ROGELIO

DANTIS, Petitioner, v. JULIO
MAGHINANG, JR., Respondent.
He added that he was constrained to
Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of institute an ejectment suit against Julio, As synthesized by the RTC from the
title and recovery of possession against Jr. before the Municipal Trial Court of respective testimonies of the principal
Julio Maghinang alleging that he was the San Miguel, Bulacan (MTC), but the witnesses, their diametrically opposed
registered owner of a parcel of land complaint was dismissed for lack of positions are as follows:
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
Plaintiff Rogelio Dantis testified that he
(TCT) No. T-125918, with an area of
In his Answer,5 Julio, Jr. denied the inherited 5,657 square meters of land,
5,657 square meters, located in Sta. Rita,
material allegations of the complaint. By identified as Lot 6-D-1 of subdivision
San Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired
way of an affirmative defense, he plan Psd-031421-054315, located at Sta.
ownership of the property through a deed
claimed that he was the actual owner of Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, through an
of extrajudicial partition of the estate of
the 352 square meters (subject lot) of the Extrajudicial Partition of Estate of
his deceased father, Emilio Dantis
land covered by TCT No. T-125918 Emilio Dantis, executed in December
(Emilio), dated December 22, 1993; that
where he was living; that he had been in 1993 which land was titled later on under
he had been paying the realty taxes on
open and continuous possession of the his name, Rogelio Dantis, married to
the said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied
property for almost thirty (30) years; the Victoria Payawal, as shown by copy of
and built a house on a portion of his
subject lot was once tenanted by his Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
property without any right at all; that
ancestral relatives until it was sold by 125918, issued by the Register of Deeds
demands were made upon Julio, Jr. that
Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to his father, of Bulacan on September 29, 1998,
he vacate the premises but the same fell
Julio Maghinang, Sr. (Julio, Sr.); that declared for taxation purposes as Tax
on deaf ears; and that the acts of Julio, Jr.
later, he succeeded to the ownership of Declaration with ARP No. C20-22-043-
had created a cloud of doubt over his title
the subject lot after his father died on 07-046. According to him, defendant and
and right of possession of his property.
March 10, 1968; and that he was entitled his predecessor-in-interest built the
Therefore, he prayed that judgment be to a separate registration of the subject house located on said lot. When he first
rendered declaring him to be the true and lot on the basis of the documentary saw it, it was only a small hut but when
real owner of the parcel of land covered evidence of sale and his open and he was about 60 years old, he told
by TCT No. T-125918; ordering Julio, Jr. uninterrupted possession of the property. defendant not to build a bigger house
to deliver the possession of that portion thereon because he would need the land
of the land he was occupying; and and defendant would have to vacate the
directing Julio, Jr. to pay rentals from land. Plaintiff, however, has not been in
October 2000 and attorney’s fees of physical possession of the premises.
P100,000.00.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr.,
presented by plaintiff as adverse witness,
testified that he has no title over the Since 1953, he has not declared the
property he is occupying. He has not property as his nor paid the taxes thereon On January 25, 2010, the CA rendered
paid realty taxes thereon. He has not paid because there is a problem.6 the assailed decision in CA-G.R. CV
any rental to anybody. He is occupying NO. 85258, finding the appeal to be
about 352 square meters of the lot. He RTC: declaring Rogelio as the true impressed with merit.  It held that
presented an affidavit executed on owner of the entire 5,657-square meter Exhibit “4” was an indubitable proof of
September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, lot located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, the sale of the 352-square meter lot
grandfather of Rogelio Dantis and the Bulacan, as evidenced by his TCT over between Emilio and Julio, Sr. It also
father of Emilio Dantis. The latter was, the same. The RTC did not lend any ruled that the partial payment of the
in turn, the father of Rogelio Dantis. The probative value on the documentary purchase price, coupled with the delivery
affidavit, according to affiant Ignacio evidence of sale adduced by Julio, Jr. of the res, gave efficacy to the oral sale
Dantis, alleged that Emilio Dantis agreed consisting of: 1) an affidavit allegedly and brought it outside the operation of
to sell 352 square meters of the lot to executed by Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio), the statute of frauds. Finally, the court a
Julio Maghinang on installment. Rogelio’s grandfather, whereby said quo declared that Julio, Jr. and his
Defendant was then 11 years old in 1952. affiant attested, among others, to the sale predecessors-in-interest had an equitable
of the subject lot made by his son, claim over the subject lot which imposed
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. likewise Emilio, to Julio, Sr. (Exhibit “3”)7; and on Rogelio and his predecessors-in-
testified that for the defendant’s case as 2) an undated handwritten receipt of interest a personal duty to convey what
follows: He owns that house located at initial downpayment in the amount of had been sold after full payment of the
Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, on a 352 P100.00 supposedly issued by Emilio to selling price.
square meter lot. He could not say that he Julio, Sr. in connection with the sale of
is the owner because there is still the subject lot (Exhibit “4”).8  The RTC ISSUE:
question about the lot. He claimed that ruled that even if these documents were WHETHER OR NOT THERE WAS
his father, Julio Maghinang (Sr.), bought adjudged as competent evidence, still, A PERFECTED CONTRACT OF
the said lot from the parents of Rogelio they would only serve as proofs that the SALE BETWEEN EMILIO AND
Dantis. He admitted that the affidavit purchase price for the subject lot had not JULIO SR.
was not signed by the alleged vendor, yet been completely paid and, hence,
Emilio Dantis, the father of Rogelio Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver RULING:
Dantis. The receipt he presented was the property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found
admittedly a mere photocopy. He spent Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by NO.
P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees. tolerance.
After carefully sifting through the
evidence on record, the Court finds that
Rogelio was able to establish a prima
facie case in his favor tending to show
his exclusive ownership of the parcel of
land under TCT No. T-125918 with an
area of 5,657 square meters, which
included the 352-square meter subject
lot. From the records, it appears that TCT In light of Rogelio’s outright denial of The concept of “preponderance of
No. T-125918 is a derivative of TCT No. the oral sale together with his insistence evidence” refers to evidence which is of
T-256228, which covered a bigger area of ownership over the subject lot, it greater weight, or more convincing, that
of land measuring 30,000 square meters behooved upon Julio, Jr. to contravene which is offered in opposition to it; at
registered in the name of Emilio Dantis; the former’s claim and convince the bottom, it means probability of truth.19
that Emilio died intestate on November court that he had a valid defense. The
13, 1952; that Emilio’s five heirs, burden of evidence shifted to Julio, Jr. to Julio, Jr. failed to discharge this burden.
including Rogelio, executed an extra- prove that his father bought the subject His pieces of evidence, Exhibit “3” and
judicial partition of estate on December lot from Emilio Dantis. In Jison v. Court Exhibit “4,” cannot prevail over the array
22, 1993 and divided among themselves of Appeals,18 the Court held: of documentary and testimonial evidence
specific portions of the property covered Simply put, he who alleges the that were adduced by Rogelio. The
by TCT No. T-256228, which were affirmative of the issue has the burden of totality of Julio, Jr.’s evidence leaves
already set apart by metes and bounds; proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil much to be desired.
that the land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the case, the burden of proof never parts.
subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315 However, in the course of trial in a civil To begin with, Exhibit “3,” the affidavit
with an area of 5,657 sq. m. went to case, once plaintiff makes out a prima of  Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and,
Rogelio, the property now covered by facie case in his favor, the duty or the thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary
TCT No. T-125918; and that the property burden of evidence shifts to defendant to weight. 
was declared for realty tax purpose in the controvert plaintiff’s prima facie case,
name of Rogelio for which a tax Evidence is hearsay when its probative
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in force depends on the competency and
declaration was issued in his name; and favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil
that the same had not been transferred to credibility of some persons other than the
cases, the party having the burden of witness by whom it is sought to be
anyone else since its issuance. proof must produce a preponderance of produced. The exclusion of hearsay
evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1)
rely on the strength of his own evidence absence of cross-examination; 2) absence
and not upon the weakness of the of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of
defendant’s. oath.20cralawvllred

Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is

merely hearsay evidence where its
affiant/maker did not take the witness
stand.21 The sworn statement of Ignacio contents in some authentic document, or
is of this kind. The affidavit was not by the testimony of witnesses in the
identified and its averments were not order stated.
affirmed by affiant Ignacio. Accordingly,
Exhibit “3” must be excluded from the Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary First, the claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio
judicial proceedings being an evidence is burdened to satisfactorily affixed his signature on the original of
inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) Exhibit “4” in 1953 is highly improbable
be deemed a declaration against interest the execution or existence of the original; because record shows that Emilio died
for the matter to be considered as an (2) the loss and destruction of the even before that year, specifically, on
exception to the hearsay rule because the original or its non-production in court; November 13, 1952.
declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but and (3) the unavailability of the original
is not due to bad faith on the part of the Second, Julio, Jr.’s testimony pertinent to
his father (Ignacio). the alleged loss of the original of Exhibit
proponent/offeror. Proof of the due
execution of the document and its “4” is laden with inconsistencies that
Exhibit “4,” on the other hand, is detract from his credibility. His
considered secondary evidence being a subsequent loss would constitute the
basis for the introduction of secondary testimony bears the earmarks of
mere photocopy which, in this case, falsehood and, hence, not reliable. Julio,
cannot be admitted to prove the contents evidence.23 In MCC Industrial Sales
Corporation v. Ssangyong Jr. testified in this wise:
of the purported undated handwritten
24
receipt. The best evidence rule requires Corporation,  it was held that where the Atty. Roldan Villacorta
that the highest available degree of proof missing document is the foundation of (On Direct examination)
must be produced. For documentary the action, more strictness in proof is
evidence, the contents of a document are required than where the document is only Q:  Mr. Witness, I noticed that this
best proved by the production of the collaterally involved. document marked as Exhibit “4” is only
document itself to the exclusion of a photocopy, where is the original of this
secondary or substitutionary evidence, In the case at bar, Julio, Jr. failed to document?
pursuant to Rule 130, Section 322. prove the due execution of the original of A:  The original was with the
Exhibit “4” as well as its subsequent safekeeping of my parents because of
A secondary evidence is admissible only loss. A nexus of logically related the lapse of time the original was
upon compliance with Rule 130, Section circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.’s misplaced, Sir.26
5, which states that: when the original evidence highly suspect. Also, his
has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be testimony was riddled with The above testimony of Julio, Jr. tends to
produced in court, the offeror, upon improbabilities and contradictions which give the impression that the original of
proof of its execution or existence and tend to erode his credibility and raise the document was lost while it was in the
the cause of its unavailability without doubt on the veracity of his evidence. possession of his parents. During cross-
bad faith on his part, may prove its
contents by a copy, or by a recital of its
examination, however, he testified that it Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew or contract of sale are: a) consent or
was lost while it was in his possession. read Exhibit “4,” much less saw it meeting of the minds, that is, consent to
executed, was presented. transfer ownership in exchange for the
Atty. Vicente Millora price; b) determinate subject matter; and
(On Cross-examination) c) price certain in money or its
equivalent.35 
Q:  x x x Where did you keep that In the absence of any shred of
document? corroborative evidence, the Court cannot The absence of any of the essential
A:  I was the one keeping that help but entertain doubts on the elements shall negate the existence of a
document because I live in different truthfulness of Julio, Jr.’s naked perfected contract of sale.36cralawvllred
places, [the said] it was lost or assertion.
misplaced, Sir. Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that sale by a receipt when it should be the
Q:  In other words, it was lost while the Exhibit “4” is admissible in evidence, receipt that should further corroborate
same was in your possession?? there will still be no valid and perfected the existence of the sale. At best, his
A:  Yes, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied) oral contract for failure of Julio, Jr. to testimony only alleges but does not
prove the concurrence of the essential prove the existence of the verbal
Still, later, Julio, Jr. claimed that his requisites of a contract of sale by agreement. Julio, Jr. miserably failed to
sister was the one responsible for the loss adequate and competent evidence. establish by preponderance of evidence
of the original of Exhibit “4” after that there was a meeting of the minds of
borrowing the same from him. By the contract of sale, one of the the parties as to the subject matter and
contracting parties obligates himself to the purchase price.
Third, it is quite strange that two receipts transfer the ownership of, and to deliver,
were prepared for the initial payment of a determinate thing, and the other to pay The chief evidence of Julio, Jr. to
P100.00 in connection with the sale of therefor a price certain in money or its substantiate the existence of the oral
the subject lot. The Court notes that the equivalent.32 A contract of sale is a contract of sale is Exhibit “4.”  For a
contents of Exhibit “4” were similar to consensual contract and, thus, is better understanding and resolution of
those of Annex “A”31 of Julio, Jr.’s perfected by mere consent which is the issue at hand, Exhibit “4” is being
Answer, dated June 9, 2002.  Annex “A,” manifested by the meeting of the offer reproduced here:
however, was typewritten and the name and the acceptance upon the thing and
of the recipient indicated therein was a the cause which are to constitute the A perusal of the above document would
certain Cornelio A. Dantis, whose contract.33 Until the contract of sale is readily show that it does not specify a
identity and participation in the alleged perfected, it cannot, as an independent determinate subject matter. Nowhere
sale was never explained. source of obligation, serve as a binding does it provide a description of the
juridical relation between the property subject of the sale, including its
34
Fourth, apart from the lone testimony of parties.  The essential elements of a metes and bounds, as well as its total
area. The Court notes that while Julio, Jr. this Court
testified that the land subject of the sale ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
consisted of 352 square meters, Exhibit
“4,” however, states that it’s more than
400 square meters. Moreover, Exhibit
“4” does not categorically declare the
price certain in money. Neither does it
state the mode of payment of the
purchase price and the period for its
payment.
Such being the situation, it cannot, The CA held that partial performance of
THEREFORE, THERE IS NO therefore, be said that a definite and firm the contract of sale – giving of a
PERFECTED CONTRACT OF SALE sales agreement between the parties had downpayment coupled with the delivery
BETWEEN EMILIO AND JULIO. been perfected over the lot in question. of the res - took the oral contract out of
Indeed, this Court has already ruled the scope of the Statute of Frauds. This
In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of before that a definite agreement on the conclusion arose from its erroneous
Appeals,37 the Court ruled that the manner of payment of the purchase price finding that there was a perfected
manner of payment of the purchase price is an essential element in the formation contract of sale. The above disquisition,
was an essential element before a valid of a binding and enforceable contract of however, shows that there was none.
and binding contract of sale could exist. sale. The fact, therefore, that the There is, therefore, no basis for the
Albeit the Civil Code does not explicitly petitioners delivered to the respondent application of the Statute of Frauds. The
provide that the minds of the contracting the sum of P10,000.00 as part of the application of the Statute of Frauds
parties must also meet on the terms or down-payment that they had to pay presupposes the existence of a perfected
manner of payment of the price, the same cannot be considered as sufficient proof contract.42 As to the delivery of the res, it
is needed, otherwise, there is no of the perfection of any purchase and does not appear to be a voluntary one
sale.38 An agreement anent the manner of sale agreement between the parties pursuant to the purported sale.  If Julio,
payment goes into the price so much so herein under Art. 1482 of the new Civil Jr. happened to be there, it was because
that a disagreement on the manner of Code, as the petitioners themselves admit his ancestors tenanted the land.  It must
payment is tantamount to a failure to that some essential matter – the terms of be noted that when Julio, Jr. built his
agree on the price.39 Further, in Velasco payment – still had to be mutually house, Rogelio protested.
v. Court of Appeals,40 where the parties covenanted.41
already agreed on the object of sale and
on the purchase price, but not on how
and when the downpayment and the
installment payments were to be paid,
 Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Batangas Kanluran ay Marcos at Fortunato Banaag
City, Branch 7. may luwang na 31,781 metros
kuwadrados humigit kumulang at may
balor amiliorada na halagang ₱950.00,
lalong kilala sa Lote 9046 ng sukat
katastro dito sa Batangas.2

