India's Push-to-Renegotiate-Long-Term-LNG-Contracts
India's Push-to-Renegotiate-Long-Term-LNG-Contracts
India's Push-to-Renegotiate-Long-Term-LNG-Contracts
Instant Insight
December 1, 2019 KS--2019-II17
India’s Push to Renegotiate Long-Term LNG Contracts 1
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20.00
18.00
16.00
14.00
LNG price ($/MMBtu)
12.00
10.00
8.00
6.00
4.00
2.00
0.00
Jan-12 Jul-12 Jan-13 Jul-13 Jan-14 Jul-14 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16 Jan-17 Jul-17 Jan-18 Jul-18 Jan-19 Jul-19
India (Petronet) total import price India spot price
Source: IHS Markit.
This will not be the first time India has renegotiated its long-term LNG contracts. In 2015, Petronet LNG,
India’s largest LNG buyer, renegotiated its contracts with Qatar’s Rasgas to change the pricing formula,
after LNG spot prices dropped significantly below oil-indexed prices (Petronet LNG 2016). Unconfirmed
reports detailed the three elements of the renegotiation: a change in the period according to which the
price was calculated; a waiver of the penalty for not honoring the take-or-pay provisions of the contracts;
and an increase in the total volume of the contracts (Moneycontrol 2016).
The weakness in LNG prices has been critical to the growth of India’s gas sector. The low spot prices since
2015 and Petronet’s renegotiated prices with Rasgas allowed India to increase its LNG consumption from
14 million tonnes per annum (Mtpa) in 2014-15 to 21.7 Mtpa in 2018-19, a growth of 55% over just four years
(Figure 2).
25
20
15
Mtpa
10
0
2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17 2017-18 2018-19
Financial year
Source: PPAC (2019).
New liquefaction capacity and weaker winter demand in 2018-19 contributed to lower spot prices (Timera
Energy 2019). New LNG plants with a capacity of 23 Mtpa have come online in the first eight months of
2019, mostly in the United States (U.S.). On the demand side, weaker economic conditions in Asia and the
on-going trade dispute between the U.S. and China have lowered demand growth for LNG. With another 25
Mtpa of LNG capacity expected to come online by 2021, spot prices are likely to remain under pressure. If
oil prices remain within the current range, the differential between spot LNG prices and LNG supplied under
long-term oil indexed contracts will also continue.
Australia, 0.04
Qatar,
2.37 US, 0.97
Contract volumes
Qatar, 8.50
Africa, 6.21
Europe, 0.86
Source: BP (2019).
Qatar is by far the largest of India’s currently contracted LNG suppliers. The three contracts between
Petronet LNG and Rasgas account for 8.5 Mtpa of India’s 12.84 Mtpa of long-term contracts. Petronet
also has a 20-year contract to import 1.44 Mtpa from Gorgon in Australia. Finally, GAIL, India’s
state-owned gas marketing and transmission company, currently has two contracts totaling 5.8 Mtpa with
U.S. LNG producers. One of these contracts is with Cheniere (Sabine Pass) for 2.9 Mtpa, and the other
contract is with Dominion Energy (Cove Point) for 2.3 Mtpa. However, these two contracts require GAIL
only to offtake the contracted volumes and not necessarily to bring them to India. As a result, instead of
shipping these cargoes from the U.S. to India, GAIL has resold some cargoes to other players, including
a resale agreement with Shell for 1 Mtpa. GAIL has also established other time swap agreements with
pure-play LNG traders. This resulted in less than 1 Mtpa of the total contracted volume of U.S. LNG being
delivered to India in 2018. Overall, GAIL has indicated that roughly 32-35 of the 85-90 contracted U.S.
LNG cargoes from Sabine Pass and Cove Point that it expects to offtake every year will go to India.
Assumed Quantity
From node Buyer Seller Export terminal Start duration (years) (Mtpa)
More long-term contracts are due to come into force over the next few years. They include contracts
between the Indian Oil Corporation Limited and Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, and between
Sempra Energy-promoted Cameron LNG and Anadarko-promoted Mozambique LNG. Finally, three other
contracts between LNG trading subsidiaries of Indian oil and gas companies to buy LNG are not origin
specific.
