Dr. Elvina Primayesa, S.E., M.Si.

Section 1: Arguments

When people mean to give arguments, they typically often use words like
‘therefore’ and ‘because.’ When analyzing an argument, the first thing to do
is to separate the premises from the conclusion. Words like these are a clue
to what the argument is supposed to be, especially if— in the argument as
given— the conclusion comes at the beginning or in the middle of the
argument.
premise indicators: since, because, given that
conclusion indicators: therefore, hence, thus, then, so
Section 1: Arguments..............

To be perfectly general, we can define an argument as a series of sentences.

The sentences at the beginning of the series are premises. The final sentence
in the series is the conclusion.
If the premises are true and the argument is a good one, then you have a
reason to accept the conclusion. Notice that this definition is quite general.
Consider this example:
There is coffee in the coffee pot.
There is a dragon playing bassoon on the armoire.
.˙. Salvador Dali was a poker player.
It may seem odd to call this an argument, but that is because it would be a
terrible argument. The two premises have nothing at all to do with the
conclusion. Nevertheless, given our definition, it still counts as an
argument—albeit a bad one.
Section 2: Sentences

In logic, we are only interested in sentences that can figure as a premise or

conclusion of an argument. So we will say that a sentence is something that
can be true or false.
You should not confuse the idea of a sentence that can be true or false with
the difference between fact and opinion. Often, sentences in logic will
express things that would count as facts— such as ‘Kierkegaard was a
hunchback’ or ‘Kierkegaard liked almonds.’ They can also express things
that you might think of as matters of opinion— such as, ‘Almonds are
yummy.’
Also, there are things that would count as ‘sentences’ in a linguistics or
grammar course that we will not count as sentences in logic.
Section 2: Question

In a grammar class, ‘Are you sleepy yet?’ would count as an interrogative

sentence. Although you might be sleepy or you might be alert, the question
itself is neither true nor false. For this reason, questions will not count as
sentences in logic. Suppose you answer the question: ‘I am not sleepy.’
This is either true or false, and so it is a sentence in the logical sense.
Generally, questions will not count as sentences, but answers will.
‘What is this course about?’ is not a sentence. ‘No one knows what this
course is about’ is a sentence.
Section 2: Imperatives

Commands are often phrased as imperatives like ‘Wake up!’, ‘Sit up

straight’, and so on. In a grammar class, these would count as imperative
sentences. Although it might be good for you to sit up straight or it might
not, the command is neither true nor false. Note, however, that commands
are not always phrased as imperatives. ‘You will respect my authority’ is
either true or false— either you will or you will not— and so it counts as a
sentence in the logical sense.
Section 2: Exclamations

‘Ouch!’ is sometimes called an exclamatory sentence, but it is neither true

nor false. We will treat ‘Ouch, I hurt my toe!’ as meaning the same thing as
‘I hurt my toe.’ The ‘ouch’ does not add anything that could be true or false.
Section 3: Two ways that arguments can go wrong

Consider the argument that you should take an umbrella (on p. 5, above). If
premise (1) is false— if it is sunny outside— then the argument gives you
no reason to carry an umbrella. Even if it is raining outside, you might not
need an umbrella. You might wear a rain pancho or keep to covered
walkways. In these cases, premise (2) would be false, since you could go
out without an umbrella and still avoid getting soaked.
Suppose for a moment that both the premises are true. You do not own a
rain pancho. You need to go places where there are no covered walkways.
Now does the argument show you that you should take an umbrella? Not
necessarily. Perhaps you enjoy walking in the rain, and you would like to
get soaked. In that case, even though the premises were true, the conclusion
would be false.
 Section 3: Two ways that arguments can go wrong...........

For any argument, there are two ways that it could be weak. First, one or more of the
premises might be false. An argument gives you a reason to believe its conclusion
only if you believe its premises. Second, the premises might fail to support the
conclusion. Even if the premises were true, the form of the argument might be weak.
The example we just considered is weak in both ways.
When an argument is weak in the second way, there is something wrong with the
logical form of the argument: Premises of the kind given do not necessarily lead to a
conclusion of the kind given. We will be interested primarily in the logical form of
arguments.
Consider another example:
You are reading this book.
This is a logic book.
.˙. You are a logic student.
 Section 3: Two ways that arguments can go wrong...........

This is not a terrible argument. Most people who read this book are logic
students. Yet, it is possible for someone besides a logic student to read this
book. If your roommate picked up the book and thumbed through it, they
would not immediately become a logic student. So the premises of this
argument, even though they are true, do not guarantee the truth of the
conclusion. Its logical form is less than perfect.
An argument that had no weakness of the second kind would have perfect
logical form. If its premises were true, then its conclusion would necessarily
be true. We call such an argument ‘deductively valid’ or just ‘valid.’
Even though we might count the argument above as a good argument in
some sense, it is not valid; that is, it is ‘invalid.’ One important task of logic
is to sort valid arguments from invalid arguments.
Section 4: Deductive validity

An argument is deductively valid if and only if it is impossible for the

premises to be true and the conclusion false.
The crucial thing about a valid argument is that it is impossible for the
premises to be true at the same time that the conclusion is false. Consider
this example:
Oranges are either fruits or musical instruments.
Oranges are not fruits.
.˙. Oranges are musical instruments.
The conclusion of this argument is ridiculous. Nevertheless, it follows
validly from the premises. This is a valid argument. If both premises were
true, then the conclusion would necessarily be true.
Section 4: Deductive validity.....................