FELINO EBREO, SPOUSES

ANTONIO and EVELYN P. From plaintiffs’ account in their Pursuant to the subdivision made by their
BERAÑA, IGNACIO EBREO and complaint, Felipe Ebreo died intestate in father Felipe, Lot No. 9046 was
ELEUTERIA CUETO, Petitioners, 1926 leaving behind as heirs his five subdivided into six lots identified as Lots
vs. children, Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio, A, B, C, D, E and F.3 lawph!l.net
GIL EBREO, represented by His and Felipa.1 Subsequently, Felipa died
Attorney-in-Fact, FELIXBERTO leaving behind her heirs, Genoveva, On 11 September 1967, the five heirs of
EBREO, FLAVIANO EBREO and Homobono and Eleuteria all surnamed Felipe Ebreo, through themselves and
HOMOBONO CUETO, Respondents. Cueto. Genoveva died in 1991 without their representatives, executed and
any issue. Defendants-spouses Antonio signed a document entitled, "Kasulatan
Does an annotation in a tax declaration Ebreo and Evelyn Beraña are the son and ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa"4 where they
of an alleged Deed of Sale sufficiently daughter-in-law, respectively, of extrajudicially partitioned the above-
prove conveyance of title to a property? defendant Felino, one of the five children described property except the portion
This is the issue presented to Us in the of Felipe Ebreo. known as Lot No. 9046-F. As agreed
present petition. upon by these heirs, Lot No. 9046-F,
Felipe Ebreo left to his children an with an area of 13,799 square meters,
A Complaint dated 04 January 1994, untitled parcel of land situated in shall remain under the co-ownership of
docketed as Civil Case No. 4132 for Barangay Sampaga, Batangas City, more Gil, Flaviano, Felino, Ignacio and the
Partition, Reconveyance, Accounting and particularly described as follows: heirs of Felipa Ebreo. However,
Damages, was filed by Gil Ebreo, plaintiffs were surprised to discover that
represented by his Attorney-in-Fact Isang palagay na lupang palayanin o Lot 9046-F was declared for taxation
Felixberto Ebreo, Flaviano Ebreo and linangin ipinamumuwis sa ilalim ng Tax purposes in the name of defendant
Homobono Cueto against petitioners Declaration No. 39949 S-1953, na ang Antonio Ebreo. Based on plaintiffs’
Felino Ebreo, Spouses Antonio Ebreo mga karatig sa Ilaya ay Prudencia Coz, recitals, they alleged that they never sold,
and Evelyn P. Beraña-Ebreo, Ignacio sa Silangan ay Pablo Cantro at Santiago ceded, conveyed or transferred their
Ebreo and Eleuteria Cueto before the Banaag, sa ibaba ay Ilat (Creek) at sa
rights, share and co-ownership over Lot No. 4042 was cancelled and a new one, Ebreo. The Deed of Absolute Sale or
9046- F. Tax Declaration No. 50669,8 for the year "Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa"10 was duly
1977, was issued in the name of Antonio executed and ratified before one
Answering the complaint, the defendants Ebreo. Attorney Meynardo L. Atienza.
countered that after the execution of the
Kasulatan ng Pagbabahagi ng Lupa, by RTC: Ordering the parties-in-interest
and among the heirs of the late Felipe (heirs of Felipe Ebreo and/or their
Ebreo, Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs representatives) to partition Lot No.
to Santiago Puyo. By virtue of this sale, 9046-F among themselves by proper
the corresponding Real Property Tax instruments of conveyance under Sec. 2,
Declaration was transferred in the name Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
of Santiago Puyo as owner. However, Procedure, and in default thereof, the
the deed of sale evidencing this partition shall be conducted in
transaction was never presented. This Tax Declaration was later on accordance with Sec. 3, et. seq., of the
revised and cancelled by Tax Declaration same Rule.
As narrated by the defendants, Tax No. 075-534 upon the marriage of
Declaration No. 39241,5 beginning in the defendant Antonio Ebreo to defendant CA: denied the appeal for lack of merit
year 1969 covering Lot 9046-F was Evelyn Beraña. and affirmed in toto the decision of the
under the names of the heirs of Felipe trial court.
Ebreo. Thereafter, upon the sale of the From 1977 up to 1994, defendants-
lot by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to spouses Antonio Ebreo and Evelyn ISSUE:
Santiago Puyo, Tax Declaration No. Beraña religiously paid the taxes due on
39241 was cancelled and a new one, Tax the land.9 WHETHER OR NOT A VALID
Declaration No. 482216 dated 15 January TRANSFER OF LOT NO. 9046-F
1973, was issued in the name of Santiago Defendants further alleged that the Deed WAS EFFECTED WHICH
Puyo. of Absolute Sale of Lot No. 9046-F by CONVEYED OWNERSHIP OF THE
the heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago PROPERTY TO SANTIAGO PUGO.
On this tax declaration, the alleged sale Puyo was executed and ratified sometime
of Lot 9046-F by the Heirs of Felipe in 1968 before Attorney Doroteo M. RULING:
Ebreo to Santiago Puyo was annotated. Chavez of Batangas City. From 1968 to
Soon, Tax Declaration No. 48221 was 1976, Mr. Santiago Puyo possessed said NO.
cancelled by Tax Declaration No. lot peacefully, continuously, publicly and
40427 for the year 1974, still in the name in the concept of owner. As stated TAX DECLARATION
of Santiago Puyo. Upon the sale by earlier, on 23 July 1976, Lot No. 9046-F The mere fact that the disputed property
Santiago Puyo of Lot 9046- F to Antonio was sold by Santiago Puyo by way of may have been declared for taxation
Ebreo on 23 July 1976, Tax Declaration Absolute Sale, to defendant Antonio purposes in the name of the petitioners
does not necessarily prove ownership. absence of the said document, the
Neither does the payment of taxes exhortations of petitioners regarding the Both the testimonies of Asuncion
conclusively prove ownership of the land existence of said deed of sale must fail. Aguado and Antonio Ebreo lacked the
paid for.22 It is merely an indicium of a legal underpinning needed to prove the
claim of ownership. deed of sale. Their testimonies were not
To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan,
recollection of witnesses who saw the
Felino Ebreo and Asuncion Aguado are
The typewritten entry on Tax Decl. No. execution and delivery of the document.
at most secondary evidence; hence, they
48221 (Exhs. “9” and “9-A”) detailing
are inadmissible considering that the
the particulars of the alleged deed of sale
petitioners, as offerors of the Deed of
in favor of Santiago Puyo is patently
Sale, thereof failed to prove any of the
suspicious and a very very poor ersatz
exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule
for the primary document. While the sale
130 of the Rules of Court a
allegedly took place in 1967, said deed
nd to establish conditions for their
was annotated on Exh. “9” which According to Sec. 4, Rule 130, the
admissibility.30 Even if they are
however only “begins with the year contents of the lost writing may be
admitted, they have no probative value.
1973.” Moreover, while the alleged sale proved, inter alia, by the recollection of
took place in 1967, yet Tax. Decl. No. witnesses.
Under this rule, it is axiomatic that
32941 (Exh. “10”) that was issued on
before a party is allowed to adduce
Feb. 7, 1968 still carried the names of As matters stand, however, Aguado’s
secondary evidence to prove the contents
Gil, Flaviano, Felino and Ignacio, all testimony relates not to the execution of
of the original of a deed or document, the
EBREO and Genoveva, Eleuteria and the document but to what her father
party has to prove with the requisite
Homobono, all CUETO and not the (Santiago Puyo) did with the property
quantum of evidence, the loss or
name of Santiago Puyo.\ after it was already acquired. (t.s.n. pp.
destruction or unavailability of all the
4-7, Direct, May 17, 1995)
copies of the original of the said deed or
It is self-evident that the seller cannot
document.
transfer more than what he has or as Similarly, Antonio Ebreo’s testimony
Indeed, before a party is allowed to
oftenly stated hyperbolically, the river does not refer to the execution and
adduce secondary evidence to prove the
cannot rise above its source. delivery of the deed of sale but of having
contents of the original of the deed, the
allegedly seen said document when he
offeror is mandated to prove the
Tax declaration is not sufficient proof of purchased the lot from Santiago Puyo.
following: “(a) the execution and
the transfer of property and inasmuch as He testified that “when I bought it from
existence of the original (b) the loss and
the subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, Santiago Puyo, he brought with him the
destruction of the original or its non-
it was incumbent on the petitioners to Tax Declaration in the name of Santiago
production in court; and (c)
adduce in evidence the original or a copy Puyo as well as the deed of sale between
unavailability of the original is not due to
of the deed consistent with Section 3, my father and his brothers and Santiago
bad faith on the part of the offeror.”
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the Puyo.” (t.s.n. pp. 13-14, Direct, Aug. 16,
1995). In fine, they were not witnesses to before Atty. Doroteo Chavez in Batangas the annotation in Tax Declaration No.
the execution and delivery of the City. Santiago Puyo caused the transfer 48221.
document of sale to qualify their of the tax declaration in his name and
testimonies under the phrase caused the sale to be annotated therein. It is worth noting that Antonio Pajilan,
“recollection of witnesses.” Only this annotation in the tax an employee of the City Assessor’s
declaration was offered as proof of the Office of Batangas City20 who testified
Neither does the testimony of Felino sale. Santiago Puyo took possession, regarding Tax Declaration No. 48221
Ebreo evoke faith and confidence. His cultivated the land, exercised dated 15 January 1973 on which was
salutary recollection of the missing uninterrupted ownership and paid real annotated the alleged sale between the
document failed to instill credulity. For estate taxes thereon for a period of eight heirs of Felipe Ebreo to Santiago Puyo,
one, it was uncorroborated by any of the years. was employed in the said office only in
parties to the alleged deed of sale. the year 1978. Thus, he did not make nor
In fact, such sale was directly Petitioners went on further to state that did he witness the causing of the
controverted by his supposed co-sellers the Deed of Sale from the heirs of Felipe annotation as he was not yet employed in
and co-owners Giland Flaviano. Ebreo to Santiago Puyo could not be the said office at that time. Likewise, he
presented because the copy on file with was neither present when the deed of sale
Finally, Felino Ebreo’s claim that he the Office of the City Assessor was lost was executed nor did he personally see
could not produce it because it was in the fire which occurred in 23 May the said deed of sale. For these reasons,
borrowed by his niece Eleuteria Cueto 1979 that gutted the building housing the testimony of Pajilan is inconclusive.
and never returned to him was squarely their office. From then on, petitioners
refuted by said Eleuteria Cueto when she advance that they have paid the real Petitioners next argue that Tax
testified in rebuttal for the plaintiffs. estate taxes on the land and were in open, Declaration No. 48221 in the name of
continous and uninterrupted possession Santiago Puyo enjoys the presumption of
until the Complaint for Partition, regularity in its issuance. It is a good
The defendant-appellants rely on the Deed of Reconveyance and Damages was filed by time as any to re-state that this rule is a
Sale supposedly executed by the heirs of the Respondents. mere presumption, not absolute nor
Felipe Ebreo in favor of Santiago Puyo. inflexible and applies only in the absence
However, defendant-appellants failed to On the basis of the above narrations, of proof to the contrary.21 Besides, the
produce the alleged Deed of Sale in violation
of the Best Evidence Rule. petitioners insist that there was a valid mere fact that the disputed property may
transfer of the lot from the heirs of Felipe have been declared for taxation purposes
As recounted by defendants, now Ebreo to Santiago Puyo, and thereafter in the name of the petitioners does not
petitioners, Antonio and Evelyn Ebreo, from Santiago Puyo to them. To buttress necessarily prove ownership. In the same
Lot 9046-F was sold by the heirs of this claim of sale by the heirs to Santiago manner, neither does the payment of
Felipe Ebreo initially to Santiago Puyo Puyo, petitioners presented the testimony taxes conclusively prove ownership of
sometime in 1967 or 1968 as evidenced of Antonio Pajilan of the City Assessors the land paid for.22 It is merely an
