10. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v.

Commission
on Elections
G.R. Nos. 179271 & 179295
April 21, 2009, 604 PHIL 131-184
Carpio, J.

Facts: The May 14, 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,
950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-list system. On July 9, 2007, the Comelec, sitting as the National Board
of Canvassers (NBC), promulgated NBC resolution No. 07-60. NBC resolution no. 07-60 proclaimed 13 parties as winners
in the party-list elections. Pursuant to NBC resolution no. 07-60, Comelec, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC resolution
no. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties. On July 9, 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono,
and A Teacher asked Comelec, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the veterans formula as stated in its NBC
resolution no. 07-60 because the veterans formula is violative of the constitution and of republic act no. 7941. On the same
day, the Comelec denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.

Aside from the 13 party-list organizations proclaimed on July 9, 2007, the Comelec proclaimed 3 other party-list
organizations as qualified parties entitled to one guaranteed seat under the party-list system. Petitioner in G.R. No.
179271- barangay Association for National Advancement and transparency (BANAT) – in a petition for certiorari and
mandamus assails the resolution promulgated on Aug. 3, 2007 by the commission on elections in NBC no. 07-041 (PL).
The comelec’s resolution in NBC no. 07-041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the
NBC legal group, to deny the petition of BANAT for being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC en banc, acting as
NBC, a petition to proclaim the full number of party-list representatives provided by the constitution.

Issue: Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution
mandatory or merely a ceiling?

Ruling: The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of
the House of Representatives to Congress: "The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x." The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is
merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
However, it cannot be allowed the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the
number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any
party from dominating the party-list elections.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from
participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to continue disallowing major political
parties from the party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in his separate opinion. On the formula to
allocate party-list seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this ponencia.

NOTES:
9. Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 118577 & 118627, March 7, 1995, 312 PHIL
259-276

Puno, J.
Facts: Two (2) petitions were filed assailing certain provisions of RA 7854 as unconstitutional. On the first petition (GR
No. 118577) only Mariano was a resident of Makati. Petitioners assail Sections 2, 51 and 52 on the following grounds: (1)
Sec. 2 did not properly identity the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, (2) Sec. 51 attempts
to alter the three-consecutive term limit for local elective officials, (3) Sec 52 was unconstitutional as it increase the
legislative district of Makati only by special law, the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill,
and the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5 of the Constitution.
The second petition was filed by John H. Osmeña, on the same grounds with the first petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional

HELD: The court finds no merit in the petitions.

In re: Section 2, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will
cause confusion as to its boundaries. Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein detailed
technical descriptions similar to those appearing in titles, as petitioners seem to imply.

In re: Section 51, The Court cannot entertain the challenge to the constitutionality of Section 51. The requirements before
a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must
be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on
the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he
would be re-elected in said elections.

In re: Section 52, Courts had then ruled that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law,
such as in the charter of a new city. And Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully
index, or completely catalogue all its details.

Ruling: Reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter of a new city.
The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than 250 members, unless otherwise fixed
by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing
for an increase in Makati’s legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would
create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation
for an indeterminate period of time. The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle
of their sovereignty. Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said
section provides that a city with a population of at least 250,000 shall have at least one representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its legislative district may still be increased since it has
met the minimum population requirement of 250,000.

NOTES:
8. Aquino III v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189793, April 7, 2010, 631 PHIL 595-652
Perez, J.

Facts: The said case was files by petitioners by way of a petition for certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the rules
of court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled “An Act reapportioning the
Composition of the 1st and 2nd legislative districts in the province of camarines sur and creating a new legislative district
from such reapportionment.”

Said act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it
has divided the existing 4 districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall
be composed of 176, 383 population count.

Petitioner countered that the reapportionment runs about of the explicit constitutional standards with a minimum
population of 250, 000 for the creation of a legislative district under section 5 (3), Art. 6 of the 1987 consti. It was
emphasized as well by the petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the consti. It must be stricken-down
for non-complience with the minimum requirement unless otherwise fixed by law.

Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of 2 fatal technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A.
9716 via the remedy of certiorari and prohibition under rule 65 of the rules of court. And second, petitioners have no locus
standi to question the consti. Of R.A. 9716.

Issue:
WON republic act. No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void.
WON a population of 250,00 is an indispensable consti. Requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a
province.

Held: No. R.A. 9716 is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction between a city and a province was explained under
the second sentence of sec. 5 (3) of the constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing
was mentioned about a population. When in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must be satisfied. In 2007, camSur
had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to 2 additional districts from the present of four. Based on the
formulation of Ordinance, other than the population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other facts
were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill no. 4264.

Yes, it is an indispensable constitutional requirement. The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative."

The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the
entitlement of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a representative, with
nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly
entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum
population is only required for a city, but not for a province.
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a250,000 minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province. DISMISSED.

NOTES:
7. Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. Nos. 168056, 168207, 168461, 168463 & 168730,
September 1, 2005
FACTS:
Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27,
2005 questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108,
respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties,
Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or
lease of properties. Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1,
2006, after specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution.
2. Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the Constitution.

RULING:
No, the revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of Representatives, the Senate was acting within its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No.
1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.

No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This
is constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it
describes what job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a
delegation of legislative power but a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increased rate under the law is contingent.

NOTES:

 The Senate was acting within its constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and
franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or
limitation on the extent of the amendments or revision the Senate can introduce. 

 The “no-amendment rule” refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with
regard to bills initiated in each of said respective houses, before said bill is transmitted to the other house
for its concurrence or amendment. Verily, to construe said provision in a way as to proscribe any further
changes to a bill after one house has voted on it would lead to absurdity as this would mean that the
other house of Congress would be deprived of its constitutional power to amend or introduce changes to
said bill. Thus, Art. VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution cannot be taken to mean that the introduction by
the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in
bills that have been acted upon by both houses of Congress is prohibited.
6. Aldaba v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010, 624 PHIL 805-823

Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative
district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the creation
of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through 4
legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate
Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.

House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by
Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.

Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000
for a city to merit representative in Congress.

Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan” is unconstitutional
as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.

Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that,
as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional Director
Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect because
the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements supported
bySection 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:

The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the National Statistics
Coordination Board.

In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB. The certification can be
issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central
Luzon NSO is unauthorized. The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated. It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate,
even if compounded, the Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1,
2010.

Facts of the Case

Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four legislative districts. The First
Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos and the municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and
Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos’ City Charter, by creating a separate legislative
district for the city.
At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to
House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. 
The population of Malolos City on 1 May 2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that House Bill No. 3693 relied on
an undated certification issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics Office (NSO) that "the projected
population of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78
between 1995 to 200
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA 9591 is
unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in
Congress as provided under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution
Issue:
Whether or not the RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population requirement as provided
under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: 
Yes. The Court declared RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district, the city must have "a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand
House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated Certification of Regional Director Alberto N. Miranda of Region III of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the City of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010." However,
the Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic projections, is without legal effect because
Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification.  In any event, a city whose population
has increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative district only in the "immediately following election" after
the attainment of the 250,000 population.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic projections he certified have been
declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda
is based on demographic projections declared official by the NSCB. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the
population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to only 241,550 in 2010. Even if the growth rate is compounded yearly,
the population of Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.
Based on the Certification’s own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 before the
10 May 2010 elections. Incidentally, the NSO has published population projections for individual municipalities or cities
but only for entire regions and provinces. 
Any population projection forming the basis for the creation of a legislative district must be based on an official and
credible source. That is why the OSG cited Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population projection would be
unreliable or speculative.
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution provides:
Any province that may be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of members as it
may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the standards set forth in paragraph (3),
Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution
A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is entitled to a legislative district only in the
"immediately following election." In short, a city must first attain the 250,000 population, and thereafter, in the
immediately following election, such city shall have a district representative. There is no showing in the present case that
the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a population of 250,000, whether actual or projected, before the 10 May
2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative district of its own under Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.

