migrants in a political, social and cultural
vacuum, by obstructing their interaction with the society in
which they lived, could the Fascio obtain total control over
them and thus spuriously claim to represent their interests
abroad.
The Statute of the Fascists Abroad not only indicated the
Italian Fascist Party’s willingness to recruit new members
among Italians: since by 1928 the party had in effect lost its
Fascism Consolidates 25
struggle to achieve primacy over the state and had become an
instrument of the latter, the statute reflected the will of the
Fascist government to bring all Italian migrants under its
direct control. Corroborating evidence of this is the fact that
all Fascist Party activities abroad had to meet with the
approval of the diplomatic representative of the Italian
government.7
The spirit of the statute inevitably clashed with the
sovereign rights of many countries, which objected to the
presence within their society of an alien minority, professing
its sympathy for a totalitarian credo and displaying an
ostentatious belief in the cultural superiority of its Fatherland.
As early as 1927 the Australian government expressed its
concern over the matter of Italians maintaining their
allegiance to Fascism once they became Australian citizens;8
and now, dismayed by the content of the statute, could but
agree with the British Ambassador in Rome, who signalled
that its general purport was ‘distasteful to more than one
foreign power’.9 The government’s concern grew when it was
learned from the same ambassador that the Fascist govern
ment had approved measures designed to discourage Italians
from acquiring foreign nationality and had instructed its
representatives abroad that no efforts should be spared to
neutralise the influences aiming at securing the denat
ionalisation of Italians.10
To restore the migrants’ links with the Fatherland, Rome
encouraged their coming to Italy to see for themselves the
achievements of the ‘new Italy’ and, in order to allay any fear
of losing their freedom of movement, instructed the Italian
diplomats to give a formal guarantee to all prospective visitors
that their return to their foreign homes would not be opposed
but that, on the contrary, such visits would be welcomed.11
This subtle approach flattered most Italians who, after their
visit to Italy, became ardent propagandists of Fascist ideas in
their country of residence.
Besides the statute, another sign of the Italian govern
ment’s determination to retain the political allegiance of
Italians abroad was Mussolini’s personal intervention: ‘No
Italian’, the Duce declared, ‘who left Italy could denationalise
himself, even if he had acquired nationalisation in the country
to which he had migrated.’.12
Soon, the impact of Rome’s instructions to its diplomats was
felt also in Australia. Not that the Italian consuls had not
previously made their voice heard in defence of Fascism: as the
/ talo-Australian reported on 7 January 1928, it was un
questionable that the consular authorities had ‘allowed few
opportunities to pass without placing the Italians’ case before
the Australian public’.13
In view of the considerable influx of Italian migrants during
the previous five years — a fact which by itself justified an
increase in the Fascists’ presence — the Italian government
reorganised its diplomatic service in Australia. By Royal
Decree printed in the Gazzetta Ufficiale on 11 March 1928, it
was decided to transfer the consulate-general from Melbourne
to Sydney, closer to the new federal capital, Canberra, and to
upgrade the legations in Melbourne and Townsville to the
status of consulates and that in Adelaide to vice-consulate.
Moreover, during this reshuffle, diplomats of indisputable
Fascist faith were promoted to senior positions: for instance,
Mario Carosi, the Sydney vice-consul, was appointed consul in
Melbourne. Others, such as Francesco Pascale at Townsville,
were quick to follow the new instructions received from Rome.
Very active with lectures and visits to Italian as well as
Australian communities, in January 1928 Pascale began
printing a newspaper, L'Eco d'Italia, which never pretended to
be anything else but the mouthpiece of the regime’s
propaganda in northern Queensland. As he later admitted in
his memoirs,14 Pascale during his tenure of office endeavoured
to convince Italian migrants that they should become models
of industriousness and of patriotism to the eyes of foreigners
and that this was feasible not by renouncing Italian citizen
ship and by becoming assimilated into the Australian en
vironment, which was a shameful decision,15but by conserving
their national heritage and by being proud of it.16 Also, he
arrogated to himself and to his colleagues the right to decide
what was in the best interest of the Italian colony in Australia
by warning its members that the true values of Italianity
would be defended abroad exclusively by Fascist officials.17
Besides instructing its consuls to see that all articles of the
statute would be applied, the Italian government saw fit to
intervene directly to prevent the denationalisation of its
subjects by curbing, at the end of 1927, Italian immigration to
Australia. This measure, which constituted only one aspect of
the regime’s new demographic policy, was motivated, as
Pascale explained in one of his typical rhetorical outbursts:
not only by the intolerable exploitation of the Italian
migrant in general, but particularly by the unfriendly
welcome with which he is greeted, by the most blatant
obstructionism, by the lack of consideration for the
Italian worker, although he, with his sweat, his sacrifice
and his self-denial has fertilised and made productive in
Australia, and particularly in North Queensland, enor
mous plots of land.18
Rome manifested its concern for the treatment of its
nationals at the time when the Australian government was
deeply worried by the social effects which the large number of
Italian migrants had on the structure of the Australian
population, whom Canberra wanted to maintain pre
dominantly British in character. On the initiative of Prime
Minister Bruce, in July 1928 the two governments mutually
agreed to limit Italian immigration to a maximum of 3,000
during that year.19This arrangement well fitted the new policy
of Fascist control over Italians in Australia; further proof that
this was Rome’s aim was the despatch to Sydney in June 1928
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of E. Rossi, appointed to
inquire on the conditions of Italians and the statement issued
in September by Mussolini, whereby semi-skilled workers of
reliable Fascist faith were encouraged to emigrate to increase
the prestige of Italy abroad, while migrants who had achieved
economic success abroad but who were not active supporters
of Fascism were encouraged to return home.20
Fascism’s regimentation of the life of Italians in Australia
became increasingly evident during this period, when the
social, educational and recreational activities of most
associations, clubs and cultural institutions underwent a
stringent scrutiny by Fascist officials, who from now on used
them as a vehicle for political indoctrination. As an example,
the Dante Alighieri Society became more and more deeply
involved in spreading Fascist propaganda, while the Fascist
branches opened schools of Italian for migrant children, whose
teachers were or had been either members of the Directorate of
the Fascist branch or officers of the diplomatic corps.21 The
teaching of Italian was encouraged by the Fasci not only as a
means of maintaining the italianitä of the migrant children,
but also as a vehicle of political propaganda: for this reason the
Fascists strongly objected to Italians speaking and en
couraging their children to speak English or their regional
dialect. Classes of elementary Italian were opened by the
Fascio in Melbourne and in Sydney, while courses at a higher
level were inaugurated at the University of Sydney on 23 June
1931 and at the University of Queensland in April 1933, with
textbooks supplied by the Italian government. After the
Lateran Pacts of 1929 when the Italian government and the
Vatican reached an agreement that put an end to the dispute
which marred their relations since the unification of Italy,
Fascist propaganda was openly made even during religious
celebrations.
Besides exploiting existing institutions, the Fascists en
deavoured to create new ones, more appropriate to their needs:
constant attempts were made to build a Casa d'Italia in areas
densely populated by Italians, where all associations could be
housed under the same roof and where it would be easier to
exercise a proper control over their activities. A Fascist branch
was opened at Port Pirie, South Australia, with a membership
of approximately 100 while in Sydney the Italian Returned
Soldiers were grouped in the Nastro Azzurro Association
under the leadership of Filippo Maria Bianchi.22 The Fascist
branches were restructured in their organisation: at the end of
1932 their directorates were modified to include a political
secretary, an administrative secretary, a youth supervisor, a
person responsible for welfare and propaganda and a person in
charge of sporting activities.23
Italians were also urged to take part in the frequent
celebrations of Fascist events: they were ordered to wear black
shirts — if party members — and to be actively involved in the
ceremonial of the celebrations. The anniversaries of the Birth
of Rome (the Natale di Roma), of the formation of the Fasci di
Combattimento and of the March on Rome were com-
memorated with great pomp in the presence of the consular
and Fascio authorities. Usually after the speeches and the
singing of patriotic songs, films illustrating the achievements
of Fascism in Italy were screened. Other important events
remembered were Vittorio Veneto Day; the distribution of
Fascist Party cards (which was held only once a year); the
distribution of presents to the members of the Balilla youth
organisation for Christmas; the death of Garibaldi; the Befana
Fascista (presentation of gifts to children); even the death of
Ariosto. To this flurry of activities must also be added the
celebration by members of the Fascist Party on Anzac Day.
They were ordered by the Italian consulate to wear the black
shirt, to march as a group separate from Australian ex-
servicemen and to lay wreaths on the local cenotaphs.24
In order to mobilise the migrants to externalise their sup
port for the regime, the Fascist authorities exploited every
circumstance, even of relative or of no political importance
whatsoever. For instance, Italians were exhorted to tune their
radios, on 14 and 15 April 1931, to the New Zealand Station
4YA of Dunedin, to listen to the party hymn Giovinezza
(Youth),25 and when Italy beat Australia at the Davis Cup in
1930 (the score was 3-2), the Italian victory was interpreted as
having a political meaning.26
The activities of the Fascist consuls compounded the impact
made by Italy’s aggressive language on the problem of the
status of Italian migrants abroad; if the Australian govern
ment was discreet in expressing its alarm by way of normal
diplomatic channels, the Australian public — especially that
section that was traditionally quick in taking every op
portunity to smear southern Europeans — was incensed.
Smith's Weekly on 29 September 1928 attacked the con
sulates, accusing them of fomenting Italian nationalism in
foreign countries and rhetorically asked its readers the
question:
is the Italian Consul-General sent to Sydney, and Consuls
into other Australian states to educate, instigate or
propel Fascists into enmity, mutual or one sided, in their
relations with Australians? Or, even to promote enmity
between Fascist and non-Fascist Italians settled in the
Commonwealth with resultant disturbance and possible
crime?
Other newspapers also condemned the activities of the Italian
diplomats in very strong terms.27
Australian politicians’ opinions on the matter were more
restrained than the comments of the press, but by no means
less hostile: indicative of their mood was the statement
released by ex-Prime Minister W. M. Hughes who said that:
we cannot have people in this country who look to
Mussolini for orders. There is only one person in this
country who can give orders and that is the head of
government. It is an intolerable thing for anybody to
arrogate to himself that power.28
The tense relations between the Italian migrants and the
Australian community were, to a large degree, the result of the
touchiness of the Fascist diplomats, who frequently over
reacted to situations of relatively minor importance and did
not hesitate to bring pressure upon Italians to conform to the
social mores of Fascism even when they clashed with the
Australian ones. When, during the Waterside Workers dispute
in October 1928, some Italian migrants in Melbourne, most
probably unaware of the industrial laws of the country, ac
cepted work on the wharves without being members of the
trade union, they received full support from the Fascist press
and from the consul, Carosi, who strongly protested against
the remarks of some members of the Sydney Trades and
Labour Council who called the strike breakers ‘scabs’.29 The
situation threatened to get out of hand when the homes of
some of these Italians were bombed: Carosi menacingly
warned that, unless protection were given, ‘Italians in
Melbourne may be forced to take measures to protect them
selves’.30 The Italian government quickly acted by sending
£200 to help the victims.31
Another episode which well illustrates the consuls’ pursuit
of the sensational in their political agitation are the consular
incidents in north Queensland in the years 1928 and 1930.
During the Christmas festivities of 1928, the coat of arms was
removed from the Italian vice-consulate at Innisfail and placed
on a public toilet further down the street.32 The act, as it was
later discovered, was the v/ork of two Australian youths
motivated more by alcohol than by virulent nationalism.
Nevertheless, the Italian authorities considered it as an af

front to the honour of their Fatherland and began issuing a
barrage of statements aimed at mobilising Italian public
opinion behind Fascism. The vice-consul of Innisfail, G.
Luciano, immediately declared that he regarded the incident as
an insult to the Italian nation and that the Italian government
would certainly be extremely displeased about the matter,
while the Townsville consul, Count di San Marzano, sent a
strong note of protest to the Queensland Acting Premier,
Forgan Smith.33 The consul-general said in Sydney that he was
closely watching developments and had done everything that
it was his duty to do.34
Quickly, the Australian government undertook proper
measures to minimise this incident. Prime Minister Bruce
promptly sent to the Italian government a message ex
pressing:
the profound regret of the Government and the people of
Australia for the grave discourtesy which has been shown
towards a friendly nation, for whom the people of
Australia entertain the highest feelings of respect and
good will.35
In the meantime, the Queensland government had taken every
possible step to bring to justice the guilty persons. Only one
week after the incident, the police discovered the offenders,
and two days later they were tried and sentenced.36 After this,
Luciano asked all Italians living in the district to attend the
ceremony of restoration of the coat of arms at the consulate,
but, perhaps because he was unable to muster enough people
to give the event the proper importance, he cancelled it by
using the excuse of local floods. The coat of arms was replaced
without any ceremony being held.
Another diplomatic incident between the Italian officials
and the Australian authorities took place when, for the second
time, the Innisfail consular insignia were removed from the
building on the night of 28-9 May 1930: again, a report was
sent to Italy and representations were made to the Queensland
and Commonwealth governments. The consular insignia were
found damaged, some days later, in thick bush on a bank of the
Johnstone River and promptly returned to the Italian vice-
consul.37 This time also it was suggested that they should be
restored before a public gathering but, once again, such a
function was not held, most probably for the same reason as
before. Nevertheless, on the day of the restoration, all Italian
legations in Australia and Italian ships within Australian
territorial waters were ordered to hoist the national flag at the
precise time when the coat of arms was being put back at
Innisfail by the acting consul of Townsville, Mario Melano.38
The Italian diplomats sent each other telegrams, obviously
drafted for public use, celebrating the event. The Italo-
Australian revealed that Consul-General Grossardi wanted
these ceremonies to be as solemn as possible.39
Both episodes showed that the Italian consular authorities
in Australia were ready to make political capital out of every
incident favourable to the exaltation of Fascist and nationalist
feelings. Even if they had no real legal grounds for presenting
formal diplomatic demands, they took advantage of the cir
cumstances in order to appear to the Italian community as
strong, determined and even capable of rebuffing the federal
government.40
Yet strong evidence suggests that during these years the
Italian community and even some members of the Fascist
Party did not respond with overwhelming enthusiasm to the
initiatives of the consuls, and as a result their behaviour was
bitterly condemned by the spokesmen of the regime. For in
stance, the celebration in Adelaide of the anniversary of the
Fascist conquest of power, on 28 October 1928, was hailed for
the first time as a success thanks to the efforts of the vice-
consul, G. Amerio, who had carried out an intense propaganda
campaign in order to ‘instil into the hearts of our migrants
that spirit of nationalism which up to now has unfortunately
been deficient in Southern Australia’.41 Similarly, in 1929 the
Italo-Australian accused the Sydney Fascist branch of
inactivity and the community of lack of patriotism.42 The poor
response of many Italians to the call for political militancy
under the flag of Fascism prodded the consuls to study new
methods of persuasion which could enhance their credibility
among the migrants. Although an analysis of Fascist
propaganda in Australia is beyond the scope of this chapter, it
is important to note that a serious attempt to gain the con
sensus of the Italian community began at this time.
Naturally, Italian Fascist propaganda in Australia between
1928 and 1932 was not carried out on the initiative of the
consuls, but followed the guidelines issued by Mussolini’s
Ufficio Stampa (Press Office) and thus reflected the indecision
and the trial-and-error approach which characterised the early
stages of Fascism’s cultural policy.43 The media used were
almost exclusively the press and public lectures.
Propaganda was conducted in two ways: at the official level
it was inspired or controlled by the Italian consular authorities
while at the unofficial one it was carried out by Italian as well
as Australian sympathisers of the regime. By far the most
important measure taken by Consul-General Grossardi in 1928
was the launching of two newspapers, the Corriere degli
Italiani in Australia and the organ of the Fascist branch in
Sydney, II Littorio, both fully dependent on the propaganda
material supplied by the Fascist government.44 Needless to
say, Pascale’s newspaper L'Eco d'Italia had also to rely on the
same source of information. Unfortunately, not one issue of
these newspapers has survived but it can be assumed that they
contained articles similar to those printed by the Italo-
Australian, which openly promoted the Fascist cause.45
Although they enjoyed the benefits of the freedom of ex
pression and repeatedly denounced — and sometimes rightly
so — instances of Australian bias against migrants, these
newspapers began sponsoring amongst Italians a political and
social behaviour which was markedly totalitarian. They
warned their readers that, as no Italian newspaper should
print statements or opinions which were ‘dangerous to the
state’,46 so all migrants should conform to this norm and shun
any criticism of Mussolini or of Fascism. Italians, it was or
dered, must rally in support of these newspapers, defend and
diffuse them; to read an ‘approved’ newspaper (that is, not the
Italian anti-Fascist press in Australia), was even a duty for
every good patriot: as the Italo-Australian put it: ‘he is not a
good Italian abroad, who does not read or does not subscribe to
the Italian newspaper which is his organ, the spokesman of his
rights, the defender of his race’.47 The sectarian character of
the Italian press did not escape the attention of the Com
monwealth government, which was extremely wary of
allowing the publication of Italian propaganda material: in
fact, for a while it deferred taking into consideration the
consul-general’s application for the publication of the Corriere
degli Italiani in Australia until Grossardi officially complained
about all the difficulties he had in obtaining a permit.48 Also,
permission to publish propaganda sheets such as II Littorio
and L'Eco d'Italia, which were very vocal in advancing
Fascism, was withdrawn after a few issues had been printed.49
The government’s opinion on this matter was that:
it is practically impossible for an Italian newspaper to
avoid Fascist or anti-Fascist propaganda, and that it is
undesirable, subject to any considerations of policy which
may commend themselves to the Prime Minister, that
foreign propaganda of this character should be published
in Australia in a foreign language.50
The Australian government’s attitude towards the spreading
of Fascist propaganda by the Italian press was vindicated by
the events which followed the appearance in Perth of the
newspaper La Stampa Italiana. On 24 April 1929 an Italian
chemist, Luigi Mistrorigo, lodged an application with the
Prime Minister’s Department for permission to publish a
newspaper.51 Permission was refused on the grounds of an
Intelligence investigation which reported unfavourably on the
applicant’s activities and character and also revealed that the
Italian vice-consul in Perth was opposed to the initiative.52
Mistrorigo did not despair. Probably guessing that the refusal
was motivated by fears that the newspaper would engage in
political propaganda, he submitted another application on 22
May 1931, in which he took pains to explain that the paper
would be non-political in character and that it would not
violate the law, the traditions and the customs of Australia: its
scope, instead, would be artistic, cultural and informative.53
Once again the Commonwealth Investigation Branch ex
pressed its adverse opinion: its Director, Major H. E. Jones,
flatly stated that:
there is no question of doubt that an Italian newspaper in
Perth is not justified or wanted by the Italian community
and that Mistrorigo enjoys a most unfavourable
reputation. His activities are causing concern to three
State Departments.54
Notwithstanding this, Mistrorigo was granted permission to
publish La Stampa Italiana on the definite understanding that
it would be published on the lines indicated in his second
application.55 Consul-General Grossardi deplored the Prime
Minister’s approval, granted, he said, contrary to the advice
given by the Italian consular representative in Perth: he
complained to Scullin that this decision was ‘hard to believe’
since, in his opinion, there were already sufficient Italian news
papers printed in Australia.56
It appears that the Italian diplomat feared that a
proliferation of newspapers, born outside the aegis of Fascist
authoritarianism, would also bring a variety of views which
would be hard to control; but he was mistaken in the case of La
Stampa Italiana. The newspaper revealed itself rabidly Fascist
from the first issue, on 3 December 1931, to the last one, on 9
September 1932.57 Its sectarian editorials and the overt
propaganda material contained in the newspaper came for the
first time to the attention of the Perth branch of the CIB when
La Stampa Italiana printed an article, ‘Lands of Sicily and
Calabria’. Inspector D. R. B. Mitchell reported that the article
made a grossly insulting reference to both the Australian and
the British people who were called ‘a gang of criminals,
miserable remnants of that tribe of the deported’. He con
cluded by warning his superiors of the extreme pro-Fascism of
Mistrorigo’s weekly and reminded them that: ‘the danger of a
paper printed in a foreign language stirring up trouble, was
pointed out on 27.5.29, and it appears La Stampa is on the way
of so doing’.58 A few weeks later, another controversial article,
‘The India of Today’, published in the issue of 17 June 1932
caused a furore.59 Smith's Weekly urged the consul-general to
silence Mistrorigo and asked the Commonwealth government
to prosecute the newspaper, adding that ‘deportation is the
only reasonable action against an Italian of the Mistrorigo
species’.60
The sense of outrage was not limited to Smith's Weekly:
many people in Perth were offended by the tone of the article
and the Commissioner of Police and the Sunday Times and
Daily News inquired into what measures would be taken
against its author.61 Major Jones counselled the Prime
Minister to withdraw immediately permission to publish the
paper and to prosecute Mistrorigo under Section 24D of the
Crimes Act or to deal with him under the Immigration Act and
deport him from Australia.62 Lyons, notwithstanding the
Attorney-General’s opinion that there was ample evidence for
prosecution under the Crimes Act, agreed to the suggestion of
action under the Immigration Act; it was feared, since a
deportation order could not be issued after five years of
residence in Australia — and Mistrorigo’s years lapsed on 5
October 1932 — that his trial might not be concluded before
that date.63 Consequently, Mistrorigo was given a dictation
test on 15 September64 and, having failed it, was prosecuted as
a prohibited immigrant and sentenced to six months’ im
prisonment pending deportation.65 He was released on a
security of £200 to dispose of his business and assets and
deported in November 1932. The Commonwealth withdrew the
permission to print La Stampa Italiana.66 The whole affair is
significant because it showed the extent of Fascist propaganda
which the Commonwealth authorities were prepared to
tolerate; also, because it taught the Italian authorities that
their propaganda had to refrain from being too direct and
aggressive but instead had to be disguised under nationalist
and cultural pretexts.
As already mentioned, the other way of spreading the
doctrine of Fascism was the public lecture. Although
sometimes disturbed by anti-Fascist demonstrators, such
political rallies were met with favour by the Italian com
munity. A typical visit was that of Father Salza, an Italian
chaplain and war invalid, who came to Australia in 1928,
sponsored by the Italian government to speak to the migrants.
His sermons were not restricted to religious arguments, but
praised the Italian regime and its policies. He lectured to a
group of 150 migrants at Cairns, to another fifty in Gor-
donvale, visited the Mossman district and stopped at all
coastal centres down to Brisbane. Everywhere, as the Italo-
Australian reported, his presence was ‘welcomed by spon
taneous manifestations of italianita and of faith’.67 When he
arrived in New South Wales, in January 1929, he visited the
communities of Corrimal and Port Kembla and then went on to
Tasmania and to Melbourne. In this city, the Fascist branch
secretary, Pietro del Mastro, urged all Italians to be present
for the patriotic speech of Father Salza. Salza then came to

Sydney where he delivered, in the presence of Grossardi and
the Sydney Fascist branch secretary, a lecture on ‘The new
Italy’, a blatant panegyric of the regime which was disrupted
for a while by some anti-Fascists who attended the meeting.68
A few days later he held a second conference on the theme of
‘Our Connotations’, in which all great Italians of the past were
remembered in order to make the Italians of today aware of
their ancestry and proud of the Fascist government. He
concluded his speech with an emotional prayer: ‘Great Lord, as
I was born Italian, make me die only and totally Italian’.69
Lectures were also given by the few Italian intellectuals
resident in Australia who were overwhelmingly in favour of
the regime. Yet the person who gave the greatest single
contribution to the cause of Fascism on a cultural level was the
president of the Dante Alighieri Society in Sydney, Antonio
Baccarini.70 Born in Avellino in 1887, Doctor of Science at the
University of Florence, where his father was chancellor, during
World War I he had been a member of the Italian Mission in
London and later liaison officer between the British and the
Italian commands on the Italian front. In 1922 he came to
Australia with his British wife and decided to settle here. An
ardent supporter of Fascism, he soon found himself in the
forefront of the cultural activities of the Italian community.
Foundation member of the Italian Chamber of Commerce and
of the Dante Alighieri Society in Sydney, he was president of
the latter for ten years, until 1935. Under his leadership, and
particularly during this period, the society spearheaded the
intellectual and political propaganda by arranging lectures,
concerts and ceremonies, and established its cultural control
over the community, in line with the directives set out by
Mussolini.71 Perhaps the best Italian speaker in Australia,
Antonio Baccarini did not miss an opportunity to explain the
Fascist doctrine nor to praise the men at the helm of govern
ment in Italy to Italian as well as to Australian audiences.72
Naturally, he was in close contact with the consul-general, who
also entrusted him with the administration of the Corriere
degli Italiani in A ustralia.13
The rather elitist character which Baccarini imprinted on the
Dante Alighieri Society caused adverse comments in some
circles of the Italian community. He was in particular accused
of restricting participation in the functions of the society to a
few personal friends and supporters,74 a charge which ob
viously hit the target since in 1931 the Administrative Board
decided to democratise the society which at that stage had a
membership of only 200, and of that number only fifty were
Italians, out of a population of 5,000 Italians resident in
Sydney.75
Apart from the reluctance shown by Italians to »become
members, the important fact which emerges from an analysis
of the society’s membership is the great number of its
Australian sympathisers. To a large extent, Baccarini was
more eager to muster the support of distinguished Australians
than that of Italian migrants, because he was aware (and
rightly so, as already pointed out by Italian historian R. De
Felice)76 that the public statements of support for Fascism by
the former had a considerable impact on the migrants, who
mainly belonged to the lowest socio-economic classes and felt
uneasy at becoming members of what looked to them — and
indeed was — a bourgeois society.
Among the Australian members of the society, special
mention must be made of Dr H. M. Moran who was one of the
most enthusiastic admirers of the Italian system and of its
Duce, and who did not spare a single public occasion to praise
the virtues of both.77 His contribution to the cause of Fascism
was such that the Italo-Australian did not hesitate to call him
‘one of those who can be called teachers of Fascism in
Australia, apart from already being a great benefactor of
Italy’.78
Yet it is important to note that Baccarini, and for that
matter the entire Italian Fascist movement in Australia,
although they strove to ingratiate themselves with the
members of the Australian Establishment in order to gain
their political support, never attempted to make a firm contact
with Australian far right-wing movements, because they were
not considered to be a serious alternative within the
Australian political context. Even if Fascist propaganda
literature was sometimes sent to members of the New Guard,
the Australian movement which was openly sympathetic to
Fascism,79 it was felt that, as Baccarini put it, none of the far
right-wing movements which:
have been prominent in the last few years in Australia
have anything to do either in form or in substance with
Fascism. They were sporadic, even if collective, phen
omena of sensibility, not movements deriving from a
maturity of thought or conscience.80
Besides, an active political involvement by Italian Fascists
with an Australian movement would have been in breach of the
1928 Statute of the Fascists Abroad, which preached the
political isolation of Italians from their foreign environment.
On the other hand, the New Guard did not seek the
collaboration of the Fascio, out of nationalism and of
detachment from anything which was alien, especially if
coming from migrants who were considered by many Guards
men as a backward race. Also, although Eric Campbell, the
leader of the New Guard, admitted his movement’s in
debtedness to some Fascist principles, he and most of his
followers believed that their policies, organisation and
operations were essentially Australian in character. Italian
Fascism in Australia therefore operated in almost complete
isolation from any organised indigenous political movement.
It is not surprising that by the early 1930s Italians in
Australia were widely suspected of being Fascists81 and that
the consular attempts at maintaining their national character
most preoccupied Australian public opinion, especially in
areas where the Italian presence was considerable, as in north
Queensland. In 1929 Prime Minister Bruce had to allay public
fears in that region: in replying to the accusation made against
Italians of wanting to introduce their language and culture, he
declared that his government would not encourage nor aid
such enterprise.82 The high density of Italian settlement in the
districts of Ingham, Innisfail and Cairns, in conjunction with
the fact that there, unlike other parts of Australia, Italian
labour was competing with Australian labour in the same area
of employment, brought the conflict into the open. The British
Preference League, an association openly advocating the
replacement of foreign labourers in the canefields with British
immigrants, was particularly bitter in its attacks against
Italians. Such discriminatory attitudes had been an un
derlying factor in labour relations in north Queensland for
many years, but the economic crisis of 1929 and the following
wave of unemployment worsened the conflict. To the frequent
appeals by the league to dismiss Italian labourers and to
starve them away, the Italian community and its represen
tatives reacted firmly. Early in June 1930, over 700 Italian
canecutters met at Innisfail and asked the authorities to grant
them the same treatment as Australian workers,83 while on 19
June Consul-General Grossardi released a statement to United
Press, defending his compatriots’ right to work and con
demning Australians who were trying to evict Italians from
jobs which the latter had occupied for years.84
The policies of the British Preference League also attracted
the wrath of the Italian government and press. Arnaldo
Mussolini wrote two articles in June 1930 in the Popolo
d'Italia, vindicating the industriousness of the Italian
migrant and asserting his right to work and to be treated with
dignity.85 These articles, noted the British Embassy in Rome,
‘caused the greatest impression in Australia. Italian labourers
had felt that they were being supported’,86 even if this support
caused more damage than benefit. In fact, Mussolini in his
articles did not limit himself to praising Italian labour, but
made some derogatory remarks about the Australian
workers.87 The Popolo d'ltalia printed a cartoon in which
Italian labour was described as the ‘living branch’ of a tree,
symbolising Australia, while Australian labour was illustrated
as the ‘dead branch’.88 The insult was taken up by Sm ith's
Weekly, which attacked the Fascist regime and the Italian
immigrants in Australia in very harsh terms.89
The incident did not develop further, but was a reminder of
the delicate relations between Italians and Australians during
the Depression years. The effects of this great economic crisis
were deeply felt by the migrants, and their plight was
acknowledged by the Italian authorities, who tried to alleviate
their sufferings through many assistance and welfare
organisations. In August 1930 the consulate-general founded a
Societd. Italiana di Beneficenza (Italian Welfare Society),
whose aim was to collect money for the unemployed; in Sep
tember 1930 three jobless Italians who had written personally
to Mussolini asking for assistance were repatriated by the
Italian government; in May 1931 Father Mambrini opened in
Sydney a branch of the Society of St Vincent de Paul to help
the needy Italians in the community; in December 1932 the
profits of the Ballo del Littorio, a celebration held during the
previous month, were presented to the consul-general by the
female branch of the Sydney Fascio, to be used for assistance
purposes. All these associations and initiatives were com
plementing the already existing ones such as the welfare office
opened in Melbourne by the local Fascist branch in October
1928.
Fascism in Australia consolidated its position between the
years 1928 and 1932 also because its respectability in the eyes
of Italian migrants was enhanced by three events which had a
great impact on their minds.
The first one in order of time and importance was the at
titude of the Roman Catholic Church towards Fascism.*
Although the regime and Italians in general had found since
the early 1920s a strenuous admirer in the Archbishop of
Brisbane, James Duhig, only after the Concordat did the
Catholic hierarchy express its full support for the regime.
Archbishop Duhig had done this already in February 1929,90
while the Archbishop of Sydney, Dr Kelly, returning from a
visit to Italy, declared his boundless admiration for the
thaumaturgical powers of the Duce.91 Yet it was only on the
occasion of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the
Fascist regime in 1932 that an official contact between the
Fascist authorities in Australia and the Apostolic Delegate for
Australasia took place. On 17 September 1932, the newly
appointed consul-general, Marquis Agostino Ferrante, visited
Bartolomeo Cattaneo, the Apostolic Delegate, for the first
time.92 The Delegate in his turn officiated at a religious func
tion and delivered a sermon which praised the marriage of the
Church with Fascism.93 The consul-general returned the
courtesy by having a party at his residence in honour of
Cattaneo on occasion of the fourth anniversary of the signing
of the Concordat.94
A second factor which increased the prestige of Fascism was
the newspapers’ constant reference to Italy’s peace policy, to
her disarmament proposals and to her historical friendship
with Great Britain. The last point was hammered with par
ticular insistence,95 and Australians were encouraged to adopt
a similar policy. ‘Follow England’, cried the Italo-Australian,
‘should be Australia’s watchword in this regard. It should
inspire her to maintain the warmest friendship with a country
which is eager to reciprocate’.96
The third event was the fascistisation of the diplomatic
representatives. As well as the upgrading of the status of its
legations in this country, Rome carried out for the first time
what Fascists liked to call ‘the change of the guard’, that is,
the switching of consular personnel in order to infuse new
spirit and create new situations favourable to the propagation
of the cause. In September 1929 the vice-consul of Perth,
Virgilio Lancellotti, the doyen of Fascists in Australia, was
posted to Brazil and replaced by Renato Citarelli. Born in
1898, Citarelli had a splendid Fascist background. He had
written for the Popolo d'Italia the history of the Fascist
militia, then had been attached to the High Command of the
militia, and left this position to take charge of the Press Office
of the National Fascist Party in Rome.97Under his control, the
Perth branch of the Fascist Party swelled to proportions which
were unreal, because Citarelli wanted to have every Italian as a
member of the Fascio.98 It was alleged that privately he was
even sympathetic with Mistrorigo’s ultra-Fascist articles.99
The posting in Perth proved to be a dead-end for such an
ambitious young man as Citarelli, and he was transferred to
Syria in July 1932,1a year of great changes for Italian consuls
in Australia. In January a new consul, Enrico Anzilotti, was
sent to Melbourne. A distinguished speaker, Oxford educated,
Anzilotti proved himself an impeccable functionary, always
ready to promote and defend the cause of his country and his
regime. But the really important change which altered the
political climate in the Italian community was the promotion
of the consul-general, Grossardi, to New York.2 Antonio
Grossardi in his twelve years of office had represented his
government with dignity and aplomb: a strong character, he
bore the imprint of the people of the Emilia. Factious and anti
clerical, Socialist by temperament and Fascist by cir
cumstance, Grossardi never expressed himself for the regime
in very warm terms, and when he manifested his sense of
admiration, it was more for Italy and the Italians than for the
party which ruled the country.3 His successor was Marquis
Agostino Ferrante, an experienced diplomat aged forty-seven
who had served as consul for twenty-two years, the last ten in
Boston and Philadelphia, and had married an American. The
arrival of Ferrante marked a watershed in the history of
Fascism in Australia. With him, the period of consolidation of
Fascism in this country ended and the movement advanced
from a stage of nationalism and cultural imperialism to a new
period where the expansionist leanings of the regime were not
expressed any longer in intellectual terms, but in the more
earthy language of Italy’s right to expand, of territorial
aspirations, of ‘a place in the sun’. Ferrante was only the ex
pression of this new mood of Italian Fascism. He still used the
old propaganda cliches, but the spirit, the motivation, were
different. Moreover, his arrival was coincidental with the
appearance on 19 March 1932, of a new Italian newspaper, II
Giornale Italiano, edited by Franco Battistessa, which would
represent during the 1930s, to 10 June 1940, the major channel
of Fascist propaganda in Australia.
Both events marked the birth of a new period in the history
of Fascism and Italians in Australia, where the represen
tatives of the regime and its local supporters interpreted the
international events and the demands which Fascist Italy
made upon other countries and upon her own citizens scattered
around the world, in a more aggressive, demanding,
totalitarian way. Fascism was approaching a new stage: that
of imperialism.
Notes
1 See Renzo De Felice, Mussolini il fascista II. L'organizzazione
dello Stato fascista. 1925-1929. Torino, 1968, p. 442. See also the
article by E. Amicucci, editor of La Gazzetta del Popolo,
reprinted in Italo-Australian, 17 March 1928.
2 I talo-Australian, 18 Feb. 1928.
3 AA, CRS A l, item 28/294, Prime Minister’s Dept to Home and
Territories, 26 April 1928.
4 Ibid. This instruction was criticised by the Sydney Daily

Guardian; Italians, pointed out the paper, ‘in proportion as they
perfervidly cherish their Italian Fascism, the more they stand
aloof from Australianism’; consequently ‘no democracy
receiving Italian Citizens can relish too much of “Evviva il
Duce" '(/talo-Australian, 18 Feb. 1928).
5 AA, CRS Al, item 28/294, Prime Minister's Dept to Home and
6 ‘They must avoid participation in the internal politics of the
countries whose hospitality they enjoy (Article I, Section 2)’.
This Article met strong oppositon from the Australian press.
The West Australian deplored it ‘if it means advice not to accept
the full obligations and interests of citizenship’ [Italo-Australian,
3 March 1928).
7 This subordination of the party to the state was unambiguously
stated by the statute in Article 6: ‘The essential task of the Fasci
is that of the assistance of fellow-countrymen abroad. The
Secretary of the Fascio shall carry out this task under the
direction of the representative of the Fascist State (Consuls-
General, Consuls and Vice-Consuls) who shall assist him in his
work’ and even more clearly in Article I, Section 5, which ordered
Fascists to ‘respect the representatives of Italy abroad and obey
their commands and direction’ (AA, CRS Al, item 28/294, Prime
Minister’s Dept to Home and Territories, 26 April 1928).
8 In a letter to the Secretary of the Home and Territories Dept
dated 24 August 1927, the Secretary to the Attorney-General’s
Dept, Sir Robert Garran, raised the problem that ‘the form of
oath administered to members of the Italian Fascist groups in
Australia is as follows:
I swear to execute, without question, the orders of the Duce
and to serve the cause of the Fascist revolution with all my
power and, if necessary, my blood’.
The Home and Territories Secretary, McLaren, discussed the
matter with Sir Robert Garran in January 1928 and, as he
reported, ‘when I pointed out to him that an alien cannot secure
naturalisation without renouncing his former allegiance, in
addition to taking an oath of allegiance to the King, he agreed
that nothing more could very well be done’ (AA, CRS Al, item
28/294, Attorney-General’s Dept to Home and Territories, 24
Aug. 1927).
9 AA, CRS Al, item 28/294, Prime Minister’s Dept to Home and
10 Ibid., Dominions No. 241 to Australia, 8 May 1928.
11 They were regarded as ‘a valuable means of propaganda. They
represent, as it were, a “bath of Italianity”, the taking of which
must be encouraged and extended as widely as possible’ (ibid.).
12 Sydney Morning Herald, 7 Nov. 1928; I talo-Australian, 24 Nov.
1928.
13 Ibid.
14 Pascale, Tra gli Italiani.
15 Ibid., p. 69.
16 Ibid., p. 139. In contrast to the praising of their national virtues
and of the world’s debt to Italian civilisation, the Fascists
maintained a spiteful attitude towards the cultural heritage of
other nations. In an article published in the Popolo d'Italia in
July 1930, Mussolini’s brother, Arnaldo, disdainfully disposed of
the Australian culture tradition by bluntly remarking that
‘Australian culture is nothing else but a second-rate product of
British culture. Australia may have thousands of electric globes,
but the spark which lights them up is given by the Italian genius
of Marconi, from the harbour of Genoa’ (ibid., pp. 210-11).
17 Ibid., p. 46.
18 Ibid., pp. 155-6.
19 AA, CRS A981, item Migration 48, Prime Minister’s Dept to
Dominions, 24 Aug. 1928. An External Affairs memorandum
dated 20 November 1941, states that ‘the net migration of
Italians to Australia during 1928 was actually only 1,374 and for
the following vear, ninety’ (AA, CRS A981, item Migration 48).
20 Ibid., 29 Sept" 1928.
21 As was the case in Sydney with Vicenzo Eolo Giuffre. V. E.
Giuffre, interview, 22 Aug. 1971. See also Italo-Australian, 8
April 1933, which advertised a course begun by G. Luciano,
former consular agent at Innisfail.
22 Italo-Australian, 13 July 1929. Bianchi was a close associate of
Franco Battistessa in India and also in Australia. For his
biography, see Vade Mecum. Illustrated Annual of the Giornale
Italiano, 30 June 1936, pp. 100-1.
23 Italo-Australian, 5 Nov. 1932 and 14 Jan. 1933.
24 Ibid., 7 Nov. 1931; 5 Nov. 1932; 18 March 1933; 30 Nov. 1929; 28
May 1932; 3 Dec. 1932; 11 June 1932; 10 June 1933; 4 May 1929
and 2 May 1931.
25 Ibid., 11 April 1931.
26 Ibid., 21 June 1930. On the politicising of sport, see also R. De
Felice, Mussolini il duce I. Gli anni del consenso. 1929-1936.
Torino, 1974, p. 101.
27 The Sydney Daily Guardian on 19 January 1929, complained
that ‘Australia has observed the . . . outrageous spirit of cock-a-
hoop self-importance in the Italian Consuls — Carosi in
Melbourne and San Marzano in Brisbane — issuing their
truculent messages to State Governments. A more temperate
ruler would keep in check . .. those loquacious Consuls in whom
Italian nationalism has not its watchdogs, but rather its terriers,
always ready to yap’.
28 Sydney Morning Herald, 7 Nov. 1928.
29 Italo-Australian, 13 Oct. 1928.
46 Fascism , A nti-Fascism and Italians in A ustralia
30 He added that ‘in name of my Government, I therefore ask for

full satisfaction for my countrymen. My Government is not
disposed to tolerate failure to protect Italians resident in
Australia’ (Italo-Australian, 3 Nov. 1928).
32 Ibid., 29 Dec. 1928; Sydney Morning Herald, 1 Jan. 1929.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 12 Jan. 1929.
36 Sydney Morning Herald, 3 Jan. and 5 Jan. 1929.
37 I talo-Australian, 28 June 1930. The culprit of the second offence
was never found despite the fact that the Queensland
government had offered a reward of £200 to any person who
could supply information leading to the capture of the offender
(Queensland Government Gazette, 1930, Vol. I, p. 2121). One of
the reasons was that ‘owing to the high feeling existing in
Innisfail at the time between various industrial, racial and
political organisations and groups — such as the British
Preference League, the Returned Sailors and Soldiers Imperial
League of Australia, the Australian Workers Union, the Italian
Club, the Queensland Canegrowers Association, the Italian
Fascists and the Italian anti-Fascists — great difficulty was
experienced by the police in obtaining information. Special police
officers were sent to investigate the matter and their
investigations were continued until it was established beyond
reasonable doubt that the matter would never be satisfactorily
solved’ (T.P. Fry, ‘The Italian consular incidents in North
Queensland’, The Australian and New Zealand Society of
International Law — Proceedings, Melbourne, 1935, Vol. I,
p. 92).
38 Sydney Morning Herald, 16 Sept. 1930.
39 I talo-Australian, 20 Sept. 1930.
40 On the powers, privileges, immunities and legal status of the
Italian consuls in Australia, with regard to the Innisfail
incidents, see Fry, ‘The Italian consular incidents’. Interesting
are his observations that while in practice the Italian consuls
held wider political powers in Australia, ‘to the Government of
which no Italian diplomatic representative is accredited, than in
countries to which Italy sends both consular and diplomatic
representatives’ (p. 97), in theory they had no such powers.
Under international law, ‘a Consul is not accredited to a
Government; he is merely instructed by his own Government to
perform, with the permission of another Government, certain
functions in the territory of the latter’ (p. 96); therefore Italian
Consuls could ‘request information, initiate proceedings [in the
Courts], make representations, or even suggest courses of
action’, but they could not ‘present formal demands, enter into
formal negotiations or agree to settlements’ (p. 97). According to
Fry, ‘it would seem that even the Consul-General would likewise
be unable to make such a formal demand(s) upon the
Commonwealth Government’ (p. 97).
42 Ibid. 26 Jan. 1929 and 2 Nov. 1929.
43 On this, see the study by Philip V. Cannistraro, La fabbrica del
consenso. Fascismo e mass media, Bari, 1975.
44 Grossardi admitted that the content of the Corriere degli Italiani
in Australia was ‘emanating from this Consulate-General’ (AA,
CRS A445, item 232/4/12, Grossardi to External Affairs, 12 Nov.
1931) .
45 After 1928 this newspaper intensified the pace of its propaganda
in favour of Fascism. In addition to items of information on
Italian politics and the Italian Fascist Party, the Italo-
Australian carried on in its pages a thorough campaign of
education in Fascist principles and policies; a few examples of it
are the articles on ‘Fascist policy and principles’ (11 May 1929);
on ‘Mussolini’s phenomenal activity’ (18 May 1929); on ‘The
Fascist rule’ (8 June 1929); on ‘Fascism’ (3 Aug. 1929); on ‘The
achievements of Fascism’ (9 Nov. 1929); on ‘Italy under Fascism’
(12 July 1930); on ‘A tribute to Fascism’ (27 Sept. 1930); on ‘A
Mussolini speech’ (8 Nov. 1930); on ‘Assassination plot’ (11 June
1932) ; on ‘A simple man’ (8 Oct. 1932).
46 Italo-Australian, 23 Jan. 1932.
47 Ibid., 28 Nov. 1931.
48 AA, CRS A445, item 232/4/12, Grossardi to External Affairs, 12
Nov. 1931.
49 Ibid., List of newspapers in foreign languages.
50 Ibid., External Affairs Opinion No. 9.
51 Ibid., O’Dea and O’Dea to Prime Minister’s Dept. 24 April 1929.
52 Ibid., External Affairs Opinion No. 9; also External Affairs to
O’Dea and O’Dea, 3 Oct. 1929.
53 Ibid., Mistrorigo to Scullin, 22 May 1931.
54 Ibid., CIB to Prime Minister’s Dept, 23 July 1931.
55 Ibid., Prime Minister’s Dept to Mistrorigo, 15 Oct. 1931.
56 Ibid., Grossardi to Prime Minister’s Dept, 12 Nov. 1931. This
statement contrasts with Mistrorigo’s assertion that ‘the paper
. . . would be published with the full approval of the Royal Italian
Vice-Consul of W.A., Cavaliere Citarelli’ (AA, CRS A445, item
232/4/12, Mistrorigo to Scullin, 22 May 1931). Obviously
Mistrorigo was lying in order to be granted permission to
publish, or the vice-consul maintained an ambiguous attitude
towards him.
57 The reasons for Mistrorigo’s extreme Fascist tendencies were
later investigated by the Commonwealth Investigation Branch,
which came out with an interesting report that is worth quoting
at length since it pinpoints the reasons behind the behaviour of
some ultra-Fascist Italians in Australia: ‘About seven years ago,
48 Fascism , Anti-Fascism and Italians in Australia
Mistrorigo had a pharmacy in Rome. About this time the

Fascists were taking active measure against the Communists,
and I am informed Mistrorigo was deemed to be a Communist
and his shop suspected of being a meeting place of Communists.
One evening a number of revolver bullets were fired through the
door of his shop. My informant, who then lived in the same
locality, told me that the local Fascists suspected that a
Communist meeting was taking place in the shop and indicated
their disapproval by a volley through the door. It was also
suggested that Mistrorigo migrated to Australia because it was
being made too hot for him in Rome . . . As regards Mistrorigo’s
starting, financing and conducting the paper La Stampa
Italiana, its decidedly pro-Fascist policy, the publication of
constant and full reports of local Fascist activities, the eulogistic
references so frequently made to the Vice-Consul and his
secretary — the theory has been advanced by an intelligent
Italian that Mistrorigo is trying to rehabilitate himself in the
eyes of the Fascists in order to be able to return to Rome under
favourable auspices. His wife recently left Australia for Italy.
The opinion was further expressed that Mistrorigo would
welcome being deported, especially over any articles in his paper
ostensibly in defence of Italian National ideals, if actually
insulting to the Empire under whose flag so many of his
countrymen earn comfortable livings and, in fact, accumulate
competencies upon which to retire to their native land’ {AA, CRS
A445, item 232/4/12, Jones to McLaren, 8 July 1932).
58 AA, CRS A445, item 232/4/12, CIB Perth to CIB Canberra, 7
June 1932.
59 The most incriminating passage of the article read as follows:
‘We continue to observe in Australia the same phenomenon
which flourishes in all lands where the English flag flies: that is,
hatred, egoism, immorality, a domineering spirit, vulgar insult,
with the difference that here, not being able to take a whip and
thrash the foreigner who is working and enriching their land,
they have established ridiculous laws and factions in order to cut
the ground under the feet of those who are trying with their toil
to earn an honest and comfortable living. Hatred becomes
fanaticism in cases where our workmen decisively surpass the
productive ability of the British. Rude and vulgar propaganda
against the foreigner grows and soars gloriously where they
come into collision with the iron wills of our fellow-countrymen.
When they can no longer fight, then the true Anglo-Saxon
politeness blossoms in the columns of their newspapers in wrhich
for courteous controversy is substituted shamless calumny, for
frank and free discussion, vulgar and foolish insult; such as is the
boasted British politeness’ (From Professor Murdoch's
translation for the CIB in A A, CRS A445, item 232/4/12, CIB,
Canberra, to Prime Minister’s Dept, 5 July 1932).
60 AA, CRS A432, item 32/01059, 23 June 1932. See also Sunday
Times, Perth, 26 June 1932.
61 AA, CRS A445, item 232/4/12. CIB Perth to CIB Canberra, 28
June 1932.
62 Ibid., Jones to Prime Minister’s Dept, 5 July 1932.
63 Ibid., Attorney-General’s Opinion, 25 Aug. 1932; also Prime
Minister’s Dept to Interior, 30 Aug. 1932.
64 Ibid., Interior to External Affairs, 19 Sept. 1932.
65 Ibid., Interior to External Affairs, 5 Oct. 1932. See also Italo-
Australian, 1 Oct. and 8 Oct 1932.
66 Commonwealth Gazette, No. 83 of 24 Nov. 1932.
68 Ibid., 2 March 1929. The correspondent of the Italo-Australian,
obviously conveying the feeling of the majority of Italians
present, remarked that ‘a priest who has also been an officer in
war, who has served his Fatherland with faith and has been
mutilated, cannot neglect patriotism and take care exclusively of
religious matters. Fatherland and Religion are to him only one
thing, which cannot be separated’ (ibid.).
69 Ibid.
70 He was quite aware of his pre-eminent role in promoting Fascism
in Australia which he considered ‘as a movement arising out of
the traditional classic culture of the Italian people’; looking back
at his activities in the 1920s and 1930s, he proudly declared in
October 1940 that ‘no other citizen, more than myself,
endeavoured to establish a closer and better understanding and
knowledge between the two countries’ (AA, Series 13, P242, item
Q30565, A. Baccarini, Statutory Declaration, 31 Oct. 1940).
71 In 1927 Mussolini stated that the duties of the Dante Alighieri
Society, ‘one of our dearest and most glorious institutions, are
today and in the future greater than those of yesterday’ (Italian
Bulletin of Australia, 16 April 1927, p. 24).
72 See, for instance, his lectures on ‘A creative synthesis:
Fascismo’, given on 23 November 1932, at the Dante Alighieri
Society in Sydney (Italian Bulletin of Australia, November 1932,
p. 10), and on ‘Fascism and Communism’, given on 5 April, 1933
at the Labor Club of the University of Svdney (Italo-Australian,
8 April 1933).
74 Ibid., 6 July 1929; 20 July 1929; 26 Oct. 1929; 30 Aug. 1930.
75 Ibid., 21 Feb. 1931.
76 R. De Felice, Mussolini il fascista II. L'organizzazione dello
Stato fascista. 1925-1929. Torino, 1968, pp. 370-1.
77 See, for instance, Italo-Australian, 1 Oct. 1932.
78 Ibid., 29 Oct. 1932.
79 Eric Campbell, The Rallying Point, Melbourne, 1965, p. 131.
80 Italian Bulletin of Commerce, November 1932, p. 13.
50 Fascism, Anti-Fascism and Italians in A ustralia
81 The Labor Daily alleged that ‘the landing permits are issued by
the Italian Consul-General in Australia’, and that Italians ‘are
admitted only if hallmarked by the Italian Government’s
assurance to the local Consul-General that they are pro-Fascist’;
consequently ‘this ensures Italians in Australia being of only one
brand —pro Mussolini’ (LaborDaily, 20 Sept. 1932).
82 Italo-Australian, 6 April 1929.
83 Ibid., 14 June 1930.
84 Grossardi, quoted in Pascale, Tra gli Italiani, p. 201. The number
of Italian canecutters in relation to the number of workers of
Australian, British and other nationalities was not large: in the
Innisfail district, for instance, where Italians were most
numerous, from a total of 303 canecutters, 102 were Italian, 105
Australian and ninety-six of other nationalities (ibid., p. 199).
85 The articles were entitled ‘Egoismi d’oltre mare’ (Overseas
selfishness) and ‘Difesa del lavoro Italiano’ (Defence of Italian
labour). See their full text in: Pascale, Tra gli Italiani, pp. 203-13.
Also, I talo-Australian, 28 July 1930.
86 AA, CRS A981, item Migration 48, British High Commissioner
to Prime Minister of Australia, 3 July 1930.
87 Pascale, Tra gli Italiani, p. 212.
88 A A, CRS A981, item Migration 48, British High Commissioner
to Prime Minister of Australia, 3 July 1930.
89 Smith's Weekly, 6 Sept. 1930.
90 Ibid., 2 Feb. 1929.
91 Ibid., 18 Oct. 1930.
92 Ibid., 24 Sept. 1932. The previous consul-general, Grossardi, did
not get along well with the representatives of the Church, being
by tradition and temperament a staunch anti-clerical (Napoleone
Costantino, interview, 17 May 1972).
93 I talo-Australian, 5 Nov. 1932.
94 Ibid., 18 Feb. 1933.
95 Ibid., 24 Oct. 1931; 5 March 1932; 17 Dec. 1932.
96 Ibid., 14 Jan. 1933 and 28 Jan. 1933.
97 Italian Bulletin of Australia, Oct. 1929, p. 11.
98 Costantino, interview.
99 See CIB Report dated 8 July 1932 in AA, CRS A445, item
232/4/12.
1 Italo-Australian, 2 July 1932. He was succeeded by Napoleone
Costantino.
2 Ibid., 25 June 1932.
3 In 1931, on his return after a brief visit to Italy, all that he could
say was that ‘Italy in the last nine years has experienced
tremendous achievements and enormous changes which must
modify world opinion of her’ (Italo-Australian, 22 Aug. 1931).
Evidence that his allegiance lay more towards the Italian
Ministry for Foreign Affairs than towards Fascism is found in
Fascism Consoiidates 51
the fact that after 1945 he reverted to his Socialist and anti
clerical beliefs, and that he fell into disgrace with the ruling
Christian-Democrat government when, as Minister in Lisbon, he
treated harshly some Italian priests who, unfortunately for him,
had powerful connections in the government (Costantino,
interview.).
3
Dissident Fascism
. . . we prefer to lose our Party membership card than our

faith.
(Franco Battistessa, 10 November 1928)
During the second half of the 1920s some Italians who had
taken an active part in the Fascist struggle for power before
1922 by serving in the para-military formations of the
squadristi, migrated to Australia. Their political background
was varied; a few had been members of the Nationalist
movement during the years preceding Word War I; others had
joined the Fascist movement during the difficult years of 1919
and 1920; some had become members of the Partito Nazionale
Fascista when the movement had been transformed by
Mussolini into a party in November 1921.
They regretted now that the daring and anti-conformist
Fascism of those times had been replaced by its dull, law-and-
order abiding new version. The reasons which compelled them
to emigrate to Australia were many, the most important ones
being economic necessity, spirit of adventure, and
disappointment with the legalitarian outcome of the Fascist
Revolution. Many believed that the old forces of the
53
E stablishm ent, in an a tte m p t to m aintain their predom inant

role in Italian politics and to survive under the new regime,
had cast aside their liberal ideology and were now trying to
influence Fascism and to em pty it of its revolutionary content.
If these forces were to succeed, the old sta te would survive
within the shell of the new F ascist state, and Fascism would
lose its dynamic spirit. These F ascists ‘of the first hour’ in
A ustralia, as indeed Farinacci and his followers in Ita ly ,1 saw
in this plan a betrayal of the F ascist Revolution. They could
not accept the fact th a t the age of squadrism had ended and
th a t the Italian governm ent was not looking favourably a t
those who were preaching un rest and perm anent revolution a t
the time when it was attem p tin g to restore order w ithin Italy
and to create abroad an image of lawfulness and respectability.
Once abroad, they brought their dissent into the Fascist
organisations in their new country, th u s transferring the
political unrest within Fascism from Italy to the overseas
branches of the p a rty .2
A lthough dissident Fascists had been arriving in A ustralia
since 1925, it was only in 1928 th a t they formed a faction in
Sydney. The reason they became active so late was twofold.
The rising anti-Fascism am ongst m igrants in 1926-27 revived
in the dissidents the wish to use again the violent means
against their opponents which had been so successful in 1921-
22. Also, the squadristi who m igrated to A ustralia in 1927-28
were much more outspoken and m ilitant than their
forerunners, because they had w itnessed and even taken p a rt
in the factional in-fighting betw een sansepolristi and
conservatives which had beset Fascism in Italy. Furtherm ore,
they were spurred into action by the arrival in Sydney, a t the
beginning of 1928, of B attistessa.
Franco B a ttiste ssa was born a t Colico, on Lake Como in
1885. He studied a t Sondrio and a t the age of twelve was sent
to E ngland to study a t Colebrook College a t Bognor Regis,
where he rem ained for five years. L ater he lived for one year a t
Lugano (Switzerland) and for another year a t Cannes and
Juan-les-Pins (France). W hen he returned to Italy he was one
of the first to join the Associazione Nazionalista in 1910, and
found himself involved in those activities aimed a t helping,
m orally and m aterially, Italian irredentism in the provinces
D issident Fascism 55
still under A ustrian domination. In these years he began his