by a deed of sale executed and ratified Office of Batangas City who testified on indicium of a claim of ownership.23
Petitioners also presented the testimony at most secondary evidence; hence, they the general result of the whole;
of Felino Ebreo, father of petitioner are inadmissible considering that the and
Antonio Ebreo, who testified that the petitioners, as offerors of the Deed of
heirs of Felipe Ebreo sold Lot 9046 –F to Sale, thereof failed to prove any of the (d) When the original is a public
Santiago Puyo.24 When queried on the exceptions provided in Section 3, Rule record in the custody of a public
whereabouts of the document of sale, 130 of the Rules of Court and to officer or is recorded in a public
Felino alleged that it was borrowed by establish conditions for their office.
30
his niece Eleuteria Cueto who is the admissibility.  Even if they are admitted,
daughter of one of the heirs, Felipa they have no probative value.31 This rule
Ebreo.25 According to Felino, Eleuteria provides:
refused to return the document and even
got angry when he tried to demand its SEC. 3. Original document must be
return.26 From Felino’s account,27 there produced; exceptions. – When the
are three copies of the missing deed of subject of inquiry is the contents of a
sale. Lamentably, petitioners failed to document, no evidence shall be Under this rule, it is axiomatic that
present any one of them. admissible other than the original before a party is allowed to adduce
document itself except in the following secondary evidence to prove the contents
Finally, petitioners presented Asuncion cases: of the original of a deed or document, the
Aguado, step-daughter of Santiago Puyo, party has to prove with the requisite
who testified that her stepfather Santiago (a) When the original has been quantum of evidence, the loss or
Puyo bought the subject lot from the lost or destroyed, or cannot be destruction or unavailability of all the
Ebreo heirs.28 Similar to Pajilan’s produced in court, without bad copies of the original of the said deed or
testimony, Aguado’s testimony cannot be faith on the part of the offeror; document. As former Supreme Court
given much weight in view of the fact Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran declared:
that save for her bare allegations that Lot (b) When the original is in the
9046-F was purchased by her stepfather custody or under the control of the "Where there are two or more originals,
Santiago Puyo, she was not likewise party against whom the evidence it must appear that all of them have been
present when the deed was executed. In is offered, and the latter fails to lost, destroyed or cannot be produced
her testimony she merely stated that her produce it after reasonable notice; before secondary evidence can be given
stepfather paid taxes for his real estate of any one. For example, a lease was
properties but could not state with (c) When the original consists of executed in duplicate, one being retained
specificity if the payment was made for numerous accounts or other by the lessor and the other by the lessee.
Lot 9056-F.29 documents which cannot be Either copy was, therefore, an original,
examined in court without great and could have been introduced as
To summarize, the testimonies of Pajilan, loss of time and the fact sought to evidence of the contract without the
Felino Ebreo and Asuncion Aguado are be established from them is only production of the other. One of these
originals could not be found. The non- Santiago Puyo sometime in 1967 for 1995). In fine, they were not witnesses to
production of the other was not ₱2,500.00 by virtue of a deed notarized the execution and delivery of the
accounted for it was held that "under before deceased Atty. Doroteo Chavez document of sale to qualify their
these circumstances, the rule is that no merits scant consideration. They were testimonies under the phrase
secondary evidence of the contents of the verbal say-so of interested parties and "recollection of witnesses."
either is admissible until it is shown that attributed acts to a party whose lips had
originals must be accounted for before been sealed by death. Quite evidently, Neither does the testimony of Felino
secondary evidence can be given of any their testimony should be taken cum Ebreo evoke faith and confidence. His
one." grano salis – with a grain of salt. salutary recollection of the missing
document failed to instill credulity. For
Indeed, before a party is allowed to Both the testimonies of Asuncion one, it was uncorroborated by any of the
adduce secondary evidence to prove the Aguado and Antonio Ebreo lacked the parties to the alleged deed of sale. In
contents of the original of the deed, the legal underpinning needed to prove the fact, such sale was directly controverted
offeror is mandated to prove the deed of sale. Their testimonies were not by his supposed co-sellers and co-owners
following: recollection of witnesses who saw the Gil and Flaviano. (t.s.n. pp. 7-8, Direct,
execution and delivery of the document. July 18, 1994; t.s.n. pp. 22-23, Cross,
"(a) the execution and existence of the According to Sec. 4, Rule 130, the Sept. 29, 1994) Then too, it appears
original (b) the loss and destruction of contents of the lost writing may be rather unusual for the heirs to retain Lot
the original or its non-production in proved, inter alia, by the recollection of 9046-F in co-ownership in their partition
court; and (c) unavailability of the witnesses. As matters stand, however, agreement of 1967 and sell the said Lot
original is not due to bad faith on the part Aguado’s testimony relates not to the that very same year (1967) if not on the
of the offeror."32 execution of the document but to what same occasion. Felino Ebreo did not give
her father (Santiago Puyo) did with the the exact date of the supposed sale to
On this score, the factual findings of the property after it was already acquired. Santiago Puyo except to say that it was
trial court are worth repeating. It held: (t.s.n. pp. 4-7, Direct, May 17, 1995) sold in 1967. The Court got the
Similarly, Antonio Ebreo’s testimony impression, though, that it was on the
The pivotal document of sale allegedly does not refer to the execution and same occasion as the partition
executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in delivery of the deed of sale but of having agreement. (t.s.n. pp. 6-7, 14-16, Direct,
favor of Santiago Puyo and chiefly relied allegedly seen said document when he Feb. 28, 1995) More important, his
upon by defendant Antonio Ebreo as the purchased the lot from Santiago Puyo. humanistic bias to favor his son Antonio
derivative basis of his ownership is sadly He testified that "when I bought it from Ebreo and his natural interest to defend
missing and remains a phantom in the Santiago Puyo, he brought with him the his actuations leading to the issuance of
dark. The testimonies of Felino Ebreo, Tax Declaration in the name of Santiago the Tax Decl. 50669 (Exh. "2") which he
Asuncion Aguado and Antonio Ebreo to Puyo as well as the deed of sale between signed caution us to accept his testimony
prove by way of recollection of my father and his brothers and Santiago with great care. He does not have the
witnesses that Lot 9046-F was sold to Puyo." (t.s.n. pp. 13-14, Direct, Aug. 16, cold neutrality of a disinterested party.
He was covetous of gain. The Tax Decl. The typewritten entry on Tax Decl. No. Thirdly, not even Tax Decl. Nos. 50669
No. 50669 that transferred in 1976 the 48221 (Exhs. "9" and "9-A") detailing and 075-534 (Exhs. "2" and "3") of
property in the name of Antonio Ebreo the particulars of the alleged deed of sale Antonio Ebreo carry such annotation to
was signed by Felino Ebreo himself in favor of Santiago Puyo is patently indicate that he acquired the property by
(Exh. "2"). This illustrated a dialectical suspicious and a very very poor ersatz virtue of Doc. No. 70, Page No. 15, Book
connection between him and his favored for the primary document. While the sale No. I, Series of 1976 of the Notarial
son Antonio Ebreo. Finally, Felino allegedly took place in 1967, said deed Register of Atty. Meynardo L. Atienza.
Ebreo’s claim that he could not produce was annotated on Exh. "9" which The pregnant suspicion lurks that the
it because it was borrowed by his niece however only "begins with the year alleged particulars of the document of
Eleuteria Cueto and never returned to 1973." Moreover, while the alleged sale sale from Santiago Puyo to Antonio
him was squarely refuted by said took place in 1967, yet Tax. Decl. No. Ebreo were belatedly annotated.
Eleuteria Cueto when she testified in 32941 (Exh. "10") that was issued on
rebuttal for the plaintiffs. (t.s.n. pp. 9, 12- Feb. 7, 1968 still carried the names of As icing on the cake, Gil Ebreo
13, Direct, Feb. 28, 1995) (See testimony Gil, Flaviano, Felino and Ignacio, all categorically stated it was Felino Ebreo
of Eleuteria Cueto in rebuttal on July 17, EBREO and Genoveva, Eleuteria and who authored the transfer. He testified on
1997) Homobono, all CUETO and not the cross-examination that it was his eldest
name of Santiago Puyo. There even brother Felino Ebreo who was the
While many things have been said about appears thereon the annotation that the caretaker of the lot and in-charge of the
the crucial deed of sale, the decisive 1968 tax was paid on Jan. 29, 1968 – payment of taxes. It was his brother
documentary evidence remains an with no mention of Santiago Puyo Felino who sold the subject lot known as
elusive phantom and conspicuously despite his having allegedly acquired the Lot No. 9046-F in favor of his son
unproven. The ownership of Santiago property the year before (1967). Antonio Ebreo. (t.s.n. pp. 16-17, Cross,
Puyo becomes moreover doubtful July 18, 1994) The evidence tended to
because while the alleged sale was Riveting further its attention to the show that indeed it was Felino Ebreo
executed by the heirs of Felipe Ebreo in typewritten entry on Exh. "9", the Court who had the opportunity to cause the
1967 yet the earliest Tax Declaration in finds it rather strange that such an entry transfer as it was he (Felino) who took
the name of Santiago Puyo was issued appears on the Tax Declaration. Firstly, possession of the lot and acted as its
only in 1973 (Exh. "9") or 1974 (Exh. it is not a widely accepted practice to overseer. (t.s.n. pp. 3-4, Direct, Nov. 17,
"4") as far as the record of this case can make such annotation. Secondly, there is 1994)
reveal. The issuance of a new tax more than meets the eye in the
declaration in the name of the sunrise conspicuous presence of this annotation The alleged document of sale executed
owner (Puyo) which was late by six (6) only on this particular Tax Declaration between Santiago Puyo and Antonio
or seven (7) years naturally cast a slur on (Exh. "9"). All other tax declarations in Ebreo denominated as "Ganap na Bilihan
the veracity of the sale. this case do not have similar entry to ng Lupa" (Exh. "1"), was ineffectual for
identify the documentary basis for the the purpose of transferring ownership of
issuance of the latest tax declaration. disputed Lot No. 9046-F to said Antonio
Ebreo because the alleged vendor transfer of property and inasmuch as the
Santiago Puyo has not, as heretofore subject of inquiry is the Deed of Sale, it
explained, acquired it from the heirs of was incumbent on the petitioners to
Felipe Ebreo as the transaction has no adduce in evidence the original or a copy
supporting document of sale. It is self- of the deed consistent with Section 3,
evident that the seller cannot transfer Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the
more than what he has or as oftenly absence of the said document, the
stated hyperbolically, the river cannot exhortations of petitioners regarding the
rise above its source. Moreover, Clerk of existence of said deed of sale must fail.
Court Jose C. Corales certified that the
Ganap na Bilihan ng Lupa (Doc. No. 70,
Page No. 15, Book No. I, Series of 1976)
despite diligent efforts could not be
found in the old CFI vault located at the
Capitol Building, Batangas City. (Exh.
"E" – Rebuttal)

The fact that tax declarations for Lot

[No.] 9046-F were issued in the name of
defendant Antonio Ebreo (Exhs. "2" and
"3") and that he paid the taxes for the
land (Exh. "8") provides no evidentiary
value that he was the owner thereof. The
existence of the tax declarations and
payment of taxes did not transmogrify
his possession into ownership. Tax
declarations are not sufficient evidence
to prove possession in the concept of
owners. (Martinez, D., Summary of 1990
Supreme Court Rulings, Part. II, p. 734)
Tax receipts are not conclusive evidence
of ownership.33

