G.R. No.

128096 January 20, 1999 recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the
charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as
vs. principal in eleven (11) information for murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second
Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
PROSECUTOR, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-
AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to
respondent. file a motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.4
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors. After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11)
amended informations5 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as
MARTINEZ, J.: an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further accused6 was dropped from the case.
defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by petitioners-intervenors the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of
proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against Republic Act No. 7975.7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief
proofs, are as follows: Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the
amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the of at least SG 27.
Kuratong Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved
in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by
Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) Justice Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia
headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). and Garchitorena dissenting,9 the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and
The ABRITG was composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original
(TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of
Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by petitioner Chief Chief Superintendent or higher.
Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration,
Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by
by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop. petitioner and some of the accused.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue
actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996,
not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG, House Bill No. 229910 and No. 109411 (sponsored by Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and
Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No. 84412
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding
panel later absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to
involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the
police operation.1 phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 824913 by the
modified the Blancaflor panel's finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder President of the Philippines on February 5, 1997.
against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors. The

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Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution14 denying (RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of
the motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution.17
resolution dated May 8, 1996."
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act
On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 No. 8249 innocuously appears to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the
Resolution, the pertinent portion of which reads: Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the
character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but the accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.18 They
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature further argued that if their case is tried before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural
enacted Republic Act 8249 and the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal to the
1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme
are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for Court.
reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring and dissenting
opinion. Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in
support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and
xxx xxx xxx praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a
Superintendents: namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and nonextendible period of ten (10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the
that trial has not yet begun in all these cases — in fact, no order of arrest has been issued question of whether the subject amended informations filed a Criminal Case Nos.
— this court has competence to take cognizance of these cases. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime
charged within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said
To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
admitted the Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1
neither concurring not dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases16 The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the
(Empahasis supplied) Philippines, filed the required supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including
Section 7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality,
court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." Petitioner argues that: and to justify its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity
a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not
faith as it was made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the convincingly discharged in the present case.
Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural
due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of a pending incident Constitution, which provides:
involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may
have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as
the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975) Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as
peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not may be determined by law.
yet commenced, as provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer
be remanded to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following
try them, thus making it an ex post facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as provisions in Article XI, Section 4:
an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 to procedural due process.
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law

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Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 148621 created the (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 123,23 P.D. No.
1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249.27 Under the latest b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to
over the following cases: their office.

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2,
amended to read as follows: 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade
cases involving: "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of court, as the case may be, pursuant to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the Blg. 129, as amended.
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance
of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed
under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of provincial the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher. special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.
(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
provisions of the Constitution;
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

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Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to
hereby further amended to read as follows: salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction
Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal
cases involving: trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying judgment, resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying
the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim positions lower than grade "27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: the public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and the proper courts which shall have exclusive jurisdiction over them.
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.
(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; "accused" appearing in the above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was
deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the parties herein are at
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled over the subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused under the amended
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; information has the rank of Superintendent28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of the
Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the the Supreme Court except in certain cases,29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
provisions of the Constitution; Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14,
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender comitting the offenses in items (a),
(b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee32 holding any of the positions enumerated in
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the
2, 14, and 4-A. jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This
paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other

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crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to
(Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to
too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is
accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just
he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover,
The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under
reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress
simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is
participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the perceived as bad faith on the part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya38 for
Sandiganbayan. their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In particular, it is stressed that the
Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by
equal protection of the law33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the the Senator. Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased against him as he
Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a contention too shallow to deserve claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the
merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated,
co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President of the
arbitrariness.34 Philippines.

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner
the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The during the committe hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was
namely: deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft
court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction; Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to
invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; legislation.40
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A.
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class,35 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law41 for they are
deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer avail of the two-
all of which are present in this case. tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v.
constitutionality and reasonables of the questioned provisions. The classification between Bull,42 an ex post facto law is one —
those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the (a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had when committed, and punishes such action; or
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or
differences.36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas
in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses (c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed
and presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction to the crime when it was committed.
of courts subject to the constitutional limitations,37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an
alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that the
privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the defendant.
cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those 43

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(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
person to his disadvantage.44 and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are
germane to that general subject.59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title
This Court added two more to the list, namely: of the law, acted within its power since Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself
empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of various
(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a courts.60
penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of
(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become Section 4 and the retroactive procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of a R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the allegations in the Informations, it
amnesty.45 is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple
Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws.46 R.A. 8249 is not penal murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.
law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their definition must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
violations;47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is
punishment.48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations,61 and not by the evidence
jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been declared by the presented by the parties at the trial.62
Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules of
procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice.49 Not As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under
being a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be
unconstitutional. committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have
jurisdiction over it.63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article
Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they XIII of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
acquired under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The over criminal cases committed by the public officers and employees, including those in
same contention has already been rejected by the court several times50 considering that the goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be
right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987)
mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the Constitution when it declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
prohibition against ex post facto laws.51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.
and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the nature of an ex post facto
law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the prohibition.52 The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was
Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.53 It has been ruled committed in relation to the office of the accussed PNP officers.
that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the
time of their passage.54 In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation
to the office if it (the offense) is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions.65 This intimate relation
to review questions of law.55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he presumption of innocence informations."66
has been convincing overcome.56
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Constitution. Much emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines"
the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the
The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, offense must be stated in ordinary and concise language without repetition not necessarily
does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary in the terms of the statute defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a
consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
subject expressed in the title57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. (Emphasis supplied)
case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve.
58 Such rule is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of recital of the facts."67 The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the

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caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification of the provision of law WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1 OSMUNDO B.
alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and members
facts in the complaint or information.68 of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their
public office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident
The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in premeditation and taking advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully
U.S. v. Karelsen: 69 unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the accused with such a the said victim.
descretion of the charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF
same cause and third, to inform the court of the facts alleged so that it may decide whether SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT.
they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one should be had. In order that the ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
requirement may be satisfied, facts must be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime is MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN,
made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with reasonable INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office as officers and
complaint must contain a specific allegation of every fact and circumstance necessary to members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact
constitute the crime charged. (Emphasis supplied) for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that
there where no arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.
as "he is presumed to have no indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense."70 CONTRARY LAW.
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused
informations for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no
averments to show the intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was
discharge of official function of the offenders. intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations71 for murder reads: victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.
AMENDED INFORMATIONS Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses intevenors as among the accessories after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on
CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the crime herein-above
INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila,
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made
AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader. There is no indication in the
SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision,
MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the
INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal accused occurred in
CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the
PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of Murder as defined and penalize under two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office
as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier
within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY discussed, is an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL,
INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in

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relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the mere allegation in the within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,73 not the
amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in Sandiganbayan.
relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not
a factual avernment that would show the close intimacy between the offense charged and WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained.
the discharge of the accused's official duties. The Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
Sandiganbayan was at issue, we ruled: jurisdiction over the said cases.1âwphi1.nêtSO ORDERED.

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or

information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
G.R. No. L-2068 October 20, 1948
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged
DOMINADOR B. BUSTOS, Petitioner, vs. ANTONIO G. LUCERO, Judge of First
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol Instance of Pampanga, Respondent.
and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen
appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then established a E. M. Banzali for petitioner.

camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control where his Acting Provincial Fiscal Albino L. Figueroa and Assistant Provincial Fiscal Marcelo L. Mallari
co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and conducted the for respondent
corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain person
without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that in line TUASON, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon his The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First
orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in Instance of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the
consequence thereof. record of the case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of
we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused origin, in order that the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses
because it was perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or in connection with their testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest
irregular of their official functions and would not have been committed had they not held of the accused. The motion was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this
their office, besides, the accused had no personal motive in committing the crime thus, proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused. According to the memorandum submitted by the petitioner's attorney to the Court of First
Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court Instance in support of his motion, the accused, assisted by counsel, appeared at the
below do not indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed preliminary investigation. In that investigation, the justice of the peace informed him of the
the latter in the course of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused charges and asked him if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, upon which he entered the plea of
for the purpose of extracting or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and not guilty. "Then his counsel moved that the complainant present her evidence so that she
detained the two victims, and failing in their common purpose they shot; and killed the said and her witnesses could be examined and cross-examined in the manner and form
victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, provided by law." The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule
and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial. 108, and the objection was sustained. "In view thereof, the accused's counsel announced
his intention to renounce his right to present evidence," and the justice of the peace
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in forwarded the case to the court of first instance.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
relation to public office "does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said virtual law library
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is
the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to present
between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of
his jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder the record for the purpose set out therein. In Dequito and Saling Buhay vs. Arellano, G.R.
was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP No. L-1336, recently promulgated, in which case the respondent justice of the peace had
officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, allowed the accused, over the complaint's objection, to recall the complainant and her
witnesses at the preliminary investigation so that they might be cross-examined, we

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sustained the justice of the peace's order. We said that section 11 of Rule 108 does not 2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the presentation of the
curtail the sound discretion of the justice of the peace on the matter. We said that "while evidence in the case, if not before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional
section 11 of Rule 108 defines the bounds of the defendant's right in the preliminary and the proceedings had in the case under the provisions of the Act constitute a
investigation, there is nothing in it or any other law restricting the authority, inherent in a prosecution of appellant without due process of law.
court of justice, to pursue a course of action reasonably calculated to bring out the
truth."chanrobles virtual law library 3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of the
accused and over the subject- matter of the complaint.
But we made it clear that the "defendant can not, as a matter of right, compel the complaint
and his witnesses to repeat in his presence what they had said at the preliminary 4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and in sentencing
examination before the issuance of the order of arrest." We called attention to the fact that him to one year and one day of prison correccional and to the payment of costs.
"the constitutional right of an accused to be confronted by the witnesses against him does
not apply to preliminary hearings' nor will the absence of a preliminary examination be an With regard to the questions of fact, we have to say that we have examined the record and
infringement of his right to confront witnesses." As a matter of fact, preliminary investigation find that the conclusions of the trial judge, as contained in his well-written decision, are
may be done away with entirely without infringing the constitutional right of an accused sufficiently sustained by the evidence submitted.
under the due process clause to a fair trial.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law The accused was driving an automobile at the rate of 30 miles an hour on a highway 6
library meter wide, notwithstanding the fact that he had to pass a narrow space between a wagon
The foregoing decision was rendered by a divided court. The minority went farther than the standing on one side of the road and a heap of stones on the other side where the were two
majority and denied even any discretion on the part of the justice of the peace or judge young boys, the appellant did not take the precaution required by the circumstances by
holding the preliminary investigation to compel the complainant and his witnesses to testify slowing his machine, and did not proceed with the vigilant care that under the
anew.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order to avoid possible accidents that
might occur, as unfortunately did occur, as his automobile ran over the boy Porfirio Parondo
Upon the foregoing considerations, the present petition is dismissed with costs against the who was instantly killed as the result of the accident.
petitioner.
These facts are so well established in the records that there cannot be a shade of doubt
about them.

G.R. No. 17584 March 8, 1922 Coming now to the other assignments of error, it will be seen that they deal with the
fundamental questions as to whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint in the
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, present case was filed, is valid and constitutional.

vs. This Act is attacked on account of the amendments that it introduces in General Orders No.
58, the defense arguing that the Philippine Legislature was, and is, not authorized to amend
GREGORIO SANTIAGO, defendant-appellant. General Orders No. 58, as it did by amending section 2 thereof because its provisions have
the character of constitutional law. Said section 2 provides as follows:
L. Porter Hamilton for appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the United States against the
persons charged with the offenses. (G. O. No. 58, sec. 2 ).
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
Act No. 2886, which amends it, by virtue of which the People of the Philippine Island is
Having caused the death of Porfirio Parondo, a boy 7 years old, by striking him with made the plaintiff in this information, contains the following provisions in section 1:
automobile that he was driving, the herein appellant was prosecuted for the crime of
homicide by reckless negligence and was sentenced to suffer one year and one day of SECTION 1. Section two of General Orders, Numbered Fifty-eight, series of nineteen
prision correccional, and to pay the costs of the trial. hundred, is hereby amended to read as follows:
Not agreeable with that sentence he now comes to this court alleging that the court below "SEC. 2. All prosecutions for public offenses shall be in the name of the People of the
committed four errors, to wit: Philippine Islands against the persons charged with the offense."
1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the appellant was being Let us examine the question.
prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the Act is
unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case.

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For practical reasons, the procedure in criminal matters is not incorporated in the its important provisions, as indicated in the following enumerated sections. (Emphasis
Constitutions of the States, but is left in the hand of the legislatures, so that it falls within the ours.)
realm of public statutory law.
Its main purpose is, therefore, limited to criminal procedure and its intention is to give to its
As has been said by Chief Justice Marshall: provisions the effect of law in criminal matters. For that reason it provides in section 1 that:

A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the Subdivisions of which its great powers The following provisions shall have the force and effect of law in criminal matters in the
will admit, and of all the means by which they may be carried into execution, would partake Philippine Islands from and after the 15th day of May, 1900, but existing laws on the same
of a prolixity of a legal code, and could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would subjects shall remain valid except in so far as hereinafter modified or repealed expressly or
probably never be understood by the public. (M'Culloch vs. Maryland [1819], 4 Wheat., 316, by necessary implication.
407; 4 L. ed., 579.)
From what has been said it clearly follows that the provisions of this General Order do not
That is why, in pursuance of the Constitution of the United States, each States, each State the nature of constitutional law either by reason of its character or by reason of the authority
has the authority, under its police power, to define and punish crimes and to lay down the that enacted it into law.
rules of criminal procedure.
It cannot be said that it has acquired this character because this order was made its own by
The states, as a part of their police power, have a large measure of discretion in creating the Congress of the United States for, as a mater of fact, this body never adopted it as a
and defining criminal offenses. . . . law of its own creation either before the promulgation of Act No. 2886, herein discussed, or,
to our knowledge, to this date.
A Statute relating to criminal procedure is void as a denial of the equal protection of the
laws if it prescribes a different procedure in the case of persons in like situation. Subject to Since the provisions of this General Order have the character of statutory law, the power of
this limitation, however, the legislature has large measure of discretion in prescribing the the Legislature to amend it is self-evident, even if the question is considered only on
modes of criminal procedure. . . . (12 C.J., 1185, 1186. See Collins vs. Johnston, 237 U.S., principle. Our present Legislature, which has enacted Act No. 2886, the subject of our
502; 35 s. Ct. Rep. 649; 59 L. ed., 1071; Shevlin-Carpenter Co. vs. Minnesota, 218 U.S., inquiry, is the legal successor to the Military Government as a legislative body.
57; 30 S. Ct. Rep., 663; 54 L. ed., 930; Lynn vs. Flancders, 141 Ga., 500; 81 S.E., 205.)
Since the advent of the American sovereignty in the Philippines the legislative branch of our
This power of the States of the North American Union was also granted to its territories government has undergone transformations and has developed itself until it attained its
such as the Philippines: present form. Firstly, it was the Military Government of the army of occupation which, in
accordance with international law and practice, was vested with legislative functions and in
The plenary legislative power which Congress possesses over the territories and fact did legislate; afterwards, complying with the instructions of President McKinley which
possessions of the United States may be exercised by that body itself, or, as is much more later were ratified by Congress (sec. 1 of the Act of July 1, 1902) the legislative powers of
often the case, it may be delegated to a local agency, such as a legislature, the organization the Military Government were transferred to the Philippine Commission; then, under the
of which proceeds upon much the same lines as in the several States or in Congress, which provisions of section 7 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, the Philippine Assembly was
is often taken as a model, and whose powers are limited by the Organic Act; but within the created and it functioned as a colegislative body with the Philippine Commission. Finally, by
scope of such act is has complete authority to legislate, . . . and in general, to legislate upon virtue of the provisions of sections 12 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, known as
all subjects within the police power of the territory. (38 Cyc., 205-207.) the Jones Law, the Philippine Commission gave way to the Philippine Senate, the
Philippine Assembly became the House of Representatives, and thus was formed the
The powers of the territorial legislatures are derived from Congress. By act of Congress present Legislature composed of two Houses which has enacted the aforesaid Act No.
their power extends "to all rightful subjects of legislation not inconsistent with the 2886.
Constitution and laws of the United States;" and this includes the power to define and
punish crimes. (16 C. J., 62.) As a matter of fact, Act No. 2886 is not the first law that amends General Orders No. 58.
The Philippine Commission, at various times, had amended it by the enactment of laws
And in the exercise of such powers the military government of the army of occupation, among which we may cite Act No. 194, regarding preliminary investigation, Act No. 440
functioning as a territorial legislature, thought it convenient to establish new rules of relating to counsels de oficio and Act No. 590 about preliminary investigations by justices of
procedure in criminal matters, by the issuance of General Orders No. 58, the preamble of the peace of provincial capitals. Later on, and before the enactment of Act No. 2886, herein
which reads: controverted, the Legislature had also amended this General Orders No. 58 by the
In the interests of justice, and to safeguard the civil liberties of the inhabitants of these enactment of Act No. 2677 regarding appeals to the Supreme Court of causes originating in
Islands, the criminal code of procedure now in force therein is hereby amended in certain of the justice of the peace courts and by Act No. 2709 which deals with the exclusion of
accused persons from the information in order to be utilized as state's witnesses.

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These amendments repeatedly made by the Philippine Commission as well as by our constitutional charters of the States of the Union and incorporated territories — a situation
present Legislature are perfectly within the scope of the powers of the said legislative which must not be understood as depriving the Government of the Philippines of its power,
bodies as the successors of the Military Government that promulgated General Orders No. however delegated, to prosecute public crimes. The fact is undeniable that the present
58. government of the Philippines, created by the Congress of the United States, is
autonomous.
No proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature had, and had, the power to
enact and amend laws. (U.S. vs. Bull. 15 Phil., 7.) That it has the power to legislate on This autonomy of the Government of the Philippines reaches all judicial actions, the case at
criminal matters is very evident from the wording of section 7 of the Jones Law which says: bar being one of them; as an example of such autonomy, this Government, the same as
that of Hawaii and Porto Rico (People of Porto Rico vs. Rosaly y Castillo [1913], 227 U.S.,
That the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with 270; 57 L. ed., 507; 33 Sup. Ct. Rep., 352) cannot be sued without its consent. (Merritt vs.
this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil., 311; L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Harrison, p. 27,
continued in force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit. ante.) The doctrine, laid down in these cases, acknowledges the prerogative of personality
in the Government of the Philippines, which, if it is sufficient to shield it from any
It is urged the right to prosecute and punish crimes is an attributed of sovereignty. This responsibility in court in its own name unless it consents thereto, it should be also, as
assertion is right; but it is also true that by reason of the principle of territoriality as applied sufficiently authoritative in law, to give that government the right to prosecute in court in its
in the supression, of crimes, such power is delegated to subordinate government own name whomsoever violates within its territory the penal laws in force therein.
subdivisions such as territories. As we have seen in the beginning, the territorial legislatures
have the power to define and punish crimes, a power also possessed by the Philippine However, limiting ourselves to the question relative to the form of the complaint in criminal
Legislature by virtue of the provisions of sections 7, already quoted, of the Jones Law. matters, it is within the power of the Legislature to prescribe the form of the criminal
These territorial governments are local agencies of the Federal Government, wherein complaint as long as the constitutional provision of the accused to be informed of the nature
sovereignty resides; and when the territorial government of the Philippines prosecutes and of the accusation is not violated.
punishes public crimes it does so by virtue of the authority delegated to it by the supreme
power of the Nation. Under the Constitution of the United States and by like provisions in the constitutions of the
various states, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the
This delegation may be made either expressly as in the case of the several States of the accusation against him . . .
Union and incorporated territories like Porto Rico and Hawaii, or tacitly as is the case with
the Philippines, which is an organized territory though not incorporated with the Union. It is within the power of the legislatures under such a constitutional provision to prescribe
(Malcolm, Philippine Constitutional Law, 181-205.) the form of the indictment or information, and such form may omit averments regarded as
necessary at common law. (22 Cyc., 285.)
This tacit delegation to our Government needs no demonstration. As a matter of fact, the
crimes committed within our territory, even before section 2 of General Orders No. 58 was All these considerations a priori are strengthened a posteriori by the important reason
amended, were prosecuted and punished in this jurisdiction as is done at present; but then disclosed by the following fact — that the Congress has tacitly approved Act No. 2886. Both
as now the repression of crimes was done, and is still done, under the sovereign authority the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, section 86, and the Jones Law, last paragraph of
of the United States, whose name appears as the heading in all pleadings in criminal section 19, provide that all the laws enacted by the Government of the Philippines or its
causes and in other judicial papers and notarial acts. Legislature shall be forwarded to the Congress of the United States, which body reserves
the right and power to annul them. And presuming, as legally we must, that the provisions
The use of such a heading is prescribed for civil cases in form 1 of section 784 of the Code of these laws have been complied with, it is undisputed that the Congress of the United
of Civil Procedure; in criminal causes the constant practice followed in this jurisdiction States did not annul any of those acts already adverted to — Nos. 194, 440, 490 (of the
established its use; and in notarial matters its use is provided by section 127 of Act No. 496. Philippine Commission), and 2677, 2709 and the one now in question No. 2886 (of the
This long continued practice in criminal matters and the legal provision relating to civil present Legislature) — all of which were amendatory of General Orders No. 58. The Act
cases and notarial acts have not been amended by any law, much less by Act No. 2886, the now under discussion (No. 2886) took effect on February 24, 1920, and the criminal
subject of the present inquiry. complaint in this case was filed on May 10, 1920. The silence of Congress regarding those
laws amendatory of the said General Order must be considered as an act of approval.
There is not a single constitutional provision applicable to the Philippines prescribing the
name to be used as party plaintiff in criminal cases. If Congress fails to notice or take action on any territorial legislation the reasonable
inference is that it approves such act. (26 R.C.L., 679; vide Clinton vs. Englebrcht, 13 Wall.,
The fact that the political status of this country is as yet undetermined and in a transitory 434; 20 [L. ed.] 659; Tiaco vs. Forbes, 228 U.S., 549; 33 S. Ct. Rep., 585; 57 [L. ed.], 960;
stage, is, in our opinion, responsible for the fact that there is no positive provision in our Nixon vs. Reid, 8 S.d., 507; 67 N.W., 57; 32 L.R.A., 315.)
constitutional law regarding the use of the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, as
party plaintiff, in criminal prosecutions, as is otherwise the case in the respective

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Furthermore, supposing for the sake of argument, that the mention of the People of the Nevertheless, the probing done by journalists must be made "with good motives and for
Philippine Islands as plaintiff in the title of the information constitutes a vice or defect, the justifiable ends[.]"1 The protection afforded by the Constitution2 to the press is not carte
same is not fatal when, as in the present case, it was not objected to in the court below. blanche that allows journalists to abandon their responsibility for truth and transparency. It is
incumbent upon them to exercise a high degree of professionalism in their work, regardless
An indictment must, in many states under express statutory or constitutional provision, of the subject of their stories.
show by its title or by proper recitals in the caption or elsewhere that the prosecution is in
the name and by the authority of the state, the commonwealth, or the people of the state, This resolves a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Court of Appeals June 13,
according to the practice in the particular jurisdictions; but omissions or defects in this 2014 Amended Decision4 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33256.
respect may be supplied or cured by other parts of the records, and the omissions of such a
recital or defects therein, even when required by the constitution or by statute, is a defect of On March 24, 2004, an article entitled "Malinis ba talaga o naglilinis-linisan lang (Sino si
form within a statute requiring exceptions for defect of form to be made before trial. (23 Finance Sec. Juanita Amatong?)"5 was published in Abante Tonite, a newspaper of general
Cyc., 237, 238.) circulation in the Philippines.6

We hold that the provisions of sections 2 of General Orders No. 58, as amended by Act No. Written by Raffy T. Tulfo (Tulfo), the article reported that a certain Michael C. Guy (Guy),
2886, do not partake of the same character as the provisions of a constitution; that the said who was then being investigated by the Revenue Integrity Protection Service of the
Act No. 2886 is valid and is not violative of any constitutional provisions and that the court a Department of Finance for tax fraud, went to former Department of Finance Secretary
quo did not commit any of the errors assigned. Juanita Amatong (Secretary Amatong)'s house to ask for help.7 Secretary Amatong then
purportedly called the head of the Revenue Integrity Protection Service and directed that all
The sentence appealed from is hereby affirmed, the appellant being furthermore sentenced the documents that the Revenue Integrity Protection Service had obtained on Guy's case
to the accessory penalties prescribed in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to indemnify the be surrendered to her.8 The article read:
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to the payment of the costs of both
instances. So ordered. Ang mga tanong ngayon, may katotohanan kaya ang akusasyon ni Salanga laban kay
Amatong? Nagsasabi naman kaya ng totoo si Amatong nang itanggi niya ang akusasyon ni
Salanga laban sa kanya?

April 10, 2019 Narito ang isang balitang natanggap ng SHOOT TO KILL mula sa isang
mapagkakatiwalaan at A-1 source na kung saan ay inarbor ni Amatong sa kanyang mga
G.R. No. 213023 tauhan ang isang negosyanteng iniimb[e]st[i]gahan ng DoF dahil sa katiwalian sa tax
refund. Narito ang kwento at kayo na ang bahalang manghusga kung sino ang may
MICHAEL C. GUY, Plaintiff-Appellee kredibilidad, si Amatong o si Salanga?
vs. Noong March 20, 2004, Sabado ng hapon pumunta ang isang negosyanteng
RAFFY TULFO, ALLEN MACASAET, NICOLAS V. QUIJANO, JR., JANET BAY, JESUS nagngangalang Michael Guy sa bahay ni Amatong. Si Guy ay iniimb[e]st[i]gahan ng mga
P. GALANG, RANDY HAGOS, JEANY LACORTE, and VENUS TANDOC, Accused- tauhan ng Revenue Integrity Protection Service (RIPS) ng DOF dahil sa kahinahinalang
Appellants mga tax refund na natanggap nito mula sa BIR simula 1998 hanggang 2003.

DECISION Problemado si Guy sapagkat natunugan niyang iniimbestigahan na siya ng RIPS. Ito'y
matapos magpadala ng sulat ang RIPS sa Central Bank at hinihingi rito ang lahat ng mga
LEONEN, J.: transaksyon ng kumpanya ni Guy sa lahat ng mga bangko. Ang nakatanggap ng sulat sa
Central Bank ay kakilala ni Guy.
The degree of freedom by which journalists operate to uncover and write the news is an
indication of the current state of our country's democracy. By freely obtaining vital Noong Sabado ng hapon din, ayon sa aking source, tinawagan ni Amatong ang hepe ng
information on matters of public concern, citizens become socially aware and well-equipped RIPS para hilingin dito na ihinto imbestigasyon laban kay Guy at isurender sa kanyang
to participate in different political processes to exercise their rights enshrined in the opisina ang lahat ng mga dokumentong nakalap ng RIPS laban dito!!!9
fundamental law. Journalists are the sentinels who keep watch over the actions of the
government. They are the eyes and ears of the citizenry. In today's digital age, the work of Claiming that the article had tainted his reputation, Guy filed before the Office of the City
journalists is held to a higher standard more than ever. Beyond the multitude that participate Prosecutor of Makati City a Complaint-Affidavit against Tulfo and the following
on social media, they have value as part of a profession that should be trusted with the representatives of Abante Tonite's publisher, Monica Publishing Corporation: (1) Allen
truth. Macasaet; (2) Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr.; (3) Janet Bay; (4) Jesus P. Galang; (5) Randy Hagos;
(6) Jeany Lacorte; and (7) Venus Tandoc (collectively, Macasaet, et al.).10

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After a preliminary investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed an Amended AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that all accused-appellants are ORDERED to pay
Information charging Tulfo and Macasaet, et al. with the crime of libel.11 Michael Guy, jointly and severally, ₱500,000.00 moral damages and ₱211,200.00
attorney's fees. The award of ₱5,000,000.00 actual damages is DELETED for lack of
On arraignment, Tulfo and Macasaet, et al. refused to enter a plea. Accordingly, the factual and legal basis.23 (Emphasis in the original)
Regional Trial Court ordered that a plea of not guilty be entered for all of them.12
On August 26, 2014, Guy filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari,24 seeking the reversal
In its February 24, 2010 Judgment, the Regional Trial Court convicted Tulfo and Macasaet, of the Court of Appeals Amended Decision and the reinstatement of the Regional Trial
et al. of the crime of libel. It ruled that the prosecution was able to establish by proof beyond Court Judgment.
reasonable doubt the elements of the crime.13
Petitioner maintains that contrary to the Court of Appeals' findings, there is factual and legal
The trial court ordered Tulfo and Macasaet, et al. to pay Guy: (1) ₱5,000,000.00 as actual basis for the award of actual damages.25 He avers that it had been established in the trial
damages; (2) ₱5,000,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) ₱211,200.00 as attorney's fees.14 court proceedings that he may be able to earn ₱50,000,000.00 in 10 years. This possibility,
The dispositive portion of its Judgment read: he points out, constitutes the factual basis for the award of actual damages.26
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Allen Macasaet, Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr., Assuming that there is no sufficient basis for the award of actual damages, petitioner
Janet Bay, Jesus P. Galang, Randy Hagos, Jeany Lacorte, Venus Tandoc and Raffy asserts that he is still entitled to temperate damages. Citing Articles 2216, 2224, and 2225
Tulfo, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel, as defined in Article 353 of of the Civil Code, he claims that temperate damages may be awarded even without
the Revised Penal Code, and sentences each of the accused to pay a fine of SIX competent proof, as long as the court finds that the victim has incurred some pecuniary
THOUSAND PESOS (P6,000.00) with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency. loss.27 He insists that in his case, the libelous article tainted his reputation, causing some of
his clients to terminate their arrangements with him.28
They are likewise hereby ordered to pay private complainant Michael C. Guy, jointly and
severally, the sum of FIVE MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) as actual damages, FIVE Petitioner further claims to have had good standing in the community, which the libelous
MILLION PESOS (P5,000,000.00) as moral damages, and TWO HUNDRED ELEVEN article destroyed. Thus, he argues that the amount of ₱5,000,000.00 as moral damages is a
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED PESOS (P211,200.00) as attorney's fees.15 (Emphasis in reasonable recompense for the grief and suffering he has endured.29
the original)
Petitioner maintains that as the president of MG Forex Corporation, a company engaged in
Aggrieved, Tulfo and Macasaet, et al. filed before the Court of Appeals separate Appeals foreign exchange trading, he was a reputable businessman.30 However, as a result of the
assailing the Regional Trial Court February 24, 2010 Judgment.16 libelous article, his business associates and clients lost trust in him. One (1) of his sisters,
who was also his business associate, sold him back her company shares after losing
In its August 30, 2013 Decision,17 the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment confidence in his dealings. Clients refused to do business with him, terrified that they be
convicting Tulfo and Macasaet, et al. of libel. Nonetheless, it reduced the award of moral linked with the accusations against him.31
damages to P500,000.00 and ordered them to pay Guy exemplary damages in the amount
of P500,000.00.18 The dispositive portion of its Decision read: Petitioner likewise avers that his family members doubted him. His mother berated him for
bringing shame to the family. His children were questioned in school for the article about
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The February 24, 2010 Judgment of the Regional their father.32
Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 04-3614 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that all accused-appellants are ordered to pay Michael Guy, jointly and Finally, petitioner contends that exemplary damages should be awarded in his favor. He
severally, P500,000.00 moral damages and ₱500,000.00 exemplary damages.19 (Emphasis maintains that respondent Tulfo deliberately took advantage of his standing as a renowned
in the original) journalist to tarnish petitioner's reputation.33 He asserts that respondent Tulfo's penchant for
writing defamatory articles should be restrained.34
Insisting on their innocence, Tulfo sought the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals
August 30, 2013 Decision. Similarly, Guy moved for partial reconsideration and clarification In its November 12, 2014 Resolution,35 this Court directed respondents to file their
of the Decision.20 comment.
In its June 13, 2014 Amended Decision,21 the Court of Appeals modified its August 30, 2013 In its July 13, 2015 Resolution,36 this Court required the counsels of respondents Tulfo and
Decision and deleted the award of exemplary damages. It likewise deleted the Regional Macasaet, et al. to show cause why they should not be disciplinary dealt with for their
Trial Court's award of actual damages for lack of factual and legal basis.22 The dispositive failure to file their respective comments. It also required them to comply with the November
portion of its Amended Decision read: 12, 2014 Resolution.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The February 24, 2010 Judgment of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 132, Makati City in Criminal Case No. 04-3614 is hereby
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On September 3, 2015, respondents Macasaet, et al. filed a Compliance,37 manifesting that Nevertheless, the private offended party's interest in a criminal case is limited to the civil
they would not submit any comment and instead leave the Petition to this Court's discretion. liability arising from it.47 It is a fundamental principle in remedial law that if the trial court
dismisses the case or renders a judgment of acquittal, the private offended party cannot
In his Comment38 filed on August 26, 2016, respondent Tulfo avers that the Court of appeal the criminal aspect of the case.48 Only the Office of the Solicitor General can
Appeals correctly deleted the award of actual damages for lack of sufficient legal basis.39 represent the State in actions brought before the Court of Appeals or this Court.49 In People
Maintaining further that the deletion of the award of exemplary damages was proper, he v. Santiago:50
argues that exemplary damages may be awarded only when the crime was committed with
one (1) or more aggravating circumstances. He insists that the amount of moral damages It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of
should also be deleted.40 the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in
the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the
In its September 21, 2016 Resolution,41 this Court required petitioner to file a reply. prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the
In his Reply,42 petitioner reiterates that he is entitled to actual, moral, and exemplary Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor General may represent the People of the Philippines on
damages. appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take such appeal. However, the
For this Court's resolution are the following issues: said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.51 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
First, whether or not there is sufficient factual basis for an award of actual damages;
Similarly, in Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. v. Piccio:52
Second, whether or not petitioner Michael C. Guy is entitled to moral damages; and
Accordingly, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial
Finally, whether or not he is entitled to exemplary damages. court or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal
on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the
The Petition is partly meritorious. principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not
the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. For this reason, the People are
I therefore deemed as the real parties in interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the
OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. In view
"Generally, a criminal case has two aspects, the civil and the criminal."43 This notion is of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
rooted in the fundamental theory that when a criminal act is committed, two (2) different the real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit,
entities are offended: (1) the State, whose law has been violated; and (2) the person directly or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, an appeal of the criminal case not filed by
injured by the offender's act or omission.44 As explained in Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:45 the People as represented by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our the offended party may, however, file an appeal without the intervention of the OSG but only
law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. He may also file a special civil
Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of
crime he offends two entities namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity preserving his interest in the civil aspect of the case.53 (Emphasis supplied, citations
called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society omitted)
whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged Here, petitioner's sole purpose is to question the amount of damages awarded by the Court
by the same punishable act or omission. . . . While an act or omission is felonious because of Appeals. He neither disputes nor challenges the Court of Appeals Amended Decision on
it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but respondents' criminal liability. He only intends to protect his interest in the civil aspect of the
because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that case. Accordingly, petitioner has the legal standing to file this Petition even without the
what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to intervention of the Office of the Solicitor General.
repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission,
done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other II
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission
results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Significantly, "[t]he issue on the amount of damages is a factual question that this [C]ourt
Damage or injury to another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the may not resolve in a Rule 45 petition."54 Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be
case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission raised in a petition for review on certiorari.55 "[This] Court is not a trier of facts and it is not
complained of is punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to its duty to review, evaluate, and weigh the probative value of the evidence adduced before
another.46 (Citations omitted) the lower courts."56 Absent "any clear showing that the trial court overlooked or
misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances that would justify altering or revising such
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findings and evaluation[,]"57 this Court will not disturb, let alone overturn the lower courts' sustained and susceptible of measurement."62 Actual damages constitute compensation for
findings of fact and appreciation of the witnesses' testimonies.58 sustained pecuniary loss. Nevertheless, a party may only be awarded actual damages
when the pecuniary loss he or she had suffered was duly proven.63 Thus:
Nonetheless, jurisprudence has carved out certain exceptions to this rule:
Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to adequate compensation
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or only for such pecuniary loss as is duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual
conjectures . . .; (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually
impossible . . .; (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion . . .; (4) When the judgment proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best
is based on a misapprehension of facts . . .; (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting . . .; evidence obtainable [.]
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee . . .; (7) The ....
findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court . . .; (8) When the
findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are This Court has, time and again, emphasized that actual damages cannot be presumed and
based . . .; (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents . . .; and (10) The finding of fact of the measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. An award of actual
Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by damages is "dependent upon competent proof of the damages suffered and the actual
the evidence on record . . . .59 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) amount thereof. The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal
knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and
Here, the Regional Trial Court awarded petitioner actual damages in the amount of unsubstantial proof."64 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
₱5,000,000.00 based on his testimony that he could earn ₱50,000,000.00 in 10 years.60
Petitioner's testimony read: As the Court of Appeals correctly found, petitioner failed to substantiate the loss he had
allegedly sustained. Save for his testimony in court, he presented no evidence to support
COURT: his claim. His allegation of possibly earning ₱50,000,000.00 in 10 years is a mere
assumption without any foundation. This bare allegation is insufficient to prove that he has
This is my problem. Now, Php50 Million is not a small amount of money and it has to be indeed lost ₱5,000,000.00 as earnings. As this Court has previously held, "the award of
based on, for example, the business standing. You did not give me any financial statement. unrealized profits cannot be based on the sole testimony of the party claiming it."65
Are you saying that you are making PhP50 Million a year?
Notwithstanding the absence of any evidence on the amount of actual damages suffered,66
MR. GUY: a party may be awarded temperate damages should the court find that he or she has
suffered some pecuniary loss even if its amount cannot be determined with exact certainty.
No, Your Honor. In my understanding, in moral damages, it is not only the amount of money 67
for a certain period of time. It also includes the sleepless nights. You do not know if there
will be new articles against you which are not true. So, I put them all together. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to prove that he has suffered any pecuniary loss.68 While he
testified that he lost clients as a result of the libelous article, records reveal that he lost only
COURT: one (1) client, Jayson Mallari (Mallari). On cross-examination, Mallari even testified "that he
So; it is clear. You do not make PhP50 Million a year? was not immediately convinced by the article and called [petitioner] before terminating his
business with him[.]"69 Moreover, as the records show, Mallari started transacting with
MR. GUY: petitioner again sometime in 2005.70

No. III

COURT: Moral damages are "compensatory damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or
mental anguish resulting from a wrong."71 They are awarded to the injured party to enable
Maybe in ten years, you can make that? him to obtain means that will ease the suffering he sustained from respondent's
reprehensible act.72
MR. GUY:
"Moral damages are not punitive in nature,"73 but are instead a type of "award designed to
It is possible.61 (Emphasis in the original) compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered[.]"74 As explained in Mangaliag v.
Catubig-Pastoral:75
Actual damages are "compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position
where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually
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It must be remembered that moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are of the court, it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily show
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social defendant's acts. This is so because moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused a person. Moral damages are awarded to estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual
enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. In Francisco vs. GSIS, the
alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable Court held that there must be clear testimony on the anguish and other forms of mental
action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo suffering. Thus, if the plaintiff fails to take the witness stand and testify as to his/her social
ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since each case must be humiliation, wounded feelings and anxiety, moral damages cannot be awarded. In Cocoland
governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no hard and fast rule in determining Development Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, the Court held that
the proper amount.76 (Citations omitted) "additional facts must be pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under
the Civil Code, these being, . . . social humiliation, wounded feelings, grave anxiety, etc.,
Similarly, in Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom:77 that resulted therefrom."86 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in In Mendoza v. Spouses Gomez,87 this Court disallowed the award of moral damages to the
some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched respondents. It ruled that they failed to allege and present "evidence of besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly reputation or physical, mental[,] or psychological suffering incurred by them."88
caused a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages must
nevertheless be somehow proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Similarly, in Quezon City Government v. Dacara,89 this Court deleted the award of moral
This is so because moral damages are in the category of an award designed to damages after finding that the respondent had failed to adduce proof of the emotional and
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered, not to impose a penalty on the mental sufferings he experienced due to the petitioners' negligent act.90Here, other than his
wrongdoer.78 (Citations omitted) bare allegations of besmirched reputation and loss of clientele, petitioner failed to present
evidence supporting his assertions. He submitted no evidence substantiating his claimed
Unlike actual and temperate damages, moral damages may be awarded even if the injured loss. He also failed to adduce proof to support his claim that his reputation was tainted due
party failed to prove that he has suffered pecuniary loss. As long as it was established that to the libelous article. Moreover, he did not present in court any testimony from the business
complainant's injury was the result of the offending party's action, the complainant may associates who had allegedly lost faith in him. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals found, the
recover moral damages.79 client, whom he had supposedly lost due to the libelous article, has been transacting
business with him again.91
Article 221980 of the Civil Code specifically states that moral damages may be recovered in
cases of libel, slander, or defamation. The amount of moral damages that courts may award Nonetheless, moral damages should still be awarded. As he had testified during trial,
depends upon the set of circumstances for each case. There is no fixed standard to members of his family were displeased with him for being accused of committing illegal and
determine the amount of moral damages to be given. Courts are given the discretion to fix corrupt acts. He was berated by his mother Tor having humiliated their family. His children
the amount to be awarded in favor of the injured party, so long as there is sufficient basis for were questioned at school. As such, an award of ₱500,000.00 as moral damages is an
awarding such amount.81 adequate recompense to the mental anguish and wounded feelings that petitioner had
endured.
Here, petitioner insists that he is entitled to moral damages in the amount of ₱5,000,000.00.
He argues that he suffered social humiliation and anxiety from the libelous article. His 77- IV
year-old mother castigated him for disgracing their family. His children questioned him after
they had been interrogated in school for the article about their father.82 Finally, petitioner The Court of Appeals deleted the award of exemplary damages and ruled that under Article
claims that the article tainted his reputation, prompting his clients and business associates 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be awarded only when the crime was
to refuse to transact with him.83 committed with one (1) or more aggravating circumstances.92

While this Court recognizes the embarrassment and unease suffered by petitioner, it must Contrary to the Court of Appeals' pronouncement, exemplary damages may be awarded
be emphasized that moral damages may only be awarded when the claimant has even in the absence of aggravating circumstances. It may be awarded "where the
sufficiently proved: (1) the factual foundation of the award; and (2) the causal connection of circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct of the
petitioner's suffering to respondents' act.84 In Kierulf v. Court of Appeals:85 offender."93

This Court cannot remind the bench and the bar often enough that in order that moral "Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
damages may be awarded, there must be pleading and proof of moral suffering, mental public good[.]"94 "It is imposed as a punishment for highly reprehensible conduct"95 and
anguish, fright and the like. While no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that serves as a notice to prevent the public from "the repetition of socially deleterious
moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the discretion actions."96 "Such damages are required by public policy, for wanton acts must be
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suppressed. They are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the organization dedicated toward stimulating high standards of ethical behavior, promoting the
body politic."97 free flow of information vital to a well-informed citizenry, and inspiring and educating current
and future journalists through professional development.100 Its Code of Ethics espouses the
Kierulf laid down the requirements that must be satisfied before exemplary damages may practice that journalism should be accurate and fair, and mandates accountability and
be awarded: transparency in the profession.101
Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has socially As such, journalists should observe high standards expected from their profession. They
deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the must take responsibility for the accuracy of their work, careful never to deliberately distort
wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It is based facts or context by verifying information before releasing it for public consumption.102
entirely on the discretion of the court. Jurisprudence sets certain requirements before
exemplary damages may be awarded, to wit: This case comes at a time when the credibility of journalists is needed more than ever;
when their tried-and-tested practice of adhering to their own code of ethics becomes more
(1) (T)hey may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, necessary, so that their truth may provide a stronger bulwark against the recklessness in
to compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their social media. Respondents, then, should have been more circumspect in what they
determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may be awarded published. They are not media practitioners with a lack of social following; their words
to the claimant; reverberate. Thus, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱1,000,000.00 is justifiable.
(2) the claimant must first establish his right to moral, temperate, liquidated or This Court can only hope that respondents appreciate the privilege their fame has brought
compensatory damages; and them and, in the future, become more circumspect in the exercise of their profession.
(3) the wrongful act must be accompanied by bad faith, and the award would be allowed WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 13, 2014 Amended
only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33256 is AFFIRMED WITH
manner.98 (Citations omitted) MODIFICATION. Respondents Raffy Tulfo, Allen Macasaet, Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr., Janet
Bay, Jesus P. Galang, Randy Hagos, Jean y Lacorte, and Venus Tandoc are ORDERED to
Here, respondents published the libelous article without verifying the truth of the allegations solidarity pay petitioner Michael C. Guy: (1) Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00)
against petitioner. As the Court of Appeals found, the Revenue Integrity Protection Service as moral damages; (2) One Million Pesos (₱1,000.000.00) as exemplary damages; and (3)
only investigates officials of the Department of Finance and its attached agencies who are Two Hundred Eleven Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (₱211,200.00) as attorney's fees.
accused of corruption. Petitioner, on the other hand, is no government official and,
therefore, beyond the Revenue Integrity Protection Service's jurisdiction. It only goes to All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
show that respondents did not verify the information on which the article was based.99 from the finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.103 SO ORDERED.
Thus, to ensure that such conduct will no longer be repeated, and considering their
profession, respondents are directed to pay petitioner exemplary damages in the amount of
₱1,000,000.00. G.R. No. 101797 March 24, 1994

V PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

Among the advantages brought by modern technology is the ease by which news can be vs.
shared and disseminated through different social media outlets. News matters are now
simultaneously cascaded in real-time. Society is swamped with a myriad of information ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant.
involving a wide array of topics. News dissemination has always been in a constant state of
flux. Occurrences across the globe, or the lack thereof, are immediately subject of the news CARLOS DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO ASMOLO, TEODULFO
written by journalists. DAGUING, FEDERICO SIMPRON, BIENVENIDO SIMPRON and DIDOC BONGCALOS
(all at large), accused.
More often than not, journalists are at the forefront of information publication and
dissemination.1âшphi1 Owing to the nature of their work, they have the prerogative to PUNO, J.:
shape the news as they see fit. This Court does not turn a blind eye to some of them who In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were charged with the crime of
twist the news to give an ambiguous interpretation that is in reckless disregard of the truth. Kidnapping with Murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. 1 They
Crafting inaccurate and misleading news is a blatant violation of the Society of Professional were Abundio Roluna, Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo, Teodulfo
Journalists Code of Ethics. The Society of Professional Journalists is a journalism
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Daguing, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information His testimony was corroborated in substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna and his
against them reads: grandmother-in-law, Iluminada Cortines de Noroño.

That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of Baybay, Province of Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and Nogalada, harboring ill-
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named feelings against him, testified falsely and implicated him in the disappearance of Anatalio
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with the use Moronia. He claimed that in 1983, he and Sombilon had a dispute over a cara y cruz game
of firearms and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, held in their barangay. Sombilon was then drunk and he, as chairman of the Kabataang
and feloniously hogtie and kidnap one Anatalio Moronia and take him away to a place Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon but the latter got mad at him. Since then, they have not
unknown up (to) this time whereat said victim was killed. talked with each other. Nogalada on the other hand, also had a grudge against him. In
1982, they had an altercation during a volleyball game held during the barangay fiesta. 5
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, 6 the dispositive portion of which
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted. The other seven (7) reads:
accused remain at large.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Abundio Roluna y Elhig guilty beyond reasonable
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado Sombilon and doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping With Murder. As kidnapping (and serious illegal
Buenaventura Nogalada, both of whom were residents of barangay Amguhan, Baybay, detention) is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and murder with reclusion temporal
Leyte. in its maximum period to death, under Article 48 of the Code, the herein accused should be
punished with the maximum of the more serious crime, hereat the supreme penalty of
CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around seven o'clock in the death. Considering that the Constitution of 1987 does not allow the imposition of the death
morning, he was on his way to sitio Bungabungan in barangay Amguhan to attend to the penalty, however, herein accused is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment or reclusion
pasture of his carabao. At a distance of thirty (30) meters, he saw his neighbor, Anatalio perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of Anatalio
Moronia, stopped in his tracks and taken captive by accused Abundio Roluna. Roluna was Moronia the sum of P30,000.00. He is credited with the full period of his detention in
then accompanied by seven (7) other persons. viz: Didoc Bongcalos, Federico Simpron, accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, except if he did not
Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo Daguing, Carlos Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo and Paterno sign an agreement to obey the prison laws, rules and regulations at the inception.
Daguing. Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while his companions were carrying
short firearms. Using an abaca strip, he saw Carlos Daguing tie up the hands of Moronia at SO ORDERED.
the back. Frightened, he did not shout for help and proceeded on his way. With the
exception of his wife, he did not inform anyone about what he saw that fateful day. 2 Hence this appeal.

BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the testimony of Sombilon. He In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond
testified that on said day, at around nine o'clock in the morning, he came from his farm in reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant points and
barangay Monterico, Baybay and was on his way home to barangay Amguhan. At a stresses that the corpus delicti was not duly proved by the prosecution. He submits, inter
distance of about twenty-five (25) meters, he saw Moronia walking along a human trail in alia, that considering that the body of Anatalio Moronia was never found, Moronia's
barangay Amguhan, with his hands tied by a rope behind his back. Moronia was followed questionable and unexplained absence and disappearance should not be blamed on him
by accused Roluna, Carlos Daguing and five (5) other persons whom he did not recognize. for the alleged victim, in all probability, may still be alive.
Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while Carlos Daguing was armed with a pistol.
Frightened, Nogalada immediately left the place. 3 In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia's death and the culpability of
accused-appellant were sufficiently established by the evidence. The People relies on the
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never seen or heard from. disputable presumption provided under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
viz.:
At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and alibi. Roluna claimed that on
May 24, 1984, Danilo Noroño, a cousin of his wife, went to their house in barangay The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
Amguhan. They were informed by Danilo that Iluminada Cortines y Noroño, his wife's among the heirs:
grandmother, was bedridden and seriously ill. He and his wife immediately proceeded to
Iluminada's house in barangay Banahaw, Baybay, Leyte. As soon as they arrived, he xxx xxx xxx
gathered some herbal plants for Iluminada. He boiled these plants and regularly applied
them on Iluminada's body. He and his wife attended to Iluminada for three (3) weeks. After (3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they returned to their home in barangay Amguhan. 4 has not been known for four (4) years.

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Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that fateful day of May 27, 1984. During accused continued ill-treating the victim until the latter died. The body of the victim was
this time, Moronia, with his hands tied at the back, was accompanied by eight (8) armed never found.
men. Clearly, he was then in danger of death. Since that day until the date of the trial (or for
a span of six years), Moronia has not been seen or heard from. The People urges that In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they merely saw one of the
these circumstances raised a presumption that Moronia has been killed by accused- accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of Moronia. He was then taken in the direction of
appellant and his companions. barangay Monterico and was never seen or heard from since. At no point during the trial
was it ever established that any of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid
The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances proved by the prosecution are a violent hand on him. Nogalada even testified that he did not hear any shot fired by any of
sufficient to establish the death of Anatalio Moronia, and; (b) if in the affirmative, whether or the eight (8) armed accused 10 so as to warrant a reasonable conclusion that Moronia was
not accused-appellants and his companions could be held liable therefor. killed by accused-appellant or any of his co-conspirators. Indeed, even the possible motive
of accused-appellant and his group for abducting Moronia was not definitively established.
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary To be sure, the circumstances proved are insufficient to produce a conviction beyond
sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular reasonable doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 7 The
corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption under Section 5 (x)
act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the
as the cause of this act or result. 8 presumptive death of Moronia. Whether accused-appellant is responsible for the death of
Moronia is a different matter. The Rules did not authorize that from this disputable
Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this case? presumption of death, it should be further presumed that the person with whom the
absentee was last seen shall be responsible for the subsequent unexplained absence/
Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last seen on May 27, disappearance of the latter. The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious crime of
1984 with his hands tied at the back and accompanied by eight (8) armed men undoubtedly kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts
shows that his life was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact that Moronia has been established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the
absent and unheard from since that time until the trial of this case (or a total of six years), a prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish
presumption of death was sufficiently raised. This is in consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the death of Moronia.
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused is presumed innocent until
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate proven otherwise. No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to convict him.
among the heirs: On the whole, the evidence adduced by the prosecution would not prove beyond a shadow
xxx xxx xxx of a doubt that accused-appellant should be convicted for the serious crime of kidnapping
with murder.
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence
has not been known for four (4) years. Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough to hold Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal
accused-appellant responsible for the death of Moronia. detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime, more
than three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its commission. Thus, since the generic
In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for aggravating circumstance of band 11 attended the commission of the crime and there being
murder although the body of the victim was not found or recovered. In said case, we ruled no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
that in case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body of the victim or as maximum and prision mayor as minimum should be imposed on accused-appellant. 12
show where it can be found. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency causing
death is proven. The Court recognized that there are cases where the death and IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED.
intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or established by
circumstantial evidence. Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal detention and is meted an
indeterminate sentence from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20)
However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at bench. In the years of reclusion temporal as maximum. 13 Costs against accused-appellant.
Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4) armed accused forcibly take the
victim from his house to a lake, beating him up all the way to the boat. While sailing, the SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 133541 April 14, 2004 saw her push Marlo towards the group of Canoto, Edgardo and Ricky. Canoto then grabbed
Marlo by the wrist and repeatedly stabbed him with a short bolo locally known as pisao.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, Edgardo followed suit by stabbing Marlo twice at the back. Despite being wounded, Marlo
was able to get away from Canoto and Edgardo and walked fast towards the nearby health
vs. center. Marlo was about to reach the gate of the health center when Ricky, who was behind
RICKY QUIMZON, appellant. Marlo, held the latter’s hands. Marlo tried to free himself from the clutches of Ricky but in
the course of his struggle he fell down. Thereupon, Ricky rode on the back of Marlo and
DECISION repeatedly stabbed him on his back. Emolyn and Rommel shouted for help prompting an
unidentified person to throw stones and utter, "that is enough". Thereafter, Canoto, Edgardo
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: and Ricky fled. With the help of some persons, Emolyn brought Marlo to the Burauen
General Hospital but Marlo died before reaching the hospital.8
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing
the decision1 dated December 17, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch In denying criminal liability, appellant interposed the defense of alibi. He claims that he does
16, in Criminal Case No. Bn-92-7-2924, finding appellant Ricky Quimzon2 guilty of murder not know Salvacion Lacsarom, Canoto Cabero and Edgardo Detona. He denies that he
and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. stabbed Marlo Casiong. Appellant testified, as follows: He could not have been at the scene
of the crime when the incident happened as he was in Barangay Patag attending another
In an Information dated July 28, 1992, appellant and three other persons, namely Salvacion benefit dance. He arrived at Barangay Patag around 7 o’clock in the evening of March 7,
Lacsarom, Canoto Cabero3 and Edgardo Detona4 were charged with the crime of murder 1992 and stayed there until 7 o’clock of the following morning. Barangay Patag is 18
allegedly committed as follows: kilometers away from the poblacion of Burauen where Marlo was killed and can only be
reached by riding a horse or a carabao or by hiking for five hours. He only came to know of
That on or about the 7th day of March, 1992, in the Municipality of Burauen, Province of the death of Marlo when he went to the poblacion of Burauen. He was included as one of
Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named the accused because he refused to testify in favor of the prosecution.9
accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another with treachery and abuse of
superior strength, with intent to kill, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously Alfredo Rellesiva, then Barangay Chairman of Barangay Patag, Burauen, Leyte; and Mauro
attack, assault, strike, stab and wound one Marlo Casiong with short bolos locally known as Lobriquinto, then second Barangay Councilor of Barangay Candag-on, corroborated
‘pisao’ which accused provided themselves for the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting appellant’s alibi.10
upon the said Marlo Casiong with fatal wounds on the different parts of his body which
caused his death shortly thereafter. After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:
Contrary to law.5
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the evidence of the prosecution having proven the
Appellant "surrendered" to the police authorities on August 18, 19946 while his other co- guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby renders the conviction of
accused remain at-large. When arraigned on September 28, 1994, appellant, with the the accused Ricky Quimzon of the crime of Murder punished under Article 248 of the
assistance of counsel, entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.7 Thereafter, trial Revised Penal Code. The crime currently is punishable by RA 7659 classifying Murder as
ensued. heinous crime to which the death penalty is to be imposed.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts: However, the crime was committed on March 7, 1992 and the effectivity of RA 7659 is
January 1994. This act therefore cannot apply in the case at bench.
On the night of March 7, 1992, victim Marlo Casiong, his sister Emolyn Casiong, and one
Rommel Redoña were at the social hall of Burauen, Leyte attending a benefit dance. Two qualifying circumstances are alleged in the Information; namely, treachery and abuse
Around 11:30 of the same evening, while dancing with one Salvacion Lacsarom, Marlo of superior strength. However, the latter circumstance is absorbed by the former.
accidentally bumped his cousin, herein appellant Ricky Quimzon. Emolyn and Rommel,
who were then dancing with each other and were about one meter away from Marlo and There is no other aggravating nor mitigating circumstance. The penalty therefore to be
Salvacion, witnessed the incident. Thereafter, while the dance continued, Salvacion held applied is reclusion perpetua being the medium of the penalty from minimum which is the
Marlo’s hand and invited him to go outside the dance hall as she had something important maximum of reclusion temporal to death.
to tell him. Thereupon, Marlo asked Emolyn to stay put because he was coming back.
Feeling apprehensions about it, Emolyn and Rommel followed Salvacion and Marlo as they The accused is therefore sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua.
went out of the dance hall. Emolyn noticed that Canoto Cabero, Edgardo Detona and
appellant Ricky also went out of the hall in a hurried manner thereby overtaking them On the civil aspect, the defense admitted the expenses incurred for the wake and burial of
(Emolyn and Rommel). Outside the social hall, Emolyn heard Salvacion say "ito na" then the victim and neither did he controvert the moral damages suffered by the mother of the

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victim. The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P53,000.00 as actual expenses for the conducted the autopsy or medical examination.17 It is made up of two elements: (a) that a
wake and burial, and P75,000.00 as moral damages payable to the mother of the victim certain result has been proved, for example, a man has died and (b) that some person is
Erlinda Casiong. criminally responsible for the act.18

The Philippine National Police and the NBI are urged to exert efforts to bring the at large co- Proof of corpus delicti is indispensable in prosecutions for felonies and offenses.19 While
accused to justice for their complicity in the crime. Furnish them a copy. Meanwhile, until the autopsy report of a medico legal expert in cases of murder or homicide is preferably
they are placed under the custody of the law, archived the case. accepted to show the extent of the injuries suffered by the victim, it is not the only
competent evidence to prove the injuries and the fact of death.20 It may be proved by the
SO ORDERED.11 testimonies of credible witnesses. Even a single witness’ uncorroborated testimony, if
credible, may suffice to prove it and warrant a conviction therefor.21
Hence, the present petition with the following Assignment of Errors.
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that the testimony of Dr. Asperin is not
I indispensable in proving the corpus delicti. Even without her testimony, the prosecution was
IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF still be able to prove the corpus delicti by establishing the fact that the victim died and that
BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF such death occurred after he was stabbed by appellant and his co-accused. These facts
MURDER WITHOUT A CORPUS DELICTI. were established by the testimony of prosecution witness Emolyn Casiong.22

II The question that remains, therefore, is whether the trial court erred in giving credence to
Emolyn’s testimony over and above the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
IT IS SUBMITTED BY THE APPELLANT THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BURAUEN, LEYTE ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF EMOLYN In his second assigned error, appellant questions Emolyn’s credibility as a witness by
CASIONG THE LONE PROSECUTION EYE WITNESS, LEADING TO THE CONVICTION pointing out that Emolyn did not execute an affidavit regarding the events that she allegedly
OF APPELLANT ON THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE.12 witnessed on March 7, 1992; that she did not present herself as a witness during the
preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Burauen, and that she
In support of his first assigned error, appellant contends that the testimony of prosecution only appeared as a witness when the case was already being tried before the trial court.
witness Dr. Adelaida Asperin on the report of the autopsy conducted on the body of the Appellant posits that Emolyn’s delay, which consisted in her failure to execute an affidavit
victim Marlo Casiong was designed to prove the corpus delicti. Appellant, however, claims and her belated appearance as a witness, puts the trustworthiness of her testimony in
that Dr. Asperin is incompetent to testify, as she was not the one who personally examined serious doubt.
the body. Instead, it was a certain Dr. Amparo Villanueva who conducted the autopsy on the
body of Marlo Casiong. Appellant asserts that the trial court should have regarded the We are not persuaded by appellant’s arguments.
testimony of Dr. Asperin as inadmissible for being hearsay; and, in the absence of such When the credibility of witnesses is in issue, appellatte courts generally defer to the findings
testimony, the prosecution would not have been able to prove the corpus delicti. of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question,
A review of the oral and documentary evidence presented before the trial court reveals that having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
it was indeed Dr. Amparo Villanueva, not Dr. Adelaida Asperin, who conducted the autopsy testifying during the trial.23
taken on the body of Marlo Casiong. As the attending physician, Dr. Villanueva was the one It is doctrinally settled that the assessment of the credibility of a witness is a function that is
who signed the autopsy report.13 In fact, Dr. Asperin herself admitted in her testimony that best discharged by the trial judge whose conclusion thereon is accorded much weight and
she never saw the victim, Marlo Casiong, and that it was Dr. Villanueva who conducted the respect that will not be disturbed on appeal unless a material or substantial fact has been
autopsy and was the one who prepared the autopsy report.14 However, Dr. Villanueva died overlooked or misappreciated which if properly taken into account could alter the outcome
before the prosecution was able to present her as witness. of the case.24
Nonetheless, even if Dr. Asperin is an incompetent witness as to the autopsy report and her After going over the records of the case, we find no compelling reason to disturb the
testimony could not have probative value for being hearsay, we still find that the prosecution findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility of Emolyn. Contrary to appellant’s
was able to sufficiently establish by competent evidence the corpus delicti in the instant assertion, we find that she took no delay in relating the killing of her brother to the police
case. authorities. Emolyn testified that shortly after the killing of her brother, she submitted herself
Corpus delicti is defined as the body, foundation or substance upon which a crime has been for investigation before the police authorities of Burauen, Leyte. However, the chief of police
committed, e.g. the corpse of a murdered man.15 It refers to the fact that a crime has been informed her that she could not execute an affidavit because she is a sister of the victim,
actually committed.16 Corpus delicti does not refer to the autopsy report evidencing the but if the court would need her, then she can execute an affidavit. Unschooled on the rules
nature of the wounds sustained by the victim nor the testimony of the physician who
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on evidence, it is but natural for Emolyn to have readily accepted the explanation of the A The Chief of Police Nuevarez, the one who prepared the affidavit of Rommel was sir
chief of police. In her direct examination, she testified, thus: Juanico.

Q Now, shortly after the killing of your brother were you investigated by the police in ATTY SAY:
connection with the killing of your brother?
Q Will you still insist that Nuevarez refused to take your affidavit because you are a sister of
A We were investigated by the Chief of Police of Burauen, Leyte. the victim?

Q When you said ‘we’, to whom are you referring? A Yes, sir.

A Me and Rommel Redoña because we were the companions of my brother Marlo Casiong. Q Even if we present Nuevarez in the witness stand you will still insist?

Q It is clear now that only you and Rommel Redoña were the companions of Marlo Casiong A Yes, sir.
on that fateful evening?
Q Is it not a fact that your affidavit could not be taken because you were still in Manila?
A Yes sir.
A I was in Burauen, Leyte when that incident occurred.
Q In the course of your investigation by the Chief of Police of Burauen relative to the killing
of your brother, was that investigation conducted on your person reduced into writing? Q But one thing is you have been in Manila?

A The Chief of Police told me that when needed I might be investigated by the Court, I was A I went to Manila in 1994 already I went after Rommel Redoña.
not asked to execute an affidavit, it was only Rommel Redoña who executed an affidavit.
Q The deceased Marlo Casiong was a very close, aside from being your brother you were
Q So no affidavit was made by the police when you were investigated? very closely associated with him?

A None because the Chief of Police informed me that Rommel Redoña would only be the A Yes, sir.
one to execute an affidavit but if the Court would need me then I will execute an affidavit
because I am a sister of the victim and I may not be allowed.25 Q And you want to do anything for him?

And on her cross-examination, to wit: A I will do everything because I was there when the incident took place.26

Q Being the witness will you tell us were you the one who reported this incident to the As to her apparent delay in testifying, Emolyn explained that she would not have appeared
police? as a witness if Rommel Redoña testified. However, she clarified that she only appeared as
a witness when the case was being tried by the trial court because she was left with no
A My mother. choice but to testify in place of Rommel Redoña who told her that he no longer wanted to
be a witness because he was being threatened by appellant, to wit:
Q Being an alleged eye witness did you submit yourself for investigation by the police?
Q What was your purpose in going after Rommel Redoña in Manila?
A My affidavit was not prepared because according to the chief of police of Burauen, Leyte I
cannot have my affidavit because I am the sister of the victim and only Rommel Redoña A Because a subpoena reached us informing us that the one who killed my brother had
was prepared. already been apprehended and because he was one of the eye witness I have to fetch him
in Manila and I even went there twice and my mother went there third time, only last
Q Sister of whom? November.

A Marlo Casiong. Q Do you know the reason why he went to Manila despite the fact that he is one of the
witnesses in this case?
....
A When I went to Manila I met him and he told me Molin I really cannot testify because I
COURT: have been threatened by Ricky and company.
Q Who is the police who said because you are the sister of the victim you cannot have an ...
affidavit?

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RE-CROSS BY ATTY. SAY: A Yes, your Honor, because Rommel Redoña did not want to testify anymore and we could
not find any other witness and since I was with them when the incident occurred, I testified
Q Now since Rommel Redoña refused to testify you have to testify despite the fact that you here.27
were told by the chief of police Nuevarez that you cannot testify in this case being a sister
of the victim? Moreover, we agree with the observation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that
the apparent delay in Emolyn’s appearance as a witness is explained by the fact that while
A The chief of police there Nuevarez told me that if ever I will be needed by this Court I a complaint against appellant and his co-accused was filed as early as May 7, 1992, the
could testify but only, my affidavit cannot be prepared then because I was the sister. case was archived because all the accused remained at-large.28 It was only on August 18,
1994 that appellant was arrested, which sufficiently explains why Emolyn was only able to
Q Then how did you know that the court needed your testimony? appear as a witness on February 21, 1995.
COURT: Appellant further attacks the veracity of Emolyn’s testimony by calling our attention to some
Q Were you subpoenaed by the Court? purported inconsistencies and improbabilities in her account of the events that took place
prior to and during the stabbing of Marlo. Appellant contends: It could not have been
A No. possible for Emolyn to overhear the conversation that took place between Salvacion and
Marlo while they were dancing because the music was loud, the beat was fast and furious,
ATTY. SAY: and Emolyn was engrossed in her dancing. It was impossible for Emolyn to hear Edgardo
Detona, Canoto Cabero and appellant ask permission from their respective dancing
Q So it was not the court actually required your testimony because you did not receive partners before going out of the dance hall because Emolyn went out of the dance hall
subpoena? ahead of them. Emolyn failed to accurately recall the sequence of events that led to the
stabbing of Marlo. She could not have witnessed Marlo’s stabbing as she admitted that it
A I did not receive any subpoena but Rommel Redoña whom I met many times was firm was dark where the incident took place.
that he cannot testify because he would be killed by the accused and because it was only
the three of us, Rommel, myself and the victim who went to the dance. We are not convinced by appellant’s contentions.
Q It is only reason why you testified in this case because Rommel Redoña has manifested First, it is not improbable for Emolyn to overhear the conversation between Salvacion and
that he will not testify? Marlo while they were dancing because she (Emolyn) testified that she was just one meter
away from Salvacion and Marlo at that time. The fact that they were dancing, that the music
A Yes, sir. is loud and that there is another couple between them and her does not discount the
COURT: possibility that she could have heard them talking. Given the above circumstances, it is
expected of Salvacion and Marlo to have raised their voices in order to hear each other,
Q So if Rommel Redoña would have testified in Court you do not need to testify? which then enabled Emolyn to hear their conversation.

A I will not anymore because I have no affidavit. Second, while Emolyn admitted that she and Rommel started to go out of the dance hall
ahead of Edgardo, Canoto and appellant, she sufficiently explained that she was able to
Q It was your lawyer Atty. Adaza who adviced you to testify in this case? hear the three men talk to their respective partners because she was still near them when
they asked permission from their partners. Emolyn explained thus:
A He did not, because we could not find any other witness I have to testify.
Q How about Canuto Cavero when he went out together with Ricky Quimson, Edgardo
Q Your lawyer did not advice you to testify? Detuna, did Canuto Cavero also leave his partner?
A No, Your Honor. A He told his partner to wait for a while because he will be going out.
Q Your lawyer did not say that you are not qualified to testify in this case because you are a Q How about Edgardo Detuna he also left his partner when he went out?
sister?
A He also told his partner to wait for a while because he will be going out.
A No, Your Honor.
Q And likewise, Ricky Quimson also told his partner to wait for a while because he will be
Q So you are testifying to substitute only the testimony of Rommel Redoña? going out?

A Yes.
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Q So, in other words the three gentlemen Canuto Cavero, Edgardo Detuna and Ricky A Yes.30
Quimson left their partners because they will be going out for a while?
Third, we find that the alleged probabilities and inaccuracies committed by Emolyn in
A Yes. recounting the events that took place prior to and during the stabbing of Marlo refers to
trivial matters that do not refer to material points and do not detract from Emolyn’s clear and
Q You are sure of that, you cannot be mistaken? positive testimony that she saw appellant and the other accused stab and kill her brother.
A I will not be mistaken. Settled is the rule that inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with
respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their
Q You are very sure because you heard each one of them, Canuto Cavero, Edgardo declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony.31 In fact, such minor flaws may
Detuna, and Ricky Quimson left their respective partners and told them, ‘Wait because I am even enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.32
going out for a while’, you cannot be mistaken.
Fourth, while Emolyn testified that it was dark inside the dance hall, it is also clear from her
A Yes because we were close to each other.29 testimony that the stabbing took place outside the hall and there were fluorescent bulbs
As to who went ahead of whom, Emolyn satisfactorily explained as follows: near the places where Marlo was stabbed by Canoto, Edgardo and appellant. When cross-
examined, she testified as follows:
Q In other words it is very clear that after Salvacion Lacsarom and your brother left you
immediately followed because you were were deeply alarmed leaving inside the hall Q How many times did you meet the accused in dances?
Edgardo Detuna, Canuto Cavero and Ricky Quimson? A Several times because we meet at dances whenever there is one.
A Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero were already outside ahead of us. Q This incident happened outside the dancing hall, is that correct?
Q Do you mean to tell us that Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero left the hall ahead of A Yes.
Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong?
Q But the alleged bumping of Ricky Quimson by Marlo Casiong happened inside the
A The two, Canuto Cavero and Edgardo Detuna were able to reach outside ahead of Marlo dancing hall?
Casiong and Salvacion Lacsarom because they walked fast.
A Yes.
Q But the fact is, Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong left the dancing hall ahead of
everybody? Q And it happened while the dance was going on?
A They went out ahead but they were overtaken by Canuto Cavero and Edgardo Detuna. A The dance was in progress but the four of them went out.33
Q So it is not correct to say that you were the one who immediately followed Salvacion Emolyn testified further:
Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong because according to you Edgardo Detuna and Canuto
Cavero followed Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong, you were not the one who Q What kind of light was illuminating the dancing hall?
immediately followed the pair but Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero, is that correct?
A Fluorescent bulbs.
A No because Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero were faster and they went out the
shorter way while I followed Marlo Casiong and Salvacion Lacsarom who took a little slower Q How many fluorescent lamps were there?
in going out.
A There were two outside and one was at the gate of the health center and one at the gate
... of the dancing hall.

Q How about Ricky Quimson, was he still dancing when you immediately followed Q How far was the nearest fluorescent lamp where the first stabbing of the victim was
Salvacion Lacsarom and Marlo Casiong outside? made?

A He was already outside the dancing hall because he followed Canuto Cavero and A Witness points to a distance which indicated 4 meters when measured.
Edgardo Detuna.
Q How high was the fluorescent lamp from the ground?
Q But he was behind Edgardo Detuna and Canuto Cavero?

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A About 2 meters and 35 cms. high from the floor. that Marlo was left with no opportunity to repel the attack or avoid it. Moreover, he was
unarmed while all three assailants were carrying deadly weapons. The treachery continued
Q At the health center where Marlo Casiong was attacked by Ricky Quimson, how far was when appellant held the hands of Marlo as the latter was running away from the initial
the fluorescent light? stabbings of Canoto and Edgardo, rode on Marlo’s back when the latter fell down and
repeatedly stabbed Marlo who had already been rendered weak by the multiple stab
A Witness points to a distance which indicated 4 meters when measured. wounds inflicted by Edgardo and Canoto. Appellant attacked Marlo from behind and
Q How about the lamp from the ground, how high? repeatedly stabbed Marlo when he was already in a defenseless position.

A The same height, about 2 meters and 35 cms. from the ground.34 In any criminal prosecution, the only requisite is that the prosecution proves the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
We have held that kerosene lamp, flashlight, even moonlight or starlight may, in proper degree of proof that, excluding the possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
situations, be considered sufficient illumination.35 In the instant case, the fluorescent bulbs certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
situated near the places where appellant and his companions attacked Marlo enabled unprejudiced mind.43
Emolyn to witness the killing of her brother.
Hence, we uphold the trial court’s judgment declaring appellant guilty of murder beyond
Thus, we reiterate the well-entrenched rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, the reasonable doubt. The attendant circumstance of treachery qualified the killing to murder as
factual findings of the trial court should be respected. The judge a quo was in a better defined under paragraph 1, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. Since treachery
position to pass judgment on the credibility of witnesses, having personally heard them attended the killing, abuse of superior strength alleged in the Information is absorbed by
when they testified and observed their deportment and manner of testifying.36 said circumstance.44

Appellant interposes the defense of alibi. However, alibi, like denial, is an inherently weak Aside from abuse of superior strength, no other aggravating circumstance was alleged and
defense as it is easy to concoct and difficult to prove.37 While appellant’s testimony is proved by the prosecution.
corroborated by defense witness Rellesiva and Lobriquito, the trial court correctly gave
more probative weight to the lone testimony of prosecution witness Emolyn who positively In a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the
identified appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime. appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed
judgment.45
Appellant’s defense of alibi fails in the face of Emolyn’s positive identification of him as one
of her brother’s killers. Positive identification destroys the defense of alibi and renders it It appears in the Commitment Order, dated August 14, 1994, issued by the Municipal Trial
impotent, especially where such identification is credible and categorical.38 The defense of Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, that appellant "voluntarily surrendered
denial is unavailing when placed astride the undisputed fact that there is positive to SPO1 Josefino Agustin of PNP Burauen, Leyte on August 18, 1994".46 An examination of
identification of the felon.39 the records reveals that it can not be considered as a mitigating circumstance. For the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the accused must
We affirm the trial court’s finding that there was treachery in the killing of Marlo. There is satisfactorily comply with three requisites: (1) he has not been actually arrested; (2) he
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter’s agent; and (3) the surrender is
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to voluntary. There must be a showing of spontaneity and an intent to surrender
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused acknowledges his guilt or he
party might make.40 The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an wishes to spare them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture.47
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real chance to defend
himself and thereby ensuring its commission with no risk to the aggressor.41 In the present The "surrender" of appellant was far from being spontaneous and unconditional. The
case, Marlo accepted Salvacion’s invitation for them to go outside the dance hall on the warrant of arrest is dated June 17, 1992 and all the accused, including appellant, remained
impression that the latter has something important to tell him. He has no inkling of any at-large, which prompted the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte to
impending danger on his life as he even told his sister, Emolyn, to wait for him because he archive the case.48 It took appellant two years before he finally "surrendered" to the police.
will be coming back.42 Outside the dance hall, as soon as Salvacion pushed Marlo towards In between said period, appellant, through counsel, filed a Motion to Fix Bail Bond49 without
them, Canoto and Edgardo immediately attacked him without warning, inflicting wounds on surrendering his person to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Records do not reveal that the
the front and back portions of his body with the use of bolos. Although this initial assault on motion had been acted upon by the trial court. This act of appellant may be considered as a
Marlo was frontal it may still be considered treacherous because the attack was sudden condition set by him before he surrenders to proper authorities, thus preventing his
and unprovoked. There is no evidence showing that the attack was preceded by any subsequent act of surrendering from being considered as a mitigating circumstance.
exchange of words or any untoward incident between the assailants and Marlo, sufficient to Moreover, we noted in the Motion to Fix Bail Bond, filed on July 9, 1992, that counsel for
warn Marlo of the impending attack on him. The mode of execution was in such a manner appellant alleged that appellant "is barely 15 years of age". When appellant was called to
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the witness stand on August 2, 1996, or four years thereafter, appellant asserted that he Nonetheless, in our recent rulings, we have held that in cases where the heirs of the victim
was 21 years old. The stabbing incident took place on March 7, 1992, thus placing failed to prove their claim for actual damages, but have shown that they have suffered
appellant to be 17 years old, a minor, when he committed the crime. The records do not pecuniary loss by reason of the death of the victim, an award of ₱25,000.00 by way of
show that the prosecution refuted appellant’s minority; and absent any evidence to the temperate damages is justified in lieu of an award of actual or compensatory damages.54 In
contrary, the trial court should have applied in favor of appellant the benefits under Article People vs. Villanueva,55 we held that in cases where actual damages was proven by
68 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: receipts during the trial but said damages amounted to less than ₱25,000.00, as in the
present case, the award of temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 is justified in
Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – lieu of said actual damages. The rationale for such an award of temperate damages is that
it would be anomalous and unfair for the heirs of the victim, who by presenting receipts,
... tried and succeeded in proving actual damages but in an amount less than ₱25,000.00, to
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than be placed in a worse situation than those who might not have presented any receipts at all
that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. (Emphasis but would be entitled to ₱25,000.00 for temperate damages.56
supplied) Erlinda Casiong testified that her son was single when he died;57 that she felt sad when her
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the perpetrator of the crime of Murder shall son was killed.58 We find her testimony sufficient to sustain the trial court’s award of moral
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the express provision of the damages but we reduce the amount of ₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 in line with current
aforequoted Article 68 and pursuant to Article 61, paragraph 2, of the same Code, to wit: jurisprudence.59

Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties. - . . . Erlinda Casiong further testified that her son was working as a helper in a passenger bus.60
The indemnification for loss of earning capacity partakes of the nature of actual damages
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty next which must be duly proved.61 In the absence of competent evidence to prove how much the
lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective victim was earning, the heirs of the victim are not entitled thereto.
graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.
The trial court did not award civil indemnity. In consonance with prevailing jurisprudence, we
... award the amount of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of Marlo Casiong as civil indemnity for his
death. The amount is awarded without need of proof other than appellant’s commission of
the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal or 12 years and 1 day to 20 years. the crime which resulted in the death of the victim.62

Considering the actual penalty to be imposed upon appellant, as prescribed by law, is not WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City (Branch 15) is
reclusion perpetua or death, appellant is entitled to the application of the Indeterminate AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Appellant Ricky Quimzon is found GUILTY beyond
Sentence Law.50 Thus, from the penalty of reclusion temporal, one degree lower is prision reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and after applying The Indeterminate Sentence
mayor or 6 years and 1 day to 12 years from which will be drawn the MINIMUM period of Law, and there being no modifying circumstance, he is sentenced to suffer imprisonment,
the indeterminate sentence; while pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 64 of the Revised Penal from eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as MINIMUM up to fourteen (14)
Code, in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty prescribed by law should years and ten (10) months of reclusion temporal as MAXIMUM. He is ordered to pay
be imposed in its medium period, or anywhere between 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 Erlinda Casiong, the mother of the deceased Marlo Casiong, the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
years and 4 months, as the MAXIMUM period of the indeterminate sentence. civil indemnity for the victim’s death; ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and ₱50,000.00
as moral damages. Costs de oficio. SO ORDERED.
We now come to the civil liability of appellant.