activ ity as a journalist. W ith C. Chiavolini, later M ussolini’s
priv ate secretary, and A rturo Rossato, future colum nist of the
Popolo d'Italia, B attistessa founded the Associazione
Nazionale dei Giovani Scrittori Italiani (National Association
of Y oung Italian W riters), becoming its secretary. He then
becam e editor of the weekly II Pensiero Giovanile and
correspondent of L ’Orizzonte of Messina.
As early as July 1911 he showed his intolerance of a
doctrinaire and literary nationalism and his preference for a
more dynam ic, warlike attitude: during th a t m onth he, with
two other friends, ventured into the Socialist Trades Hall of
M ilan where an anti-war rally against the war in Libya was
being held, to break up the m eeting and to shout ‘Long live
w ar!’ In 1913 B attistessa was sent by an Italian textile firm to
m anage its agency in Bombay. He remained in India for six
years. W hen in 1919 he returned to Italy for a holiday, he
im m ediately joined the Fasci di com battim ento and became
com m ander of one of the squads, the ‘Randaccio’, sub
sequently called by M ussolini T In tre p id a ’ (the Intrepid One).
A fter a brief return to India, he was back in Italy early in 1921
and w ith his squad escorted M ussolini from M ilan to Rome
when the Duce was elected D eputy to the Parliam ent. On 22
M arch 1921, B attistessa led his squad into the Socialist
district of Milan called Greco Milanese, where a bloody
confrontation with the anti-Fascists took place and a young
squadrist, Aldo Sette, was shot dead. In Jan u ary 1922,
B a ttiste ssa was appointed secretary of the association La
Guardia al Brennero (The G uard on the Brenner). This body
had been created, under the patronage of M ussolini, by the
leader of the F u tu rist movement, F. T. M arinetti, to com bat
the increasing German nationalism in the Alto Adige region.3
A fter Fascism came to power, B attistessa continued in his
journalistic activity, corresponding for the newspapers
Corriere Fascista, Prode Anselm o, Corriere dell'A lto A dige
and the m agazines I I 1919 and the R iv ista Illustrata Italiana.
In 1926 he returned to India, where he rem ained for two years
founding in Bom bay the first Italian newspaper in India,
L'ltaliano, and becoming political secretary of the F ascist
branch.4 In 1928 B attistessa em igrated to A ustralia. W hen he
arrived in Sydney, his fluency in English and Italian, his
culture, his political past, contributed to put him at the fore of
the political life of the community.
The dissident fascists were encouraged in their attitude by
three new developments. Throughout 1927 the young and
recently appointed consuls in Australia adopted the policy of
bolstering the sagging nationalism of Italians by seeking the
widest publicity for their statements in support of Fascism.
Also, the strong stand taken by the Fascist government at this
time with regard to the migrants’ poor working and socio
cultural conditions received the overwhelming support of most
Italians. It was felt, as the Italo-Australian put it, that ‘it was
now derogatory to the dignity of Italy that her citizens should
go seeking work haphazardly in other countries of the world’.5
Moreover, the new Secretary-General of the Fasci Abroad,
Piero Parini, took a more militant line than his predecessor and
shortly after the issuing of the new Statute of the Fasci
Abroad fanned the flame of dissident Fascism in Australia by
declaring that migrants in foreign countries must remain
‘exasperatingly Italian’ and that the process of fascist-
izzazione of the diplomatic service must be completed as soon
as possible.6
When, in January 1928, the Italian government transferred
its consulate-general from Melbourne to Sydney, so that its
representative could be closer to the new Federal Capital,
Canberra and at the same time promoted the Sydney vice-
consul, Mario Carosi, to consul, many militant Fascists
thought that Parini’s line was also the government’s, and that
as a result at last the Italian officials would be fascistizzati
even in Australia. They hoped that Rome would recall the then
consul-general, Grossardi, and replace him with a young
Fascist diplomat. Their assumption that Mussolini would
favour a ‘change of the guard’ was strengthened by an article,
written by Dino Grandi in II Legionario, official organ of the
National Fascist Party Abroad, in which the Under-Secretary
for Foreign Affairs stated that the consul was not only the
main agent of Italian political, economic and cultural
expansion, but also the pioneer of the new Fascist civilisation,
the principal propagandist of its doctrine.7
In March 1928 the Fascists who had always objected to the
Dissident Fascism 57
leadership of the consul-general were prompted into action. At
the beginning of that month they sent around to their comrades
in Sydney a petition, which they planned to forward to the
Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, asking that the Sydney
consul, Carosi, be not posted to another assignment, but kept
there and even promoted to the highest diplomatic position in
Australia. First-hour Fascists, claimed the promoters of the
petition, had been appointed consuls-general everywhere
except in Australia; it would be proper, therefore, that the new
consulate-general in Sydney should be opened by a new consul-
general in possession of the Fascist prerequisites demanded by
the regime.8
The petition collected 200 signatures,9a remarkable figure if
one considers that the total membership of the Sydney Fascio
was 200.10 This open act of censure against Grossardi’s tenure
of office betrayed those people who resented the leadership of
one whom they considered as the survivor of a world which
they had fought and destroyed. When the authorities knew
about it, they acted at once. The president of the Sydney
Fascio, Napoleone Costantino, ordered the immediate
destruction of the 200 signatures and warned the supporters of
the petition against plotting further dissident action. Also,
under direct orders from Grossardi, the Sydney Fascists were
hastily summoned and, in the presence of Consul Carosi,
ordered to vote in favour of a motion supporting the conduct of
all consuls in Australia, with no exception. Only twenty-five
Fascists were present at this meeting.
These events created a new, deeper rift which divided the
Italian community further, and the consul-general’s swift and
resolute intervention contributed to the polarisation of
popular feeling. In the meantime, the Italo-Australian voiced
in its pages the opposition of a section of the community to
Grossardi’s lukewarm Fascism by commenting in one of its
editorials that the majority of Italians in Sydney approved of
the petition, and by publishing letters from readers
condemning the attitude of the consul-general.
Grossardi entered the polemic personally by writing a letter
to the owner of the Italo-Australian, Lubrano, accusing his
editor, Eustacchio Del Pin, of behaving in his private life in a
manner unworthy of a Fascist. Del Pin retorted by reminding
the consul-general that only of late had he become a member of
those Fascist branches in Victoria which he, Del Pin, had
founded already in 1925.
Thus Del Pin touched on one of the important points of
contrast between official Fascism and dissident Fascists in
Australia: the latter accused some of the consular and party
representatives of being opportunists who had sided with the
enemies of Fascism between 1919 and 1922 and had joined the
victorious movement only when they saw that their careers
would be imperilled if they did not become members of the
party and did not pay lip service to the new order. These
people, in the opinion of the dissident fascists, could not
command the allegiance of the true fascists, of people who had
been with Mussolini since the early days of Via Paolo del
Cannobio: as Battistessa pointed out, referring to the
secretary of the Sydney Fascio, Mario Melano, ‘he who has
deceitfully gained admittance to Fascism by the back door,
has one duty only: to keep quiet in order to be forgiven’. Even
if their past could be forgiven, their present methods of
guiding the colony could not be accepted; ideas could not be
imposed by force, obedience could not be obtained by means of
threats. The authoritarianism of official Fascism was the
second most important bone of contention between the two
factions: many squadrists, who had served in the arditi during
World War I or even had an Anarchist background, resented
strongly the discipline and the unquestioning obedience which
Rome was trying to impose.11
When Battistessa joined the staff of the Italo-Australian, he
shared these feelings with many Fascists discontented with
the consular authorities; also, by virtue of his background, he
became immediately the leader of the movement of protest
against official Fascism in Australia. In an article on 26 May
1928, appealing for harmony in the community, Battistessa
laid down two postulates which, according to him, were
essential to the success of Fascism among the migrants. The
Fascist branches must be absolutely free from any interference
by the representatives of the Italian government, interference
which could be dictated by interests that did not always
coincide with those of the Fascist party or were compatible
with the ideals of the Fascist Revolution. Also, the Fasci had
to be run in an open fashion, by discussing the issues and

without imposing sanctions upon the dissenters.
It was to be expected that such postulates would put the
author and his supporters in direct conflict with official
Fascism since they ran contrary to the 1926 Statute of the
Fasci Abroad and to its 1928 revised version. The statute ruled
that a Fascist branch could not be, even de facto, independent
from the consul-general’s authority, because he was the
highest party as well as government representative in
Australia; nor were the branches allowed to discuss their
problems openly because of their delicate political nature. The
demands for the fascistizzazione of the diplomatic service, for
a less hierarchical and more participatory party structure, for
the independence of the party from the state and for the
rejection of secrecy as a means of conducting the affairs of the
Fascio, marked the exact line of division between dissident
Fascism and the authorities.
The dissent was restricted to a vocal minority of
approximately thirty-five Fascists who enjoyed the tacit
support of a sizeable number of party members.12 The other
members passively witnessed the conflict, abiding by the
party regulations without inner conviction. In this sense they
remained loyal to the authorities, but the value of their
allegiance was questionable. As Del Pin commented
appropriately:
unfortunately in the life of a colony which is very far from
the Fatherland . . . there are people who obey in good
faith, others who obey for peace sake, or because they are
in need . . . and people who obey for interest, or who obey
only in part, and people who . . . pretend to obey. Who are
the rebels, then? Nobody.13
Some dissident Fascists judged the situation to be so serious
and beyond any possibility of rapprochement either with the
diplomats in Australia or with official Fascism in Rome that
they considered forming an Australian Branch of Dissident
Fascists. Only the political perspective, intelligence and
authority of Battistessa succeeded in avoiding, for the
moment, a dramatic confrontation. When the dispute was at
its worst, he (perhaps in order to bring the authorities to a
position of compromise) made public the fact that the old
Fascists had asked for his advice on the opportuneness of such
an initiative, but that he had discouraged them and had
exhorted them to accept discipline.14 In reality, Battistessa
opposed the formation of a breakaway movement because he
believed that the present situation was temporary and was to a
large extent the product of the ineptitude of the men at the
head of the movement in Australia. In time such men would go
and then the control of the community would fall inevitably
into the hands of the rightful guardians of the Revolution, the
true Fascists of the first hour. A secession would weaken the
movement irretrievably, thus endangering the cause of
Fascism among Italians in Australia. Yet Battistessa’s role as
moderator clashed with his inclination for the personal
challenge, for the daring squadrist feat, for the idealistic
condemnation of injustice, with no consideration for personal
consequences. The Fascist motto was ‘To dare, not to plot’,
and Battistessa thought that instead of forming dissident
Fascist branches and of dividing the community further, it
was the duty of the true Fascist, of the squadrist, to denounce
personally, directly, publicly, the opportunists, the Fascists
for convenience. As he said in 1928:
injustice is fought openly, not by means of arbitrary
actions . . . If the authorities are inept or guilty they must
be fought on their own ground, not in the ambush of
secessionist or rebellious movements, repulsive to the
manly and loyal Fascists.15
Ironically, the episode which was meant to mark the
beginning of this open action policy and which highlighted the
dissident Fascists’ opposition to the conduct of Fascist
officialdom in Australia was the rather pathetic and absurd
Paddington Town Hall incident on 30 May 1928. That night,
while the Italian community in Sydney was assembled in the
Paddington Town Hall to celebrate with a banquet the transfer
of the consulate-general from Melbourne to Sydney and the
arrival of Grossardi, Franco Battistessa, in the uniform of
commander of the punitive squad ‘Randaccio’, and two other
squadrists, Ligustri and Borghetti, stormed into the hall
interrupting the ceremony. After having given the Fascist
salute, in the silence that ensued, Battistessa, on behalf of the
old blackshirts, charged Grossardi with being unworthy of the
position he was occupying, since he was not defending the
interests of Fascism but instead was gorging himself and
dancing in a moment of national disaster, when General
Nobile, together with seventeen other Italian heroes, was
missing over the North Pole in an airship. In the pandemonium
which followed, some women fainted, the waiters quickly
collected the knives from the tables, the police were called in
and Grossardi angrily promised Battistessa that his insults to
the authority of the consul-general would bear grave
consequences for him.16 To increase the tension, a few days
after the incident some dozen Fascist dissidents declared their
solidarity with the rebels.17
Thereafter the pace of events quickened. Battistessa
received from Rome notice of his expulsion from the party
while the Sydney Fascist branch expelled Ligustri and
Borghetti for their part in the Paddington Town Hall incident.
Another dissident, Fortuna to Veller, supported publicly the
three expelled and asked for the same punishment.18 He was
satisfied almost immediately: Mario Melano explained the
expulsion by saying that Veller was unworthy to associate
with other Fascists loyal to the authorities.19At the same time
the secretary of the Melbourne Fascio, Pietro Del Mastro,
attacked Battistessa in the party’s newspaper II Littorio,20
while Melano in Sydney went further by accusing the
dissidents of being ‘dead weights, people to purge . . . evil and
ambitious, meddlesome . . . enemies of Fascism’ and warned
Italians not to frequent their company.21
These violent attacks were evidence of the authorities’ deep
concern for the fact that the dissidents found some
encouragement in the community, and that people were
demanding Rome’s intervention to oust the pseudo-Fascists
from their positions of power.22 But the revolt was doomed to
failure: the consular authorities had the support of the Italian
government and of the Partito Nazionale Fascista, and
nothing could persuade them to accept a compromise or even
to leave the dissidents a way to save face. Between 1925 and
1928 Mussolini struck at those intransigent Fascists who
represented the most serious and immediate threat to his
authority and who believed that the abandonment of the
violent and illegal means used during 1921-22 would be
tantamount to a moral demobilisation. To tolerate further
their opposition within the party would have put at great risk
the policy of conservatism and moderation which, at that
stage, was essential to Mussolini for the consolidation of his
regime.23
Therefore Battistessa and his followers were left with no
alternative but to persist in their unreconciled attitude. In
vain Battistessa solicited Virgilio Lancellotti for his support
and protested against the inertness of the Melbourne Fascists
when the latter were confronted with increased anti-fascist
activities; in vain he accused the Sydney Fascio of lacking
political initiative and blasted his powerful opponents from the
columns of the Italo-Australian, warning them that ‘it is not
Fascism that must . . . adapt to the times, but it is you who
must . . . become Fascists’. A few months after the signing of
the petition, the consuls had succeeded in turning the tide and
in slowly isolating the dissidents politically. Battistessa still
tried to put up a last ditch defence by playing on the consuls’
allegedly varying degrees of allegiance to Fascism. He
constantly praised the behaviour of the consul in Melbourne,
Carosi, the ardito di guerra, the young Fascist who did not
miss any opportunity to defend and to propagate Fascism, and
compared it with Grossardi’s reticence.
Although afraid of supporting the dissidents in public, many
fascists, by now intimidated by the consuls, believed that
there was some truth in Battistessa’s charges. Their belief was
strengthened when, on the anniversary of the March on Rome,
Carosi invited every Italian in Melbourne to take part in the
celebrations while Grossardi in Sydney issued a few printed
invitations to his personal friends to come on board the vessel
Maria Cristina.2* The Sydney celebration sparked a new series
of incidents. It was learnt that the consul-general had invited
very few to the ship because he suspected that the dissidents
would disrupt a public meeting thus causing him embarrass
ment, particularly in view of the fact that Battistessa and
other dissidents had formed La Squadraccia, a group modelled
on the punitive squads of the squadristi, with intent to make
life difficult for the consul-general.25 Yet some dissidents,
among whom was Eustacchio Del Pin, a war invalid and much
decorated ex-serviceman, tried to go on board uninvited but
they were barred access to the ship by the branch secretary,
Melano.26
Again there was a public outcry, led by the Italo-Australian,
and other appeals to purge Grossardi were sent to Rome.27
Instead, Parini sent the official confirmation of the expulsion
from the party of six dissidents involved in the Paddington
Town Hall affair. While Battistessa accepted the verdict
philosophically and told his readers that he preferred to lose
his party membership card rather than his faith,28 other
dissidents did not take it so meekly. Thirty-five of them,
having also been excluded from the ceremony on the Maria
Cristina, celebrated the March on Rome by parading through
the streets of Surry Hills and singing Giovinezza29 Others
formed a branch of the Returned Servicemen, in open defiance
of the authorities, and appointed Ligustri as its secretary.30
Another group of dissidents organised itself into an
association of old Fascists called La Vecchia Guardia Fascista
(The Old Fascist Guard). Ligustri, in an attempt to muster
support, also organised a picnic and controversially invited to
it all Italians without distinction.31 These moves did not worry
Grossardi unduly; he knew that they were doomed to failure
because of the lack of determination in many dissidents and of
the official excommunication imparted by Rome.
Instead, he was most concerned by the stream of anti-
consular propaganda which poured out of the pages of the
I talo-Australian. As this newspaper had been behind the revolt
of the dissidents in March and the Paddington Town Hall
incident, Grossardi decided that its influence should be
checked and to that purpose founded II Corriere degli Italiani
in Australia. Although all issues have been lost, an early
mention of it is made in the I talo-Australian on 9 June 1928.
The newspaper was backed financially by wealthy Italian
businessmen, one of whom, Bartolomeo Callose, became its
first editor, as well as by public subscriptions. Its political
aims must have been quite obvious, to the point that the Italo-
Australian on 8 December 1928 protested that: ‘the Corriere
does not represent the interests of the organisations in the
colony, but of those who, with other people’s money, prefer to
fight the newspaper I talo-Australian.
The newspaper was launched with much publicity by the
consul-general, who took that opportunity to defend his work
and to condemn, yet again, the activities of the Fascist
dissidents. In an important interview with the Daily Guardian,
he stated categorically that: ‘the official organ of the Italian
community is the Corriere degli Italiani in Australia, which is
the authorised organ of all recognised Italian associations in
this country,’ while the T talo-Australian newspaper does not
represent the Italian community’32 but was making capital out
of a regrettable situation caused by a small group of
dissidents. In order to dispel any doubts in the minds of
Italians and Australians that he was in full control of the
situation and that the challenge to his authority was coming
from a lunatic fringe, he explained to them that there was: ‘no
condition of a “social war” among Italians in Australia or
Sydney. But, a handful of troublesome elements, who have
been relegated to the background, are actuated by their
personal rancour’.33Furthermore, concluded Grossardi:
the fact that I have remained Consul-General in Australia
for nine years is in itself sufficient evidence that I have
gained, in my consulate, the confidence of my Govern
ment and of the Italian community in Australia.34
By the end of 1928 Grossardi had won the battle against
Fascist dissenters and had intervened successfully in limiting
the influence of the Italo-Australian. In fact, upon his advice to
ban the newspaper,35 on 5 January 1929, the PNF informed its
overseas members, by means of II Legionario, that: ‘the
Secretary of the Fascist Party gives notice that the Sydney
periodical I talo-Australian is not a Fascist journal. Its attitude
decidedly does not conform with the Party’s policy’.36 The
London Times reported that the Italian Foreign Office
declined to comment beyond the statement printed in the
Legionario;37 it was nevertheless the general impression that
Rome was forbidding the Fascists to read the I talo-Australian.
The position assumed against the Sydney weekly was in line
with the new restriction upon the freedom of the press which
had been introduced in Italy at the end of 1927.38
During 1928 Fascism hit hard, even in Australia, at its
opponents inside as well as outside the party, and began
imposing a forced consensus for the policies of the Fascist
government, an imposition which became institutionalised
with the consolidation of the regime. By the end of the year the
problem of having to deal with the revolutionaries once the
revolution had been accomplished was solved with the victory
of the state over the party, although the two souls of Fascism,
which De Felice calls Fascism-Movement and Fascism-
Regime, continued to co-exist in Italian political life until the
demise of this ideology.39
The dissenters, in Australia as indeed in Italy, after being
relegated for a few years to a political limbo, found their way
back into the party during the 1930s. Many of them, such as
Battistessa, although they became prominent again in local
politics, looked back with regret to the days when Fascism
meant more than the occasional dinner to celebrate a national
festivity, the collective singing of Giovinezza, the wearing of
the black shirt and the Roman salute to the authorities. They
still dreamt of a society in which Fascism would be a living
reality, a guide to the daily life of all Italians, and not an
amorphous set of rules, similar to an old flag which, as
Battistessa bitterly remarked, ‘is exposed, faded and limp,
only on important occasions, at country fairs, more for the
sake of tradition than for love’.40
Their halcyon days were over: another revolution had been
betrayed when, once again, the apparatus had prevailed over
the individual.
Notes
1 On the history of Fascist dissidents in Italy, see Renzo De Felice,
M ussolini il fascista II. L'organizzazione dello Stato Fascista,
1925-1929, Torino, 1968, chap. 2. The Australian government had
been briefed about the dissent within the Italian Fascist Party
by its unofficial representative in Italy, Major-General G.
Ramaciotti. In this First Report dated 30 June 1925, Ramaciotti
reported that ‘Fascismo is strongly predominant, but its
difficulties are not diminishing. Party discipline is irksome to
many “legionaries” and the return to normal government
desired by Mussolini is retarded by those of his followers who
will not desist from taking the law into their own hands or who
have private axes to grind’ (AA, CRS A981, item Italy 28 pt II,
Ramaciotti, First Report, 30 June 1925).
2 Felice Rando, interview, 7 Sept. 1971.
3 Italo-Australian, 10 Aug. 1929; Vade Mecum, 30 June 1936,
p. 102.
4 Vade Mecum, 30 June 1936.
5 I talo-Australian, 14 Jan. 1928.
6 Ibid., 25 Feb. 1928.
7 Ibid., 17 March 1928.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid., 24 March 1928.
11 See letter in I talo-Australian, 26 May 1928.
12 Ibid., 16 June 1928.
13 Ibid., 19 May 1928.
14 Ibid., 26 May and 9 June 1928.
15 Ibid., 26 May 1928.
16 F. Battistessa, interview, 9 Aug. 1971. Sydney Morning Herald,
31 May 1928.
17 I talo-Australian, 30 June 1928.
18 Ibid., 9 June 1928.
19 Ibid., 30 June 1928.
20 Ibid., 23 June 1928.
21 Ibid. Also 14 July 1928.
22 Ibid., 16 and 23 June 1928.
23 On this, see R. De Felice, Mussolini il fascista II, pp. 183-8,
302-4.
24 Ibid., 27 Oct. 1928.
25 Battistessa, interview, 3 Aug. 1972.
26 I talo-Australian, 3 Nov. 1928.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 10 Nov. 1928.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., 24 Nov. 1928.
31 Ibid.
32 Daily Guardian, 12 Nov. 1928.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 Italo-Australlian, 20 July 1929.
36 Sun, Sydney, 16 July 1929.
37 Ibid.
38 On this, see De Felice, Mussolini il fascista II, pp. 349-52.
39 On this, see R. De Felice, Intervista sul Fascismo, Bari, 1975,
chapter 3.
40 Italo-Australian, 26 May 1928.
4
The Years of Fascist
Imperialism, 1932-1940
The twentieth century will be the century of Fascism, will

be the century of Italian might, will be the century during
which Italy for the third time will take the lead of human
civilisation, because outside our principles there is no
salvation, neither for the individual nor for the peoples
. . . Within a decade Europe will be Fascist or fascistised.
This belief, expressed by Mussolini in his speech in Milan on
24 October 1932,1 during the celebration of the tenth
anniversary of the regime, the Decennale, highlighted the
significant switch in Italy’s foreign policy which took place in
that year.
Although the party’s elite had been confronted since the
early 1920s with the dilemma whether to encourage far right-
wing movements abroad to follow the Italian example or to
consider Fascism as a political phenomenon peculiar to Italy
alone, a dilemma which was reflected in the Duce’s apparently
contradictory statements on this problem,2not until 1933 was
the policy of spreading Fascism abroad and of supporting
political movements friendly to the Italian regime actually
adopted.3
67
Mussolini’s inconsistency is only apparent, since it became

expedient for him to draw on the support of the Fascists
abroad by keeping their hopes alive and by using them as a
possible threat against hostile powers, while at the same time
reassuring foreign governments that Italian Fascism would
not be a party to the undermining of their institutions.
It can be argued that the successful bid for power of the
National Socialist Party in Germany offered the Italian
dictator the opportunity for a change of policy. In addition, the
failure of the ruralisation and fascistisation programs at home
prodded Mussolini to divert the attention of his subjects to
international problems and to seek success in this context to
compensate for the defeat of his internal policies.4.
Having consolidated his regime at home, and spurred by
Hitler’s success,5 the Duce turned his energy to the task of
creating an international climate favourable to the emergence
of Fascist movements in other countries. In July 1932 he
dismissed his Foreign Minister, Dino Grandi, and once again
took control of this portfolio.6
Although steps to bring Italians abroad under a stricter
supervision by the Fascist Party (to make them, in Mussolini’s
words, ‘disciplined abroad . . . as I demand and see to it that
Italians are disciplined at home’)7 had been taken since the late
1920s, the new ecumenical attitude of Italy’s foreign policy
had the effect of encouraging among Italians abroad the
debate on Fascism’s role in the world and of stimulating their
sense of identity with the regime’s imperial aspirations. This
response was evident also in Australia.
It is significant that in 1933 Consul-General Ferrante,
during his first year of office, was mostly concerned with
allaying the preoccupation of informed Australians and Italian
migrants on the nature of Italian imperialism. On his arrival he
had stressed Italy’s desire for peace and friendship with the
other European nations,8 and he continued to reiterate these
points during the following months.9Yet this policy of prestige
and peace was not meant to be a sign of weakness on the part
of Italy. Quite the opposite. ‘Italy’, Ferrante warned, ‘has been
accused of imperialism by some who are used to confounding
the meaning of the two words “pacific” and “unwarlike” ’;
The Years of Fascist Imperialism 69
instead, while ‘she has no intention of interrupting peace, . . .
she is ready to defend her interests in any part of the world’.10
Indeed, the events which took place in Australia between
1933 and 1940 can easily be related to the development of
Italian foreign policy and can also be roughly divided into
three stages: the period of preparation up to 1935; the years of
fulfilment, from 1935 to 1937; and the years of totalitarian
involvement, 1938 to 1940. A different consul-general presided
over each of these stages: Agostino Ferrante, Marquis of
Ruffano, held office from August 1932 to February 1935;
Paolo Vita-Finzi from November 1935 to February 1937; and
Amedeo Mammalella from April 1938 to June 1940.
During his consulate Ferrante began forging the
instruments which in the late 1930s would enable the consuls
to assume greater control of Italian activities. Although
outwardly projecting the image of a typical old-style career
diplomat, socialite, sportsman and horse-racing fan, the new
consul-general nevertheless injected a new dynamism into
Fascist politics in Australia.
In February 1933 he obtained the ratification by Rome of his
appointment of Felice Rando, an ambitious young man who
would rise in the late 1930s to the highest position of the
Fascist hierarchy in Australia, as secretary of the Sydney
Fascist branch.
Under Ferrante’s and Rando’s leadership, the party’s
control of Italian migrants grew significantly. In the cities the
Fascio extended its influence over the existing associations
and even created some of its own, such as the Dopolavoro, in
order to condition the social, political and sporting life of
Italians. At the beginning of 1935 in Sydney alone there were
nineteen associations covering an Italian population of 3,000.11
In the countryside, and especially in Queensland, where there
were large Italian communities along the sugar belt, the
Fascist presence was also felt. There, every large centre had an
Italian doctor and an Italian commission agent. These were
usually strong Fascists, and became the leaders of the local
communities and provided a liaison between the migrants and
the consulates. Ferrante also planned to develop in these
Queensland centres Italian minority groups strong enough to
enforce any demands which they might put forward.12
Moreover, during this period the Fascist diplomats began
practising a political control over Italian immigratior. whereby
anyone who wished to bring his relatives from Ita’y had to
obtain the approval of the consuls, who were thus able to
ensure that known enemies of the regime did not reach
Australia.13
However, by 1933 Fascism was no longer satisfied with an
indirect control of the general political outlook of its nationals,
but developed the screening of individual suspects. Ferrante
and his consuls performed many of the functions of the OVRA,
the Italian secret police. In particular, they carried out
investigations into the activities of anti-Fascist Italians, built
up dossiers on those whom they considered subversive,
exchanged information with the OVRA headquarters in Italy
and improved the intelligence apparatus which they had
inherited from the 1920s.14 A section of the Central Political
Office of the Italian Ministry for the Interior, entrusted with
the task of spying on the enemies of the regime in this country,
had been operating at the Melbourne consulate as early as
1928. Its files contained photographs of suspects and covered
their lifetime movements and activities. The dossier on
Francesco Fantin, an Anarchist who was killed by a Fascist
internee at the Loveday Internment Camp in 1942, contains
evidence that he had been closely watched since 1927, and that
his murder was due, in the conclusion reached by the
Australian Security Service, to ‘a long and carefully planned
campaign against him which was initiated in Rome as far back
as 1927’.15
For the gathering of these data, Ferrante and his agents
relied upon a number of informers in the Italian community as
well as upon information supplied by Australian authorities.
In November 1933 he did not hesitate to ask the Minister for
External Affairs for details regarding five Italians, in
particular their ‘political and moral behaviour’ and even their
addresses.16 He also continued to use the tactic started by his
predecessor, Grossardi, of denouncing the anti-Fascists to the
Australian government as dangerous subversives, as
Communists. Ferrante made it quite clear to the Minister for
External Affairs that he expected from the Commonwealth
some demonstrative action against his enemies, and not just
words of acknowledgment of his efforts: as he put it:
I have always thought it my essential duty to co-operate
with the proper authorities by notifying them of the
names of persons on whose behaviour I had received
unfavourable reports, for measures to be taken against
them, not excluding their deportation.17
To the credit of the Australian government, no anti-Fascist in

Australia was ever deported or handed over to the Fascist
authorities on grounds of his political beliefs, because the
Commonwealth Investigation Branch had seen through the
motives behind the consul-general’s pleas.18
By 1933 Ferrante began sending regularly to the National
Fascist Institute for Commerce Abroad in Rome quarterly
reports (later they became bi-monthly) on the economic,
political and social conditions of all Australian states. These
reports covered twenty-nine points of inquiry, which included
all possible aspects of migrant life.19 At the same time efforts
were made to improve the means of receiving news directly
from Italy, to balance the news reports on Italian politics
published by British and Australian sources. In December
1933 the consul-general asked the Department of External
Affairs to allow him to use the services of the Amalgamated
Wireless company to receive the Italian government official
press news, broadcast by the Agenzia Stefani,20but permission
was not granted.21
The problem of drawing on Fascist information sources was
partially resolved when the Italian Ministry for Foreign
Affairs commissioned a journalist in Rome, Goliardo Paoloni,
to write for II Giornale Italiano, which regularly published his
articles.
After the noticeable lack of success in moulding a generation
of Fascists out of Italians, the problem of youth education
became in Australia, as well as in Italy, an important priority
for the Fascist officials. The schools organised by the Fascio
were subsidised by the Italian consulates,22 and parents were
encouraged to send their children there.23 In 1935 the teaching
of Italian was introduced in New South Wales at an
intermediate and high school level, after considerable lobbying
by Ferrante and A. Baccarini.24
The Italian Fascists in Australia also strove to catch up with
the political developments taking place in Italy, ar.d in this
process they became victims of the aggressive self-CDnfidence
generated by the growing militarist rhetoric. This attitude was
manifest also in business. In April 1934 Ferrante tried
unsuccessfully to sell to the Department of the Navy some
FIAT motorboats,25 while in August Italy unilateraily cut by
50 per cent its imports of Australian wool in retaliation for the
considerable deficit in her balance of payments with Australia.
This measure was interpreted by the Minister for Trade and
Customs, T. W. White, as a breach of the Anglo-Italian Treaty
of 1883.26 By the end of 1934 the Fascist authorities in
Australia defiantly declared 2 November to be the ‘Day of the
Italian Product’, and urged Italians to buy exclusively Italian
goods in support of the regime’s policy of autarchy.27Such self-
confidence was bolstered in October 1934 by the coming to
Sydney and to Melbourne of the cruiser Armando Diaz, the
first Italian warship to enter Australian waters since the Libia
in 1922. The visit, paid on occasion of the Centenary
Celebration of the state of Victoria, was hailed by tile Italian
authorities and by the Fascist press in Australia as an
important political event.28
It can therefore be said that when in February 1935 Ferrante
was posted to Malta, he left behind a situation in which
Fascism was solidly entrenched and attracted the active or
passive support of the majority of Italians in Australia. His
successor, Vita-Finzi, inherited a consular territory which was
well prepared to face the crises in Abyssinia (now Ethiopia)
and Spain.
Of Jewish extraction, Paolo Vita-Finzi was born in Turin in
1899. World War I saw him in the front line where he fought
gallantly and was awarded a bronze medal and two war
crosses. In November 1920 he graduated in law at Turin
University, joined the diplomatic service and began a career
which brought him to Algiers, Düsseldorf, Sfax, Tiflis and
Rosario (Argentina) before coming to Sydney.
When he took charge of his new posting, the Abyssinian
affair had already erupted into full-scale war. In the months
before Vita-Finzi’s arrival, the Melbourne consul, Anzilotti,
had taken temporary control of Italian affairs in Australia and
had faced the wave of hostility arising from Australian circles
with coolness and sense of leadership. When scores of Italians,
concerned by the possibility of a war between the British
Commonwealth and Italy, and dreading to be called to the
colours, rushed to obtain their naturalisation, they were
condemned in the strongest terms and their names were
published by the Italo-Australian, thus exposing them to the
contempt of the public. Anzilotti put the weight of his official
position behind this condemnation. At a meeting at the Club
Cavour in Melbourne in August 1935, he stated that in those
circumstances, he considered the applicants for naturalisation
to be vulgar betrayers of their Fatherland, and ordered their
expulsion from the Fascist branches.29 At the same time, he
laid down four guidelines for Italians in this country: to remain
Italian, not to be alarmed by the news printed by the
Australian press, which was often false, to avoid discussions
with Australians which could degenerate into incidents, and to
isolate themselves from the Australian environment in order
to avoid the hostility which surrounded them.30
These measures had to be taken because in the early stages
of the dispute many migrants and even some party members
wavered in their faith: a few openly expressed their fears,
others became naturalised or changed their names to conceal
their origin.31 To make matters worse, Italian anti-Fascists
were quick to condemn the colonial war and its supporters at
protest rallies, or with resolutions which were sent to the
consulate-general, notably from Griffith and Mourilyan.32
Disturbed by the anti-Fascists’ campaign, II Giornale Italiano
attacked them furiously, in particular through the pen of its
editor, Franco Battistessa.
The initial hesitation in handling the situation wras quickly
overcome by the Italian diplomats. By July 1935 the Italian
associations in Melbourne had closed ranks and declared their
unconditional support for Fascism’s African venture, while
lectures were given to Italians explaining Italy’s colonial
policy.36 In February 1936 II Giornale Italiano began coming
out twice weekly to counter more effectively what was seen as
the unjustified hostility of the Australian press against the
Italian case. Moreover, a significant propaganda effort was
made throughout 1935 and 1936 by A. Baccarini, who
published in Italian as well as Australian newspapers, articles

on the Abyssinian conflict,33 spoke on the radio, held lectures
and published a book, What for, Abyssinia? The League, most
probably using official Italian sources supplied to him by the
consulate-general.34
Diplomatic activity also increased; in September 1935
Acting Consul-General Vitali handed to Prime Minister Lyons
an aide-memoire explaining the position of the Italian
government on the Abyssinian question.35 Consul-General
Vita-Finzi had not even presented his credentials when he was
involved in protesting against the publishing of a caricature of
Mussolini in the Sunday Sun and Guardian on 1 December
1935.36 Although Anzilotti had already made representations
against the insulting expressions used by many Austrahan
newspapers with regard to the Duce, the Italian nation and her
army, asking Canberra to intervene and to ban the publication
of these articles,37 the only result that he and Vita-Finzi could
obtain was an appeal by Lyons to the press not to print
anything affecting the Italo-Abyssinian dispute which would
embarrass the Australian government.38
Notwithstanding the opposition, indeed in spite of it, it can
be argued that the great majority of Italians in Australia
approved of the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. Their
enthusiasm was so intoxicating that it surprised even the
Fascist officials. The argument of Italy’s spreading, as
Battistessa put it, ‘Latin civilisation against the diabolical
barbarism of wild Africa’,39 was well received by the migrants
who saw in the Italian version of the Anglo-Saxon concept of
the white man’s burden, the long-awaited and much needed
factual refutation of all remarks made by many Austrahan
newspapers of the time on the inferiority and on the social,
political and military backwardness of southern Europeans.
The fact that Italy now had an empire, as did Great Britain,
gave Italians the confidence and the capacity to overcome
their inferiority complex towards the British. In short, theirs
was an explosion of nationalism, a manifestation of approval
for the policies of the government of the Fatherland. If it was a
dictatorial and Fascist government, that was a point of
relative unimportance. Evidence of such state of mind is given
by two circumstances: that now, even some anti-Fascists
backed the colonial policy of the regime, and that the numbers
of migrants participating at meetings and activities in support
of the war effort were far superior to those attracted by rallies
purely Fascist in nature.
These two facts did not escape the consuls’ attention. At the
celebration of the anniversaries of the March on Rome and of
the Victory held on 27 October 1935 on board the motorship
Esquilino in Sydney, more than 800 Italians assembled ‘to
show their full agreement with the national politics’.40 When
news reached Australia of the capture of Addis Ababa, unpre
cedented crowds of migrants joined the Fascist officials in the
festivities. In Adelaide, more than 500 people out of a total
Italian population in South Australia of 1,500, some of them
coming from as far away as 400 kilometres, took part at a
meeting. The Adelaide News reported that: ‘outside the
premises where the celebration took place, were dozens of
vehicles which ranged from fish carts and fruit lorries to
luxurious limousines. The happy, laughing crowd inside were
no less varied’.41 At Wonthaggi, a traditional anti-Fascist
centre, Italian miners left their jobs, commandeered a bus,
decorated it with the Italian flag and went to other towns
singing patriotic songs and spreading the news.42 Italians,
Fascists and some anti-Fascists, happily mixed in the same
rejoicing crowds; Vita-Finzi reported that at a Sydney
gathering, ‘there was pointed out to me a little group of
subversive individuals from the South Coast who applauded
with more enthusiasm than the others’.43
The spontaneity of Italians’ enthusiasm is illustrated by the
success of the various initiatives taken by the consulates
during the Abyssinian war. Many migrants offered to
volunteer for service in East Africa, but none of them actually
managed to go there.44The collection of gold and the donations
of gold wedding rings for the Fatherland began in December
1935 on the initiative of Vita-Finzi,45 and the names of the
donors were printed weekly by the Italian press in Australia.46
The gold appeal raised 21V2 kilograms of gold and 3 IV2 of
silver.47 Sometimes the patriotic fervour was collective: the
small community of fishermen of Fremantle donated more
than 1V2 kilograms of gold and a large sum of money at a rally
on 30 December 1935.48 By February 1936 the Melbourne
Fascio had sent to the Italian Treasury 2,396 lire as a

contribution to the anti-sanctionist campaign,49 while by
March Italians in Australia had donated more than £5,000 to
the Italian Red Cross.50 Money flowed in also for projects such
as the construction of an Italian school in Abyssinia51 or for
sending gift parcels to servicemen there.52
The interest in the Abyssinian war was so high among
Italian migrants that many of them, especially in Western
Australia, purchased short-wave radio sets to tune in to
Rome’s news reports.53
In 1936 Vita-Finzi continued to maintain pressure on the
patriotism of his countrymen as well as to contest any
offensive or negative remark uttered by Australian critics. In
May he sent to the government a note of protest against a
broadcast from Sydney 2CH Station, in which Italy was
accused of being behind the Arab revolt in Palestine.54
Italy’s African campaign had the effect of uniting the
overwhelming majority of Italians in Australia behind the
policies of Fascism and behind the organisations which the
Fascist officials had created in Australia for the purpose of
controlling and guiding the community. It also tested the
efficiency of such organisations as well as of the instruments of
control which the consuls had forged.
Although the Spanish Civil War determined the future of
Fascism more than any other event, it did not rouse among
Italians feelings so deep and emotional as the war in
Abyssinia. Spain’s was a war of ideologies, not a conflict with
which the poorly-educated, nationalist migrants could identify
themselves. By this time, Italians believed that they were
living in an anti-Italian environment, isolated in a sea of
hostility. The Spanish affair was seen as a problem remote
from their interests, to be left to those who knew best, to the
politicians; they did not expect to gain personally as from the
conquest of Abyssinia, where many of them hoped to go
eventually as settlers. Therefore, Spain did not attract large
meetings, donations, political mobilisation. The struggle was
delegated mainly to the newspapers, which by now were
‘nothing more or less than an extension of the Italian press to
Australia’.55
By the end of 1936, Fascist influence among Italians, and

the network of centres which carried out propaganda,
espionage and proselytising activities, were so sophisticated
that they caused real concern to the Australian Security
Service. Although the possibility of a conflict led the consuls
to avoid publicity as far as possible, except in those cases
where appeals were directed to Australians generally,56Fascist
operations in Australia now reached an intensity never
experienced before.
A population of approximately 40,000 Italians was under
the jurisdiction of the Sydney consulate-general, the
Melbourne consulate, the vice-consulates of Townsville,
Adelaide and Perth and the consular agencies at Cairns,
Brisbane and Hobart.57 Fascist branches were active in
Sydney, Brisbane, Ingham, Cairns, Babinda, Innisfail,
Melbourne (with sections at Shepparton, Wonthaggi and
Werribee), Adelaide, Port Pirie, Perth (with a section at
Wiluna) and Fremantle. In the late 1930s sections were also
opened at Stanthorpe, Texas, Corrimal, Coffs Harbour, Port
Wakefield and a branch at Edie Creek in New Guinea.
The Associazione Nazionale Combattenti (National ex-
Servicemen’s Association) had sections in Sydney, Melbourne,
Babinda, Cairns, Shepparton, Wonthaggi, Werribee and Perth;
the National Union of Italian Reserve Officers had branches in
Sydney, Melbourne, Perth and Townsville; the Dante Alighieri
Society had centres in Sydney, Brisbane and Melbourne; there
were Fascio schools in Sydney, Brisbane, Melbourne,
Shepparton, Wonthaggi, Werribee, Adelaide, Fremantle,
Perth and Wiluna.
The consulates also supervised or strongly influenced the
activities of the Italian clubs at Mourilyan, Cairns, Brisbane,
Fremantle, the Eolian Islands Club and the Club Italia in
Sydney, the Club Cavour and the Ealian Islands Mutual
Benefit Society in Melbourne, and the House of Italy in Perth.
Moreover, in Sydney there were also the female Fascio, the
Youth Group, the Italian Army and Navy Union, the National
Association of the Alpini, the Italian Inter-University
Institute, the Italian Chamber of Commerce.
Three newspapers pursued the official Fascist line: the Italo-
Australian in Sydney, the II Giornale Italiano in Melbourne
and L'ltaliano in Brisbane (the Corriere degli Italiani in
Australia merged with II Giornale Italiano in July 1937).
It is therefore hardly surprising that the Australian
authorities saw with apprehension this mushrooming of
Fascist bodies; evidence of this attitude is the lengthy and
detailed Summary on Italian and Fascist Activities and
Propaganda in Australia drafted by the security service in
December 1936.58 Not only was it noted that Italy at that time
was ‘spending money lavishly on propaganda and on
maintaining the Italianity of her nationals’,59but Major Jones
agreed with the British Intelligence Service that Italian
Fascism was more dangerous than the Nazi movement,
because:
while the Italian Fascist organisation is perhaps run on
less methodical lines than its German counterpart, it was
obvious that it does provide the Italian government with
ready-made machinery for dangerous action in British
countries in an emergency. If less methodical in detail,
the Italian Regime has the advantage of being more
mature.60
Consequently, he instructed all his branches and the
Directors of Military and Naval Intelligence to increase, in the
utmost secrecy, the surveillance of Fascist activities. Agents
were ordered to ascertain the extent of consular and Fascio
activities, eventual contacts with Australian people who might
be potential informers, the names of the leaders of Italian
societies and of the officials of the Italian shipping lines as
possible couriers of naval information; also, they had to
examine the personnel of civil aerodromes and aircraft
companies and record all principal Italian restaurants, cafes,
etc. which were meeting places of Fascists.61 In June 1937 the
Commonwealth government appointed a committee consisting
of representatives of the CIB, of the Departments of the
Interior and External Affairs, of the Army and Navy
Intelligence, to investigate Italian activities in Australia, and
received its report in December of the same year.62
The Australian Security Service’s apprehensions were not
unfounded. By the late 1930s the consulates were unequi
vocally engaged in espionage activities. Apart from sending to
the Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs extremely accurate
and detailed analyses on Australia’s internal, foreign,
economic and immigration policies, on her trade relations and,
significantly, on the state of her defences, on the army, navy,
air force, war industries and civil aviation,63 the Italian
consulates had extended their surveillance from those
migrants belonging to anti-Fascist groups to all Italians who
for one reason or another did not toe the line imposed by
Fascist officials. By April 1937 the security service had
evidence that files were being kept on Italians who had
adopted British nationality during the Abyssinian campaign.64
Also, Military Intelligence had received in June 1936 positive
information that ‘the OVRA functions] under an official who
is located at the Italian Consulate-General in Sydney’ and that
the Italian Secret Service had placed spies in various places in
Australia.65 In fact, the OVRA had agents in every consulate
and also many secretaries of the Fascist branches were
members of the OVRA.66 This agency gathered information
through a considerable network of Italian informers who
reported to confidential agents appointed by the Fascio
secretary. In 1939 the Sydney branch had fifteen of such
agents.67
From an analysis of documents seized by the security service
at the Adelaide vice-consulate at the outbreak of World War
II, it is now possible to reconstruct the modus operandi of
Italian espionage in Australia. Owing to the irresponsibility of
Vice-Consul Amerio, who left many compromising documents
in his files which a trained man would have destroyed, the
2,400 files captured establish conclusively that the consul-
general in Sydney received reports from the other consulates:
‘on the State economics, such as imports and exports . . . the
extent of public services and the location of important plants,
such as gas, electricity, water supply, railway repairing yards,
etc’.68 Amerio also sent to the consul-general details of the
movements of Australian naval units. The consuls had their
‘spies in well protected positions’, and the files ‘reveal the
existence of trained informers’, whose letters were carelessly
kept by the vice consulate. Spies came also from Italy; in
March 1939 two agents arrived with the MV Viminale,69
which, as with all other Italian ships, had among its crew
OVRA agents who regularly carried out espionage work
during their stay in Australian ports.
While the consul-general and the Melbourne consul were

concerned mainly with espionage regarding Australia,70affairs
concerning Italians in Australia were taken care of by the
section of the Central Political Office operating from the
Melbourne consulate and directed by Gianni Borsi, who
worked under the cover of consular secretary. He not only was
‘the general advisor in all matters affecting the supervision of
real or suspected subversive individuals of Italian origin’,71
but masterminded all secret police activities. In Adelaide alone
files were kept on fifty anti-fascists, that is, on 10 per cent of
the Italian population. Borsi contacted his informers either
personally or by telephone; nevertheless the archives captured
contain ‘ample evidence of the secret political junta’s
operations within the Italian community’. He was the
eminence grise of Italian espionage in Australia; apart from
intelligence activities, the Adelaide files document also: ‘cases
of flagrant dishonesty on the part of Consul officials, and
always it was to Borsi that they appealed when their
dishonesty was found out’.72
Borsi’s cover was never blown. In 1939, when he became
acting consul during Arrighi’s leave, all that the Investigation
Branch knew of him was that he was ‘a likeable young man’,
married to an Australian, and well known to Inspector
Browne.73
It is not surprising that Australian Intelligence, in part
aware and in part guessing of the danger of Fascist activities,
took them very seriously. Already during the Abyssinian war
the service was alarmed by the possibility of sabotage by
Italians and warned all its branches that the intention to use
Italian Fasci in British countries for sabotage purposes in the
event of hostilities has existed in the minds of the Italian
authorities.74
Thus Canberra began building up its own network of
informers within the Italian community; the security service
files covering these years contain much interesting
information about their identity, sometimes concealed under
fanciful code names, their methods and their reports.75Some of
them were well known in the community for their social and
economic standing, and had been careful to build up for
themselves a political alibi beyond suspicion. For instance, a
prominent Cairns businessman, Pietro Martinuzzi, having
‘considerable influence with the Italian element’ in the late
1930s, was believed to be ‘active in stirring up anti-British
feelings’.76 When war broke out, he was interned by the
Commonwealth Police but Military Intelligence ordered his
immediate release because he had been ‘a source of information
to the Intelligence Section with regard to the subversive
activities of other Italians’.77
Sometimes the role of an informer was so complex that it is
hard to assess for which side he was working. For instance,
since 1935 Vaccari was supplying information to Australian
Intelligence, which was convinced that ‘he did not agree with
the Fascist idea’.78 Yet during the late 1930s he often
expressed in public his support for Fascism and donated
lavishly to Fascist causes, while in private, and unknown to
the CIB, he was concerned in dispelling the misconception that
he was anti-Fascist79 and was advising C. Albanese, editor of
L'ltaliano, to adhere strictly to a policy favouring Fascism.80
In 1940 Vaccari was still in close contact with the security
service and ‘on occasions, rendered service of value’. The
service still had ‘no reason to doubt his loyalty’ and his
‘readiness to assist’ was considered as ‘evidence of his real
feelings’.81
Known Fascists and migrants attending Fascist meetings
were closely watched by intelligence officers. Battistessa was
reported observing fuel oil tanks and taking ‘many notes’ at
Port Pirie. In the same township, Italians taking part in a
picnic suspected of being a Fascist rally had the registration
numbers of their cars taken down for identification.82
Circumstantial evidence also suggests that Australian
Intelligence had agents within some Italian consulates and
even received from them copies of OVRA correspondence; this
source was regarded by Military Intelligence as ‘most
reliable’83 and great pains were taken not to expose these
informants.84
When Consul-General Vita-Finzi was recalled home and
Amedeo Mammalella was appointed new consul-general,85
Fascism had achieved extensive control of the community.
Between 1938 and 1940 Mammalella only improved it and
tuned Fascist propaganda and activities to the highest pitch
ever reached in Australia. Migrants were constantly reminded
of their nationhood so that they found it impossible, even if
they were willing, to sever their ties with Italy and to become
loyal citizens of Australia. A security officer perceptively
noticed that:
the venomous propaganda calculatingly drummed into
them by their erstwhile [sic] Government has in many
cases become irremovably ingrained in their character . . .
Gullibility due to much illiteracy and a low standard of
education, pliableness of mind and impressionability due
to youth has made the ‘driving-in’ process by high
pressure methods, easy and thorough.86
These methods boosted the confidence of Italians in Fascism
and encouraged them to express it defiantly in front of
foreigners.87
Whenever the consuls judged that Italians did not respond
according to their wishes, they did not refrain from using
threats or questionable methods. Migrants were ‘persuaded’ to
become members of the Fascio, to come to Fascist meetings,
not to renounce, or to advise others to renounce, Italian
citizenship, to sell their properties and to return to Italy, to
consent to serve in the Italian armed forces even if naturalised
British subjects.88 Political pressure was applied also to
members of the Italian Establishment in Australia. In 1933
L'ltaliano fell into disfavour for having printed a letter from
an Italian anti-Fascist. The newspaper lost advertising from
the Italia Shipping Company and its editor was informed that:
‘the paper would be refused entry to Italy, that he himself
would not be allowed to return to Italy, and that he must
change the policy of the paper to one more in favour with the
Italian Government’.89 In 1935 Commander Duilio Nurra was
suspended from the Fascio for having been disrespectful to the
consular authorities,90and in 1938 a journalist was ‘advised’ to
sever his connections with L'ltaliano.91 In 1940 the editor of
this newspaper informed Vaccari that Mammalella had told
him that if he wanted to maintain good relations with the
authorities, the paper could not print any criticism, even if
justified; it was essential, in order not to be accused of anti-
Fascism, to carry out a policy of ‘absolute obedience’,
otherwise the newspaper would be ‘excommunicated’ and
Italians instructed not to purchase it if they did not want to be
registered in the ‘black book’.92
On the other hand, if a newspaper was totally subservient to
the consular political dictates, it was rewarded with a subsidy.
The Cosmopolitan Publishing Company which printed II
Giornale Italiano received an annual grant of £500.93
During the two years preceding the outbreak of the war,
Mammalella exercised a dictatorial influence over the affairs of
the community. Neapolitan, a man of culture although he did
not speak English, he imposed his personality on his country
men by frequent lecturing, haranguing, contacting people, by
compelling the powerful to mix with the humble, by not
tolerating any diversity of opinion, by displaying kindness and
wit as well as by using pressure and force.
After the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact and the Pact of
Steel, he renewed efforts for a rapprochement between Nazis
and Fascists in Australia, and as from February 1938 some
public functions were held at clubs in the presence of Italian
and German consuls, and propaganda films were screened.94
But collaboration between the two communities did not
develop much further. There was no co-ordination of policies
between the Nazi and Fascist branches,95 and the German
community maintained an attitude of disdain towards
Italians,96 the latter being mainly working people, while the
former were professional men and woolbuyers; they could have
nothing in common. Thus liaison between Nazis and Fascists
was kept essentially through the consulates. In Melbourne, the
secretary of the German consulate, who was also the Gestapo
chief in Australia, and spoke Italian fluently, sometimes
addressed the Fascists at their gatherings, and in Sydney the
connection was maintained by a consular employee,
Ladendorff, whose wife was half-Italian.97 The chief of the
Central Political Office, Borsi, was also in contact with the
Germans through the Director of II Giornale Italiano,
F. M. Bianchi.98
Although the international situation and the hostility
towards Fascism induced the Fascist officials in the late 1930s
to tone down their outbursts and to act covertly, incidents did
occur. Several protests by Italian diplomats against hostile
press articles contributed to maintain that siege mentality
which was so necessary for them to exclude Italians from any
meaningful external democratic influence and to motivate the
migrants’ support for Fascism." There is also reason to sus
pect that sometimes Fascists provoked and welcomed the
Australians’ hostility. In October 1937 wide publicity was
given to the intention of the Sydney Fascists to broadcast
from Station 2SM ‘propaganda of national utility in defence of
Italy and Italians’,1 and Italian tenor Tito Schipa raised his
hand five times giving the Fascist salute at a concert at the
Sydney Town Hall in July 1937 after being warned by
Alderman Donald Grant that this political act would be
resented by the Australian public.2
The most serious diplomatic incident, with the exception of
the Montecuccoli affair in February 1938 (see pp. 00), occurred
in 1940, when Felice Rando succeeded Amerio as vice-consul in
Adelaide. He had already attracted the attention of Military
Intelligence in August 1938 when, in the words of an army
officer, ‘he began his work of fostering strife and national
feeling’.3
A short while after taking office, on 17 March 1940, Rando
delivered a speech to the Italian community of Adelaide. With
a tone of voice that the security service observer described as
‘high-pitched’ and ‘husky’, Rando ‘held his audience in tense
and unwavering attention’, being ‘a pastmaster of the
Hitlerian ranting method’, and ‘embarked upon the most
virulent and inflammatory speech, quite openly anti-British
and anti-Ally’.4
Immediately the Minister for Foreign Affairs called
Mammalella to Canberra and gave him a strong warning that
unless he was able to prevent a recurrence of such an incident,
he would make diplomatic representations directly to the
Italian government. Mammalella apologised and ‘went so far
as to say that he was prepared to close the Italian Consulate at
Adelaide and dispense with the services of Mr Rando’.5
By this time the relations between Italy and the Common
wealth and the position of Italians in Australia had de
teriorated to such an extent that this incident could not
worsen them any further. The awareness that Italy would side
against the Allies and the possibility that Italians in Australia
would be a potential military danger had been considered since
early 1939 and measures to neutralise their effectiveness had
already been taken. By May, attempts were made to disperse
Italians in order to reduce their organisational strength,6while
in Queensland Italian centres had been searched in vain for
hidden arms and ammunition.7 At this time the security
service had completed the indexing of all Italians who were
thought to represent a threat to the country. Serious
consideration was given to the possibility that Fascists might
carry out acts of sabotage. In 1940 all branches of the service
were instructed to give this matter special consideration after
Canberra had received information from London that Italian
consuls in British territories had instructed their co-nationals
to commit acts of destruction on an extensive scale.8
It was feared that Italian wharf labourers, and miners and
lorry drivers working in quarries, who had access to explosive
materials, would steal them for sabotage purposes;9 they, and
those who were considered agents of the Italian espionage
network, were watched constantly by Australian Intelli
gence.10 By mid-April 1940 the army was asked to complete
without delay measures to treat Italians as enemy aliens and
to maintain extra vigilance against possible Fascist
saboteurs.11 On 10 May a comprehensive plan had been
drafted, whereby 1,135 Italians, including at least 187
naturalised British subjects, were considered for internment.
It was believed that by detaining a comparatively small
number of their leaders, Italians would be prevented from
being a source of danger to the security of Australia.12
The possibility of having to intern large numbers of
migrants, irrespective of their political beliefs, loomed large,
owing to the sharp increase in hostility towards the Italian
community,13 hostility which found its most irrational ex
pression in the ‘fifth column’ scare. Many Australian
organisations appealed to the government to beware the
danger of Italians forming a Fascist guerrilla army in
Australia on the model of the one raised in Madrid by the
Falangists during the Spanish Civil War.14 The feeling of
hostility was so high that Western Command in May 1940
thought seriously of interning a large percentage of Italians
for their own protection, in fear of major demonstrations
against them,15 while the New South Wales government
became worried by the absence of any state powers to deal
with the situation and attracted the Prime Minister’s
attention to the fact that: ‘the feeling against disloyalists in
this State has become so intense that disorder is likely to break
out at any time unless the fears of the community can be
allayed by prompt action’.16
War was now imminent, and it was clear to everybody that a
long period of hardship was before all Italian migrants, long
time settlers and newly arrived, naturalised British subjects
and Italian citizens, Fascists and anti-Fascists. Fascism’s
thundering propaganda claims of having re-modelled innocent
peasants and labourers into Mussolini’s soldiers, into fighting
legions, of having vanquished all anti-Fascist opposition, of
having created a new breed of Italian, achieved the paradoxical
result of convincing many Australians and some officers of
their Intelligence Services that Italian migrants were
dangerous elements, fifth columnists ready to strike, eager to
use the stocks of weapons and explosives which allegedly were
in their possession. The truth was that they were nothing of
the sort. Not one act of sabotage was committed, not one
weapon or a pound of explosive was found in their hands, not a
single attempt at organising any covert military group was
exposed.
When Italy entered the war on 10 June 1940, Italians, as
they had been led by the Fascist officials into political
obedience during the years of Fascist imperialism, were
meekly led into internment camps, after having been rounded
up by police officers as well as by zealous vigilante groups.
Both gaolers and internees were victims of a political doctrine
which advanced claims that proved groundless. The former
believed that Italians were all Fascists, were all for Mussolini,
were really what Fascist propaganda was fictitiously claiming
they were; consequently they threw in the same camps the
Fascists with the anti-Fascists, the naturalised British
subjects with the migrants who were still Italian nationals, the
Jews side by side with those who advocated their racial
extermination. On the other hand, the bulk of the Italian
population, although it did not take active part in Fascist
politics, was largely sympathetic to this credo, having been led
to believe that Fascism was the answer to their problems, that
Mussolini was always right and that soon A ustralia would also
be Fascist. So ingrained was this conviction in the average
migrant th at on the whole he did not change his mind even
after the internment camp doors closed behind him.
The people largely responsible for the perpetration of this
deception were more fortunate. The consul-general, the other
consuls and the consular staff on 30 June 1940 left Australia
for Japan on the MV K am o Maru, and the safeguard of Italian
interests in Australia was handed over to the Japanese
consulate-general.17
Thus the years of Fascist imperialism, after a trium phant
beginning, ended in what can be truly called an anti-climax.
Italians in Australia had the doubtful privilege of being the
first to experience personally, well before their brothers in
Italy, the vacuity of Fascism’s pretensions and to witness the
first act of Fascism’s own final solution.
Notes
1 B. Mussolini, Opera Omnia, XXV, pp. 147-8.
2 On this, see Meir Michaelis, T rapporti tra Fascismo e Nazismo
prima dell’avvento di Hitler al potere (1922-1933)’, Rivista
Storica Italiana, LXXXV, No. 3, 1973, pp. 569-78. Also, Renzo
De Felice, Mussolini il duce I. Gli anni del consenso 1929-1936,
Torino, 1974, pp. 307-11.
3 Dino Grandi, during the dramatic last meeting of the Fascist
Grand Council on 24-25 July 1943, pointed out that this change
of policy took place ‘in 1932, during the Decennale of the
Revolution, when . . . to the fundamental principle which had
guided until then our international activities (Fascism is not an
article for export) was substituted the subversive and
apocalyptic principle of “Fascist universalism” and of Fascism
as a breeder of a new world revolution’ (quoted in Michaelis, T
rapporti tra Fascismo’).
4 De Felice, Mussolini il duce I, pp. 179-99.
5 At this time ultra Fascist circles in Rome and people of
Mussolini’s entourage, as well as some members of the Fascist
Grand Council, wanted to ‘draw as close as possible to Hitler and
his Nazis and throw in their lot with them’. This policy was
resisted by Grandi. (AA, CRS A981 item Italy 60, pt I. External
Affairs Note, undated).
6 On this, see C. F. Delzell, Mediterranean Fascism, New York,
1970, pp. 185-6.
7 A A, 13.P.242, item Q30565, Military Intelligence Report, 26

July 1939.
8 I talo-Australian, 20 Aug. 1932.
9 Ibid., 10 Dec. 1932. In this context, see also the editorial in II
Giornale Italiano of 22 April 1933, which stated that ‘the Italian
Duce is essentially a man of peace and the only hegemony he
advocates for Italy is a spiritual and cultural one, not political or
territorial’.
11 II Giornale Italiano, 8 May 1935.
12 AA, CRS A1066, item E/45/19/11, W. B. Simpson to External
Affairs, 3 April 1945. There were in Australia twenty Italian
medical practitioners: seven in North Queensland, three in
Brisbane, four in Sydney, four in Melbourne and two in Perth
(AA, 13.P.242, item Q30577, Notes on the Italian Communities
in Australia, 1939?).
13 AA, CRS A1066, item E/45/19/11, W. B. Simpson to External
Affairs, 3 April 1945.
14 Ibid.
15 AA, CRS A373, item 10913, Security Service Report 44/4221,14
June 1944.
16 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 365, Ferrante to Latham, 3 Nov.
1933.
17 Ibid., item Consuls 359, Ferrante to Latham, 24 Aug. 1933.
18 On this, see AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 365, Jones to Prime
Minister’s Dept, 12 Jan. 1934.
19 AA, AP 501/1 and 2, unnumbered file, Fascio Port Pirie III.
20 AA, CRS A1608, item F14/1/3, Ferrante to Latham, 6 Dec. 1933.
21 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 359, R. G. Casey to Ferrante, 21
May 1934.
22 In October 1935 the Adelaide Fascio received £13 5s. 6d. from the
Adelaide vice-consulate (AA, AP501/1 and 2, unnumbered file,
Adelaide Fascio to Adelaide vice-consulate, 27 Oct. 1933), while
in May 1936, £105, donated by Gualtiero Vaccari for the
teaching of Italian, were distributed by the Melbourne consulate
to schools throughout Australia (ibid., Anzilotti to Amerio, 23
May 1936).
23 II Giornale Italiano, 28 Aug. 1935.
24 Ibid., 1 May 1935.
25 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 359, Ferrante to Lyons, 20 April
1934. Gualtiero Vaccari was the FIAT representative in
Australia at that time.
26 II Giornale Italiano, 1 Aug. 1934. This retaliatory measure did
not redress the balance of payments between the two countries.
By 1937 in an Italian Political Report on Australia it is shown
that the balance of trade was one to ten against Italy, owing to
her heavy purchases of wool and wheat, with a net profit of
£3,846,707 for Australia (United States National Archives,
Italian Documents (hereafter USNAID) T586/1289/107007).
27 II Giornale Italiano, 24 Oct. and 28 Nov. 1934.