In sum, considering that the annotation

of the disputed Deed of Sale in a tax
declaration is not sufficient proof of the
 EDSA SHANGRI-LA HOTEL
AND RESORT, INC., RUFO B.
COLAYCO, RUFINO L. In a memorandum-letter dated August
SAMANIEGO, KUOK KHOON 16, 1991 to BF, ESHRI laid out the
CHEN, and KUOK KHOON collection procedure BF was to follow, to From May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, BF
TSEN, petitioners, wit: (1) submission of the progress submitted a total of 19 progress billings
vs. billing to ESHRI's Engineering following the procedure agreed upon.
BF CORPORATION, respondent. Department; (2) following-up of the Based on Progress Billing Nos. 1 to 13,
preparation of the Progress Payment ESHRI paid BF PhP 86,501,834.05.7
Before us are these two (2) consolidated Certificate with the Head of the Quantity
petitions for review under Rule 45 to Surveying Department; and (3) However, According to BF, ESHRI, for
nullify certain issuances of the Court of following-up of the release of the Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, did not
Appeals (CA). payment with one Evelyn San Pascual. re-measure the work done, did not
BF adhered to the procedures agreed prepare the Progress Payment
Both petitions stemmed from a upon in all its billings for the period from Certificates, let alone remit payment for
construction contract denominated May 1, 1991 to June 30, 1992, the inclusive periods covered. In this
as Agreement for the Execution of submitting for the purpose the required regard, BF claimed having been misled
Builder's Work for the EDSA Shangri-la Builders Work Summary, the monthly into working continuously on the project
Hotel Project4 that ESHRI and BF progress billings, including an evaluation by ESHRI which gave the assurance
executed for the construction of the of the work in accordance with the about the Progress Payment Certificates
EDSA Shangri-la Hotel starting May 1, Project Manager's Instructions (PMIs) already being processed.
1991. Among other things, the contract and the detailed valuations contained in
stipulated for the payment of the contract the Work Variation Orders (WVOs) for After several futile attempts to collect the
price on the basis of the work final re-measurement under the PMIs. unpaid billings, BF filed, on July 26,
accomplished as described in the BF said that the values of the Work 1993, before the RTC a suit for a sum of
monthly progress billings. Under this Variation Orders were contained in the money and damages.
arrangement, BF shall submit a monthly progress billings under the section
progress billing to ESHRI which would "Change Orders.6 In its defense, ESHRI claimed having
then re-measure the work accomplished overpaid BF for Progress Billing Nos. 1
and prepare a Progress Payment to 13 and, by way of counterclaim with
Certificate for that month's progress damages, asked that BF be ordered to
billing.5 refund the excess payments. ESHRI also
charged BF with incurring delay and
turning up with inferior work
accomplishment.
RTC: ruled in favor of BF

According to the RTC, ESHRI's refusal

to pay BF's valid claims constituted
evident bad faith entitling BF to moral ISSUE: The SC agrees with BF which averred
damages and attorney's fees. having complied with the laying-the-
WHETHER OR NOT BF basis requirement. Defending the action
CA: affirmed RTC in toto. COMPLIED WITH THE LAYING- of the courts below in admitting into
THE- BASIS REQUIREMENT FOR evidence the photocopies of the
The CA predicated its ruling on the THE ADMISSION OF THE documents aforementioned, BF
interplay of two main reasons. First, the PHOTOCOPIES AS SECONDARY explained that it could not present the
issues the parties raised in their EVIDENCE. original of the documents since they
respective briefs were, for the most part, were in the possession of ESHRI which
factual and evidentiary. Thus, there is no RULING: refused to hand them over to BF despite
reason to disturb the case disposition of requests.
the RTC, inclusive of its award of YES.
damages and attorney's fees and the We agree with BF. The only actual rule
reasons underpinning the award. Second, Admissibility of Photocopies of that the term "best evidence" denotes is
BF had sufficiently established its case Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19, the rule requiring that the original of a
by preponderance of evidence. Part of PMIs and WVOs writing must, as a general proposition, be
what it had sufficiently proven relates to produced17 and secondary evidence of its
ESHRI being remiss in its obligation to Petitioners fault the CA, and necessarily contents is not admissible except where
re-measure BF's later work the trial court, on the matter of the the original cannot be had under Rule
accomplishments and pay the same. On admission in evidence of the photocopies 130, Section 3 particulary subsection b of
the other hand, ESHRI had failed to of Progress Billing Nos. 14 to 19 and the the Rules of Court enunciates the best
prove the basis of its disclaimer from complementing PMIs and the WVOs. evidence rule:
liability, such as its allegation on the According to petitioners, BF, before
defective work accomplished by BF. being allowed to adduce in evidence the SEC. 3. Original document must
photocopies adverted to, ought to have be produced; exceptions. - When
laid the basis for the presentation of the the subject of inquiry is the
photocopies as secondary evidence, contents of a document, no
conformably to the best evidence rule. evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself,
except in the following cases:
 (a) When the original has original is lost or destroyed, but also documents and I am referring
been lost or destroyed, or when it is in the custody or under the specifically to the Progress Payment
cannot be produced in control of the adverse party. In either Certificates. We requested your Honor,
court, without bad faith on instance, however, certain explanations that in order that plaintiff [BF] be
the part of the offeror; must be given before a party can resort to allowed to present secondary original,
secondary evidence. that opposing counsel first be given
(b) When the original is opportunity to present the originals
in the custody or under According to the SC, the trial court which are in their possession. May we
the control of the party correctly allowed the presentation of the know if they have brought the originals
against whom the photocopied documents in question as and whether they will present the
evidence is offered, and secondary evidence. According to the originals in court, Your Honor.
the latter fails to produce exhanges between the counsel of BF and (Emphasis added.)
it after reasonable notice; ESHRI, the counsel for BF informed that
(Emphasis added.) some of the originals are in ESHRI’s ATTY. AUTEA:
possession.
Complementing the above provision is We have already informed our client
Sec. 6 of Rule 130, which reads: Any suggestion that BF failed to lay the about the situation, your Honor, that it
required basis for presenting the has been claimed by plaintiff that some
SEC. 6. When original document photocopies of Progress Billing Nos. 14 of the originals are in their possession
is in adverse party's custody or to 19 instead of their originals has to be and our client assured that, they will try
control. - If the document is in the dismissed. The stenographic notes of the to check. Unfortunately, we have not
custody or under control of the following exchanges between Atty. heard from our client, Your Honor.
adverse party, he must have Andres and Atty. Autea, counsel for BF
reasonable notice to produce it. If and ESHRI, respectively, reveal that BF As such, from the exchanges between the
after such notice and after had complied with the requirements: counsels, it can be concluded that there
satisfactory proof of its existence, was:
he fails to produce the document, ATTY. ANDRES:
secondary evidence may be (1) the existence of the original
presented as in the case of loss. During the previous hearing of this case, documents which ESHRI had possession
your Honor, likewise, the witness of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to
Secondary evidence of the contents of a testified that certain exhibits namely, the produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was
written instrument or document refers to Progress Payment Certificates and the afforded sufficient time to produce them;
evidence other than the original Progress Billings the originals of these and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to
instrument or document itself.18 A party documents were transmitted to ESHRI, produce them.
may present secondary evidence of the all the originals are in the possession of
contents of a writing not only when the ESHRI since these are internal
Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in The offeror must prove that he has funds without awaiting the final outcome
this case fall under the exception under done all in his power to secure the of the main case. For ease of reference,
Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. In other words, the best evidence by giving notice to we reproduce what the appellate court
conditions sine qua non for the the said party to produce the pertinently wrote in its Resolution of
presentation and reception of the document. The notice may be in August 13, 1999:
photocopies of the original document as the form of a motion for the
secondary evidence have been met. production of the original or made
These are: (1) there is proof of the in open court in the presence of
original document's execution or the adverse party
existence; (2) there is proof of the cause or via a subpoena duces tecum,
of the original document's unavailability; provided that the party in custody
and (3) the offeror is in good of the original has sufficient time
faith.19 While perhaps not on all fours to produce the same. When such
because it involved a check, what the party has the original of the
Court said in Magdayao v. People, is writing and does not voluntarily
very much apt, thus: offer to produce it or refuses to
produce it, secondary evidence
x x x To warrant the admissibility may be admitted.20 (Emphasis
of secondary evidence when the supplied.)
original of a writing is in the
custody or control of the adverse On the Restitution of the Garnished
party, Section 6 of Rule 130 Funds
provides that the adverse party
must be given reasonable notice, We now come to the propriety of the
that he fails or refuses to produce restitution of the garnished funds. As
the same in court and that the petitioners maintain, the CA effectively,
offeror offers satisfactory proof of but erroneously, prevented restitution of
its existence. ESHRI's improperly garnished funds
when it nullified its own August 13,
xxxx 1999 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No.
43187. In this regard, petitioners invite
The mere fact that the original of attention to the fact that the restitution of
the writing is in the custody or the funds was in accordance with this
control of the party against whom Court's final and already executory
it is offered does not warrant the decision in G.R. No. 132655, implying
admission of secondary evidence. that ESHRI should be restored to its own
 REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, vs DEVELOPMENT
RESOURCES CORPORATION, On April 5, 1993 petitioner Republic,
represented by Carlos Chua and THE acting through the Office of the Solicitor
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO General, filed a complaint before the The RTC ruled that LC Map 47 has no
CITY.. Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao probative value because: (1) the copy
City2 for cancellation of TCT 44671 and presented in court was a reproduction
Eighty-seven years ago on October 14, TCT 44675 and for the reversion of Lots and not the original or certified copy; and
1922 the Court of First Instance of 1 and 5 of Pcs-16678 to the public (2) it does not show that the land was
Davao, sitting as cadastral court, domain. The Republic claimed that no declared alienable and disposable only as
adjudicated Lot 544 of Cad-102 in valid title vested in 1922 on Antonio of August 6, 1923; rather that it was
Davao City, consisting of 260,818 square Matute, respondent DRC's predecessor, certified on that date.8
meters, in favor of Antonio Matute. because all of Lot 544 from which the
Three years later, or on December 15, two lots came was still a public forest CA: affirmed in toto.
1925 the Register of Deeds issued and inalienable on October 14,
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) 493 1922.3 The Republic asserted that only ISSUE:
to him by virtue of Decree 195328. Since on August 6, 1923 was Lot 544 declared
then, several transfer certificates of title alienable based on LC Map 47.4 The WHETHER OR NOT THE LC MAP 47
(TCTs) derived from OCT 493 were Republic presented a certification to this HAS A PROBATIVE VALUE.
issued, including TCT 44671, effect from the Department of
covering Lot 1 of Pcs-16678, with an Environment and Natural Resources RULING:
area of 36,485 sq m and TCT 44675, (DENR).5 
covering Lot 5 also of Pcs-16678 with an NO.
area of 33,415 sq m, both in the name of DRC, on the other hand, contended that
its two lots could no longer be reverted Since a complaint for reversion can upset
respondent Development Resources
to the public domain because they are the stability of registered titles through
Corporation (DRC).1
now private properties held by the cancellation of the original title and
purchasers in good faith.6 the others that emanate from it, the State
bears a heavy burden of proving the
RTC: dismissed the complaint, holding ground for its action.11 
that the Republic failed to prove that the
subject lots were still part of the public In the case at bar, the Republic fails to
domain when the same were adjudicated discharge such burden.
to Antonio Matute.7 
For one, it failed to present the original
or a certified true copy of LC Map 47 but
only its electronic reproduction,12 which
has no probative value.13