As to actual damages, we find that the evidence presented by the prosecution do not
adequately provide a concrete basis for the amount of ₱53,000.00 awarded by the trial
court to the victim’s mother, Erlinda Casiong. She testified that her family incurred expenses
amounting to ₱50,206.00, during the wake and burial of her son. As proof, she presented
seven official receipts amounting to ₱4,490.00 only.51 Other evidence consisting of small
pieces of paper which were properly identified by Erlinda as having been signed by the
persons from whom she bought the merchandise that were used or consumed during
Marlo’s wake and burial, amounting to ₱4,020.0052 may be considered competent evidence
and admitted under Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.53 Thus, the prosecution was
able to prove only a total of ₱8,510.00. The other receipts presented were not properly
identified and therefore inadmissible under the Rules of Court.
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SECOND DIVISION That on or about the 10th day of May 2005, in the City of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna,
G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018 Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HERMINIO VIDAL, JR. Y UAYAN @ conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with treachery and evident
"PATO," ARNOLD DAVID Y CRUZ @ "ANOT," CIPRIANO REFREA, JR. Y ALMEDA @ premeditation and while conveniently armed with firearms, with intent to kill, did then and
"COBRA," RICARDO H. PINEDA @ "PETER," EDWIN R. BARQUEROS @ "MARVIN," there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack, assault and shoot Police Officer 2 Erwin B.
AND DANIEL YASON@ "ACE," Accused. Rivera with the said firearms, knowing fully well that he was a police officer and an agent of
HERMINIO VIDAL, JR. Y UAYAN @ "PATO," AND ARNOLD DAVID Y CRUZ @ "ANOT," person in authority, and in the performance of his duty as security escort of Mayor Leon C.
Accused-Appellants. Arcillas, thereby inflicting him injuries on different parts of his body that caused his
instantaneous death to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.
DECISION
CONTRARY TO LAW.
PERALTA, J.:
Criminal Case No. 17648-B
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision1 dated February 24, 2016 of the Court of Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Frustrated Murder
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06206, which affirmed with modification the
Judgment2 dated February 6, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Biñan City, That on or about the 10th day of May 2005, in the City of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna,
Laguna (RTC), finding accusedappellants Herminia Vibal, Jr. y Uayan @ Pato (Vibal) and Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot (David) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2) counts of conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with treachery and evident
the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos. 17646-B and 17647- premeditation and while conveniently armed with firearms, with intent to kill, did then and
B, and one (1) count of Direct Assault with Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 17648- there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack, assault and shoot Police Officer 3 Wilfredo B.
B. Almendras with the said firearms, knowing fully well that he was a police officer and an
The antecedent facts are as follows: agent of person in authority, and in the performance of his duty as security escort of Mayor
Leon C. Arcillas, thereby inflicting him injuries on different parts of his body, thus accused
Vibal and David, together with accused Cipriano Refrea, Jr. y Almeda @ Cobra (Refrea), performs all the acts of execution which would produce the crime as a consequence but
Ricardo H. Pineda @ Peter (Pineda), Edwin R. Barqueros @ Marvin (Barqueros) and which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
Daniel Yason @ Ace (Yason) were charged with two (2) counts of the complex crime of accused, that is by timely medical attendance on said Police Officer 3 Wilfredo B.
Direct Assault with Murder and one (1) count of Direct Assault with Frustrated Murder in an Almendras to his damage and prejudice.
Information dated July 4, 2007 and two Amended Informations dated March 9, 2009,
respectively, the accusatory portion of each reads: CONTRARY TO LAW.
Criminal Case No. 17646-B When arraigned on May 13, 2009, appellants and accused Refrea, pleaded not guilty to the
Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Murder crimes charged. Accused Yason entered a plea of not guilty to the charges during his
arraignment on April 6, 2010. Accused Ricardo Pineda and Edwin Barqueros have not been
That on or about the 10th day of May 2005, in the City of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna, arraigned yet as they are still at-large. Pre-trial with respect to Vibal, David and Refrea was
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, terminated on October 22, 2009. While pre-trial with respect to Yason was terminated on
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another with treachery and evident June 22, 2010. Thereafter, joint trials on the merits followed.
premeditation and while conveniently being armed with firearms, with intent to kill, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously attack, assault and shoot Mayor Leon C. Arcillas During trial, Refrea died and as a consequence, he was dropped as one of the accused.
with the said firearms, knowing fully well that he was a City Mayor of Sta. Rosa City, a Meanwhile, Yason's demurrer to evidence was granted by the RTC which resulted to the
person in authority, and while in the performance of his duty as such, thereby inflicting the dismissal of the criminal cases as against the said accused.
latter fatal injuries on the head and other parts of his body that caused his instantaneous
death to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs. Version of the Prosecution

CONTRARY TO LAW. The Office of the Solicitor General summarized the evidence for the prosecution in this
wise:
Criminal Case No. 17647-B On May 10, 2005, at around 8:00 o'clock in the morning, PO3 Wilfredo Almendras, together
Complex Crime of Direct Assault with Murder with PO2 Binmaot and PO2 Erwin Rivera, and two (2) other civilian escorts, was with Mayor
Leon Arcillas at the 2nd floor of the Municipal City Hall of Sta. Rosa City. The police officers
were assigned as security escorts of the Mayor. Mayor Arcillas was then solemnizing

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marriages. The ceremony ended at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning. The Mayor then Version of the Defense
proceeded to the Office of the Commission on Audit (COA) located at the same floor. While
they were going out of the room where the ceremony was conducted, PO3 Almendras The defense, on the other hand, relates its version of the facts in this manner:
noticed that they were being followed by two (2) young kids. After spending a moment in the On 10 May 2005 at 10:00 o'clock a.m., accused ARNOLD DAVID was at Tanay, Rizal,
COA office, the group then proceeded to the Office of the Mayor. On their way to said where he has been staying since October 2004 as requested by his father because he was
Office, gunshots were fired on them. PO3 Almendras was not able to pull out his gun since accused of murder in a gang war that happened at GMA, Cavite. He was then arrested on
there was a rapid fire coming from their front and back. He, PO2 Rivera and the Mayor 19 December 2006 in connection with a case in GMA, Cavite, where he was brought
sustained gunshots wounds. The three (3) fell to the ground. While on the floor, PO3 somewhere blindfolded. On 2 January 2007, SPO1 Peria arrived and showed him
Almendras heard three (3) more gunshots before he felt dizzy. Thereafter, PO3 Almendras photographs of the gang, but he denied he was in these. He denied knowing Cipriano
and Mayor Arcillas were brought to the hospital. Refrea, Jr. prior to his arrest, knowing only the latter at the police station.

At that time, SPO1 Victoriano Peria, received a call from an unknown caller reporting that a Accused HERMINIO VIBAL, JR. likewise denied participation in the incident that happened
shooting incident took place inside the Municipal building. on 10 May 2005. He claimed that on that date, at 10:30 o'clock a.m., he was at GMA,
Cavite, with his family, including his sister, LORELYN CORONEL, and did not leave until
Upon reaching the municipal hall, he saw Mayor Arcillas bloodied and being carried out by afternoon. In February 2006, he was arrested and detained at the Cavite Provincial Jail in
several men and was put inside the vehicle. In the second floor, he saw PO2 Erwin Rivera relation to prior cases. In December 2006, SPO1 Peria visited him and asked about the
lying near the door already dead, while the other victim PO3 Almendras was brought to the death of Reynaldo Cesar, to which Vibal denied. SPO1 Peria later took Vibal's photograph
hospital. and left. He was visited again by SPO1 Peria and asked if he had any participation in the
death of Mayor Arcillas. Again, Vibal denied. SPO1 Peria once again visited Vibal, this time
The team searched the whole building of the City Hall for possible apprehension of the with PO3 Almendras. The latter asked Vibal if he knew him, but Vibal could not answer as
culprits, but to no avail. Thus, Regional Director P/Chief Supt. Jesus Versoza created a he was sick at the time. He was again photographed. In January 2007, he was again visited
special investigating task force composed of the NBI, CIDG, Regional Intelligence Unit, by SPO1 Peria and PO3 Almendras, who were now with Cipriano Refrea, Jr. and who was
SOCO and Laguna Investigation Division to conduct an investigation to ascertain the asked to point at Vibal. Another photograph was taken of Vibal. Prior to this meeting, Vibal
identity of the assailants. did not know who Refrea was.4
The RTC Ruling
During the investigation, Cipriano Refrea appeared and told SPO1 Peria that accused-
appellants Vibal and David were his companions when the killing transpired. Refrea pointed In its Decision, dated February 6, 2013, the RTC found Vibal and David guilty of the crimes
to them as the gunmen. After knowing from Refrea the identity of accused-appellant Vibal, charged. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
SPO1 Peria asked his whereabouts. He came to know that accused-appellant Vibal was WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
presently detained at the Trece Martirez. SPO1 Peria, together with the other policemen HERMINIO U. VIBAL, JR. y UAYAN and ARNOLD DAVID y CRUZ, guilty beyond
visited Vibal, and when asked about his participation on the shooting incident, he at first reasonable doubt of the complex crime of direct assault with murder (2 counts) and direct
denied his participation, but later on admitted to his participation. assault with frustrated murder. Accordingly, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
as follows:
With respect to the identity of accused-appellant David, they came to know that he was
detained at GMA, Cavite.
1) In Criminal Case No. 17646-B and 17647-B, reclusion perpetua (two
In his investigation, SPO1 Peria was able to ascertain that Vibal, David and Refrea were counts). As civil liability, for them to pay jointly the following: 1)
members of the gang called Royal Blood Gangsta. P75,000.00 as civil liability ex-delicto in each case; 2) P500,000.00 in
moral damages to the heirs of the victims in each case;
Dr. Roy A. Camarillo, the medico-legal officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory at Camp
Vicente Lim, Calamba, Laguna, conducted the autopsy of the cadaver[s] of Mayor Arcillas
and PO2 Rivera. Based from the medico-legal report, Mayor Arcillas sustained three (3)
gunshot wounds, the fatal of which are the 2 gunshots in his head. PO2 Rivera, on the 2) In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, the indeterminate penalty ranging from 14
other hand, sustained two (2) gunshot wounds, on the nape and chest, the latter being the years of reclusion temporal, as minimum to 17 years 4 months and 1 day
fatal one that caused the death of the victim.
of reclusion temporal, as maximum. As civil liability, accused are ordered
PO3 Almendras was examined and found to have fracture at the left forearm and weakness to pay the victim the amount of P50,000.00 in moral damages.
of the right hand.3

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On the other hand, the cases against accused Ricardo Pineda and Edwin Barqueros are
sent to the archives pending their arrest. (2) In Criminal Case No. 17647-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y
Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are hereby held GUILTY
SO ORDERED.5 beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime of direct assault with
The RTC concluded that all the elements of the offenses charged were satisfactorily proven murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
by the prosecution. It rejected the twin defenses of denial and alibi interposed by appellants without eligibility for parole. Accused-appellants are ordered to pay the
in the light of the positive identification of them by prosecution witness PO3 Wilfreda heirs of PO2 Erwin Rivera the following amounts: Seventy Five Thousand
Almendras (PO3 Almendras) as the culprits to the dastardly deeds. The RTC added that the Pesos (P75,000,00) as civil indemnity; Seventy Five Thousand Pesos
manner by which the appellants committed the felonious acts revealed a community of (P75,000.00) as moral damages; Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as
criminal design, and thereby held that conspiracy exists. Lastly, the RTC ruled that evident
exemplary damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as
premeditation and treachery attended the commission of the crimes which qualified the
killing of Mayor Leon Arcillas (Mayor Arcillas) and PO2 Erwin Rivera (PO2 Rivera) to temperate damages;
murder.

Not in conformity, Vibal and David appealed the February 6, 2013 RTC Decision before the
CA. (3) In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y
Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are hereby held GUILTY
The CA Ruling beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime of direct assault with
attempted murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
On February 24, 2016, the CA rendered its assailed Decision upholding the conviction of imprisonment from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
Vibal and David for two counts of the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder in correccional to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
Criminal Case Nos. 17646-B and 17647-B but held that the said appellants are criminally Accused-appellants are ordered to pay private complainant PO2 Wilfredo
liable only for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Attempted Murder in Criminal Case
B. Almendras Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) as moral damages;
No. 17648-B, the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Judgment dated and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and
February 6, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Biñan City, Laguna is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that the dispositive portion thereof is to read as follows:

(4) Accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David
(1) In Criminal Case No. 17646-B, accused-appellants Herminia Vibal, Jr. y y Cruz @ Anot are further ordered to pay interest on all damages
Uayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are hereby held GUILTY awarded at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of
beyond reasonable doubt for the complex crime of direct assault with finality of this judgment.
murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole. Accused-appellants are ordered to pay the
SO ORDERED.6
heirs of Mayor Leon Arcillas the following amounts: Seventy-Five The appellate court held that the credible testimony of PO3 Almendras is sufficient to
Thousand Pesos (P75,000,00) as civil indemnity; Seventy-Five Thousand sustain the conviction of the appellants for the crimes charged. It likewise debunked
Pesos (P75,000.00) as moral damages; Thirty Thousand Pesos appellants' denial and alibi declaring that the same were not satisfactorily established and
(P30,000.00) as exemplary damages; and Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos not at all persuasive when pitted against the positive and convincing identification by PO3
(P25,000.00) as temperate damages; Almendras, who has no ill motive to testify falsely against them. According to the CA, the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was not adequately
established by the prosecution. Finally, the CA ruled that the appellants should be held
liable only for the complex crime of direct assault with attempted murder in Criminal Case
No. 17648-B because the prosecution failed to prove that the gunshot wound inflicted upon
PO2 Almendras was fatal.

Undaunted, appellants filed the present appeal and posited the same lone assignment of
error they previously raised before the CA, to wit:

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THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE clear, worthy of credence and has met the requirements of moral certainty. The Court
TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESS' POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE agrees, and finds no cogent reason to disturb this conclusion of the RTC as affirmed by the
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WHEN THE FACTS OF THE CASE SHOW THAT THERE ARE CA.
DOUBTS CONCERNING THE ALLEGED POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION.7
In the Resolution8 dated March 29, 2017, the Court directed both parties to submit their The cause of the prosecution draws its strength on the positive identification by PO3
supplemental briefs, if they so desire. On May 29, 2017, the accused-appellants filed a Almendras, pinpointing to appellants Vibal and David as the perpetrators of the gruesome
Manifestation (In Lieu of Supplemental Brief)9 averring that they would adopt all their killing of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera and who inflicted gunshot wounds upon him. PO3
arguments in their Appellant's Brief filed before the CA. On June 27, 2017, the Office of the Almendras vividly recounted before the RTC the appellants' respective positions and
Solicitor General filed its Manifestation10 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental participation in the shooting incident, having been able to witness closely how they
brief as its Appellee's Brief had sufficiently ventilated the issues raised. committed the crime, more so because the crime happened in the morning when conditions
of visibility are very much favorable. He had a close and unobstructed view of the incident
Accused-appellants principally contend that the CA gravely erred in its over-reliance on the and was able to take a good glimpse and recognize the faces of the gunmen as the same
problematic identification provided by prosecution witness/private complainant PO3 two young males he saw earlier in the day following his group. Hailed to the witness stand,
Almendras. They insist that PO3 Almendras could not have properly seen and identity the PO3 Almendras stuck to the essentials of his story, and without any hesitation, pointed to
assailants at the time of the shooting incident because after he was shot, he felt dizzy and Vibal and David as the two culprits, which thus eliminated any possibility of mistaken
lost consciousness. Also, they brand Almendras' identification of them as the culprits to be identification. Jurisprudence recognizes that victims of crime have a penchant for seeing
dubious considering that it was only made more than a year after the incident. Appellants the faces and features of their attackers, and remembering them.14
argue that their respective defenses of denial and alibi assume significance because the
prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the identities of the authors of the The following testimony of PO3 Almendras shows beyond cavil that he saw the faces of the
crime. appellants as the two young males who followed them from the room where Mayor Arcillas
solemnized the mass wedding, and who later open fired at them:
Accordingly, the decisive question that begs an answer from the Court is whether the Q: What time did the solemnization of the marriages end?
identification of the culprits by eyewitness PO3 Almendras was reliable and positive enough A: At 10:00 o'clock sir.
to support the convictions of the appellants.
Q: After the solemnization of marriages did you observe anything unusual?
The Court's Ruling A: There was sir. When we were going out, I observed that there were 2 young kids (2 bata)
following us.
After a careful scrutiny of the records and evaluation of the evidence adduced by the
parties, the Court finds this appeal to be absolutely without merit. Q: Did you recognize those 2 kids?
A: Yes, sir.15
Every criminal conviction requires the prosecution to prove two things: (1) the fact of the
crime, i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands xxxx
charged, and (2) the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime.11 When a crime is
committed, it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the Q: From the COA office where you stayed for a while, where did you go?
crime beyond reasonable doubt for there can be no conviction even if the commission of A: We were about to go to the office of the Mayor. (Papunta sa office ni mayor.)
the crime is established.12 Apart from showing the existence and commission of a crime, the
State has the burden to correctly identify the author of such crime. Both facts must be Q: As you were going to the Office of the Mayor was there anything unusual that
proved by the State beyond cavil of a doubt on the strength of its evidence and without happened?
solace from the weakness of the defense.13 A: There was sir.

Our legal culture demands the presentation of proof beyond reasonable doubt before any Q: What was that?
person may be convicted of any crime and deprived of his life, liberty or even property. As A: Suddenly I heard gunshots.
every crime must be established beyond reasonable doubt, it is also paramount to prove,
with the same quantum of evidence, the identity of the culprit. It is basic and elementary Q: What happened when you heard gunshots?
that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused has been positively identified. A: I was about to pull out my gun but there was a rapid fire so I was not able to draw my
gun.
In the case at bench, the RTC and the CA were one in declaring that the identification of
appellants Vibal and David as the gunmen based on the recognition of PO3 Almendras was Q: In relation to where you were at that time, where did the gunshots come from?

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A: In front and at the back sir. remember how they look like. Experience dictates that precisely because of the startling
acts of violence committed right before their eyes, eyewitnesses can recall with a high
Q: To whom? degree of reliability the identities of the criminals and how at any given time the crime has
A: I was the one who was shot first and the other bodyguard was shot next. been committed by them.18 It is important to note that PO3 Almendras identified Vibal and
David as the gunmen without any presumptions or suggestions from the police or the court
Q: Who was that person? at the trial.
A: Erwin Rivera sir.
This Court fails to discern any improper motive which could have impelled PO3 Almendras
Q: You stated earlier that the shot came in front and behind whom? to maliciously impute to appellants such serious crimes and hence, his testimony is worthy
A: Because we were walking together at that time and the shot came in front and back. of evidentiary weight. Further, as an actual victim, PO3 Almedras is naturally interested in
vindicating the outrageous wrong done to his person. His natural interest in securing the
Q: Together with whom? conviction of the perpetrators would strongly deter him from implicating persons other than
A: Mayor Leon C. Arcillas, Erwin Rivera and me sir. the real culprits. Otherwise, the latter could escape with impunity the strong and just arm of
the law. Absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witness to
Q: Where was then the Mayor at the time when you heard the gunshots? perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and that his testimony
A: He was in between me and Erwin Rivera. is entitled to full faith and credit.19

Q: What did you notice after hearing the gunshots with respect to the Mayor? Vibal and David are clutching at straws in insisting that PO3 Almedras' identification of them
A: "Nagbagsakan na kami." (We three fell down) as the gunmen is improbable and should not have been accorded credence since it was
made only after the lapse of more than a year from the time the shooting incident occurred.
xxxx A perusal of the records would readily disclose that no unreasonable delay can be
attributed to PO3 Almedras. We quote with approval the observation of the CA on this
Q: Who fired the shots if you know? score:
A: The two kids sir, the 2 young male(s). Appellants' attempt to discredit the testimony of private complainant by pointing out that
there was a delay of one (1) year before he identified appellants as the gunmen is of no
Q: Who are these 2 kids that fired the shot in relation to the 2 kids you noticed earlier when moment. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, private complainant
you were going out of the room where the Mayor solemnized marriages? was not in a position to identify who shot him and killed Mayor Leon Arcillas and PO2 Erwin
A: Arnold David and Herminigildo Vibal.16 Rivera immediately after the incident. Private complainant was rushed to the hospital
because of gunshot wounds and was confined for around a month. Moreover, the
xxxx investigation took a long time and appellants were not immediately apprehended. Private
complainant, however, asserted that he remembers the faces of the shooters and was, in
Q: If you will see these persons again, will you be able to identify them? fact, able to identify both appellants when he finally saw them.20
A: Yes, sir. Having ascertained that herein appellants are the gunmen, the Court shall now proceed to
the determination of their criminal liabilities.
Q: Would you kindly look inside the court room and tell us if they are present inside the
court room? The courts a quo are correct in ruling that appellants are liable for the complex crime of
A: Yes, sir. Direct Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos. 17646- B and 17647-B. Direct assault, a
crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by "any person or persons
Q: Will you kindly point to them? who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of
the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;" and second, by
xxxx any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in
Interpreter the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance."21

The two accused identified to by the witness, when asked of their names, answered Arnold Appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are: 1) that there
David and Herminigildo Vibal.17 must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in
Verily, PO3 Almendras had seen the faces of Vibal and David when they committed the authority or his agent; 2) the assault was made when the said person was performing his
crimes on that fateful morning of May 10, 2005, albeit brief, but enough for him to duties or on the occasion of such performance; and 3) the accused knew that the victim is a

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person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend,
injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in The Court affirms the conclusion of the CA that the appellants should be held criminally
authority.22 liable for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No.
17648-B. It is well-settled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested
Here, Mayor Arcillas was a duly elected mayor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna and thus, was a by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim sustained fatal or mortal
person in authority while PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almendras were agents of a person in wounds but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is
authority. There is no dispute that all of the three victims were in the performance of their frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying
official duties at the time of the shooting incident. Mayor Arcillas was inside the Sta. Rosa circumstances under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present.29 But, if the
City Hall officiating a mass wedding, and thereafter, while he was walking along the hallway wounds sustained by the victim in such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime
from the COA office to his office, he was shot and killed. Victim PO2 Rivera and private committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.30
complainant PO3 Almendras were likewise performing their duty of protecting and guarding
Mayor Arcillas at the time of the shooting incident. Appellants' conduct of attacking the Here, the use of firearms and the manner of the commission of the crime by the appellants
victims inside the Sta. Rosa City Hall clearly showed their criminal intent to assault and unmistakably show that they intended to kill PO3 Almendras and that treachery was
injure the agents of the law. present. However, no evidence was adduced to show that the nature of gunshot wounds
sustained by PO3 Almedras was sufficient to cause the latter's death without timely medical
When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in authority for that matter, intervention. We note that the attending physician of PO3 Almendras was not called to the
there arises the complex crime of Direct Assault with murder or homicide.23 Here, treachery witness stand to testify on the gravity or character of the gunshot wounds inflicted on the
qualified the killing of Mayor Arcillas and PO2 Rivera to murder. Treachery also attended said victim. Also, no evidence was introduced to prove that PO3 Almendras would have
the shooting of PO3 Almendras. There is treachery when the following essential elements died from his gunshot wounds without timely medical attendance. Where there is nothing in
are present, viz.: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if not medically attended to, the
himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the
methods or forms of attack employed by him.24 The essence of treachery lies in the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated,
suddenness of the attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of murder.31
any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring the commission of the offense without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make.25 The Court agrees with the CA that the modifying circumstance of evident premeditation did
not attend the commission of the offenses. Here, the records are bereft of any proof, direct
In the case at bench, the shooting was deliberate and without a warning, done in a swift or circumstantial, tending to show a plan or preparation to kill by appellants Vibal and David
and unexpected manner. Mayor Arcillas, PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almendras were absolutely as well as when they meditated and reflected upon their decision to kill or/injure the three
unaware of the imminent deadly assaults, and were for that reason in no position to defend victims and the intervening time that elapsed before this plan was carried out. Accordingly,
themselves or to repel their assailants. Vibal and David, who were armed with guns, the circumstance of evident premeditation cannot be presumed against appellants. To
suddenly appeared in front and at the back of Mayor Arcillas, PO2 Rivera and PO3 qualify a killing to murder, the circumstances invoked must be proven as indubitably as the
Almedras and shot the three victims. The gunshots that came from the front of the victims killing itself and cannot be deduced from mere supposition.32
were fired by Vibal, while those that came from behind them were fired by David.26 Said
manner of attack clearly revealed appellants' deliberate design to thereby ensure the Appellants simply raise denial, which is inherently weak and cannot prevail over the positive
accomplishment of their purpose to kill or injure the three victims without any possibility of identification made by prosecution witness PO3 Almendras that they were the gunmen.
their escape or of any retaliation from them. Moreover, an affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony especially
when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness,33 as in this case. Appellants' defense
Conspiracy is very much evident from the actuations of the appellants. They were of alibi is likewise unavailing. In order that alibi might prosper, it is not enough to prove that
synchronized in their approach to shoot Mayor Arcillas and his group. The concerted efforts the accused has been somewhere else during the commission of the crime; it must also be
of the appellants were performed with closeness and coordination, indicating a single shown that it would have been impossible for him to be anywhere within the vicinity of the
criminal impulse - to kill the victims. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and crime scene.34 Appellants miserably failed to discharge this burden. Besides, the
manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused prosecution was able to present a photograph taken by prosecution witness Mercedita De
themselves when these point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and Jesus, the official photographer during the solemnization of the mass wedding, prior to the
community of interest.27 The ascertainment of who among appellants actually hit, killed and/ shooting incident which showed appellant Vibal at the background. Said picture proves that
or caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial. Where conspiracy has been Vibal was at the Sta. Rosa City Hall on May 10, 2005 which thus effectively belied his claim
adequately proven, as in the present case, all the conspirators are liable as co-principals that he was at his residence in GMA, Cavite on that day.
regardless of the extent and character of their participation because, in contemplation of
law, the act of one is the act of all.28

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When the offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to
be imposed in the maximum period.35 For the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder 1 . In Criminal Case No. 17646-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y
in Criminal Case Nos. 17646-B and 17647-B, the graver offense is Murder. Article 248 of ) Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are found guilty beyond
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder.
the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have been death. However, Accordingly, each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
considering that the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. without eligibility for parole. Further, they are ordered to pay, jointly and
9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines"; the severally, the heirs of Mayor Leon Arcillas the amounts of P100,000.00 as
penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon appellants. In addition, the civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
qualification "without eligibility for parole" should be affixed to qualify reclusion perpetua exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC. Thus, the CA has properly imposed upon appellants the
penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.

In Criminal Case No. 17648-B for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Attempted
Murder, the penalty to be imposed on appellants should be that for Attempted Murder, 2 . In Criminal Case No. 17647-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y
which is the more serious crime. The penalty for Attempted Murder is two degrees lower ) Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are found guilty beyond
than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Article 51 of the RPC. Accordingly, reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder.
the imposable penalty is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Accordingly, each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in without eligibility for parole. Further, they are ordered to pay, jointly and
any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years while severally, the heirs of PO2 Erwin Rivera the amounts of P100,000.00 as
the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as
prision mayor, the maximum period of the imposable penalty. This Court deems it proper to exemplary damages and P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
impose on the appellants the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum.
3 . In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y
Coming now to the pecuniary liabilities, the Court finds that the award of civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages in Criminal Case Nos. 17646-B and 17647-B ) Uayan @ Pato and Arnold David y Cruz @ Anot are found guilty beyond
should be increased to P100,000.00 each, while the award of temperate damages should reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Direct Assault with Attempted
likewise be increased to P50,000.00 being consistent with our pronouncement in People v. Murder. Accordingly, each is sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4)
Jugueta.36 In Criminal Case No. 17648-B, the Court finds it apt to award civil indemnity, in years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
addition to moral damages and exemplary damages, the amount of which should all be (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Further, they
fixed at P50,000.00 each in line with existing jurisprudence.37 Further, six percent (6%) are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the private complainant Wilfreda
interest per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded to be reckoned from the date B. Almendras the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00
of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.38 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
February 24,2016 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06206 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS as follows:
4 . Accused-appellants Herminio Vibal, Jr. y Dayan @ Pato and Arnold David
) y Cruz @ Anot are also ORDERED to PAY interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the time of finality of this Decision until
fully paid, to be imposed on the civil indemnity, moral damages,
exemplary damages and temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.

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G.R. No. 130487 June 19, 2000 The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant
Health Officer of Dagupan City who issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado
Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda
vs. Sobremonte, the victim's sister. The prosecution established the following facts:
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant. In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City, the
PUNO, J.: sacrament of confirmation was being performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan
City on the children of Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more than a thousand
This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give
Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. 1 We his final blessing to the children in the front rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing,
nullify the proceedings in the court a quo and remand the case for proper disposition. a man from the crowd went up and walked towards the center of the altar. He stopped
beside the Bishop's chair, turned around and, in full view of the Catholic faithful, sat on the
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez Bishop's chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the
was charged with the crime of murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and
guard. The Information reads: requested him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Gripping the chair's armrest, accused-appellant
replied in Pangasinese: "No matter what will happen, I will not move out!" Hearing this,
That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and Santillan moved away. 6
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO
ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a butcher's knife, with intent to kill one Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral.
ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of worship, did then Mararac went near accused-appellant and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Accused-
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon appellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his nightstick and used it to tap
the latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said weapon, accused-appellant's hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped
thereby causing his death shortly thereafter due to "Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive the latter's hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly
Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound" as per Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death accused-appellant drew a knife from his back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting
both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this City, to the damage him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the victim and tried to
and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of stab him again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around
not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other him. He got up, went to the microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one can
consequential damages. beat me here!). He returned to the Bishop's chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded
and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar. 7
Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of
Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994. 2 a commotion inside the cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man,
accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a knife in one hand sitting on a chair at
At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's counsel, the Public Attorney's the center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to drop the knife.
Office, filed an "Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that accused-appellant could Inspector Wendy Rosario, Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the
not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-appellant to pick up the knife.
that before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with
Baguio General Hospital in Baguio City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-appellant. The police
and the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital. 3 came and when they frisked appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his
The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded waist. 8 He was brought to the police station and placed in jail.
several questions on accused-appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired
answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the motion that same day. 4 a few minutes upon arrival. He died of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic
The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused- hemorrhage, stab wound." 9 He was found to have sustained two (2) stab wounds: one just
appellant's behalf. 5 below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy reported the following
findings:

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EXTERNAL FINDINGS being attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they were sleeping, appellant took out
all his personal effects and waste matter and burned them inside the cell which again
1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 1/2" x 1 caused panic among the inmates. Appellant's counsel prayed that his client be confined at
1/2" penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed. the National Center for Mental Health in Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital. 16
Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One, dated February 19, 1996, was from
2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/2". The edge of one Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge
side of the wound is sharp and pointed. informing him of appellant's irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order for
INTERNAL FINDINGS the immediate psychiatric and mental examination of accused-appellant. 17 The second
letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from the Bukang
Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed
left lung. The left pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut. 10 by the president, secretary and adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of
appellant's unusual behavior and requested that immediate action be taken against him to
After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a avoid future violent incidents in the jail. 18
"Demurrer to Evidence." He claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder
because there was no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery; that there was On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the
unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped accused-appellant's hand with his "Demurrer to Evidence." The court ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence on
nightstick; and that accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate his October 15, 1996. 19
defensive acts because he was of unsound mind. 11
Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the
The "Demurrer to Evidence" was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad Gawidan, 20 a resident physician in the Department of
accused "pretended to be weak, tame and of unsound mind;" that after he made the first Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, and accused-appellant's medical and clinical
stab, he "furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to finish him off undeterred by records at the said hospital. 21 Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined at the
the fact that he was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was being conducted;" and BGH from February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered from
the plea of unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of "Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid
January 6, 1995. 12 type;" 22 and after four (4) days of confinement, he was discharged in improved physical and
mental condition. 23 The medical and clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter of
On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dr. Alfredo Sy, Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado,
Dagupan City to the trial court. Inspector Valdez requested the court to allow accused- Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for admission and treatment after "a relapse of
appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to be treated at the Baguio General Hospital to his violent behavior;" 24 (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the BGH; 25 (3) the
determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. The consent slip of appellant's wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH; 26 (4) the
other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with appellant because he had been Patient's Record; 27 (5) the Consent for Discharge signed by appellant's wife; 28 (6) the
exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see Summary and Discharges of appellant; 29 (7) appellant's clinical case history; 30 (8) the
his family. 13 admitting notes; 31 (9) Physician's Order Form; 32 (10) the Treatment Form/medication sheet;
33 and (11) Nurses' Notes. 34
As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail warden's
letter. He reiterated that the mental condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence
been determined; unless a competent government agency certifies otherwise, the trial and found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to
should proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper person to determine whether death, viz:
accused-appellant was mentally ill or not. 14
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable
In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the "Demurrer to Evidence". 15 doubt of the crime of Murder and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
Accused-appellant moved for reconsideration. cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating circumstance, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of
While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for P50,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt
accused-appellant filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric
Examination." Appellant's counsel informed the court that accused-appellant had been The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and
exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and P100,000.00 as moral damages.
cause panic among the jail inmates and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and
sleeping; that his co-inmates had been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of SO ORDERED. 25

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In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors: must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. 50
I
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. 51 And the evidence on this point
CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY. execution. 52
II To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive
evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH time. 53 Direct testimony is not required. 54 Neither are specific acts of derangement
OF ROGELIO MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY essential to establish insanity as a defense. 55 Circumstantial evidence, if clear and
CRUELTY, GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S PLEA OF INSANITY convincing, suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A person's
CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE. 36 thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine
The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 56
committed by him. 37 Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity
the basis of criminal liability is human free Will. 38 Man is essentially a moral creature with at the time he killed Mararac. The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely
an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. 39 When he commits a felonious or discount the probability that appellant was not of sound mind at that time. From the affidavit
criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, 40 i.e., with of Crisanto Santillan 57 attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that
freedom, intelligence and intent. 41 Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full
for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. 42 possession of his mental faculties when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a
In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound sane person to go up to the altar and sit in the Bishop's chair while the Bishop was
mind 43 and that all acts are voluntary. 44 The moral and legal presumption under our law is administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It
that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. 45 This goes against normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from
presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity the security guard, to stab the latter at the altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all
which exempts the actor from criminal liability. 46 the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to flee after the
stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address
The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides: system, uttered words to the faithful which the rational person would have been made. He
then returned to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if nothing happened.
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt
from criminal liability: Accused-appellant's history of mental illness was brought to the court's attention on the day
of arraignment. Counsel for accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on
1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. the ground that his client could not properly and intelligently enter a plea due to his mental
condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12, Rule 116 of the 1985
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:
felony (delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. — The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time
obtaining the permission of the same court. thereof:

An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid (a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively
interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently
committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if necessary, his
asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused confinement for such purpose.
does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by
commitment of the accused to a mental institution. 47 (b) x x x xxx xxx

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be
committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 48 suffering from an unsound mental condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully
The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." 49 He understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. Under these

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circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and order the mental examination counsel such that the defendant must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The
of the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order such confinement second is the relation of the defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must
and examination. If the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the time have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings. 68
he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
the process is itself a felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the charge The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused,
nor can he give an intelligent plea thereto. 58 rather than of the public. 69 It has been held that it is inhuman to require an accused
disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. 70 To put a legally
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court. 59 incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional
And the test to determine whether the proceedings will be suspended depends on the rights to a fair trial 71 and due process of law; 72 and this has several reasons underlying it. 73
question of whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel, would have a fair For one, the accuracy of the proceedings may not be assured, as an incompetent
trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus: defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what information is
relevant to the proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of
In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an the rights afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with
accused person on the ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not counsel, the right to testify in his own behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses,
every aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result. Second, the fairness of the
suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the accused would have a fair proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a
trial, with the assistance which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that under a criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is
system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it is not his plea. Third, the dignity of the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent
necessary to be so particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner which may destroy the
advocate but himself. 60 decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension
fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is
In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accused's "present insanity" or insanity at the essentially an adversarial proceeding. If the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent
time of the court proceedings is separate and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction between an
time of commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a criminal trial concerns the individual and his community and becomes an invective against an insensible object.
defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime's commission. "Present insanity" is Fourth, it is important that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension
commonly referred to as "competency to stand trial" 61 and relates to the appropriateness of which is greatly dependent upon his understanding of what occurs at trial. An incompetent
conducting the criminal proceeding in light of the defendant's present inability to participate defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal goal of
meaningfully and effectively. 62 In competency cases, the accused may have been sane or institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear
insane during the commission of the offense which relates to a determination of his guilt. against one who cannot comprehend its significance. 74
However, if he is found incompetent to stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such
time as he may be found competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it merely The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests
postpones the trial. 63 generally in the discretion of the trial court. 75 Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient.
There must be evidence or circumstances that raise a "reasonable doubt" 76 or a "bona fide
In determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the doubt" 77 as to defendant's competence to stand trial. Among the factors a judge may
capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings consider is evidence of the defendant's irrational behavior, history of mental illness or
against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to cooperate, communicate behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement for mental disturbance, demeanor of the
with, and assist his counsel to the end that any available defense may be interposed. 64 This defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of competency in a
test is prescribed by state law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at particular case. 78
common law. 65 Thus:
In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the
[I]f is not enough for the . . . judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place, ground of accused's mental condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the
and [has] some recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he has sufficient questions propounded on appellant were intelligently answered by him. The court declared:
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings xxx xxx xxx
against him. 66
It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions on
There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is the accused, and he (accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked
sufficiently coherent to provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to where he was born, he answered, in Tayug.
constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is able to comprehend the significance of the
trial and his relation to it. 67 The first requisite is the relation between the defendant and his The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him.
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WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Sec. 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental
Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED. examination." 86 The human mind is an entity, and understanding it is not purely an
intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon emotional and psychological
SO ORDERED. 79 appreciation. 87 Thus, an intelligent determination of an accused's capacity for rational
understanding ought to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental
The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is condition than laymen can make through observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical
not conclusive evidence that he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of incompetency be
defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental condition that "effectively determined by the trial court. By this time, the accused's abilities may be measured against
renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead the specific demands a trial will make upon him. 88
intelligently thereto." It is not clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to
fully understand the charge against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it
intelligently. The plea of "not guilty" was not made by accused-appellant but by the trial may have served a dual purpose 89 by determining both his competency to stand trial and
court "because of his refusal to plead." 80 his sanity at the time of the offense. In some Philippine cases, the medical and clinical
findings of insanity made immediately after the commission of the crime served as one of
The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The the bases for the acquittal of the accused. 90 The crime in the instant case was committed
trial judge is not a psychiatrist or psychologist or some other expert equipped with the way back in December 1994, almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding
specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental health. To determine alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellant's mental condition at the time of
the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should the crime's commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of insanity. 91
have at least ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellant's competence to stand
latter's history of mental illness. trial must be properly ascertained to enable him to participate, in his trial meaningfully.
If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judge's mind of By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant
accused-appellants competency to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. of a fair trial.1awphil The trial court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of
One month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden of Dagupan City wrote the due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before the said court must be nullified. In
trial judge informing him of accused-appellant's unusual behavior and requesting that he be People v. Serafica, 92 we ordered that the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and the
examined at the hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some cases remanded to the court a quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who was charged
other institution. The trial judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellant's with two (2) counts of murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of
counsel filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric "guilty" to all three charges and was sentenced to death. We found that the accused's plea
Examination." Attached to this motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of was not an unconditional admission of guilt because he was "not in full possession of his
Dagupan City accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members of the Bukang Liwayway mental faculties when he killed the victim;" and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the
Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2) attached letters, 81 the judge ignored the necessary medical examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of
"Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." The records commission of the crime. 93
are barren of any order disposing of the said motion. The trial court instead ordered
accused-appellant to present his evidence. 82 IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in
Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and
Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid sentencing him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the court a quo for the
type, is a "lifetime illness" and that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses. conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his
83 After accused-appellant was discharged on February 22, 1993, he never returned to the
competency to stand trial, and for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
hospital, not even for a check-up. 84

Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-
appellant was waiving the right to testify in his own behalf because he was "suffering from
mental illness." 85 This manifestation was made in open court more than two (2) years after
the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And despite all
the overwhelming indications of accused-appellant's state of mind, the judge persisted in
his personal assessment and never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a
medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant guilty and sentenced him to
death!

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G.R. Nos. 159418-19 December 10, 2003 Resurreccion T. Castillo, Security Bank and Trust Company Check No. 038111 postdated to
October 24, 1994 in the amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
NORMA DE JOYA, PETITIONER, (₱225,000.00), Philippine Currency, to apply on account or for value, but when said check
was presented for full payment with the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days
vs. from the date of the check, the same was dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground of
THE JAIL WARDEN OF BATANGAS CITY AND HON. RUBEN A. GALVEZ AS `account closed,' which in effect is even more than a dishonor for insufficiency of funds, and
PRESIDING JUDGE OF BATANGAS CITY MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES, despite notice of dishonor and demands made upon her to make good her check by making
BRANCH I, RESPONDENTS. proper arrangement with the drawee bank or pay her obligation in full directly to
Resurreccion T. Castillo, accused failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute a clear
DECISION violation of the aforecited law, to the damage and prejudice of transaction in commercial
documents in general and of Resurreccion T. Castillo in particular in the aforementioned
CALLEJO, SR., J.: amount.

This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Norma de Joya praying for her release CONTRARY TO LAW.2
from the Batangas City Jail on the claim that her detention was illegal.
When arraigned in both cases, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. While
The Antecedents trial was going on, the petitioner jumped bail. No evidence was thereby adduced in her
defense in any of the two cases.
The petitioner was charged separately with violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before
the Municipal Trial Court In Cities in Batangas City. The docket numbers and accusatory On December 14, 1995, the trial court promulgated its decision in Criminal Case No. 25484.
portion of each of the Informations reads: The petitioner and her counsel failed to appear despite due notice. The decretal portion of
the decision reads as follows:
Criminal Case No. 25484
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Norma de Joya guilty of the crime of Violation
That on or about September 28, 1994 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and hereby sentences said accused to suffer an imprisonment
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, well-knowing that she does of one (1) year and to indemnify the offended party, Flor Catapang Tenorio, in the sum of
not have funds in or credit with the Solid Bank, Batangas Branch, Batangas City, did then ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (₱150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to Flor Catapang de
Tenorio, Solid Bank Check No. 040297 postdated to October 28, 1994 in the amount of SO ORDERED.3
ONE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND (₱150,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to apply
on account or for value, but when said check was presented for full payment with the On March 21, 1997, the decision in Criminal Case No. 25773 was likewise promulgated in
drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days from the date of the check, the same was absentia. The decretal portion of the said decision reads:
dishonored by the drawee bank on the ground `account closed,' which in effect is even
more than a dishonor for insufficiency of funds, and despite notice of dishonor and WHEREFORE, the Prosecution having satisfactorily established the guilt of the accused
demands made upon her to make good her check by making proper arrangement with the beyond reasonable doubt, this Court hereby sentences herein-accused Norma de Joya of
drawee bank or pay her obligation in full directly to Flor Catapang de Tenorio, accused imprisonment of ONE (1) YEAR and to pay complainant Resurreccion Castillo of the
failed and refused to do so, which acts constitute a clear violation of the aforecited law, to amount of TWO HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND (₱225,000.00) PESOS by way of
the damage and prejudice of transaction in commercial documents in general and of Flor damages.
Catapang de Tenorio in particular in the aforementioned amount. SO ORDERED.4
CONTRARY TO LAW.1 The petitioner remained at large and no appeal was filed from any of the said decisions. In
... the meantime, the Court issued Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 on
November 21, 2000 enjoining all courts and judges concerned to take notice of the ruling
Criminal Case No. 25773 and policy of the Court enunciated in Vaca v. Court of Appeals5 and Lim v. People6 with
regard to the imposition of the penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.
That on or about October 17, 1994 at Batangas City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, well-knowing that she does not have After five years, the petitioner was finally arrested while she was applying for an NBI
fund in or credit with the Security Bank and Trust Company, Batangas Branch, Batangas clearance. She was forthwith detained at the Batangas City Jail on December 3, 2002. On
City, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously draw, make and issue to July 28, 2003, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Municipal Trial Court of

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Batangas City asking the court to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively In this case, the petitioner was arrested and detained pursuant to the final judgment of the
pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code and to order her release from detention. Municipal Trial Court of Batangas City, convicting her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Irrefragably
The public prosecutor opposed the motion. In an Order dated August 15, 2003, the trial then, the petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner's reliance of our
court denied the motion on three grounds: (a) its decision convicting the petitioner of ruling in Ordonez v. Vinarao10 that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 had long become final and executory; hence, could no longer be reduction of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon,11 is misplaced. Thus,
amended to change the penalty imposed therein; (b) the SC Circular should be applied her plea that as provided for in Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular
prospectively; and (c) the SC Circular did not amend B.P. Blg. 22, a substantive law, but No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001 should benefit her has no
merely encourages trial court judges to have a uniform imposition of fine. basis.

Hence, the petition at bar. First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code is not applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the
The petitioner posits that SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 deleted the penalty of date of its effectivity and not to cases already terminated by final judgment.
imprisonment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 and allows only the imposition of a fine. The trial
court was mandated to apply SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 retroactively conformably Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular
with Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code citing the ruling of this Court in United States v. No. 12-2000 merely lays down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for
Pacrose.7 The petitioner prays that the Court declare her detention illegal and order her violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg. 22, nor defeat the legislative intent
release from the Batangas City Jail. behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take into
account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused –
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the petition contending that: whether he acted in good faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence – and
such other circumstance which the trial court or the appellate court believes relevant to the
1) penalty to be imposed. The Court thus emphasized that:
THE TWO (2) JUDGMENTS OF CONVICTION AGAINST THE PETITIONER HAD LONG The clear tenor and intention of Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 is not to remove
ATTAINED FINALITY AND COULD NO LONGER BE MODIFIED. imprisonment as an alternative penalty, but to lay down a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22.

2) The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose the possibility of imprisonment for
violators of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent behind the law.
ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 12-2000 AS MODIFIED BY ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 13-2001 DID NOT DELETE THE PENALTY OF IMPRISONMENT IN BP 22 Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application
CASES.8 of the penal provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the
offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
The OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Abarquez v. Court of Appeals.9 negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the
The petition has no merit. imposition of a fine alone rests solely upon the Judge. Should the Judge decide that
imprisonment is the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that the writ of habeas not be deemed a hindrance.
corpus is not allowed if the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a It is, therefore, understood that:
court of record:
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 does not remove imprisonment as an alternative
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. – If it appears that the person penalty for violations of B.P. Blg. 22;
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment; or make the order, the writ consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social
Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
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Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal opportunity to live a new life and rejoin society as a productive and civic-spirited member of
obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary the community. The court has to consider not only the primary elements of punishment,
imprisonment.12 namely, the moral responsibility of the convict, the relation of the convict to the private
complainant, the intention of the convict, the temptation to the act or the excuse for the
B.P. Blg. 22 provides for alternative penalties of fine or imprisonment or both fine and crime - was it done by a rich man in the insolence of his wealth or by a poor man in the
imprisonment as follows: extremity of his need? The court must also take into account the secondary elements of
punishment, namely, the reformation of the offender, the prevention of further offenses by
SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. – Any person who makes or draws and issues the offender, the repression of offenses in others.16 As Rousseau said, crimes can be
any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not thoroughly repressed only by a system of penalties which, from the benignity they breathe,
have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full serve rather than to soften than to inflame those on whom they are imposed.17 There is also
upon its presentment, which check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for merit in the view that punishment inflicted beyond the merit of the offense is so much
insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason had not punishment of innocence.18
the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment, shall be punished
by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of In this case, even if the Court applies SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000, as revised,
not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case retroactively, the petition must nevertheless be dismissed. The petitioner did not offer any
exceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion evidence during trial. The judgment of the court became final and executory upon her failure
of the court.13 to appeal therefrom. Worse, the petitioner remained at large for five long years. Were it not
for her attempt to secure an NBI clearance, she would have been able to elude the long
The courts are given the discretion to choose whether to impose a single penalty or arm of the law. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of
conjunctive penalties; that is, whether to impose a penalty of fine, or a penalty of merit. SO ORDERED.
imprisonment only, or a penalty of both fine and imprisonment.

In providing for alternative penalties in B.P. Blg. 22, Congress took into account the principal
objectives of the law, namely, the prohibition on the making of worthless checks and putting G.R. Nos. 108135-36 September 30, 1999
them in circulation. The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on
public interest. The effects of the increase of worthless checks transcend the private POTENCIANA M. EVANGELISTA, petitioner,
interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but vs.
also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can very well pollute the channels of trade and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the DIVISION), respondents.
public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
against public order.14
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the Sandiganbayan
However, in imposing penalties for crimes, the courts must bear in mind that Philippine dated September 11, 1992 in Criminal Case Nos. 14208-14209 finding petitioner
penal law is based on the Spanish penal code and has adopted features of the positivist Potenciana M. Evangelista guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 268,
theory of criminal law. The positivist theory states that the basis for criminal liability is the paragraph 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
sum total of the social and economic phenomena to which the offense is expressed. The 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
adoption of the aspects of the theory is exemplified by the indeterminate sentence law,
Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code (impossible crime), Article 68 and Articles Tanduay Distillery Inc., is a company engaged in the manufacture and sale of rum, gin,
11 to 14, not to mention Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code (penalties for heinous and vodka and other spirits. On September 17, 1987, Tanduay filed with the Bureau of Internal
quasi-heinous crimes). Philippine penal law looks at the convict as a member of society. Revenue (BIR) an application for tax credit in the sum of P180,701,682.00 representing
Among the important factors to be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed on alleged erroneous payments for ad valorem taxes covering the period January 1, 1986 to
him are (1) his relationship towards his dependents, family and their relationship with him; August 31, 1987. Attached to the application was a schedule of ad valorem taxes 1 allegedly
and (2) his relationship towards society at large and the State. The State is concerned not paid by Tanduay with supporting confirmation receipts. The application was filed with the
only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal Specific Tax Office of the BIR headed by Aquilino T. Larin.
acts of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness
and other social ends.15 The purpose of penalties is to secure justice. The penalties Tanduay anchored its claim for tax credit on the ground that it is a rectifier which is liable for
imposed must not only be retributive but must also be reformative, to give the convict an specific taxes and not ad valorem taxes, citing a BIR ruling in a case involving Distilleria

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Limtuaco and Co. Inc. The ruling states that rectifiers are considered as extensions of amount of P180,701,682.00 be tax credited as in the case of Distilleria Limtuaco and Co.
distillers inasmuch as they purchase alcohol from distillers without prepayment of the Inc.
specific tax. Since specific tax should be paid by the distiller before its removal from the
place of production, the burden of payment therefor is shifted to and assumed by the On October 13, 1987, Eufracio D. Santos, Deputy Commissioner of the BIR, approved the
rectifier. recommendation made by Larin in his memorandum and thereafter signed Tax Credit
Memo No. 5177 in the amount of P180,701,682.00 in favor of Tanduay Distillery, Inc. The
In its application for tax credit, Tanduay stated that it is a rectifier with Assessment No. A-1-8 approval was based on the following:
and a compounder with Assessment No. A-1-8-A, although compounding is only incidental
to rectification of its products. Consequently, before the tax credit being sought by Tanduay 1. The memorandum of the Assistant Commissioner for Specific Tax Office, Aquilino T.
could be granted, the BIR's Tax and Alcohol Division, headed by Teodoro D. Pareño, had to Larin;
verify first whether Tanduay's products are distilled spirits or compounded liquor based on
how they are manufactured. To do this, Justino Galban, Head of the Compounders, 2. The memorandum of the Chief of Alcohol Division, Teodoro D. Pareño; and
Rectifiers and Repackers Section under the Alcohol and Tax Division, had to look into the 3. The 1st indorsement/certification issued by Chief of Revenue Accounting Division, herein
technical process for the manufacture of rum, gin, vodka and other intoxicating beverages petitioner Potenciano M. Evangelista.3
of Tanduay. If it is determined that the products can be properly classified as distilled spirits
based on how they are manufactured, then Tanduay could properly claim for a tax credit on Immediately after the approval of Tax Credit Memo No. 5177, Tanduay availed of the tax
its payments of ad valorem taxes in accordance with Section 121 of the NIRC and the credit on various dates covering the period from October 19, 1987 to June 20, 1988. 4
Limtuaco ruling that rectifiers, as an extension of distillers, are subject to specific and not ad However, on June 22, 1988, a certain Ruperto Lim wrote a letter-complaint to BIR
valorem taxes. Finally, it had to be verified by the Revenue Accounting Division (RAD) Commissioner Bienvenido Tan, Jr. alleging that the grant of Tax Credit Memo No. 5177 in
headed by petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista whether Tanduay actually paid the favor of Tanduay was irregular and anomalous. More specifically, Lim pointed out that
P180,701,682.00 as ad valorem taxes to the BIR which it claims it paid.1âwphi1.nêt Tanduay had paid only P73,614,287.20 5 by way of ad valorem taxes to the BIR from
January 1, 1986 to August 31, 1987 and not P180,701,682.00 as claimed. Deputy
On September 23, 1987, Larin, in a marginal handwritten note, directed Pareño to prepare Commissioner Santos, in approving TCM No. 5177, failed to notice that petitioner's 1st
a request to the Revenue Accounting Division (RAD) for the authentication of the indorsement contained a listing of TNC indicating tax payments received from Tanduay
confirmation receipts covering the tax payments sought to be credited. Accordingly, a under two categories, i.e., TNC 3011-0011 and TNC 0000-0000. As earlier mentioned, a
memorandum, signed by Larin, was sent to the RAD headed by petitioner Evangelista total of 149 confirmation receipts were listed as tax payments under TNC 3011-0011 while a
requesting verification and authentication whether the amounts reflected in the confirmation total of 88 confirmation receipts were listed as tax payments under TNC 0000-0000. Deputy
receipts submitted by Tanduay were actually paid to the BIR as ad valorem taxes. Commissioner Santos admitted that while he knew that there was a tax numeric code for
Larin's a Memorandum was received by the Records and Administrative Section (RAS), a the kind of tax paid, he did not know which particular numbers corresponded to a particular
unit under RAD, on September 24, 1987. In due course, RAS made the necessary tax revenue. These codes are contained in the "Handbook of Tax Numeric Code of the
verification on the basis of its records and prepared the corresponding verification 2 in the Revenue Sources," wherein it is stated that TNC No. 3011-0011 stands for specific tax on
form of a 1st Indorsement to the Specific Tax Office on September 25, 1987. The domestic and distilled spirits, TNC No. 3023-2001 for ad valorem on compounded liquors
indorsement, which was signed by petitioner Evangelista, contained a listing of two hundred and TNC No. 0000-0000 for unclassified taxes. Had Deputy Commissioner Santos looked
thirty seven (237) confirmation receipts in various amounts under two categories these up in the Handbook, he would have known that Tanduay was not entitled to the whole
designated with Tax Numeric Code (TNC) 3011-0011 and TNC 0000-0000. A total of 149 sum of P180,701,682.00. Santos, however, contended that the practice of using numeric
confirmation receipts covering P102,519,100.00 were listed as tax payments under TNC tax codes is for the purpose of checking remittances of payments by the banks which
3011-0011 and a total of 88 confirmation receipts covering P78,182,582.00 were listed as properly falls under the jurisdiction of the RAD. He claimed that he merely relied on the
tax receipts under TNC 0000-0000. certification of his subordinates, inasmuch as his work was merely confirmational.

A memorandum was thereafter prepared by Galban as Chief of the Compounders and On January 3, 1990, two informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan against Aquilino T.
Rectifier's Section addressed to Pareño describing the technical aspects of Tanduay's Larin, Teodoro D. Pareño, Justino E. Galban, Jr. and petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista
manufacturing process. Galban made no recommendation, however, as to the validity of for violation of Section 268, Par. 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), docketed
Tanduay's claim. On October 13, 1987, Pareño sent a memorandum to Larin as Criminal Case No. 14208, and for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 of the Anti-
recommending that the request for tax credit of Tanduay Distillery, Inc. be given due course Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14209.
on the ground that Tanduay as a rectifier is an extension of the distiller and its products are Sec. 268, par. 4 of the NIRC reads:
subject of the payment of specific tax and not ad valorem tax. On same date, Larin signed a
memorandum for the Deputy Commissioner of the BIR recommending that the claim of Sec. 268. Violations committed by government enforcement officers — Every official agent
Tanduay Distillery Inc., for the alleged erroneous payment of ad valorem taxes in the or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue or any other agency of the government

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charged with the enforcement of the provisions of this Code, who is guilty of any of the In her letter, petitioner also categorically stated that, "Upon signing of this indorsement/
offenses herein below specified, shall upon conviction for each act or omission, be fined in certification I or whoever is head of this Division, for that matter, do not know what TNC
the sum of not less than five thousand pesos but not more than fifty thousand pesos or stands for." 6
imprisoned for a term of not less than one year but not more than ten years or both;
On September 18, 1992, Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro D. Pareño and petitioner Potenciana M.
xxx xxx xxx Evangelista were convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate period of 4 years, 8 months and 1 day by way of minimum to 6 years and 8
4. Those who conspire or collude with one another or others to defraud the revenues or months by way of maximum, and a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) each in
otherwise violate the provisions of this Code. Criminal Case No. 14208; while in Criminal Case No. 124209, Aquilino T. Larin, Teodoro D.
Pareño and petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista were convicted and sentenced to suffer
On the other hand, Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices imprisonment for an indeterminate period ranging from a minimum of 9 years and 1 month
Act states: to a maximum of 12 years. The penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office was
Sec. 3. Corrupt Practices of Public Officers — in addition to acts or omissions of public likewise imposed upon the three accused. Justino Galban was acquitted inasmuch as his
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of only participation was the preparation of the memorandum describing Tanduay's
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful; manufacturing process as rectifier and compounder of liquors.

xxx xxx xxx Petitioner Evangelista was convicted on the basis of the 1st indorsement issued by her
which the Sandiganbayan condemned as a "studied non-response" to Larin's query as to
e. Causing any undue injury to any party including the government, or giving any private how much the BIR actually received as payment for ad valorem taxes from Tanduay. The
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official Sandiganbayan held that Evangelista's indorsement could have been explicitly and directly
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross responsive because Larin's memo was clear and the purpose for his query was specific:
inexcusable negligence. How much was paid by Tanduay to the BIR by way of ad valorem taxes for the purpose of
computing the amount properly creditable to Tanduay for refund? However, Evangelista's
Upon arraignment, all the accused including petitioner Evangelista pleaded not guilty. They response merely enumerated a set of confirmation receipts with the corresponding TNC
raised the defense that no undue injury had been caused to the government and no numbers despite the fact that several employees of the Bureau were not well acquainted
unwarranted benefits had been accorded to Tanduay inasmuch as Tanduay had already with the use and meaning of TNCs. Petitioner's ambiguous reply, according to the
fully reimbursed the BIR of the availments found to have been unjustified or improper in the Sandiganbayan, permitted her superiors to equivocate as to its meaning which resulted in
amount of P73,000,000.00 and had, additionally paid P11,000,000.00 by way of penalties, the improper grant of tax credits to Tanduay. The Sandiganbayan thus concluded that the
or a total of P84,000,000.00. gross negligence of the petitioner and its confluence with the acts of accused Larin and
Pareño in recommending the approval of Tanduay's application for tax credit adequately
Petitioner Evangelista, for her part, did not deny having issued the 1st indorsement. proved conspiracy among them.
However, instead of taking the witness stand, she, like her three co-accused, refused to
testify and opted to present as evidence in her behalf the following paragraphs from her Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Sandiganbayan, Evangelista filed
letter of explanation dated November 21, 1988 to BIR Commissioner Bienvenido Tan which the instant petition contending that the 1st indorsement was issued after proper verification
read as follows: of the data given to the RAD against available records of the division. Petitioner claims the
certification issued was patterned after the prescribed format as a routine response to an
Confirmation receipts do not contain any information as to the kind of tax or TNC. Thus, official request of the Assistant Commissioner for Excise Tax Office. Petitioner insists that
there can never be any verification and certification as to kind of tax. What can only be she could not be held liable because there was no mention in the 1st indorsement that the
verified/certified by this Division as required in existing orders is the fact that the total payments made by Tanduay Distillery Inc. were actually for ad valorem taxes for which it
amount of each CR were remitted to the BIR by the collecting bank on the given date. could claim tax credit in the sum of P180,701,682.00.
xxx xxx xxx On November 29, 1993, the Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion
in lieu of comment recommending the acquittal of petitioner. The Manifestation stated that:
In the case of Tanduay Distillery. I did not know at the time I signed the indorsement what "Although petitioner herself may not have known the exact kind of taxes covered by the
the TNC therein stand for because I was informing (sic) was that payments were received TNC reflected in her 1st Indorsement, this does not in any way make her guilty of gross
by BIR. I just became curious to know its meaning and verify the same from the Handbook negligence. Her duty was purely ministerial in nature, that is, to report all data pertinent to
of Tax Numeric Codes of Revenue Sources, 1985 when a certain Atty. Villavicencio called Tanduay's tax payments on file with RAD. She was not duty-bound to report her personal
me up to his Office at the Internal Security Division some two weeks ago to ask questions perception, understanding or conclusion regarding the significance or meaning of the data
on the subject indorsement. she had reported. It was Larin and Pareño's duty to do so." 7

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In view of the position taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Ombudsman and the kind of tax is being paid by the taxpayer nor the TNC, the BIR's copy of the confirmation
Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for leave of court to file comment which was receipt is usually attached to the original copy of the Payment Order (PO) which in turn
granted. In its comment, the Office of the Ombudsman and the Office of the Special specifies the kind of tax paid and the TNC. Since petitioner's division is the repository of all
Prosecutor sought petitioner's conviction on the ground that the decision of the accounting records of the Bureau, it should have copies of the payment orders for the
Sandiganbayan on the two cases filed against her is in accord with applicable jurisprudence corresponding confirmation receipts and therefore petitioner could have easily verified what
and supported by factual evidence. kind of taxes were covered by the payments made by Tanduay from January 1, 1986 to
August 31, 1987. Moreover, petitioner's claim that there were no pertinent records, codes
We find no reason to overturn petitioner's conviction for gross negligence. and references that could be used to distinguish the confirmation receipts as either for ad
valorem or specific tax is belied by the denial of her immediate superior, Melchor Ramos,
Before 1969, internal revenue taxes were designated by descriptive words. This, however, who stated that the RAD has in its possession the monthly Alpha List of Taxpayers issued in
proved to be unsatisfactory inasmuch as tax data could not easily be stored and processed 1986 as well as the collection report by agent banks (Abstract of Collection thru Banks) for
by the computer, resulting in delayed compilation and retrieval of the data. the same year which were prepared by the Revenue Information System Service, Inc.
To facilitate the preparation of statistical and other management reports, the BIR adopted (RISSI) based on the confirmation receipts transmitted to them by the field offices and the
the Tax Numeric Code System under which a numeric code stands for kinds or classes of PO/CR Monitoring Division. Petitioner's immediate superior added that these records
tax and their applicable rate. For this purpose, a "Handbook on Tax Numeric Codes of the contain the TNC of every receipt listed therein and thus it would be very easy to identify the
Revenue Sources," was issued for BIR use. 8 Under this system, TNC No. 3011-0011 was kind of tax paid by the taxpayer by simply referring to the Handbook on Numeric Tax Code.
12
made to stand for "specific tax on domestic distilled spirits," 9 TNC No. 3023-2001 for ad
valorem on compounded liquors, 10 and TNC No. 0000-0000 for unclassified taxes. Under Clearly, petitioner's alleged lack of knowledge as to what TNC meant was grossly
various BIR Revenue Memorandum Orders and Circulars, the use of TNC instead of word inexcusable if not improbable considering that the use of TNC to record tax payments
descriptions to identify and record tax payments was made mandatory. 11 It may not be received by the Bureau is directly connected with the duties of her office. If there is anyone
amiss to note at this point however that despite the fact that the use of TNC to identify and in the. Bureau who was expected to have a working knowledge of the TNC, it should have
record tax payments was made mandatory, it had become obvious during trial that not all been petitioner because the use of TNC was precisely meant to facilitate the recording of
employees of the BIR were well acquainted with the meanings of the TNC. Even Deputy the tax payments received by the Bureau for verification purposes. Petitioner as head of the
Commissioner Santos who approved the Tax Credit Memo and the BIR Commissioner Revenue Accounting Division was called upon to verify whether the schedule of payments
himself, Bienvenido Tan, were not familiar with the corresponding TNC numbers for a submitted by Tanduay in support of its application for tax credit were payments for ad
particular revenue. Not surprisingly, petitioner and the three other accused claimed they too valorem taxes. Petitioner had submitted a list of payments made by Tanduay with the
were unaware of the meaning of TNC. corresponding bank account nos., amounts and TNC Nos., as required by the
In the case at bar, petitioner is the head of the Revenue Accounting Division (RAD). Under Memorandum Circular. But, as admitted by petitioner herself, she had not the slightest idea
Revenue Administrative Order No. 5-84, one of the functions of the said division is to what TNC meant, despite the fact that they are mandated by the Bureau to use it
"Confirm and certify as to the correctness of payment and other informations verified from accordingly in identifying and recording tax payments.
accounting records and documents." As head of the RAD, petitioner holds an extremely We have a situation where the Head of the Division, which is in charge of recording tax
sensitive position, whose certification to the payments received by the Bureau from payments received by the Bureau and whose certification is relied upon by the Bureau in
taxpayers determines whether the taxpayer is entitled to a refund or a tax credit. Despite the granting of tax credits, does not even know or care to know what are the kind of tax
her sensitive position, however, and despite her own admission from the pleadings that the payments received by the Bureau. For all intents and purposes, petitioner issued an
use of TNC instead of word descriptions to identify and record tax payments were made indorsement certifying a whole schedule of payments made by the taxpayer without a
mandatory since 1969, petitioner claims that she practically had no idea what the TNC specification of the kinds of taxes since she did not have any idea what TNC meant. It could
meant until a year after having issued the 1st indorsement, when investigation regarding not even be said that petitioner made an error of judgment in answering Larin's query with
the tax credits given to Tanduay was well under way. Petitioner further claims that there was an enumeration of TNCs instead of opting for a more explicit response since petitioner, not
no way she could have verified whether the payments made by Tanduay were for ad having any idea as to what the TNCs meant, could not have couched the statement of her
valorem taxes because the confirmation receipts do not contain any information as to the 1st Indorsement in any other way. She could not have made a more explicit answer to the
kind of tax paid by the taxpayer nor the requisite TNC. query of Larin inasmuch as she did not even know or care to find out whether the BIR
We are not impressed. actually received payments for ad valorem taxes from Tanduay. Clearly, there is no doubt
that petitioner was grossly negligent in discharging her duties. As defined in the case of
A payment order, which contains the particular kind of tax to be paid and the corresponding Alejandro v. People, 13 gross negligence is "negligence characterized by want of even slight
TNC, is issued to a taxpayer to be presented by him to the bank where he pays his taxes. care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but
When the payment order is presented, a confirmation receipt is issued by the bank willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
evidencing payment of the tax. Although it is not stated in the confirmation receipts what persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and
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thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property." The test to determine the National Internal Revenue Code inasmuch as it has not been proven that there was an
existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated in this wise: "Did the defendant actual agreement between her and her co-accused to grant unwarranted tax credits to
in doing the negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent Tanduay. What is punished in said Sec. 268(4) is the act of conspiring and colluding to
person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The defraud the government of revenues. It is well entrenched in our jurisprudence that
law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be exercised by the discreet conspiracy must be shown to exist as clearly and as convincingly as the commission of the
paterfamilias of Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined offense itself. Absent any act or circumstance from which may be logically inferred the
by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law existence of a common design among the accused to commit the crime, the theory of
considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary conspiracy remains a speculation not a fact. 15
intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that." 14
Significantly, in the separate appeal of petitioner's two other co-accused to this Court,
Petitioner asserts that there was nothing untruthful in the certification she issued regarding entitled Pareño vs. Sandiganbayan and the People of the Philippines, 16 we ruled that "the
the tax payments received by the BIR from Tanduay. Petitioner further claims that the first acts of petitioners and that of Evangelista may be considered concerted only because they
endorsement was patterned after the standard format used by the division whenever a performed interrelated functions but there is no actual proof that conspiracy existed
request is made for verification of payments and she could not be faulted for adhering to the between the parties."
mandate of the various memoranda issued regarding the use of TNCs.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14208 convicting
Admittedly, the use of TNCs to record tax payments is mandated by various memoranda petitioner Potenciana M. Evangelista of violation of Section 268 (4) of the National Internal
issued by the Bureau. Petitioner, however, as previously stated, never exerted any effort to Revenue Code is REVERSED and petitioner is accordingly ACQUITTED. The decision of
find out what the TNCs meant. Had she been more circumspect, she would have the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 14209 convicting petitioner of violation of R.A.
appreciated the significance of her certification. She would have known that Tanduay was 3019 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
not entitled to the whole amount of P180,701,682.00 it was claiming as tax credit. She that petitioner is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6)
would have been forewarned of the implied consequences of her certification and could years and one month as minimum to twelve (12) years as maximum. The penalty of
have accordingly informed her superiors and her co-accused whether Tanduay was really perpetual disqualification from public office is likewise imposed on her. No costs. SO
entitled to a tax credit at all or not. That her co-accused were mandated to know what TNC ORDERED.
meant is beside the point. Petitioner, by the position she occupies, is mandated to know the
kind of taxes for which payment is made by the taxpayer claiming a refund before she
issues a certification because it is on the basis of this certification that it is determined
whether tax credits should be granted at all. Certainly, the petitioner held a sensitive EN BANC
position with a function that could hardly be classified as ministerial. As head of the division
which is supposedly in charge of encoding payment received by the Bureau from taxpayers
and who is supposedly expected more than anyone to know the meaning of the TNC, [G.R. No. L-34105. February 4, 1983.]
petitioner issued an indorsement containing cryptic codes which she admittedly did not
know the meaning of and expecting her superiors, who were not even in charge of
recording tax payments and who relied on her certification, to be familiar with.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TIMOTEO CABURAL,
Petitioner cannot take refuge in the claim that the 1st indorsement was issued in the usual CIRIACO YANGYANG, BENJAMIN LASPONIA, and LEONIDE CABUAL, Accused,
format as a routine response to an official request of the Commissioner of Excise Tax after it TIMOTEO CABURAL and CIRIACO YANGYANG, Defendants-Appellants.
has verified the data given to them against available records of the division. We fully concur
with the observation of the Sandiganbayan that — DECISION

to begin with, nobody has demonstrated that the text of the first indorsement of the Tanduay RELOVA, J.:
matter and on the Limtuaco matter were the correct responses to the query made by Larin.
As aforesaid, nobody, whether for or from the accused, testified. This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte, dated
June 4, 1970, convicting Timoteo Cabural of the crime of Robbery with Rape and
And since nobody actually testified on any of the documents of the accused — not even her sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and, convicting Leonide
boss, Assistant Commissioner Melchor S. Ramos — so that a full clarification could be had Cabual, Benjamin Lasponia and Ciriaco Yangyang of the crime of Robbery and sentencing
thereon, this court cannot be deemed to accept his written statements unqualifiedly. each of them to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of Prision Mayor, as maximum; to indemnify the offended party
While petitioner was grossly negligent in her duties for which she could be held liable under in the sum of P9,435.50, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay
R.A. No. 3019 (e), petitioner may not be held liable for violation of Section 268(4) of the proportionately the costs of the proceedings.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
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 and some personal belongings in the total amount of P9,435.50 were asported by the
robbers (tsn, pp. 29-36, Oct. 23, 1961; tsn, pp. 120-126, June 13, 1961).
The statement of facts in the brief filed by the People of the Philippines is as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph "The accident having been reported, both the local police as well as the Philippine
Constabulary stationed in Iligan conducted their investigation. In the course of the
investigation, members of the Philippine Constabulary found a .30-caliber carbine with 4
". . . [A]t about 2:00 o’clock in the morning of September 14, 1960, three masked men magazines and a .45 caliber pistol well wrapped in a banca at the shore behind the house
entered the building of the Kim San Milling in Palao, City of Iligan, thru an opening of the of the accused Benjamin Lasponia. This led to the investigation of Lasponia who
roof above the kitchen that was being repaired and forced themselves inside a room where subsequently admitted the crime and pointed to his companions that night. On September
Pua Lim Pin, Bebencio Palang, Sy Chua Tian and Siao Chou were sleeping (tsn, pp. 78-82, 18, 1960, Benjamin Lasponia signed a confession before Assistant Fiscal Leonardo
May 31, 1965; tsn, pp. 141-148, June 13, 1961). The masked men, at gunpoint, hogtied the Magsalin, Exhibits B, B-1, B-2, and B-3, at the PC headquarters in Iligan (pp. 1025-1028,
four occupants of the room and after commanding them to lie on the floor, face down, were Vol. III Rec.). He confessed to the last detail his participation in the crime. On September
all covered with blankets (tsn, pp. 82-83, ibid). The inmates of the room heard that the 19, 1960, the accused Leonide Cabual subscribed to an affidavit before the same Fiscal
cabinets were being ransacked (tsn, p. 82, ibid). As this was going on, one of the men Magsalin regarding his participation and that of his co-accused in the robbery of Kim San
approached Pua Lim Pin to ask him if he could open the safe to which he answered in the Milling in the early morning of September 14, 1960, Exhibits C, C-1. C-2, C-3 and C-5 (pp.
negative as he was a mere employee of the firm (tsn, p. 83, May 31, 1961). An hour later, 1029-1034 Vol. III Record). Ciriaco Yangyang followed. He subscribed his confession
one of the men approached Sy Chua Tian (also See Chou Kian, tsn, p. 89, ibid) and told before Special Counsel Dominador Padilla in the Office of the City Fiscal of Iligan on
him: ‘now is 3:30, if by 4:00 the safe is not open we will kill you.’ (tsn, p. 94, ibid.) September 26, 1960, Exhibits H, H-1 and H-2 (pp. 1036-1038, Vol. III, Record, See
complete testimony of Eustaquio Cabides, tsn, pp. 52-72, July 17, 1969)."cralaw virtua1aw
"As this was going on, another episode was taking place inside the next room where the library
maids were sleeping (tsn, p. 91, May 31, 1961). Restituta Biosano, Panchita Maghanoy and
Agripina Maglangit have retired at about 10:00 o’clock in the evening of September 13, On September 21, 1960, (1) Timoteo Cabural, alias Romeo alias Tiyoy; (2) Benjamin
1960, after their chores were performed (tsn, p. 91, ibid, tsn, p. 10, May 7, 1961; tsn, p. 13, Lasponia; (3) Leonide Cabual alias Eddie; (4) Ciriaco Yangyang; (5) William Tate alias
May 29, 1961; tsn, p. 25, ibid). At about 2:00 o’clock the following morning, they were Negro; (6) Fausto Dacera, and, (7) Alfonso Caloy-on, alias Pablo, were charged before the
awakened by two persons, one holding a pistol and the other holding a hunting knife. Like Court of First Instance of Lanao del Norte of the crime of Robbery in Band with Rape, in an
the fate of the four inmates of the other room, the maids were all hogtied, made to lie on the information filed by the City Fiscal of Iligan City. The crime charged was allegedly
floor, face downward, and were all covered with blankets (tsn, pp. 25-29, May 29, 1961). committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
The two then left the room (tsn, p. 29, ibid). After two hours later, one of the two men re-
appeared in the room and after discovering that Agripina Maglangit had freed her hands, he "That on or about September 14, 1960 in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the
showed anger and remarked that he would separate her from the rest. With his pistol jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, in company with one Fred Ybañez
pointed at her, he took her outside the building to a secluded place within the Kim San alias Godofredo Camisic and one John Doe, who are still at-large, conspiring and
Compound (tsn, pp. 30-33, ibid.). Here, with her hands tied, she was made to lie down flat confederating together and mutually helping one another, and armed with deadly weapons,
on the ground face upwards. He then raised her skirt, pulled down her panties, and had all unlicensed, to wit: carbines, revolvers, tommy guns, garand rifles and knives, did then
sexual intercourse with her. She was unable to resist him and fight back because at the and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of violence
time she had lost her strength not to mention the fact that she was deprived of the use of against and intimidation of persons, and with the use of force upon things, to wit: by passing
her hands that were both tied together. The rape having been consummated, he pulled her through an opening not intended for entrance or egress, enter the main building and office
left arm so she could stand up. He then left her (tsn, pp. 33-35, ibid.). of the Kim San Milling Company, an inhabited building, and once inside, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, rob and carry away therefrom, the following
"Agripina Maglangit recognized the features of the man that raped her. She identified her personal properties, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
rapist to be the accused Timoteo Cabural (tsn, pp. 36-39, ibid.).
"Cash money P5,972.00
"At about four o’clock that morning (September 14, 1960) all the intruders must have left
because the four men that were hogtied in the other room noticed complete silence. They Wrist watch ‘Technos’ 100.00
each struggled to free themselves which they succeeded. Maghanoy lost her ‘Alosa’ 15-
jewel watch costing her P65.00 (tsn, p. 22, May 29, 1961); Sy Chua Tian (See Chou Kian) Gold Ring 20.00
lost his Omega automatic wrist watch valued in the amount of P385.00 that was snatched
from his wrist by one of the robbers, besides his wallet counting P264.00 in paper currency Sunglasses 30.00
(tsn, p. 85 and p. 95, May 31, 1961). After the robbers left, the inmates discovered that cash

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Four pieces of golden bracelets 1,400.00 feloniously have carnal knowledge of one Agripina Maglangit, a woman, by means of
violence and intimidation and against her will.
Chinese gold ring with dark blue stone 90.00
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 294 paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code as
One gold ring with brilliant stone 400.00 amended by Republic Act No. 18 and Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code as amended
by Republic Act No. 12, Section 3, with the following aggravating circumstances, to wit: that
One Chinese gold necklace with red stone 150.00 the said offense was committed during night time and by a band; that it was committed with
the use of disguise; and that it was committed with the use of a motor vehicle."cralaw
One pair of earrings Chinese gold with red stone 60.00 virtua1aw library

Three pairs of earrings with pearls 120.00 Upon arraignment, the defendants pleaded not guilty. However, during the course of the
trial, three (3) of the accused, namely: William Tate, Fausto Dacera and Alfonso Caloy-on
Four Chinese gold rings with stones of different colors 140.00 were dropped on petition of the City Fiscal and trial proceeded against the four (4)
remaining accused, namely: Timoteo Cabural, alias Romeo Cabural; Benjamin Lasponia,
Sweepstakes tickets 45.00 Leonide Cabual and Ciriaco Yangyang. As aforesaid, Cabural, Lasponia, Cabual and
Yangyang were convicted. Benjamin Lasponia did not appeal; however, Cabural, Yangyang
One American gold Lady’s ring with dark pink stone 30.00 and Cabual did and claimed that the trial court erred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Four men’s rings 32.00 I.