28 Ibid., 10, 17 and 31 Oct. 1934. In command of the Armando Diaz
was Captain Angelo Iachino, who during World War II would
become one of the most famous admirals in the Royal Italian
Navy. On board was also Junio Valerio Borghese, then
midshipman, who would achieve fame in the 1940s as hero of the
submarine war and commander of the ill-famed Tenth Mas
Legion in 1944-45, and as leader of the aborted neo-Fascist coup
d'etat in 1970.
29 II Giornale Italiano, 31 July, 21 and 28 Aug. 1935. The number of
Italians who obtained their naturalisation papers was so high
that by 1938 more Italians were naturalised than applicants of
any other nationality. Statistics issued by the Australian Dept
of the Interior show that during the period 1933-8 ‘Italians
formed forty-five per cent of the total persons to whom
Certificates of Naturalisation were granted’ (AA, CRS A461,
item A349/3/6, pt I, Interior to Prime Minister’s Dept, 27 Sept.
1938). By contrast, during the period 1923-33 only 5953 Italians
had been granted naturalisation (II Giornale Italiano, 6 Dec.
1933).
30 II Giornale Italiano, 28 Aug. 1935. Anzilotti often stressed
during these months the need for moderation; in January 1936
he warned Italians that ‘a daily campaign of lies seeks to blind
them: they must not be blinded!’ (II Giornale Italiano, 29 Jan.
1936).
31 Ibid., 31 July and 18 Dec. 1935; 13 May 1936.
32 Ibid., 11 Dec. 1935; AA, CRS A981, item Abyssinia 33 (old),
Mourilyan Canecutters to Lyons, 18 Oct. 1935.
33 See his articles in Sydney Telegraph, 22 Aug. 1935 and II
Giornale Italiano, 9 and 16 Oct. and 4 and 18 Dec. 1935; 26 Feb.,
18 March and 20 May 1936.
34 Although Baccarini was granted naturalisation in June 1930 he
remained a member of the Sydney Fascist branch and continued
to express in public his Fascist beliefs (cf. II Giornale Italiano, 6
Feb. 1935). In 1935 he was among those British subjects of
Italian origin who offered to serve with the Italian Army in
Abyssinia (AA, AP538/1, item SA3074, pt III, CIB Report,
undated, pp. 31-2). The source of information for his book was
never established . but the Commonwealth Investigation Branch
considered, in the words of its Director, that ‘as he is persona
grata with the Italian consular officials in Sydney, sufficient
official material could have been placed at his disposal to help
him compile the intricate details of the information contained in
the book’ (AA, CRS A981, item Abyssinia 50 (old), Jones to
External Affairs, 28 July 1936).
35 II Giornale Italiano, 4 Sept. 1935.
36 Ibid., 21 Dec. 1935; also AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 361, Vita-
Finzi to Pearce, 3 Dec. 1935. The Minister for External Affairs
wrote to the Sunday Sun asking its Director not to exacerbate

Italian feelings further, but was coldly rebuffed by him (ibid.,
Pearce to Sunday Sun, 9 Dec. 1935; Sunday Sun to Pearce, 11
Dec. 1935). Vita-Finzi, upon receiving a copy of Pearce’s letter to
the Sunday Sun and not knowing of the latter’s reply to it,
thought that ‘effective measures have been taken to avoid
repetition of such distasteful articles’ {II Giornale Italiano, 21
Dec. 1935). He would soon be disappointed.
37 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 361, Anzilotti to Pearce, 31 Oct.
and 16 Nov. 1935.
38 Ibid., Pearce to Vita-Finzi, 9 Dec. 1935.
39 II Giornale Italiano, 26 Feb. 1936.
40 AA, 13.P.242, item Q30577, Memorandum to Mussolini, 29 Oct.
1935, unsigned. Also, II Giornale Italiano, 30 Oct. 1935.
41 Adelaide News, 5 May 1936. See also AA, AP538/1, item
SA3074, Report, Adelaide Fascio to M. Miserocchi, 9 Nov. 1938.
42 II Giornale Italiano, 13 May 1936.
43 AA, 13.P.242, item Q30577, Vita-Finzi to Mussolini, 23 May
1936. It was later reported to Rome that ‘the Ethiopian
campaign has hastened and made almost complete the process of
redemption of those persons who emigrated many years ago and
who through ignorance, personal resentment and bad faith had
anti-Fascist ideas’ (AA, 13.P.242, item Q30577, Notes on the
Italian communities in Australia, 1939?).
44 II Giornale Italiano, 28 Aug. 1935. Actually a known Fascist,
Vittorio Tabacchi, who had returned to Italy, was with the
Italian armies in Abyssinia and corresponded with his friends in
Melbourne (ibid., 13 Nov. 1935).
45 Ibid., 11 Dec. 1935.
46 See II Giornale Italiano and Italo-Australian, December 1935
and January 1936.
47 AA, 13.P.242, item Q30565, p. 116.
48 II Giornale Italiano, 15 Jan. 1936.
49 Ibid., 26 Feb. 1936.
50 Ibid., 23 March 1936.
51 Ibid., 2 Sept. 1936. By this date the donations reached the
amount of £96. See also AA, 13.P.242, item Q30580, lb Section,
Military Intelligence Report 18/1/353,17 Dec. 1940.
52 II Giornale Italiano, 22 April 1936.
53 Ibid., 6 Nov. 1935.
54 A A, CRS A981, item Consuls 360, Vita-Finzi to Pearce, 20 May
1936.
55 A A, AP538/1, item SA3074, pt IV, South Australia Security
Report No. 73, undated.
56 AA, 13.P.242, item Q30580, lb Section, Lt R. Finzel’s Report, 15
Oct. 1941, p. 5. Also, see ibid., item Q30565, Italians, Master File
1940-42, p. 78.
57 By the late 1930s, Italians were settled as follows:

Queensland 15,000
New South Wales 8,000
Victoria 7,000
South Australia 1,500
Western Australia 8,000
Tasmania 150
A.C.T. 30
Northern Territory 30
New Guinea 100
New Caledonia 50
(AA, 13.P.242, item Q30577, Notes on the Italian communities in
Australia, 1939?).
58 AA, AP538/1, item SA3074.
59 Ibid., CIB Canberra to CIB Adelaide, 8 Dec. 1936.
60 Ibid., pt II, CIB Report, 22 June 1936.
61 Ibid., Jones to CIB Adelaide, 22 June 1936. It is obvious from
their reports that not all investigators were culturally and
politically prepared to take up their jobs: some were just crassly
ignorant such as the South Australian detective who reported
that his suspect, an unassuming and barely literate Southern
Italian immigrant had ‘corresponded with Mussolini and
received a badge from him’ (AA, MP729/6, item 63/401/93,
Campbelltown Police Report, 11 July 1940).
62 AA, CRS A432, item 43/1122, Attorney-General’s Dept to CIB
Canberra, 16 June 1937; CIB Canberra to Attorney-General’s
Dept, 8 Dec. 1937.
63 See one of these reports in USiNAID, T586/1289/107002-107011.
The security service knew that ‘part of an Italian Consul’s duty
includes the organisation and control of intelligence work in his
area — that is to say, the collection of information of military,
naval and air importance. Italian commercial and shipping firms
are also suspected of espionage and supply information to
Consuls situated in seaside towns and ports’ (AA, AP538/1, item
SA3074 pt II, CIB Report, 22 June 1936).
64 AA, CRS A981, item Nationality and Naturalisation 43, Jones
to External Affairs, 30 April 1937. See also AA, AP501/1, item
SA19907, List of files captured by the CIB at the Adelaide Vice-
Consulate in June 1940.
65 AA, AP538/1, item SA3074, Military Intelligence to all Military
Districts, 25 June 1936, p. 20.
66 Ibid., Military Intelligence to NECW Commands, 7 MD, 23 Aug.
1940, p. 31.
67 AA, AP538/1, item SA3074, K. K. Barris, Fascism, p. 22; also
AA, 13.P.242, item Q30565, Italians, Master File, 1940-42, p. 69.
68 AA, AP501/1 and 2, unnumbered file, Adelaide Security Service
Report, 29 Aug. 1944.
69 The Investigation Branch was aware of the fact that

‘at intervals of a fortnight approximately, Italian and German
agents arrive here in the vessels of their countries’ (AA,
AP538/1, item SA3074, pt I, CIB Adelaide to CIB Canberra, 4
May 1939).
70 See, for instance, the documents relevant to Melbourne Consul
Arrighi’s request to Amerio for information on the reason for
many government ministers’ and public servants’ flights to
Alice Springs in July 1938, and Amerio’s report to Arrighi which
revealed that roads, houses and hutments ‘some of which are
large enough to serve as military barracks’ were being built in
view of the construction of a great centre for the air service and
railway link between Adelaide and Darwin (AA, AP501/1 and 2,
unnumbered file, Arrighi to Amerio, 2 Aug. 1938 and Amerio to
Arrighi, 9 Aug. 1938).
71 AA, AP501/1 and 2, unnumbered file, Adelaide Security Service
Report, 29 Aug. 1944.
72 Ibid.
73 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 158, CIB Melbourne to CIB
Canberra, 23 March 1939.
74 AA, AP538/1, item SA3074, pt II, Canberra CIB Report, 22
June 1936.
75 See, for instance, the reports of ‘Prospector Reynolds’ in ibid., pt
I, 10 May 1940. Also, ibid., CIB Adelaide to CIB Canberra 20
March 1940 and CIB Adelaide Report, 7 March 1940; pt II, CIB
Canberra to CIB Adelaide, 27 April 1937.
76 AA, MP729/6, item 63/401/125, Military Intelligence Note, 22
June 1940.
77 Ibid., Defence Advisory Committee Minutes, 8 Aug. 1940. The
Italian vice-consul at Townsville, Chieffi, must have suspected
Martinuzzi of being a double agent; an Australian intelligence
officer reported that, when Chieffi was told that the businessman
had been interned, he stated that ‘Martinuzzi’s internment was
the only one he was pleased about’. Apparently, the officer
concluded ironically, ‘Martinuzzi was no help to Chieffi’s
organisation’ (ibid., Particulars of Pietro Martinuzzi).
78 AA, CRS A373, item 6230, CIB Report, 20 June 1941.
79 Ibid., Vaccari to Albanese, 12 April 1940.
80 Ibid., Vaccari to Albanese, 20 Feb. 1940. The Director-General of
Security would not know about this until 1944 (ibid., W. G.
Simpson to CIB Brisbane, 24 Feb. 1944).
81 AA, CRS A373, item 6230, CIB Report, 20 June 1941.
82 AA, AP538/1 item SA3074 pt I, CIB Adelaide Report, 9 Aug.
1939; ibid., Mt Barker Police Report, 15 April 1940.
83 AA, .13.P.242, item Q30565, Military Intelligence to NESW
Commands, 7 M.D., 23 A ug. 1940, p. 29.
84 Ibid., Military Intelligence to Military Districts, 25 June 1936,
p. 20.
85 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 161, Italian Embassy, London, to

British Foreign Office, 23 Dec. 1937. Vita-Finzi fell into disgrace
because he was a Jew. Soon after, his name appeared on the list
of Jewish writers, issued by the Ministry for Popular Culture,
whose works were banned from circulation in Italy (Cannistraro,
La fabbrica. del consenso. p. 434). During World War II he took
refuge in Argentina where he published from 1943 to 1945 the
anti-Fascist periodical Domani. After the war he took part in
several seminars on Fascism (see his essay ‘Italian Fascism and
the intellectuals’ in S. J. Woolf (ed.), The Nature of Fascism,
London, 1968).
86 AA, AP538/1, item SA3074 pt IV, SA, Security Report No. 73,
undated.
87 See ibid., pt II, Army to CIB Canberra, 10 Feb. 1939, where it
was alleged that young members of the Italian community at
Griffith ‘are becoming arrogant’; or AA, CRS A981, item
Fascism 4, CIB Canberra to External Affairs, 19 July 1938,
when Major H. E. Jones reported that Fascist propaganda in
North Queensland ‘had the effect of giving some impetus to the
Italian Fascist Movement’.
88 AA, AP538/1 item SA3974, pt I, CIB Adelaide to CIB Canberra,
23 June 1939; CIB Adelaide Report, 9 Aug. 1939; CIB Adelaide
to Army, 19 March 1940; pt II Army to CIB Adelaide, 10 Feb.
1939; SA Police to CIB Canberra, 18 March 1938. When Italians
manifested their resentment of the methods used by the consuls,
they were often intimidated, such as that naturalised Italian in
South Australia who, upon scoffing at a consular request, was
warned by Amerio that ‘if at any future date he were to travel to
Italy, he may find himself in difficulties if he persisted in his
attitude’ (AA, AP538/1, item SA3074, pt I, CIB Adelaide to CIB
Canberra, 23 June 1939).
89 AA, CRS A373, item 6230, Brisbane CIB Report, 3 Nov. 1943.
90 II Giornale Italiano, 17 July 1935.
91 AA, CRS A373, item 6230, Albanese to Vaccari, 10 Feb. 1940.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., Vaccari to Albanese, 3 and 11 May 1940.
94 AA, AP538/1, item SA3074, pt I, CIB Adelaide Report, 9 Aug.
1938; also ibid., CIB Adelaide to CIB Canberra, 5 May 1939.
Before November 1937, when the Anti-Comintern Pact was
signed, ‘apparently following instructions from Berlin to act
warily . . . Nazi-Fascist relations in Sydney were carried on more
or less rather by personal contacts than through attendance at
public or party functions’ (AA, AP538/1, item SA20499,
Security Service Report, 19 Jan. 1943).
95 AA, AP538/1, item SA20499, interviews with Fascio Secretaries
at Loveday Camp, 5 Nov. 1943.
96 Ibid., CIB Adelaide to CIB Canberra, 11 Nov. 1943.
97 Ibid., Security Service Report, 19 Jan. 1943.
98 Apparently Bianchi had ‘some degree of influence’ over Borsi

(AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 158, CIB Melbourne to CIB
Canberra, 23 March 1939; AA, CRS A373, item 6230, Vaccari to
Albanese, 3 May 1940), and was on intimate terms with Nazi
officials; in fact, when in June 1940 he was brought to the Tatura
internment camp, he was greeted by the ‘leading interned Nazis
as a dear old friend, and immediately admitted into the inner ring
running and controlling that camp’ (AA, AP538/1, item
SA20499, Security Service Report, 19 Jan. 1943).
99 See, for instance, Anzilotti’s protest against an article published
by Truth (AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 361, Anzilotti to Pearce,
25 March 1937); Mammalella’s protest against an article of the
Lithgow Mercury (ibid Mammalella to External Affairs, 6 Feb.
1940); again Mammalella against an article printed by the Bondi
Daily, (ibid., Mammalella to External Affairs, 3 May 1940).
Arrighi’s protest against a play performed in Melbourne,
allegedly containing remarks offensive to the Italian Army (AA,
CRS A981, item Consuls 364, Arrighi to Lyons, 6 Feb. 1939).
1 II Giornale Italiano, 6 Oct. 1937; AA, CRS A981, item Fascism 5,
Postmaster-General’s Dept to External Affairs, 9 Nov. 1937.
3 AA, AP501/1 and 2, unnumbered file, Army Intelligence to HQ
Southern Command, 27 June 1940. Rando arrived in Australia
on 14 October 1922. For some considerable time he was on the
staff of the consulate in Sydney, editor of the Corriere degli
Italiani in Australia, secretary of the Sydney Fascio, councillor
of the Italian Chamber of Commerce of Sydney and, since 1937,
Inspector of the Italian Fascists in Australia. Ironically, he had
been given a most favourable report by the Sydney CIB which
described him as a ‘well educated, quiet spoken, gentlemanly
class of man . . . always prepared to co-operate with
Commonwealth officials’ (AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 152, CIB
Sydney to CIB Canberra, 19 Feb. 1940).
4 A A, CRS A981, item Consuls 152, Security Service Report, 17
March 1940.
5 Ibid., External Affairs to Army, 13 May 1940.
6 AA, CRS A461, item Q349/3/5, pt I, Prime Minister’s Dept to
Mrs E. Walters, 10 May 1939. ‘The Government. . . is taking all
possible steps to ensure that foreigners are not permitted to
congregate to any appreciable extent in particular towns or
centres’.
7 Ibid., Attorney-General’s Dept to Prime Minister’s Dept, 11
Oct. 1939.
8 AA, AP538/1, item SA3074, pt I, CIB Adelaide to CIB
Canberra, 8 May 1940.
9 AA, MP729/6, item 22/401/65, Army Adelaide to Military Board,
Melbourne, 17 April 1941; AA, AP538/1, item SA3074, pt I,
Adelaide Police to F. C. McKay, 5 June 1940. There were more
than 200 Italians working on the Adelaide waterfront, about
seventy per cent of the total labour force.
10 Felice Rando in particular was singled out by the Security
Service, which closely followed his movements (AA, AP538/1,
item SA3074, pt I, CIB Adelaide to CIB Canberra, 20 March
1940), and now considered him to be ‘an enemy agent
masquerading as a Consul. . . a Political Officer pure and simple’
(AA, AP501/1 and 2, unnumbered file, Military Intelligence,
Adelaide to HQ Southern Command, 27 June 1940).
11 AA, MP/729/6, item 22/401/65, Army to Attorney-General’s
Dept, 15 April 1940.
12 Ibid., item 22/401/68, Army Minute Paper, 10 May 1940.
13 Ibid. ‘The detention of larger numbers would depend largely on
local considerations and, to an extent, on the attitude of the
British Subjects regarding the presence and property of Italians
in the community’.
14 AA, CRS A433, item 45/2/2294, Gulargambone Graziers
Association to J. Clark, 5 June 1940; AA, CRS A1608, item
F39/2/3, pt I, 11th Light Horse Regiment, AIF to Prime
Minister, 22 May 1940.
15 AA, MP729/6, item 22/401/68, Army Minute Paper, 10 May
1940.
16 AA, CRS A1608, item F39/2/3, pt I, Memorandum to Premier, 23
May 1940.
17 AA, MP729/6, item 22/401/104, Defence, Southern Command to
Military Board, 15 July 1940.
5
The Anti-Fascists
.. . we must remember our martyrs not only with

speeches and flowers, but with guns, not like slaves, but
like men. We must not celebrate, but avenge. A people
that does not fight violence by means of violence, that
bends its knees and cowardly tolerates the impositions of
infamous mercenaries, is unworthy of such a name.
(Francesco Carmagnola, 20 June 1930)
Very little has been written up till now on the reception given
to Fascism between 1922 and 1940 by Italian migrants settled
in overseas countries such as the United States, Argentina and
Australia, where they constituted sizable and politically
important minorities.1 Even less is known of the opposition to
the regime and to its ideology which sprang up amongst
sections of these Italian communities abroad.
This chapter aims at drawing the general lines of the Italian
resistance to Fascism as it occurred in Australia during the
period between the two World Wars.
During the early 1920s Fascism was accepted by the
greatest majority of the 20,000 Italian-born migrants residing
in Australia because in the actions and the rhetoric of the new
97
government, they seemed to detect a new determination to
defend their economic interests and political rights and to
counter the threats posed to their religion, language and
traditions by a largely hostile social and political environment.
The cause of Fascism did not gain the allegiance of all
Italians in Australia. Although Fascism could count on the
sympathy of a silent majority and on the vocal involvement of
an articulate and educated elite, the opposition to the regime
was in Australia a force by no means negligible. Its strength,
as well as its weakness, lay in the fact that it came mainly from
Italians who had seen the birth of Fascism in Italy and were
militantly opposed to it; who had been persecuted for their
ideals and compelled to emigrate after its coming to power.
These Italians were predominatly industrial and agricultural
workers from the northern part of the country and from the Po
River valley. The bidk of them arrived in Australia between
the years 1924 and 1926, and for this reason an organised anti-
Fascist movement could not start in Australia before 1927.
Before this, opposition to the regime was vented only on an
individual level, mainly by sending letters and clippings from
anti-Fascist newspapers to the Italo-Australian, the only
Italian newspaper in Australia and notoriously pro-Fascist.
Its editor, A. Folli, not only used to rebuke its authors,
accusing them of being agents of Communism, but also sent
their letters to the Italian consular authorities, in case the
latter would deem it necessary to take action against the
adversaries of Fascism.
Once in Australia, anti-Fascist Italians preferred to settle in
areas where there was already a high concentration of their
countrymen: in the canefields of northern Queensland, in the
cities of Sydney and Melbourne, in the industrial and mineral
centres of Corrimal, Wonthaggi, Lithgow, Broken Hill,
Kalgoorlie, Boulder, Wiluna, in the agricultural areas of
Griffith and Lismore. Their presence in the middle of
communities which harboured also pro-Fascist elements
sparked frequent clashes. In the cities, they lived in boarding
houses, where after a day’s work they met, played cards and
bocce — Italian bowls — and discussed politics. On the whole,
they preferred to congregate with people of the same village
and region, with whom they had in common the same heritage,
The Anti-Fascists 99
culture, class and political affiliation.2 Moreover, the new
immigrants brought into the boarding houses the latest news
from Italy, about the native village, the economic conditions
which had compelled them to emigrate, the political situation
and the determination of Fascism to make life difficult for the
opposition.
These first-hand, emotional reports had a strong impact on
the boarders who were in the main young, single and class
conscious, and in this respect the boarding houses performed
the function of centres of anti-Fascist political indoctrination
and propaganda. The political activities and attempted
conversion of Italians to the cause of anti-Fascism in these
boarding houses were so widespread that they deeply worried
the Fascist authorities, to the point that in 1927 the consul-
general, Grossardi, wrote to the Prime Minister, Bruce,
suggesting to him that it would be wise to keep some of them
under police observation.3 Grossardi's intervention reflected
the great apprehension of the Italian government for the anti-
Fascist activities carried out by Italian emigrants.
The Duce not only personally resented the attacks on his
regime by the Italian anti-Fascist press abroad, but was
worried that anti-Fascism abroad could create the impression
of a divided nation in which Fascism faced strong opposition.
Mussolini recognised that anti-Fascist propaganda could hurt
the image of the regime in foreign countries: it was necessary
to minimise the strength of the opposition or, as he put it,
‘above all to criticise behaviour [of] Italian renegades and to
insist on almost unanimous — I stress unanimous — support
of the Italian people for the Fascist Regime’. 1The consuls were
instructed to fight anti-Fascism on all levels: by asking foreign
governments to expel ‘those Italian agitators who are most
active and who work for the perversion of the working
masses’;5 by creating obstacles to the distribution of anti-
Fascist newspapers;6 by organising a spy ring on the political
activities of Italians abroad.7
The Italian authorities repeatedly boasted success in this
field, as when in 1934 Piero Parini, the head of the Direzione
Generale degli Italiani all'Estero, claimed that Fascist party
branches abroad had resisted the efforts of anti-Fascists to
sow dissent among Italians in foreign countries. Parini
declared:
Anti-Fascism, with the assistance of the fuorusciti, set
out to conquer the emigrants in order to bring Fascist
Italy face to face with the moral drama of millions of
Italians outside the frontiers declaredly opposed to the
regime which had charge of the fate of their country,
but the campaign had failed.8
With reference to the history of anti-Fascism in Australia,
Parini’s claim is valid only in part. Although in a minority,
Italian anti-Fascists in Australia remained a vocal and active
group throughout the historical life of Fascism, and their
achievements did not fall short altogether of their aims of
denouncing to Australians and Italians the anti-democratic
and tyrannical nature of Fascism, of exposing the falsehoods
of Fascist propaganda and of halting the spread of Fascism
among Italians in Australia. Although holding different poli
tical beliefs, the Italian Republicans, Socialists, Communists
and Anarchists in Australia had in common their hatred for
Fascism, even when they were divided by internal dissensions.
The Anarchist movement was particularly strong in this
country and owed its success to the remarkable activity of its
leader, Francesco Carmagnola. Carmagnola asserted himself,
as early as 1924, as leader of those anti-Fascists who
advocated a strong line of action against Fascism. Born at San
Vito Di Leguzzano (Vicenza) in 1900, during his military
service between 1918 and 1921 he had been noted by the
military authorities for his Anarchist beliefs. During these
years he was stationed near Bologna, thus being able to
witness the rise and deeds of Fascism: here he developed his
hatred for the Fascists and his determination to fight them. In
May 1922 he arrived in Australia and went to work in the
canefields of northern Queensland. It is there that in March
1925 the first anti-Fascist demonstration in Australia
occurred. When three Fascists from Mantua, who had been
involved in beatings of anti-Fascists, arrived at Halifax, they
were confronted by Carmagnola and other anti-Fascists,
assaulted and forced to drink castor oil.9 The political climate
was so tense in the areas of northern Queensland that all
Fascists were ‘treated as they treated anti-Fascists in Italy’10
and compelled to leave the area, so much so that the Italo-

Australian lamented that ‘the fact is that almost all Italians in
North Queensland are bitter and irreconcilable enemies of
Fascism’.11
By 1926 the position of anti-Fascism in Australia had
consolidated enough to give birth to the first political
organisation, the Lega A ntifascist (Anti-Fascist League),
founded in Sydney by Frank Carmagnola at the end of that
year. Financial contributions came also from the miners of
Corrimal and Lithgow. The League could count on the support
of approximately 300 people in Sydney and 100 at Corrimal
and Lithgow.
In the beginning, the League printed leaflets and
broadsheets and mailed them to Italians all over Australia.
The response to this initiative was so favourable that
Carmagnola and his friends were encouraged to publish a
newspaper. The first issue of II Risveglio appeared on 1 July
1927. One thousand copies were distributed among anti-
Fascists and Italians. Although lacking an editorial, its
program was clearly stated by its correspondents. Isidoro
Bertazzon, in the article ‘The lies of Fascism’ quite openly
advocated the struggle against Italian as well as international
Fascism, while the anonymous author of the article ‘From the
land of Maramaldo’ advocated the countering of Fascist
violence in Italy with equal violence in Australia. The second
number of the paper was issued on 1 August, and also
contained appeals for international anti-Fascist solidarity and
expressed ‘its regret that Mussolini has not been killed in one
of the attempts on his life’ and ‘the hope that Mussolini may
be hung to a lamp post and with him all his followers’.12 The
third issue appeared on 1 September 1927 and enlarged on the
themes of the previous issues: anti-Fascist, anti-capitalist,
anti-religious and anti-monarchist articles figured prominently
in its pages.
By this time the Italian authorities and the Fascists in the
community were so incensed by the appearance of II Risveglio
that the consul-general deemed it necessary to make a re
presentation to the Prime Minister, Bruce, against the appear
ance of the newspaper, ‘a monthly publication of extremist
character’ which he considered: ‘to be most dangerous, and
likely to inflame the minds of the Italians and cause a lot of

trouble as it is openly inciting class warfare, Bolshevism,
anarchy, violence and political murders’.13 In the same letter
the Italian consul-general went so far as to suggest to the Com
monwealth government the legislation under which II Ris-
veglio could be banned.
The Bruce government, sensitive to all outcries of
subversion, had in effect taken steps before the representation
of the consul-general, in view of the fact that II Risveglio was
printed at the Communist Party’s printery at Annandale,
Sydney.14 On 23 August the Commonwealth Crown Solicitor
had already taken action by banning the publication of II
Risveglio and Francesco Carmagnola had been prosecuted and
convicted to pay a fine of £3 or, in default, serve seven days’
imprisonment.15
Indeed, this episode as well as many others in the following
years bear witness that before the advent of World War II, the
cause of Italian anti-Fascism was regarded adversely by the
Commonwealth government, which looked instead more
favourably on the Fascists as representatives of law and order,
of stability, of the Establishment.
Unmoved by the setback, the Anti-Fascist League started
printing leaflets which were equally strongly worded against
Fascism and its institutions, and distributed them to the
Italian communities around Australia. Again, the consul-
general wrote to the Prime Minister asking for their
suppression.16 The Commonwealth Investigation Branch
unsuccessfully attempted to trace where the actual printing
was done, notwithstanding the fact that Grossardi had
supplied names and addresses of anti-Fascist leaders.17
Anti-Fascism and Fascism in the meantime confronted each
other with increasingly animosity. The Sydney vice-consul,
Carosi, in July 1927 was compelled to go to Broken Hill to
defuse the dangerous situation that had arisen between
Fascist and anti-Fascist Italians.18 In September there was an
Anarchist provocation during a picnic organised by the
Fascists at Killarney, Sydney,19 while in Melbourne violence
erupted between Fascists and anti-Fascists at Carlton,
compelling the police to intervene and to separate the two
factions.20 Also in 1927, in Adelaide, the sailors of the MV
Palermo clashed with Italian anti-Fascists who were wearing
red scarfs and singing the ‘Red Flag’ on the pier of Port
Adelaide,21 and in Sydney the Anarchists demonstrated
against the execution of Sacco and Vanzetti by parading in the
streets with flags and posters bearing the inscription ‘Down
with Mussolini, assassin of the Italian people’.22 The Fascist
authorities, in order to counter the wave of anti-Fascism, in
particular the influence of II Risveglio, in September 1927
issued II Litt.orio, as a vehicle of propaganda and anti
propaganda.23
Yet the most significant event of that year was the opening
in Melbourne of an anti-Fascist club, the Matteotti Club.
Under Francesco Carmagnola as secretary and Tommaso
Saviane as president, the club attracted all anti-Fascist
Italians whatever their political allegiance. After only one year
of life, the number of its members had increased so much that
the club had to move from its small premises in Spring Street
to larger ones near the Trades Hall in Victoria Street. Its
membership amounted to approximately 600 subscriptions.
The Matteotti Club functioned as the main centre for the
diffusion of anti-Fascism and of ideals of class solidarity.
Financially, the club supported itself with the money collected
from newspaper subscriptions, membership fees, profits from
the dance evenings that were held three times a week,
donations from workers and from anonymous people. These
funds were used to finance the diffusion all around Australia of
anti-Fascist and Anarchist literature and to support Italians
when they were on strike; also, money was sent (sometimes in
large quantities — hundreds of pounds) to France, in order to
pay the legal costs of the trials against anti-Fascists. As early
as 1928 Carmagnola had tried to obtain permission from the
Commonwealth government to print another newspaper, La
Riscossa, but he had been refused by the Prime Minister.24Not
until November 1929 was permission granted to the secretary
of the Matteotti Club to publish La Riscossa.25The appearance
of the newspaper gave new impetus to the cause of anti-
Fascism in Australia. Three thousand copies were printed
monthly or fortnightly according to the funds available and
distributed throughout the country by Carmagnola’s agents.
They were also distributing other anti-Fascist literature which
the Matteotti Club was sending them, mainly the leading
Anarchist newspapers from Paris, New York and Buenos
Aires.
The Matteotti Club ‘tried to make Australians aware that
there were Italians against Fascism’,26 but could not claim
much progress in this direction; instead it succeeded in raising
the Fascists’ anger. The more militant of them were so
annoyed by the club’s activities that some squadrists offered
their services to Battistessa, the doyen of the Italian
squadrists in Australia, to storm the Matteotti Club and to
destroy all vestiges of La Riscossa;27 others, such as Vittorio
Tabacchi, prominent Melbourne Fascist, expressed their
animosity by throwing bricks through the club’s windows.28
Fascists were not the only ones to watch over the club’s
activities: the police also kept it under close surveillance. In
October 1930, detectives of the CIB raided the club and seized
propaganda leaflets, literature and a flag with the writing
‘Down with Mussolini, assassin of the Italian people’.29 They
also arrested the custodian, Valentino Ciotti, for unlawful
possession of a loaded gun and a knife; he was later found
guilty and fined £5.30
The year 1928 saw the rise to prominence in the anti-Fascist
circles of Australia of a remarkable man, Omero Schiassi.31 A
militant Socialist, he had been an intimate friend of Giacomo
Matteotti and also of Mussolini, when the latter was a
Socialist. His Socialism was so radical and uncompromising
that it was often confused with Communism by friends and
foes. The reason for this lies perhaps in the fact that Schiassi
maintained contacts with the whole spectrum of anti-Fascism
in Australia and overseas, including the Communist party of
Italy in exile. In Melbourne in 1928 he formed the Anti-Fascist
Concentration of Australasia, of which he became president.
This organisation performed its task mainly by distributing
anti-Fascist propaganda material to influential people,
institutions and government departments. Schiassi used to
send, to many ministers, anti-Fascist newspapers containing
articles denouncing the manoeuvres of Fascism abroad. The
Concentration was a branch of the Anti-Fascist Concentration
based in Paris. Its importance was both:
political and moral: to demonstrate, to witness to the
world that not all Italians were Fascists or had bent to
Fascism . . . ‘to make its voice heard, countering
systematically Fascist propaganda and letting the world
know what was the real situation in Italy; to be the point
of reference of all democratic anti-Fascist forces’.32
In short, the same goals as the Matteotti Club and the
Anarchists. At the beginning there was some collaboration
between Schiassi and his Concentration and Carmagnola,
Bertazzon and other Anarchists, although neither the
Communists nor the Anarchists formally joined the Anti-
Fascist Concentration either in France or in Australia.33
The outstanding achievement of this short collaboration was
the commemoration of Matteotti, held at the New Gaiety
Theatre, Melbourne, on 10 June, 1928. Soon after this
ceremony the collaboration between the two anti-Fascist
groups ceased. The split was caused by ideological differences,
by a quarrel between Schiassi and Bertazzon,34 by the fact
that, although Schiassi exercised considerable influence
among anti-Fascist Italians, his anti-Fascism was expressed
largely by rhetoric, whereas the supporters of the Matteotti
Club wanted action, not just words; they sought
confrontations with the Fascists, and to this purpose went
around in clubs and public places, armed with guns and iron
bars, provoking Fascists to fight. On 2 February 1929, when
the first talking picture was screened at the Auditorium in
Melbourne, showing an address by Mussolini to the American
people, Carmagnola and few dozen anti-Fascists disrupted the
show. Similar disturbances were staged during the visit of
Father Salza, an agent of Fascist propaganda. At Ingham, in
November 1928, anti-Fascists gathered outside the building
where he was lecturing and threw stones on the tin roof thus
causing panic among the audience.35 When Father Salza
lectured at the Australian Hall in Sydney, about thirty anti-
Fascists attempted to disrupt the meeting, but were
confronted by the Fascists and thrown out.36 In August, when
the Italian consul, Count di San Marzano, visited Innisfail, the
anti-Fascists plastered the walls and fences of the town with
posters denouncing his visit.37
Yet the most remarkable incident of that year was what was
later called by the anti-Fascists the Russell Street fight. On 27
October 1929, while 100 to 150 of Melbourne's Fascists, all
wearing their black shirts, were celebrating at the Temperance
Hall in Russell Street the seventh anniversary of the March on
Rome, they were attacked by Carmagnola and his men who
rushed into the hall and took them by surprise. Before they
realised what was happening, several Fascists were injured.38
The news of the fight quickly reached Sydney: the impact on
the local Fascists was such that many did not attend the local
celebration of the March on Rome, held on 29 October, in fear
of a similar attack from Sydney anti-Fascists, and many of
those who were present at the celebration refrained from
wearing the black shirt.39
The year 1930 witnessed a toughening of the anti-Fascist
positions. In January, anti-Fascist Italians at Corrimal
demanded that the management of the local mines dismiss an
Italian who admitted being a member of the Fascist Party. At
Coalcliff Italian workers, suspected of belonging to the Fascist
Party, were closely questioned and allowed to continue to work
only when their ‘innocence’ was proved.40 In February, in a
letter to the All Australian Trade Union Congress,
Carmagnola charged the Italian consuls in Australia with
being ‘actively engaged in organising strike breakers by
forcing Italian workmen to accept work at less than award
rates of pay’. The secretary of the Matteotti Club went on to
claim that the consuls had given advice to unemployed
Italians to accept the jobs of Australians, while the latter were
on strike. The letter added: ‘Any Italian worker who
disregards the advice is put on the list of anti-Fascists, and the
Government of Italy advised, which leads to the persecution of
any relatives or friends in Italy’.41 In March Schiassi extended
his activities to New Zealand by nominating a sympathiser,
Umberto Colonna, as New Zealand representative of the Anti-
Fascist Concentration of Australasia.42 On May Day, Italian
anti-Fascists paraded in red shirts along with all labour
organisations, carrying banners and posters condemning
Fascism.43 Carmagnola’s capacity for succeeding in arousing
the Fascists’ temper was demonstrated when in December
1930 he sent to the Prime Minister, Scullin, who was in Rome
on an official state visit, a cablegram asking him to lay a
wreath on M atteotti’s grave.44
But in 1930 there also occurred the most serious and in fact
irreparable crisis within the anti-Fascist movement. Hit by the
Depression, many anti-Fascists were unable to subscribe to La
Riscossa or to pay the membership fee of one guinea to the
Matteotti Club. Rivalries between Carmagnola and Bertazzon
as well as economic difficulties split the anti-Fascist
movement and Bertazzon was expelled from the Matteotti
Club. On 14 June 1930 he started the publication of another
fortnightly paper, L'Avanguardia Libertarian which was of
strong Anarchist inspiration, and continued publishing it up
to 15 November 1932; meanwhile Carmagnola was still issuing
La Riscossa in Melbourne, up to the second half of 1931.
During this period the two groups advanced on the path of
self-destruction by viciously attacking each other. By the end
of 1931 the split had reached its logical conclusion: La
Riscossa ceased publishing and the Matteotti Club declined in
influence until it was finally closed in December 1933;
Carmagnola returned to North Queensland where he found
work on a tobacco farm and still continued to publish La
Riscossa from Ingham, although in a reduced format. In
Melbourne, after the collapse of the Anarchist front, Schiassi
and Simeoni attempted to regroup the anti-Fascists by
founding the Casa cTItalia, a club that was supposed to take
the place of the Matteotti Club (as well as being Schiassi’s
answer to the proposed Fascist Casa d'Italia), but its activities
were limited by the political and economic realities of those
years.45
Carmagnola at Ingham continued to harass Fascism and
Fascists. On 26 December 1931 he and two other anti-Fascists,
Tommaso Saviane and Mario Tardiani, abused and assaulted
the Italian consul of Townsville, Mario Melano, beat him and
ripped from his coat his Fascist Party badge. Later on the
same day, a group of forty anti-Fascists stormed the hotel
where Melano was staying and threw a glass at him.
Carmagnola and Tardiani were charged with unlawful assault
and granted bail of £120.46 The trial was held at the Supreme
Court at Townsville on 11 and 12 February 1932. Although the
police testified against Tardiani who, in the words of Constable
Still, ‘had been causing a lot of trouble lately’, and against the
evidence of the facts,47 the jury returned a verdict of not
guilty.48
This victory did not bear any fruits. By the end of the year
the anti-Fascist movement in Australia had disappeared as an
effective, aggressive force. To mark its doom, the
Commonwealth government on 10 November, 1932, took steps
‘for the suppression of the two publications printed in
Australia in the Italian language under the titles La Riscossa
and L ’A vanguardia Libertaria ’.49
Without press, without effective clubs, the anti-Fascist
movement between the years 1933 and 1940 made its presence
felt only sporadically. Even Italian aggression in Abyssinia
did not revive the anti-Fascist movement. On the contrary,
some anti-Fascists switched their alliance at the time of the
sanctions against Italy, because they personally felt the
hatred of sections of the Australian community that did not
distinguish between Italian Fascists and anti-Fascists. Many
miners at Wiluna, Western Australia, who up to then had been
staunch enemies of the regime, in 1936 greeted the Fascist
consul of Perth, N. Costantino, with cries of ‘Viva il Fas-
cismo’.50
Opposition to the regime became again a personal act of
defiance, of emotional and sometimes violent reaction to
specific issues or events. Amongst the few of these outbursts
worth remembering is the one that occurred in December 1934
at Ingham, during the visit of the Italian consul-general,
Marquis Agostino Ferrante. On that occasion, Italian anti-
Fascists printed propaganda leaflets against his coming, and
the consul-general had to be granted police protection for the
duration of his stay at Ingham.51 In the same township, a year
later, an invalid, Bruno Rossi, who — either imprudently or
absent-mindedly — entered the local hotel with the Fascist
Party badge in the lapel of his coat, was beaten up with his
own crutches.52
The most important manifestation of anti-Fascism in the
second half of the 1930s occurred in Melbourne. In 1938
Carmagnola organised the distribution of anti-Fascist propa
ganda aboard Italian ships. Leaflets were planted on the
MV Remo, and the Fascist authorities increased their efforts
to catch the culprits. When the Italian cruiser Raimondo
Montecuccoli arrived in Melbourne in February 1938, its
sailors were approached and given newspapers and propa
ganda leaflets. The second in command of the Montecuccoli,
Captain Santo Bondi, had already ‘addressed the crew on the
menace of the anti-Fascist literature and suggested
provocatively the manner in which the distributors should be
dealt with’.53 The sailors were quick to put into practice the
commanding officer’s advice. On 15 February they thought
they recognised among the visitors to the cruiser an anti-
Fascist involved in the distribution of literature hostile to the
regime. The man, an Italian taxi driver, was savagely beaten
up, then questioned by the ship’s commander about his
political beliefs and allowed to go free only after he swore he
had not been involved in the distribution of anti-Fascist
propaganda material.54
The brutality of the assault incensed the anti-Fascist circles
and the population of Melbourne. On 17 February a huge
demonstration took place at Port Melbourne. Over 12,000
people and 2,000 cars assembled in front of the cruiser, while
100 police blocked the pier, and the crew of the Montecuccoli,
who had been refused shore leave, patrolled brightly lit decks,
fearing an attack. An effigy of Mussolini was burnt while the
crowd was addressed by Francesco Carmagnola. The police
also took the precaution of posting guards inside and outside
the Italian consulate.55 The Minister for Foreign Affairs, W.
M. Hughes, even spoke of demanding apologies and
compensation from the Italian government, but after cabinet
discussion, no such demand was sent.56
The rally against the Montecuccoli incident was the last big
anti-Fascist demonstration held in Australia. By 1939 the
clouds of war were approaching fast, and the indiscriminate
hostility against Italians amongst Australians at large made
any anti-Fascist activity impossible and also pointless.
Carmagnola, who by then had a pie shop in Sydney, tried to
make the point that Italian anti-Fascists too were fighting
Mussolini and what he stood for. He distributed posters
carrying the writing ‘Not all Italians are Fascists’ and a list of
anti-Fascist activities held during the preceding years. But to
no avail. When war broke out, all Italians, Fascists or anti-
Fascists, naturalised or not, were caught in the whirlwind of
hate and many of them were interned.
Before drawing up a balance sheet of Italian anti-Fascism in
Australia during the years 1922 to 1940, it is necessary to
evaluate the obstacles and difficulties encountered by the
movement.
In the first place, anti-Fascism had the disability of fighting
a doctrine which ascribed to itself the right of being the sole
dispenser of patriotism. Fascism appealed quite successfully
to the unsophisticated, scarcely educated migrants, who were
linguistically and socially insecure and isolated, targets of
discrimination and abuse. Although, as Gaetano Salvemini
lamented, ‘ninety-eight per cent know nothing about politics
and do not want to know about it’,57 Italians abroad in general
and in Australia in particular fell for the Fascist rhetoric, the
ceremonies, the speeches, the trappings of the regime, for its
aggressive and bombastic style. Italian anti-Fascists, much as
they declared that they: ‘were not, as the Fascists claimed,
anti-Italian, but were more Italian than they, only [they] were
for an Italy as Mazzini and Garibaldi wanted it, for a
Republican Italy’, were not believed.58
Secondly, anti-Fascism had to fight with limited means a
subtle, efficient and well financed Fascist propaganda
machine. The Fascist consuls, the secretaries of the Fascist
branches, the Italian press, the clubs, all diligently carried out
the Italian government’s policy towards anti-Fascism: Italians
were warned not to finance anti-Fascist newspapers such as II
Risveglio ,59 and the anti-Fascists were threatened with being
deported to Italy. Moreover, the consuls’ duty was to maintain
a close surveillance of all anti-Fascists already in Australia
and to prevent the landing on this continent of more of them.60
Anti-Fascists were denied membership of the ‘national’ clubs
such as the Club Cavour in Melbourne, because of their ‘anti-
national’ activities.61 They were discriminated against by
Italian employers and businessmen who, having to rely on the
good offices of the Italian authorities for obtaining import
licences of goods from Italy, were forced by circumstances to
declare their allegiance to Fascism.62 With the passing of the
years, the effects of Fascist propaganda became obvious:
many anti-Fascists, frustrated by years of activities that
seemed to them to be leading nowhere, deserted the anti-

Fascist ranks and Fascist propaganda reaped its fruits even
among its opponents.
The third factor which hampered the progress of the anti-
Fascist cause was the narrow base of support which the
movement enjoyed. Outside general links with the Communist
Party of Australia and the Trade Union movement, during the
1920s Italian anti-Fascism in this country was politically
isolated, both nationally and internationally. Allegations made
by the Fascist authorities that the enemies of Fascism in
Australia were acting under orders from international
Communism cannot be corroborated by any evidence. It is
nevertheless true that the Central Committee of the
Communist International tried to establish a liaison with the
local Italian anti-Fascists and to increase the distribution in
Australia of its propaganda material. In a letter to the
Secretariat of the Italian Communist Party, Angelo Tasca
(‘Rienzi’), the delegate of the PCI to the Communist
International, informed his superiors that:
The Comintern asked us whether we have an individual to
send to Australia to organise the Italians migrated in
that continent . . . we have also spoken about sending
there literature in the Italian language . . . but in this
respect things look rather gloomy . . . a large diffusion of
our literature in the Italian language down there has poor
chances. We must nevertheless try . . . ,63
Soon after, Palmiro Togliatti (‘Ercoli’) replied to Tasca that ‘we
have not, now, an Italian available to be sent to Australia’64
thus renouncing, at this stage, the possibility of influencing
directly the Italian anti-Fascist movement in Australia. A
direct contact would be established in the 1930s.65
Moreover, because of their inability to work harmoniously
together and to present a united front against Fascism, the
Italian anti-Fascists scattered their meagre intellectual and
financial resources and weakened the political effectiveness of
their activity.
Furthermore, the anti-Fascists had to face hostile public
opinion: their internationalism, their class consciousness, the
advocacy of violence, alienated and isolated them from the
majority of the population. They ‘were believed to be what the
Fascists and the Consuls said [they] were: Communists,

troublemakers, dangerous people; instead, [they] were only
poor immigrants who came here to improve [their] conditions’.66
Anti-Fascists were frequently warned, ‘in their interest, to
abstain from provoking further public disorders and from
bringing into Australia their political wrangles and national
divisions’.67 Missing completely all ideological implications
and historical realities, Australians believed that the place for
Italians to settle their quarrels was Rome, and not Sydney or
Melbourne.
Finally, an important obstacle met by the opposition to
Fascism was the absence in its ranks — with the exception of
Schiassi — of an educated £lite, of an intellectual leadership. In
Australia there were no fuorusciti as in France or the United
States, who could be at the fore of an articulate and informed
opposition; instead, here, the character of Italian anti-Fascism
was brisk, rough and libellous.
Notwithstanding all these difficulties, and although they
could not claim great victories to their credit, the importance
of the Italian resistance to Fascism in Australia is undeniable.
Morally they made the point that Fascism had not
succeeded in bending to its will all Italians, but that its values
and methods were questioned and rejected even by humble and
simple people. They made it clear that intimidation and
violence could not alter their resolution to fight Fascism to the
end, even in the worst possible conditions.
In practical terms, anti-Fascist activities and propaganda,
even if they failed in their goal of convincing Australians that
Fascism was a political and moral doctrine which ought to be
impeached publicly in the eyes of the world, succeeded in
halting the spread of Fascism among Italians in Australia. The
popularity and the determination of anti-Fascism at centres
such as Ingham, Innisfail, Halifax, Mourilyan, Corrimal,
Lithgow, Broken Hill, Wiluna, Kalgoorlie, deterred the
Fascists from adopting a hard-line policy of indoctrination,
because they knew that eventually their violence would be met
with equal violence. Thus many conflicts which could have had
tragic and bloody consequences were avoided in Australia.
The A nti-Fascists 113
Notes
1 The first full-scale study on the impact of Fascism in America is
Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism.
2 While the boarding houses were the exclusive meeting point for
anti-Fascist working-class Italians, the supporters of Fascism
(the employees of the Lloyd Sabaudo Shipping Agency, of the
Italian newspapers, the businessmen, traders, greengrocers
and in general the members of the Italian Establishment)
congregated in clubs such as the Circolo Isole Eolie and the Club
Italia in Sydney, or the Club Cavour in Melbourne.
3 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, Grossardi to Bruce, 19 Sept.
1927.
4 DDI, Series VI, Vol. IV, Doc. 178, Mussolini to Preziosi, 17 Feb.
1925.
5 DDI, Series VII, Vol. II, Doc. 71, Romano Avezzana to
Mussolini, 6 June 1923.
6 Ibid., Vol. IV, Doc. 210, Mussolini to Romano Avezzana, 27 Dec.
1925.
7 Ibid., Doc. 306, Grandi to Representatives abroad, 23 April
1926.
8 AA, CRS A981, item Fascism 4, Murray to Sir John Simon, 29
Nov. 1934.
9 Italo-Australian, 14 March 1925. It was a notorious Fascist
practice to compel their political opponents to drink castor oil in
order to be ‘purged’of their ‘subversive’ ideas.
10 Francesco Carmagnola, interview, 18 Sept. 1971.
11 I talo-Australian, 14 March 1925.
12 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, Grossardi to Bruce, 19 Sept.
1927.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., Premier to Bruce, 3 Nov. 1927.
15 Ibid., Bruce to Grossardi, 14 Oct. 1927.
16 Ibid., Grossardi to Bruce, 2 Dec. 1927.
17 Ibid., Attorney General to Prime Minister, 16 April 1928.
18 Italo-Australian, 6 July 1927.
19 Ibid., 28 Sept. 1927.
20 IlRisveglio, 1 Sept. 1927.
21 Tommaso Saviane, interview, 7 Nov. 1971.
22 Ibid.
24 AA, CRS A445, item 232/4/12 External Affairs Opinion No. 9.
25 Ibid., list of newspapers published in foreign languages in
Australia.
26 Saviane, interview.
28 Carmagnola, interview.