The Court held in SAAD Agro-

Industries, Inc. v. Republic of the Furthermore, the RTC below correctly As such, the RTC and CA correctly
Philippines14 that a mere photocopy of an held that LC Map 47 does not state on its dismissed the subject reversion suit for
LC Map is not a competent evidence of face that Lot 544 became alienable and failure of the Republic to discharge its
the existence of such map. While disposable only on the date appearing on evidential burden.
evidence is admissible when the original that Map, namely, on August 6, 1923,
of a document is in the custody of a about 10 months after Lots 1 and 5 of WHEREFORE, the petition
public officer or is recorded in a public Pcs-16678 of the Davao Cadastre were is DENIED for lack of merit.
office, as in this case, there is a need to adjudicated to Antonio Matute. The
present a certified copy of it issued by DENR certification17 has no additional
the public officer having custody of the value since it was just based on the same
document to prove its map.
contents.ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
In Sta. Monica Industrial and
The Republic of course claims that its Development Corporation v. Court of
version of LC Map 47 should be Appeals,18 the Republic offered in
regarded as the original itself because it evidence LC Map 2427 to prove that at
was the official copy of the region the time the land was decreed to the
furnished by the National Mapping and original owner, it had not yet been
Resources Inventory Authority where the released and still fell within the forest
original is kept.15 But, as admitted by zone. The Court did not, however, give
Crisanto Galo, the Land Evaluation credence to the LC map because it did
Coordinator for DENR Region XI, the not conclusively state the actual
copy they presented was neither marked classification of the land at the time it
nor certified as a reproduction of the was adjudicated to the original owner. It
original.16 Hence, it cannot be considered does not help the Republic's case that the
as an official copy, more so an original subject lots were part of a cadastral
copy. survey initiated by the Government to
encourage titling of the lands in Davao
by those in legitimate possession.
 Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, exclusion of the whole world including
namely: LOLITA GABATAN, respondent.
POMPEYO GABATAN, It was also claimed that prior to her
PEREGRINO GABATAN, death Hermogena demanded for the Petitioners clarified that Jesus Jabinis
REYNALDO GABATAN, NILA return of the land but to no avail. After and Catalino Acantilado have no interest
GABATAN AND JESUS JABINIS, Hermogena’s death, respondent also did in the subject land; the former is merely
RIORITA GABATAN TUMALA and the same but petitioners refused to heed the husband of Teofilo’s daughter while
FREIRA GABATAN, Petitioners, the numerous demands to surrender the the latter is just a caretaker. Petitioners
vs. subject property. According to added that a similar case was previously
Hon. COURT OF APPEALS and respondent, when Teofilo and his wife filed by respondent against Teofilo’s
LOURDES EVERO died, petitioners Jesus Jabinis and wife, Rita Vda. de Gabatan, on February
PACANA, Respondents. Catalino Acantilado took possession of 21, 1978, docketed as Civil Case No.
the disputed land despite respondent’s 5840 but the case was dismissed on May
Subject of the present controversy is a demands for them to vacate the same. 3, 1983 for lack of interest. Finally,
1.1062 hectare parcel of land, identified petitioners contended that the complaint
as Lot 3095 C-5 and situated at In their answer, petitioners denied that lacks or states no cause of action or, if
Calinugan, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro respondent’s mother Hermogena was the there was any, the same has long
City. This lot was declared for taxation daughter of Juan Gabatan with Laureana prescribed and/or has been barred by
in the name of Juan Gabatan. In the Clarito and that Hermogena or laches.
complaint before the RTC, respondent respondent is the rightful heir of Juan
Pacana alleged that she is the sole owner Gabatan. On June 20, 1989, the complaint was
of Lot 3095 C-5, having inherited the amended wherein the heirs of Teofilo
same from her deceased mother, Petitioners maintained that Juan Gabatan were individually named, to wit: Lolita
Hermogena Gabatan Evero died single in 1934 and without any issue Gabatan, Pompeyo Gabatan, Peregrino
(Hermogena). and that Juan was survived by one Gabatan, Reynaldo Gabatan, Nila
brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo Gabatan and Jesus Jabinis, Riorita
Respondent further claimed that her (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest), Gabatan Tumal and Freira Gabatan.
mother, Hermogena, is the only child of Macaria and Justa. These siblings and/or
Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana their heirs, inherited the subject land On July 30, 1990, petitioners filed an
Clarito. Respondent alleged that upon the from Juan Gabatan and have been in amended answer, additionally alleging
death of Juan Gabatan, Lot 3095 C-5 was actual, physical, open, public, adverse, that the disputed land was already
entrusted to his brother, Teofilo Gabatan continuous and uninterrupted possession covered by OCT No. P-3316 in the name
(Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita thereof in the concept of owners for more of the heirs of Juan Gabatan represented
Gabatan, for administration. than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the by petitioner Riorita Gabatan (Teofilo’s
fruits of the improvements thereon, to the daughter).
RTC: in favor of Pacana they acknowledged Hermogena’s status
as the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
CA: affirmed in toto

Discounting petitioners’ argument that

respondent is not related to Juan Applying Section 38, Rule 1306 of the
Gabatan, the CA declared that Rules of Court on the declaration against ISSUE:
respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan interest, the CA ruled that petitioners
Gabatan was sufficiently established could not deny that even their very own WHETHER OR NOT PACANA WAS
during trial. Thus, the CA echoed a long father, Teofilo formally recognized THE SOLE HEIR OF GABATAN.
line of jurisprudence that findings of fact Hermogena’s right to heirship from Juan
of the trial court are entitled to great Gabatan which ultimately passed on to RULING:
weight and are not disturbed except for respondent.
cogent reasons, such as when the NO.
findings of fact are not supported by As to the issue of prescription, the CA
evidence. ruled that petitioners’ possession of the After a meticulous review of the records
disputed property could not ripen into of this case, we find insufficient and
The CA likewise gave weight to the acquisitive prescription because their questionable the basis of the RTC in
Deed of Absolute Sale5 executed by predecessor-in-interest, Teofilo, never conferring upon respondent the status of
Macaria Gabatan de Abrogar, Teofilo, held the property in the concept of an sole heir of Juan Gabatan.
Hermogena and heirs of Justa Gabatan, owner.lawphil.net
wherein Hermogena was identified as an Respondent, in asserting to be entitled to
heir of Juan Gabatan: possession and ownership of the
property, pinned her claim entirely on
x x x HERMOGENA GABATAN, of her alleged status as sole heir of Juan
legal age, married, Filipino citizen and Gabatan. It was incumbent upon her to
presently residing at Kolambugan, Lanao present preponderant evidence in support
del Norte, Philippines, as Heir of the of her complaint.
deceased, JUAN GABATAN; x x x.
Under the Civil Code, the filiation of
To the CA, the Deed of Absolute Sale on legitimate children is established by any
July 30, 1966 containing such of the following:
declaration which was signed by Teofilo
and the latter’s nearest relatives by ART. 265. The filiation of legitimate
consanguinity, is a tangible proof that children is proved by the record of birth
appearing in the Civil Register, or by an Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff and Exhibit
authentic document or a final judgment. "1" for the defendants. Which of this
(sic) is genuine, and which is falsified.
ART. 266. In the absence of the titles These (sic) issue is crucial and requires
indicated in the preceding article, the serious scrutiny.
filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a
legitimate child.

