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VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 445

Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr.

*
SBC Case No. 519. July 31, 1997.

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON

BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Gross Immorality; Words and

Phrases; A person’s engaging in premarital sexual relations with
another, making promises to marry, suggests a doubtful moral
character but the same does not constitute grossly immoral
conduct; A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false
as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as
to be reprehensible to a high degree.—Respondent was prevented
from taking the lawyer’s oath in 1971 because of the charges of
gross immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart,
Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his
promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations. We
find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality
warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent from the legal
profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with
complainant and promises to marry suggests a doubtful moral
character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct. The Court has held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt
and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled or
disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.” It is a willful,
flagrant, or shameless act which shows a moral indifference to the
opinion of respectable members of the community.

Same; Same; Same; Mere intimacy between a man and a

woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of the
former, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the
imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result
of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.—We find the
ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite relevant because mere
intimacy between a man and a woman, both of whom possess no
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impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any

deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so
unprincipled as to warrant

______________

* EN BANC.

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Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr.

the imposition of disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a

result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.

Same; Same; Same; Marriages; The Supreme Court cannot

castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered
into because of love, not for any other reason.—Respondent and
complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were
evidently consensual. We do not find complainant’s assertions
that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She
continued to see and be respondent’s girlfriend even after she had
given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of
amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she
was forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was
then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their
relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could be
easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and
settle permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a
man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for marriage is a
sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because
of love, not for any other reason.

Same; Same; Same; Even assuming that a person’s

indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that he has been
prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor.—We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act
of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to the end.
It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it
seems, perpetually, sacrificing the profession he worked very hard
to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are
ignoble, the twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented

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from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor.

During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years of age,
should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyer’s oath.

ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court.

Disbarment.

The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

     Pablo S. Tolentino for complainant.
     Jose Rome S. Maranon for respondent.
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VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 447

Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa

petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be denied
admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed
the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth attempt, after
unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he
could take his oath, however, complainant filed the instant
petition averring that respondent and she had been
sweethearts, that a child out of wedlock was born to them
and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
marry her.
The facts were manifested in hearings held before
Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July 1971.
Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay,
Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their teens, they
were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to
complainant when she reigned as Queen at the 1953 town
fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with
respondent sometime in 1960. Their intimacy yielded
1
a son,
Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964. It was after
the child was born, complainant alleged, that respondent
first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar
examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent
allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises of
marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latter’s
birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship ended in

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1971, when she learned that respondent married another

woman. Hence, this petition.
Upon complainant’s motion, the Court authorized the
taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in 1972.
On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation
and Motion to Dismiss the case citing complainant’s failure
to

_______________

1 Respondent filed a Manifestation on December 4, 1995 informing the

Court of Rafael Barranco’s death at age 28 years caused by cardio-
respiratory arrest and pancreatitis. Rollo, volume II, page 23.

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Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr.

comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be

relieved from the duty to take aforesaid testimonies by
deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she
had justifiable reasons in failing to file the earlier comment
required and that she remains interested in the resolution
of the present case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied
respondent’s motion to dismiss.
On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a
motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment
2
filed by
respondent on September 17, 1979. Respondent’s third
motion to dismiss was noted 3
in the Court’s Resolution
dated September 15, 1982. In 1988, respondent repeated
his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his
active participation in civic organizations and good
standing in the community as well as the length of time
this case has been pending
4
as reasons to allow him to take
his oath as a lawyer.
On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss
the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the
case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow
Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take 5
the lawyer’s oath upon
payment of the required fees.
Respondent’s hopes were again dashed on November 17,
1988 when the Court, in response to complainant’s
opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On
June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
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The IBP’s report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the

dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to
take the lawyer’s oath.

______________

2 Rollo, p. 238.
3 Rollo, p. 244.
4 Appearance with Motion to Dismiss and to Allow Respondent to Take
his Oath and Sign Roll of Attorneys, September 2, 1988, Rollo, p. 247.
5 Rollo, p. 259.

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Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr.

We agree.
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer’s
oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross immorality
made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an
illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa,
who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry
her after he passes the bar examinations.
We find that these facts do not constitute gross
immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of
respondent from the legal profession. His engaging in
premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises
to marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his part
but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct.
The Court has held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. “A grossly immoral act is
one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled
6
or disgraceful as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.” It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
which shows a moral indifference 7to the opinion of
respectable members of the community. 8
We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang quite
relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a
woman, both of whom possess no impediment to marry,
voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part
of respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as
to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction against
him, even if as a result
9
of such relationship a child was
born out of wedlock.
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose
sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not find
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complainant’s assertions that she had been forced into

sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see and be
respon-

______________

6 Reyes v. Wong, 63 SCRA 667 (January 29, 1975).

7 7 C.J.S. 959 cited in De los Reyes v. Aznar, 179 SCRA 653 (November
28, 1989).
8 106 SCRA 591 (August 14, 1981).
9 Also Radaza v. Tejano, 106 SCRA 250 (July 31, 1981) and Reyes v.
Wong, supra.

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450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Figueroa vs. Barranco, Jr.

dent’s girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in

1964 and until 1971. All those years of amicable and
intimate relations refute her allegations that she was
forced to have sexual congress with him. Complainant was
then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their
relationship and was not an innocent young girl who could
be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to
marry and settle permanently with another woman. We
cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his
dreams, for marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which
should be entered into because of love, not for any other
reason.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act
of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving to
the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer
severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even
assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from
being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment therefor.
During this time 10there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two years
of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the
lawyer’s oath.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is
ALLOWED to take his oath as a lawyer upon payment of
the proper fees.
SO ORDERED.

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          Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo,

Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and
Panganiban, JJ., concur.
     Narvasa (C.J.), On official leave.
     Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres, Jr., JJ., On leave.

Petition denied, Respondent allowed to take lawyer’s

oath.

______________

10 Bitangcor v. Tan, 112 SCRA 113 (February 25, 1982).

451

VOL. 276, JULY 31, 1997 451

P.I. Manpower Placements, Inc. vs. NLRC (Second
Division)

Note.—Thirty-two years of having been denied

admission to the Bar is sufficient chastisement for a man
who, though morally delinquent in his younger years, has
made up for it by observing a respectable, useful and
religious life since then as attested by prominent citizens
and his children from the three women he married. (In Re:
Socorro Ke. Ladrera, 147 SCRA 350 [1987])

——o0o——

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