30 Ibid., 8 Nov. 1930.
31 On him, see chap. 10.
32 De Felice, Mussolini il fascista II, pp. 460-1.
33 USNAID, T586/1122/074457.
35 Ibid.
36 Italo-A ustralian, 2 March 1929.
37 Argus, 26 Aug. 1929; Italo-Australian, 31 Aug. 1929.
38 Argus, 29 Oct. 1929; Sydney Morning Herald, 28 Oct. 1929;
Italo-Australian, 2 Nov. 1929.
40 Ibid., 25 Jan. 1930.
41 Argus, 1 March 1930. Evidence shows that consuls were
threatening migrants with reprisals against their relatives still
resident in Italy if they did not conform to the Fascist Party’s
wishes. On this, see Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, pp. 102-4,
and La Riscossa, 21 July 1931, p. 4.
43 Ibid., 17 May 1930; Saviane, interview.
44 Daily Guardian, 10 Dec. 1930; Italo-Australian, 13 Dec. 1930.
46 Brisbane Courier, 14 Jan. 1932.
47 Ibid., 12 Feb. 1932.
48 Ibid., 13 Feb. 1932.
49 AA, CRS A445, item 232/4/12, Postmaster-General to Prime
Minister, 10 Nov. 1932.
50 Napoleone Costantino, interview, 17 May 1972.
51 Workers' Weekly, 21 Dec. 1934.
53 Workers' Weekly, 8 Feb. 1938.
54 AA, CRS A432, item 1938/147, Police report to Attorney-
General, 16 Feb. 1938.
55 Ibid., CIB Melbourne to CIB Canberra, 17-18 Feb. 1938;
Canberra Times, 18 Feb. 1938; Workers' Weekly, 22 Feb. 1938.
56 Workers' Weekly, 1 March, 8 March 1938; on the incident see
also Ralph Gibson, My Years in the Communist Party,
Morningside, Qld, 1966, p. 65; E. M. Andrews, Isolationism and
Appeasement in Australia, Canberra, 1970, pp. 109-10.
57 See Diggins, Mussolini and Fascism, p. 142.
60 Ibid., 12 Oct. 1927.
61 Ibid., 16 Nov. 1929.
62 Anti-Fascists were not accepted as canecutters in the gangs
hired by Italian cane farmers (Saviane, interview).
63 Italian Communist Party Achives (hereafter APC), 673/144,
Tasca to PCI Secretariat, 1 Nov. 1928.
Plate I Above: Italians giving the Fascist salute during the
foundation ceremony of the first official Fascist Branch in
Melbourne on 31 October 1926 4
-
Plate II Below: Anti-Fascist Italians of the Italia Libera

movement, some in Australian Army uniform, parade through
the streets of Melbourne at the end of the war
M
Plate III Above: Omero Schiassi, in black suit and hat behind
the flag, leads the Italian contingent of Melbourne in the May
Day procession in 1945
Plate IV Below: Carosi and the leaders of the Italian

associations in Sydney give the Fascist salute after placing a
wreath on the Cenotaph on 4 November 1929, Italian
Armistice Day
Plate V Above left: Father Ugo Modotti, S. J.
Plate VI Above right: Consul-General Paolo Vita-Finzi
Plate VII Below: Frank Carmagnola addresses the

participants in a political rally at the Matteotti Club.
Presiding at the table is Don Cameron
■ . t
A" 02005 :i5
I t ' l k ‘L St
• / / V<v
/ ' /«,'//<' <//
W«- « UÖ ÜM r f. 2 M.OV«.
1b o
. ,. u X....w ....
i U i ^ L X S 'j j i .
<// />/•< / c s x i c a e
, . \ .
«• tu.svnf/t' <JuI f ........•*•*'
IL DELEG /TO
IL SEGRETARiO DEL FASCiC IL SEGRET a R-O GENERATE

DEI EASCl ALL ESTERO
Plate VIII Above :Franco Battistessa in 1927
Plate IX Below: The founders of the first unofficial Fascist

Branch in Melbourne on 17 October 1925. Eustacchio Del Pin
is fourth from the right
Plate X Above left: Consul-General Amedeo Mammalella
Plate XI Above right: Consul-General Agostino Ferrante
Plate XII Below :Members of the Italia Libera in Melbourne

crating clothes collected by the Australian Relief for Italy
(ARI), to be sent to the Italian people in 1945
Plate XIII Above: Anti-Fascist Italians of the Matteotti Club
in Melbourne after the May Day March in 1927. Standing on
the extreme left is Isidoro Bertazzon, on the extreme right,
Frank Carmagnola
Plate XIV Below: Italian children of the Balilla and Piccole

Italiene organisation of Sydney in 1934. Last on the right is
Fascio Secretary, Felice Rando
IL RISVEGLIO tv %^
Plate XV Above left: First issue of II Risveglio , printed in

Sydney in July 1927
Plate XVI Above right: Consul-General A. Grossardi
addresses a Fascist rally in Melbourne in 1926
Plate XVII Below: Italian ex-servicemen marching during

Anzac Day in Sydney in 1937. Third from the right is Antonio
Baccarini
XXX - >u - a . xx
w , 'J1 :1k
v v. v i- « ,. A d t w i « Ü« r o
jj 1 . . v■ * A J l » - » J A. A t, b Ü A
a l C u u e r a ta
IA j e ^ r e t a r i o d i oorm
C aap c d ’ I r . t t r n w a i r .t o K -^ -L cV^_ aY- 3ud A u s t r a l i a
Plate XVIII Above left: Francisco Fantin

Plate XIX Above right: Diploma of the Opera Nazionale
Dopolavoro, bearing Fascist insignia and dated according to
the Fascist calendar, distributed to Italian internees at the
Loveday Internment Camp in 1942
Plate XX Below: Anti-Fascist posters, mounted on a lorry and
paraded through the streets of Melbourne by the Italian Group
Against War and Fascism during the years of the Spanish
Civil War
64 APC, 673/168, Togliatti to Tasca, 27 Dec. 1928.

65 See Chap. 6.
6
Anti-Fascism and
Communism before
World War II
The hatred caused by wars, and by this one in particular,

attracts to their country, which is in war against
England, all people who have never been militant and
who feel and understand nothing and who have no
interest in social problems.
(Francesco Carmagnola, 13 November 1941)
While during the 1920s Communism did not exercise any

worthwhile influence amongst Italian anti-Fascists in
Australia, in the 1930s its impact on them was important, by
reason of the change in policy of the Communist International
towards Fascism. It was then that Fascism, and not Social-
Democracy, was recognised as the real enemy, and the
Communist Parties were directed to work for the defeat of
Fascism by forming alliances with other left-wing organis
ations, a collaboration which reached its peak at the time of the
popular fronts.
How great was Communism’s ascendancy over the Italian
community in Australia and, in particular, within the anti-
Fascist movement? A report drafted in 1944 by an ex-Fascist
businessman, G. Vaccari, claims that the Italian Communists
117
were relatively few and that their influence was small.
According to him, in June 1940, the Communists amounted in
all to about 200, out of which about 150 were nominal, forty
were actual Communists but not militant, and only ten were
militant. The vast majority of Italians, about 123,000, were, as
Vaccari put it:
satisfied with the Australian democratic liberal order and
therefore refractory to autocratic totalitarian systems.
Not belonging to extreme parties in Australia (i.e. non
Fascist, non Communist nor self-declared anti-Fascist).
Sympathising with the legitimate national aspirations of
Italy such as independence, order, tolerance, welfare, but
disinterested in Italian politics.1
Although the reasons given by Vaccari to explain Italians’
reluctance to commit themselves to a political ideology must
be contested,2 his figures on the Communists’ strength are
basically correct: yet the Communist contribution to the anti-
Fascist struggle went well beyond their numbers.
The collapse, at the end of 1932, of the anti-Fascist
organisations which had their raison d'etre in the social and
political activities of the Matteotti Club and in publishing the
newspapers La Riscossa and L'Avanguardia Libertarian was a
serious blow to the opponents of Fascism. The Anarchists,
who until that year had been the driving force behind all
political initiatives aiming at rallying the Italian community
in Australia to a policy of opposition against the Italian
government, never recovered from their factional fights and
from the economic consequences of the Depression which
destroyed the movement.
The need to fill the political vacuum which ensued was soon
felt by many anti-Fascists, who began to look around for
alternative leaders who could replace the Anarchists
Carmagnola and Bertazzon, gone to North Queensland and to
New South Wales. The Italian anti-Fascists, unable to create a
new political movement on the ruins of the Matteotti Club,
unable to find a new leader who could bring them together,
began to feel strongly attracted to the Australian political
movements and parties which were most vocal in their
opposition to Fascism, and which could offer them the
opportunity of carrying on with their struggle. They joined the
Anti-Fascism and Communism 119
Labor Party and the Communist Party, or were militant
members of the Trade Union movement or of any organisation
in which they could find an identity of aims.
Soon Communism became the most attractive single force of
the Australian political system, not only because the
Communist Party of Australia in the past had often supported
the anti-Fascist movement and lent to Italian anti-Fascists its
facilities, such as printing presses and halls, but mainly
because it was the brother-party of the Italian Communist
Party in exile, the only Italian party which survived the
Fascist totalitarian onslaught and in the 1930s still operated
an efficient network of underground contacts all over the world
through which anti-Fascist propaganda was distributed to the
masses of Italian migrants and political refugees abroad.
To Italian anti-Fascists in Australia, Communism was
attractive for what it offered: an organisation to rely upon;
political guidance; a source of information on the development
of international anti-Fascist movements and activities; a
wealth of readily available propaganda material in the Italian
language. But Italians of Communist, Republican, Socialist,
Populist and Anarchist faiths soon felt that they could not rely
exclusively on Australian political institutions but that they
ought to express their own political identity by forming an
autonomous group which would have as its distinguishing aim
the struggle against Italian Fascism and against its
representatives and supporters in Australia.
This project was realised in Melbourne in 1934 by a handful
of people, among whom were the outstanding figures of Luigi
Stellato, a Calabrian fruit and vegetable market agent, holding
strong pacifist ideas, and Matteo Cristofaro, who became the
leader of Italian Communists in Australia.
Born at San Marco in Lamis, in the province of Foggia, in
the southern Italian region of Puglie in 1908, Matteo
Cristofaro had been influenced by his father’s Socialist beliefs
and at an early age became a member of the Communist Youth
League. He witnessed the Fascists’ violence in his own village,
where some Socialists were beaten up and one was shot. For
economic as well as political reasons he migrated to Australia,
where he arrived in Melbourne in February 1927. For a few
years he worked in the Victorian countryside, taking up any
job which was available: harvesting beans, digging beetroots,

picking fruit and tomatoes, cutting trees, clearing forests,
building roads.3
In 1931 he came to Melbourne and began working at the
Victoria Markets as an agent. Here he was approached by
other fruit marketers who introduced him to the anti-Fascist
movement. For a short while he frequented the Matteotti Club,
where he read the Anarchist press.4 He improved his political
education by spending his nights at the State Library of
Victoria and by going to the Yarra Bank, where he attentively
listened to the speeches of J. W. Fleming, the Anarchist,5 to
Socialist speakers and to the Communist Dr G. P. O’Day. He
called the Yarra Bank meetings ‘my University’.6A t the end of
1931 he joined the Communist Party of Australia and was
assigned to the North Melbourne area, where he carried out
useful propaganda work and acquired valuable experience.
In 1934 Cristofaro was asked by Luigi Stellato to attend a
meeting of Italians at Rathdowne Street, Melbourne. Eighteen
people took part. They represented all shades of anti-Fascist
political opinion. It was then decided to form the Gruppo
Italiano contro la Guerra (Italian Group Against War).
Giovanni Corso was elected president of the group, and Matteo
Cristofaro secretary, while members of the committee were
Angelo Coladetti, who had been active in the Matteotti Club
and was one of the protagonists of the Russell Street fight;
Ottavio Brida, a carpenter from the province of Trento; Boris
Franceschini, an Anarchist from the Matteotti Club; and Luigi
Stellato. Giovanni Corso and Ottavio Brida later joined the
Communist Party. The aim of the group was to oppose the
expansion of Fascism’s influence among Italians in Australia;
to attract all people who previously belonged to or frequented
the Matteotti Club and bring them together into a militant
organisation; and, as Cristofaro quickly realised, to gather the
best elements of Italian anti-Fascism for the Communist
Party.7 The name chosen shows that Cristofaro was already
well acquainted with and influenced by the demonstrations of
political opposition to Fascism taking place abroad, and that
he was already receiving from various sources a great deal of
anti-Fascist literature which enabled him to have up-to-date
information on the strength and activities of anti-Fascism
overseas. The Amsterdam World Congress Against War,

organised by the French writers Henri Barbusse and Romain
Rolland, and from which the first World Committee Against
War was set up, was not held until August 1932, while
national and state Councils Against War and Fascism were
formed throughout Australia in 1933.8
The Gruppo Italiano contro la Guerra became affiliated with
them. The group was involved in all activities promoted by the
Communist Party of Australia and other left-wing
organisations: when Egon Irwin Kisch, a Czech writer and
delegate to the second National Congress Against War and
Fascism in Melbourne, was refused landing by the Lyons
government in 1934 and later on was arrested for illegally
entering the Commonwealth, the Gruppo Italiano assembled
almost 300 Italians who took part along with members of the
Victorian Council Against War and Fascism in anti
government demonstrations.9 By the end of 1934 the Gruppo
included approximately forty militants, a dozen of whom were
also members of the Communist Party of Australia.10 The
Communists, by far the most active in the Gruppo, met under
the ideological supervision of Ralph Gibson, then a member of
the Central Committee of the Communist Party, who was
present at their weekly meetings and counselled on the
political line which they ought to follow: the motions carried
by the Communists were then put forward to the whole
membership of the Gruppo Italiano and discussed.11
By 1932 Matteo Cristofaro had begun corresponding with
the Italian Communist Party in exile in Paris and was sent
propaganda material and books. He received and distributed
the party’s theoretical magazine Stato Operaio; he raised
subscriptions to the newspapers L'Idea Popolare, L'Unitd, II
Grido del Popolo, La Voce degli Italiani, and sold a host of
pamphlets and booklets supplied by the Editions de Culture
Sociale of Paris. Between 1932 and 1940 hundreds of pounds
were spent by Italians in Australia in subscribing to and
purchasing Communist literature in the Italian language and
these sums were remitted to the Italian Communist Party by
Matteo Cristofaro.
The propaganda material received from overseas
supplemented the small amount of anti-Fascist literature
printed in Australia. After the disappearance of the two
Anarchist newspapers, the anti-Fascist movement was unable,
throughout the 1930s, to publish another newspaper. With the
exception of Dr Schiassi, who, urged by Cristofaro to begin a
newspaper, refused, there was no other person in the Gruppo
Italiano or in the anti-Fascist community intellectually
prepared to organise any relevant publishing activity.
Between 1935 and 1940 the Gruppo Italiano printed only
leaflets and small pamphlets illustrating its opposition to
specific actions of the Fascist government. Matteo Cristofaro
especially deeply regretted the absence of a cultured and active
organiser, and in 1935 he asked the Central Committee of the
Italian Communist Party to send to Australia an experienced
man who could be assigned to this task. Ruggero Grieco
replied that Vittorio Vidali, the Communist leader from
Trieste, was available if the Gruppo would find employment
for him or provide for his maintenance. Cristofaro, although
prepared to meet Grieco’s request, was unable to obtain an
entry visa for Vidali and the whole plan was dropped.12
The Italo-Abyssinian conflict boosted the political activities
of the Gruppo Italiano. The African war persuaded many
Italians, in Italy as well as in Australia, to rally in support of
the Fascist regime, but was also the catalyst which prompted
the anti-Fascist movement to action. For the first time Italian
Fascism was showing its aggressive, imperialist nature, which
the Gruppo had repeatedly denounced in the past. At the
beginning of 1935 the group’s name was changed to Gruppo
Italiano contro la Guerra e il Fascismo (Italian Group Against
War and Fascism), and its committee was enlarged to nine
members, the, new ones being Guido Canteri, Ruggero Vinco,
Carlo Simeoni, Paolo De Angelis and Giuseppe Poli.13
On May Day 1935 the Gruppo Italiano denounced the
capitalist nature of Italy’s colonial claims and appealed to all
Italian workers to form a united front against war and
Fascism. In a memorable leaflet Italians in Melbourne were
warned that Fascism was preparing for war against Abyssinia
and were urged to deny men and money which the Fascist
authorities in Australia were then trying to raise for Fascism’s
African ventures. In July the president of the Italian Group
Against War of North Melbourne, A. Vanzini, denounced
Italian aggression against Abyssinia and promised to
‘influence the Italian people in Australia into registering their
protest against the new massacre’.14 On 1 August 1935, the
Victorian Council Against War and Fascism organised a mass
rally in front of the Melbourne Trades Hall, in which the
Italian group took part, and meetings were held on 18 August
and 29 September 1935 in the hall of the Gruppo Italiano in
Melbourne, in which Italian and Australian speakers debated
the impending threat of war, and on 15 October 1935, at the
Unity Hall. Yet another march was organised on 10 November
from the Trades Hall to the Yarra Bank, while on the same day
a rally was held at the Star Hall at Shepparton. The leaflets
announcing these meetings denounced: ‘Mussolini, the
arrogant Roman Napoleon . . . who wants war in order to
satisfy the lust for conquest of the Italian capitalist brigands
and for the domestic needs of his nefarious decadent
dictatorship’.15
In North Queensland, the Italians of the Herbert River
issued at the same time a Manifesto Against War which
condemned the Abyssinian conflict, while in February 1936,
Matteo Cristofaro, concealing his identity under the cover
name of Boschi di Branciaretti in fear of Fascist reprisals
against his family in Australia or his relatives in Italy, went to
Shepparton and spoke, together with another Italian and two
Australian speakers, to a group of 150 people, fifty of whom
were Italians.16The Idea Popolare, referring to rallies in which
thousands of Australian workers as well as Italian anti-
Fascists took part, reported that ‘all over Australia huge
demonstrations took place against the Fascist war in
Abyssinia, the most important being the one held in November
in Melbourne’, where the presence of the Italian Group
Against War and Fascism was: ‘particularly noted for its flag
and the two posters with the slogans “Down with Fascism,
ruin to the Italian and Abyssinian people’’ and “Fascism does
not believe in peace — Let war be its grave for the welfare of
Humanity” \ 17
During the Abyssinian conflict, the Gruppo Italiano also
paraded through the streets of Melbourne exhibiting large
posters mounted on trucks, illustrating the militarist and
socially oppressive nature of Fascism. The posters were
painted by artists of the Australian Communist Party. The
distribution of propaganda material by Cristofaro increased
noticeably at this time: the recipients paid for it and Cristofaro
sent the money to the National Committee of Diffusion and
Defence of Proletarian Press of the Italian Communist Party
which rewarded his efforts and appointed him to the position
of Udarnico. 18 The increase in the party’s propaganda
activities in Australia has to be viewed in the light of Russia’s
decision to support the popular fronts, a move which improved
the position of all Communist Parties directly engaged in the
struggle against Fascism vis-ä-vis other left-wing parties. The
administration of Stato Operaio also thanked the Gruppo
Italiano for sending to Paris names and addresses of Italians
in Australia to whom sample copies of the magazine could be
sent, although it was pointed out that ‘only very few copies
reach North Queensland, where there is a strong Italian
community’.19
In 1936 the Italian Communist Party began forwarding to
members of the Gruppo Italiano lists of addresses of people
living in Italy to whom they should mail, anonymously,
propaganda material. The party hoped to avoid in this way the
strict censorship affecting all mail and printed literature
coming to Italy from countries such as France, Belgium, the
United States or Argentina, which hosted large communities
of exiles. About sixty to eighty names were supplied to
members of the Gruppo Italiano20 and Cristofaro sent
propaganda material, mainly newsprint on rice paper, such as
L'Unita, to twelve addresses in various parts of Italy.
Soon Cristofaro’s postal propaganda was discovered by the
Fascist authorities. Most probably one of his contacts
informed on him. On 4 June 1936, he received an invitation to
come to the Italian consulate in Melbourne.21 A few days later,
when Cristofaro went there, he was questioned about his
activities by the consul, Anzilotti, and was asked not to send
propaganda literature to Italy. Cristofaro maintained a hostile
attitude: having already obtained his Certificate of Naturali
sation, no pressure could be exercised on him by the Italian
diplomat.22
By 1936, although a firm contact had been established with
the Italian Communist Party, it affected mainly the area of
propaganda, and not of political strategy. A significant letter
to Cristofaro from Ruggero Grieco, one of the leaders of the
PCI, discloses the state of almost total political isolation in
which the Italian Communist movement in Australia was
working when he remarked that:
we know little of the political situation in Australia (only
what is published by our international press, which is
little); we cannot yet form our opinion about many things;
character and social and political structure of Italian
emigration; geographical distribution of Italian
settlements; their relations with Italy; activities of the
Fascists and the priests among the migrant masses;
relations between migrants and Australian political
movements; what sort of social life do Italians have. We
know little even about our Australian Party . . . We do
not know, therefore, if you have an organisation which is
directing the work amongst Italians, where it is located,
whether it is legal, what are its activities, whether it is
issuing publications.23
In effect the Italian Communist Party was completely in the
dark on what was happening in this country. This very fact
suggests that the party was of the opinion that whatever anti-
Fascist activities were taking place in Australia, they were not
significantly relevant to the local political situation nor to the
international anti-Fascist movement. Grieco’s letter clearly
betrayed the impression that even the propaganda activities
by Cristofaro and his Gruppo Italiano were deemed to have an
amateurish character, and the Italian Communist cautioned
Cristofaro to be prudent.24Australia’s distance from the nerve-
centre of the Italian opposition abroad, France, and its
relatively small political weight accounts for the tenuous links
of the Italian Communists with the party and also for the
individualism and spontaneity of Italian anti-Fascism in
Australia.
The Gruppo Italiano during 1936 began corresponding with
the Italian Socialists in exile to raise funds for the relief of
imprisoned and deported Italian anti-Fascists. Subscription
lists were sent all over Australia and money was collected for
the liberation of the Anarchist Gino Lucetti, the Communist
Umberto Terracini, the Socialist Alessandro Pertini, and for
the Pesenti Committee. Sums of hundreds of pounds were also
raised for the Soccorso Rosso Italiano (Italian Red Relief)
during the Spanish Civil War and in the following years.25
Public lectures were held in aid of Italian anti-Fascist
prisoners, to which Australian political and trade union
leaders were invited. T. M. Gleeson, President of the
Australian Railways Union, chaired one of these meetings,
convened in Melbourne by the Socialist Dr Schiassi on 29
March 1936.26
As well as money, reports on the strength of the anti-Fascist
movement all around Australia reached Cristofaro and his
Gruppo Italiano. The Anarchist Francesco Carmagnola, then
in Sydney, wrote that among Italians living in that city the
anti-Fascist movement was non-existent,27 while from North
Queensland there was greater interest in the activities of the
group.28
During the Spanish Civil War the political activity of the
Gruppo Italiano contro la Guerra e il Fascismo reached its
peak, since by 1936 most Australians and those Italians who,
until then, had hoped for a compromise with the dictatorship,
understood the overt imperialist nature of European Fascism.
Pamphlets were printed in Italian to explain to the migrants
how much the Fascist intevention damaged the real interests
of the Italian people. Posters condemning the Italian collusion
with Franco were paraded during May Day marches and on
other occasions. Money was collected for the purchase of
woollen clothes, food and medical supplies for the
International Brigades.29 The Gruppo Italiano participated in
huge rallies at the Exhibition Buildings in Melbourne along
with other organisations of an anti-Fascist People’s Front
character and was in close contact with many of them, such as
the Victorian Council Against War and Fascism; the Spanish
Relief Committee and the Council for Civil Liberties.
Members of the group were corresponding with many
Communists who would soon leave France and go to Spain to
achieve international fame: early in 1936 Ottavio Brida was
still writing to Luigi Longo (Gallo), Di Vittorio, Mario
Montagnana, Emilio Sereni and Teresa Noce (Estella).30 Also,
by mid-1937 Cristofaro began sending to the Central
Committee of the Italian Communist Party in Paris a monthly
report on the activities of the Italian Communists in Australia,
which was considered, at least in two instances, inadequate,
mainly because Cristofaro was not experienced in writing such
reports.31
Yet by this time the party realised that its comrades in
Australia might render an important service in gathering
information on political and military events in Spain and Italy.
Cristofaro was instructed to approach Italian sailors,
especially if belonging to the Royal Italian Navy. Massimi
remarked that:
the information which you can obtain from them is
precious to our Party . . . The sailors can give information
on the economic situation of their country, which can be
useful to the Party as an indication of the real state of
affairs of the Italian people.32
He was supposed not only to collect intelligence and to dis
tribute among migrants propaganda literature, but also to try
to ‘make them aware of the serious situation in which Fascism
had driven and was still driving the Italian people with its
policy of war’.33 The Gruppo Italiano did this whenever it was
possible, and Cristofaro was even bold enough to go aboard the
cruiser Montecuccoli when it arrived in Melbourne in February
1938 and concealed wherever he could copies of the newspaper
L'Unitä.34
By 1938 the members of the Gruppo Italiano who were also
members of the Communist Party of Australia numbered
about thirty-five.35 Also, non-Communist members and
sympathisers of the group had considerably increased. Many
of them felt the need to have their own club or a place where
they might meet socially and where politics could be discussed
and activities carried out. At that time the Melbourne Fascists
were collecting money for the construction of their club, which
they intended to call the Casa d'Italia, in line with the
instructions imparted by Consul-General Vita-Finzi in 1936.
Unfortunately, they forgot to register the name Casa d'Italia.
When Carlo Simeoni, a friend of Dr Schiassi, found out the
Fascists’ blunder, he quickly registered it on behalf of the
Italian anti-Fascist Group.36
The anti-Fascist Casa d'Italia was officially opened on 12
June 1938 in Carlton. The club, right from the beginning, had a
specific political and social program, which was outlined in its
statute, drafted by Dr Schiassi, Luigi Stellato and by F. A. L.
Callill, a lawyer sympathetic to the anti-Fascist cause.37
Article 2 of the statute declared that the objectives of the
club were:
(a) to gather all progressive, liberal Italians migrated to
Australia in a social, cultural and welfare club;
(b) to promote friendship between the Italian and
Australian people in the interest of peace and mutual
welfare;
(c) to set up a fund of ‘Mutual Relief’ in order to assist
needy members and friends;
(d) to set up a school of English for Italian migrants;
(e) to set up a library for members’ use;
(f) to establish a theatrical company for the staging of
Italian works;
(g) to have a building in Melbourne for the use of the club’s
members.
Membership of the Casa d'Italia was denied by article 3 to
people ‘having political opinions incompatible with the
principles of social progress’, while article 35 even barred
access to visitors ‘who are considered by the Committee
reprehensible or dangerous to the interests of the Casa
d'Italia . Both articles were obviously aimed at excluding from
the club Fascists, Fascist sympathisers or agents provo
cateurs.38Dr Schiassi was appointed honorary president, Carlo
Simeoni was its first president and two committees were
formed, one administrative, the other political. In the political
committee the Communist members of the Gruppo Italiano
were strongly represented: they included Matteo Cristofaro,
Guido Canteri, who also was the club’s secretary, Ottavio
Brida and Ruggero Vinco.39 Dr Schiassi, in his inaugural
speech, declared that the new institution aimed at ‘becoming
essentially a centre of education, generating and stimulating
culture, in order to give to the working class its leaders . . .’40
The Casa d'Italia was what the name indicated: a building, a
meeting place, and the activities associated with the
building:41 social evenings and dance nights, sometimes
attended by over 600 people, lectures and political rallies
which were addressed, as well as by the ubiquitous Dr
Schiassi, by several Australian speakers, among whom were
Guido Baracchi, an outstanding Australian working-class
leader and one of the founders of the Australian Communist
Party;42Judge Foster; Ralph Gibson, then Victorian Secretary
of the Communist Party; A. A. Calwell; E. J. Holloway, Labor
MHR; and Senator Cameron.
Members of the Casa d'Italia also staged and performed in
theatrical works, such as Goldoni’s comedies and other plays.43
One of the memorable events in the club’s history was the
reception given to Ernesto Baratto, a Queensland anti-Fascist
who fought in the International Brigades. Upon his return
from Spain he was brought to the Casa d'Italia and welcomed
by a crowd of 600 cheering people.44
The Italian Communist Party sent from France to the Casa
d'Italia approximately 200 books as well as Communist
newspapers for its library,45 and in 1939 intensified its drive to
increase the circulation of Communist and anti-Fascist
literature among the non-Communist members of the club.46
The Casa d'Italia became an important anti-Fascist centre in
the last years before the War,47 and there is no available
evidence to show that its impact on anti-Fascist Italians was
ever lessened, not even at the time of the Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact. In a way, it resumed the activities which the Matteotti
club had so effectively promoted in the late 1920s, with the
important difference that in the Casa d'Italia the Gruppo
Italiano became the political guardian of its activities, and its
Communist members were the ones who determined the
political line followed by the Gruppo Italiano.
Membership of the Casa d'Italia remained restricted to its
thirty-eight foundation members: it was feared that agents
provocateurs or spies would otherwise infiltrate the
organisation and undermine it.48 Indeed, not only in the Casa
d'Italia but also among the members of the Gruppo Italiano
mutual distrust was frequent: Cristofaro, a very suspicious
character,49 had doubts about the political reliability of many
members of the group and even about the president of the Casa
d'Italia, Simeoni. He suspected them of collusion with the
Commonwealth Investigation Branch. These fears were not
altogether groundless: the branch was keeping a close watch
on all Communist and left-wing organisations and one of its
informers was very friendly with Simeoni and several times
approached Cristofaro.50 After September 1939 the Casa
d'ltalia was visited three or four times by the CIB and
Cristofaro was called to the CIB and questioned.51
The allegations against Simeoni’s connections with the CIB
cost him the presidency of the Casa d'Italia: at a rowdy
meeting in 1940, Simeoni was compelled to relinquish the post
and he was replaced by Boris Franceschini, an Anarchist with
Communist sympathies.52
Italy’s entry into the war marked the end of the Gruppo
Italiano contro la Guerra e il Fascimo and of the Casa d'Italia.
Only two dozen people took part in the last meeting of the
club, the majority of anti-Fascists being as scared and
uncertain about their future as the Fascists.53 The Casa
d'Italia was closed by the police on 7 September 1940.
Matteo Cristofaro, although the Communist Party of
Australia had been declared an illegal organisation by the
Menzies government on 15 June 1940, still persisted in his
struggle against Fascism. By 1941 he had already formed the
Movimento Antifascista Italiano (Italian Anti-Fascist
Movement) which carried on with the activities that had
distinguished the Gruppo Italiano. Pamphlets were printed
and distributed in Victoria and New South Wales. Francesco
Carmagnola wrote to Cristofaro that his leaflets ‘got on the
nerves of the local Italian greengrocers at the markets’.54 Yet
the response of the Italians who had not been interned was
very poor, and in 1941 the movement relied exclusively on the
support of a hard core of militants, a few dozen, who had been
faithful to the cause of anti-Fascism since the times of the
Matteotti Club.55
After Hitler’s aggression against the Soviet Union, the
Italian anti-Fascist movement gained in popularity and
became instrumental in the revival of anti-Fascism among
Italians, which resulted in the foundation of the Italia Libera
Movement in 1943.
For Italian Communists in Australia the 1930s were years of
struggle. Deeply affected by the social dislocation caused by
the Depression, confronted with the increasing successes of
Fascism in international affairs, hardly tolerated by the
Australian government, lacking an intellectual elite which
could articulate their policies and propaganda and could
organise them on a wider scale, the Italian Communists were
the only ones who, between 1932 and 1940, clearly saw their
moral and political duty to pick up the torch of the anti-Fascist
struggle and they carried it through the darkest years of the
history of the Italian Resistance against Fascism.
Such men as Matteo Cristofaro, Paolo De Angelis, Ottavio
Brida, Ruggero Vinco, Guido Canteri, Giovanni Corso, Angelo
Coladetti, Boris Franceschini, Luigi Stellato, Giuseppe
Zammarchi, although the nucleus of a small minority among
the Italian community in Australia, never despaired of their
cause. Hardly literate (Cristofaro’s schooling ended at the
fourth primary), they achieved political self-education and
carried out their activities with faith and idealism.
At times they met incomprehension and hostility even
among Australian Communists. Cristofaro, before the Spanish
Civil War, was approached by an Australian party member
and told to disband the Gruppo Italiano, which he refused to
do. Obviously, the existence and the success of a ‘dago’
organisation associated with the party, yet autonomous, was
objected to by some Australian Communists.56 During these
years bias against aliens trying to express their political and
cultural needs through their own organisations was not
uniquely a bourgeois peculiarity.
In the final assessment, the Gruppo Italiano contro la
Guerra e il Fascismo, notwithstanding the dedication of its
members, did not achieve spectacular results during the 1930s.
The group’s strength was limited to Melbourne and a few
Victorian country towns, and although propaganda literature
was sent to other states, no other Australian centre possessed
a political group which could match the activities of the
Gruppo Italiano.
Its membership remained very limited, and even the
Communists (the most active and therefore the most
influential anti-Fascists) failed to attract new recruits.
Although donating money to the cause of anti-Fascism, many
young people refused to join such a militant organisation as
the Gruppo Italiano or to become members of the Communist
Party of Australia.57
Matteo Cristofaro was an accomplished working-class
leader, and carried out remarkable propaganda work, but did
not succeed in creating an anti-Fascist mass movement. Many
people, commented Ralph Gibson, ‘fell out because they were
not ready to follow him through fire and water’.58
In the late 1930s the rising fortunes of Fascism dazzled
Italians of all political opinions and discouraged those leaning
towards the anti-Fascist cause to express in public their
support for it. In addition the strong anti-Communist feelings
of the Australian government acted on Italian Communist
sympathisers as a deterrent equivalent to the one exercised on
Italian sympathisers of Fascism by Australia’s hostility
towards Mussolini’s government.
Thus, before World War II Communism had a limited
influence on the political activities of the Italian community,
and even its contribution to the anti-Fascist movement in
Australia, although of great historical and ideological
importance was, in terms of organisation, negligible, because it
fell short of its declared aims to organise the Italian migrants
into a militant mass party ready to fight Fascism and
representative of the class consciousness of Italian workers in
Australia.
Notes
1 AA, CRS A989, item 455/7/2, Vaccari to Prime Minister of Italy,
7 Aug. 1944.
2 The Fascist authorities in Australia always tried to inculcate
upon the minds of their countrymen the policy of not engaging
themselves in politics, but of blindly following the dictates of
those who knew better. Undoubtedly they achieved remarkable
results, and Italians were not conscious practitioners of the
democratic interplay, but succumbed to the persuasiveness of
Fascist propaganda. Apart from the anti-Fascists and the core of
militant Fascists, the greatest majority were unconscious
crypto-Fascists. The best proof which invalidates the
interpretation put forward by Vaccari is given by Vaccari
himself: in 1940 he stated that ‘at least nine out of ten of our co
nationals are not enrolled in Fascism, but they are not against it’
(AA, CRS A373, item 6230, Vaccari to Albanese, 20 Feb. 1940).
3 Matteo Cristofaro, interview, 17 Dec. 1973. These were for him
times of extreme hardship, being often compelled to work,
unpaid, just for one hot meal a day, and sleeping in the open on
sugar bags filled with straw. At one stage Cristofaro fell
seriously ill by feeding himself only on bread and tea.
4 He read II Martello and L'Adunata dei Refrattari (Cristofaro,
interview, 29 May 1973).
5 On J. W. Fleming, see Bertha Walker, Solidarity Forever,
Melbourne, 1972, pp. 6U3.
6 Cristofaro, interview, 17 Dec. 1973.
7 Cristofaro, interview 29 May 1973.
8 See Gibson, My Years in the Communist Party, pp. 40-1. Ralph
Gibson was born in London in 1906. He came to Australia in
1912, and in the 1920s graduated in history and political science
at the University of Melbourne. Both his father and brother
became Professors of Philosophy at the same university. He
obtained his M.A. degree in economics at Manchester
University, England, in 1930. He joined the Australian
Communist Party in 1932 and was elected to the Victorian State
Committee of the party in 1933, and soon after this to the
Central Committee. He spoke Italian.
9 Paolo De Angelis, interview, 17 Dec. 1973; Ottavio Brida,
interview', 13 March 1974.
10 Cristofaro, interview, 17 Dec. 1973: ibid., 14 March 1974; Ralph
Gibson, interview, 28 May 1973.
11 Cristofaro, interview, 29 May 1973.
12 Cristofaro Papers, Cristofaro to Mario Montagnana, 26 June
1943. The papers are held by the author. Also, ibid., Grieco to
Cristofaro, 9 June 1936.
13 Cristofaro to author, letter, 6 April, 1974.
14 Age, 2 July 1935. His threat was countered with a statement by
the presidents of the Melbourne Fascio, the Italian Returned
Soldier’s Association of Melbourne, the Dante Alighieri Society,
the Club Cavour, the SM S IsoleEolie and the Italian Chamber of
Commerce, Victorian Branch, in which they stated ‘on behalf of
their Italian members, whose aggregate number represents the
majority of the Italian residents in Victoria, that they have the
fullest confidence in their Government and in its ability to
uphold the honour and rights of Italy’ (Sun, 4 July 1935). Vanzini
challenged their claim of representation, but the presidents
confirmed it. The associate editor of II Giornale Italiano, Pino
Boggio, condemned the statements of the Italian Group Against
Wrar, adding that the group represented ‘only a negligible section
of the Italian community in Melbourne’, and that its statements
were met not only ‘with the contempt of the Italian community,
but also of any fair-minded Australian, who is ever mindful of his
duty towards his own country’ (Sun, 21 Aug. 1935).
15 Bando ad ogni esitazione: tutti al comizio, leaflet held by the
author.
16 Idea Popolare, Feb. 1936.
17 Ibid.
18 Cristofare Papers, 1936 file. Udarnico is derived from a Russian

word for worker.
19 Stato Operaio, Supplement, Aug. 1936, No. 8.
20 Brida, interview.
21 Cristofaro Papers, Invitation No. 1778 dated 4 June 1936 (ibid.).
23 Cristofaro Papers, Grieco to Cristofaro, 9 June 1936.
24 Ibid. Grieco pointed out that ‘propaganda literature cannot be
sold as you are selling fruit; everybody eats fruit: instead our
literature is welcome only by people who begin, at least, to take
an interest in the struggle of liberation of the working class .. .
You must be careful in writing to your relatives in Italy; be
cunning; do not compromise those poor people with hasty
enterprises. They, for sure, are glad to receive the literature
which you are sending: but you must not take advantage of their
good faith’.
25 Cristofaro, interview 18 Dec. 1973; Cristofaro Papers, 1936 file;
Brida, interview.
26 Cristofaro Papers, Gleeson to Schiassi, 17 March 1936. The
meeting was also addressed by Maurice Blackburn, Labor MHR
and close friend of Dr Schiassi. Dr Schiassi spoke on ‘Carducci as
a man, politician, thinker, critic and poet’. Percy Laidler, one of
the founders of the Victorian Branch of the Communist Party,
also spoke.
27 Ibid., Carmagnola to Cristofaro, 14 Feb. 1936.
28 Ibid., Noselli to Cristofaro, 1 March 1936. From Mareeba, Qld,
ten Italians asked for more literature and offered their solidarity
in the struggle against Fascism and ‘the maniac from
Predappio’.
29 De Angelis, interview, 16 Nov. 1973.
30 Brida, interview.
31 Cesare Massimi (Silverio), rather bewildered, wrote to Cristofaro
that ‘we have received your monthly report. We are surprised,
since it is the second one which you are sending to us blank,
without even a line telling us anything, at least whether you have
received our letter of the 22/6/37, or how is your work going, if
you need any other addresses to which to mail propaganda
literature’ (Cristofaro Papers, ‘Silverio’ to ‘Branciaretti’, 23
Sept. 1937).
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 18 May 1973.
36 De Angelis, interview, 17 Dec. 1973; Luigi Stellato, interview, 13
March 1974. Although the credit for the opening of the Casa
d'ltalia must go to non-Communists, in particular to Carlo
Simeoni and Luigi Stellato, it must be noted that already in 1936
Matteo Cristofaro suggested to Grieco the idea of creating clubs
for Italian workers, and Grieco encouraged the scheme, advising

him to set them up on the pattern of the Italian Brotherhoods in
France (Cristofaro Papers, Grieco to Cristofaro, 9 June 1936).
37 Stellato, interview.
38 Stellato Papers, 1938 file. Statute of the club Casa d'Italia. The
papers are held by the author.
39 De Angelis, interview, 17 Dec. 1973.
40 From the pamphlet issued on the occasion of the opening of the
Casa d ’Italia.
41 Gibson, interview.
42 On him, see Walker, Solidarity, pp. 142-9 and 230-3.
43 De Angelis, interview, 17 Dec. 1973; Brida, interview; Cristofaro,
interview, 17 Dec. 1973.
44 Brida, interview; De Angelis, interview, 17 Dec. 1973.
45 Brida, interview; Cristofaro Papers, Editions de Culture Sociale
to ‘Branciaretti’, 13 Feb. 1939.
46 Cristofaro Papers, Strada to Cristofaro, 5 Aug. 1939.
48 De Angelis, interview, 17 Dec. 1973.
49 Cristofaro, interview, 14 March 1974; Gibson, interview.
50 Cristofaro, interview, 17 Dec. 1973. On the personality and
activities of O’Cassidy see Walker, Solidarity, pp. 191-3 and
Gibson, My Years in the Communist Party, pp. 19-20.
51 Cristofaro, interview, 14 March 1974.
52 Ibid., 17 Dec. 1973; also, Boris Franceschini, interview, 18 Dec.
1973.
54 Cristofaro Papers, Carmagnola to Cristofaro, 13 Nov. 1941.
55 Carmagnola in 1941 commented that ‘we must admit that it is
very difficult now to make propaganda, because the greatest
majority of our nationals, owing to the war, are with Mussolini’s
Italy. The hatred caused by wars, and by this one in particular,
attracts to their country, which is in war against England, all
people who have never been militant and who feel and
understand nothing and who have no interest in social problems’
(ibid.).
56 When the group wanted to purchase a property in Queensberry
Street with the idea of opening a club, and Cristofaro approached
the party for financial support, he was told that the scheme did
not meet with the approval of the party since a separate Italian
organisation was not necessary; yet soon after and to
Cristofaro’s amazement the property was purchased by the
Communist Party of Australia (Cristofaro, interview, 14 March
1974).
7
Fascist Propaganda
in Australia, 1922-1940
Shortly, an organisation will arise here which will be the

first in Italy. Everything will pass through my hands, we
will speak to the whole world. We will tell all other
countries about Italy and her great men. We will use
radio, theatre, and the movies. And, naturally, we will use
the press. But above all we will use men.
(Galeazzo Ciano, 1935 speech)
In contrast with the wealth of material and literature on Nazi
propaganda, very little has been written on the extent and the
aims of political propaganda spread by the Italian Fascist
regime amongst its citizens abroad.
The importance of influencing the opinions and behaviour of
Italians abroad in favour of the new political ideals had been
realised by Mussolini and his colleagues even before coming to
power. By 1919 Mussolini was proclaiming from the columns
of the Popolo d'Italia that the ‘Italy of tomorrow’ would follow
a policy of ‘peaceful economic and spiritual’ expansionism in
the world.1 Soon after the seizure of power, when the first
branches of the Fascist Party were formed by Italians abroad,
their scope was described as being that of ‘enlisting’ all
Italians and of ‘informing’ them of the Fascist government’s
137
interpretation of current political events.2 To this effect the
Ufficio Stampa (Press Bureau) of the Italian Ministry for
Foreign Affairs was reorganised and given a new head,
Amedeo Giannini, who was instructed to increase his efforts in
order to ‘defend more effectively the interests of Italians
abroad’.3 Notwithstanding Mussolini’s repeated assertions
during the 1920s that Fascism could not be ‘exported’ to other
countries, as early as 1923 the importance of controlling the
attitudes and actions of Italians abroad was openly admitted
by Fascist officials. In October of that year, Giovanni
Marinelli, who was, together with Cesare Rossi and Michele
Bianchi, a member of the central leadership of the Fasci,
suggested to Mussolini that the Secretary of the Office of
Fascist Branches Abroad should be admitted to the General
Secretariat of the PNF.4 At the same time, one of the most
influential men close to the Duce, Cornelio Di Marzio, who was
to become from March 1927 to January 1928 General
Secretary of the Italian Fasci Abroad, in his book Fascism
Abroad, stressed the point that Fascism was a flexible
doctrine and that ‘its magnificent nature allows it to be
transplanted in every country and to be effective in every
climate’.5
Italians abroad must be conditioned to ‘second and to obey’
Fascism: ‘they cannot and must not have opinions differing
from the ones put forward by the national Government: they
must not have opposite ideas; if they do not criticise they will
have nothing to oppose’.6
Yet in spite of the rash statements by its leaders, Fascist
propaganda abroad, and in Australia in particular, started on a
low key. There is no evidence to suggest that in the 1920s the
aspiration of controlling the political opinions of Italians in
Australia materialised in a program, nor that all available
propaganda channels were exploited in a systematic way. This
failure could be attributed to the fact that the mass media had
not yet reached a very advanced technological development.
Radio and cinema had limited audiences, and no newspaper
had a circulation wide enough to reach all sections of the
population. Moreover, owing to its rapid success, Fascism
lacked cadres experienced in the work of grass-root propa
ganda.7
Fascist Propaganda in Australia 139
From 1922 to the end of 1927 Fascist propaganda in

Australia was carried out mainly by the Italo-Australian
which, since its first issue, declared its unconditional support
for the cause of Fascism. From its pages this newspaper went
on for years praising the policies of the new Italian
government and defending them against its opponents; its
main goal was to explain to the Italian community what
Fascism was and to make it acceptable to the widest public.
Articles such as that on ‘What is Fascism’, stating that
‘Mussolini . . . wants a strong Italy, capable of protecting her
sons both at home and abroad’,8 and those written by Antonio
Baccarini ‘On the recent political events in Italy’,9 figured
prominently in the pages of the Italian weekly.
At the same time, political statements made by the leaders
of the Italian community were given wide coverage. When
Tommaso Fiaschi, president of the Associazione Italiona,
declared at a banquet that ‘God has given us Benito
Mussolini’, the I talo-Australian reported that his words had
been applauded enthusiastically by all present.10
Statements by Australians sympathetic to Fascism were
also used for propaganda purposes. H. S. W. Lawson, Premier
of Victoria, visited Italy in 1923 and met Mussolini. Upon his
return, he went out of his way to praise Fascism and its leader
‘the man whom Providence wanted to lead Italy’.11
Similar declarations by Sir George Fuller, Premier of New
South Wales, expressing unreserved admiration of ‘the man
. . . who saved Italy . . . from Bolshevism’,12 were widely cir
culated amongst the Italian community in Australia.
Such unsolicited statements of support for Fascism were
very important to the Fascist leaders in Australia: they served
the purpose of demonstrating to all Italians that a wide
spectrum of responsible foreign public opinion was in
agreement with the Italian government’s policies, and that
only ‘anti-national’ elements could oppose a cause that was
internationally recognised as promoting the welfare of Italy.
The I talo-Australian faithfully translated all foreign articles
praising Fascism and reprinted them in its pages; it also
reprinted news and articles from the Popolo d'Italia and other
Fascist newspapers which reached Sydney.
In 1926 propaganda activities were stepped up disguised as
lectures. The contribution of the Sydney Vice-Consul Mario
Carosi was instrumental in their success.13 At the same time
foreign lecturers praised Fascism to Italian and Australian
audiences. Worth mentioning again is the cycle of lectures
given in 1927 by Brigadier-General Charles Rudkin. His
contribution to the cause of Fascism in Australia was
considered so valuable by the Fascists that the Dante
Alighieri Society presented him with a book containing the
biographies of 3,000 squadrists killed in the Fascist cause
during the years 1919-22.14
The Fascist propaganda effort in Australia was made easier
during these years by the attitude of the Catholic Church:
many Italians were impressed by the unreserved praise
showered upon Mussolini and Fascism by the Archbishop of
Brisbane, James Duhig.
On the whole, the general impression derived from the
activities of Italian Fascists in the propaganda field in
Australia between 1922 and 1927 is one of ad hoc initiatives,
unrelated to each other. They lacked vision and long range
planning. The aims of Fascist propaganda during these years
were not clearly stated, but seemed to be oriented towards the
conversion of all Italians in Australia by sheer appeal to their
patriotic feelings. The equation ‘Fascism is Italy’ was often
brought to the attention of the recipients of Fascist
propaganda. Yet by the end of 1927 it seemed obvious that
such methods were just not enough. The international
opposition to Fascism was becoming increasingly vocal, and a
revision of Fascist propaganda methods was overdue. Such
need was clearly expressed by the General Secretary of the
Italian Fasci Abroad, Cornelio Di Marzio, at the Fascist Grand
Council meeting of 7 November 1927. In his report, Di Marzio
repeatedly mentioned the absence of organisation and lack of
direction, and asked for a:
co-ordination of aims and resources since we are still too
many to deal with our activities abroad. Lately even the
Party has extended some of its activities abroad. We
must be allowed to penetrate every organisation which
deals with our activities abroad: we must assume all
initiatives and responsibilities.15
The need to centralise the control of all activities, to take the
initiative by circulating more propaganda material abroad and
not just to respond to requests for propaganda, was sponsored
by Giuseppe Bottai in his report to the Fascist Grand Council
of 17 September 1928, where he complained that ‘on request,
we prepare data and information; but it is not enough’.16
From 1928 to 1931, the year in which the Italian Ministry
for Foreign Affairs opened a Servizio per la Propaganda
(Propaganda Bureau) aiming at centralising in the hands of
this body the responsibility for the control of all services
operating abroad, it is possible to detect an increasing
consciousness by Fascist officials in Italy and abroad of the
importance of propaganda. Balbino Giuliano, Minister for
National Education, in a speech in October 1929 at the thirty-
fourth Congress of the Dante Alighieri Society, openly
admitted how important to the regime were the cultural and
propaganda activities carried out by Italian associations,
individuals and foreign sympathisers: he declared: ‘Today all
nations are committed to a struggle that is involving all
processes of learning and culture and that must decide on the
extent of their spiritual spheres of influence in the new order’.17
In Australia this period witnessed an increasing sophisti
cation in the propaganda techniques employed by the repre
sentatives of the Italian government. While the old methods of
using the press for circulating all news favourable to the
regime, the community meetings for whipping up Italian
nationalism, the lectures for promoting — under cultural
pretexts — Fascist principles, received great impetus, new
weapons were added to the Fascist propaganda arsenal. The
newly-formed party branches contributed to meetings and
celebrations with the charisma of their black shirts, badges,
flags, husky cries of A Noi (To Us), songs and all the other
trappings of Fascist choreography. All this left a definite
imprint on the minds of simple Italians, convinced by the
martial and disciplined show of strength that the new regime
was really ready to show its teeth in defence of their rights if
the need should arise. During 1928 other newspapers
appeared, flanking with their pro-Fascist propaganda the
Italo-Australian, the Italian Bulletin of Australia, and the
Sydney Fascist Branch organ, II Littorio, which started
publishing in September 1927. They were the already mentioned
L'eco d'Italia, promoted by the Italian Consul Francesco
Pascale, and the Corriere degli Italiani in Australia, sponsored
by the Italian consul-general.
During the same year a new medium was used for the first
time in Australia for the diffusion of Fascist propaganda: the
cinema. The regime had realised the importance of this new
channel of mass communications in 1925, when Mussolini
ordered his ministers to grant official recognition to the
Istituto LUCE (National Institute for Educational Film-
making) and to use its services for propaganda purposes.18 It
was in Sydney in April 1928 that the first propaganda film,
Militia, was screened.19 In February of the following year
another film, Mussolini Speaks, was shown at the Auditorium
in Melbourne.20 Yet these were only timid attempts in the use
of this new instrument and the cinema would be widely and
successfully used only in the 1930s.
It is the year 1931 that really marks the watershed of
Fascist propaganda abroad, when Mussolini publicly
repudiated his previous assertion that Fascism was not an
article for export and proclaimed instead that: ‘Fascism as an
idea, a doctrine, a realisation, is universal; it is Italian in its
particular institutions, but universal in its spirit, nor could it
be otherwise . . . Fascism today is relevant to the universal
needs’.21 At the same time a prominent journalist, an intimate
friend of Mussolini since the days of Via Paolo del Cannobio
who would be close to the Duce in the most important
moments of his life, at Munich and in Milan in April 1945,
Asvero Gravelli, published a book, Verso VInternazionale
Fascista, in which he expanded on Mussolini’s statement and
identified the aims of Italian Fascist propaganda abroad as
follows:
We shall establish and consolidate an alliance with all
Fascist groups or groups of similar tendency or domestic
groups that have the same spiritual, political and
economic needs. We shall establish close contacts with all
groups scattered around the world, in order to sow and
spread the Fascist ideals. We shall carry out an incessant
propaganda activity, reaching every intellectual,
wherever he might be . . . We shall establish a permanent
liaison with the European and world elites.22
By 1931 the aims of Fascist propaganda became more
articulate and more intelligently defined. By and large the
original need to maintain a certain cultural pressure on the
masses was considered still as being of paramount importance;
yet for the first time Rome advocated the co-operation of
foreign political groups and of individuals who could be
instrumental in the diffusion of Fascist ideals and in the
creation of a Fascist International. Consequently, the
extension of propaganda aims made necessary a revision of the
currently available techniques. For the first time propaganda
in favour of the regime by overseas sympathisers was not
simply welcome but was solicited by the Italian regime.
This policy of direct commitment by the Italian government
to the diffusion of Fascism in foreign countries became
manifest also in Australia. Here too the Italian authorities
aimed at imposing upon their countrymen their total political
and educational control, from the cradle to the grave. Thus
propaganda began in the school, since the education of youth
was of paramount concern to the regime. When in 1933 the
Fascist branches in Australia began to run classes in Italian
language and culture, their teachers, recruited exclusively
among members of the Fascist Party, used textbooks supplied
by the Direzione delle Scuole all'Estero. The books contained
obvious propaganda aimed at winning the allegiance of the
young minds: the children were taught that Fascism
commanded from other nations respect and fear for Italy and
that they ‘must feel the pride of being the heirs of Rome, the
sons of Rome’, because ‘Rome’s destiny is one of greatness and
power’.23 Schools were opened in Sydney, Melbourne,
Brisbane, Adelaide, Wonthaggi, Werribee. Children were
drafted in the Balilla, the Fascist youth organisation, and
attended classes in Fascist uniform. At times they took part in
political rallies: in Adelaide, on the occasion of the official
termination of the Italo-Abyssinian war, between thirty to
forty children paraded as members of the Balilla and the vice-
consul, Amerio, attended in Fascist uniform and addressed the
children. In the 1930s the Italian government opened summer
camps in Italy for boys and girls living abroad, for the purpose
of preventing Italian children resident or born abroad from
being lost to Italy. In Australia there was only one attempt to
send children to these camps: in 1936 Fascists of Innisfail and
Ingham started to raise funds to send Australian-born Italian
youths to Italy for Easter 1937.24
Fascism in Australia endeavoured to expand its educational
institutions whenever and wherever opportunities arose. Even
on the eve of the outbreak of hostilities in 1940 the Fascist
authorities continued opening new schools: the vice-consul in
Adelaide, Felice Rando, inaugurated the last one in Adelaide in
March 1940. The fact that these schools were not just
fostering among Italian children the knowledge of the cultural
heritage of their Fatherland but were hotbeds of Fascist
indoctrination was explicitly admitted by the Italian
government, when in 1939 the Carta della Scuola (Education
Charter) codified the intimate connection between the Fascist
Party and the school in all aspects of education, training and
social assistance.25 The Fascist bias of the Italian schools was
quickly detected by the Australian authorities who
nevertheless did nothing to discourage or to stop their
continuation.26
In 1931 the Italian government began distributing in
Australia pamphlets illustrating the achievements and the
policies of the regime to the educated Italian elite and to
Australian sympathisers. The leader of the New Guard, Eric
Campbell, was given Fascist literature by Antonio Baccarini,
President of the Dante Alighieri Society, one of the many
organisations entrusted with the distribution of such
material.27 Yet the supply of literature was irregular,
insufficient and took too long to reach its destination. All
Italian legations were in the difficult situation of having to ask
for propaganda material and, when it was sent only in limited
quantities, it arrived too late to make an impact on its
readers.28 Consul-General Agostino Ferrante complained to
Rome that he did not receive until December 1934 five copies
of a pamphlet that he had requested in July.29
It was only with the outbreak of the war in Abyssinia that
the Italian government stepped up the distribution of
pamphlets and other material in large quantities. In October
1935 the Direzione Generale per i Servizi della Propaganda
reported that during that month the distribution in Oceania of
propaganda material had reached a record: 2,130 pamphlets,
eighty-eight photographs and nine graphs.30
The increase in the volume of propaganda received in
Australia at this time reflected the upgrading of the
propaganda machine carried out by Mussolini: in September
1934 the Ufficio Stampa was abolished and replaced by an
Under secretariat for Press and Propaganda which was raised
in June 1935 to the status of Ministry for Press and
Propaganda. In May 1937 the name of this institution was
changed to Ministry for Popular Culture. In order to stream
line its activities, the Direzione Generale per i Servizi della
Propaganda was divided into four sections: the Ufficio I looked
after the aspects of general propaganda; the Ufficio I I was in
charge of anti-Communist propaganda; the Ufficio II I
controlled radio broadcasts; the Ufficio IV organised all
artistic and cinematic propaganda.31
In April 1936 the Direzione Generale began to send
periodically pamphlets and books to thirty-two Australian
citizens. They had been chosen upon recommendation of the
Italian consuls in Australia and were prominent representa
tives of the Australian Establishment. The literature was sent
by the Direzione Generale to the consuls in Sydney and
Melbourne, who were instructed to mail it anonymously,
‘without indicating the sender’s origin’.32 The Sydney
consulate-general was given the task of distributing the
material to eighteen addresses, while the Melbourne consulate
did the same with the other fourteen.33
By 1937 Rome responded quickly to requests for material,
but as a rule, before sending anything, information was
requested from the local consuls on the applicants’ political
ideas. All people approaching the Italian authorities with
requests for literature on the country’s political institutions
were screened and registered in Rome. In February 1937 the
files on foreign sympathisers or students of Fascism all over
the world included 7,125 names.34 In October 1935 alone, they
were sent a total of 9,051 pamphlets.35 The consuls were also
requested:
in order to enrich the Personal File of the Direzione
Generale, to send information on the name, the address,
the political and professional activities and their feelings
for Fascist Italy, of the people to whom pamphlets will be
delivered.36
The Ufficio /, by means of the services of the consuls,
endeavoured to have photographs of Italian political events
printed in Australian newspapers, but met with considerable
difficulties. In November 1936 the Melbourne consul, Enrico
Anzilott.i, protested to the Ministry for Press and Propaganda
that:
having the possibility to obtain publication in Australian
magazines and newspapers of photographs of Italian
current events . . . they are often received when the
events are already forgotten and therefore are not any
longer interesting enough to justify their publication.37
During the Abyssinian conflict the Direzione Generale per i
Servizi della Propaganda began to send to the Italian consuls
in Australia articles written by journalists and specialists in
its employment, outlining the Italian position in the conflict,
or praising the achievements of the regime. The consuls tried
to have them printed by the Australian press. The Italian
newspapers, and in the first place the Giornale Italiano which,
according to Anzilotti, carried out ‘useful propaganda work’,38
regularly printed such articles without mentioning their
origin. The publication of the same articles by the Australian
press was more difficult, owing to its hostile attitude to
Fascism, but the consuls usually overcame the problem by
asking local Italians to send the articles in their name, thus
disguising their real origin.39 The Direzione Generale reported
in August 1940 that Australia’s demand for articles in the
1930s had been one of the highest in the world.40
The Ministry for Press and Propaganda did not stop at
sending articles and pamphlets; it also engaged the services of
cultured Italians in Australia and gave them all possible
assistance in order to help in their efforts in favour of Fascism.
Dr Antonio Baccarini printed in 1936 a booklet entitled What
For? outlining the point of view of a naturalised Australian on
the Italo-Abyssinian dispute and praising the regime’s
determination to conquer its ‘place in the sun’, its ‘civilising
mission’ in Abyssinia that was at the same time ‘a revolution
against imperialism and international capitalism’.41
This publication attracted the attention of the Common
wealth Investigation Branch, which sent a copy to London for
purposes of comparison with other Fascist literature
distributed in the United Kingdom by the Italian Embassy
and the consulates. The Investigation Branch, although
unable to establish whether Baccarini had been assisted by the
Italian diplomatic representatives in writing his book,
strongly suspected the connivance of the Fascist consuls in his
propaganda effort.42
Pamphlets distributed in Melbourne and Sydney caused
growing concern to the Commonwealth authorities. When in
September 1935 3,000 copies of a pamphlet entitled IIpunto di
vista Italiano nella Questione Abissina (The Abyssinian
question from the Italian standpoint) and prepared by G.
Vaccari, a wealthy businessman of Melbourne, were published,
the federal government objected to its biased propaganda
content and sought to prevent its distribution unless the
Italian consul-general would agree to modify the parts which
the Minister for External Affairs, Sir G. F. Pearce, described:
‘as provocative and liable to lead to reprisals from those
holding different views and therefore calculated to bring about
events, which might impair good international relations’.43
Notwithstanding that amendments to the original text were
made by the Melbourne consul, Anzilotti, the content of the
pamphlet was still objectionable to Pearce, who reiterated that
‘nothing is further from the truth, and nothing is more
calculated to do harm at the present time than a continuation
of such propaganda’.44 The Italian consulates were not
deterred by the minister’s representations: on the contrary,
the pamphlet was reprinted in its original form in November
1935 under the signature of Nino Gremmo45 and distributed to
all Italians calling at the Sydney and Melbourne consulates.46
The transmission of pamphlets continued unabated, even up to
Italy’s entry into World War II: between 10 January and 10
June 1940 the Direzione Generale per i Servizi della Propa
ganda despatched to this country 505 publications.47
Articles and pamphlets in support of the Italian case on the
Abyssinian question were also written by Australian
sympathisers with Fascism. Dr H. M. Moran upon his return
from Italy and from his second audience with Mussolini in
1935 wrote his Letters from Rome which were printed in
booklet form and given wide distribution. D. G. M. Jackson, a
Catholic journalist, with his articles in favour of Fascism in
the Tribune and the Advocate, earned the admiration of the
Melbourne consul, Arrighi, who proposed him to the Italian
government for a prize in token of appreciation for his
attachment to the Fascist cause.48
In the 1930s the Italian consuls in Australia tried to
promote Fascism by launching several initiatives that on the
surface did not seem to have a propaganda content but that
well fitted the overall pattern of publicising the regime’s
policies abroad. When in 1936 the Australian Broadcasting
Commission asked the Italian government for the texts of
modern Italian plays with the aim of broadcasting them to the
Australian public, the consul-general, Paolo Vita-Finzi, wrote
to the Ministry for Press and Propaganda recommending the
acceptance of this request, ‘because it would be a useful
channel of propaganda to our favour’.49 The Italian partici
pation in the Sydney Art Exhibition that opened on 1 July
1936, although officially sponsored by the Biennale Exhibition
of Venice, was in fact financed by the Ministry for Press and
Propaganda, and the consul-general reported to Rome on the
reactions of the Australian public.50
Other initiatives included gifts of propaganda books to the
University of Western Australia, to be distributed to the
students;51 of slides of Fascist Italy to the South Australian
government52 and of political books to several individuals and
associations requesting them for educational or research
purposes, as was the case with a Victorian schoolteacher, who
asked Rome for ‘any available information and aids . . . for the
education of children up to about seventeen years of age’ and
received a copy of Volpe’s H istory of the Fascist Movement,
Mussolini’s The Doctrine o f Fascism and Four Speeches on the
Corporate State, and scores of other propaganda pamphlets;53
or with Miss M. Hentze of the History Department of the
University of Sydney who, upon her request, received
propaganda material only after the Ministry for Popular
Culture asked and obtained from the consulate-general ‘about
this person every possible information that would enable us to
judge about her usefulness to the aims of our propaganda’.54
Another aspect of propaganda was the assistance given by
the Italian government and by its representatives in Australia
to leading Australian politicians, businessmen, journalists,
who visited Italy for professional reasons or for the purpose of
fostering their knowledge of Fascist Italy. When two members
of the federal parliament visited Italy in 1935, they expressed
the wish to see the achievements of the regime. Upon
instructions of Ciano, then Under-Secretary for Press and
Propaganda, they were shown Littoria and Saubadia as guests
of the Ministry for the Interior.55 Similarly, E. F. Borrie, Chief
Engineer of the Melbourne Metropolitan Board of Works, had
his study tour arranged by the Ministry for Press and
Propaganda on recommendation of Consul Anzilotti, who
supported it by stressing: ‘the importance of the Board and the
opportunity, for our propaganda aims, to spread in this
country, so ignorant about our Fatherland, a greater
knowledge of what has been and is being achieved by the
Regime’.56 Journalists travelling to Italy to research various
aspects of contemporary Italian society were also well taken
care of. The Melbourne consul, Arrighi, in 1937 introduced
D. P. McGuire, a Catholic journalist, to Andrea Gheisser
Celesia, Director-General of Propaganda, asking him to ‘help
and orient in his work’ in Italy this ‘friend of Italy’.57
Yet the highest sign of the regime’s appreciation for the
propaganda work carried out by foreigners was to grant them
an audience with Mussolini. This official recognition of their
valuable contribution to the cause of Fascism was not only a
reward, but also stimulated the people on which it was
bestowed to further pronouncements in favour of this
ideology. Archbishop Duhig, we have seen, received this
honour in the mid-1920s; Eric Campbell, leader of the New
Guard movement, went to Rome in 1933 with a letter of
introduction from Sir Oswald Mosley, but the Duce was away
and instead he was received by the Secretary of the Fascist
Party, Starace.58. Dr H. M. Moran, whose sympathies for
Fascism were well known, saw Mussolini in 1932 and again in
193559while E. G. Waterhouse, Professor of German literature
at the University of Sj'dney and councillor of the Sydney
branch of the Dante Alighieri Society, was admitted to the
Duce’s presence in 1934. The Ufficio Stampa recommended the
granting of an interview because Professor Waterhouse was:
a very influential person and an admirer of the Duce. He
still expresses some reservation on Fascism: the granting
of an audience by the head of Government would suffice,
according to the President of the Dante, to dispel any
remaining prejudice and to stimulate him to promote our
language and culture in Australia.60
During the 1930s two other methods of mass media
communication were widely used for propaganda purposes by
the Italian supporters of Fascism: the cinema and the radio.
Cinema turned out to be Italy’s best propaganda weapon, and
by the end of the 1930s the Direzione Generale operated a
complicated system of film distribution that enabled the
regime to reach all over the world even the smallest Italian
community, ‘wherever it was in our interest to be present’.61
The screening of propaganda films showing the public works
and the military might of the regime began in Australia in
1932. By that year, the DIES (.Direzione degli Italiani
alVEstero) was already sending to the consulate-general in
Sydney a considerable number of films ‘to be utilised for
propaganda work all over Australia’.62 Early in 1933 Consul-
General Ferrante could proudly report to Mussolini that
documentaries on the most important political events in Italy,
such as the celebrations for the tenth anniversary of the March
on Rome, the military parades and the gymnastic exercises of
the Balilla, were shown almost weekly in the cinemas of
Sydney. They were followed, in stark contrast, by films on the
London clashes between the police and unemployed workers
and by pictures of British children dressed in rags, thus
emphasising, in Ferrante’s opinion, the superior social system
of Fascist Italy.63 Documentary films aroused the interest of
the Italian communities in Australia, whose members came in
numbers to their screening, especially in moments of great
tension, either social or political, such as during the
xenophobic riots at Kalgoorlie in 1934 or during the
Abyssinian conflict.64
Yet propaganda by means of the cinema was not co
ordinated nor managed very efficiently until the war in
Abyssinia; there is ample evidence of its unsophisticated
approach and of its shortcomings in distribution before the
African conflict. For instance, Ferrante, in reporting to