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of

birth, authentic document, final judgment Here, two conflicting birth The Court is of the observation that
or possession of status, legitimate certificates19 of respondent were Exhibit "A" for the plaintiff which is a
filiation may be proved by any other presented at the RTC. Respondent, certified true copy is in due form and
means allowed by the Rules of Court and during her direct testimony, presented bears the "as is and where is" rule. It has
special laws. and identified a purported certified true the impression of the original certificate.
copy of her typewritten birth certificate The forms (sic) is an old one used in the
which indicated that her mother’s maiden 1950’s. Her mother’s maiden name
name was "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." appearing thereof is Hermogina (sic)
Clarito Gabatan. While Exhibit "1", the
Petitioners, on the other hand, presented entries found thereof (sic) is handwritten
a certified true copy of respondent’s which is very unusual and of dubious
handwritten birth certificate which source. The form used is of latest
differed from the copy presented by vintage. The entry on the space for
respondent. Among the differences was mother’s maiden name is Hermogena
respondent’s mother’s full maiden name Calarito. There seems to be an apparent
which was indicated as "Hermogena attempt to thwart plaintiff’s mother
Calarito" in the handwritten birth filiation with the omission of the
certificate. surname Gabatan. Considering these
circumstances alone the Court is inclined
In resolving this particular issue, the to believe that Exhibit "A" for the
regional trial court ruled in this wise: plaintiff is far more genuine and
authentic certificate of live birth.20
The parties are trying to outdo with (sic)
each other by presenting two conflicting Having carefully examined the
Certificate (sic) of Live Birth of plaintiff questioned birth certificates, SC simply
herein, Lourdes Evero Pacana, which are
cannot agree with the above-quoted July 6, 1977" above the signature of Both witnesses testified that: (a) as part
findings of the trial court. Maximo P. Noriga on Exhibit A appear of their official duties they have custody
to be inscribed by the same typewriter as of birth records in their respective
To begin with, Exhibit A, as the trial the very entries in Exhibit A. It would offices,23 and (b) the certified true copy
court noted, was an original typewritten seem that Exhibit A and the information of respondent’s handwritten birth
document, not a mere photocopy or stated therein were prepared and entered certificate is a faithful reproduction of
facsimile. It uses a form of 1950’s only in 1977. the original birth certificate registered in
vintage21 but this Court is unable to their respective offices.24 
concur in the trial court’s finding that
Exhibit 122 was of a later vintage than
Exhibit A which was one of the trial
court’s bases for doubting the Ms. Vidal, during her testimony, even
authenticity of Exhibit 1. On the Significantly, Maximo P. Noriga was brought the original of the handwritten
contrary, the printed notation on the never presented as a witness to identify birth certificate before the trial court and
upper left hand corner of Exhibit 1 states Exhibit A. Said document and the respondent’s counsel confirmed that the
"Municipal Form No. 102 – (Revised, signature of Maximo P. Noriga therein certified true copy (which was eventually
January 1945)" which makes it an older were identified by respondent herself marked as Exhibit 1) was a faithful
form than Exhibit A. Thus, the trial whose self-serving testimony cannot be reproduction of the original.25 Ms. Vidal
court’s finding regarding which form deemed sufficient authentication of her likewise categorically testified that no
was of more recent vintage was birth certificate. other copy of respondent’s birth
manifestly contradicted by the evidence certificate exists in their records except
on record. We cannot subscribe to the trial court’s the handwritten birth certificate.26 Ms.
view that since the entries in Exhibit 1 Cacho, in turn, testified that the original
No actual signature appears on Exhibit were handwritten, Exhibit 1 was the one of respondent’s handwritten birth
A except that of a certain Maximo P. of dubious credibility. Verily, the certificate found in the records of the
Noriga, Deputy Local Civil Registrar of certified true copies of the handwritten NSO Manila (from which Exhibit 8 was
the Office of the Local Civil Registrar, birth certificate of respondent photocopied) was the one officially
Cagayan de Oro City, who purportedly (petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8) were duly transmitted to their office by the Local
certified on July 6, 1977 that Exhibit A authenticated by two competent Civil Registry Office of Cagayan de
was a true copy of respondent’s birth witnesses; namely, Rosita Vidal (Ms. Oro.27 Both Ms. Vidal and Ms. Cacho
certificate. The names of the attendant at Vidal), Assistant Registration Officer of testified and brought their respective
birth (Petra Sambaan) and the local civil the Office of the City Civil Registrar, offices’ copies of respondent’s birth
registrar (J.L. Rivera) in 1950 were Cagayan de Oro City and Maribeth E. certificate in compliance with subpoenas
typewritten with the notation "(Sgd.)" Cacho (Ms. Cacho), Archivist of the issued by the trial court and there is no
also merely typewritten beside their National Statistics Office (NSO), Sta. showing that they were motivated by ill
names. The words "A certified true copy: Mesa, Manila. will or bias in giving their testimonies.
Thus, between respondent’s Exhibit A child. Only in the absence of these two birth. These witnesses based their
and petitioners’ Exhibits 1 and 8, the classes of evidence is the respondent testimony on what they had been told by,
latter documents deserve to be given allowed to present other proof admissible or heard from, others as young children.
greater probative weight. under the Rules of Court of her mother’s Their testimonies were, in a word,
relationship to Juan Gabatan. hearsay.
Even assuming purely for the sake of
argument that the birth certificate However, respondent’s mother’s Other circumstances prevent us from
presented by respondent (Exhibit A) is a (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which giving full faith to respondent’s
reliable document, the same on its face is would have been the best evidence of witnesses’ testimonies. The records
insufficient to prove respondent’s Hermogena’s relationship to Juan would show that they cannot be said to
filiation to her alleged grandfather, Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence be credible and impartial witnesses.
Gabatan. All that Exhibit A, if it had at the RTC. Neither did respondent Frisco Lawan testified that he was the
been credible and authentic, would have present any authentic document or final son of Laureana by a man other than
proven was that respondent’s mother was judgment categorically evidencing Juan Gabatan and was admittedly not at
a certain "Hermogena Clarito Gabatan." Hermogena’s relationship to Juan all related to Juan Gabatan.29 His
It does not prove that same "Hermogena Gabatan. testimony regarding the relationships
Clarito Gabatan" is the daughter of Juan within the Gabatan family is hardly
Gabatan. Even the CA held that the Respondent relied on the testimony of reliable. As for Felicisima Nagac Pacana
conflicting certificates of live birth of her witnesses, Frisco Lawan, Felicisima and Cecilia Nagac Villareal who are
respondent submitted by the parties only Nagac Pacana and Cecilia Nagac children of Justa Gabatan Nagac,30 this
proved the filiation of respondent to Villareal who testified that they Court is wary of according probative
Hermogena.28 personally knew Hermogena weight to their testimonies since
(respondent’s mother) and/or Juan respondent admitted during her cross-
It was absolutely crucial to respondent’s Gabatan, that they knew Juan Gabatan examination that her (respondent’s)
cause of action that she convincingly was married to Laureana Clarito and that husband is the son of Felicisima Nagac
proves the filiation of her mother to Juan Hermogena was the child of Juan and Pacana.31 In other words, although these
Gabatan. To reiterate, to prove the Laureana. However, none of these witnesses are indeed blood relatives of
relationship of respondent’s mother to witnesses had personal knowledge of the petitioners, they are also the mother and
Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the aunt of respondent’s husband. They
best evidence of such familial tie was the the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan cannot be said to be entirely disinterested
record of birth appearing in the Civil and Laureana. They were not yet born or in the outcome of the case.
Register, or an authentic document or a were very young when Juan supposedly
final judgment. In the absence of these, married Laureana or when Hermogena Aside from the testimonies of
respondent should have presented proof was born and they all admitted that none respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC
that her mother enjoyed the continuous of them were present at Juan and and the CA relied heavily on a
possession of the status of a legitimate Laureana’s wedding or Hermogena’s photocopy of a Deed of Absolute
Sale32 (Exhibit H) presented by where the presentation of secondary officer in the local assessor’s office.
respondent and which appeared to be evidence would be allowed, such as Regarding the authentication of public
signed by the siblings and the heirs of the when the original is lost or the original is documents, the Rules of Court38 provide
siblings of Juan Gabatan. In this a public record, the basis for the that the record of public documents,
document involving the sale of a lot presentation of secondary evidence must when admissible for any purpose, may be
different from Lot 3095 C-5, still be established. Thus, in Department evidenced by an official publication
"Hermogena Gabatan as heir of the of Education Culture and Sports v. Del thereof or by a copy attested by the
deceased Juan Gabatan" was indicated as Rosario,37 we held that a party must first officer having legal custody of the
one of the vendors. The RTC deemed the satisfactorily explain the loss of the best record, or by his deputy.39 
statement therein as an affirmation or or primary evidence before he can resort
recognition by Teofilo Gabatan, to secondary evidence.
petitioners’ predecessor in interest, that
Hermogena Gabatan was the heir of Juan
Gabatan.33 The CA considered the same
statement as a declaration against interest A party must first present to the court The attestation of the certifying officer
on the part of Teofilo Gabatan.34 proof of loss or other satisfactory must state, in substance, that the copy is
explanation for non-production of the a correct copy of the original, or a
However, the admission of this Deed of original instrument. specific part thereof, as the case may
Absolute Sale, including its contents and be.40
the signatures therein, as competent In the case at bar, a perusal of the
evidence was vigorously and repeatedly transcript of the testimony of Felicisima To begin with, no proof whatsoever was
objected to by petitioners’ counsel for Nagac Pacana (who identified the presented by respondent that an original
being a mere photocopy and not being photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) of Exhibit H was registered or exists in
properly authenticated.35 After a close plainly shows that she gave no testimony the records of the local assessor’s office.
scrutiny of the said photocopy of the regarding the whereabouts of the Furthermore, the stamped certification of
Deed of Absolute Sale, this Court cannot original, whether it was lost or whether it Honesto P. Velez is insufficient
uphold the admissibility of the same. was recorded in any public office. authentication of Exhibit H since Velez’s
certification did not state that Exhibit H
Under the best evidence rule, when the There is an ostensible attempt to pass off was a true copy from the original. Even
subject of inquiry is the contents of a Exhibit H as an admissible public worse, Velez was not presented as a
document, no evidence shall be document. For this, respondent relied on witness to attest that Exhibit H was a true
admissible other than the original the stamped notation on the photocopy of copy from the original. Indeed, it is
document itself.36  the deed that it is a certified true xerox highly doubtful that Velez could have
copy and said notation was signed by a made such an attestation since the
Although the best evidence rule admits certain Honesto P. Velez, Sr., assessor’s office is not the official
of exceptions and there are instances Assessment Officer, who seems to be an repository of original notarized deeds of
sale and could not have been the legal does not show the filiation of respondent We cannot accept respondent’s flimsy
custodian contemplated in the rules. to either Hermogena Gabatan or Juan reason. It is precisely because Rita
Gabatan. As discussed above, the only Gabatan and her contemporaries (who
It is the notary public who is mandated document that respondent produced to might have personal knowledge of the
by law to keep an original of the Deed of demonstrate her filiation to "Hermogena matters litigated in this case) were
Absolute Sale in his notarial register and Gabatan" (respondent’s Exhibit A) was advancing in age and might soon expire
to forward the same to the proper court. successfully put in doubt by contrary that respondent should have exerted
It is the notary public or the proper court evidence presented by petitioners. every effort to preserve valuable
that has custody of his notarial register evidence and speedily litigate her claim.
that could have produced the original or As for the issue of laches, we are As we held in Republic of the
a certified true copy thereof. Instead, the inclined to likewise rule against Philippines v. Agunoy: "Vigilantibus,
Deed of Absolute Sale was identified by respondent. According to respondent’s sed non dormientibus, jura subveniunt,
Felicisima Nagac Pacana who, despite own testimony,42 Juan Gabatan died the law aids the vigilant, not those who
appearing to be a signatory thereto, is not sometime in 1933 and thus, the cause of sleep on their rights…[O]ne may not
a disinterested witness and as can be action of the heirs of Juan Gabatan to sleep on a right while expecting to
gleaned from her testimony, she had no recover the decedent’s property from preserve it in its pristine purity."47
personal knowledge of the preparation of third parties or to quiet title to their
the alleged certified true copy of the inheritance accrued in 1933. Yet, All in all, this Court finds that
Deed of Absolute Sale. respondent and/or her mother respondent dismally failed to
Hermogena, if they were truly the legal substantiate, with convincing, credible
She did not even know who secured a heirs of Juan Gabatan, did not assert their and independently verifiable proof, her
copy of Exhibit H from the assessor’s rights as such. It is only in 1978 that assertion that she is the sole heir of Juan
office.41 To be sure, the roundabout and respondent filed her first complaint to Gabatan and thus, entitled to the property
defective manner of authentication of recover the subject property, docketed as under litigation. Aggravating the
Exhibit H renders it inadmissible for the Civil Case No. 5840, against Rita weakness of her evidence were the
purpose it was offered, i.e. as proof that Gabatan, the widow of Teofilo circumstances that (a) she did not come
Teofilo Gabatan acknowledged or Gabatan.43 However, that case was to court with clean hands for she
admitted the status of Hermogena dismissed without prejudice for failure to presented a tampered/altered, if not
Gabatan as heir of Juan Gabatan. prosecute.44 Again, respondent waited outright spurious, copy of her certificate
until 1989 to refile her cause of action, of live birth and (b) she unreasonably
Even if we are to overlook the lack of i.e. the present case.45 She claimed that delayed the prosecution of her own cause
proper authentication of Exhibit H and she waited until the death of Rita of action. If the Court cannot now affirm
consider the same admissible, it still Gabatan to refile her case out of respect her claim, respondent has her own self to
nonetheless would have only provided because Rita was then already old.46 blame.
proof that a certain Hermogena Gabatan
was the heir of Juan Gabatan. Exhibit H
WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Court of Appeals’
Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 52273,
affirming the decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 89-092, is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The complaint and amended complaint in
Civil Case No. 89-092 are DISMISSED
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
SPOUSES ARMANDO AND LORNA Thus, the spouses respected the contract
TRINIDAD, Petitioners, v. DONA* MA of lease between Imson respondent and
RIE GLENN IMSON, Respondent. the original owners; however, since June she thought it best not to have the
2002 up to the time of the filing of the condominium unit registered yet in her
On August 17, 2007, herein petitioners complaint for ejectment, respondent name; instead, she requested Armando
Spouses Trinidad filed with the neither remitted nor consigned the Trinidad, who was her confidante, to
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of monthly rentals due to petitioners for her purchase the unit and register it under his
Pasig City a Complaint4 for ejectment continued use of the condominium unit; name with the understanding that the
against Imson herein respondent. In their the rental arrears amounted to a total of said property would actually be owned
Position Paper,5 petitioners alleging that: P2,130,000.00; petitioners sent a letter of by respondent;
they are the owners of a condominium demand to respondent requiring that she,
unit, denominated as Unit 2203, which is together with any and all persons using Armando agreed without objection,
located at AIC Gold Tower, Emerald the said unit with her approval, vacate which led to the execution of the Deed of
Avenue, Ortigas Center, Pasig City; they the premises and pay her arrears; Assignment and Transfer of Rights in his
purchased the condominum unit from respondent ignored petitioners' demand name; payments for the purchase price
three (3) Indian nationals who originally letter; petitioners tried to settle the case were made by respondent through cash
contracted to buy the said property from amicably but no agreement was reached. and checks paid to the original owners
the developer, AIC Realty Corporation who acknowledged said payments; aside
(AIC), but had not fully paid for it yet; In her Answer with Compulsory from paying the purchase price,
Counterclaims,8 Imson countered that: respondent also paid the real property
petitioners' purchase was evidenced by a she, indeed, entered into a contract of taxes due on the condominium unit as
Deed of Assignment and Transfer of lease with the original owners of the well as the association dues, water bills,
Rights6 dated June 13, 2002 and, later on, disputed condominium unit which was to common area real estate tax, building
a Deed of Absolute Sale7 dated July 13, commence on April 1, 2002 and would insurance and other charges billed by the
2007 in the name of petitioner Armando; end on March 1, 2003; sometime in June developer; having full trust in Armando,
at the time of petitioners' purchase of the 2002, she decided to purchase the unit; coupled with her hectic schedule,
subject condominium unit, the same was however, since she was then undergoing respondent did not bother to transfer
being leased by Imson respondent from proceedings to annul her previous ownership of the subject unit in her
the original owners; the period of lease marriage and thinking that her purchase name;
was from April 1, 2002 to March 1, of the subject property would disrupt the
2003; property arrangements already agreed since April 2002 up to the time of filing
upon, her Answer, respondent has been in open
and public possession of the subject
property;
in 2007, while respondent was out of the
country, Armando, without respondent's
knowledge, annotated his claim on the
condominium certificate of title; he also On December 22, 2010, the CA
executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in his promulgated its assailed Decision setting ISSUE:
favor on July 13, 2007; as a result, aside the RTC judgment and ordering
respondent was surprised to receive a petitioners to return possession of the WHETHER OR NOT THE PIECES
copy of petitioners' demand letter and subject condominium unit to respondent. OF EVIDENCE SHOWN BY IMSON
complaint. IS SUFFICIENT TO
The CA ratiocinated that, based on the PROVISIONALLY DECLARE HER
The MeTC found that respondent is the evidence adduced by the parties, AS OWNER OF THE SUBJECT
true owner of the subject property and respondent's claim of ownership deserves CONDOMINIUM UNIT.
that the true intention of the parties is for more credence. The CA ruled that
Armando to hold the condominium unit records of payment of the purchase price RULING:
in behalf of respondent until the property of the subject property, through
could be placed in the latter's name. respondent's personal checks, YES.
acknowledgment of these payments by
RTC: reversed. the former owners by way of receipt and The SC is not persuaded with the
affidavit, and respondent's exercise of Spouses trinidad’s contention that they
The RTC held that, by preponderance of acts of ownership prove that she is the heavily reliedon the Deed of Assignment
evidence, the question of ownership is owner of the disputed condominium unit and Transfer of Rights as well as the
resolved in favor of petitioners. The RTC and, thus, is entitled to the possession Deed of Absolute Sale, which were
held that the subject Deed of Assignment thereof. executed in Armando's favor, to prove
and Transfer of Rights and the Deed of their ownership of the subject property.
Absolute Sale in the name of Armando is Having been notarized, they contend that
superior to the evidence presented by these documents outweigh all the pieces
respondent, which merely consisted of of evidence presented by respondent.
bills of payments of association dues,
utility bills, real estate tax on the
While it is true that the subject Deed of
common areas and building insurance.
Assignment and Transfer of Rights and
Deed of Absolute Sale are notarized. It is
well settled that a document
acknowledged before a notary public is a
public document that enjoys the
presumption of regularity.19 It is a prima
facie evidence of the truth of the facts payment of the real estate taxes due on if she is not, in fact, the buyer of the
stated therein and a conclusive the property;24  property.
presumption of its existence and due
execution.20However, the CA correctly
held that the existence and due execution
of these documents are not in issue.
Moreover, the presumption of truth of
the facts stated in notarized documents is (4) Certification issued by AIC Golden Neither was there any justification why
merely prima facie, which means that Tower Condominium acknowledging respondent paid the real property taxes
this presumption can be overcome by respondent's regular payment of due on the property, as well as the utility
clear and convincing evidence.21 Hence, association dues, water bills, common bills, association dues, common area real
the truth of the facts stated in the area real estate tax, building insurance estate tax and building insurance. More
disputed Deed of Assignment and and other charges billed by AIC;25 (5) importantly, petitioners also fell short in
Transfer of Rights as well as the Deed of Affidavit executed by the former owners advancing a plausible refutation why the
Absolute Sale may be rebutted by acknowledging the supposed agreement former owners would execute an
evidence. of the parties that the condominium unit affidavit indicating therein that the
shall be purchased in the name of agreement among the parties is that the
In the case at bar, what is being asserted Armando with the understanding that he subject property shall be purchased in the
by respondent is that the above will hold it in behalf of respondent until name of Armando with the
documents do not embody the true intent the same could be placed in her name.26 understanding between the latter and
and agreement of the parties. To this end, respondent that Armando would hold the
respondent submitted sufficient proof to The MeTC and the CA were one in property in respondent's behalf until it
refute the contents of the aforementioned holding that the foregoing pieces of will be placed in her name, thus exposing
documents and to establish the real intent evidence submitted by respondent, themselves to possible perjury charges, if
of the parties, to wit: (1) nine [9] checks coupled with the surrounding such agreement is not really true.
drawn from the personal account of circumstances in this case, are sufficient
respondent, variously dated from to overcome the prima facie presumption In addition, if petitioners are the real
October 11, 2002 to June 11, 2003, each of the truth of the facts stated in the owners of the subject condominium unit,
of which amounts to P416,666.67 and questioned Deed of Assignment and why did they wait until February 19,
paid to the order of Amarnath Transfer of Rights and Deed of Absolute 2007,27 or almost four (4) years after the
Hinduja;22 (2) Acknowledgment Receipt Sale. The Court agrees. supposed expiration of respondent's lease
recognizing the various payments made contract, to demand that she vacate the
by respondent to the former owners of Indeed, petitioners failed to offer any disputed premises and pay rentals.
the subject property;23(3) Real Property credible explanation why payments of Moreover, as the MeTC has noted, it was
Tax Receipts evidencing respondent's the purchase price were made by only in 2007 that Armando annotated his
respondent by using her personal checks claim on the condominium certificate of
title, executed the subject Deed of
Absolute Sale and requested certification
of his ownership from the developer.

