RAPE

G.R. No. 128363             May 27, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
EMILIANO CAPAREDA, appellant.

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 92-2054, 92-2085, 92-2086 and 92-2087 convicting the appellant Emiliano Capareda of four (4) counts of rape under
Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

The appellant was charged of rape under four (4) separate Informations, the accusatory portions of which except for the
date of the offense charged are similarly worded, viz:

Criminal Case No. 92-2054

That sometime in the month of June 1992, at 8:00 o’clock, P.M., more or less, at Zone 4, Pasil, Kauswagan,
Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with
complainant-victim, RIZALYN LUFERA, accused forcing himself sexually on the latter, a 13-year-old minor,
against her will.2

Criminal Case No. 92-2085

That sometime in the month of July 1992, at 8:00 o’clock in the evening, more or less, at Zone 4, Pasil,
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge with complainant-victim, RIZALYN T. LUFERA, accused forcing himself sexually on the latter, a 13-
year-old minor, against her will.3

Criminal Case No. 92-2086

That sometime in the 2nd week of the month of July 1992, at 8:00 o’clock, P.M., at (sic), more or less, at Pasil,
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge with complainant-victim, RIZALYN LUFERA, accused forcing himself sexually on the latter, a 13-year-
old minor, against her will.4

Criminal Case No. 92-2087

That sometime in the month of June 12, 1992, (sic) at 8:00 o’clock, P.M., more or less, at Zone 4, Pasil,
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with force and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have carnal
knowledge with complainant-victim, RIZALYN LUFERA, accused forcing himself sexually on the latter, a 13-year-
old minor, against her will.5

Upon his arraignment on March 16, 1994, the appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.6 Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.

The Case for the Prosecution

Rizalyn Torres Lufera was born on June 19, 1979.7 She and her younger brother Ricardo Torres and their mother Jocelyn
Torres Lufera resided in the two-storey house of the latter’s parents, the spouses Cariño and Victorina Torres, at Zone 4,
Pasil, Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City.8 Rizalyn’s parents had been separated since she was still an infant. She grew
up under the joint care of her mother and her grandparents, as well as her aunts and uncles.9

The ground floor of the house had two bedrooms, one occupied by Rizalyn’s grandparents and the other occupied by her
three unnamed uncles who were then still studying. Rizalyn, her mother and her younger brother Ricardo, occupied one of
the three rooms in the second floor.10
The appellant Emiliano Capareda was the brother-in-law of Cariño Torres, being the second husband of Anita Torres Vda.
de Dagsang, Cariño Torres’ sister.11 The couple resided in Banlag, Valencia, Bukidnon. Sometime in the last week of May
1992, a relative of Anita and Cariño died.12 The appellant, together with his wife Anita and her son by her previous
husband, Almor Dagsang, attended the interment and, thereafter,

stayed for some time in the house of Cariño Torres.13 The couple occupied the living room in the second floor, as the two
other rooms were respectively occupied by Rizalyn’s uncle and her two single aunts.14 Nevertheless, Emiliano and Anita
had their clothes placed in Rizalyn’s room and had access therein.15

In June 1992, Rizalyn was thirteen years old16 and a first year high school student at the Misamis Oriental General
Comprehensive High School. She was a bright student and belonged to the first section of the science class.17 To
maintain her academic status, every night, after taking dinner and doing her part of the household chores, Rizalyn would
go up to their room and study her lessons.18

At around 8:00 p.m. on June 10, 1992, while Rizalyn was studying her lessons, the appellant entered the room to get
some things and to change his clothes.19 Ricardo, Rizalyn’s brother, and the other occupants of the house were on the
ground floor.20 Rizalyn was shocked when suddenly, the appellant held her by her shirt collar and poked his right clenched
fist at her.21 He gave Rizalyn dagger looks and warned her, saying, "Hoy, ‘Zalyn bantay lang kon mutug-an ka sa imong
Mama" ("Hoy, ‘Zalyn beware if you will report to your mother"). He then pushed her to the floor and laid on top of her. The
appellant removed his short pants and briefs and pulled down Rizalyn’s shorts and underwear. He spread her thighs,
inserted his penis into her vagina and made push and pull movements. Rizalyn felt severe pain in her vagina and cried.
Satiated, the appellant stood up and wiped his penis. He put on his briefs and short pants and left the room, leaving the
sobbing Rizalyn alone. She kept the shocking experience to herself because of the appellant’s warning.22

At around 8:00 p.m. on June 12, 1992, Rizalyn was in her room studying. She was reading a book while lying prostrate on
the floor, face down. The appellant collared her anew. She was more terrified this time because the appellant was armed
with an eighteen-inch bolo. The appellant warned her that if she reported the matter to her mother, he would kill all of
them. Fearing for her life, as well as those of her mother and brother, Rizalyn complied when the appellant ordered her to
lie flat on the floor. The appellant undressed himself, then Rizalyn, and again inserted his private organ into her vagina.23

The appellant raped Rizalyn anew two more times in July 1992. The appellant sneaked upon Rizalyn while the latter was
studying in her room and, while holding a bolo, threatened to kill her and her family if she reported the matter to her
mother. The appellant then proceeded to rape her. Petrified, Rizalyn did nothing but to submit herself to the appellant’s
bestial desires. Since the appellant was still living with them and kept close watch on her actions, Rizalyn kept her
harrowing ordeal to herself. She noticed the appellant giving her menacing looks whenever she conversed with a
relative.24

Meanwhile, Jocelyn noticed that Rizalyn had not had her monthly menstruation. She also noticed Rizalyn vomiting every
now and then and had frequent fevers and colds.25 Jocelyn confronted Rizalyn, who then confessed that the appellant had
raped her on four separate occasions, in June and July 1992, while she was alone in her room. Jocelyn was shocked at
her daughter’s revelation.26

On August 31, 1992, Jocelyn brought Rizalyn to the Northern Mindanao Regional Training Hospital at Cagayan de Oro
City27 where Dr. Olivia Sumampan of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department conducted an examination on her. The
examination disclosed that Rizalyn was already six (6) weeks pregnant.28 Because of her pregnancy, Rizalyn was forced
to discontinue her schooling effective the first week of September 1992.29 Rizalyn signed a criminal complaint charging the
appellant for the crime of rape. Earlier, or on September 4, 1992, she had given a sworn statement to the Criminal
Investigation Section of the Integrated National Police. On December 4, 1992, a warrant was issued for the appellant’s
arrest.

On March 26, 1993,30 Rizalyn Torres Lufera gave birth to a baby girl. Sometime in February 1994, SPO2 Exudio Vidal of
the PNP-CIS Regional Office apprehended the appellant at Barangay Tipolo, Quezon, a locality in Bukidnon bordering
Davao.31

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant admitted to having had sexual intercourse with Rizalyn. However, he claimed that she consented to have
sexual intercourse with him since they were sweethearts. Prior to June 1992, when he and his family frequented the
house of Cariño Torres, he and Rizalyn would go swimming at sea. On those occasions, he and Rizalyn developed
feelings of mutual understanding ("Nagkasabot ang among kasingkasing"). Since the second week of June 1992 until
August 1992, he and Rizalyn had sexual intercourse almost every night and at dawn in the ground floor, and in the
second floor of the house of the Torreses. The only times that he and Rizalyn did not have sexual intercourse was when
he went to Bukidnon or to Scions, Calaanan, Cagayan de Oro City.32

The appellant’s testimony was corroborated by his stepson, Almor Dagsang, who was then barely twelve years old. He
testified that he saw the appellant and Rizalyn having sexual intercourse on two occasions. He belied Rizalyn’s
asseveration that his stepfather raped her because it was Rizalyn who made advances on the appellant. He recounted
that one early morning, while his mother and the other occupants of the house were away, Rizalyn went upstairs and
seduced the appellant into having sexual intercourse with her. Almor was about three meters away from Rizalyn and the
appellant. Even as the appellant tried to persuade Rizalyn to stop for fear that someone might see them, Rizalyn refused
because she was enjoying the sexual intercourse. Almor, ashamed at what he saw, just closed his eyes.

On another occasion, while they were watching the television one evening, Almor told the appellant that he was already
going upstairs to sleep. Rizalyn stopped him and told him to continue viewing the television and that she would just be the
one to lie down with her step-grandfather.

Later that night, he saw Rizalyn and the appellant hugging each other.33

On April 3, 1996, the trial court promulgated its Decision34 convicting the appellant of the crimes charged. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Emiliano Capareda guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the consummated crime of Rape as charged in the four (4) separate complaints, and sentences the
accused Emiliano Capareda for the four (4) separate crimes, Criminal Case No. 92-2054; Criminal Case No. 92-
2085; Criminal Case No. 92-2086; and Criminal Case No. 92-2087, to suffer an imprisonment of Reclusion
Perpetua for each crime committed on Rizalyn Torres Lufera and to indemnify the offended party the sum of
P50,000.00 and to acknowledge the offspring Marjorie Torres Lufera as his child and accused is ordered to
provide a monthly support of P2,000.00 per month which shall be correspondingly increased as the need of the
child arise.35

The appellant assails the decision of the trial court contending that:

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR THE
CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.36

The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove beyond cavil that he coerced, intimidated or forced Rizalyn
into having sexual intercourse with him. He avers that Rizalyn consented to have sexual intercourse with him, as shown
by her failure to resist when he undressed her and inserted his private organ into her vagina.

According to the appellant, Rizalyn did not even shout while she was being undressed, and even when he lay on top of
her. Her mouth was not covered, but she did not even shout despite the extreme pain she experienced as the appellant
inserted his penis into her vagina. The appellant asserts that Rizalyn could have ran while the appellant was undressing
her, or stomped her feet to call the attention of her relatives who were on the ground floor of the house. Rizalyn did not
seek anyone’s help. As it was, Rizalyn lay motionless, without exerting any degree of resistance. All the foregoing
circumstances, the appellant concludes, are proof of her consent to the sexual congress with him.

We are not convinced. Case law has it that the failure of the victim to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make
voluntary the victim’s submission to the criminal acts of the accused.37 Resistance is not an element of rape and the
absence thereof is not tantamount to consent.38 The law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving
resistance.39 In fact, physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim
and she submits herself against her will to the rapist’s lust because of fear for life or personal safety.40 Indeed, it has been
said that, in rape cases, it is not necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death or sustained injuries in the
hands of the rapist. It suffices that intercourse takes place against her will or that she yields because of a genuine
apprehension of great harm.41

We have also held that intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule.42 The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces fear in the
mind of a reasonable person – that if one resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be
carried out.43 In the instant case, Rizalyn was cowed into submission because of the appellant’s very real and present
threat of physical harm on her person. The appellant was armed with an eighteen-inch long bolo and threatened Rizalyn
when he raped her on June 12, 1992 and in July 1992. She was barely thirteen years old at the time of the rape incidents
and, at such a tender age, must have been overcome with fear of serious physical harm, thus, did not resist the bestial
desires of the appellant.

We note that Rizalyn’s father left his family when she was yet an infant. Helpless and homeless, Jocelyn and her children
had to live with Rizalyn’s grandparents at Zone 4, Pasil, Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City. Rizalyn grew up without her
father and looked up to her uncles and her grandfather as the only tangible and credible male models of moral and
spiritual leadership that only a father could have been. The same could be said of her relationship with and her regard for
the appellant, who was the husband of her grandmother, Anita Torres.

The appellant further argues that Rizalyn’s demeanor in the aftermath of the sexual intercourse was inconsistent with the
normal human conduct and behavior of one who had been forcibly sexually assaulted. He contends that after the alleged
sexual molestation, Rizalyn concealed the alleged crime by placing her bloodied panty among her other soiled clothes
and underwear. She even had to change her underwear before going to bed. Moreover, barely five minutes after the
alleged traumatic ordeal, she immediately went to bed and slept as if nothing traumatic had happened.

The appellant insists that the following morning, she underwent with her usual routine as if she was not raped at all.
Rizalyn had every opportunity to confide in her aunt while the appellant was still asleep, but she kept mum about the
incident. She even went to school, apparently unperturbed. The appellant notes that the following evening, Rizalyn again
studied her lessons and did not even undertake the precaution of bolting her door to prevent another untoward
incident.44 All the foregoing circumstances, the appellant asserts, undoubtedly negate rape.

The contention does not hold water. We have repeatedly ruled that different people react differently to the same situation,
and not every victim of a crime can be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the expectations of everyone.45 For
this reason, that Rizalyn was calm and composed after the raping incidents is not a ground for disbelieving her testimony
as unusual for a rape victim. There is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a
frightful experience.46 The victim’s mien, rather than composure, could mean resignation, considering her continuing
suffering, or apoplexy and numbness as aftermaths of her ordeal.47

Rizalyn’s initial reluctance to reveal to her mother, grandparents and relatives the sexual assault upon her person does
not detract from her credibility, her hesitation being attributable to her age, and the appellant’s threats of physical harm
and death against her and the other members of her family.48 This Court has ruled that it is not proper to judge the actions
of children who have undergone traumatic experiences by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from
mature persons. The range of emotion shown by rape victims is yet to be captured even by calculus. It is, thus, unrealistic
to expect uniform reactions from rape victims.49 The workings of the human mind, placed under a great deal of emotional
and psychological stress (such as during rape), are unpredictable, and different people react differently. There is no
standard form of behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful or traumatic experience –
some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility.50

The natural reluctance of a young lass like Rizalyn to report immediately to the mother and relatives that the appellant had
raped her is understandable, especially considering that it was her granduncle who sexually assaulted her. Often, a victim
involving a thirteen-year-old girl would rather suffer in silence the onslaught on her honor rather than reveal her
story.51 Thus, her delay in reporting the rape ought not to be taken against her, nor used to weaken her credibility.52 The
Court takes judicial notice of a young woman’s inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which
blemish her honor and virtue. Rape stigmatizes the victim, not the perpetrator.53 Rape is a harrowing experience and the
shock concomitant to it may linger for a while. Oftentimes, victims would rather bear the ignominy and the pain in private
than reveal their shame to the world or risk the rapist’s making good the threat to do them harm.54

Still and all, it should be observed that the private complainant was subsequently able to narrate the harrowing details of
her ordeal, thus:

Q You said you were raped by your stepgrandfather. Please tell this Honorable Court how?

A While I was studying in my room located at the second floor, Emiliano Capareda went upstairs and suddenly
went inside my room and when he was already inside my room, he held the collar of my shirt with his left hand.

Q What was on his right hand, if any?

A At that particular time, Emiliano Capareda was not holding anything with his right hand, but he showed only his
right hand with a clinch (sic) fist.
Q Will you kindly illustrate for the benefit of this Honorable Court how you (sic) stepgrandfather do (sic) these two
things.

A (Witness demonstrating by holding the collar of the shirt of the interpreter with her left hand and with her right
hand showing a clinch [sic] fist).

Q And what was your position when your stepgrandfather held your collar and at the same time showed his right
hand with a clinch (sic) fist?

A I was sitting on the floor.

Q What was the position of your stepgrandfather at that time when he held your collar and showed his right hand
with a clinch (sic) fist?

A When he held my collar with his left hand and showing his right clinch (sic) fist, he was bending his body.

Q Now, after he held your collar with left hand and showing his right clinch (sic) fist, what did he do next to you?

A After Emiliano Capareda poked his right clinch fist at me, he warned me by saying, "Hoy, ‘Zalyn bantay lang
kon mutug-an ka sa imong Mama", ("Hoy, ‘Zalyn beware if you will report to your mother") staring at me with a
dogger (sic) look and pushed me to the floor.

Q What other words, if any, uttered (sic) by the accused at this time when you were already pushed to the floor?

A There were no more words uttered by the accused.

COURT : Ask her how did she feel.

Q Now, at the time the accused held your collar with your (sic) left hand and clinched (sic) his right fist and
pushed you to the floor staring at you with a dogger (sic) look, what did your (sic) feel?

A I was afraid.

Q What else did you feel?

A I got mad at him and I cried.

Q When he pushed you to the floor and staring at you with a dogger (sic) look, what did he do next?

A After Emiliano Capareda held my collar and showed me his right clinch (sic) fist, he pushed me to the floor and
he then laid on top of me and then removed his short pants and brief.

Q After this, what did he do next to you?

A After Emiliano Capareda removed his pants and brief, he then pulled up my skirt and then he pulled down my
short pants and panty and spread my thighs.

Q When the accused did this to you, what was your feeling?

A When Emiliano Capareda did this to me, "nasilag ako" (meaning, I hated him) because I was raped by him.

Q After the accused spread your thighs, what did he do next to you?

A After spreading my two thighs, Emiliano Capareda made a push and pull movement.
Q Towards what part of your body?

A Towards my vagina.

Q What was your feeling then at that time when the accused made a push and pull movement towards your
vagina?

A While Emiliano Capareda was making a push and pull movement in my vagina, I felt pain.

Q While the accused was making a push and pull movement towards your vagina and you were hurt, what did
you do, if any?

A I just cried.

Q A while ago you said that you hated him for raping you. Now, why did you feel in this manner?

A I hated Emiliano Capareda because he raped me.

Q What is your relationship to Emiliano Capareda?.

A I am his granddaughter.

Q Now, after the accused made a push and pull movement towards your vagina, what did he do next, if any?

A After Emiliano Capareda made a push and pull movement towards my vagina, he then stood up and wiped his
penis and then he wore back his brief and short pants and then he left me crying inside the room.

Q At this time, where was you (sic) mother, Jocelyn Torres Lupera (sic)?

A All this time, my mother was in (sic) the first floor of the house.

Q Who was with her, if you know?

A She was with my younger brother, Ricardo, my grandparents, Cariño and Victorina Torres, my aunts, Grace
and Merced Torres, and my uncles, Marvin, Darwin and Mariel.

Q On June 12, 1992 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, where were you?

A At 8:00 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 1992, I was at the second floor in my room.

Q What were you doing there?

A I was still studying my lessons.

Q What was you (sic) position while studying?

A I was lying flat with my face on the floor.

Q Was there an unusual incident that occurred at this time?

A This time, Emiliano Capareda did the same thing to me. He raped me again.

Q Now, starting from the very beginning of June 12, 1992, can you tell the Honorable (sic) how did Emiliano
Capareda do this thing to you?

A While I was studying in our room, Emiliano Capareda pretended to come inside our room and then he held my
collar with his left hand and showed me a long bolo on his right hand.
Q How long is this bolo?

A As long as this. (Parties agreed that the length of the bolo is about 18 inches as demonstrated by the witness.)

Q When he collared you and showed you the 18 inches (sic) bolo on his right hand, what was your feeling?

A This time, I became more terrified because he showed me a long bolo.

Q Comparing this feeling right now when you were showed a bolo, how would you compare it with your feeling
during the first incident of rape?

A Comparing the first and the second incident, I am more terrified during the second incident.

Q After collaring you and showing you a bolo, what did the accused do to you next?

A He then ordered me to lie on the floor facing the ceiling.

Q Did you comply with his order?

A I just followed his order because he was carrying a weapon.

Q What did he do next to you?

A Just like the first incident, Emiliano Capaeda (sic) laid on top of me and then removed his shirt, his short pants
and then his brief and after that he undressed me.

Q Before these things occurred, what words were uttered to you by the accused.

A Before Emiliano Capareda laid on top of me and then removed his shirt, short pants and his brief and then
undressed me, he warned me by saying "Bantay ka lang kong mutugan ka sa imong Mama kay pamatyon ko
kamong tanan" (meaning, "Beware. If you will report this to your mother, I will kill you all.")

Q When he uttered those threats to you, did you believe him?

A Yes, Sir. I believe (sic) him.

Q When he said, "I will kill you all," did you understand to whom he was referring?

A Yes, Sir. I know that he was referring to me and to my family.

Q Now, a while ago, you said that the accused did to you what he did to you during the first incident. On June 12,
1992, what did the accused do to you, specifically?

A He then again raped me.

Q How?

A He forced me.

Q How was this rape done to you?

A When Emiliano Capareda undressed me already, he inserted his penis in my vagina.

Q How?

A He made a push and pull movement.

Q What did you feel when he made a push and pull movement towards your vagina?

A I still felt the pain.

Q Where?

A In my vagina.

Q And after he did this to you, what did he do next to you?

A After Emiliano Capareda raped me, he then stood up and wiped his penis and then he left just what (sic) he did
during the first incident.

Q What about you when he left you, what was your feeling or reaction?

A I was afraid and I cried.

Q Before he left you, what words, if any, did he utter to you?

A He did not utter anything before he left me.

Q Sometime in the month of July 1992 at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, where were you?

A I was again in (sic) the second floor of our house, particularly inside our room.

Q What were you doing there?

A I was again studying my lesson.

Q What was your position while studying?

A I was again lying on the floor.

Q Now, while you were lying on the floor, what unusual incident, if any, occurred?

A I was raped by Emiliano Capareda.

Q How was this third incident done to you by the accused?

A This time, Emiliano Capareda pretended to spread their mat where he and his wife will sleep and then he
entered our room and then afterward he collared me again and showed me again his long bolo.

Q After he collared you and showed you his long bolo, about 18 inches long, what did he do next?

A Just the same Emiliano Capareda laid on top of me. He undressed himself and then he undressed me and
spread my thighs and then he inserted his penis in my vagina.

Q How did he insert his penis to your vagina?

A He inserted his penis on my vagina by making a push and pull movement.

Q And what did you feel when he made a push and pull movement for the third time?

A I still felt the pain.

Q What else did you feel?

A I hated him and I cried.

Q When he was making a push and pull movement towards your vagina, what did you do?

A I just did nothing.

Q You did not utter any word to your stepgrandfather?

A I did not say any word to my stepgrandfather because I was afraid of him.

Q During the second rape incident of June 12, 1992 while he was making the push and pull movement towards
your vagina, what did you do towards your stepgrandfather, Emiliano Capareda?

A I did nothing.

Q Why?

A Because I was afraid of him.