One and a half dozens handkerchiefs 34.50

"IN HOLDING THAT THE AFFIDAVITS OR EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF
Lady’s wrist watch 30.00 ACCUSED BENJAMIN LASPONIA, LEONIDE CABUAL, AND CIRIACO YANGYANG
WHICH WERE NOT OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE, VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATIONS AND
Three ladies watches 69.00 THREATS AND SERIOUS MALTREATMENTS ARE ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE AND
THEREFORE COULD BE A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE CONVICTIONS OF ACCUSED.
One men’s watch 60.00
II.
One Chinese gold necklace 58.00

One Lady’s wrist watch 15.00 "IN HOLDING THAT EVEN IF IN THE EXECUTION OF SAID AFFIDAVITS OF
CONFESSIONS BY THE THREE ACCUSED SOME PERSONAL INCONVENIENCE
One Chinese gold necklace 58.00 WERE MADE BY THE PC SOLDIERS BUT BECAUSE THE CONTENTS OF SAID
CONFESSIONS ARE TRUE SAID EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS ARE ADMISSIBLE
One Men’s wrist watch 60.00 AS EVIDENCE AND COULD BE MADE A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE CONVICTIONS OF
ALL ACCUSED,
One Men’s wrist watch ‘Tugaris’ 65.00
III.
Knife 12.00

One Men’s wrist watch ‘Omega’ Seamaster 385.00 "IN HOLDING THAT THE THREE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS BY THREE
ACCUSED BEING INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS IS ENOUGH AND SUFFICIENT TO
with a total value of P9,435.50, belonging to the Kim San Milling Company, Bebencio SUSTAIN THEIR CONVICTIONS ON PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT;
Palang, Agapito Tan, Restituta Biosano, Panchita Maghanoy, Catalina Boisano, Pua Lim
Pin and Sy Chua Tian, to the damage and prejudice of the said owners in the said sum of IV.
P9,435.50, Philippine currency; and that on the occasion or by reason of the said robbery,
the above-named accused except William Tate alias Negro, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

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"IN HOLDING THAT THE THREE EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSIONS OF THREE
ACCUSED INTERLOCKED WITH EACH OTHER EVEN IF INADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE A I was threatened and I was forced.
BECAUSE OBTAINED THROUGH FORCE, VIOLENCE, INTIMIDATION, ETC. IS
ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF ACCUSED TIMOTEO CABURAL Q How were you threatened?
BECAUSE HE WAS SUFFICIENTLY IDENTIFIED BY VICTIM AGRIPINA MAGLANGIT AS
HER RAPIST;chanrobles virtual lawlibrary A He pointed to me his pistol and let me lie down.

V. Q This place where he threatened you and made you lie down outside, was this place near
to the place where you had slept?

"IN HOLDING THAT THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE FOR THE CONVICTIONS OF A It is very far but it is within the compound of the Kim San.
ACCUSED REACHED THE LEGAL STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT AS REQUIRED BY LAW. Q After he had threatened you and made you lie down, what, if any, did you do?

On October 14, 1971, this Court granted the motion of Leonide Cabual to withdraw his A He raised my skirt.
appeal (p. 60, rollo).chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
Q At the time he was raising your skirt, what was your position?
Appellant Cabural declared that from 2:00 in the afternoon of September 13, 1960 to 3:00 in
the early morning of September 14, 1960, he was playing mahjong with Virginia Cruz A I was lying down with face upward.
Maruhom and one Gomer in the store of Ason in Maigo, Lanao del Norte which is about 37
kilometers from Iligan City and would take about two (2) hours by bus or about one (1) hour Q After he had raised your skirt, what happened next, if any?
by car to negotiate the distance between the two places; that he could not have been
present at complainant’s place at 2:00 in the morning of September 14, 1960 when the A When my skirt was raised and since I have no more strength because (as demonstrated
robbery took place; that he was brought to the Philippine Constabulary Headquarters in by the witness), her laps were numb, he took off my pantie.
Iligan City by PC soldiers on September 15, 1960 and was subjected to all kinds of torture;
and that after he was severely maltreated, including the 7-Up treatment and threatened with Q How did your laps happen to be numb?
pistol, he was asked to sign an affidavit. Despite his insistence that he was innocent he was
induced to sign a statement after he was told: "if you obey us you may get free" and that "if A Because my laps were pushed so that I cannot move.
you confess we will protect you."cralaw virtua1aw library
Q What particular part of your body did he push to numbness?
Ciriaco Yangyang also denied participation in the commission of the crime considering that
at that time he was in Barrio Mentering attending the counting of votes for the muse of the A My laps.
barrio fiesta. He was reading the ballots cast for each candidate at the microphone. It was
only in the following morning of September 14, 1960 when he returned to Maigo. Q After he had taken off your pantie, what, if any, did he do?

The identity of appellant Timoteo Cabural as the rapist of Agripina Maglangit is established A I feel that he had what he wants.
in the testimony of the latter as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Q What do you mean by that?
"Q After that man had told you that you would be separated from the rest, what happened
next, if any? A To disgrace my honor.

A I was brought outside. Q How did he disgrace your honor?

Q What do you mean by ‘outside?’ A He had sexual intercourse.

A I was brought outside of the office of the Kim San. Q How long did he have that sexual intercourse with you?

Q After you have been taken outside, what happened, if any? A I do not remember how long because of my fear.

48 of 221
Q Did he finish having sexual intercourse with you? Finally, We find no merit in the alibis interposed by appellants Cabural and Yangyang. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
A Yes, sir.
"The fact that Cabural played mahjong with Virginia Cruz Maruhom and a certain Gomer at
Q After he had that sexual intercourse with you, what happened next, if any? the store of Ason in Barrio Maigo, from 2:00 P.M. of September 13, 1960 to 3:00 A.M. of
September 14, 1960 is no guarantee that he could not be at the scene of the crime (Kim
A (As demonstrated by the witness, her left arm was pulled to stand up). San Milling Company, situated in Palao), a 37-kilometer stretch which could be negotiated
in one hour by car (tsn., p. 8, Sept. 20, 1966). Considering the confessions of Lasponia,
Q Were you able to stand up? Cabual and Yangyang all pointing to Cabural as the one in control of the vehicle utilized in
the commission of the crime, the conclusion is not hard to reach that his presence at the
A Yes, sir. scene of the crime is much likelier than at Maigo."cralaw virtua1aw library

Q After you have stood up, that man where, if any, did he go? Otherwise stated, appellants failed to show the plausibility and verity of their alibis and the
crime is aggravated by dwelling and nighttime.
A I did not notice where the man go but I went back to our room.
As aforesaid, the trial court convicted Timoteo Cabural of the crime of robbery with rape,
Q Upon your arrival to your quarters, what, if any, did you do? which is penalized by Article 294(2) of the Revised Penal Code, by reclusion temporal
medium to reclusion perpetua. Effective August 15, 1976 (or subsequent to this date),
A I told my companions. Presidential Decree No. 767 imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death "when the
robbery accompanied with rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
Q Who were they? more persons."cralaw virtua1aw library

A They were Restituta Biosano, Pena Maglangit, Catalina Biosano. In People v. Perello, Jr., 111 SCRA 147, it was mentioned that" [t]he Chief Justice and the
herein ponente (Justice Ramon C. Aquino) are of the opinion that article 335 cannot be
Q That man who had sexual intercourse with you, is he here now in the courtroom? applied to robbery with rape and that offense should be penalized under article 294(2) in
which case reclusion perpetua should be imposed. As the accused was charged with a
A Yes, sir. crime against property, he should not be convicted of a crime against chastity, a private
offense. (See People v. Olden, L-27570-71, September 20, 1972, 47 SCRA 45)." However,
Q Will you please point him out? also in the same case, "Justices Teehankee, Barredo and Makasiar believe that article 335
should be applied to this case. (See People v. Carandang, L-310102, August 15, 1973, 52
A (Witness went down from the stand and went to the accused seated in the courtroom and SCRA 259, People v. Mabag, L-38548, July 24, 1980, 98 SCRA 730; People v. Arias,
pointed to the accused Timoteo Cabural). (tsn. pp. 32-35, May 29, 1961 hearing) L-40531, January 27, 1981, 102 SCRA 303; People v. Boado, L-44725, March 31, 1981,
103 SCRA 607; People v. Cañizares, L-32515, September 10, 1981; People v. Pizarras,
We agree with the lower court that Cabural alone was responsible for the rape on Agripina. L-35915, October 30, 1981)."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no evidence that his co-appellant Yangyang and the other malefactors made
advances on her. Besides, the extra-judicial confessions of Lasponia (Exhibits B, B-1, B-2 The writer of this decision is of the opinion that in robbery with rape, the accused should be
and B-3), Leonide Cabual (Exhibits C, C-1 to C-5), and Ciriaco Yangyang (Exhibits H, H-1 penalized under Article 294(2) of the Revised Penal Code because it is a crime against
and H-2) point to appellant Cabural as the mastermind and the role each of them would property and not a crime against chastity, a private offense.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
play (as in fact they did) in the commission of the crime. Their interlocking confessions
indicate how they would go to the scene of the crime, the manner by which they would WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. With costs against
enter into the premises of Kim San Milling Company and, as aptly observed by the trial both appellants.
court, the details which only the participants could amply give.
SO ORDERED.
Further, Accused Cabual and Lasponia were sworn by Fiscal Leonardo Magsalin who
instructed the PC investigators to leave the room so that they (Cabual and Lasponia) would Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Escolin, Vasquez and
be able to speak their minds freely. Fiscal Magsalin testified that said accused readily and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
without hesitation signed their respective extra-judicial confessions.

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Makasiar, J., Accused Cabural should be sentenced to death under Art. 335, R.P.C. So it has been in the Philippines since then. It was the same Justice Moreland who in
United States v. Abad Santos 12 promulgated in 1917, gave expression to a variation of
Melencio-Herrera, J., I vote for the application of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code and such a fundamental postulate in this wise: "Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No
the imposition of the death penalty. person should be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should any
act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute." 13 The same year,
Plana, J., on official leave. Justice Carson in United States v. Estapia 14 in rejecting the contention that the application
of a penal provision even if not covered by its terms should be viewed by the judiciary as
Separate Opinions commendable, conducive as it is "to the repression of a reprehensible practice" pointed out:
"To this it should be sufficient answer to say that neither the executive nor the judicial
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library authorities are authorized to impose fines and prison sentences in cases wherein such fines
and prison sentences are not clearly authorized by law, and this without regard to the end
My concurrence in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Relova is full, entire, and sought to be attained by the enforcement of such unauthorized penalties." 15
complete. Nonetheless, I wish to express my gratification that this Court by a decisive vote
1 sustains the basic postulate in both civil law and common law jurisdictions, expressed in It is to be admitted that from the standpoint of logic alone, there is much to be said for the
the maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege. It is undoubted, therefore, that unless view that since rape under certain circumstances is penalized with death, it is an affront to
there be a radical change in the thinking of the Court, it is Article 294(2) not Article 335 of reason if robbery with rape carries with it a lesser penalty. The latter offense is far more
the Revised Penal Code that. calls for application in the crime of robbery with rape. 2 As reprehensible, ergo it must be punished at least with equal if not more severity. It is from
noted in the opinion of the Court penned by Justice Aquino in People v. Perello: 3 "Effective that perspective that in People v. Carandang 16 while the penalty imposed is that of
August 15, 1975 (or subsequent to this case) Presidential Decree No. 767 imposes the reclusion perpetua there were two separate opinions one from Justice Teehankee and the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death ‘when the robbery accompanied with rape is other from the late Chief Justice, then Justice, Castro. They would apply Article 335 of the
committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons.’ That increased Revised Penal Code. Retired Chief Justice Makalintal, now Speaker of the Batasan
penalty cannot be retroactively applied to this case." 4 As such offense of robbery was Pambansa, then Acting Chief Justice, concurred in the separate opinion of the late Chief
committed before that date, it is Article 294(2), before its amendment, that supplies the Justice Castro. Less than a year before, however, in September of 1972, Carandang being
governing rule. The applicable law then is clear and explicit. It defined the offense and a 1973 decision, he penned the unanimous opinion in People v. Olden 17 affirming the joint
prescribed the penalty. The doctrine announced in Lizarraga Hermanos v. Yap Tico 5 by judgment of a Court of First Instance of Davao in two cases, one of which was robbery in
Justice Moreland, in categorical language comes to mind. Thus: "The first and fundamental band with multiple rape. It was not the death sentence that was imposed but reclusion
duty of courts, in our judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come perpetua. 18 That case is certainly later than People v. Obtinalia 19 decided in April of
only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without 1971, where, in a per curiam opinion, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code was applied,
them." 6 There is relevance too to this excerpt from Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa although the offense for which the accused were found guilty was robbery with rape. It is,
Manila Railroad Company Credit Union, Inc. v. Manila Railroad Company: 7 "The applicable therefore, reassuring that with the decision of this case, the uncertainty which has
provision of Republic Act No. 2023 quoted earlier, speaks for itself. There is no ambiguity. beclouded the issue of the appropriate imposable penalty has been
As thus worded, it was so applied. Petitioner-appellant cannot therefore raise any valid removed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
objection. For the lower court to view it otherwise would have been to alter the law. That
cannot be done by the judiciary. That is a function that properly appertains to the legislative One last word. The maximum Nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege has its roots in history. It
branch." 8 is in accordance with both centuries of civil law and common law tradition. Moreover, it is an
indispensable corollary to a regime of liberty enshrined in our Constitution. It is of the
Nothing more appropriately appertains to the legislative branch than the definition of a essence then that while anti-social acts should be penalized, there must be a clear
crime and the prescription of the penalty to be imposed. That is not a doctrine of recent definition of the punishable offense as well as the penalty that may be imposed - a penalty,
vintage. It is traceable to United States v. Wiltberger, 9 an 1820 American Supreme Court to repeat, that can be fixed by the legislative body, and the legislative body alone. So
opinion. No less than the eminent Chief Justice Marshall spoke for the Court. To quote his constitutionalism mandates, with its stress on jurisdictio rather than guvernaculum. The
exact language: "The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much judiciary as the dispenser of justice through law must be aware of the limitation on its own
less old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of power.
individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the
legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the court, which is to Such a concept calls for undiminished respect from the judiciary. For it is the department by
define a crime, and ordain its punishment." 10 That ruling was followed in the Philippines in which the other branches are held to strict accountability. It sees to it, in appropriate cases
a 1906 decision, United States v. Almond. 11 of course, that they are held within the bounds of their authority. Certainly, the judiciary is
not devoid of discretion. It can, to paraphrase Cardozo, fill in the gap and clear the
ambiguities. To that extent, it is free but, to recall Cardozo anew, it "is still not wholly free. [A

50 of 221
judge] is no to innovate at pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of emotion, to resist being swayed by strong public sentiments, and to rule strictly based on
his own ideal of beauty or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated the elements of the offense and the facts allowed in evidence.
principles." 20
Before the Court are the consolidated cases docketed as G.R. No. 151258 (Villareal v.
Tersely stated, the judiciary administers justice according to law. This is by no means to People), G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People),
imply that in the case at hand, justice according to law is at war with the concept of justice and G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona).
viewed from the layman’s standpoint. The system of criminal law followed in the Philippines,
true to the ways of constitutionalism, has always leaned toward the milder form of Facts
responsibility, whether as to the nature of the offense or the penalty to be incurred by the The pertinent facts, as determined by the Court of Appeals (CA)8 and the trial court,9 are as
wrongdoer. 21 Where, as in this case, the law speaks in clear and categorical language, follows:
such a principle is impressed with greater weight.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School
of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III,
G.R. No. 151258 February 1, 2012 Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).

vs. On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. - (many GR) Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter
DECISION were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were
SERENO, J.: brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
The public outrage over the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa – the victim in this case – on Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults
10 February 1991 led to a very strong clamor to put an end to hazing.1 Due in large part to from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the
the brave efforts of his mother, petitioner Gerarda Villa, groups were organized, pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to
condemning his senseless and tragic death. This widespread condemnation prompted them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites."
Congress to enact a special law, which became effective in 1995, that would criminalize These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two
hazing.2 The intent of the law was to discourage members from making hazing a parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express,"
requirement for joining their sorority, fraternity, organization, or association.3 Moreover, the which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their
law was meant to counteract the exculpatory implications of "consent" and "initial innocent legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in
act" in the conduct of initiation rites by making the mere act of hazing punishable or mala which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans
prohibita.4 charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the
latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on their thighs by two
Sadly, the Lenny Villa tragedy did not discourage hazing activities in the country.5 Within a Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the
year of his death, six more cases of hazing-related deaths emerged – those of Frederick opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were
Cahiyang of the University of Visayas in Cebu; Raul Camaligan of San Beda College; also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
Felipe Narne of Pamantasan ng Araullo in Cabanatuan City; Dennis Cenedoza of the
Cavite Naval Training Center; Joselito Mangga of the Philippine Merchant Marine Institute; On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to
and Joselito Hernandez of the University of the Philippines in Baguio City.6 present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and
recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they
Although courts must not remain indifferent to public sentiments, in this case the general would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation
condemnation of a hazing-related death, they are still bound to observe a fundamental rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes
principle in our criminal justice system – "[N]o act constitutes a crime… unless it is made so were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation.
by law."7 Nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. Even if an act is viewed by a large section of After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
the populace as immoral or injurious, it cannot be considered a crime, absent any law
prohibiting its commission. As interpreters of the law, judges are called upon to set aside

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After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members10 Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) 16. Antonio General (General)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation
rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon
and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty
in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was
officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport. 21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him
through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. 25. Adel Abas (Abas)
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans: 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon) 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) 4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda) 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino) 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban) 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo) Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.11
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero) On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No.
C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.12
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez) holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized
with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.13 A few weeks after
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos) the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340
against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.14
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)

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On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520)15 set aside the finding of conspiracy by 15520.21 Petitioner sets forth two main issues – first, that he was denied due process when
the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each of the CA sustained the trial court’s forfeiture of his right to present evidence; and, second,
the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed that he was deprived of due process when the CA did not apply to him the same "ratio
away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz: decidendi that served as basis of acquittal of the other accused."22

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, As regards the first issue, the trial court made a ruling, which forfeited Dizon’s right to
De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza, Verdadero, present evidence during trial. The trial court expected Dizon to present evidence on an
Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) – were acquitted, as their earlier date since a co-accused, Antonio General, no longer presented separate evidence
individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. during trial. According to Dizon, his right should not have been considered as waived
because he was justified in asking for a postponement. He argues that he did not ask for a
2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio Mariano resetting of any of the hearing dates and in fact insisted that he was ready to present
Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the crime of slight evidence on the original pre-assigned schedule, and not on an earlier hearing date.
physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also ordered to
jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱ 30,000 as indemnity. Regarding the second issue, petitioner contends that he should have likewise been
acquitted, like the other accused, since his acts were also part of the traditional initiation
3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found guilty rites and were not tainted by evil motives.23 He claims that the additional paddling session
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal was part of the official activity of the fraternity. He also points out that one of the neophytes
Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA sentenced them to admitted that the chairperson of the initiation rites "decided that [Lenny] was fit enough to
an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. undergo the initiation so Mr. Villareal proceeded to do the paddling…."24 Further, petitioner
They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the echoes the argument of the Solicitor General that "the individual blows inflicted by Dizon
sum of ₱ 50,000 and to pay the additional amount of ₱ 1,000,000 by way of moral and Villareal could not have resulted in Lenny’s death."25 The Solicitor General purportedly
damages. averred that, "on the contrary, Dr. Arizala testified that the injuries suffered by Lenny could
not be considered fatal if taken individually, but if taken collectively, the result is the violent
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against death of the victim."26
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.16 Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective Petitioner then counters the finding of the CA that he was motivated by ill will. He claims
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.17 On 25 October that Lenny’s father could not have stolen the parking space of Dizon’s father, since the latter
2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 9015318 reversed the trial court’s Orders and did not have a car, and their fathers did not work in the same place or office. Revenge for
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the loss of the parking space was the alleged ill motive of Dizon. According to petitioner, his
violation of their right to speedy trial.19 utterances regarding a stolen parking space were only part of the "psychological initiation."
He then cites the testimony of Lenny’s co-neophyte – witness Marquez – who admitted
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually knowing "it was not true and that he was just making it up…."27
brought before this Court.
Further, petitioner argues that his alleged motivation of ill will was negated by his show of
G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People concern for Villa after the initiation rites. Dizon alludes to the testimony of one of the
The instant case refers to accused Villareal’s Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule neophytes, who mentioned that the former had kicked the leg of the neophyte and told him
45. The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its Decision to switch places with Lenny to prevent the latter’s chills. When the chills did not stop, Dizon,
dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 – first, denial of due process; and, second, together with Victorino, helped Lenny through a sleeping bag and made him sit on a chair.
conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt.20 According to petitioner, his alleged ill motivation is contradicted by his manifestation of
compassion and concern for the victim’s well-being.
While the Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a
Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner Villareal G.R. No. 154954 – People v. Court of Appeals
died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of the Petition This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 seeks the reversal of the CA’s Decision dated 10
previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the accused. January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520, insofar as it
G.R. No. 155101 – Dizon v. People acquitted 19 (Victorino et al.) and convicted 4 (Tecson et al.) of the accused Aquilans of the
lesser crime of slight physical injuries.28 According to the Solicitor General, the CA erred in
Accused Dizon filed a Rule 45 Petition for Review on Certiorari, questioning the CA’s holding that there could have been no conspiracy to commit hazing, as hazing or fraternity
Decision dated 10 January 2002 and Resolution dated 30 August 2002 in CA-G.R. No. initiation had not yet been criminalized at the time Lenny died.

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In the alternative, petitioner claims that the ruling of the trial court should have been upheld, 3. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
inasmuch as it found that there was conspiracy to inflict physical injuries on Lenny. Since jurisdiction, when it set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and adjudicated the
the injuries led to the victim’s death, petitioner posits that the accused Aquilans are liability of each accused according to individual participation;
criminally liable for the resulting crime of homicide, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised
Penal Code.29 The said article provides: "Criminal liability shall be incurred… [b]y any 4. Whether accused Dizon is guilty of homicide; and
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended." 5. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it pronounced Tecson, Ama,
Almeda, and Bantug guilty only of slight physical injuries.
Petitioner also argues that the rule on double jeopardy is inapplicable. According to the
Solicitor General, the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess Discussion
of jurisdiction, in setting aside the trial court’s finding of conspiracy and in ruling that the Resolution on Preliminary Matters
criminal liability of all the accused must be based on their individual participation in the
commission of the crime. G.R. No. 151258 – Villareal v. People
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 – Villa v. Escalona In a Notice dated 26 September 2011 and while the Petition was pending resolution, this
Court took note of counsel for petitioner’s Notice of Death of Party.
Petitioner Villa filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari, praying for the reversal of
the CA’s Decision dated 25 October 2006 and Resolution dated 17 May 2007 in CA-G.R. According to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability for personal penalties
S.P. Nos. 89060 and 90153.30 The Petition involves the dismissal of the criminal charge filed is totally extinguished by the death of the convict. In contrast, criminal liability for pecuniary
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. penalties is extinguished if the offender dies prior to final judgment. The term "personal
penalties" refers to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,31 while the term
Due to "several pending incidents," the trial court ordered a separate trial for accused "pecuniary penalties" (las pecuniarias) refers to fines and costs,32 including civil liability
Escalona, Saruca, Adriano, Ramos, Ampil, Concepcion, De Vera, S. Fernandez, and predicated on the criminal offense complained of (i.e., civil liability ex delicto).33 However,
Cabangon (Criminal Case No. C-38340) to commence after proceedings against the 26 civil liability based on a source of obligation other than the delict survives the death of the
other accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) shall have terminated. On 8 November accused and is recoverable through a separate civil action.34
1993, the trial court found the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. C-38340 involving the nine other co-accused Thus, we hold that the death of petitioner Villareal extinguished his criminal liability for both
recommenced on 29 November 1993. For "various reasons," the initial trial of the case did personal and pecuniary penalties, including his civil liability directly arising from the delict
not commence until 28 March 2005, or almost 12 years after the arraignment of the nine complained of. Consequently, his Petition is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case
accused. against him deemed closed and terminated.
Petitioner Villa assails the CA’s dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused, G.R. No. 155101 (Dizon v. People)
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. She argues that the accused failed to
assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time. She also points out that In an Order dated 28 July 1993, the trial court set the dates for the reception of evidence for
the prosecution cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required accused-petitioner Dizon on the 8th, 15th, and 22nd of September; and the 5th and 12 of
evidence were not at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court. October 1993.35 The Order likewise stated that "it will not entertain any postponement and
that all the accused who have not yet presented their respective evidence should be ready
We resolve herein the various issues that we group into five. at all times down the line, with their evidence on all said dates. Failure on their part to
present evidence when required shall therefore be construed as waiver to present
Issues evidence."36
1. Whether the forfeiture of petitioner Dizon’s right to present evidence constitutes denial of However, on 19 August 1993, counsel for another accused manifested in open court that
due process; his client – Antonio General – would no longer present separate evidence. Instead, the
2. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of counsel would adopt the testimonial evidence of the other accused who had already
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for testified.37 Because of this development and pursuant to the trial court’s Order that the
violation of the right of the accused to speedy trial; parties "should be ready at all times down the line," the trial court expected Dizon to present
evidence on the next trial date – 25 August 1993 – instead of his originally assigned dates.
The original dates were supposed to start two weeks later, or on 8 September 1993.38
Counsel for accused Dizon was not able to present evidence on the accelerated date. To
address the situation, counsel filed a Constancia on 25 August 1993, alleging that he had to
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appear in a previously scheduled case, and that he would be ready to present evidence on nature and consequences of a waiver. Crisostomo was not even forewarned. The
the dates originally assigned to his clients.39 The trial court denied the Manifestation on the Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to present evidence
same date and treated the Constancia as a motion for postponement, in violation of the without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
three-day-notice rule under the Rules of Court.40 Consequently, the trial court ruled that the
failure of Dizon to present evidence amounted to a waiver of that right.41 Clearly, the waiver of the right to present evidence in a criminal case involving a grave
penalty is not assumed and taken lightly. The presence of the accused and his counsel is
Accused-petitioner Dizon thus argues that he was deprived of due process of law when the indispensable so that the court could personally conduct a searching inquiry into the waiver
trial court forfeited his right to present evidence. According to him, the postponement of the x x x.46 (Emphasis supplied)
25 August 1993 hearing should have been considered justified, since his original pre-
assigned trial dates were not supposed to start until 8 September 1993, when he was The trial court should not have deemed the failure of petitioner to present evidence on 25
scheduled to present evidence. He posits that he was ready to present evidence on the August 1993 as a waiver of his right to present evidence. On the contrary, it should have
dates assigned to him. He also points out that he did not ask for a resetting of any of the considered the excuse of counsel justified, especially since counsel for another accused –
said hearing dates; that he in fact insisted on being allowed to present evidence on the General – had made a last-minute adoption of testimonial evidence that freed up the
dates fixed by the trial court. Thus, he contends that the trial court erred in accelerating the succeeding trial dates; and since Dizon was not scheduled to testify until two weeks later. At
schedule of presentation of evidence, thereby invalidating the finding of his guilt. any rate, the trial court pre-assigned five hearing dates for the reception of evidence. If it
really wanted to impose its Order strictly, the most it could have done was to forfeit one out
The right of the accused to present evidence is guaranteed by no less than the Constitution of the five days set for Dizon’s testimonial evidence. Stripping the accused of all his pre-
itself.42 Article III, Section 14(2) thereof, provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the assigned trial dates constitutes a patent denial of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
accused … shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel…" This constitutional due process.
right includes the right to present evidence in one’s defense,43 as well as the right to be
present and defend oneself in person at every stage of the proceedings.44 Nevertheless, as in the case of an improvident guilty plea, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard does not per se work to vacate a finding of guilt in the
In Crisostomo v. Sandiganbayan,45 the Sandiganbayan set the hearing of the defense’s criminal case or to enforce an automatic remand of the case to the trial court.47 In People v.
presentation of evidence for 21, 22 and 23 June 1995. The 21 June 1995 hearing was Bodoso, we ruled that where facts have adequately been represented in a criminal case,
cancelled due to "lack of quorum in the regular membership" of the Sandiganbayan’s and no procedural unfairness or irregularity has prejudiced either the prosecution or the
Second Division and upon the agreement of the parties. The hearing was reset for the next defense as a result of the invalid waiver, the rule is that a guilty verdict may nevertheless be
day, 22 June 1995, but Crisostomo and his counsel failed to attend. The Sandiganbayan, upheld if the judgment is supported beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record.48
on the very same day, issued an Order directing the issuance of a warrant for the arrest of
Crisostomo and the confiscation of his surety bond. The Order further declared that he had We do not see any material inadequacy in the relevant facts on record to resolve the case
waived his right to present evidence because of his nonappearance at "yesterday’s and at bar. Neither can we see any "procedural unfairness or irregularity" that would
today’s scheduled hearings." In ruling against the Order, we held thus: substantially prejudice either the prosecution or the defense as a result of the invalid waiver.
In fact, the arguments set forth by accused Dizon in his Petition corroborate the material
Under Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, facts relevant to decide the matter. Instead, what he is really contesting in his Petition is the
Crisostomo’s non-appearance during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right application of the law to the facts by the trial court and the CA. Petitioner Dizon admits
to be present for trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial dates… direct participation in the hazing of Lenny Villa by alleging in his Petition that "all actions of
the petitioner were part of the traditional rites," and that "the alleged extension of the
xxx xxx xxx initiation rites was not outside the official activity of the fraternity."49 He even argues that
"Dizon did not request for the extension and he participated only after the activity was
Moreover, Crisostomo’s absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been sanctioned."50
deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be
waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to For one reason or another, the case has been passed or turned over from one judge or
relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his justice to another – at the trial court, at the CA, and even at the Supreme Court. Remanding
counsel the right to present evidence. The Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the the case for the reception of the evidence of petitioner Dizon would only inflict further
agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and Calingayan's counsel. injustice on the parties. This case has been going on for almost two decades. Its resolution
is long overdue. Since the key facts necessary to decide the case have already been
In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the determined, we shall proceed to decide it.
court is called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the
consequences of a waiver of the right to present evidence. In fact, it is not enough that the G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 (Villa v. Escalona)
accused is simply warned of the consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding
hearings. The court must first explain to the accused personally in clear terms the exact
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Petitioner Villa argues that the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano should [T]he absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the
not have been dismissed, since they failed to assert their right to speedy trial within a case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecution’s failure to comply with the
reasonable period of time. She points out that the accused failed to raise a protest during order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is
the dormancy of the criminal case against them, and that they asserted their right only after glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo
the trial court had dismissed the case against their co-accused Concepcion. Petitioner also already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to
emphasizes that the trial court denied the respective Motions to Dismiss filed by Saruca, secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not
Escalona, Ramos, and Adriano, because it found that "the prosecution could not be faulted comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in
for the delay in the movement of this case when the original records and the evidence it an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the
may require were not at its disposal as these were in the Court of Appeals."51 prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that
even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16, because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.52 This right requires that there be a trial free from filed by co-accused Concepcion x x x.
vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays.53 The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of time xxx xxx xxx
is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.54 In
determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for
the case.55 The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed.56 Also to the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on
be considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Saruca’s motion to set case for trial on August 17,
right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.57 1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length
of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
We have consistently ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to constitution frowns upon x x x.63 (Emphasis supplied)
the right of the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal.58 As a consequence, an
appeal or a reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of This Court points out that on 10 January 1992, the final amended Information was filed
double jeopardy.59 As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, Ampil, S. Fernandez, Adriano, Cabangon, Concepcion,
case is capricious, certiorari lies.60 The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a and De Vera.64 On 29 November 1993, they were all arraigned.65 Unfortunately, the initial
petition challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof.61 trial of the case did not commence until 28 March 2005 or almost 12 years after
Rather, grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction arraignment.66
prevents double jeopardy from attaching.62
As illustrated in our ruling in Abardo v. Sandiganbayan, the unexplained interval or inactivity
We do not see grave abuse of discretion in the CA’s dismissal of the case against accused of the Sandiganbayan for close to five years since the arraignment of the accused amounts
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of the violation of their right to speedy to an unreasonable delay in the disposition of cases – a clear violation of the right of the
trial. The court held thus: accused to a speedy disposition of cases.67 Thus, we held:

An examination of the procedural history of this case would reveal that the following factors The delay in this case measures up to the unreasonableness of the delay in the disposition
contributed to the slow progress of the proceedings in the case below: of cases in Angchangco, Jr. vs. Ombudsman, where the Court found the delay of six years
by the Ombudsman in resolving the criminal complaints to be violative of the constitutionally
xxx xxx xxx guaranteed right to a speedy disposition of cases; similarly, in Roque vs. Office of the
Ombudsman, where the Court held that the delay of almost six years disregarded the
5) The fact that the records of the case were elevated to the Court of Appeals and the Ombudsman's duty to act promptly on complaints before him; and in Cervantes vs.
prosecution’s failure to comply with the order of the court a quo requiring them to secure Sandiganbayan, where the Court held that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
certified true copies of the same. in not quashing the information which was filed six years after the initiatory complaint was
filed and thereby depriving petitioner of his right to a speedy disposition of the case. So it
xxx xxx xxx must be in the instant case, where the reinvestigation by the Ombudsman has dragged on
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that contributed to the for a decade already.68 (Emphasis supplied)
delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We nonetheless hold that their right to From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 89060 that
speedy trial has been utterly violated in this case x x x. accused Escalona et al.’s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there is nothing in the
xxx xxx xxx records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes accused Ampil, S.

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Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling shall be limited to accused securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying
Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty."76 We further stressed that
"an acquitted defendant is entitled to the right of repose as a direct consequence of the
G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals) finality of his acquittal."77
The rule on double jeopardy is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system. It dictates This prohibition, however, is not absolute. The state may challenge the lower court’s
that when a person is charged with an offense, and the case is terminated – either by acquittal of the accused or the imposition of a lower penalty on the latter in the following
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused – the recognized exceptions: (1) where the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to
accused cannot again be charged with the same or an identical offense.69 This principle is prosecute and prove its case, tantamount to a deprivation of due process;78 (2) where there
founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience.70 It is embodied in the civil law is a finding of mistrial;79 or (3) where there has been a grave abuse of discretion.80
maxim non bis in idem found in the common law of England and undoubtedly in every
system of jurisprudence.71 It found expression in the Spanish Law, in the Constitution of the The third instance refers to this Court’s judicial power under Rule 65 to determine whether
United States, and in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen,72 or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
viz: on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.81 Here, the party asking for
the review must show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
Article III – Bill of Rights equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason
an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall of passion and hostility;82 or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so grave and so severe
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice.83 In such an event, the accused
Rule 117, Section 7 of the Rules of Court, which implements this particular constitutional cannot be considered to be at risk of double jeopardy.84
right, provides as follows:73 The Solicitor General filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari, which seeks the reversal of (1)
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been the acquittal of Victorino et al. and (2) the conviction of Tecson et al. for the lesser crime of
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without slight physical injuries, both on the basis of a misappreciation of facts and evidence.
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or According to the Petition, "the decision of the Court of Appeals is not in accordance with law
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction because private complainant and petitioner were denied due process of law when the
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused public respondent completely ignored the a) Position Paper x x x b) the Motion for Partial
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or Reconsideration x x x and c) the petitioner’s Comment x x x."85 Allegedly, the CA ignored
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which evidence when it adopted the theory of individual responsibility; set aside the finding of
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former conspiracy by the trial court; and failed to apply Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code.86 The
complaint or information. Solicitor General also assails the finding that the physical blows were inflicted only by Dizon
and Villareal, as well as the appreciation of Lenny Villa’s consent to hazing.87
The rule on double jeopardy thus prohibits the state from appealing the judgment in order to
reverse the acquittal or to increase the penalty imposed either through a regular appeal In our view, what the Petition seeks is that we reexamine, reassess, and reweigh the
under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court or through an appeal by certiorari on pure questions of probative value of the evidence presented by the parties.88 In People v. Maquiling, we held
law under Rule 45 of the same Rules.74 The requisites for invoking double jeopardy are the that grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
following: (a) there is a valid complaint or information; (b) it is filed before a competent misappreciated the facts and the evidence.89 Mere errors of judgment are correctible by an
court; (c) the defendant pleaded to the charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted or appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, and not by an
convicted, or the case against him or her was dismissed or otherwise terminated without application for a writ of certiorari.90 Therefore, pursuant to the rule on double jeopardy, we
the defendant’s express consent.75 are constrained to deny the Petition contra Victorino et al. – the 19 acquitted fraternity
members.
As we have reiterated in People v. Court of Appeals and Galicia, "[a] verdict of acquittal is
immediately final and a reexamination of the merits of such acquittal, even in the appellate We, however, modify the assailed judgment as regards Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug
courts, will put the accused in jeopardy for the same offense. The finality-of-acquittal – the four fraternity members convicted of slight physical injuries.
doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its Indeed, we have ruled in a line of cases that the rule on double jeopardy similarly applies
criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude when the state seeks the imposition of a higher penalty against the accused.91 We have
of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the also recognized, however, that certiorari may be used to correct an abusive judgment upon
State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of a clear demonstration that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave
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as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.92 The present case is one of those tantamount to a whimsical, capricious, and abusive exercise of judgment amounting to lack
instances of grave abuse of discretion. of jurisdiction. According to the Revised Penal Code, the mandatory and legally imposable
penalty in case the victim dies should be based on the framework governing the destruction
In imposing the penalty of slight physical injuries on Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug, the of the life of a person, punished under Articles 246 to 261 for intentional felonies and Article
CA reasoned thus: 365 for culpable felonies, and not under the aforementioned provisions. We emphasize that
these two types of felonies are distinct from and legally inconsistent with each other, in that
Based on the medical findings, it would appear that with the exclusion of the fatal wounds the accused cannot be held criminally liable for physical injuries when actual death occurs.
inflicted by the accused Dizon and Villareal, the injuries sustained by the victim as a result 102
of the physical punishment heaped on him were serious in nature. However, by reason of
the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the Attributing criminal liability solely to Villareal and Dizon – as if only their acts, in and of
incapacity or the medical attendance required. To do so, at this stage would be merely themselves, caused the death of Lenny Villa – is contrary to the CA’s own findings. From
speculative. In a prosecution for this crime where the category of the offense and the proof that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the multiple injuries he
severity of the penalty depend on the period of illness or incapacity for labor, the length of suffered,103 the only logical conclusion is that criminal responsibility should redound to all
this period must likewise be proved beyond reasonable doubt in much the same manner as those who have been proven to have directly participated in the infliction of physical injuries
the same act charged [People v. Codilla, CA-G.R. No. 4079-R, June 26, 1950]. And when on Lenny. The accumulation of bruising on his body caused him to suffer cardiac arrest.
proof of the said period is absent, the crime committed should be deemed only as slight Accordingly, we find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
physical injuries [People v. De los Santos, CA, 59 O.G. 4393, citing People v. Penesa, 81 excess of jurisdiction in finding Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug criminally liable for slight
Phil. 398]. As such, this Court is constrained to rule that the injuries inflicted by the physical injuries. As an allowable exception to the rule on double jeopardy, we therefore
appellants, Tecson, Ama, Almeda and Bantug, Jr., are only slight and not serious, in nature. give due course to the Petition in G.R. No. 154954.
93 (Emphasis supplied and citations included)

Resolution on Ultimate Findings

The appellate court relied on our ruling in People v. Penesa94 in finding that the four
accused should be held guilty only of slight physical injuries. According to the CA, because According to the trial court, although hazing was not (at the time) punishable as a crime, the
of "the death of the victim, there can be no precise means to determine the duration of the intentional infliction of physical injuries on Villa was nonetheless a felonious act under
incapacity or medical attendance required."95 The reliance on Penesa was utterly Articles 263 to 266 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, in ruling against the accused, the
misplaced. A review of that case would reveal that the accused therein was guilty merely of court a quo found that pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the accused
slight physical injuries, because the victim’s injuries neither caused incapacity for labor nor fraternity members were guilty of homicide, as it was the direct, natural and logical
required medical attendance.96 Furthermore, he did not die.97 His injuries were not even consequence of the physical injuries they had intentionally inflicted.104
serious.98 Since Penesa involved a case in which the victim allegedly suffered physical
injuries and not death, the ruling cited by the CA was patently inapplicable. The CA modified the trial court’s finding of criminal liability. It ruled that there could have
been no conspiracy since the neophytes, including Lenny Villa, had knowingly consented to
On the contrary, the CA’s ultimate conclusion that Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug were the conduct of hazing during their initiation rites. The accused fraternity members, therefore,
liable merely for slight physical injuries grossly contradicts its own findings of fact. were liable only for the consequences of their individual acts. Accordingly, 19 of the
According to the court, the four accused "were found to have inflicted more than the usual accused – Victorino et al. – were acquitted; 4 of them – Tecson et al. – were found guilty of
punishment undertaken during such initiation rites on the person of Villa."99 It then adopted slight physical injuries; and the remaining 2 – Dizon and Villareal – were found guilty of
the NBI medico-legal officer’s findings that the antecedent cause of Lenny Villa’s death was homicide.
the "multiple traumatic injuries" he suffered from the initiation rites.100 Considering that the
CA found that the "physical punishment heaped on [Lenny Villa was] serious in nature,"101 it The issue at hand does not concern a typical criminal case wherein the perpetrator clearly
was patently erroneous for the court to limit the criminal liability to slight physical injuries, commits a felony in order to take revenge upon, to gain advantage over, to harm
which is a light felony. maliciously, or to get even with, the victim. Rather, the case involves an ex ante situation in
which a man – driven by his own desire to join a society of men – pledged to go through
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code dictates that the perpetrator shall be liable for the physically and psychologically strenuous admission rituals, just so he could enter the
consequences of an act, even if its result is different from that intended. Thus, once a fraternity. Thus, in order to understand how our criminal laws apply to such situation absent
person is found to have committed an initial felonious act, such as the unlawful infliction of the Anti-Hazing Law, we deem it necessary to make a brief exposition on the underlying
physical injuries that results in the death of the victim, courts are required to automatically concepts shaping intentional felonies, as well as on the nature of physical and
apply the legal framework governing the destruction of life. This rule is mandatory, and not psychological initiations widely known as hazing.
subject to discretion.
Intentional Felony and Conspiracy
The CA’s application of the legal framework governing physical injuries – punished under
Articles 262 to 266 for intentional felonies and Article 365 for culpable felonies – is therefore
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Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought.105 The classical theory The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
posits that a human person is essentially a moral creature with an absolute free will to establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.129 Being mala in se, the
choose between good and evil.106 It asserts that one should only be adjudged or held felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo130 immediately before or
accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired.107 The basic simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.131 Intent to kill – or animus interficendi – cannot
postulate of the classical penal system is that humans are rational and calculating beings and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.132
who guide their actions with reference to the principles of pleasure and pain.108 They refrain Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause,
from criminal acts if threatened with punishment sufficient to cancel the hope of possible or suicide.133 If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent – but
gain or advantage in committing the crime.109 Here, criminal liability is thus based on the with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or
free will and moral blame of the actor.110 The identity of mens rea – defined as a guilty mind, simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.134
a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent – is the predominant consideration.111 Thus, it
is not enough to do what the law prohibits.112 In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is Hazing and other forms of initiation rites
necessary that the act be committed by means of dolo or "malice."113
The notion of hazing is not a recent development in our society.135 It is said that, throughout
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, history, hazing in some form or another has been associated with organizations ranging
intelligence, and intent.114 The first element, freedom, refers to an act done with deliberation from military groups to indigenous tribes.136 Some say that elements of hazing can be
and with power to choose between two things.115 The second element, intelligence, traced back to the Middle Ages, during which new students who enrolled in European
concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts, as well as the capacity to universities worked as servants for upperclassmen.137 It is believed that the concept of
distinguish between a licit and an illicit act.116 The last element, intent, involves an aim or a hazing is rooted in ancient Greece,138 where young men recruited into the military were
determination to do a certain act.117 tested with pain or challenged to demonstrate the limits of their loyalty and to prepare the
recruits for battle.139 Modern fraternities and sororities espouse some connection to these
The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is described as the state of mind values of ancient Greek civilization.140 According to a scholar, this concept lends historical
accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act.118 It refers to the purpose of the mind and legitimacy to a "tradition" or "ritual" whereby prospective members are asked to prove their
the resolve with which a person proceeds.119 It does not refer to mere will, for the latter worthiness and loyalty to the organization in which they seek to attain membership through
pertains to the act, while intent concerns the result of the act.120 While motive is the "moving hazing.141
power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the "purpose" of using a
particular means to produce the result.121 On the other hand, the term "felonious" means, Thus, it is said that in the Greek fraternity system, custom requires a student wishing to join
inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose.122 With an organization to receive an invitation in order to be a neophyte for a particular chapter.142
these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to The neophyte period is usually one to two semesters long.143 During the "program,"
malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind accompanying a forbidden neophytes are required to interview and to get to know the active members of the chapter;
act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence of dolus malus – that the act to learn chapter history; to understand the principles of the organization; to maintain a
or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate evil intent," and "with malice specified grade point average; to participate in the organization’s activities; and to show
aforethought."123 The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea – a crime is not dignity and respect for their fellow neophytes, the organization, and its active and alumni
committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is innocent.124 As is members.144 Some chapters require the initiation activities for a recruit to involve hazing
required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven acts during the entire neophyte stage.145
beyond reasonable doubt.125
Hazing, as commonly understood, involves an initiation rite or ritual that serves as
In turn, the existence of malicious intent is necessary in order for conspiracy to attach. prerequisite for admission to an organization.146 In hazing, the "recruit," "pledge,"
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code – which provides that "conspiracy exists when two or "neophyte," "initiate," "applicant" – or any other term by which the organization may refer to
more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to such a person – is generally placed in embarrassing or humiliating situations, like being
commit it" – is to be interpreted to refer only to felonies committed by means of dolo or forced to do menial, silly, foolish, or other similar tasks or activities.147 It encompasses
malice. The phrase "coming to an agreement" connotes the existence of a prefaced "intent" different forms of conduct that humiliate, degrade, abuse, or physically endanger those who
to cause injury to another, an element present only in intentional felonies. In culpable desire membership in the organization.148 These acts usually involve physical or
felonies or criminal negligence, the injury inflicted on another is unintentional, the wrong psychological suffering or injury.149
done being simply the result of an act performed without malice or criminal design.126 Here,
a person performs an initial lawful deed; however, due to negligence, imprudence, lack of The concept of initiation rites in the country is nothing new. In fact, more than a century ago,
foresight, or lack of skill, the deed results in a wrongful act.127 Verily, a deliberate intent to do our national hero – Andres Bonifacio – organized a secret society named Kataastaasan
an unlawful act, which is a requisite in conspiracy, is inconsistent with the idea of a felony Kagalanggalangang Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan (The Highest and Most Venerable
committed by means of culpa.128 Association of the Sons and Daughters of the Nation).150 The Katipunan, or KKK, started as
a small confraternity believed to be inspired by European Freemasonry, as well as by

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confraternities or sodalities approved by the Catholic Church.151 The Katipunan’s ideology peppers, hot sauce, butter, and "yerks" (a mixture of hot sauce, mayonnaise, butter, beans,
was brought home to each member through the society’s initiation ritual.152 It is said that and other items); (5) doing chores for the fraternity and its members, such as cleaning the
initiates were brought to a dark room, lit by a single point of illumination, and were fraternity house and yard, being designated as driver, and running errands; (6) appearing
asked a series of questions to determine their fitness, loyalty, courage, and resolve. regularly at 2 a.m. "meetings," during which the pledges would be hazed for a couple of
153 They were made to go through vigorous trials such as "pagsuot sa isang lungga" hours; and (7) "running the gauntlet," during which the pledges were pushed, kicked, and hit
or "[pagtalon] sa balon."154 It would seem that they were also made to withstand the as they ran down a hallway and descended down a flight of stairs.169
blow of "pangherong bakal sa pisngi" and to endure a "matalas na punyal."155 As a
final step in the ritual, the neophyte Katipunero was made to sign membership In Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity, decided in 1999, the victim – Sylvester Lloyd – was
papers with the his own blood.156 accepted to pledge at the Cornell University chapter of the Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity.170 He
participated in initiation activities, which included various forms of physical beatings and
It is believed that the Greek fraternity system was transported by the Americans to the torture, psychological coercion and embarrassment.171
Philippines in the late 19th century. As can be seen in the following instances, the manner
of hazing in the United States was jarringly similar to that inflicted by the Aquila Fraternity In Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity, decided in 2002, the initiate-victim suffered injuries
on Lenny Villa. from hazing activities during the fraternity’s initiation rites.172 Kenner and the other initiates
went through psychological and physical hazing, including being paddled on the buttocks
Early in 1865, upperclassmen at West Point Academy forced the fourth classmen to do for more than 200 times.173
exhausting physical exercises that sometimes resulted in permanent physical damage; to
eat or drink unpalatable foods; and in various ways to humiliate themselves.157 In 1901, In Morton v. State, Marcus Jones – a university student in Florida – sought initiation into the
General Douglas MacArthur got involved in a congressional investigation of hazing at the campus chapter of the Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity during the 2005-06 academic year.174
academy during his second year at West Point.158 The pledge’s efforts to join the fraternity culminated in a series of initiation rituals conducted
in four nights. Jones, together with other candidates, was blindfolded, verbally harassed,
In Easler v. Hejaz Temple of Greenville, decided in 1985, the candidate-victim was injured and caned on his face and buttocks.175 In these rituals described as "preliminaries," which
during the shriner’s hazing event, which was part of the initiation ceremonies for Hejaz lasted for two evenings, he received approximately 60 canings on his buttocks.176 During
membership.159 The ritual involved what was known as the "mattress-rotating barrel the last two days of the hazing, the rituals intensified.177 The pledges sustained roughly 210
trick."160 It required each candidate to slide down an eight to nine-foot-high metal board onto cane strikes during the four-night initiation.178 Jones and several other candidates passed
connected mattresses leading to a barrel, over which the candidate was required to climb. out.179
161 Members of Hejaz would stand on each side of the mattresses and barrel and fun-

paddle candidates en route to the barrel.162 The purported raison d’être behind hazing practices is the proverbial "birth by fire," through
which the pledge who has successfully withstood the hazing proves his or her worth.180
In a video footage taken in 1991, U.S. Marine paratroopers in Camp Lejeune, North Some organizations even believe that hazing is the path to enlightenment. It is said that this
Carolina, were seen performing a ceremony in which they pinned paratrooper jump wings process enables the organization to establish unity among the pledges and, hence,
directly onto the neophyte paratroopers’ chests.163 The victims were shown writhing and reinforces and ensures the future of the organization.181 Alleged benefits of joining include
crying out in pain as others pounded the spiked medals through the shirts and into the leadership opportunities; improved academic performance; higher self-esteem; professional
chests of the victims.164 networking opportunities; and the esprit d’corp associated with close, almost filial, friendship
and common cause.182
In State v. Allen, decided in 1995, the Southeast Missouri State University chapter of Kappa
Alpha Psi invited male students to enter into a pledgeship program.165 The fraternity Anti-Hazing laws in the U.S.
members subjected the pledges to repeated physical abuse including repeated, open-hand
strikes at the nape, the chest, and the back; caning of the bare soles of the feet and The first hazing statute in the U.S. appeared in 1874 in response to hazing in the military.183
buttocks; blows to the back with the use of a heavy book and a cookie sheet while the The hazing of recruits and plebes in the armed services was so prevalent that Congress
pledges were on their hands and knees; various kicks and punches to the body; and "body prohibited all forms of military hazing, harmful or not.184 It was not until 1901 that Illinois
slamming," an activity in which active members of the fraternity lifted pledges up in the air passed the first state anti-hazing law, criminalizing conduct "whereby any one sustains an
and dropped them to the ground.166 The fraternity members then put the pledges through a injury to his [or her] person therefrom."185
seven-station circle of physical abuse.167
However, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s, due in large part to the efforts of the
In Ex Parte Barran, decided in 1998, the pledge-victim went through hazing by fraternity Committee to Halt Useless College Killings and other similar organizations, that states
members of the Kappa Alpha Order at the Auburn University in Alabama.168 The hazing increasingly began to enact legislation prohibiting and/or criminalizing hazing.186 As of 2008,
included the following: (1) having to dig a ditch and jump into it after it had been filled with all but six states had enacted criminal or civil statutes proscribing hazing.187 Most anti-
water, urine, feces, dinner leftovers, and vomit; (2) receiving paddlings on the buttocks; (3) hazing laws in the U.S. treat hazing as a misdemeanor and carry relatively light
being pushed and kicked, often onto walls or into pits and trash cans; (4) eating foods like
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consequences for even the most severe situations.188 Only a few states with anti-hazing inflict physical injuries on him. It justified its finding of homicide against Dizon by holding
laws consider hazing as a felony in case death or great bodily harm occurs.189 that he had apparently been motivated by ill will while beating up Villa. Dizon kept repeating
that his father’s parking space had been stolen by the victim’s father.207 As to Villareal, the
Under the laws of Illinois, hazing is a Class A misdemeanor, except hazing that results in court said that the accused suspected the family of Bienvenido Marquez, one of the
death or great bodily harm, which is a Class 4 felony.190 In a Class 4 felony, a sentence of neophytes, to have had a hand in the death of Villareal’s brother.208 The CA then ruled as
imprisonment shall be for a term of not less than one year and not more than three years.191 follows:
Indiana criminal law provides that a person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally
performs hazing that results in serious bodily injury to a person commits criminal The two had their own axes to grind against Villa and Marquez. It was very clear that they
recklessness, a Class D felony.192 acted with evil and criminal intent. The evidence on this matter is unrebutted and so for the
death of Villa, appellants Dizon and Villareal must and should face the consequence of their
The offense becomes a Class C felony if committed by means of a deadly weapon.193 As an acts, that is, to be held liable for the crime of homicide.209 (Emphasis supplied)
element of a Class C felony – criminal recklessness – resulting in serious bodily injury,
death falls under the category of "serious bodily injury."194 A person who commits a Class C We cannot subscribe to this conclusion.
felony is imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the
advisory sentence being four (4) years.195 Pursuant to Missouri law, hazing is a Class A The appellate court relied mainly on the testimony of Bienvenido Marquez to determine the
misdemeanor, unless the act creates a substantial risk to the life of the student or existence of animus interficendi. For a full appreciation of the context in which the supposed
prospective member, in which case it becomes a Class C felony.196 A Class C felony utterances were made, the Court deems it necessary to reproduce the relevant portions of
provides for an imprisonment term not to exceed seven years.197 witness Marquez’s testimony:

In Texas, hazing that causes the death of another is a state jail felony.198 An individual Witness We were brought up into [Michael Musngi’s] room and we were briefed as to what
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony is punished by confinement in a state jail for any term of to expect during the next three days and we were told the members of the fraternity and
not more than two years or not less than 180 days.199 Under Utah law, if hazing results in their batch and we were also told about the fraternity song, sir.
serious bodily injury, the hazer is guilty of a third-degree felony.200 A person who has been
convicted of a third-degree felony may be sentenced to imprisonment for a term not to xxx xxx xxx
exceed five years.201 West Virginia law provides that if the act of hazing would otherwise be Witness We were escorted out of [Michael Musngi’s] house and we were made to ride a
deemed a felony, the hazer may be found guilty thereof and subject to penalties provided van and we were brought to another place in Kalookan City which I later found to be the
therefor.202 In Wisconsin, a person is guilty of a Class G felony if hazing results in the death place of Mariano Almeda, sir.
of another.203 A Class G felony carries a fine not to exceed $25,000 or imprisonment not to
exceed 10 years, or both.204 xxx xxx xxx
In certain states in the U.S., victims of hazing were left with limited remedies, as there was Witness Upon arrival, we were instructed to bow our head down and to link our arms and
no hazing statute.205 This situation was exemplified in Ballou v. Sigma Nu General then the driver of the van and other members of the Aquilans who were inside left us inside
Fraternity, wherein Barry Ballou’s family resorted to a civil action for wrongful death, since the van, sir.
there was no anti-hazing statute in South Carolina until 1994.206
xxx xxx xxx
The existence of animus interficendi or intent to kill not proven beyond reasonable doubt
Witness We heard voices shouted outside the van to the effect, "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion
The presence of an ex ante situation – in this case, fraternity initiation rites – does not Patay ka" and the people outside pound the van, rock the van, sir.
automatically amount to the absence of malicious intent or dolus malus. If it is proven
beyond reasonable doubt that the perpetrators were equipped with a guilty mind – whether Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall in what tone of voice and how strong a voice these
or not there is a contextual background or factual premise – they are still criminally liable for remarks uttered upon your arrival?
intentional felony.
Witness Some were almost shouting, you could feel the sense of excitement in their voices,
The trial court, the CA, and the Solicitor General are all in agreement that – with the sir.
exception of Villareal and Dizon – accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, and Bantug did not have
the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa or the other neophytes. We shall no xxx xxx xxx
longer disturb this finding.
Atty. Tadiar During all these times that the van was being rocked through and through, what
As regards Villareal and Dizon, the CA modified the Decision of the trial court and found were the voices or utterances that you heard?
that the two accused had the animus interficendi or intent to kill Lenny Villa, not merely to

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Witness "Villa akin ka," "Asuncion patay ka," "Recinto patay ka sa amin," etc., sir. Witness Of course, I knew sir that it was not true and that he was just making it up sir. So
he said that I knew nothing of that incident. However, he just in fact after the Bicol Express,
Atty. Tadiar And those utterances and threats, how long did they continue during the rocking he kept on uttering those words/statements so that it would in turn justify him and to give
of the van which lasted for 5 minutes? me harder blows, sir.
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
Witness Even after they rocked the van, we still kept on hearing voices, sir. Atty. Tadiar You mentioned about Dizon in particular mentioning that Lenny Villa’s father
stole the parking space allotted for his father, do you recall who were within hearing
xxx xxx xxx distance when that utterance was made?
Atty. Tadiar During the time that this rounds [of physical beating] were being inflicted, was Witness Yes, sir. All of the neophytes heard that utterance, sir.
there any utterances by anybody?
xxx xxx xxx
Witness Yes sir. Some were piercing, some were discouraging, and some were
encouraging others who were pounding and beating us, it was just like a fiesta atmosphere, Witness There were different times made this accusation so there were different people
actually some of them enjoyed looking us being pounded, sir. who heard from time to time, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Do you recall what were those voices that you heard? xxx xxx xxx
Witness One particular utterance always said was, they asked us whether "matigas pa yan, Atty. Tadiar Can you tell the Honorable Court when was the next accusation against Lenny
kayang-kaya pa niyan." Villa’s father was made?
Atty. Tadiar Do you know who in particular uttered those particular words that you quote? Witness When we were line up against the wall, Boyet Dizon came near to us and when
Lenny Villa’s turn, I heard him uttered those statements, sir.
Witness I cannot particularly point to because there were utterances simultaneously, I could
not really pin point who uttered those words, sir. Atty. Tadiar What happened after he made this accusation to Lenny Villa’s father?
xxx xxx xxx Witness He continued to inflict blows on Lenny Villa.
Atty. Tadiar Were there any utterances that you heard during the conduct of this Bicol Atty. Tadiar How were those blows inflicted?
Express?
Witness There were slaps and he knelt on Lenny Villa’s thighs and sometime he stand up
Witness Yes, sir I heard utterances. and he kicked his thighs and sometimes jumped at it, sir.
Atty. Tadiar Will you please recall to this Honorable Court what were the utterances that you xxx xxx xxx
remember?
Atty. Tadiar We would go on to the second day but not right now. You mentioned also that
Witness For example, one person particularly Boyet Dizon stepped on my thigh, he would accusations made by Dizon "you or your family had his brother killed," can you inform this
say that and I quote "ito, yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko," so that would in Honorable Court what exactly were the accusations that were charged against you while
turn sort of justifying him in inflicting more serious pain on me. So instead of just walking, he inflicting blows upon you in particular?
would jump on my thighs and then after on was Lenny Villa. He was saying to the effect that
"this guy, his father stole the parking space of my father," sir. So, that’s why he inflicted Witness While he was inflicting blows upon me, he told me in particular if I knew that his
more pain on Villa and that went on, sir. family who had his brother killed, and he said that his brother was an NPA, sir so I knew
that it was just a story that he made up and I said that I knew nothing about it and he
Atty. Tadiar And you were referring to which particular accused? continued inflicting blows on me, sir. And another incident was when a talk was being given,
Dizon was on another part of the pelota court and I was sort of looking and we saw that he
Witness Boyet Dizon, sir. was drinking beer, and he said and I quote: "Marquez, Marquez, ano ang tinitingin-tingin mo
Atty. Tadiar When Boyet Dizon at that particular time was accusing you of having your diyan, ikaw yung pamilya mo ang nagpapatay sa aking kapatid, yari ka sa akin," sir.
family have his brother killed, what was your response? Atty. Tadiar What else?

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Witness That’s all, sir. Judge Purisima Now, will you admit Mr. Marquez that much of the initiation procedures is
psychological in nature?
Atty. Tadiar And on that first night of February 8, 1991, did ever a doctor or a physician
came around as promised to you earlier? Witness Combination, sir.211 (Emphasis supplied)

Witness No, sir.210 (Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx

On cross-examination, witness Bienvenido Marquez testified thus: Atty. Jimenez The initiation that was conducted did not consist only of physical initiation,
meaning body contact, is that correct?
Judge Purisima When you testified on direct examination Mr. Marquez, have you stated that
there was a briefing that was conducted immediately before your initiation as regards to Witness Yes, sir.
what to expect during the initiation, did I hear you right?
Atty. Jimenez Part of the initiation was the so-called psychological initiation, correct?
Witness Yes, sir.
Witness Yes, sir.
Judge Purisima Who did the briefing?
Atty. Jimenez And this consisted of making you believe of things calculated to terrify you,
Witness Mr. Michael Musngi, sir and Nelson Victorino. scare you, correct?

Judge Purisima Will you kindly tell the Honorable Court what they told you to expect during Witness Yes, sir.
the initiation?
Atty. Jimenez In other words, the initiating masters made belief situation intended to, I
Witness They told us at the time we would be brought to a particular place, we would be repeat, terrify you, frighten you, scare you into perhaps quitting the initiation, is this correct?
mocked at, sir.
Witness Sometimes sir, yes.
Judge Purisima So, you expected to be mocked at, ridiculed, humiliated etc., and the likes?
Atty. Jimenez You said on direct that while Mr. Dizon was initiating you, he said or he was
Witness Yes, sir. supposed to have said according to you that your family were responsible for the killing of
his brother who was an NPA, do you remember saying that?
Judge Purisima You were also told beforehand that there would be physical contact?
Witness Yes, sir.
Witness Yes, sir at the briefing.
Atty. Jimenez You also said in connection with that statement said to you by Dizon that you
xxx xxx xxx did not believe him because that is not true, correct?
Witness Yes, sir, because they informed that we could immediately go back to school. All Witness Yes, sir.
the bruises would be limited to our arms and legs, sir. So, if we wear the regular school
uniforms like long sleeves, it would be covered actually so we have no thinking that our face Atty. Jimenez In other words, he was only psychologizing you perhaps, the purpose as I
would be slapped, sir. have mentioned before, terrifying you, scaring you or frightening you into quitting the
initiation, this is correct?
Judge Purisima So, you mean to say that beforehand that you would have bruises on your
body but that will be covered? Witness No, sir, perhaps it is one but the main reason, I think, why he was saying those
things was because he wanted to inflict injury.
Witness Yes, sir.
Atty. Jimenez He did not tell that to you. That is your only perception, correct?
JudgePurisima So, what kind of physical contact or implements that you expect that would
create bruises to your body? Witness No, sir, because at one point, while he was telling this to Villareal, he was hitting
me.
Witness At that point I am already sure that there would be hitting by a paddling or paddle,
sir. Atty. Jimenez But did you not say earlier that you [were] subjected to the same forms of
initiation by all the initiating masters? You said that earlier, right?
xxx xxx xxx

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Witness Yes, sir. Asuncion," "Putang ina nyo, patay kayo sa amin," or some other words to that effect.215
While beating the neophytes, Dizon accused Marquez of the death of the former’s
Atty. Jimenez Are you saying also that the others who jumped on you or kicked you said purported NPA brother, and then blamed Lenny Villa’s father for stealing the parking space
something similar as was told to you by Mr. Dizon? of Dizon’s father. According to the Solicitor General, these statements, including those of
the accused Dizon, were all part of the psychological initiation employed by the Aquila
Witness No, sir. Fraternity.216
Atty. Jimenez But the fact remains that in the Bicol Express for instance, the masters would Thus, to our understanding, accused Dizon’s way of inflicting psychological pressure was
run on your thighs, right? through hurling make-believe accusations at the initiates. He concocted the fictitious
Witness Yes, sir. stories, so that he could "justify" giving the neophytes harder blows, all in the context of
fraternity initiation and role playing. Even one of the neophytes admitted that the
Atty. Jimenez This was the regular procedure that was followed by the initiating masters not accusations were untrue and made-up.
only on you but also on the other neophytes?
The infliction of psychological pressure is not unusual in the conduct of hazing. In fact,
Witness Yes, sir. during the Senate deliberations on the then proposed Anti-Hazing Law, former Senator Lina
spoke as follows:
Atty. Jimenez In other words, it is fair to say that whatever forms of initiation was
administered by one master, was also administered by one master on a neophyte, was also Senator Lina. -- so as to capture the intent that we conveyed during the period of
administered by another master on the other neophyte, this is correct? interpellations on why we included the phrase "or psychological pain and suffering."

Witness Yes, sir.212 (Emphasis supplied) xxx xxx xxx

According to the Solicitor General himself, the ill motives attributed by the CA to Dizon and So that if no direct physical harm is inflicted upon the neophyte or the recruit but the recruit
Villareal were "baseless,"213 since the statements of the accused were "just part of the or neophyte is made to undergo certain acts which I already described yesterday, like
psychological initiation calculated to instill fear on the part of the neophytes"; that "[t]here is playing the Russian roulette extensively to test the readiness and the willingness of the
no element of truth in it as testified by Bienvenido Marquez"; and that the "harsh words neophyte or recruit to continue his desire to be a member of the fraternity, sorority or similar
uttered by Petitioner and Villareal are part of ‘tradition’ concurred and accepted by all the organization or playing and putting a noose on the neck of the neophyte or recruit, making
fraternity members during their initiation rites."214 the recruit or neophyte stand on the ledge of the fourth floor of the building facing outside,
asking him to jump outside after making him turn around several times but the reality is that
We agree with the Solicitor General. he will be made to jump towards the inside portion of the building – these are the mental or
psychological tests that are resorted to by these organizations, sororities or fraternities. The
The foregoing testimony of witness Marquez reveals a glaring mistake of substantial doctors who appeared during the public hearing testified that such acts can result in some
proportion on the part of the CA – it mistook the utterances of Dizon for those of Villareal. mental aberration, that they can even lead to psychosis, neurosis or insanity. This is what
Such inaccuracy cannot be tolerated, especially because it was the CA’s primary basis for we want to prevent.217 (Emphasis supplied)
finding that Villarreal had the intent to kill Lenny Villa, thereby making Villareal guilty of the
intentional felony of homicide. To repeat, according to Bienvenido Marquez’s testimony, as Thus, without proof beyond reasonable doubt, Dizon’s behavior must not be automatically
reproduced above, it was Dizon who uttered both "accusations" against Villa and Marquez; viewed as evidence of a genuine, evil motivation to kill Lenny Villa. Rather, it must be taken
Villareal had no participation whatsoever in the specific threats referred to by the CA. It was within the context of the fraternity’s psychological initiation. This Court points out that it was
"Boyet Dizon [who] stepped on [Marquez’s] thigh"; and who told witness Marquez, "[I]to, not even established whether the fathers of Dizon and Villa really had any familiarity with
yung pamilya nito ay pinapatay yung kapatid ko." It was also Dizon who jumped on Villa’s each other as would lend credence to the veracity of Dizon’s threats. The testimony of
thighs while saying, "[T]his guy, his father stole the parking space of my father." With the Lenny’s co-neophyte, Marquez, only confirmed this view. According to Marquez, he "knew it
testimony clarified, we find that the CA had no basis for concluding the existence of intent to was not true and that [Dizon] was just making it up…."218 Even the trial court did not give
kill based solely thereon. weight to the utterances of Dizon as constituting intent to kill: "[T]he cumulative acts of all
the accused were not directed toward killing Villa, but merely to inflict physical harm as part
As to the existence of animus interficendi on the part of Dizon, we refer to the entire factual of the fraternity initiation rites x x x."219 The Solicitor General shares the same view.
milieu and contextual premise of the incident to fully appreciate and understand the
testimony of witness Marquez. At the outset, the neophytes were briefed that they would be Verily, we cannot sustain the CA in finding the accused Dizon guilty of homicide under
subjected to psychological pressure in order to scare them. They knew that they would be Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code on the basis of the existence of intent to kill. Animus
mocked, ridiculed, and intimidated. They heard fraternity members shout, "Patay ka, interficendi cannot and should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable
Recinto," "Yari ka, Recinto," "Villa, akin ka," "Asuncion, gulpi ka," "Putang ina mo, doubt of such intent.220 Instead, we adopt and reinstate the finding of the trial court in part,
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insofar as it ruled that none of the fraternity members had the specific intent to kill Lenny In People v. Regato, we ruled that malicious intent must be judged by the action, conduct,
Villa.221 and external acts of the accused.227 What persons do is the best index of their intention.228
We have also ruled that the method employed, the kind of weapon used, and the parts of
The existence of animus iniuriandi or malicious intent to injure not proven beyond the body on which the injury was inflicted may be determinative of the intent of the
reasonable doubt perpetrator.229 The Court shall thus examine the whole contextual background surrounding
the death of Lenny Villa.
The Solicitor General argues, instead, that there was an intent to inflict physical injuries on
Lenny Villa. Echoing the Decision of the trial court, the Solicitor General then posits that Lenny died during Aquila’s fraternity initiation rites. The night before the commencement of
since all of the accused fraternity members conspired to inflict physical injuries on Lenny the rites, they were briefed on what to expect. They were told that there would be physical
Villa and death ensued, all of them should be liable for the crime of homicide pursuant to beatings, that the whole event would last for three days, and that they could quit anytime.
Article 4(1) of the Revised Penal Code. On their first night, they were subjected to "traditional" initiation rites, including the "Indian
Run," "Bicol Express," "Rounds," and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round." The beatings were
In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the predominantly directed at the neophytes’ arms and legs.
Revised Penal Code,222 the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since In the morning of their second day of initiation, they were made to present comic plays and
injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat. If to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite the Aquila
there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, Fraternity’s principles. Late in the afternoon, they were once again subjected to "traditional"
in case of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific animus initiation rituals. When the rituals were officially reopened on the insistence of Dizon and
iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a Villareal, the neophytes were subjected to another "traditional" ritual – paddling by the
person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without fraternity.
proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting
physical injuries per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an During the whole initiation rites, auxiliaries were assigned to the neophytes. The auxiliaries
intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless protected the neophytes by functioning as human barriers and shielding them from those
his intentions are.223 who were designated to inflict physical and psychological pain on the initiates.230 It was their
regular duty to stop foul or excessive physical blows; to help the neophytes to "pump" their
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances224 that the mere infliction of physical injuries, legs in order that their blood would circulate; to facilitate a rest interval after every physical
absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional activity or "round"; to serve food and water; to tell jokes; to coach the initiates; and to give
felony. In Bagajo v. People,225 the accused teacher, using a bamboo stick, whipped one of them whatever they needed.
her students behind her legs and thighs as a form of discipline. The student suffered lesions
and bruises from the corporal punishment. In reversing the trial court’s finding of criminal These rituals were performed with Lenny’s consent.231 A few days before the "rites," he
liability for slight physical injuries, this Court stated thus: "Independently of any civil or asked both his parents for permission to join the Aquila Fraternity.232 His father knew that
administrative responsibility … [w]e are persuaded that she did not do what she had done Lenny would go through an initiation process and would be gone for three days.233 The CA
with criminal intent … the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not found as follows:
motivated by ill-will, hatred or any malevolent intent." Considering the applicable laws, we
then ruled that "as a matter of law, petitioner did not incur any criminal liability for her act of It is worth pointing out that the neophytes willingly and voluntarily consented to undergo
whipping her pupil." In People v. Carmen,226 the accused members of the religious group physical initiation and hazing. As can be gleaned from the narration of facts, they voluntarily
known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima – under the guise of a "ritual or treatment" agreed to join the initiation rites to become members of the Aquila Legis Fraternity. Prior to
– plunged the head of the victim into a barrel of water, banged his head against a bench, the initiation, they were given briefings on what to expect. It is of common knowledge that
pounded his chest with fists, and stabbed him on the side with a kitchen knife, in order to before admission in a fraternity, the neophytes will undergo a rite of passage. Thus, they
cure him of "nervous breakdown" by expelling through those means the bad spirits were made aware that traditional methods such as mocking, psychological tests and
possessing him. The collective acts of the group caused the death of the victim. Since physical punishment would take place. They knew that the initiation would involve beatings
malicious intent was not proven, we reversed the trial court’s finding of liability for murder and other forms of hazing. They were also told of their right and opportunity to quit at any
under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code and instead ruled that the accused should be time they wanted to. In fact, prosecution witness Navera testified that accused Tecson told
held criminally liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 him that "after a week, you can already play basketball." Prosecution witness Marquez for
thereof. his part, admitted that he knew that the initiates would be hit "in the arms and legs," that a
wooden paddle would be used to hit them and that he expected bruises on his arms and
Indeed, the threshold question is whether the accused’s initial acts of inflicting physical pain legs…. Indeed, there can be no fraternity initiation without consenting neophytes.234
on the neophytes were attended by animus iniuriandi amounting to a felonious act (Emphasis supplied)
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, thereby making it subject to Article 4(1) thereof.