This shows that a deductively valid argument does not need to have true
premises or a true conclusion. Conversely, having true premises and a true
conclusion is not enough to make an argument valid. Consider this example:
London is in England.
Beijing is in China.
.˙. Paris is in France.
Section 4: Deductive validity.....................

The premises and conclusion of this argument are, as a matter of fact, all
true. This is a terrible argument, however, because the premises have
nothing to do with the conclusion. Imagine what would happen if Paris
declared independence from the rest of France. Then the conclusion would
be false, even though the premises would both still be true. Thus, it is
logically possible for the premises of this argument to be true and the
conclusion false. The argument is invalid.
The important thing to remember is that validity is not about the actual truth
or falsity of the sentences in the argument. Instead, it is about the form of
the argument: The truth of the premises is incompatible with the falsity of
the conclusion.
Section 4: Inductive validity

There can be good arguments which nevertheless fail to be deductively

valid. Consider this one:
In January 1997, it rained in San Diego.
In January 1998, it rained in San Diego.
In January 1999, it rained in San Diego.
.˙. It rains every January in San Diego.
This is an inductive argument, because it generalizes from many cases to a
conclusion about all cases.
Section 4: Inductive validity..........................

Certainly, the argument could be made stronger by adding additional

premises: In January 2000, it rained in San Diego. In January 2001. . . and
so on. Regardless of how many premises we add, however, the argument
will still not be deductively valid. It is possible, although unlikely, that it
will fail to rain next January in San Diego. Moreover, we know that the
weather can be fickle. No amount of evidence should convince us that it
rains there every January. Who is to say that some year will not be a
freakish year in which there is no rain in January in San Diego; even a
single counter-example is enough to make the conclusion of the argument
false.
Inductive arguments, even good inductive arguments, are not deductively
valid. We will not be interested in inductive arguments in this book.
Section 5: Other logical notions

In addition to deductive validity, we will be interested in some other logical

concepts.
Truth-values
True or false is said to be the truth-value of a sentence. We defined
sentences as things that could be true or false; we could have said instead
that sentences are things that can have truth-values.
Section 5: Other logical notions.........................

Logical truth
In considering arguments formally, we care about what would be true if the premises
were true. Generally, we are not concerned with the actual truth value of any
particular sentences— whether they are actually true or false. Yet there are some
sentences that must be true, just as a matter of logic.
Consider these sentences:
1. It is raining.
2. Either it is raining, or it is not.
3. It is both raining and not raining.
In order to know if sentence 1 is true, you would need to look outside or check the
weather channel. Logically speaking, it might be either true or false. Sentences like
this are called contingent sentences.
Section 5: Other logical notions.......................

Sentence 2 is different. You do not need to look outside to know that it is

true. Regardless of what the weather is like, it is either raining or not. This
sentence is logically true; it is true merely as a matter of logic, regardless of
what the world is actually like. A logically true sentence is called a
tautology.
You do not need to check the weather to know about sentence 3, either. It
must be false, simply as a matter of logic. It might be raining here and not
raining across town, it might be raining now but stop raining even as you
read this, but it is impossible for it to be both raining and not raining here at
this moment. The third sentence is logically false; it is false regardless of
what the world is like. A logically false sentence is called a contradiction.
Section 5: Other logical notions.......................

To be precise, we can define a contingent sentence as a sentence that is

neither a tautology nor a contradiction.
A sentence might always be true and still be contingent. For instance, if
there never were a time when the universe contained fewer than seven
things, then the sentence ‘At least seven things exist’ would always be true.
Yet the sentence is contingent; its truth is not a matter of logic. There is no
contradiction in considering a possible world in which there are fewer than
seven things. The important question is whether the sentence must be true,
just on account of logic.
Section 5: Other logical notions.......................

Logical equivalence
We can also ask about the logical relations between two sentences. For
example:
John went to the store after he washed the dishes.
John washed the dishes before he went to the store.
These two sentences are both contingent, since John might not have gone to
the store or washed dishes at all. Yet they must have the same truth-value.
If either of the sentences is true, then they both are; if either of the
sentences is false, then they both are. When two sentences necessarily have
the same truth value, we say that they are logically equivalent.
 Section 5: Other logical notions.......................
Consistency
Consider these two sentences:
B1 My only brother is taller than I am.
B2 My only brother is shorter than I am.
Logic alone cannot tell us which, if either, of these sentences is true. Yet we can say
that if the first sentence (B1) is true, then the second sentence (B2) must be false.
And if B2 is true, then B1 must be false. It cannot be the case that both of these
sentences are true.
If a set of sentences could not all be true at the same time, like B1–B2, they are said
to be inconsistent. Otherwise, they are consistent.
We can ask about the consistency of any number of sentences. For example, consider
the following list of sentences:
 Section 5: Other logical notions.......................

G1 There are at least four giraffes at the wild animal park.

G2 There are exactly seven gorillas at the wild animal park.
G3 There are not more than two martians at the wild animal park.
G4 Every giraffe at the wild animal park is a martian.
G1 and G4 together imply that there are at least four martian giraffes at the park. This conflicts
with G3, which implies that there are no more than two martian giraffes there. So the set of
sentences G1–G4 is inconsistent. Notice that the inconsistency has nothing at all to do with G2.
G2 just happens to be part of an inconsistent set.
Sometimes, people will say that an inconsistent set of sentences ‘contains a contradiction.’ By
this, they mean that it would be logically impossible for all of the sentences to be true at once. A
set might be inconsistent even if each of the sentences in it is either contingent or tautologous.
When a single sentence is a contradiction, then that sentence alone cannot be true.