Q During the first incident sometime in the month of June 1992 while he was making a push and pull movement,
what did you do with your stepgrandfather, if any?

A I did nothing, sir, while he was making a push and pull movement towards my vagina.

Q Why?

A Because I was afraid of him.

Q When he left you after the third incident, what words, if any, did he to you? (sic)

A When Emiliano Capareda left me after the incident of July 1992, he did not utter anything.

Q On the second week of July 1992, at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening, where were you?

A I was again in (sic) the second floor, inside our room.

Q What were you doing then?

A I was again studying my lesson.

Q What was your position while studying?

A I was again lying on the floor.

Q While you were studying lying on the floor, what was incident occurred (sic), if any?

A I was again raped by Emiliano Capareda.

Q How?

A He raped me and forced me.

Q This time, how was it done?

A This time, Emiliano Capareda went inside our room and then he collared me and showed me his long bolo.

Q When he did this to you for the fourth time, what was your reaction?

A I was again afraid or terrified.

Q What were you afraid of?

A I was afraid because he showed me his long bolo.

Q What words, if any, uttered (sic) to you by the accused?

A This time, the accused again warned me by saying, "Magbantay lang ako kay kong motugan ako sa akong
Mama, pamatyon mi niyang tana" (meaning, I will just watch out because if I will report to my mother, he will kill us
all).

COURT : Ask her whether she believe (sic) this.

Q When the accused uttered those things, do (sic) you believe him?

A Yes, Sir. I believe (sic) him when he uttered those threatening words.

Q When he uttered "I will kill you all," what was your reaction?

A I was afraid.

Q When he uttered, "I will kill you all," did you understand to whom was he referring that?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Who was he referring to?

A He was referring to me and to my family.

Q Who is this family?

A My mother, Jocelyn Torres, my younger brother, Ricardo Torres Lupera (sic), my grandparents, Cariño and
Victorina Torres, my aunts and my uncles.

Q Do you love you (sic) mother and your brother?

A Yes, Sir.

Q How about your aunts and uncles?

A Yes, Sir?

Q How about your grandparents?

A Yes, Sir.

Q After he collared you and showed you his long bolo, what did he do next to you, this time?

A He then placed his bolo at my side, then he undressed me and then he undressed himself.
Q Now, after he undressed you first and then the accused undressed himself, what did he do next to you?

A Then he laid on top of me.

Q While he was lying on top of you, what did he do next?

A He then spread my two thighs and then he made a push and pull movement.

Q Where is this push and pull movement directed to?

A He made a push and pull movement towards my vagina.

Q When the accused made a push and pull movement towards your vagina, what did you feel?

A I felt pain on my vagina.

Q What was the caused (sic) of this pain inside your vagina?

A I felt pain on my vagina because he inserted his penis and he made a push and pull movement.

Q During this first incident in the month of June 1992, you said you felt pain in your vagina. What was the caused
(sic) of this pain during the first incident?

A I felt pain on my vagina because he inserted his penis inside my vagina.

Q On June 12, 1992, during the second incident, you said you felt pain in your vagina. What was the caused (sic)
of that pain?

A I still felt pain on my vagina because he inserted his penis and made a push and pull movement towards my
vagina.

Q During the third incident, you said you felt pain in your vagina. What was the caused (sic) of that pain?

A I felt pain because he inserted his penis inside my vagina.

Q Aside from the pain which you felt inside your vagina, what was your other feeling while he was inserting his
penis towards my (sic) vagina?

A I was afraid.

Q What else?

A I cried.

Q What else?

A No more.

Q You said you were afraid. To whom you are afraid?

A I was afraid of Emiliano Capareda.

Q Why were you afraid of him?

A Because I was raped by him.

 Q Aside from being afraid for being raped, why you were (sic) afraid of Emiliano Capareda?

A Aside from being afraid for being raped, I was afraid because he threatened me (sic) to kill me and my family if I
will report the incident to my mother and because he showed me a long bolo.

Q In the month of June 1992, you said that you were also afraid. To who you were (sic) afraid of?

A I was afraid of Emiliano Capareda.

Q Why you were afraid during the first incident of June 1992?

A I was afraid of him because he threatened me that he will kill me and poked his clinch (sic) right fist towards me.

Q During the second incident of June 12, 1992, you said you were afraid. To whom you were (sic) afraid of?

A I was afraid of Emiliano Capareda.

Q Why were you afraid of Emiliano Capareda?

A I was afraid of Emiliano Capareda because he raped me.

Q What else was the caused (sic) of your fear towards Emiliano Capareda?

A Aside from being raped, I was also afraid of Emiliano Capareda because I was threatened by him that he will kill
me and showed to me his long bolo.

Q Now, in the third incident of July 1992, you said that you were afraid. To whom you were (sic) afraid of?

A I was afraid of Emiliano Capareda.

Q Why were you afraid of him?

A Because he raped me.

Q What else was the caused (sic) of your fear?

A Because he poked his long bolo and threatened me that he will kill me and my family if I will report the incident
to my mother.55

Even under grueling cross-examination by the infatigable counsel of the appellant, Rizalyn never wavered in her
testimony that the appellant had forced her to have sexual intercourse with him; that he poked a bolo at her on June 12,
1992 and in July 1992; and, threatened to kill her and her family if she reported the defilement on her person to anyone,
especially to her mother. We find that her testimony bears the hallmarks of truth. It is consistent on material points. When
a rape victim’s testimony is straightforward and candid, unshaken by rigid cross-examination and unflawed by
inconsistencies or contradictions in its material points, the same must be given full faith and credit.56

Established is the rule that the testimonies of rape victims, especially child victims, are given full weight and credit.57 It
bears emphasis that the victim was barely thirteen when she was raped. In a litany of cases, this Court has applied the
well-settled rule that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that
is necessary to prove that rape was committed, for as long as her testimony meets the test of credibility.58 No young girl,
indeed, would concoct a sordid tale of so serious a crime as rape at the hands of a close kin, undergo medical
examination, then subject herself to the stigma and embarrassment of a public trial, if her motive were other than an
earnest desire to seek justice.59 This holds true especially where the complainant is a minor, whose testimony deserves
full credence.60 Certainly, Rizalyn’s testimony is entitled to great weight especially when she accuses a close relative of
having ravished her. For there can be ascribed no greater motivation for a woman abused by her own kin than that innate
yearning of the human spirit to declare the truth to obtain justice.61
In the review of rape cases, we are almost invariably guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be
made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must
be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.62

In a prosecution for rape, therefore, the victim’s credibility becomes the single most important issue, and when her
testimony satisfies the test of credibility, an accused may be convicted solely on the basis thereof.63. In the instant case,
we find no reason to doubt that Rizalyn was telling the truth when she declared that the appellant had sexually ravished
her on four separate occasions in the months of June and July 1992. Rizalyn’s credibility was not successfully assailed by
the appellant.

The essence of rape as defined under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code64 is carnal knowledge of a woman against
her will. The appellant failed to show that Rizalyn consented to have sexual intercourse with him. On the contrary, the
evidence showed that the carnal acts were done against her will.

Finally, the "sweetheart defense" proffered by the appellant is barren of factual consideration. The alleged "illicit love
affair" angle appears to be a mere fabrication of the appellant’s, to exculpate himself from the rape charges filed against
him. Having admitted to having had carnal knowledge of the complainant on the dates and times in question, the appellant
bears the burden of proving his affirmative defense by clear and convincing evidence.65 The appellant, however, failed to
discharge his burden. A "sweetheart defense" should be substantiated by some documentary and/or other evidence of the
relationship.66 Other than his self-serving assertions and those of his biased stepson, there is no support to appellant’s
claim that he and complainant were lovers. The appellant failed to adduce in evidence any mementos, love letters, notes,
pictures, or any concrete proof of a romantic nature. Moreover, even if we were to assume that the appellant and the
private complainant were indeed lovers, this fact would not have precluded rape, as it did not necessarily mean there was
consent. A love affair could not have justified what the appellant did – subjecting Rizalyn to his carnal desires against her
will.67 The Court has previously taken judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in this country, young ladies by
custom and tradition act with circumspection and prudence, and that great caution is observed so that their reputation
remains untainted.68 It is unbelievable that Rizalyn would have participated in, much less initiated, these alleged romantic
trysts.

The appellant’s reliance on the testimony of his stepson Almor is desperation personified with the finding of the trial court
and this Court that Rizalyn’s testimony as to when and how the appellant despoiled her is the truth. The testimony of
Almor in defense of the appellant cannot prevail over that of Rizalyn.

It is basic that where there is no showing that the complainant was impelled by an improper motive in making the
accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credit.69 Considering her young age, it would
have been highly improbable for Rizalyn to fabricate a charge so humiliating to her and her family, had she not been truly
subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse.70 We additionally consider the fact that it is hard to believe that a
mother would sacrifice her own daughter and present her to be the subject of a public trial if she, in fact, has not been
motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit punished.71 It is quite unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an
engine of malice, especially if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even stigma.72

More telling of the appellant’s culpability is his flight after the charges against him had been filed. The appellant himself on
cross-examination admitted that although he had known that charges had already been filed against him, he did not file a
counter-affidavit in all the four complaints upon his wife’s instructions. His wife promised to talk to her brother Cariño
Torres to convince them to withdraw the complaints.73 The appellant also testified that he knew that a subpoena was
served at their address at Banlag, Valencia, Bukidnon on October 5, 1992 which was received by his wife.74 The
appellant, however, ignored the subpoena and continued to stay in Kipulot, Bukidnon, under the pretext of preaching for
the Seventh Day Adventist Church. He managed to elude arrest for more than a year until he was finally arrested in
February 1994. The appellant cannot feign ignorance of the warrant for his arrest which was issued as early as November
1992. The policemen tried to serve the warrant of arrest on the appellant but the latter was nowhere to be found. The
appellant himself testified that while he was in Kipulot, his wife Anita Torres frequented the residence of her brother
Cariño Torres to persuade them that she and the appellant would be the one to shoulder the expenses of Rizalyn’s
delivery, and to give support for the child.75 The appellant was, therefore, constantly communicating with his wife, Anita
Torres, and as such, the issuance of the warrant for her husband’s arrest could not have escaped her attention. The
appellant was fully aware of the pending charges against him. In fact, in the first week of September, he and his wife went
to Rizalyn’s residence for the purpose of pleading for forgiveness, in the hope that the latter would withdraw her complaint
against the appellant. But Rizalyn and her family were resolute in prosecuting the case against the appellant.76
While we affirm the appellant’s conviction, the trial court’s decision must be modified with respect to the award of
damages. We note that the trial court failed to specify and particularize the damages given to Rizalyn.

Evidently, as the text of the decision indicates, the amount of ₱50,000 was intended as indemnification to the private
complainant. In accordance with current case law, we award Rizalyn civil indemnity in the amount of ₱50,000 for each
count of rape,77 or a total of ₱200,000 for all four counts. Civil indemnity is automatically granted once the fact of rape had
been established. We also deem it proper to award the complainant moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000 for each
count of rape. Moral damages are automatically granted to the victim in rape cases without need for further proof other
than the commission of the crime.78 The fact that the victim suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological
sufferings which constitute the bases for moral damages is too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the
victim, since the Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her credibility.
Accordingly, for the appellant’s conviction in the four criminal cases filed against him by the complainant, the latter is
entitled to moral damages in the amount of ₱200,000.

The alternative aggravating circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
considered in the instant case considering that the relationship between a step-grandniece and her step-grandfather is not
one of the relatives specifically enumerated therein.79

Apropos the penalty imposed by the trial court, Article 335, paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.

In rape cases, "use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons" are special aggravating circumstances. During the
trial, the prosecution was able to prove that the appellant used a bolo to intimidate the victim into having sexual
intercourse with him, once on June 12, 1992 and twice in July 1992. This circumstance was not, however, alleged in the
information. Section 880 and Section 981 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,82 provides
that aggravating as well as qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information; otherwise, they cannot be
considered in imposing the appropriate penalty against the accused even if proven during the trial. Being favorable to the
accused, the said rule may be applied retroactively in this case. In any event, the death penalty, even if appropriate, may
not be imposed, considering that its imposition was yet suspended at the time of the commission of the crimes under
consideration.

Nonetheless, the circumstance of use of a bolo may be appreciated as basis for an award of exemplary damages in line
with current jurisprudence.83 Consequently, the victim is entitled to ₱25,000 as exemplary damages for each of the three
counts of rape as she was intimidated by the appellant into sexual congress with the use of a bolo.84

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the September 23, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, Branch 25, in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-2054, 92-2085, 92-2086 and 92-2087 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The appellant Emiliano Capareda is ORDERED to pay the complainant Rizalyn
Torres Lufera for EACH count of rape the amount of ₱50,000 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000 as moral damages; and,
₱25,000 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 126282               June 20, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
WILSON DREU alias "ADANG DREU," accused-appellant.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 51, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, finding accused-
appellant Wilson "Adang" Dreu guilty of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua  and to pay the
victim Josephine Guevarra the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages and the costs of suit.

The information 1 against accused-appellant and his co-accused Minda Dollesin reads:

The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Adang Dreu as principal by direct participation and Minda
Dollesin as principal by indispensable cooperation, both residents of Rangas, Juban, Sorsogon, of the crime of
Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of May, 1986, in Barangay Rangas, Municipality of Juban, Province of Sorsogon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Adang Dreu, did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by force and intimidation while Josephine Guevarra was deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious have sexual intercourse with said Josephine Guevarra, against her will and
consent, and with the indispensable cooperation of Minda Dollesin, to the damage and prejudice of said
Josephine Guevarra.

The facts are as follows:

On the evening of May 10, 1986, Josephine Guevarra and several companions went to a dance in Rangas, Juban,
Sorsogon. At around one o'clock in the morning of May 11, 1986, Josephine, with her aunt Leonora Diche and some
friends, decided to go home in Mabini, Casiguran, Sorsogon, about two kilometers from Rangas. 2 On their way, Minda
Dollesin, Josephine's close friend of two years, invited her to pass by the former's (Minda's) house. 3 Josephine did not
think twice about it and accepted Minda's invitation. So the two proceeded to Minda's house, while the rest went their
separate ways. Instead of going to Minda's house, however, the two went to the house of a certain Victor Guerrero where
Minda had a small store. Minda said she wanted to get something from her store. Minda went inside the store and told
Josephine to wait outside. Moments later, a man whom Josephine recognized as accused-appellant, came out of the
store and immediately covered her head and face with a jacket. Josephine instantly felt nauseated as the jacket smelled
of rugby. Accused-appellant went behind her and, with his left hand, held both of Josephine's hands behind her, while his
right hand held a bladed weapon at Josephine's right side. She was then dragged a few meters from the store and led to a
grassy area where she was made to lie on the ground. Accused-appellant then removed the jacket from Josephine's head
and removed her pants.1âwphi1.nêt

Josephine wanted to fight back, but she felt weak and afraid. She tried to talk accused-appellant out of his design, telling
him "that it could be done in a good or nice way," 4 but accused-appellant paid no heed to her pleas, as he took off his
pants. At this point, Josephine lost consciousness. When she came to about 30 minutes later, she found her private parts
bleeding. She saw accused-appellant put on his pants and then leave. Josephine then put on her own pants and went to
the waiting shed by the roadside. 5 She was weeping when her brother, Jessie Guevarra, and the latter's companions
found her. It was about 1:30 in the morning. Her brother and his companions were going home. Jessie asked Josephine
what happened to her but, as the latter was about to recount her ordeal, Minda Dollesin arrived together with
Panny 6 Dreu, accused-appellant's brother. Minda told them that they should not involve her in the incident. 7 Jessie then
took Josephine home. Later that morning, Josephine told her brother what had happened to her. Jessie then reported the
matter to their father, Pablo Guevarra, who lost no time in reporting the incident to the authorities. 8

On May 12, 1986, Dr. Erlinda Orense, Municipal Health Officer of Juban, Sorsogon, examined Josephine and found
"vaginal laceration at 3 o'clock and 9 o'clock position . . . which admits one finger with ease." 9

On May 31, 1986, Josephine executed a sworn statement 10 which formed the basis of a criminal complaint 11 against
accused-appellant and Minda Dollesin. After preliminary investigation, an information was filed charging both accused
with the crime of rape. At the arraignment held on June 9, 1987, only Minda Dollesin was present. She pleaded "not guilty"
to the charge 12 and, upon her motion, she was tried separately.

After the prosecution presented its evidence and rested its case, counsel for Minda Dollesin, with leave of court, filed a
demurrer to evidence. 13 In an order, 14 dated December 8, 1989, the trial court found that the evidence against Minda
Dollesin was insufficient and ordered the case archived pending the arrest of accused-appellant. Accused-appellant was
finally arrested on February 2, 1991. He was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty," whereupon, he was tried.

On September 18, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision 15 finding accused-appellant guilty of rape. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the accused Wilson alias Adang Dreu is convicted of Rape defined and penalized under
paragraph 1 Art. 338 as amended by Republic Act No. 4111 and sentenced him to Reclusion Perpetua and to
indemnify the offended party the amount of P30,000.00 for moral damages and costs of suit.

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT USED FORCE
AND INTIMIDATION WHEN IN FACT THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE WAS WITH THE MUTUAL
CONSENT OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY
OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT DESPITE THE VARIOUS INCONSISTENCIES AND
CONTRADICTIONS IN HER TESTIMONY ON SOME MATERIAL AND VITAL POINTS.

III. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE WEAK EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION AGAINST HIM.

The appeal has no merit.

First. Accused-appellant claims he and Josephine were lovers and that what happened in the early morning of May 11,
1986 was consensual. He claims that there is no evidence that he used force and intimidation in having sexual intercourse
with Josephine. 16

This is without basis. Accused-appellant failed to present any evidence to support his claim that he and Josephine were
sweethearts. 17 It appears that shortly after the incident, accused-appellant offered to marry Josephine but the latter
spurned the offer, declaring "[she] did not like him to be [her] husband."18 Instead, Josephine tenaciously pursued her case
against accused-appellant. 19

The "sweetheart defense" has often been raised in rape cases but has rarely been upheld as the defense failed to come
up with convincing proof. Indeed, accused-appellant bears the burden of proving that he and complainant had an affair
which naturally led to a sexual relationship. 20 As we held in People v. Barcelona: 21

. . . No young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit she had been raped unless that was the truth. Even in
these modern times, this principle still holds true.

Besides, even if indeed accused-appellant and complainant are sweethearts, this fact does not necessarily
negate rape. "A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex against her will. Definitely, a man cannot demand
sexual gratification from a fiancee and, worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love. Love is not a
license for lust."

Nor can we sustain accused-appellant's claim that there was no force or intimidation employed by him in this case.
In People v. Fraga, 22 we held:

The test is whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the mind of the victim that if she
resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the threat would be carried out. Where resistance would be
futile, offering none at all does not amount to consent to the sexual assault. It is not necessary that the victim
should have resisted unto death or sustained physical injuries in the hands of the rapist. It is enough if the
intercourse takes place against her will or if she yields because of genuine apprehension of harm to her if she did
not do so. Indeed, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance.

In this case, accused-appellant covered Josephine's head with a jacket laced with rugby which made her dizzy, making it
easy for him to drag her to a secluded area and abuse her. He poked a knife at her side. The nausea and fear not only
prevented Josephine from putting up a resistance, but even caused her to lose consciousness.
It is of no moment either that the medical certificate fails to show that Josephine suffered any contusion or abrasion.
Although the results of a medical examination may be considered strong evidence to prove that the victim was raped,
such evidence is not indispensable in establishing accused-appellant's guilt or innocence. In People v. Docena, we
stated: 23

That there was no medical examination report presented, sign of resistance during the actual copulation, or proof
of violence committed against MARGIE does not detract from our conclusion that she was raped. A medical
examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Medical findings or proof of injuries, virginity, or an
allegation of the exact time and date of the commission of the crime are not essential in a prosecution for
rape. . . .

. . . [The defense's contention is not bolstered by the victim's] failure to put up a strong resistance or shout for
help, nor by the fact that there was no sign of force and intimidation, which should be viewed in the context of the
victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the offense. It is subjective; thus, lack of
physical resistance cannot be considered consent.

Second. Accused-appellant claims that Josephine's testimony is full of inconsistencies and contradictions which render
the same incredible and negates any moral certainty as to his guilt. In his brief, he points out the following inconsistencies
and contradictions in Josephine's testimony:

1. Place of incident as testified to by private complainant.

1.01. Beside a grassy  road at Rangas, Juban, Sorsogon (Exhibit D) Question and Answer No. 3, p. 2).

1.02. At the back of the house of Victor Guerrero, 30 meters from the road (TSN, Feb. 17, 1992, p. 44).

x x x           x x x          x x x

2. Where alleged rapist came from:

2.01. A man suddenly appeared from behind. (TSN, Feb. 17, 1988, p. 9).

2.02. A man suddenly went out of the door and she glanced at him. (TSN, February 17, 1992, p. 27).

3. Alleged force and intimidation employed

3.01. Accused was holding a Batangas knife-like instrument with his right hand which the victim felt but
was not able to see. (TSN, February 17, 1992, p. 10).

(... later this was changed)

3.02. . . . it was a Batangas knife because it has a handle and it could be folded; that she was looking at
this knife while she was being dragged. (TSN, February 17, 1992, p. 38).

x x x           x x x          x x x

4. While being raped:

4.01. Victim's aunt and other companions went ahead to their respective houses. (TSN, February 17,
1992, p. 61)

4.02. Victim's companion including her aunt were at the waiting shed but left when stoned were hurried at
the shed; that she heard the sound of stones hurried; that when she was being raped the shed was
stones and she could hear the thuds of the stones on the walls. (TSN, August 18, 1988, pp. 22-23).