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Even after going through Aquila’s grueling traditional rituals during the first day, Lenny Senator Lina. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority,
continued his participation and finished the second day of initiation. fraternity or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already
resulted in these specific acts or results, Mr. President.
Based on the foregoing contextual background, and absent further proof showing clear
malicious intent, we are constrained to rule that the specific animus iniuriandi was not That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
present in this case. Even if the specific acts of punching, kicking, paddling, and other association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member
modes of inflicting physical pain were done voluntarily, freely, and with intelligence, thereby without being held criminally liable.
satisfying the elements of freedom and intelligence in the felony of physical injuries, the
fundamental ingredient of criminal intent was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the xxx xxx xxx
contrary, all that was proven was that the acts were done pursuant to tradition. Although the
additional "rounds" on the second night were held upon the insistence of Villareal and Senator Guingona. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
Dizon, the initiations were officially reopened with the consent of the head of the initiation distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not
rites; and the accused fraternity members still participated in the rituals, including the seeking the punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the
paddling, which were performed pursuant to tradition. Other than the paddle, no other punishment of certain acts that resulted in death, et cetera as a result of hazing which are
"weapon" was used to inflict injuries on Lenny. The targeted body parts were predominantly already covered crimes.
the legs and the arms. The designation of roles, including the role of auxiliaries, which were The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive
assigned for the specific purpose of lending assistance to and taking care of the neophytes hazing, but it may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses,
during the initiation rites, further belied the presence of malicious intent. All those who because these very same acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
wished to join the fraternity went through the same process of "traditional" initiation; there is
no proof that Lenny Villa was specifically targeted or given a different treatment. We stress That is my difficulty, Mr. President.
that Congress itself recognized that hazing is uniquely different from common crimes.235
The totality of the circumstances must therefore be taken into consideration. Senator Lina. x x x

The underlying context and motive in which the infliction of physical injuries was rooted may Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or
also be determined by Lenny’s continued participation in the initiation and consent to the group of persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization,
method used even after the first day. The following discussion of the framers of the 1995 the intent to commit a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in
Anti-Hazing Law is enlightening: these specific crimes, Mr. President, let us say there is death or there is homicide,
mutilation, if one files a case, then the intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if
Senator Guingona. Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised the crime of hazing is the basis, what is important is the result from the act of hazing.
Penal Code.
To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President. fraternities; that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these
fraternities or sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that
Senator Guingona. If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be acts of lasciviousness are even committed initially, Mr. President.
murder or homicide.
So, what we want to discourage is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President. need to institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority
Senator Guingona. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious ay magre-recruit. Wala talaga silang intensiyong makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at
physical injuries. buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang
intensiyong patayin talaga iyong neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President. natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin
natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at
Senator Guingona. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."
under rape or acts of lasciviousness.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Lina. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I
Senator Guingona. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent
of the crime of hazing? that resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the
acts of lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the
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accused in proving or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation Senator Biazon. Mr. President, this Representation has no objection to the inclusion of
where we create the special crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the sodomy as one of the conditions resulting from hazing as necessary to be punished.
basic elements of any crime. However, the act of sodomy can be committed by two persons with or without consent.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no To make it clearer, what is being punished here is the commission of sodomy forced into
offense. And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to another individual by another individual. I move, Mr. President, that sodomy be modified by
initiate, the intent to have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What the phrase "without consent" for purposes of this section.
are punishable are the acts that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be
proven by intent, but just because there was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic Senator Lina. I am afraid, Mr. President, that if we qualify sodomy with the concept that it is
concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr. President. only going to aggravate the crime of hazing if it is done without consent will change a lot of
concepts here. Because the results from hazing aggravate the offense with or without
Senator Lina. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in consent. In fact, when a person joins a fraternity, sorority, or any association for that matter,
the context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct it can be with or without the consent of the intended victim. The fact that a person joins a
hazing, no one will admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already sorority or fraternity with his consent does not negate the crime of hazing.
criminalizing the fact of inflicting physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we
want it stopped, deterred, discouraged. This is a proposed law intended to protect the citizens from the malpractices that attend
initiation which may have been announced with or without physical infliction of pain or injury,
If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill Mr. President. Regardless of whether there is announcement that there will be physical
or the masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. hazing or whether there is none, and therefore, the neophyte is duped into joining a
Otherwise, the masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape fraternity is of no moment. What is important is that there is an infliction of physical pain.
responsibility and say, "We did not have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites.
This is normal. We do not have any intention to kill or maim." The bottom line of this law is that a citizen even has to be protected from himself if he joins
a fraternity, so that at a certain point in time, the State, the individual, or the parents of the
This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the victim can run after the perpetrators of the crime, regardless of whether or not there was
ordinary crime of homicide, mutilation, et cetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty consent on the part of the victim.
proving the elements if they are separate offenses.
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Lina. Mr. President, I understand the position taken by the distinguished
Senator Guingona. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person Gentleman from Cavite and Metro Manila. It is correct that society sometimes adopts new
died. The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the mores, traditions, and practices.
prosecution have to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
In this bill, we are not going to encroach into the private proclivities of some individuals
Senator Lina. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x when they do their acts in private as we do not take a peek into the private rooms of
couples. They can do their thing if they want to make love in ways that are not considered
Senator Guingona. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove acceptable by the mainstream of society. That is not something that the State should
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not? prohibit.
Senator Lina. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may
need to prove intent to kill. even be entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done
with the consent of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing
Senator Guingona. But the charge is murder. not punishable because the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.
Senator Lina. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it
President. 236 (Emphasis supplied) upon himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with
During a discussion between Senator Biazon and Senator Lina on the issue of whether to the consent of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no
include sodomy as a punishable act under the Anti-Hazing Law, Senator Lina further significance if we pass this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed
clarified thus: the infliction of pain or suffering. He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

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But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the being no proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of malicious intent to inflict
defense of consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or physical injuries or animus iniuriandi as required in mala in se cases, considering the
psychological suffering is, by itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like contextual background of his death, the unique nature of hazing, and absent a law
death or physical injuries merely aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense prohibiting hazing.
of consent is not going to nullify the criminal nature of the act.
The accused fraternity members guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is
committed without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
collapse. fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3
Senator Biazon. Thank you, Mr. President. thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
Senator Lina. Thank you very much.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from
The President. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an
hears none; the same is approved.237 inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it.241 In
this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor.242 In contrast,
(Emphasis supplied) simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an
Realizing the implication of removing the state’s burden to prove intent, Senator Lina, the injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill.243 Here, the
principal author of the Senate Bill, said: threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible. 244

I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or The test245 for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows:
whether there it is mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed foresee
the point that he wants to go to. harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the
If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.246
will not include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not
foreclose that suggestion, Mr. President.238 (Emphasis supplied) As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the
degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.
247 If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person
Thus, having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle
of mala in se adhered to under the Revised Penal Code, Congress did not simply enact an is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to
amendment thereto. Instead, it created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury.248 In contrast, if the danger is
of mala prohibita. This dilemma faced by Congress is further proof of how the nature of minor, not much care is required.249 It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of
hazing – unique as against typical crimes – cast a cloud of doubt on whether society precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of
considered the act as an inherently wrong conduct or mala in se at the time. It is safe to care to the most vigilant effort."250 The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of
presume that Lenny’s parents would not have consented239 to his participation in Aquila care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.251
Fraternity’s initiation rites if the practice of hazing were considered by them as mala in se.
There was patent recklessness in the hazing of Lenny Villa.
Furthermore, in Vedaña v. Valencia (1998), we noted through Associate Justice (now retired
Chief Justice) Hilario Davide that "in our nation’s very recent history, the people have According to the NBI medico-legal officer, Lenny died of cardiac failure secondary to
spoken, through Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of … hazing, [an] act[] previously multiple traumatic injuries.252 The officer explained that cardiac failure refers to the failure of
considered harmless by custom, as criminal."240 Although it may be regarded as a simple the heart to work as a pump and as part of the circulatory system due to the lack of blood.
253 In the present case, the victim’s heart could no longer work as a pumping organ,
obiter dictum, the statement nonetheless shows recognition that hazing – or the conduct of
initiation rites through physical and/or psychological suffering – has not been traditionally because it was deprived of its requisite blood and oxygen.254 The deprivation was due to the
criminalized. Prior to the 1995 Anti-Hazing Law, there was to some extent a lacuna in the "channeling" of the blood supply from the entire circulatory system – including the heart,
law; hazing was not clearly considered an intentional felony. And when there is doubt on the arteries, veins, venules, and capillaries – to the thigh, leg, and arm areas of Lenny, thus
interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the accused. In dubio pro reo. causing the formation of multiple hematomas or blood clots.255 The multiple hematomas
were wide, thick, and deep,256 indicating that these could have resulted mainly from injuries
For the foregoing reasons, and as a matter of law, the Court is constrained to rule against sustained by the victim from fist blows, knee blows, paddles, or the like.257 Repeated blows
the trial court’s finding of malicious intent to inflict physical injuries on Lenny Villa, there to those areas caused the blood to gradually ooze out of the capillaries until the circulating
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blood became so markedly diminished as to produce death. 258 The officer also found that the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating
the brain, liver, kidney, pancreas, intestines, and all other organs seen in the abdominals, as circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties.
well as the thoracic organ in the lungs, were pale due to the lack of blood, which was
redirected to the thighs and forearms.259 It was concluded that there was nothing in the It is truly astonishing how men would wittingly – or unwittingly –impose the misery of hazing
heart that would indicate that the victim suffered from a previous cardiac arrest or disease. and employ appalling rituals in the name of brotherhood. There must be a better way to
260 establish "kinship." A neophyte admitted that he joined the fraternity to have more friends
and to avail himself of the benefits it offered, such as tips during bar examinations.270
The multiple hematomas or bruises found in Lenny Villa’s arms and thighs, resulting from Another initiate did not give up, because he feared being looked down upon as a quitter,
repeated blows to those areas, caused the loss of blood from his vital organs and led to his and because he felt he did not have a choice.271 Thus, for Lenny Villa and the other
eventual death. These hematomas must be taken in the light of the hazing activities neophytes, joining the Aquila Fraternity entailed a leap in the dark. By giving consent under
performed on him by the Aquila Fraternity. According to the testimonies of the co-neophytes the circumstances, they left their fates in the hands of the fraternity members. Unfortunately,
of Lenny, they were punched, kicked, elbowed, kneed, stamped on; and hit with different the hands to which lives were entrusted were barbaric as they were reckless.
objects on their arms, legs, and thighs.261 They were also "paddled" at the back of their
thighs or legs;262 and slapped on their faces.263 They were made to play rough basketball.264 Our finding of criminal liability for the felony of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
Witness Marquez testified on Lenny, saying: "[T]inamaan daw sya sa spine."265 The NBI shall cover only accused Tecson, Ama, Almeda, Bantug, and Dizon. Had the Anti-Hazing
medico-legal officer explained that the death of the victim was the cumulative effect of the Law been in effect then, these five accused fraternity members would have all been
multiple injuries suffered by the latter.266 The relevant portion of the testimony is as follows: convicted of the crime of hazing punishable by reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment).272
Since there was no law prohibiting the act of hazing when Lenny died, we are constrained
Atty. Tadiar Doctor, there was, rather, it was your testimony on various cross examinations to rule according to existing laws at the time of his death. The CA found that the prosecution
of defense counsels that the injuries that you have enumerated on the body of the failed to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, Victorino et al.’s individual participation in the
deceased Lenny Villa previously marked as Exhibit "G-1" to "G-14" individually by infliction of physical injuries upon Lenny Villa.273 As to accused Villareal, his criminal liability
themselves would not cause the death of the victim. The question I am going to propound to was totally extinguished by the fact of his death, pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal
you is what is the cumulative effect of all of these injuries marked from Exhibit "G-1" to Code.
"G-14"?
Furthermore, our ruling herein shall be interpreted without prejudice to the applicability of
Witness All together nothing in concert to cause to the demise of the victim. So, it is not fair the Anti-Hazing Law to subsequent cases. Furthermore, the modification of criminal liability
for us to isolate such injuries here because we are talking of the whole body. At the same from slight physical injuries to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide shall apply only
manner that as a car would not run minus one (1) wheel. No, the more humane in human with respect to accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.
approach is to interpret all those injuries in whole and not in part.267
The accused liable to pay damages
There is also evidence to show that some of the accused fraternity members were drinking
during the initiation rites.268 The CA awarded damages in favor of the heirs of Lenny Villa in the amounts of ₱ 50,000 as
civil indemnity ex delicto and ₱ 1,000,000 as moral damages, to be jointly and severally
Consequently, the collective acts of the fraternity members were tantamount to paid by accused Dizon and Villareal. It also awarded the amount of ₱ 30,000 as indemnity
recklessness, which made the resulting death of Lenny a culpable felony. It must be to be jointly and severally paid by accused Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson.1âwphi1
remembered that organizations owe to their initiates a duty of care not to cause them injury
in the process.269 With the foregoing facts, we rule that the accused are guilty of reckless Civil indemnity ex delicto is automatically awarded for the sole fact of death of the victim.274
imprudence resulting in homicide. Since the NBI medico-legal officer found that the victim’s In accordance with prevailing jurisprudence,275 we sustain the CA’s award of indemnity in
death was the cumulative effect of the injuries suffered, criminal responsibility redounds to the amount of ₱ 50,000.
all those who directly participated in and contributed to the infliction of physical injuries.
The heirs of the victim are entitled to actual or compensatory damages, including expenses
It appears from the aforementioned facts that the incident may have been prevented, or at incurred in connection with the death of the victim, so long as the claim is supported by
least mitigated, had the alumni of Aquila Fraternity – accused Dizon and Villareal – tangible documents.276 Though we are prepared to award actual damages, the Court is
restrained themselves from insisting on reopening the initiation rites. Although this point did prevented from granting them, since the records are bereft of any evidence to show that
not matter in the end, as records would show that the other fraternity members participated actual expenses were incurred or proven during trial. Furthermore, in the appeal, the
in the reopened initiation rites – having in mind the concept of "seniority" in fraternities – the Solicitor General does not interpose any claim for actual damages.277
implication of the presence of alumni should be seen as a point of review in future
legislation. We further note that some of the fraternity members were intoxicated during The heirs of the deceased may recover moral damages for the grief suffered on account of
Lenny’s initiation rites. In this light, the Court submits to Congress, for legislative the victim’s death.278 This penalty is pursuant to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, which
consideration, the amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and provides that the "spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and the ascendants of

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the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of said newspaper, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously, maliciously, and with
the deceased."279 Thus, we hereby we affirm the CA’s award of moral damages in the intent to impeach the honesty, virtue, and reputation of one Ramon Sotelo as member of
amount of ₱ 1,000,000. the bar of the Philippine Islands and as a private individual, and to expose him to public
hatred, contempt and ridicule, compose, print, edit, publish, and circulate and procure to be
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon composed, printed, edited, published, and circulated in said newspaper's issue of the above
guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and set aside IN PART. The appealed Judgment in mentioned date, September 25, 1913, a certain false and malicious defamation and libel in
G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, the English language of and concerning the said Ramon Sotelo, which reads as follows:
Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED and
set aside in part. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, " 'OWNERS FIRED BUILDING TO COLLECT INSURANCE.
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in CRIMINAL CHARGES FOLLOW CIVIL SUIT.
relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, " 'Conspiracy divulged in three sworn statements made by members of the party after a
to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition, family disagreement. Sensational statement sworn to. Mystery of Calle O'Donnell fire
accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity solved and papers served.
ex delicto in the amount of ₱ 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of ₱ 1,000,000, " 'Conspiracy to defraud the insurance company.
plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of
this Decision until satisfaction.280 Costs de oficio. " 'The building was fired to collect the amount of insurance.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby affirmed. " 'The movable furniture of value was removed before the fire.
The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the criminal case filed
against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise affirmed. Finally, pursuant to " 'The full amount of the insurance was collected, and the conspiracy was a success.
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby
dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed closed and " 'The above is the gist of the sworn statements of Vicente Sotelo and Eugenio Martin in
TERMINATED. connection with the fire that destroyed house No. 2157 Calle O'Donnell on April 4.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the " 'The case in question is a sensational one to say the least, and the court is being
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing petitioned to set aside the ruling and cite the parties to show cause why they should not be
Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni fraternity cited to answer charges of conspiracy to defraud.
members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the applicable
penalties. SO ORDERED. " 'On April 4,1913, the house located at 2157 Calle O'Donnell was destroyed by fire. The
house was insured for P5,000, the contents for an additional P5,000, with the West of
Scotland Insurance Association, of which Lutz & Co. are the local agents, with an additional
P1,500 with Smith, Bell & Co.
28 Phil. 599
"'The full amount of the insurance on the property was paid by the agents of the insurance
companies and the matter apparently dropped from the records.

JOHNSON, J.: " 'Then there was internal trouble and information began to leak out which resulted in
sensational statements to the effect that the destruction of the property had been an act of
This was an action for criminal libel. incendiarism in order to collect the insurance. Then there was an investigation started and it
resulted in sworn statements of the three persons above mentioned.
The complaint alleged:
" 'Notarial returns were made yesterday by the sheriff, based on the sworn statements and
"That on the 25th day of September, 1913, the said Carson Taylor, being then and there the the parties are cited to appear in court and show cause.
acting editor and proprietor, manager, printer, and publisher in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, of a certain daily bilingual newspaper, edited in the English and Spanish " "The investigation also showed that the furniture, which was supposed to be in the house
languages, and known as the 'Manila Daily Bulletin,' a paper of large circulation throughout at the time of the conflagration and which was paid for by the insurance agents, sworn
the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other countries in all of which statements having been made that it was destroyed in the fire, was in a certain house in
both languages are spoken and written, and having as such the supervision and control of Montalban, where it was identified upon the sworn statements of the above mentioned.

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Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of tne attorney for the plaintiff "Fourth. The court erred in holding that the article was libelous, while finding that there was
who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal proceedings no malice.
will be brought as well as against the original owners.
"Fifth. The court erred in finding that the alleged libel, ous article referred to attorney Ramon
" 'Attorney Burke, who represents Lutz & Co. in the proceedings, was seen last night and Sotelo.
asked for a statement as to the case. Mr. Burke refused to talk on the case and stated that
when it came to trial it would be time enough to obtain the facts. "Sixth. The court erred in finding that Ramon Sotelo was attorney for the plaintiffs in case
No. 10191, when the alleged libel was published."
" 'The present action came before the court on a motion of Attorney Burke to set aside the
judgment, which, in the original case, gave the owners of the property judgment for the After a careful examination of the record and the arguments presented by the appellant, we
amount of the insurance. deem it necessary to discuss only the first and second assignments of error.

"'Attorney Burke filed the sworn statements with the court and the notarial returns to the In the Philippine Islands there exist no crimes such as are known in the United States and
same were made yesterday afternoon, the sworn statements as to the burning of the house England as common law crimes. No act constitutes a crime here unless it is made so by
being in the hands of the sheriff. law. Libel is made a crime here by Act No. 277 of the United States Philippine Commission.
Said Act
"'It was stated yesterday that a criminal action would follow the civil proceedings instituted
to recover the funds in the case entitled on the court records, Maria Mortera de Eceiza and (No. 277) not only defines the crime of libel and prescribes the particular conditions
Manuel Eceiza versus the West of Scotland Association, Limited, No. 10191 on the court necessary to constitute it, but it also names the persons who may be guilty of such crime. In
records. the present case the complaint alleges that the defendant was, at the time of the publication
of said alleged article "the acting editor, proprietor, manager, printer, publisher, etc. etc. of a
" 'It might be stated also that Eugenio Martin was one of the plaintiffs in the recent suit certain bilingual, newspaper, etc., known as the 'Manila Daily Bulletin, a paper of large
brought against Ex-Governor W. Cameron Forbes for lumber supplied for his Boston home.' circulation throughout the Philippine Islands, as well as in the United States and other
countries."
"That in this article is contained the following paragraph. to wit:
It will be noted that the complaint charges the defendant as "the acting editor, proprietor,
" ' * * *. Implicated in the charges of conspiracy and fraud is the name of the attorney for the manager, printer, and publisher." From an examination of said Act No. 277, we find that
plaintiff who made affidavit as to the burning of the house and against whom criminal section 6 provides that: "Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, newspaper, or serial
proceedings will be brought as well as against the original owners,' by which the said publication is chargeable with the.publication of any words contained in any part of said
accused meant to refer and did refer to the said Ramon Sotelo, who then and there was the book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of the same."
attorney for the plaintiff in the case aforesaid, No. 10191 of the Court of First Instance of the
city of Manila, and so was understood by the public who read the same; that the statements By an examination of said article, with reference to the persons who may be liable for the
and allegations made in said paragraph are wholly false and untrue, thus impeaching the publication of a libel in a newspaper, we find that it only provides for the punishment of "the
honesty, virtue, and reputation of the said offended party as a member of the bar of the author, editor, or proprietor." It would follow, therefore, that unless the proof shows that the
Philippine Islands and as a private individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt defendant in the present case is the "author, editor, or proprietor" of the newspaper in which
and ridicule. Contrary to law." the libel was published, he can not be held liable.

Upon said complaint the defendant was arrested, arraigned, plead not guilty, was tried, In the present case the Solicitor-General in his brief said that "No person is represented to
found guilty of the crime charged, and sentenced by the Honorable George N. Hurd, judge, be either the 'author, editor, or proprietor.'" That statement of the Solicitor-General is fully
to pay a fine of P200. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made sustained by the record. There is not a word of proof in the record showing: that the
the following assignments of error: defendant was either the "atithor, the editor, or the proprietor." The proof shows that the
defendant was the "manager." He must, therefore, be acquitted of the crime charged
"First. The court erred in finding that the defendant was responsible for and guilty of the against him, unless it is shown by the proof that he, as "manager" of the newspaper, was in
alleged libel. some way directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained
in said alleged libelous article. The prosecution presented the newspaper, the "Manila Daily
"Second. The court erred in finding that the defendant was the proprietor and publisher of Bulletin," for the purpose of showing the relation which the defendant had to it. That was the
the 'Manila Daily Bulletin. only proof presented by the prosecution to show the relation which the defendant had to the
"Third. The court erred in finding that the alleged Jibelous article was libelous per se. publication of the libel in question. From an examination of the editorial page of said exhibit,
we find that it shows that the "Manila Daily Bulletin" is owned by the "Bulletin Publishing
Company," and that the defendant was its manager. There is not a word of proof in the

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record which shows what relation the manager had to the publication of said newspaper. proprietor" of the newspaper. If he was in fact the "author, editor, or proprietor," he can not
We might, by a series of presumptions and assumptions, conclude that the manager of a escape responsibility by calling himself the "manager" or "printer." It is the relation which he
newspaper has some direct responsibility with its publication; We believe, however, that bears to the publication and not the name or title which he has assumed, which is important
such presumptions and assumptions, in the absence of a single letter of proof relating in an investigation. He can not wear the toga of author or editor and hide his responsibility
thereto, would be unwarranted and unjustified. The prosecuting attorney had an opportunity by giving himself some other name. While the terms "author, editor, and proprietor" of a
to present proof upon that question. Either because he had no proof or because no such newspaper are terms well defined, the particular words "author, editor, or proprietor" are not
proof was obtainable, he presented none. It certainly is not a difficult matter to ascertain material or important, further thati that they are words which are intended to show the
who is the real person responsible for the publication of a newspaper which is published relation of the responsible party to the publication. That relation may as well exist under
daily and has a wide circulation in a particular community. No question was asked the some other name or denomination.
defendant concerning his particular relation to the publication of the newspaper in question.
We do not desire to be understood in our conclusions here as holding that the "manager" or For the foregoing reasons, therefore, there being no proof whatever in the record showing
the "printer" may not, under certain conditions and proper proof, be held to be the "author, that the defendant was the "author, the editor, or the proprietor" of the newspaper in
editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. He may denominate himself as "manager' or "printer" question, the sentence of the lower court must be reversed, the complaint dismissed and
simply, and be at the same time the "author, editor; or proprietor" of the newspaper. He can the defendant discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de officio. So ordered.
not avoid responsibility by using some other term or" word, indicating his relation to the
newspaper or the publication, when, as a matter of fact, he is the "author, the editor, or the Arellano, C. J., Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.
proprietor" of the same. His real relation to the said publication is a matter of proof. The
Solicitor-General, in his brief, says that the defendant used the word "manager" with the
hope of evading legal responsibility, as the Libel Law places the responsibility for publishing G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
a libel, on "every author, editor, or proprietor of any book, etc." Had the prosecuting attorney
in the trial of the cause believed that the defendant, even though he called himself the LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
"manager" was, in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of said publication, he should have
presented some proof supporting that contention. Neither do we desire to be understood as vs.
holding that simply because a person connected with the publication of a newspaper who
calls himself the "manager" or "printer" may not, in fact and at the same time, be the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
"author, editor, or proprietor." The "author, editor, or proprietor" can not avoid responsibility DECISION
for the writing and publication of a libelous article, by simply calling himself the "manager" or
the "printer" of a newspaper. That, however, is a question of proof. The burden is upon the PERALTA, J.:
prosecution to show that the defendant is, by whatever name he may call himself, in truth
and in fact, the "author, editor, or proprietor" of a newspaper. The courts cannot assume, in This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
the absence of proof, that one who called himself "manager" was in fact the "author, editor, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set
or proprietor." We might assume, perhaps, that the "manager" of a newspaper plays an aside the Decision1 dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the
important part in the publication of the same by virtue of the general signification of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision3 dated July 30, 2004
word "manager," Men can not, however, be sentenced upon the basis of a mere of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the petitioner
assumption. There must be some proof. The word "manage" has been defined by Webster guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-
to mean "to have under control and direction; to conduct; to guide; to administer; to treat; to paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code.
handle." Webster defines "manager" to be "one who manages; a conductor or director; as,
the manager of a theater." A manager, as that word is generally understood, we do not The antecedent facts follow.
believe includes the idea of ownership. Generally speaking it means one who is
representing another as an agent. That being true, his powers and duties and obligations Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in
are generally defined by contract. He may have expressed as well as implied powers, but Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant was then engaged in the business of
whatever his powers and duties are they must be dependent upon the nature of the lending money to casino players and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of
business and the terms of his contract. There is no fixed rule which indicates particularly jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and offered
and definitely his duties, powers and obligations. An examination into the character of the to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private complainant agreed, and as
business and the contract of his employment must be made for the purpose of ascertaining a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items: an 18k diamond ring for
definitely wliat his duties and obligations are. His exact relation is always a matter of proof. men; a woman's bracelet; one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an
It is incumbent upon the prosecution in a case like the present, to show that whatever title, aggregate value of ₱98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both agreed
name or designation the defendant may bear, he was, in fact, the "author, the editor, or the that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if unsold, to return the same
items, within a period of 60 days. The period expired without petitioner remitting the
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proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty
to meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items consisting of an imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS
entrusted to him, but to no avail. AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion Temporal in its minimum
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of
follows: ₱98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and SO ORDERED.
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, after having
received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1) men's diamond ring, 18k, worth ₱45,000.00; one The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and
(1) three-baht men's bracelet, 22k, worth ₱25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
worth ₱12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00),
Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004
proceeds of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with
in possession of the said items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that accused-appellant shall suffer the
confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did then and there indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own personal years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total
use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the
amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (₱98,000.00), Philippine currency, to the damage SO ORDERED.
and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount. Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the
CONTRARY TO LAW. present petition stating the following grounds:

On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION
guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE,
INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which
can be summarized, as follows: B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE
engaged in the financing business of extending loans to Base employees. For every UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
collection made, they earn a commission. Petitioner denied having transacted any business
with private complainant. 1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES
OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was REMITTED, IF SOLD;
made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same receipt was then dated May 2, 1991
and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of 2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION
jewelry, which he did not even see. AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO
BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in
the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states: C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY,
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE –
felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised WAS PROVED;
Penal Code;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND
the penalty imposable; REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -

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1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make
INCIDENT; the latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:

2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation
AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE; of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of
the Rules of Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE; of the accused;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE. the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. In the case
following counter-arguments: at bar, a reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth (5th) day of
admissibility. July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of the
same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph
the offense and the acts complained of. 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or
property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside from the fact that the date of
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged. the commission thereof is not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure
of the prosecution to specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit. defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which accused-appellant
should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant,
weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the therefore, cannot now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges
findings are totally devoid of support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous proferred against him.7
as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.4 Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in
affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court raising both It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article
procedural and substantive issues. 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although mentioned hereinbelow.
the same was merely a photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the
records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the 1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant. The CA
also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to xxxx
the prosecution's formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.
The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for
waived.5 administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond;
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
Information filed against him. He contends that the Information does not contain the period
when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be returned and that the date when the crime The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or
occurred was different from the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
untenable. The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially complete and administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to
in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property
cannot be made for the first time on appeal. It is true that the gravamen of the crime of by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or
estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the owner6 and that the time of the offended party on the offender.8
occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and
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Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand.10 Demand need not
party on the offender, was not proved. This Court disagrees. In his testimony, private even be formal; it may be verbal.11 The specific word "demand" need not even be used to
complainant narrated how he was able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from show that it has indeed been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as
the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items with the to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount to a demand.
latter promising to pay them. Thus: 12 As expounded in Asejo v. People:13

PROS. MARTINEZ With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind
of estafa need not be formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have with regard to the form of demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came?
When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be
a I went looking for him, sir. necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the word "demand" should be
interpreted in its general meaning as to include both written and oral demand. Thus, the
q For whom? failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.
a Lito Corpuz, sir. In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money
q Were you able to look (sic) for him? entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:

a I looked for him for a week, sir. x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the
crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds
q Did you know his residence? or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way,
however, be established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar.14
a Yes, sir.
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the
q Did you go there? existence of all the elements of the crime. Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of
jewelry in trust, or on commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
a Yes, sir. obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold. There was
misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of jewelry
q Did you find him? sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the
a No, sir. agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991? Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the
same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this
a I talked to him, sir. Court gives great respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity
to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the witness stand, an
q How many times? opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the records of the case.15 The
assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness
a Two times, sir. or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such
finding is affirmed by the CA.16 Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by
q What did you talk (sic) to him? the quality of their testimonies, for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the
a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir. witnesses are to be weighed not numbered.17

q Referring to Exhibit A-2? As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating on this case, the
question of the continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items property came up. The legislature apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the
are and he promised me that he will pay these amount, sir. money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the members
of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of first
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full? impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court en banc for consideration and
resolution. Thus, several amici curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their
a No, sir.9 academic opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose
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Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege," that
President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The parties were later heard is, that there can exist no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided
on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as for by penal statute.
counsel de oficio of the petitioner.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not deem it necessary
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless
the following: to punish such act.

There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence
courts continue to impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the on the ground that the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause
amount of damage measured by the value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the
this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the penalties provided for in the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court's decisions, as that would be
encroaching upon the power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C.
render the whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño-Aquino, in their book, The Revised
framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this matter by including Article 5, Penal Code,21 echoed the above-cited commentary, thus:
which reads:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or
not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has justness of the penalties fixed by law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon
knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by conviction of violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough, are
law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is the duty of the
Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given
made the subject of penal legislation. penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment."
A petition for clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on
sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the the current inflation rate or at the ratio of ₱1.00 is equal to ₱100.00 . However, it would be
imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and dangerous as this would result in uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the
the injury caused by the offense.18 penalties. It must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed
imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties will not
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-amending law. Had the framers of the RPC
which is not punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to intended that to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier
render the proper decision and thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present legislature has
Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in order to conform with the present
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the subject of any times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter
penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously
that act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to
except for the situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding broaden the coverage of those who violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its
penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy therefore, as in the first original minimum amount of ₱100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it to
paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to the Chief ₱50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon which
Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply, from ₱1,000,000.00 to ₱500,000.00.
with the act committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of
the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty. It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not
seem to be excessive compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code,19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that penalties. In Theft, the provisions state that:
in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a
recommendation for an amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
to be harsh. Thus:
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1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the
stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the
thing stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one minimum and the maximum amounts, which is the basis of determining the proper penalty
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose caused:
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be. I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the
penalties are not changed:
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of
the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos. 1. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00 will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punished by
prision mayor minimum to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos. 2. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punished by
prision correccional medium and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the day to 6 years).24
value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
3. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by prision
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
pesos. months).

6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 4. ₱50.00 to ₱200.00 will become ₱5,000.00 to ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor
pesos. medium to prision correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).

7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the 5. ₱5.00 to ₱50.00 will become ₱500.00 to ₱5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1
circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the month and 1 day to 6 months).
thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of
any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made applicable. 6. ₱5.00 will become ₱500.00, punishable by arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor
medium.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of
the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of x x x x.
hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his
family. II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but
the penalties are not changed, as follows:
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is ₱6,000.00, the above-provision states that
the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day 1st. ₱12,000.00 to ₱22,000.00, will become ₱1,200,000.00 to ₱2,200,000.00, punishable
to 4 years and 2 months). Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is by prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to
₱6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision 8 years).25
correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). It would seem 2nd. ₱6,000.00 to ₱12,000.00 will become ₱600,000.00 to ₱1,200,000.00, punishable by
that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty prision correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4
proposed. In fact, after the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the years and 2 months).26
existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum
penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1 day to 6 3rd. ₱200.00 to ₱6,000.00 will become ₱20,000.00 to ₱600,000.00, punishable by arresto
months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said minimum mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
period and may even apply for probation. Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum months).
penalty after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum
period to arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the 4th. ₱200.00 will become ₱20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months
minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that the present penalty and 1 day to 6 months).
imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The same is also true in the crime of Estafa.23

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An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is DEAN DIOKNO:
that the incremental penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal
Protection Clause. Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule
unconstitutional, then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according
to a valid classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of JUSTICE PERALTA:
reasonableness,27 which has four requisites:
But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (₱100,000.00) Pesos ...

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; DEAN DIOKNO:

(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and Well, my presen ... (interrupted)

(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.28 JUSTICE PERALTA:

According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial For every One Hundred Thousand (₱100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty-Two
distinctions as ₱10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year,
which violates the first requisite; the IPR was devised so that those who commit estafa did I get you right?
involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer
achieved, because a person who steals ₱142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as DEAN DIOKNO:
someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
violates requisite no. 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time
the law was promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today. JUSTICE PERALTA:
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the Ah ...
incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause,
what then is the penalty that should be applied in case the amount of the thing subject DEAN DIOKNO:
matter of the crime exceeds ₱22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more
questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law...
is to refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate
laws. JUSTICE PERALTA:

Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, But if we de ... (interrupted)
the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus: DEAN DIOKNO:
xxxx ....then....
JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix
unconstitutional because it is absurd. the amount ...
DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment. No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than ... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand
Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos. (₱22,000.00) Pesos.

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DEAN DIOKNO: form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a sentence
is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense,
No, Your Honor. and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or
JUSTICE PERALTA: to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences imposed for commission of the
The Court cannot do that. same crime in other jurisdictions.

DEAN DIOKNO: However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in
Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of
Could not be. South Dakota after it took into account the latter’s recidivist statute and not the original
penalty for uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the crime
JUSTICE PERALTA: would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine. Nonetheless, respondent
was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s
The only remedy is to go to Congress... recidivist statute because of his six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents
of Solem are different from the present controversy.
DEAN DIOKNO:
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty
Yes, Your Honor. for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty
JUSTICE PERALTA: against a domestic servant is the fact that in the commission of the crime, the helper will
essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After
... and determine the value or the amount. accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon
such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and properties, a
DEAN DIOKNO: subsequent betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a
higher penalty to deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
Yes, Your Honor.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the
JUSTICE PERALTA: subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious
implications. For example, in the crime of Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on
That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty-Two the amount of the money malversed by the public official, thus:
Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any
DEAN DIOKNO: public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
Yes, Your Honor. property, shall appropriate the same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
JUSTICE PERALTA: funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (₱22,000.00) Pesos.
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
Thank you, Dean. involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO: 2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved
is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
Thank you.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum
x x x x29 period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve
thousand pesos.
Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel
and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States 4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount
Federal Supreme Court has expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If
prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just its

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the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum ₱20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of ₱200.00 under the existing law will now
period to reclusion perpetua. become ₱20,000.00. The amount of Fine under this situation will now become excessive
and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC.33 Unless we also amend Article
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total 26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the
value of the property embezzled. same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly, may not be legally and
constitutionally feasible.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected
evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. by the proposal, such as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based
on the value of the damage caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or usurpation of real
the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms
₱200.00 (under the existing law), the amount now becomes ₱20,000.00 and the penalty is of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328
prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and 1 day to 6 (Special cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues,
years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement of ₱20,000.00 public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be
compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public treasury and similar offenses),
Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions),
wherein the injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary
amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years)32 under the Anti-Graft Law will now Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of
become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of malversation, the accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a responsible public officer to
public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of the render accounts before leaving the country).
government entrusted to him.
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will also affect crimes
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited which are punishable by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section
or uninhabited) where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering,
are the bases of the penalty imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as
of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused. grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft.35 Under the law, the offender shall
be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the Code, which means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value
thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now of the timber or forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said proposal
be the value of the thing unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging be amended also in so far
entering the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of Qualified as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of
Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the former is the RPC? The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not
punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months in question.
and 1 day to 6 years) and a fine not exceeding ₱1,000.00 (₱100,000.00 now if the ratio is
1:100) where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and
justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with force upon things, it is Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a
punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity and necessity. There may be some
unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to
is the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking. conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a
study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can the competence of the Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public
be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 hearings on the matter, consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide
months) if the value of the damage caused exceeds ₱1,000.00, but under the proposal, the whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or even create a new
value of the damage will now become ₱100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by arresto legislation which will adopt to the times.
mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of the damaged property does not
exceed ₱200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than the value of the Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal
damage caused and not more than ₱200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present,
₱200.00 or cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, ₱200.00 will now become
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fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, Article 222039 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be
37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the
promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and cultural settings were far suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil
different from today’s conditions. indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.

Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as
not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive
or construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of in nature. Whether or not they are excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that
interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a should be left to lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially
construction which is repugnant to its terms.38 The Court should apply the law in a manner when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that which is plainly
that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent written.
and purpose. Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary
function of a co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of judicial legislation. incremental penalty provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts
should only impose the penalty corresponding to the amount of ₱22,000.00, regardless if
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, the actual amount involved exceeds ₱22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now until the
it can be increased by the Court when appropriate. Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides: law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be punished by the
appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the
least three thousand pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the application of the law has
addition: no legal basis and directly runs counter to what the law provides.
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 765940 in December
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent 1993. The said law has been questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re-
death; imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346,41 the Court did not impede
the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a "cruel punishment" within the
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, purview of Section 19 (1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of
the recipient who is not an heir called to the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or Congress suspending the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and
intestate succession, may demand support from the person causing the death, for a period not via the intervention of the Court.
not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased provision of the law from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. action. Not only is it violative of due process, considering that the State and the concerned
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled that
restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because constitutionality
latter by the accused, which in a sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally,43 more so in the present controversy
indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of money as Revised Penal Code.
restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is
contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in
imposition of the proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the respect of duration or amount, and applies to punishments which public sentiment has
value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same reasoning that would regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it is apparent from Article 2206 that the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine and
law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is ₱3,000.00. The imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition.44
law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot
be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty
increased when the present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute
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is severe does not make it cruel and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held Yes.
that to come under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly oppressive,"
"wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the JUSTICE PERALTA:
community."45
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it
to our modern time. PROFESSOR TADIAR:

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing
questioned monetary values to the present value of money based only on the current all of those economic terms.
inflation rate. There are other factors and variables that need to be taken into consideration, JUSTICE PERALTA:
researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly
adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio-economic Yeah, but ...
impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive
at a wholistic change that all of us believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, PROFESSOR TADIAR:
the Court is ill-equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public
hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these changes in our Revised And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value
Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor to One Hundred (₱100.00) Pesos to ...
Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
xxxx
Yeah.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso
you have to take into consideration several factors. ... One (₱1.00.00) Peso in 1930.

PROFESSOR TADIAR: JUSTICE PERALTA:

Yes. That is legislative in nature.

JUSTICE PERALTA: PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Per capita income. That is my position that the Supreme Court ...

PROFESSOR TADIAR: JUSTICE PERALTA:

Per capita income. Yeah, okay.

JUSTICE PERALTA: PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Consumer price index. ... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the
adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah.
Thank you, Professor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Inflation ...
Thank you.46
PROFESSOR TADIAR:

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Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which
that the role of the Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty
prevent injustice. Thus, in order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court into three equal portions of time included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of
should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider the each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and
proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation. Furthermore, the Court has in minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
the past taken into consideration "changed conditions" or "significant changes in
circumstances" in its decisions. Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years

Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
substance of a statute. The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in
crimes against persons, which the Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days49
like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to
presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. prisión mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my portion shall be deemed to form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51 In
Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation. Short of being the present case, the amount involved is ₱98,000.00, which exceeds ₱22,000.00, thus, the
repetitious and as extensively discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months
legislate laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should refrain from and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year
crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity, as elucidated before, this refers shall be added to the penalty for every additional ₱10,000.00 defrauded in excess of
to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is ₱22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
truly based on the value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as Considering that the amount of ₱98,000.00 is ₱76,000.00 more than the ₱22,000.00 ceiling
earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several other set by law, then, adding one year for each additional ₱10,000.00, the maximum period of 6
factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7
only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years, plus an additional 7
proscribed. Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions. years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the
the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum,
of prision correccional in its medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight the penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium
(8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the CA periods.
imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be anywhere from 6 months
year for each additional ₱10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years. and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of
is highly instructive, thus: lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of
making and enacting laws. While it may be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides: judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means legislation.
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by: WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and
minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with
pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are hereby
and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of
of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion imprisonment ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of
temporal, as the case may be.
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prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as and Narag verified all the reports and other documents turned-over to them by petitioner.6
maximum. On the basis of said findings, Narag sent a letter to the LBP to confirm the remittances
made by petitioner. After adding all the deposits made and upon checking with the teller's
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished blotter, Nadelline Orallo, the resident auditor of LBP, found that no deposits were made by
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice. petitioner for the account of DOTC on September 19, 1996 for the amount of ₱11,300.00
and November 29, 1996 for the amount of ₱81,340.20.7
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives. SO ORDERED. Thereafter, the LBP's officer-in-charge, Rebecca R. Sanchez, instructed the bank's teller,
Catalina Ngaosi, to conduct their own independent inquiry. It was discovered that on
September 19, 1996, the only deposit in favor of the DOTC was that made by its Ifugao
EN BANC office in the Lagawe branch of the LBP.8 This prompted Lopez to write to petitioner
informing her that the two (2) aforesaid remittances were not acknowledged by the bank.
December 5, 2017 The auditors then found that petitioner duly accounted for the ₱81,348.20 remittance but
not for the ₱11,300.00. Dissatisfied with petitioner's explanation as to the whereabouts of
G.R. No. 217874 the said remittance, Narag reported the matter to the COA Regional Director who, in turn
wrote to the LBP for confirmation. The LBP then denied receiving any ₱11,300.00 deposit
OPHELIA HERNAN, Petitioner, on September 19, 1996 from petitioner for the account of the DOTC.9 Thus, the COA
demanded that she pay the said amount. Petitioner, however, refused. Consequently, the
vs. COA filed a complaint for malversation of public funds against petitioner with the Office of
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,, Respondent the Ombudsman for Luzon which, after due investigation, recommended her indictment for
the loss of ₱11,300.00.10 Accordingly, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Baguio City
DECISION in an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

PERALTA, J.: That on or about September 16, 1996, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City
of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court, the above-
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court named accused, a public officer, being then the Disbursing Officer of the Department of
seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolution1 dated February 2, 2015 and Decision2 Transportation and Communications, Baguio City, and as such an accountable officer,
dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd Division which affirmed, with entrusted with and responsible for the amount of ₱1 1,300.00 which accused received and
modification, the Decision dated June 28, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7, collected for the DOTC, and intended for deposit under the account of DOTC with the Land
Baguio City convicting petitioner of the crime of malversation of public funds in Criminal Bank of the Philippines-Baguio City, by reason of her position, while in the performance of
Case No. 15722-R. her official functions, taking advantage of her position, did then and there, wilfully,
feloniously, and unlawfully misappropriate or consent, or through abandonment or
The antecedent facts are as follows: negligence, permit other persons to take such amount of ₱11,300.00 to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
In October 1982, petitioner Ophelia Hernan joined the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR) in Baguio City wherein CONTRARY TO LAW.11
she served as an accounting clerk. In September 1984, she was promoted to the position of
Supervising Fiscal Clerk by virtue of which she was designated as cashier, disbursement Upon arraignment on July 31, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
and collection officer.3 As such, petitioner received cash and other collections from Hence, trial on the merits ensued.
customers and clients for the payment of telegraphic transfers, toll foes, and special
message fees. The collections she received were deposited at the bank account of the To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of two (2) COA auditors,
DOTC at the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), Baguio City Branch.4 namely, Maria Lopez and Sherelyn Narag as well as three (3) LBP employees, namely,
Rebecca Sanchez, Catalina Ngaosi, and Nadelline Orallo.12 In response, the defense
On December 17, 1996, Maria Imelda Lopez, an auditor of the Commission on Audit (COA), presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized as follows:
conducted a cash examination of the accounts handled by petitioner as instructed by her
superior, Sherelyn Narag. As a result, Lopez came across deposit slips dated September On September 19, 1996, petitioner and her supervisor, Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP
19, 1996 and November 29, 1996 bearing the amounts of ₱11,300.00 and ₱81,348.20, Baguio branch and personally deposited the exact amount of ₱11,300.00 with
rcspectively.5 Upon close scrutiny, she noticed that said deposit slips did not bear a stamp accomplished deposit slips in six (6) copies.13 Since there were many clients who came
of receipt by the LBP nor was it machine validated. Suspicious about what she found, she ahead of her, she decided to go with her usual arrangement of leaving the money with the
teller and telling her that she would just come back to retrieve the deposit slip. Thus, she
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handed the money to Teller No. 2, whom she identified as Catalina Ngaosi. Upon her return Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated December 21, 2009 alleging that during
at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, she retrieved four (4) copies of the deposit slip from the trial before the RTC, her counsel was unable to elicit many facts which would show her
Ngaosi. She noticed that the same had no acknowledgment mark on it. Being contented innocence. Said counsel principally failed to present certain witnesses and documents that
with the initials of the teller on the deposit slips, she returned to her office and kept them in would supposedly acquit her from the crime charged. The Sandiganbayan, however, denied
her vault. It was only during the cash count conducted by auditor Lopez when she found out the motion in a Resolution dated August 31, 2010 on the ground that evidence not formally
that the said amount was not remitted to the account of the LBP. When demand was made offered before the court below cannot be considered on appeal.19
on her to return the amount, she requested that she be allowed to pay only after
investigation of a complaint of Estafa that she would file with the National Bureau of On June 26, 2013, the Resolution denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration became
Investigation against some personnel of the bank, particularly Catalina Ngaosi.14 The final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.20 On July 26,
complaint, however, was eventually dismissed.15 2013, petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Meshack Macwes, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen
the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay the Execution.21 In a Resolution22
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in dated December 4, 2013, however, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion and directed the
the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision states: execution of the judgment of conviction. It noted the absence of the following requisites for
the reopening of a case: (1) the reopening must be before finality of a judgment of
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered convicting conviction; (2) the order is issued by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the
accused Ophelia Hernan of Malversation and hereby sentences her, after applying the order is issued only after a hearing is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a
Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day of miscarriage of justice; and (5) the presentation of additional and/or further evidence should
prision mayor medium period, as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months and 21 days of prision be terminated within thirty (30) days from the issuance of the order.23
mayor as maximum period to reclusion temporal maximum period, as maximum, and to pay
a fine of ₱11,300.00. Unfazed, petitioner filed on January 9, 2014 a Petition for Reconsideration with Prayer for
Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of Execution of Judgment praying
Accused Ophelia Hernan is further sentenced to suffer the penalty of perpetual special for a reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan' s recent Resolution, that the case be reopened
disqualification. for further reception of evidence, and the recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26,
2013.24 In a Resolution dated February 2, 2015, the Sandiganbayan denied the petition for
Likewise, accused Ophelia Hernan is hereby ordered to pay back to the government the lack of merit. According to the said court, the motion is clearly a third motion for
amount of ₱11,300.00 plus legal interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum to be reconsideration, which is a prohibited pleading under the Rules of Court. Also, the grounds
computed from the date of the filing of the Information up to the time the same is actually raised therein were merely a rehash of those raised in the two previous motions. The claims
paid. that the accused could not contact her counsel on whom she merely relied on for
Costs against the accused. appropriate remedies to be filed on her behalf, and that she has additional evidence to
present, were already thoroughly discussed in the August 31, 2010 and December 4, 2013
SO ORDERED.16 Resolutions. Moreover, the cases relied upon by petitioner are not on point.25

Erroneously, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed her conviction On May 14, 2015, petitioner filed the instant petition invoking the following arguments:
but modified the penalty imposed. Upon motion, however, the CA set aside its decision on
the finding that it has no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Instead, it is the I.
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over petitioner occupying a THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
position lower than Salary Grade 27.17 Petitioner's new counsel, Atty. Leticia Gutierrez DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONCLUDING
Hayes-Allen, then appealed the case to the Sandiganbayan. In a Decision dated November THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN WAS FILED OUT OF TIME CONSIDERING TI-IE
13, 2009, the Sandiganbayan affirmed the RTC's judgment of conviction but modified the EXTRAORDINARY AND EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE CASE.
penalty imposed, the dispositive opinion of which reads:
II.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED,
with the modifications that the indeterminate penalty to be imposed on the accused should THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
be from 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum, to 11 years, 6 months, and 21 DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT
days of prision mayor as maximum, together with the accessory penalties under Article 42 THE EVIDENCE INTENDED TO BE PRESENTED BY PETITIONER SHOULD HER
of the Revised Penal Code, and that interest of only 6% shall be imposed on the amount of MOTTON FOR REOPENING BE GRANTED, WAS PASSED UPON BY THE TRIAL
₱11,300.00 to be restored by the accused. COURT.
SO ORDERED.18 III.

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THE SANDIGANBA YAN GRAVELY ERRED AS IT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF dated December 4, 2013 and February 2, 2015 wherein said court denied her motion to
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN reopen the malversation case against her. Said resolutions are clearly final orders that
PRONOUNCING THAT THE MOTION TO REOPEN AND THE PETITION FOR dispose the proceedings completely. The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is,
RECONSIDERATION FILED BY PETITIONER ARE CONSIDERED AS THE SECOND AND therefore, improper.
THIRD MOTIONS TO THE DENIAL OF THE DECISION.
Even if We assume the propriety of petitioner's chosen action, the Court still cannot grant
Petitioner posits that her counsel, Atty. Hayes-Allen, never received the August 31, 2010 the reliefs she prays for, specifically: (1) the reversal of the Sandiganbayan's December 4,
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying her Motion for Reconsideration. This is because 2013 and February 2, 2015 Resolutions denying her motion to reopen and petition for
notice thereof was erroneously sent to said counsel's previous office at Poblacion, La reconsideration; (2) the reopening of the case for further reception of evidence; and (3) the
Trinidad, Benguet, despite the fact that it was specifically indicated in the Motion for recall of the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013.33
Reconsideration that the new office is at the Public Attorney's Office of Tayug, Pangasinan,
following her counsel's appointment as public attorney. Thus, since her counsel was not First of all, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that since her counsel was not properly
properly notified of the subject resolution, the entry of judgment is premature.26 In support of notified of the August 31, 2010 Resolution as notice thereof was erroneously sent to her old
her assertion, she cites Our ruling in People v. Chavez,27 wherein We held that an entry of office address, the entry of judgment is premature. As the Court sees it, petitioner has no
judgment without receipt of the resolution is premature. one but herself to blame. Time and again, the Court has held that in the absence of a
proper and adequate notice to the court of a change of address, the service of the order or
Petitioner also claims that during trial, she could not obtain the necessary evidence for her resolution of a court upon the parties must be made at the last address of their counsel on
defense due to the fact that the odds were against her. Because of this, she asks the Court record.34 It is the duty of the party and his counsel to device a system for the receipt of mail
to relax the strict application of the rules and consider remanding the case to the lower intended for them, just as it is the duty of the counsel to inform the court officially of a
court for further reception of evidence.28 In particular, petitioner seeks the reception of an change in his address.35 If counsel moves to another address without informing the court of
affidavit of a certain John L. Ziganay, an accountant at the Depaiiment of Science and that change, such omission or neglect is inexcusable and will not stay the finality of the
Technology (DOST), who previously worked at the DOTC and COA, as well as two (2) decision. The court cannot be expected to take judicial notice of the new address of a
deposit slips. According to petitioner, these pieces of evidence would show that the lawyer who has moved or to ascertain on its own whether or not the counsel of record has
₱11,300.00 deposited at the Lagawe branch of the LBP was actually the deposit made by been changed and who the new counsel could possibly be or where he probably resides or
petitioner and not by a certain Lanie Cabacungan, as the prosecution suggests. This is holds office.36
because the ₱11,300.00 deposit made by Cabacungan consists of two (2) different
amounts, which, if proper accounting procedure is followed, shall be recorded in the bank Here, it is undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to inform the court of the change in her
statement as two (2) separate amounts and not their total sum of ₱11,300.00.29 Thus, the office address from Poblacion, La Trinidad, Benguet, to the Public Attorney's Office in
Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen the case is capricious, despotic, Tayug, Pangasinan. The fact that said new address was indicated in petitioner's Motion for
and whimsical since the admission of her additional evidence will prevent a miscarriage. Reconsideration does not suffice as "proper and adequate notice" to the court. As
previously stated, courts cannot be expected to take notice of every single time the counsel
Finally, petitioner denies the Sandiganbayan's ruling that her motion to reopen and petition of a party changes address. Besides, it must be noted that petitioner even expressly
for reconsideration are considered as a second and third motion for reconsideration, and admitted having received the subject resolution "sometime in September or October
are thus, prohibited pleadings. This is because the additional evidence she seeks to 2010."37 Easily, she could have informed her counsel of the same. As respondent posits, it
introduce were not available during the trial of her case. is not as if petitioner had no knowledge of the whereabouts of her counsel considering that
at the time of the filing of her Motion for Reconsideration, said counsel was already with the
The petition is devoid of merit. PA0.38 Moreover, the Court cannot permit petitioner's reliance on the Chavez case because
there, petitioner did not receive the resolution of the Court of Appeals through no fault or
At the outset, the Court notes that as pointed out by respondent Office of the Special negligence on his paii.39 Here, however, petitioner's non-receipt of the subject resolution
Prosecutor, petitioner's resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was mainly attributable not only to her counsel's negligence but hers, as well. Thus, the
is an improper remedy. In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a Court deems it necessary to remind litigants, who are represented by counsel, that they
party aggrieved by a cou1i order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the outcome of their
nature of the order, resolution or decision he intends to assail.30 It bears stressing that the case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel for what is at stake is their
extraordinary remedy of certiorari can be availed of only if there is no appeal or any other interest in the case. It is, therefore, their responsibility to check the status of their case from
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.31 If the Order or time to time.40
Resolution sought to be assailed is in the nature of a final order, the remedy of the
aggrieved party would be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules To recall, petitioner, on December 21, 2009, filed her Motion for Reconsideration seeking a
of Court. Otherwise, the appropriate remedy would be to file a petition for certiorari under reversal of the Sandiganbayan's November 13, 2009 Decision which affirmed the RTC's
Rule 65.32 Petitioner, in the instant case, seeks to assail the Sandiganbayan's Resolutions ruling convicting her of the crime of malversation. In a Resolution dated August 31, 2010,

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the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Said resolution became especially in view of the fact that the rulings it seeks to refute are legally sound and
final in the absence of any pleading filed thereafter, and hence, was recorded in the Book of appropriately based on the evidences presented by the parties. On this score, the elements
Entries of Judgments on June 26, 2013. Subsequently, on July 12, 2013, petitioner, through of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1)
her new counsel, filed an Urgent Motion to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with that the offender is a public officer; (2) that he had the custody or control of funds or
Prayer to Stay the Execution, which was denied through the Sandiganbayan's Resolution property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) that those funds or property were public
dated December 4, 2013.41 Undeterred, petitioner filed her Petition for Reconsideration with funds or prope1iy for which he was accountable; and (4) that he appropriated, took,
Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for the Stay of Execution of misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
Judgement on January 9, 2014 which was likewise denied in the Sandiganbayan's person to take them. This article establishes a presumption that when a public officer fails to
February 2, 2015 Resolution. have duly forthcoming any public funds with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, it shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds
It seems, therefore, that petitioner waited almost an entire three (3) year period from the to personal uses.47
denial of her Motion for Reconsideration to act upon the malversation case against her
through the filing of her urgent motion to reopen. In fact, her filing of said motion may very As duly found by the trial court, and affinned by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner's defense
well be prompted only by her realization that the case has finally concluded by reason of that she, together with her supervisor Cecilia Paraiso, went to the LBP and handed the
the entry of judgment. Stated otherwise, the Court is under the impression that had she not subject ₱11,300.00 deposit to the teller Ngaosi and, thereafter, had no idea as to where the
heard of the recording of the August 31, 2010 Resolution in the Book of Entries of money went failed to overcome the presumption of law. For one, Paraiso was never
Judgments on June 26, 2013, petitioner would not even have inquired about the status of presented to corroborate her version. For another, when questioned about the subject
her case. As respondent puts it, the urgent motion to reopen appears to have been filed as deposit, not only did petitioner fail to make the same readily available, she also could not
a substitute for the lost remedy of an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari before the satisfactorily explain its whereabouts. Indeed, in the crime of malversation, all that is
Court.42 On this inexcusable negligence alone, the Court finds sufficient basis to deny the necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the accountable officer had received public
instant petition. funds, that she did not have them in her possession when demand therefor was made, and
that she could not satisfactorily explain her failure to do so.48 Thus, even if it is assumed
Second of all, petitioner's claim that the Sandiganbayan's denial of her motion to reopen the that it was somebody else who misappropriated the said amount, petitioner may still be held
case is capricious, despotic, and whimsical since the admission of her additional evidence liable for malversation. The Comi quotes, with approval, the trial court's ruling, viz.:
will prevent a miscarriage has no legal nor factual leg to stand on. Section 24, Rule 119 and
existing jurisprudence provide for the following requirements for the reopening a case: (l) Even if the claim of Hernan, i.e., that she actually left the amount of ₱11,300.00 and
the reopening must be before the finality of a judgment of conviction; (2) the order is issued the corresponding deposit slip with the Bank Teller Ngaosi and she came back to
by the judge on his own initiative or upon motion; (3) the order is issued only after a hearing retrieve the deposit slip later, is to be believed and then it came out that the said
is conducted; (4) the order intends to prevent a miscarriage of justice; and (5) the ₱11,300.00 was not credited to the account of DOTC with the Land Bank and was in
presentation of additional and/or further evidence should be terminated within thirty days fact missing, still accused Hernan should be convicted of malversation because in
from the issuance of the order.43 this latter situation she permits through her inexcusable negligence another person
to take the money. And this is still malversation under Article 217.49
But as the Sandiganbayan ruled, the absence of the first requisite that the reopening must
be before the finality of a judgment of conviction already cripples the motion.1âwphi1 The Said ruling was, in fact, duly reiterated by the Sandiganbayan in its Decision, thus:
records of the case clearly reveal that the August 3l, 2010 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration had already become final and executory Shifting our gaze to the possibility that it was the bank teller Catalina Ngaosi who
and, in fact, was already recorded in the Entry Book of Judgments on June 26, 2013. misappropriated the amount and should therefore be held liable, as the accused would
Moreover, petitioner's supposed predicament about her former counsel failing to present want to poltray, the Court doubts the tenability of that position. As consistently ruled by
witnesses and documents should have been advanced before the trial court.44 It is the trial jurisprudence, a public officer may be held liable for malversation even if he does not use
court, and neither the Sandiganbayan nor the Court, which receives evidence and rules public property or funds under his custody for his personal benefit, but consents to the
over exhibits formally offered.45 Thus, it was, indeed, too late in the day to advance taking thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted such
additional allegations for petitioner had all the opportunity to do so in the lower court. An taking. The accused, by her negligence, simply created the opportunity for the
appellate court will generally not disturb the trial court's assessment of factual matters misappropriation. Even her justification that her deposits which were not machine-
except only when it clearly overlooked certain facts or where the evidence fails to validated were nonetheless acknowledged by the bank cannot fortify her defense. On
substantiate the lower court's findings or when the disputed decision is based on a the contrary, it all the more emphasizes her propensity for negligence each time that
misapprehension of facts.46 she accepted deposit slips which were not machinevalidated, her only proof of
receipt of her deposits. 50
Ultimately, it bears stressing that the Court does not find that the Sandiganbayan acted in a
capricious, despotic, or whimsical manner when it denied petitioner's motion to reopen

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In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan's finding that petitioner's applicable to the crime charged herein is an example of such exceptional circumstance.
motion to reopen and petition for reconsideration are practically second and third motions Section 40 of said Act provides:
for reconsideration from its Decision dated November 13, 2009. Under the rules, the
motions are already prohibited pleadings under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court SEC. 40. Article 217 of the same Act, as amended by Republic Act. No. 1060, is hereby
due to the fact that the grounds raised in the petition for reconsideration are merely a further amended to read as follows:
rehash of those raised in the two (2) previous motions filed before it. These grounds were
already thoroughly discussed by the Sandiganbayan in its subject resolutions. Hence, as ART. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. - Any
duly noted by the Sandiganbayan, in the law of pleading, courts are called upon to pierce public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
the form and go into the substance, not to be misled by a false or wrong name given to a property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent,
pleading because the title thereof is not controlling and the court should be guided by its through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
averments.51 Thus, the fact that the pleadings filed by petitioner are entitled Urgent Motion funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
to Reopen the Case with Leave of Court and with Prayer to Stay Execution and Petition for malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:
Reconsideration with Prayer for Recall of Entry of Judgment in lieu of the Prayer for Stay of 1. The penalty of pnswn correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
Execution of Judgment does not exempt them from the application of the rules on amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation docs not exceed Forty
prohibited pleadings. thousand pesos (₱40,000.00).
Let it be remembered that the doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the xxxx
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional
error, the judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
some definite date fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total
clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tune entries which cause no prejudice to any party, value of the property embezzled.
void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
which render its execution unjust and inequitable.52 None of the exceptions is present in this Pursuant to the aforequoted provision, therefore, We have here a novel situation wherein
case. the judgment convicting the accused, petitioner herein, has already become final and
executory and yet the penalty imposed thereon has been reduced by virtue of the passage
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and of said law. Because of this, not only must petitioner's sentence be modified respecting the
unappealable. Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed settled rule on the retroactive effectivity of laws, the sentencing being favorable to the
period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution accused,56 she may even apply for probation,57 as long as she does not possess any
of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law." ground for disqualification,58 in view of recent legislation on probation, or R.A. No. 10707
To frustrate it by dilatory schemes on the part of the losing party is to frustrate all the efforts, entitled An Act Amending Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the "Probation
time and expenditure of the courts. It is in the interest of justice that this Court should write Law of 1976," As Amended. allowing an accused to apply for probation in the event that she
finis to this litigation.53 is sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of not more than six (6) years when
a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed,
The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court finds that it is still necessary to reopen the instant and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty.59
case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan, not for
further reception of evidence, however, as petitioner prays for, but in order to modify the Thus, in order to effectively avoid any injustice that petitioner may suffer as well as a
penalty imposed by said court. The general rule is that a judgment that has acquired finality possible multiplicity of suits arising therefrom, the Court deems it proper to reopen the
becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if instant case and recall the Entry of Judgment dated June 26, 2013 of the Sandiganbayan,
the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will which imposed the penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land.54 When, however, eleven (11) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision mayor, as maximum.
circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and Instead, since the amount involved herein is ₱11,300.00, which does not exceed
inequitable, the Court may sit en bane and give due regard to such exceptional ₱40,000.00, the new penalty that should be imposed is prision correccional in its medium
circumstance warranting the relaxation of the doctrine of immutability. The same is in line and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one
with Section 3(c),55 Rule II of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, which provides that (1) day, to six (6) years. The Court, however, takes note of the presence of the mitigating
cases raising novel questions of law are acted upon by the Court en bane. To the Court, the circumstance of voluntary surrender appreciated by the Sandiganbayan in favor of
recent passage of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10951 entitled An Act Adjusting the Amount or petitioner.60 Hence, taking into consideration the absence of any aggravating circumstance
the Value of Property and Damage on which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed and the presence of one (1) mitigating circumstance, the range of the penalty that must be
Under the Revised Penal Code Amending for the Purpose Act No. 3815 Otherwise Known imposed as the maximum term should be prision correccional medium to prision
as the "Revised Penal Code" as Amended which accordingly reduced the penalty correccional maximum in its minimum period, or from two (2) years, four (4) months, and
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one (1) day, to three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days, in accordance with give priority to those cases covered by R.A. No. 10951 to avoid any prolonged
Article 6461 of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the range of the imprisonment.
minimum term that should be imposed upon petitioners is anywhere within the period of
arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum with a range of four (4) months WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated
and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Accordingly, petitioner is sentenced to February 2, 2015 and Decision dated November 13, 2009 of the Sandiganbayan 2nd
suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3) Division are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer the
years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum. indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum term, to three (3)
years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days prision correccional, as maximum term.
On a final note, judges, public prosecutors, public attorneys, private counsels, and such
other officers of the law are hereby advised to similarly apply the provisions of RA No. Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
10951 whenever it is, by reason of justice and equity, called for by the facts of each case. dissemination to the First and Second Level courts, and also to the Presiding Justices of
Hence, said recent legislation shall find application in cases where the imposable penalties the appellate courts, the Department of Justice, Office of the Solicitor General, Public
of the affected crimes such as theft, qualified theft, estafa, robbery with force upon things, Attorney's Office, Prosecutor General's Office, the Directors of the National Penitentiary and
malicious mischief, malversation, and such other crimes, the penalty of which is dependent Correctional Institution for Women, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their
upon the value of the object in consideration thereof, have been reduced, as in the case at information, guidance, and appropriate action.
hand, taking into consideration the presence of existing circumstances attending its
commission. For as long as it is favorable to the accused, said recent legislation shall find Likewise, let the Office of the President, the Senate of the Philippines, and the House of
application regardless of whether its effectivity comes after the time when the judgment of Representatives, be furnished copies of this Decision for their information.
conviction is rendered and even if service of sentence has already begun. The accused, in SO ORDERED.
these applicable instances, shall be entitled to the benefits of the new law warranting him to
serve a lesser sentence, or to his release, if he has already begun serving his previous
sentence, and said service already accomplishes the term of the modified sentence. In the
latter case, moreover, the Court, in the interest of justice and expediency, further directs the G.R. No. L-11676 October 17, 1916
appropriate filing of an action before the Court that seeks the reopening of the case rather
than an original petition filed for a similar purpose. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

Indeed, when exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant vs.
amendatory law imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court
shall not hesitate to direct the reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of ANDRES PABLO, defendant-appellant.
which is to correct not so much the findings of guilt but the applicable penalties to be Alfonso E. Mendoza for appellant. 

imposed. Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.
Henceforth: (1) the Directors of the National Penitentiary and Correctional Institution for
Women are hereby ordered to determine if there are accused serving final sentences
similarly situated as the accused in this particular case and if there are, to coordinate and TORRES, J.:
communicate with the Public Attorney's Office and the latter, to represent and file the
necessary pleading before this Court in behalf of these convicted accused in light of this At about noon of the 21st of October, 1915, Andres Pablo, a policeman of the municipality
Court's pronouncement; (2) For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive of Balanga, went by order of his chief to the barrio of Tuyo to raid a jueteng game which,
imprisonment, either the cases against them are non-bailable or cannot put up the bail in according to the information lodged, was being conducted in that place; but before the said
view of the penalties imposable under the old law, their respective counsels are hereby officer arrived there the players, perhaps advised of his approach by a spy, left and ran
ordered to file the necessary pleading before the proper courts, whether undergoing trial in away; however, on his arrival at a vacant lot the defendant there found Francisco Dato and,
the RTC or undergoing appeal in the appellate courts and apply for bail, for their provisional at a short distance away, a low table. After a search of the premises he also found thereon
liberty; (3) For those cases where the accused are undergoing preventive imprisonment a tambiolo (receptacle) and 37 bolas (balls). Notwithstanding that the officer had seen the
pending trial or appeal, their respective counsels are hereby ordered to file the necessary men Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo leave the said lot, yet, as at first he had seen no
pleading if the accused have already served the minimum sentence of the crime charged material proof that the game was being played, he refrained from arresting them, and on
against them based on the penalties imposable under the new law, R.A. No. 10951, for their leaving the place only arrested Francisco Daro, who had remained there.
immediate release in accordance with A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC or the Guidelines For
Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing The Rights Of Accused Persons To Bail And To In reporting to his chief what had occurred, the policeman presented a memorandum
Speedy Trial; 62 and (4) Lastly, all courts, including appellate courts, are hereby ordered to containing the following statement: "In the barrio of Tuyo I raided a jueteng na bilat game,

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seized a tambiolo and bolas, and saw the cabecillas Maximo MAlicsi and Antonio Rodrigo Francisco Dato, on testifying as a witness, said that when the policemen Andres Pablo and
and the gambler Francisco Dato. I saw the two cabecillas escape." Tomas de Leon arrived at the place where the jueteng was being played, they found the
defendant gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo; that, prior to the hearing of the case in the justice
In consequence, chief of police Jose D. Reyes, on October 22, 1915, filed a complaint in of the peace court, Malicsi and Rodrigo ordered him to call Andres Pablo, who, together
the court of justice of the peace charging the said Rodrigo, Malicsi, and Dato with having with witness, went to the house of Valentin Sioson, where they held a conference; that
gambled at jueteng, in violation of municipal ordinance No. 5. As a result of this complaint witness pleaded guilty in the justice of the peace court, in fulfillment of his part of an
the accused were arrested, but were afterwards admitted to bail. agreement made between himself and his two coaccused, Malicsi and Rodrigo, who
promised him that they would support his family during the time he might be a prisoner in
At the hearing of the case Francisco Dato pleaded guilty. The other two accused, Maximo jail; that Andres Pablo did not know that they were gamblers, because he did not find them
Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, pleaded not guilty; therefore, during the trial the chief of police in the place where the game was in progress, but that when witness was being taken to the
presented the memorandum exhibited by the policeman Andres Pablo, who testified under municipal building by the policemen he told them who the gamblers were who had run away
oath that on the date mentioned he and Tomas de Leon went to the said barrio to raid a and whom Andres Pablo could have seen.
jueteng game, but that before they arrived there they saw from afar that some persons
started to run toward the hills; that when witness and his companion arrived at a vacant lot Maximo Malicsi corroborated the foregoing testimony and further stated that, on the arrival
they saw Francisco Dato and a low table there, and the table caused them to suspect that a of the policemen who made the arrest and while they were looking for the tambiolo, he
jueteng game was being carried on; that in fact they did find on one side of the lot a succeeded in escaping; that Andres Pablo had known him for a long time and could have
tambiolo and 37 bolas, but that they did not see the accused Rodrigo and Malicsi on the arrested him had he wished to do so; that prior to the hearing he and his codefendants,
said lot, nor did they see them run; and that only afterwards did the witness learn that these ROdrigo and Dato, did in fact meet in the house of Valentin Sioson, on which occasion they
latter were the cabecillas or ringleaders in the jueteng game, from information given him by agreed that they would give the policemen Andres Pablo P20, provided witness and
an unknown person. In view of this testimony by the police officer who made the arrest and Rodrigo were excluded from the charge; and that only P15 was delivered to the said Pablo,
of the other evidence adduced at the trial the court acquitted the defendants Antonio through Gregorio Ganzon. This statement was corroborated by the latter, though he said
Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi and sentenced only Francisco Dato, as a gambler. nothing about what amount of money he delivered to the policeman Pablo.
Before the case came to trial in the justice of the peace court the policeman Andres Pablo The defendant Andres Pablo testified under oath that, on his being asked by the justice of
had an interview and conference with the accused Malicsi and ROdrigo in the house of the peace how he could have seen Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, he replied that he
Valentin Sioson. On this occasion he was instructed not to testify against Malicsi and did not see them at the place where the game was being conducted nor did he see them
Rodrigo, and in fact received through Gregorio Ganzon the sum of P5. run away from there, for he only found the table, the tambiolo, the bolas, and Francisco
Dato; that he did not surprise the game because the players ran away before he arrived on
By reason of the foregoing and after making a preliminary investigation the provincial fiscal, the lot where, after fifteen minutes' search, he found only the tambiolo and the bolas; that
on December 1, 1915, filed an information in the Court of First Instance of Bataan charging on arriving at the place where the game was played, they found only Francisco Dato and
Andres Pablo with the crime of perjury, under the provisions of section 3 of Act No. 1697. some women in the Street, and as Dato had already gone away, witness' companion, the
The following is an extract from the complaint: policeman Tomas de Leon, got on his bicycle and went after him; and that he found the
That on or about November 6, 1915, in the municipality of Balanga, Bataan, P.I., and within tambiolo at a distance of about 6 meters from a low table standing on the lot.
the jurisdiction of this court, the said accused, Andres Pablo, during the hearing in the From the facts above related, it is concluded that the defendant Andres Pablo, who pleaded
justice of the peace court of Balanga of the criminal cause No. 787, entitled the United not guilty, falsely testified under oath in the justice of the peace court of Balanga, Bataan, in
States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, for violation of Municipal Ordinance No. 5 saying he had not seen the alleged gamblers Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo in the
of the municipality of Balanga, did, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously affirm and swear in place where, according to the complaint filed, the game of jueteng was being played and
legal form before the justice of the peace court as follow: `We did not there overtake the where the defendant and his companion, the policeman Tomas de Leon, had found a table,
accused Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo Malicsi, nor did we even see them run,' the said tambiolo and bolas, used in the game of jueteng, while it was proved at the trial that he did
statement being utterly false, as the accused well knew that it was, and material to the not them and did overtake them while they were still in the place where the game was being
decision of the said criminal cause No. 787, United States vs. Antonio Rodrigo and Maximo played. But notwithstanding his having seen them there, upon testifying in the cause
Malicsi. An act committed with violation of law. prosecuted against these men and another for gambling, he stated that he had not seen
The case came to trial and on December 28, 1915, the court rendered judgment therein them there, knowing that he was not telling the truth and was false to the oath he had
sentencing the defendant to the penalty of two years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P100 taken, and he did so willfully and deliberately on account of his agreement with the men,
and, in case of insolvency, to the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, and to pay the Malicsi and Rodrigo, and in consideration of a bribe of P15 which he had received in
costs. The defendant was also disqualified from thereafter holding any public office and payment for his false testimony he afterwards gave.
from testifying in the courts of the Philippine Islands until the said disqualification should be
removed. From this judgment he appealed.
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Francisco Dato and Gregorio Ganzon corroborated the assertion that the policeman Andres There certainly are laws which deal with perjury or false testimony, like Law 7 et seq. of Title
Pablo undertook to exclude the gamblers, Malicsi and Rodrigo, from the charge and from 2, third Partida.
his testimony in consideration for P15 which he received through Gregorio Ganzon.
However, since the Penal Code went into force, the crime of false testimony has been
Andres Pablo was charged with the crime of perjury and was afterwards convicted under punished under the said articles of the said Code, which as we have already said, have not
Act No. 1697, which (according to the principle laid down by this court in various decisions been specifically repealed by the said Act No. 1697, but since its enactment, have not been
that are already well-settled rules of law) repealed the provisions contained in articles 318 applied, by the mere interpretation given to them by this court in its decisions; yet, from the
to 324 of the Penal Code relative to false testimony. moment that Act was repealed by the Administrative Code, the needs of society have made
it necessary that the said articles 318 to 324 should be deemed to be in force, inasmuch as
By the second paragraph of the final section of the last article of the Administrative Code, or the Administrative Code, in repealing the said Act relating to perjury, has not explicitly
Act No. 2657, there was repealed, among the other statutes therein mentioned, the said Act provided that the said articles of the Penal Code have likewise been repealed.
No. 1697 relating to perjury, and the repealing clause of the said Administrative Code does
not say under what other penal law in force the crime of false testimony, at least, if not that This manner of understanding and construing the statutes applicable to the crime of false
of perjury, shall be punished. testimony or perjury is in harmony with the provision of Law 11, Title 2, Book 3, of the
Novisima Recopilacion which says::
Under these circumstances, may the crime of perjury or of false testimony go unpunished,
and is there no penal sanction whatever in this country for this crime? May the truth be All the laws of the kingdom, not expressly repealed by other subsequent laws, must be
freely perverted in testimony given under oath and which, for the very reason that it may literally obeyed and the excuse that they are not in use cannot avail; for the Catholic kings
save a guilty person from punishment, may also result in the conviction and punishment of and their successors so ordered in numerous laws, and so also have I ordered on different
an innocent person? If all this is not possible and is not right before the law and good occasions, and even though they were repealed, it is seen that they have been revived by
morals in a society of even mediocre culture, it must be acknowledged that it is imperatively the decree which I issued in conformity with them although they were not expressly
necessary to punish the crime of perjury or of false testimony — a crime which can produce designated. The council will be informed thereof and will take account of the importance of
incalculable and far-reaching harm to society and cause infinite disturbance of social order. the matter.