Mussolini the ‘enormously successful’ screening in Sydney and
Griffith of the film Year IX, lamented that: ‘the English
subtitles are subject to ridicule, since the Italian text has been
translated literally by the dictionary, its translator obviously
having a scant, elementary knowledge of the language’.65
Moreover, most of the films were in Italian, thus limiting their
propaganda effect to a restricted public, and excluding
altogether from their influence the eventual Australian
sympathisers. This disadvantage was often drawn to the
attention of the Ministry for Press and Propaganda by the
Italian consuls who rated the films as ‘one of the most efficient
means of propaganda in the Australian environment’.66
Furthermore, up to 1935 films as well as other kinds of
propaganda material did not reach the consulates at regular
intervals, thus slackening off the pace of the process of
indoctrination that many consuls so strenuously strove to
achieve: Anzilotti, in December 1935 protested to the Ministry
for Press and Propaganda that his consulate ‘had not received
any propaganda film for the last eighteen months’.67
The Italo-Abyssinian conflict sped up the delivery of
documentary films to Australia, and in the main they were
favourably received by the majority of Italians; their
nationalist and imperialist message whipped up the patriotism
of the Italian community, which felt isolated and threatened
by the Australian government’s hostile policy towards Italy
and by the animosity of a large section of Australian society
against Italians, be they Fascists or not. Anzilotti reported
that in Melbourne ‘the enthusiasm for the screening of the
films was enormous’, and that ‘at every screening hundreds of
nationals were present, and many of them came even from the
countryside for the occasion’.68
Nevertheless the consuls had to take into consideration the
unfriendliness of Australian political circles, so the propa
ganda content of the films had to be less evident, while more
emphasis on aspects readily acceptable to the Australian
public was needed: for instance, ‘films to be screened to
Australians should mention our civilising mission in
Ethiopia’;69 they should also imply that Italy was adopting
policies that had been practised for centuries by the British
Empire. Also, propaganda must seem to be objective:
favourable statements and opinions by neutrals and by people
not connected with Fascism had to be given maximum
diffusion. The film Abyssinia was considered by Rome to be
particularly suitable to this purpose, because: ‘filmed by the
Swiss flier Mittelholzer, it is an excellent documentary
effectively showing the state of barbarism of Abyssinia that
can be a much more useful instrument of propaganda since it
has been filmed by a foreigner’.70 The Italian consuls did not
limit their activities to the distribution of films: they also
commissioned propaganda films to be produced in Australia.
When the Italian cruiser Montecuccoli arrived in Sydney in
1938, the Melbourne consul, Arrighi, commissioned a Catholic
film group to film the ceremonies in which the Italian officers
and sailors took part during their stay in this city.71 Cinema
was used as a means of propaganda up to the outbreak of
hostilities in June 1940, under the ever more watchful eye of
the Commonwealth censor, to whom all films had to be
submitted before screening and who did not hesitate to cut the
objectionable or controversial political sections.72 Yet all films
and documentaries screened to Italians in Australia by the
consuls contained the political messages of a ‘new Italy’, full of
life, free from the evils besetting capitalist societies; they all
glorified Italy’s history, military might, cultural superiority
and economic progress. They conformed to what Cornelio Di
Marzio, one of the cultural eminences grises of the regime,
believed was the role of this medium: that in a totalitarian
state cinema cannot avoid being political cinema; indeed, it
must reflect the ideals and political values of the regime.
‘Films without a moral or ethical lesson’, maintained Di
Marzio, ‘were not for the Italian public’.73
Radio propaganda reached Australia in the 1930s. Fascist
Italy had been a pioneer in this field; at that time it probably
had a keener sense of the importance of radio than any other
country in the world. Programs in Italian and other languages,
beamed to overseas countries, began in 1933, and a number of
these programs were specialty designed to sell Fascist ideology
to Italians living there. The Fascist concept of the role of the
radio was outlined in the yearbook of the EIAR (Ente Italiano
per le A udizioni Radiofoniche) as follows:
Invincible as an arm of propaganda, disciplined and
willing instrument of the Regime, the Italian radio brings
to foreign peoples, together with news in foreign
languages, information and precise and objective
comments on Fascist reality, destroying legends and
obliterating insidious falsehoods. Radio must be a great
educator and in Italy it is . . . It introduces itself
wherever the idea of Italianness affirms itself.74
An interesting method of extending Fascism abroad took the
form of Italian lessons by radio. The texts for dictation were
Mussolini’s speeches. The listeners were asked to send their
work to Rome for correction and the exercises came back to
them with program announcements of the Italian radio and
propaganda pamphlets.75
The propaganda purpose of the radio broadcasts was openly
admitted in Australia. In 1933 the consul-general, Ferrante,
informed the Commonwealth government that the Agenzia
Stefani of Rome was broadcasting daily official press news on
political, economic and sporting events and that he wished to
avail himself ‘of this service to the purpose of supplying
official news to the local newspapers’.76 Two years later, the
consul-general requested permission to use the services of
Amalgamated Wireless (A’asia) Ltd to intercept the short
wave broadcasts of news by the Italian station at Coltano, and
to use the scripts for propaganda purposes, but the request
was turned down by the government on grounds that it
represented a ‘danger’ and that it was detrimental to ‘the
interests of Empire security and defence’.77 All the same, by
the end of 1936 Italian consulates were distributing to the
press news bulletins put together with material received by
means of short wave radio.78
No effort was spared by the Fascist authorities in Australia
to use radio as a propaganda instrument. In September 1935
Anzilotti informed Rome that all expenses for intercepting
Coltano radio would be met by the Italian community in
Melbourne.79 In Victoria, the local branch of the Dante
Alighieri Society approached the Australian Broadcasting
Commission applying for permission to broadcast ‘propa
ganda lectures on Italian history, literature, art and music’.80
In 1937 the Ministry for Press and Propaganda instructed the
EIAR to supply radio material to Chandler’s Broadcasting
Service of Brisbane, to be beamed by that company’s
Queensland radio stations.81 At the same time, Italian plays
were sent to the Australian Broadcasting Commission
because, as the consul-general, Vita-Finzi, remarked, ‘the
exercise should be useful to the purposes of propaganda in our
favour’.82
The same year, a committee of Italians approached the
Sydney station 2SM asking for a weekly quarter hour to
broadcast an ‘Italian Session’. The committee consisted of
Signor Rando, Secretary of the Sydney Fascist Branch; Dr
Baccarini of the Dante Alighieri Society; Franco Battistessa of
the Giornale Italiano, and Marco Panozzo. The enterprise was
officially supported by the consular authorities.83 It was
decided to spend the whole period of fifteen minutes on
propaganda in defence of Italy and Italians. Also, considering
the climate of hostility against Fascism, it was felt that a
program purely of propaganda would not be permitted by the
Commonwealth authorities, ‘unless such propaganda were
masked by a horse of Troy of cultural and travel material’.84 A
subscription for financing the project was launched, and
Italian broadcasts took place in Sydney up to the beginning of
hostilities in 1940.
The prevailing tenor of Italian radio propaganda was well
described in a memorandum by the British government at the
end of 1937: its remarks can also be applied to Australia with
regard to the short-wave transmissions from Coltano, to the
local broadcasts and to the material supplied by Italy to
Australian stations. The document concluded:
The general impression gathered during this short initial
period of listening-in is of a well-balanced aggressive, yet
subtle, presentation of carefully selected news items,
often of dubious authority, dealing very largely with
foreign affairs, and edited with a strong ideological bias,
distasteful to democratic countries and particularly
disagreeable to Great Britain.85
By the end of 1936 the Italian authorities in Australia had
built an efficient network of organisations through which
propaganda was passed on to the public. To the fore were the
Fascist branches, formed in all major Australian centres and
in country areas where sizable Italian communities were
present.86 With the Fasci were associated subsidiary societies
such as the Fasci femminili, the activities of which consisted of
raising money, organising social events and maintaining
contacts with Italian and Australian women; the Gruppi
Giovanili, the Fascist Youth organisations; the Associäzione
Nationale Combattenti, the Italian Returned Soldiers Associ
ation; the Italian Army and Navy Union; the Associäzione
Nationale Alpini; the Societa Dante Alighieri, which
frequently contributed financially to the Fascio’s efforts; the
Unione Universitaria Italiana, which encouraged the
universities to introduce the Italian language as a course;87 the
clubs, such as the Club Italia and the Circolo Isole Eolie in
Sydney, the Club Cavour in Melbourne, the Armando Diaz
Club at Cairns, the Club Italiano at Fremantle; the news
papers; the Italian Chamber of Commerce; the Fascio’s
schools. Members of the consular staff were, without
exception, on the executive committees of all these
associations, appointed to control, guide and enforce the
Italian government’s policies. After the Abyssinian conflict
the consulate-general moved to unite all these organisations
and to co-ordinate their propaganda activities. The scheme
included the purchase or construction of a Casa d 'Italia in each
major Australian centre. The underlying purpose was to group
under one roof all Italian associations thus strengthening the
national spirit of their members, maintaining the use of the
Italian language and retarding Italians from assimilating
Australian customs and ideals. Consul-General Vita-Finzi
launched this project in Sydney on 15 August 1936 and funds
were collected in this city in September of that year.88 The
consul-general opened the list of donations with £50 while the
Italia Shipping Line gave £100. Also, the Apostolic Delegate,
Mons. G. Panico, promised his wholehearted authoritative
support. All Italians were solicited for funds with circular
letters, typical of them being the one issued by the
Associäzione Nationale Combattenti in which the aims of the
Casa d'Italia were outlined as being those of commemorating
‘the great victory of our armies in Africa’ and of perpetuating
‘the ideals of the foundation of the Empire and the resistance
of the Italian people against economic trials’.89 Although this
project was never fully realised, since Case d'Italia were
opened only in Perth and Fremantle, the Ministry for Popular
Culture lent its full support by sending to Australia books for
the library of the future institution in Melbourne90 and a film
projector for the one in Sydney.91
Fascism in Australia did not limit its activities to the
dissemination of propaganda by all possible means: it also
controlled its effects by studying the reactions of the Italian
community and by spying on its more active members. It was
regarded as a fact amongst Italians that the consulates
maintained ‘a body of agents who report on the attitude of
local Italians with regard to Fascism generally’.92 This
suspicion was well founded; as we have seen, the consul-
general knew of the location, activities and strength of all anti-
Fascists and in his police work he was aided not only by his
agents and informers, but also by the federal government.93 In
addition Italian Fascists resorted to defamation and slander as
a means of weakening anti-Fascist propaganda by exposing
the character and personal life of their enemies: evidence of
this was given by the Director of the Commonwealth Inves
tigation Branch in a report to the Prime Minister in which he
pointed out that:
we have received in the past numerous allegations
against Italians throughout the Commonwealth, which
very often narrowed down to the fact that such Italians
have earned the displeasure of their consular authorities
or compatriots and have been classified as undesirable,
through refusal to become ardent and active Fascists.94
By 1937 the Fascist officials extended their surveillance not

only to anti-Fascists but also to people who had applied for the
certificate of naturalisation because they were disillusioned
with Fascism or they feared to remain Italian citizens in an
environment hostile to Italy and her policies. In April 1937 the
Italian vice-consul at Townsville, L. Chieffi, approached the
Brisbane branch of the CIB and asked for full particulars and
photographs of two Italians who had become naturalised
British subjects. His request prompted H. E. Jones, Director
of the CIB, to warn the Department of External Affairs that
‘some steps are being taken’ by the Italian authorities ‘to
establish a system of record of Italians who have adopted
British nationality’.95
A large part of Fascist propaganda in Australia was busy
counteracting and dispelling hostile and anti-Fascist
propaganda coming from Italian and Australian sources. It is
unquestionable that the consular authorities felt ‘very hurt
over the unfriendly tone of the Australian press, even down to
Communist publications’.96 When Captain V. B. Brocchieri of
the Fascist Party headquarters in Italy came to Australia on a
tour of inspection of Fascist organisations, he visited the
offices of the Bulletin and Sun newspapers, strongly critical of
Fascism, and volunteered to supply ‘true’ information on
Italian policies, to combat the alleged falsehoods that these
newspapers were publishing and that he considered
‘detrimental to Italy’s interests’.98
The Italian diplomats often protested to the Australian
government against propaganda hostile to Fascism. Grossardi
several times complained of the freedom that Italian
Communists and Anarchists enjoyed in distributing anti-
Fascist propaganda99 and so did Ferrante; in 1936 Vita-Finzi
made representations against the unfriendly content of some
radio programs on Italy’s foreign policy which he described as
‘fantastic and offensive’ and ‘likely to create an atmosphere of
unfriendliness, and to disturb the good relations between the
two countries’;1 Mammalella in 1939 strongly objected to a
play staged in Melbourne, allegedly containing remarks
offensive to the Italian Army.2 Anzilotti in his capacity as
acting consul-general in 1937 protested against an anti-Italian
article in Truth, claiming that the ‘contemptible utterances’ of
this ‘disreputable newspaper’ would ‘arouse ill-feeling among a
community which numbers several thousands and possibly
lead to regrettable incidents’.3
Another reason for the growth of Fascist propaganda and its
nervous, brash, almost violent style can be detected in the
difficulties, frustrations and isolation encountered by Fascist
propagandists in a community and a society increasingly
hostile to their efforts,4 Indeed, a great number of Italians
maintained an ambiguous posture: they conspicuously took
part in Fascist meetings, cheered the speeches of their leaders
and accepted propaganda material, but on the other hand
sought naturalisation and became involved in Australian
activities.5 Thus Italians, although they were the targets of a
capillary system of propaganda, proved refractory to it: they
all declared themselves Fascists, while in fact they were not;
they all raised their hands in the Fascist salute and applauded
at the right moment, in effect they were indifferent. This state
of affairs was realised by Mammalella as he reported to the
Ministry for Popular Culture that his ‘most urgent problem is
that of reviving the Italianness of a colony already in a most
advanced stage of Australian naturalisation’.6
The Australian political world turned out to be far more
impervious to the penetration of Fascist propaganda. Since the
Abyssinian conflict, the Australian press remained constantly
hostile to Italy, her policies and to the representatives of
Fascism abroad. The Melbourne consul, Arrighi, admitted that
it was ‘very difficult, if not impossible’ to have articles ex
plaining the Italian point of view printed by the Australian
press.7 Australian political circles were also adamant in their
rejection of the totalitarian methods employed by the Italian
government in its expansionist adventures: their opposition
was deeply resented by the Fascist consuls, who sometimes
reacted sharply to their self-inflicted position of diplomatic
isolation.8
Granted the obvious restrictions imposed by the political
situation and by the apathy of the Italian community, what
then were the aims that the Italian authorities hoped to
achieve by spreading Fascist propaganda in Australia? In a
letter to the Director-General of Propaganda, Celesia, the
Melbourne consul, Arrighi, confessed that he wanted to
muster the elite of the politically-minded Italians and to form
in Australia, ‘among approximately 30,000 resident Italians, a
core of 5-10,000 propagandists, good, efficient, tough and
determined’.9 In short, he aimed at creating a Fascist fifth
column. His aspiration was in line with the propaganda
policies pursued by the Italian Fascist government. In July
1938 a secret circular letter was sent by the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs to all Italian diplomatic representatives
abroad instructing them to form propaganda nuclei to be put
in action ‘in case of mobilisation’, whose duties would be to:
‘potentiate to the highest degree the Fascist national feeling of
Italians; to influence the local public opinion, and to obtain
when possible useful information; to carry out anti-Communist
propaganda’.10 There is no evidence to the effect that any of
these nuclei were formed in Australia, and Arrighi’s hopes did
not materialise. Yet the absence in this country of a formal,
secretive, para-military intelligence organisation such as the
NuPIE (Nuclei di Propaganda Italiana all'Estero) did not
mean that their aims were not pursued, as the Minister for
Popular Culture, Alfieri, did not fail to point out in his Report
on the Propaganda Nuclei at Home and Abroad in February
1939.11
In the final analysis, Fascist propaganda in Australia
suffered from the strictures imposed upon it by an
unnecessary duplication of efforts: co-ordination of intents
between the various Italian associations and even between an
association and its sister branch in another state was never
totally achieved. What Cornelio Di Marzio complained about
to Ciano in 1934 concerning propaganda abroad could be
considered specifically relevant to the general propaganda
situation in Australia, where ‘today everybody makes
propaganda . . . from the Fasci to the Dante . . . everybody
does what he wants to and as he wants to’.12
Notwithstanding the unavoidable failures of performance
and the defects inherent in its organisation, if the overall
degree of success of Fascist propaganda in Australia is — as it
must be — to be measured in terms of its achievements in
relation to its declared aims, it is very hard not to be impressed
by the considerable success which favoured the Italian
authorities in this continent. Gheisser Celesia, Director-
General of Propaganda, wrote in 1938 that the function of his
department was that of a ‘brain, that should intelligently and
speedily motivate to action other organisations outside itself;
and the publications, the articles, the photographs, etc., should
be a necessary medium, but not the essential part of our
activities’.13 Ottaviano Armando Koch, Director-General of
Propaganda in 1940, went further by adding that propaganda
should:
validly contribute to the activities aimed at clarifying the
principles and the ordinances of the Regime; document in
a fresh and effective way its practical results; fight the
preconceived suspicions against Fascism and the hostile
propaganda; collaborate with other organisations for a
wider diffusion of Italian culture abroad.14
Fascism in Australia achieved all the goals hoped for by
Celesia and Koch, and the various aspects of its success are
quite obvious.
A remarkable degree of control was achieved over the Italian
community, which, willingly or unwillingly, conformed to the
guidelines of Fascist propaganda, took part in Fascist
meetings, gave their money to Fascist causes, educated their
children under the regime’s ideological supervision. So well
advertised was their allegiance to Fascism (whether it was
sincerely felt or not is another matter), that for no other
reason, at the beginning of hostilities, scores of Italians were
interned. Fascist propaganda held the Italian migrant under a
spell, notwithstanding their efforts to assimilate into
Australian society.
Fascist propaganda was also successful in arousing a large
amount of sympathy for the cause of Italy among many
influential Australians, who saw in Fascism the only effective
alternative to Communism and to what they considered a
decadent and weak democratic parliamentary system. Men of
repute such as Archbishop Duhig, Eric Campbell, Archbishop
Mannix, F. M. Bruxner, significantly contributed to orient the
public in favour of the doctrines preached by the Italian
regime.
Moreover, the vitality of Fascist propaganda in Australia
was reflected in the constant concern of the Commonwealth
Investigation Branch for its activities. The branch controlled
all written propaganda, screened all political meetings held by
Italians, planted agents in the midst of their communities,
reported to the government on the contacts of the Italian
diplomats with their nationals, shadowed ail Fascists involved
in political activities.
Furthermore, the enforcers of Fascist propaganda were able
to gain the tactical advantage of maintaining the initiative in
the war of ideas by persisting in their attacks against their
enemies and detractors. The constant repeating ad nauseam of
Fascist oriented interpretation of current events slowly
instilled in the minds of many the idea that there had to be at
least some element of truth in Fascist propaganda. It is

possible to see, then, why many people in Australia, although
opposed to this totalitarian ideology, stood in admiration and
awe of Fascist propaganda and of its dynamic aspects. Many
were caught by its ‘spirit of daring and audacity’, by its
‘brilliant inventiveness, both of phrase and of manner’, by the
‘kind of realism, in the midst of its most sweeping generali
sations, which keep it moving and live’. Many felt its ‘ad hoc
character, as if it were not wholly shackled by the chains of a
closed and completed system’, but could ‘grow and fit itself to
the kaleidoscopic change and the opportunities of practical
affairs ’. 15
Italy’s entry into World War II on the Axis side abruptly
stopped all Fascist propaganda activities in Australia. The
sudden collapse of the intricate network of agencies which
advocated the Italian point of view cannot be attributed to
deficiencies inherent in its structure nor to misjudgments of
the objective political situation, but to the unavoidable
development of Italian foreign policy which, after the Pact of
Steel, was bent on the collision course that led to war against
the democracies. On the contrary, the degree of success of
Fascist propaganda in Australia can be detected, for instance,
in the indisputable fact that even after the outbreak of
hostilities, even in the internment camps, Italians held onto
their belief that Fascism was synonymous with Italy and that,
their country right or wrong, they could not turn away from it,
particularly in wartime, because this would have meant
betraying their Fatherland.
Even more important for its lasting implications is the
political inheritance that Fascist propaganda left to Italians in
this country: namely the condition that alienated them from
exercising their duty to question any government’s right to
rule on all political, moral and intellectual aspects of their life.
Fascist propaganda hammered for years the slogan that
Italians abroad, if they wanted to be respected by their host
countries, must be proud of Italy’s achievements, which were
Fascism’s achievements, since no nation would consider worth
accepting as a new citizen any detractor of his previous
country of origin.
The logic of this proposition, although politically invalid,
stuck in the m inds of Italians in A ustralia, who willingly and

irresponsibly delegated to the propaganda machine of the
regime th a t they had abetted, the job of thinking for their own
sake.
Notes
1 Mussolini in B. Vigezzi (ed.) 1919-25. Dopoguerra e Fascismo,
Bari, 1965, pp. 425-6.
3 Ibid., With the advent of Fascism, the Ufficio Stampa became an
important political instrument, its task being that of controlling
the opposition press. On 9 Aug. 1923 the Ufficio Stampa was put
under the direct supervision of the Prime Minister, who did not
fail to grasp its significance to the purpose of press propaganda
at home and abroad. For an outline of Fascism’s cultural policy,
see Philip V. Cannistraro, ‘Burocrazia e politica culturale nello
stato fascista: il Ministero della cultura popolare’, Storia
Contemporanea, Year I, No. 2, June 1970, pp. 277-8.
4 USNAID, T586/1118/073832.
5 Cornelio Di Marzio, II Fascismo all'Estero, Milano, 1923, p. 20.
6 Ibid., p. 41.
7 On this, see Adrian Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power, London,
1973, pp. 379-401.
9 Ibid., 28 July, 7 Aug. and 14 Aug. 1923.
10 Ibid., 7 June 1924.
11 Ibid., 4 Aug. 1923.
12 Ibid., 7 June 1924; cf. ibid., 24 March 1923.
13 In February he launched a subscription in favour of the Italian
repayment of war debts (Italo-Australian, 13 Feb. 1926), in
March he attacked the Australian Trade Union movement for its
opposition to Fascism (ibid., 27 March 1926) and also spoke at
the Dante Alighieri on Rome’s imperial destiny (ibid., 24 April
1926); in August he addressed a crowd at Sydney’s Lyceum
Theatre on ‘Italy today’ (ibid., 21 Aug. 1926); on 20 Sept, he
spoke at a public ceremony commemorating the anniversary of
the Italian Unity (ibid., 27 Sept. 1926) while on 22 Oct.
celebrated the Fascist March on Rome with a lecture at the
Royal Society (ibid., 25 Oct. 1926); in December he spoke at the
Club Italia at Lithgow (ibid., 6 Dec. 1926), and so on.
14 Italo-Australian, 9 May 1927.
15 USNAID, T586/1122/074445.
16 USNAID, T586/1122/074570.
17 Balbino Giuliano, L'opera e la missione della Dante Alighieri,
Societä Nazionale Dante Alighieri, Rome, 1929, p. 4.
18 Philip V. Cannistraro, ‘II cinema italiano sotto il fascismo’,
Storia Contemporanea, Year III, No. 3, Sept. 1972, p. 417.
20 Ibid., 9 Feb. 1929.
21 Mussolini in Asvero Gravelli, Verso VInternazionale Fascista,
Rome, 1932, pp. 31-2.
22 Ibid., p.228.
23 Piero Parini, ‘Roma ritorna — Ritorna a Roma’, Sole d'ltalia:
Letture Classe V, Rome, 1935, p. 137.
24 AA, CRS A981, Fascism 4, CIB to External Affairs, 4 Jan. 1937.
25 The first declaration of the charter stated that ‘in the moral,
political and economic unity of the Italian nation, completely
achieved by the Fascist State, the School, instrument of
cohesion of all social forces, from the family to the Corporation,
to the Party, shapes the human and political consciousness of
the new generations’, while the second declaration went further
by pointing out that ‘in the Fascist order, school age and
political age coincide. School, GIL and GUF are, together, an
instrument of F ascist education ’ (USN AID, T586/1112/075017).
26 Australian Intelligence clearly saw the political instrumentality
of the Italian schools. One of its officers, Lieutenant J. M.
Allison, reported that Italians in Australia were compelled by
the consular authorities to ‘set up Italian schools and send their
children to them. The teachers of such schools must be members
of the Fascist Party. Their children are also to be organised in
the GILE, the organisation for youth abroad corresponding to
the ONB in its wider aspect in Italy’ (AA, CRS A989, item
925/1/97).
27 In his book on the New Guard, Eric Campbell recollects that ‘my
only source of information in Sydney [on Fascism, NdA.] was Dr
Baccarini, a cultured Italian gentleman who happened to be a
client of mine. From him I borrowed quite a lot of literature on
the subject. It was of the propaganda type, mostly pamphlets in
both Italian and English and even after discounting the bias of
the enthusiastic protagonist authors I liked what I read’
(Campbell, The Rallying Point, p. 131).
28 The Melbourne Consulate received in May 1935 the following
material:
ten copies of the History of the Fascist Movement
thirty copies of the Corporate Economy
twenty copies of the Four Speeches on the Corporate State
by Mussolini
thirty copies of the Labour Charter
ten copies of the Corporate Organisation and Structure,
hardly literature sufficient to inform and influence a community
of thousands of Italians (Italy — Archivio Centrale dello Stato,
Ministero dello Cultura Popolare (hereafter ACS, Minculpop),
Busta 257, Direzione Generale per i Servizi della Propaganda

(hereafter DGSP) to Melbourne consulate, 20 May 1935).
29 ACS, Minculpop 257, Ferrante to Mussolini, 6 Dec. 1934.
30 USNAID, T586/466/031798. The same report stated that ‘today
in the event of an outbreak of hostilities the propaganda network
abroad is formed by 132 Nuclei and 569 activists’ (USNAID,
T586/466/031797).
31 USNAID, T586/466/031812.
32 ACS, Minculpop 257, DGSP to Sydney consulate-general, 23
April 1936; DGSP to Melbourne consulate, 22 April 1936. The
Direzione Generale was quite aware of the fact that in countries
such as Australia, where there was a large amount of hostility
against Italy, the disclosure of the source of supply of such
material would have aroused immediate suspicion of the
trustworthiness of same (USNAID, T586/466/031819). There
fore the Direzione Generale assiduously appealed to its
agents abroad to ‘proceed in their work of continuous and
deep penetration in an “impersonal” manner’ (USNAID,
T586/466/031871).
33 Among the people who received such literature were Michael
Frederick Bruxner, Deputy Premier of NSW; the Hon. H. E.
Manning, MLC, Attorney-General of NSW; Sir Daniel Levy,
former Attorney-General in the first Stevens-Bruxner Ministry;
Mr C. Lloyd Jones of David Jones Ltd; Mr W. J. Cleary of the
Australian Broadcasting Commission; Mr H. E. Drummond of
the Department of Education; Monsignor J. Duhig, Archbishop
of Brisbane; Professor E. G. Waterhouse of the University of
Sydney; Colonel Eric Campbell, leader of the New Guard; the
Hon. F. R. Jordan of the Supreme Court of NSW.
34 USNAID, T586/466/031812.
35 Ibid., T586/466/031807.
36 ACS, Minculpop 257, DGSP to Melbourne consulate, 30 March
1937.
37 Ibid., Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 25 Nov.
1936. In its reply the ministry assured Anzilotti that in future he
would receive propaganda literature more regularly and speedily
(ibid., Alessandrini to Anzilotti, 23 Dec. 1936).
38 Ibid., Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 11 March
1936.
39 Consul-General Vita-Finzi could thus inform Rome that he
succeeded in having published by the Sydney Morning Herald an
article on ‘Abyssinia — Mandate B’, but that, ‘in order to
conceal its obvious propaganda character, I have arranged to
have it rewritten and published under his name by our subject
Luigi Gariglio’. Vita-Finzi enthusiastically explained that ‘the
Sydney Morning Herald is the most read and important daily
newspaper of Australia, completely subservient to the interests
of British conservatives; never before had it printed articles
illustrating our point of view on the Ethiopian problem’ (ibid.,

Vita-Finzi to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 15 Feb. 1936).
40 USNAID, T586/466/031898.
41 Antonio Baccarini, What For?, Melbourne, 1936, p. 12.
42 AA, CRS A981, item Fascism 4, Hodgson to CIB, 24 June 1936.
Also, ibid., item Abyssinia 50 (old), Jones to External Affairs, 28
July 1936.
43 AA, CRS A981, item Abyssinia 30, Pearce to Vitali, 10 Sept.
1935.
44 Ibid., Pearce to Anzilotti, 30 Sept. 1935.
45 The Director of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch
described him as ‘an Italian who came to Australia from Italy as
a woolbuyer in September 1934 .. . Gremmo is an educated man
holding Fascist views on modern Italy’ (ibid., Jones to External
Affairs, 8 Nov. 1935).
46 Ibid.; also, see ibid., Pearce to Vita-Finzi, 13 May 1936.
47 USNAID, T586/466/031877.
48 Arrighi reported that Jackson ‘has always been a firm friend of
Italy, especially during the difficult period of the Ethiopian
conquest, and also later on he has never lost nor loses the chance
to write intelligently on Italy and on international problems
from the Italian standpoint’ (ACS, Minculpop 257, Arrighi to
Ministry for Popular Culture, 15 Dec. 1937).
49 Ibid., Vita-Finzi to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 16 Dec.
1936.
50 Ibid., Italian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Ministry for Press
and Propaganda, 18 Sept. 1936. In his report on the Ministry’s
activities for the year 1937, the Director-General of Propaganda,
Gheisser Celesia, admitted that in cases such as that of the
Sydney Art Exhibition, ‘having to deal with a country in which
it is risky, to the success of any enterprise, to attribute to it even
the slightest propaganda character, the paternity of the
Exhibition has been left to the Biennale, an exclusively artistic
body, although this Administration has financed and organised
it’ (USNAID, T586/466/031844).
51 ACS, Minculpop 257, Costantino to Ministry for Press and
Propaganda, 12 Oct. 1936.
52 The donation was recommended by the Melbourne consul,
Anzilotti, who declared that ‘considering the peculiar conditions
of this political environment, I think that such propaganda
would be very effective and useful to our country’ (ibid.,
Anzilotti to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 30 April 1935).
53 Ibid., Ministry for Press and Propaganda to Miss King, 31
March 1936.
54 Ibid., Ministry for Popular Culture to Sydney consulate-general.
14 Feb. 1938.
55 Ibid., Luciano to Senise, 1 June 1935.
56 Ibid., Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 3 April

1937. Similar assistance was given by the Ministry for Press and
Propaganda to George S. Dempster, Engineer of the Victorian
Roads Board, who in 1937 went to Italy on a study tour (ibid.,
Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 16 Feb. 1937).
The Italian vice-consul of Perth, Costantino, signalled to Rome
the impending visit of Ivor Cardell-Oliver, son of a conservative
MP of the Western Australian State Parliament, who was
interested in Italy’s production methods of synthetic wool,
Lanital. The diplomat suggested that ‘it would be opportune and
useful to assist as far as possible’ Mr Cardell-Oliver, since ‘it is
probable that in future he will enter the political life of this State’
(ibid., Costantino to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 3 April
1937).
57 Ibid., Arrighi to Celesia, 4 June 1937. Similarly, Eva Webb-
Jones, wife of the Italian singer A. Marotta, daughter of the
editor of the New Zealand Wanganui Herald and member of the
Parti to Nazionale Fascista, who went to Italy in order to write
articles on the general situation of the country, was granted
‘every possible facilitation’ by the Ministry for Popular Culture
since ‘she is motivated by a deep feeling of Italianita and has
already carried out in Australia propaganda work in our favour’
(ibid., Tommasi to Depretis, 17 Sept. 1937).
58 Campbell, The Rallying Point, p. 136.
59 H. M. Moran, Letters from Rome, Sydney, 1935, p. 7.
60 ACS, Minculpop 257, Ufficio Stampa, Sezione Propaganda,
Notes for the Duce, 13 April 1934.
61 USNAID, T586/466/031912.
62 ACS, Minculpop 257, Parini to Anzilotti, 6 Sept. 1932. From this
letter it is evident that at this stage the distribution of
propaganda films was not properly co-ordinated by the
consulate-general of Sydney. The Melbourne consul asked Rome
to send directly to him some propaganda films, but was refused.
63 Ibid., Ferrante to Mussolini, 10 Jan. 1933. In the same letter the
consul-general commented that these documentaries ‘constitute
an efficient form of propaganda’ on the viewers, among whom
were many politicians and businessmen. Also, Ferrante informed
the Duce that he was in ‘excellent rapport with many of the most
important owners and directors of local theatres and will take
every opportunity for letting them know the merits of our
Cinema’.
64 Consul-General Ferrante arranged to have the film Year IX
screened ‘as a propaganda exercise among the Italian and
Australian communities’ at Kalgoorlie and Boulder soon after
the racial riots that took place in these towns in 1934 (ibid.,
Ferrante to Mussolini, 3 July 1934).
65 Ibid., Ferrante to Mussolini, 5 Oct. 1933.
Fascist Propaganda in A ustralia 167
66 Ibid., Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 6 Dec.
1935; cf. ibid., Vita-Finzi to Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 12 Dec.
1935.
67 Ibid., Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 6 Dec.
1935.
68 Ibid., Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 15 May
1936. See also Anzilotti’s letter in which he observed that ‘films
in Italian showing current events, public works, sport, etc., are
the best means of propaganda and are highly rated by our
subjects, many of whom have not seen Italy for years. The films
. . . have been screened in many Australian cities and in the most
important country centres where groups of co-nationals are
living, and everywhere they have been shown to a crowded
audience of Italians’ (ibid., Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and
Propaganda, 10 Nov. 1936).
69 Ibid., Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 15 May
1936.
70 Ibid., De Peppo to Melbourne consulate, 28 March 1936.
71 Ibid., Arrighi to Ministry for the Navy, 25 June 1938.
72 Ibid., Vita-Finzi to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 14 July
1936.
73 Cannistraro, Tl cinema Italiano’, p. 444.
74 Quoted in Charles J. Rolo, Radio Goes to War, London, 1943, pp.
105-6.
75 Ibid., p. 47.
76 AA, CRS A1608, item F I4/1/3, Ferrante to J. G. Latham, 6 Dec.
1933.
77 Ibid., External Affairs to Italian Consul-General, 14 Oct. 1935.
Also cf. ibid., C. L. Baillieu to J. A. Lyons, 19 Feb. 1934; and AA,
CRS A981, item Consuls 367.
78 AA, CRS A981, item Fascism 4, CIB to External Affairs, 4 Jan.
1937.
79 ACS, Minculpop 257, Anzilotti to Ministry for Press and
Propaganda, 12 Sept. 1935.
80 Ibid., Dante Alighieri Society to Ministry for Press and
Propaganda, 26 June 1936.
81 Ibid., Celesia to EIAR, 9 Feb. 1937.
82 Ibid., Vita-Finzi to Ministry for Press and Propaganda, 16 Dec.
1936. Also, cf. ibid., Celesia to Sydney consulate-general, 9 Feb.
1937.
83 Cf. II Giornale Italiano, 20 Oct. 1937. The Commonwealth
Investigation Branch reported that ‘this sort of propaganda had
the approval of the Italian Consulate and the principal movers in
the matter are Fascists’ (AA, CRS A981, item Fascism 5, CIB to
External Affairs, 27 Oct. 1937).
84 AA, CRS A981, item Fascism 5, CIB to External Affairs, 27 Oct.
1937.
85 Ibid., British Government Memorandum R7027/1/22 dated 20
Oct. 1937.
86 All Fasci were named after a Fascist fallen during Fascism’s
struggle for the conquest of power in 1919-22, or a Gold
Medallist of the campaigns in Abyssinia or Spain. The
Australian branches were the Luigi Platania in Sydney; Gino
Lisa in Melbourne; Giuseppe Degal in Brisbane; Armando
Bergossi in Adelaide; Paolo Solariol in Cairns; Domenico Picca
at Port Pirie; Edmondo Mazzuoli in Babinda; Riccardo Cittarelli
in Perth; Nicola Nisco at Innisfail; Giuseppe Carli in Fremantle.
There were also a number of Fascist sections at smaller country
places such as Stanthorpe, Texas, Coffs Harbour, Port
Wakefield, Werribee, Wonthaggi, Rabatil (AA, CRS A989, item
925/1/97, Intelligence Report, 7 Aug. 1943).
87 Fascist activities were conspicuous at some universities. At the
University of Melbourne, B. A. Santamaria, then a law student,
was the leader of the group which promoted Fascism among the
students and disrupted anti-Fascist meetings at the university.
He also edited the Catholic Worker, a strongly anti-Communist
Church organ (Judah Waten, interview, 29 May 1973).
88 Italian Bulletin of Australia, Aug. 1936, p. 6.
1937.
90 ACS, Minculpop 257, Arrighi to Celesia, 11 March 1938.
91 Ibid., Celesia to L. Freddi, 21 Sept. 1938.
1937.
93 When Consul-General Ferrante wrote to the Minister for
External Affairs, J. G. Latham, that he had been ‘confidentially
informed’ that an Italian was ‘actively engaged in anarchist
propaganda’ and asked him to supply him ‘with information as
to the identity of this man, his political and moral behaviour’, he
received total assistance from the Australian authorities.
Ironically, while the Commonwealth Investigation Branch was
unable to trace the man’s whereabouts, it was given his address
by the consul-general who had his own sources of information
(AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 365, Ferrante to Latham, 3 Nov.
1933; ibid., R. G. Casey to Ferrante, 6 April 1934; ibid., Ferrante
to External Affairs, 29 Jan. 1934).
94 Ibid., CIB to Prime Minister’s Dept, 12 Jan. 1934.
95 AA, CRS A981, item Nationality and Naturalisation 43, CIB to
External Affairs, 30 April 1937. The two Italians were Ugo
Biondi and Severino Cazzulino, both Communists (ibid., CIB to
External Affairs, 7 Oct. 1937).
96 Ibid., item Fascism 7, CIB to External Affairs, 10 June 1937.
97 Ibid.
98 He even called the attention of the Apostolic Delegate to the
‘violent anti-religious propaganda and vulgar insults against
Fascist Propaganda in A ustralia 169
priests and ministers of the Church’ printed in the newspaper La

Riscossa and solicited the Commonwealth government to
suppress the sheet and to ‘take action against its printers and
publishers’ (AA, CRS A432, item 1932/320, Grossardi to Prime
Minister’s Dept, 1 June 1930; also, cf. ibid., Prime Minister’s
Dept to Attorney-General, 5 Feb. 1929).
99 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 360, Vita-Finzi to External
Affairs, 20 May 1936.
1 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 364, Mammalella to J. A. Lyons, 6
Feb. 1939. The play, Idiot's Delight, condemned war and the
private manufacture of munitions, and one of the characters
referred to certain soldiers, who were presumably Italians, as
swine. In rejecting Mammalella’s protest, the Prime Minister
scored a point by drawing the diplomat’s attention to the fact
that by censoring the incriminating passages, as the latter
suggested, he would ‘direct public opinion attention much more
widely to the banned passages and in that way have the opposite
effect to that desired by those who take exception to the context’
(ibid., J. A. Lyons to Mammalella, 7 Feb. 1939).
2 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 361, Anzilotti to External Affairs,
25 March 1937. Also, cf. ibid., Anzilotti to External Affairs, 31
Oct. 1935; ibid., Anzilotti to External Affairs, 16 Nov. 1935;
ibid., Vita-Finzi to External Affairs, 3 Dec. 1935. The editor of
Truth, approached by the Commonwealth on the matter, curtly
objected that whilst the acting consul-general for Italy was
‘perhaps, to be pardoned for falling into the error of thinking
that Governments, or politicians, in a democratic country are
held in any great awe by newspapers’, he should be informed that
‘the press of Australia asks nobody’s permission before it
criticises even its own Government, let alone that of another
country’ (ibid., F. V. McGuinness to External Affairs, 7 April
1937).
3 In 1937 Celesia ordered the intensification of the propaganda
effort ‘in those countries where contingent political necessities
would demand it and where most markedly hostility and
incomprehension was shown towards us’ (USNAID,
T586/466/031819).
4 Australian Intelligence reported that ‘the majority of the Italian
community in Sydney does not want to be identified with the
Fascist movement by Australian people and neither do they
want to be regarded by the leaders of the Italian Fascisti as
indifferent to their country’s welfare so accordingly they attend
a victory celebration and subscribe small donations to the Red
Cross’ (AA, CRS A981, item Fascism 4, CIB to External Affairs,
4 Jan. 1937).
5 ACS, Minculpop 257, Mammalella to Ministry for Popular
Culture, 11 Aug. 1938.
6 Ibid., Arrighi to Ministry for Popular Culture, 13 Jan. 1938. The
accuracy of this statement is confirmed by a report of the
Commonwealth Investigation Branch stating that ‘there is not
one newspaper here which has ever given the benefit of the doubt
to Italy as, we believe, is the case in England. The Italian
newspaper published in Sydney, II Giornale Italiano, needless to
say, publishes what the consular authorities wish it to, and
attacks the combined press of Australia. It circulates among
Italians and influences no one but Italians who wish so to be’
(AA, CRS A981, item Fascism 7, CIB to External Affairs, 10
July 1937).
7 The Melbourne consul, Arrighi, for instance, described the
Australians’ dismay at the ruthless Fascist warfare in Spain as
an over-reaction by ‘political circles of old, wilted virgins who are
moved by few bombs fallen on Guernica’ (ACS, Minculpop 257,
Arrighi to Celesia, 5 May 1937).
8 Ibid., Arrighi to Celesia, 2 Dec. 1937.
9 USNAID, T586/460/032808.
10 Alfieri remarked that ‘to some of our consular representatives it
has not been possible to form nuclei owing to the lack of a sizable
Italian community and also for conditions peculiar to the local
political environment; nevertheless these factors have not
hindered in those countries our propaganda activity, that is
carried out by members of our Diplomatic Missions’ (ibid.,
T586/460/032809).
11 Quoted in Cannistraro, ‘Burocrazia e politica culturale nello
stato fascista’, p. 281.
12 USNAID, T586/466/031850.
13 Ibid., T586/466/031877.
14 F. C. Bartlett, Political Propaganda, Cambridge, 1940, p. 42.
8
The War Years
. . . there will be hell let loose here very soon.