NOTES: It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is
to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
5. Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 632
PHIL 32-142
Issue:

Whether or not the Commission on Elections erred in their assailed resolution of refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-
list organization on moral grounds.

Facts:

Ang Ladlad filed a petition to apply again as a party-list but on the grounds of immorality and religious doctrines or
principles followed in the country, it was denied by the Commission on Elections. Although arguing that the LGBT
community consists of individuals who have been victims of discrimination, exclusion, and violence, even complying to
the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the court, and outlining, and outlining its national membership base consisting of
individual members and organizational supporters and platform governance, the COMELEC contended that the definition
of the petitioner for sexual orientation tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs as per the bible of the
Christians and the koran of the muslims.

The COMELEC also argues that Ang Ladlad defies provisions in the Civil Code, namely Article 695, 1306 and 1409, and in
the Revised Penal Code through Article 201, which are all in relation to morality and decency. Further, COMELEC argued
that And Ladlad had not been truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not
violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections,” and that it will be exposing the youth
to an environment in contrary or not in conformity with the teachings of faith, thus invoking Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation.

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to
deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman broke the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First
Assailed Resolution invoking Article 2 of Republic Act No. 7941 and Article 201 of the RPC, explaining that moral
parameters that have been long accepted in the Philippines, and justifying that there is no substantial differentiation
between the members of the LGBT community from actual male and female citizens who are protected by the law.

Conclusion:

Yes, the Commission on Elections erred in their assailed resolution of refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization on moral grounds.

Ruling:

The Petition of Ang Ladlad is granted. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and
December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are set aside. Moreover, the Commission on Elections is directed to grant
petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation.

Application:

The Court finds that there has been no misinterpretations and that Ang Ladlad never claimed in its petition that they exist
in every provinces in the Philippines, instead, it alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to
constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and 4,044 members in
its electronic discussion group. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines composed of a number of LGBT networks.

Further, the Court also finds that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal requirements for
accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the
records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under
any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang
Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

The Court also invokes Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution which states, “No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” and that it was grave violation of the non-establishment
clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Moreover, the Court
states that homosexuality is not criminalized in the Philippines despite of the years of disapproval and that the COMELEC
has not collected evidences that any member of Ang Ladlad has committed immoract acts in any way.

Finally, the Court also stated that according to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, the equal protection clause
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other
persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances, and that moral disapproval of an unpopular minority
is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause, and that
the members of the LGBT community also has the right to hold and express their own views of homosexuality .

4. Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 151914, July 31, 2002, 434 PHIL 861-879

Mendoza, J.
Facts: Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965,
when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy.
On1998 he came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the
United States. Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on Naturalization
which was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.
On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in 2001.
On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for
"two (2) years.” Oras’ incumbent mayor, Neil Alvarez, who was running for re election sought to cancel
Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a immaterial
representation as he only resided therein for six months after his oath as a citizen. Before the COMELEC could render
a decision, elections commenced and Coquillo was proclaimed the winner. On July 19, 2001, the Second Division of the
COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Was COMELEC’s order of cancellation of the certificate of candidacy Teodulo M. Coquilla proper ?
Ruling: COMELEC properly ordered the cancellation of Coquilla’S COC. COMELEC still had jurisdiction over his case
although he was already proclaimed because RA 6646 provides that the proceedings for disqualification of candidates or
for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been begun before the elections, should continue
even after such elections and proclamation of the winners. In this case, the COC was correctly cancelled because Coquilla
did not possess the legal qualification of at least 1 year residency. The term "residence" is to be understood as the"
domicile" or legal residence. He has lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen and he has not re-
established his claimed domicile in Oras by mere filing of taxes or by obtaining a voter’s registration as it only requires six-
months residency. The material falsification he committed merits the cancellation of his COC.