However in another part of her testimony

 4.03. she stated that after the accused-appellant removed her panty, she did not know anymore what
happened because she lost her consciousness already. (TSN, February 17, 1992, p. 14).

x x x           x x x          x x x

5. After the alleged rape:

5.01. After she was raped, complainant cried because the accused-appellant  left her then she provided to
the waiting shed. (TSN, August 18, 1988, p. 5).

5.02. Her brother Jessie came upon her at the side of the road where she sat; (TSN, February 17, 1992,
p. 15) she was alone which prompted her brother to ask her what happened (TSN supra, p. 17) she told
her brother what happened. He got angry. Later Minda Dollesin came out from her house with cousin
Panit Dreu; (TSN, supra, p. 18).

This declaration of the complainant is very much inconsistent with the statement of her brother Jessie Guevarra,
to wit:

5.03. When Jessie arrived at the waiting shed, he saw her sister crying; she was sitting at the said waiting
shed with two other companion, Adan Dreau and Panit Dreau; he asked her what happened; she did not
say anything; the two men left for a while and returned to the shed with Minda Dollesin; Jessie and her
sister then proceeded home. (TSN, January 24, 1989, pp. 3-6).

Jessie Guevarra's testimony was likewise contradicted when he again took the witness stand.

5.04. On May 11, 1 986 around midnight, she was at the waiting shed of Rangos, Juban, Sorsogon.
When he was about to leave met his sister Josephine near the road  crying; she was squatting along the
road, he then brought her home. (TSN, May 10, 1993, pp. 3-4, emphasis added).24

The inconsistencies in Josephine's testimony, however, concern minor matters and, therefore, are inconsequential. They
do not in any way render her account less credible. Moreover, there is no showing of any ulterior motive on the part of
Josephine to testify falsely against accused-appellant. We note that she was called to the witness stand four (4) times in a
span of seven (7) years, viz.: February 17, 1988, August 8, 1988, February 17, 1992 and March 6, 1995. All throughout,
she never wavered on the material points of her testimony: that she went to the dance on the night of May 10, 1986; that
she was on her way home from the dance when her friend, Minda Dollesin, asked her to go with her to Minda's house;
that instead of going to Minda Dollesin's house, they went to the house of a certain Victor Guerrero on the pretext that
Minda wanted to get something from her store in that house; that, while waiting for Minda Dollesin by the door, accused-
appellant came out of the house, covered her head and face with a jacket that smelled of rugby, held a knife at her side,
and pulled her to a grassy area behind the house; that accused-appellant then took the jacket off her head, undressed her
by pulling down her pants and underpants; that accused-appellant then took off his own pants and went on top of her; that
because of fear and nausea, she lost consciousness; that when she came to, she felt some pain in her private parts and
saw that she was bleeding; and that when accused-appellant had left, she gathered strength to put on her clothes and
walk to the roadside where she was found by her brother Jessie Guevarra.

Indeed, accused-appellant points to the inconsistency in the testimonies of Josephine and her brother, Jessie, but his
counsel never cross-examined Jessie nor required him to explain the supposed inconsistencies. In any event, we cannot
consider the same as sufficient to justify disregarding Josephine's testimony altogether and sustain accused-appellant's
claims. Well-settled is the rule that "inconsistencies on minor details of the testimony of a witness serve to strengthen his
credibility as they are badges of truth rather than an indicia  of falsehood." 25 In People v. Arafiles, 26 we held:

We have ruled that the protracted examination of a young girl, not accustomed to public trial, could produce
contradictions which nevertheless would not destroy her credibility. Paradoxically, they may be badges of
spontaneity, indicating that the witness was unrehearsed. . .

When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the complainant to testify against the
accused or to falsely implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony is
worthy of full faith and credence.
Third. Finally, accused-appellant's guilt is established by the fact that he offered to marry Josephine after the incident was
reported to the authorities. This was testified to by Josephine, 27 her father, Pablo Guevarra, 28 her mother, Wennie
Guevarra, 29 and by accused-appellant himself. 30 As a rule in rape cases, an offer of marriage is an admission of guilt. 31

Nor is accused-appellant's position aided by the fact that, after his offer of marriage was rejected, he left their town and
only came back after his co-accused, Minda Dollesin, had been acquitted. His offer of marriage was apparently only an
attempt to evade prosecution and clearly makes his leaving town an incident of flight. This is evidence of guilt. 32

The trial court ordered accused-appellant to pay Josephine moral damages in the amount of P30,000.00 only. This award
must be increased. Currently, moral damages for rape is fixed at P50,000.00. 33 In addition, accused-appellant must be
ordered to pay civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, consistent with the recent rulings of this court. 34

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to
pay P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity to Josephine Guevarra.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 217459

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
ALBERTO FORTUNA ALBERCA, Accused-Appellant

Questioned in this appeal is the Decision1 dated July 16, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
01071, which sustained accused-appellant's conviction for two counts of Qualified Rape by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 25 in Maasin City, Southern Leyte, in its Decision2 dated June 15, 2009 in Criminal Case Nos. 2304 and
2305.

The Factual and Procedural Antecedents

In two separate Amended Informations, accused-appellant was charged with Qualified Rape in this manner, viz.:

In Criminal Case No. 2304

That on or about the the day of September 2000 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, more or less, at barangay Tigbawan, city
of Maasin, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is the common-law husband of the mother of the victim, with lustful intent and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously ravish the victim, AAA, 11 years of age, and
successfully had sexual intercourse with said victim without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice
of said AAA and of the social order. CONTRARY TO LAW.3

In Criminal Case No. 2305

That on or about the 4th day of January 2001 at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at barangay Canyuom, city of
Maasin, province of Southern Leyte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is the common-law husband of the mother of the victim, with lustful intent and by means of force, threat and
intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously ravish the victim, AAA, 11 years of age, and
successfully had sexual intercourse with said victim without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice
of said AAA and of the social order.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment on May 10, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.5 Pre-trial and trial thereafter
ensued.6

During trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of the following witnesses, to wit: AAA, the victim; CCC, the mother
of the victim; Dr. Teodula K. Salas, the doctor who physically examined AAA; SP02 Generoso Guerra, the officer on duty
when the victim was brought to the police station to file a complaint; and Jumar Carsola, AAA's classmate who was with
her before the second rape happened. 7

AAA testified that on September 7, 2000, at around one o'clock in the afternoon, on her way home from her grandmother's
house, the accused-appellant, her mother's live-in partner, waylaid her and dragged her towards the forest. Upon reaching
the Mabaguhan trees, accused-appellant removed his short pants and then undressed her. She tried to resist but he
threatened to kill her with the long firearm that he was carrying at that time. He then made her lie down, held her hands
together, placed himself on top of her, inserted his penis into her vagina and made rapid push and pull movements.

Thereafter, AAA went home and did not tell anybody about the incident as accused-appellant threatened to kill her and
her family. 8

On January 4, 2001, at around seven o'clock in the morning, AAA was on her way to school with her brother and
classmates when they saw accused-appellant. Accused-appellant told AAA to go with him to the· forest and ordered her
brother and classmates to go ahead and leave her. AAA refused but accused-appellant· held her hands and made her
walk ahead of him. When they reached the forest, he dragged her inside the hut, took his short pants off, undressed her,
made her lie down, inserted his penis into her vagina, and made repeated push and pull movements. Thereafter, he told
her to go to school. AAA's brother and classmates told her mother that accused-appellant brought AAA to the forest. This
prompted CCC to bring AAA to the police station to report the incident and to the hospital for an examination, where it was
found out that AAA was no longer a virgin.9

On April 3, 2001, AAA was re-examined and found out that she was about four months pregnant. The child was, however,
delivered prematurely at seven months on July 26, 2001 and died. 10

AAA's testimony was corroborated by the other prosecution witnesses.

SP02 Guerra testified that he was on duty when AAA was brought to the police station. AAA narrated to him the rape
incidents. He then assisted AAA in executing her affidavit. SP02 Guerra also testified that accused-appellant was invited
for questioning but he could not be found at his residence. On January 14, 2001, however, accused-appellant voluntarily
appeared at the police station and admitted that he raped AAA. 11

For its part, the defense presented the testimonies of Dr. Salas, Barangay Captain Antonio Jualo of Barangay,
Tigabawan, Maasin City, and accused-appellant. 12

In the main, accused-appellant raised the defense of denial and alibi, alleging that he could not have raped AAA on
September 7, 2000 at one o'clock in the afternoon as he was at that time processing copra in another barangay, which is
six kilometers away from the barangay where the rape was allegedly committed. 13 He also averred that he could not have
raped AAA in the morning of January 4, 2001 as AAA and BBB left to go to the police station at around eight o'clock that
morning to report that he slapped them both on January 2, 2001 and that by 8 o'clock that evening, he was arrested and
placed in jail. 14

Accused-appellant further averred that AAA was ill-motivated in filing false charges of rape against him because she
wanted him and her mother to separate. 15

Accused-appellant also pointed out that AAA was already pregnant before the alleged second rape on January 4, 2001 as
testified to by Dr. Salas, hence, accused-appellant theorized that he could not have fathered the child. 16

The Ruling of the RTC

In its June 15, 2009 Decision, the RTC gave full faith and credit to AAA's testimony, being a girl in her tender years,
pursuant to the principle that youth and immaturity, especially in a rape case, are generally badges of truth and
sincerity. 17 The RTC observed that no amount of enmity or desire to have the accused leave her mother would impel a
child to subject herself to such a traumatic process as public as a trial for rape. 18

The findings of Dr. Salas also corroborate AAA's testimony. The RTC ruled that the non-virgin state of the victim when first
examined is enough proof that penetration occurred, which is an essential requisite of carnal knowledge. The RTC also
noted that the age of the stillborn child at the time of delivery is consistent with the date of the second rape, January 4,
2001. It further ruled that the absence of marks of external bodily injuries does not negate rape as proof of injury is not an
essential element of the crime. 19

AAA's conduct after the rape incidents, according to the trial court, should not be taken against her. Her non-revelation of
the rape incidents can be attributed to her fear as the accused-appellant threatened to kill her and her family. 20

The RTC ruled that the positive and categorical testimony of a rape victim should prevail over the accused-appellant's
bare denial and alibi, the latter being self-serving.

Finally, the RTC took into consideration the special qualifying circumstance of the accused-appellant's relationship to the
victim, the same being properly alleged in the Amended Informations and proven during the trial.21

The RTC disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Alberto F0rtuna Alberca GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of two (2) counts of qualified rape committed against (AAA), eleven-year-old daughter of his common-law spouse,
and sentences him to suffer reclusion perpetua in each case, instead of death, in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346.
For each count of qualified rape, the accused is hereby ordered to pay (AAA) the sums of seventy five thousand pesos
(₱75,000.00) as civil indemnity, seventy five thousand pesos (₱75,000.00) as moral damages, and twenty five thousand
pesos (₱25,000.00) as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.22

The Ruling of the CA

The CA sustained accused-appellant's conviction as found by the RTC, upholding AAA's credibility as a witness as she
was firth and unrelenting in pointing to the accused-appellant as the one who raped her on two occasions. 23

The CA also ruled that there is no standard behavioral response from rape victims; hence, the truth or falsehood of an
allegation of rape cannot be gauged therefrom, contrary to the accused-appellant's argument.24

The CA likewise dismissed accused-appellant's argument that the absence of physical injury, hymenal laceration, and
seminal fluid negates the fact of rape, the same not being an essential element of the crime. 25

The fact that AAA was found to be seven months pregnant on July 26, 2001, leading to the conclusion that she was
already pregnant on December 26, 2000, does not negate the fact of rape on January 4, 2001. 26 The CA cited
jurisprudence to the effect that a month's difference in the stage of pregnancy as shown by the physical examination is not
substantial. 27

The CA, thus, affirmed the R TC's finding that the prosecution was able to establish accused-appellant's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt to the charges. The appellate court, however, modified the penalty by increasing the exemplary
damages awarded by the RTC from Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (Php25,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (Php30,000) to
conform with the prevailing jurisprudence at that time. 28 Also, the CA imposed an .interest on the rate of six percent per
annum on all the damages awarded from the finality of the judgment until said amounts are fully paid. 29

The CA, in its appealed Decision, disposed thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court's Decision finding accused-appellant Alberto
Fortuna Alberca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of qualified rape, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, in lieu of death and ordering him to pay the offended party P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages for each count of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the
exemplary damages is increased to P30,000.00 for each count of qualified rape. Accused-appellant Alberto Fortuna
Alberca is further ordered to pay the offended; party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this decision until such amounts shall have been duly paid.

SO ORDERED. 30

Hence, this appeal.

Both the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for the People, and the accused-appellant manifested before this Court
that they are adopting their respective Briefs filed before the CA in lieu of the supplemental briefs required by this Court.31

The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
Qualified Rape.

This Court's Ruling

In the main, accused-appellant attacks AAA's credibility, averring that the facts and circumstances narrated by AAA are
improbable and questionable.32 . Specifically, accused-appellant points out that AAA did not shout and ask for help while
she was allegedly being dragged along the road. AAA likewise did not run away when she had the opportunity to do so
while accused-appellant was allegedly taking off his pants which took time. Also, AAA's story that accused-appellant told
her to come with him to the forest when she was with her brother and classmates in a public road during daytime was
unbelievable, according to the accused-appellant, as she· could have refused to go with him, cried for help, and fought
back but she did not. Accused-appellant avers that the RTC merely assumed the truthfulness of the said narration
pursuant to the principle on minor witnesses. The accused-appellant also raises the fact of the absence of seminal fluid
and physical injury, and the improbability of having sexual intercourse with AAA from December 18, 2000 to January 4,
2001, as the latter was already pregnant during that period. 33

We affirm the conviction.

The Court is not at all swayed by the arguments of the accused-appellant.1avvphi1 The RTC and the CA have aptly and
thoroughly discussed every defense raised by the accused-appellant.

Time and again, this Court has held that questions on the credibility of witnesses should best be addressed to the trial
court because of its unique position to observe the elusive and incommunicable evidence of witnesses' deportment on the
stand while testifying which is denied to the appellate courts. 34 Hence; the trial judge's assessment of the witnesses'
testimonies and findings of fact are accorded great respect on appeal. In the absence of substantial reason to justify the
reversal of the trial court's assessment and conclusion, as when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have
been overlooked or disregarded, the reviewing court is generally bound by the former's findings. The rule is even more
strictly applied if the appellate court has concurred with the trial court as in this case.

We are, thus, one with the R TC and CA in applying the jurisprudential principle that testimonies of child victims are given
full weight and credit, for when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.35 Accused-appellant's imputation of ill-motive to the young victim
deserves scant consideration. Indeed, no woman, least of a child, will concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination
of her private parts, and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled
to seek justice for the wrong done to her. 36 As found by the RTC and CA, AAA's testimony was candid, spontaneous, and
consistent. We find no cogent reason to deviate from such finding.

Besides, as can be gleaned from the records, the assailed findings and ruling were not solely based on AAA's testimony.
The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses, corroborating that of AAA's, were also considered. Jumar Carsola's
testimony corroborated that of AAA's narration of facts as to the second rape in that they were together on their way to
school when the accused-appellant asked AAA to go to the forest with him and ordered the others to go ahead and leave
AAA with him. The medical findings of Dr. Salas that AAA was not a virgin anymore, as well as the period of her
pregnancy, coincided with the rape incidents. Thus, while it has been held in the past that the accused in rape cases may
be convicted solely on the basis of the victim's testimony which passed the test of credibility, 37 in this case, there is more
than sufficient evidence presented to arrive at such conclusion.

The absence of hymenal laceration is of no moment. Contrary to the accused-appellant's theory, the same does not
negate the fact of rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of rape 38 . In fact, this Court has, in a previous
case, affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape despite the absence of laceration on the victim's hymen since
medical findings suggest that it is possible for the victim's hymen to stay intact despite repeated sexual intercourse.39

Likewise, the absence of hymenal fluid or spermatozoa is not a negation of rape.40 The presence or absence thereof is
immaterial since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which constitutes the crime of rape.41 Besides, the absence of the
seminal fluid from the vagina could be due to a number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of the semen from the
vagina, the acidity of the vagina, or simply the washing of the vagina after the sexual intercourse.42 At any rate, the
presence of spermatozoa is not an element of the crime of rape.43

Anent accused-appellant's theory as to the impossibility of sexual intercourse with AAA on January 4, 2001 as she was
already pregnant on December 26, 2000, being found as seven months pregnant on July 26, 2001, the CA aptly cited the
case of People v. Adora  44  , thus:

Computation of the whole period of gestation, thus, becomes a purely academic endeavor. In this light, while most
authorities would agree on an average duration, there are still cases of long and short gestations.

Thus, the stage of development of the fetus cannot be determined with any exactitude, and an error of at least two weeks,
if not more, should be allowed for this, together with the recognized variation in the duration of normal pregnancies,
makes it very unsafe to dogmatize in a medico-legal case xxx.

More importantly, it should be pointed out that these consolidated cases are criminal cases for rape, not civil actions for
paternity or filiation.1âwphi1 The identity of the father of the victim's child is a non-issue. Even her pregnancy is beside the
point. What matters is the occurrence of the sexual assault committed by the appellant on the person of the victim xxx. At
any rate, that the victim was already pregnant before the first rape does not disprove he1 testimony that the appellant
raped her.

The CA correctly concluded, therefore, that the finding that AAA was already seven months pregnant as of July 26, 2001
cannot be considered a hundred percent accurate assessment and thus, does not discount the possibility that accused-
appellant raped and even impregnated AAA on January 4, 2001, which notably was just nine days apart from the
estimated start of AAA's pregnancy on December 26, 2000.

Accused-appellant's argument that AAA's demeanor after the alleged rape incidents was unbelievable and contrary to
human experience also could not sway Us. As already settled in jurisprudence, not all victims react the same
way. 45 Some people may cry out, some may faint, some may be shocked into insensibility, others may appear to yield to
the intrusion.46 Some may offer strong resistance, while others may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all.47 The
mere fact that accused-appellant has moral ascendancy over AAA, being the latter's surrogate father, coupled with AAA's
tender age and accused-appellant's threat against her, would suffice to justify AAA's fear in abiding by accused-
appellant's orders, failure to resist, and also option to keep the harrowing experience to herself.

Lastly, pitted against AAA's clear, convincing, and straightforward testimony, accused-appellant's unsupported denial and
alibi cannot prevail.

Denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution has sufficiently and
positively ascertained the identity of the accused. 48 And as often stressed, a categorical and positive identification of an
accused, without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the witness testifying on the matter, prevails over denial, which is
a negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of real weight in law unless substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence.49

All told, We find no reversible error in the factual findings and legal conclusions of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA.

As regards the penalty, however, while We uphold the imposition of reclusion perpetua  in lieu of the death penalty
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A) No. 9346,50 the victim being below 18 years old and the offender being a step-parent or
common-law spouse of the victim's mother,51 We find it proper to modify the award of damages in accordance with the
prevailing jurisprudence pronounced in the case of People v. Jugueta,  52 stating that when the penalty imposed is death
but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages to be imposed will each be PhP100,000 for each count of rape.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 16, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01071 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION as follows:

"WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Regional Trial Court's Decision finding accused-appellant Alberto
Fortuna Alberca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of the crime of qualified rape, sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, in lieu of death and ordering him to pay the offended
party PhPl00,000 as civil indemnity, PhPl00,000 as moral damages, and PhPl00,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count of qualified rape is AFFIRMED.

Accused-appellant Alberto Fortuna Alberca is further ordered to pay the offended party interest on all damages awarded
at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until such amounts shall have been fully paid."

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 225642-43

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO, Accused-Appellant

This is an appeal from the 17 February 2016 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC Nos. 01226-MIN
and 01227-MIN affirming in toto the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 of Davao
City (RTC). The RTC found Juvy D. Amarela (Amarela) and Junard G. Racho (Racho) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) different charges of rape.

THE FACTS

The two (2) Informations in this case read:

Criminal Case No. 64,964-09

That on or about February 10, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
[AAA], against her will, immediately after boxing her legs.3

Criminal Case No. 64,965-09

That on or about February 11, 2009, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, through force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of
[AAA], against her will, immediately after grappling her.4

These two (2) cases were jointly tried before the RTC, and Amarela and Racho's appeals, although separate, were
consolidated in the CA on 13 November 2015.5

The RTC summarized the factual milieu of this case:

Prosecution presented [AAA], single, housekeeper and a resident of [XXX], Calinan, Davao City. On February 10, 2009,
at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, she was watching a beauty contest with her aunt at Maligatong, Baguio District,
Calinan, Davao City. The contest was being held at a basketball court where a make-shift stage was put up. The only
lights available were those coming from the vehicles around.

She had the urge to urinate so she went to the comfort room beside the building of the Maligatong Cooperative near the
basketball court. Between the cooperative building and the basketball court were several trees. She was not able to reach
the comfort room because [ Amarela] was already waiting for her along the way. Amarela suddenly pulled her towards the
day care center. She was shocked and was no match to the strength of Amarela who pulled her under the stage of the
day care center. He punched her in the abdomen which rendered her weak. Then Amarela undressed her. She tried to
resist him but he was stronger. He boxed her upper thigh and she felt numb. He placed himself on top of her and inserted
his penis inside her vagina and made a push and pull movement. She shouted for help and then three (3) men came to
her rescue [so] Amarela fled.

The three (3) persons brought her to a hut. But they closed the hut and had bad intentions with her. So she fled and hid in
a neighboring house. When she saw that the persons were no longer around, she proceeded on her way home. She went
to the house of Godo Dumandan who brought her first to the Racho residence because Dumandan thought her aunt was
not at home. Dumandan stayed behind So Neneng Racho asked her son [Racho] to bring her to her aunt's house instead.

xxxx

[AAA] then said that [Racho] brought her to a shanty along the way against her will. She was told to lie down. When she
refused, [Racho] boxed her abdomen and she felt sick. She resisted by kicking him but he succeeded in undressing her.
He, then, undressed himself and placed himself on top of [AAA]. [Racho] then inserted his penis into [AAA]'s vagina. After
consummating the act, [Racho] left her. So [AAA] went home alone.
When she reached home, her parents were already asleep. She went inside her room and cried. The following morning,
she decided to leave home. Her mother was surprised at her decision until eventually, [AAA] told her mother about what
happened to her. She told her [eldest] brother first who got very angry.