(Internee, Loveday Camp, December 1942)
Italy’s declaration of war on Great Britain and France was not

unexpected by Italians in Australia. The representatives of the
Italian government had been aware of this possibility since
early May 1940, when they began destroying the documents of
the consular files. When, at dawn of 11 June 1940, news
reached Australia of the declaration of war, the consuls
hurriedly burned the last compromising documents, minutes
before the consulates were closed down by officers of the
Security Service and Army Intelligence.1
The members of the Fasci and the Italian communities had
been forewarned by Fascist propaganda and by consular
officials of the possibility of Italy’s entering the conflict as an
ally of Germany. The Adelaide vice-consul, Felice Rando, was
reported as stating on 23 March 1940, at a secret meeting of
Italians at Port Pirie, that Italy ‘would soon begin the war on
the side of Germany’.2 Therefore, most Italians were not
surprised when they were visited, on the morning of 11 June,
by police and security service officers who came to arrest
them.
171
The methods of identification, arrest and internment had
been worked out in August 1939 and the necessary legislation
had been passed soon after. Since the end of August 1939, a
special branch with the task of screening Italian and German
nationals had been formed at the police headquarters of all
capital cities at the request of the military authorities,3and the
number of its officers had risen considerably in the following
months. For instance, the Sydney branch increased its
strength from 150 men in September 1939 to 250 in September
1940.»
The task confronting these special branches proved a
formidable one, given the large number of Italian migrants in
this country, but they worked hard and fast, and by November
1939 the Victorian branch could report having screened over
12,000 aliens.5 The branches’ findings allowed Military
Intelligence to group all Italians under categories according to
their suspected capacity of being a security risk. Category A
included all people suspected of espionage (Al), of belonging to
the Italian armed forces (A2), of association with Communist
organisations (A3), of association with foreign political
societies such as the Fascist Party (A4), and of association
with criminal groups such as the Mafia (A5). Category B
comprised all people connected with shipping, port or harbour
works (Bl), with transportation or communication systems
(B2), with factories for war material (B3), with public utilities
(B4) or with other occupations affording opportunities for
sabotage or espionage (B5). Category C included all leaders
and people of influence in the Italian community, while
category D included all Italian males of military age, capable
of bearing arms. Under category O were listed all ordinary
harmless persons.6
Well before the outbreak of the conflict, the Australian army
had prepared detention orders, under the National Security
Regulations, for all Italians who were classified under A, B and
C categories, while detention of people grouped under D
category was considered on the merits of each particular case.
For instance, none of the seventy-five Italians in the Northern
Territory, although belonging to Category D, was interned
because, as the Commanding Officer of the Seventh Military
District reported: ‘most of them . .. are in such isolated
The War Years 173
country that they are virtually interned now. They are in
desert country, 250 miles from the nearest settlement, and can
travel only by truck or camel’.7
Italians who had become British subjects were still treated
as Italian citizens and their activities were scrutinised with
great care. The security service did not believe in the sincerity
of their oath of allegiance to the Crown because many of these
naturalised Italians were still active members of Italian
Fascist organisations in Australia. For example, in 1939 out of
the total membership of 300 of the Sydney Fascio, approxi
mately one third were naturalised British subjects.8
When war broke out, the internment machine sprang into
action. With the exception of Victoria, where only the militant
Fascists were arrested (most probably because of Archbishop
Mannix’s strong appeals in support of Italians), internment
was carried out on a large scale, and in some instances people
were interned for no other reason than their foreign birth. The
most distinguished Italian internee was Prince Alfonso Del
Drago, who had been president of the Italian ex-Servicemen’s
Association and a member of the Sydney Fascio. Prince Del
Drago had the honour of being the only internee whom the
Italian government attempted to exchange with Australian
prisoners in its custody. On 8 August 1940, the Japanese
consul-general informed the Australian government that Italy
was interested in the exchange but, because the Italian
government did not hold as prisoner or internee an Australian
of sufficient importance, no exchange took place.9 Other
Italians interned were the sailors and passengers of two Italian
ships, the Remo and the Romolo, which were still in Australian
waters at that time, since their sailing had been delayed by
Australian port authorities. This delay was not accidental:
Canberra had been instructed by London to hamper the
departure of Italian ships by any possible means.10 It followed
that on 11 June 1940, the Remo was seized at Fremantle11 and
its 125 passengers and crew were interned in Western
Australia.12The Romolo had left Brisbane on 5 June but on 12
June she was located in mid-Pacific by a vessel of the Royal
Australian Navy, whereupon the Romolo was set on fire by her
crew and scuttled. The crew and passengers were picked up by
the Australian ship and brought to Townsville, where they
were interned.13
By 10 August 1940, 1,901 Italians had been interned, of
whom more than half, 1,044, were in Western Australia alone.
By now the Director of Military Operations and Intelligence
began doubting the wisdom of this policy of — in many
instances — indiscriminate internment in the interests of
national security.14 Following public protests and appeals by
migrants, by November 1940 Italians could appeal against
their internment to an Aliens Tribunal. At this time 1,544
Italian citizens were interned together with 182 naturalised
Italians, and their number dropped slightly in the next twelve
months only to increase dramatically after Japan’s attack on
Pearl Harbour. At the beginning of 1942, scores of Italians in
Queensland were interned and the number of Italian internees
reached a wartime maximum of 3,651 in September 1942.15
Thereafter, as the danger of a Japanese invasion disappeared,
they were steadily released, and by September 1944 only 135
hard-core Fascists remained in the internment camps, while
3,510 Italians out of whom 711 were naturalised, had been
freed.16
Life in the internment camps was not physically burdensome
for the internees. From the various detailed reports prepared
by the International Red Cross Delegate in Australia, George
W. Morel,17it is quite clear that the treatment of the internees
by the Australian authorities was excellent and that the
relations between the internees and the garrison troops were
cordial. Accommodation, clothing and food were satisfactory
or even of first-class quality. The food rations had been
established taking into consideration the eating habits of
Italians, and the selection of the particular items of food had
been fixed by common agreement between the authorities and
the internees. The camps had an infirmary, a library, a cafe, a
canteen, a recreational and devotional hut, school huts and a
workshop. Each camp had also a Catholic chaplain. Theatrical
performances and concerts were organised regularly, in
addition to film screenings which took place every week. The
sporting facilities were also good. Camp 1A at Tatura, for
instance, where in 1945 there were still fifty-six Italian
The War Years 175
internees, had three tennis courts, a gymnasium and a football

ground.18
Neutral observers19 and even Fascist officials acknowledged
that the Australian military authorities were adhering
scrupulously to the Geneva Convention with regard to the
treatment of civilian internees: Melbourne Consul Luciolli
admitted, after visiting one of these camps in June 1940, that
the conditions were excellent as far as hygiene and facilities
were concerned.20
The tolerance shown by the Australian authorities and the
considerable degree of personal freedom enjoyed by the
internees soon brought about a revival of political activities
within the camps. They were allowed to elect a camp leader,
whose duties included the administration of the camp library,
canteen and kitchen, and the distribution of mail. It was
expected of him to be able to influence the conduct of the
internees under his control and, in general, to be responsible
for their behaviour. Since the majority of the internees were
Fascists, the elected camp leader was invariably a prominent
Fascist. Under his control, the internees continued with their
Fascist rituals, celebrations and political rallies. Even sporting
activities and art and crafts exhibitions were intended to have
Fascist significance; diplomas distributed to the internees still
bore the Fascist coat of arms and were dated according to the
Fascist calendar. Fascist Italians, once interned, were
confirmed in their belief in the final victory of the Axis and
became boisterous to the point that they were quarrelling
among themselves not only in order to assert their authority
over each other, but also on who would govern what state of
Australia once the Nazi-Fascist armies had invaded this
country.21 Between 1940 and 1943 security service officers
reported increasing manifestations of sympathy for Fascism
and for Nazism amongst Italians in the camps,22 and by 1945
the Australian authorities had realised that the influence of
the camp leaders over the internees had been instrumental in
kindling the latter’s faith in these ideologies. An inquiry
carried out by the Minister for Information discovered that:
‘the influence exercised by camp leaders and their supporters
over other internees operate[d] to cause many internees of no
firm political belief to continue their adherence to our enemies’,
and that ‘the camp leaders have not shrunk even from the use
of physical violence if that be necessary to maintain their
dominance’.23 The Director-General of Security confirmed the
accuracy of this finding in April 1945.24
What made the continuation of Fascist practices in
internment camps dangerous was the fact that Italians of
Fascist as well as anti-Fascist opinions had been interned in
the same camps. It was inevitable that their living close
together would cause friction and incitement to violence. There
is conclusive documentary evidence to the effect that anti-
Fascist Italians were harassed, provoked and assaulted, and
that the strong-arm tactics of the Fascist element created an
atmosphere of tension and terror among internees who were
not active supporters of either faction.25 At the internment
camp at Hay, where evidence of intimidation and threats
against anti-Fascists had been obtained by the army and
where in November 1940 an anti-Fascist Italian had been
assaulted,26 the situation was so serious that the camp
commandant recommended to the military board that the two
factions housed in this ‘difficult compound’ be permanently
separated by building a barbed wire fence across the camp.
The army agreed to this proposal in February 1941.27 Yet the
separation of internees at Hay remained an isolated instance
and, in other camps, Fascist and anti-Fascist internees lived
together until the beginning of 1943. Besides, the political
implications of keeping together people so hostile to each other
as well as the gravity of the situation on a human level were
not fully realised until the Fantin case.
On 16 November 1942, an Italian Anarchist, Francesco
Fantin, was killed at the South Australian internment camp
No. 14A at Loveday by a Fascist internee, Giovanni Casotti.
The murder arose from a fight between the two, after Italian
anti-Fascists and Jews of camp 14D had, a few days earlier,
subscribed to a list collecting money in aid of Russia. When,
shortly before, news of the collection had reached camp 14A,
the Fascist clique running the camp was enraged by the
audacity shown by the anti-Fascists. A slogan was
immediately coined: ‘Kill the Communists, kill the bastards
who gave money for Russia’,28 and that same night some
Fascists were overheard saying that they had to kill the
The War Years 177
actively anti-Fascist internees.29 An atmosphere of violence
against the opponents of Fascism had been reigning at the
Loveday camps for some time; Fantin had already been
physically attacked twice, on 15 August, when someone tried
to strangle him, and on 7 November,30 and other anti-Fascists
had suffered the same fate at the hands of Fascist Italians
armed with sticks and razor blades.31 When, at the beginning
of November 1942, 496 hard-line Fascists were transferred
from Western Australian camps to Loveday, the tension
reached a breaking point. The security service later
ascertained that ‘each side, anti-Fascist and Fascist, wishe[d]
to be rid of the other’ and that ‘Fantin’s death was the
culmination of the unequal struggle of anti-Fascists against
Fascists in the compound’.32
The circumstances of Fantin’s death are rather obscure.
Casotti claimed that Fantin insulted him and that he pushed
him in anger against a water tap; Fantin fell and hit his head
against the wooden upright supporting the water pipe and the
tap. Contrary to this account, some witnesses to the incident
stated that Casotti struck his victim on the head with a piece
of wood and that when Fantin fell he kicked him.33 It is
important to determine the exact cause of Fantin’s death
because it throws light on the conduct of the internee Fascists
and of the military authorities following the incident. When
Fantin was brought unconscious to his hut, Dr Piscitelli, who
also was the camp leader and a staunch Fascist, tried to hide
the murder by saying that the heat caused Fantin to faint,
although minutes before he heard Casotti saying T have just
finished that f. . . b. . . Venetian’ and had told him to keep
quiet. He also tried later on to prevent the anti-Fascist friends
of Fantin from giving evidence at the inquest held by the army
only ten days after the event.34 Indeed, Dr Piscitelli concealed
from the Australian authorities the name of the author of the
murderous action until Casotti came forward after the result of
Fantin’s autopsy was known and pleaded guilty of having
pushed Fantin against the tap thus causing his accidental
death.35 Instead, he was charged with murder.
Soon the news of Fantin’s death reached his Italian and
Australian friends outside the camp. Immediately represen
tations against Fantin’s murder and his previous treatment in
the internment camp were made to the government by the
trade unions, Italian anti-Fascists, and political parties as well
as by religious and civil liberty organisations. These protests
also raised the questions why the government kept in
internment people of anti-Fascist opinions, and why these
people were held in camps together with Fascist internees.
Fantin’s murder put in doubt the capacity of the army to
maintain order in the camps and to protect the lives of people
who did not share the same political opinion as the majority of
interned Italians. The security service admitted that the
charge of murder, which could be carried in this case, was
bound not only to embarass the government because it cast
serious doubts on the efficiency of its administration of the
detention regulations, but also it ‘might involve difficult
questions for the Minister to answer’ and ‘might produce
protests and further complicate matters’.36 Consequently,
although the accused’s actions strongly pointed to murder, it
was decided to try Casotti for manslaughter. The changing of
the charge was justified ‘on account of the majority of the
witnesses being alien’.37 It is not clear whether this flimsy
excuse implied that the killing of a foreigner was a less serious
crime than the murder of a British subject or that a statement
under oath by an alien could not be relied upon. Giovanni
Casotti was tried on 19 March 1943, found guilty and
sentenced to two years’ hard labour. Mr Justice Richards in
passing sentence did not leave any doubt that Fantin had been
struck intentionally by the accused, who delivered a very
violent blow that killed the Anarchist. Mr Justice Richards
told Casotti that he might consider himself very fortunate in
not receiving a much heavier sentence, since he had been
prosecuted for manslaughter ‘for reasons which need not be
stated’.38
The conditions of terror in the camps did not change after
Fantin’s murder. At Loveday in particular, Dr Piscitelli and
those whom the security service euphemistically called his
‘confidential friends’39 (that is his Fascist cronies who formed
the political junta in that camp), continued their persecution of
anti-Fascist internees. On 18 January 1943, the camp
commandant was authorised to transfer to a camp in another
state four internees who wished to give evidence on Fantin’s
The War Years 179
death. The transfer was recommended by the security service
‘in order to avoid physical risk from attack by other
internees’.40 In December 1942 a German national interned at
camp 14D at Loveday complained to the Swiss consul, who
protected German interests in Australia, that Italians and
Germans loyal to their governments were compelled to share
the camp with ‘a devilish mixture of elements hostile and
traitorous . . . a group of Communists, Jews, half-Jews and
others . . . ’. This arrangement was undoubtedly intolerable to
these loyal subjects and the Australian authorities, according
to him, bore the responsibility of allowing ‘this continual
provocation in this camp’, which brought about ‘unbearable
tension the result of which may soon be serious’. Indeed,
continued the author of this letter, ‘unless the authorities act
promptly and separate us from . . . similar provocators there
will be hell let loose here very soon’.41 That anti-Fascist
internees were persecuted was well known to the security
service from the many references made by apprehensive
internees in their letters to their friends and relatives.
Moreover, the service admitted that they were unable to
prevent further killings and adopted the ad hoc policy of
releasing the active anti-Fascists ‘in case the ardent Fascists
decided to attack [them] also’.42
Thus Fantin’s murder and the public outcry which followed
had the effect of speeding up the release from internment of
Italian anti-Fascists. At the end of 1942 at least fifty of them
were still interned,43 but their situation improved considerably
with the appointment of Brigadier W.B. Simpson as Director-
General of Security. Not only did he feel disturbed by Fantin’s
death, in view of the fact that he had personally investigated
the case and had set the date for the release of Fantin the week
following his murder, but also he considered it essential to the
war effort and to the improvement of the segregation position
in the camps that all Italians ‘who are known to be anti-Fascist
or even not violently Fascist, should be released’ and usefully
employed in agriculture or industry.44 Although the army was
‘doing its best to segregate the sheep from the goats’,45 that is,
to separate Italian Fascists from the anti-Fascists, it seems
that the army and the security service had different opinions
on their release. The Australian Chief of the General Staff
maintained the view that the loyalty of Italian anti-Fascists to
the British and Allied cause was questionable on account of
‘the intensity of their patriotism for the country of their
origin’, so that even if their sincerity was beyond any possible
doubt, the army believed that they were ‘rightly held in
internment’.46 The security service showed more flexibility on
the issue and in January 1943 made plans for the release of
1,500 to 2,000 Italian internees during the next three
months.47 This measure undoubtedly eased the segregation
problems in the camps and made available to the war effort
considerable labour resources at a time when manpower was
scarce and when Australia, like the United States, Great
Britain, Germany and Japan, was gearing its economy to its
maximum war potential. Yet disturbances in the camps were
by no means quashed after the Fantin case; in January 1943
the Deputy Director of Security for Queensland recommended
the segregation of Fascists from anti-Fascists and Commu
nists at the Cowra camp to prevent violence,48 and in Sep
tember 1944 there was bloodshed at the Hay internment
camp, where the warring factions gave vent to their
smouldering hatred.49 The problem of Fascist influence in
internment camps was still pressing in 1945 when the Minister
for Information, Arthur A. Calwell, suggested that an inquiry
should be held on ‘why the dual systems of Nazism and
Fascism were ever allowed to develop in our Australian
internment camps’.50
Italian anti-Fascists were not the only ones to suffer for their
beliefs from the hands of their co-nationals; many Jews, who
had migrated to Australia after the racial laws had been
enacted in Italy in 1938 and who were stupidly interned
together with the Fascists, were easy victims of the latter’s
prejudice and racial hatred. Only in September 1942 did the
army acknowledge the problem and put the Jewish internees in
a separate camp.51
Italians interned for the whole period of the war remained
firm in their allegiance to Fascism, although the reason for
their attachment sounded more and more like a justification.
For instance, when news of Italy’s capitulation reached No. 9
internment camp at Loveday, the compound observed a day of
mourning and ‘had never been seen so intensely quiet before’.
The War Years 181
With the exception of the Fascist leaders who looked ‘very
sick’ and the diehards who plastered the blackboard of the
school with signs ‘VV IL DUCE’ ‘VV IL FASCISMO’, the
general attitude was that Italians had chosen Fascism as a
lesser evil than Communism.52 Yet the Italian political and
military catastrophe did not convert many, if any at all,
Fascist internees to active anti-Fascism. The vast majority of
them, although still Fascist in sympathy, were loath to be
caught again in any form of political activity and seemed to be
mainly preoccupied with re-establishing themselves and
adjusting their private affairs as soon as they were released
from internment.
A second and by far the largest group of Italians held in
captivity in Australia were the prisoners-of-war captured
mainly in the threatres of operations of North and East Africa
and sent to Australian POW camps. Living conditions and
accommodation in the camps were excellent, and left a most
favourable impression on the International Red Cross
delegate, Morel, who visited them quite frequently. By
September 1943 there were 7,100 Italian POWs in Australia,53
but their number swelled in June 1944 to 14,00054 and to
16,780 in March 1945.55 In December 1945 the army was
holding in its custody 17,131 Italian POWs.56 They were
welcomed by the Australian government who insistently
asked the British War Office to send more of them to this
country to assist in the production of vital foodstuffs.57From 2
June 1943, Italian POWs were employed without guards in
groups of up to three on individual farms and in parties of fifty
to 200 in rural industry.58 By June 1944 over 12,000 were
employed unguarded in rural work of great importance to
Australian food production59 and their number reached a
maximum of 15,000 in March 1945.60 On the whole, they
behaved admirably, were well received by the Australian
families for whom they worked and never represented a
security risk. The army and the security service were anxious
to avoid any fraternising between POWs and civilians, and for
this reason did not allot POWs to farmers of Italian origin.61
Farmers and civilians who were alleged to show friendship
towards POWs were investigated and if the claims were proven
correct they were denied the use of POW labour in future.62
Notwithstanding the penalties involved, Italian POWs in
some cases ‘were being treated as members of the family’ by
Australian farmers.63
POWs released from the camps for rural work did not
include active Fascists, agitators or otherwise troublesome
types,64 who were denied this opportunity. The POW camps
remained the breeding ground for Fascist propaganda. The
enforced idleness and the isolation of the camps, both physical
and intellectual, favoured not only the development of a
climate of mental stagnation and of hopeless clinging to an
outdated interpretation of world events, but also to instances
of moral degradation. In particular, the Italian officers
confined at the Myrtleford POW camp were suffering
tremendously from these conditions and some of them fell
victims ‘to neuraesthenia and to abnormal sexual relations’.65
It is not surprising therefore that Italian POWs who still
believed in Fascism were badly shocked by the news of
Mussolini’s downfall.66 Yet for many prisoners-of-war, as for
many internees, Fascism was a mental habit more than an
ideology, and they could not shake it off even when confronted
with its historical bankruptcy. Evidence of Fascist activities
in POW camps throughout 1944 and the first part of 1945
prompted the Australian army to issue directives in May 1945
to all camp commandants instructing them to eliminate
Fascist ideology and practices in the camps. All Fascist
salutes were forbidden, Fascist signs, emblems and literature
were to be seized, and the sale of the anti-Fascist newspaper II
Risveglio was encouraged. By this the army hoped that the
Fascist diehards would lose their influence in the camps and
that, if steady pressure were applied: ‘to indicate that
continued adherence to the Nazi and Fascist doctrines will
merely lead the persons concerned into positions of great
difficulty for themselves, a change-over in the outlook of the
majority should be inevitable’.67 The army directives warned
also that ‘at a later stage action will be taken in respect of
intransigent minorities’.
The threat of unspecified action against the Fascist
extremists did not materialise because by May 1945 the war
against Italy and Germany was over and the problem of
repatriating all Italian POWs arose. The Australian
The War Years 183
government had previously decided to continue the
employment of Italian prisoners on rural work until they had
to be repatriated or until the need for their labour no longer
existed, but refused to contemplate their retention as civilian
labourers after the war.68 The first ship with 718 prisoners-of-
war left for Italy on 3 August 1945,69and the repatriation of all
Italian POWs was completed in various stages by January
1947, as the availability of shipping permitted.70
Not all Italian POWs returned home; some 130 died in
Australia during their captivity and are buried at Murchison,
Victoria.
The third large group of Italians in Australia were the
migrants who were not interned during the war and who
continued to live and to work amongst the Australians. Their
situation was undoubtedly the hardest of the three groups.
While the position of the civilian internees and of the
prisoners-of-war had been clearly determined and, rightly or
wrongly, they were considered as positive security risks, the
Italians at large were always under suspicion of being a
potential threat to national security and were attacked by the
most irrational and jingoistic section of Australian public
opinion, and not only verbally. Many of them lost their jobs in
June 1940 as a result of Italy’s entering the war.71 The
government was so concerned to prevent a repetition of the
situation which had arisen at the outbreak of World War I
(when job discrimination against enemy aliens had been so
ferocious that ‘it was found necessary to intern these people to
save them from starvation’),72that in 1939 it had already taken
steps to avoid a similar situation and had accepted financial
responsibility for any person to whom the states could not
provide relief.73 The security service backed this policy,
pointing out that unemployed migrants were ‘much more
liable to be affected by hostile and subversive influences . . . in
addition to becoming a burden on the State’.74
The uneasiness created by the fact that so many Italians
were free reached alarming proportions in 1942, when the
danger of a Japanese invasion was really serious. In February
the Labor Premier of New South Wales, McKell, showing a
remarkable lack of humanity, recommended the uprooting of
9,000 Italians living in the coastal areas of the state and their
resettlement in inland areas, but this suggestion was turned
down by the Director-General of Security.75 Even some
security officers were caught in this climate of fear and lost
their objectivity; one of them expressed the opinion that the
Italian community as a whole could not be regarded ‘as other
than a definite danger to the security of Australia’,76 while
another pointed out that all enemy aliens ought always to be
distrusted.77 At times the concern for Italian activities in
Australia reached absurd and irrational levels when people
attributed to them mysterious conspiratorial designs. This
attitude is typically illustrated in a report by a police inspector
from Queenstown, Tasmania, who stated that the local
Italians were: ‘alright, but one has to realise the activities of
the fifth column, consequently none can be regarded as really
reliable, though none of the Italians here appear to be pleased
with the idea of Italy entering the War’.78 Also, purchases of
real estate effected by Italians during the months prior to the
outbreak of hostilities were believed by the New South Wales
Premier to be so suspect ‘as to give the idea that they formed
part of a system ’.79
The presence of enemy aliens not interned and allowed to
carry on with their work or their business contributed to
fanning ill-feeling amongst the less educated Australians who
throughout 1942 persistently and indiscriminately accused
Italians on the South Coast of New South Wales of being ‘a
fifth column and a menace’, and of committing ‘disloyal and
subversive actions’ such as ‘going out to sea in their boats to
celebrate an Axis victory every time the news came thro’.80
However, some people rightly saw that the national interests
were better served by freeing Italians and allowing them to
work in the fields, in the factories, by using their skills and
their manpower to the benefit of the war effort. Those
concerned with winning the war and not with jingoistic
histrionics agreed that the Italians, with the exception of a few
hundred already interned, could not be considered a potential
threat but instead were simple people, attached primarily to
their family, their land and their peasant traditions. The
situation in the Murrumbidgee Irrigation Area of New South
Wales is perhaps typical of most country communities with a
The War Years 185
sizable Italian minority; there, officers of the Department of
the Interior reported:
the Italians are quiet and well behaved and going about
their work in a normal way. All opinions from officials,
business men, and block holders were unanimous that the
Italian element is not likely to cause any trouble . . . The
only potential danger under present circumstances is
that some hot heads amongst the Australians may
endeavour to take direct action against Italians . . . ,81
The Commonwealth government soon realised that the
policy of allowing innocent Italians to return to their
occupations was not only an act of justice as well as of
economic utility, but also a necessity which in many instances
offered no other alternative. For instance, in 1940 the
internment of many Italian farmers in Western Australia
threatened total ruin for the potato crop of that state.
Immediately the federal government was inundated with pleas
for their release coming from people who otherwise would not
have bothered to speak on their behalf.82 Canberra not only
recognised that it was essential, in the general interests of
security, to let Italians carry on with their normal business of
producing food,83 but was also concerned to keep them
informed on current events in their own language, and to this
purpose allowed the previously pro-Fascist Brisbane
newspaper LLtaliano to continue publishing under a strict
censorship well after the outbreak of the war.84
The need of being informed, as well as of informing other
people, was felt by many Italians. To them this meant being
involved in politics again. The war years and the
understandable hostility by Australians towards Italians did
not deter some of the latter who were free from becoming
politically active. Between 1940 and 1945 the same issues
which divided the Italian community in the pre-war years were
still confronting and dividing it, and, in most instances, even
the people involved were the same ones who figured
prominently in community affairs during the 1920s and 1930s.
Nevertheless, the realities of the international situation
compelled the groups and the people competing to achieve
political supremacy within the Italian community to operate
under substantially different political conditions. The anti-
Fascists, now rallying around the Italia Libera Movement, had
to face the situation — new to them — of enjoying the
Australian government’s recognition and support for their
aims and of being in a position to speak authoritatively on
behalf of the Italian community because their twenty-year-old
struggle against Fascism was now the main Allied war aim as
well as the official policy of the new Italian government of the
south. Cast in this role much to their surprise and not on their
own merit, they had to adjust to it after having spent a lifetime
in the political wilderness. The old supporters of Fascism, on
the other hand, without the support of the Fascist consuls and
without the network of clubs and associations through which
Fascism was promoted before the war, were confronted with
the danger of being pushed in their turn into a position of
social as well as political isolation. They soon realised that, in
order to maintain their position of privilege which was
threatened by the political influence acquired recently by the
Italia Libera Movement, they had to discredit the anti-Fascist
policies and to deny them the opportunity of influencing the
majority of Italian migrants.
This operation had a chance of success only if two conditions
could be satisfied: that an ideology alternative to Fascism be
elaborated, which would be acceptable to the majority of
Italians, would not antagonise the Australian government and
would thus create a climate favourable to the defence of their
interests; second, that they should win enough political
backing to balance and to neutralise the support afforded to
Italia Libera by the federal government.The strategy adopted
was based on the indisputable truth that most Italians were
showing little interest in politics as well as on the claim that
they were truly democratic at heart, which obviously was not
easily verifiable. While this line aimed at influencing positively
Australian public opinion, Italian migrants were approached
in a different way. The method used with them was to rely
heavily on the old but by no means ineffective repertoire of
nationalist and conservative propaganda. They were told that
in those days of national disaster they had the duty to
remaining united and that whoever was promoting policies of
division was an anti-national element. It was perfectly useless,
stressed the advocates of this line, to criticise Fascism, Mus
solini, Badoglio and the King, when Italians in Australia did
The War Years 187
not fully understand the situation. The best attitude one could
take was not to be involved in politics, not to take a stand —
with the exception, it goes without saying, of the masterminds
of this policy. ‘We do not know the facts and personally have
neither declared war nor signed the armistice. Let history pass
its judgement on this issue’, wrote one of them.*5
Naturally, the promotion of what was undoubtedly another
instance of the classical Italian game of political trasformismo
depended largely on success in gaining the support of an Australian
institution which could fill the role played by the Italian consuls
before the war, so successful with Italian migrants, and which was
already exerting considerable influence in Australian public life.
No institution could respond better to the expectations of the old
supporters of Fascism than the Catholic Church in Australia.
Indeed, ever since the 1920s the Catholic hierarchy had shown its
intention of shielding the migrants from the doctrines of political
secularism and of Communism, mainly through the activities of its
Italian-born clergy. After the outbreak of the war, the old
supporters of Fascism found a natural and complacent ally in those
priests still free to exercise their ministry. It can be argued that,
while in effect the Church’s support was essential to the former in
the pursuit of their interests, their own involvement as well was
instrumental to the Church’s plan of creating a sizable conservative
Italian public opinion which could thwart the political efforts of
the anti-Fascists. The consequences of this alliance would become
manifest after World War II when its leaders exercised a hegemonic
authority over the second wave of Italian immigrants to this
country.
The clerical spokesman of this policy was the Jesuit Father Ugo
Modotti. He arrived in Melbourne at the end of August 1938 after
Archbishop Mannix had repeatedly pressed the Vatican for a
successor to Father De Francesco, also a Jesuit, who had been
working in Melbourne for fourteen years before his return to Italy
in 1933. From the outset Modotti acted under Mannix’s direct
supervision and authority.86Modotti believed that his religious task
was to stop Italians from becoming atheist and Communist,87 and
to this purpose he began publishing in December 1938 a monthly
bulletin, L'Angelo della Famiglia, which was distributed
mainly in Melbourne. Modotti also contributed to publications
th at declared openly their Fascist sympathies. In October
1939 he published the article ‘World without Soul’ in the Vade
Mecum, in which he condemned modern science, capitalism,
Socialism, materialism and even the ideals of the French
Revolution but did not hesitate in stating that ‘history —
impartial judge — will say in future how farsighted and wise
was Benito Mussolini’s domestic policy’.88 In 1939 Mannix
and Modotti opened in Melbourne schools of Italian language
for Italian children, to ‘protect them from the insidious
objectives of the Communists’,89 that is, to draw them away
from the school that the Italian anti-Fascists, whom Modotti,
following the Fascist custom, indiscriminately called
Communists, planned to open at Carlton.
When Italy entered the war, Modotti was charged by the
Commonwealth Investigation Branch with being a Fascist and
arrested. He was released after two hours thanks to
Archbishop Mannix’s personal intervention and was put on
parole. Nevertheless his movements and his activities were
watched closely by the security service, which suspected him
of espionage, spreading Fascist propaganda and even of
harbouring Italian POW escapees.90 In May 1941 Modotti
complained to the Apostolic Delegate that Italian anti-
Fascists ‘under the pretence of false patriotism’ were
hindering his work ‘as a priest and as an Italian . . . in a foreign
land’.91 His work, inter alia, consisted of sponsoring the release
of the Fascist leaders who were interned, in particular that of
Mario Speirani, F. M. Bianchi and F. Valente. On the other
hand, there is no evidence that he ever made representations to
the government in favour of an anti-Fascist. When the Italia
Libera Movement was formed at the end of 1942, Modotti and
his political friends saw in it ‘another manifestation of the
machinations of principalities and powers and another reason
for the consolidation of [their] work’.92To contain the influence
of the anti-Fascists, Archbishop Mannix in September 1943
launched an Appeal for Italian Relief. Its committee members
were Father Modotti, Mons. P. Lyons, Vicar-General of the
Melbourne archdiocese, B. A. Santamaria and G. Vaccari.93
The appeal aimed at winning the allegiance of Italians through
the Trojan horse of welfare work and religious assistance, and
by December 1943 the results were so encouraging that a
friend of Modotti, impressed by the committee’s work, in
The War Years 189
particular Vaccari's, commented: ‘no wonder Our Lord chose
you blokes to man his principal terrestrial executive’.94
Indeed, Modotti and his associates embarked on their
struggle against the anti-Fascists as if they were the holders of
a supernatural mandate and showed intolerance towards
anyone who opposed them or was mildly critical of their
position. In December 1945 Modotti even accused the
Apostolic Delegate of sympathising with the Communists and
of affording his protection to the editors of II Risveglio.9b Late
in 1943 and at the beginning of 1944 the main channel of
propaganda used by the Modotti group was to insert in the
monthly magazine of the west Melbourne parish, Stella Maris,
a section in Italian called L'Angelo della Famiglia, but soon
they felt the need to revive the parochial bulletin of the same
name published in 1938-40, and in August 1944 its first
number again appeared as a monthly magazine. Ten thousand
copies were printed and distributed to Italian civilians and to
POWs in the camps.96 Nevertheless, even this publication was
considered inadequate to counter II Risveglio and the
increasing amount of anti-Fascist literature circulated by the
Italia Libera Movement. In April 1945 the Apostolic Delegate
asked Modotti to approach B. A. Santamaria to get him to
apply as soon as possible for permission to edit a new weekly
paper for the Italian community, and ordered that the
Delegate’s name should not be mentioned in reference to the
paper since he did ‘not want it known that priests have
anything to do with it’.97 The authorities, according to the
Apostolic Delegate, were sympathetic to the project because
they realised the need to combat Communism. Yet the
Victorian bishops and the Catholic Action forbade Santamaria
to have anything to do with the proposed weekly and the
matter was taken up by a member of the Archbishop’s
Committee, G. Briglia, who in April submitted the application.
The Comptroller-General of Trade and Customs refused to
issue a permit to publish on the grounds that there was not
enough newsprint available.98 This ruling, based on technical
and not political reasons, paved the way for the appearance of
the conservative Italian press of the post-war years.
By mid-1945 World War II was over and Modotti, having
carried out his ‘mission’ in Australia, returned to Italy at the
end of that year. Italian internees were released shortly after
and many of them who had been imprisoned because of their
Fascist ideas returned to their previous positions of influence
and power within the Italian community. The ensuing Cold
War sped up this process of restoration.
Notwithstanding the economic hardships, the hostility of
some Australians, their internment and their status of enemy
aliens, the Italians in Australia came out of the war years
virtually unscathed, both in social and political terms. The
bitter and fratricidal civil wrar which tore Northern Italy apart
in 1943-5 did not cause any irreparable division among Italians
in this country and they were able to become again an integral
part of the society in which they lived. On the whole, the
Australian government and all organisations concerned with
the handling of Italians during the war years behaved towards
them in a manner which gives credit to their tolerance and
sense of fair play, once they were able to understand the
political divisions besetting the migrants. This fact was
admitted by the representative of the new Italian government
in London, Count Carandini, who stated that ‘the Italians in
Australia have been extremely well treated’.99
By 1945 Fascism was politically finished but its legacy
continued to influence the behaviour of many migrants who for
twenty years had been accustomed to giving unquestioned
obedience to the representatives of the regime. After 1945,
unable to free themselves from this state of intellectual
servitude, they depended upon the political guidance of their
‘new’ community leaders, who in many instances were the
same old Fascists who continued in their habit of counselling
the migrants to mind their own business, to avoid being
involved in political activities and taking part in what is the
essential democratic process of questioning things before
accepting them.
For Italians in Australia, after the fall of Fascism, things
changed to remain just the same as before.
Notes
1 See Mario Luciolli, Palazzo Chigi: anni roventi, Milano, 1976, p.
82.
The W ar Years 191
2 AA, MP729/6, item 22/401/211, Army to External Affairs, 12

April 1940.
3 AA, CRS A1608, item A 19/1/1 pt I, SA Premier to Prime
Minister, 8 April 1943.
4 Ibid., NSW Premier to Prime Minister, 11 Sept. 1940.
5 Ibid.. Victorian Premier to Prime Minister, 10 Nov. 1939.
6 AA, CRS A376, item T189, list No. 189.
7 AA, MP729/6, item 22/401/76, Army 7 MD, to Military Board, 2
May 1940.
8 AA, 13.P242, item Q30565, Italians, Master File, p. 9, Report by
CIB officer on Italian organisations, undated.
9 AA, MP729/6, item 63/401/111, Defence to consul-general of
Japan, 24 Sept. 1940.
10 AA, CRS A1608, item 441/1/4 pt II, Dominion Affairs to Prime
Minister’s Dept, 2 June 1940.
11 Ibid., Trade and Customs to Prime Minister’s Dept, 14 June
1940.
12 AA, MP729/6, item 63/401/119, Western Command to Military
Board, 29 Aug. 1940.
13 AA, CRS A432, item 40/335, Crown Solicitor to Attorney-
General’s Dept, 28 Oct. 1940.
14 AA, MP729/6, item 63/401/119, Army to Western Command, 15
Aug. 1940. The Western Australian internees included 690
Italians working in the goldfields area, interned because ‘it was
feared that riots would eventuate and mining property be
destroyed, thus seriously affecting not only the morale of the
people, but also the general war effort’!; 125 from the Geraldton
area, where the army had its second largest oil reserves in
Western Australia, and eighty-three from the South Western
timber areas, interned because ‘of the likelihood of strikes taking
place unless the Italians are interned’ (ibid.) Western Command
to Military Board, 29 Aug. 1940).
15 Paul Hasluck, The Government and the People, 1939-1941,
Canberra, 1965, p. 594. At this time all Italians in Queensland
were considered ‘as being potentially very dangerous to the
security of Australia in the event of a Japanese invasion or
attack’ (AA, CRS A1608, item 319/1/4, Trade and Customs to
Prime Minister’s Dept, 16 March 1942).
16 Sydney Morning Herald, 30 Nov. 1944.
17 Morel was appointed delegate in February 1941. See AA, CRS
A989, item 40/4 pt I, External Affairs to G. Morel, 13 Feb. 1941.
18 AA, CRS A1066, item IC45/32/10, Morel to IRC, 21 March 1945.
19 The Jesuit Archives, Hawthorn, Victoria. The Modotti Papers
(hereafter JAMP), A. Owens to Modotti, 3 Dec. 1941. The
Military chaplain at Tatura assured Modotti that he ‘must not
think for a moment that they are being harshly treated. Under
international law, prisoners-of-war have certain rights that have
to be respected. In these camps however, the authorities do not
limit themselves to doing only what they are bound to do. The
prisoners are granted many privileges, and I often see instances
of how the Camp Commandants and others go out of their way to
do something to help them, in cases where there is certainly no
obligation on them to do so’.
20 Luciolli, Palazzo Chigi, p. 84.
21 Giuseppe Zammarchi, interview, 14 March 1974. See also AA,
MP508/1, item 255/714/241, Army Minute Paper, 11 Dec. 1940,
which quotes the following extract from a letter written by an
internee at Hay: T am in the midst of a noisy howling mob of
Fascists. They quarrel bitterly among themselves, the Fascists
of N.S.W. against those from Victoria and Queensland, to decide
who is going to control the internal affairs of the cam p. . .
22 ‘There are quite a few Italians in the camp who are very pro-
German’ (from the Security Service Report on an interview with
an internee at the Loveday camp on 5 November 1943, in AA,
AP538/1, item SA20499).
23 AA, CRS A373, item 10913, Minister for Information to
Attorney-General, 7 March 1945.
24 ‘Though the results of the War had done much to destroy Fascist
beliefs, the Party spirit had been kept alive in internment camps
by leaders’ (AA, CRS A1066, item E/45/19/11, Director-General
of Security to External Affairs, 3 April 1945).
25 An anti-Fascist, writing to a friend on 18 November, 1942 from
Loveday, informed him that ‘if there would not have been the
deterrent and the fear of the [Australian] Military Command, I
am certain that [the Fascists] before now would have done us’
(Cristofaro Papers, V. Manassero to Cristofaro, 18 Nov. 1942).
Another Loveday anti-Fascist conveyed to a friend the
atmosphere of terror reigning in the camp when he asked him to
get him out of there because ‘especially in these days here we are
in a terrible situation, we are very few, and you understand the
reason; I hope that you will be able to do something for me soon’
(Cristofaro Papers, G. Sceresini to Cristofaro, 22 Nov. 1942). Yet
another Loveday internee wrote to his sister-in-law on 22
December 1942 that T do not wish to remain among certain
Italians . . . I am afraid among these people’ (AA, CRS A373,
item 10913, Intelligence Report No. 188). Another one, writing
to his wife in January 1943 said that ‘the atmosphere here is a bit
tense . . . I keep out of all political trouble but the tension
between 100 per cent Communists and Fascists is growing . . .
From one of the Italian mess-huts sounds the Fascist hymn —
just now sounds the Fascist salute. I can see it come there is
trouble in the air’ (ibid.).
26 AA, MP508/1, item 255/714/241, Eastern Command Intelligence
Report No. 39, 6-13 Dec. 1940. Also Zammarchi, interview.
27 AA, MP508/1, item 255/714/241, Eastern Command to Military
Board, 31 Jan. 1941; Military Board to Eastern Command, 25
Feb. 1941.
The War Years 193
28 Advertiser, 22 Jan. 1943; Sunday Telegraph, 24 Jan. 1943.

29 AA, CRS A373, item 3744, SA Intelligence Report attached to:
Security Service, Qld to Security Service, Canberra, 16 Jan.
1943.
30 Ibid., item 10913, SA Intelligence Report No. 191, 2 Feb. 1943.
31 Ibid., item 3744, G. Bossone’s statement on the attack suffered
by him, undated.
32 Ibid., SA Intelligence Report attached to: Security Service, Qld
to Security Service, Canberra, 16 Jan. 1943.
33 Ibid., ‘What goes on in Internment Camps’.
34 Ibid. Also, ibid., Director-General of Security to Security Service
Brisbane, 16 Dec. 1942.
35 Ibid., SA Intelligence Report for week ending 20 Nov. 1942.
36 AA, CRS A373, item 10913, Security Service Adelaide to
Security Service Canberra, 6 Feb. 1943.
37 Ibid., Security Service Adelaide to Brigadier W. B. Simpson,
Canberra, 2 March 1943.
38 Ibid., Text of Sentence passed by Mr Justice Richards, R. v
Giovanni Casotti, 19 March 1943.
39 Ibid., item 3744, SA Security Service Report for week ending 20
Nov. 1942.
40 Ibid., Security Service, Confidential Note on Death of internee
Francesco Fantin at Loveday, 18 Jan. 1943.
41 Ibid., SA Intelligence Report No. 183, 8 Dec. 1942.
42 Ibid., Director-General of Security to Security Service Brisbane,
16 Dec. 1942.
43 Ibid., List of anti-Fascist Italians interned, 18 Jan. 1943.
44 Ibid., Director-General of Security to Waterside Workers’
Federation of Australia, 1 Jan. 1943.
45 Ibid., Director-General of Security to Attorney-General, 8 Jan.
1943.
46 Ibid., Army to Director-General of Security, 9 Jan. 1943, ref.
910.
47 Ibid., Army to Director-General of Security, 9 Jan. 1943, ref.
912.
48 Ibid., Security Service Brisbane to Director-General of Security,
2 Jan. 1943.
49 Ibid., item 10913, Minister for Labour and National Service to
Director-General of Security, 12 Sept. 1944.
50 Ibid., Minister for Information to Attorney-General, 7 March
1945.
51 Ibid., item 3744, Army to Rev. C. V. Pilcher, Jan. 1943.
52 AA, AP613 Series 2, item 90/1/237, Intelligence Report, Loveday
camp, 10 Sept. 1943. The majority stated that ‘they were
Fascists by compulsion rather than design, and were glad the
Regime had ended’ (AA, AP613 Series 2, item 130/1/37, Army
SA to Army Headquarters, 12 June 1945). The veracity of both
statements, in particular the second one, is very doubtful,
because by this time most POWs, even the less articulate ones,
had sensed the momentous changes taking place in Italy and
were seeking to adapt themselves to the new political reality by
claiming to have always felt an inward distaste for the regime, a
sentiment which obviously could not be substantiated.
53 A A, CRS A989, item 925/1/34, Cablegram, High Commissioner’s
Office, London, to Prime Minister’s Dept, 10 Sept. 1943.
54 Ibid., item 925/1/111, Teleprinter, External Affairs to Army, 5
June 1944.
55 AA, CRS A1066, item E/45/19/11, External Affairs
Memorandum, Appointment of an Italian Agent, 27 March
1945.
56 Ibid., item IC45/32/6/25, Cablegram, External Affairs to High
Commissioner’s Office, London, 3 Dec. 1945.
57 AA, CRS A989, item 925/1/34, Cablegram, External Affairs to
High Commissioner’s Office, London, 22 Oct. 1943.
58 Ibid., item 925/1/87, Army to External Affairs, 22 July 1943.
59 Ibid., item 925/1/111, Cablegram, External Affairs to the
Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, London, 7 June 1944.
60 AA, CRS A376, item T321, Security Service Canberra to all
Branches, 15 March 1945.
61 AA, CRS A373, item 11638 pt I, Director-General of Security to
the Director-General of Manpower, 7 Feb. 1944.
62 Ibid., Survey of POW Employment Scheme in Shepparton
District, 26 Jan. 1944.
63 A A, CRS A376, item T321, Security Service Launceston to
Security Service Hobart, 22 March 1944.
64 AA, CRS A989, item 925/1/87, Army, Procedure for
Employment of POWs without guards, p. 3.
65 Ibid., item 925/1/30 pt 3, G. Morel, Report on the visit made to
the Italian Prisoners of War camps at Myrtleford, Victoria, 17
July 1943.
66 On this, see AA, CRS A373, item 6811, ‘Reaction to Overthrow
of Fascism in Italy and Surrender of Italy’, 1943-44.
67 AA, AP613 Series 2, item 130/1/37, Army Headquarters, 4th
MD to POWs camps, 25 May 1945. On Fascist influence in POW
camps, see AA, CRS A989, item 925/1/69, Army to External
Affairs, 3 Dec. 1943.
68 AA, CRS A989, item 925/1/87, Cablegram, External Affairs to
the High Commissioner’s Office, London, 6 Nov. 1944.
69 AA, CRS A1066, item IC45/7/25, External Affairs to Mrs E.
Morel, 6 Nov. 1945.
70 Ibid., item IC45/32/6/25, External Affairs to the High
Commissioner’s Office, London, 3 Dec. 1945.
71 On this, see AA, CRS A1608, item A19/1/3, Prime Minister’s
Dept to Mr D. Filipuzzi, 19 June 1940; Attorney-General’s Dept
to C1B Canberra, 20 Aug. 1940. Also II Risueglio, 13 Nov. 1946
and 22 Jan. 1947.
The W ar Years 195
72 Ibid., Defence to Prime Minister’s Dept, 30 Oct. 1939.
73 Ibid., Treasury to Prime Minister’s Dept, 23 Nov. 1939.
74 Ibid., item D19/1/1, Director of Military Intelligence to NEWS
Commands, undated.
75 Ibid., item A19/1/3, NSW Premier to Prime Minister, 23 Feb.
1942; Director-General of Security to Army, 16 July 1942.
76 AA AP719/3, item SA22082, Security Service Sydney to
Security Service Adelaide, 9 Feb. 1942.
77 A A, CRS A376, item T311, Deputy Director of Security,
Tasmania, to Director-General of Security, 9 Dec. 1942.
78 Ibid., item T189, Inspector T. A. Canning to Commissioner of
Police, Hobart, 3 June 1940.
79 AA, CRS A1608, item D19/1/2 pt I, NSW Premier to Prime
Minister, 10 July 1940.
80 Ibid., item W19/1/1 pt I, R. N. Beale MLA to Prime Minister, 21
March 1942.
81 AA, CRS A433, item 43/2/201, Report by officers of the
Department of the Interior, 12 July 1940.
82 AA, CRS A1608, item SC B19/1/2, WA Premier to Prime
Minister, 6 Aug. 1940; Senator Allan McDonald (WA), Hansard,
Senate, 20 Aug. 1940.
83 Ibid., item E 19/1/2, Department of Defence Co-ordination to
Prime Minister’s Dept, 27 Aug. 1940.
84 Ibid., item B19/1/4, Army to Prime Minister’s Dept, 21 May
1941.
85 JAMP, Vaccari to E. Rubeo, 4 Oct. 1943.
86 Ibid., Statement by Archbishop Mannix, 15 April 1943.
87 Ibid., Modotti to Father Magni, 15 May 1939.
88 ‘Mondo senz’anima’, Vade Mecum, Oct. 1939.
89 JAMP, Modotti, Statement, 15 April 1943, p. 4.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., Modotti to Panico, 7 May 1941.
92 Ibid., M. F. Toad to Modotti, 29 Dec. 1943.
93 Ibid., Modotti to E. Rubeo, 14 Oct. 1943; Modotti to Father
Provincial, 31 Dec. 1945.
94 Ibid., M. F. Toad to Modotti, 29 Dec. 1943.
95 Ibid., Modotti to Father Provincial, 31 Dec. 1945.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., J. Meagher, SJ, to Modotti, 11 April 1945.
98 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, External Affairs Memorandum,
28 June 1945.
99 AA, CRS A1066, item IC45/15/13/1, Bruce to Prime Minister, 8
March 1945.
9
The Italia Libera Movement
I tell you, my Italian friends, that we, small Italian

community in Australia, must all group ourselves in this
association ITALIA LIBERA, open to all who feel that
the duty of a good Italian is to help with all means those
who fight for the destruction of nazism and fascism.
(Massimo Montagnana, 18 April 1943)
At the beginning of 1942, to most Australians the war against
the Fascist powers had become a desperate struggle for their
physical survival. The fail of Singapore, the bombing of
Darwin, the Japanese advance in New Guinea, were traumatic
experiences: the enemy presence at the doors of the country
made everybody aware of the need for vigilance against any
possible enemy or collaborator within.
In March the members of the anti-British, quasi-Fascist and
anti-Semitic Australia First Movement were secretly
interned.1During the same period more Italians were rounded
up, especially in Queensland, where the Commonwealth
government feared a Japanese landing.
In these circumstances the Italians in Australia who had
opposed Fascism since its inception became aware that, for
197
several reasons, their old methods of fighting this doctrine
were no longer effective.
First, there was widespread distrust of all Italians, whatever
political ideas they claimed to profess and irrespective of their
period of residence in Australia. They were suspected of being,
if not actual, at least potential fifth columnists. Scared of
being even remotely involved in political activities, Italians
tended to shun political discussions.
As so many of them were interned, the size of the audience
for the anti-Fascists, who, before the war, had concentrated
their propaganda efforts almost exclusively on the Italian
community, was greatly reduced. This factor, and the lack of
political rapport with the Australian public promised to
hamper any effort to revive the struggle against Fascism
along the lines followed in the past. Many anti-Fascists
recognised the need for a radically new approach to fighting
Fascism; they believed that an anti-Fascist policy, in order to
be effective, should take note of the changed political reality
and that this new outlook should be institutionalised by the
creation of a new political organisation. The isolation and, even
more, the hostility which the anti-Fascists experienced during
these months of 1942 magnified the blunders of their previous
tactics and forced them to reassess their strategy and to plan
it along altogether different lines.
They realised, for instance, that they had made a great
mistake in neglecting to obtain the support, or at least the
interest, of the Australian people for their cause. They had
restricted their activities to the Italian community, thus
failing to ‘internationalise’ the struggle against Fascism. In
consequence of their shortsightedness, anti-Fascism before the
war was understood by Australians to be a parochial squabble
among migrants, and of no direct relevance to their society.2
To achieve success now, Italian anti-Fascists had to win the
backing of the Australian people.
Another shortcoming of Mussolini’s enemies was now
identified in their failure to establish a liaison with Australian
politicians, who could be lobbied for their support against
Fascism. Anti-Fascism had never become a pressure group.
The Australian government and the politicians had been
The Italia Libera Movement 199
approached only by the Italian consuls and by pro-Fascist
businessmen.
Further, it was realised that in order to guarantee the
success of a new anti-Fascist policy in 1942, it was necessary
to attract to the anti-Fascist ranks not only the Italians who
had been and were opposed to Fascism because of its
totalitarian philosophy, but also those who in the past had
been the victims of Fascist propaganda and were now ready to
support the Allied cause and the creation of a new, democratic
Italian state. The policy of confrontation carried out for
twenty years had to give way to a policy of persuasion.
Also, Italians opposed to Mussolini’s regime became aware
that it was their duty to contribute to the Allied war effort
against Fascism by forming a democratically elected
organisation through which they could express their
aspirations for Italy’s future. In this, they were inspired by the
example already given by Italian exiles in other countries. On
12 November 1941, a few Italian political refugees in Mexico
City, among whom were Francesco Frola (who had been
Socialist deputy for Turin and member of the Direzione of the
Italian Socialist Party), Mario Montagnana (Communist
leader and brother-in-law of Palmiro Togliatti) and Vittorio
Vidali (the legendary Communist commander of the Fifth
Regiment in the Spanish Civil War), founded the Alleanza
Internazionale Giuseppe Garibaldi.3 A branch of the Alleanza
was soon open in Bolivia. In New York the Mazzini Society,
under the patronage of Count Sforza and of Randolfo Pac-
ciardi, ex-commander of the Garibaldi Battalion in Spain and
future leader of the partisans in northern Italy, organised all
Italian anti-Fascists in the United States. A similar
association, the Italia Libre, was formed in Argentina.
The aim of these associations was to rally Italians abroad
against Fascism, but they were hindered by the political
differences which divided them. Several attempts were made
to bring them together, the most notable being the
Montevideo conference in August 1942, attended by all the
American associations, but the result was unimpressive. Yet
the need and the urgency of achieving unity of purpose was
admitted by all parties: in the first place by the Italian
Communist Party in exile, which for years had advocated from
the columns of its theoretical magazine Stato Operaio the need
for unity among anti-Fascists,4 and in particular by Mario
Montagnana from Mexico City who clearly saw where the
political duties of Italian anti-Fascists lay. In an article
published in February 1943, which outlined policies that had
been put forward early in 1942, although not quite as clearly,
by other correspondents of Stato Operaio, he declared that the
task was:
(1) To achieve immediately . . . as much unity as it is
possible to achieve right now.
(2) To clarify, orient and organise the great migrant
masses.
(3) To be aware of, and to make known, the fact that the
anti-Fascists . . . have the right to represent and do in
fact represent the interests and the aspirations not only
of the Italian migrants, but also — as much as this is
possible, far away from their country, and without very
strong contacts with it — those of the Italian people
who are living in Italy.5
The influence of these ideas on the anti-Fascists in Australia
was remarkable. At this time both Frola and Montagnana
were corresponding with Matteo Cristofaro, the Melbourne-
based secretary of the Italian Anti-Fascist Movement. A
further reason for the interest of the Melbourne anti-Fascists
in the Alleanza Garibaldi was the arrival in that city of the
brother of Mario Montagnana, Massimo, and of his wife, Rosa.
Indeed, the presence of Massimo produced a stimulating effect
on the other anti-Fascists. When Omero Schiassi, Matteo
Cristofaro and Paolo De Angelis went to his residence on 3
September 1942, to meet him for the first time, it was then and
there decided to form a new anti-Fascist movement in
Australia, modelled on the Alleanza Garibaldi. The idea was
put forward to all Melbourne anti-Fascists at a meeting at the
Savoy Theatre on 6 September 1942 and was unanimously
accepted: Cristofaro wrote to Mario Montagnana and
announced the Italian Anti-Fascist Movement’s affiliation to
the Alleanza Garibaldi.
In the months which followed, the name to be given to the
new organisation and the policies it was to adopt were widely
discussed in Melbourne. At first Omero Schiassi, the
intellectual doyen of Italian anti-Fascists, wanted to maintain