NOTES:

Pro forma is a standard document

G.R. No. 151914  July 31, 2002
TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, 
vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.

Facts: Petitioner Coquilla was born on 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there
until 1965, when he was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen after joining the US Navy. In 1998, he came to the
Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States.

Coquilla eventually applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 8171 to the Special Committee on Naturalization which was
approved. On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar which was approved in
2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern
Samar for 2 years.

Incumbent mayor Alvarez, who was running for re-election sought to cancel Coquilla’s certificate of candidacy on the
ground that his statement as to the two year residency in Oras was a material misrepresentation as he only resided therein
for 6 months after his oath as a citizen.

Before the COMELEC could render a decision, elections commenced and Coquilla was proclaimed the winner. On July 19,
2001, COMELEC granted Alvarez’ petition and ordered the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the basis
of following findings: 

Issue/s:
1. WON the COMELEC retained jurisdiction to decide this case notwithstanding the proclamation of petitioner.
2. WON petitioner had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar at least one (1) year before the elections held on May 14,
2001 as he represented in his certificate of candidacy
3. WON the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running of the
period for filing this petition for certiorari because the motion was pro forma.

Ruling:
1. Yes. R.A. No. 6646 provides:
 SECTION 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
 
SECTION 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided
shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.
 
The rule then is that candidates who are disqualified by final judgment before the election shall not be voted for and the
votes cast for them shall not be counted. But those against whom no final judgment of disqualification had been rendered
may be voted for and proclaimed, unless, on motion of the complainant, the COMELEC suspends their proclamation
because the grounds for their disqualification or cancellation of their certificates of candidacy are strong.  Meanwhile, the
proceedings for disqualification of candidates or for the cancellation or denial of certificates of candidacy, which have been
begun before the elections, should continue even after such elections and proclamation of the winners.
 
 
2. No. Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code (R.A No. 7160) provides:
 
Qualifications. - (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay,
municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. 
 
The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but
rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,
where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
 
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in
1965.  From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was an alien
without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as
a resident alien.
 
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a “greencard,” which
entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. With more
reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
 
 
3. It is contended that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc did not suspend the running
of the period for filing this petition because the motion was pro forma.
 
The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does
not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new
trial or some other remedy. 
 
In the cases where a motion for reconsideration was held to be pro forma, the motion was so held because (1) it was
a second motion for reconsideration,[or (2) it did not comply with the rule that the motion must specify the findings and
conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the evidence, or (3) it failed to substantiate the alleged
errors, or (4) it merely alleged that the decision in question was contrary to law, or (5) the adverse party was not given
notice thereof. 
 
The 16-page motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the COMELEC en banc suffers from none of the foregoing
defects, and it was error for the COMELEC en banc to rule that petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was pro forma
because the allegations raised therein are a mere “rehash” of his earlier pleadings or did not raise “new matters.” Hence,
the filing of the motion suspended the running of the 30-day period to file the petition in this case, which, as earlier
shown, was done within the reglementary period provided by law.
 3. Sema v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 177597 & 178628, July 16, 2008, 580 PHIL 623-
689
Issues:

1. WON Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional.
2. WON a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under MMA Act 201 is entitled to one representative in
the House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.
3. WON Resolution No. 7902 is valid

Held:

1. No. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. The creation of
any of the four local government units—province, city, municipality or barangay—must comply with three
conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a
plebiscite in the political units affected. Congress under its plenary power may delegate to local legislative bodies
the power to create local government units but this must be subject to reasonable standards and it must not be in
conflict with the Constitution. Art. X of the Constitution provides that only the act of Congress can create
provinces, cities and municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress under its plenary power designated
the power to create local government units because this power was not an express grant of the Constitution to
regional legislative bodies. There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is another matter.
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousSimilarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may
hereafter be created, or any city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty
thousand shall be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”and, or each
province, shall have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives. This means that for a province to
be created, a legislative district because it will violate Sec. 5 (3), Art. VI of the Constitution as well as Sec. 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. A city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created
without a legislative district. Hence, the power to create a province or a city also requires the power to create a
legislative district because once the population of the city reaches 250,000 the city is automatically entitled to one
seat in the House of Representative.
The Congress cannot validly delegate the power to create a legislative district. Only the Congress has the power to
increase the allowable membership in the House of Representative and to reapportion legislative districts. Sec. 5,
Art. VI (4) of the Constitution provides that: “(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.”
Congress may only increase the legislative districts or the seats in the House by enacting a national law pertaining
to such changes. In Montejo v. COMELEC, the Court held that the “power of redistricting x x x is traditionally
regarded as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws,” and thus is vested exclusively in Congress. It is absurd
to say that the regional legislative bodies can enact laws to affect or change membership in the Congress. An
inferior legislative body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior
legislative body. Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or
impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national office is to allow its legislative powers to operate
outside the ARMM’s territorial jurisdiction. This violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly
limits the coverage of the Regional Assembly’s legislative powers “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.”
2. No. As mentioned in the first issue, in creating a province or a city a legislative district must also be created. The
power to create a legislative district is vested solely to the Congress. The Felwa case raised by Sema is not
applicable in this case because in the case of Sema the city was created as a result of a special law enacted by
Congress itself. Thus, it complied with the requirement of the law. However, that is not the case with the creation
of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create legislative districts
without complying with the requirements provided for by law will create disastrous effects. Some of the disastrous
effects are:
 (1) An inferior legislative body like the ARMM Regional Assembly can create 100 or more provinces and thus
increase the membership of a superior legislative body, the House of Representatives, beyond the maximum limit
of 250 fixed in the Constitution (unless a national law provides otherwise);
(2) The proportional representation in the House of Representatives based on one representative for at least every
250,000 residents will be negated because the ARMM Regional Assembly need not comply with the requirement
in Section 461(a)(ii) of RA 7160 that every province created must have a population of at least 250,000; and
(3) Representatives from the ARMM provinces can become the majority in the House of Representatives through
the ARMM Regional Assembly’s continuous creation of provinces or cities within the ARMM.
3. Yes. The Court held that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, preserving the geographic and legislative district of the
First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely complies with Section 5 of Article VI and
Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.

2. Abayon v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. Nos. 189466 & 189506,
February 11, 2010, 626 PHIL 346-356
G. R. No. 189466 DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON, PETITIONER, PRESENT: VS. THE HONORABLE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ
AND AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, RESPONDENTS.
Facts: During the 2007 elections, Aangat Tayo party-list organization won a seat in the House of Representatives with
Abayon as the party-list representative.
The respondents of this case claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of
Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors. They also claimed that Abayon
was not qualified to sit in the House of Representatives thru the party-list system since she did not belong to the
marginalized and underrepresented sector.
Petitioner countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral
party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the
women sector.
Petitioner also said that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since respondent
Lucaban and the others with him attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list organization, a matter already
confirmed by the COMELEC. It was Aangat Tayo that was taking a seat in the House of Representatives, and not Abayon
who was just its nominee. All questions involving her eligibility as first nominee were internal concerns of Aangat Tayo.

G. R. No. 189506 CONGRESSMAN JOVITO S. PALPARAN, JR., PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF

REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET), DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., CRISTINA
PALABAY, RENATO M. REYES, JR., ERLINDA CADAPAN, ANTONIO FLORES AND JOSELITO USTAREZ,
RESPONDENTS.
Facts: Petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the 2007
elections for the members of the House of Representatives.
Lesaca and the others alleged that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of Representatives as party-list nominee
because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that Bantay represented.
Petitioner countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually Bantay party-list, not him,
that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he was just Bantay's
nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of Bantay.