They reported the matter to the police and eventually [ Amarela] and [Racho] were arrested.6

For the defense, Amarela testified for himself denying that he had anything to do with what happened with AAA:

Defense presented [Amarela] who confirmed the fact that on February 10, 2009, he attended the fiesta celebrations in
Maligatong, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao City. He said he met private complainant, [AAA], at the cooperative building at
around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [AAA] asked him if he knew a person by the name of Eric Dumandan who was
allegedly her boyfriend. After a while, Eric Dumandan passed by and so he told him that [AAA] was looking for him. Then
he left.

Amarela said he had a drinking spree with his friend Asther Sanchez. While drinking, he felt dizzy and fell down from the
bench. So Sanchez brought him to the house of his elder brother Joey in Tawan-tawan. He did not know what happened
next because he slept and woke up at six o'clock in the morning.7

On his part, Racho confirmed that he went with AAA to bring her home but also denied raping her:

Defense also presented [Racho], a resident of Sitio Maligatong, Barangay Tawan-tawan, Baguio District, Calinan, Davao
City. He testified that he was at the house of his mother on February 10, 2009. At around 10:00 o'clock in the evening,
[AAA] arrived with Godo Dumandan. [AAA] was asking for help while crying because she was allegedly raped by three
persons in the pineapple plantation.

His mother advised her to just take a bath and change clothes and sleep at his brother's house. But [AAA] wanted to go
home. Since he was the only one who was not drunk, Racho was instructed by [his] mother to accompany [AAA] in going
to her aunt's house.

When they reached Caniamo, [AAA] did not want to be brought to her aunt's house because she knows the latter would
just scold her. Instead, she wanted to be conveyed to their house at Ventura. Since Ventura was far, Racho did not go
with her and instead went back home.

When asked about the charge of rape against him, Racho said he could not have done that because his hand is impaired
while showing a long scar on his left arm. This was a result allegedly of a hacking incident on September 21, 2008. He
offered a Medical Certificate (Exh. 1) issued by Dr. Lugi Andrew Sabal of the Davao Medical Center which indicates that
Racho was confined in the said hospital from September 21, 2008 up to October 1, 2008 after an operation on his left
forearm. He said that his left arm was placed in a plaster cast but that he removed the cast after three (3) months. He said
that even after he removed the cast, his arm was still painful and he could not move it around.

Racho said he was surprised when policemen came to his house on February 11, 2009 and invited him to the police
station because there was a complaint for rape against him.

Anita Racho testified that she was at home in the evening of February 10, 2009 together with her husband and sons
Bobby and [Racho]. Godo Dumandan arrived together with [AAA] who was allegedly raped by three (3) men. [AAA]
appeared madly and wet so she advised her to take a bath and not to go home anymore since it was late. [AAA] insisted
on going home, so she asked her son [Racho] to accompany her. [Racho] at first refused pointing to his elder brother
Bobby to accompany her. He eventually brought [AAA] home. He came back at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening and
then he went to sleep.

The following day, she was surprised when [Racho] was arrested allegedly for raping [AAA]. [Racho] denied raping
[AAA].8

Ruling of the Trial Court

In its joint judgment, the RTC found AAA's testimony, positively identifying both Amarela and Racho, to be clear, positive,
and straightforward. Hence, the trial court did not give much weight to their denial as these could not have overcome the
categorical testimony of AAA. As a result, Amarela and Racho were convicted as follows:
In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 64964-09 finding [Amarela] GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity and the
further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.

In Criminal Case No. 64965-09, judgment is hereby rendered finding [Racho] GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of RAPE and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

He is further sentenced to pay [AAA] the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as civil indemnity and the
further sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱50,000.00) as moral damages.9

The Assailed CA Decision

Before the CA, Amarela and Racho pointed out that although there were other witnesses, the only material testimony on
record was that of AAA. They argued that there were several circumstances casting doubt on AAA' s claim that she was
raped because her testimony does not conform to common knowledge and to ordinary human experience.

In the assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment in toto finding no reason to reverse the trial court's factual
findings. It held:

[AAA] has testified in a straightforward manner during her direct examination and remained steadfast in her cross-
examination that Amarela sexually abused her on February 10, 2009, and [Racho] abused her five hours later. The first
rape incident took place in the daycare center. She was pulled by Amarela while she was on her way to the comfort room
located at the back of the x x x cooperative building. Private complainant, full of mud and wet, with dress tom, took refuge
at the house of her boyfriend and sought for help. Her boyfriend's father took her to the house of the in-laws of her cousin.
[AAA], who was still wet and muddy, begged the mother-in-law of her cousin that she be taken to the house of her aunt.
While the in-laws of her cousin helped her by having escorted her to her aunt's house, it turned out however, that [Racho]
her escort had another plan in mind. [Racho] sexually abused [AAA], who had no more strength to fight him.

The records render no reason to reverse the factual findings of the court a quo. Both of the appellants' denials miserably
fail in contrast to [AAA's] positive identification of the accused-appellants as the person who sexually abused her. There is
no doubt in our mind that both appellants had carnal knowledge of [AAA]. Her credibility is cemented by her lack of motive
to testify against the two appellants, Amarela and [Ra.cho]. There is no evidence to suggest that she could have been
actuated by such motive. The People has ably demonstrated the existence of the elements of Rape under the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which states:

xxxx

The Court sees no reason to deviate from the well-entrenched rule that in matters of credibility of witnesses, the
assessment made by the trial court should be respected and given preponderant weight. [AAA's] ordeal is so traumatic
that she would rather forget the whole incident. But once a rape victim has decided to seek justice, that means she is
willing to recall the dastardly detail of the animalistic act committed on her person.

[Racho] would have us believe that the charge against him was merely fabricated because, according to him, being raped
by two different assailants, on two different occasions and only hours apart, is contrary to the normal course of things.

We are not convinced.

The Supreme Court has once said that rape in itself is prompted by the abnormal need of a man to overpower and control
a woman by way of sexual abuse. There is no typical mode, norm, or circumstance in committing rape or sexual abuse for
the evil in man has no conscience. In fact, in a catena of cases, the Supreme Court had ruled that rape is no respecter of
time or place. Thus, we cannot agree with [Racho]'s argument that just because [AAA] had been raped five hours earlier,
the possibility that she might get raped again is nil.

Undeterred, appellants posit that [AAA's] testimony is not substantially corroborated by medical findings as the medical
certificate does not show any physical injuries resulting from the alleged use of force by the appellants.

We do not agree.
The absence of any superficial abrasion or contusion on the person of the offended party does not militate against the
claim of the latter whose clear and candid testimony bears the badges of truth, honesty, and candor. It must be stressed
that the absence or presence of visible signs of injury on the victim depends on the degree of force employed by the
accused to consummate the purpose which he had in mind to have carnal knowledge with the offended woman. Thus, the
force employed in rape need not be so great nor of such a character as could not be resisted. It is only that the force used
by the accused is sufficient to enable him to consummate his purpose.

Appellant Amarela also argues that [AAA] could not have identified her assailant because it was very dark at the place
where [AAA] was allegedly pulled by her assailant and the place where she was allegedly raped.

[AAA], in her re-direct examination, testified that she knew it was Amarela who raped her because she saw Amarela's fact
while Amarela brought her from the cooperative building to the daycare center.

Time and time again, the High Court has repeatedly ruled that positive identification prevails over denial, a negative
defense that is inherently unreliable. We have no reason to doubt [AAA's] unwavering assertions positively establishing
the identities of the two accused-appellants. We find the guilt of each of the accused-appellants to have been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.

FOR THESE REASONS, the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED in toto. 10

OUR RULING

More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell her story of sexual· depredation, rape cases are solely
decided based on the credibility of the testimony of the private complainant. In doing so, we have hinged on the
impression that no young Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is
the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. 11 However, this misconception, particularly in this day and age,
not only puts the accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of justice.

The "women's honor" doctrine surfaced in our jurisprudence sometime in 1960. In the case of People v. Tana, 12 the Court
affirmed the conviction of three (3) armed robbers who took turns raping a person named Herminigilda Domingo. The
Court, speaking through Justice Alejo Labrador, said:

It is a well-known fact that women, especially Filipinos, would not admit that they have been abused unless that abuse
had actually happened. This is due to their natural instinct to protect their honor. We cannot believe that the offended
party would have positively stated that intercourse took place unless it did actually take place.13

This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor. And while the factual setting back then would have been appropriate
to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to
the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. We, should stay away from such mindset and
accept the realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who has over the years transformed into a strong and
confidently intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.

In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural misconception.
It is important to weed out these unnecessary notions because an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the victim, provided of course, that the testimony is credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and
the normal course of things.14 Thus, in order for us to affirm a conviction for rape, we must believe beyond reasonable
doubt the version of events narrated by the victim.

In an appeal from a judgment of conviction in rape cases, the issue boils down, almost invariably, to the credibility and
story of the victim and eyewitnesses. The Court is oftentimes constrained to rely on the observations of the trial court who
had the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
and at times unfriendly, examination.15 It has since become imperative that the evaluation of testimonial evidence by the
trial court be accorded great respect by this Court; for it can be expected that said determination is based on reasonable
discretion as to which testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief.16 Although we put a premium on the
factual findings of the trial court, especially when they are affirmed by the appellate court,17 this rule is not absolute and
admits exceptions, such as when some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked,
misapprehended, and misinterpreted.

We follow certain guidelines when the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before us, to wit:
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the R TC' s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, considering its
unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its vantage point, the trial court is in
the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC's assessments and conclusions, the
reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court's findings, particularly when no significant facts and circumstances,
affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC.18

After a careful review of the records and a closer scrutiny of AAA's testimony, reasonable doubt lingers as we are not fully
convinced that AAA was telling the truth. The following circumstances, particularly, would cast doubt as to the credibility of
her testimony: (1) the version of AAA's story appearing in her affidavit-complaint differs materially from her testimony in
court; (2) AAA could not have easily identified Amarela because the crime scene was dark and she only saw him for the
first time; (3) her testimony lacks material details on how she was brought under the stage against her will; and (4) the
medical findings do not corroborate physical injuries and are inconclusive of any signs of forced entry.

First, AAA narrates that she was on her way to the comfort room, isolated from the crowd at the beauty contest and made
it easy for Amarela to grab her without anyone noticing:

Q: Now, you said that you watched the beauty contest at around 7:00 in the evening on Feb. 10, 2009. After that, Ms.
Witness, while watching, what did you do?

A: I was on my way to the CR.

Q: And where is the CR located?

A: Near the coop.

Q: Can you please tell us the name of that cooperative?

A: Cooperative.

Q: Can you recall the exact name?

A: Maligatong Cooperative.

Q: And, where is this Maligatong Cooperative, Ms. Witness, in relation to the basketball court where the beauty contest
was held?

A: It's near.

xxxx

Q: Now, between the basketball court and the cooperative you referred to, what separates these two buildings?

A: Durian trees and cacao.

Q: You said that you were going to the CR located at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative to relieve yourself. And,
were you able to go to the CR at the back of the Maligatong Cooperative?

A: Nomore.

Q: Why not?

A: [Amarela] was waiting for me.

Q: Exactly, can you please tell us the location where he was waiting for you?

A: At the back of the cooperative.

Q: And, upon seeing [Amarela] at the back of the cooperative, Ms. Witness, tell us what happened?

A: He pulled me.

Q: Going to what place?

A: Going towards the day care center.19

Meanwhile, her affidavit-complaint would indicate that Amarela pulled AAA away from the beauty contest stage to the day
care center:

6. At around 6:00 in the afternoon, I, my aunt [BBB] together with her siblings and grand children went back to Maligatong
Cooperative Building to watch a beauty contest. My companions stayed at the multicab at the parking area of said
building, while my cousin [CCC] and I went closer to the stage. While at there, the person of [Amarela], drunk, suddenly
appeared and introduced himself to me. I resisted to get his hand on my hands because he is holding it tightly and forcibly
brought me to the back portion of the building. I asked for help but nobody heard me maybe because of the high volume
of the sound system.

7. While at the back of said building I saw my boyfriend Eric Dumandan coming and [Amarela] told him, "Ran (Eric's
palayaw) naa si gemma diri!" and Eric responded, "ahh! tinga-a."

8. When Eric left us, [Amarela] grabbed me going to the purok beside the daycare center of Sitio Maligatong, Brgy.
Tawan-Tawan, Baguio District [more or less] 20 meters away from the [cooperative] building. I shouted for help but still
nobody heard me.20

It has often been noted that if there is an inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the latter
should be given more weight since affidavits being taken ex parte are usually incomplete and inadequate.21 We usually
brush aside these inconsistencies since they are trivial and do not impair the credibility of the rape victim.22 In this case,
however, the version in AAA's affidavit-complaint is remotely different from her court testimony. At the first instance, AAA
claims that she was pulled away from the vicinity of the stage; later, in court, she says that she was on her way to the rest
room when she was grabbed. By this alone, we are hesitant to believe AAA's retraction because it goes into whether it
was even possible for Amarela to abduct AAA against her will.

If we were to take into account AAA's initial claim that Amarela pulled her away from the vicinity of the stage, people
facing the stage would easily notice that a man was holding a woman against her will. Thus, AAA's version that she was
on her way to the rest room, instead of being pulled away from the crowd watching the beauty contest, would make it
seem that nobody would notice if AAA was being taken away against her will. If indeed AAA was on her way to the rest
room when she was grabbed by Amarela, why does her sworn statement reflect another story that differs from her court
testimony? To our mind, AAA's testimony could have been concocted to just make her story believable rather than
sticking to her original story that Amarela introduced himself and pulled her away from the stage. We cannot say that this
inconsistency is simply a minor detail because it casts some doubt as to whether AAA was telling the truth - that she was
abducted against her will before she was raped.

Although we cannot acquit Amarela solely based on an inconsistency, this instance already puts AAA's credibility in
question. Again, we must remember that if we were to convict based solely on the lone testimony of the victim, her
testimony must be clear, straightforward, convincing, and consistent with human experience. We must set a high standard
in evaluating the credibility of the testimony of a victim who is not a minor and is mentally capable.

Second, we also find it dubious how AAA was able to identify Amarela considering that the whole incident allegedly
happened in a dark place. In fact, she had testified that the place was not illuminated and that she did not see Amarela's
face:

Direct Examination

Q: Now, what separates this beauty contest from what you were testifying a while ago as the daycare center?
A: Coconut trees, durian trees, and cacao.

Q: ·what else?

A: Several trees.

Q: How about grass?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, can you please tell us the illumination in that place?

A: It was dark.

Q: Why is it that it was dark?

A: Because there was no lighting.23

Cross-Examination

Q: Since it was already night time, it was very dark at that time, correct?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And when you went to the CR to relieve yourself which CR was located at Maligatong Cooperative building, it was also
dark on your way?

A: Yes, ma'am.

xxxx

Q: Now, while under the makeshift stage of that day care center, it was dark, very dark?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And you cannot see the face of [Amarela], was not clear to you because it was very dark, correct?

A: Yes, ma' am.24

Re-Direct Examination

Q: At the time that you said that while [Amarela] was undressing you could not see his face, would you confirm that?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What about his body?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why, Ms. Witness?

A: It was dark.

xxxx
Q: Now, at the time that you were raped you said that it was too dark, how did you then identify that [Amarela] was the
one who raped you?

A: I know him when he brought me from the Coop.

Q: From the Coop. to the day care center that was the time that you identified him?

A: Yes, sir.25

From AAA's testimony, we are unsure whether she was able to see Amarela given the lighting conditions in the crime
scene. In her re-direct examination, AAA clarified that she identified Amarela while she was being pulled to the day care
center. Even so, the prosecution failed to clarify as to how she was able to do so when, according to AAA herself, the way
to the day care center was dark and covered by trees. Thus, leaving this material detail unexplained, we again draw
reservations from AAA's testimony.

Proving the identity of the accused as the malefactor is the prosecution's primary responsibility. The identity of the
offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the
prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the crime can
be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.26

Third, her claim that she was forcibly brought under a makeshift stage, stripped naked, and then raped seems unrealistic
and beyond human experience. She said:

Q: At the day care center, where exactly did he bring you?

A: Under.

Q: Under what?

A: Under the makeshift stage.

Q: You said there was also a makeshift stage at the day care center?

A: Yes.

Q: Was it finished makeshift stage or not?

A: Not yet finished.

Q: You said that he brought you under that makeshift stage?

A: Yes.

Q: Please tell us how did you fit in that makeshift stage?

A: Because the flooring is about 2 feet high.

Q: Since you said he pulled you towards that makeshift stage, what was your reaction, Ms. Witness?

A: I was scared.

Q: And what did you do?

A: I did not know what to do then.

xxxx
Q: Now, after that, what happened, Ms. Witness?

A: He pushed me under.

Q: What happened after that?

A: He [punched] me in my abdomen.

Q: What else did he do to you?

A: I felt weak.

Q: After that what happened?

A: He undressed me.

Q: While he was undressing you, what did you do, Ms. Witness?

A: I was just lying down.

xxxx

Q: What else did he do to you while you were resisting his advances?

A: He boxed my upper left thigh.

Q: .What did you feel when he boxed your left thigh?

A: I felt numbness.

xxxx

Q: Now, you said that he undressed you, Ms. Witness, and you said he also undressed himself. What, then, [did he] do to
you?

A: He placed himself on top of me.

Q: What did he do after that?

A: He inserted his penis in my sex organ.27

From this, AAA would like us to believe that Amarela was able to undress himself and AAA, and place himself on top of
her while under a 2- feet high makeshift stage. It is physically impossible for two human beings to move freely under a
stage, much more when the other person is trying to resist sexual advances. Moreover, AAA failed to mention how exactly
Amarela pulled her to the makeshift stage without any sign of struggle or resistance. If indeed she was being held against
her will, AAA could have easily called for help or simply run away.

Fourth, the challenge to AAA's credibility is further supported by the medical findings of the medico-legal officer. The
medico-legal certificate dated 12 February 2009 would reflect that AAA had no pertinent physical findings/or physical
injuries:28

FINDINGS
GENERAL PHYSICAL FINDINGS
Height 5 feet & 4 inches Weight 44 Kg
General Survey Awake, afebrile, not in respiratory
 distress
Conscious, coherent, respond well to
Mental Status questions when asked and maintained
eye to eye contact
Pertinent Physical Findings/Physical Normal Findings
Injuries
ANO-GENITAL EXAMINATION
External Genitalia Normal findings
Urethra and Periurethral Area Normal findings
Perihymenal Area and Fossa (+) Hyperemic/Erythematous perihymenal
Narvicularis area.
(+) Complete laceration at 9 o’clock and 3
Hymen o’clock positions with minimal bloody
secretion on the lacerated area.
Perineum Normal findings
Discharge None
Internal and Speculum exam Not done
Anal Examination Good Sphincteric tone
DIAGNOSTIC AND EVIDENCE GATHERING
Forensic Evidence and Laboratory Pending laboratory results (Spermatocyte
Results determination gram staining).
IMPRESSONS
Anogenital findings are diagnostic of blunt force or penetrating trauma.29

Insofar as the evidentiary value of a medical examination is concerned, we have held that a medico-legal report is not
indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case, it being merely corroborative in nature.30 In convicting rapists based
entirely on the testimony of their victim, we have said that a medico-legal report is by no means controlling.31 Thus, since it
is merely corroborative in character, a medico-legal report could even be dispensed with.32

A medico-legal's findings are at most corroborative because they are mere opinions that can only infer possibilities and
not absolute necessities. A medico-legal, who did not witness the actual incident, cannot testify on what exactly happened
as his testimony would not be based on personal knowledge or derived from his own perception. Consequently, a medico-
legal's testimony cannot establish a certain fact as it can only suggest what most likely happened.

In the same way, a medico-legal's findings can raise serious doubt as to the credibility of the alleged rape victim. Based
on the testimony of the medico-legal officer who conducted the medical examination on AAA, she diagnosed that the ano-
genital findings were caused by a blunt force or penetrating trauma.

In a study conducted by Radostina D. Miterva,33 the most common sites for lacerations were determined, "in rape victims
with ring-shaped hymens, lacerations were most commonly located as followed at dorsal recumbence of the patient: (1)
one laceration at 6 o'clock position in 42.02% of cases; (2) two lacerations at 5 and 7 o'clock positions in 24.55% cases;
(3) three lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o'clock positions in 45.36% of cases; and (4) four lacerations at 3, 5, 6 and 9 o'clock
positions in 25% of cases."

These findings were supported by an earlier study that described patterns of genital injury resulting from sexual abuse.34

However, in a similar study comparing injuries from consensual and non-consensual intercourse, the authors discovered
that the statistical results of the locations of vaginal laceration are almost the same.35 Their findings suggest that the
injuries are similar after consensual and non-consensual intercourse.36

From all this, we observe that a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish consensual from non-
consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the frequency of lacerations and whether they are
located in different positions) to determine whether the sexual act was consensual or not. If the frequency of lacerations is
located in different areas of the vaginal orifice, then it would be a good indicator that there was sexual abuse. On the other
hand, if the lacerations are found in a specific area, it could indicate forced rape, but could also suggest consensual
intercourse.