The right of prosecution and punishment for a crime is one of the attributes that by a natural It is, then, assumed that the said articles of the Penal Code are in force and are properly
law belongs to the sovereign power instinctively charged by the common will of the applicable to crimes of false testimony. Therefore, in consideration of the fact that in the
members of society to look after, guard and defend the interests of the community, the case at bar the evidence shows it to have been duly proven that the defendant, Andres
individual and social rights and the liberties of every citizen and the guaranty of the exercise Pablo, in testifying in the cause prosecuted for gambling at jueteng, perverted the truth, for
of his rights. the purpose of favoring the alleged gamblers, Maximo Malicsi and Antonio Rodrigo, with the
aggravating circumstance of the crime being committed through bribery, for it was also
The power to punish evildoers has never been attacked or challenged, as the necessity for proved that the defendant Pablo received P15 in order that he should make no mention of
its existence has been recognized even by the most backward peoples. At times the the said two gamblers in his sworn testimony, whereby he knowingly perverted the truth, we
criticism has been made that certain penalties are cruel, barbarous, and atrocious; at other, hold that, in the commission of the crime of false testimony, there concurred the aggravating
that they are light and inadequate to the nature and gravity of the offense, but the imposition circumstance of price or reward, No. 3 of article 10 of the Code, with no mitigating
of punishment is admitted to be just by the whole human race, and even barbarians and circumstance to offset the effects of the said aggravating one; wherefore the defendant has
savages themselves, who are ignorant of all civilization, are no exception.lawphil.net incurred the maximum period of the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum degree to
prision correccional in its medium degree, and a fine.
Notwithstanding that the said Act No. 1697 (which, as interpreted by this court in its
decisions, was deemed to have repealed the aforementioned article of the Penal Code For the foregoing reasons, we hereby reverse the judgment appealed from and sentence
relating to false testimony, comprised within the term of perjury) did not expressly repeal the Andres Pablo to the penalty of two years four months and one day of prision correccional,
said articles of the Penal Code; and as the said final article of the Administrative Code, in to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding
totally repealing Act No. 1697, does not explicitly provide that the mentioned articles of the subsidiary imprisonment, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty. He shall
Penal Code are also repealed, the will of the legislation not being expressly and clearly also pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.
stated with respect to the complete or partial repeal of the said articles of the Penal Code,
in the manner that it has totally repealed the said Act No. 1697 relating its perjury; and,
furthermore, as it is imperative that society punish those of its members who are guilty of
perjury or false testimony, and it cannot be conceived that these crimes should go
unpunished or be freely committed without punishment of any kind, it must be conceded
that there must be in this country some prior, preexistent law that punishes perjury or false
testimony.
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G.R. No. 169364 September 18, 2009 5. Prostitutes.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
vs.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA, arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto
Respondents. mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging
from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court.
DECISION
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: to Quash3 on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and
If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as Michelangelo overbroad.
painted, or Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep In an Order4 dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed
streets so well that all the hosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to say, here lived a great respondents anew to file their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also
street sweeper who did his job well. declared that the law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power and
– Martin Luther King, Jr. justified by the Latin maxim "salus populi est suprem(a) lex," which calls for the
subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the greater number, thus:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order1 of Branch 11,
Davao City Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An authority on
respondents’ Petition for Certiorari and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised police power, Professor Freund describes laconically police power "as the power of
Penal Code unconstitutional. promoting public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and
property." (Citations omitted). In fact the person’s acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy the police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin maxim, salus populi est
pursuant to Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated supreme (sic) lex" (the god of the people is the Supreme Law). This calls for the
November 18, 2003, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater number.In the case at bar
and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Davao City. The Informations, the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex "A" lucidly shows
read: that there was a prior surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and
prostitutes proliferate in the place where the two accused (among other women) were
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the wandering and in the wee hours of night and soliciting male customer. Thus, on that basis
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case. Thus, in the interest of
feloniously wandered and loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be given their day in Court: the
any visible means to support herself nor lawful and justifiable purpose.2 prosecution proof of the crime, and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of
the accused in the indictment can’t be categorized as a crime.5
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants: Jay Plaza, it was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in
an area reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors.
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to Hence, the prosecution should be given the opportunity to prove the crime, and the defense
work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; to rebut the evidence.1avvphi1
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support; Trial Court of Davao City,6 directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law,
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those claiming that the definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being
who habitually associate with prostitutes; vague, results as well in an arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the
crime includes in its coverage persons who are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause under
be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and unemployed, thus permitting
lawful or justifiable purpose; an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
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The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Court’s Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the
ruling in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,7 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only Revised Penal Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate
to free speech cases and not to penal statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be those who have no visible means of support by force of circumstance and those who
presumed valid and constitutional, since the respondents failed to overcome this choose to loiter about and bum around, who are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation,
presumption. it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality.11

On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby DECLARING UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE12
GRANTED. Paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared
unconstitutional and the Order of the court a quo, dated April 28, 2004, denying the Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be
petitioners’ Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is ordered to dismiss the subject resolved in favor of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,13 the
criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it. overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only
and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes; that respondents failed to
SO ORDERED.8 overcome the presumed validity of the statute, failing to prove that it was vague under the
standards set out by the Courts; and that the State may regulate individual conduct for the
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police power.
violated the equal protection clause. It held that the "void for vagueness" doctrine is equally
applicable in testing the validity of penal statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth
Jacksonville,9 where an anti vagrancy ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the and vagueness doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the
Supreme Court of the United States, the trial court ruled: constitutionally-guaranteed rights to due process and the equal protection of the laws; that
the due process vagueness standard, as distinguished from the free speech vagueness
The U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2) unconstitutional and void on its face; and
Ordinance are equally applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code. that the presumption of constitutionality was adequately overthrown.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being "found loitering about public The Court finds for petitioner.
or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets
without visible means of support" offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in
who should be arrested and who should not. nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an
aspect of police power. The legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of considered innocent and lawful provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged.14
recession when there are many who are "without visible means of support" not by reason of However, in exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature
choice but by force of circumstance as borne out by the high unemployment rate in the must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to prohibit so that he
entire country. may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his duty to
avoid.15 This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than which states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so
the fact that he cannot find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury.10 vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."16
Constitution, the trial court declared: In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,17 the Court recognized the application of the void-for-
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present vagueness doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein held:
runs afoul of the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to
classification between those covered by the law and those who are not. bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the
or inflicts upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j)
case offending. of Republic Act No. 8189 – the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded
examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners’ case would be
antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an

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existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of
or anticipatory.18 the offending conduct. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S.
391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S.
The first statute punishing vagrancy – Act No. 519 – was modeled after American vagrancy 81. In the field of regulatory statutes governing business activities, where the acts limited
statutes and passed by the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
1870 which was in force in this country up to December 31, 1931 did not contain a provision States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U. S. 29; United
on vagrancy.19 While historically an Anglo-American concept of crime prevention, the law on States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.
vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as a permanent feature of the Revised
Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides: The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and not
alerted to the regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. – The following are vagrants: understanding of their meaning and impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from
being caught in the vagrancy net by the necessity of having a specific intent to commit an
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S. 91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United
work and who neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling; States, supra.
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support; normally innocent. "Nightwalking" is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and those criminal one night's wandering, Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the "habitual"
who habitually associate with prostitutes; wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it, "common night walkers." We know, however,
from experience that sleepless people often walk at night, perhaps hopeful that sleep-
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall inducing relaxation will result.
be found loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any
lawful or justifiable purpose; Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that "loafing" was a
national virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a
5. Prostitutes. crime in Jacksonville.

For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual xxxx
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by and Vachel Lindsay. The qualification "without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap
arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto for innocent acts. Persons "neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time
mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging by frequenting . . . places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served" would literally
from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the discretion of the court. embrace many members of golf clubs and city clubs.

In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or
person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or loiterers may be "casing" a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support. This provision family matter, and normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting
was based on the second clause of Section 1 of Act No. 519 which defined "vagrant" as for numerous crimes.
"every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or gambling houses, or tramping
or straying through the country without visible means of support." The second clause was The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have
essentially retained with the modification that the places under which the offense might be known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These
committed is now expressed in general terms – public or semi-public places. unwritten amenities have been, in part, responsible for giving our people the feeling of
independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These amenities have dignified
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be nonconformists and the right to defy
mainly from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville20 submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits, rather than hushed, suffocating
case, which in essence declares: silence.

Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are xxxx
entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S. 453.
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Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose or object,
those convicted may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority: habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business and habitually
spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where
"The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the
magistrates in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in
for almost any kind of conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
convenient dumping-ground for problems that appear to have no other immediate solution."
Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional,
because such activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any
xxxx lawful purpose or object, habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and living upon the earnings of wives or minor
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack of children, which are otherwise common and normal, were declared illegal. But these are
notice given a potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2). The closest to Article 202 (2) –
hands of the Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early student of this subject, has called "any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or
the vagrancy-type law as offering "punishment by analogy." Such crimes, though long wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support" – from the
common in Russia, are not compatible with our constitutional system. Jacksonville ordinance, would be "persons wandering or strolling around from place to
xxxx place without any lawful purpose or object." But these two acts are still not the same: Article
202 (2) is qualified by "without visible means of support" while the Jacksonville ordinance
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where prohibits wandering or strolling "without any lawful purpose or object," which was held by
liquor is sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a "trap for innocent acts."
to become future criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in
these generalized vagrancy standards -- that crime is being nipped in the bud -- is too Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons,
extravagant to deserve extended treatment. Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
police. Of course, they are nets making easy the roundup of so-called undesirables. But the nature and for any purpose, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
rule of law implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws of the Jacksonville upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of the oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.24 Thus, as with
poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together.21 any other act or offense, the requirement of probable cause provides an acceptable limit
on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the search or
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the
"fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is respondents, echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the
forbidden by the statute;" and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application police to make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement
of discriminatory law enforcement. of probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or
possibility.25
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202
(2) in this case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without
application here because under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from pain of punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of
compliance therewith.22 This principle is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and abuse. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the
limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under American law, ignorance of the law is merely a arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
traditional rule that admits of exceptions.23 committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
provisions thereof, which are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest.26
Ordinance Code § 257) provided, as follows:
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers, their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the
walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of
lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers, persons

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restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly cut off from that domestic security which action in court to assert their claims.31 Any private person may abate a public nuisance
renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable.27 which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing
which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the peace, or doing
As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting unnecessary injury.32
previous surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this
satisfies the probable cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts – from public indecencies
moved by respondents’ trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police and immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made
abuse in their case. illegal by their offensiveness to society’s basic sensibilities and their adverse effect on the
quality of life of the people of society. For example, the issuance or making of a bouncing
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon check is deemed a public nuisance, a crime against public order that must be abated.33 As
the constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have a matter of public policy, the failure to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the goods
witnessed the streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods, if not sold, is a public nuisance to be
harassing "watch-your-car" boys, petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.34 Thus, public nuisances must be abated
prostitutes, and individuals performing acts that go beyond decency and morality, if not because they have the effect of interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property
basic humanity. The streets and parks have become the training ground for petty offenders by members of a community.
who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred criminals. Everyday, the news is rife with
reports of innocent and hardworking people being robbed, swindled, harassed or mauled – Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate
if not killed – by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straight from against the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for
withdrawing hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated teller machines); students are their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such
held up for having to use and thus exhibit publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the
men are mauled by thrill-seeking gangs; innocent passers-by are stabbed to death by community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a justification to act indecently or
rowdy drunken men walking the streets; fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and to engage in immoral conduct.
harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers, thieves, pickpockets and
snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of their life Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a
savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place
pester and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law- and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and
abiding drivers and citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the streets outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized
and in public places, day or night. and ordered society, as would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being
of members of the community.
The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them each day,
or else we can never say that we have performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State
must rid the streets of the scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency should train its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court
and morality in them. perceives difficulties. Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets in the wee hours of
the morning, dangerous robbers and thieves ply their trade in the trains stations, drunken
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night and urinate on otherwise decent corners of
laws were crafted to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in our streets. Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national parks and busy intersections.
human society. These laws may be traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, Prostitutes wait for customers by the roadside all around the metropolis, some even venture
they have also come to be associated with the struggle to improve the citizens’ quality of in bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter around dark avenues waiting to pounce on
life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution.28 Civilly, they are covered by the "abuse of helpless citizens. Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and establishments for
rights" doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code concerning Human their next hit. The streets must be made safe once more. Though a man’s house is his
Relations, to the end, in part, that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another castle,35 outside on the streets, the king is fair game.
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.29 This provision is, together with the succeeding articles on human The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
relations, intended to embody certain basic principles "that are to be observed for the
rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order."30 Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should
be presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is
In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal elementary that every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution
disorder and breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves bearing in mind that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be
entitled to the possession of the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate resolved in favor of its constitutionality.36 The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on
constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid
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in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the
this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon each protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as
the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its tremendous success in several cities,
studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a
finally enacted.37 portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein
private respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been casino there during the Christmas season.
defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile.
with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the On December 7, 1992, it enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:
good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. The power is
plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public ORDINANCE NO. 3353
health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare.38 As an obvious police power AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF BUSINESS PERMIT AND
measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light. CANCELLING EXISTING BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR PORTION THEREOF FOR
Court of Davao City in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, THE OPERATION OF CASINO.
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro, in
ASIDE. session assembled that:
Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus Sec. 1. — That pursuant to the policy of the city banning the operation of casino within its
continue. territorial jurisdiction, no business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or
No costs. corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.

SO ORDERED. Sec. 2. — That it shall be a violation of existing business permit by any persons, partnership
or corporation to use its business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof
by others for casino operation and other gambling activities.

G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994 Sec. 3. — PENALTIES. — Any violation of such existing business permit as defined in the
preceding section shall suffer the following penalties, to wit:
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners,
a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for the first offense and a fine of
vs. P1,000.00/day

PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for the second offense, and a fine
GAMING CORPORATION, respondents. of P3,000.00/day

Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for petitioners. c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and imprisonment of One (1) year, for the
third and subsequent offenses.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
Sec. 4. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days from publication thereof.

Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading
CRUZ, J.: as follows:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced the opening of a casino in ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
Cagayan de Oro City. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious
elements echoed the objection and so did the women's groups and the youth. AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF CASINO AND PROVIDING
PENALTY FOR VIOLATION THEREFOR.

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WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990 against CASINO under 1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro does
its Resolution No. 2295; not have the power and authority to prohibit the establishment and operation of a PAGCOR
gambling casino within the City's territorial limits.
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed another Resolution No. 2673,
reiterating its policy against the establishment of CASINO; 2. The phrase "gambling and other prohibited games of chance" found in Sec. 458, par. (a),
sub-par. (1) — (v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean "illegal gambling."
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the
issuance of Business Permit and to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment 3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D. 1869 and are therefore invalid on that
for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of point.
CASINO;
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to casino and partial to cockfighting and
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph VI of the Local Government are therefore invalid on that point.
Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing
rules of the Local Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative Body shall enact 5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not consonant with the general powers
measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and general welfare of the people and purposes of the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent with the laws or policy of
and/or regulate or prohibit such activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order the State.
to protect social and moral welfare of the community;
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No.
NOW THEREFORE, 91649, May 14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues presented in this present
case.
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly assembled that:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all
Sec. 1. — The operation of gambling CASINO in the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
prohibited. Philippines. In Basco v. Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation, 4 this Court
sustained the constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of the entity to the
Sec. 2. — Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject to the following penalties: national economy as the third highest revenue-earner in the government, next only to the
BIR and the Bureau of Customs.
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against the proprietor, partnership or
corporation undertaking the operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in the Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
City and closure thereof; ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested
with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year or a fine in the Section 16 as follows:
amount of P5,000.00 or both at the discretion of the court against the manager, supervisor,
and/or any person responsible in the establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
CASINO. expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
Sec. 3. — This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days after its publication in a local essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
newspaper of general circulation. jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
PAGCOR as intervenor and supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On March people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
for to prohibit their enforcement. 1 Reconsideration of this decision was denied on July 13, economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
1993. 2 maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in this petition for review under Rule In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically declares that:
45 of the Rules of Court. 3 They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding Sec. 458. — Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The Sangguniang
that: Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to

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Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as not conform to its philosophy and provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause
provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and shall: reading as follows:

(1) Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and effective city (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
government, and in this connection, shall: proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
xxx xxx xxx
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt regarding the effect of the Local
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate penalties for Government Code on P.D. 1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners, in
habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy, prostitution, establishment accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its liberal interpretation in favor of the
and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling and other prohibited games of chance, local government units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
fraudulent devices and ways to obtain money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of
drug dens, drug pushing, juvenile delinquency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of Sec. 5. Rules of Interpretation. — In the interpretation of the provisions of this Code, the
obscene or pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the following rules shall apply:
welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be liberally interpreted in its
This section also authorizes the local government units to regulate properties and favor, and in case of doubt, any question thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of
businesses within their territorial limits in the interest of the general welfare. 5 powers and of the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the
existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the local government unit concerned;
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions, the Sangguniang Panlungsod may
prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are xxx xxx xxx
detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the
Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be (c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally interpreted to give more
exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents powers to local government units in accelerating economic development and upgrading the
erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. quality of life for the people in the community; . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its
territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code. Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various
provisions of the Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with the policy of local autonomy as and official disapprobation of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the
mandated in Article II, Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as various other proper upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, call attention to the old case of
provisions therein seeking to strengthen the character of the nation. In giving the local U.S. v. Salaveria,7 which sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of
government units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other social problems, the panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of gambling. They also impugn the
Local Government Code has recognized the competence of such communities to determine wisdom of P.D. 1869 (which they describe as "a martial law instrument") in creating
and adopt the measures best expected to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos "on land and sea within the territorial
in line with the policies of the State. jurisdiction of the Philippines."

The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly authorized the local government This is the opportune time to stress an important point.
units to prevent and suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance, like craps,
baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all forms of gambling without distinction. Ubi lex The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is
non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. 6 Otherwise, it would have expressly excluded generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
from the scope of their power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by special Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did not do so simply means that the local mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise
government units are permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their territories, of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
including the operation of casinos. limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it
may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is pointed out, had the effect of modifying cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own
the charter of the PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D. 1869 and so wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been
is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies between them. More than this, the powers of said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. 8 That is the
the PAGCOR under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code insofar as they do prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom,
morality, or practicibility of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved

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only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our modification of P.D. 1869 by the Local Government Code is permissible because one law
scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide, can change or repeal another law.
they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately
judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice. It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While insisting that the decree
has only been "modified pro tanto," they are actually arguing that it is already dead,
The only question we can and shall resolve in this petition is the validity of Ordinance No. repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR of
3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now be
de Oro City. And we shall do so only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only
convictions on the propriety of gambling. discretionary but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word "shall" as used therein is
to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have now no choice but to
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the petitioners' view includes both legal and illegal
be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements: gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to regulate
or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local government units pursuant to the
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute. mandatory duty imposed upon them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive. continue to exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will no longer be
able to exercise its powers as a prime source of government revenue through the operation
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory. of casinos.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade. It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the repealing clause,
conveniently discarding the rest of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific
5) It must be general and consistent with public policy. laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code. Significantly, P.D.
1869 is not one of them. A reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced
6) It must not be unreasonable. below, will disclose the omission:
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. — (a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, otherwise known as the
government units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others, "gambling and "Local Government Code," Executive Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319
other prohibited games of chance." Obviously, this provision excludes games of chance (1988) are hereby repealed.
which are not prohibited but are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than
accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such games of chance but did not. (b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other decrees, orders, instructions,
In fact it does. The language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of memoranda and issuances related to or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude that since the word (c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No. 1939 regarding hospital fund;
"gambling" is associated with "and other prohibited games of chance," the word should be Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund;
read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other prohibited games of chance, Presidential Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and 1741;
must be prevented or suppressed. Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential Decree No. 436 as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 558; and Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632,
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle the problem quite conclusively. But 752, and 1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
we will not. The vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the inhabitants of Cagayan
de Oro City, and the earnestness of their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this (d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as it governs locally-funded
Court. projects.

The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the (e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended insofar as they are
public policy embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising the power inconsistent with the provisions of this Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree
conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an No. 704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67,
ingenious answer to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have changed 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, and 74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and Section 16
P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail against a statute. Their theory is that of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended, and
the change has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted
by the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has been, not really repealed (f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
by the Code, but merely "modified pro tanto" in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
operate a casino over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

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Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is
of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co. v. Apostol, 10 this obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils
Court explained: exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all proceed on the assumption that than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
if the act of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and
abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but there must always be a negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
sufficient revelation of this intention, and it has become an unbending rule of statutory
construction that the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the Legislature Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from
when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions, with reference to which the question the legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
arises bear to each other the relation of general to special. creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is
some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the can suppose it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of
private respondent points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two later the municipal corporations in the State, and the corporation could not prevent it. We know
enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board of Claims under the of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They
Department of Justice for the benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature. 11
violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the power crisis.
PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the PAGCOR This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has
charter has not been repealed by the Local Government Code but has in fact been not been enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of
improved as it were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of the local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress
government. retains control of the local government units although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still includes the power to
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in an destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to withhold or recall. True, there are
inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them, certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the local
remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate government units of the power to tax, 12 which cannot now be withdrawn by mere statute.
branch of the government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government
Code, the proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give effect to both by units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case before us. The proper resolution
of the problem at hand is to hold that under the Local Government Code, local government The Court understands and admires the concern of the petitioners for the welfare of their
units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of gambling within their constituents and their apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will be
territories except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the view that "the hope of large or easy
such laws must be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally gain, obtained without special effort, turns the head of the workman" 13 and that "habitual
effective and mutually complementary. gambling is a cause of laziness and ruin." 14 In People v. Gorostiza, 15 we declared: "The
social scourge of gambling must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to wit, the enforced to the limit." George Washington called gambling "the child of avarice, the brother
illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is of iniquity and the father of mischief." Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of the
probably as old as illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The petitioners' suggestion that legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize certain forms of gambling, as was done
the Code authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction in P.D. 1869 and impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That decision can be
between these two forms of gambling without a clear indication that this is the will of the revoked by this Court only if it contravenes the Constitution as the touchstone of all official
legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance, acts. We do not find such contravention here.
prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as authorized
by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance,
R.A. 309 and R.A. 983. including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,
remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code,
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged on which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress only those forms of
us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary, we find that gambling prohibited by law.
the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute, as well as
the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that
despite the prohibition of gambling in general. cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the

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Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting entitled "Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18)
the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang
operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila,
P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void. through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M.
to 4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of the respondent Court Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes"
of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so ordered. dated October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No.
SP- 2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in
Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00 A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/
EN BANC Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City
Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
August 8, 2017
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) - an
G.R. No. 225442 association of young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in
particular the protection of the rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE present petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a)
LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, and thus, fall under the void for
REYES, and CLARISSA JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate
her father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners, activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
vs. primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners
assert that the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY OF MANILA, as
represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and
MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO,, Respondents, discriminatory enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how
law enforcers should apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
DECISION violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based only on the law enforcer's visual
assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew
ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the
petition prays that a temporary restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents activities exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working
Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective students or students with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not
local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and enforcing these cover the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be
issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the City of Manila's out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the legitimate activities of minors during curfew
ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the "Juvenile hours.15
Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they
violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear deprive minors of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;
their children. 16 and (b) fail to pass the strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for

The Facts employing means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the
prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per se protect and promote the
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide social and moral welfare of children of the community.18
curfew for minors, several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement
their curfew ordinances on minors through police operations which were publicly known as Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof,
part of "Oplan Rody."3 contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision
imposes on minors the penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: contend that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express command that no
(a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew violations.21

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Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial
contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and power, which up to then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies
primary right in the rearing of the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less involving rights that were legally demandable and enforceable."25
restrictive means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest massive
street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit televisions) in public streets, In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before
and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and the Court "are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose more excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may
reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars be determined under the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x
informing the parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach,
a penalty for parents who allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22 and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-
The Issue Before the Court judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
Ordinances are unconstitutional. quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text
of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28
The Court's Ruling
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical
The petition is partly granted. Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural
I. rule has been promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial
power and because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its
seek the dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be used as the medium for petitions invoking
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; the courts' expanded jurisdiction[. ]"30
(b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c)
the lack of actual controversy and standing to warrant judicial review.23 In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative
councils of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative
A. Propriety of the Petition for powers on the ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the
provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of parents to rear their
Certiorari and Prohibition. children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors,
conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on minors
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when an act is
only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
enforceable," but also "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. "31 In light of the foregoing,
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these
instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads: governmental actions were not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
ARTICLE VIII B. Direct Resort to the Court.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the
constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower whether or not petitioners' direct resort to this Court is justified.
courts as may be established by law.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [Regional Trial Courts], a direct invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set out in the
petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of constitutionality of a law or
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regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount importance and immediately "The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether
affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people,"33 as in this case. those assailing the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the
Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified. court for adjudication. [Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial
interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in immediate danger of
C. Requisites of Judicial Review. sustaining, some direct injury as a consequence of the enforcement of the
challenged governmental act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material -
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act- as distinguished from being
constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the merely incidental or general."41
Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) "The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites. constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42
1. Actual Case or Controversy. As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional
rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2)
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional or in the expanded the primary right of parents to rear their children. Related to the first is the purported conflict
setting - is the presence of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
controversy is one which 'involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal
claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal
difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a contrariety of legal rights that standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a
can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."36 minor at the time the petition was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of
According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night
the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely requiring a prima facie after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of apprehension by virtue of the Curfew
showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."37 Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro
Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted in
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage.
ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct Thus, they are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for direct injury as a consequence thereof.
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself violate the parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before
as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is this Court as parent/s and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr.
of."38 (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the petition for himself for the alleged violation
of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor child,
in this case given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
Curfew Ordinances impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the
Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal
petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the substantive discussions below - conveyed a personality to bring an action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue,
prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise SPARK still has no standing as it failed to allege that it was authorized by its members who
its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication, considering that the were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining
their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the
speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent. controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged
violation of the minors' right to travel, but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.
2. Legal Standing.

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These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar Ordinances, which, because of its vague terminology, fails to provide fair warning and
as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.49 The
involved in this case. "In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process considerations, which are
the requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:
when those who challenge the official act are able to craft an issue of transcendental
significance to the people, the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take [T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve
cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to show that "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty
they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other government act."46 cases." "Procedural due process uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language
was so obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances well as to provide proper standards for adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the
is placed under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due
issuances on the right of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no constitutional provision that
also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."50
interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this case is of overarching significance to the
public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local
the standing requirement. authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert
any confusion as to what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case. only point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related
to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are
II. best left for the political branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing
unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for vagueness analysis; rather,
A. Void for Vagueness. petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a
their children, this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of
are void for vagueness. law contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably
decipher what conduct the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing Middletown, 51 it was ratiocinated that:
sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled
discretion to carry out their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries
these issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they for resolution on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and
were already of legal age. They maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the arbitrary application based on individual impressions and personal predilections.52
suspected curfew offenders based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the
arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance requires provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of
enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the said a suspected minor would be determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal
ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show his provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for vagueness
age.47 doctrine.
The arguments are untenable. Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible identify suspected curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and explicitly state these parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by 9344, as amended, provides:
it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determined from the
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the
Government muscle."48 absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other
considering that they do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew relevant evidence. (Emphases supplied)

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This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew Ordinances because RA independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is during childhood
10630 (the law that amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the
law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught in child for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral
violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and, therefore, covered by its standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative
provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity with law is one of the process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the
essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary growth of young people into mature, socially responsible citizens."59
implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related
statutory law. By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over
one's children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US)
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was remarked that "constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in
application of the Curfew Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of the structure of our society."62 As in our Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear
identification establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law their children is not only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of the suspect, which - "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in the upbringing of
needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the circumstances. their children.63 The rationale for the State's deference to parental control over their
Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental
denied. action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in
important decisions by minors. But an additional and more important justification for
B. Right of Parents to Rear their state deference to parental control over children is that "the child is not [a) mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
Children. coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
parents of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when
process. In this regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether actions concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of
minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. the child, the [Sltate may act to promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n
Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily with parents and not with the State, the cases in which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety,
latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be compelling.57 peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained. override the parents' qualified right to control the upbringing of their children."67

Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise
rights of parents in the rearing of their children: of these rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather,
complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors, viz. :
the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and [Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in
moral character shall receive the support of the Government. (Emphasis and an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of
underscoring supplied.) what concerns them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the an opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
"youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."69 (Emphases and underscoring
not only as parental rights, but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only supplied)
given the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are equally obliged
to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty aspect of this provision is a reflection of As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the
the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free, moral development of their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents
to fulfill their parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors,
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especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for even if there exists a compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and
the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive means for achieving the
and rewarding. Under the Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from
and others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility for children's overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79
well-being are entitled to the support of the laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."71 Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine,
their role of promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater considering that petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free
length, these ordinances further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of speech or any inhibition of speech-related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement
juvenile safety and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on Network, Inc. v. AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that
the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors, because of their peculiar "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to potential physical harm owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"81
by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise viz.:
imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.72
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under
minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
accompanied by their parents. This serves as an explicit recognition of the State's regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially
deference to the primary nature of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.
child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their children's conduct
during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all actuality, the only The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to
aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that
allow minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment during the a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve
curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a
discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
authority to influence or control their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules
Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court
right to bring up his or her child. invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad
law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
to spend more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties
opportunities to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very
Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city government "was entitled to existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would promote parental involvement in a child's speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent
upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the effect on the speech of those third parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those children."76
Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend time on their In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to
studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are free speech claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme
no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental rights. Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law
parents' right to rear their children. or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks
on overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of
C. Right to Travel. constitutionally protected expression. "'85

Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial
minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, challenges can only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness.
therefore, necessitates the application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that Southern Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due process
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rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety
the realm of freedom of expression."87 and prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The
restriction on the minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability
case, there being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to
Court finds proper to examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test. the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal system is
replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to children, i.e.,
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: 9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local
shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to government units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It
travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public reads:
health, as may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines curfew hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to
to other countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general enforce curfew ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local
concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a birthright of every person - includes the power of authorities.
locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to
live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the ends of life.92 x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what
rights, such as the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion. respondents have done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In
93 The inter-relation of the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly
other words, PD 603 provides sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to
rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows: restrict the minors' exercise of the right to travel.
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise
association require one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess
under the First Amendment. and enjoy constitutional rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as
those of adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates
Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs
rights. One court has eloquently pointed this out: concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the right to engage in
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment gainful employment.113 With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by law to
to freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before they
their church, their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or can travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents.114
drive to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors'
people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the streets of a community, opportunities activities than over similar actions of adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general
for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on the minors'
involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied) exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally apply to adults.

Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential
if made against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of
another, jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution children; second, their inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature
itself reads, the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child rearing:118
they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) [On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the
are provided by law.97 same constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State
is entitled to adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their
needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
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[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during should be emphasized that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact
the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, that the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not trigger the
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v. City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US
to them. x x x. court illumined that:

xxxx Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the
fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary.
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies The Supreme Court teaches that rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than
limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse adults, but that the analysis of those rights may differ:
governmental action and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x. Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one
attains the state-defined age of majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are
xxxx protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed,
however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus, minors' rights are not coextensive with
be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring infringement of minors' rights.
supplied)
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the differential analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test
heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as compared to adults: [however] does not establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts
young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against to determine whether the state has a compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions
impeding restraints and dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most on minors than on adults. x x x.
appropriate for such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more especially in x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors
public places, and the possible harms arising from other activities subject to all the differently than adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is
diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately appropriate to review burdens on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.
designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether against the parent's
claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action. According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases
supplied)
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways.
But even in such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar
uses, whether in work or in other things, this difference may be magnified.121 circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as
(Emphases and underscoring supplied) parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-being with the compelling State interests
justifying the assailed government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
travel rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds. disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the has the burden of proving that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a
reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification compelling State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect such
either (i) interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132
guaranteed under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate a. Compelling State Interest.
scrutiny test applies when a classification does not involve suspect classes or
fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared
gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all other subjects not policies.133 This Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to
covered by the first two tests.125 protect and care for them as parenspatriae constitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no individual liberties must give way.135 As explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows
less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it that the State has a compelling interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on

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adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this compelling interest localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled to conclude that
of the State to protect and care for their welfare. keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer
community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less wholesome
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the character at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a
Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of series of dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them
public areas, so as to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or
to insulate them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years of childhood and adolescence,
themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid
in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes that: choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal
influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their
guidance, education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug finger on the pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its
addiction, and become vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses; curfew the opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal influences, the City
xxxx was directly advancing its first objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138
(Emphases and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-
standers, street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and
meander in public or private roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in Manila presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming
groups without lawful purpose or justification; prevalence of crimes involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective
localities.139
xxxx
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children pursuant to their police power under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court
roaming around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities thus finds that the local governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to
involved in various infractions of city ordinances and national laws; substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors.
As such, a compelling State interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of Curfew Ordinances.
minor children during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect,
abuse or cruelty and exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to
development; determine if the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or
provide the least restrictive means to address the cited compelling State interest - the
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
a restraint on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities
wastefully, especially in the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
dissident elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering their
nefarious activities[.]136 The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that
citizens should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the constitutional rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only
City Council to support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling
as a guidepost to our own eatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US interest. When it is possible for governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn
court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement policies for a safer to avoid conflicts with constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141
community, in relation to the proclivity of children to make dangerous and potentially life-
shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of night: Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on
minors as they are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity,
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially whether it be social, religious, or civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances
assist its first stated interest-that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council must be narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to
acted on the basis of information from many sources, including records from travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143
Charlottesville's police department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the
United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police reports from other

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In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful
being narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely employment, and to travel at night from school or work.148 However, even with those
exercise their religion and to free speech.145 It observed that: safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila Ordinance still do
not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of association, free exercise of
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.
Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various
local Protestant Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon
Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional
uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from taking their minor relatives of any age to the rights than the Manila Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as
above mentioned services. x x x. discussed in detail below:

xxxx First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from
engaging in legitimate non-school or nonchurch activities in the streets or going to and from
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the such activities; thus, their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing
city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his that participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school or church, also
views on the necessity to repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and intellectual development, yet, such
Amendment right to freedom of speech. participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
xxxx Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas
Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] activities (such as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the
very narrowly drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very scenario depicted in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to
carefully drafted in an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by
a direct route from religious, school, or voluntary association activities. (Emphases Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in
supplied) political rallies or attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their
right to peaceably assemble and to free expression.
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that
only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities
and Navotas Ordinances do not. outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in
these legitimate activities during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, State's compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such
namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These legitimate activities are merely
guardian; (b) those running lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas
telecommunication facilities for emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited
and those who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or outside their exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night exceptions, which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew
classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in regulations, are inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental
coordination with a specific barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such,
curfew hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents, guardians, they cannot subsist independently despite the presence150 of any separability clause.151
or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those involved in accidents,
calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during these specific The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it
occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:
the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday,
Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147 Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be
covered by the provisions of this ordinance;
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their
exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' (a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

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(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/ Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is
or other extra-curricular activities of their school or organization wherein their implicitly considered as an exception found in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City
attendance are required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are out Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment
and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond their control as verified should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense. As the Court
by the proper authorities concerned; and sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to reconcile the
juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such as conflagration, only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;] the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or going to or Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these
returning home from the same place of employment activity without any detour or stop; ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable
of giving proper consent due to their incapability to fully understand the import and
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied by an adult in no consequences of their actions. In one case it was observed that:
violation of this Ordinance;
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency; she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an official school, religious, the nature or import of her actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to
recreational, educational, social, community or other similar private activity minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are as yet unable to take
sponsored by the city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.153
organization/group (recognized by the community) that supervises the activity or Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity,
when the minor is going to or returning home from such activity, without any detour and balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
or stop; and and prevent juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a student and was Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence,
dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a working student.152 constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no way limited or restricted, as the
(Emphases and underscoring supplied) State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police power, is not precluded from
crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association,
free exercise of religion, travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression. D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.

Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised - to
protection of these aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
by enabling minors to attend both official and extra-curricular activities not only of To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s or guardian under
their school or church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to Section 8 thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas
peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by these items given Ordinance requires the minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social
that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or religious organizations civic duty and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the
are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in addition to the fine imposed therein.155
free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on
exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their the age and frequency of violations, to wit:
right to ravel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the
places where these activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance
Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
contribute to the well-being of minors who publicly loaf and loiter within the locality
at a time where danger is perceivably more prominent. (a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to or person exercising parental authority.
run lawful errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew
hours. As astutely observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate

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(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the such as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against
sanction/penalty shall be: a person who has violated the law."160

1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition; The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of
the minor in violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A
2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning about the thereof empowers local governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as
legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and community-based programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day to ten In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of
(10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or both at the intervention program that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could
discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be filed by the appropriately adopt in an ordinance to promote the welfare of minors. For one, the
PunongBarangay with the office of the City Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring community service programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they
supplied). promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and social stigma caused
by jail detention.
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors
these sanctions - i.e., (a) community . service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and compliance with the law and
(d) imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit legal orders. More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become productive
the imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their
viz.: community.
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with
committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and
if committed by a child. expressing disapproval to the minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a
"gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by local governments Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n authoritatively issued warning or censure";164
concerning juvenile status offenses such as but not limited to, curfew violations, while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke,
truancy, parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an expression of
offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to, authoritative advice or warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare
nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, that "a warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166
shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on children for
said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any barangay In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition
official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate are clearly not penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less
intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be intrusive on the rights and conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally
recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall inform and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions must be
also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied.) A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or
imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the as "a severe or formal reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of
conduct of minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the
penalized (i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and formal censure or severe reproof,
minors for violations of these regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is
ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of more than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and public
Section 57-A. pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize and
rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public
"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of against repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring
imprisonment or fine";158 "[p ]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the
commits a deliberate or negligent act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence,
prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended.
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Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001
provided in our various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section
57-A of RA 9344, as amended, evidently prohibits. JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states vs.
that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status
offenses]." Thus, for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and DECISION
irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and
hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of community service programs and BELLOSILLO, J.:
admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute penalties.
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense
CONCLUSION of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the State and the inroads of societal
pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be
of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges
to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the that the exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is
Quezon City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold fulfillment.
only issuance out of the three which provides for the least restrictive means to achieve this Thus he says -
interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that
enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with
hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which
said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his
construed to include parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and will, is to prevent harm to others.
hence, an allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of enforcement,
however, is left to the discretion of the local government unit. Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-
preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness of the body politic,
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its
void, while the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.
accordance with this Decision.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of fundamental rights and
imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the
9344, as amended. Hence, following the rule that ordinances should always conform with process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed
the law, these provisions must be struck down as invalid. in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often
outright collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably followed. It is
No. 8046, issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its
Blg. No. 99-02, as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local severest test.
government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while
Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014, issued by the local government of the Quezon City Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA
is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this Decision. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),1 as amended by RA 7659,2
wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses
SO ORDERED. that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore
makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness;
(b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal

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Code, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not
to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance
of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder: acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8)
material possession of any person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as
him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of
associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes: Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids 6713 (The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d)
on the public treasury; Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim.
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the
government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to specification "d" of the charges in
concerned; the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file
Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause.
or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries; Noticeably, the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/
reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The purported
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were
any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future employment in any never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility
business enterprise or undertaking; of the Plunder Law.

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No.
and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the
special interests; or issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an indictable offense since the
law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the
or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten June 2001 petitioner submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the
wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the accused to due process;
of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it
be considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their is within the power of Congress to so classify it.
interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks
derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is
supplied). predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony
with the Constitution.3 Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever
a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional
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adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or
it is forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by
branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature. establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence in determining
whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should 3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated
proceed with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of or acquired is at least ₱50,000,000.00.
the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being a
measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
constitutionality. sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon4 we held that as long as there is some basis the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is wealth of at least ₱50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in
not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed
domain of the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with
the fundamental law be unduly eroded. reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have
committed:
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party
challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that "The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the
there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE
put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan
the Plunder Law. or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined 7659, committed as follows:
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation.
Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the
or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT
particularity. Thus - OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/
CONSPIRACY with his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/
of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
other persons; AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR
series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE
misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, H U N D R E D S E V E N T Y T H R E E P E S O S A N D S E V E N T E E N C E N TAV O S
directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of (₱4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series
or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or of overt OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
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(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable
THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
(₱545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These
DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING; omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being
impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due
INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount process.
of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (₱130,000,000.00), more or less,
representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (₱200,000,000.00) The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and
tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of
himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN terms without defining them;6 much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides,
DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define
JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied). each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression
of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES
OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,7 unless it is
FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.8
(₱1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus,
(₱744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of
EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT the words "combination" and "series:"
THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (₱1,847,578,057.50); AND
BY COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To
IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND and temporal succession.
PESOS (₱189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE CORPORATION
WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their
ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;' popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES,
PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS
THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN
(₱3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there
'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK." are two or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or number one and
something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
- that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to proof, these factual
assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal
REP. ISIDRO: Series.

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REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series. SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination. REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: Yes. REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that - REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

REP. GARCIA: Two. DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes "one" or maybe even
twice of one enumeration. "two" acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider
deleting the words "a series of overt or," to read, therefore: "or conspiracy COMMITTED by
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice. criminal acts such as." Remove the idea of necessitating "a series." Anyway, the criminal
acts are in the plural.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts. in this.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, that’s it. When we say combination, we mean, two THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because "a series" implies several or many; two or more.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular
REP. GARCIA: A series. crime. But when we say "acts of plunder" there should be, at least, two or more.
REP. ISIDRO: That’s not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr.
series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba? President.
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts
is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on
we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di.... belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term "series?" On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal
acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo. misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec.
1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations.... for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for
it in the law.
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan9 that this term is
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination? sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
REP. GARCIA: Yes. x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different? to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common
REP. GARCIA: Yes. purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy'

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to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal accused and public officer area of protected freedoms."14
and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used by A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
common goal. statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity."15
formulated in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., statutes.
that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of speech.
what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.10 But the doctrine The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,17
"saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
whenever directed against such activities.11 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
measured by common understanding and practice.12 It must be stressed, however, that the which the Act would be valid."18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and of the law as applied to the conduct of others."19
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
as in all other statutes. American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on
Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that the Plunder Law is the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity - situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."21 Consequently, there
at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and
law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose in its entirety.

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Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
constitutionally protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
settings and in sterile abstract contexts.23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases
Younger v. Harris24 "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an not mean that the indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support;
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
. . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D.
questions, whichever way they might be decided. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978,
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly
strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"25 and is generally The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt
disfavored.26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct
with which the defendant is charged.27 x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as
Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. amended).
Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is
Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions,
part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified,
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident
feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of
the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
anchorage. petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan28 must be mentioned if only to illustrate and On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the
emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond
the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only
construction that will support and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be
"unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning or settled necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient
(e), violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient notice of what it to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
(3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality;
(b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal
"unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always has in his favor the
official function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the

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accused is entitled to an acquittal.29 The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the
indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in the application standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden still remains with the
of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a standard prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute
of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also the crime.
important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision. What the prosecution
standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving an amount of at least
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which ₱50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the
he is charged.30 The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Information to have been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful
Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of Representatives scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate,
are elucidating - supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed
fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50)
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990 raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable
doubt provided only that they amounted to at least ₱50,000,000.00.31
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is
alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that
one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy"
work against the right of the accused especially so if the amount committed, say, by inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
falsification is less than ₱100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is ₱100 million otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable
since there is malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft? doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the
proof of the predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense.
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every
element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the overt or criminal acts to stash ₱50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to
things taken by the robber in the information – three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to
need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the
crime for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt is
the element of the offense. Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that
"pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such
the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only
₱50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to accumulate ₱1 million. Now, JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder
when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable
interpretation on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
him?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example,
one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is ₱100 million. Now, in a JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond
series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have a conviction under the
would be ₱110 or ₱120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we Plunder Law?
will sum up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is ₱100 million,
then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied). JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an
accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?

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ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus
element of the law x x x x alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that
proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting plunder? is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Tañada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of
evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way SENATOR TAÑADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be
by which we can avoid Section 4. evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish
the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the
predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that far by applying However, Senator Tañada was discussing §4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the
Section 4? transcript quoted by petitioner:

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in
element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the prosecution.32 Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier
and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder
can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and SENATOR TAÑADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34
"pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear
and unequivocal: Senator Tañada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the
prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved
case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It
is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. Indeed, §2 provides that -
4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the
argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
simply be severed from the rest of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. the court.
Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal
application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected intent. It is true that §2 refers to "any person who participates with the said public officer in
thereby. the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to
believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws
a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws
not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each as saying what they obviously mean."35
other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion - among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous
crimes are punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:36
must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information
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The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the
despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale
and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure
subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as
murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of
victim is detained for more than three days or serious physical injuries were inflicted on the national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion generated by petitioner's
victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a
or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people
occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by reclusion that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise
perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature. above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder
implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-political and Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare
economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.
its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that
bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government
must muster the political will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and G.R. No. 152259 July 29, 2004
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the
psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner,
the most basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or misapplication of
government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in vs.
turn, the very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous
are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the
in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their PHILIPPINES, respondents.
perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it
is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal indictment prior to plea
they are mala in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, and trial, however they may be named or identified -- whether as a motion to quash or
especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it motion to dismiss or by any other nomenclature -- delay the administration of justice and
would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for unduly burden the court system. Grounds not included in the first of such repetitive motions
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, are generally deemed waived and can no longer be used as bases of similar motions
without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts. subsequently filed.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential relatives
7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is now too late in the day who "intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application
for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by with the Government." This provision is not vague or "impermissibly broad," because it can
People v. Echegaray38 to the archives of jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court easily be understood with the use of simple statutory construction. Neither may the
therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and constitutionality of a criminal statute such as this be challenged on the basis of the
becomes, by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it. "overbreadth" and the "void-for-vagueness" doctrines, which apply only to free-speech
cases.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in
high places which have shaken its very foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has The Case
become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly Before us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and aside the November 20, 20012 and the March 1, 20023 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in
radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily Criminal Case No. 13736. The first Resolution disposed thus:
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"WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The arraignment "On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Victorio U. Tabanguil,
of the accused and the pre-trial of the case shall proceed as scheduled."4 manifested that the prosecution had already concluded the reinvestigation of the case. He
recommended the dismissal of the instant case. Both the Deputy Special Prosecutor and
The second Resolution denied reconsideration. the Special Prosecutor approved the recommendation. However, Ombudsman Aniano A.
Desierto disagreed and directed the prosecutors to let the [petitioner] present his evidence
The Facts in Court.
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows: "Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second 'MOTION TO QUASH AND
"[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission on Good TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT'.
Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before [the anti-graft court] "On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit.
charging the accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019,5 as amended.
The Information reads: "On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a 'MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION TO
DISMISS'. On June 29, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan] admitted the motion and admitted the
'That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the Sandiganbayan], said [petitioner],
brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and therefore, "The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:
related to the latter by affinity within the third civil degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and
unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic] 'I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF [PETITIONER] WAS
and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National VIOLATED DURING THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING
Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned and controlled WAYS:
corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private
corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by former President Ferdinand E. 'A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN THE INSTANT
Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its CASE; AND
ownership and all its titles and interests over all equipment and facilities including
structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable 'B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY A BIASED AND PARTIAL
assets, located at the Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some INVESTIGATOR
of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by 'II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF THE
BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00. NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS VIOLATED
'Contrary to law.' 'III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION,
"On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first 'MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO DEFER [PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
ARRAIGNMENT' claiming that no valid preliminary investigation was conducted in the 'IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY
instant case. He asserts that if a preliminary investigation could be said to have been PRESCRIPTION'"6
conducted, the same was null and void having been undertaken by a biased and partial
investigative body. Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
"On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division, issued an order The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner, except the third
giving the accused fifteen days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the one, had already been raised by him and passed upon in its previous Resolutions.7 In
Special Prosecutor. resolving the third ground, the anti-graft court pointed out that Section 17 of the 1973
Constitution became effective only in 1981 when the basic law was amended. Since his
"[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a petition for Certiorari and alleged illegal intervention had been committed on or about 1975, the amended provision
Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order. On January 21, 1998, the Supreme was inapplicable to him.8
Court dismissed the petition for failure to show that [the Sandiganbayan] committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order. In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan passed
upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that his right to a preliminary investigation
"On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a was not violated, because he had been granted a reinvestigation.9 It further held that his
Motion to Quash. right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation was not trampled upon,

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either, inasmuch as the Information had set forth the essential elements of the offense First Issue:
charged.10
Constitutionality of Section 5,

Hence, this Petition.11 Republic Act 3019

The Issues Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for the first time in the
Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Attached to his December 7,
In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our consideration: 2001 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying his Motion to Dismiss was this
Supplemental Motion which was, in effect, his third motion to quash.13 We note that the
"Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its discretion Petition for Certiorari before us challenges the denial of his original, not his Supplemental,
amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction – Motion to Dismiss.
I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite clear and Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000, petitioner could have
incontrovertible evidence that: filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial. Had reconsideration been turned down, the
A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because its vagueness violates next proper remedy would have been either (1) a petition for certiorari14 -- if there was grave
the due process right of an individual to be informed of the nature and the cause of the abuse of discretion -- which should be filed within 60 days from notice of the assailed order;
15 or (2) to proceed to trial without prejudice to his right, if final judgment is rendered against
accusation against him;
him, to raise the same questions before the proper appellate court.16 But instead of availing
B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because it violates the due himself of these remedies, he filed a "Motion to Dismiss" on June 19, 2001.
process right of an individual to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved;
Impropriety of 

C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be informed of the nature and the cause of Repetitive Motions
the accusation against him was violated;
There is no substantial distinction between a "motion to quash" and a "motion to dismiss."
D. The constitutional right to due process of law of petitioner x x x was violated during the Both pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case. Such motions are
preliminary investigation stage in the following ways: employed to raise preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity of proceeding to trial.
A motion to quash is generally used in criminal proceedings to annul a defective indictment.
[i] No valid preliminary investigation was con-ducted for Criminal Case No. 13736; and A motion to dismiss, the nomenclature ordinarily used in civil proceedings, is aimed at
summarily defeating a complaint. Thus, our Rules of Court use the term "motion to quash"
[ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a biased and partial investigator. in criminal,17 and "motion to dismiss" in civil, proceedings.18
E. The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and In the present case, however, both the "Motion to Quash" and the "Motion to Dismiss" are
anchored on basically the same grounds and pray for the same relief. The hairsplitting
F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution, petitioner x x x is immune distinction posited by petitioner does not really make a difference.
from criminal prosecution.
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second motion to
And quash. A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar or different, by installment.
II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner['s] x x x right to equal protection of the The Rules abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to preliminary
laws."12 objections, and trial would never commence. A second motion to quash delays the
administration of justice and unduly burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act 3019 is grounds not raised in the first motion to quash are generally deemed waived.19 Petitioner's
unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether there was a valid "Motion to Dismiss" violates this rule.
preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has been extinguished
by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is immune from criminal prosecution under then Constitutionality of

Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution. the Challenged Provision

The Court's Ruling If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be dismissed outright.
However, given the importance of this case in curtailing graft and corruption, the Court will
The Petition has no merit. nevertheless address the other issues on their merit. Petitioner challenges the validity of

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Section 5 of Republic Act 3019, a penal statute, on the ground that the act constituting the constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and
offense is allegedly vague and "impermissibly broad." permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In
Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth20 and the vagueness21 doctrines have 27
special application only to free-speech cases. They are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza explained the reason as follows: "[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
"A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
because of possible 'chilling effect' upon protected speech. The theory is that '[w]hen controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes,
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided."
overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity.' The For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as
possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly
perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has
statutes. been charged.28

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be examined only
effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason "as applied" to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not be declared unconstitutional
alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful for overbreadth or vagueness.
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
speech. The questioned provision reads as follows:

xxxxxxxxx "Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any
relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the President of the
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the
to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other the same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any application filed by him
'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued
typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'"22 (underscoring pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of
supplied) a profession."

"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of Petitioner also claims that the phrase "to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business,
ambiguity."23 While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept transaction, contract or application with the Government" is vague and violates his right to
has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,24 the be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him.29 He further complains
Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, that the provision does not specify what acts are punishable under the term intervene, and
not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec25 decreed as void a mere Comelec thus transgresses his right to be presumed innocent.30 We disagree.
Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec26 held that a portion of RA 6735 was
unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of Every statute is presumed valid.31 On the party challenging its validity weighs heavily the
vagueness. onerous task of rebutting this presumption.32 Any reasonable doubt about the validity of the
law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.33 To doubt is to sustain, as tersely put
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of by Justice George Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,34 the rationale for the
parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would presumption of constitutionality was explained by this Court thus:
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"The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that 1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable degree of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the
showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts
of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President 2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, transaction, contract or
of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance application with the government.
with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted."35
Applicability of

In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such presumption. This Statutory Construction
Court has previously laid down the test for determining whether a statute is vague, as
follows: As to petitioner's claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court agrees with the Office of
the Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood through simple statutory
"x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient construction. The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited the law "void for vagueness," if the meaning can be determined through the judicial function
by the statute. It can only be invoked against that species of legislation that is utterly vague of construction.43 Elementary is the principle that words should be construed in their
on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction. ordinary and usual meaning.

"A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;44 much less do we
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment.
what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.36 But the doctrine the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of
does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are x x x.
apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be
'saved' by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second "x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
whenever directed against such activities.37 With more reason, the doctrine cannot be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,45 unless it is
invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case. evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.46
The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and
"The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed."47
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when
measured by common understanding and practice.38 It must be stressed, however, that the The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to
'vagueness' doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be "to come between."48 Criminally liable is anyone covered in the enumeration of Section 5 of
upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction, contract
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and or application with the government. As we have explained, it is impossible for the law to
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it provide in advance details of how such acts of intervention could be performed. But the
might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, courts may pass upon those details once trial is concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance intervene is not a ground to quash the information prior to the commencement of the trial.
as in all other statutes."39 In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and that in any event,
A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,40 in which the Court said that there was the "overbreath" and "void for vagueness" doctrines are not applicable to this case.
nothing vague about a penal law that adequately answered the basic query "What is the Second Issue:
violation?"41 Anything beyond -- the hows and the whys -- are evidentiary matters that the
law itself cannot possibly disclose, in view of the uniqueness of every case.42 Allegedly Vague Information
The question "What is the violation?" is sufficiently answered by Section 5 of RA 3019, as Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene, petitioner further
follows: contends that the Information itself is also unconstitutionally vague, because it does not
specify the acts of intervention that he supposedly performed.49 Again, we disagree.

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When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is The Sandiganbayan's actions are in accord also with Raro v. Sandiganbayan,60 which held
not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.50 The pertinent provision in the that the failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation would not warrant the quashal of
Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote: an information. If the information has already been filed, the proper procedure is for the
Sandiganbayan to hold the trial in abeyance while the preliminary investigation is being
"Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of conducted or completed.61
particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial. The motion shall specify the
alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired." Fourth Issue:

The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity Prescription
as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with and to enable the court to
pronounce judgment. 51 The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner
may immediately know what is meant by the information.52 with the Sandiganbayan on October 8, 1999.62 Such issue should be disregarded at this
stage, since he failed to challenge its ruling debunking his Motion within the 60-day period
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the information, for the filing of a petition for certiorari. A party may not circumvent this rule by filing a
53 matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the subsequent motion that raises the same issue and the same arguments.
offense -- need not be averred.54 Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be
alleged are to be determined by reference to the definition and the essential elements of the Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by petitioner is utterly
specific crimes.55 unmeritorious. He points out that according to the Information, the offense was committed
"during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975." He argues that when the
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements of a Information was filed on July 12, 1989,63 prescription had already set in, because the
violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently. Likewise, the allegations prescriptive period for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is only ten (10) years from the
describe the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to time the offense was allegedly committed. The increase of this prescriptive period to fifteen
prepare an intelligent defense. Details of the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that (15) years took effect only on March 16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg.
need not be alleged in the Information. 195.64

Third Issue: Act No. 3326, as amended,65 governs the prescription of offenses penalized by special
laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
Preliminary Investigation
"Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary investigation when he law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
questioned before this Court in GR No. 128317 the Sandiganbayan's Order giving him 15 of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.56 Citing
Cojuangco v. Presidential Commission on Good Government,57 he undauntedly averred that "The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation, because the PCGG acted both person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
as complainant and as investigator.58 constituting jeopardy."

In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power to conduct a Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously reckoned the
preliminary investigation, the latter could not do so with the "cold neutrality of an impartial prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
judge" in cases in which it was the agency that had gathered evidence and subsequently Revolution) from the discovery of the violation.66 In Republic v. Desierto, the Court
filed the complaint.59 On that basis, this Court nullified the preliminary investigation explained:
conducted by PCGG and directed the transmittal of the records to the Ombudsman for
appropriate action. "This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale, in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-
Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. In the said recent case, the Board of
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of the Information Directors of the Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of the Philippines were
against herein petitioner. True, the PCGG initiated the present Complaint against him; charged with violation of paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3 of RA No. 3019, by the
hence, it could not properly conduct the preliminary investigation. However, he was Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, created by then President
accorded his rights -- the Sandiganbayan suspended the trial and afforded him a Fidel V. Ramos to investigate and to recover the so-called 'Behest Loans', where the
reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The procedure outlined in Cojuangco was thus Philippine Government guaranteed several foreign loans to corporations and entities
followed. connected with the former President Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had not yet
prescribed, this Court ruled that:

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'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have investigations that the alleged crime was discovered. This led to the initiation on November
known the violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made 29, 1988 of a Complaint against former President Marcos and petitioner for violation of the
because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, the filing of the Information on July 12,
'beneficiaries of the loans.' Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive 1989 was well within the prescriptive period of ten years from the discovery of the offense.
period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should
be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such Fifth Issue
commission.
Immunity from Prosecution
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a
'People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration: In the high-ranking naval officer -- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp -- of former President
nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not immoral or obviously Marcos.70 He relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which
criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of we quote:
the special law is not known at the time, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or "The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever
acts.' (Italics supplied) shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his specific orders during his
tenure.
"There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case and the present one
which lead us to apply the ruling of the former to the latter. First, both cases arose out of "x x x xxx x x x"
seemingly innocent business transactions; second, both were 'discovered' only after the As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not applicable to petitioner
government created bodies to investigate these anomalous transactions; third, both involve because the immunity amendment became effective only in 1981 while the alleged crime
prosecutions for violations of RA No. 3019; and, fourth, in both cases, it was sufficiently happened in 1975.
raised in the pleadings that the respondents conspired and connived with one another in
order to keep the alleged violations hidden from public scrutiny. In Estrada v. Desierto,71 this Court exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in
order to determine the extent of its applicability. We explained therein that executive
"This Court's pronouncement in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan is quite relevant immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a
and instructive as to the date when the discovery of the offense should be reckoned, thus: non-sitting President from prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office.
'In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one who
have known the violations committed at the time the questioned transactions were made is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close
because both parties to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetuate fraud relatives "are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such
against the government. The alleged anomalous transactions could only have been but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser."
discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the original respondents, then In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
President Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would in issuing the assailed Resolutions.72 On the contrary, it acted prudently, in accordance with
have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence, the counting law and jurisprudence.
of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which
could have been between February 1986 after the EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned Resolutions of the
when the initiatory complaint was filed.'"67 Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case. The general rule that SO ORDERED.
prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the crime cannot apply to
the present case. It is not legally prudent to charge the State, the aggrieved party, with
knowledge of the violation of RA 3019 at the time the alleged intervention was made. The
accused is the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos' brother-in-law. He was charged with
intervening in a sale involving a private corporation, the majority stocks of which was
allegedly owned by President Marcos. G.R. No. 178552 October 5, 2010

Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared question the SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-
legality of the sale or would even have thought of investigating petitioner's alleged South Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN
involvement in the transaction. It was only after the creation68 of PCGG69 and its exhaustive M. SANTOS, JR., Petitioners,

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vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-
Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY
JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY
STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
G.R. No. 178554 PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE
PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its Chairperson Elmer Labog, NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO (NAFLU-KMU), and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
represented by its National President Joselito V. Ustarez and Secretary General
Antonio C. Pascual, and CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS, x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
represented by its Executive Director Daisy Arago, Petitioners, G.R. No. 178890
vs. KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLE'S RIGHTS,
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, NORBERTO represented herein by Dr. Edelina de la Paz, and representing the following
GONZALES, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of National Defense, HON. RAUL organizations: HUSTISYA, represented by Evangeline Hernandez and also on her
GONZALES, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his own behalf; DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary Guy Portajada and also on her
capacity as Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, GEN. HERMOGENES own behalf, SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA
ESPERON, in his capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR SA AMNESTIYA (SELDA), represented by Donato Continente and also on his own
CALDERON, in his capacity as PNP Chief of Staff, Respondents. behalf, ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP), represented by
Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon, UCCP, and PROMOTION OF CHURCH PEOPLE'S
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert Sabado, OCARM, Petitioners,

G.R. No. 178581 vs.

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN), GENERAL ALLIANCE BINDING GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-
WOMEN FOR REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP AND ACTION Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
(GABRIELA), KILUSANG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT OF SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY
CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(COURAGE), KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY
CAVITE WORKERS, LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), ANAKBAYAN, MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE
PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA), ALLIANCE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL
OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE, HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
LUMBERA, RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY JOHN MANANSAN OSB, PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE
DEAN CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN (ret.), PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR. CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence
REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
CASAMBRE, Petitioners,
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
vs.
G.R. No. 179157

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THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP), represented by Atty. Feliciano M. CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Bautista, COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY (CODAL), SEN. MA. ANA
CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and FORMER SENATORS SERGIO OSMEÑA III and Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, Petitioners, (RA 9372), "An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism," otherwise
known as the Human Security Act of 2007,1 signed into law on March 6, 2007.
vs.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,2 petitioner Southern Hemisphere
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI- Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a
TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC), Respondents. concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on July
16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and
Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective
G.R. No. 179461 officers3 who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST), certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
GABRIELA-ST, KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHYANG MAGSASAKA-TIMOG The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),
KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action
LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS, ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST, (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISA'T UGNAYAN NG MGA Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY),
MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN SA Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan,
TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA- Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned
ST, KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG AGRARYO Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented
KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN by their respective officers,4 and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto
(BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary John
TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSÑOS RURAL POOR Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry
ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS & EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIÑO LAJARA, Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo
TEODORO REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS, Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for
OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
BELTRAN, Petitioners,
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya,
vs. Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as President and Commander-in- (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church
Chief, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE People’s Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers5 who are
SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ, DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SECRETARY also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY docketed as G.R. No. 178890.
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF FINCANCE SECRETARY of Liberty (CODAL),6 Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmeña III, and
MARGARITO TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES, THE Wigberto E. Tañada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE NATIONAL 179157.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and
PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL (AMLC), THE organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region,7 and individuals8 followed suit
PHILIPPINE CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.
and investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, Respondents.
Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council9
DECISION composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita
as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs
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Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a
impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon. concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National [A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal
Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it
Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that
elements. it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or
that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
The petitions fail. complained of.
Petitioners’ resort to certiorari is improper For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1)
it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3)
quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear: the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring
Section 1. Petition for certiorari.—When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or supplied.)
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected "communist
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor fronts" by the government, especially the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, While Chavez v. PCGG13 holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the
board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require. requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied) personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an
altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer
respondents acted without or in excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same. of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No.
viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus 178890, allege that they have been subjected to "close security surveillance by state
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) security forces," their members followed by "suspicious persons" and "vehicles with dark
the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.10 windshields," and their offices monitored by "men with military build." They likewise claim
In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most that they have been branded as "enemies of the [S]tate."14
essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous. Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
Petitioners lack locus standi correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported
"surveillance" and the implementation of RA 9372.
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan,
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.11 PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No.
178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging
Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary12 summarized the rule on them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
locus standi, thus: and its armed wing, the National People’s Army (NPA). The tagging, according to

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petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list
the law.15 The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the same allegations. Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda
Ilagan,20 urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing
The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged "tagging" of petitioners. the impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA
by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of the
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter Aquino Administration21 of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not
must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its
settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the allied organizations.
jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially interests in the questions being raised.22 Of recent development is the filing of the first case
noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally for proscription under Section 1723 of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before the
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.24 Petitioner-organizations do
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable. not in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.
Things of "common knowledge," of which courts take judicial matters coming to the Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA
knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them.
be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and
unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally known, and which may be In Ladlad v. Velasco,25 the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006
found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis,
they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casiño and Saturnino Ocampo of
as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro
man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and
being matters of common knowledge. But a court cannot take judicial notice of any fact Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the Communist movement
which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY,
has no constructive knowledge.16 (emphasis and underscoring supplied.) LFS and COURAGE.26

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one,
Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this
proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code.
belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor
tagging. does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements
not having been altered.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who
merely harp as well on their supposed "link" to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective
how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three years after the enactment
their organization and members. of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.

While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their
States of America17 (US) and the European Union18 (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing
and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.
statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that
the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to
terrorist organizations.19 Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.27 The IBP failed to sufficiently
courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional
outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single
now. From July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.
activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or
proscription under RA 9372. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of
"political surveillance," also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal

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basis, of the claim of "political surveillance," the Court finds that she has not shown even Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC33 cannot be more
the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are emphatic:
former Senator Wigberto Tañada and Senator Sergio Osmeña III, who cite their being
respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside [C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed. however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable—definite and
concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other
Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one
G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they raise are of transcendental hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely
importance, "which must be settled early" and are of "far-reaching implications," without a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and
clothe litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of underscoring supplied)
sustaining, direct injury as a result of the law’s enforcement. To rule otherwise would be to
corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati into a
the general public. Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent
events.34 Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to operate a
Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. radio or television station has been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a
A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.35
Congress,28 whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the
proceeding.29 The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections36
for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,37 to rule
for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived
and personal interest in the implementation of the law. potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law,
there being no actual controversy between real litigants.
It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public
right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key. The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes
on ad infinitum.
Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy
The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or threat to any constitutional interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional
controversy. challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts
to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.38
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,39 allowed the
pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies plaintiffs faced a "credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief."40 The plaintiffs therein
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction filed an action before a federal court to assail the constitutionality of the material support
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.30 (emphasis and statute, 18 U.S.C. §2339B (a) (1),41 proscribing the provision of material support to
underscoring supplied.) organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 the Court ruled that the power of judicial claimed that they intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of
review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of two such organizations.
argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an
legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy.42
ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the
amount to an advisory opinion.32 challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that

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they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,52 the Court stated
existing one. that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to
conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense53
Petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic "surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged,
"communist fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these is couched in precise language.54
allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.
43 The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion55 of Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act
Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions
characterized by "double contingency," where both the activity the petitioners intend to The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie concept of a "facial" invalidation as opposed to an "as-applied" challenge. He basically
beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.44 postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial
review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza,
The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar
to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.45 Allegations of A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable. statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself
as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to
A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate
that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
crime of terrorism46 under RA 9372 in that terms like "widespread and extraordinary fear outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and
and panic among the populace" and "coerce the government to give in to an unlawful perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad
demand" are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the statutes.
prohibited acts.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem
Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason
overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply only to free alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free
For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the speech.
schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute. cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court
Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth'
application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the
Hon. Sandiganbayan47 and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.48 Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
The Court clarifies. "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has
At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word "intervene" in Section 549 of been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may
application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff
penal statutes."50 It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness
therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.51 of the law as applied to the conduct of others."

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In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.58
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that
to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other behavior, even though some of it is protected.59
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out,
"vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real
typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and
no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the
its entirety. assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.60
ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle61 in his concurring opinion that the
constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made without concrete factual to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal
settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.
Younger v. Harris
The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring "chilling effect" on protected speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an abridged.62 As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the generally bear an "in terrorem effect" in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected
. . ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional rights.63
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
The Court reiterated that there are "critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly challenged" and "underscored that an ‘on-its-face’ invalidation of penal statutes x x x may
strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally not be allowed."64
disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which
are alleged to have been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct [T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom,
with which the defendant is charged.56 (Underscoring supplied.) and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal
statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution
vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of
(under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights). requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous
the same plane. and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not
before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal with crime. If warranted,
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or
due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.65 (Emphasis and
the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its underscoring supplied)
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.57 The overbreadth
doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities

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It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants’ claims that
to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine hailed as "among the
applicable only to free speech cases. most important guarantees of liberty under law."75

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause
in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three
before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. cases,76 the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable
the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants. under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of
the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed
some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that penal statute, unlike in the present case.
a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve
away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial
case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of analysis of its validity
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules
give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the
invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any of
law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the enumerated special
The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is
enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law’s "very existence may actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners
speech of those third parties.66 (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.) contend that the element of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism77 must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two clause.
cases,67 observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine
outside the limited context of the First Amendment,68 and that claims of facial overbreadth The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate
only spoken words.69 In Virginia v. Hicks,70 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an "unlawful
or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the demand." Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting
"transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression."71 the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, conduct into a protected speech.
a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt
the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in
however, that there was no basis to review the law "on its face and in its entirety."72 It negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case78 illustrated that the fact
stressed that "statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer
'as applied' to a particular defendant."73 to take down a sign reading "White Applicants Only" hardly means that the law should be
analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct.
American jurisprudence74 instructs that "vagueness challenges that do not involve the First
Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter
regard to the statute's facial validity." neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole
act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the

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expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion AQUINO, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
perceptible.
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the Official Gazette of June
[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances 14, 1982, of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980, providing for
brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one
of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the province to another.
conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either
spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-
of speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against wheeler truck in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf from Sipocot,
agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia, Batangas, as the destination.
deemed injurious to society.79 (italics and underscoring supplied)
They were provided with (1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian of
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely Camarines Sur, issued under the Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No.
evidence a prohibited conduct.80 Since speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed 533, the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974; (2) a permit to transport large cattle issued under
the call for a facial analysis.1avvphi1 the authority of the provincial commander; and (3) three certificates of inspection, one from
the Constabulary command attesting that the carabaos were not included in the list of lost,
IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the stolen and questionable animals; one from the LIvestock inspector, Bureau of Animal
therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were Industry of Libmanan, Camarines Sur and one from the mayor of Sipocot.
actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in
said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in In spite of the permit to transport and the said four certificates, the carabaos, while passing
its entirety. at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town's
police station commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian. The
In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of confiscation was basis on the aforementioned Executive Order No. 626-A which provides
a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a "that henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no
"credible threat of prosecution" and "should not be required to await and undergo a carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabaos or carabeef
criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief." transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation
and forfeiture by the government to be distributed ... to deserving farmers through dispersal
As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos" (78 OG 3144).
threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed
definition of "terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among twenty-five farmers of Basud, and to a
power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statute’s future effect on farmer from the Vinzons municipal nursery (Annex 1).
hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress. The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for replevin for the
recovery of the carabaos allegedly valued at P70,000 and damages of P92,000. The
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. replevin order could not be executed by the sheriff. In his order of April 25, 1983 Judge
Domingo Medina Angeles, who heard the case at Daet and who was later transferred to
Caloocan City, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984 The Pesigans appealed to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 25 of
the Interim Rules and pursuant to Republic Act No. 5440, a 1968 law which superseded
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN and MARCELINO L. PESIGAN, petitioners, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
vs. We hold that the said executive order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April
JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES, Regional Trial Court, Caloocan City Branch 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two months
129, acting for REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of Camarines Norte, now presided over by later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective only fifteen days
JUDGE NICANOR ORIÑO, Daet Branch 40; DRA. BELLA S. MIRANDA, ARNULFO V. thereafter as provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of the Revised
ZENAROSA, ET AL., respondents. Administrative Code.

The word "laws" in article 2 (article 1 of the old Civil Code) includes circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the

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contents of the regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
thereby. (People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Lim Hoa Ting vs. Central Bank of the Phils.,
104 Phil. 573; Balbuna vs. Secretary of Education, 110 Phil. 150.) LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
The Spanish Supreme Court ruled that "bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se
comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales vs.
ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad (1
Manresa, Codigo Civil, 7th Ed., p. 146.) HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
Thus, in the Que Po Lay case, a person, convicted by the trial court of having violated MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records
Central Bank Circular No. 20 and sentenced to six months' imprisonment and to pay a fine Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,
of P1,000, was acquitted by this Court because the circular was published in the Official respondents.
Gazette three months after his conviction. He was not bound by the circular.
ESCOLIN, J.:
That ruling applies to a violation of Executive Order No. 626-A because its confiscation and
forfeiture provision or sanction makes it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized
public must be informed of that provision by means of publication in the Gazette before in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that
violators of the executive order can be bound thereby. laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise
effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public
The cases of Police Commission vs. Bello, L-29960, January 30, 1971, 37 SCRA 230 and officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
Philippine Blooming Mills vs. Social Security System, 124 Phil. 499, cited by the presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
respondents, do not involve the enforcement of any penal regulation. orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every order or
document which shag prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265,
legal effect." 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427,
429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658,
Indeed, the practice has always been to publish executive orders in the Gazette. Section 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061,
551 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that even bureau "regulations and orders 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810,
shall become effective only when approved by the Department Head and published in the 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
Official Gazette or otherwise publicly promulgated". (See Commissioner of Civil Service vs.
Cruz, 122 Phil. 1015.) b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155,
161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228,
In the instant case, the livestock inspector and the provincial veterinarian of Camarines 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293,
Norte and the head of the Public Affairs Office of the Ministry of Agriculture were unaware of 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382,
Executive Order No. 626-A. The Pesigans could not have been expected to be cognizant of 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576,
such an executive order. 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726,
837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.
It results that they have a cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary
confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
Pesigans. However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now
bound by the said executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532,
Zenarosa acted in good faith in ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos. 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609,
1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation and dispersal of the 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807,
carabaos are reversed and set aside. Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844,
restore the carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as owners are 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918,
entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of them in Basud or Sipocot, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145,
Camarines Sur. No costs. SO ORDERED.1äw 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

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e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be
570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be
854-857. applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general
rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123. applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439. No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel
for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no
the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential
issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote: enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental
law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered
resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd his appearance for respondents in this case.
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own
that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question
specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official
pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2
defendant. of the Civil Code:
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official
Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself
that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to provides for the date when it goes into effect.
apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e.,
469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3]
call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said: be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents
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or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
so to be published. ... reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the
pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen to wit:
for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a
constructive one. The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It
President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa— unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior
and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such publicity to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed
texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted
generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of
Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5 those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be invalidity cannot be justified.
published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.
listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be
included or excluded from such publication. Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in
the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-
is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only
not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6 Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have
not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may
general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7: Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the
law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their
official and specific contents.
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Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that 5. When is the publication to be made?
they shall take effect immediately.
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
published, they shall have no binding force and effect. Gazette. 2
SO ORDERED. In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion
was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the
merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant
[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.] that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when
necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject
decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited
a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events,
FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. intended only for the interval administration of a government agency or for particular
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and in
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., Respondents. the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding
because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5
RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.: The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The "ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to after such publication."cralaw virtua1aw library
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24,
1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so other date, without its previous publication.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
published, they shall have no binding force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed
of that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the
library Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the
Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ? because it was "otherwise provided."cralaw virtua1aw library

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
3. What is meant by "publication" ? deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
4. Where is the publication to be made? approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result;

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and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly enforce.
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
operate.cralawnad Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by
the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this
course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal rule but by the Local Government Code.
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
government. the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability
a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to
said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made
as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a should be made, 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to
whole. arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by
the necessary vote.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers
legislature.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code,
of their duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to period provided by the legislature.chanrobles law library
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. Pero sa admin code, sinama na pati newspaper of gen circulation
All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to
place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course,
The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely although not suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a

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mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this time.
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and
advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment. Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William
McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an
open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation
always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio
sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them. and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services –
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further
freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan
legislature are concealed. and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for
disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum,
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a which reads:
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade "P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
is drawn.
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon
their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code. Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
SO ORDERED. Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published,
but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013 No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274
and 730.
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same
vs. day.

MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent. including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito
Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to
x-----------------------x prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at
Fort Bonifacio.
DECISION
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.
SERENO, CJ.: (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of
assailing the Decision1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to
No. 97925. Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and
THE FACTS (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot
to its bona fide occupants.4
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On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for
by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of I
SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON
Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7 THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral II
part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President
could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
Proclamation RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF
LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could
not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, III
Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO
power had ceased. THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that LAND CASES.14
pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
she held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no
occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission had no THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE
authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of Proclamation BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN
No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the legislature. ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN
BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by
the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10 Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in
ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No.
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP 2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007. in the publication of the said law.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed THE COURT’S RULING
Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots),
the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to
SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all
DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public
respondents are likewise land when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original) However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when
Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions
for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies
in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the
THE ISSUES force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

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ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
after such publication. the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to pursuant also to a valid delegation.
the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the xxxx
completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
had the occasion to rule thus: All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public
place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to
out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the enforce.
Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the
Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply xxxx
because it was "otherwise provided."
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability
and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The evident purpose was to
not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to xxxx
operate. Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
xxxx shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like is drawn. (Emphases supplied)
a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be
said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten
directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, never had any legal force and effect.
even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be invalid Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the
as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may
whole. not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can

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create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise The claim of petitioner that the challenged provision constitutes an ex post facto law is
would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of likewise untenable.
our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where
ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The An ex post facto law is one which:.
remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that
would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification. (1) makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent
when done, and punishes such an act;
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is crime when committed;
DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs. SO ORDERED.
(4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different
testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;
G.R. No. L-32485 October 22, 1970 (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF THE PETITIONER'S deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful; and
RIGHTS AND DUTIES UNDER SEC. 8 OF R.A. No. 6132. (6) deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
KAY VILLEGAS KAMI, INC., petitioner. entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of
amnesty.3
MAKASIAR, J.:.
From the aforesaid definition as well as classification of ex post facto laws, the
This petition for declaratory relief was filed by Kay Villegas Kami, Inc., claiming to be a duly constitutional inhibition refers only to criminal laws which are given retroactive effect.4
recognized and existing non-stock and non-profit corporation created under the laws of the
land, and praying for a determination of the validity of Sec. 8 of R.A. No. 6132 and a While it is true that Sec. 18 penalizes a violation of any provision of R.A. No. 6132 including
declaration of petitioner's rights and duties thereunder. In paragraph 7 of its petition, Sec. 8(a) thereof, the penalty is imposed only for acts committed after the approval of the
petitioner avers that it has printed materials designed to propagate its ideology and program law and not those perpetrated prior thereto. There is nothing in the law that remotely
of government, which materials include Annex B; and that in paragraph 11 of said petition, insinuates that Secs. 8(a) and 18, or any other provision thereof, shall apply to acts carried
petitioner intends to pursue its purposes by supporting delegates to the Constitutional out prior to its approval. On the contrary, See. 23 directs that the entire law shall be
Convention who will propagate its ideology. effective upon its approval. It was approved on August 24, 1970.