G.R. No. 189466 and G.R. No 189506 have the same issue and ruling.
Issue: WON respondent HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners in both cases as
nominees of their respective party-list organizations, who took the seats at the House of Representatives that such
organizations won in the 2007 elections

Ruling: Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that becomes a
member of the House of Representatives. 
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,[5] identifies who the "members" of that House are:
Section 5 (1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national,
regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds: "members x x x who shall be elected from
legislative districts" and "those who x x x shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations." This means that, from the Constitution's point of view, it is the party-list representatives
who are "elected" into office, not their parties or organizations.
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among
other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list
nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications.
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo
warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the
qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
1. Abakada Guro Party List petitioners
v. Purisima respondents
G.R. No. 166715, August 14, 2008, 584 PHIL 246-331
Facts: RA 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenue-generation capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). The law intends to encourage BIR and BOC officials and employees to
exceed their revenue targets by providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the creation of a Rewards and
Incentives Fund (Fund) and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board). It covers all officials and employees of the
BIR and the BOC with at least six months of service, regardless of employment status. The Fund is sourced from the
collection of the BIR and the BOC in excess of their revenue targets for the year. Any incentive or reward is taken from the
fund and allocated to the BIR and the BOC in proportion to their contribution in the excess collection of the targeted
amount of tax revenue.

The DOF, DBM, NEDA, BIR, BOC and the Civil Service Commission (CSC) were tasked to promulgate and issue the
implementing rules and regulations of RA 9335, to be approved by a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created for
such purpose.

One of the Petitioners’ contentions

Petitioners as taxpayers invoke their right and challenge the constitutionality of RA 9335 a tax reform legislation. They
claim that by establishing a system of rewards and incentives the law "transform[s] the officials and employees of the BIR
and the BOC into mercenaries and bounty hunters" as they will do their best only in consideration of such rewards. Thus,
the system of rewards and incentives invites corruption and undermines the constitutionally mandated duty of these
officials and employees to serve the people with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Petitioner’s also claims that limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to officials and employees of
the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and employees of all other government agencies.

Petitioners assail the creation of a congressional oversight committee on the ground that it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. While the legislative function is deemed accomplished and completed upon the enactment and
approval of the law, the creation of the congressional oversight committee permits legislative participation in the
implementation and enforcement of the law.

Respondents’ Comment
Petitioner’s allegation of the reward system will breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate
the law.

The declared objective of RA 9335, the law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they perform are
distinct from those of the other government agencies and instrumentalities. Moreover, the law provides a sufficient
standard that will guide the executive in the implementation of its provisions.

The creation of the congressional oversight committee under the law enhances, rather than violates, separation of powers.
It ensures the fulfillment of the legislative policy and serves as a check to any over-accumulation of power on the part of
the executive and the implementing agencies.

Issue: WON Section 12 of RA 9335 creating a Joint Congressional Oversight Committee to approve the implementing
rules and regulations of the law is unconstitutional.

Ruling: YES. The congressional oversight neither constitute an encroachment on the executive power to implement laws
nor undermines the constitutional separation of powers, rather it is integral to the checks and balances inherent in a
democratic system of government. To forestall the danger of congressional encroachment beyond the legislative sphere,
the constitution imposes 2 basic and related constraints on congress. It should be limited to scrutiny and investigation,

(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress’ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in connection with it,
its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on any matter pertaining to
their departments and its power of confirmation and

(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation.