In the instant case, the lacerations were found only at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the hymen. Considering the
locality of these lacerations, we cannot completely rule out the probability that AAA voluntarily had sex that night.
Moreover, the absence of bruises on AAA's thighs-when she said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that
AAA may have had consensual intercourse.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the female.37 It is also
committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her
consent.38 Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is
capable in the eyes of the law of giving consent.39 The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any
time prior to penetration, however reluctantly given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents
the act from being rape, provided the consent is willing and free of initial coercion.40

Although Amarela or Racho did not raise consensual intercourse as a defense, We must bear in mind that the burden of
proof is never shifted and the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits. Whether the accused's
defense has merit is entirely irrelevant in a criminal case. It is fundamental that the prosecution's case cannot be allowed
to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.41

As to Racho's case, we note that AAA testified only once for both criminal cases.1âwphi1 This means that both Amarela
and Racho were convicted based on her lone testimony. When we rely on the testimony of the private complainant in rape
cases, we require that her testimony be entirely credible, trustworthy, and realistic. For when certain parts would seem
unbelievable, especially when it concerns one of the elements of the crime, the victim's testimony as a whole does not
pass the test of credibility. Since we doubt AAA's account on how she was raped by Amarela, we have to consider her
testimony against Racho under the same light.

In her testimony, AAA claimed that Racho was instructed to bring her to her aunt's house, but instead forced her to go
inside a house along the way. While inside the house, Racho supposedly boxed AAA's abdomen, undressed himself,
placed himself on top of AAA, and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. Afterwards, Racho got dressed and left AAA to go
home by herself.42

We find it odd that AAA was not brought to the police right after she arrived at Godo Dumandan's house to seek help.
Instead, she was brought to the Racho residence where she told Neneng Racho what happened. Again, instead of
reporting the incident to the police, AAA insisted that she be brought to her aunt's house nearby. This is way beyond
human experience. If AAA had already told other people what happened, there was no reason for her not to report the
incident to the proper authorities.

Faced with AAA's doubtful narration before she went home alone, we are inclined to believe Racho's version that they
parted ways when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home. To begin with, Racho did not even want to bring AAA to her
aunt's house nearby.43 If he had the intention to have sex with AAA, Racho would not have declined her mother's
instruction. To add, Racho said he left AAA by herself because he did not want to bring AAA to her house since this was
in another town from her aunt's house.44 His reason for leaving AAA to go home alone is supported by the fact that he was
able to immediately come home right after he left with AAA. Unlike AAA's testimony, the version offered by Racho is
corroborated by the testimony of his mother.

Undeniably, the defenses of denial and alibi are commonly raised in rape cases. Nevertheless, we have dismissed such
defenses for being inherently weak, self-serving, and, more often than not, uncorroborated. To recall, Racho did not deny
that he accompanied AAA to her aunt's house, but he said he left her when AAA insisted that she wanted to go home.
Racho's mother corroborated this part of the story. To our mind, if the denial and alibi are readily available, Racho could
have easily raised these defenses and denied that AAA ever came to the house. His mother could have likewise covered
up this story, but she did not and confirmed that Racho was with AAA that night. If indeed Racho raped AAA that night,
the best defense available for him was alibi which he thought he did not have to raise, given that he was telling the truth
when he left AAA by herself to go home. To our mind, these are badges of truth which persuade us that Racho might be
telling the truth.

In the end, what needs to be stressed here is that a conviction in a criminal case must be supported by proof beyond
reasonable doubt or moral certainty that the accused is guilty.45 Absolute guarantee of guilt is not demanded by the law to
convict a person of a criminal charge but there must, at least, be moral certainty on each element essential to constitute
the offense and on the responsibility of the offender.46 Thus, the prosecution has the primordial duty to present its case
with clarity and persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion.47

The prosecution in this case miserably failed to present a clear story of what transpired. Whether AAA's ill-fated story is
true or not, by seeking relief for an alleged crime, the prosecution must do its part to convince the court that the accused
is guilty. Prosecutors are given ample resources of the government to present a logical and realistic account of every
alleged crime, and they should, to the best of their ability, present a detailed story to get a conviction. But here we cannot
ascertain what happened based on the lone testimony of AAA. It should have been the prosecution's duty to properly
evaluate the evidence if it had enough to convict Amarela or Racho.

Henceforth, we are constrained to reverse the R TC and the CA rulings due to the presence of lingering doubts which are
inconsistent with the requirement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt as quantum of evidence to convict an accused in a
criminal case. Amarela and Racho are entitled to an acquittal, as a matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to
prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 26 June 2012 Joint Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11 of Davao
City, in Criminal Case Nos. 64964-09 and 64965-09, as well as the 17 February 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR HC Nos. 01226 and 01227-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Accused-appellants Juvy D. Amarela and Junard G. Racho are ACQUITTED of the charge of rape on the ground of
reasonable doubt. Their IMMEDIATE RELEASE from custody is hereby ordered unless they are being held for other
lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 211002               January 21, 2015

RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Even men can become victims of rape.

Before us is a criminal case for rape through sexual assault committed against a 10-year-old boy. Accused Richard
Ricalde (Ricalde) was charged with rape as described under the second paragraph of Section 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code, committed "[b ]y any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person." 1

This is a Petition for Review2 assailing the Court of Appeals’ August 28, 2013 Decision3 affirming Ricalde’s conviction for
rape through sexual assault and January 15, 2014 Resolution4 denying reconsideration.

The Provincial Prosecutor of Biñan, Laguna filed an Information charging Ricalde of rape through sexual assault:

That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously inserting [sic] his penis into the anus of XXX who was then ten (10) years of age against his will
and consent, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, 2002.6 The prosecution presented the victim (XXX),7 his
mother, and the medico-legal as witnesses, while the defense presented Ricalde as its sole witness.8

The facts as found by the lower courts follow.

On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00
p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years old,10 is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old.11

After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late.12 He slept on the sofa while XXX
slept on the living room floor.13

It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in his
anus."14 He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis."15 When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran toward his mother’s room
to tell her what happened.16 He also told his mother that Ricalde played with his sexual organ.17

XXX’s mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the incident, but he
remained silent.18 She asked him to leave.19

XXX’s mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to report the incident to the Sta.
Rosa police station.20 The police referred them to the municipal health center for medical examination.21 Dr. Roy Camarillo
examined22 XXX and found no signs of recent trauma in his anal orifice23 that was also "NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa."24

On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the Sta. Rosa police station, leading to the
criminal complaint filed against Ricalde.25

Ricalde denied the accusations.26 He testified that he met XXX during the 2001 town fiesta of Calaca, Batangas and
learned that XXX’s mother is the cousin of his cousin Arlan Ricalde.27 He and XXX became textmates, and XXX invited
him to his house.28 On January 30, 2002, XXX’s mother picked him up to sleep at their house.29 He slept at 10:00 p.m. on
the living room sofa while XXX slept on the floor.30 He denied the alleged rape through sexual assault.31

The Regional Trial Court in its Decision32 dated June 20, 2011 found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape
through sexual assault:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Richard Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape by sexual
assault and, accordingly, sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum. Accused is ordered
to pay [XXX] the sums of 50,000.00 as moral damages and 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.33

The Court of Appeals in its Decision34 dated August 28, 2013 affirmed the conviction with the modification of lowering the
amounts of damages awarded:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2011 of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, in Crim.
Case No. 11906-B, is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the award of damages. Accused-appellant RICHARD
RICALDE is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos and moral
damages likewise in the amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos, both with interest at the legal rate of six (6%)
percent per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.35

Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his acquittal.36

Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the medico-legal testified that he found "no physical
signs or external signs of recent trauma [in XXX’s] anus,"37 or any trace of spermatozoa.38 He contends that physical
evidence "ranks high in [the court’s] hierarchy of trustworthy evidence." 39

Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any object
being inserted into his anal orifice.40 XXX was also able to immediately push him away.41 Thus, no push and pull
movement happened that would explain XXX’s alleged stomach ache.42 Petitioner submits that the alleged stomach ache
was an attempt to aggravate the charge against him.43

Petitioner argues that XXX’s inconsistent testimony raises reasonable doubt on his guilt.44 XXX claimed that he
immediately pushed petitioner away, but in another instance, he testified as follows: "I felt that he was inserting his penis
inside my anus because I was even able to hold his penis. He was also playing with my penis."45 XXX also stated in his
salaysay that "the penis reached only the periphery of his anal orifice."46

Third, XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that petitioner was wearing pants with the zipper
open.47 Petitioner submits that performing anal coitus while wearing pants with an open zipper poses a challenge — the
risk of injuring the sexual organ or having pubic hair entangled in the zipper. 48 Petitioner argues that the court must
consider every circumstance favoring the innocence of an accused.49

Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have applied the "variance doctrine" in
People v. Sumingwa,50 and the court would have found him guilty for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.51 The petition then enumerated circumstances showing possible homosexual
affections between petitioner and XXX.52 These include the fact that they were textmates and that petitioner played with
XXX’s penis.53

Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX mistook as penetration.54 XXX could also
have mistaken the "overreaching fingers as a male organ trying to enter his [anus]."55 Assuming these acts took place,
these would only be considered as acts of lasciviousness.56

The People of the Philippines counters that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime
charged.

The Comment57 discussed that it is neither improbable nor contrary to human experience that XXX’s mother allowed her
son to be left alone with a stranger.58 Petitioner was not a complete stranger, and she could not have foreseen such abuse
since "rape by sexual assault or any form of sexual abuse of a boy by a grown man is fairly uncommon in our culture."59

Petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s findings deserves scant consideration.60 The Comment quoted People v.
Penilla61 in that "[a] medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape inasmuch as the
victim’s testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the crime."62 In any case, the medico-legal
testified on the sphincter’s flexibility and how an insertion into the anal orifice would not necessarily cause injury.63
Lastly, the prosecution established all elements of rape through sexual assault based on XXX’s clear and categorical
testimony.64 Petitioner’s defense of mere denial cannot outweigh positive testimony.65 Consequently, petitioner’s
contention that the incident only amounts to acts of lasciviousness lacks merit.66

The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt petitioner Richard
Ricalde’s guilt for the crime of rape through sexual assault.

We affirm petitioner’s conviction with modification on the penalty imposed.

The Anti-Rape Law of 199767 classified rape as a crime against persons68 and amended the Revised Penal Code to
include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:

Article 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed.—Rape is Committed—

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)

Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object rape,"69 "gender-free rape,"70 or
"homosexual rape."71 The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the insertion of the penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice."72

Jurisprudence holds that "the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded respect if
not conclusive effect."73

The trial court found that XXX’s "straightforward, unequivocal and convincing testimony"74 sufficiently proved that
petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into XXX’s anal orifice.75 There was no showing of ill
motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner.76 The Court of Appeals accorded great weight to the trial court’s
findings and affirmed petitioner’s conviction.77

No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts’ findings.

First, petitioner’s argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXX’s testimony fails to convince.

In a long line of cases,78 this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims. Their "[y]outh and
immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."79 XXX, then only 10 years old, had no reason to concoct lies
against petitioner.80

This court has also held that "[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating
past incidents of abuse."81

Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis
or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.

This contradicts petitioner’s earlier statement in his appellant’s brief82 that "[a]lthough it is true that the Supreme Court, in a
long line of cases, did not rule out the possibility of rape in cases where the victim remained physically intact at the time
she or he was physically examined, still, it bears stressing that in the instant case, the private complainant testified that
the accused-appellant’s penis fully penetrated his anus."83

The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXX’s testimony in that he "felt something was inserted in [his]
anus."84

Q: That early morning of January 31, 2002, while you were sleeping at your house, do you recall any unusual
incident that happened to you?

A: Yes sir, I felt something was inserted in my anus.. . . .

Q: When you said that you felt something was inserted in your anus, what did you do?

A: I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold his penis. He was also
playing with my penis.

Q: So when you said he was inserting his penis to your anus and he was even playing with your private part, who
is this person you are referring to as "he"?

A: Richard, sir.85

In People v. Soria,86 this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her genital or anal
orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed:

We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object that was inserted
into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted into her vagina. To require "AAA" to
identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due
process.87

Second, petitioner’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding of no recent trauma in XXX’s anal orifice, or any trace of
spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection
and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive testimony of XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural,
and consistent with human nature.

This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the possibility of convictions for rape
based on the victim’s credible lone testimony.88

In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding of trauma in the anal orifice does not remove the
possibility of an insertion considering the flexibility of the sphincter:

Q: Now, a while ago you testified that he was sodomized and your findings states [sic] that you did not find any congestion
or abrasion, can you explain to this court why you stated in your findings that you did not find any congestion or abrasion?

A: Again, based on my examination[,] there were no external signs of recent trauma to the anus. It should be realized that
the sphincter, that is the particular portion of the anus controlling the bowel movement, it exhibits a certain flexibility such
that it can resist any objected [sic] inserted and that area is very vascular, meaning to say, it is rich in blood supply, such
that any injuries would be healed in 24 hours or less than 24 hours, sir?89

Lastly, we address petitioner’s invocation of the "variance doctrine" citing People v. Sumingwa.90 Section 4 in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the "variance doctrine":

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.—When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of
the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.—An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the
former continue or form part of those constituting the latter.

In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with qualified rape but was convicted for
the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
761091 since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert [the accused’s] penis into [the victim’s] vagina."92

In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during trial. The prosecution
established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.

XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus."93 The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ
distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v. Bonaagua94 discussed this distinction:

It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ or even
its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in like manner, if
the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also be considered as already
consummating the crime of rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the
present case, such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only
touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim, however, is
open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in
conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot
be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.95 (Emphasis supplied)

People v. Bonaagua considers a woman’s private organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape involves a
woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a man in that the slightest
penetration to the victim’s anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual assault.

The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victim’s dignity. The degree of penetration is not important. Rape is an
"assault on human dignity."96

People v. Quintos97 discussed how rape causes incalculable damage on a victim’s dignity, regardless of the manner of its
commission:

The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are relevant only insofar as these define the
manners of commission of rape. However, it does not mean that one manner is less heinous or wrong than the other.
Whether rape is committed by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of a woman or by insertion of the penis into the mouth of
another person, the damage to the victim’s dignity is incalculable. Child sexual abuse in general has been associated with
negative psychological impacts such as trauma, sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-destructive behavior, emotional pain,
impaired sense of self, and interpersonal difficulties. Hence, one experience of sexual abuse should not be trivialized just
because it was committed in a relatively unusual manner.

"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the
same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order."
Crimes are punished as retribution so that society would understand that the act punished was wrong.

Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message that one experience of rape is
relatively trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different levels of wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape,
in whatever manner, is a desecration of a person’s will and body. In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing
rape as greater or less in heinousness than another may be of doubtful constitutionality.

However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result was not raised in this case. Acknowledging
that every presumption must be accorded in favor of accused in criminal cases, we have no choice but to impose a lesser
penalty for rape committed by inserting the penis into the mouth of the victim.98 (Citations omitted)

We affirm petitioner’s conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower court to the penalty under Article III, Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act":99
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.— Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpertua shall be imposed upon the following:

....

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case maybe: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; (Emphasis supplied)

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines "lascivious conduct": [T]he intentional
touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction
of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.100

In People v. Chingh,101 the accused was charged with rape "for inserting his fingers and afterwards his penis into the
private part of his minor victim[.]"102 The Court of Appeals found the accused guilty of two counts of rape: statutory rape
and rape through sexual assault.103 This court modified the penalty imposed for rape through sexual assault to the penalty
provided in Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, discussing as follows:

It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10) years old. This calls for the
application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act," which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty therefor in Section 5(b), Article III, to wit:. . . .

In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the above-
quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty prescribed
therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering further that Armando’s
act of inserting his finger in VVV’s private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable
penalty should be that provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium
period.

The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under Article 366, in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period than
the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably
unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the
applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No.
7610 is still good law, which must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of
age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition."104 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Thus, "for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, [the accused Chingh was] sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum."105

The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5(b) "for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period." This penalty is higher than the imposable penalty of
prision correccional for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code.

In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty when the victi m is a child.

The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his birth certificate, and this was
admitted by the defense.106 His age of 10 years old was alleged in the Information.107 The higher penalty under Republic
Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v. Chingh, applies in this case.
Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act No. 7610). It is a progression
from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for children. Justice Velasco suggests that this is not so. He
anchors his view on his interpretation that Republic Act No. 7610 requires a showing that apart from the actual coerced
sexual act on the 10-year-old, the child must also be exploited by prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is
inaccurate on grounds of verba legis and ratione legis.

The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that "children . . . who . . . due to the
coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . . are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse." The label "children exploited in . . . other sexual abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject
of coercion and sexual intercourse.

Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who is liable and the penalty to be imposed. The person who
engages in sexual intercourse with a child already coerced is liable.

It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a child as child abuse. The proposal of Justice Velasco implies
that there has to be other acts of a sexual nature other than the rape itself that will characterize rape as child abuse. One
count of rape is not enough. Child abuse, in his view, is not yet present with one count of rape.

This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial insensitivity to the purpose of the law. If we adopt his view, it would
amount to our collective official sanction to the idea that a single act of rape is not debilitating to a child. That a single act
of rape is not a tormenting memory that will sear into a child’s memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or her
of the trust that will enable him or her to have full and diverse meaningful interactions with other human beings. In my
view, a single act of sexual abuse to a child, by law, is already reprehensible. Our society has expressed that this is
conduct which should be punishable. The purpose and text of the law already punish that single act as child abuse.

Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.

Justice Velasco further observes that the right to due process of the accused will be violated should we impose the
penalty under Republic Act No. 7610. I disagree.

The Information was clear about the facts constitutive of the offense. The facts constitutive of the offense will suggest the
crime punishable by law. The principle is that ignorantia legis non excusat. With the facts clearly laid out in the
Information, the law which punishes the offense should already be clear and the accused put on notice of the charges
against him.

Additionally, there is no argument that the accused was not represented by counsel. Clear from the records is the entry
and active participation of his lawyer up to and including this appeal.

On the award of damages, we maintain the amount of 30,000.00 in favor of XXX as a victim of rape through sexual
assault, consistent with jurisprudence.108

This court has stated that "jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the information that the prevailing amount
awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple rape committed by means other than penile insertion is ₱30,000."109

This statement considered the prevailing situation in our jurisprudence where victims of rape are all
women.1âwphi1 However, as in this case, men can also become victims of rape through sexual assault, and this can
involve penile insertion.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 34387 dated August 28, 2013 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that for rape through sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard
Ricalde is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of
reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. He is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the amount of ₱30,000.00 and moral damages likewise in the
amount of ₱30,000.00, both with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206393               January 21, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
MICHAEL JOSON y ROGANDO, Defendant-Appellant.

For consideration by the Court is the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated 31. August 2012 that affirmed the judgment2 of
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Dasmarinas (RTC), Cavite, Branch 90 sitting in Imus, Cavite, convicting appellant
Michael Joson y Rogando of the crime of rape of his 14-year old sister.

Appellant was charged with violation of Articles 266-A of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610 in
an Information, the accusatory portion of which reads:

That on or about the 14th day of May 2009, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of XXX, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being the biological brother and thus a relative within the
second degree of consanguinity of [AAA],3 a minor fourteen (14) years of age and born on March 24, 1995, motivated by
lust and with lewd design, with the use of force and intimidation and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over her,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said [AAA], against her will and consent,
thereby debasing, degrading and demeaning her intrinsic worth and integrity as a child, to the damage and prejudice of
said complainant.4

On arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The prosecution’s evidence is based on the sole testimony of
the victim. AAA lives with appellant and his common-law partner. AAA testified that at around 1:00 in the morning of 14
May 2009, and while appellant’s wife was away, AAA was awakened by appellant undressing her. AAA tried to struggle
but appellant was tightly holding her arms. After undressing her, appellant kissed and mounted her. Appellant was able to
insert his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain in her genitalia. Thereafter, appellant went back to sleep leaving AAA crying.
At about 6:00 or 7:00 in the morning, appellant left AAA with a letter apologizing for what happened and begging her not
to tell on his wife. The letter reads:

Ne!

Sorry Ne. Patawarin mo ko. Dalalang ng kalasingan kaya ko nagawa ang ganung bagay. Sana powala ng ibang
makaalam nito lalu na si Ate Cindy mo. Ayokong masira na naman ang pamilya ko at mga buhay natin. Paki
tapon muna to pag tapos mong basahin.5

At around 5:00 in the afternoon of that same date, AAA related to appellant’s wife the rape incident.6 And on 1 June 2009,
AAA, accompanied by her father, reported the incident to the police and she executed a sworn statement detailing the
rape.7

The prosecution presented a provisional medico-legal report on the examination conducted on AAA by Irene D. Baluyut of
Philippine General Hospital which essentially states that there is no evident injury on AAA at the time of the examination.

Also submitted as part of the prosecution’s evidence is the birth certificate of AAA to prove that she was still a minor at the
time the rape was committed on 14 May 2009.

Appellant admitted that AAA is his sister but he proffered the defense of alibi and claimed that he was staying in Alfonso,
Cavite on 14 May 2009 and only went back to his house in Dasmariñas on 26 May 2009. Appellant vehemently denied the
accusation against him and speculated that AAA resented him because he was strict with his sister. Appellant also denied
writing the apology letter and presented his specimen handwriting in court.8

After evaluating the evidence, the trial court found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and
meted outthe penalty of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused MICHAEL JOSON y ROGANDO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape as defined in Article 266-Aparagraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic Act No. 7610, and
hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,and the said accused is hereby ordered to
indemnify the victim by way of moral damages in the amount of Php50,000.00, civil indemnity ex-delictoin the amount of
Php50,000.00 and exemplary damages in the amount of Php25,000.00.9
The trial court found credible the testimony of AAA. It noted that appellant even wrote to the victim thathe was sorry for
what he has done. The trial court considered the letter as admission against appellant’s interest.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.10 On 31 August 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision affirming the
judgment of conviction.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal11 with the appellate court. In a Resolution12 dated 19 June 2013, the Court ordered the
elevation of the records and directed the parties to filetheir respective supplemental briefs should they so desire.
However, appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General both manifested that they were adopting their respective appeal
briefs previously filed with the Court of Appeals.13

In his Appeal Brief, appellant maintains that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of rape as defined under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, particularly the elements of force, threat or intimidation. Appellant argues that
AAA did not allege that she was threatened by appellant with the use of any firearm or any bladed weapon nor did
appellant say anything to threaten or intimidate her. With respect to moral ascendancy, appellant contends that the Court
in a recent case did not consider a brother as one of those close kin who has moral ascendancy over a victim that would
substitute for force and intimidation. Appellant further points out that there was no showing ofany resistance on the part of
AAA to his alleged sexual advances. Upon a careful evaluation of the case, we find no reason to reverse appellant’s
conviction.

