The Policy of Non-Alignment

CHAPTER I
THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT
In the past fifteen years the primary concern of newly independent

nations was the assertion of a national identity after their previous
colonial existence and foreign policy became the main instrument for
expressing their new dignity. The postwar international situation
provided an opportunity to gain a position of infiuence which exceeded
the realities of economic and military power. But diplomatic action
was strongly conditioned by the domestic scene. 1 Internationalrelations
were spread as widely as possible since partiality towards any group
of nations, and particularly towards the former colonial powers, would
have carried the risk of losing control over the nationalist movement.
As both camps in the cold war gradually accepted the existence of non-
aligned nations and were prepared to aid them economically a neutralist
position acquired considerable attraction for countries in need of
substantial assistance.
Immediately after the last war the system of collective security
envisaged under the United Nations seemed to leave no room for
neutrality. But the widerring rift between the big powers and the failure
of the Charter to provide for automatic application of enforcement
measures, soon revived the desire to keep out of confiicts individually.
The difference with pre-war neutrality was that modern neutralists,
although not claiming tobe able to avoid another world war, positively
aimed at preventing one. In halting further bi-polarisation they hoped
to perform a positive function as a channel of international communi-
cations and to play a part in reducing tension. They therefore rejected
neutralism as a negative term and preferred to be described as non-
aligned or non-committed.
There is as yet no chance of the non-aligned functioning as the
"balancer" of power politics. Not only is their weakness too apparent,
but they also lack substantial common interests besides their desire for
peace. They came together mainly through the negative impulses of
anti-colonialism and a refusal to join military alliances. Individual non-
1 See: Scalapino, A., Neutralism in Asia.
W. F. Van Eekelen, Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1967
2 THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT
aligned nations are, however, able to play a useful part in exploring

the possibilities of a particular compromise in the cold war when both
sides are edging towards each other but find it difficult to reach agree-
ment.1 Depending upon the willingness of the great powers to accept
some form of mediation the non-committed may be instrumental in
proionging the detente by assisting in the execution of an agreed
solution or by pressing for continuing negotiations. Indian chairmanship
of the International Control Commission in Laos and her membership
ofthe Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva provide
two current examples.
THE INDIAN CASE
Non-alignment had its roots in the Indian freedom movement and,

under Nehru's predominant influence in the field of foreign affairs,
the Indian Ieaders already had committed themselves to this policy
before independence. The Haripur session of the Indian National
Congress in 1938 considered it "urgently necessary for India to direct
her own foreign policy as an independent nation, thereby keeping aloof
from both imperialism and fascism and pursuing her path of freedom
and peace." Immediately after the transfer of power there was still a
reference to opposition against "fascism and all other tendencies which
suppress human spirit," 2 but from then onwards non-alignment was
transferred to the presentjuxtaposition ofthe Westernalliance and the
communist bloc. The same resolution expressed that India should
"maintain friendly and cooperative relations with all nations and ...
avoid entanglement in military or similar alliances which tend to divide
up the world in rival groups and thus endanger world peace." It may
even be argued that any other course would inevitably have produced
such serious internal disagreements that a national policy would have
been impossible. The freedom struggle created a yearning for an
important voice in world affairs, but the reaction agairrst British
imperialism simultaneously produced a desire to save Irrdia from
involvement in power politics. -
A peculiar mixture of interventionism and isolationism, partially
accentuated by the emphasis on non-violence, determined thc moral
climate in which foreign policy had to be formulated. This dual urge
reproduced itself on different Ievels in Nehru's thinking. His British
education inclined him towards the concept of individual liberty and
1 cj. Morgenthau, H. J., Neutrality and Neutralism; G. Schwarzenberger, The scope of
neutralism.
2 Foreign policy resolution of Jaipur Session, Dec., 1948. See also p. 21, note I.

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CHAPTER I

THE POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT

In the past fifteen years the primary concern of newly independent

aligned nations are, however, able to play a useful part in exploring

Non-alignment had its roots in the Indian freedom movement and,

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