As observed by the CA, respondent

Thus, the second paragraph of Section 9, squarely put in issue in her Answer31 that
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides the Deed of Assignment and Transfer of
Furthermore, the SC did not agree with the exceptions, to wit: Rights did not express the true intent of
the Spouses’ argument that under the the parties. Hence, the exception applies.
Parole Evidence Rule, when the terms of Section 9. Evidence of written
an agreement have been reduced to agreements. - x x x The Court is neither convinced by
writing, it is considered as containing all petitioners' argument that when ley
the terms agreed upon and there can be, However, a party may present evidence bought the subject property from its
as between the parties, no evidence of to modify, explain or add to the terms of former owners, they stepped into the
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement if he puts in issue in shoes of the latter who were the lessors
written agreement.28  his pleading: of respondent and that, as lessee,
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or respondent is barred from contesting the
Based on this rule, petitioners contend imperfection in the written agreement; title of her lessor or her lessor's
that since the former owners, as well as sjuccessor-in-interest, who are herein
respondent, are all parties to the Deed of (b) The failure of the  written petitioners.
Assignment and Transfer of Rights, they agreement to express the true intent
are bound by the said Deed and they and agreement of the parties thereto; Article 1436 of the Civil Code provides
cannot allege terms which are not found that "[a] lessee or bailee is estopped from
within the said agreement. (c) The validity of the written agreement; asserting title to the thing leased or
or received, as against the lpssor or bailor."
However, according to the SC, the fact In addition, the conclusive presumption
that the Deed of Assignment and (d) The existence of other terms agreed found in Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the
Transfer of Rights was put in writing and to by the parties or their successors in Rules of Court known as estoppel against
notarized does not accord it the quality of interest after the execution of the written tenants provides as follows:
incontrovertibility otherwise provided by agreement. Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. — The
the Parole Evidence Rule.29  following are instances of conclusive
The term "agreement" includes wills.30 presumptions:
The rule on parole evidence is not, as it x x x x
were, ironclad.
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny
the title of his landlord at the time of the price is paid by another for the purpose statements made by the parties at or
commencement of the relation of of having the beneficial interest of the before the time title passes.39 Because an
landlord and tenant between them. property." This is sometimes referred to implied trust is neither dependent upon
as a purchase money resulting trust, the an express agreement nor required to be
It is clear from the above-quoted elements of which are: (a) an actual evidenced by writing, Article 1457 of our
provision that what a tenant is stopped payment of money, property or services, Civil Code authorizes the admission of
from denying is the title of his landlord or an equivalent, constituting valuable parole evidence to prove their
at the time of the commencement of the consideration; and (b) such consideration existence.40 Parole evidence that is
landlord-tenant relation.32 If the title must be furnished by the alleged required to establish the existence of an
asserted is one that is alleged to have beneficiary of a resulting trust.35 The implied trust necessarily has to be
been acquired subsequent to the principle of a resulting trust is based on trustworthy and it cannot rest on loose,
commencement of that relation, the the equitable doctrine that valuable equivocal or Indefinite declarations.41 In
presumption will not apply.33 Hence, the consideration, and not legal title, the instant petition, the Court finds no
tenant may show that the landlord's title determines the equitable title or interest cogent reason to depart from the findings
has expired or been conveyed to another and are presumed always to have been of the MeTC and the CA that, under the
or himself; and he is not estopped to contemplated by the parties.36 They arise circumstances of the case, the parole
deny a claim for rent, if he has been from the nature or circumstances of the evidence presented by respondent
ousted or evicted by title paramount.34 In consideration involved in a transaction sufficiently proves that an implied trust
the present case, what respondent is whereby one person thereby becomes was created in her favor.
claiming is her title to the subject invested with legal title but is obligated
property which she acquired subsequent in equity to hold his legal title for the Finally, a trust, which derives its strength
to the commencement of the landlord- benefit of another.37 from the confidence one reposes on
tenant relation between her and the another, does not lose that character
former owners of the questioned Intention - although only presumed, simply because of what appears in a legal
condominium unit. Thus, the implied or supposed by law from the document.42 Applying this principle to
presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule nature of the transaction or from the facts the present case, petitioner Armando, as
131 of the Rules of Court does not apply and circumstances accompanying the trustee, cannot repudiate the trust by
and respondent is not estopped from transaction, particularly the source of the simply relying on the questioned Deed of
asserting title over the disputed property. consideration - is always an element of a Assignment and Transfer of Rights and
resulting trust and may be inferred from the Deed of Absolute Sale.
As to whether or not an implied trust was the acts or conduct of the parties rather
created in respondent's favor, the first than from direct expression of
sentence of Article 1448 of the Civil conduct.38 Certainly, intent as an
Code provides that "[t]here is an implied indispensable element, is a matter that
trust when property is sold and the legal necessarily lies in the evidence, that is,
estate is granted to one party but the by evidence, even circumstantial, of
 SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and Respondents Espejos were the original Containing an area of 2.000 hectares.
NESTOR DELA CRUZ, Petitioners, registered owners of two parcels of Bounded on the northeast, by Road; on
vs. agricultural land, with an area of two the southeast, and southwest by public
ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA hectares each. One is located land; and on the northwest by Public
ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, at Barangay Lantap, Bagabag, Nueva Land, properties claimed by Hilario
OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL Vizcaya (the Lantap property) while the Gaudia and Santos Navarrete. Bearings
ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, other is located in Barangay Murong, true. Declination 0131 ‘E. Points referred
OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya (the Murong to are marked on plan H-176292.
ESPEJO and NEMI property). There is no dispute among the Surveyed under authority of sections 12-
FERNANDEZ, Respondents. parties that the Lantap property is 22 Act No. 2874 and in accordance with
tenanted by respondent Nemi Fernandez existing regulations of the Bureau of
When the parties admit the contents of (Nemi)6 (who is the husband7 of Lands by H.O. Bauman Public Land
written documents but put in issue respondent Elenita Espejo (Elenita), Surveyor, [in] December 1912-March
whether these documents adequately and while the Murong property is tenanted by 1913. Note: All corners are Conc. Mons.
correctly express the true intention of the petitioners Salun-at Marquez (Marquez) 15x15x60 cm. This is Lot No. 79-A=Lot
parties, the deciding body is authorized and Nestor Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz).8 No. 159 of Bagabag Townsite, K-27.9
to look beyond these instruments and
into the contemporaneous and Nemi mortgaged both parcels of land to Subsequently, TCT No. T-62836 dated
subsequent actions of the parties in order Rural Bank of Bayombong, Inc. (RBBI) June 4, 1985 was issued for the Lantap
to determine such intent. to secure certain loans. Upon their failure property and contained the following
to pay the loans, the mortgaged description:
Well-settled is the rule that in case of properties were foreclosed and sold to
doubt, it is the intention of the RBBI. RBBI eventually consolidated Both TCTs describe their respective
contracting parties that prevails, for the title to the properties and transfer subjects as located in "Bagabag
intention is the soul of a contract, not its certificates of title (TCTs) were issued in Townsite, K-27," without any reference
wording which is prone to mistakes, the name of RBBI. TCT No. T- to either Barangay Lantap or Barangay
inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold 62096 dated January 14, 1985 was issued Murong.
otherwise would give life, validity, and for the Murong property.
precedence to mere typographical errors On February 26, 1985, respondents
and defeat the very purpose of Espejos bought back one of their lots
agreements. from RBBI. The Deed of
Sale11 described the property sold as the respondents and almost seven years
follows: after the execution of VLTs in favor of
the petitioners),
of which the Rural Bank of Bayombong
(NV) Inc., is the registered owner in fee
simple in accordance with the Land
Registration Act, its title thereto
being evidenced by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-62096 issued by the Meanwhile, on June 20, 1990, RBBI, respondents filed a Complaint20 before
Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya. pursuant to Sections 2013 and 2114 of the Regional Agrarian Reform
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657,15 executed Adjudicator (RARAD) of Bayombong,
As may be seen from the foregoing, the separate Deeds of Voluntary Land Nueva Vizcaya for the cancellation of
Deed of Sale did not mention Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners petitioners’ CLOAs, the deposit of
the barangay where the property was Marquez and Dela Cruz, the tenants of leasehold rentals by petitioners in favor
located but mentioned the title of the the Murong property. Both VLTs of respondents, and the execution of a
property (TCT No. T-62096), which title described the subject thereof as an deed of voluntary land transfer by RBBI
corresponds to the Murong property. agricultural land located in Barangay in favor of respondent Nemi. The
Murong and covered by TCT No. T- complaint was based on respondents’
However, there is no evidence that 62836 (which, however, is the title theory that the Murong property,
respondents took possession of the corresponding to the Lantap property).16 occupied by the petitioners, was owned
Murong property, or demanded lease by the respondents by virtue of the 1985
rentals from the petitioners (who After the petitioners completed the buy-back, as documented in the Deed of
continued to be the tenants of the payment of the purchase price of Sale. They based their claim on the fact
Murong property), or otherwise ₱90,000.00 to RBBI, the DAR issued the that their Deed of Sale refers to TCT No.
exercised acts of ownership over the corresponding Certificates of Land 62096, which pertains to the Murong
Murong property. On the other hand, Ownership Award (CLOAs) to property.
17 18
respondent Nemi (husband of respondent petitioners Marquez  and Dela Cruz  on
Elenita and brother-in-law of the other September 5, 1991. Both CLOAs stated Petitioners filed their Answer21 and
respondents), continued working on the that their subjects were parcels of insisted that they bought the Murong
other property -- the Lantap property -- agricultural land situated in Barangay property as farmer-beneficiaries thereof.
without any evidence that he ever paid Murong.19 The CLOAs were registered in They maintained that they have always
rentals to RBBI or to any landowner. The the Registry of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya displayed good faith, paid lease rentals to
Deed of Sale was annotated on TCT No. on September 5, 1991. RBBI when it became the owner of the
T-62096 almost a decade later, on July 1, Murong property, bought the same from
1994.12 On February 10, 1997 (more than 10 RBBI upon the honest belief that they
years after the Deed of Sale in favor of were buying the Murong property, and
occupied and exercised acts of ownership property, the OIC-RARAD ruled that it more imperative by the respondents’
over the Murong property. Petitioners was a mere typographical error. admission that petitioners are the actual
also argued that what respondents tillers of the Murong property, hence
Espejos repurchased from RBBI in 1985 Further, since the VLTs covered the qualified beneficiaries thereof.
was actually the Lantap property, as Lantap property and petitioners are not
evidenced by their continued occupation the actual tillers thereof, the OIC- As for respondents’ allegation that they
and possession of the Lantap property RARAD declared that they were bought back the Murong property from
through respondent Nemi. disqualified to become tenants of the RBBI, the DARAB ruled that they failed
Lantap property and ordered the to support their allegation with
RBBI answered22 that it was the Lantap cancellation of their CLOAs. It then substantial evidence. It gave more
property which was the subject of the ordered RBBI to execute a leasehold credence to RBBI’s claim that
buy-back transaction with respondents contract with the real tenant of the respondents repurchased the Lantap
Espejos. It denied committing a grave Lantap property, Nemi. property, not the Murong property.
mistake in the transaction and maintained Respondents, as owners of the Lantap
its good faith in the disposition of its The OIC-RARAD recognized that property, were ordered to enter into an
acquired assets in conformity with the petitioners’ only right as the actual tillers agricultural leasehold contract with their
rural banking rules and regulations. of the Murong property is to remain as brother-in-law Nemi, who is the actual
the tenants thereof after the execution of tenant of the Lantap property.
OIC-RARAD Decision23 leasehold contracts with and payment of
rentals in arrears to respondents. The DARAB ended its January 17, 2001
The OIC-RARAD gave precedence to Decision in this wise:
the TCT numbers appearing on the Deed DARAB Decision24
of Sale and the VLTs. Since TCT No. T- We find no basis or justification to
62096 appeared on respondents’ Deed of Upon appeal filed by petitioners, the question the authenticity and validity of
Sale and the said title refers to the DARAB reversed the OIC-RARAD the CLOAs issued to appellants as they
Murong property, the OIC-RARAD Decision. It ruled that in assailing the are by operation of law qualified
concluded that the subject of sale was validity of the CLOAs issued to beneficiaries over the landholdings; there
indeed the Murong property. On the petitioners as bona fide tenant-farmers, is nothing to quiet as these titles were
other hand, since the petitioners’ VLTs the burden of proof rests on the awarded in conformity with the CARP
referred to TCT No. T-62836, which respondents. There being no evidence program implementation; and finally, the
corresponds to the Lantap property, the that the DAR field personnel were remiss Board declares that all controverted
OIC-RARAD ruled that petitioners’ in the performance of their official duties claims to or against the subject
CLOAs necessarily refer to the Lantap when they issued the corresponding landholding must be completely and
property. As for the particular CLOAs in favor of petitioners, the finally laid to rest.
description contained in the VLTs that presumption of regular performance of
the subject thereof is the Murong duty prevails. This conclusion is made Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In appealing to the CA, the respondents The CA further ruled that as for Considering the allegations, issues[,] and
insisted that the DARAB erred in ruling petitioners’ VLTs, the same refer to the arguments adduced in the petition for
that they repurchased the Lantap property with TCT No. T-62836; thus, review on certiorari, the Court Resolves
property, while the petitioners were the subject of their CLOAs is the Lantap to DENY the petition for lack of
awarded the Murong property. They property. The additional description in sufficient showing that the Court of
were adamant that the title numbers the VLTs that the subject thereof is Appeals had committed any reversible
indicated in their respective deeds of located in Barangay Murong was error in the questioned judgment to
conveyance should control in considered to be a mere typographical warrant the exercise by this Court of its
determining the subjects thereof. error. The CA ruled that the technical discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this
description contained in the TCT is more case.30
Since respondents’ Deed of Sale accurate in identifying the subject
expressed that its subject is the property property since the same particularly Their Motion for Reconsideration was
with TCT No. T-62096, then what was describes the properties’ metes and likewise denied with finality.31 Entry of
sold to them was the Murong property. bounds. judgment was made in that case on
On the other hand, petitioners’ VLTs and December 15, 2004.32
CLOAs say that they cover the property Both the RBBI26 and petitioners27 filed
with TCT No. T-62836; thus it should be their respective motions for ISSUE:
understood that they were awarded the reconsideration, which were separately
Lantap property. Respondents added that denied.28 WHETHER OR NOT THE BEST
since petitioners are not the actual tillers EVIDENCE RULE SHOULD BE
of the Lantap property, their CLOAs On June 22, 2004, RBBI filed a separate APPLIED TO DETERMINE THE
should be cancelled due to their lack of Petition for Review on Certiorari, SUBJECT OF THE CONTRACT.
qualification. docketed as G.R. No. 163320, with this
Court.29 RBBI raised the issue that the RULING:
The CA agreed with the respondents. CA failed to appreciate that respondents
Using the Best Evidence Rule embodied did not come to court with clean hands NO.
in Rule 130, Section 3, the CA held that because they misled RBBI to believe at
the Deed of Sale is the best evidence as the time of the sale that the two lots were The SC held that the CA erred in citing
to its contents, particularly the not tenanted. RBBI also asked that they the Best Evidence Rule in Rule 130,
description of the land which was the be declared free from any liability to the Section 3.
object of the sale. Since the Deed of Sale parties as it did not enrich itself at
expressed that its subject is the land anyone’s expense. RBBI’s petition was It did not agree with what the CA held
covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the dismissed on July 26, 2004 for lack of that the Deed of Sale between
Murong property – then that is the merit. The said Resolution reads: respondents and RBBI is the best
property that the respondents evidence as to the property that was sold
repurchased. by RBBI to the respondents. Since the
Deed of Sale stated that its subject is the of undetected tampering with the the petitioners, and the reference to
land covered by TCT No. T-62096 – the document.42 "Barangay Murong" was a typographical
title for the Murong property – then the error. On the other hand, petitioners
property repurchased by the respondents In the instant case, there is no room for claim that the reference to "Barangay
was the Murong property. Likewise, the the application of the Best Evidence Rule Murong" reflects their true intention,
CA held that since the VLTs between because there is no dispute regarding the while the reference to TCT No. T-62836
petitioners and RBBI refer to TCT No. contents of the documents. It is admitted was a mere error.
T-62836 – the title for the Lantap by the parties that the respondents’
property – then the property transferred
to petitioners was the Lantap property.