For a charge of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the prosecution must prove that: (1)
the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished this act through force, threat or intimidation,
when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.14

AAA gave a complete account of her ordeal in the hands of her own brother, to wit:

Q: Do you know one Michael Joson?

A: Opo.

Q: Why do you know him?

A: He is my brother.

Q: Is he inside the courtroom?

A: Opo.

Q: Please point to him. (Witness points to a man wearing a yellow tshirt, who when asked what his name is, answered
"Michael Joson.")

Q: On May 14, 2009, around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon, where were you?

A: Nasa bahay po.

Q: What were you doing in your house?

A: Tulog po.

Q: What time did you wake up?

A: Sa tingin ko po mga 1:00 o’clock.

Q: Will you please tell this Honorable Court the reason why you woke up early?

A: Hinuhubaran po niya ako.

Q: Who are you referring to?

A: Ng kapatid ko.

Q: He was undressing you? Sowhat did you do while he was undressing you, while you were lying or sleeping? That’s
why you were awakened?

A: Opo.

Q: So what happened next when you felt that he was undressing you?

A: Pumalag po ako, kasi hinihigpitan po niya ako sa braso ko.

Q: So what else did you do?

A: Sabi po niya kasi, wag daw po ako maingay.

Q: Who was your companion in the house, aside from your brother? Who else was there in the house?

A: Wala po.

Q: Where were they?

A: ‘Yung asawa niya po, umuwi sa kanila.

Q: What about your parents, where were they?

A: ‘Yung tatay ko po, nagtatrabaho.

Q: Your mother?

A: Patay na po.

Q: What happened next when you were told not to shout?

A: Hinubaran niya po ‘yung ibaba ko, tapos pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko tapos pinaghahalikan niya ko.

Q: Was he able to undress you?

A: Opo.

Q: Totally?

A: Opo.

Q: Thereafter, what did you do?

A: Pinaghahalikan niya po ako.

Q: What were you doing?

A: Umiiyak lang po ako.

Q: What about the accused, what did he do to you?

A: Pumatong po siya sa ibabaw ko.

Q: He went on top of you? Thereafter what did the accused do next?

A: Pilit niya pong ipinapasok ang ari niya sa ari ko.

Q: Was he able to insert his penis?

A: Opo.

Q: For how long?

A: Matagal po.

Q: How did you feel when his organ was inside your organ?

A: Masakit po.

Q: And what (sic)you trying to do while his organ was inside?

A: Umiiyak lang po ako.

Q: After that, what happened next?

A: Pinaghahalikan niya pa rin po ako, tapos tumayo po siya sandali tapos humiga po uli siya. Natulog po.

Q: What about you, you went to sleep also?

A: Hindi po, umiiyak lang po ako.

Q: The following day, in the morning, were you not able to sleep after that incident?

A: Hindi po.

Q: What did you do?

A: Doon lang po, umiiyak lang po.

Q: What about the accused?

A: Doon lang din po siya.

Q: Beside you?

A: Opo.

Q: And what happened next, at 6:00 o’clock in the morning or 7:00 o’clock?

A: May iniwan po siyang sulat.

Q: Where did he go, if you know?

A: Sa trabaho po.

Q: What was the letter all about?

A: Humihingi po siya ng sorry.15

Her testimony has established all the elements of rape required under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code. First,
appellant had carnal knowledge of the victim. AAA positively identified her own brother as the assailant. She was likewise
unwavering in her narration that appellant inserted his penis into her vagina. Second, appellant employed threat, force
and intimidation to satisfy his lust. At this juncture, we quote with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals on this point:

The Supreme Court has, time and again, ruled that the force or violence that is required inrape cases is relative; when
applied, it need not be overpowering or irresistible. That it enables the offender to consummate his purpose is enough.
The parties’ relative age, size and strength should be taken into account in evaluating the existence of the element of
force in the crime of rape. The degree of force which may not suffice when the victim is an adult may be more than
enough if employed against a person of tender age.

In the case at bench, the accused-appellant employed that amount of force sufficient to consummate the rape. It must be
stressed that, at the time of the incident, AAA was only 14 years old. Considering the tender years of the offended party
as compared to the accused-appellant who was in the prime of his life, the act of the accused-appellant in pinning the
arms of AAA to avoid any form of resistance from her suffices. Force or intimidation is not limited to physical force. As
long as it is present and brings the desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the
point.

xxxx

We are not persuaded by the accused-appellant’s insistence that the absence of any resistance on the partof AAA raised
doubts as to whether the sexual congress was without her consent. The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the
sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to consent. Physical resistance need not be established in rape when
threats and intimidation are employed and the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of fear.

Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to determine whether a woman voluntarily succumbed tothe lust of
anaccused. Rape victims show no uniform reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others may be too
intimidated to offer any resistanceat all. After all, resistance is not an element of rape and its absence does not denigrate
AAA’s claim that the accused-appellant consummated his bestial act.16

Anent appellant’s argument that as a brother he lacks moral ascendancy over her sister, the victim, that could substitute
for force and intimidation, our ruling in People v. Villaruel,17 as cited by the Court of Appeals, has rejected such
proposition.

The fact remains that Myra positively testified in court that her brother sexually molested her in the morning of February
21, 1996. The accused-appellant was her older brother who had definitely moral ascendancy over her. He, being the
eldest had definitely moral ascendancy over her. He, being the eldest among the children since both of their parents were
dead, the accused-appellant stood as guardian of the siblings. Thus, when the complainant was roused from her sleep to
accompany the accused-appellant to buy bread, the complainant obediently followed him. To the accused-appellant, this
was highly improbable that the complainant would entertain his plea to go out with him at such an unholy hour or even
allegedly knowing fully well that the latter had taken shabu and liquor. There is nothing incredible with the complainant’s
story. Notwithstanding the time or the physical condition of her brother, Myra certainly did not expect that he had other ill
motives against her. It certainly is not normal for a brother to take out his lust on his sister. Myra also testified that she did
not resist his advances for fear of her life as her brother had two (2) fan knives poking at her as she was being raped.
More importantly, the moral ascendancy and influence the accused-appellant has over the complainant sufficiently
substitute for the force and intimidation required in rape.18

Moreover, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals found AAA’s testimony credible. The trial court, having the
opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during the trial, can best assess the credibility of the witnesses
and their testimonies. Thus, the trial court’s findings are accorded great respect unless the trial court has over looked or
misconstrued some substantial facts, which if considered might affect the result of the case.19

With respect to appellant’s defense of denial and alibi, it is an of trepeated rule that positive identification where
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter
prevails over a denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses
who testify on affirmative matters.20

We likewise agree that appellantshould suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
provides that the death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed when the victim is under eighteen
(18) years ofage and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 which
prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, however, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

In conformance with the prevailing jurisprudence, we deem it proper to modify the amount of damages awarded in this
case. In People v. Gambao,21 we increase the amounts of indemnity and damage where the penalty for the crime
committed is death but which cannot be imposed because of Republic Act No. 9346, as follow:

1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no proof; and

3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.

All damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully
paid.22

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals' decision dated 31 August 2012 finding appellant Michael Joson y Rogando guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The civil
indemnity awarded is increased to ₱100,000.00; moral damages to ₱100,000.00; and the exemplary damages to
₱100,000.00. The award of damages shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of the
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168932               October 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CHARLIE BUTIONG, Defendant-Appellant.

This case involves a man who had sexual intercourse with a woman who, although 29 years of age, was a mental
retardate with the mentality of a six- to seven-year old.

The man, Charlie Butiong, seeks the review and reversal of the judgment promulgated on May 18, 2005,1 whereby the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for rape handed down by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 258, in
Parañaque City, for which he was imposed reclusion perpetua. He insists that the State did not duly establish that the
woman had been a mental retardate.

The records show that Butiong had been arraigned and tried under an information that alleged:

xxxx

That on or about the 7th day of October 1998, in the City of Parañaque, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the complainant [AAA], a mental retardate, against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

Antecedents

In the evening of October 7, 1998, AAA,3 then a 29-year-old mental retardate, was invited by Butiong, her long-time
neighbor, to go over to his house because he would give her something. AAA obliged. He locked the door as soon as she
had stepped inside his house, and then took off his shorts and the shorts of AAA. He led her to the sofa, where he had
carnal knowledge of her. AAA remembered that she then felt pain in her abdomen and became angry at him for what he
had done.4

Upon reaching home, AAA forthwith told her older sister what had happened. Her sister brought AAA to the police
station,5 and later on to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), where AAA underwent a medico-legal examination by
Dr. Armie M. Soreta-Umil. The medico-legal examination revealed that AAA’s hymen was intact but "distensible and its
orifice wide (2.5 cms. in diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average-sized adult Filipino male organ in full
erection without producing any genital injury."6 Noticing AAA’s disorientation and incoherence, Dr. Soreta-Umil endorsed
her to the NBI Psychiatric Section for evaluation.7 AAA also underwent a series of psychological tests at the National
Mental Hospital. The tests included the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test, Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test, and Draw a
Person Test. A Rorschach Psycho-Diagnostic Test was not used because AAA was not able to answer.8 Another test, the
Sack’s Sentence Completion Test, was not used because of AAA’s inability to comply with the instructions.9 The results of
the psychological tests showed that she had a mild level of mental retardation, and that her mental age was that of a child
aged from six to seven years; she was unaware of what went on around her and was interested only in gratifying her own
needs.10

The Defense presented only one witness in the person of Dr. Natividad Dayan, whom it offered as an expert psychologist.
She concluded that the Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test and the Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test administered on
AAA were unreliable for determining the existence of mental retardation. She based her conclusion on James Morizon’s
DSM-4 Made Easy: The Clinician’s Guide for Diagnosis, and Jay Siskin’s Coping With Psychiatric and Psychological
Testimony.11 According to her, an individually administered intelligence test, like the Stamp Intelligence Scale or the
Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale, as well as projective techniques, like the Rorschach Psychodiagnostic Test and the
Thematic Perception Test, should have been instead administered to appropriately determine AAA’s mental age.12

Ruling of the RTC

The RTC rendered judgment finding Butiong guilty of rape, viz:

WHEREFORE, the prosecution having been able to prove the guilt of the accused CHARLIE BUTIONG beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of simple RAPE defined and punishable under Art. 266-A par. 1 in relation to Art. 266-B
par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 8353, accused CHARLIE BUTIONG is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

Pursuant to the existing jurisprudence, accused CHARLIE BUTIONG is further ordered to indemnify the private
complainant, AAA, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as and by
way of exemplary damages.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.13

The RTC noted that nothing in Dr. Dayan’s testimony on the unreliability of the tests administered on AAA would
invalidate the findings of psychologist Nimia de Guzman and Dr. Diana de Castro, both of the National Center for Mental
Health, to the effect that AAA had mild level retardation with a mental age of a six- to seven-year old person; and that
such findings were admissible and had more than sufficiently complied with the required historical and physical
examination for determining AAA’s mental condition. The trial judge himself held,14 based on his personal observation of
AAA as a witness in court, that she was a retardate who could narrate what had transpired albeit with some difficulty
about how she had been sexually abused. He considered AAA as a competent witness whose behavior and appearance
manifested no possibility for her to concoct a story of her defloration at the hands of the accused.

Ruling of the CA

Butiong appealed, but the CA affirmed the conviction on May 18, 2005,15 to wit:

In sum, the Court sees no cogent reason to depart from the well-entrenched doctrine that the trial court’s assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is accorded great respect because of its opportunity to hear their testimonies and observe their
demeanor and manner of testifying. Absent any showing that the trial court overlooked or misappreciated some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which would affect the result of the case, the Court sees no reason to alter the
findings of the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated February 24, 2003 is affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

The CA considered the State’s evidence sufficient to support the conclusion that AAA was mentally retarded. It concluded
that the State’s expert witness psychologist de Guzman had not only interviewed AAA and a relative of AAA but had also
administered a series of tests on AAA upon which to base her findings about AAA’s mental condition; that the results of
the psychiatric examination done by Dr. de Castro, as well as the trial judge’s personal observation that AAA was a
mental retardate supported the findings of psychologist de Guzman; and that AAA could not legally give her consent to
the sexual act, as held in People v. Asturias,16 because the clinical findings showed her mentality to be at par with that of a
six- or seven-year-old.

The CA rejected Butiong’s argument that rape was not established because no semen had been taken from AAA,
stressing that the fact of rape depended not on the presence of spermatozoa but on the fact of unlawful penetration of the
female genitalia by the male organ, which the State amply proved.

Issues

In this appeal, Butiong submits that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PROOF OF THE DATE OF THE COMMISSION OF THE
OFFENSE IS NOT NECESSARY IN ORDER TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE OFFENDED PARTY IS A MENTAL RETARDATE.
 III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A MENTAL RETARDATE IS IN THE SAME CLASS AS A
WOMAN DEPRIVED OF REASON OR OTHERWISE UNCONSCIOUS.

Anent the first assigned error, Butiong contends that the State did not establish rape because there was no evidence
showing the exact date when the rape occurred. Under the second assigned error, he disputes the RTC’s conclusion that
AAA was a mental retardate by focusing on the inconclusiveness of the findings of psychologist de Guzman brought about
by her failure to ascertain AAA’s personal history and by her computing AAA’s mental age upon inaccurate and unverified
information. He notes that two other physicians who had examined AAA, one from the NBI and the other from the National
Center for Mental Health, were not presented as witnesses. He insists on his innocence, and emphasizes the testimony of
Dr. Dayan on the unreliability of the tests administered on AAA. He maintains that the unreliability of the tests
administered on AAA for determining the presence of mental retardation should be appreciated in his favor in accordance
with People v. Cartuano, Jr.,17 which required that a diagnosis of mental retardation should be made after a thorough
evaluation based on history, and physical and laboratory examinations by a clinician. Lastly, he posits that the State did
not establish the elements of rape, considering that a mental retardate qualified neither as a "woman deprived of reason"
nor as "a woman under twelve years of age" as provided under Article 266-A par. 1(b) nor of par. 1(d) of the Revised
Penal Code.

Ruling

We affirm the conviction.

Exact date of rape and absence of spermatozoa

from victim’s genitalia are not elements of rape

Butiong argues that the State did not duly establish the fact of rape because the exact date of the incident was
indeterminate, and because no spermatozoa was found in AAA’s genital organ.

The argument deserves no consideration.

The CA fully debunked the argument on the exact date of the rape not being established by simply quoting from AAA’s
testimony that the rape had occurred on October 7, 1998.18 We need to emphasize, however, that the date of the rape
need not be precisely proved considering that date is not an element of rape.19

Nor did the absence of spermatozoa from the genitalia of AAA negate or disprove the rape.20 The basic element of rape is
carnal knowledge or sexual intercourse, not ejaculation.21 Carnal knowledge is defined as "the act of a man having sexual
bodily connections with a woman."22 This explains why the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates the
rape. As such, a mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act already
constitutes consummated rape.23 People v. Campuhan24 has aimed to remove any confusion as to the extent of "touching"
in rape:

[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a
slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There
must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which
are required to be "touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal
surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion
that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

The pudendum or vulva is the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons
pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubis is the rounded eminence
that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majora or the outer
lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface
is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has
many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majora is the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia
majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either
labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not
acts of lasciviousness.25 [emphasis supplied]

That AAA’s recollection on the rape was corroborated by the results of the medico-legal examination was sufficient proof
of the consummation of rape. We have ruled that rape can be established by the sole testimony of the victim that is
credible and untainted with serious uncertainty.26 With more reason is this true when the medical findings supported the
testimony of the victim,27 like herein.

II

Rape was committed because AAA

was a mental retardate

One of Butiong’s contentions is that having sexual intercourse with AAA, a mental retardate, did not amount to a rape,
because it could not be considered as carnal knowledge of a woman deprived of reason or of a female under twelve years
of age as provided under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The contention cannot be sustained.

Rape is essentially a crime committed through force or intimidation, that is, against the will of the female. It is also
committed without force or intimidation when carnal knowledge of a female is alleged and shown to be without her
consent. This understanding of the commission of rape has been prevalent in both the common law and the statutory law
systems. As Corpus Juris Secundum has summed up:28

At common law rape could be committed only where the unlawful carnal knowledge of a female was had without her
consent or against her will; lack of consent was an essential element of the offense; and there can be no rape in the
common-law sense without the element of lack of consent. Under the statutes punishing the offense, an essential element
of the crime of rape is that the act was committed without the consent of the female, or, as it is otherwise expressed,
against her will. The act of sexual intercourse is against the female’s will or without her consent when, for any cause, she
is not in a position to exercise any judgment about the matter.

Carnal knowledge of the female with her consent is not rape, provided she is above the age of consent or is capable in
the eyes of the law of giving consent. Thus, mere copulation, with the woman passively acquiescent, does not constitute
rape. The female must not at any time consent; her consent, given at any time prior to penetration, however reluctantly
given, or if accompanied with mere verbal protests and refusals, prevents the act from being rape, provided the consent is
willing and free of initial coercion. Thus, where a man takes hold of a woman against her will and she afterward consents
to intercourse before the act is committed, his act is not rape. However, where the female consents, but then withdraws
her consent before penetration, and the act is accomplished by force, it is rape; and where a woman offers to allow a man
to have intercourse with her on certain conditions and he refuses to comply with the conditions, but accomplishes the act
without her consent, he is guilty of rape. [emphasis supplied]

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code,29 Justice Aquino discusses the concept of committing rape against the
female’s will or without her consent, to wit:

In rape committed by means of duress, the victim’s will is nullified or destroyed. Hence, the necessity of proving real and
constant resistance on the part of the woman to establish that the act was committed against her will. On the other hand,
in the rape of a woman deprived of reason or unconscious, the victim has no will. The absence of will determines the
existence of the rape. Such lack of will may exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totally deprived of reason, but
also when she is suffering some mental deficiency impairing her reason or free will. In that case, it is not necessary that
she should offer real opposition or constant resistance to the sexual intercourse. Carnal knowledge of a woman so weak
in intellect as to be incapable of legal consent constitutes rape. Where the offended woman was feeble-minded, sickly and
almost an idiot, sexual intercourse with her is rape. Her failure to offer resistance to the act did not mean consent for she
was incapable of giving any rational consent.

The deprivation of reason need not be complete. Mental abnormality or deficiency is enough. Cohabitation with a
feebleminded, idiotic woman is rape. Sexual intercourse with an insane woman was considered rape. But a deafmute is
not necessarily deprived of reason. This circumstances must be proven. Intercourse with a deafmute is not rape of a
woman deprived of reason, in the absence of proof that she is an imbecile. Viada says that the rape under par. 2 may be
committed when the offended woman is deprived of reason due to any cause such as when she is asleep, or due to
lethargy produced by sickness or narcotics administered to her by the accused. xxx [emphasis supplied]

Butiong was arraigned, tried and convicted of the crime of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1, Article 266-
A, in relation to paragraph 1, Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under an amended information that
plainly averred that AAA was a "mental retardate." The insertion of the phrase in the amended information was significant,
because the phrase put him on sufficient notice that the victim "was not in full possession of her normal reasoning
faculty."30 The phrase further specifically indicated which of the four modes of committing the crime of rape as provided in
paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, applied in his case, namely:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age, or is demented, even though none of the circumstances first
mentioned is present.

Yet, Butiong’s contention is that his case did not come under any of the four modes due to carnal knowledge of a mental
retardate not being either carnal knowledge of a female deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or of a female
under 12 years of age or demented.

The contention is unwarranted.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 8353, provides:

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. ̶ Rape is committed –

1) By a man who have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the genital or
anal orifice of another person.

Carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act No. 8353 because a mental retardate is not capable of giving her consent to a sexual act. Proof
of force or intimidation is not necessary, it being sufficient for the State to establish, one, the sexual congress between the
accused and the victim, and, two, the mental retardation of the victim.31 It should no longer be debatable that rape of a
mental retardate falls under paragraph 1, b), of Article 266-A, supra, because the provision refers to a rape of a female
"deprived of reason," a phrase that refers to mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.32

Who, then, is a mental retardate within the context of the phrase "deprived of reason" used in the Revised Penal Code?

In People v. Dalandas,33 the Court renders the following exposition on mental retardation and its various levels, viz:

Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and characterized by impaired intellectual
functioning measured by standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily demands of the
individual’s own social environment. Commonly, a mental retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or
psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity.

Although "mental retardation" is often used interchangeably with "mental deficiency," the latter term is usually reserved for
those without recognizable brain pathology. The degrees of mental retardation according to their level of intellectual
function are illustrated, thus:

Mental Retardation
LEVEL DESCRIPTION TERM INTELLIGENCE QUOTIENT

(IQ RANGE)

I Profound Below 20

II Severe 20-35

III Moderate 36-52

IV Mild 53-68

xxxx

The traditional but now obsolescent terms applied to those degrees of mental retardation were (a) idiot, having an IQ of 0
to 19, and a maximum intellectual factor in adult life equivalent to that of the average two-year old child; (b) imbecile by an
IQ of 20 to 49 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the average seven-year old child;
moron or feebleminded, having an IQ of 50 to 69 and a maximum intellectual function in adult life equivalent to that of the
average twelve-year old child. Psychiatrists and psychologists apply the term "borderline" intelligence to those with IQ
between 70 to 89. In People vs. Palma, we ruled that a person is guilty of rape when he had sexual intercourse with a
female who was suffering from a "borderline mental deficiency." [emphasis supplied]

Considering the findings of psychologist de Guzman to the effect that AAA had the mental age of a six- to seven-year old,
an age equated with imbecility under the previous classification, her mental age was even lower than that of a borderline
mental deficiency within the context of that term as characterized in People v. Dalandas, supra.34 As such, Butiong’s
carnal knowledge of AAA amounted to rape of a person deprived of reason.