And any action beyond this will undermine the separation of powers by the constitution in which Legislative veto falls.
Legislative veto is a statutory provision requiring the President or an administrative agency to present the proposed
implementing rules and regulations of a law to Congress which, by itself or through a committee formed by it, retains a
"right" or "power" to approve or disapprove such regulations before they take effect.
In this case, the action of the joint congressional oversight committee which approved the IRR undermines the separation
of powers and the state. Section 12 of RA 9335 which grants to the oversight committee the power to approve the IRR
more than just to scrutinize and investigate which enables them to have the power to veto some proposed rules is
unconstitutional.
Because the power to veto some proposed rules should only befall to the Congress. <- Personal Opinion
11. Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. Nos. 179271 & 179295 (Resolution), July 8, 2009, 609 PHIL 751-774
Petitioner: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparecy
Respondent/s: COE (sitting as the National Board of Canvassers)
Intervenors: Arts Business and Science Professionals, Aangat Tayo, and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens of PH
Ponente: Justice Carpio

FACTS
HoR filed a motion for clarification in intervention and enumerated issues for clarification of the following: 
1. There are 219 legislative districts and not 220. The allotted seats for party-list representation
should only be 54 and not 55. The HoR seeks clarification on which party-list reps shall be admitted to the
Roll of Members considering that the Court declared 55 party-lists rep.
2. HoR wishes to be guided on whether it should enroll its Roll of Members the 32 named party-list
representatives or only such number of representatives that would complete the 250 member
maximum prescribed by Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. In the event that it is ordered to
admit all 32, will this act not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision considering that the
total members would now rise to 270.
3. The Court declared as unconstitutional the 2% threshold only in relation to the distribution of additional seats
as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. Yet, it distributed first seats to party-list groups
which did not attain the minimum number of votes that will entitle them to one seat. Clarification is, therefore,
sought whether the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining
available seats. Corollary thereto, the House of Representatives wishes to be clarified whether
there is no more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative.
4. For the guidance of the House of Representatives, clarification is sought as to whether the principle laid
down in Veterans that "the filling up of the allowable seats for party-list representatives is not
mandatory," has been abandoned.
Armi Jane Roa-Borje (Roa-Borje), third nominee of Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), filed a motion for leave
for partial reconsideration-in-intervention, alleging that: The Supreme Court, in ruling on the procedure for distribution
of seats, has deprived without due process and in violation of the equal protection clause, parties with more significant
constituencies, such as CIBAC, Gabriela and APEC, in favor of parties who did not even meet the 2% threshold.
Roa-Borje’s position stems from the perceived need for absolute proportionality in the allocation of party-list seats. 
ISSUES
1. WON there are 219 legislative districts and not 220, resulting to 54 allotted seats for the party-list representation?
2. WON if the 32 named party-list representatives are admitted, will it violate Section 5(1) Article VI of the
Constitution?
3. WON the term "additional seats" refer to 2nd and 3rd seats only or all remaining available seats? WON there is no
more minimum vote requirement to qualify as a party-list representative?
4. Does the principle of proportional representation apply to the party-list system?
RULING
1. Yes, there are a total of 219 legislative districts and not 220, resulting to 54 allotted seats for the part-list
representation.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads in part: The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.

The 1987 Constitution fixes the ratio of party-list representatives to district representatives. This ratio automatically
applies whenever the number of district representatives is increased by law. The mathematical formula for determining
the number of seats available to party-list representatives is:

Number of seats
available Number of seats available to
to legislative districts .
x =
20
party-list representatives
.80
"[t]his formula allows for the corresponding increase in the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created by law." Thus, for every four district representatives,
the 1987 Constitution mandates that there shall be one party-list representative. There is no need for legislation to create
an additional party-list seat whenever four additional legislative districts are created by law. Section 5(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution automatically creates such additional party-list seat. 
BANAT v COE April 21, 2009 DECISION of the Court, there were 220 legislative districts. Fifty-five party-list seats were
thus allocated. However, the number of legislative districts was subsequently reduced to 219 (with our ruling on 16 July
2008) declaring void the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan. Thus, in the 2007 elections, the number of party-
list seats available for distribution should be correspondingly reduced from 55 to 54. 
2. No, it will not violate Section 5(1) Article VI of the Constitution.
Any change in the number of legislative districts brings a corresponding change in the number of party-list seats. The
Constitution fixes the maximum number of members of the House of Representatives at 250, however, the Constitution
expressly allows for an increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives provided a
law is enacted for the purpose, this is clear from the phrase "unless otherwise provided by law". The Legislature
has the option to choose whether the increase in the number of members of the House of Representatives is done by
piecemeal legislation or by enactment of a law authorizing a general increase. 
In this case, in the event that the House of Representative is ordered to admit all 32 named party-list representatives, the
act will not violate the above-cited Constitutional provision. 
3. Yes, there is no minimum vote requirement to obtain a party-list seat because the Court has struck down the
application of the 2% threshold in the allocation of additional seats. 
Specifically, the provision in Section 11(b) of the Party-List Act stating that "those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in the proportion to their total number of votes" can no longer be given any
effect. Otherwise, the 20 percent party-list seats in the total membership of the House of Representatives as provided in
the 1987 Constitution will mathematically be impossible to fill up.
**However, a party-list organization has to obtain a sufficient number of votes to gain a seat in the second round of seat
allocation. What is deemed a sufficient number of votes is dependent upon the circumstances of each election, such as the
number of participating parties, the number of available party-list seats, and the number of parties with guaranteed
seats received in the first round of seat allocation. To continue the example above, if only ten parties participated in the
2007 party-list election and each party received only one thousand votes, then each of the ten parties would receive 10%
of the votes cast. All are guaranteed one seat, and are further entitled to receive two more seats in the second round of
seat allocation. 
4.  No, this principle of proportional representation applies only to legislative districts not to the party-list system.
The allocation of seats under the party-list system is governed by the Section 5(1) Article VI “those who, as provided by
law, shall be elected through a party-list system,” giving the Legislature has the option in formulating the allocation of
party-list seats. There is no constitutional requirement for absolute proportional representation in the allocation of party-
list seats in the HoR.
Section 2, on Declaration of Policy, of R.A. No. 7941 provides that the "State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof x x x." 
However, this proportional representation in Section 2 is qualified by Section 11(b) of the same law which mandates a
three-seat cap, which is intended to bar any single party-list organization from dominating the party-list system. Section
11(b) also qualifies this proportional representation by imposing a two percent cut-off for those entitled
to the guaranteed seats. These statutory qualifications are valid because they do not violate the
Constitution, which does not require absolute proportional representation for the party-list system.  
NOTES
To summarize, there are four parameters in a Philippine-style party-list election system:
1. Twenty percent of the total number of the membership of the House of Representatives is the maximum
number of seats available to party-list organizations, such that there is automatically one party-list seat for every
four existing legislative districts.
2. Garnering two percent of the total votes cast in the party-list elections guarantees a party-list organization one
seat. The guaranteed seats shall be distributed in a first round of seat allocation to parties receiving at least two
percent of the total party-list votes.
 3. The additional seats, that is, the remaining seats after allocation of the guaranteed seats, shall be distributed to
the party-list organizations including those that received less than two percent of the total votes. The continued
operation of the two percent threshold as it applies to the allocation of the additional seats is now unconstitutional
because this threshold mathematically and physically prevents the filling up of the available party-list seats. The
additional seats shall be distributed to the parties in a second round of seat allocation according to the two-step
procedure laid down in the Decision of 21 April 2009 as clarified in this Resolution. 
4. The three-seat cap is constitutional. The three-seat cap is intended by the Legislature to prevent any party from
dominating the party-list system. There is no violation of the Constitution because the 1987 Constitution does not
require absolute proportionality for the party-list system. The well-settled rule is that courts will not question the
wisdom of the Legislature as long as it is not violative of the Constitution. 
These four parameters allow the mathematical and practical fulfillment of the Constitutional provision that party-list
representatives shall comprise twenty percent of the members of the House of Representatives. At the same time, these
four parameters uphold as much as possible the Party-List Act, striking down only that provision of the Party-List Act that
could not be reconciled anymore with the 1987 Constitution.