Petitioner, in paragraph 7 of its petition, actually impugns because it quoted, only the first WHEREFORE, the prayer of the petition is hereby denied and paragraph 1 of Sec. 8(a) of
paragraph of Sec. 8(a) on the ground that it violates the due process clause, right of R.A. No. 6132 is not unconstitutional. Without costs.
association, and freedom of expression and that it is an ex post facto law.

The first three grounds were overruled by this Court when it held that the questioned
provision is a valid limitation on the due process, freedom of expression, freedom of
association, freedom of assembly and equal protection clauses; for the same is designed to
prevent the clear and present danger of the twin substantive evils, namely, the prostitution
of electoral process and denial of the equal protection of the laws. Moreover, under the
balancing-of-interests test, the cleansing of the electoral process, the guarantee of equal
change for all candidates, and the independence of the delegates who must be "beholden
to no one but to God, country and conscience," are interests that should be accorded
primacy.1

The petitioner should therefore be accordingly guided by the pronouncements in the cases
of Imbong and Gonzales. 2

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[G.R. NO. 145184 : March 14, 2008] ACCORDINGLY, an "Ad-Hoc FACT FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS" is
hereby created to be composed of the following:
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS,
represented by PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT through Chairman of the Presidential
ATTY. ORLANDO L. SALVADOR, Petitioner, v. HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his
capacity as OMBUDSMAN; DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES' MEMBERS Commission on Good Government - Chairman
OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND OFFICERS AT THE TIME - RAFAEL SISON,
JOSEPH TENGCO, ALICE REYES, VICENTE PATERNO, JOSEPH EDRALIN, ROBERTO The Solicitor General - Vice-Chairman
ONGPIN, VERDEN DANGILAN, RODOLFO MANALO; BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND Representative from the
OFFICERS INTEGRATED CIRCUITS PHILIPPINES, INC. QUERUBE MAKALINTAL,*
AMBROSIO MAKALINTAL, VICENTE JAYME, ANTONIO SANTIAGO, EDGAR QUINTO, Office of the Executive Secretary - Member
HORACIO MAKALINTAL, ALFREDO DE LOS ANGELES, JOSE REY D. RUEDA,
RAMONCITO MODESTO, GERARDO LIMJUCO, Respondents. Representative from the

DECISION Department of Finance - Member

NACHURA, J.: Representative from the

The Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, (the Committee), Department of Justice - Member
representing the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), through Atty.
Orlando L. Salvador (Atty. Salvador) filed this Petition for Certiorari seeking to nullify the Representative from the
September 3, 1999 Resolution1 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-0-95-0443,
dismissing the criminal complaint filed against private respondents, and the June 6, 2000 Development Bank of the Philippines - Member
Order2 denying its reconsideration. Representative from the
On October 8, 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 13 creating Philippine National Bank - Member
the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans (Committee), which
reads: Representative from the
WHEREAS, Sec. 28, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that "Subject to reasonable Asset Privatization Trust - Member
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all transactions involving public interest"; Government Corporate Counsel - Member

WHEREAS, Sec. 15, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that "The right of the state Representative from the
to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or from
their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or estoppel"; Philippine Export and Foreign

WHEREAS, there have been allegations of loans, guarantees, or other forms of financial Loan Guarantee Corporation - Member
accommodation granted, directly or indirectly, by government owned and controlled bank or
financial institutions, at the behest, command or urging by previous government officials to The Ad Hoc Committee shall perform the following functions:
the disadvantage and detriment of the Philippine government and the Filipino people; 1. Inventory all behest loans; identify the lenders and borrowers, including the principal
officers and stockholders of the borrowing firms, as well as the persons responsible for
granting the loans or who influenced the grant thereof;

2. Identify the borrowers who were granted "friendly waivers", as well as the government
officials who granted these waivers; determine the validity of these waivers;

3. Determine the courses of action that the government should take to recover those loans,
and to recommend appropriate actions to the Office of the President within sixty (60) days
from the date hereof.

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The Committee is hereby empowered to call upon any department, bureau, office, agency, undercapitalized at the time the loan was granted. ICPI's paid up capital by then was only
instrumentality or corporation of the government, or any officer or employee thereof, for P3,000,000.00, while the appraised value of the machinery and equipment offered as
such assistance as it may need in the discharge of its function. collaterals was only P5,943,610.00. Atty. Salvador concluded that ICPI was undeserving of
the concession given to it, and the approval of the loan constitutes a violation of Section
By Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, the functions of the Committee 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
were subsequently expanded by including in its investigation, inventory and study all non-
performing loans, whether behest or non-behest. It likewise provided for the following On March 13, 1996, Atty. Salvador filed a Supplementary Complaint Affidavit,4 to include in
criteria which might be utilized as frame of reference in determining a behest loan, to wit: his complaint ICPI's interim loan of P1,786,000.00, which he claimed was granted with
undue haste and without collateral, except a promissory note and comfort letter signed by
1. It is under-collateralized; DBP Chairman Rafael Sison. He added that the stockholders, officers and agents are
identified cronies, since the Chairman of the Board - Querube Makalintal - was, at the same
2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized; time, the then Speaker of the Interim Batasang Pambansa. He named Rafael A. Sison,
3. Direct or indirect endorsement by high government officials like presence of marginal Jose Tengco, Alice Ll. Reyes, and Casimiro Tanedo as the ones responsible for the
notes; approval of the loan who should, thus, be charged, along with the officers and directors of
ICPI, for violation of R.A. No. 3019.
4. Stockholders, officers or agents of the borrower corporation are identified as cronies;
After evaluating the evidence submitted by the Committee, the Ombudsman issued the
5. Deviation of use of loan proceeds from the purpose intended; assailed Memorandum, finding that:

6. Use of corporate layering; After going over the record, we find no probable cause to warrant the filing of the instant
case in court.
7. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought; andcralawlibrary
To start with, the cause of action has prescribed.
8. Extraordinary speed in which the loan release was made.
The loan in [question] was entered into between ICPI and DBP sometime in August 1980,
Moreover, a behest loan may be distinguished from a non-behest loan in that while both while the complaint was filed on February 17, 1995 only, or after the lapse of almost fifteen
may involve civil liability for non-payment or non-recovery, the former may likewise entail years. Under Section 11, RA 3019, offenses committed before March 16, 1982, prescribed
criminal liability. in ten (10) years.

Several loan accounts were referred to the Committee for its investigation, including the The transaction was duly documented and the instruments drawn in support thereof were
loan transactions between Comptronics Philippines, Inc. (CPI), now Integrated Circuits duly registered and open to public scrutiny, the prescriptive period of any legal action in
Philippines (ICPI), and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). connection with the said transaction commenced to run from the date the same was
registered sometime in 1980.
After examining and studying the loan transactions, the Committee determined that they
bore the characteristics of a behest loan as defined under Memorandum Order No. 61. x x x
Consequently, Atty. Orlando L. Salvador, Consultant of the Committee, and representing the
PCGG, filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint3 for violation of Section Complainant's allegation that the questioned loans were not covered by sufficient collaterals
3(e)(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, against is negated by the evidence on record. It appears from the Executive Summary attached to
the Concerned Members of the DBP Board of Governors, and Concerned Directors and the complaint that ICPI loans were secured by the following, to wit: (a) Machinery and
Officers of ICPI, namely, Querube Makalintal, Ambrosio C. Makalintal, Vicente R. Jayme, Equipment to be acquired valued at P5,943,610.00; (b) The Philippine Export and Foreign
Antonio A. Santiago, Edgar L. Quinto, Horacio G. Makalintal, Alfredo F. delos Angeles, Loan Guarantee Corporation guarantee up to 70% of the proposed DBP loan or
Josery D. Ruede, Manuel Tupaz, Alberto T. Perez and Gerardo A. Limjuco (private P7,100,000.00; (c) By the Joint and several signatures with ICPI, Philippine Underwriter
respondents). Finance Corporation; Atrium Capital Corporation, Mr. Ambrocio and Querube Macalintal.
The value of the machineries and equipment and the amount guaranteed by Philippine
Atty. Salvador alleged that ICPI applied for an industrial loan (foreign currency loan) of Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation have a total amount P13,043,610.00.
US$1,352,400.00, or P10,143,000.00, from DBP. The loan application was approved on ICPI's paid up capital in the amount of P3,000,000.00 was also considered as additional
August 6, 1980 under DBP Board Resolution No. 2924. Atty. Salvador claimed that there security. The aggregate value of ICPI's securities was therefore P16,043,610.00, while the
was undue haste in the approval of the loan. He also alleged that prior to its approval, ICPI total amount of loans granted was only P10,143,000.00. Clearly, therefore, the loans
was granted an interim loan of P1,786,000.00 to cover the project's initial financing granted to ICPI were not undercollaterized (sic).
requirement. He added that the ICPI's industrial loan was under-collateralized and ICPI was

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Moreover, ICPI had an authorized capital stock of P10 Million of which P3 Million had been Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with
paid up or more than 25% of the authorized capital. It cannot be said that the corporation is which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
undercapitalized. discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.9

In fine, the questioned loans were not considered behest loans within the purview of The ruling was reiterated in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
Memorandum Order No. 61, dated November 9, 1992 (Broadening the Scope of the Ad- v. Ombudsman Desierto,10 wherein the Court explained:
Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans Created Pursuant to Administrative Order
No. 13, dated October 8, 1992). In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986 EDSA
Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the government as the
Finally, the aforesaid Administrative and Memorandum Orders both issued by the President aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the time the questioned
in 1992, may not be retroactively applied to the questioned transactions which took place in transactions were made. Moreover, no person would have dared to question the legality of
1980 because to do so would be tantamount to an ex post facto law which is proscribed by those transactions. Thus, the counting of the prescriptive period commenced from the date
the Constitution.5 of discovery of the offense in 1992 after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad
Hoc Committee on Behest Loans.11
Thus, the Ombudsman disposed:
The Sworn Statement filed by Atty. Salvador did not specify the exact dates when the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let the instant complaint be, as the same is hereby, alleged offenses were discovered. However, the records show that it was the Committee
DISMISSED. that discovered the same. As such, the discovery could not have been made earlier than
October 8, 1992, the date when the Committee was created. The complaint was filed on
SO RESOLVED.6 February 17, 1995, less than three (3) years from the presumptive date of discovery. Thus,
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but the Ombudsman denied the same on June 6, the criminal offenses allegedly committed by the private respondents had not yet prescribed
2000.7 when the complaint was filed.

Hence, this petition for certiorari . Likewise, we do not agree with the Ombudsman's declaration that Administrative Order No.
13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot be applied retroactively to the questioned
Before tackling the issues raised by the petitioner, this Court takes notice of a serious transactions because to do so would violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post
procedural flaw. Joseph Edralin, Roberto Ongpin, Verden Dangilan and Rodolfo Manalo facto laws.
were impleaded as respondents in this petition. However, they were not made respondents
in the proceedings before the Ombudsman. Neither was there any allegation in the sworn- An ex post facto law has been defined as one - (a) which makes an action done before the
complaint and supplementary complaint executed by Atty. Salvador before the Ombudsman passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action;
that Edralin, Ongpin, Dangilan and Manalo had any participation in, or were responsible for, or (b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c)
the approval of the questioned loan. As such, they cannot be made respondents for the first which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to
time in this petition. Accordingly, we dismiss the petition as against them. the crime when it was committed; or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and
receives less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of
With the procedural issue resolved, this Court now comes to the issues raised by the the offense in order to convict the defendant;12 or (e) which assumes to regulate civil rights
petitioner. and remedies only, but in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of a right which when
exercised was lawful; or (f) which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
Petitioner alleges that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or
lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that (i) the offenses subject of its criminal complaint acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.13
had prescribed; (ii) Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 are ex post
facto laws; and (iii) there is no probable cause to indict private respondents for violation The constitutional proscription of ex post facto laws is aimed against the retrospectivity of
under Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019. penal laws. Penal laws are acts of the legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide
The computation of the prescriptive period for offenses involving the acquisition of behest for their punishment.14
loans had already been laid to rest in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans v. Desierto,8 thus: Administrative Order No. 13 does not mete out a penalty for the act of granting behest
loans. It merely creates the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact - Finding Committee on Behest Loans
[I]t was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations and provides for its composition and functions. Memorandum Order No. 61, on the other
of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, hand, simply provides the frame of reference in determining the existence of behest loans.
the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the "beneficiaries of the loans."
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Not being penal laws, Administrative Order No. 13 and Memorandum Order No. 61 cannot inexcusable negligence; and 3) he must have caused undue injury to any party, including
be characterized as ex-post facto laws. the government, or given any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference,
in the discharge of his functions.18 Evidently, mere bad faith or partiality and negligence per
Furthermore, in Estarija v. Ranada,15 in which petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality se are not enough for one to be held liable under the law. It is required that the act
of R.A. No. 6770 in his motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman's decision, we had constitutive of bad faith or partiality must, in the first place, be evident or manifest, while the
occasion to state that the Ombudsman had no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the negligent deed should be both gross and inexcusable. Further, it is necessary to show that
constitutionality of a law. The Ombudsman, therefore, acted in excess of its jurisdiction in any or all of these modalities resulted in undue injury to a specified party.19
delving into the constitutionality of the subject administrative and memorandum orders.
On the other hand, to be liable under Section 3(g), there must be a showing that private
Now, on the merits of the case. respondents entered into a grossly disadvantageous contract on behalf of the government.
Private respondents were charged with violation of Section 3(e)(g) of R.A. No. 3019. The Petitioner did not satisfy either criterion.
pertinent provisions read:
It is clear from the records that the DBP officers studied and evaluated ICPI's request for an
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to acts or omissions of public interim loan and an industrial loan, and they were convinced that ICPI was deserving of the
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of grant, considering the viability and economic desirability of its project. Petitioners failed to
any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: demonstrate that DBP did not exercise sound business judgment when it approved the
loan. Neither was there any proof that the conditions imposed for the loan were specially
xxx designed in order to favor ICPI.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private The Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code directs every person, inter alia, to
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, observe good faith, which springs from the fountain of good conscience.20 Well-settled is
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross the rule that good faith is presumed. Specifically, a public officer is presumed to have acted
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of officers or in good faith in the performance of his duties.
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable, absent a clear showing that he
was motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.21 "Bad faith" does not
xxx simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence. There must be some dishonest purpose
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a sworn duty through
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit some motive or intent, or ill will. It partakes of the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of
thereby. mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for
ulterior purposes.22 Petitioners utterly failed to show that private respondents' actions fit
Petitioner asserts that the loan transaction between DBP and ICPI bore the characteristics such description.
of a behest loan. It claims that the loan was under-collateralized and ICPI was under-
capitalized when the questioned loan was hastily granted. Petitioner believes that there Neither was there any convincing proof offered to demonstrate that the contracts were
exists probable cause to indict the private respondents for violation of Section 3(e)(g) of grossly disadvantageous to the Government, or that they were entered into to give ICPI
R.A. No. 3019. unwarranted benefits and advantages.

Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office Petitioner asserts that ICPI was undeserving of the accommodation given by DBP. To
during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the support this allegation, petitioners quoted a portion of the credit evaluation report, which
Ombudsman.16 The Ombudsman is empowered to determine, in the exercise of his reads:
discretion, whether probable cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have Investigations conducted by DBP's Credit Department revealed adverse findings on ICPI
committed the crime as defined by law. As a rule, courts should not interfere with the and Mr. Gene Vicente Tamesis, who until recently, has been the principal stockholder and
Ombudsman's investigatory power, exercised through the Ombudsman Prosecutors, and executive officer of subject Corporation. x x x Mr. Tamesis, however, has since transferred
the authority to determine the presence or absence of probable cause, except when the all of his shareholdings to Mr. Ambrosio G. Makalintal. Aware of Mr. Tamesis' unfavorable
finding is tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.17 credit standing, ICPI's management has, further, caused him to yield his position as
For one to have violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the following elements must be Chairman of the Board in favor of Mr. Querube C. Makalintal, former Justice of the Supreme
established: 1) the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or Court and presently Speaker of the Interim Batasang Pambansa.23
official functions; 2) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
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But we note that the said credit investigation report goes further, and states: allegation, much less proof, as to when ICPI applied for this interim loan. In the absence of
such proof, we cannot conclude that the same was hastily granted.
With the responsible management of the Makalintals and the conversion of substantial
liabilities of ICPI into equity (subject-firm's major creditors, namely, Philippine Underwriters Neither does the industrial loan appear to have been hastily granted. Admittedly, the interim
Finance Corporation and Atrium Capital Corporation have both agreed, in principle, to loan granted on April 6, 1980 formed part of ICPI's application for industrial or foreign
convert their claims into equity), the corporation can now operate on a clean credit slate currency loan in the amount of US$1,352,400.00. Logically then, we can assume that ICPI's
and stands a good chance of meeting its credit obligations.24 application was filed earlier than April 6, 1980, the date of the approval of the interim loan.
DBP, however, approved the industrial loan only on August 6, 1980. The processing period
There is, thus, no solid basis for petitioners to claim that ICPI did not deserve the of more than four months is inconsistent with the claim that the loan was hastily granted.29
concession given by DBP.
In sum, petitioner does not persuade us that the contract between ICPI and DBP was a
Contrary to what petitioner wants to portray, the contracts between ICPI and DBP were not behest loan.
behest loans. ICPI was not under-capitalized and the loan was not under-collateralized at
the time of its approval. Likewise, the approval can hardly be depicted as one done with Finally, we note that petitioner did not specify the precise role played by, or the participation
undue haste. of, each of the private respondents in the alleged violation of R.A. No. 3019. No concrete or
overt acts of the ICP's directors and officers, particularly of Mr. Querube Makalintal, were
The records show that in 1979, Atrium Capital Corporation and Philippine Underwriter's specifically alleged or mentioned in the complaint and its supplement, and no proof was
Corporation agreed on the conversion of their P8,500,000.00 worth of creditor's equity into adduced to show that they unduly influenced the directors and concerned officials of DBP.
capital stocks.25 Then, in 1980, the individual stockholders paid their respective Neither were circumstances shown to indicate a common criminal design of either the
subscriptions amounting to P3,000,000.00, thereby increasing ICPI's paid up capital to officers of DPB or ICPI, nor that they colluded to cause undue injury to the government by
P11,500,000.00 as of April 23, 1980.26 This belies petitioners' claim that, at that time, ICPI giving unwarranted benefits to ICPI.
was under-capitalized.
The Ombudsman can hardly be faulted for not wanting to proceed with the prosecution of
Similarly, the industrial loan was sufficiently collateralized at the time of its approval. It was the offense, convinced that he does not possess the necessary evidence to secure a
granted on the condition that the assets intended for acquisition by ICPI would serve as conviction.
collateral. The Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation (PEFLGC) also
guaranteed 70% of the loan extended. ICPI was further required to assign to DBP not less WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Memorandum and Order of the
than 67% of its total subscribed and outstanding voting shares, which should be maintained Ombudsman in OMB-0-95-0443, are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
at all times and should subsist during the existence of the loan. As additional security, ICPI's
majority stockholders, namely, Integrated Circuits Philippine, Inc. (ICP) of Philippine
Underwriters Finance Corporation, Atrium Corporation (AC), Ambrosio G. Makalintal and
Querube Makalintal were also made jointly and severally liable to DBP. DBP was also given G.R. No. L-18208 February 14, 1922
the right to designate its comptroller in ICP.27 THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
Petitioner's insistence that DBP excluded the joint and several liabilities of the majority vs.
stockholders of ICP and AC and of Querube Makalintal has to be rejected. It is true that
DBP's Industrial Project Department recommended the amendment of this condition. VICENTE DIAZ CONDE and APOLINARIA R. DE CONDE, defendants-appellants.
However, no proof was offered to prove that the DBP Board of Directors approved such
recommendation.chanrobles virtual law library JOHNSON, J.:

Petitioner also points to the alleged non-implementation of the guarantee by PEFLGC to It appears from the record that on the 6th day of May, 1921, a complaint was presented in
demonstrate that the loan was under-collateralized at the time of its approval. But the the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila, charging the defendants with a violation of
evidence28 presented shows that the PEFLGC approved the guarantee, although the the Usury Law (Act No. 2655). Upon said complaint they were each arrested, arraigned,
approval lapsed in 1985. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that, at the time of the approval of the and pleaded not guilty. The cause was finally brought on for trial on the 1st day of
loan, there was a guarantee by PEFLGC. Besides, even if we exclude as security the September, 1921. At the close of the trial, and after a consideration of the evidence
guarantee of PEFLGC, the loan still had sufficient collaterals at the time of its approval. adduced, the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, judge, found that the defendants were guilty of
the crime charged in the complaint and sentenced each of them to pay a fine of P120 and,
The contention that the loan was hastily granted also fails to persuade. The supplemental in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of
complaint alleged that the interim loan was granted on April 6, 1980. However, there was no the law. From that sentence each of the defendants appealed to this court.

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The appellants now contend: (a) That the contract upon which the alleged usurious interest legal at its inception, it cannot be rendered illegal by any subsequent legislation. If that were
was collected was executed before Act No. 2655 was adopted; (b) that at the time said permitted then the obligations of a contract might be impaired, which is prohibited by the
contract was made (December 30, 1915), there was no usury law in force in the Philippine organic law of the Philippine Islands. (U.S. vs. Constantino Tan Quingco Chua, 39 Phil.,
Islands; (c) that said Act No. 2655 did not become effective until the 1st day of May, 1916, 552; Aguilar vs. Rubiato and Gonzales Vila, 40 Phil., 570.)
or four months and a half after the contract in question was executed; (d) that said law
could have no retroactive effect or operation, and (e) that said law impairs the obligation of Ex post facto laws, unless they are favorable to the defendant, are prohibited in this
a contract, and that for all of said reasons the judgment imposed by the lower court should jurisdiction. Every law that makes an action, done before the passage of the law, and which
be revoked; that the complaint should be dismissed, and that they should each be was innocent when done, criminal, and punishes such action, is an ex post facto law. In the
discharged from the custody of the law. present case Act No. 2655 made an act which had been done before the law was adopted,
a criminal act, and to make said Act applicable to the act complained of would be to give it
The essential facts constituting the basis of the criminal action are not in dispute, and may an ex post facto operation. The Legislature is prohibited from adopting a law which will
be stated as follows: (1) That on the 30th day of December, 1915, the alleged offended make an act done before its adoption a crime. A law may be given a retroactive effect in civil
persons Bartolome Oliveros and Engracia Lianco executed and delivered to the defendants action, providing it is curative in character, but ex post facto laws are absolutely prohibited
a contract (Exhibit B) evidencing the fact that the former had borrowed from the latter the unless its retroactive effect is favorable to the defendant.
sum of P300, and (2) that, by virtue of the terms of said contract, the said Bartolome
Oliveros and Engracia Lianco obligated themselves to pay to the defendants interest at the For the reason, therefore, that the acts complained of in the present case were legal at the
rate of five per cent (5%) per month, payable within the first ten days of each and every time of their occurrence, they cannot be made criminal by any subsequent or ex post facto
month, the first payment to be made on the 10th day of January, 1916. There were other legislation. What the courts may say, considering the provisions of article 1255 of the Civil
terms in the contract which, however, are not important for the decision in the present case. Code, when a civil action is brought upon said contract, cannot now be determined. A
contract may be annulled by the courts when it is shown that it is against morals or public
The lower court, in the course of its opinion, stated that at the time of the execution and order.
delivery of said contract (Exhibit B), there was no law in force in the Philippine Islands
punishing usury; but, inasmuch as the defendants had collected a usurious rate of interest For all of the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion, and so decide, that the acts
after the adoption of the Usury Law in the Philippine Islands (Act No. 2655), they were guilty complained of by the defendants did not constitute a crime at the time they were committed,
of a violation of that law and should be punished in accordance with its provisions. and therefore the sentence of the lower court should be, and is hereby, revoked; and it is
hereby ordered and decreed that the complaint be dismissed, and that the defendants be
The law, we think, is well established that when a contract contains an obligation to pay discharged from the custody of the law, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
interest upon the principal, the interest thereby becomes part of the principal and is
included within the promise to pay. In other words, the obligation to pay interest on money
due under a contract, be it express or implied, is a part of the obligation of the contract.
Laws adopted after the execution of a contract, changing or altering the rate of interest, G.R. No. L-46228 January 17, 1978
cannot be made to apply to such contract without violating the provisions of the constitution THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
which prohibit the adoption of a law "impairing the obligation of contract." (8 Cyc., 996; 12
Corpus Juris, 1058-1059.) vs.
The obligation of the contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement HON. ROLANDO R. VILLARAZA (as City Judge of Cagayan de Oro City), and
if it is not contrary to the law of the land, morals or public order. That law must govern and CAESAR PUERTO, respondents.
control the contract in every aspect in which it is intended to bear upon it, whether it affect
its validity, construction, or discharge. Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner AQUINO, J.:
changes the intention of the parties, necessarily impairs the contract itself. If a law impairs
the obligation of a contract, it is prohibited by the Jones Law, and is null and void. The laws This case is about the jurisdiction of a city court in estafa cases.
in force in the Philippine Islands prior to any legislation by the American sovereignty,
prohibited the Legislature from giving to any penal law a retroactive effect unless such law On December 3, 1975 an assistant city fiscal charged Caesar Puerto with estafa in the city
was favorable to the person accused. (Articles 21 and 22, Penal Code.) court of Cagayan de Oro City for having issued on October 16, 1974 two bouncing checks
for the total sum of P4, 966. 63 (Criminal Case No. 32140).
A law imposing a new penalty, or a new liability or disability, or giving a new right of action,
must not be construed as having a retroactive effect. It is an elementary rule of contract that City Judge Rolando R. Villaraza in his order March 31, 1976 noted that the accused had
the laws in force at the time the contract was made must govern its interpretation and waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. He directed that the case be
application. Laws must be construed prospectively and not retrospectively. If a contract is elevated, for trial, to the court of First Instance or the Circuit Criminal Court.

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Upon petition of the prosecution, the Court of first Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan G.R. Nos. L-32613-14 December 27, 1972
de Oro Branch VIII, in its order of February 3, 1977 returned the case to the city court
because in its opinion the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of the two courts and, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
the city court, as the first court which took cognizance of the case, should try it.
vs.
Disagreeing with the Court of First Instance, respondent city judge in his order of April 21,
1977 directed the re-elevation of the case. His view is that the case falls within the HON. SIMEON. FERRER (in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance because estafa committed by the Tarlac, Branch I), FELICIANO CO alias LEONCIO CO alias "Bob," and NILO S. TAYAG
accused is punishable by prision mayor medium under Presidential Decree No. 818 which alias Romy Reyes alias "Taba," respondents.
took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. CASTRO, J.:p
That order of respondent judge is assailed in the petition for certiorari filed in this Court on I. Statement of the Case
May 27, 1977 by the office of the city fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City.
Posed in issue in these two cases is the constitutionality of the Anti-Subversion 

We hold that the case was properly filed with the city court which has original jurisdiction Act,1 which outlaws the Communist Party of the Philippines and other "subversive
over it. The estafa imputed to Caesar Puerto is punishable under article 315 of the Revised associations," and punishes any person who "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts affiliates
Penal Code by arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum or four months and himself with, becomes or remains a member" of the Party or of any other similar
one day to two years and four months. "subversive" organization.
The penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years, imposed by On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act
Presidential Decree No. 818, applies only to swindling by means of issuing bouncing was filed against the respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. On
checks which was committed or after October 22, 1975. March 10 Judge Jose C. de Guzman conducted a preliminary investigation and, finding a
That increased penalty does not apply to the estafa committed by Puerto on October 16, prima facie case against Co, directed the Government prosecutors to file the corresponding
1974. To apply it to Puerto would make the decree an ex post facto law. Its retroactive information. The twice-amended information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27, recites:
application is prohibited by articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code and section 12, That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas, Province of
Article IV of the Constitution. Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed
The city court has original jurisdiction over the case because the penultimate paragraph or accused, feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the
section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the
provides that "judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for
to try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the
which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in
not more than six years or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both." the Mao Tse Tung University, the training school of recruits of the New People's Army, the
military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines.
As section 87 itself shows, that jurisdiction is concurrent with the court of First Instance
which is empowered to try "all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is That in the commission of the above offense, the following aggravating circumstances are
imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos" (Sec. present, to wit:
44[f], Judiciary Law. See People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531). (a) That the crime has been committed in contempt of or with insult to public authorities;
It was not necessary for the city court to have conducted the preliminary investigation of the (b) That the crime was committed by a band; and afford impunity.
case. The filing of the information by the fiscal presupposes that he had conducted the
requisite preliminary investigation pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Republic (c) With the aid of armed men or persons who insure or afford impunity.
Act No. 5180, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 77.
Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.
WHEREFORE, the order of the Court of First Instance, returning the case to the city court,
is affirmed and the two orders of the respondent city judge, elevating the case to the Court Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was filed with the same court,
of First Instance, are set aside. The city court is directed to try the case. No costs. sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and five others with subversion. After preliminary
investigation was had, an information was filed, which, as amended, reads:
SO ORDERED.

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The undersigned provincial Fiscal of Tarlac and State Prosecutors duly designated by the Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, in its resolution of September 15,
Secretary of Justice to collaborate with the Provincial Fiscal of Tarlac, pursuant to the Order 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds that it is a bill of attainder and that it is
dated June 5, above entitled case, hereby accuse Nilo S. Tayag, alias Romy Reyes alias vague and overboard, and dismissed the informations against the two accused. The
TABA, ARTHUR GARCIA, RENATO (REY) CASIPE, ABELARDO GARCIA, MANUEL Government appealed. We resolved to treat its appeal as a special civil action for certiorari.
ALAVADO, BENJAMIN BIE alias COMMANDER MELODY and several JOHN DOES,
whose identities are still unknown, for violation of REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise II. Is the Act a Bill of Attainder?
known as the Anti-Subversion Law, committed as follows:
Article III, section 1 (11) of the Constitution states that "No bill of attainder or ex port facto
That in or about March 1969 and for sometime prior thereto and thereafter, in the Province law shall be enacted."2 A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without
of Tarlac, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and elsewhere in the Philippines, trial.3 Its essence is the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt.4 The
the above-named accused knowingly, willfully and by overt acts organized, joined and/or constitutional ban against bills of attainder serves to implement the principle of separation
remained as offices and/or ranking leaders, of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a of powers 5 by confining legislatures to
subversive organization as defined in Republic Act No. 1700; that BENJAMIN BIE and
COMMANDER MELODY, in addition thereto, knowingly, willfully and by over acts joined rule-making 6 and thereby forestalling legislative usurpation of the judicial function.7 History
and/or remained as a member and became an officer and/or ranking leader not only of the in perspective, bills of attainder were employed to suppress unpopular causes and political
Communist Party of the Philippines but also of the New People's Army, the military arm of minorities, 8 and it is against this evil that the constitutional prohibition is directed. The
the Communist Party of the Philippines; and that all the above-named accused, as such singling out of a definite class, the imposition of a burden on it, and a legislative intent,
officers and/or ranking leaders of the aforestated subversive organizations, conspiring, suffice to stigmatizea statute as a bill of attainder. 9
confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there knowingly, willfully and In the case at bar, the Anti-Subversion Act was condemned by the court a quo as a bill of
feloniously commit subversive and/or seditious acts, by inciting, instigating and stirring the attainder because it "tars and feathers" the Communist Party of the Philippines as a
people to unite and rise publicly and tumultuously and take up arms against the "continuing menace to the freedom and security of the country; its existence, a 'clear,
government, and/or engage in rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the present and grave danger to the security of the Philippines.'" By means of the Act, the trial
government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or court said, Congress usurped "the powers of the judge," and assumed "judicial magistracy
other illegal means among which are the following: by pronouncing the guilt of the CCP without any of the forms or safeguards of judicial trial."
1. On several occasions within the province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings Finally, according to the trial court, "if the only issue [to be determined] is whether or not the
and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the accused is a knowing and voluntary member, the law is still a bill of attainder because it has
people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the expressly created a presumption of organizational guilt which the accused can never hope
Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and toward to overthrow."
this end, the said accused organized, among others a chapter of the KABATAANG 1. When the Act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
MAKABAYAN in barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac for the avowed purpose of undertaking or Communist Party of the Philippines or the members thereof for the purpose of punishment.
promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/ What it does is simply to declare the Party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow
or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the of the Government for the purposes of the prohibition, stated in section 4, against
Republic of the Philippines and to established in the Philippines a Communist regime. membership in the outlawed organization. The term "Communist Party of the Philippines"
2. The accused NILO TAYAG alias ROMY REYES alias TABA, together with FRANCISCO issued solely for definitional purposes. In fact the Act applies not only to the Communist
PORTEM alias KIKO Gonzales and others, pursued the above subversive and/or seditious Party of the Philippines but also to "any other organization having the same purpose and
activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the New People's Army, and/or by their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct. 10
instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the This feature of the Act distinguishes it from section 504 of the U.S. Federal Labor-
Government of the Republic of the Philippines through armed revolution, deceit, subversion Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 11 which, in U.S. vs. Brown, 12 was held
and/or other illegal means, and establishing in the Philippines a Communist Government. to be a bill of attainder and therefore unconstitutional. Section 504 provided in its pertinent
That the following aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense: (a) parts as follows:
aid of armed men or persons to insure or afford impunity; and (b) craft, fraud, or disguise (a) No person who is or has been a member of the Communist
was employed.
Party ... shall serve —
On July 21, 1970 Tayag moved to quash, impugning the validity of the statute on the
grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3) it embraces more than one subject
not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal protection of the laws.

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(1) as an officer, director, trustee, member of any executive board or similar governing body, comes within the terms of the Act. If the Party should at anytime choose to abandon these
business agent, manager, organizer, or other employee (other than as an employee activities, after it is once registered pursuant to sec. 7, the Act provides adequate means of
performing exclusively clerical or custodial duties) of any labor organization. relief. (367 US, at 87, 6 L ed 2d at 683)

during or for five years after the termination of his membership in the Communist Party.... Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to
charge Communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
(b) Any person who willfully violates this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established.
imprisoned for not more than one year, or both. The Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party, knowing its subversive character
This statute specified the Communist Party, and imposes disability and penalties on its and with specific intent to further its basic objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing
members. Membership in the Party, without more, ipso facto disqualifies a person from Government by force deceit, and other illegal means and place the country under the
becoming an officer or a member of the governing body of any labor organization. As the control and domination of a foreign power.
Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:
As to the claim that under the statute organizationl guilt is nonetheless imputed despite the
Under the line of cases just outlined, sec. 504 of the Labor Management Reporting and requirement of proof of knowing membership in the Party, suffice it to say that is precisely
Disclosure Act plainly constitutes a bill of attainder. Congress undoubtedly possesses the nature of conspiracy, which has been referred to as a "dragneet device" whereby all
power under the Commerce Clause to enact legislation designed to keep from positions who participate in the criminal covenant are liable. The contention would be correct if the
affecting interstate commerce persons who may use of such positions to bring about statute were construed as punishing mere membership devoid of any specific intent to
political strikes. In section 504, however, Congress has exceeded the authority granted it by further the unlawful goals of the Party. 13 But the statute specifically required that
the Constitution. The statute does not set forth a generally applicable rule decreeing that membership must be knowing or active, with specific intent to further the illegal objectives
any person who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics (acts and of the Party. That is what section 4 means when it requires that membership, to be unlawful,
characteristics which, in Congress' view, make them likely to initiate political strikes) shall must be shown to have been acquired "knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." 14 The
not hold union office, and leaves to courts and juries the job of deciding what persons have ingredient of specific intent to pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by
committed the specified acts or possessed the specified characteristics. Instead, it "overt acts." 15 This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from the ingredient of
designates in no uncertain terms the persons who possess the feared characteristics and guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of direct participation in the organization's
therefore cannot hold union office without incurring criminal liability — members of the unlawful activities, while the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's
Communist Party. illegal objectives.
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 US 1, 6 L ed 2d 625, 81 S CT 2. Even assuming, however, that the Act specifies individuals and not activities, this feature
1357, lend a support to our conclusion. That case involved an appeal from an order by the is not enough to render it a bill of attainder. A statute prohibiting partners or employees of
Control Board ordering the Communist Party to register as a "Communist-action securities underwriting firms from serving as officers or employees of national banks on the
organization," under the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 987, 50 USC sec. basis of a legislative finding that the persons mentioned would be subject to the temptation
781 et seq. (1958 ed). The definition of "Communist-action organization" which the Board is to commit acts deemed inimical to the national economy, has been declared not to be a bill
to apply is set forth in sec. 3 of the Act: of attainder. 16 Similarly, a statute requiring every secret, oath-bound society having a
[A]ny organization in the United States ... which (i)is substantially directed, dominated, or membership of at least twenty to register, and punishing any person who becomes a
controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world member of such society which fails to register or remains a member thereof, was declared
Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and(ii) operates primarily to valid even if in its operation it was shown to apply only to the members of the Ku Klux Klan.
17
advance the objectives of such world Communist movement... 64 Stat 989, 50 USC sec.
782 (1958 ed.) In the Philippines the validity of section 23 (b) of the Industrial Peace Act, 18 requiring labor
A majority of the Court rejected the argument that the Act was a bill of attainder, reasoning unions to file with the Department of Labor affidavits of union officers "to the effect that they
that sec. 3 does not specify the persons or groups upon which the deprivations setforth in are not members of the Communist Party and that they are not members of any
the Act are to be imposed, but instead sets forth a general definition. Although the Board organization which teaches the overthrow of the Government by force or by any illegal or
has determined in 1953 that the Communist Party was a "Communist-action organization," unconstitutional method," was upheld by this Court. 19
the Court found the statutory definition not to be so narrow as to insure that the Party would Indeed, it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to easily
always come within it: ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
In this proceeding the Board had found, and the Court of Appeals has sustained its judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder. 20 It is upon this ground that statutes which
conclusion, that the Communist Party, by virtud of the activities in which it now engages, disqualified those who had taken part in the rebellion against the Government of the United

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States during the Civil War from holding office, 21 or from exercising their profession, 22 or from the Know Nothing and the A. P. A. orders of other periods; that its memberships was
which prohibited the payment of further compensation to individuals named in the Act on limited to native-born, gentile, protestant whites; that in part of its constitution and printed
the basis of a finding that they had engages in subversive activities, 23 or which made it a creed it proclaimed the widest freedom for all and full adherence to the Constitution of the
crime for a member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or employee of a labor United States; in another exacted of its member an oath to shield and preserve "white
union, 24 have been invalidated as bills of attainder. supremacy;" and in still another declared any person actively opposing its principles to be
"a dangerous ingredient in the body politic of our country and an enemy to the weal of our
But when the judgment expressed in legislation is so universally acknowledged to be national commonwealth;" that it was conducting a crusade against Catholics, Jews, and
certain as to be "judicially noticeable," the legislature may apply its own rules, and judicial Negroes, and stimulating hurtful religious and race prejudices; that it was striving for
hearing is not needed fairly to make such determination. 25 political power and assuming a sort of guardianship over the administration of local, state
and national affairs; and that at times it was taking into its own hands the punishment of
In New York ex rel. Bryant vs. Zimmerman, 26 the New York legislature passed a law what some of its members conceived to be crimes. 27
requiring every secret, oath-bound society with a membership of at least twenty to register,
and punishing any person who joined or remained a member of such a society failing to In the Philippines the character of the Communist Party has been the object of continuing
register. While the statute did not specify the Ku Klux Klan, in its operation the law applied scrutiny by this Court. In 1932 we found the Communist Party of the Philippines to be an
to the KKK exclusively. In sustaining the statute against the claim that it discriminated illegal association. 28 In 1969 we again found that the objective of the Party was the
against the Ku Klux Klan while exempting other secret, oath-bound organizations like "overthrow of the Philippine Government by armed struggle and to establish in the
masonic societies and the Knights of Columbus, the United States Supreme Court relied on Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red
common knowledge of the nature and activities of the Ku Klux Klan. The Court said: China." 29 More recently, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 30 we noted the growth of the Communist
Party of the Philippines and the organization of Communist fronts among youth
The courts below recognized the principle shown in the cases just cited and reached the organizations such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) and the emergence of the New
conclusion that the classification was justified by a difference between the two classes of People's Army. After meticulously reviewing the evidence, we said: "We entertain, therefore,
associations shown by experience, and that the difference consisted (a) in a manifest no doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms
tendency on the part of one class to make the secrecy surrounding its purpose and to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion against
membership a cloak for acts and conduct inimical to personal rights and public welfare, and the Government of the Philippines.
(b) in the absence of such a tendency on the part of the other class. In pointing out this
difference one of the courts said of the Ku Klux Klan, the principal association in the 3. Nor is it enough that the statute specify persons or groups in order that it may fall within
included class: "It is a matter of common knowledge that this organization functions largely the ambit of the prohibition against bills of attainder. It is also necessary that it must apply
at night, its members disguised by hoods and gowns and doing things calculated to strike retroactively and reach past conduct. This requirement follows from the nature of a bill of
terror into the minds of the people;" and later said of the other class: "These organizations attainder as a legislative adjudication of guilt. As Justice Frankfurter observed, "frequently a
and their purposes are well known, many of them having been in existence for many years. bill of attainder was ... doubly objectionable because of its ex post facto features. This is the
Many of them are oath-bound and secret. But we hear no complaint against them regarding historic explanation for uniting the two mischiefs in one
violation of the peace or interfering with the rights of others." Another of the courts said: "It
is a matter of common knowledge that the association or organization of which the relator is clause — 'No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed.' ... Therefore, if [a
concededly a member exercises activities tending to the prejudice and intimidation of statute] is a bill of attainder it is also an ex post facto law. But if it is not an ex post facto law,
sundry classes of our citizens. But the legislation is not confined to this society;" and later the reasons that establish that it is not are persuasive that it cannot be a bill of attainder." 31
said of the other class: "Labor unions have a recognized lawful purpose. The benevolent
orders mentioned in the Benevolent Orders Law have already received legislative scrutiny Thus in Gardner vs. Board of Public Works, 32 the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the validity of
and have been granted special privileges so that the legislature may well consider them the Charter of the City of Los Angeles which provided:
beneficial rather than harmful agencies." The third court, after recognizing "the potentialities
of evil in secret societies," and observing that "the danger of certain organizations has been ... [N]o person shall hold or retain or be eligible for any public office or employment in the
judicially demonstrated," — meaning in that state, — said: "Benevolent orders, labor unions service of the City of Los Angeles, in any office or department thereof, either elective or
and college fraternities have existed for many years, and, while not immune from hostile appointive, who has within five (5) years prior to the effective date of this section advised,
criticism, have on the whole justified their existence." advocated, or taught, or who may, after this section becomes effective, become a member
of or affiliated with any group, society, association, organization or party which advises,
We assume that the legislature had before it such information as was readily available advocates or teaches or has within said period of five (5) years advised, advocated, or
including the published report of a hearing, before a committee of the House of taught the overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States of
Representatives of the 57th Congress relating to the formation, purposes and activities of America or of the State of California.
the Klu Klux Klan. If so it was advised — putting aside controverted evidence — that the
order was a revival of the Ku Klux Klan of an earlier time with additional features borrowed In upholding the statute, the Court stressed the prospective application of the Act to the
petitioner therein, thus:
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... Immaterial here is any opinion we might have as to the charter provision insofar as it on their exercise mustbe justified by the existence of a substantive evil. This isthe reason
purported to apply restrospectively for a five-year period to its effective date. We assume why before enacting the statute in question Congressconducted careful investigations and
that under the Federal Constitution the Charter Amendment is valid to the extent that it bars then stated itsfindings in the preamble, thus:
from the city's public service persons who, subsequently to its adoption in 1941, advise,
advocate, or reach the violent overthrow of the Government or who are or become affiliated ... [T]he Communist Party of the Philippines althoughpurportedly a political party, is in fact
with any group doing so. The provisions operating thus prospectively were a reasonable an organized conspiracyto overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippinesnot
regulation to protect the municipal service by establishing an employment qualification of only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversionand other illegal means, for the
loyalty to the State and the United States. purpose of establishing in thePhilippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien
dominationand control;
... Unlike the provisions of the charter and ordinance under which petitioners were removed,
the statute in the Lovett case did not declare general and prospectively operative standards ... [T]he continued existence and activities of the CommunistParty of the Philippines
of qualification and eligibility for public employment. Rather, by its terms it prohibited any constitutes a clear, present andgrave danger to the security of the Philippines;
further payment of compensationto named individuals or employees. Under these
circumstances, viewed against the legislative background, the statutewas held to have ... [I]n the face of the organized, systematice and persistentsubversion, national in scope
imposed penalties without judicial trial. but international in direction,posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities,there is urgent need for special legislation to cope withthis continuing menace to
Indeed, if one objection to the bill of attainder is thatCongress thereby assumed judicial the freedom and security of the country.
magistracy, them it mustbe demonstrated that the statute claimed to be a bill of
attainderreaches past conduct and that the penalties it imposesare inescapable. As the In truth, the constitutionality of the Act would be opento question if, instead of making these
U.S. Supreme Court observedwith respect to the U.S. Federal Subversive Activities findings in enactingthe statute, Congress omitted to do so.
ControlAct of 1950: In saying that by means of the Act Congress has assumed judicial magistracy, the trial
Nor is the statute made an act of "outlawry" or of attainderby the fact that the conduct which courd failed to takeproper account of the distinction between legislative fact and
it regulates is describedwith such particularity that, in probability, few organizationswill come adjudicative fact. Professor Paul Freund elucidatesthe crucial distinction, thus:
within the statutory terms. Legislatures may act tocurb behaviour which they regard as ... A law forbidding the sale of beverages containingmore than 3.2 per cent of alcohol would
harmful to the public welfare,whether that conduct is found to be engaged in by raise a question of legislativefact, i.e., whether this standard has a reasonable relationto
manypersons or by one. So long as the incidence of legislation issuch that the persons who public health, morals, and the enforcement problem. Alaw forbidding the sale of intoxicating
engage in the regulated conduct, bethey many or few, can escape regulation merely by beverages (assuming itis not so vague as to require supplementation by rule-making)would
altering thecourse of their own present activities, there can be no complaintof an attainder. raise a question of adjudicative fact, i.e., whether thisor that beverage is intoxicating within
33
the meaning of the statuteand the limits on governmental action imposed by the
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of theAnti-Subversion Act. Section 4 thereof Constitution. Of course what we mean by fact in each case is itselfan ultimate conclusion
expressly statesthat the prohibition therein applies only to acts committed"After the founded on underlying facts and oncriteria of judgment for weighing them.
approval of this Act." Only those who "knowingly,willfully and by overt acts affiliate A conventional formulation is that legislative facts — those facts which are relevant to the
themselves with,become or remain members of the Communist Party of thePhilippines and/ legislative judgment — will not be canvassed save to determine whether there is a
or its successors or of any subversive association"after June 20, 1957, are punished. Those rationalbasis for believing that they exist, while adjudicativefacts — those which tie the
whowere members of the Party or of any other subversive associationat the time of the legislative enactment to the litigant — are to be demonstrated and found according to the
enactment of the law, weregiven the opportunity of purging themselves of liability ordinarystandards prevailing for judicial trials. 36
byrenouncing in writing and under oath their membershipin the Party. The law expressly
provides that such renunciationshall operate to exempt such persons from penalliability. 34 The test formulated in Nebbia vs. new York, 37 andadopted by this Court in Lansang vs.
The penalties prescribed by the Act are thereforenot inescapable. Garcia, 38 is that 'if laws are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
III. The Act and the Requirements of Due Process satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio." The recital
1. As already stated, the legislative declaration in section 2 of the Act that the Communist of legislative findings implements this test.
Party of the Philippinesis an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of theGovernment is With respect to a similar statement of legislative findingsin the U.S. Federal Subversive
inteded not to provide the basis for a legislativefinding of guilt of the members of the Party Activities Control Actof 1950 (that "Communist-action organizations" are controlledby the
butrather to justify the proscription spelled out in section 4. Freedom of expression and foreign government controlling the worldCommunist movement and that they operate
freedom of association are sofundamental that they are thought by some to occupy
a"preferred position" in the hierarchy of constitutional values. 35 Accordingly, any limitation
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primarily to"advance the objectives of such world Communist movement"),the U.S. thatthe overthrow contemplated is "overthrow not only by forceand violence but also be
Supreme Court said: deceit, subversion and other illegalmeans." The absence of this qualificatio in section 2
appearsto be due more to an oversight rather than to deliberateomission.
It is not for the courts to reexamine the validity of theselegislative findings and reject
them....They are the productof extensive investigation by Committes of Congress over Moreover, the word "overthrow' sufficiently connotesthe use of violent and other illegal
morethan a decade and a half. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.502, 516, 530. We means. Only in a metaphoricalsense may one speak of peaceful overthrow ofgovernments,
certainly cannot dismiss them as unfoundedirrational imaginings. ... And if we accept them, and certainly the law does not speak in metaphors.In the case of the Anti-Subversion Act,
as we mustas a not unentertainable appraisal by Congress of the threatwhich Communist the use ofthe word "overthrow" in a metaphorical sense is hardlyconsistent with the clearly
organizations pose not only to existing governmentin the United States, but to the United delineated objective of the "overthrow,"namely, "establishing in the Philippines a
States as asovereign, independent Nation. ...we must recognize that thepower of Congress totalitarianregime and place [sic] the Government under thecontrol and domination of an
to regulate Communist organizations of thisnature is alien power." What thisCourt once said in a prosecution for sedition is appropos: "The
language used by the appellant clearly imported anoverthrow of the Government by
extensive. 39 violence, and it should beinterpreted in the plain and obvious sense in which it wasevidently
intended to be understood. The word 'overthrow'could not have been intended as referring
This statement, mutatis mutandis, may be said of thelegislative findings articulated in the to an ordinarychange by the exercise of the elective franchise. The useof the whip [which
Anti-Subversion Act. the accused exhorted his audience to useagainst the Constabulary], an instrument
That the Government has a right to protect itself againstsubversion is a proposition too plain designed toleave marks on the sides of adversaries, is inconsistentwith the mild
to require elaboration.Self-preservation is the "ultimate value" of society. It surpasses and interpretation which the appellant wouldhave us impute to the language." 45
transcendes every other value, "forif a society cannot protect its very structure from IV. The Act and the Guaranty of Free Expression
armedinternal attack, ...no subordinate value can be protected" 40 As Chief Justice Vinson
so aptly said in Dennis vs. United States: 41 As already pointed out, the Act is aimed against conspiracies to overthrow the Government
by force, violence orother illegal means. Whatever interest in freedom of speechand
Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argumentthat there is a 'right' to rebellion freedom of association is infringed by the prohibitionagainst knowing membership in the
against dictatorial governmentsis without force where the existing structure of government Communist Party ofthe Philippines, is so indirect and so insubstantial as to beclearly and
provides for peaceful and orderly change. We rejectany principle of governmental heavily outweighed by the overriding considerationsof national security and the
helplessness in the face of preparationfor revolution, which principle, carried to its logical preservartion of democraticinstitutions in his country.
conclusion,must lead to anarchy. No one could conceive that it isnot within the power of
Congress to prohibit acts intended tooverthrow the government by force and violence. The membership clause of the U.S. Federal Smith Actis similar in many respects to the
membership provision ofthe Anti-Subversion Act. The former provides:
2. By carefully delimiting the reach of the Act to conduct (as explicitly described in sectin 4
thereof), Congressreaffirmed its respect for the rule that "even throughthe governmental Whoever organizes or helps or attempts to organize anysociety, group, or assembly of
purpose be legitimate and substantial,that purpose cannot be pursued by means that persons who teach, advocate, orencourage the overthrow or destruction of any such
broadly stiflefundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." governmentby force or violence; or becomes or is a member of, or affiliatedwith, any such
42 The requirement of knowing membership,as distinguished from nominal membership,
society, group or assembly of persons, knowingthe purpose thereof —
hasbeen held as a sufficient basis for penalizing membershipin a subversive organization.
43 For, as has been stated: Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or imprisoned notmore than twenty years, or both,
and shall be ineligible for emplymentby the United States or any department or
Membership in an organization renders aid and encouragement to the organization; and agencythereof, for the five years next following his conviction.... 46
when membership is acceptedor retained with knowledge that the organization is engaged
inan unlawful purpose, the one accepting or retaining membershipwith such knowledge In sustaining the validity of this provision, the "Court said in Scales vs. United States: 47
makes himself a party to the unlawfulenterprise in which it is engaged. 44
It was settled in Dennis that advocacy with which we arehere concerned is not
3. The argument that the Act is unconstitutionallyoverbroad because section 2 merely constitutionally protected speech, and itwas further established that a combination to
speaks of "overthrow"of the Government and overthrow may be achieved by peaceful promote suchadvocacy, albeit under the aegis of what purports to be a politicalparty, is not
means, misconceives the function of the phrase"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts" in such association as is protected by the firstAmendment. We can discern no reason why
section 4. Section 2 is merely a legislative declaration; the definitionsof and the penalties membership, whenit constitutes a purposeful form of complicity in a group engagingin this
prescribed for the different acts prescribedare stated in section 4 which requires that same forbidden advocacy, should receive anygreater degree of protection from the
membershipin the Communist Party of the Philippines, to be unlawful, must be acquired guarantees of that Amendment.
"knowingly, willfully and by overt acts." Indeed, the first "whereas" clause makes clear

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Moreover, as was held in another case, where the problemsof accommodating the VI. Conclusion and Guidelines
exigencies of self-preservationand the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as
inthe situation described in the legislative findings stated inthe U.S. Federal Subversive In conclusion, even as we uphold the validity of theAnti-Subversion Act, we cannot
Activities Control Act of 1950,the legislative judgment as to how that threat may best bemet overemphasize the needfor prudence and circumspection in its enforcement, operatingas it
consistently with the safeguards of personal freedomsis not to be set aside merely because does in the sensitive area of freedom of expressionand belief. Accordingly, we set the
the judgment of judgeswould, in the first instance, have chosen other methods. 48 For in following basic guidelines to be observed in any prosecution under the Act.The
truth, legislation, "whether it restrains freedom tohire or freedom to speak, is itself an effort Government, in addition to proving such circumstancesas may affect liability, must establish
at compromisebetween the claims of the social order and individual freedom,and when the the following elementsof the crime of joining the Communist Party of the Philippinesor any
legislative compromise in either case isbrought to the judicial test the court stands one step other subversive association:
removedfrom the conflict and its resolution through law." 49
(1) In the case of subversive organizations other thanthe Communist Party of the
V. The Act and its Title Philippines, (a) that thepurpose of the organization is to overthrow the presentGovernment
of the Philippines and to establish in thiscountry a totalitarian regime under the domination
The respondent Tayag invokes the constitutional commandthat "no bill which may be of aforeign power; (b) that the accused joined such organization;and (c) that he did so
enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title knowingly, willfully and byovert acts; and
of the bill." 50
(2) In the case of the Communist Party of the Philippines,(a) that the CPP continues to
What is assailed as not germane to or embraced in thetitle of the Act is the last proviso of pursue the objectiveswhich led Congress in 1957 to declare it to be an organizedconspiracy
section 4 which reads: for the overthrow of the Government by illegalmeans for the purpose of placing the country
under thecontrol of a foreign power; (b) that the accused joined theCPP; and (c) that he did
And provided, finally, That one who conspires with anyother person to overthrow the so willfully, knowingly and byovert acts.
Government of the Republic ofthe Philippines, or the government of any of its political
subdivisionsby force, violence, deceit, subversion or illegal means,for the purpose of We refrain from making any pronouncement as to thecrime or remaining a member of the
placing such Government or political subdivisionunder the control and domination of any Communist Party ofthe Philippines or of any other subversive association: weleave this
lien power, shallbe punished by prision correccional to prision mayor with allthe accessory matter to future determination.
penalties provided therefor in the same code.
ACCORDINGLY, the questioned resolution of September15, 1970 is set aside, and these
It is argued that the said proviso, in reality, punishes notonly membership in the Communist two cases are herebyremanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits. Costs de oficio.
Party of the Philippinesor similar associations, but as well "any conspiracyby two persons to
overthrow the national or any local governmentby illegal means, even if their intent is not to
establisha totalitarian regime, burt a democratic regime, evenif their purpose is not to place
the nation under an aliencommunist power, but under an alien democratic power likethe G.R. No. 171855 October 15, 2012
United States or England or Malaysia or even an anti-communistpower like Spain, Japan, FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F. APAREJADO, represented by
Thailand or Taiwanor Indonesia." EDGAR AP AREJADO, Petitioners,
The Act, in addition to its main title ("An Act to Outlawthe Communist Party of the vs.
Philippines and SimilarAssociations, Penalizing Membership Therein, and forOther
Purposes"), has a short title. Section 1 providesthat "This Act shall be known as the HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON
RURAL, CAA JOSE MATU, CAA MORIE FLORES, CAA GUILLEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY
Anti-Subversion Act."Together with the main title, the short title of the statuteunequivocally FLORES, CAA LEONARDO CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE ROM, Respondents.
indicates that the subject matter is subversionin general which has for its fundamental
purpose the substitutionof a foreign totalitarian regime in place of theexisting Government DECISION
and not merely subversion by Communistconspiracies..
PERALTA, J.:
The title of a bill need not be a catalogue or an indexof its contents, and need not recite the
details of the Act. 51 It is a valid title if it indicates in broad but clear termsthe nature, scope, Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
and consequences of the proposed lawand its operation. 52 A narrow or technical Court, filed by petitioners Fe Rapsing, Tita C. Villanueva and Annie Aparejado, · as
construction isto be avoided, and the statute will be read fairly and reasonablyin order not to represented by Edgar Aparejado, seeking to set aside the Orders dated December 6, 20051
thwart the legislative intent. We holdthat the Anti-Subversion Act fully satisfies these and January 11, 2006,2 respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City,
requirements. Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 11846.

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The antecedents are as follows: CONTRARY TO LAW.

Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu, CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillien Topas, Masbate City, February 15, 2005.
CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom are members of the
Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th Division of the Philippine Army based at On July 28, 2005, a warrant5 for the arrest of respondents was issued by the RTC of
Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate. Masbate City, Branch 47, but before respondents could be arrested, the Judge Advocate
General's Office (JAGO) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) filed an Omnibus
Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of Teogenes Rapsing, Teofilo Villanueva and Motion6 dated July 20, 2005, with the trial court seeking the cases against respondents be
Edwin Aparejado, who were allegedly killed in cold blood by the respondents. transferred to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal.7 Initially, the trial court denied the
motion filed by the JAGO on the ground that respondents have not been arrested. The
Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, around 1 o'clock in the afternoon, they received JAGO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,8 and in an Order9 dated December 6, 2005, the
information about the presence of armed elements reputed to be New People’s Army (NPA) trial court granted the Omnibus Motion and the entire records of the case were turned over
partisans in Sitio Gaway-gaway, Barangay Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. Acting on the to the Commanding General of the 9th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, for appropriate
information, they coordinated with the Philippine National Police and proceeded to the action.
place. Thereat, they encountered armed elements which resulted in an intense firefight.
When the battle ceased, seven (7) persons, namely: Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Petitioners sought reconsideration10 of the Order, but was denied by the trial court in an
Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro, Isidro Order11 dated January 11, 2006.
Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova were found
sprawled on the ground lifeless. The post-incident report of the Philippine Army states that a Hence, the present petition with the following arguments:
legitimate military operation was conducted and in the course of which, the victims, armed
with high-powered firearms, engaged in a shoot-out with the military. I

On the other hand, petitioners complained that there was no encounter that ensued and HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO ABLES GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
that the victims were summarily executed in cold blood by respondents. Hence, they EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN GRANTING THE MOTION TO TRANSFER THE INSTANT
requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the case. After CRIMINAL CASE OF MULTIPLE MURDER TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY
investigation, the NBI recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate City that a COURT MARTIAL, AS THE SAID TRIBUNAL, BASED ON FACTS AND IN LAW, HAS NO
preliminary investigation be conducted against respondents for the crime of multiple JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT MURDER CASE.
murder. In reaching its recommendation, the NBI relied on the statements of witnesses who II
claim that the military massacred helpless and unarmed civilians.
IT IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS IN JURISDICTION IF
On February 9, 2005, the provincial prosecutor issued a Resolution3 recommending the NOT GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW ON THE PART OF HONORABLE JUDGE
filing of an Information for Multiple Murder. Consequently, respondents were charged with MAXIMINO ABLES TO HOLD THAT HIS ORDER DATED DECEMBER 6, 2005 COULD
multiple murder in an Information4 dated February 15, 2005, which reads: ONLY BE REVIEWED THROUGH AN APPEAL, AS THERE IS NO TRIAL ON THE MERIT
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses SSGT Edison Rural, CAA YET ON THE INSTANT CRIMINAL CASE.12
Jose Matu. CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillen Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to excess of
Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom, stationed at Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th jurisdiction when it transferred the criminal case filed against the respondents to the
Division, Philippine Army, Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate, committed as jurisdiction of the military tribunal, as jurisdiction over the same is conferred upon the civil
follows: courts by Republic Act No. 7055 (RA 7055).13 On the other hand, the respondents and the
That on May 9, 2004, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon thereof, at Barangay Lagta, Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) alleged that the acts complained of are service
Municipality of Baleno, Province of Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this connected and falls within the jurisdiction of the military court.
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with The petition is meritorious. The trial court gravely abused its discretion in not taking
one another, taking advantage of their superior strength as elements of the Philippine Army, cognizance of the case, which actually falls within its jurisdiction.
armed with their government issued firearms, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case
and shoot Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint irrespective of
y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.14
and Norberto Aranilla y Cordova, hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby As a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon
inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths. the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question
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of jurisdiction would almost entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out between the two of you? I will
jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations suspend the session for a minute, if there is no objection. There was none.
in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are
the matters to be consulted.15 It was 5:02 p.m.

In the case at bar, the information states that respondents, "conspiring together and RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION
mutually helping with one another, taking advantage of their superior strength, as elements
of the Philippine Army, armed with their government-issued firearms with intent to kill, by At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.
means of treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and The President. The session is resumed.
feloniously attack, assault and shoot the [victims], hitting them on different parts of their
bodies, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths."16 Senator Tañada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has graciously accepted my amendment
Murder is a crime punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as to her amendment, subject to refinement and style.
amended, and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.17 Hence, irrespective of whether the
killing was actually justified or not, jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the The President. Is there any objection? Silence There being none, the amendment is
respondents has been vested upon the RTC by law. approved.19

Respondents, however, contend that the military tribunal has jurisdiction over the case at In the same session, Senator Tañada emphasized:
bar because the crime charged was a service-connected offense allegedly committed by
members of the AFP. To support their position, respondents cite the senate deliberations on Senator Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses committed by persons
R.A. 7055. subject to military law ... will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which are service-
related or connected. And we specified which would be considered service-related or
Respondents stress in particular the proposal made by Senator Leticia Ramos Shahani to connected under the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. 408.20 (Emphasis supplied.)
define a service-connected offense as those committed by military personnel pursuant to
the lawful order of their superior officer or within the context of a valid military exercise or The said amendment was later on reflected in the final version of the statute as Paragraph
mission.18 Respondents maintain that the foregoing definition is deemed part of the statute. 2 of Section 1. Section 1 of R.A. 7055 reads in full:
1âwphi1
Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to
However, a careful reading of R.A. 7055 indicate that the proposed definition was not military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
included as part of the statute. The proposed definition made by Senator Shahani was not commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal
adopted due to the amendment made by Senator Wigberto E. Tañada, to wit: laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-
accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to the Sponsor of this tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment
amendment to consider, perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses would be by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-
under the Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her consideration the following martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order
amendment to her amendment which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION, or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE proper civil courts.
DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND
ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those
AMENDED. defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended. (Emphasis supplied)
This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these service-related or connected offenses or
crimes would be. (Emphasis supplied.) The second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. 7055 explicitly specifies what are considered
"service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408), as
The President. What will happen to the definition of "service-connected offense" already put amended,21 to wit:
forward by Senator Shahani?
Articles 54 to 70:
Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in the specification of the Article I
have mentioned in the Articles of War. Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.

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Art. 56. False Muster. Art. 83. Spies.

Art. 57. False Returns. Art. 84. Military Property. – Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or Wrongful Disposition.

Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion. Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers.

Art. 59. Desertion. Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert. Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter. Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 62. Absence Without Leave. Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Secretary of National Defense.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 97 General Article.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction over
Articles 72 to 92 respondents' case since the offense for which they were charged is not included in the
enumeration of "service-connected offenses or crimes" as provided for under Section 1
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners. thereof. The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who
commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received. with the civil courts. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority. exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
There is no room for interpretation, but only application.22 Hence, the RTC cannot divest
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities. itself of its jurisdiction over the alleged crime of multiple murder.1âwphi1

Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy. WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 47,
dated December 6, 2005 and January 11, 2006, respectively, in Criminal Case No. 11846
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender. are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Masbate City, is
DIRECTED to reinstate Criminal Case No. 11846 to its docket and conduct further
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign. proceedings thereon with utmost dispatch in light of the foregoing disquisition.
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard. SO ORDERED.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

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G.R. No. 162318 October 25, 2004 Background4

1LT. JULIUS R. NAVALES, 1LT. EMERSON L. MARGATE, 2LT. RYAN H. QUISAI, TSG. At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior officers and enlisted
ELMER D. COLON, CAPT. JULIUS W. ESPORO, SGT. NOLI FORONDA, SGT. GIL P. men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP – the Philippine Army’s Scout Rangers and the
LOZADA, SGT. RAYMUND DUMAGO and PFC. REGIE A. ALAGABAN, petitioners, Philippine Navy’s Special Warfare Group (SWAG) – quietly entered the premises of the
Ayala Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took over the Oakwood
vs. Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted explosives around the building and in its
vicinity. Snipers were posted at the Oakwood roof deck.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), B.GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., as Judge Advocate General (JAG) of The soldiers, mostly in full battle gear and wearing red arm bands, were led by a small
the AFP, and OTHER PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY, respondents. number of junior officers, widely known as the Magdalo Group. The leaders were later
identified as including Navy LtSG. Antonio Trillanes IV, Army Capt. Gerardo Gambala, Army
x--------------------------x Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Navy LtSG. James Layug, and Marine Capt. Gary Alejano.
DECISION Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public statement through the
CALLEJO, SR., J.: ABS-CBN News (ANC) network. They claimed that they went to Oakwood to air their
grievances against the administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Among those
Before the Court are two petitions essentially assailing the jurisdiction of the General Court- grievances were: the graft and corruption in the military, the sale of arms and ammunition to
Martial to conduct the court-martial proceedings involving several junior officers and the "enemies" of the State, the bombings in Davao City which were allegedly ordered by
enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) charged with violations of the Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, Chief of the ISAFP, in order to obtain more military assistance
Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended) in connection with their from the United States government, and the "micro-management" in the AFP by then
participation in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Ayala Center, Makati Department of National Defense (DND) Secretary Angelo Reyes. They declared their
City on July 27, 2003. withdrawal of support from the chain of command and demanded the resignation of key
civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo administration.
In G.R. No. 162341, Roberto Rafael Pulido, a lawyer, filed with this Court a Petition for
Habeas Corpus seeking the release of his clients, junior officers and enlisted men of the Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to give up their positions
AFP, who are allegedly being unlawfully detained by virtue of the Commitment Order1 dated peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 p.m., she declared the existence of a "state
August 2, 2003 issued by General Narciso L. Abaya, Chief of Staff of the AFP, pursuant to of rebellion" and issued an order to use reasonable force in putting down the rebellion. A
Article 70 of the Articles of War. Under the said commitment order, all the Major Service few hours later, the soldiers again went on television reiterating their grievances. The
Commanders and the Chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the deadline was extended twice, initially to 7:00 p.m., and later, indefinitely.
Philippines (ISAFP) were directed to take custodial responsibility of all the "military
personnel involved in the 27 July 2003 mutiny" belonging to their respective commands. In the meantime, a series of negotiations ensued between the soldiers and the Government
This included all the junior officers and enlisted men (hereinafter referred to as Capt. team led by Ambassador Roy Cimatu. An agreement was forged between the two groups at
Reaso,2 et al.) who are subject of the instant petition for habeas corpus. The commitment 9:30 p.m. Shortly thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood was
order, however, expressly stated that LtSG. Antonio F. Trillanes, LtSG. James A. Layug, over. The soldiers agreed to return to barracks and were out of the Oakwood premises by
Capt. Garry C. Alejano, Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, Capt. Gerardo O. Gambala, and 11:00 p.m.
Capt. Nicanor E. Faeldon would remain under the custody of the Chief of the ISAFP.3 The Filing of Charges
In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as 1Lt. Navales, et al.), seven of Under the Information5 dated August 1, 2003 filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
the detained junior officers and enlisted men, filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ) charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to enjoin the General Court-Martial from the "Oakwood Incident" with violation of Article 134-A (coup d’etat) of the Revised Penal
proceeding with the trial of the petitioners and their co-accused for alleged violations of the Code.6 Among those charged were petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. (G.R. No. 162318) and
Articles of War. those who are subject of the petition for habeas corpus Capt. Reaso, et al. (G.R. No.
Named as respondents in the two petitions are General Narciso Abaya who, as Chief of 162341). The case, entitled People v. Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, et al., was docketed as
Staff of the AFP, exercises command and control over all the members and agencies of the Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and raffled to Branch 61 presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza.
AFP, and Brigadier General Mariano Sarmiento, Jr., the Judge Advocate General of the AFP On September 12, 2003, several (243 in number) of the accused in Criminal Case No.
and officer in command of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), the agency of the 03-2784 filed with the RTC (Branch 61) an Omnibus Motion praying that the trial court:
AFP tasked to conduct the court-martial proceedings.

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1. [A]ssume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military tribunal in accordance WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the Orders dated November 14 and 18,
with Republic Act No. 7055; and 2003 of Judge Romeo Barza, the Omnibus Motion to: 1) Assume jurisdiction over all
charges filed before the Military Courts in accordance with R.A. 7055; and 2) Implement the
2. Order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable cause against 316 of the August 7, 2003 Order of the Court requiring the prosecution to produce evidence to
321 accused and, should the prosecution fail to do so, dismiss the case as against the 316 establish probable cause are hereby considered MOOT AND ACADEMIC and, lastly, all
other accused.7 charges before the court-martial against the accused (those included in the Order of
November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused (those included in the Order of
While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the Resolution dated November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and
October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup d’etat8 against only 31 of the original 321 in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup d’etat.13
accused and dismissing the charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence.
In the Notice of Hearing dated March 1, 2004, the General Court-Martial set on March 16,
Thus, upon the instance of the prosecution, the RTC (Branch 61), in its Order9 dated 2004 the arraignment/trial of those charged with violations of the Articles of War in
November 14, 2003, admitted the Amended Information10 dated October 30, 2003 charging connection with the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident.
only 31 of the original accused with the crime of coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of
the Revised Penal Code.11 Only the following were charged under the Amended The present petitions were then filed with this Court. Acting on the prayer for the issuance
Information: CPT. MILO D. MAESTRECAMPO, LTSG. ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, CPT. of temporary restraining order in the petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 162318, this Court,
GARY C. ALEJANO, LTSG. JAMES A. LAYUG, CPT. LAURENCE LUIS B. SOMERA, CPT. in the Resolution dated March 16, 2004, directed the parties to observe the status quo
GERARDO O. GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, CPT. ALBERT T. BALOLOY, CPT. prevailing before the filing of the petition.14
SEGUNDINO P. ORFIANO, JR., CPT. JOHN P. ANDRES, CPT. ALVIN H. EBREO, 1LT.
FLORENTINO B. SOMERA, 1LT. CLEO B. DUNGGA-AS, 1LT. SONNY S. SARMIENTO, The Petitioners’ Case
1LT. AUDIE S. TOCLOY, 1LT. VON RIO TAYAB, 1LT. REX C. BOLO, 1LT. LAURENCE R.
SAN JUAN, 1LT. WARREN LEE G. DAGUPON, 1LT. NATHANIEL N. RABONZA, 2LT. In support of the petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus, the petitioners advance the
KRISTOFFER BRYAN M. YASAY, 1LT. JONNEL P. SANGGALANG, 1LT. BILLY S. following arguments:
PASCUA, 1LT. FRANCISCO ACEDILLO, LTSG. MANUEL G. CABOCHAN, LTSG.
EUGENE LOUIE GONZALES, LTSG. ANDY G. TORRATO, LTJG. ARTURO S. PASCUA, I. UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7055, THE RESPONDENTS AND THE GENERAL COURT-
JR., ENS. ARMAND PONTEJOS, PO3 JULIUS J. MESA, PO3 CESAR GONZALES, and MARTIAL ARE WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION TO FURTHER CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS
several JOHN DOES and JANE DOES. Further, the said Order expressly stated that the AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AND THEIR COLLEAGUES BECAUSE THE REGIONAL
case against the other 290 accused, including petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and those who TRIAL COURT HAS ALREADY DETERMINED THAT THE OFFENSES ARE NOT
are subject of the petition for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. In another SERVICE-RELATED AND ARE PROPERLY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE
Order dated November 18, 2003, the RTC (Branch 61) issued commitment orders against CIVILIAN COURTS;15 and
those 31 accused charged under the Amended Information and set their arraignment. II. THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO FURTHER DETAIN THE JUNIOR
Meanwhile, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who were earlier dropped as OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN AS THE CHARGES FOR COUP D’ETAT BEFORE THE
accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, were charged before the General Court-Martial with REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE UPON
violations of the Articles of War (AW), particularly: AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 97 (Conduct MOTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.16
Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer Citing Section 117 of Republic Act No. 7055,18 the petitioners theorize that since the RTC
and a Gentleman), AW 63 (Disrespect to the President, the Secretary of Defense, etc.) and (Branch 148), in its Order dated February 11, 2004, already declared that the offenses for
AW 64 (Disrespect Towards Superior Officer).12 On the other hand, Capt. Maestrecampo which all the accused were charged were not service-connected, but absorbed and in
and the 30 others who remained charged under the Amended Information were not furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, the General Court-Martial no longer has jurisdiction
included in the charge sheets for violations of the Articles of War. over them. As such, respondents Gen. Abaya and the JAGO have no authority to constitute
Thereafter, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, the General Court-Martial, to charge and prosecute the petitioners and their co-accused for
entitled People v. Ramon Cardenas, pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City, violations of the Articles of War in connection with the July 27, 2003 Oakwood Incident. The
presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel. petitioners posit that, as a corollary, there is no longer any basis for their continued
detention under the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003 issued by Gen. Abaya
On February 11, 2004, acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by the 243 of the original considering that the charge against them for coup d’etat had already been dismissed.
accused under the Information dated August 1, 2003, the RTC (Branch 148) issued an
Order, the dispositive portion of which reads: In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners pray that the respondents be enjoined from constituting
the General Court-Martial and from further proceeding with the court-martial of the
petitioners and their co-accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection with the

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Oakwood Incident of July 27, 2003. In G.R. No. 162341, the petitioner prays that the The respondents denounce the petitioners for their forum shopping. Apparently, a similar
respondents be ordered to explain why the detained junior officers and enlisted men subject petition (petition for habeas corpus, prohibition with injunction and prayer for issuance of a
of the petition for habeas corpus should not be released without delay. temporary restraining order) had been filed by the petitioners’ co-accused with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82695. The case was resolved against the
The Respondents’ Arguments petitioners therein.
The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the Court to dismiss the The respondents pray that the petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.
petitions. The respondents contend that the Order dated February 11, 2004 promulgated by
the RTC (Branch 148), insofar as it resolved the Omnibus Motion and declared that the Issue
charges against all the accused, including those excluded in the Amended Information,
were not service-connected, is null and void. They aver that at the time that the said motion The sole issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the
was resolved, petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. (as movants therein) writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
were no longer parties in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 as the charge against them was
already dismissed by the RTC (Branch 61) in the Order dated November 14, 2003. Thus, The Court’s Ruling
1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. no longer had any personality to pursue the We rule in the negative.
Omnibus Motion since one who has no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the
jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the petitioners were not "real parties in interest" at We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch
the time that their Omnibus Motion was resolved by the RTC (Branch 148). 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before
the court-martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in
The respondents further claim denial of due process as they were not given an opportunity furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. For reasons which shall be
to oppose or comment on the Omnibus Motion. Worse, they were not even given a copy of discussed shortly, such declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a
the Order dated February 11, 2004. As such, the same cannot be enforced against the nullity.
respondents, especially because they were not parties to Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
The trial court’s declaration was
The respondents, likewise, point out a seeming ambiguity in the February 11, 2004 Order
as it declared, on one hand, that the charges filed before the court-martial were not service- made when the Omnibus Motion
connected, but on the other hand, it ruled that the Omnibus Motion was moot and
academic. According to the respondents, these two pronouncements cannot stand side by had already been rendered moot
side. If the Omnibus Motion was already moot and academic, because the accused who
filed the same were no longer being charged with coup d’etat under the Amended and academic with respect to
Information, then the trial court did not have any authority to further resolve and grant the
same Omnibus Motion. 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.