the title of the old association, the Italian Anti-Fascist
Movement,6, but soon realised that a new name was needed, to
symbolise the new direction taken by the anti-Fascist policy in
Australia. He very much liked the name Garibaldi Anti-
Fascist Movement, but immediately saw that its choice would
have been a grave political mistake. At this stage, Schiassi
was firmly convinced that it was imperative for the anti-
Fascists to stop their policy of outright condemnation of
Fascism and to appeal instead to the sentiment of national
unity of all people who had previously been insensitive to the
anti-Fascist call. 7 The adoption of the title Garibaldi Anti-
Fascist Movement would be calamitous since it would deter
the two major sections of the community, the Fascists and the
Catholics, from joining the new association. Schiassi rightly
saw that there was no hope of creating an anti-Fascist mass
movement without their support. ‘We are appealing to the
Fascist masses, victims of the Fascists’, wrote the old
Socialist, ‘but how can we believe or hope, and anyhow with
what political decency can we say: you Fascists become here
and now anti-Fascists ! ’ 8 The very mention of the name
Garibaldi would inevitably alienate the Catholics, who would
not be prepared to serve in a movement named after the anti
clerical hero of the Two Worlds. Eventually consensus was
reached over a name (proposed by the more recent refugees,
Jewish and Communist), which would avoid all ideological
obstacles and would allow all people to subscribe to it without
any loss of dignity. The new movement was christened
Movimento Italia Libera (Free Italy Movement), and the
Italian Anti-Fascist Movement of Melbourne and the Sydney
anti-Fascists promptly announced their affiliation to it . 9
Immediately Italia Libera began to formulate its new
policies. It accepted Schiassi’s principle that, for the sake of
unity, all Italians who would be prepared to work for the Allied
cause and for the defeat of the Axis should be admitted in
Italia Libera. This concept was in line with the policy pursued
at this time by the Alleanza Garibaldi and by the Italian
Communist Party . 10 The opening of the doors to people who
had previously served in the Fascist ranks did not mean an
ideological surrender. As Schiassi put it:
the stretched hand to the Fascists does not mean an
embraqon nous general, the forgetting of all crimes
committed. On the contrary. When the end will come, not
one criminal must escape the just and more than earned
punishment.11
Another important aspect of the new policy was the
concerted effort, as from November 1942, to secure the
support of distinguished Australians. To this purpose, the
friendships and acquaintances which Schiassi had cultivated
over the years proved an invaluable asset. In particular, he
was able to obtain the active co-operation of his friend and
colleague A. R. Chisholm, Dean of the Faculty of Arts of
Melbourne University. Professor Chisholm not only translated
all pamphlets and letters for Schiassi and the movement, but
his most valued contribution consisted in lobbying his
influential Australian friends in support of Italia Libera.
A third but by no means less important goal was to achieve
official recognition of the movement by the Australian
government, in particular, to obtain from the Attorney-
General, Dr Evatt, the necessary legality to operate in the
open. At the end of January 1943 Evatt was sent a letter,
drafted by Professor Chisholm and signed by Schiassi,
requesting the government’s permission to work amongst
Italians to assist in the Allied war effort. The letter stressed
the fact that the movement was being sponsored by eighteen
Australians, among whom were Sir Isaac Isaacs, ex-Governor
General of Australia; E. J. Holloway, Minister for Social
Services; Senator Don Cameron, Minister for Aircraft
Production; Sir Harry Lawson, former Premier of Victoria; the
writer Vance Palmer; Professor Walter Murdoch, Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Western Australia; Professors
A. B. Gibson and H. A. Woodruff of Melbourne University;
Maurice Blackburn, Labor MHR; Judge Foster; Brian
Fitzpatrick, historian and General Secretary of the Australian
Council for Civil Liberties.
The Attorney-General’s Department immediately consented
to allow the Italia Libera Movement to operate as requested.12
There is no available evidence to explain why the Australian
government at this point allowed such an organisation to work
freely amongst the subjects of an enemy country. Perhaps
Canberra wanted to exploit all available anti-Fascist
movements for propaganda purposes; yet there is no record
showing that Italia Libera was used to such purpose. Most
probably the sympathetic attitude of the Commonwealth was
due to the life-long personal interest in the cause of Italian
anti-Fascism by the Ministers Holloway and Cameron and to
the social and political influence of the Australian sponsors.
At the same time, Chisholm in his capacity as honorary
president and Schiassi as chairman, as well as Montagnana as
general secretary of the movement, began canvassing for
support among the Italian community, in anticipation of the
first General Assembly of the members of Italia Libera. A
circular letter sent to many people in Melbourne summarised
quite clearly the aims and the political parameters within
which the movement planned to operate, although all matters
of policy and procedure had not yet been codified and had to be
endorsed by the General Assembly. It was pointed out that
Italia Libera stood:
for the ending of the Mussolini Regime; the ending of the
German domination of Italy; the immediate opening of
peace negotiations by Italy with the Allied countries; and
a free popular election in which all Italians can decide
their own future.
The letter continued:
We aim to win for the support of this programme all
freedom-loving Italians whether they be Liberals,
Socialists, Catholics, or former supporters of the Fascist
Party. We ask the support of Australians as well as
Italians for the ‘Free Italy’ movement. This will add
strength to the movement and help to bring Government
patronage and support which we are confident we can
secure.13
The first General Assembly of Italia Libera was held at the
Assembly Hall in Melbourne on 18 March 1943. Eight hundred
people were present. The Vice-Chairman, K. Petrucco, opened
the proceedings by reading a letter from Dr Evatt. Then
Professor Chisholm took the chair and a discussion followed on
the three points which would form the political platform of the
movement.
They were:
(1) The triumph of the United Nations.
(2) The overthrow of the Mussolini regime.
(3) The restoration of democratic freedom in Italy.
A motion was moved by Schiassi for their adoption and it was
carried by the Assembly. After the election of fifteen members
to the committee and of seven to the executive committee, the
question of the movement’s new name was raised. Matteo
Cristofaro’s motion proposing that it should be called Italian
Democratic Movement was defeated; instead, the resolution
by R. A. Shaw, Lecturer in Italian at Sydney University, that
the movement be named Italia Libera — Australian Italian
Anti-Fascist Movement, was seconded by L. Stellato and
carried unanimously. The committee was instructed to frame a
constitution for the movement14 and telegrams were sent to
Count Sforza in the United States and to Dr Frola in Mexico
informing them of the foundation of Italia Libera, while
another telegram was sent to Prime Minister Curtin asking for
the sympathy and co-operation of his government in carrying
out the movement’s program.15
A month later Italia Libera held its first public meeting in
Melbourne. Professor Chisholm, Massimo Montagnana,
Matteo Cristofaro and Omero Schiassi spoke, and E. J.
Holloway represented the Australian government. The
minister stressed the point that:
the Italian anti-Fascist organisation was meant to be a
means by which freedom-loving Italians could help each
other in an organised way, to help the Australian
Government’s effort towards defeating the Japanese war
lords and the war against the Axis group generally.16
His statement betrayed the government’s intention not to
grant the movement any special status or right of
representation on behalf of Italians and the admission that its
activities were tolerated only as far as they conformed to the
Commonwealth policy and did not pursue an independent
course. In this way Italia Libera Movement began its work
among the Italians in Australia.
One of its first tasks was to obtain the release of all anti-
Fascists from the internment camps. The movement
corresponded with a large number of the internees and in many
instances was able to make successful representations on their
behalf to the federal government. Canberra’s official
recognition of Italia Libera allowed its members to lobby with
increased confidence federal MHRs and cabinet ministers on
problems concerning Italians in Australia;17 in particular, the
government was asked to change the classification of anti-
Fascist Italians from ‘Enemy Aliens’ to the one of ‘Friendly
Aliens’. Furthermore, Italia Libera protested against the
discrimination practised against Italians conscripted in the
Allied Works Council, since they were treated and paid worse
than Australian workers and their civil rights were not
respected. In addition the movement pressed the Common
wealth to allow all naturalised anti-Fascist Italians to serve in
the armed forces against the Axis.18 Matteo Cristofaro even
tried to obtain permission to visit the internment camps,
especially the one at Loveday, South Australia, where most of
the Italians were interned, to muster support for the
movement, but his request was turned down by the security
service.19
Notwithstanding the inevitable failures, Italia Libera
succeeded in obtaining the release of many anti-Fascists, some
of whom were Jewish refugees who had escaped from Italy
after the 1938 racial laws. They joined the movement and
became its intellectual leaders.
The contacts with Italian internees at the end of 1942 and
during the first half of 1943 were instrumental in the creation
of a solid infrastructure for the movement. Indeed, after its
official birth Italia Libera expanded considerably all over
Australia. In New South Wales its rapid growth was, to a large
extent, due to the excellent work carried out by its secretary
and old-time anti-Fascist, Tommaso Saviane. He had or
ganised a group of Italians and held weekly meetings since
November 1942; in April 1943 he was already printing
thousands of leaflets in New South Wales and sent 1,000 to
Melbourne for distribution there.20 The first public rally took
place on May Day 1943: the members of Italia Libera paraded
through the streets of Sydney and its state president, R. A.
Shaw, spoke to the crowd. That day forty-five people became
new members. A second public rally was held on 15 August to
celebrate the downfall of Mussolini. In September and
December 1943 £85 was collected on behalf of the Red Cross.
During the first year of activity in New South Wales, the
movement opened five branches — at Griffith, at Leeton, on
the South Coast, at Broken Hill and in Canberra. By February
1944, Italia Libera had 300 members21 and had opened an
office in Sydney. It had lobbied and gained the support of
several Australian associations, including many trade unions,
the Civil Rights League and the Anglican Bishop of Sydney.
Also, 31,000 propaganda leaflets, as well as anti-Fascist
literature printed in Italian and received from the United
States, had been distributed all over Australia. In his report to
the State Committee of Italia Libera in March 1944, Saviane
stated that the program for the future was:
for the members to increase their activities and to
convince the majority of Italians to join us, explaining to
them that our Movement strives to improve the welfare
of Italians, so that they can settle in Australia; therefore
whoever works with us, works for his own future.22
Throughout 1943 the activities in all states had been similar
to those of the New South WTales Branch. In Melbourne the
central committee printed several leaflets explaining the
current political events and organised a rally on 8 August
1943, attended by 800 people, to celebrate the collapse of
Fascism in Italy. Italia Libera members spoke at the Workers’
Educational Association, at the Education Department, at the
University Labor Club, at the Christian Women’s Association,
at May Day and International Women’s Day celebrations.
Dances, concerts and educational lectures were an important
aspect of the movement’s attempts to integrate anti-fascist
Italians into the mainstream of Australian culture. Often they
attracted a large Italian and Australian audience.23
The leaders of Italia Libera tried hard to make their presence
felt with regard to the conduct of Italian affairs in Australia.
Huge donations were made to the Victory Loans launched by
the Australian government: Schiassi was proud to mention to
Evatt that Italians had contributed £50,000 to the first
Victory Loan campaign.24 while a quota of £12,000 was set on
behalf of the Italia Libera Movement for the second Victory
Loan.25
In July 1943, Montagnana asked for the federal govern
ment’s permission to print a monthly newspaper, but it was
not granted.26 In July 1944 another application was filed.
Schiassi supported his request by stressing the point that:
a bulletin of ours reaching regularly the Italians living
here would . . . help to establish a more intimate contact
between them and the land where they live: their ultimate
full assimilation in the Australian nation would be
assisted and facilitated.27
This time the application was successful, not in virtue of the
arguments put forward by Schiassi, but because the security
service believed that, by allowing the various factions
coexisting in the movement to have a public outlet for their
political discussions, it would tighten its control over the
Communist minority and the more extreme elements.28
Permission to publish a newspaper was granted to Italia
Libera on 9 October 1944,29 and its first issue, called II
Risveglio, appeared on 30 November 1944, although bulletins
of the same name had been issued since August 1944. The
newspaper was sold fortnightly and lasted for many years,
until 1956, when it was closed down.30 Printed in Sydney by
the Newsletter Printery, which was controlled by the
Communist Party of Australia,31 II Risveglio had by June
1945 1,600 subscribers, and a further 2,000 copies were sold
all over Australia,32out of a total printing of 4,000 copies.33
The main aim of the newspaper was to win Italian public
opinion for the anti-Fascist cause. II Risveglio failed to achieve
this goal. At the peak of its fame, it reached only five per cent
of Italian migrants and its impact on the Italian community
was slight.
Moreover, Italia Libera was not successful in many other
respects. It did not become a mass party since it was not able
to reach the Catholic masses nor the masses influenced by
Fascist propaganda. It failed to win recognition from the
Australian government as the sole spokesman for the Italian
community and did not exploit to the utmost its political
opportunities because of internal disunity. The New South
Wales branch never submitted to the authority of the
Executive Committee of Melbourne, and by December 1944
this body was transferred to Sydney. Disagreement existed
not only on matters of authority and power: there were also
fundamental differences of opinion on the political raison
d'etre of the Movement. Sydney was in favour of the line that
Italia Libera should be a popular mass movement and should
use the masses to bring pressure upon the authorities; it
emphasised the necessity of attracting as many Australians as
possible in order to integrate Italia Libera into Australian
political life. Melbourne instead believed in the efficacy of
lobbying the government directly, without attempting to
involve the masses of Italians who, experience taught, were
generally reluctant to join political organisations. Schiassi and
Montagnana saw the usefulness of an anti-Fascist movement
in Australia only in relation to the political order which would
be established in Italy at the end of the war. They thought that
the political future of Italy would be decided by London and
that the public opinion of the Commonwealth carried a lot of
weight there. By persuading the Australian government to
respond favourably to their policy, the Melbourne leaders
hoped to influence indirectly the outcome of the new Italian
political equilibrium.
The Italia Libera Movement also failed because it was not
able to produce an 61ite large enough to take control of Italian
politics in Australia, and because the movement did not enjoy
the support of any organisation or pressure group other than
itself. During the first year of operation, the shortcomings of
Italia Libera became evident also to its secretary, Massimo
Montagnana. As early as March 1944 he complained that the
movement should have at least 10,000 members, out of an
Italian population of 70,000, and remarked that this quota had
not been reached owing to the personal squabbles which were
tearing the movement apart. Italia Libera , concluded
Montagnana, could only play a modest role in defence of
Italian interests in Australia.
Montagnana’s appraisal of the political situation was
correct. Moreover, the progress of Italia Libera was hindered
not only by its own mistakes and human weaknesses: there
also were other powers which barred the way to the anti-
Fascists. The war years did not destroy the social and political
infrastructure of the Italian community. Although the most
rabid Fascists were interned, other people, who had supported
Fascism for twenty years but had been more restrained in their
public life, were still holding positions of influence. Now, as
twenty years before, they were ready to dump an
uncomfortable ideological baggage: while in the 1920s they
sold Liberalism for Fascism, in 1943 they traded Fascism for
democracy. They were the historical reincarnation of those
whom Italian historian R. De Felice calls the fiancheggiatori.34
The most remarkable representative of this group was
G. Vaccari. During the Fascist regime he publicly expressed
his support for Fascist aggression against Abyssinia.35 On 15
July 1935, he spoke at the Club Cavour in Melbourne praising
Fascism and its leaders in Australia. On 7 October 1936 he was
reported to have been bestowed the title of Knight of the
Crown of Italy by Mussolini’s government, while in July 1937
he donated £500 to the Fascist Casa dLtalia, and on 18 May
1938 subscribed £5 to the Melbourne Fascio33 Author of the
pamphlet The Abyssinian Question from the Italian
Standpoint, which attracted the wrath of the Australian
government in 1935 for its offensive remarks against the
British Empire, he had conveniently taken his Certificate of
Naturalisation on 27 July 1939.37 Vaccari, according to
Schiassi, was: ‘a clever, cunning man, [who] has always been
the 'eminence grise of Italian Fascism in Australia, and there
has never been here any Fascist political activity in which,
either openly or secretly, he has not had a hand in it’.38
When the war broke out, Vaccari was not interned; instead,
he became the protege of the other institution which from the
outset was strenuously opposed to Italia Libera: the Catholic
Church. Archbishop Mannix, and the Jesuit directly
responsible to him for the affairs concerning the Italian
community, Father Ugo Modotti, immediately saw that the
new anti-Fascist movement was determined to win the
allegiance of Italian Catholics and was undermining the
political and moral authority of the Church. Their opposition,
of course, was not solely an expression of pro-Fascist
tendencies but was to some extent also an expression of anti-
Communist fears. A few months after the creation of Italia
Libera, Mannix held a rally in Fitzroy to launch a relief fund
for Italy and to explain the duties of Catholics in the existing
political situation. When, before the rally, Cristofaro and
Montagnana approached Mannix and Modotti and asked to be
allowed to address the audience on behalf of Italia Libera, they
were curtly refused. Instead, Father Modotti in his speech
condemned the actions of Italians who rejoiced at the news
that Italy had signed the armistice with the Allies as ‘anti-
Italian, inhuman and criminal’. Further, he said, referring to
Fascism, that ‘we are not ashamed of what took place
yesterday in Italy’. Archbishop Mannix was next to speak.
The Irish prelate declared:
I say that Mussolini is the greatest man living today. His
will go down in history as the greatest Government Italy
has ever had. The cultural, educational civilisation
created by him, Italy and the world will always admire
and hold it as the greatest in the history of the globe.39
But the piece de resistance was the intervention of the Federal
Minister for Information, A. A. Calwell. Previously he had
attended and had given his support to anti-Fascist meetings,
such as that organised by the Communists of the Italian Anti-
Fascist Movement at Carlton on 30 March 1942. Now he took
a completely unexpected stand. He uncompromisingly stated:
T say that those who have been associated with Italia Libera,
that they are not rendering any service to the Italian
community by maintaining that body in existence’.40 The last
speaker was Vaccari.41
After this public declaration of war on Italia Libera,
Archbishop Mannix adopted more devious methods of political
intrigue. In September 1943, he wrote to Prime Minister
Curtin asking him to appoint an Italian as an accredited
liaison officer between the government and the Italian
community. In case the Prime Minister was in favour of his
suggestion, he, continued Mannix, would be ‘very happy to
nominate an Italian who, I am confident, will give you
complete satisfaction’.42 Curtin accepted Mannix’s proposal,
and the name of Vaccari was suggested to the Prime Minister
for consideration. The security service investigated Vaccari’s
past and advised the Prime Minister that ‘Vaccari is persona
grata with Security Brigadier Simpson. Major Brown knows
him well’.43 It is not clear why Vaccari enjoyed the trust of the
Australian Security Service, nor why the service ignored the
man’s previous Fascist sympathies, since it was well informed,

before the war, on what was happening in the Fascist branches
and had obviously placed informers high up in the Fascist
Party hierarchy in Australia. Nevertheless, on 26 November
1943, Vaccari was appointed Unofficial Italian Liaison Officer
in Australia. The decision was taken at a conference between
the Secretary of the Department of External Affairs, the
Director-General of Security Brigadier W. B. Simpson and,
significantly, the Minister for Information, A. A. Calwell.44
The appointment was a severe blow to Italia Libera, because
it meant that the government had granted to Vaccari
unofficial recognition as the sole spokesman for Italian affairs
in Australia, a more or less de facto consular position. The
setback was particularly disappointing for the anti-Fascist
movement since its leaders, in June 1943, had unsuccessfully
sought that role for themselves.45
Vaccari’s nomination was made public at another meeting in
Melbourne on 5 December 1943, where Calwell expressed the
hope that Vaccari would become the future consul-general for
Italy in Australia.
In December 1943, Italia Libera sent a strong letter of
protest because ‘the Commonwealth Government has
accorded official recognition to one who has always been and
still is a Fascist’,46 and in February 1944 a Country Party
MHR, G. J. Rankin, demanded a full review of Vaccari’s
nomination in consideration of the allegations that he had been
a Fascist.47 Dr Evatt replied in Parliament on 23 February,
saying that ‘when Mr Vaccari was authorised to act the
Government had no knowledge of any alleged association by
him with the Fascist Party, past or present’. By not denying
Vaccari’s Fascist connections, Evatt implied that the
government was now aware of his political background.
Further, the Attorney-General revealed that the day before his
attention had been drawn to certain aspects of Vaccari’s past
which compelled him to ask:
the appropriate authority [the Security Service; N.d.A.]
to report fully on the matter so as to enable the
Government to consider whether Mr Vaccari’s authority
to make representations should be further continued.48
In fact, Dr Evatt had already issued instructions on 16

February ‘that the authorisation of Mr Vaccari to make
representations in relation to certain members of the Italian
community should be discontinued’.49 He went even further by
declaring in Parliament on 23 March 1944 that Vaccari:
was not at any time appointed to represent the Italian
community, but was merely authorised, on humanitarian
grounds, to make representations to various Common
wealth departments concerned with the welfare of
persons of Italian origin.50
Although discredited and bitter, to the point that in May
1945 he complained to Calwell of the security service’s lack of
co-operation,51 Vaccari continued to obstruct the progress of
Italia Libera, but by now even the government had seen
through his professed belief in democracy: in March 1945, in a
telegram to its representative in London, the Commonwealth
signalled the presence in Australia of ‘a small extreme Rightist
group comprising Mr Vaccari and others’.52 One of Vaccari’s
mojt forceful attempts to denigrate the anti-Fascist
movement was made in August 1944, when he sent to the
Italian Prime Minister, Ivanoe Bonomi, a report on the
composition and the political attitude of the Italian
community in Australia. After declaring that ‘politically I
have never loved extreme parties’, he went on trying to
demonstrate that in this country Italian Fascism had made
only a superficial impact and that the anti-Fascists were a
handful of people without any political weight. He attacked
Schiassi as a ‘fanatic anti-clerical . . . visionary and apostle of
an ever imminent revolution of the masses’, as the holder of a
‘negative philosophy’; then went on accusing the Jewish anti-
Fascist refugees of having been ‘generally Fascists in Italy up
to 1938-1939 before the Racial Laws, and then they have been
rabid anti-Fascists’, and of sheltering behind the classification
of Refugee Aliens in order to ‘enjoy certain advantages as
compared with Italian Subjects’, as if they were not Italians.
Vaccari continued by stating that Italia Libera was the
product of the ‘initiative of the Melbourne Communist group
in agreement with certain recent refugees’, who ‘have just
disowned’ their country and that ‘none of such refugees has
the slightest intention of fighting either against Germany or
against Japan’. Instead, Vaccari assured Bonomi:
the overwhelming majority of the Italian community in
Australia will resist the infiltration of new false prophets
in the shadow of freedom, sowers of discord and
fractricidal hatreds, who would make it militant in new
political extremisms in Italy. In the matter of faraway
politics alien to it, such majority wishes only to be left in
peace not to be urged to mix itself up with them.53
If Vaccari with his racist and Fascist outbursts was the
secular weapon in the arsenal of the Catholic Church, there
also was a clerical one, no less efficient, in the person of Father
Ugo Modotti. This Jesuit quickly realised that the struggle for
the conquest of the conscience of Italians would be fought in
the first place by means of an intense propaganda campaign in
the press and on the radio. The correctness of his opinion was
confirmed by a report of the security service which stated that:
‘the mass of Italian workers, in the hands of capable leaders,
might easily be swayed in a direction which would retard their
assimilation, largely because of their lack of education and
consequent susceptibility to propaganda’.54
To achieve this end, as already illustrated in chapter 8, in
August 1944 Modotti launched a new newspaper, L'Angelo
della Famiglia from whose columns Italians were warned to
beware of the anti-Fascists, who were described as atheist
traitors of their Fatherland. The editorial in the first issue
made clear in no uncertain terms the unequivocal opposition of
the Church to Italia Libera. The readers were told: ‘right now
we declare that we do not share the ideas of those who are
calling themselves Italians and who from Australia want to
dictate their will to our country after having abandoned it’.55
At the same time permission was unsuccessfully sought from
the Federal government to print another newspaper,56 and
attempts were made to stop the publication of II Risveglio by
accusing its editors of picking out and publishing ‘all anti-
Catholic and anti-monarchical matter in order to disseminate
Communist theories’.57
In short, in 1944-5 Modotti adopted the same policy which
Consul-General Grossardi had carried out in 1926-8: that of
branding all anti-Fascists as Communists and of setting up an
effective propaganda machine. However, this time the
campaign of denigration failed: the government knew that
neither the editors of II Risveglio nor the leadership of Italia
Libera were Communist. The government’s view was that ‘the
attack by Father Modotti on the policy of the paper appears to
be based on religious and political grounds’.58 Modotti’s grand
design to outmanoeuvre II Risveglio was not unknown to its
editor, Claudio Alcorso, who was racing against time to have
both the newspaper and the movement accepted by the Italian
community. He realised that, as he put it, ‘the reactionaries
will soon try to come out with their own paper, and that is why
it is vital to establish IIRisveglio before them’.59
By the end of World War II Alcorso admitted that Italia
Libera s goal to become a mass movement had failed. The
Catholics had been reluctant to accept its overtures and the
Fascists were certainly not prepared to join such a left-wing
organisation, not even after February 1945, when Alcorso
dropped the word ‘anti-Fascist’ from the name of the
movement in order to attract a wider section of the
community,60 and accepted the sponsorship of people who had
been in sympathy with Mussolini’s government, such as Sir
Raphael Cilento, President of the Dante Alighieri Society in
Brisbane during the Fascist period. Alcorso was ready to go a
long way on the road of compromise in order to gain
widespread support. When in 1945 Italia Libera set up an
organisation called Australian Relief for Italy (ARI), to collect
money and food for the people of Italy, he instructed the
members of the movement to be flexible. Whilst he admitted:
that we should not collaborate with the most prominent
ex-Fascists, we should, at the same time, try if possible to
work, on this issue, together with anybody who was not
too obviously compromised even though he or she may
have Rightist ideas.61
The lowering of the standards of ideological purity upset
many anti-Fascists who, by May 1945, aware that the
movement had failed to grow notwithstanding Alcorso’s last-
hour exercises in political pragmatism, became estranged from
it. Italia Libera was not able to obtain recognition from the
Commonwealth as the sole representative of the democratic
aspirations of the Italian community. Canberra never
consulted Schiassi or Alcorso on any problem, not even on

those which were directly relevant to the affairs of Italians in
Australia. After Vaccari’s appointment, the leaders of Italia
Libera were sometimes given a hostile reception by some
government departments. In May 1944 the Sydney president
of Italia Libera complained that he had experienced ‘a lack of
understanding, if not a deliberate misrepresentation, of our
Movement, and its aims, in certain official quarters in
Canberra’.62 The government in this respect reflected the
mistrust of the community for any foreign organisation or
newspaper, and did not pursue a policy in aid of the Italian
anti-Fascist movement. Italia Libera was thus denied
permission to distribute its propaganda to Italians employed
by the Allied Works Council63 or in prisoner-of-war camps
almost up to the end of the war.
Moreover, Italia Libera's efforts to draw the Australian
people’s attention to the anti-Fascist contribution to the Allied
cause, in both Italy and Australia, achieved only a very limited
success. Many Australian organisations and the press
continued in their attacks against Italians in general, without
giving consideration to the fact that some of them were anti-
Fascists. Although the censor had instructions not to allow the
publication of the word ‘dago’, this epithet was used on several
occasions. When II Risveglio appeared, Smith's Weekly, in an
article entitled ‘Another Wop Newspaper’, advocated its
banning, reminding the readers of Smith 's successful fight to
ban the supplement in Italian which the Queensland Worker
printed ‘for Dago members of the AWU’.64
In the end, Italia Libera's main policies failed. Alcorso’s
hopes of creating a mass movement were frustrated by the
apathy and the political illiteracy of the Italian masses and by
the xenophobic malaise of most Australians; while Schiassi’s
forays in international power politics were bound to meet with
failure owing to the Australian government’s indifference to
the aspirations of a small, foreign and potentially subversive
political group.
At the end of World War II, when Italy became a free nation
again, the Italia Libera Movement had outlived its purpose
and suffered a long series of setbacks which prevented the
achievement of most of its immediate political aims.
Yet Italia Libera was not a complete failure, since some of its
policies had a lasting effect. The movement gave to all Italians
the opportunity to exercise a distinct political choice and, to
those who took it, a feeling of pride in contributing to the
liberation of their country. It freed many of them from the
internment camps, and fought against the conformism, the
bigotry and the interested opportunism of many others.
Australians were urged to realise that Italians were not just a
mass of stereotyped foreigners, but were human beings who
cherished strong political beliefs, and who were ready to fight
even their own people in order to uphold their right to social
justice and political democracy.
It is difficult to measure to what extent Italian anti-Fascism
was successful in these areas. All available evidence validates
the claim that between 1943 and 1945 Italia Libera
contributed substantially to the creation of a climate of
political detente between the Italian community and the
Australian people, and an indication of its success in this
particular area is given by the fact that, while Italian migrants
after World War I, in which Italy fought as an ally of
Australia, were met in this country only with barely concealed
contempt, open hostility and discrimination, after World War
II, when Fascist Italy was an enemy of Australia, they found
more respect and consideration than ever for their social and
political problems.
Notes
1 See their story in Bruce Muirden, The Puzzled Patriots,
Melbourne, 1968.
2 The Australian organisation before the war which most
effectively supported the cause of Italian anti-Fascists, the
Communist Party, in 1942 was still declared by the Common
wealth government an illegal organisation, and therefore unable
to come to their aid. Significantly, the period of illegality of the
CPA, from 15 June 1940 to December 1942, is coincidental with
the time of the greatest depression of the anti-Fascist fortunes in
Australia.
3 APC, Mario Montagnana to M. Cristofaro, 4 Oct. 1942.
4 See the article by Giuseppe Berti ‘Sul Comitato Nazionale
Italiano’, Stato Operaio, Sept.-Oct. 1942; Mario Montagnana,
‘Dopo Montevideo’, Stato Operaio, Jan.-Feb. 1943; Mario
Montagnana, ‘Le nostre responsabilitä’, Stato Operaio, March-
April 1943
5 Montagnana, ‘Dopo Montevideo’.
6 Cristofaro Papers, 1942 file.
7 As he clearly put it, ‘our present duty demands our coming
closer to the Fascist masses: that is, our contingent task is
primarily a strategic one: to deprive Mussolini of — or at least to
take away from him as much as it is possible — the bulk of his
army with whom he physically fights us. This goal can only be
achieved by means of a policy of appeasement. Otherwise, we will
play into the Nazi-Fascist hands’ (Cristofaro Papers, Schiassi to
Comrades, 31 Dec. 1942).
8 Ibid., Schiassi to Cristofaro, 6 Jan. 1943.
9 Ibid., Cristofaro to A. Muggia, 22 Dec. 1942.
10 The Alleanza Garibaldi in September 1942, by means of
the clandestine broadcasting station Radio Milano-Lib er td,
appealed to Italians abroad to form an Italian National Commit
tee Abroad which should strive to achieve the political unity of
all Italians overseas and, in Mario Montagnana’s words, ‘should
be a very wide organisation, attracting also the support of people
who are today, very far from us’. News of the broadcast reached
Cristofaro in Melbourne in October 1942 via Montagnana in
Mexico City (APC, Montagnana to Cristofaro, 4 Oct. 1942).
11 Cristofaro Papers, Schiassi to Cristofaro, 6 Jan. 1943.
12 Ibid., A. R. Chisholm to Cristofaro, 14 Feb. 1943.
13 Ibid., leaflet.
14 The drafting of the constitution was finished at the beginning of
October 1943 by Professor Chisholm, Luigi Stellato, Omero
Schiassi and F. A. L. Callill, a Melbourne lawyer who counselled
on the legality of the document. The enunciation of the political
objectives of the movement somehow departed from the three
points approved at the General Assembly of 18 March 1943, and
reflected a more militant and committed philosophy. The
constitution declared that Italia Libera sought:
1. Peace and friendship with the democracies of the world, and
active collaboration with the liberty-loving forces against all
forms of Fascist reaction.
2. Formation and support of a government in Italy representing
all social and political strata, based on democratic principles.
3. Restoration and preservation of democratic freedom,
liberation of anti-Fascist political prisoners and punishment
of the Fascist criminals.
4. To cement the bonds of friendship and promote more
complete understanding between the Italian community and
the Australian people; advancement of Italian culture and
social welfare.
(Stellato Papers, 1943 file).
15 Cristofaro Papers, 1943 file.
16 Ibid., pamphlet. Further evidence of the government’s
‘availability’ to all anti-Fascist movements was given by the
minister at this meeting when he ‘welcomed the Movement and
hoped the Free Italians, Greeks, French, Dutch, Yugoslavs and
Czechs and other free peoples who had come to Australia would
all form such groups to fight for freedom’.
17 See, for instance, the case where 1talia Libera, upon the advice of
E. J. Holloway, asked George Martens, Labor MHR, to seek
from the Director-General of Security the release of nine Italian
anti-Fascists and naturalised British subjects of long standing
(Cristofaro Papers, Cristofaro to Martens, 10 July 1943).
18 AA, CRS A989, item 455/7/2, Italia Libera to External Affairs,
28 June 1943.
19 Cristofaro Papers, Security Service to Cristofaro, 20 Feb. 1943.
20 Ibid., Saviane to Cristofaro, 1 April 1943.
21 Ibid., Massimo Montagnana to Cristofaro, 27 Feb. 1943.
22 Ibid., Saviane, Report dated 12 March 1944.
23 See, for instance, the cycle of lectures held at the Savoy Theatre
from 16 February to 26 April 1944, in which Montagnana spoke
on ‘The Italian Republics and Tomorrow’s Italy’; F. Levi on
‘Modern Applications of Science’; G. Adrian on ‘Elements of
Evolutionary Theory’; P. De Angelis on ‘Italy from 1870 to
1915’; Professor Chisholm on the ‘Development of Democratic
Principles in Australia’; and E. Monti on ‘Italian Emigration’.
The lectures did not attract a large public. Montagnana
complained that at his lecture only twenty people were present.
Instead the dances always attracted 100 to 150 people
(Cristofaro Papers, Montagnana to Cristofaro, 19 Feb. 1944).
24 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, Schiassi to Evatt, 18 July 1944.
25 Cristofaro Papers, Italia Libera, circular letter dated 31 Oct.
1944.
26 Ibid., Saviane to Cristofaro, 1 July 1943; Massimo Montagnana,
Report dated 29 March 1944.
27 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, Schiassi to Evatt, 18 July 1944.
28 W. B. Simpson, Director-General of Security, declared that T
consider that the proposed publication would assist this Service
to keep a check on any undesirable or subversive elements which
may endeavour to influence the policy of the Movement’ (AA,
CRS A446, item 57/67255, Service to External Affairs, 3 Aug.
1944).
29 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, External Affairs to Posts and
Telegraphs, 7 Feb. 1945.
30 See the only available collection of II Risveglio at the Mitchell
Library, Sydney.
31 Although printed in a Communist printery, the newspaper was

not controlled nor influenced by the Communist Party of
Australia. This fact was certified by the security service, which
reported that ‘II Risveglio is in no way associated with the
Communist Party. The printing of the paper is on a strictly
business basis .. (AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, CIB Sydney
to CIB Canberra, 5 March 1945).
32 Cristofaro Papers, C. Alcorso to Cristofaro, 6 June 1945.
33 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, CIB Sydney to CIB Canberra, 5
March 1945.
34 De Felice, Mussolini il fascista II, Chap. I. The term
fiancheggiatori means fellow-travellers, but De Felice refers it
specifically to people who supported Fascism not out of
conviction, but with the aim of exploiting and channelling the
movement to benefit their own personal or political interests.
36 AA, CRS A989, item 40/40, Appendix E, Data on Mr Vaccari.
Vaccari admitted to the author that he had sympathised with
Fascism in its first years but later changed his mind, and that he
had been compelled by the Italian consul to take the party card
in 1934 under threat of having his import permits revoked. (G.
Vaccari, telephone interview, 15 Nov. 1973).
37 AA, CRS A989, item 40/40, Security Service to External Affairs,
21 March 1944.
38 Cristofaro Papers, Schiassi to Cristofaro, 9 March 1943.
39 Ibid., minutes of the meeting, 1943 file. Neither the Age nor the
Argus reported Mannix’s speech in full. The Advocate
(Melbourne) made brief mention of the meeting in its issue of 16
September and then on 23 September quoted Mannix as follows:
At this distance it is impossible to know what has led up to
the changes and who is responsible for the removal of
Mussolini. I was never a wholehearted supporter of his
policy or of his principles. I am the more free to say,
therefore, that in my opinion history will call him one of the
big men of the century. Like many big men he seems to
have failed. But Italy will never again, I hope, fall back into
the state in which Mussolini found her. We can only pray
God to save any good thing that he has achieved for his
country and his people.
I have decided to rely upon the version contained in the
Cristofaro Papers. Wherever it has been possible to check other
information supplied to or collected by Cristofaro that
information has always been proved reliable and accurate. For
example, the report on Calwell’s speech matches exactly the text
of the pamphlet Did you know this? (See note 43). The speech
reported in the Advocate appeared thirteen days after the
meeting and might perhaps have been re-written for publication.
40 He went on, saying that ‘I don’t care what the motives of those
responsible for such movements are, but even if they be the best
in the world, there can be no justification in my mind for their
continuation’ (Stellato Papers, 1945 file, pamphlet entitled Did
you know this? p. 8).
41 His conversion to the Allied cause stunned many anti-Fascists,
among them Omero Schiassi, who wrote that Vaccari’s political
transformism ‘had on me the same effect, as if I would hear —
apart from the titanic difference, as between a louse and an
elephant — inversely, that Stalin, betraying the Communist
Party, has asked to become a member of the British
Conservative Party!’ (Cristofaro Papers, Schiassi to Cristofaro,
9 March 1943).
42 AA, CRS A1608, item AA19/1/1, Mannix to Curtin, 13 Sept.
1943.
43 Ibid., handwritten note by Prime Minister Curtin.
44 AA, CRS A989, item 40/40, External Affairs to Prime Minister,
29 Dec. 1943.
45 Ibid.
46 AA, CRS A1608, item AA19/1/1, Italia Libera to Prime Minister,
8 Dec. 1943.
47 AA, CRS A989, item 40/40, House of Representatives, Business
of the Day No. 13,11 Feb. 1944.
48 AA, CRS A1608, item AA19/1/1, Hansard, 23 Feb. 1944.
49 AA, CRS A989, item 40/40, External Affairs note, signed by
Evatt.
50 AA, CRS A1066, item E/45/19/3, External Affairs to Prime
Minister, 30 May 1945.
51 Vaccari protested that ‘the Director-General of Security objects
to my appointing personal assistants anywhere for my work
which is strictly non-sectional and generally humanitarian. Vide
his recent intimation that he was issuing instructions to his
Deputies in all States that they must refuse to treat with or to
give any information to any person whom I may so unofficially
nominate’ (AA, CRS A1608, item AA19/1/1, Vaccari to Calwell,
2 May 1945).
52 AA, CRS A1066, item E/45/19/11, External Affairs Memo, 27
March 1945.
53 AA, CRS A989, item 455/7/2, Vaccari to Italian Prime Minister,
7 Aug. 1944.
54 AA, CRS A1066, item E/45/19/11, Director-General of Security
to External Affairs, 3 April 1945.
55 L'Angelo della Famiglia, No. 1, Aug. 1944, p. 2.
56 AA, CRS A1608, item AA19/1/1, Vaccari to Calwell, 2 May 1945.
57 Ibid.
58 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, Report to CIB dated 7 Nov.
1945.
59 Cristofaro Papers, Alcorso to Cristofaro, 5 Feb. 1945.
60 Ibid., Alcorso to Cristofaro, 6 Feb. 1945.
61 Ibid., Alcorso to Cristofaro, 18 July 1945. The ARI was set up in
opposition to the Catholic Church’s Relief to Italy from
Australia, and was responsible for many shipments of clothing
to Italy. In October 1945 ARI in Melbourne consigned to
UNNRA sixty tons of goods collected by Italia Libera, while
other consignments were made in Sydney and Perth.
62 AA, CRS A989, item 455/7/2, R. A. Shaw to External Affairs, 16
March 1944.
63 Ibid.
64 Smith's Weekly, 3 March 1945.
10
Omero Schiassi
. . . few of those who knew and liked [Schiassi] knew

anything about the simple heroism with which he had
spoken out, in Italy, against Fascism, or the simple
devotion with which he had chosen exile rather than
submission.
(A. R. Chisholm, Men were my Milestones, p. 123)
The history of Italian anti-Fascism in Australia between 1922

and 1945, as well as being the history of the ideals of social
democracy and political freedom pursued by associations and
movements opposed to the Italian regime, is the history of the
activities of people, of individuals who passionately fought
Fascism, in many instances single-handed.
Omero Schiassi was one of them: his contribution to the anti-
Fascist struggle in this country was so important that failure
to take it into consideration would lead the historian to an
inaccurate interpretation of Italian anti-Fascism in Australia.
Not only was he endowed with a remarkable intellectual
capacity, but in the early 1920s he had gained wide political
experience in Italy where, as a lawyer, he had enjoyed the
confidence of the leaders of the Italian Socialist Party; he also
223
possessed a historical, legal and literary culture as did no other
Italian in this country, which put him in the unchallenged
position of spiritual leader of Italian anti-Fascism in Australia.
Omero Schiassi was born on 3 September 1877, at San
Giorgio di Piano, in the province of Bologna. His father
Guglielmo gave him a characteristically middle-class edu
cation and young Omero graduated in law at the University of
Bologna. Of his youth little else is known, but he must have
developed at an early age a keen interest in social problems,
since at twenty-two he became First Secretary of the
Provincial Federation of the Workers of the Land for the
province of Bologna and occupied this position for two years,
from 1898 to 1899. In 1900, the Secretary of the National
Federation of the Workers of the Land, Carlo Vezzani,
appointed Schiassi to the position of official propagandist for
the federation. In this capacity, he travelled all over Italy,
organising peasant leagues and leading the peasant strikes
which took place everywhere in that year.1
Soon after, he joined the Employment Office of the
Humanitarian Society of Milan (Achille Loria Bequest), an
institute of research on the social conditions of the working
class and the peasantry; on its behalf Schiassi published a
monograph on the peasants of the provinces of Milan and
Ravenna. During these years he became a member of the
Italian Socialist Party and was one of the organisers of the
first political campaign of Ivanoe Bonomi, the reformist
Socialist leader; he was well acquainted with Mussolini, but his
political sympathies lay with the democratic reformist
Socialists represented by Turati, Treves, Modigliani and
Matteotti; he was an intimate friend of the last whom he knew
from his student days when both frequented the Law Faculty
of Bologna University. When the war broke out, Schiassi was
conscripted and served in the army as a Lieutenant of the
Alpini, with some pride, judging from his photographs in
uniform.2 His was the typical reaction of a reformist Socialist
who, out of patriotism, accepted his involvement in a conflict
between capitalist powers which the maximalist section of the
party opposed because it felt that it would only serve the
interests of their class enemies.
Omero Schiassi 225
At the end of the conflict he went back to his positions
of Aldermann of the City Council of Bologna, which he had
occupied since 1914, and of lawyer of the Trades Hall. He also
became the editor of the journal Socialista.
When Fascism began practising its strategy of
confrontation with Socialism, Schiassi fully committed
himself to granting free legal aid to workers and to party
members accused of defending themselves against Fascist
aggression. Soon he became dangerously popular in Bologna.
In 1921 the squadrists devastated the Bologna Trades Hall
and also destroyed Schiassi’s office, which was in the same
building. At that time he was at Sorrento, near Naples,
recovering from a serious illness: there, he received a telegram
warning him not to return to Bologna, because the Fascists
wanted him dead. A few days later he was assaulted and, in his
own words, ‘miraculously escaped from being murdered in my
convalescing bed’.3
Most probably Schiassi attracted the attention of the
Fascists not only for his legal work in favour of the Socialists,
but also because he was well known for his verbal belligerency.
In one of his conversations with Modigliani at the time of the
occupation of the factories, in September 1920, Schiassi
expressed the opinion that Matteotti should take over the
power of the state.4
After Sorrento, he went to Rome for five or six months and
then, upon the advice of Modigliani, he moved on to Genoa
where he became legal counsellor to Giulietti’s National
Federation of the Workers of the Sea and to the Garibaldi Co
operative. His appointment to this important position was a
recognition of Schiassi’s faithful endorsement of the line
pursued by the moderate, reformist right wing of the Socialist
movement.5 The Fascist reaction did not take long to reach
Schiassi even in Liguria. When the Fascists stormed the San
Pier d’Arena Trades Hall, he was among those who repulsed
the attack. On 5 August 1922, Fascist squads attacked the
Genoa Trades Hall and Palazzo San Giorgio, headquarters of
the Federation of the Workers of the Sea, where Schiassi had
his study, and burned his papers. It was the end of his legal
career and of his future in Italian politics. He decided to
emigrate, but the Fascist government denied him permission
early in 1924. Unmoved by the decree, Schiassi successfully

manoeuvred to obtain the support of two influential Fascists
who helped him out of the country under obscure
circumstances: ‘with his wardrobe, a modest amount of cash
and a certificato penale of which he was strangely proud — a
document attesting that he had no criminal record’.6
In leaving Italy he was determined not to sever his political
ties with his comrades. In February 1924 he was appointed by
Pietro Nenni as Australian correspondent of the Socialist
Party’s newspaper A vanti! (to which he would regularly
contribute in the following years) and a few days later sailed
from Genoa on the Ormond, bound for Melbourne, where he
arrived in April 1924. The decision to emigrate to Australia
reflects one facet of Schiassi’s personality. He was very
conscious of the state of his health and there were evidently
health reasons which prompted him to choose Melbourne. An
unconfirmed story, which nevertheless perfectly fits the man’s
character, alleges that Schiassi chose Melbourne because it
had the most equable climate, or so he thought, having read
somewhere that the average yearly temperature was 65° F and
not thinking that averages are made up of highs and lows.7
Melbourne’s Italians could not avoid taking notice of
Schiassi’s presence. He was then forty-seven years of age, five
feet and five inches tall, with blue eyes and blond hair, and
wore a pointed beard a la Lenin, which he shaved a few years
later. Always impeccably dressed, he was wearing the most
extraordinary garments which came out of his Italian
wardrobe, as by a miracle, complete with hat, gold-headed
walking stick, a diamond ring and gaiters. He wryly admitted
that his friends in Bologna dubbed him the best-dressed
Socialist in town. This bizarre external appearance was
matched by an equally eccentric character. He was the strange
mixture of a man who seemed the very epitome of the Italian
middle-class gentleman: almost courtly in his manners, he was
aloof and conscious of his intellectual superiority and, at the
same time, he was a convinced Socialist. His friend Professor
A. R. Chisholm teasingly but quite accurately called him a
gentleman Socialist of 1848. Enormously proud of his law
degree, he insisted on being called ‘Doctor’, a fact which
widened the gap between him and the uneducated, barely
Omero Schiassi 227
literate Italian workers and businessmen. Schiassi had a very

dramatic imagination, which prompted him to exaggerate
things and to let himself loose in long-winded rhetorical
speeches which were admired, although often not understood,
by ordinary Italians.8 He spoke so well that even proven
Fascists flocked to his lectures and anti-Fascist rallies, to
enjoy the flourish of his eloquence.9 His vast culture and socio
political background isolated him from most Italians, since
they could not satisfy his intellectual needs. Schiassi was not a
man of many friends, and the very few he had were almost
exclusively from among Australian intellectuals who could
speak Italian, since Schiassi did not speak English in 1924, nor
was he ever able to master it.
Soon after his arrival in Melbourne, Schiassi became
involved in anti-Fascist political activities. A rather amusing
story tells that when he learned that the Italian consul-general
in Australia was none other than his old-time Socialist
reformist acquaintance Antonio Grossardi, Schiassi took the
rather naive step for a man involved in politics for more than
twenty years, of going to see him and ask for his help in
getting a position appropriate to his education and legal
experience. When Grossardi, seemingly unmoved by Schiassi’s
appeals to his sense of Socialist camaraderie, ironically offered
his good services to find for him employment in a fruit shop or
in a restaurant, Schiassi was outraged and they parted
exchanging harsh words.10 This story, probably true,
illustrates one of the finest aspects of Schiassi’s character: his
steadfast loyalty to his principles of political morality. He
could have compromised and done what the consul-general
wranted of him. Instead he took the consequences of his
opposition.
Ostracised by Italian officialdom in Australia, speaking only
broken English, and living on the meagre savings which he had
brought with him from Italy, Schiassi faced his destiny with
great courage. He rented a room in Clarendon Street, East
Melbourne,11 where he lived in extreme poverty for many
years. Yet his unshaken faith in Socialism helped him to
endure his economic adversities. He was not very tolerant of
any other political opinion except his own, especially of
Liberalism which he believed was in collusion with Fascism.
His hatred for Fascism was a personal affair: he was
particularly bitter with Mussolini and never forgave him; he
looked at him as a traitor of the Socialist cause and simply
hated him.12
Stirred by political feelings of such depth, immediately after
his arrival in Melbourne Schiassi contacted many trade union
leaders, Labor Party members and intellectuals, soliciting
their support in his struggle against Fascism. Late in 1924 he
approached Albert Monk and Don Cameron at the Trades Hall
and remained their political associate for the rest of his life.13
The following year he became a good friend of Professors
Chisholm and Lodewyckx of the University of Melbourne, and
also established excellent connections with the Australian
Labor Party and with the Australian government, to the
annoyance of the Italian consul-general, who did not hesitate
to react against Schiassi’s popularity.
In 1925 Schiassi wrote for the Avanti! newspaper of Milan
two articles, one on the police strike in Melbourne and the
other on the November federal elections. Grossardi, who was
entrusted by the Italian secret police with the task of
investigating the activities of anti-Fascist Italians, reported
Schiassi’s articles, full of praise for the unions and critical of
the government, to the Home and Territories Department. In
consequence of the consul-general’s representation, Schiassi
was refused nomination as instructor in Italian at the
University of Melbourne.14
When in 1926 Grossardi accidentally came to know that
Schiassi was going to be received by the Acting Prime
Minister, he immediately alerted Earle Page to the fact that:
‘Omero Schiassi is for many years inscribed on the list of the
dangerous Communists kept by the Italian Government and
here in Australia he is always trying to carry out
propaganda’.15 That this information was false (and Grossardi
surely knew the difference between a reformist Socialist and a
Communist!) was a fact of no importance to the consul-general:
what mattered to him was undermining Schiassi’s credibility
and destroying his reputation. Grossardi worked towards this
goal with great energy, albeit unsuccessfully. In 1927 Schiassi
was appointed instructor in Italian at the University of
Melbourne, with the help of Professors Chisholm and
Omero Schiassi 229
Lodewyckx. The appointment greatly disturbed Grossardi,
who this time had the effrontery to complain to Prime Minister
Bruce that ‘this was done without giving me any notice of the
appointment and without informing me in any way that an
appointment was taking place’, and that it was done
notwithstanding ‘that the University was well acquainted
with Dr Schiassi’s political tendencies’.16
Unable to stop Schiassi’s nomination, the Italian consulate-
general undertook among the Italian community what
Professor Chisholm called ‘some lobbying of that intense and
untiring kind of which Mediterraneans are often capable.’17
Since Schiassi’s salary varied with the number of his pupils,
Italians were ‘advised’ not to attend the lectures of the anti-
Fascist Doctor, thereby keeping him in poverty.18
Not surprisingly, Schiassi was very suspicious of everybody,
particularly mistrusting Italians who had recently arrived
from Italy or who were not known in anti-Fascist circles. His
fears were justified: Grossardi s informers kept him up to date
on the activitities of the Socialist from Bologna, to the point
that the consul-general knew not only what Schiassi had done,
but even what he intended to do. For instance, in December
1927 Grossardi was aware that Schiassi was trying to form an
anti-Fascist club in Melbourne,19 which could be used by the
enemies of the regime as a rallying point, a centre aiming at
rationalising their —until then —disorganised opposition.
Why only in 1928, after four years of residence in Melbourne,
did Schiassi decide to put himself to the fore of the anti-Fascist
struggle in Australia? Why not earlier? There are many
answers to this question. To begin with, Schiassi achieved a
small degree of economic security only after his appointment
at the university, and this allowed him to turn his attention to
problems other than his previous pressing material needs.
Also, by 1928 the political situation within the Fascist as well
as the anti-Fascist camps favoured a determined drive for the
leadership of the anti-Fascist movement. At this time,
dissident Fascism in Australia expressed most strongly its
objection to the party’s being subordinate to the state (here
represented by its diplomats) and reacted to the condition
where people who joined the Fascist movement at a late stage
had achieved the control of the local Fascist organisations, to
the detriment of the first-hour Fascists, the sansepolcristi, the
squadristi. Besides, by 1928 it was evident that many Italians
who opposed the regime were now ready to organise
themselves: the Anarchists had already taken advantage of
this trend and formed their Matteotti Club in Melbourne. The
state of confusion in the Fascist ranks and the eagerness for
action of many anti-Fascists convinced Schiassi that his
moment had come. He also took the rather opportunist
attitude of seeing himself as the natural leader of the Italian
anti-Fascists, as the uomo politico who possessed the
undisputed cultural prerequisites for this role.
Schiassi was spurred into action by the new anti-Fascist
strategy adopted by the Italian opposition in exile as well as
by the Australian political situation. In 1927 an Anti-Fascist
Concentration had been formed in France, bringing together
most opposition parties and aiming at presenting a united
front against Fascism.20 Schiassi, who, during the previous
four years, had always been in contact with his Socialist
friends in France, saw now the opportunity of putting Italian
anti-Fascism in Australia on the map of world anti-Fascism.
Supported by a few other people, in June 1928 he founded in
Melbourne the Concentrazione Antifascista delVOceania (Anti-
Fascist Concentration of Australasia) as a branch of the Paris-
based Anti-Fascist Concentration. From the beginning he
identified the problems and the tasks facing his Concentration.
The most immediate problem was that of choosing its allies
and of defining the terms of the alliance. The Anarchists of the
Matteotti Club in Melbourne, who could also be useful for their
Australia-wide network of contacts, were for Schiassi the
obvious choice. Their record of militancy and toughness, their
ascendancy over Italian migrants, their pragmatic approach to
the problems of anti-Fascism made of them powerful allies.
Moreover, Schiassi rightly saw that it was one of the main
duties of the concentration to obtain the help and the
collaboration of all Australian political parties and
associations which could be sympathetic to its aims. The ALP,
the ACTU, the Socialist Party, and also the Communist Party
were persistently lobbied for their support.
The birth of the Anti-Fascist Concentration of Australasia
was publicised with much fanfare and was celebrated with a
Omero Schiassi 231
rally at the New Gaiety Theatre in Melbourne on 10 June 1928,
during which an official commemoration of the fourth
anniversary of M atteotti’s murder was also held. The event,
which caused some concern among the Fascists and prompted
Consul-General Grossardi to come to Melbourne to observe its
development personally, is a useful illustration of the methods
and the aims of Schiassi’s policy.
All major anti-Fascist groups and organisations were
represented: for the Anarchists spoke Isidoro Bertazzon; J.
Shelley for the Communist Party of Australia; R. S. Ross for
the Australian Socialist Party. The Federal Labor Member
Maurice Blackburn delivered a eulogy of Matteotti, and so did
W. J. Duggan, federal president of the ACTU and the ALP.
The rally was chaired by Don Cameron, who also read
messages of support from W. Maloney, the doyen of the House
of Representatives; from E. J. Holloway, Secretary of the
Melbourne Trades Hall, and from Crofts, Secretary of the
Trades Council of Australasia. The only dissenting voice was
that of A. W att, past Speaker of the House of Representatives,
who expressed the opinion that Australians, not knowing the
full facts, should abstain from participating in rallies of that
nature.21
The impressive array of personalities who responded to
Schiassi’s appeal is evidence of his seriousness in canvassing
the Italian and Australian political organisations for their
support. The hundreds of people who filled the hall to the limit,
and among whom stood out the red-shirted Italians of the
Matteotti Club, enthusiastically welcomed Schiassi’s oration
in which, taking the opportunity of M atteotti’s commem
oration, he developed the two cardinal points of his policy: to
denounce Fascism as an evil form of government and to appeal
to Australians to join in the condemnation of Fascist Italy.22
The rally was widely reported by the Australian press and
Schiassi informed the most important anti-Fascist organ
isations overseas of the foundation of a branch of the
Concentration in Australia: a pamphlet containing his speech
was sent to Francesco Frola, member of the Directorate of the
Italian Socialist Party in exile in Paris.23He also contacted the
Executive Committee of the Communist International in
Berlin, which, upon receiving Schiassi’s pamphlet, guessing
that he wanted to open a dialogue with the Communist
movement, instructed the Secretariat of the Italian
Communist Party to correspond with Schiassi and to send to
him propaganda material.24 This was done, and Schiassi
afterwards regularly received from France and distributed the
Italian Communist Party theoretical magazine Stato
Operaio.25
His collabotation with Communists, both in Australia and
overseas, marks a significant switch in Schiassi’s political
philosophy and indicates a new development in the thought
and the strategy of many reformist Socialists in exile who,
identifying in the lack of unity of action of all anti-Fascist
forces one of the main reasons for their defeat at the hands of
the Fascists, were now ready to collaborate with the
Communists.
Schiassi’s more radical stand was confused by many as an
embrace of the Communist doctrine.26 Instead, Schiassi, a
diligent student of Marxism, never became a Communist. He
never joined the Australian Communist Party, although he
was in agreement with many of its policies and patronised
organisations of a left-wing and popular front nature. Ralph
Gibson, the Victorian Communist leader who was closest to
Schiassi, believes that there were two reasons which deterred
Schiassi from joining the party: his bourgeois upbringing and
intellectual snobbery, and the reason that, particularly in the
late 1920s he could not stand ‘another scrape with the law’.27
This second cause and the fact that Fascist propaganda never
lost the opportunity to smear Schiassi for being a Communist
agent, substantiate Schiassi’s fears for his safety during these
years. He was convinced that the Fascists were after him,
trying to murder him or to deport him.28 He had already been
thrown out of the Cafe Latin for expressing in public his anti-
Fascist sentiments29 and had been assaulted by the notorious
Melbourne Fascist R. Budica.30 An Australian historian
reports that an unsuccessful attempt was made by some
Italian sailors to kidnap him and to take him back to Italy.31
It is not surprising then that Schiassi sought naturalisation
with great anxiety. He lodged his application exactly at the
end of the required five years of residence, on 12 April 1929.
But the defamatory campaign instigated against him by the
Omero Schiassi 233
Fascist authorities bore fruit. Although the Commonwealth
Investigation Branch could find ‘no reason why the
application should not be granted’32, the minister ruled to defer
the decision for twelve months, on the grounds that: ‘Schiassi
is regarded in his own country as a Communist, and if he still
holds Communistic views, his naturalisation would be
debarred under the Minister’s general ruling’.33 When, in
October 1929, Labor came to power, Schiassi thought that he
had a better chance. He wrote to his personal friend A. E.
Green, Minister for Defence, pleading for his case and
exposing the Fascist plot for preventing his naturalisation. In
the letter he stated that:
Fascists or agents of Fascism, who eventually will deny
to be as such, will manage in such a way as to be asked by
Police officials of the State or of the Commonwealth,
informations on my account, and so to have the
possibility of answering concerted falsehoods, so that the
Minister, in presence of official reports, be not able to
give the requested naturalisation.34
He was not believed and his representation was unsuccessful:
the government decided to defer Schiassi’s application further.
Only after E. J. Holloway, Labor MHR, interceded in his
favour in February 1931 did the Minister for Home Affairs
approve of the issue of the certificate of naturalisation.35 An
important factor for Blakeley’s change of mind was a further
report of the investigation branch in which it was stated that
Schiassi’s ‘private character is thought to be beyond reproach
and his opposition to the Italian Fascist movement can be
understood and perhaps sympathised with’.36 Schiassi’s
naturalisation had been delayed because the government was
influenced by the slanders intentionally circulated by the
Fascist authorities; also because it was anxious to avoid a
diplomatic incident with the Italian government caused by
Schiassi’s outspoken anti-Fascism: he had been warned by the
investigation branch that his application could be favourably
considered only in the case that ‘his future interests would he
rather in Australian than in Italian matters’, and if he would
‘remove himself largely from his present political interests’.37
Evidence at present available shows bias by the Australian
authorities in favour of the Fascists. While the Commonwealth
government’s granting of naturalisation certificates to proven
Fascists proceeded smoothly because it did not attract
protests, it nevertheless established a double standard which
discriminated against Italian anti-Fascists. For the latter the
certificates guaranteed personal safety and protection against
any request for their deportation by the Italian government;
on the other hand, the Fascists who applied for naturalisation
were paradoxically motivated by their wish to avoid
deportation by the Commonwealth government in
consequence of their extremist activities and to remain in the
country in order to continue their propaganda. When Remigio
Budica, one of the most violent Fascists of Melbourne, and
assailant of Schiassi, applied for his certificate of
naturalisation, he got it in less than a month, by virtue of
Italian consular pressures and of a sympathetic investigation
branch report.38
Between 1928 and 1931 Schiassi felt frustrated by this sense
of insecurity. Yet he was not deterred and carried out his
political activity with a courage and perseverance which
attracted the grudging admiration even of his enemies.39 As
president of the Anti-Fascist Concentration of Australasia, he
maintained contacts with the concentration in Paris, received
propaganda material from France and distributed it to
important people, to institutions and government depart
ments. Schiassi used to send to many federal ministers
opposition newspapers containing articles denouncing the
manoeuvres of Fascism abroad.40 He was quite punctilious in
checking the truthfulness of all statements before giving them
his support: in writing to the Prime Minister on 1 January
1930, he stressed that: ‘we have been and are always very
cautious in every public statement, and are giving always
great care before spending a single word, to be always on the
line of pure and proved tru th ’.42
During these years some of his initiatives were extremely
controversial; in particular, he attracted upon himself the
wrath of the local Fascists when he passed on to Smith's
Weekly an article from thePopolo d'ltalia, in which Australian
workers were unfavourably compared with Italian workers42
and, when he announced that he had been put in charge of the
project to erect a monument in Melbourne to Giacomo
M atteotti.43
Omero Schiassi 235
By the end of the 1920s the Concentration had shown its
limits: Schiassi had been unable to weld together the various
strands of anti-Fascism and had split from the Anarchists of
the Matteotti Club. The reasons for this break stem from
Schiassi’s belief that they were writing articles too
inflammatory and acting in a way which would inevitably call
for the repressive intervention of the Commonwealth
authorities.44 Instead of their policy of direct confrontation he
preferred a concerted political action aiming at rallying the
widest public opinion support.
Schiassi’s character and personality contributed signifi
cantly to alienating many people from his Concentration: his
intellectual egotism and his social snobbery prejudiced his
active participation in any association or political group, so
much so that there is some truth in what an opponent of
Schiassi, Vaccari, stated in 1944: that ‘the Anti-Fascist
Concentration in Australia never has . . . counted any
members apart from its founder and director, Dr Schiassi'.45
The Depression saw the collapse of all Italian anti-Fascist
organisations, including Schiassi’s Concentration. Many
Italians, now unemployed, left Melbourne and went looking for
jobs in the bush or in Queensland; thus the Concentration died
of lack of members and of financial support. Nevertheless,
during these years Schiassi carefully watched for any sign of
an anti-Fascist revival among Australians and Italians, and
his presence was always noted at meetings of the Rationalist
Society and of the Friends of the Soviet Union, at the Yarra
Bank, at lectures held by the Victorian Council for Civil
Liberties and at several other events. In 1936, in one of his rare
public appearances, he spoke at a peace rally organised by the
Victorian Council of the World Peace Congress, a body
affiliated to the World Committee Against War and Fascism,
which campaigned, among other things, against Italy’s
aggression against Abyssinia.46 When a group of Melbourne
Italians set up in 1934 the Italian Group Against War,
Schiassi was in close contact with its leaders but never became
more than its intellectual mentor: he drafted pamphlets, gave
some lectures, took part in a few meetings; he obviously
shunned being dragged to the foreground of the political
struggle. Similarly, in 1938, when the anti-Fascist Casa
d'Italia opened in Melbourne, although he accepted the
nomination of honorary president and was party to the
drafting of its statute, Schiassi avoided playing an active role
in its functions.
There are several reasons which can explain his behaviour.
He certainly learned from his discouraging experience with the
Concentration that to keep together Italians of different
political beliefs was an almost impossible task; also, he had
serious doubts about the possibility of activating the political
consciousness of his illiterate fellow countrymen: the apathy,
the personal rivalries and bickerings, the cultural and social
backwardness of most of them were a serious obstacle to the
achievement of this goal. Moreover, Schiassi was most
probably inwardly ever-conscious of the assurance which he
had given in taking up his naturalisation certificate in 1931
not to be involved too much in Italian politics: it is worthy of
note that his political commitment increased in the late 1930s
and early 1940s in direct proportion to the rise of an anti-
Fascist conscience among the Australian government and
people.
Yet Schiassi’s attitude was not attributable to mere
resignation or opportunism: he was a man of great moral and
intellectual courage, who was never intimidated by any
political threat and stood up to it. When World War II broke
out, Schiassi did not hesitate to support the Allied cause and
to campaign for the defeat of Fascism. Worthy of mention is
his pamphlet Italians All! in which, with his usual vivid
forensic style, he appealed to all Italians to join at once the
Australian armed forces in order to make true ‘the dream
cherished throughout our life, for the realisation of which we
have given the best part of ourselves’.47
He was also the intellectual guardian of the Italian political
groups which sprang up during the war years; in particular,
the Italian Anti-Fascist Movement and the Italia Libera. Of
the latter, the most important — in terms of membership,
influence and activities — of all anti-Fascist movements born
in Australia, he became president and took an active role. His
renewed militancy was justified by the historical reality of
those years: for the first time after two decades he saw a real
chance to defeat Fascism in Italy and to establish there a
Omero Schiassi 237
democratic system based on the principles of social justice
which he cherished. He was also aware that the fight against
Italian Fascism was by then somehow subordinate to the vital
struggle to save from complete destruction the cultural and
human heritage of Italy. In his inaugural address for the
foundation of Italia Libera in April 1943, he pointed out that
those were times for all Italians to unite in a spirit of national
conciliation: :Primum vivere, deinde philosophan . First it was
necessary to survive, later on we could fight about politics, he
admonished: ‘we are no longer concerned merely with anti-
Fascism. It has now become a matter of saving Italy from the
threatened chaos, from destruction, from annihilation’.48
Furthermore, the problem of the political future of Italy after
Fascism required immediate attention: Schiassi believed that
he and his friends could influence its outcome by persuading
the Australian government to advocate their case in any
future Allied post-war settlement conference.
Although Schiassi had no illusions about the amount of
pressure which could be brought to bear upon the
Commonwealth government,49 he knew that any result, albeit
modest, could be achieved only with a show of unity of Italians
in Australia. It is against this obstacle that Schiassi’s attempt
to form a powerful, homogeneous organisation met its failure.
He could never overcome the petty envy and vanity of many
members of Italia Libera. In this context, he bitterly
commented that Italians were ‘eternal asses of Buridan . . .
ever ready to put their formula before actual substance, like
gourds tossing in the water’, stubbornly indulging ‘their
chicanery while the fury of the tempest increases’.50
His fiery character certainly did not help to dampen the
contrasts: he often antagonised his colleagues with scathing
personal remarks.51 In a way, he lived in his own world of ideas
and hopes, which confirmed him in his unflinching opposition
to Fascism. He always clamoured for moral satisfaction when
he considered it due to him; this, in effect, as Professor
Chisholm argued,52 was his philosophy in a nutshell: to stand
steadfastly by your principles, against all adversities, all
compromises, at any personal cost.53 Schiassi was an
intellectual and a great idealist: thus it is understandable why
he was such a mediocre politician. He impressed people with
his culture and eloquence, but as a leader lacked charisma and
failed to gain their confidence. The measure of his political
naivety is shown by his waiting, after the fall of Mussolini,to
be asked back to Italy by Badoglio; he even hoped that the
general would send an aeroplane for him. When this did not
happen, he felt very bitter.54
The end of Fascism represented for Schiassi the culmination
of more than twenty years of struggle for freedom and
Socialism. During this period he braved poverty, isolation,
physical violence, threats and disillusions, but his faith in the
ultimate triumph of what he believed to be a just and moral
cause never wavered. Some thought that he was foolish to
persist in his hope for political and social justice for the Italian
people: he nevertheless relentlesly waited for his soddisfazione
morale, for the moral satisfaction of being proven right.
In the final analysis, his greatness lies in his moral
stubbornness: he was an example, a guide to all anti-Fascists
who looked to him for advice and leadership, particularly
during the darkest years of Fascist international triumphs. A
lonely character,55 his paradoxical behaviour puzzled those
who knew him. Although a rigorous student of Marx and
Engels, he repeatedly refused to teach Marxism to his friends
or to publish a newspaper for the anti-Fascist movement;56 his
atheist beliefs did not stop him from observing Christmas with
solemn seriousness; a professed anti-clerical, he loved to
analyse the minutiae of Catholic theology, of which he was an
expert. Even his Socialism was a peculiar expression of his
character: he always maintained a gentlemanly aloofness from
his comrades, conscious of his intellectual superiority.57
After the war he continued to be involved in Italian politics,
sponsoring progressive causes and maintaining the presidency
of the Italia Libera Movement up to his death on 2 January
1956 at Myrtleford, where he was buried. A memorial meeting
was held at the Unitarian church in Melbourne on 22 January
1956, in the presence of 150 people, many of whom paid tribute
to his memory. A cable was read from Pietro Nenni, leader of
the Italian Socialist Party.58 On his tombstone his friends of
Italia Libera inscribed the epitaph ‘LIBERTY, HUMANITY,
JUSTICE HE ADVOCATED’. They chose it because they
believed that it was indicative of the principles guiding
Omero Schiassi 239
Schiassi in his political activity. Truly, these words epitomise