Petitioners argue that the appellate court

erred in using the best evidence rule to
determine the subject of the Deed of Sale
and the Deeds of Voluntary Land This dispute reflects an intrinsic
Transfer. They maintain that the issue in Deed of Sale referred to TCT No. T- ambiguity in the contracts, arising from
the case is not the contents of the 62096 as its subject; while the an apparent failure of the instruments to
contracts but the intention of the parties petitioners’ Deeds of Voluntary Land adequately express the true intention of
that was not adequately expressed in Transfer referred to TCT No. T-62836 as the parties. To resolve the ambiguity,
their contracts. Petitioners then argue its subject, which is further described as resort must be had to evidence outside of
that it is the Parol Evidence Rule that located in Barangay Murong. the instruments.
should be applied in order to adequately
resolve the dispute. The real issue is whether the admitted The CA, however, refused to look
contents of these documents adequately beyond the literal wording of the
Indeed, the appellate court erred in its and correctly express the true intention documents and rejected any other
application of the Best Evidence Rule. of the parties. As to the Deed of Sale, evidence that could shed light on the
petitioners (and RBBI) maintain that actual intention of the contracting
The Best Evidence Rule states that when while it refers to TCT No. T-62096, the parties. Though the CA cited the Best
the subject of inquiry is the contents of a parties actually intended the sale of the Evidence Rule, it appears that what it
document, the best evidence is the Lantap property (covered by TCT No. T- actually applied was the Parol Evidence
original document itself and no other 62836). Rule instead, which provides:
evidence (such as a reproduction,
photocopy or oral evidence) is As to the VLTs, respondents contend that When the terms of an agreement have
admissible as a general rule. The original the reference to TCT No. T-62836 been reduced to writing, it is considered
is preferred because it reduces the chance (corresponding to the Lantap property) as containing all the terms agreed upon
reflects the true intention of RBBI and and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence his claim on the instrument or assert a Even the respondents’ Deed of Sale falls
of such terms other than the contents of right originating in the instrument.44 under the exception to the Parol
the written agreement.43 Evidence Rule. It refers to "TCT No. T-
Moreover, the instant case falls under the 62096" (Murong property), but RBBI
The Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as contended that the true intent was to sell
or extrinsic evidence by which a party provided in the second paragraph of Rule the Lantap property. In short, it was
seeks to contradict, vary, add to or 130, Section 9: squarely put in issue that the written
subtract from the terms of a valid agreement failed to express the true
agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears intent of the parties.
that what the CA actually applied in its
assailed Decision when it refused to look
beyond the words of the contracts was
the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best
Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave
primacy to the literal terms of the two However, a party may present evidence Based on the foregoing, the resolution of
contracts and refused to admit any other to modify, explain or add to the terms of the instant case necessitates an
evidence that would contradict such the written agreement if he puts in issue examination of the parties’ respective
terms. in his pleading: parol evidence, in order to determine the
true intent of the parties.
However, even the application of the (1) An intrinsic ambiguity,
Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the mistake or imperfection in the Well-settled is the rule that in case of
case at bar. written agreement; doubt, it is the intention of the
contracting parties that prevails, for the
In the first place, respondents are not (2) The failure of the written intention is the soul of a contract,45 not
parties to the VLTs executed between agreement to express the true its wording which is prone to mistakes,
RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers intent and agreement of the parties inadequacies, or ambiguities. To hold
to the written contracts. thereto; otherwise would give life, validity, and
precedence to mere typographical errors
Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides x x x x (Emphasis supplied) and defeat the very purpose of
that parol evidence rule is exclusive only agreements.
as "between the parties and their Here, the petitioners’ VLTs suffer from
successors-in-interest." The parol intrinsic ambiguity. The VLTs described In this regard, guidance is provided by
evidence rule may not be invoked where the subject property as covered by TCT the following articles of the Civil Code
at least one of the parties to the suit is not No. T-62836 (Lantap property), but they involving the interpretation of contracts:
a party or a privy of a party to the written also describe the subject property as
document in question, and does not base being located in "Barangay Murong."
Article 1370. If the terms of a contract the contemporaneous and subsequent respondents really repurchased was the
are clear and leave no doubt upon the acts of the parties. Lantap property. Respondent Nemi
intention of the contracting parties, the (husband of respondent Elenita) is the
literal meaning of its stipulations shall Third issue farmer actually tilling the Lantap
control. property, without turning over the
Determining the intention of the parties supposed landowner’s share to RBBI.
If the words appear to be contrary to the regarding the subjects of their contracts This strongly indicates that the
evident intention of the parties, the latter respondents considered themselves
shall prevail over the former. We are convinced that the subject of the (and not RBBI) as the owners of the
Deed of Sale between RBBI and the Lantap property. For if respondents
Article 1371. In order to judge the respondents was the Lantap property, (particularly spouses Elenita and Nemi)
intention of the contracting parties, their and not the Murong property. truly believed that RBBI retained
contemporaneous and subsequent acts ownership of the Lantap property, how
shall be principally considered. come they never complied with their
obligations as supposed tenants of
Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for RBBI’s land? The factual circumstances
the rules on the interpretation of of the case simply do not support the
documents is likewise enlightening: After the execution in 1985 of the Deed theory propounded by the respondents.
of Sale, the respondents did not exercise
Section 13. Interpretation according to acts of ownership that could show that We are likewise convinced that the
circumstances. – For the proper they indeed knew and believed that they subject of the Deeds of Voluntary Land
construction of an instrument, the repurchased the Murong property. They Transfer (VLTs) in favor of petitioners
circumstances under which it was made, did not take possession of the Murong was the Murong property, and not the
including the situation of the subject property. As admitted by the parties, the Lantap property. When the VLTs were
thereof and of the parties to it, may be Murong property was in the possession executed in 1990, petitioners were
shown, so that the judge may be placed of the petitioners, who occupied and already the tenant-farmers of the Murong
in the position of those whose language tilled the same without any objection property, and had been paying rentals to
he is to interpret. from the respondents. Moreover, RBBI accordingly. It is therefore natural
petitioners paid leasehold rentals for that the Murong property and no other
Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it using the Murong property to RBBI, not was the one that they had intended to
is clear that the Deed of Sale was to the respondents. acquire from RBBI with the execution of
intended to transfer the Lantap property the VLTs. Moreover, after the execution
to the respondents, while the VLTs were Aside from respondents’ neglect of their of the VLTs, petitioners remained in
intended to convey the Murong property alleged ownership rights over the possession of the Murong property,
to the petitioners. This may be seen from Murong property, there is one other enjoying and tilling it without any
circumstance that convinces us that what opposition from anybody. Subsequently,
after the petitioners completed their 62836 only refers to the Municipality of property under TCT No. T-62836, while
payment of the total purchase price of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, and does the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
₱90,000.00 to RBBI, the Department of not indicate the particular barangay and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-
Agrarian Reform (DAR) officials where the property is located. Moreover, 396 of the petitioners cover the Murong
conducted their investigation of the both properties are bounded by a road property under TCT No. T-62096. In
Murong property which, with the and public land. Hence, were it not for consequence, the CA’s ruling against
presumption of regularity in the the detailed technical description, the RBBI should not be executed as such
performance of official duty, did not titles for the two properties are very execution would be inconsistent with our
reveal any anomaly. Petitioners were similar. ruling herein. Although the CA’s
found to be in actual possession of the decision had already become final and
Murong property and were the qualified The respondents attempt to discredit executory as against RBBI with the
beneficiaries thereof. Thus, the DAR petitioners’ argument that their VLTs dismissal of RBBI’s petition in G.R. No.
officials issued CLOAs in petitioners’ were intrinsically ambiguous and failed 163320, our ruling herein in favor of
favor; and these CLOAs explicitly refer to express their true intention by asking petitioners is a supervening cause which
to the land in Barangay Murong. All this why petitioners never filed an action for renders the execution of the CA decision
time, petitioners were in possession of the reformation of their contract.46 A against RBBI unjust and inequitable.
the Murong property, undisturbed by cause of action for the reformation of a
anyone for several long years, until contract only arises when one of the
respondents started the controversy in contracting parties manifests an
1997. intention, by overt acts, not to abide by
the true agreement of the parties.47 It
All of these contemporaneous and seems fairly obvious that petitioners had
subsequent actions of RBBI and no cause to reform their VLTs because
petitioners support their position that the the parties thereto (RBBI and petitioners)
subject of their contract (VLTs) is the never had any dispute as to the
Murong property, not the Lantap interpretation and application thereof. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review
property. Conversely, there has been no They both understood the VLTs to cover on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
contrary evidence of the parties’ the Murong property (and not the Lantap assailed October 7, 2003 Decision, as
actuations to indicate that they intended property). It was only much later, when well as the May 11, 2005 Resolution of
the sale of the Lantap property. Thus, it strangers to the contracts argued for a the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
appears that the reference in their VLT to different interpretation, that the issue 69981
TCT No. T-62836 (Lantap property) was became relevant for the first time. are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
due to their honest but mistaken belief January 17, 2001 Decision of the
that the said title covers the Murong All told, we rule that the Deed of Sale DARAB Central Office
property. Such a mistake is not dated February 26, 1985 between is REINSTATED. The Deed of Sale
farfetched considering that TCT No. T- respondents and RBBI covers the Lantap dated February 26, 1985 between
respondents and Rural Bank of
Bayombong, Inc. covers the Lantap
property under TCT No. T-62836, while
the Deeds of Voluntary Land Transfer
and TCT Nos. CLOA-395 and CLOA-
396 of the petitioners cover the Murong
property under TCT No. T-62096. The
Register of Deeds of Nueva Vizcaya is
directed to make the necessary
corrections to the titles of the said
properties in accordance with this
Decision. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.