The respondents maintain that since 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. were not Reaso, et al. by reason of the
being charged with coup d’etat under the Amended Information, the trial court could not dismissal of the charge of coup
make a finding that the charges filed against them before the General Court-Martial were in
furtherance of coup d’etat. For this reason, the declaration contained in the dispositive d’etat against them
portion of the February 11, 2004 Order - that charges filed against the accused before the
court-martial were not service-connected - cannot be given effect. The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve the Omnibus Motion,
which prayed for the trial court to, inter alia, acquire jurisdiction over all the charges filed
Similarly invoking Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055, the respondents vigorously assert that before the military courts in accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055. The said Omnibus Motion
the charges against 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. filed with the General Court- was filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the original accused under the Information
Martial, i.e., violations of the Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97, are, in fact, among those dated August 1, 2003. However, this information was subsequently superseded by the
declared to be service-connected under the second paragraph of this provision. This means Amended Information dated October 20, 2003 under which only 31 were charged with the
that the civil court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the said offenses, the same being crime of coup d’etat. In the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61), the
properly cognizable by the General Court-Martial. Thus, the RTC (Branch 148) acted Amended Information was admitted and the case against the 290 accused, including 1Lt.
without or in excess of jurisdiction when it declared in its February 11, 2004 Order that the Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. The said Order became final and
charges against those accused before the General Court-Martial were not service- executory since no motion for reconsideration thereof had been filed by any of the parties.
connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat. Said
pronouncement is allegedly null and void.
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Thus, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus Motion on February 11, superfluity and cannot be given effect for having been made by the RTC (Branch 148)
2004, the said motion had already been rendered moot by the November 14, 2003 Order of without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
the RTC (Branch 61) admitting the Amended Information under which only 31 of the
accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290. It had become Such declaration was made by the
moot with respect to those whose charge against them was dismissed, including 1Lt.
Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., because they were no longer parties to the case. RTC (Branch 148) in violation of
This was conceded by the RTC (Branch 148) itself as it stated in the body of its February Section 1, Republic Act No. 7055
11, 2004 Order that:
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 reads in full:
Now, after going over the records of the case, the Court is of the view that the movants’ first
concern in their omnibus motion, i.e., assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to
military courts in accordance with R.A. 7055, has been rendered moot and academic by military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
virtue of the Order dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against TSg. Leonel M. commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal
Alnas, TSg. Ramon B. Norico, SSg. Eduardo G. Cedeno, et al. and finding probable cause laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co-
in the Order dated November 18, 2003 against accused Cpt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, LtSg. accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be
Antonio F. Trillanes IV, et al., issued by Judge Barza. tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment
by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-
In view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order
aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of proper civil courts.
November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza, there being no motion filed by the prosecution to
reconsider the order or by any of the accused.19 As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those
defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act
Accordingly, in the dispositive portion of the said Order, the RTC (Branch 148) held that the No. 408, as amended.
Omnibus Motion was considered "moot and academic." And yet, in the same dispositive
portion, the RTC (Branch 148) still proceeded to declare in the last clause thereof that "all In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
the charges before the court-martial against the accused (those included in the Order of consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special
November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused (those included in the Order of laws, or local government ordinances.
November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not service-connected," on its perception that the
crimes defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what are considered
coup d’etat; hence, absorbed by the latter crime. "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408), as
amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:
As earlier explained, insofar as those whose case against them was dismissed, there was
nothing else left to resolve after the Omnibus Motion was considered moot and academic. Articles 54 to 70:
Indeed, as they were no longer parties to the case, no further relief could be granted to
them. 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. could be properly considered as strangers Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03-2784. And in the same manner that strangers to
a case are not bound by any judgment rendered by the court,20 any rulings made by the trial Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 are no longer binding on 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Art. 56. False Muster.
Reaso, et al. The RTC (Branch 148) itself recognized this as it made the statement, quoted
earlier, that "in view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the Art. 57. False Returns.
case against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer assume jurisdiction
over all charges filed before the military courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
Order of November 14, 2003 of Judge Barza there being no motion filed by the prosecution
to reconsider the order or by any of the accused."21 Art. 59. Desertion.

Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who are no longer charged with coup Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
d’etat, cannot find solace in the declaration of the RTC (Branch 148) that the charges filed
before the General Court-Martial against them were not service-connected. The same is a Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

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Art. 62. Absence Without Leave. Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines, or Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
Secretary of National Defense.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
Art. 92. Dueling.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
Articles 95 to 97:
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
Art. 97 General Article.
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the
Articles 72 to 92 foregoing offenses. The following deliberations in the Senate on Senate Bill No. 1468,
which, upon consolidation with House Bill No. 31130, subsequently became Rep. Act No.
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners. 7055, are instructive:
Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received. Senator Shahani. I would like to propose an addition to Section 1, but this will have to be on
page 2. This will be in line 5, which should be another paragraph, but still within Section 1.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority. This is to propose a definition of what "service-connected" means, because this appears on
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities. line 8. My proposal is the following:

Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy. "SERVICE-CONNECTED OFFENSES SHALL MEAN THOSE COMMITTED BY MILITARY
PERSONNEL PURSUANT TO THE LAWFUL ORDER OF THEIR SUPERIOR OFFICER
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender. OR WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A VALID MILITARY EXERCISE OR MISSION."

Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign. I believe this amendment seeks to avoid any confusion as to what "service-connected
offense" means. Please note that "service-connected offense," under this bill, remains
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard. within the jurisdiction of military tribunals.

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service. So, I think that is an important distinction, Mr. President.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property. Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to the Sponsor of this
amendment to consider, perhaps, defining what this service-related offenses would be
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy. under the Articles of War. And so, I would submit for her consideration the following
amendment to her amendment which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS SECTION,
Art. 83. Spies. SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE
Art. 84. Military Property. – Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or Wrongful Disposition. DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO 70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND
ARTICLES 84 TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 408 AS
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers. AMENDED.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty. This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these service-related or connected offenses or
crimes would be.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
The President. What will happen to the definition of "service-connected offense" already put
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions. forward by Senator Shahani?
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Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in the specification of the Article I offenses or crimes" under Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the
have mentioned in the Articles of War. military courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.

SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION There was no factual and legal basis for the RTC (Branch 148) to rule that violations of
Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War were committed in furtherance of coup
The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out between the two of you? I will d’etat and, as such, absorbed by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a
suspend the session for a minute, if there is no objection. [There was none.] reinvestigation, the Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup d’etat against
the petitioners and recommended the dismissal of the case against them. The trial court
It was 5:02 p.m. approved the recommendation and dismissed the case as against the petitioners. There is,
RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION as yet, no evidence on record that the petitioners committed the violations of Articles 63, 64,
96, and 97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup d’etat.
At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.
In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were not service-connected,
The President. The session is resumed. but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, the RTC (Branch 148)
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in legal contemplation,
Senator Tañada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has graciously accepted my amendment necessarily null and void and does not exist.28
to her amendment, subject to refinement and style.
At this point, a review of its legislative history would put in better perspective the raison
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment is d’etre of Rep. Act No. 7055. As early as 1938, jurisdiction over offenses punishable under
approved.22 CA 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, committed by "persons subject to
military law" was vested on the military courts. Thereafter, then President Ferdinand E.
In the same session, Senator Wigberto E. Tañada, the principal sponsor of SB No. 1468, Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree (PD) Nos. 1822,29 185030 and 1852.31 These
emphasized: presidential decrees transferred from the civil courts to the military courts jurisdiction over
all offenses committed by members of the AFP, the former Philippine Constabulary, the
Senator Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses committed by persons former Integrated National Police, including firemen, jail guards and all persons subject to
subject to military law ... will be tried by the civil courts, except, those which are service- military law.
related or connected. And we specified which would be considered service-related or
connected under the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. 408.23 In 1991, after a series of failed coup d’etats, Rep. Act No. 7055 was enacted. In his
sponsorship speech, Senator Tañada explained the intendment of the law, thus:
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles Senator Tañada. The long and horrible nightmare of the past continues to haunt us to this
95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or present day. Its vestiges remain instituted in our legal and judicial system. Draconian
offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial. decrees which served to prolong the past dictatorial regime subsist to rule our new-found
lives. Two of these decrees, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Presidential Decree No.
Indeed, jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide a case.24 1850, as amended, remain intact as laws, in spite of the fact that four years have passed
Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action is conferred only by the since we regained our democratic freedom.
Constitution or by law.25 It cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2)
acquired, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; or (3) The late Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee enunciated in the case of Olaguer vs. Military
conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.26 Once vested by law on a particular court or Commission No. 34 that "the greatest threat to freedom is the shortness of human
body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by memory."
any body other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law. The power to change
the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative enactment which none but the PD No. 1822 and PD No. 1850 made all offenses committed by members of the Armed
legislature may do. Congress has the sole power to define, prescribe and apportion the Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary, the Integrated National Police,
jurisdiction of the courts.27 including firemen and jail guards, and all persons subject to military law exclusively triable
by military courts though, clearly, jurisdiction over common crimes rightly belongs to civil
In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch 148) cannot divest the courts.
General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over those charged with violations of Articles 63
(Disrespect Toward the President etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that civilian authority is, at all times,
or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General supreme over the military. Likewise, Article VIII, Section 1 declares that "the judicial power
Article) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as "service-connected

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shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
law."
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, LT. (SG) ANTONIO
In the case of Anima vs. The Minister of National Defense, (146 Supreme Court Reports TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO
Annotated, page 406), the Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Gutierrez declared: GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS. ARMAND
PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT. JONNEL SANGGALANG, Petitioners,
The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes at a time when all civil courts
were fully operational and freely functioning constitutes one of the saddest chapters in the vs.
history of the Philippine Judiciary.
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by the glorification of military tribunals ... the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge
many judicial problems spawned by extended authoritarian rule which effectively eroded Advocate General of the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO), Respondents.
judicial independence and self-respect will require plenty of time and determined efforts to
cure. DECISION

The immediate return to civil courts of all cases which properly belong to them is only a SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
beginning.
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a temporary restraining
... order) filed by the above-named members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
herein petitioners, against the AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General,
Thus, as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, respondents.
military tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over military men for criminal offenses
committed by them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. ...32 The facts are:

Clearly, in enacting Rep. Act No. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to the On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received intelligence reports that
civilian courts the jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their some members of the AFP, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned their designated
jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. The President then
Articles of War. directed the AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them.

Conclusion On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed junior officers and
enlisted men of the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the
The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and habeas corpus (G.R. No. 162341) prayed for Navy’s Special Warfare Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
by the petitioners must perforce fail. As a general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and planted
issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer explosive devices around the building.
under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so.33 Further, the writ of
habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red armbands emblazoned
charged before any court or quasi-judicial body.34 The term "court" necessarily includes the with the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through
General Court-Martial. These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al., as they are under detention broadcast media, announced their grievances against the administration of President Gloria
pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August 2, 2003 issued by respondent Chief of Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the illegal sale of arms
Staff of the AFP pursuant to Article 7035 of the Articles of War. and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and the bombings in Davao City intended to
acquire more military assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal
On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent inferior courts, of support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign as President of
corporations, boards or persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her cabinet members and the top brass
which they have not been vested by law.36 As earlier discussed, the General Court-Martial of the AFP and PNP.
has jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. under Rep. Act
No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction. About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 427 declaring a
state of rebellion, followed by General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. necessary measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. She then
called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five o’clock in the afternoon of that same
day.

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In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent negotiators to dialogue with incident be charged before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96,
the soldiers. The aim was to persuade them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After and 97 of the Articles of War.
several hours of negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay
down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises of the Oakwood Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a reinvestigation, found
Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their barracks. probable cause against only 31 (petitioners included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case
No. 03-2784. Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended Information. 6
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the authorities.
In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the Amended Information and
The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident and recommended that dropped the charge of coup d’etat against the 290 accused.
the military personnel involved be charged with coup d’etat defined and penalized under
Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its
Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing of the Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO, recommending that, following the
corresponding Information against them. "doctrine of absorption," those charged with coup d’etat before the RTCshould not be
charged before the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War, respondent
General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff, ordered the arrest and detention of the For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating that "all charges
soldiers involved in the Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate before the court martial against the accused…are hereby declared not service-connected,
investigation. but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." The trial court
then proceeded to hear petitioners’ applications for bail.
On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City an
Information for coup d’etat 2 against those soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-in-charge of the JAGO,
and eventually raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F. Barza. 3 Subsequently, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the
this case was consolidated with Criminal Case No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, officers involved in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a
pending before Branch 148 of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel. general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
gentleman) of the Articles of War.
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a reinvestigation of Criminal
Case No. 03-2784. On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved by the AFP top brass.
The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed petitioners to submit their answer to the
On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No. 625 creating a Pre- charge. Instead of complying, they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition
Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the propriety of filing with the military tribunal praying that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with violation of Article 96
charges for violations of the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as of the Articles of War in relation to the Oakwood incident. 9
amended, against the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a) violation of
Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its Order of February
violation of Article 64 for disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a
mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of
gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct prejudicial to good order and military coup d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its jurisdiction.
discipline.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. No. 7055 specifies
Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243 (including petitioners which offenses covered by the Articles of War areservice-connected. These are violations of
herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court Articles 54 to 70, 72 to 92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles
assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked are properly cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against petitioners is violation of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5 Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a service-connected offense, then it falls under the
jurisdiction of the court martial.
On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO)
a motion praying for the suspension of its proceedings until after the RTC shall have Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition raising the additional
resolved their motion to assume jurisdiction. issue that the offense charged before the General Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners
alleged therein that during the pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded
On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its Initial Report to the with the Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of Article 96
AFP Chief of Staff recommending that the military personnel involved in the Oakwood (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial
Investigation Panel then referred the case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two

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years since the Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio or direct at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the
Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable circumstances;" 10 that in proper civil courts.
the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that they were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2) years from the As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those
date of the commission of the alleged offense, in violation of Article 38 of the Articles of defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act
War; 11 that "the offense charged prescribed on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General Court No. 408, as amended.
Martial ruled, however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight of July
26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was approaching and it was becoming In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
apparent that the accused could not be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special
position and asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and that laws, or local government ordinances.
petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the general court martial in its Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous. First, it lays down the
Order dated September 14, 2005. 15 general rule that members of the AFP and other persons subject to military law, including
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental Petition be denied for members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
lack of merit. He alleges that "contrary to petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were duly penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other special penal laws, or
arraigned on July 13 and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil court. Next, it provides the exception to the
2005, all the 29 accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military Prosecutor Captain general rule, i.e., where the civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to
Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court be service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court martial. Lastly, the
(pp. 64, TSN, July 13, 2005)." 17 law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where the President of the Philippines, in the
interest of justice, directs before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are entitled to the writ of the proper civil court.
prohibition.
The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the "service-connected
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are subject to military law. crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as Articles 95 to 97" of the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by
the Articles of War, the term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." Article court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts and the court martial
2 provides: over crimes or offenses committed by military personnel.

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are subject to these articles Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to preserve the peculiar
and shall be understood as included in the term "any person subject to military law" or nature of military justice system over military personnel charged with service-connected
"persons subject to military law," whenever used in these articles: offenses. The military justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military efficiency. 18 Military law is
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Forces of the established not merely to enforce discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the
Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary, all members of the reserve force, from the tranquility and security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more dangerous to
dates of their call to active duty and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing the public peace and safety than a licentious and undisciplined military body. 19 The
military instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or to duty administration of military justice has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all
or for training in the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, the armies in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military law and its
draft, or order to obey the same. administration as the most effective means of enforcing discipline. For this reason, the court
martial has become invariably an indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being
Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads: the most potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. 20
SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and
military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who a gentleman) of the Articles of War before the court martial, thus:
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal
laws, or local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are co- All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at Oakwood Hotel, Makati
accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be City, Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate their solemn oath as
tried by the proper civil court, except when the offense, as determined before arraignment officers to defend the Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and
by the civil court, is service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court- abused their constitutional duty to protect the people and the State by, among others,
martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected and legitimate President by force and
violence, seriously disturbing the peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are
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sworn to protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military profession, Articles 54 to 70:
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in violation of AW 96 of the Articles of
War. Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours) Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.

Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides: Art. 56. False Muster.

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any officer, member of the Art. 57. False Returns.
Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the service. Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
(Underscoring ours) Art. 59. Desertion.
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War is service- Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 (second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It
bears stressing that the charge against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
their solemn oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect to the military Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on their professional conduct or behavior
as military officers. Equally indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the service – imposable only by the
military court.Such penalty is purely disciplinary in character, evidently intended to Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
cleanse the military profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military Defense.
discipline.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no longer be charged
before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War because the same Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
has been declared by the RTC in its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected,
but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat," hence, triable by Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such declaration, practically amended the law which
expressly vests in the court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away. It is only the
Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the court, tribunal, body or officer over Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
the subject matter or nature of an action which can do so. 22 And it is only through a Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
constitutional amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The first and
fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as they find it, not as they like it to Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion
tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. Articles 72 to 92:

In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., held: Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.

We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by the RTC (Branch Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated February 11, 2004 that all charges before
the court-martial against the accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
furtherance of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such declaration was
made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity. Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055) Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
explicitly specifies what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:

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Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign. Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio during the deliberation of
this case is worth quoting, thus:
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by holding that the charge of
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the
alleged crime of coup d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to
Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property. criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same statute, 25 unlike here
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy. where different statutes are involved. Secondly, the doctrine applies only if the trial court
has jurisdiction over both offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
Art. 83. Spies. jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of the Articles of War.
Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not applicable to this case.
Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]), applicable only to
or wrongful Disposition. military personnel because the military constitutes an armed organization requiring a
system of discipline separate from that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83
Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property [1953]). Military personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons not allowed
to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a military organization dictate that military
Issued to Soldiers. personnel must be subjected to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty. civilians or unarmed government personnel.

Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel. A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his superior may question
his reassignment by asking a temporary restraining order or injunction from a civil court.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions. However, a soldier cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his
military commander reassigns him to another area of military operations. If this is allowed,
Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court. military discipline will collapse.

Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions. xxx

Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed. This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of the Executive to
enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to effectively command, control, and
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures. discipline the armed forces (see Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s
Military Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form part of the
Art. 92. Dueling. disciplinary system that ensures the President’s control, and thus civilian supremacy, over
Articles 95 to 97: the military. At the apex of this disciplinary system is the President who exercises review
powers over decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War; quoted
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government. provisions omitted).

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. xxx

Art. 97. General Article. While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar proceedings, it did so
sparingly and only to release a military personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts the jurisdiction over the Prisons, 80 Phil. 401 [1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75
foregoing offenses. x x x. Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-martial proceedings on the ground
that the offense charged ‘is absorbed and in furtherance of’ another criminal charge
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the military courts of pending with the civil courts. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and one of the service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is not the
Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes situation in the present case.
or offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial.
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their Supplemental Petition,
suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the same. The contending parties are at

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loggerheads as to (a) who among the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates
of their arraignment. These are matters involving questions of fact, not within our power of Together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito Palparan (Major General Palparan),5
review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for prohibition, such as the one at bar, only SSgt. Osorio was charged in two (2) Informations before Branch 14, Regional Trial Court,
legal issues affecting the jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be Malolos City for allegedly kidnapping University of the Philippines students Karen E.
resolved on the basis of the undisputed facts. 26 Empeño (Empeño) and Sherlyn T. Cadapan (Cadapan). The accusatory portion of these
Informations read:
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of prohibition is to prevent the
unlawful and oppressive exercise of authority and is directed against proceedings that are CRIM. CASE NO. 3905-M-2011
done without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being no
appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 27 Stated
differently, prohibition is the remedy to prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or That on or about the 26th of June 2006, in the house of one Raquel Halili at Barangay San
persons from usurping or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
vested by law. 28 named accused, acting as private individuals, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
one another, did then and there, by taking advantage of nighttime and with the use of a
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in convening a court motor vehicle, forcibly abduct KAREN E. EMPEÑO, a female person, and deprive her of
martial and in charging petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War. liberty by detaining her against her will first at Camp Tecson, in San Miguel, Bulacan, then
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. subsequently in other places to include the barangay hall of Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan;
the camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army in Limay, Bataan; and, a
resort/safehouse in Iba, Zambales, from June 2006 to July 2007, a period of more than
three (3) days, resulting in the said female victim's continuing disappearance, to the
G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018 damage and prejudice of KAREN E. EMPEÑO and her heirs.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS, SSGT. EDGARDO L. CONTRARY TO LAW.6 (Emphasis in the original)
OSORIO, Petitioner, v. ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR JUAN PEDRO C. NAVERA;
ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA; ASSOCIATE PROSECUTION CRIM. CASE NO. 3906-M-2011
ATTORNEY ETHEL RHEA G. SURIL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MANILA;
COLONEL ROBERT M. AREVALO, COMMANDER, HEADQUARTERS AND
HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP PHILIPPINE ARMY; COLONEL ROSALIO G. That on or about the 26th of June 2006, in the house of one Raquel Halili at Barangay San
POMPA, INF (GSC), PA, COMMANDING OFFICER, MP BATALLION, HHSG, PA; AND Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
CAPTAIN TELESFORO C. BALASABAS, INF PA, AND/OR ANY AND ALL PERSONS named accused, acting as private individuals, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF SSGT. EDGARDO L. one another, did then and there, by taking advantage of nighttime and with the use of a
OSORIO, Respondents. motor vehicle, forcibly abduct SHERLYN T. CADAPAN, a female person, and deprive her of
liberty by detaining her against her will first at Camp Tecson, in San Miguel, Bulacan, then
RESOLUTION subsequently in other places to include the barangay hall of Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan;
LEONEN, J.: the camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine Army in Limay, Bataan; and, a
resort/safehouse in Iba, Zambales, from June 2006 to July 2007, a period of more than
Kidnapping should never be part of the functions of a soldier. It cannot be done in a three (3) days, resulting in the said female victim's continuing disappearance, to the
soldier's official capacity. If a soldier nonetheless proceeds allegedly on the orders of a damage and prejudice of SHERLYN T. CADAPAN and her heirs.
superior officer, the soldier shall be tried before the civil courts. The remedy of habeas
corpus, on the argument that only courts-martial have jurisdiction over members of the CONTRARY TO LAW.7 (Emphasis in the original)
Armed Forces, will not lie.

Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio on December 19, 2011.8
This resolves the Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 141332 dated July 27, 20152 and February 22, 2016.3 The The next day, at about 3:00 p.m., SSgt. Osorio was arrested by Colonel Herbert Yambing,
Court of Appeals found that custody over Staff Sergeant Edgardo L. Osorio (SSgt. Osorio) the Provost Marshall General of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. SSgt. Osorio was
was by virtue of a valid judicial process; thus, it denied SSgt. Osorio's Petition for Issuance turned over to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame, Quezon
of a Writ of Habeas Corpus.4

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City and was detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred to the Philippine
Army Custodial Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City where he is currently detained.9 SSgt. Osorio maintains that he is being illegally deprived of his liberty because he was
charged with an "inexistent offense." He argues that kidnapping and serious illegal
Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt. Osorio filed a Petition10 detention can only be committed by a private person, not by a member of the Armed Forces
for Habeas Corpus before the Court of Appeals on July 21, 2015. Impleaded as of the Philippines.23
respondents were Presiding Judge Teodora Gonzales of Branch 14, Regional Trial Court,
Malolos City, Bulacan, the judge who issued the warrants of arrest; Assistant State Given that he is a soldier on active duty, SSgt. Osorio adds that only courts-martial have
Prosecutors Juan Pedro Navera and Irwin A. Maraya, and Associate Prosecution Attorney jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide a criminal case against him. In the alternative, SSgt.
Ethel Rhea G. Suril, who filed the Informations for kidnapping and illegal detention; and Osorio argues that the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, not the Department of Justice or
Colonel Robert M. Arevalo, Colonel Rosalio G. Pompa, and Captain Telesforo C. the Regional Trial Court, have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation and to hear,
Balasabas, SSgt. Osorio's superiors.11 try, and decide the criminal case because one of his co-accused, Major General Palparan,
was an officer in the Philippine Army with a rank higher than colonel and with a salary grade
SSgt. Osorio mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court such as the Regional Trial of 28.24
Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case considering that he was a soldier on active
duty and that the offense charged was allegedly "service-connected." In the alternative, Lastly, SSgt. Osorio claims that he was deprived of his right to due process of law because
SSgt. Osorio argued that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct preliminary no preliminary investigation was allegedly conducted in this case.25
investigation and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case because among his co-
accused was Major General Palparan, a public officer with salary grade higher than 28.12 Respondents counter that a public officer such as SSgt. Osorio may be charged under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal detention. A public
SSgt. Osorio added that he could not be charged with the felony of kidnapping and serious officer detaining a person without authority is acting in a private, not official, capacity. Since
illegal detention because under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,13 the felony may kidnapping is not part of the duties of an officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines,
only be committed by a private individual, not a ranking officer of the Armed Forces of the respondents argue that SSgt. Osorio acted in a private capacity when he took part in
Philippines.14 Lastly, he claimed deprivation of due process because he was allegedly illegally detaining Empeño and Cadapan.26
charged without undergoing proper preliminary investigation.15
On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents argue that the Regional Trial Court properly took
The Court of Appeals held that SSgt. Osorio's confinement was "by virtue of a valid cognizance of the case. Under Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, members of the Armed
judgment or a judicial process[.]"16 Under Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, a crime Forces of the Philippines charged with crimes or offenses punished under the Revised
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, even if committed by a member of the Armed Penal Code "shall be tried by the proper civil court." The only exception is when the crime is
Forces of the Philippines, is to be tried "by the proper civil court." The only exception to this "service-connected," in which case, courts-martial assume jurisdiction. Considering that
rule is when the crime is "service-connected," i.e., those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles kidnapping is not a "service-connected" offense, SSgt. Osorio was properly charged before
72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War,17 in which case, the courts-martial a civil court.27
have jurisdiction. Since the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is punished
under the Revised Penal Code and is not "service-connected," the Regional Trial Court of Lastly, respondents argue that no writ of habeas corpus should be issued in this case.
Malolos City properly took cognizance of the case and, consequently, the warrants of arrest Respondents contend that habeas corpus "does not extend beyond an inquiry into the
against SSgt. Osorio were issued under a valid judicial process. jurisdiction of the court by which it was issued and the validity of the process upon its
face."28 Habeas corpus, being an extraordinary remedy, "will not issue where the person
As to SSgt. Osorio's other arguments, the Court of Appeals said that they "should be alleged to be restrained of his [or her] liberty is in custody of an officer under a process
resolved through other appropriate remedies such as a motion to quash." According to the issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do so."29
Court of Appeals, habeas corpus is not a "writ of error," and questions relating to procedure
or merits of the case cannot be addressed in habeas corpus proceedings.18 The principal issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not a writ of habeas corpus is
petitioner SSgt. Edgardo L. Osorio's proper remedy. Subsumed in the resolution of this
In its July 27, 2015 Resolution,19 the Court of Appeals denied SSgt. Osorio's Petition for issue are the following: first, whether or not a civil court may take cognizance of a criminal
Habeas Corpus. SSgt. Osorio's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied in the case against a soldier on active duty; and, second, whether or not a public officer may be
Court of Appeals February 22, 2016 Resolution.20 charged with kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, considering that the provision speaks of "any private individual."
On April 20, 2016, SSgt. Osorio filed his Petition for Review on Certiorari.21 Upon the
directive of this Court, respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed their This Petition must be denied.
Comment22 on the Petition.

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I Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under
lawful judgment.
Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise expressly provided by If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court, the proper remedy is
law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention to pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies.44 This ordinary remedy
by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is to file a motion to quash the information or the warrant of arrest45 based on one or more
is withheld from the person entitled thereto. of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

The "great writ of liberty"30 of habeas corpus "was devised and exists as a speedy and Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only any of the following grounds:
sufficient defense of personal freedom."31 Habeas corpus is an extraordinary,32 summary,33
and equitable writ, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal liberty."34 Its
primary purpose "is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from
voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which (a That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
will preclude freedom of action is sufficient."35 )
The restraint of liberty need not be confined to any offense so as to entitle a person to the (b That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
writ. Habeas corpus may be availed of as a post-conviction remedy36 or when there is an
) charged;
alleged violation of the liberty of abode.37

In In re: Saliba v. Warden,38 this Court allowed the issuance of the writ due to mistaken (c That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
identity. Instead of Butukan S. Malang, authorities arrested and detained one Datukan ) accused;
Malang Salibo (Salibo) for his alleged participation in the Maguindanao Massacre. Salibo,
having proved that he was not the accused Butukan S. Malang named in the arrest warrant, (d That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
and that he was in Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage at the time of the incident, was ordered )
released. To detain a person, when he has proven that he is not the person accused of the
crime, is a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. (e That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
)
Habeas corpus, therefore, effectively substantiates the implied autonomy of citizens
constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.39 (f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishment
With liberty being a constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate for various offenses is prescribed by law;
level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in the
labyrinth of other processes.40
(g That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person allegedly deprived )
of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the court.41 The restraint then has
become lega1.42 Therefore, the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. (h That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse
43 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides: ) or justification; and

Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that the person (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or terminated without his express consent.
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.

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With a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal complaint or at any time before arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil
information ... for insufficiency on its face in [a] point of law, or for defects which are courts.
apparent in the face of the information."46 An accused filing a motion to quash
"hypothetically admits the facts alleged in the information" and cannot present evidence As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be limited to those
aliunde or those extrinsic from the Information.47 defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act
No. 408, as amended.

The effect of the grant of the motion to quash depends on the grounds availed of. When the In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial may take into
defect in the complaint or information can be cured by amendment, the grant of the motion consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the Revised Penal Code, other special
to quash will result in an order directing the amendment.48 If the ground is that the facts laws, or local government ordinances.
charged do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."49 If, despite amendment, the complaint or
information still suffers from the same defect, the complaint or information shall be quashed. Under this Section, the only time courts-martial may assume jurisdiction is if, before
50
arraignment, the civil court determines that the offense is "service-connected." These
service-connected offenses are found in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95
As an exception, the Court said in In re: Salibo that a motion to quash would be ineffectual to 97 of the Articles of War, to wit:
because none of the grounds would have applied under the circumstances of that case.
The information and warrant of arrest were issued on the premise that the accused named ARTICLE 54. Fraudulent Enlistment ...
Butukan S. Malang and the person named Datukan Malang Salibo were the same person,
a premise proven as false. An amendment from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan Malang ARTICLE 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment ...
Salibo" in the information will not cure this defect.
ARTICLE 56. False Muster ...
II
ARTICLE 57. False Returns-Omission to Render Returns ...

In availing himself of habeas corpus, SSgt. Osorio mainly contends that the Regional Trial
Court that issued the warrants for his arrest had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the ARTICLE 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion ...
kidnapping case against him. SSgt. Osorio argues that courts-martial, not civil courts, have
jurisdiction to try and decide a case against a soldier on active duty. In the alternative, SSgt. ARTICLE 59. Desertion ...
Osorio argues that the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan should have conducted the
preliminary investigation and decided the kidnapping case against him since his co- ARTICLE 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert ...
accused, Major General Palparan, had a rank higher than colonel and had salary grade 28
at the time of the commission of the offense. ARTICLE 61. Entertaining a Deserter ...

SSgt. Osorio's claim lacks merit. The Regional Trial Court properly took cognizance of the ARTICLE 62. Absence Without Leave ...
kidnapping case against him.
ARTICLE 63. Disrespect toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of the Philippines,
Republic Act No. 7055,51 Section 1 provides that if the accused is a member of the Armed or Secretary of National Defense ...
Forces of the Philippines and the crime involved is one punished under the Revised Penal
Code, civil courts shall have the authority to hear, try, and decide the case, thus: ARTICLE 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer ...

Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other persons subject to ARTICLE 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer ...
military law, including members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Units, who
commit crimes or offenses penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal ARTICLE 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer ...
laws, or local government ordinances regardless of whether or not civilians are co-accused,
victims, or offended parties which may be natural or juridical persons, shall be tried by the ARTICLE 67. Mutiny or Sedition ...
proper civil court except when the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil
court, is service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-martial: ARTICLE 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition ...
Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the interest of justice, order or direct
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ARTICLE 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders ... ARTICLE 95. Frauds Against the Government Affecting Matters and Equipments ...

ARTICLE 70. Arrest or Confinement ... ARTICLE 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman ...

ARTICLE 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners ... ARTICLE 97. General Article ...

ARTICLE 73. Report of Prisoners Received ...

SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under Article 267 of the
ARTICLE 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Proper Authority ... Revised Penal Code.[52 Applying Republic Act No. 7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried
by a civil court, specifically by the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the crime
ARTICLE 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities ... of kidnapping.53 The processes which the trial court issued, therefore, were valid.

ARTICLE 76. Misbehaviour Before the Enemy ... Contrary to SSgt. Osorio's claim, the offense he committed was not service-connected. The
case filed against him is none of those enumerated under Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to
ARTICLE 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender ... 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles of War.

ARTICLE 78. Improper Use of Countersign ... Further, kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier. Even if a public officer has the
legal duty to detain a person, the public officer must be able to show the existence of legal
ARTICLE 79. Forcing a Safeguard ... grounds for the detention. Without these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have
acted in a private capacity and is considered a "private individual." The public officer
ARTICLE 80. Captured Property to Be Secured for Public Service ... becomes liable for kidnapping and serious illegal detention punishable by reclusion
perpetua, not with arbitrary detention punished with significantly lower penalties.
ARTICLE 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property ...
The cases cited by respondents are on point. In People v. Santiano,54 members of the
ARTICLE 82. Relieving, Corresponding with, or Aiding the Enemy ... Philippine National Police were convicted of kidnapping with murder. On appeal, they
contended that they cannot be charged with kidnapping considering that they were public
ARTICLE 83. Spies ... officers. This Court rejected the argument and said that "in abducting and taking away the
victim, [the accused] did so neither in furtherance of official function nor in the pursuit of
ARTICLE 84. Military Property — Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or Wrongful Disposition authority vested in them. It is not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private
... capacity, that they [committed the crime]."55 This Court, thus, affirmed the conviction of the
accused in Santiano.
ARTICLE 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to Soldiers ...
In People v. PO1 Trestiza,56 members of the Philippine National Police were initially
ARTICLE 86. Drunk on Duty ... charged with kidnapping for ransom. The public prosecutor, however, filed a motion to
withdraw information before the trial court and filed a new one for robbery. According to the
ARTICLE 87. Misbehaviour of Sentinel ... public prosecutor, the accused cannot be charged with kidnapping because the crime may
only be committed by private individuals. Moreover, the accused argued that the detention
ARTICLE 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions ... was allegedly part of a "legitimate police operation."

ARTICLE 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions ... The trial court denied the motion to withdraw. It examined the Pre-Operation/Coordination
Sheet presented by the defense and found that it was neither authenticated nor its
ARTICLE 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed ... signatories presented in court. The defense failed to show proof of a "legitimate police
operation" and, based on Santiano, the accused were deemed to have acted in a private
ARTICLE 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures ... capacity in detaining the victims. This Court affirmed the conviction of the police officers for
kidnapping.
ARTICLE 92. Dueling ...
....

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It is not impossible for a public officer to be charged with and be convicted of kidnapping as by the person charged with the offense at the time of its commission exempts him from the
Santiano and Trestiza illustrated. SSgt. Osorio's claim that he was charged with an ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.
"inexistent crime" because he is a public officer is, therefore, incorrect.
As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an assault of the
Further, since SSgt. Osorio is charged with a crime committed in a private capacity, the character charged in the complaint committed in time of war by a military person upon a
Sandiganbayan cannot take cognizance of the case. Under Presidential Decree No. 1606, prisoner of war is punishable as an offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice (art.
the Sandiganbayan was created and was vested jurisdiction over crimes or offenses 232), and it is also true that under the provisions of the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the military
committed by public officers in relation in to their offices.57 tribunals have, with certain exceptions which it is not material to state, exclusive cognizance
of all offenses, whether of a purely military nature or otherwise, committed by military
All told, the arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio were issued by the court that has persons. But the fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as an
jurisdiction over the offense charged. SSgt. Osorio's restraint has become legal; hence, the offense under the Spanish military legislation does not render them any less an offense
remedy of habeas corpus is already moot and academic.[58 SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is under the article of the Penal Code above cited. There is nothing in the language of that
to pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies, the first of which would article to indicate that it does not apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the
be a motion to quash, filed before arraignment, on the following grounds: the facts charged law. Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military Justice above cited a military person
do not constitute an offense; the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for an assault upon a prisoner of war, but
charged; and the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.59 by the commission of that offense he incurred a criminal responsibility for which he was
amenable only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility, however, arose from
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Resolutions dated July an infraction of the general penal laws, although the same acts, viewed in another aspect,
27, 2015 and February 22, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 141332 are might also, if committed in time of war, constitute an infraction of the military code. We are
AFFIRMED. unable to see how these provisions of the Spanish Military Code, no longer in force here
and which indeed never had any application to the Army of the United States, can in any
possible view have the effect claimed for them by counsel for the appellant.
G.R. No. 448 September 20, 1901
The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was committed by an
THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee, employee of the United States military authorities deprive the court of jurisdiction? We have
been cited to no provision in the legislation of Congress, and to none in the local legislation,
vs. which has the effect of limiting, as respects employees of the United States military
establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon the Courts of First Instance by Act
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant. No. 136 of the United States Philippine Commission above cited, and we are not aware of
LADD, J.: the existence of any such provision. The case is therefore open to the application of the
general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil tribunals is unaffected by the military or
The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal Code now in force by other special character of the person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly
arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of the established in the law of England and America and which must, we think, prevail under any
United States Philippine Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are given system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express legislation to the contrary. (United
original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six months' States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.) The appellant's claim that the acts alleged to
imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be imposed." The offense was constitute the offense were performed by him in the execution of the orders of his military
therefore cognizable by the court below unless the fact that the appellant was at the time of superiors may, if true, be available by way of defense upon the merits in the trial in the court
its alleged commission an employee of the United States military authorities in the below, but can not under this principle affect the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the
Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person upon whom it is alleged to have been case.
committed was a prisoner of war in the custody of such authorities, are sufficient to deprive
it of jurisdiction. We must assume that both these facts are true, as found, either upon Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in this case a court of one of
sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the prosecuting attorney, by the court below. the United States would have jurisdiction to try the offender against the State laws (see In
re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149), it is not necessary to consider. The present is not a case
Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of duty" at the time the where the courts of one government are attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the military
alleged offense was committed, which is not supported by the findings or by any evidence agents or employees of another and distinct government, because the court asserting
which appears in the record, the contention that the court was without jurisdiction, as we jurisdiction here derives its existence and powers from the same Government under the
understand it, is reducible to two propositions: First, that an assault committed by a soldier authority of which the acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed to have been
or military employee upon a prisoner of war is not an offense under the Penal Code; and performed.
second, that if it is an offense under the Code, nevertheless the military character sustained
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It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between the two jurisdictions in the inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires
present case nor any claim of jurisdiction on the part of the military tribunals. On the for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time.1 At any
contrary it appears from the findings of the court below that the complaint was entered by rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto
order of the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines, a fact not important, result in the dropping of the charges.2
perhaps, as regards the technical question of jurisdiction, but which relieves the case from
any practical embarrassment which might result from a claim on the part of the military Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:
tribunals to exclusive cognizance of the offense.
Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article experts and
The order of the court below is affirmed with costs to the appellant. consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the following privileges and
immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official
G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000 capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity.

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts
was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls
vs. within the ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance
to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. controverting evidence, should it so desire.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement
Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Sometime in because our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name
1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he of official duty.3 The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions.
was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad
Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4 It appears that even the
bail at P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken by
Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the petitioner and that of the DFA.
Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity from legal Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic agent,
process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state
Government regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. except in the case of an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised
Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the MeTC by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official functions.5 As already
judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a mentioned above, the commission of a crime is not part of official duty.
motion for reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied,
the prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to
(RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter court to say that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC
enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was such as the one at bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be
denied, petitioner elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that he is invoked only when specifically granted by law.7 The rule on the criminal procedure is clear
covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
before the criminal cases were filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt MeTC.8 Besides the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.9
The petition is not impressed with merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA
that petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving
ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the two criminal cases without
notice to the prosecution, the latter's right to due process was violated. It should be noted
that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed

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G.R. No. L-44896 July 31, 1936 2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by
the Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner, exclusive. The Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific terms, but
merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such original and appellate jurisdiction
vs. as may be possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the
MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, respondent. time of the adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the original
jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ABAD SANTOS, J.: ministers, and consuls."

The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at Manila, Philippine Islands In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the question arises whether
on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
with the crime of falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of the Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive.
court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United States and the
Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no jurisdiction to try him. His objection The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine
having been overruled, he filed this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing Islands at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act
the Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the criminal action filed No. 136, which reads as follows: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue
against him. writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo warranto in the cases
and in the manner prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the
In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That the Court of First controversies thus brought before it, and in other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to
Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the case filed against the petitioner for the issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and habeas corpus was also
reason that under Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190,
Court of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting ambassadors, other secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and 525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and
public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction excludes the courts of the Philippines; exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the
and (2) that even under the Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of the Courts of First Instance.
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is conferred exclusively upon Inasmuch as this is the same original jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and
the Supreme Court of the Philippines. made to include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, it
follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is not exclusive.
This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well settled that a consul is not
entitled to the privileges and immunities of an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds support in the pertinent
laws and regulations of the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The Constitution of the United States
403; 34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution for violations of the provides that the Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting
laws of the country where he resides. (U. S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this constitutional
Wheaton's International Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this case is provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the "original jurisdiction thus
one of jurisdiction. conferred upon the Supreme Court by the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and
that such grant of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring original
1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the Constitution of the jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate courts of the Union. (U. S. vs.
United States governs this case. We do not deem it necessary to discuss the question Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.)
whether the constitutional provision relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio vigore
over the Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth 3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth
on November 15, 1935, has brought about a fundamental change in the political and legal conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to
status of the Philippines. On the date mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went which a penalty of more than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred
into full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land. Not only the dollars might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included the trial of
members of this court but all other officers, legislative, executive and judicial, of the criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have already indicated, consuls, not
Government of the Commonwealth, are bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article being entitled to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to
XIII, section 2.) This court owes its own existence to the great instrument, and derives all its the laws and regulations of the country where they reside. By Article XV, section 2, of the
powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction, this court is bound by the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the time of the adoption of the
provisions of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this Constitution were to continue in force until the inauguration of the Commonwealth;
court "shall include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls." In thereafter, they were to remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution until
deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this constitutional provision. amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. The original jurisdiction

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granted to the Courts of First Instance to try criminal cases was not made exclusively by the military. Jose Iñigo, on the other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto
any, law in force prior to the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the Saruca, a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the anti-Khomeini
conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases movement in the Philippines.
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction,
the laws in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First "During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon the introduction of Jose
Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not inconsistent with the Constitution, and must be Iñigo, the defendant expressed his interest in buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought
deemed to remain operative and in force, subject to the power of the National Assembly to two kilos of caviar from plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of
amend alter, modify, or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs, U. Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his business after the
S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620, 623.) Khomeini government cut his pension of over $3,000.00 per month. During their
introduction in that meeting, the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which showed
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction to try the that he is working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of the Drug
petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of prohibition must be denied. So ordered. Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the United States, and gave his
address as US Embassy, Manila. At the back of the card appears a telephone number in
defendant’s own handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.
G.R. No. 142396 February 11, 2003 "It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire to obtain a US Visa
for his wife and the wife of a countryman named Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him
KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner, that he [could] help plaintiff for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however,
vs. was more concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant promised
to see plaintiff again.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR SCALZO, respondents.
"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the latter for dinner at
DECISION Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200 grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the
merchandize but for the reason that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the
VITUG, J.: restaurant people to x x x place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came and
plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid. Then their conversation was again
Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, focused on politics and business.
otherwise also known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner
Khosrow Minucher and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of "On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's residence for 18 years at
Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" conducted by the Philippine Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at
police narcotic agents in the house of Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of $27,900.00. After some haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant
heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were did not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come back the next day. The
accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due time, become one of following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his $24,000.00, which he gave to the
the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08 January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave him the pair of carpets.1awphi1.nét
Migrino rendered a decision acquitting the two accused.
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came back again to
On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before the Regional Trial Court plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's bedroom, where the latter and his
(RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on account of what he claimed to have been countryman, Abbas Torabian, were playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed and obtained $2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in obtaining a
what it had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case. visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he would be leaving the Philippines very
soon and requested him to come out of the house for a while so that he can introduce him
"The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national. He came to the to his cousin waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as he was
Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he saw a parked cab opposite
the Shah of Iran, he was appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, the street. To his complete surprise, an American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-
Japan and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by Ayatollah Khomeini, powered gun. He was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 Americans,
plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations and continued to stay in the Philippines. He all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes in the street, he was brought
headed the Iranian National Resistance Movement in the Philippines. inside the house by the defendant. He was made to sit down while in handcuffs while the
defendant was inside his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out from
"He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was brought to his defendant's attaché case, he took something and placed it on the table in front of the
house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iñigo, an informer of the Intelligence Unit of
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plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife who was at that time at the boutique near his house incident in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this Court. The
and likewise arrested Torabian, who was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with SC Circular No. 1-88; in any
were handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he was being handcuffed and why the event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed to show that the appellate court was in error in its
privacy of his house, especially his bedroom was invaded by defendant. He was not questioned judgment.
allowed to use the telephone. In fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any
warrant, but the defendant told him to `shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he would be Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was issued (a) declaring
able to call for his lawyer who can defend him. Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive pleading (answer) and (b) setting the
case for the reception of evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him to come out to meet the order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the motion, the trial
his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the $24,000.00 the defendant paid for the court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo denied the material allegations of the
carpets and another $8,000.00 which he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet complaint and raised the affirmative defenses (a) of Minucher’s failure to state a cause of
worth $15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also discovered missing action in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his official duties as
upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States
he bought for P30,000.00 together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he Department of Justice. Scalzo interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for
was handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was, therefore, nothing attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation.
left in his house.
Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized throughout the world, in filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the
various newspapers, particularly in Australia, America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. He
He was identified in the papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United States Embassy, dated 29
May 1990, addressed to the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on television, not only in the Certification, dated 11 June 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note
Philippines, but also in America and in Germany. His friends in said places informed him is a true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the trial court denied
that they saw him on TV with said news. the motion to dismiss.
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to Camp Crame On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with this Court,
handcuffed together, where they were detained for three days without food and water."1 docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et
al.," asking that the complaint in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The case
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special appearance for was referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No. 22505, per this
Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an answer pending a supposed advice from Court’s resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October 1990, the Court of Appeals
the United States Department of State and Department of Justice on the defenses to be promulgated its decision sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the
raised. The trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed another special dismissal of the complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this Court,
appearance to quash the summons on the ground that he, not being a resident of the docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs. the Honorable Court of
Philippines and the action being one in personam, was beyond the processes of the court. Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242), appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The motion was denied by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that the In a decision, dated 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an answer to the complaint was a Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and remanded the case
voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons which could likewise be construed to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered on the theses (a) that the Court of
a waiver of the requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration of the Appeals erred in granting the motion to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his
court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to file an answer was not a person without even considering the issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note No. 414
voluntary appearance equivalent to service of summons since it did not seek an affirmative and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to the effect that Scalzo
relief. Scalzo argued that in cases involving the United States government, as well as its committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity and outside the scope of his official
agencies and officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly unavoidable due to the need duties and, absent any evidence to the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity
(1) for both the Department of State and the Department of Justice to agree on the could not be taken up.
defenses to be raised and (2) to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be
expected to first review the case. The court a quo denied the motion for reconsideration in The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17 November 1995, the
its order of 15 October 1989. trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. No.
17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated 06 October 1989, the appellate court
denied the petition and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the
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"WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) make the actual arrest." Scalzo has
rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully established his claim by sufficient evidence, submitted to the trial court a number of documents -
against the defendant in the manner following:
1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990;
"`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of
P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of 2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated 11 June 1990;
P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.
3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991;
`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note of the lien of the
Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid docket fees considering that the plaintiff in 4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
this case instituted this action as a pauper litigant.’"2 5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988.
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence presented by 6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal Adviser, Department of
him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court
nevertheless, should be held accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his of RTC Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court);
official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and
sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity 7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement (Exh. '3'); and
during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the
"Receiving State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. 8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the Protocol, Department of
Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec. Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review raises a two-fold issue: (1) this Court.5
whether or not the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered
by this Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals from resolving The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United States Embassy
the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2) whether or not Arthur Scalzo is accordingly advised the Executive Department of the Philippine Government that Scalzo
indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity. was a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival
in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988; (2) that the
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res judicata, would require United States Government was firm from the very beginning in asserting the diplomatic
1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and the immunity of Scalzo with respect to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna
parties on the part of the court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an Convention on Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy repeatedly
identity of the parties, subject matter and causes of action.3 Even while one of the issues urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate action to inform the trial court of
submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not public respondent Court of Appeals erred in Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate
ruling that private respondent Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with that: (1) the Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department, recognizing and
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal question raised in the respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally advised the "Judicial Department" of his
instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, however, has not resolved that point with diplomatic status and his entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the
finality. Indeed, the Court there has made this observation - Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself authenticated
Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in his Pre-trial Brief filed reports of investigation on the surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the
on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he would present documentary evidence certification of the Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
consisting of DEA records on his investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all times relevant to
position and duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right to the complaint, and the special power of attorney executed by him in favor of his previous
present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the alleged diplomatic counsel6 to show (a) that the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul,
immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied acknowledged Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States diplomatic
upon for a reasonable, intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity."4 mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986, with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement
Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity from suit, describing his functions officials and in the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he investigated
as an agent of the United States Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting surveillance Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the Philippine Department
operations on suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14
prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained the target, (he then) October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of the United
States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the Government of the

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Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the functions of the overseas office of the who may be in charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There could
United States Drugs Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative expertise also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or departments of the
and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on narcotic and drug control programs government, other than the foreign ministry or department, who are detailed by their
upon the request of the host country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host respective ministries or departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air,
country and counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct complex commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the like. Attaches assist a
criminal investigations involving international criminal conspiracies which affect the interests chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him, but their main function is to
of the United States. observe, analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields in the host
country and submit reports to their own ministries or departments in the home government.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of centuries-old 14 These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are
customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18 April 1961, its rules of law had long they normally designated as having diplomatic rank.
become stable. Among the city states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the
Mediterranean before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states of In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414,
India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the diplomatic envoy in time 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991
of peace were universally held sacrosanct.7 By the end of the 16th century, when the and 17 November 1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court's initial
earliest treatises on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors was reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz:
firmly established as a rule of customary international law.8 Traditionally, the exercise of
diplomatic intercourse among states was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being "While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public respondent gravely abused its
the preeminent embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption
official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a state would wish to that simply because of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed with diplomatic
have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the receiving state, it would then send to the immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over his person.
latter a diplomatic mission. Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the
diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the interests of the sending "x x x x x x x x x
state and promoting friendly relations with the receiving state.9 "And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the private respondent.
The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to include (a) Setting aside for the moment the issue of authenticity raised by the petitioner and the
ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state,10 (b) envoys,11 ministers or doubts that surround such claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1)
internuncios accredited to the heads of states; and (c) charges d' affairs12 accredited to the year, eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel filed on 12
ministers of foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are the September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking for a first extension of time to file
diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and service staff. Only the heads the Answer because the Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America
of missions, as well as members of the diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the were studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before he could secure
administrative, technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic rank. the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, and even granting for the sake of
Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides for immunity to the argument that such note is authentic, the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot
members of diplomatic missions, it does so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the be peremptorily dismissed.
same be restrictively applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, "x x x x x x x x x
are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal suits. The Convention
defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, "There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts imputed to him were done
thus impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear stressing that in his official capacity. Nothing supports this self-serving claim other than the so-called
even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of commerce and Diplomatic Note. x x x. The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court's
navigation and perform certain administrative and notarial duties, such as the issuance of denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most proper and appropriate
passports and visas, authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose
ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges accorded diplomats, belated issuance is even suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The
mainly for the reason that they are not charged with the duty of representing their states in undue haste with which respondent Court yielded to the private respondent's claim is
political matters. Indeed, the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat arbitrary."
entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he performs duties of diplomatic
nature. A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08 November 1992, issued
by the Office of Protocol of the Department of Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C.
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an Assistant Attaché of Fernandez, Assistant Secretary, certifying that "the records of the Department (would) show
the United States diplomatic mission and was accredited as such by the Philippine that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the Philippines (from 14 October
Government. An attaché belongs to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed as an Assistant Attaché of the United States
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diplomatic mission and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic status by the Government of In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the United States Air Force
the Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records," the supposed bases for the and special officers of the Air Force Office of Special Investigators charged with the duty of
belated issuance, was presented in evidence. preventing the distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has ruled -

Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the executive "While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits against the state
branch of the government. In World Health Organization vs. Aquino,15 the Court has without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the state for
recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot for a
apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain moment be imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity when they
exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the Philippine government, apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It follows that for discharging their
specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable
particularly be no less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be to their principal, which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on
recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial behalf of the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is that government, and
sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of not the petitioners personally, [who were] responsible for their acts."25
territorial jurisdiction.16 The government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to
be acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic agent. The State This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs. Court of Appeals26
Department policy is to only concede diplomatic status to a person who possesses an elaborates:
acknowledged diplomatic title and "performs duties of diplomatic nature."17 Supplementary
criteria for accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from States "It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such
which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally representing the intention to for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by
assign the person to diplomatic duties, the holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over Justice Zaldivar in Director of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al.
twenty-one years of age, and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time (33 SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers,
basis.18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate and descriptive job unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action
title to that which currently applies to the duties performed. The Office of the Protocol would against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such
then assign each individual to the appropriate functional category.19 acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity
of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in
But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain contentious, it was equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
Agency and was tasked to conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority which he does
country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur Scalzo not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may
was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
complaint, the present controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
State Immunity from Suit.
"x x x x x x x x x
The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-
standing rule of customary international law then closely identified with the personal "(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be invoked where the public
immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, official is being sued in his private and personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of
made to attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative, but also protection afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the moment they
distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity.21 If the acts giving rise to a suit are are sued in their individual capacity. This situation usually arises where the public official
those of a foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a acts without authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle
diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever
the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith or beyond the
of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded scope of his authority and jurisdiction."27
for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with immunity from suit but only
par in parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert as long as it can be established that he is acting within the directives of the sending state.
jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad terms, is that if the judgment The consent of the host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between
against an official would require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and personnel of the United
award, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed States, stationed within Philippine territory, under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement.
against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself, although it has not While evidence is wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of the
been formally impleaded.23 Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents and to conduct
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surveillance and related activities of suspected drug dealers in the Philippines), the consent It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, has jurisdiction
or imprimatur of the Philippine government to the activities of the United States Drug over all offenses committed within its territory, but it may, by treaty or by agreement,
Enforcement Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere consent that the United States or any other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over
mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between agencies of the government certain offenses committed within certain portions of said territory. On March 11, 1947, the
of the two countries, certifications from officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America, entered
Affairs and the United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the into an agreement concerning military bases, and Article XIII thereof is as follows:
Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted at the residence of
Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of JURISDICTION
the latter but they give enough indication that the Philippine government has given its
imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine territory of agent Scalzo of the 1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right to exercise
United States Drug Enforcement Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to jurisdiction over the following offenses:
conduct surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained the target, (a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except where the offender and
to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected to make the arrest. In conducting offended parties are both Philippine citizens (not members of the armed forces of the United
surveillance activities on Minucher, later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust States on active duty) or the offense is against the security of the Philippines;
operation, and then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against Minucher,
Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. (b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the
United States in which the offended party is also a member of the armed forces of the
All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur Scalzo, an agent of the United States; and
United States Drug Enforcement Agency allowed by the Philippine government to conduct
activities in the country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to the (c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the
defense of state immunity from suit. United States against the security of the United States.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED. No costs. SO 2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all other offenses
ORDERED. committed outside the bases by any member of the armed forces of the United States.

3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to exercise the
jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this Article, the officer holding the
G.R. No. L-1988 February 24, 1948 offender in custody shall so notify the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province in
JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner, which the offense has been committed within ten days after his arrest, and in such case the
Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction.
vs.
4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to exercise the jurisdiction
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES reserved to it in paragraph 2 of this Article, the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or
ARMY, respondents. province where the offense has been committed shall so notify the officer holding the
offender in custody within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case the United States
MORAN, C.J.: shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any offense falling under paragraph 2 of this article is
committed by any member of the armed forces of the United States.
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus Miquiabas against the
Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus Command, United States Army, who is alleged to (a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific military duty, or
have petitioner under custody and to have appointed a General Court-Martial to try
petitioner in connection with an offense over which the said court has no jurisdiction. (b) during a period of national emergency declared by either Government and the fiscal
(prosecuting attorney) so finds from the evidence, he shall immediately notify the officer
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the holding the offender in custody that the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction. In the
Philippines, who has been charged with disposing in the Port of Manila Area of things event the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense was not committed in the actual
belonging to the United States Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United performance of a specific military duty, the offender's commanding officer shall have the
States. He has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial appointed by right to appeal from such finding to the Secretary of Justice within ten days from the receipt
respondent tried and found him guilty and sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. This of the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the Secretary of Justice shall be final.
sentence, however, is not yet final for it is still subject to review.
5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the custody of the accused,
pending trial and final judgment, shall be entrusted without delay to the commanding officer
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of the nearest base, who shall acknowledge in writing that such accused has been Governments; but such extension shall not apply to the existing temporary quarters and
delivered to him for custody pending trial in a competent court of the Philippines and that he installations within the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case exceed a period of
will be held ready to appear and will be produced before said court when required by it. The three years.
commanding officer shall be furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the
information against the accused upon the filing of the original in the competent court. 2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Port of Manila reservation
with boundaries as of 1941 will be available for use to the United States armed forces until
6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is naturally agreed that in time of war the such time as other arrangements can be made for the supply of the bases by mutual
United States shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses which agreement of the two Governments.
may be committed by members of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines.
3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable to temporary
7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the bases to any person quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of this article while they are so
fleeing from the lawful jurisdiction of the Philippines. Should such person be found in any occupied by the armed forces of the United States; provided, that offenses committed within
base, he will be surrendered on demand to the competent authorities of the Philippines. the temporary quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City of
Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the
8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by the United States, the provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, except that the election not to exercise the
offended party may institute a separate civil action against the offender in the proper court jurisdiction reserved to the Philippines shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is
of the Philippines to enforce the civil liability which under the laws of the Philippines may agreed that the United States shall have full use and full control of all these quarters and
arise from the offense. installations while they are occupied by the armed forces of the United States, including the
exercise of such measures as may be necessary to police said quarters for the security of
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have jurisdiction over the criminal the personnel and property therein.
case against petitioner if the offense had been committed within a base. Under paragraph 1
(b), if the offense had been committed outside a base, still the General Court-Martial would The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading, is "Temporary Installations."
have jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a "member of the armed forces of Paragraph 1 refers to temporary quarters and installations existing outside the bases
the United States" there being no question that the offended party in this case is the United specified in Annex A and Annex B, which may be retained by the United States armed
States. It is not necessary therefore, to consider whether the offense is against "the security forces for such reasonable time as may be necessary not exceeding two years in duration,
of the United States" under paragraph 1 (c), or whether petitioner committed it in "the actual extendible fro not more than three years, the extension not being applicable to existing
performance of a specific military duty" or in time of a declared "national emergency" under temporary quarters and installations within the limits of the City of Manila.
paragraph 4, or whether we are still in a state of war under paragraph 6, for in all these
instances the military jurisdiction depends also upon whether the offender is a member of Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation, which will be available
the armed forces of the United States. We shall then determine in this case (1) whether the for use to the United States armed forces, also as a temporary quarters and installations, its
offense has been committed within or without a base, and, in the second instance, (2) temporariness not being for a definite period of time, but "until such time as other
whether the offender is or is not a member of the armed forces of the United States. arrangements can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two
Governments." There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be construed as placing
As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement provides that "bases are those area the Port of Manila Reservation in the category of a permanent base.
named in Annex A and Annex B and such additional areas as may be acquired for military
purposes pursuant to the terms of this Agreement." Among the areas specified in Annexes A Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within the temporary quarters
and B, there is none that has reference to the Port Area of Manila where the offense has and installations located within the present limits of the City of Manila shall not be
allegedly been committed. On the contrary, it appears in Annex A that "army considered as offenses within the bases but shall be governed by the provisions of Article
communications system" is included, but with "the deletion of all stations in the Port of XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be considered as committed
Manila Area." within, but without, a base, since it has been committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is
not one of the bases mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and is merely
Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The whole article is as follows: temporary quarters located within the present limits of the City of Manila.
TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be considered as a member of the
armed forces of the United States under Article XIII, paragraph 1 (b). As above stated,
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to occupy temporary petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United States Army in the
quarters and installations now existing outside the bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex Philippines. Under the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered
B, for such reasonable time, not exceeding two years, as may be necessary to develop as a member of the armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI and XVIII of the
adequate facilities within the bases for the United States armed forces. If circumstances Agreement make mention of civilian employees separately from members of the armed
require an extension of time, such a period will be fixed by mutual agreement of the two

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forces of the United States, which is a conclusive indication that under said Agreement States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that the evidence is insufficient
armed forces do not include civilian employees. to support the conviction.

Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the United States, which The information alleges:
enumerates, among the persons subject to military law, persons accompanying or serving
with the armies of the United States. But this case should be decided not under the Articles That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, the said H. N. Bull
of War, but under the terms of the Base Agreement between the United States and the was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel known as the steamship Standard,
Philippines. And not because a person is subject to military law under the Articles of War which vessel was then and there engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and
does he become, for that reason alone, a member of the armed forces under the Base other animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that the said
Agreement. And even under the Articles of War, the mere fact that a civilian employee is in accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, on or about the 2d day of
the service of the United States Army does not make him a member of the armed forces of December, 1908, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and
the United States. Otherwise, it would have been necessary for said Article to enumerate bring into the port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng,
civilian employees separately from members of the armed forces of the United States. Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and carabaos, without
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty
Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action because the Secretary of and unnecessary suffering to the said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull,
Justice had not notified the officer holding the petitioner in custody whether or not the master, as aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in transit
Philippines desired to retain jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 3, of the Military Base and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a proper manner, and did then
Agreement. It is sufficient to state in this connection that in cases like the present where the and there cause some of said animals to be tied by means of rings passed through their
offender is a civilian employee and not a member of the Unites States armed forces, no noses, and allow and permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of
waiver can be made either by the prosecuting attorney of by the Secretary of Justice, under said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without bedding; that by reason of
paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph 3 of Article XXI, of the the aforesaid neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said
Agreement. animals while so in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and many
of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said vessel, and cruelly
We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General Court-Martial appointed by wounded, bruised, and killed.
respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for the offense allegedly committed by him
and, consequently, the judgment rendered by said court sentencing the petitioner to 15 All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine Commission.
years' imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, provides that —
It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent without prejudice to any
criminal action which may be instituted in the proper court of the Philippines. The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the Honorable, Secretary of Justice. any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the
vessels carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for the suitable
sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period occupied by the vessel in passage
from the port of shipment to the port of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be
G.R. No. L-5270 January 15, 1910 provided with adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four hours
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their final debarkation.

vs. By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended by adding to section 1
thereof the following:
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant.
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or transporting cattle,
ELLIOTT, J.: sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the Philippine Islands to another, or from
any foreign port to any port within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a violation of section 1 of Act securing such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to
No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading and unloading cattle or other
appealed to this court, where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the animals upon or from vessels upon which they are transported, without cruelty or
complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court; (2) that under unnecessary suffering. It is hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from
the evidence the trial court was without jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that vessels by swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to the thorns.
Act No. 55 as amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the United
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Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that — The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, but the
objection to the jurisdiction raises the further question whether that jurisdiction is restricted
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who knowingly and willfully by the fact of the nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and
fails to comply with the provisions of section one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right, even public vessels may
pay a penalty of not less that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United not enter the ports of a friendly power without permission, but it is now conceded that in the
States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be instituted in any Court of absence of a prohibition such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly
First Instance or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while within such waters was
are disembarked. not established until within comparatively recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford,
and in 1796 Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of nations
1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does not state that the court invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no exemption from the jurisdiction of the
was sitting at a port where the cattle were disembarked, or that the offense was committed country into which he comes." (1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also
on board a vessel registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands. supported by Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as late as
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on Courts of First Instance 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116,
or any provost court organized in the province or port in which such animals are 144), Chief Justice Marshall said that the implied license under which such vessels enter a
disembarked, and there is nothing inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides friendly port may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the jurisdiction of
generally for the organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400 merely the sovereign within whose territory she claims the rights of hospitality." The principle was
extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain offenses committed on the high accepted by the Geneva Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of
seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law of nations; not as an
Islands on board a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded on the principle of courtesy and mutual
Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil. Rep., 614.) This deference between nations."
jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First Instance in any province into which such (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Taylor, Int. Law, sec.
ship or water upon which the offense or crime was committed shall come after the 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.)
commission thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a Philippine
registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction of the court, because it is Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come and go freely. Local
expressly conferred, and the Act is in accordance with well recognized and established official exercise but little control over their actions, and offenses committed by their crew are
public law. But the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was not justiciable by their own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe allegiance.
registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws thereof. We have then the This limitation upon the general principle of territorial sovereignty is based entirely upon
question whether the court had jurisdiction over an offense of this character, committed on comity and convenience, and finds its justification in the fact that experience shows that
board a foreign ship by the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which such vessels are generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are essential
constitutes the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial waters of to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity and convenience does not
the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offenses or require the extension of the same degree of exemption to merchant vessels. There are two
crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but well-defined theories as to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to
when she came within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant ship which do not
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles concern the tranquillity of the port or persons foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the
became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., court of the country to which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim
sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels in foreign
jurisdiction of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency. This ports by one member of the crew against another. (See Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.),
offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line which determines these secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p.
waters the Standard must have traveled at least 25 miles before she came to anchor. 292; Masse, Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or claim by
During that part of her voyage the violation of the statue continued, and as far as the Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded it by treaties. (Halleck, Int.
jurisdiction of the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider
existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming that it originated at exterritoriality as a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but Hall,
the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing one, and every element necessary to who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that —
constitute it existed during the voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden
act was done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction over the It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality of merchant vessels
subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender. that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a foreign state they become subject to the local
jurisdiction on all points in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p.
263.)

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The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a merchant vessel enters treaty of 1827 between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations
a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of the local authorities, unless the local contained in the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it is contended by you
sovereignty has by act of acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular officers, not only in regard to such differences
a portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. of a civil nature growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as to
204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in disposing of controversies resulting from personal violence involving offense for which the
the case of the Exchange, said that — party may be held amenable under the local criminal law.

When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be obviously in convinient This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible of such broad
and dangerous to society and would subject the laws to continual infraction and the interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the consuls is conceived to be limited to their
government to degradation if such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local right to sit as judges or abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and
allegiance, and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country. crews of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the captain or
crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country. When, however, a complaint is
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the merchant vessels of one made to a local magistrate, either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel,
country visiting the ports of another for the purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it is competent for such
which govern the ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in furtherance of the local laws, and under such
peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 U. S., 520-525.) circumstances in the United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate
is not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily be left to the local
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are imposed by article 13 of the judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take place in the United States or in Sweden
treaty of commerce and navigation between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of to determine if in fact there had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity,
July 4, 1827, which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each and if the complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the party
country "The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences as may arise between accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be defined against the
the captains and crews of the vessels belonging to the nation whose interests are offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore, Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
committed to their charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless the
conduct of the crews or of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction over offenses
country." (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to controversies committed on board a merchant vessel by one member of the crew against another which
between the members of the ship's company, and particularly to disputes regarding wages. amount to a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec. 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and construction of the language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws disturbs
tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not amount to a riot or the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which the appellant is charged had
general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one member of the crew upon another, nothing to so with any difference between the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the
committed upon the ship, of which the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by master of the criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that neither
this treaty withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities. by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the commission of the offense, or the
prohibitions of any treaty or general principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine
In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on Islands deprived of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case.
board the vessel in the port of Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of
the peace, but the United States district attorney was instructed by the Government to take It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does not allege that the
the necessary steps to have the proceedings dismissed, and the aid of the governor of animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an allegation which it is claimed is
Texas was invoked with the view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. essential to the jurisdiction of the court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon
Fish, Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May 16, 1876; this issue would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly against the
Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel" was of such a nature as to Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not necessary in order to constitute the
amount to a breach of the criminal laws of Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the completed offense, and a reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers
Norwegian bark Livingston was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are bought. They are
assault and battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of Philadelphia, it then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, and the mere fact of their disembarkation
was held that there was nothing in the treaty which deprived the local courts of jurisdiction. is immaterial so far as jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation
(Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations were made through of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it does not.
diplomatic channels to the State Department, and on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of
State, wrote to Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows: It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails to allege that the
defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide suitable means for securing said animals
I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful consideration in connection while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the
with the views and suggestion of your note and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the complaint that the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was committed

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knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word statute regulating commerce with its ports been enacted by the legislature of one of the
'willfully' carries the idea, when used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act States of the Union, it would doubtless have been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the
must be done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will consented to, Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R. A., N. S., 1071.)
designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was
said: "The first one is that the complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United States is controlled by
appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, was fully answered by the constitutional principles different from those which apply to States of the Union. The
respondent's counsel — that the words 'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same importance of the question thus presented requires a statement of the principles which
meaning. To 'willfully' do an act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain govern those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of the legislative power
purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was 'knowingly' done." To the of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of the Philippines. After much discussion
same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the and considerable diversity of opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are
present case. established.

The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly done, but his The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to make war and
defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his experience, the system of carrying treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to acquire territory by conquest or
cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs to the United States, and to guard against the
comfort of the animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was done knowingly possibility of the power of Congress to provide for its government being questioned, the
and intentionally. framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress should have the power
"to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting territory and other
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, paragraph 3, it is only property belonging to the United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the
necessary to state the act or omission complained of as constituting a crime or public territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into the Union, the duty of
offense in ordinary and concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in providing a government therefor devolves upon Congress. It may govern the territory by its
the words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person of common direct acts, or it may create a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers
understanding to know what is intended and the court to pronounce judgment according to required for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been the usual
right. A complaint which complies with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. procedure. Congress has provided such governments for territories which were within the
Rep., 556.) Union, and for newly acquired territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary
to organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into executive, legislative,
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of a vessel the duty to and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act certain general conditions in accordance with
"provide suitable means for securing such animals while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty which the local government should act. The organic act thus became the constitution of the
and unnecessary suffering to the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in government of the territory which had not been formally incorporated into the Union, and
English is that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the cattle "without the validity of legislation enacted by the local legislature was determined by its conformity
providing suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty with the requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto (U. S.), 129.)
and unnecessary suffering to the said animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid To the legislative body of the local government Congress has delegated that portion of
neglect and failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals were legislative power which in its wisdom it deemed necessary for the government of the
cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of said territory, reserving, however, the right to annul the action of the local legislature and itself
vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised, and killed." legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised during the entire period of
the history of the United States. The right of Congress to delegate such legislative power
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the information does not can no longer be seriously questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen,
charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" and "adequate" means. The words used are 206 U. S., 370, 385.)
"medios suficientes" and "medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint
was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by the words The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate within such territory,
"adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to the context and circumstances, although the liberality of Congress in legislating the Constitution into contiguous territory
we determine this point against the appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the tended to create an impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its own
objection was not made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure to force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with reference to this territory, the
provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals." power of Congress is limited only by those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the
very root of its power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it is
2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No. 55 and the amendment plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs.
thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally erroneous conception of the constitutional law Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S.,
of these Islands. The statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation 516.)
of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands, and had a similar

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This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole history of the United funds of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an efficient civil
States, and legislation founded on the theory was enacted long prior to the acquisition of service; the organization and establishment of courts; the organization and establishment of
the present Insular possessions. Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides municipal and departmental government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the
that "The Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable military governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a legislative character."
shall have the same force and effect within all the organized territories, and in every This grant of legislative power to the Commission was to be exercised in conformity with
Territory hereafter organized, as elsewhere within the United States." When Congress certain declared general principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the
organized a civil government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section of protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind that the government to
the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands. (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.) be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but
for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by the United States as measures adopted should be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and even
a result of the war with Spain, the executive and legislative authorities have consistently their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the
proceeded in conformity with the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered indispensable requisites of just and effective government." The specific restrictions upon
to the United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was directed to hold legislative power were found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life,
the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a peace which should determine the liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property shall not be taken for
control, disposition, and government of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the public use without just compensation; that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
American authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within the enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, and on August 26 General accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process
Merritt assumed the duties of military governor. The treaty of peace was signed December for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense;
10, 1898. On the 22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction of that excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically effected the conquest of the unusual punishment inflicted; that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same
Philippine Islands and the suspension of the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the offense or be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the right
treaty of peace the future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; that neither
ceded to the United States. During the periods of strict military occupation, before the treaty slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of
of peace was ratified, and the interim thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. attainder or ex post facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the
Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), the territory was governed under the military authority of the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and
President as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the President petition the Government for a redress of grievances; that no law shall be made respecting
organized a civil government which, however, had its legal justification, like the purely an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free
military government which it gradually superseded, in the war power. The military power of exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without discrimination or
the President embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such military or civil preference shall forever be allowed."
agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his report for 1901 —
To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being raised, the Spooner
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation includes executive, amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed March 2, 1901, provided that "all military,
legislative, and judicial authority. It not infrequently happens that in a single order of a civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise
military commander can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in
exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of action; of judicial power such manner, as the President of the United States shall direct, for the establishment of civil
by determination of right; and the executive power by the enforcement of the rules government, and for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free
prescribed and the rights determined. enjoyment of their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the authority,
which had been exercised previously by the military governor, was transferred to that
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil government as rapidly as official. The government thus created by virtue of the authority of the President as
conditions would permit. After full investigation, the organization of civil government was Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands
initiated by the appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be gradually under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1, 1902, Congress assumed
transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, subject to the approval of the control of the situation by the enactment of a law which, in connection with the instructions
President. "that part of the military power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is of April 7, 1900, constitutes the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
legislative in its character" was transferred from the military government to the Commission,
to be exercised under such rules and regulations as should be prescribed by the Secretary The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of government which the
of War, until such time as complete civil government should be established, or congress President had erected. Congress adopted the system which was in operation, and
otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the Commission was approved the action of the President in organizing the government. Substantially all the
declared to include "the making of rules and orders having the effect of law for the raising of limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the President's instructions
revenue by taxes, customs duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public were included in the law, Congress thus extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the
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Constitution, but all its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of individuals governments operating under written constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative
which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of the President in creating the enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official acts. In performing these
Commission with designated powers of government, in creating the office of the Governor- functions it acts with the same independence as the Federal and State judiciaries in the
General and Vice-Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain United States. Under no other constitutional theory could there be that government of laws
executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified. Subsequently the action of the and not of men which is essential for the protection of rights under a free and orderly
President in imposing a tariff before and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also government.
ratified and approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902; U.S. vs.
Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.) Until otherwise provided by law Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the Philippine Islands, it is
the Islands were to continue to be governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future apparent that the courts must consider the question of the validity of an act of the Philippine
the enacting clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States" instead of Commission or the Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State
"By the authority of the President." In the course of time the legislative authority of the legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are expressly or
Commission in all parts of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United States, while the States exercise all
be transferred to a legislature consisting of two houses — the Philippine Commission and powers which have not been granted to the central government. The former operates under
the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus assumed by Congress grants, the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress depends upon
under its power to govern newly acquired territory not incorporated into the United States. whether the Constitution of the United States contains a grant of express or implied
authority to enact it. An act of a State legislature is valid unless the Federal or State
This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory, although its form and constitution expressly or impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of
organization somewhat resembles that of both. It stands outside of the constitutional the Philippines Government which has not been expressly disapproved by Congress is
relation which unites the States and Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by congressional legislation, or its
and maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States, which, however, enactment forbidden by some provision of the organic laws.
operates on the President and Congress, and not directly on the Philippine Government. It
is the creation of the United States, acting through the President and Congress, both The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted in general terms
deriving power from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers and subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not alone of power to legislate on certain
the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked to the orders of the subjects, but to exercise the legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that
President before Congress acted and the Acts of Congress after it assumed control. Its specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government relative to certain subjects of
organic laws are derived from the formally and legally expressed will of the President and legislation, and that Congress has itself legislated upon certain other subjects. These,
Congress, instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any subject however, should be viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully
relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it exercise such power its act informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the local legislative
is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the legal equivalent of an amendment of a authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. of U. S., April 16, 1908.)
constitution in the United States.
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of legislation by the
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is a complete Government of the Philippine tends strongly to confirm the view that for purposes of
governmental organism with executive, legislative, and judicial departments exercising the construction the Government of the Philippines should be regarded as one of general
functions commonly assigned to such departments. The separation of powers is as instead of enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new government
complete as in most governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this was to operate far from the source of its authority. To relieve Congress from the necessity of
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. For instance, in the legislating with reference to details, it was thought better to grant general legislative power
Federal Government the Senate exercises executive powers, and the President to some to the new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, and reserve to
extent controls legislation through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with disapproval. It was therefore provided
exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the head of the executive "that all laws passed by the Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to
department in the Philippine Government, is a member of the Philippine Commission, but Congress, which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." (Act of
as executive he has no veto power. The President and Congress framed the government on Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not suspend the acts of the
the model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best adapted for the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by Congress, or when approved, expressly or
advancement of the public interests and the protection of individual rights and priviliges. by acquiescence, make them the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government
of the Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U. S.), 1.)
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to adopt the general
constitutional doctrined which are inherent in the system. Hence, under it the Legislature In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain whether the
must enact laws subject to the limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of
the national Constitution, and the States under the national and state constitutions. The the Constitution of the United States operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no
executive must execute such laws as are constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all application to the Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign

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commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern the territory belonging That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle abroad steamship
to the United States, it may regulate foreign commerce with such territory. It may do this coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of Manila is by way of individual stalls for
directly, or indirectly through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this such cattle, providing partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear
respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the duties which shall be thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are transported, of that in
paid upon goods imported into the Philippines, and it has expressly authorized the case of storms, which are common in this community at sea, such cattle may be able to
Government of the Philippines to provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors stand without slipping and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the
and navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign commerce may be production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle were transported in this
found in the Acts of Congress, but its general regulation is left to the Government of the case. Captain Summerville of the steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced
Philippines, subject to the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not seaman, has testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated positively that
meet with its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the Commission and since the introduction in the ships with which he is acquainted of the stall system for the
Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority with respect to the regulation of commerce transportation of animals and cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year.
with foreign countries. Act No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the The defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according to his experience
Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner amendment of March the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in the hold is preferable and more
2, 1901, was passed. The military government, and the civil government instituted by the secure to the life and comfort of the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable,
President, had the power, whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate either by the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for instance,
commerce between foreign nations and the ports of the territory. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or any other protection for them
How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21 Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has remained in individually can safely and suitably carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the
force since its enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must be holds of ships; such a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if
presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied that the Commission he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the wounding of half the
had, and the Legislature now has, full constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation animals upon the ship if transported in the manner found in this case.
of commerce between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and that Act
No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid. The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two hundred and fifty pesos,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and
3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the meaning of the Act can judgment is affirmed. So ordered.
not be left to the judgment of the master of the ship. It is a question which must be
determined by the court from the evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull
brought into and disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came from
the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means for securing said animals G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
the provisions of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The trial
court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by the evidence: vs. nag-land ng opium within Philippine soil
That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian steamer known as LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
the Standard, for a period of six months or thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December,
1908, was engaged in the transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ARELLANO, C. J.:
ports to and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, stated
That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master and captain as that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in his possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of
aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said ship, a large number of cattle, which opium," and that "he had been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared
ship was anchored, under the directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in opium."
front of the city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court; and that
fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three others of said cattle were The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of which was the
dead, having broken legs; and also that said cattle were transported and carried upon said more than one crime was charged in the complaint. The demurrer was sustained, as the
ship as aforesaid by the defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without court found that the complaint contained two charges, one, for the unlawful possession of
suitable precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid danger and opium, and the other, for the unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence of that ruling, it
risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle were so transported abroad said ordered that the fiscal should separated one charge from the other and file a complaint for
ship by the defendant and brought into the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any each violation; this, the fiscal did, and this cause concerns only the unlawful possession of
provisions being made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to opium. It is registered as No. 375, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and as No. 5887
maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such transportation. on the general docket of this court.