If the current set of long-term contracts were to continue under a business as usual (BAU) scenario,
India’s optimal LNG portfolio in 2020 would comprise imports from Qatar (58%), the U.S. (29%), Australia
(6%) and other Middle Eastern countries (6%) (Figure 4). By 2025, the share of Qatar in such an optimal
portfolio would increase to 70%, with the share of the U.S. falling to 19% and that of Australia declining to
4%, even though contractual volumes would be maintained.
Figure 4. India’s optimal LNG import mix with existing long-term contracts.
30 10
20 9
$/MMBtu
Mtpa
10 8
0 7
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Figure 5. India’s optimal import portfolio without long-term contracts from 2020.
30 10
20
8
$/MMBtu
Mtpa
7
10
0 5
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
However, without these long-term agreements, suppliers would be under no obligation to make LNG
available to India and would likely reallocate sales to the highest bidders in the spot market. In particular,
once the current spurt in LNG supply peters out, and the market tightens again by the mid-2020s, India
would be crowded out of global LNG markets. This would limit its ability to import LNG and would result in
lower domestic consumption. The impact of this squeeze in supply would be most strongly felt in the two
largest and most price sensitive consuming sectors of natural gas in India, industry and power (Figure 6).
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
Mt
-1.5
-2.0
-2.5
-3.0
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025
Power Industry
Conclusion
It is clear that a large part of India’s LNG import portfolio relies on long-term contracts. India continues
to highlight the need for a weaker price regime in these contracts (Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas
2019). While a move away from such contracts would result in India being able to source LNG supplies
more cheaply, potentially saving US$15 billion between 2020-25, it would also result in a fall in gas
supplies to India, as LNG suppliers would not be bound by long-term contracts. The decline in LNG
supplies would hit the largest natural gas consuming sectors in India the most, namely industry and
power. Thus, the loss in committed gas supplies must be weighed against the overall fall in import costs
for gas.
IHS Markit. 2019. “India Natural Gas Market Profile.” IHS Markit, August.
Livemint. 2017. “The gains from the Gorgon LNG contract renegotiation.” September 14. Accessed
September 2, 2019. https://www.livemint.com/Money/MpJAxVSQwMExq5KmfpYGJL/The-gains-from-the-
Gorgon-LNG-contract-renegotiation.html.
Ministry of Petroleum & Natural Gas. 2019. “Shri Dharmendra Pradhan meets Australian Minister for
Resources and Northern Australia, Senator Matthew Canavan.” August 28. Accessed September 2, 2019.
https://www.pib.nic.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1583257.
Moneycontrol. 2016. “No ʽtake or pay’ clause in new contract with RasGas: Petronet.” January 6.
Accessed September 2, 2019. https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/companies/no-take-or-pay-
clausenew-contractrasgas-petronet-1052052.html.
Petronet LNG. 2016. “Re-negotiated Qatar gas deal giving daily gain of $5/MMBtu.” January 5. Accessed
September 2, 2019. https://www.petronetlng.com/NewsContent.php?newsid=425.
Petroleum Planning & Analysis Cell (PPAC). 2019. “Import of LNG.” August 27. Accessed September 2,
2019. https://www.ppac.gov.in/WriteReadData/userfiles/file/NG-H-LNG%20Import.xls.
Ruud Egging, Franziska Holz and Steven A. Gabriel. 2010. “The World Gas Model: A multi-period mixed
complementarity model for the global natural gas market.” Energy 35 (10): 4016-4029. doi:https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.energy.2010.03.053.
S&P Global Platts. 2019. “Commodities.” September 2. Accessed September 2, 2019. https://www.
spglobal.com/platts/en/commodities/lng.
———. 2019. “Indian oil minister hints at long-term LNG contract price review.” August 27.
Accessed August 28, 2019. https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/
natural-gas/082719-indian-oil-minister-hints-at-long-term-lng-contract-price-review.
Timera Energy. 2019. “Asian LNG demand stalls in H1 2019.” August 26. Accessed August 28, 2019.
https://timera-energy.com/asian-lng-demand-stalls-in-h1-2019/.