his idealistic approach to politics, in contrast with his
professions of Socialism: an approach similar in many respects
to that of the Giustizia e Liberta movement in Italy and
equally destined to failure for its naivety.
Indeed, it is this divorce from reality which characterises
Schiassi’s greatness as a spiritual leader as well as his
mediocrity as a political organiser. But notwithstanding his
limitations, Schiassi was instrumental in keeping alive the
flame of Italian anti-Fascism, and if an opposition to Fascism
could exist in Australia throughout the lifespan of the regime,
it was to a large extent indebted to the untiring activities and
teachings of the Socialist intellectual from Bologna.
Notes
1 II Risveglio, 18 April 1945. For a history of the National
Federation of the Workers of the Land, see Renato Zangheri (ed.)
Lotte agrarie in Italia. La Federazione nazionale dei lavoratori
della terra 1901-26, Milano, 1960.
2 Later Schiassi confessed his embarrassment as a Socialist for
these photographs, which betrayed his youthful militaristic
enthusiasm for the uniform (A. R. Chisholm, interview, 18 Dec.
1973).
3 IIRisveglio, 18 April 1945.
4 To which Modigliani, reflecting the reformists’ indecision to take
upon themselves the responsibility of government, replied: ‘Yes,
but what would he do with it?’ (Gibson, interview, 28 May 1973).
5 In Genoa, writes Tasca, ‘the workers movement is in the hands
of the “autonomous” Socialists, that is of those outside the
official Party, Socialists of the extreme Right, who have been in
favour of Italy’s intervention in the World War’ (A. Tasca,
Nascita e avvento del Fascismo, Bari, 1971, pp. 346-7).
6 A. R. Chisholm, Men Were My Milestones, Melbourne, 1958, p.
117. Schiassi claimed that he ‘played a trick on the one who
boasts of being the most cunning man on earth, the most swinish
Benito Mussolini. I left Italy with his consent, without asking
anything of him’ (IIRisveglio, 18 April 1945).
7 C. A. McCormick to author, 17 May 1972. Also, F. Carmagnola,
interview, 18 Sept. 1971.
8 Chisholm, interview. For an accurate and sympathetic character
portrait of Schiassi, see Chisholm, Men Were My Milestones.
10 Carmagnola, interview; Saviane, interview, 7 Nov. 1971.
11 He remained faithful to Clarendon Street to the end of his life,
changing residence only once, from No. 140 to No. 142. Ralph
Gibson remembers that Schiassi once boasted of having
outlasted seven landladies who in vain tried to oust him in order
to charge higher rents to new tenants (Gibson, My Years in the
Communist Party, pp. 65-7). One of the landladies served him a
notice to quit on 13 December 1943, giving as her reason that
‘you have been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or
annoyance to adjoining or neighbouring occupiers by throwing
water on another tenant and assaulting him and also by making
noises during the night’.
12 Chisholm, interview.
13 Cristofaro Papers, Schiassi to Cristofaro, 29 July 1946.
14 Grossardi boasted of his negative influence in the affair in a
letter to the Secretary of the Acting Prime Minister, Earle Page:
in it he claimed that ‘Dr Schiassi applied a while ago for the
position of teacher of Italian at the Melbourne University but his
application was not accepted and I have reason to believe that
the University applied for information to the Home and
Territories Department’ (AA, CRS A1606, item SC C5/1,
Grossardi to Strahan, 1 Dec. 1926).
15 Ibid.
16 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, Grossardi to Bruce, 2 Dec. 1927.
17 Chisholm, Men Were M y Milestones, p. 118.
18 Gibson, My Years in the Communist Party, p. 66. Schiassi was a
very fine Dante scholar, and the university commissioned him to
write a commentary on the Divine Comedy, which he undertook
in the Italian language, but never finished. Worth noting is the
fact that his political commitment was so intense that even his
lectures on Dante were coloured by his political views. He used
to comment, rather amusingly, that the tragedy of Paolo and
Francesca would not have happened had Italy had a better
government, preferably a Socialist one (Chisholm, interview).
19 AA, CRS A446, item 57/67255, Grossardi to Bruce, 2 Dec. 1927.
20 For an analysis of the policies of the Anti-Fascist Concentration
and of the Italian Socialist Party in exile, see Simona Colarizi, Tl
Partito Socialista Italiano in esilio (1926-1933)’, Storia
Contemporanea, No. 1, March 1974, pp. 47-91.
21 See Fascism Exposed!, pamphlet, undated.
22 Carried away by strong emotion, Schiassi solemnly declared that
‘the Anti-Fascist Concentration of Australasia denounces to the
Australian people and to its legitimate representative, the Right
Honorable Stanley Bruce, Prime Minister of the Commonwealth,
Benito Mussolini and his Government!
Liberty is the goal, which is so dear
As he knows, who for it lays down his life.
Dante’.
Omero Schiassi 241
He also urged Bruce ‘to say to the world that Italy does not
deserve executioners, but civic rule and liberty’ (ibid).
23 APC, Mario Montagnana to Cristofaro, 4 Oct. 1942.
24 The Communist International saw a chance ‘to carry out even
there some work in the direction of the proletarian united front’,
a position which was broadly coincidental with Schiassi’s
strategy at the time (APC, Tasca? to PCI Secretariat, 5 Dec.
1928).
25 Gramsci Institute to author, 4 April 1972.
26 At the time his Australian friends could not appreciate the
difference between a Socialist and a Communist: Professor
Chisholm in his Men Were My Milestones described Schiassi as
‘an uncompromising Socialist’ but believed that ‘he held
Communist views’ (Chisholm to author, 2 July 1972). C. A.
McCormick ‘did not know if he was formally a Communist, but
he seemed to share their ideas’ (McCormick to author, 17 May
1972).
28 Chisholm, interview.
29 AA, CRS Al, item 31/721, Department of Home and Territories,
Memorandum No. 29/3939, 30 April 1929.
30 Paolo De Angelis, interview, 17 Dec. 1973; Italo-Australian, 13
Sept. 1930; La Riscossa, 1 Oct. 1930.
31 Walker, Solidarity Forever, p. 48; Bertha Walker, interview, 3
Oct. 1973.
32 AA, CRS Al, item 31/721, Attorney-General’s Dept to Home
Affairs, 22 April 1929.
33 Ibid., Department of Home and Territories, Memorandum No.
29/3939, 30 April 1929.
34 Ibid., Schiassi to A. E. Green, 21 April 1930.
35 Ibid., Blakeley to Holloway, 20 Feb. 1931.
36 Ibid., Attorney-General’s Dept to Home Affairs, 19 Feb. 1931.
37 Ibid., Department of Home and Territories, Memorandum No.
29/3939, 30 April 1929.
38 The Melbourne Fascist consul, Mario Melano, rather ironically
swore that Budica ‘has always been of excellent behaviour’ (AA,
CRS Al, item 28/1049, Melano, Certificate, 18 Jan. 1928), and
the Commonwealth Investigation Branch reported that
although Budica ‘is a member of the Italian Fascist movement in
this city, he appears to be quite a suitable subject for
naturalisation’ and recommended ‘that his application be treated
as an urgent one’ (AA, CRS Al, 28/1049 Attorney-General’s
Dept to Depai tment of Home and Territories, 24 Jan. 1928).
39 See B attistessa’s articles in the I talo-Australian, 30 June 1928, 3
Nov. 1928.
40 AA, CRS A981, item Fascism 1, and AA, CRS Al, item 31/721.
41 A.A., CRS A981, item Fascism 1, Schiassi to Scullin, 11 Jan.
1930.
42 Smith's Weekly, 6 Sept. 1930; Italo-Australian, 13 Sept. 1930.

43 I talo-Australian, 21 June 1930.
44 Schiassi had great contempt for the violent methods of the
Anarchists: ‘they are all a bunch of rogues’, he used to say (De
Angelis, interview).
45 AA, CRS A989, item 455/7/2, Vaccari to Bonomi, Report, 7 Aug.
1944.
46 Workers' Weekly, 11 Sept. 1936.
47 Italians All! pamphlet, 16 Jan. 1942. The closing paragraph of
this appeal is an excellent example of Schiassi’s rhetorical style
and also contains in a nutshell his political philosophy: ‘Forward,
forward, Italians all, worthy of the name of Italians; forward
with torch in hand, and axe, and book, and sickle and hammer:
with the torch, in order not to deviate from the right path; with
the book and axe, to cut through the branches and roots of
ignorance; with the sickle, to reap the substance essential for
physical and intellectual well being; with the hammer, to
construct the new society; and in the same fleeting instance in
which we address ourselves to you, with the rifle, to lay low the
upholders of barbarity! ’
48 Italia Libera, pamphlet, 18 April 1943.
49 In 1943 he warned the anti-Fascists not to delude themselves
that they were a powerful pressure group. Speaking of the Italia
Libera ‘It is my modest opinion’ he said, ‘that we must beware
the possible handicap of preparing giant clothes for a future
baby still in its foetal state’ (Cristofaro Papers, Schiassi to
Cristofaro, 25 Feb. 1943).
50 Italia Libera, pamphlet, 18 April 1943.
51 He told Matteo Cristofaro that he was so uneducated that he
was unable to pronounce correctly even his own name (Chisholm,
interview). On another occasion he blasted the NSW President of
the Italia Libera, R. A. Shaw, for allegedly attempting to take
over the control of the Movement: ‘this moral slime’ wrote
Schiassi, ‘nothing else but unlimited, unrestrained, burning
ambition, Shaw has proven himself to be a harmful element, a
serious danger, a permanent threat to our Movement’
(Cristofaro Papers, Schiassi to Cristofaro, 7 March 1944).
52 Chisholm, Men Were My Milestones, p. 124.
53 He was rightly proud of the fact that, as he wrote, T have been
left alone during my long political life in decisive circumstances,
but the facts have always proven me right’ (Cristofaro Papers,
Schiassi to Cristofaro, 23 Sept. 1943).
54 Judah Waten, interview, 29 May 1973.
55 Man of few friends, Schiassi did not seen to have had a romantic
life, although it was alleged in 1932 that he wanted to bring his
fiancee to Australia, but was refused permission by the Italian
authorities because of his anti-Fascist activities (Italo-
Australian, 24 Sept. 1932).
Omero Schiassi 243

57 Sometimes Schiassi quite impudently showed off his lack of
modesty. In 1931 he assured Holloway that ‘I am not a great
deal inferior to the man in the street: to that, I am proud to say
that I am superior for a scrupulous sense of duty and honesty’
(AA, CRS Al, item 31/721, Schiassi to Holloway, 20 Nov. 1931).
58 The Guardian, 26 Jan. 1956.
Conclusion
The end of World War II and the collapse of Fascism in Italy

set the stage for the beginning of a new chapter in the history
of Italians in Australia, which began in 1947, when the
Minister for Immigration, A. A. Calwell, launched his program
of mass immigration. During the ensuing twenty-five years,
hundreds of thousands of Italians took advantage of this
policy decision and settled in Australia, integrating
themselves into the pre-war Italian communities (which, on the
surface, bore little evidence of having been scarred by their
Fascist interlude) and, by the sheer weight of their numbers,
drastically changing the character of these communities. The
demise of Fascism meant the historical end of a period of
political struggles which began with the surging of Fascism as
well as with the considerable increase in size of Italian
settlement in Australia. During this period, the Italian
migrants, for the first time in their history, voiced openly, even
when the odds were heavily against them, their passions, their
ideas, their hopes, and expressed their political aspirations
through their associations, clubs and activities, as has been
seen in the previous chapters.
245
It seems appropriate now to conclude by gathering together
the main strands of argument pursued throughout this study.
Although the activities of Italians in Australia in support of
or in opposition to Fascism were of minor importance if
compared to the overall pattern of Australian history of those
years, they were significantly relevant to the history of the
migrant communities of this country. Isolated for religious,
linguistic and socio-economic reasons from Australian political
life, the majority of Italian migrants adapted themselves to a
life which shunned active political participation. Their
behaviour with respect to their Australian condition was
nevertheless reminiscent of the political apathy which for
generations they had shown in Italy, where they had felt
hopelessly alienated from the central government and from
any form of political activity.
Only a minority of better educated migrants in the 1920s
and the 1930s expressed their political opinion with regard to
Fascism, and it is extremely difficult for the historian to
ascertain whether their feelings were motivated by conscious
acceptance of the Fascist principles, or by emotional
nationalism, or whether Fascism was opposed out of rejection
of its dictatorial connotations, or out of resentment of a
government and a social system which had compelled them to
emigrate. Fascist and anti-Fascist activities in Australia
followed the same pattern as in other countries, such as the
United States, France and Argentina, with periods of
enthusiastic support for the regime, as during the Abyssinian
war, or of militant opposition to it, as in the years of the
M atteotti Club and of the Italia Libera Movement.
What distinguished the Fascist as well as the anti-Fascist
movements in Australia was the absence in their midst of an
intellectual and of a professional political 61ite which could
create the conditions favourable to political mass movements.
This explains also the relative incapacity to rouse the political
sensitivity of Italian migrants, as well as the isolation of both
movements from the main stream of initiatives taking place
overseas. There was no international Communist conspiracy
nor a Fascist International pulling the strings of Italian
politics in this country. With the exception of irregular
contacts with the Comintern, the Italian Communist Party in
Conclusion 247
exile, the Concentrazione Antifascista, or the Direzione

Generale degli Italiani all'Estero, there was no planned
international co-ordination of anti-Fascist or Fascist activities,
although this consideration is less relevant for the latter.
Distance and the lack of reliable communications compounded
the difficulties just mentioned.
The low standard of education of the Italian migrants also
favoured their estrangement from political life; moreover, they
were deterred by some aspects of Fascist and anti-Fascist
propaganda, in particular by the anti-Fascists’ outright
commitment to destroy the institutions which had aided and
abetted the ascent of Fascism, namely the bourgeois state, the
Church, the monarchy and the capitalist system. Fascist
propaganda on the other hand exacted unquestioning
obedience to the policies of the regime, in this way favouring
political conformism and discouraging any personal opinion.
World War II, the understandable suspicion and hostility
towards Italians by Australian authorities and people,
internment, the feeling of being enemy aliens in a foreign
country, conditioned Italians even further against an
uninhibited participation in the democratic process.
This legacy of frustration and of apathy was evident in the
post-war period, when Italian migrants began exercising,
albeit slowly and timidly, their rights as free citizens in a
pluralist society. Too many of them still believed that politics
was a ‘dirty business’, the exclusive domain of the powerful
and the educated, and that they could not alter significantly
their social and political conditions by taking part in political
activities.
Even today the legacy of Fascism is still conditioning the
attitudes of those Italians in Australia (as well as in Italy) who
claim that a dispassionate historical analysis of the Fascist
period is not possible because not enough time has elapsed to
allow historians to write ‘objectively’, as if, by suspending
their research on this period, historians could somehow acquire
at a later stage that antiseptic objectivity, devoid of any
moral, social or political implications for the present times,
which the unwitting supporters of this opinion prefer to shun.
In fact, if, taken in this context, Croce’s dictum that all
history is contemporary history is still valid, even more
poignantly relevant is Renzo De Felice’s view, expressed in his
Intervista sul Fascismo, that, until we can face the problem of
Fascism in historical terms, we will not free ourselves from all
those contradictions and inabilities to understand not only
Italian history, but even its politics or its current affairs.
Inspired by De Felice’s remarks, this study on the attitudes of
Italians in Australia towards Fascism aims at being a small
contribution to a better understanding of their history in this
country.
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E. Tape Recorded In ter views
The following people were interviewed, some more than once, in order
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documented. Oral history interviews proved an important aid in the
formation of a comprehensive picture of the history of Italians in
Australia during this period. Especially for the anti-Fascist side, this
book could not have been written without the personal recollections
and the documents of the people approached.
Barker, Leonard (Melbourne).
Battistessa, Franco (Sydney).
Brida, Ottavio (Melbourne).
Bugno, Antonio (Griffith, NSW).
Carmagnola, Francesco (Camden, NSW).
Chisholm, Prof. A. R. (Melbourne).
Costantino, Napoleone (Sydney).
Cristofaro, Matteo (Melbourne).
De Angelis, Paolo (Melbourne).
Del Pin, Eustacchio (Sydney).
Franceschini, Boris (Melbourne).
Gibson, Ralph (Melbourne).
Giuffre, Vincenzo Eolo (Sydney).
La Rosa, Fortunato (Sydney).
Payne, Bert (Melbourne).
Rando, Felice (Sydney).
Saviane, Tommaso (Sydney).
252 Bibliography
Sonnino, Dr Paolo (Sydney).
Stellato, Luigi (Melbourne).
Walker, Bertha (Melbourne).
Waten, Judah (Melbourne).
Zammarchi, Giuseppe (Melbourne).
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Queensland Government
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Italian Government
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Advertiser, Adelaide.
Age, Melbourne.
L'Angelo della Famiglia, Melbourne.
Argus, Melbourne.
LAvanguardia Libertaria, Melbourne.
Brisbane Courier, Brisbane.
Canberra Times, Canberra.
Daily Guardian, Sydney.
Daily Telegraph, Sydney.
Did you Know This?, Melbourne, 1945.
II Giornale Italiano, Sydney.
IlGlobo, Melbourne.
LTdeaPopolare, Paris.
Italian Bulletin of Australia, Sydney.
Italo-Australian, Sydney.
Labor Daily, Sydney.
La Liberta, Paris.
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LaRiscossa, Melbourne.
IlRisveglio, Sydney.
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----- , Italiani Tutti!, Melbourne, 1942.
----- , Italia Libera, Melbourne, 1943.
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Smith's Weekly, Sydney.

La Stampa Italiano, Perth.
Stato Operio, Paris, New York.
Sun, Sydney.
Sunday Sun, Sydney.
Sunday Telegraph, Adelaide.
Sunday Times, Perth.
Sydney Morning Herald, Sydney.
Townsville Daily Bulletin,Townsville.
Truth, Sydney.
Vade Mecum, Illustrated Annual of the Giornale I taliano, Sydney.
Workers' Weekly, Sydney.
C. Books and Articles
Andrews, E.M., Isolationism and Appeasement in Australia,
Australian National University Press, Canberra, 1970.
Baccarini, Antonio, What For?, Cosmopolitan Publishing Co.,
Melbourne, 1936.
Bartlett, F. C., Political Propaganda, Cambridge University Press,
1940.
Borrie, W. D., Italians and Germans in Australia, Cheshire,
Melbourne, 1954.
Campbell, Eric, The New Road, Briton Publications, Sydney, 1934.
----- , The Rallying Point, Melbourne University Press, 1965.
Cannistraro, Philip V., La fabbrica del consenso. Fascismo e mass
media, Laterza, Bari, 1975.
----- ,‘Burocrazia e politica culturale nello stato fascista: il Ministero
della cultura popolare’, Storia Contemporanea, Year I, No. 2,
June 1970.
----- , ‘II cinema italiano sotto il fascismo’, Storia Contemporanea,
Year III, No. 3, September 1972.
Cassels, Alan, Mussolini's Early Diplomacy, Princeton University
Press, 1970.
Chisholm, A. R., Men were My Milestones, Melbourne University
Press, 1958.
Colarizi, Simona, ‘Il Partito Socialista Italiano in esilio (1926-1933)’,
Storia Contemporanea, Year V, No. I, March 1974.
De Felice, Renzo, Mussolini il fascista II. L'organizzazione dello
Stato fascista. 1925-1929, Einaudi, Torino, 1968.
----- , Mussolini il duce I. Gli anni del consenso. 1929-1936, Einaudi,
Torino, 1974.
-----, Intervista sul Fascismo, Laterza, Bari, 1975.
Delzell, C. F. (ed.), Mediterranean Fascism, Harper & Row, New
York, 1970.
Diggins, J. P., Mussolini and Fascism. The View from America,
Princeton University Press, 1972.
Di Marzio, Cornelio, Il Fascismo all'estero, Imperia, Milano, 1923.
254 Bibliography
Fry, T. P., ‘The Italian consular incidents in North Queensland’,
Australian and New Zealand Society of International Law-
Proceedings, Melbourne University Press, 1935.
Gibson, Ralph, My Years in the Communist Party, Coronation
Printery, Morningside, Qld, 1966.
Giuliano, Balbino, L'opera e la missione della Dante Alighieri,
Societä Nazionale Dante Alighieri, Rome, 1929.
Gravelli, Asvero, Verso VInternazionale Fascista, Nuova Europa,
Rome, 1932.
Hasluck, Paul, The Government and the People, 1939-1941,
Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1965.
Luciolli, Mario, Palazzo Chigi: anni roventi, Rusconi, Milano, 1976.
Lyttelton, Adrian, The Seizure of Power, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
London, 1973.
Michaelis, Meir, T rapporti tra Fascismo e Nazismo prima
dell’avvento di Hitler al potere (1922-1933)’, R ivista Storica
Italiana, Year LXXXV, No. 34, 1973.
Moran, H. M., Letters from Rome, Angus & Robertson, Sydney,
1935.
Murden, Bruce, The Puzzled Patriots, Melbourne University Press,
1968.
Mussolini, Benito, Opera Omnia, XXV, La Fenice, Florence, 1959.
Parini, Piero, ‘Roma Ritorna — Ritorna a Roma’, Sole d'Italia:
Letture Classe V, Rome, 1935.
Pascale, Francesco, Tra gli Italiani in Australia, Accademia, Rome,
1930.
Price, C. A., Southern Europeans in Australia, Oxford University
Press, Melbourne, 1963.
Rolo, Charles J., Radio Goes to War, Faber and Faber, London, 1943.
Rumi, Giorgio, Alle origini della politica estera fascista, 1918-1923,
Laterza, Bari, 1968.
Tasca, Angelo, Nascita e avvento del Fascismo, Laterza, Bari, 1971.
Trevor-Roper, H. R., ‘The Phenomenon of Fascism’, in S. J. Woolf
(ed.), European Fascism, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London,
1968.
Vigezzi, B. (ed.), 1919-1925. Dopoguerra e Fascismo, Laterza, Bari.
1965.
Walker, Bertha, Solidarity Forever, The National Press, Melbourne,
1972.
Woolf, S. J. (ed.), The Nature of Fascism, Weidenfeld and Nicolson,
London, 1968.
Zangheri, Renato (ed.), Lotte agrarie in Italia. La Federazione
nazionale dei lavoratori della terra, 1901-1926, Feltrinelli, Milano,
1960.
Index
A.C.T.U., 230, 231 Russell Street fight, 106; release of
Adrian, G., 218n from internment camps, 204
L' Adunata dei Refrattari, 133n Anzilotti, Enrico, 42, 72, 73, 74, 94n,
Advocate, 148, 219n 124, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 157,
Agenzia Stefani, 71, 153 164n,165n, 166n
Albanese, C., 81 Argus, 219n
Alcorso, Claudio, 214, 215 Armando Diaz, 72, 89n
Alfieri, Dino, 159, 170n Arrighi, Ernesto, 80, 92n, 148, 149,
Alleanza Nazionale Giuseppe Gari 152, 158, 159, 165n, 170n
baldi, 199, 200, 201, 217n Asinari, Gabrio, Count of San
Allied Works Council, 205, 215 Marzano, 12, 31, 45n, 105;
Allison, J. M., 163n biographical note, 20n
Alpini, 224 Associazione Italiana, 139
Amalgamated Wireless (A.Asia) Ltd, Associazione Nazionale Combat-
71,153 temi, 155
Amerio, Giuseppe, 14, 32, 79, 84, Associazione Nazionalista, 54
92n, 93n, 143; biographical note, Australia: and hostility against
21n Fascism, 164n; and hostility
Amicucci, Ermanno, 43n against Italians, 184, 185, 191n,
L Angelo della famiglia, 187, 189, 198; restricts immigration of
213 Italians, 27; surveillance of Fascist
Anti-Fascism: and Abyssinia. 122-4; activities, 80-1,91n
aims, 198-200; and Australian Australia First Movement, 197
authorities, 128-30, 132, 186; Australian Labor Party and
beginning of, in Australia, 7, 17, 98; Fascism, 12,119, 228
centres of, 98, 112; and Molotov- Australian Relief for Italy, 214, 22In
Ribbentrop Pact, 129; and LAvanguardia Libertarian 107, 108,
propaganda, 126, 205-6; and World 118
War II, 130 Avanti!, 226, 228
Anti-Fascists: and Abyssinia, 108; Axis, 161, 175,184, 201
aims of, 105; contrasts between,
105; and the Depression, 107; Baccarini, Antonio, 9, 38, 39, 71, 73,
exposing Fascist supporters, 106; 89n, 139, 144, 146, 147, 154, 163n;
hostility against, 111; and the biographical note, 37
Melano incident, 107; and the Badoglio, Pietro, 186, 238
Montecuccoli incident, 109; ob Baracchi, Guido, 129
stacles confronting, 110-12; the Baratto, Ernesto, 129
255
256 Index
Barbusse, Henri, 121 Cannistraro, Phillip V., 47n, 93n,
Barris, K. K., 91n 162n
Bastianini, Giuseppe, 11 Cantalupo, Roberto, 2
Battistessa, Franco, 43, 45n, 53, 58, Canteri, Guido, 122, 128,131
59, 62, 63, 65, 73, 74, 81, 104, 154, Carandini, Nicolo, 190
24 ln; biographical note, 54-5; Gardell Oliver, Ivor, 166n
Paddington Town Hall incident, 60- Carmagnola, Francesco Giuseppe,
1,63 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 106,
Beckett, John, 15 107, 109,117,118, 126,130, 135n
Bertazzon, Isidoro, 101, 105, 107, Carosi, Mario, 10, 12, 26, 30, 45n, 56,
118, 231 57, 62, 102, 140; biographical note,
Bianchi, Felippo Maria, 28, 45n, 83, 20n
94n,188 Casa d'ltalia (Anti-Fascist), 107, 127,
Bianchi, Michele, 138 129, 134n, 235-6; closure of, 130;
Biennale, 165n statute of, 128
Biondi, Ugo, 168n Casa d'ltalia (Fascist), 28, 155, 156,
Bissolati, Leonida, 8 209
Blackburn, Maurice, 134n, 202, 231 Casotti, Giovanni, 176-8
Blakeley, Arthur, 233 Cassels, Alan, 18n, 20n
Boggio, Pino, 133n Catholic Church, 15, 209, 213, 247;
Bolshevism, 102, 139 and Communism, 187; and
Bondi, Santo, 109 Fascism, 16
Bonomi, Ivanoe, 212, 213, 224 Catholic Worker, 168n
Borghese, Junio Valerio, 89n Cattaneo, Bartolomeo, 41
Borghetti, 60, 61 Cazzulino, Severino, 168n
Borrie, E. F., 149 Central Political Office, 70, 80, 83
Borrie, W. D., 18n Chamberlain, Neville, 18n
Borsi, Gianni, 80, 83, 94n Chiavolini, C., 55
Bottai, Giuseppe, 141 Chieffi, L„ 92n, 156
Brida, Ottavio, 120, 126,128, 131 Chisholm, A. R„ 202, 203, 204, 217n,
Briglia, B., 189 218n, 223, 226, 228, 229, 237, 239n,
British Preference League, 39-40 241n
British Union of Fascists, 15 Ciano, Galeazzo, 137,149, 159
Brocchieri, Vincenzo Beonio, 157 Cilento, Raphael, 214
Brown, Major, 216 Ciotti, Valentino, 104
Browne, Inspector, 80 Circolo I sole Eolie, 19n, 113n, 155
Bruce, Stanley Melbourne, 16, 27, 31, Circolo Cavour, 19n, 73, 110, 113n,
39, 99, 101, 102, 229, 240n, 241n 155, 209
Bruxner, Frederick Michael, 160, Circolo Duca degli A bruzzi, 19n
164n Circolo Savoia, 19n
Budica, Remigio, 232, 234, 241n Citarelli, Renato, 42, 47n
Bulletin, 157 Cleary, W. J., 164n
Buoninsegni Vitali, Luigi, 8, 12, 19n, Club Concordia, 19n
74 Club Italia, 10, 19n, 113n, 155
Coladetti, Angelo, 120, 131
Callill, F. A. L„ 128, 217n Colarizi, Simona, 240n
Callose, Bartolomeo, 63 Colonna, Umberto, 106
Calwell, Arthur Augustus, 129, 175, Commissariat-General for Migra
180, 210, 211, 212, 219n, 245 tion, 10-11, 19n
Cameron, Donald, 129, 202, 203, 228, Communist International, 111, 117,
231 231,241n, 246
Campbell, Eric, 39, 144, 149, 160, Communist Party of Australia, 119,
163n, 164n 120, 121, 124, 127, 130, 131, 135n,
Index 257
207, 216n,219n, 231,232 Propaganda, 144-7

Communist Party of Italy, 111, 118, Di Vittorio, Giuseppe, 126
119, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 129, Drummond, H. E., 164n
131, 199, 201,232,246 Duggan, W. J., 231
Concentrazione Antifascista, 104, Duhig, James, 15, 41, 140, 149, 160,
105, 106, 230, 231, 234, 235, 240n, 164n; and Mussolini, 22n
247 L'Eco d'ltalia, 26, 33, 34, 142
Corfu, 5, 6 Editions de Culture Sociale, 121
II Corriere degli Italiani in Australia, E.I.A.R., 152, 154
33,34,37,63, 64, 94n, 142 Engels, Friedrich, 238
Corso, Giovanni, 120, 131 Esquilino, 75
Cosmopolitan Publishing Co., 83 Evatt. Herbert Vere, 202. 203, 206,
Costantino, Napoleone, 14, 50n, 57, 211,212
108,166n
Council Against War and Fascism; Fantin, Francesco, 70, 179; death of
121, 123, 126,235 176-8
Council for Civil Liberties, 126, 202, Farinacci, Roberto, 54
235 Fascism: and Abyssinia, l33n, 144,
Cristofaro, Matteo (Boschi di 146, 151, 158; in Australia, 2, 4, 9,
Branciaretti), 119-32, 134n, 135n, 15, 16, 22n, 23, 32, 97, 110;
200, 204, 205, 210, 217n, 219n, 242n Australian sympathisers with, 15,
Croce, Benedetto, 247 16, 139, 140, 144, 147-50; diplo
Crofts, —,231 matic incidents, 30-2, 46n, 84, 147,
Curtin, John, 204, 210 157, 169n; and expansionism, 2,
17n, 24, 68-9,137,142, 151; in Italy,
Daily Guardian, 44n, 45n, 64 9; and M atteotti’s murder, 6-7; on
Daily News, 35 migrants, 68, 69; and Nazism, 83,
Dante, 240n 93n; and religion, 49n; and the
Dante Alighieri Society, 9, 27, 37, Spanish Civil War, 170n; in the
49n, 140, 141, 144, 149, 153, 154, United States, 2; during World
155, 159, 214 War II, 186-7
Darley, F. W., 15 Fascist: branches abroad, 2, 5, 17n;
De Angelis, Paolo, 122, 131, 200, branches in Australia, 7, 11, 12, 13,
218n 14, 28, 77, 168n, 173; celebrations,
De Felice, Renzo, 38, 43n, 45n, 65, 28-9, 41, 141; clubs, 77; espionage,
209,219n, 248 78-81, 85, 92n, 156-7, 168n; foreign
De Francesco, Vincenzo, 187 policy, 6, 42, 43; Grand Council, 2,
Del Drago, Alfonso, 173 87n, 140, 141; International, 2, 87n;
Del Mastro, Pietro, 36, 61 intimidation against migrants,
Del Pin, Eustacchio, 13, 14, 20n, 57, 113n, 114n; migration policy, 10,
58,59,62 11, 25-6; newspapers, 33, 77-8;
Delzell, Charles F., 87n Party’s Overseas Branches
De Michelis, Giuseppe, 14 Congress, 11; schools, 28, 71, 77,
Dempster, GeorgeS., 166n 143-4, 163n; Statute of the Fascist
Depression, 118,130, 235 Branches Abroad, 24-5, 39, 44n, 56,
Diaz, Porfirio, 11 59; violence, 119
Dictation test, 36 Fascist propaganda, 33, 47n, 78, 81-
Diggins, J. P., 18n, 113n 2, 84, 93n, 110, 132n, 137; aims,
Di Marzio, Cornelio, 24, 138, 140, 158-61, 169n; associations, 155;
152,159 Australian screening of, 160, 167n,
Direzione degli Italiani all'Estero, 170n, 172, 213; books 148, 163n;
150,247 cinema, 142, 150-2, 166n, 167n;
Direzione Generale per i Servizi della lectures, 162n; newspapers, 146,
258 Index
158; pamphlets, 144-5; photo Gruppo Italiano contro la Guerra,
graphs, 146; radio, 148, 150, 152-4 121-7,129-31, 235; aims of, 120
Ferrante, Agostino, Marquis of
Ruffano, 41, 43, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, Hatcher, James O., 15
108, 144, 150, 151, 153, 157, 166n, Hentze, M., 148
168n Hitler, Adolf, 68
Fiaschi, Tommaso, 18n, 139 Holloway, Edward James, 129, 202,
Fitzpatrick, Brian, 202 203, 204, 218n, 231, 233, 243n
Fleming, J. W., 120 Hughes, William Morris, 16, 19n, 30,
Folli, Antonio, 5, 6, 98 109
Fornari, 14 Humanitarian Society, 224
Foster, A. W„ 129, 202 Iachino, Angelo, 89n
Franceschini, Boris, 120,130, 131 L'Idea Popolare, 121, 123
Franco, Francisco, 126 International Brigades, 126, 129, 199
Friends of the Soviet Union, 235 International Red Cross, 174
Frola, Francesco, 199, 200, 204, 231 Internment of Italians, 85, 88n, 172,
Fry, T. P„ 46n 174, 183-4; Aliens Tribunal, 174;
Fuller, George, 139 conditions in internment camps,
174-5, 190, 191n; Fascist activities
Garibaldi, Giuseppe, 110, 201 in camps, 175, 192n; Jews, 180;
Gariglio, Luigi, 164n Naturalised British Subjects in
Garran, Robert, 44n terned, 173, 174; regulations, 172;
Gazzetta Ufficiale, 26 release from internment, 180;
Geisser Celesia di Vegliasco, Andrea, violence in camps, 176-80,192n
149,158,159, 160, 165n, 169n Isaacs, Isaac, 202
Geneva Convention, 175 Istituto LUCE, 142
Giannini, Amedeo, 138 Italia Libera Movement, 130, 185,
Gibson, A. Boyce, 202 188, 189, 209-15, 221n, 246;
Gibson, Ralph, 121, 129, 132, 133n, achievements of, 216; activities of,
232, 240n 206, 218n; aims of, 201-4, 206, 214,
II Giornale Italiano, 43, 71, 73, 83, 217n; and the Australian govern
88n, 146,170n ment, 186, 202, 218n; branches of,
Giuffre, Vincenzo Eolo, 45n 205, 206; disagreement within, 208;
Giuliano, Balbino, 141 failure of, 207-8, 214-15; and
Giulietti, Giuseppe, 225 Schiassi, 236-8
Giustizia e Liberta, 239 Italia Shipping Company, 82
Gleeson, T. M., 126 Italian Bulletin of Australia, 5, 141
Goldoni, Carlo, 129 Italian Chamber of Commerce in
Grandi, Dino, 13, 56, 68, 87n Australia, 5, 94n
Grant, Donald, 84 Italian consuls in Australia, 12, 26,
Gravelli, Asvero, 142 42,77
Green, Albert Ernest, 233 Italian migrants: and Abyssinia, 73-
Gremmo, Nino, 147, 165n 6; and the Depression, 40;
II Grido del Popolo, 121 discrimination against, 4, 27, 39,
Grieco, Ruggiero, 122, 125, 134n, 205; economic conditions of, 3, 185;
135n Fascist sympathies of, 158, 169n,
Grossardi, Antonio, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 180-1, 193n; and the Kalgoorlie
19n, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 40, 47n, 56, riots, 150, 166n; and the Matteotti
57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 70, 99, 102, murder, 7; nationalism of, 4-6;
157, 213, 227, 228, 229, 231, 240n; naturalisation of, 89n, 93n; settle
biographical note, 42-3; political ment of, 3, 5, 91n; and the Spanish
affiliations of, 18n; pro-Fascism of, Civil War, 76; and World War II,
50n; sectarianism of, 18n 171
Index 259
L'Italiano, 81, 82, 185 Mafia, 172

Italian Socialist Party, 223, 224, 231, Maloney, W., 231
238 Mambrini, O. F. M., 41
Italo-Australian, 5-8, 14, 16, 17, 26, Mammalella, Amedeo, 69, 81, 82, 84,
32, 33, 36, 38, 42, 47n, 56, 57, 58, 62, 157, 158, 169n; biographical note,
63,64,73,98, 101, 139, 141 83
Italo-Australian Association, 10 Manning, Henry Edward, 164n
Italy: restricts emigration to Aust Mannix, Daniel, 160, 173, 187, 188,
ralia, 27; trade with Australia, 88n; 209; on Mussolini, 210, 219n
war loans, 4 Marano, V., 8 ,19n
Marconi, Guglielmo, 45n
Jackson, D. G. M., 148,165n Maria Cristina, 62, 63
Jones, Charles Lloyd, 164n Marinelli, Giovanni, 138
Jones, H.E., 34.35, 78, 156 Marinetti, Filippo Tommaso, 55
Jordan, F. R., 164n Marotta, A., 166n
Joyce, William (Lord Haw-Haw), 15 II Martello, 133n
Martens, George, 218n
KamoMaru, 87 Martinuzzi, Pietro, 81, 92n
Kelly, Michael, 41 Marx, Karl, 238
Kisch, Egon Irwin, 121 Massimi, Cesare (Silverio), 127,134n
Koch, Ottaviano Armando, 159, 160 Matteotti Club, 105, 107, 118, 120,
129, 130, 230, 231, 235, 246; aims
Labor Daily, 50n of, 104; foundation of, 103
Labour Council, Sydney, 30 Matteotti, Giacomo, 6, 9, 104, 105,
Ladendorff, 83 107,224,231,234
Laidler, Percy, 134n Mazzini, Giuseppe, 110
Lalli, Pietro, 19n Mazzini Society, 199
Lancellotti, Virgilio, 10, 11, 12, 14, McGuire, D. P., 149
42,62 McKell, William John, 183, 184
Lanital, 166n McLaren, —, 44n
La Rinascenza Club, 10 Melano, Mario, 10, 32, 58, 61, 107,
Lateran Pacts, 28, 41 24 In
Latham, John Grieg, 168n Menzies, Robert Gordon, 130
Lawson, H. S. W., 139 Michaelis, Meir, 87n
Lawson, Harry, 202 Mistrorigo, Luigi, 34-6, 42, 47n, 48n
Lega Antifascista, 101,102 Mitchell, D. R. B., 35
Lega Italiana, 19n Mittelholzer, — , 152
II Legionario, 56, 64 Modigliani, Giuseppe Emanuele, 224,
Levi, Fulvio, 218n 225, 239n
Levy, Daniel, 164n Modotti, Ugo, 187, 189, 191n, 209,
Libia, 72 210; on Italia Libera, 213, 214; on
Ligustri, 60, 61, 63 Mussolini, 188
IlLittorio, 33, 34, 61, 103, 141 Monk, Albert, 228
Lodewyckx, A., 228, 229 Montagnana, Mario, 126, 199, 200,
Longo, Luigi (Gallo), 126 217n
Loria, Achille, 224 Montagnana, Massimo, 197, 200,
Lubrano, Francesco, 5, 8,13, 57 203, 204, 207, 208, 210, 218n
Lucetti, Gino, 125 Montagnana, Rosa, 200
Luciano, Giuseppe, 31, 45n Montecuccoli, 109, 127, 152
Luciolli, Mario, 175 Montevideo Conference, 199
Lyons, Joseph Aloysius, 36, 74, 121, Monti, Ernesto, 218n
169n Moran, Herbert M., 38,147, 149
Lyons, P., 188 Morel, George W., 174
260 Index
Mosley, Oswald, 149 and Mussolini’s downfall, 182;
Movimento Antifascista Italiano, repatriation of, 183; working
130, 200,201,210,236 outside camps, 181-2
Murdoch, Walter, 48n, 202
Mussolini, Arnaldo, 40, 45n Ramaciotti, G. 4,16, 65n
Mussolini, Benito, 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, Rando, Felice, 69, 84, 94n, 95n, 144,
11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 17n, 23, 25, 27, 33, 154, 171
37, 41, 53, 55, 56, 58, 61, 62, 67, 68, Rankin, G. J., 211
86, 87, 91n, 99, 101, 103, 104, 105, Rationalist Society, 235
109, 123, 132, 135n, 137, 138, 139, Remo, 108; seizure of, 173
140, 142, 145, 147, 149, 150, 151, Richards, R., 178
153, 182, 186, 188, 198, 199, 203, La Riscossa, 103, 104, 107, 108, 118,
204, 206, 209, 210, 214, 217n, 224, 169n
239, 239n, 240n II Risveglio, 101, 102, 103, 110, 182,
Nastro Azzurro Association, 28 189, 207, 213, 214, 215, 219n
Nazism, 15, 68, 78, 83; and propa Rolland, Romain, 121
ganda, 137, 175 Romolo, scuttling of 173
Nenni, Pietro, 226, 238 Ross, R. S., 231
New Guard, 38-9 Rossato, Arturo, 55
News, Adelaide, 75 Rossi, Bruno, 108
Nobile, Umberto, 61 Rossi, Cesare, 138
Noce, Teresa (Estella), 126 Rossi, Egisto, 27
NuPIE, 159,164n Rostagno, D., 14
Nurra, Duilio, 82 Rudkin, Charles, 15,19n, 140
Rumi, Giorgio, 17n
O’Cassidy, John, 135n Russell Street fight, 120
O’Day, G. P., 120
Ormond, 226 Sacco, Nicola, 103
Oronsay, 15 Salvemini, Gaetano, 110
OVRA, 70, 79,81 Salza, Father, 36, 37,105
Santamaria, B. A., 168n, 188, 189
Pacciardi, Randolfo, 199 Saviane, Tommaso, 103, 107, 205,
Page, Earle Christmas Grafton, 228, 206
240n Schiassi, Guglielmo, 224
Palermo, 103 Schiassi, Omero, 104, 105, 106, 112,
Palmer, Vance, 202 122, 126-9, 134n, 200-4, 206-9, 212,
Panico, G., 155 215, 217n; and Anarchists, 242n;
Panozzo, Marco, 154 appointed at Melbourne Univer
Paoloni, Goliardo, 71 sity, 228-9, 240n; character of, 223,
Parini, Piero, 24, 56, 63, 99, 100 227; commemorates Matteotti,
Pascale, Francesco, 12, 26, 27, 33, 231, 240n; and Communism, 232-3,
142; biographical note, 20n 24In; idealism of, 238; on Italia
Pearce, George Foster, 147 Libera, 242n; leaves Italy, 226; on
Pertini, Sandro, 125 Mussolini, 224, 228; and naturali
Pesenti Committee, 125 sation, 233; persecuted by Fascists,
Petrucco, K., 203 225-6, 228, 232; rhetorical style,
Piscitelli, M„ 177, 178 242n; scholarship of, 240n; on
Poli, Giuseppe, 122 Vaccari, 220n
II Popolo d'ltalia, 40, 42, 45n, 55, Schipa, Tito, 84
137, 139, 234 Scullin, James Henry, 35,106
Prestito delLittorio, 22n Sereni, Emilio, 126
Prisoners of war, Italian: arrival of Sette, Aldo, 55
181; Fascist activities among, 182; Sforza, Carlo, 199, 204
Index 261
Shaw, R. A„ 204, 205, 242n United States, 5,10

Shelley, J., 231 University of Queensland, 28
Simeoni, Carlo, 122, 127, 128, 129, University of Sydney, 28, 49n
130,134n U.N.N.R.A., 221n
Simpson, William B., 88n, 179, 210,
211, 218n Vaccari, Gualtiero, 81, 82, 88n, 117,
Smith, William Forgan, 31 118, 132n, 147, 188, 189, 209, 210,
Smith's Weekly, 29, 35, 40, 215, 234 211, 215, 219n, 220n; report on
Socieia Italiana di Beneficenza, 40 Italians in Australia, 212-13; on
Soccorso Rosso Italiano, 126 Schiassi, 235
Socialists 225 Vade Mecum, 45n, 188
Sollazzo, Guido, 2ln Valente, F., 188
Sottoscrizione Nazionale del Dollarn, Vanzetti, Bartolomeo, 103
22n Vanzini, A., 122
Spanish Civil War, 126, 131 Vatican, 28, 187
Speirani, Mario, 188 Veller, Fortunato, 61
Stalin, Josip V. D., 220n Vezzani, Carlo, 224
La Stampa Italians 34, 35, 36, 48n Victor Emmanuel III, 7, 186
Starace, Achille, 149 Victory Loans, 206
State Library of Victoria, 120 Vidali, Vittorio (Carlos), 122,199
Stato Operaio, 121, 124, 200, 217n, Vigezzi, B., 162n
232 Viminale, 79
Stella Maris, 189 Vinco, Ruggiero, 122, 128,131
Stellato, Luigi, 119, 120, 128, 131, Vita-Finzi, Paolo, 69, 74, 75, 76, 81,
134n,204, 217n 90n, 93n, 127, 148, 154, 155, 157,
Still, Constable, 108 164n; biographical note, 72
St Vincent de Paul, 41 La Voce degli Italiani, 121
Sunday Sus 74, 90n, 157
Sunday Times (Perth), 35 Walters, E., 94n
Sydney Morning Herald, 164n Wanganui Herald, 166n
Waterhouse, E. G., 149,150,164n
Tabacchi, Vittorio, 90n, 104 Waterside workers, Adelaide, 30
Tardiani, Mario, 107 Watt, A., 231
Tasca, Angelo (Rienzi), 111, 239n Webb-Jones, Eva, 166n
Terracini, Umberto, 125 West Australian, 44n
Times (London), 64 What For?, 74, 146-7
Togliatti, Palmiro, 111, 199 White, Thomas Walter, 72
Treves, Claudio, 224 Woodroff, H. A., 202
Trevor-Roper, Hugh, 4 Woolf, Stuart J., 18n, 93n
Tribune, 148 Worker, 215
Truth, 12, 157, 169n Workers’ Educational Association,
Turati, Filippo, 224 206
World Congress against War, 121
Udarnico, 124, 134n
Ufficio Stamps 33, 42, 138, 145, 149, YarraBank, 120,123,235
162n
L'Uniih, 121,124, 127 Zammarchi, Giuseppe, 131,192n
United Press, 40 Zangheri, Renato, 239n
G ianfranco Cresciani m igrated to
A u stralia from Italy in 1962 and
g rad u ated from the U niversity of
Sydney in 1971. He has since worked
on th e history of Italians in
A u stralia and has published many
articles on th e subject. D uring study
trip s to Ita ly he has carried out
extensive research in Italian ar
chives on the history of Italian
m igration to A ustralia. He is at
present lecturing in Italian history
for the U niversity of Sydney Board
of A dult E ducation.
T ext set in C entury Textbook and

printed by Southw ood Press
Gianfranco Cresciani migrated to
Australia from Italy in 1962 and
graduated from the University of
Sydney in 1971. He has since worked
on the history of Italians in Australia
and has published many articles on
the subject. During study trips to
Italy he has carried out extensive
research in Italian archives on the
history of Italian migration to
Australia. He is at present lecturing in
Italian history for the University of
Sydney Board of Adult Education.
Jacket design by ANU Graphic Design/

Stephen Cole
Printed in Australia

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Although Italians had migrated to

Australia since the middle of the

Australian National University Press

Canberra, ACT, London, England and Trumbull, Conn. USA

Library of Congress No. 78-73567

D uring the years between the two World W ars, Italian

In addition, this study em phasises th a t the popularity of

W inston Hills, 1978 G.C.

Between pages 1 1 4 a n d ll5

Emigration is an evil, because it pauperises the nation of

When, in 1922, Fascism came to power in Italy, it found fertile

into a very important and well organised administrative unit,

opposition to Fiaschi was dictated by reasons of a personal

established, as an integral part of the Italian Ministry for

58 Documenti Diplomatici Italiani (hereafter DDI), Series VII, vol.

In the period since 1929 Fascism has changed from an

Nevertheless, the Italian authorities considered it as an af­

for the patriotic speech of Father Salza. Salza then came to

4 Ibid. This instruction was criticised by the Sydney Daily

30 He added that ‘in name of my Government, I therefore ask for

Mistrorigo had a pharmacy in Rome. About this time the

. . . we prefer to lose our Party membership card than our

E stablishm ent, in an a tte m p t to m aintain their predom inant

still under A ustrian domination. In these years he began his

to be run in an open fashion, by discussing the issues and

The twentieth century will be the century of Fascism, will

Mussolini’s inconsistency is only apparent, since it became

To the credit of the Australian government, no anti-Fascist in

published in Italian as well as Australian newspapers, articles

Fascio had sent to the Italian Treasury 2,396 lire as a

By the end of 1936, Fascist influence among Italians, and

While the consul-general and the Melbourne consul were

7 A A, 13.P.242, item Q30565, Military Intelligence Report, 26

27 II Giornale Italiano, 24 Oct. and 28 Nov. 1934.

wrote to the Sunday Sun asking its Director not to exacerbate

57 By the late 1930s, Italians were settled as follows:

69 The Investigation Branch was aware of the fact that

85 AA, CRS A981, item Consuls 161, Italian Embassy, London, to

98 Apparently Bianchi had ‘some degree of influence’ over Borsi

.. . we must remember our martyrs not only with

and compelled to leave the area, so much so that the Italo-

likely to inflame the minds of the Italians and cause a lot of

seemed to them to be leading nowhere, deserted the anti-

Fascists and the Consuls said [they] were: Communists,

29 Italo-Australian, 25 Oct. 1930.

Plate II Below: Anti-Fascist Italians of the Italia Libera

Plate IV Below: Carosi and the leaders of the Italian

Plate VI Above right: Consul-General Paolo Vita-Finzi

Plate VII Below: Frank Carmagnola addresses the

/ ' /«,'//<' <//

IL SEGRETARiO DEL FASCiC IL SEGRET a R-O GENERATE

Plate VIII Above :Franco Battistessa in 1927

Plate IX Below: The founders of the first unofficial Fascist

Plate XI Above right: Consul-General Agostino Ferrante

Plate XII Below :Members of the Italia Libera in Melbourne

Plate XIV Below: Italian children of the Balilla and Piccole

Plate XV Above left: First issue of II Risveglio , printed in

Plate XVII Below: Italian ex-servicemen marching during

Nevertheless, the Italian authorities considered it as an af