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The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial court: The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles mentioned as
Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found on board the steamship Erroll, a
The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on the present month vessel of English nationality, and that it was true that the defendant stated that these sacks
(stated as August 19, 1909), several persons, among them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, of opium were his and that he had them in his possession.
chief of the department of the port of Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu,
respectively, went abroad the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found, According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the defendant stated to him, in the
first in a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the hold, another presence of the provincial fiscal, of a Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not needed,
sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit A contained 49 cans of opium, and the because the defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four guards, that the
other, Exhibit B, the larger sack, also contained several cans of the same substance. The opium seized in the vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong, at three pesos for each
hold, in which the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's round can and five pesos for each one of the others, for the purpose of selling it, as
control, who moreover, freely and of his own will and accord admitted that this sack, as well contraband, in Mexico and Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the 15th the vessel arrived at
as the other referred to in Exhibit B and found in the cabin, belonged to him. The said Cebu, and on the same day he sold opium; that he had tried to sell opium for P16 a can;
defendant also stated, freely and voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of opium, in that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about P500; that the opium found in
Hongkong with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, the room of the other two Chinamen prosecuted in another cause, was his, and that he had
as his hold had already been searched several times for opium, he ordered two other left it in their stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had already been
Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A. searched many times; and that, according to the defendant, the contents of the large sack
was 80 cans of opium, and of the small one, 49, and the total number, 129.
It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as Exhibits A and B,
properly constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover, another lot of four cans of opium, marked, It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality, that it came from
as Exhibit C, was the subject matter of investigation at the trial, and with respect to which Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the call ports of Manila and Cebu.
the chief of the department of the port of Cebu testified that they were found in the part of
the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and that they were delivered to the first officer The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the court had no
of the ship to be returned to the said firemen after the vessel should have left the jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned therein did not constitute a crime. The
Philippines, because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions fiscal, at the conclusion of his argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be
he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, imposed upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium seized. The
always provided it should not be taken shore. court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within
its district, on the wharf of Cebu.
And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus delicti and important
as evidence in this cause. With regard to this the internal-revenue agent testified as The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000,
follows:itc-alf with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, though not to exceed one
third of the principal penalty, and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the
FISCAL. What is it? confiscation, in favor of the Insular Government, of the exhibits presented in the case, and
that, in the event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or when the sentenced should
WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant by a secret-service have been served, the defendant be not released from custody, but turned over to the
agent and taken to the office of the governor to prove that the accused had opium in his customs authorities for the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing laws on immigration.
possession to sell.
From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.lawphi1.net
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be stricken out "because it
refers to a sale." But, with respect to this answer, the chief of the department of customs The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made therein by the parties, it
had already given this testimony, to wit: is found: That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands,
aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule,
FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel? constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being
considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that a party brought him article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of
a sample of opium and that the same party knew that there was more opium on board the opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of
steamer, and the agent asked that the vessel be searched. the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the
The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its being hearsay place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had
evidence, and the court only ordered that the part thereof "that there was more opium, on competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
board the vessel" be stricken out.

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It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug seized, the subject matter prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from
of the present case, was considerable, it does not appear that, on such account, the two the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land,
penalties fixed by the law on the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree. with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the
commission of the crime, only the court established in the said place itself has competent
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000, jurisdiction, in the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.1awphil.net
respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment appealed from, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered. A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the facts in the present
instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw case, the charge case the illegal
possession and sale of opium — in the present case the charge as illegal importation of
opium; in the Look Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in the present case the
G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917 foreign vessel was not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was landed from the
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vessel upon Philippine soil — in the present case of United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34
Phil., 840), the main point, and the one on which resolution turned, was that in a
vs. prosecution based on the illegal importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the
Nag-import ng opium Government must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the vessel
AH SING, defendant-appellant. from which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters from a foreign country with
the drug on board. In the Jose case, the defendants were acquitted because it was not
MALCOLM, J.: proved that the opium was imported from a foreign country; in the present case there is no
question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu. However, in the opinion in the
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu finding the Jose case, we find the following which may be obiter dicta, but which at least is interesting
defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. 2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing as showing the view of the writer of the opinion:
him to two years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying it anchored in Subic
Bay. It was not necessary that the opium discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of China employed as a sufficient that the opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat
fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a port of the Philippine
at the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.
defendant bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the steamship
Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip from Saigon to Cebu. When Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views just quoted, we return
the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a to an examination of the applicable provisions of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of
search found the eight cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug
of the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner of this opium, and into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The Federal Courts
that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not confess, however, as to his purpose in of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking bulk,
buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into is prima facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And
the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the intention of the again, the importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the
accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced. bringing them into port; and the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House.
(U. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.], 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands been proven? applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person unlawfully imports or brings
Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, but with the intimation any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this
that there exists inconsistently between the doctrines laid down in the two cases. However, person's control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the
neither decision is directly a precedent on the facts before us. jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal
importation of the drug unless contrary circumstances exist or the defense proves
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in the opinion handed otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused was
down by the Chief Justice, it is found — merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere pleasure of
so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an
That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being possible, the logical
foreign vessel in transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime deduction is that the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine
triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as an Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of opium from a foreign
extension of its own nationality, the same rule does no apply when the article, whose use is

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country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any possible misunderstanding, let it be . . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be obviously
said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present. inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject the laws to continual infraction,
and the government to degradation, if such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary
The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as and local allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the country. . . .
charged and the sentence of the trial court being within the limits provided by law, it results
that the judgment must be affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held:
ordered.
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense or crime committed on
the high seas or within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came within
three miles of a line drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay,
G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922 she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton,
International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.;
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the
territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded by that sovereignty
vs. Nag-smoke ng opium sa ship through the proper political agency. . . .
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee.
It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as in Mali and Wildenhus
ROMUALDEZ, J.: vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), wherein it was said that:

In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order of the Court of First . . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder which disturb only the
Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer presented by the defendant to the information peace of the ship or those on board are to be dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of
that initiated this case and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked the home of the ship, but those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if
opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality while said vessel was need be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local jurisdiction. It may not
anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city. be easy at all times to determine which of the two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder
belongs. Much will undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower court, which so held and case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the local jurisdiction, and
dismissed the case. that if the proper authorities are proceeding with the case in the regular way the consul has
no right to interfere to prevent it.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such ruling is erroneous or
not; and it will or will not be erroneous according as said court has or has no jurisdiction Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held that:
over said offense.
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands,
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime, like aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute a
the one herein involved, committed aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of
waters. 1awph!l.net its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is
prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon Philippine soil; in such a case an
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International open violation of the laws of the land is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation
Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other than
merchant vessels should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence of an
territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and agreement under an international treaty.
security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed
in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing
in general triable in the courts of the country within territory they were committed. Of this such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is
two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at present the theories concerned, to which nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs.
and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the Besides, in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy says the
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States. following:

In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 Cranch [U. S.], 116), There shall be between the territories of the United States of America, and all the territories
Chief Justice Marshall said: of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the
two countries, respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their ships

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and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories aforesaid, to which other On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another
foreigners are permitted to come, to enter into the same, and to remain and reside in any Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other
parts of the said territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and warehouses boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days
for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the merchants and traders of each of navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the
nation respectively shall enjoy the most complete protection and security for their Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by six
commerce, but subject always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on
(Art. 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.) the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the men, and brutally
violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was the Dutch boat, with the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and
held by this court not triable by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of fact, these
Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the
the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our territory, Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo,
does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute contemplates who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to
avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public escape.
order.
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine
But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu
is certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros,
produce its pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that based on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of
our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute. Moreover, as the First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not constitute
Attorney-General aptly observes: a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was
overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was rendered finding the two
. . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign vessel at anchor in the defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to
port of Manila in open defiance of the local authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on return together with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended
him, is simply subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the imagination to parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify them in the
conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of Manila and allow or solicit Chinese amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
residents to smoke opium on board.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be quickly disposed of.
for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs. So
ordered. The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present.
Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas, without lawful authority and done
animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
G.R. No. 17958 February 27, 1922 It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was without jurisdiction of the case.
Pirates are in law hostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state
vs. but against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where
Piracy the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants. all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor
does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign
MALCOLM, J.: state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong
[1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery
and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the imagination, when grostesque The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first
brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code dealing with the crime of piracy are
Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of
rapine and near murder.

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ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying
nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena belligerent; and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force,
temporal to cadena perpetua. and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the
occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General
Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor. Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy
preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or death, and those who were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to
commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the
temporal to cadena perpetua: Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos.
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same. The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by
the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific provisions of the Penal Code are
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This
injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four hundred and fifteen and in must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect
paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen. in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to
II, Title IX, of this book. define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offenses against
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute
themselves. books the necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits
the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or found
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates. in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty
formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and the
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal
Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any part of the national territory. conception under the law of nations.

ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to
according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a Spaniard shall be piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding provisions in force in the United States.
considered as such.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles dealing with the crime of piracy,
effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the United States are well-known. The would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United
political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the
it is consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands." somewhat
institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules, laws similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533)
subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the to give to the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning, which would
community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the
new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. Government of the Philippine Islands.
McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the follows:
Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the
Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said: The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the
Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war with the United States, shall
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered
territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible United States, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.

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We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered as follows:
153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
1. In Criminal Case No. 13102, the Court Finds (sic) the accused Augusto Loreto Ringor
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder defined and penalized under Article
article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances named in the last cited 248 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 6, RA 7659, qualified by Treachery
article as authorizing either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was and as further qualified by the use of an unlicensed firearm and hereby sentences him to
accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons suffer the supreme penalty of Death; to indemnify the heirs of deceased Marcelino Florida,
without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to Jr., the sum of P50,000.00 for his death and the sum of P100,000.00 as Moral damages for
determine as to whether the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In his death, both indemnification being without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of and to pay the costs.
nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code, sentenced the accused 2. In Criminal Case No. 13100-R, the Court Finds (sic) accused Augusto Loreto Ringor
to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Violation of Section 1 PD 1866 (Illegal
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not Possession of firearm and ammunitions) as charged in the Information and hereby
necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that sentences him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment ranging from
means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be 17 years 4 months and I day as Minimum to 20 years as Maximum and to pay the costs.
taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering, therefore, the number and
importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be The subject gun, caliber .38 (Paltik) bearing Serial Number 853169 (Exh. A) being the
offset by the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of subject of the offense is hereby declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the State.
the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment. The accused Augusto Loreto Ringor is entitled to be credited in the service of his sentence
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of four fifth (4/5) of his preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised
the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the Penal Code.
women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his SO ORDERED.2
nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the
judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is Filed on June 28, 1994, the Informations against accused-appellant, alleges:
reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy
and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and place as shall be fixed by In Criminal Case No. 13102-R
the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together
with Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a one-half part the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then armed with a
of the costs of both instances. So ordered. Caliber 38 handgun paltick with Serial Number 853169 and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot MARCELINO BUSLAY
FLORIDA, JR. thereby inflicting upon the latter hypovolemic shock secondary to massive
hemorrhage; multiple gunshot wounds of the liver, stomach, small intestine and mesentric
[G.R. No. 123918. December 9, 1999] blood vessels, which injuries directly caused his death.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AUGUSTO LORETO RINGOR, That the qualifying circumstance of TREACHERY attended the commission of the crime
JR., accused-appellant. when the accused suddenly attacked victim and shot him several times at the back, with the
use of a handgun, thus employing means, methods of forms in the execution thereof which
DECISION tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
PURISIMA, J.: defense which the offended party might make.

For automatic review is the Decision1 ated November 13, 1995 of Branch 6 of the Regional CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Trial Court in Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. guilty of the and in Criminal Case No. 13100-R
crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in Criminal
Case No. 13102-R, also guilty of illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within
Criminal Case No. 13100-R for and disposing thus: the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess and carry outside of his residence, a firearm,
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Caliber .38 revolver (Paltik) bearing Serial Number 853169, without any legal authority or found that appellant is not a licensed firearm holder nor, was the subject firearm duly
permit from any government official or authority concerned, in violation of the above cited registered with the said office (Exh. A).5cräläwvirtualibräry
provision of law.
The autopsy conducted by Dr. John Tinoyan on the cadaver of the deceased yielded a
CONTRARY TO LAW.4 Necropsy Report, which states:

With the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entering a plea of Not Guilty upon POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
arraignment, a joint trial of the two cases ensued.
Body of a male, 1.66 m. height, medium built, with complete rigor mortis, lividity well
The inculpatory facts and circumstances sued upon are succinctly summarized in the developed on the dependent parts, cloudy cornea and dilated pupils with very pale papebral
Appellees Brief as follows: conjunctive.

On June 23, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M.(sic), Fely Batanes, a waitress at Peoples Gunshot wounds: GSW no.1 measuring 10 x 10 mm. serrated edges, positive powder
Restaurant located at Kalantiao St., Baguio City, saw appellant Ringor and his two burns located at the left mid clavicular line, posterior, 2 inches below the shoulder. It was
companions enter the restaurant. (Tsn, December 8, 1994, p. 4). After seating themselves, directed downward towards the mid-body, penetrating the skin. (sic) soft tissue, middle 3rd
the group ordered a bottle of gin (ibid., p. 6). Minutes later, appellant approached one of the of the 3rd rib, the upper and lower lobes of the left lung to the diaphragm, through and
tables where Florida, the restaurants cook was drinking beer. Without any warning, through the stomach, lacerating the superior mesentric vessels, perforating the small
appellant pulled Floridas hair and poked a knife on the latters throat. Florida stood up and intestine then lodged at the superior surface of the urinary bladder (slug was recovered
pleaded with appellant not to harm him (ibid., p. 7). Appellant relented and released his grip marked no. 1)
on Florida. Thereafter, he left the restaurant together with his companions. However, a few
minutes latter he was back (ibid, p.8). GSW no.2 measures 8 mm. diameter, positive powder burns, located on the right shoulder
near the s. joint posteriorly, penetrating the skin, soft tissue, then lodged at the surface of
Appellant brandished a gun and menacingly entered the restaurant. Not encountering any the fractured surgical neck of the humorous (sic) (slug recovered). Marked no. 2.
resistance, he thus proceeded to the kitchen where Florida worked (ibid). Stealthily
approaching Florida from behind, appellant fired six successive shots at Florida who fell GSW no. 3 measures 8 mm. Diameter, positive powder burns, located on the right shoulder
down (Ibid., p. 9). His evil deed accomplished, appellant left the kitchen and fled (ibid). posteriorly near the joint penetrating the skin, soft tissues, and the head of the Humorous,
(sic) then dislodged form the same entry point.
Appellant was chased by a man who while running, shouted at onlookers that the person he
was running after was armed and had just killed somebody. Alerted, SPO2 Fernandez, who GSW no. 4 measures 8 x 10 mm, oval shaped, with abrasion superiorly located at the
was then in the vicinity, went into action and nabbed appellant. He frisked appellant and anterior left parasternal line at the level of the 6th ICS. It was directed downward towards
recovered from him a Paltik revolver, caliber. 38, with Serial Number 853169 (Exh. A). He the posterior of the body, penetrating the skin, soft tissue, the left lobe of the liver with
checked the revolvers cylinder and found six empty cartridges (Exhs. T to T-6). He noted partial avulsion, then perforating the stomach through and though the duodenum lumbar
that it smelled of gunpowder. He and PO1 Ortega turned over appellant and the confiscated muscle then lodged underneath the skin, (1) paravertebral, level of L3 (slug recovered
firearm to the Investigation Division of the Baguio Police and then executed a Joint Affidavit marked no. 4).
of Arrest (Exhibit O). On the same night, Fely Batanes gave her sworn statement (Exhibit E)
to the Baguio Police wherein she positively identified appellant as the assailant. CAUSE OF DEATH:

xxx xxx xxx HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK SECONDARY TO MASSIVE HEMORRHAGE; MULTIPLE

GUNSHOT WOUND(S) OF THE LIVER, STOMACH, SMALL INTESTINE AND
xxx xxx xxx MESENTRIC BLOOD VESSELS. Multiple Gunshot Wound(s) of the body.6

NBI Forensic Chemist Ms. Carina Javier found both hands of appellant positive for nitrates Accused-appellant admitted shooting the victim but theorized that he acted in self-defense.
as stated in her Chemist Report No. C-94-22. She conducted a microscopic chemical As embodied in the Appellants Brief, the defense version runs thus:
examination on the subject firearm and found that the gun was fired within one week prior
to June 27, 1994. 3.01 On June 23, 1994, at a little after five oclock in the afternoon, appellant, together with
two (2) other companions, entered the Peoples Restaurant in Baguio City to order drinks.
Elmer Nelson Piedad, Ballistician of the Firearm Investigation Division, NBI, Manila, tested They sat at a table next to another then occupied by Marcelino B. Florida, Jr. (Florida) and a
and concluded that the slugs recovered from the victim were fired from appellants firearm. woman companion (TSN, Testimony of Augusto Loreto G. Ringor, Jr., May 4, 1995, pp.
Upon verification from the Firearms Explosive division, Camp Crame, Quezon City, it was 3-6).

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3.02 Soon after receiving their orders, appellants companion, Ramon Fernandez, stood up For self-defense to prosper, it must be established that: (1) there was unlawful aggression
and approached Florida to inquire about his (Fernandez) brother, Cesar. Florida angrily by the victim; (2) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression was
responded to the query and said, Putang ina ninyo! anong pakialam ko diyan! reasonable; and (3) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.11
3.03 A quarrel thereafter ensued between Fernandez and Florida prompting the appellant to
intervene and pacify Fernandez. When Fernandez drew out a gun from his waist, appellant In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression.
immediately seized the same directing his friend to leave the restaurant before he started The allegation that the victim allegedly went out of the kitchen armed with a bolo, and was
hurting other people with his gun. No sooner had Fernandez stepped out, however, Florida, about to hack him (accused-appellant) who was then at an almost prone lying position on
armed with a bolo, came charging in from the kitchen and headed towards the appellant. the table he was occupying,12 is a self-serving and unconvincing statement which did not in
(Ibid, pp. 6 - 7) anyway constitute the requisite quantum of proof for unlawful aggression. Prosecution
witness Fely Batanes, a waitress in the restaurant where the shooting incident occurred,
3.04 Surprised, appellant shot Florida with the gun he was holding just as the latter was was firm in her declaration that the victim was in the kitchen unarmed13 hen the accused-
about to hit him with the bolo. Thereafter, appellant put the gun on the table and walked out appellant shot him. The victim had no weapon or bolo. He was neither threatening to attack
of the restaurant. Once already outside the restaurant, appellants other companion, Virgilio, nor in any manner manifesting any aggressive act which could have imperiled accused-
followed him and handed to him the gun he (appellant) left at the table. He then proceeded appellants safety and well-being.
to surrender the gun and report the incident at the nearest police station. (Ibid, pp. 8 - 9)
No improper motive having been shown on the part of Fely Batanes to testify falsely against
3.05 Before appellant could reach the police station, however, appellant was already accused-appellant or to implicate him in the commission of the crime, the logical conclusion
arrested by off-duty policeman who brought him back to the Peoples Restaurant. Appellant is that there was no such improper motive and her testimony is worthy of full faith and
was thereafter incarcerated at the Baguio City Police Station. (Ibid, pp. 10 - 12)7 credit.14
On November 13, 1995, the trial court handed down the decision under automatic review. What is more, the testimony of Fely Batanes is buttressed by the fact that immediately after
Accused-appellant contends that: the incident, the body of the victim was found lying in the kitchen and not outside; thus
weakening further the theory of accused-appellant that he shot the victim while they were at
I the dining area.15
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT FOR SIMPLE ILLEGAL Then too, the nature, location and number of gunshot wounds inflicted on the deceased
P O S S E S S I O N O F F I R E A R M S A N D S E N T E N C I N G H I M TO S U F F E R A N belie accused-appellants theory of self-defense.16 The deceased sustained three gun shot
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE OF 17 YEARS AND 1 DAY AS MINIMUM TO 20 YEARS AS wounds on the back and one in front. Dr. John Tinoyan, who conducted the autopsy on the
MAXIMUM. cadaver of the victim, testified that the gunshot wound on the frontal portion of the victims
II body showed a downward trajectory of the bullet on his chest, penetrating the liver,
perforating the stomach down to the small intestine, and then lodged underneath the skin.17
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF MURDER. Verily, such finding negates the claim of accused-appellant that he shot the victim while he
was at an almost prone lying position and the victim was standing in front of him about to
III strike with a bolo. If this were true, the trajectory of the bullet should have been upward or
better still, it should have been at the level at which the gun was fired while he (accused-
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO DEATH appellant) was in a prone lying position.
ON THE GROUNDS THAT: (i) THE CHARGE OF MURDER WAS NOT PROVED BY THE
PROSECUTION; AND (ii) ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT MURDER WAS COMMITTED Rather telling are the three gunshot wounds on the back of the victim, which wounds
BY APPELLANT, THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY FOR THE OFFENSE IS RECLUSION showed traces of gunpowder which, according to Dr. Tinoyan, indicated that the weapon
PERPETUA THERE BEING NO AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE TO RAISE THE used was at a distance of less than one meter.18 Evidently, accused-appellant stealthily
PENALTY TO DEATH.8 approached the victim from behind and fired at him six successive shots, four of which hit
him, to ensure his death.19 If he shot the victim merely to defend himself, there would have
Well-settled is the rule that in interposing self-defense, the offender admits authorship of the been no cause for accused-appellant to pump several bullets into the body of the victim.
killing. The onus probandi is thus shifted to him to prove the elements of self-defense and
that the killing was justified;9 otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is In light of the foregoing, the imputation of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
inescapable. Concomitantly, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on cannot be believed. Absent the element of unlawful aggression by the deceased, there can
the weakness of the prosecutions evidence.10 be no self-defense, complete or incomplete. If there was no unlawful aggression, there was
nothing to prevent or repel and the second and third requisites of self-defense would have
no basis.20
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The Court a quo properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of treachery which such use merely as a qualifying circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have
qualified the crime to murder. It was clearly established that the accused-appellant fired six been the intention of the lawmaker because the term penalty in the subject provision is
successive shots on the victim, suddenly, without warning, and from behind, giving the obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of firearm and not the penalty for
victim no chance to flee or to prepare for his defense or to put up the least resistance to for homicide or murder. We explicitly stated in Tac-an:
such sudden assault. There is treachery when the means, manner or method of attack
employed by the offender offered no risk to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act There is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
which the victim might have taken.21 circumstance in homicide or murder. Under an information charging homicide or
muder, the fact that the death weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used to
All things studiedly considered and viewed in proper perspective, the mind of the Court can increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to death (or
rest easy on a finding that accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. is guilty beyond reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and did not act in self-defense. character or condition of the instrument used in destroying human life or committing some
other crime, is not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
perpetua to death for the crime of murder. When, as in this case, neither aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance is attendant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be A law may, of course, be enacted making the use of an unlicensed firearm as a
applied,22 in accordance with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code. qualifying circumstance.28(Emphasis supplied)

With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of firearms under Thus, before R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6, 1997) made the use of unlicensed
P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of People vs. Molina23 nd reiterated in the recent firearm as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, the penalty for the murder
case of People vs. Ronaldo Valdez,24 that in cases where murder or homicide is committed committed by accused-appellant on June 23, 1994 was not death, as erroneously imposed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no separate conviction for the crime of by the trial court. There was yet no such aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by firearm to raise the penalty for murder from reclusion perpetua to death, at the time of
Republic Act No. 8294. Thereunder, the use of unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is commission of the crime.
simply considered as an aggravating circumstance in the murder or homicide and no longer
as a separate offense. Furthermore, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms shall be The amendatory law making the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating
imposed provided that no other crime is committed.25 In other words, where murder or circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be applied here because the said provision of
homicide was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no longer R.A. No. 8294 is not favorable to accused-appellant, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.29
imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.26
WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 13102-R is AFFIRMED with the
It bears stressing, however, that the dismissal of the present case for illegal possession of modification that accused-appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. is hereby sentenced to suffer
firearm should not be misinterpreted to mean that there can no longer be any prosecution the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It is understood that the civil liabilities imposed below are
for the offense of illegal possession of firearms. In general, all pending cases involving UPHELD.
illegal possession of firearms should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no other crimes
expressly provided in R. A. No. 8294 are involved (murder or homicide, under Section 1, Criminal Case No. 13100-R instituted pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1866 is
and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d etat, under Section 3).27 DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, where the new law is favorable to the SO ORDERED.
accused, it has to be applied retroactively. Thus, insofar as it spares accused-appellant a Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
separate conviction for illegal possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 has to be Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. 13100-R.
pwede retroactive
On the matter of the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm in the
commission of murder or homicide, the trial court erred in appreciating the same to qualify G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019
to death the penalty for the murder committed by accused-appellant. It should be noted that
at the time accused-appellant perpetrated the offense, the unlicensed character of a firearm INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA CITY, NAMELY: VENANCIO A.
used in taking the life of another was not yet an aggravating circumstance in homicide or ROXAS, SATURNINO V. PARAS, EDGARDO G. MANUEL, HERMINILDO V. CRUZ,
murder; to wit: ALLAN F. TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P. MONDEJAR, ARMANDO M.
CABUANG, JONATHAN O. CRISANTO, EDGAR ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO,
Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide or murder with JOSENEL ALVARAN, AND CRISENCIO NERI, JR., PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY
death if either crime is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND SECRETARY MANUEL A.
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ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
RESPONDENTS.
 except in the following cases:


ATTY. RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., PETITIONER-INTERVENOR, 
 1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any

 crime; and
WILLIAM M. MONTINOLA, FORTUNATO P. VISTO, AND ARESENIO C. CABANILLA,
PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS,
 2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to

 surrender voluntarily.
[G.R. No. 214637]


 If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed
REYNALDO D. EDAGO, PETER R. TORIDA, JIMMY E. ACLAO, WILFREDO V. upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and
OMERES, PASCUA B. GALLADAN, VICTOR M. MACOY, JR., EDWIN C. TRABUNCON, shall be credited in the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he
WILFREDO A. PATERNO, FEDERICO ELLIOT, AND ROMEO R. MACOLBAS, has undergone preventive imprisonment.
PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
GOVERNMENT; ACTING DIRECTOR FRANKLIN JESUS B. BUCAYU, BUREAU OF deducted from thirty (30) years.
CORRECTIONS; AND JAIL CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT DIONY DACANAY MAMARIL,
BUREAU OF JAIL MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, RESPONDENTS. Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the
possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and
DECISION his case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review.
PERALTA, J.: Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under
The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases1 is the legality of Section 4, Rule 1 this paragraph shall be the actual period of detention with good conduct time
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592,2 which allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause
states: at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules provide for new persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In
procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of good conduct time allowance as case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be
provided in Section 4 of Rule V hereof and require the creation of a Management, released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same Rule,
the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act No. 10592 shall be ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability — Criminal liability is extinguished partially:
prospective in application.
1. By conditional pardon;

The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of special time allowance 2. By commutation of the sentence; and
for loyalty shall also be prospective in application as these privileges are likewise subject to
the management, screening and evaluation of the MSEC.3 3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he is undergoing
The Case preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.

On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into law R.A. No. 10592, ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of any offender qualified for
amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC). credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any
4 For reference, the modifications are underscored as follows: convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. — other local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in
the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during 1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees twenty days for each month of good behavior during detention;
voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance

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2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a Mondejar, Armando M. Cabuang, Jonathan O. Crisanto, Edgar Echenique, Janmark
deduction of twenty-three days for each month of good behavior during detention; Saracho, Josenel Alvaran, and Crisencio Neri, Jr. (Roxas et al.). Petitioners filed the case
as real parties-in-interest and as representatives of their member organizations and the
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be organizations' individual members, as a class suit for themselves and in behalf of all who
allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during are similarly situated. They contend that the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are penal in
detention; nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence, should be given retroactive effect in
accordance with Article 22 of the RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law it implements.
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a They are puzzled why it would be complex for the Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR) and the
deduction of thirty days for each month of good behavior during detention; and Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP) to retroactively apply the law when the
prisoners' records are complete and the distinctions between the pertinent provisions of the
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another RPC and R.A. No. 10592 are easily identifiable. Petitioners submit that the simple
deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month standards added by the new law, which are matters of record, and the creation of the
of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered. Management, Screening and Evaluation Committee (MSEC) should not override the
constitutional guarantee of the rights to liberty and due process of law aside from the
An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to the above principle that penal laws beneficial to the accused are given retroactive effect.
allowances for good conduct.
Almost a month after, or on July 11, 2014, Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, Sr. filed a Petition (In
ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one fifth of the period of his Intervention).9 He incorporates by reference the Roxas et al. petition, impleads the same
sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive respondents, and adds that nowhere from the legislative history of R.A. No. 10592 that it
imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article intends to be prospective in character. On July 22, 2014, the Court resolved to grant the
158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the issuance leave to intervene and require the adverse parties to comment thereon.10
of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe referred to in
said article. A deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in Another Petition-in-Intervention11 was filed on October 21, 2014. This time, the Free Legal
case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the Assistance Group (FLAG) served as counsel for William M. Montinola, Fortunato P. Visto,
existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code. and Arsenio C. Cabanilla (Montinola et al.), who are also inmates of the NBP. The petition
argues that Section 4, Rule I of the IRR is facially void for being contrary to the equal
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment protection clause of the 1987 Constitution; it discriminates, without any reasonable basis,
or serving sentence. against those who would have been benefited from the retroactive application of the law;
and is also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the authority of respondents to promulgate.
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the In a Resolution dated November 25, 2014, We required the adverse parties to comment on
Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology the petition-in-intervention.12
and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant allowances
for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked. (Emphases ours) On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated
Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by respondents Department of Comment13 to the Petition of Roxas et al. and Petition-in-Intervention of Atty. Saguisag, Sr.
Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima and Department of the Interior and Local More than two years later, or on July 7, 2017, it filed a Comment14 to the Petition-in-
Government (DILG) Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became effective Intervention of Montinola et al.
on April 18, 2014.5 Petitioners and intervenors assail the validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that
directs the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance (GCTA), G.R. No. 214637
time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time allowance for
loyalty (STAL) mainly on the ground that it violates Article 22 of the RPC.6 On October 24, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition15 was filed by Reynaldo D.
Edago, Peter R. Torida, Jimmy E. Aclao, Wilfredo V. Omeres, Pascua B. Galladan, Victor M.
G.R. No. 212719 Macoy, Jr., Edwin C. Trabuncon, Wilfredo A. Paterno, Federico Elliot, and Romeo R.
Macolbas (Edago et al.), who are all inmates at the Maximum Security Compound of the
On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with Prayer for the Issuance of a NBP, against DOJ Secretary De Lima, DILG Secretary Roxas, BUCOR Acting Director
Preliminary Injunction)7 was filed against respondents DOJ Secretary De Lima and DILG Franklin Jesus B. Bucayu, and BJMP Chief Superintendent (Officer-in-Charge) Diony
Secretary Roxas by Atty. Michael J. Evangelista acting as the attorney-in-fact8 of convicted Dacanay Mamaril. The grounds of the petition are as follows:
prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), namely: Venancio A. Roxas, Saturnino V. Paras, A.
Edgardo G. Manuel, Herminildo V. Cruz, Allan F. Tejada, Roberto C. Marquez, Julito P.

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SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR PROVIDING FOR A PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF obtaining their prison records and computing the purported application of the revised credits
THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. 10592 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION for GCTA under R.A. No. 10592.
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND THEREBY VOID AND
ILLEGAL FOR BEING CONTRARY AND ANATHEMA TO R.A. 10592. We disagree.
• R.A. 10592 does not state that its provisions shall have prospective application.
• It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
• Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. 10592 is contrary to Article 22 of the Revised Penal governmental act may be heard and decided unless the following requisites for judicial
Code providing that penal laws that are beneficial to the accused shall have inquiry are present: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise
retroactive application. of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
• validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
• Section 4, Rule I of the IRR contravenes public policy and the intent of Congress the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
when it enacted R.A. 10592. case.22 As to the requirement of actual case or controversy, the Court stated in Province of
B. North Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't of the Rep. of the Phils. Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
(GRP), et al.:23
SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR WAS ISSUED BY RESPONDENTS WITH GRAVE The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION issue advisory opinions or to resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic
BECAUSE IT IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL. questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies
• Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates the Equal Protection Clause of the defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the
Constitution. courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.
•
• Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates substantive due process.16 An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite
Per Resolution17 dated November 11, 2014, respondents were ordered to file their comment legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
to the petition. In compliance, BJMP Chief Mamaril filed a Comment18 on December 10, abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be
2014, while the OSG did the same on February 9, 201519 in behalf of all the respondents. interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence, x x x.

Subsequently, Edago et al. filed a Motion with Leave of Court to File and Admit Reply,20 Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.
attaching therein said Reply. On July 28, 2015, We granted the motion and noted the Reply. A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse
21 effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is
a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch
The Court's Ruling before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
The petition is granted. that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a
result of the act complained of.24
Procedural Matters There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there is a contrariety of
legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
Actual case or controversy jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the prospective application of the grant of GCTA,
TASTM, and STAL while petitioners and intervenors view that such provision violates the
Respondents contend that the petition of Edago et al. did not comply with all the elements Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe for adjudication as the
of justiciability as the requirement of an actual case or controversy vis-a-vis the requirement challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect on petitioners and those detained and
of ripeness has not been complied with. For them, the claimed injury of petitioners has not convicted prisoners who are similarly situated. There exists an immediate and/or threatened
ripened to an actual case requiring this Court's intervention: First, the MSEC has not been injury and they have sustained or are immediately in danger of sustaining direct injury as a
constituted yet so there is effectively no authority or specialized body to screen, evaluate result of the act complained of. In fact, while the case is pending, petitioners are languishing
and recommend any applications for time credits based on R.A. No. 10592. Second, none in jail. If their assertion proved to be true, their illegal confinement or detention in the
of petitioners has applied for the revised credits, making their claim of injury premature, if meantime is oppressive. With the prisoners' continued incarceration, any delay in resolving
not anticipatory. And third, the prison records annexed to the petition are neither signed nor the case would cause them great prejudice. Justice demands that they be released
certified by the BUCOR Director which belie the claim of actual injury resulting from alleged soonest, if not on time.
extended incarceration. What petitioners did was they immediately filed this case after

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There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation of the MSEC. A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show "not only that the
Petitioners Edago et al. correctly invoked Our ruling in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre.25 law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of
There, We dismissed the novel theory that people should wait for the implementing evil to sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers
befall on them before they could question acts that are illegal or unconstitutional, and held thereby in some indefinite way." It must [be] shown that he has been, or is about to be,
that "[by] the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is about to be
action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained of.29
overt act." Similar to Pimentel, Jr., the real issue in this case is whether the Constitution and In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR because they
the RPC are contravened by Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR, not whether they are violated by are prisoners currently serving their respective sentences at the NBP. They have a personal
the acts implementing it. Concrete acts are not necessary to render the present controversy stake in the outcome of this case as their stay in prison will potentially be shortened (if the
ripe.26 An actual case may exist even in the absence of tangible instances when the assailed provision of the IRR is declared unlawful and void) or their dates of release will be
assailed IRR has actually and adversely affected petitioners. The mere issuance of the delayed (if R.A. No. 10592 is applied prospectively). It is erroneous to assert that the
subject IRR has led to the ripening of a judicial controversy even without any other overt questioned provision has no direct adverse effect on petitioners since there were no GCTAs
act. If this Court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the granted to them. There is none precisely because of the prospective application of R.A. No.
controversy actual and ripe for judicial intervention,27 the same can be said for an IRR. 10592. It is a proof of the act complained of rather than an evidence that petitioners lack
Here, petitioners need not wait for the creation of the MSEC and be individually rejected in legal standing. Further, the submission of certified prison records is immaterial in
their applications. They do not need to actually apply for the revised credits, considering determining whether or not petitioners' rights were breached by the IRR because, to repeat,
that such application would be an exercise in futility in view of respondents' insistence that the possible violation was already fait accompli by the issuance of the IRR. The prison
the law should be prospectively applied. If the assailed provision is indeed unconstitutional records were merely furnished to show that respondents have prospectively applied R.A.
and illegal, there is no better time than the present action to settle such question once and No. 10592 and that petitioners will be affected thereby.
for all.28
Propriety of legal remedy:
Legal standing
Respondents argue that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the petitions-
We do not subscribe to respondents' supposition that it is the Congress which may claim in-intervention, should be dismissed because such petitions are proper only against a
any injury from the alleged executive encroachment of the legislative function to amend, tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 4, Rule 1 of
modify or repeal laws and that the challenged acts of respondents have no direct adverse the IRR is an administrative issuance of respondents made in the exercise of their rule-
effect on petitioners, considering that based on records, there was no GCTA granted to making or quasi-legislative functions.
them.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an appropriate remedy to assail the
party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the validity of the subject IRR as it was issued in the exercise of respondents' rule-making or
party entitled to the avails of the suit. quasi-legislative function. Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held that "petitions for
certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected review, prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials."30 In Araullo v. Aquino
by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere III,31 former Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Lucas P. Bersamin, explained the
incidental interest. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished remedies of certiorari and prohibition, thus:
from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be
he must appear to be the present real owner of the right sought to be enforced." determined under the Constitution?

"Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance. The The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting
concept has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness judgments and final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of Commission on Audit.
difficult constitutional questions.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly
explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company:

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In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the
issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no
courts to return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be
sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an
inspection of the record whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered without ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the
authority. The errors were of such a nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners' allegation that "respondents are performing or
substantial injury to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately
court acted without authority, the record was then revised and corrected in matters of law. be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order.
The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the inferior court was said to be With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts. issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
issue the writ of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the
the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the
requirements for that purpose, viz.: Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
xxxx
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
includes the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry
this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court
abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial has been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and
power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal the obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or
hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such balances.32
judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or In view of the foregoing, We shall proceed to discuss the substantive issues raised herein
whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. so as to finally resolve the question on the validity of Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR, which is
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is purely legal in nature. This is also because of the public importance of the issues raised,33
to be distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re- and the interest of substantial justice,34 not to mention the absence of any dispute as to any
examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or underlying fact.35
proceeding in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative
remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself. The Court Hierarchy of courts
expounded on the nature and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association, Inc. v. Defensor: Respondents contend that the petition for certiorari and prohibition, as well as the petitions-
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the in-intervention, should still be dismissed for failure to observe the rule on hierarchy of
exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against courts. According to them, this Court's jurisdiction over actions assailing the validity of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial administrative issuances is primarily appellate in nature by virtue of Section 5(2)(a), Article
or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings VIII of the Constitution.36 An action assailing the validity of an administrative issuance is one
when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or that is incapable of pecuniary estimation, which, under Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.)
are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, 129, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has exclusive original jurisdiction. Further, a petition for
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial declaratory relief filed before the RTC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, is the
or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, proper remedy to question the validity of the IRR.37
the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction
in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the Indeed, under Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the question presented here is a matter
proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, incapable of pecuniary estimation, which exclusively and originally pertained to the proper

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RTC.38 Fundamentally, there is no doubt that this consolidated case captioned as petition following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex
for certiorari and prohibition seeks to declare the unconstitutionality and illegality of Section defuturo, judex de proeterito (the law provides for the future, the judge for the past); and
4 Rule 1 of the IRR; thus, partaking the nature of a petition for declaratory relief over which adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience
We only have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the and good law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known aphorism:
Constitution. In accordance with Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, the special civil action of Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one distinguished author has put it, the
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. exception was inspired by sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science.49
According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as a right" of the
Nevertheless, the judicial policy has been to entertain a direct resort to this Court in offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on
serious implications, and those of transcendental importance and of first impression.39 As political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice."50
the petitions clearly and specifically set out special and important reasons therefor, We may
overlook the Rules. Here, petitioners Edago et al. are correct in asserting that R.A. No. Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article 22 of the RPC
10592 and its IRR affect the entire correctional system of the Philippines. Not only the applies to said Code51 and its amendments,52 as well as to special laws,53 such as Act No.
social, economic, and moral well-being of the convicts and detainees are involved but also 2126,54 Presidential Decree No. 603,55 R.A. No. 7636,56 R.A. No. 8293,57 R.A. No. 8294,58
their victims and their own families, the jails, and the society at large. The nationwide R.A. No. 9344,59 and R.A. No. 10586,60 to cite a few.
implications of the petitions, the extensive scope of the subject matter, the upholding of
public policy, and the repercussions on the society are factors warranting direct recourse to But what exactly is a penal law?
Us.
A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by jurisprudence as follows:
Yet more than anything, there is an urgent necessity to dispense substantive justice on the A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.61
numerous affected inmates. It is a must to treat this consolidated case with a circumspect
leniency, granting petitioners the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions defining offenses and
rather than lose their liberty on the basis of technicalities.40 It need not be said that while prescribing penalties for their violation.62
this case has been pending, their right to liberty is on the line. An extended period of
detention or one that is beyond the period allowed by law violates the accused person's Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for an offense committed
right to liberty.41 Hence, We shunt the rigidity of the rules of procedure so as not to deprive against the state which, under the Constitution, the Executive has the power to pardon. In
such birthright.42 The Court zealously guards against the curtailment of a person's basic common use, however, this sense has been enlarged to include within the term "penal
constitutional and natural right to liberty.43 The right to liberty, which stands second only to statutes" all statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish penalties for
life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.44 At its core, their violation, and even those which, without expressly prohibiting certain acts, impose a
substantive due process guarantees a right to liberty that cannot be taken away or unduly penalty upon their commission.63
constricted, except through valid causes provided by law.45
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish
Substantive Issues penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide
for their punishment.64
Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, however, a penal law The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer to substantive laws, not
that is favorable or advantageous to the accused shall be given retroactive effect if he is not procedural rules.65 Moreover, the mere fact that a law contains penal provisions does not
a habitual criminal. These are the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception make it penal in nature.66
on the effectivity of laws.46
In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies because R.A. No.
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda (penal laws 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has become an integral part of the RPC as
which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect) is well entrenched.47 It has Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to
been sanctioned since the old Penal Code.48 the RPC that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused cannot be
x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in these Islands until applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law that makes the penalties lighter
the 31st of December, 1931, the principle underlying our laws granting to the accused in should be considered penal laws in accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.
certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the
law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried over into the Revised Penal We concur.
Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22 x x x. This is an exception to
the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the

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While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or provide/prescribe/establish a Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and regulations, as may be
penalty67 as it addresses the rehabilitation component68 of our correctional system, its prescribed by the Secretary of Public Instruction, the wardens or officers in charge of
provisions have the purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the crime. Insular or provincial jails or prisons were mandated to make and keep such records and
The further reduction on the length of the penalty of imprisonment is, in the ultimate take such further actions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of Act No. 1533.74
analysis, beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the When the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932,75 the Director of Prisons was empowered to
application of Article 22 of the RPC. grant allowances for good conduct whenever lawfully justified.76 With the effectivity of R.A.
No. 10592 on June 6, 2013, such authority is now vested on the Director of the BUCOR,
The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No. 10592 actually works to the Chief of the BJMP and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail.77
the disadvantage of petitioners and those who are similarly situated. It precludes the
decrease in the penalty attached to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay;
thus, making more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed. Depriving them Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as the recommending
of time off to which they are justly entitled as a practical matter results in extending their body for the grant of GCTA and TASTM.78 They are tasked to manage, screen and evaluate
sentence and increasing their punishment.69 Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate the behavior and conduct of a detention or convicted prisoner and to monitor and certify
of Article 22 of the RPC. whether said prisoner has actually studied, taught or performed mentoring activities.79 The
creation of the MSEC, however, does not justify the prospective application of R.A. No.
In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL, 10592. Nowhere in the amendatory law was its formation set as a precondition before its
respondents aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A. No. 10592 would indicate the need for "new beneficial provisions are applied. What R.A. No. 10592 only provides is that the Secretaries
procedures and standards of behavior" to fully implement the law by the BUCOR (as to of the DOJ and the DILG are authorized to promulgate rules and regulations on the
persons serving their sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to accused who are classification system for good conduct and time allowances, as may be necessary to
under preventive detention). It is alleged that the amendments introduced are substantial implement its provisions.80 Clearly, respondents went outside the bounds of their legal
and of utmost importance that they may not be implemented without a thorough revision of mandate when they provided for rules beyond what was contemplated by the law to be
the BUCOR and the BJMP operating manuals on jail management. In particular, the enforced.
establishment of the MSEC is said to be an administrative mechanism to address the policy Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the Government under
and necessity that the BUCOR superintendents and the BJMP jail wardens must follow legislative authority must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the
uniform guidelines in managing, screening and evaluating the behavior or conduct of sole purpose of carrying the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
prisoners prior to their recommendation to the heads of the two bureaus on who may be expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency cannot amend an act of
granted time allowances. Congress.81
The contention of Edago et al. stands undisputed that, prior to the issuance of the assailed
Respondents fail to persuade Us. IRR and even before the enactment of R.A. No. 10592, a Classification Board had been
handling the functions of the MSEC and implementing the provisions of the RPC on time
Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner who chose to stay in allowances. While there is a noble intent to systematize and/or institutionalize existing set-
the place of his confinement despite the existence of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated up, the administrative and procedural restructuring should not in any way prejudice the
in Article 158 of the RPC, the provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are mere modifications of the substantive rights of current detention and convicted prisoners.
RPC that have been implemented by the BUCOR prior to the issuance of the challenged
IRR. In view of this, the claim of "new procedures and standards of behavior" for the grant Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of behavior in granting
of time allowances is untenable. GCTA remains to be "good conduct." In essence, the definition of what constitutes "good
conduct" has been invariable through the years, thus:
It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916 when Act No. 2557 was enacted,70 prisoners Act No. 1533: "not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the rules of the prison,
have already been entitled to deduct the period of preventive imprisonment from the service and has labored with diligence and fidelity upon all such tasks as have been assigned to
of their sentences. In addition, good conduct time allowance has been in existence since him."82
August 30, 1906 upon the passage of Act No. 1533.71 Said law provided for the diminution
of sentences imposed upon convicted prisoners in consideration of good conduct and BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000: "displays good behavior and who has no
diligence.72 Under Act No. 1533 and subsequently under Article 97 of the RPC, the time record of breach of discipline or violation of prison rules and regulations."83
allowance may also apply to detention prisoners if they voluntarily offer in writing to perform
such labor as may be assigned to them.73 Such prerequisite was removed by R.A. No. IRR of R.A. No. 10592: "the conspicuous and satisfactory behavior of a detention or
10592. convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in rehabilitation programs, productive
participation in authorized work activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds coupled
with faithful obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations"84

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Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on his behavior or Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer
conduct while in prison.85 Likewise, the certificate/diploma issued upon successful reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson
completion of an educational program or course (i.e., elementary, secondary and college and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua,
education as well as vocational training) forms part of the record.86 These considered, the likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other
Court cannot but share the same sentiment of Roxas et al. It is indeed perplexing why it is offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to
complex for respondents to retroactively apply R.A. No. 10592 when all that the MSEC has the first two, on March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on December 15, 1955. The last
to do is to utilize the same standard of behavior for the grant of time allowances and refer to petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
existing prison records. murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion perpetua.
Each of the petitioners has been since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section 4, Rule 1 of the Each of them has served more than 13 years.5
Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid
insofar as it provides for the prospective application of the grant of good conduct time Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez,6 as above noted, this Court ruled that the
allowance, time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and special time allowance for information against the accused in that case for rebellion complexed with murder, arson and
loyalty. The Director General of the Bureau of Corrections and the Chief of the Bureau of robbery was not warranted under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
Jail Management and Penology are REQUIRED to RE-COMPUTE with reasonable such complex offense.7 In the recently-decided case of People vs. Lava,8 we expressly
dispatch the time allowances due to petitioners and all those who are similarly situated and, reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the plea of the Solicitor General for the
thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release from imprisonment in case of full service of abandonment of such doctrine. It is the contention of each of the petitioners that he has
sentence, unless they are being confined thereat for any other lawful cause. served, in the light of the above, more than the maximum penalty that could have been
imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued detention being illegal.9
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. SO ORDERED.
The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release on a habeas corpus
proceeding prompted petitioners, as had been mentioned, to ask that it be appraised anew
and, if necessary, discarded. We can resolve the present petition without doing so. The plea
G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971 there made was unconvincing, there being a failure to invoke the contentions now pressed
MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W. Diokno, as to the existence of a denial of a
and PATERNO PALMARES, petitioners, constitutional right that would suffice to raise a serious jurisdictional question and the
retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to one already sentenced to a final
vs. judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code. To repeat, these two grounds carry
weight. We have to grant this petition.
THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of habeas corpus under the
FERNANDO, J.: circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian scope to assure that illegality of restraint and
detention be avoided is one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for
Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners, five in number, for their nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of ascertaining whether there
release from imprisonment. Meted out life terms for the complex crime of rebellion with is any legal justification for a deprivation of physical freedom. Unless there be such a
murder and other crimes, they would invoke the People v. Hernandez1 doctrine, negating showing, the confinement must thereby cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even
the existence of such an offense, a ruling that unfortunately for them was not handed down for a moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any deviation from the
until after their convictions had become final. Nor is this the first instance, a proceeding of legal norms call for the termination of the imprisonment.
this character was instituted, as in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,2 likewise a petition for
habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer given was in the negative. Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important human rights provision" in
Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter. They would premise their stand on the denial the fundamental law. 10 Nor is such praise unique. Cooley spoke of it as "one of the
of equal protection if their plea would not be granted. Moreover they did invoke the codal principal safeguards to personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the greatest of the
provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines,3 safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal imprisonment by
necessarily resulting in the conclusion that the Hernandez decision once promulgated calls whomsoever detention may be exercised or ordered." 12 Burdick echoed a similar
for a retroactive effect under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to penal sentiment, referring to it as "one of the most important bulwarks of liberty." 13 Fraenkel made
laws having such character even if at the time of their application a final sentence has been it unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of no avail." 14 Thereby the rule of
rendered "and the convict is serving the same."4 These arguments carry considerable law is assured.
persuasion. Accordingly we find for petitioners, without going so far as to overrule Pomeroy.

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A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in the defense of liberty and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
coupled with its limitations may be detected in the opinions of former Chief Justices make the order," the writ does not lie. 31 That principle dates back to 1902, 32 when this
Arellano, 15 Avanceña, 16 Abad Santos, 17 Paras, 18 Bengzon, 19 and the present Chief Court announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person detained was in the
Justice. 20 It fell to Justice Malcolm's lot, however to emphasize quite a few times the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or magistrate. This is understandable,
breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v. Lukban, 21 the remedy came in as during the time the Philippines was under American rule, there was necessarily an
handy to challenge the validity of the order of the then respondent Mayor of Manila who, for adherence to authoritative doctrines of constitutional law there followed.
the best of reasons but without legal justification, ordered the transportation of more than
150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring to the writ of habeas corpus as One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of jurisdictional defect. As
having been devised and existing "as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground on
from unlawful restraint" the opinion of Justice Malcolm continued: "The essential object and which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on
purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its
Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 22 proceedings void." 33

The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus petitions even if There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in mind. Once a
presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit was demonstrated in Ganaway v. deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the court that rendered the judgment is
Quilen, 23 where this Court, again through Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone the deemed ousted of jurisdiction and habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the
petition for habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its motion, legality of the detention. 34
ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case entitled Thomas Casey, et al. v.
George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice Malcolm likewise in Conde v. Rivera, 25 to whom is 3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial of
traceable the doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a equal protection. According to their petition: "In the case at bar, the petitioners were
disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of jurisdiction and entitles convicted by Courts of First Instance for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez,
the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his Geronimo, and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted is the very
same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not and has not been changed. For
freedom." 26 the same crime, committed under the same law, how can we, in conscience, allow
petitioners to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?" 35
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice Marshall put the matter
thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common law, the They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal protection, people similarly
great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient situated were not similarly dealt with. What is required under this required constitutional
cause." Then there is this affirmation from an 1869 decision 28 of the then Chief Justice guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been for centuries esteemed the best and only circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the privileges conferred and
sufficient defense of personal freedom." The passing of the years has only served to the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision: "Favoritism and undue preference
confirm its primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the other year, Justice cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
Fortas spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is the every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law be looked
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the
state action. ... The scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest."
36
illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have
always been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature
of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The continued incarceration
insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and corrected." 29 Justice after the twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in
Fortas explicitly made reference to Blackstone, who spoke of it as "the great and efficacious accordance with our controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed,
writ, in all manner of illegal confinement." Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-eminent role is fraught with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the
is his adoption of Holmes' famous dissent in Frank v. Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical
through all forms and goes to the very tissue of the structure." offense, the only distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the
Hernandez ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would be
2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in what has been judicially made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as noted in the petition before us, after our
ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners who were mere followers would be made to languish in
if "the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under jail for perhaps the rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been duly considered as
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, having paid their penalty to society, and freed. Such a deplorable result is to be avoided.

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4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely on Article 22 of the G.R. No. L-44988 October 31, 1936
Revised Penal Code which requires that penal judgment be given a retroactive effect. In
support of their contention, petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S. vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
Almencion, 39 People v. Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While reference in the above
provision is made not to judicial decisions but to legislative acts, petitioners entertain the vs.
view that it would be merely an exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a case like CANUTO BERNAL, defendant-appellant.
the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously noted, the Civil Code
provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution, as well as IMPERIAL, J.:
legislation, form part of our legal system. Petitioners would even find support in the well-
known dictum of Bishop Hoadley: The accused was charged with the crime of theft, the information alleging that, aside from
the presence of the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the accused is an habitual
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is delinquent because he had been convicted, prior to the commission of the offense at bar,
truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first thought or spoke thrice of the same crime of theft. The accused pleaded not guilty, but the court, after trial,
them." It is to be admitted that constitutional law scholars, notably found him guilty as charged, and sentenced him to four (4) months and one (1) day of
arresto mayor, to pay the accessories of the law, to return the three stolen roosters to
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as well as the jurist Mariano de Leon or to indemnify the latter the value thereof in the sum of P3, and to pay
John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the truth and the soundness of the above the costs. As an habitual delinquent, because previously convicted three times of the same
observations. We do not have to go that far though. Enough for present purposes that both crime of theft, he was sentenced to an additional penalty of seven (7) years of prision
the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call for, a retroactive mayor.
application.
The facts are not disputed by the defense. It has been established that late in the evening
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a retroactive effect of October 11, 1935, the accused, without the owner's consent, took three gamecocks
petitioners had served the full term for which they could have been legally committed, is belonging to Elias Piamonte valued at P50, and three other roosters belonging to Mariano
habeas corpus the appropriate remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as de Leon valued at P3. Only two of the gamecocks of Elias Piamonte, valued at P30, were
1910 the prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v. Director of Prisons. 45 Thus: "The recovered. It has equally been established that the accused had been thrice convicted of
courts uniformly hold that where a sentence imposes punishment in excess of the power of the crime of theft; The first time on April 25, 1935 by the justice of the peace court of San
the court to impose, such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold Pablo, Laguna; the second time on June 24, 1935 by the justice of the peace court of San
that the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the proposition that Pablo, Laguna; and third time on October 19, 1935, by the justice of the peace court of
such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed in case the parts are separable, the Tanauan, Batangas.
rule being that the petitioner is not entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus
unless he has served out so much of the sentence as was valid." 46 There is a reiteration of The defense assigns only one error of law in the judgment, to wit, the accused an habitual
such a principle in Director v. Director of Prisons 47 where it was explicitly announced by this delinquent under subsection (b) of paragraph 5 of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code,
Court "that the only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the and in imposing upon him the penalty therein provided. It contends that the applicable
accused ... is the writ of habeas corpus." 48 While the above decision speaks of a trial judge provision is that found in subsection (a) of the aforesaid codal paragraph and article,
losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the because in truth and according to the decisions, the accused has no more than two prior
emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive convictions, the third being the one at bar. Elaborating on this contention, the defense
character of a favorable decision holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully alleges that the conviction on October 19, 1935, for the crime of theft should not be counted
sustained the burden of justifying their release. against the accused because it took place after the commission of the offense at bar on the
11th of the said month and year. The Solicitor-General in his brief agrees with the defense,
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is ordered that petitioners and recommends that the penalty fixed in subsection (a) of paragraph 5 of article 62 of the
be forthwith set at liberty. Revised Penal Code be imposed upon the accused. We hold that the third conviction,
having taken place after the commission of the last offense with which the accused is now
charged, should not be reckoned with in determining habitual delinquency and the
additional penalty to be imposed, upon the authority of the decisions of this court in People
vs. Santiago (55 Phil., 266), People vs. Ventura (56 Phil., 1, 5), and People vs. Reyes (G.R.
Nos. 43904, 43905, October 18, 1935 [62 Phil., 966).

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in the commission
of the crime of theft in view of the established fact that the accused was thrice convicted of

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the said crime prior to the trial of this case on November 4, 1935 (art. 14, par. 9, Revised been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title.
Penal Code). For this reason, the penalty imposable should be six (6) months and one (1) For the existence of habitual delinquency, it is not enough that the accused shall have been
day of prision correccional. As an habitual delinquent, because he was twice convicted of convicted of any of the crimes specified, and that the last conviction shall have taken place
the crime of theft prior to the commission of the offense at bar (art. 62, last paragraph of the ten (10) years before the commission of the last offense. It is necessary that the crimes
Revised Penal Code), he should be sentenced to the additional penalty of three (3) years of previously committed be prior to the commission of the offense with which the accused is
prision correccional pursuant to subsection (a) of paragraph 5 of the said article. charged a third time or oftener.

The question arose, in the course of our deliberation on this case, of whether or not in In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is modified, and the accused-appellant is
instances where the accused turns out to be an habitual delinquent the aggravating found guilty of the crime of theft charged in the complaint and sentenced to six (6) months
circumstance of recidivism, when alleged and proved, should be taken into account in fixing and one (1) day of prision correccional, to return to the offended parties the stolen and
the penalty applicable for the commission of the principal offense, independently of the unrecovered roosters, or in default thereof to indemnify Elias Piamonte in the sum of P20
additional penalty provided by law for habitual delinquency. It has been urged that said and Mariano de Leon in the sum of P3, with the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in
aggravating should not be considered, otherwise it would be twice held against the accused case of insolvency, and to an additional penalty of three (3) years of prision correccional,
inasmuch as it is necessarily taken into account in ascertaining whether he is a habitual with the costs in both instances. So ordered.
delinquent or not. The majority of the court hold to the contrary view, namely, that recidivism
should be reckoned with; hence, the accused is sentenced to the minimum of the maximum
penalty fixed by law.
G.R. No. L-2873 February 28, 1950
In resolving this question as above set out, the majority of the court gave heed to the
following considerations: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

First: This is not the first time that the question has been submitted to the consideration of vs.
the court. In People vs. Melendrez (59 Phil., 154), and People vs, Espina (62 Phil., 607), we EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL, defendant-appellant.
have already held that in cases similar to the one at bar, the aggravating circumstance of
recidivism should be taken into consideration, notwithstanding the allegation and proof that TUASON, J.:
the accused were habitual delinquents and should accordingly be sentenced to the
additional penalty provided by law; and The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the appellant, being 17 years of age
at the time of at the time of the commission of the crime, was entitled to the privileged
Second: It is not correct to assume that recidivism is twice taken into account when the mitigating circumstance of article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The lower
accused is declared an habitual delinquent and when it is deemed to aggravate the crime in court, ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of from 4
fixing the principal penalty to be imposed, because recidivism as an aggravating years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to 8 years of prision mayor for the crime
circumstance modifying criminal liability is not an inherent or integral element of habitual of robbery of which he was found guilty. He was also sentenced to pay the offended party,
delinquency which the Revised Penal Code considers as an extraordinary and special jointly and severally with the other accused, the sum of P85 as indemnity.
aggravating circumstance.
Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal Code by reducing from
Under the last subsection of paragraph 5 of article 62 of he Revised Penal Code, a person 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to "be committed to the custody or care of a
shall be deemed to be habitually delinquent, if within a period of ten years from the date of public or private, benevolent or charitable institution," instead of being convicted and
his release or last conviction of the crime of robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification, he is sentenced to prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor General believes that
found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. Paragraph 9 of article 14 of the the amendment by implication has also amended paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised
Revised Penal Code defines recidivism by stating that it is committed by a person who, at Pena Code, which provides that when the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years
the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of age, "The penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in
another crime embraced in the same title of the Code. Defining reiteration or habituality the proper period."
paragraph 10 of the same article provides that it is committed when the offender has been
previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches at an equal or greater penalty There are well recognized rules of statutory construction which are against the
or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. Reflecting on these Government's contention.
definitions it will be seen that recidivism, viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a
factor or element which necessarily forms an integral part of habitual delinquency. It will be One of these rules is that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and reconciled so that
noted that the elements as well as the basis of each of these circumstances are different. effect may be given to each and every part thereof, and that conflicting intention in the
For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on the date of his trial, shall have same statute are never to be supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an
unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.)
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This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment, both being read than 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. In all other respect the appealed
together as whole. "An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute judgment is affirmed. The appellant will pay the costs of this appeal.
has been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted
in its stead; or, as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any action after the
adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally enacted in its amended
form the amendment becomes a part of the original statute as if it had always been G.R. No. 150762 January 20, 2006
contained therein, unless such amendment involves the abrogation of contractual relations COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,
between the state and others. Where an amendment leaves certain portions of the original
act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they vs.
had before the amendment. So where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute
shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the existing law THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
as are retained, either literally or substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the existing
law, and not as a new enactment." (59 C. J., 1096, 1097.) DECISION

We find no irreconcilable conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as it nowstands and CARPIO, J.:
article 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility between granting accused of the ages of
15 to 18 a privileged mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons The Case
who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. In other words, there is no inconsistency Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 23 June 2000 Decision2 and the 7
between sending defendants of certain ages to prison and giving them a penalty lower than November 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court
the imposable one on adults under the same or similar circumstances. Let it be remember of Appeals affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
that the privilege of article 68, supra, is not by its nature inherent in age but purely statutory Branch 50 ("trial court") in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. The trial court found
and conventional, and that this privilege is granted adult offenders under given conditions. Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista ("Abarquez") guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an
At least there is no clear intention on the part of the Congress to amend article 68. Indeed accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055.
the rational presumption is that if there had been such an intention the lawmakers should The Charge
have said so expressly, instead of leaving the change to inference.
The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and attempted homicide in
One other rule of interpretation that quarrels with the theory of implied repeal or amendment two Informations,5 as follows:
is that penal law is to be construed, in case of doubt, strictly against the state. "Criminal and
penal statutes must be strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or extended by Criminal Case No. 94-135055
intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In other words, the language
cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms in order to carry into effect the The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of
general purpose for which the statute was enacted. Only those persons, offenses, and HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
penalties, clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered within the
statute's operation. They must come clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
statute, and where there is any reasonable doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the person conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has
accused of violating the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of already been charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under
those from whom the penalty is sought." (Statutory Construction, Crawford, pp. 460-462.) Crim. Case No. 93-129891 and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
The offense charged in the information of which the appellant was found guilty is punishable one RICARDO QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and there stabbing him twice with a bladed
under article 294, case No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by section 6 of weapon and hitting him with a gun at the back, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
Republic Act No. 18, with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
medium period. The penalty one degree lower than this is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its medium period. There being no modifying circumstance, CONTRARY TO LAW.6
the appropriate penalty in the present case is from 6 months and 1 day of arresto mayor to
2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. Being entitled to an indeterminate penalty as Criminal Case No. 94-135056
provided in section 1 of Act No. L-4103 as amended, the accused should be, and he is The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y EVANGELISTA of the crime of
hereby sentenced to imprisonment of not less than 4 months of arresto mayor and not more ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE, committed as follows:

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That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused Managuelod at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. The medico-legal certificate showed that
conspiring and confederating with one ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has Paz sustained a 3-cm. lacerated wound on his left forearm.
already been charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of Manila under
Crim. Case No. 93-129892 and mutually helping each other, with intent to kill, did then and About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad") was at the WPD Homicide
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide Division, his station received a call from the UST Hospital informing them of the death of
directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there holding one JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI Quejong. SPO1 Vidad and PO3 Ed Co went to the UST Hospital morgue and investigated
and stabbing him with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the left arm, but the said accused the incident. They learned that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed Quejong. Upon
did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide the execution of sworn statements by Paz and Masula, SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and
as a consequence, by reason of causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that Abarquez for homicide and frustrated homicide and prepared the referral letter to the
is, the injury inflicted upon said JOSE BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI is only slight and not fatal. inquest prosecutor.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7 Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela voluntarily surrendered to
one SPO4 Soriano at Police Station No. 10 and was turned over to the WPD Homicide
Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were tried jointly. Division.

The Version of the Prosecution Dr. Antonio Rebosa9 ("Dr. Rebosa"), a medico-legal consultant at UST Hospital, conducted
the post-mortem examination and autopsy on Quejong. Dr. Rebosa reported that Quejong
On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz8 ("Paz"), Ricardo Quejong sustained two stab wounds and suffered from massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab
("Quejong") and their friends were in the house of one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St., Sta. wounds to the heart and left lung. According to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp instrument probably
Mesa, Manila. They were drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyet’s son. About caused the wound. Dr. Rebosa also reported that Quejong sustained abrasions and
7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong decided to go home. Boyet Tong, Abarquez’s son Bardie and contusions on the right upper body, the wrist and on the lower extremities.
Sonito Masula ("Masula") joined Paz and Quejong. They proceeded towards the exit of San
Jose St. The Version of the Defense

Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyet’s house, Alberto Almojuela also Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his residence at 3363 San Jose
known as Bitoy ("Almojuela"), a certain Ising and Abarquez also known as Dale, were St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. About 7:30 p.m., Almojuela’s wife informed him that the group of Paz
likewise drinking liquor in front of Almojuela’s house. As the group of Paz was passing was challenging Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, proceeded
towards the main road, Almojuela and his companions blocked their path. to Almojuela’s house. Almojuela’s house was about twenty meters away from Abarquez’s
house. When he arrived at Almojuela’s house, Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground
Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" Almojuela got angry and being strangled by Quejong. Paz was holding Almojuela’s waist and boxing him at the
attacked Paz with a knife. Paz parried the attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. stomach. Masula was near Almojuela’s head holding a piece of stone as if waiting for a
Abarquez held Paz on both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked chance to hit him. Abarquez shouted at the group to stop. The group did not heed
Abarquez, "What is our atraso, we were going home, why did you block our way?" Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning shot into the air. Still, the group did not heed
Abarquez answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, tumigil ka na." Abarquez who then fired a second warning shot. Paz, Quejong, and Masula scampered
away.
Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, followed by a scuffle. Paz
tried to get away from Abarquez who continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group of Paz from smoking
Quejong fall on the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz approached marijuana. Almojuela then went inside his house while Abarquez went home. On his way
Quejong and found him already bloodied. It turned out the Almojuela stabbed Quejong with home, Abarquez met the Chief Tanod of the barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy
a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards Lego ("Lego") advised him to report the incident to the police. They all proceeded to
the exit of San Jose St. to ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard Abarquez Precinct No. 4 where Lego reported the incident to the desk officer. The desk officer told
shout, "You left your companion already wounded!" them that a person had been stabbed. When Abarquez reached their house, he saw
policemen and media men with their barangay chairman. He informed them that he had just
When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on the ground. Almojuela reported the incident. Upon the request of SPO1 Vidad, Abarquez then went to the police
and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his companions brought Quejong to the UST station to shed light on the incident.
Hospital. They next proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to report the incident. However,
there was nobody in the precinct. With Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz went to the WPD Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter informed him that there
General Headquarters to report the incident. At the WPD General Headquarters, they was marijuana smoke coming to their window. He went outside to look for the source of the
learned that Quejong died at the UST Hospital. Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic smoke and saw Quejong, Paz, and Masula smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group
to move away as there were children inside the house. He was on his way back to the
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house when Quejong tried to strangle him. Later, Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard 2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving more credence to the
Abarquez shouting, "Tumigil na kayo." Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran away. testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

Winfred Evangelista10 ("Evangelista") testified that he was resting in front of his house when Abarquez alleges that the prosecution’s evidence does not satisfy the test of moral certainty
he heard a commotion. He noticed that Paz and Quejong were quarreling. Evangelista saw and is not sufficient to support his conviction as an accomplice. He further alleges that there
Paz kicking Almojuela. Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but he was told not to was a misapprehension of facts and that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached
interfere. Abarquez was forced to fire a warning shot and the persons involved in the their conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures. Abarquez also
commotion ran away. assails the credibility of the witnesses against him.

The Ruling of the Trial Court The Ruling of This Court

In its Decision11 dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found Abarquez guilty as an The petition is meritorious.
accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial court held that the prosecution failed to prove
that Abarquez was a co-conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the value and weight of the
could not be convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide. However, the trial court ruled testimony of a witness. The exception is if the trial court failed to consider certain facts of
that Abarquez, in holding and restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong substance and value, which if considered, might affect the result of the case.16 This case is
and allowed Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance. an exception to the rule.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads: Concurrence in Criminal Design

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the accused, Coverdale Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not
Abarquez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide only as accomplice and being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or
hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of simultaneous acts."17
prision correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor. In Criminal Case No. 94-135056, the
accused is hereby acquitted. Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an accomplice: (1)
community of design, which means that the accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the
With costs de oficio. criminal design of the principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the
accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission
SO ORDERED.12 of the crime.18 Mere commission of an act, which aids the perpetrator, is not enough.19
Thus:
Abarquez appealed the trial court’s Decision before the Court of Appeals.
The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly rendered, which cannot
In its Decision13 of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Decision. exist without the previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. It is
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in giving more credence to the testimony of therefore required in order to be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with
Paz. The Court of Appeals held that the prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez the criminal design of the principal by direct participation.20
aided Almojuela in fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals rejected Abarquez’s
allegation that he was merely at the crime scene to pacify the quarreling parties. Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the accused at the crime
scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he committed the crime charged.21
In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,14 the Court of Appeals denied Abarquez’s motion for
reconsideration. Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals relied mainly on the
testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by Abarquez on the shoulders, thus
Hence, the petition before this Court. preventing him from helping Quejong who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz testified:
The Issues q. And what happened in the exchange of words or altercations between Bitoy and Ricardo
Quejong?
The issues15 Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as follows:
a. They grappled with each other, sir.
1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt; q. When Bitoy and Ricardo grappled with each other, what did you do, if any?

a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale, sir.

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q. And how this Dale hold you? [q.] And it was during that time when you were held in both shoulders by the accused
[C]overdale Abarquez?
a. He held my two shoulders, sir.
a. Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:
q. and that Coverdale Abarquez was infront of you, is it not?
I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by the accused holding both
shoulders, your Honor. a. Yes, sir on my side.

q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your shoulders, what happened next, if any? q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy from further quarrelling you, is
it not?
a. He got angry scolding us. While scolding me the two
a. That is not the way of pacifying, sir.
who were grappling each other walking away, sir. (sic)
q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the shoulder by Abarquez?
q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what happened in the course of grappling, if
any? ATTY. GASCON:

You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other, what happened in the course Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act as the witness while the witness
of grappling? (sic) act as the accused demonstrating holding both hands of interpreter preventing the witness
and saying Joey tumigil ka na, joey tumigil ka na.
a. They fell to the ground, sir.
COURT:
q. After that what happened next, if any?
q. How many times?
a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release from the hold of Dale and I
approach the two. I saw Ricky blooded so I was trying to pull him, sir. (sic) a. Twice, Your Honor.

q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic) ATTY. GASCON:

a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir. The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na because you were trying to
attack Bitoy, is it not?
q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Ricky or Ricardo? (sic)
a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. (sic)
a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 inches including the handle).
q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you and told you Joey tumigal ka
q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while you were trying to free na, Joey tumigil ka na. What would be the reason?
yourself from the hold Dale Abarquez, "Pinagalitan kayo", in what way or manner did Dale
Abarquez reprimanded you? (sic) a. While I was just talking to Bitoy, when he told me to stop.

a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)22 COURT:

xxx xxx xxx Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to Bitoy when the accused tried
to hold you and prevent you?
q. You said you were first attacked by Bitoy, is that correct?
a. Yes, sir.
a. Yes, sir.
q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is not pacifying you but to stop
q. After Bitoy pacified Bardy Abarquez, he went after Ricky Quejong, is it not?23 you from helping the victim?
a. They were just arguing, sir. a. Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

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q. The only word that the accused [C]overdale Abarquez uttered was Joey, tumigil ka na, We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in issue
Joey tumigil ka na, is it not? or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of
proof loses.28 Hence:
a. He uttered that you are MATAPANG, Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na.24
xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the inculpatory facts and
Paz’s testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with Almojuela’s criminal design. circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the
"Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly, Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does
fray, not from helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to Almojuela. not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly
However, Paz could not have been merely talking to Almojuela, as he tried to portray, stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found
because Almojuela was already grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted lacking.29
Abarquez’s action as an attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation
was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals. Yet, in his testimony, WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June 2000 Decision and 7
Paz admitted that while restraining him, Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and November 2001 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which
telling him to stop. It was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping affirmed the 30 September 1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50
Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fight. in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista as
Abarquez’s act of trying to stop Paz does not translate to assistance to Almojuela. an accomplice in the crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No
pronouncement as to costs.
In People v. Fabros, 25 the Court explained:
SO ORDERED.
To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and participation
in the criminal act. In other words, the principal and the accomplice must have acted in
conjunction and directed their efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were
united in their criminal design. phï1.ñët

xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the (principal’s) criminal
design did not automatically make him an accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not
show his concurrence in the principal’s criminal intent.

Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela. However, Paz testified that
Abarquez’s son Bardie, who was one of Paz’s companions, was the one trying to pacify
Almojuela. The trial court in its factual findings confirmed this when it stated that while
Abarquez was holding Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela.26

The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a barangay kagawad in
not extending assistance to the then wounded Quejong. This, however, does not
necessarily show concurrence in Almojuela’s criminal act. When Paz ran away, Abarquez
shouted at him that he left his wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was not aware of
the extent of Quejong’s injury and he expected Paz to look after his own companion.

When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be resolved in his favor.
Thus:

Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proven
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of innocence stands as a fundamental principle
of both constitutional and criminal law. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving
every single fact establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational basis must be
removed. The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no reason to convict. Within this
framework, the prosecution must prove its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense
need not even speak at all. The presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.27

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