The ability of the female to given rational consent to carnal intercourse determines if carnal knowledge of a mental
retardate like AAA is rape. Indeed, the Court has consistently considered carnal knowledge of a female mental retardate
with the mental age below 12 years of age as rape of a woman deprived of reason.35 As the Court aptly stated in People v.
Manlapaz,36 where the victim was a 13-year old girl with the mentality of a five-year-old, that ability to give rational consent
was not present, viz:

Sexual intercourse with a woman who is deprived of reason or with a girl who is below twelve years of age is rape
because she is incapable of giving rational consent to the carnal intercourse. "Las mujeres privadas de razon,
enajenadas, idiotas, imbeciles, son incapaces por su estado mental de apreciar la ofensa que el culpable infiere a su
honestidad y, por tanto, incapaces de consentir. Pero no es condicion precisa que la carencia de razon sea completa,
basta la abnormalidad o deficiencia mental que solo la disminuye, sin embargo, la jurisprudence es discordante" (II Cuello
Calon, Derecho Penal, 14th Ed., 1975, pp. 538-9).

"Comete violacion el que yace mujer que no tiene normalmente desarrolladas sus facultades mentales (19 nov. 1930);
aqui esta comprendido el yacimiento con debiles o retrasados mentales (11 mayo 1932, 25 feb. 1948, 27 sept. 1951);
constituye este delito el coito con una niña de 15 años enferma de epilepsia genuina que carece de capacidad para
conocer el valor de sus actos (2 marzo 1953); el yacimiento con oligofrenicas (mentally deficient persons) 28 abril, 24
octubre, 1956, 19 feb. 1958); xxx" (ibid., note 3).

The same rule prevails in American jurisprudence. "There can be no question but that a copulation with a woman known
to be mentally incapable of giving even an imperfect consent is rape" (State vs. Jewett, 192 At. 7).
"An accused is guilty of the crime of rape when it is established that he had sexual intercourse with a female who was
mentally incapable of validly consenting to or opposing the carnal act" (65 Am Jur 2nd 766 citing State vs. Prokosch, 152
Minn. 86, 187 NW 971; Cokeley vs. State, 87 Tex. Crim. 256, 220 SW 1099; 31 ALR 3rd 1227, sec. 3).

"In this species of rape neither force upon the part of a man nor resistance upon the part of a woman forms an element of
the crime. If, by reason of any mental weakness, she is incapable of legally consenting, resistance is not expected any
more than it is in the case of one who has been drugged to unconsciousness, or robbed of judgment by intoxicants. Nor
will an apparent consent in such a case avail any more than in the case of a child who may actually consent, but who by
law is conclusively held incapable of legal consent. Whether the woman possessed mental capacity sufficient to give legal
consent must, saving in exceptional cases, remain a question of fact xxx. It need but be said that legal consent
presupposes an intelligence capable of understanding the act, its nature, and possible consequences. This degree of
intelligence may exist with an impaired and weakened intellect, or it may not" (People vs. Boggs, 290 Pac. 618 citing
People vs. Griffin, 49 Pac. 711 and People vs. Peery, 146 Pac. 44). [emphasis supplied]

III

People v. Cartuano was not applicable

To boost his challenge to the finding that AAA was a mental retardate, Butiong cites People v. Cartuano,37 a case where
the Court ruled that a diagnosis of mental retardation required a thorough evaluation of the history of the victim, and held
that a physical and laboratory examination by a clinician was necessary. He insists that the findings of the psychologist
and the physicians who had examined AAA fell short of the requirements set in People v. Cartuano, considering that
psychologist de Guzman did not try to locate the biological parents of AAA for the purpose of ascertaining her personal
history, and did not base her findings on reliable data.

Butiong’s reliance on People v. Cartuano does not advance his cause.

People v. Cartuano applies only to cases where there is a dearth of medical records to sustain a finding of mental
retardation. Indeed, the Court has clarified so in People v. Delos Santos,38 declaring that the records in People v.
Cartuano were wanting in clinical, laboratory, and psychometric support to sustain a finding that the victim had been
suffering from mental retardation. It is noted that in People v. Delos Santos, the Court upheld the finding that the victim
had been mentally retarded by an examining psychiatrist who had been able to identify the tests administered to the victim
and to sufficiently explain the results of the tests to the trial court.39

In direct contrast to People v. Cartuano, this case did not lack clinical findings on the mentality of the victim.1awphi1

Moreover, as clarified in People v. Dalandas,40 People v. Cartuano does not preclude the presentation by the State of
proof other than clinical evidence to establish the mental retardation of the victim. For sure, the courts are not entirely
dependent on the results of clinical examinations in establishing mental retardation. In People v. Almacin,41 for instance,
the Court took into consideration the fact that the victim was illiterate and unschooled in concluding that she was mentally
incapable of assenting to or dissenting from the sexual intercourse.42 Also, in People v. Dumanon,43 the Court concurred in
the trial court’s observation and conclusion that the victim was a mental retardate based on her physical appearance and
on her difficulty to understand and answer the questions during her testimony.44

Here, the State’s witnesses sufficiently explained the psychological tests conducted to establish AAA’s mental retardation
with the mentality of a six- or seven-year-old. The trial judge himself reached a conclusion on AAA’s mentality from his
close personal observation of her as a witness in court, noting that she manifested a difficulty in responding to the
questions, especially those bearing on her being sexually abused.45 The trial judge’s observation to the effect that she had
no notion of the wrong that had been done to her was validated by the clinical findings. As such, the totality of the
evidence presented by the State established beyond reasonable doubt AAA’s deficient mental condition.

IV

Presumption of innocence was overcome

by sufficient evidence of guilt

Notable is that Butiong did not testify. He offered neither alibi nor denial despite the strong charge of rape brought against
him. His defense was purposely limited to his submission, through Dr. Dayan, that AAA had not been established to be a
mental retardate. Thereby, he did not refute that he had carnal knowledge of AAA. Having earlier demonstrated the futility
of Dr. Dayan’s discounting of the State’s evidence of AAA’s mental retardation, we can justifiably consider the
presumption of innocence in favor of Butiong as overcome.

Still, even if he had asserted alibi and denial, his guilt for the rape of AAA would not be reversed in the face of AAA’s
unwavering testimony and of her very positive and firm identification of him as the man who had undressed her and
sexually gratified himself off her.46 He could no longer hide behind the protective shield of his presumed innocence, but
should have come forward with credible and strong evidence of his lack of authorship of the crime. Considering that the
burden of the evidence had shifted to him but he did not discharge his burden at all, there is no other outcome except to
affirm his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 18, 2005 in CA-GR CR HC No. 00862.

The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187495               April 21, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a home, to
provide her with the comforts and the necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly and not cruelly or inhumanely.
He is bound to honor her x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her, but also to protect her from oppression
and wrong."1

REYES, J.:

Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if
not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The Case

This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00353, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and 99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count.

The Facts

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and raised their
four (4) children6 as they put up several businesses over the years.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-appellant, raped her
at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, and that on
December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex with him.

On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution,8 finding probable
cause for grave threats, less serious physical injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate criminal
information be filed against the accused-appellant.

On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 99-
6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the accused-appellant as
follows:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the
latter[']s will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669 reads:

That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, her [sic] wife, against the
latter's will.

Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the accused-
appellant filed a Motion for Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On
even date, the accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty to both charges.14

On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Amended Information15 averring that the name of the private
complainant was omitted in the original informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK, thru a Supplemental
Affidavit dated November 15, 1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of the crime are October 16, 1998 and
October 1 7, 1998 thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on
January 18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were amended as follows:

Criminal Case No. 99-668:

That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.18

Criminal Case No. 99-669:

That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge with the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the latter's will.

Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.19

The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a joint trial
of the two cases forthwith ensued.

Version of the prosecution

The prosecution's theory was anchored on the testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000, which, together with
pertinent physical evidence, depicted the following events:

KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her parents where his father was one of the laborers. They got married after
a year of courtship.20 When their first child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant put up a sari-sari
store.21 Later on, they engaged in several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and hardware. KKK managed the
businesses except for the rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted
employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the trucks to haul
goods.22

Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even the
daughters observed the disproportionate labors of their parents.23 He would drive the trucks sometimes but KKK was the
one who actively managed the businesses.24

She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with that objective.25

In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro
City.26 Three of the children transferred residence therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of their sons stayed
in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled between the two places regularly and sometimes he accompanied her.27 In 1998,
KKK stayed in Gusa, Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week.28 On Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan,
Bukidnon to procure supplies for the family store and then returned to Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29

Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both
frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm.30 However, in
1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but
he would threaten her into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to attend to him.
She was preoccupied with financial problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He wanted KKK to stay at home
because "a woman must stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She disobeyed his wishes and focused on
her goal of providing a good future for the children.32

Four days before the subject rape incidents or on October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept together in
Cebu City where the graduation rites of their eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the three of them were
already back in Cagayan de Oro City.33

On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife KKK and their children went about their nightly routine. The family
store in their residence was closed at about 9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and the children went to
the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-appellant watched television in the
living room.34 OOO and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to
come with him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the house. KKK complied.35

Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with the
accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask
angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our bed."36

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the cot and threw it
against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and
transferred to the bed.37

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by tapping his
fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not feeling well.38

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, he
pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs.40

The accused-appellant then raised KKK's daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs on them. She tried to
wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was carrying out his carnal desires,
KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."42

With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden partition on the other enclosing the spouses' bedroom,43 KKK's
pleas were audible in the children's bedroom where MMM lay awake.

Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on me,"44 MMM woke up
000 who prodded her to go to their parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs, vigorously knocked on the door of
her parents' bedroom and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?"46 The accused-appellant then quickly put on his
briefs and shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere because this is a family trouble," before closing it
again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry, MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the bedroom door
again, and then kicked it.48 A furious accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked MMM once more: "Don't
interfere us. Go downstairs because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK crouching and crying on top of the bed,
MMM boldly entered the room, approached her mother and asked: "Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father:
"Pa, what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is torn[?]"49

When MMM received no definite answers to her questions, she helped her mother get up in order to bring her to the girls'
bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom underwear and covered herself with a blanket.50 However, their breakout from the
room was not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm
towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here, you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK pleaded: "Eddie,
allow me to go out." He then held KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to get away, MMM leaned against
door and embraced her mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51

In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water and queried her as to what happened.52 KKK relayed: "[Y]our
father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls then locked the door
and let her rest."53

The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the following night. After closing the family store on October 17, 1998, KKK
and the children took their supper. The accused-appellant did not join them since, according to him, he already ate dinner
elsewhere. After resting for a short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls' bedroom and prayed the rosary.
KKK decided to spend the night in the room's small bed and the girls were already fixing the beddings when the accused-
appellant entered.

"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep with the
children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be paid [P]
1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After that, he left the room.55

He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted her from the bed
and attempted to carry her out of the room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets go to our bedroom." When
she defied him, he grabbed her short pants causing them to tear apart.57 At this point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that
to Mama because we are in front of you."58

The presence of his children apparently did not pacify the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you, I can have
sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to leave the room.
Frightened, the girls obliged and went to the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas of their helpless mother
resonate with the creaking bed.59

The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing. The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants and
panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I
cannot do what you wanted me to do [sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60

After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced himself inside
her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out of the room laughing
as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex." He then retreated
to the masters' bedroom.61

Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the door locked.
MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and disengaged its lock. Upon
entering the room, MMM and OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma,
what happened to you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is a beast and animal, he again forced me to
have sex with him even if I don't feel well. "62

Version of the defense

The defense spun a different tale. The accused-appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's father. He came
to know KKK because she brought food for her father's laborers. When they got married on October 18, 1975, he was a
high school graduate while she was an elementary graduate.

Their humble educational background did not deter them from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard work
and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal properties and established their own businesses that included a rice
mill managed by the accused-appellant. He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or com.63

The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those dates he was in
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in Angeles Ranch, Maluko,
Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend MMM's graduation in Cebu on
October 12 with KKK. When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan
de Oro City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the truck and buy some com.64

Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January 1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above claims. According to
him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading area in Dangcagan,
Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck. On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon,
loading sacks of com into the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The accused-appellant then instructed Equia to
proceed to Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow the stalled
truck left there by the accused-appellant in October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City together with the
separate truck loaded with com.

They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to the towing bar of
the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them then proceeded to
Cagayan de Oro City where they arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-appellant went to Gusa while the
other three men brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65

The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he took over the
control and management of their businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up truck in January 1999. The
accused-appellant was provoked to do so when she failed to account for their bank deposits and business earnings. The
entries in their bank account showed the balance of ₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a month or on
November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled to a measly ₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately report to the police also
belies her rape allegations.67

KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd behavior.
While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had sexual intercourse.
He was surprised when his wife asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex. He tagged her request as "high-
tech," because they did not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had also become increasingly indifferent to
him. When he arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself
and would no longer ask for his permission whenever she went out.68

Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters purportedly
addressed to Bebs but were actually intended for KKK.70

KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-Jong, Joy or
Joey, somebody from the military or the Philippine National Police, another one is a government employee, a certain
Fernandez and three other priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours of his wife but he never confronted
her or them about it because he trusted her.72

What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO was
listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to tum down the
volume of the cassette player. She got annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit the accused-appellant's
head with the socket. His head bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and KKK thereafter followed because
the latter took OOO's side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK was better off without the accused-appellant
because she had somebody young, handsome, and a businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled bad, and
was old, and ugly.73

KKK also wanted their property divided between them with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to the
accused-appellant. However, the separation did not push through because the accused-appellant's parents
intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case No.
00588-99 before the Office of Lupong Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and thereafter obtaining a Certificate
to File Action dated February 18, 1999.75

Ruling of the RTC

In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained the version proffered by the prosecution by giving greater weight
and credence to the spontaneous and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses. The trial court also
upheld as sincere and genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not natural in our culture for daughters to testify
against their own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not truly committed.

The trial court rejected the version of the defense and found unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations of extra-
marital affairs and money squandering against KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi for being
premised on inconsistent testimonies and the contradicting declarations of the other defense witness, Equia, as to the
accused-appellant's actual whereabouts on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two (2)
separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to pay
complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral damages, indemnify complainant the sum of (P]75,000.00 in each case,
[P]50,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.77

Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the amendment of the original informations. Further, the accused-appellant was
not prejudiced by the amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect to the amended informations.

The CA found that the prosecution, through the straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the corroborative
declarations of MMM and OOO, was able to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements of rape under R.A. No.
8353. The accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and intimidation.

The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to medical examination did not negate the commission of the crime
because a medical certificate is not necessary to prove rape.

The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual obligations of
and right to sexual intercourse, there must be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the alleged force and
intimidation used upon KKK such as bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of external injures is not
indispensable to prosecute and convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the victim was forced to have sexual
intercourse with the accused.

In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the truthfulness of
KKK's accusations because no wife in her right mind would accuse her husband of having raped her if it were not true.

The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she only found out
that a wife may charge his husband with rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint for grave threats and
physical injuries told her about it.

Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi for lack of convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for
him to be at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes, considering that
Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away. Accordingly, the decretal
portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.79

Hence, the present review. In the Court Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the parties that, if they so
desire, they may file their respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the
appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16,
2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan de Oro
City when the alleged rape incidents took place, and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is negated by: (a) KKK's
voluntary act of going with him to the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's failure to put up resistance or
seek help from police authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82

Our Ruling

I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection

The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a man conquered
a woman through rape and 'stealing an heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married her.83

The rape laws then were intended not to redress the violation of the woman's chastity but rather to punish the act of
obtaining the heiress' property by forcible marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in his wife's chastity or her
daughter's virginity.85

If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of stealing her father's property and if a man raped his wife, he was
merely using his property.86

Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects or goods and such treatment was justified under three ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th century, a woman was the property of her father until she marries to
become the property of her husband.87 If a man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the owner, and later buy
her from the owner; buying and marrying a wife were synonymous.88

From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost her identity upon marriage and the law denied her political power
and status under the feudal doctrine of coverture.89

A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the
family.90

This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman becomes
one with her husband. She had no right to make a contract, sue another, own personal property or write a will.91

II. The marital exemption rule

In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied consent theory
that would later on emerge as the marital exemption rule in rape. He stated that:

[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial
consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.92

The rule was observed in common law countries such as the United States of America (USA) and England. It gives legal
immunity to a man who forcibly sexually assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if committed against a woman not
his wife.93 In those jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible penetration of the body of a woman who is not
the wife of the perpetrator."94

The first case in the USA that applied the marital exemption rule was Commonwealth v. Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always be a defense in rape to show marriage to
the victim. Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.96

The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New York in 1909. A husband was endowed with absolute immunity
from prosecution for the rape of his wife.97 The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right
to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98

In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for being violative of
married women's right to be equally protected under rape laws.99

In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New York by proscribing the application of the rule in cases where the
husband and wife are living apart pursuant to a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires such living apart,"
or a decree, judgment or written agreement of separation.100

In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in New York when the Court of Appeals of New York declared the
same unconstitutional in People v. Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing between marital rape and non-
marital rape. The decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:

We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various rationales
which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either based upon archaic notions about the consent and
property rights incident to marriage or are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny. We therefore declare the
marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.

Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a married woman to sexual intercourse has been cited most
frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x Any argument based on a supposed consent, however, is untenable.
Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates
the bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and psychic harm x x x. To ever imply
consent to such an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape statutes, marriage has never been
viewed as giving a husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should
not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to
control her own body as does an unmarried woman x x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to engage in
sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or forceful self-help x x
x."

The other traditional justifications for the marital exemption were the common-law doctrines that a woman was the
property of her husband and that the legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband x x x." Both these doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-
law world - [or] in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity
and the dignity associated with recognition as a whole human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)

By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with 17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing the act
without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other states granted some exemptions to a husband from prosecution such as
when the wife is mentally or physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally unable to consent.103

III. Marital Rape in the Philippines

Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however, that the old
provisions of rape under Article 335 of the RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent theory, albeit in a limited
form. According to Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of rape under Article 335 of Act No.
3815 but, in case there is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of rape if he forces his wife to submit to
sexual intercourse.105

In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (UN-CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill of rights, the CEDAW is the
first major instrument that contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against women. The Philippines assumed the role
of promoting gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital element in addressing global concerns.107 The country
also committed, among others, to condemn discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed to pursue, by all
appropriate means and without delay, a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertook:

(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate
legislation if not yet incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate means, the practical
realization of this principle;

(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all
discrimination against women;

xxxx

(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs
and practices which constitute discrimination against women;

(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute discrimination against women.108

In compliance with the foregoing international commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of gender equality in
the 1987 Constitution specifically in Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:

Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights.

xxxx

Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the
law of women and men. The Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the generally accepted principles of
international law such as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:

Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. (Emphasis ours)

The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the
stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed
it from the ambit of crimes against chastity. More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive
proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration,
viz:

Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the criminal
action or the penalty imposed.

In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio.

Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that
R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his victim, thus:

Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible from the records of the deliberations of the 10th Congress on the
law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265 and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging the crime as 'marital rape'
due to conservative Filipino impressions on marriage, the consensus of our lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize
marital rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one more point

of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill, House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape. But under
Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the legal husband who is the offender... " Does this presuppose that there is now
marital rape? x x x.

MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the legal
profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this jurisdiction there is no law
that prohibits a husband from being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we don't have any jurisprudence that
prohibits a wife from suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in this bill expanding the definition of crime that
is now being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't
provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband for marital
rape and she cannot be prevented from doing so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits her from doing
so. This is why we had to put second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of many of us. x x x, that if it is true that
in this jurisdiction there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then we must provide for something that will unify
and keep the cohesion of the family together that is why we have the second paragraph.

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our provision
on a husband forcing the wife is not marital rape, it is marital sexual assault.

MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor, direct to the
point, under Article 266-C, is it our understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In case it is the legal husband who
is the offender, this refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The answer is no.

MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual assault, what do you call- it?

MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.

MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault, Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because under 1 and 2 it
is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House version which
provided for sexual assault was not carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes under this bicameral
conference committee report are all now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from reclusion perpetua to death or
whether the penalty is only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor, is that correct?

xxxx

MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who forces
the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual assault because of the
sanctity of marriage. x x x.110 (Emphasis ours)

HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.

HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no specific mention.

HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital rape.

xxxx

HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon, then this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the second
paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in the House version x x x. But it was not another definition of rape. You will
notice, it only says, that because you are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot commit rape. Theoretically, I
mean, you can beat up your wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was raped, I guess that, I mean, you just
cannot raise the defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up?
That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang ang marital
rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you cannot beat me up. x x
x. That's why to me it's not alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the] husband, you cannot say when I am charged
with rape x x x.

PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do you propose it if we put it in[?]

HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are the lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal
knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I don't know how
that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not meant to have another
classification of rape. It is all the same definition x x x.

xxxx

HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain 266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in the first
proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.

HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.

HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of evidence is
now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect of pardon.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.

HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect of
pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should understand
that a husband cannot beat at his wife to have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
 xxxx

HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal husband,
Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I almost want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat me up.

So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I hope, to the
women and they would understand that it is half achieved.

HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand that we are not defining or creating a new crime but instead, we
are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.

HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is not,
does not negate.111

CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance of the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is where to
place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if it is done with
force or intimidation or any of the circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial. The fact that the husband and
wife are separated does not come into the picture. So even if they are living under one roof x x x for as long as the
attendant circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that is rape.112

PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr. Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does not actually
change the meaning of rape. It merely erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape can indeed be committed
by the husband against the wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to one another is not a legal impediment.
So I don't really think there is any need to change the concept of rape as defined presently under the revised penal code.
This do[es] not actually add anything to the definition of rape. It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the
wife has evidence to show that she was really brow beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having sexual
intercourse against her will, then the crime of rape has been committed against her by the husband, notwithstanding the
fact that they have been legally married. It does not change anything at all, Mr. Chairman.

PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is no change on this x x x.113

The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,114 which regards rape
within marriage as a form of sexual violence that may be committed by a man against his wife within or outside the family
abode, viz:

Violence against women and their children refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited
to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do
indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or
sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

Statistical figures confirm the above characterization. Emotional and other forms of non-personal violence are the most
common type of spousal violence accounting for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in seven ever-married
women experienced physical violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%) experienced sexual violence.115

IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments

The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his appeal brief
before the CA, he posits that the two incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape,
were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and cohabiting
couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is
proved.

The accused-appellant further claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary rape cases and
that the standards for determining the presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual
community is a mutual right and obligation between husband and wife.116

The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.

The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already been
superseded by modem global principles on the equality of rights between men and women and respect for human dignity
established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW,
recognized that a change in the traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed
to achieve full equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed to take all appropriate measures to modify the
social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs
and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on
stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of such measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the archaic
notion that marital rape cannot exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her
consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed.

Another important international instrument on gender equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women, which was Promulgated118 by the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W. The Declaration, in
enumerating the forms of gender-based violence that constitute acts of discrimination against women, identified 'marital
rape' as a species of sexual violence, viz:

Article 1

For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence against women" means any act of gender-based violence that
results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such
acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in private life.

Article 2

Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not be limited to, the following:

(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female
children in the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and other traditional practices
harmful to women, non-spousal violence and violence related to exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)

Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her
wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the
CEDA W and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse with his
wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling a marital consortium with a fellow human being with dignity equal120 to
that he accords himself. He cannot be permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to engage in a sexual act without
her full and free consent. Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international commitments and accommodate
conservative yet irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and sexual
intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both spontaneous and mutual123 and not the kind which is unilaterally exacted by
force or coercion.

Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty and coercion.
Sexual intimacy brings spouses wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a
deep sense of spiritual communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation and ensures the continuation of
family relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go a long
way in deepening marital relationship.124 When it is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to advance a
felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty purpose, vindicate
justice and protect our laws and State policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his indifferent or uninterested
wife's absolute refusal to engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's intervention to declare her
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill an essential marital obligation.125 But he cannot and should not demand sexual
intimacy from her coercively or violently.

Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the
crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. The Constitutional right to equal protection
of the laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others; no person or class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws, which is enjoyed,
by other persons or other classes in like circumstances.127

As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally known; (b)
sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The single definition for all
three forms of the crime shows that the law does not distinguish between rape committed in wedlock and those committed
without a marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women raped by their husband and those raped by any other
man alike.

The posture advanced by the accused-appellant arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims over unmarried rape
victims because it withholds from married women raped by their husbands the penal redress equally granted by law to all
rape victims.

Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to those raised by
herein accused-appellant. A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife
with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried woman.128 She can
give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from
her in case she refuses.

Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters
related to their sexuality, including sexual and reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and violence.129 Women
do not divest themselves of such right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that human rights are inalienable.130

In fine, since the law does not separately categorize marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for different definition
or elements for either, the Court, tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates, cannot trudge the forbidden sphere
of judicial legislation and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth. Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter
evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and irrationally classify
them differently from the victims of non-marital rape.

Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape any
differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal husband. The elements and quantum of proof that support a moral
certainty of guilt in rape cases should apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship between the accused and his
accuser.

Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case in accordance with the established legal principles and
evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of rape cases and found that no reversible error can be imputed to
the conviction meted the accused-appellant.

The evidence for the prosecution was

based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict mandate that all
courts must examine thoroughly the testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a rape case may be convicted
solely on the testimony of the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-bound to establish that their reliance on
the victim's testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise consistent
with human nature. If the testimony of the complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis thereof.131

It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the
highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their deportment, conduct
and attitude, especially during cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its evaluation was tainted with
arbitrariness or certain facts of substance and value have been plainly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied, the
same will not be disturbed on appeal.132

After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial
proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses' testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its findings.

Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the witness stand
on six separate occasions, KKK never wavered neither did her statements vacillate between uncertainty and certitude.
She remained consistent, categorical, straightforward, and candid during the rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal
examination, she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the allegations of the defense.

She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced her to have sex with him despite her refusal on October 16, 1998.
He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where she was resting. In
order not to aggravate his temper, KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have sex. When she rejected his
advances due to abdominal pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed into a stubborn demand. Unyielding,
KKK held her panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear
apart. She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging
subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and inserted his
penis into her vagina. She continued pleading but he never desisted.133

Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the appalling
episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom. While her daughters
were fixing the beddings, the accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her for refusing to go with him to their
conjugal bedroom. When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the accused-appellant got angry and pulled her
up. MMM's attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged him. He reminded them that as the head of the family
he could do whatever he wants with his wife. To demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the children to go out of the
room and thereafter proceeded to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled down her short pants and panties
as KKK begged "Dont do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to
do. I cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears. The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs,
spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying himself, he
got dressed, left the room as he chuckled: "Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or fond of sex."135

Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape cases, the essential element that must be proved is the absence of
the victim's consent to the sexual congress.136

Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation, fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority; or (b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary consent because
he/she is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.

Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations, KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force and intimidation
both of which were established beyond moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent testimony of KKK, viz:

On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO:

Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together with your husband, do you remember what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with him.

Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with you?

A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex with him but I warded off his hand.

Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his hand?

A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used his finger by touching or knocking her lap which means that he
wanted to have sex."

Q So, what did you do after that?

A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)

Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him to have sex with you?

A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is why my pantie [sic] was tom.

Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your pantie [sic]?

A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed, because he is so strong.

xx xx

Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband, what else did he do?

A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my legs.

Q So after that what else did he do?

A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed because he is
stronger than me.

COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing while she is giving her testimony.

ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)

Q So, what did you do when your husband already stretched your two legs and rode on you and held your two hands?

A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well and my whole body is aching."

Q How did you say that to your husband?

A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling well."

Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?

xxxx

A I shouted when I uttered that words.

xxxx

Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire?

 xxxx

A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything.137

(Cross-Examination)

ATTY. AMARGA;

Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was your husband normally remove your panty?

A Yes, Sir.

Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove your panty because according to you he normally do that if he have
sex with you?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And finally according to you your husband have sex with you?

A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of holding my panty because I don't want to have sex with him at that
time.

Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he removed your panty?

A Yes, Sir.

Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during that time?

A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.

xxxx

Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed your panty he also remove your nightgown?

A No, Sir.

Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your face?

A He raised my duster [sic] up.

Q In other words your face was covered when he raised your duster [sic]?

A No, only on the breast level.138

On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:

(Direct Examination)

ATTY. LARGO

Q So, after your children went out of the room, what transpired?

A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled my short pant and pantie forcible.

Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your short and pantie?
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do.
I cannot withstand sex."

Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly pulled it down?

A It was tom.

Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by your husband, what did he do?

A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two legs and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex with
me.139

The accused-appellant forced his wife when he knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands, flexing her legs and
then resting his own legs thereon in order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired non-consensual sexual
intercourse.

Records also show that the accused-appellant employed sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to the
actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his wife. He
furiously demanded for her to lay with him on the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual craving.

The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted to sleep in
the children's bedroom and the fact that he exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed KKK into submission.

The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998 cannot be
stretched to mean that she consented to the forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-appellant was KKK's
husband and hence it was customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No consent can be deduced from such act
of KKK because at that juncture there were no indications that sexual intercourse was about to take place. The issue of
consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the same is legally required did not exist yet or at least unclear to the
person from whom the consent was desired. The significant point when consent must be given is at that time when it is
clear to the victim that her aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that point is when the accused-appellant
tapped his fingers on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she
refused.

Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.

We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that she was
resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not an element of rape and the law does not impose upon the victim the
burden to prove resistance140 much more requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.

At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to recognize that she
seriously did not assent to a sexual congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from undressing her, she refused
to bend her legs and she repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.

Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring about the
desired result. What is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the purpose that the
accused had in mind141 or is of such a degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to bow into submission.142

Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a medical
certificate do not negate rape. It is not the presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear that determines the
fact of rape143 inasmuch as a medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not necessary to prove rape.144 These
details do not pertain to the elements that produce the gravamen of the offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman
against her will or without her consent.145

The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of which are,
however, disparate from those in the present case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was inherently weak,
inconsistent, and was controverted by the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who stated that force was not applied
based on the position of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude that the absence of any sign of physical
violence on the victim's body is an indication of consent.147 Here, however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier,
credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.

The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's testimonies lacked probative value as they did not witness the
actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative isolation, thus, it is usually
only the victim who can testify with regard to the fact of the forced sexual intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of
MMM and OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations were
in harmony with KKK's narration of the circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent with, the rape incidents.

MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and crying:
"Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK and the accused-
appellant went to their conjugal bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her mother, the accused-appellant
admonished her for meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the
accused-appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the room
downstairs.

MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying, with her hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the floor.
After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant, MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to the children's
bedroom where KKK narrated to her daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to have sex with him
when I'm not feeling well. "

KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the following night after the accused-appellant barged inside the
children's bedroom. The couple had an argument and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant ordered her
and OOO to get out after bragging that he can have sex with his wife even in front of the children because he is the head
of the family. The girls then stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard their mother helplessly crying and
shouting for the accused-appellant to stop.

Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO coherently depicted that the accused-appellant, through the use of force
and intimidation, had non-consensual and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the nights of October 16 and 17,
1998.

KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical resistance were clear
manifestations of coercion. Her appearance when MMM saw her on the bed after the accused appellant opened the door
on October 16, 1998, her conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out of the room, and her categorical outcry
to her children after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were
against her will.

Failure to immediately report to the

police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.

The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be discredited merely because they failed to report the rape incidents
to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims in reporting sexual
assaults does not necessarily impair their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.150

At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual intercourse is
considered rape. In fact, KKK only found out that she could sue his husband for rape when Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique,
Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique) told her about it when she filed the separate charges for grave threats and physical injuries
against the accused-appellant.151

It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital exemption in
rape cases hence it is understandable that it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal professionals like
Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear of reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common factor that deter rape victims
from reporting the crime to the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape cases. This is in view of the popular yet
outdated belief that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own
wife is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny that could have
befallen KKK and her family had the intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors been sought, are acceptable
explanations for the failure or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.

The victim -S testimony on the

witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.

The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the credible, candid and
positive testimony of KKK on the witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight than the affidavit since it
underwent the rudiments of a direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations. Affidavits or statements taken ex parte
are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature, they are inferior to testimony given in court.152

Ill motive imputed to the victim

The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with loopholes
generated by incongruent and flimsy evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the ₱3 Million deposit in the
spouses' bank account was the proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI
ML instruction sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of ₱3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-appellant
claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan, he admitted that
approximately ₱3 Million was spent for the construction of their house. These pieces of evidence effectively belie the
accused appellant's allegation that KKK could not account for the money deposited in the bank.153

Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife KKK when
the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23. The accused-appellant
also did not present Bebs herself, being a more competent witness to the existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He
likewise failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate
KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the Court finds it
unbelievable that an able man would not have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled around with 10 men - some
of whom he has even met. The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the witness stand are inconsistent with the
theory of extra-marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he merely made up those malicious stories as a
desperate ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.

At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold no
evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In sum, the defense
failed to present sufficiently convincing evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is harassing the accused-
appellant with fabricated rape charges.

Alibi

It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied consent theory as defense, the accused-appellant has
essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This admission is
inconsistent with the defense of alibi and any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.

At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.

Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to
fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused by eyewitnesses
who had no improper motive to testify falsely.154

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the
commission of the crime, but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate
vicinity. Physical impossibility refers not only to the geographical distance between the place where the accused was and
the place where the crime was committed when the crime transpired, but more importantly, the facility of access between
the two places.155

Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or was
hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The accused-
appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be at his residence in
Cagayan de Oro City at the time of the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can be traversed by about four or
five hours from Cagayan de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was available to the accused appellant at
any time.156 Thus, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs criminis at the dates and times when the two
rape incidents were committed.

Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and the positive identification and credible testimony of the victim, and
her two daughters, the Court must give weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive on their part to falsely
testify against the accused-appellant.

Conclusion

All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear,
straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to
consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the
physical evidence of KKK's tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is
morally certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.

Penalties

The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant for being in
accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3
of R.A. No. 9346, which states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences
will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise
known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157

The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the amount of ₱50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to rape victims
without need of proof other than the fact of rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral injuries from the
experience she underwent.158

The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory upon the finding that rape took place.1âwphi1 Considering that the
crime committed is simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances attendant in its commission, the appropriate
amount is ₱50,000.00159 and not ₱75,000.00 as awarded by the RTC.

To serve as an example for public good and in order to deter a similar form of domestic violence, an award of ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages is imperative.160

The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from the date of
finality of this judgment until fully paid.161

A Final Note

Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and dignity as a human
being. It respects no time, place, age, physical condition or social status. It can happen anywhere and it can happen to
anyone. Even, as shown in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored fortress, the family home, committed
against her by her husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The herein pronouncement is an affirmation to
wives that our rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their sexually coercive husbands.

Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not own his
wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying, she does not divest herself of the human right to an exclusive autonomy
over her own body and thus, she can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital coitus. A husband aggrieved
by his wife's unremitting refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to felonious force or coercion to make her
yield. He can seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine whether her refusal constitutes psychological
incapacity justifying an annulment of the marriage.

Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves the
marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual sexual
cooperation and never sexual coercion or imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may use this as
a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal justice system are in
place to spot and scrutinize fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any person who institutes untrue and malicious
charges will be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of the RPC and/or other laws.

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count,
without eligibility for parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages
shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182835               April 20, 2010

RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.

This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent to the girl
the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with her face on it.

The Indictment

The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler,
Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act (R.A.) 9262 in an
information that reads:

That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and reckless
conduct, sent through the Short Messaging Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic picture to one Irish
Sagud, who was his former girlfriend, whereby the face of the latter was attached to a completely naked body of another
woman making it to appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in the said obscene and pornographic picture
thereby causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1

The Facts and the Case

The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were classmates at
Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off" sweethearts towards the end
of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten
pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he
did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to
the other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and
sent her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and
0921-8084768. Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to leave her alone.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s cellphone number,
stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish surmised that he copied the
picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit B).3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him to
create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet. One of
the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac
rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked
Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in a motorcycle. After
parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested him. They searched him and
seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan was being questioned at the police
station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State College of Technology, testified as an expert in information technology
and computer graphics. He said that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a woman from a picture and
superimpose it on the body of another woman in another picture. Pictures can be manipulated and enhanced by computer
to make it appear that the face and the body belonged to just one person.

Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A) had two distinct irregularities: the face was not proportionate to
the body and the face had a lighter color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied from the
picture of Irish in Exhibit B. Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done, transferring a picture from a computer to
a cellphone like the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.

For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their relation
lasted until December of that year. He claimed that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation. They met in
December 2004 but, after he told her that his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already pregnant, Irish walked out
on him.

Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish, asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she needed his help
in selling her cellphone. When he arrived at the place, two police officers approached him, seized his cellphone and the
contents of his pockets, and brought him to the police station.

Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster who was
sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person.
Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone.
This explained, he said, why the obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan
claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman
whom he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she
received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and angry. She
did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear
naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Irish denied that she was
the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed.

After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC
observed that she wept while recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were tangible
expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of
the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne out of human nature and
experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262.

On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the latter rendered a decision dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the
RTC decision. The CA denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed
the present for review on certiorari.

The Issues Presented

The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the picture with her
face pasted on the body of a nude woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and humiliation on her in violation of
Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

The subordinate issues are:

1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed between Rustan and Irish as this term is defined in R.A. 9262;

2. Whether or not a single act of harassment, like the sending of the nude picture in this case, already constitutes
a violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262;

3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his constitutional
rights; and

4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.

The Court’s Rulings

Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an act or acts of a person against a woman with
whom he has or had a sexual or dating relationship. Thus:
 SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,

(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate,
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty.

xxxx

Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against women and these include any form of
harassment that causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:

SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. – The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to,
the following acts:

xxxx

5. Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the elements of the crime of violence against women through
harassment are:

1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended woman;

2. The offender, by himself or through another, commits an act or series of acts of harassment against the
woman; and

3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to her.

One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating relationship"
with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. Thus:

(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual
acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.
(Underscoring supplied.)

Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the offender and the offended woman have or had
sexual relations. According to him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary
Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance" used as a verb, i.e., "to make
love; to make love to" as in "He romanced her."

But it seems clear that the law did not use in its provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a sexual act. It did
not say that the offender must have "romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the noun "romance" to describe a
couple’s relationship, i.e., "a love affair."9

R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any
person against a woman x x x with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the law itself
distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines "dating relationship"
while Section 3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a single sexual act which may or may not result in the
bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a sexual
intercourse taking place between those involved.

Rustan also claims that since the relationship between Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati), their
romance cannot be regarded as having developed "over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of them were
romantically involved, as Rustan himself admits, from October to December of 2003. That would be time enough for
nurturing a relationship of mutual trust and love.

An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does not mean
that the romantic relation between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of misunderstanding. Explaining
what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry
at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic relation as continuous.10

Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should not be considered a form of harassment. He
claims that such would unduly ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262
punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence against women. This means that a single act of harassment,
which translates into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women and children. Punishing only
violence that is repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.

Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene communications that her getting one could not
possibly have produced alarm in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He claims having
previously exchanged obscene pictures with Irish such that she was already desensitized by them.

But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with their claim
that it was Irish who sent the obscene pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the woman in the picture was Irish
since her face did not clearly show on them.

Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But her
testimony did not make sense. She said that she did not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after she deleted
the pictures. Later, however, she said that she did not have time to delete them.11 And, if she thought that she had deleted
all the pictures from the memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and hide such memory card. There would
have been nothing to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained in the card, there was no reason for her to
keep it for several years, given that as she said she was too jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus, the
RTC was correct in not giving credence to her testimony.1avvphi1

Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the alleged
moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of course only be
determined based on the circumstances of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her legs spread open and
bearing Irish’s head and face, was clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and offensive one. Surely, any
woman like Irish, who is not in the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained if she sees herself in such a
picture. What makes it further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the picture with a threat to post it in the
internet for all to see. That must have given her a nightmare.

Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were seized from him without any warrant, the
evidence presented against him should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not present in
evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The
prosecution did not need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a photograph depicting the
Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.

Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the obscene picture
and malicious text messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with whom she had been
previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan, Irish and the police used
such numbers to summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to
present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to prove that Rustan sent those messages.

Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious text messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself received
those messages from an unidentified person who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the same to her, using his
cellphone. But Rustan never presented the cellphone number of the unidentified person who sent the messages to him to
authenticate the same. The RTC did not give credence to such version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most
unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had merely tried to help her identify the sender.

Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document.
Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this
Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time it
was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.14

Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to
civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15

In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged beyond
reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567
dated January 31, 2008 and its resolution dated April 25, 2008.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 135981               September 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MARIVIC GENOSA, appellant.

It is a hornbook rule that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire records to review. The Court may pass upon all
relevant issues, including those factual in nature and those that may not have been brought before the trial court. This is
true especially in cases involving the imposition of the death penalty, in which the accused must be allowed to avail
themselves of all possible avenues for their defense. Even novel theories such as the "battered woman syndrome," which
is alleged to be equivalent to self-defense, should be heard, given due consideration and ruled upon on the merits, not
rejected merely on technical or procedural grounds. Criminal conviction must rest on proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.

The Case

For resolution by the Court is an Urgent Omnibus Motion filed by Appellant Marivic Genosa y Isidro in connection with the
automatic review of the September 25, 1998 "Judgment"1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City2 in Criminal
Case No. 5016-0. The RTC found her guilty of parricide aggravated by treachery and sentenced her to death.

In an Information3 dated November 14, 1996, Provincial Prosecutor I Rosario D. Beleta charged appellant-movant with
parricide allegedly committed as follows:

"That on or about the 15th day of November 1995, at Barangay Bilwang, Municipality of Isabel, Province of Leyte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound one BEN
GENOSA, her legitimate husband, with the use of a hard deadly weapon, which the accused had provided herself for the
purpose, [causing] the following wounds, to wit:

'Cadaveric spasm.

'Body on the 2nd stage of decomposition.

'Face, black, blown[ ]up & swollen w/ evident post- mortem lividity. Eyes protruding from its sockets and tongue slightly
protrudes out of the mouth.

'Fracture, open, depressed, circular located at the occipital bone of the head, resulting [in] laceration of the brain,
spontaneous rupture of the blood vessels on the posterior surface of the brain, laceration of the dura and meningeal
vessels producing severe intracranial hemorrhage.

'Blisters at both extrem[i]ties, anterior chest, posterior chest, trunk w/ shedding of the epidermis.

'Abdomen distended w/ gas. Trunk bloated.'

which caused his death."

After arraignment and trial, the court a quo  promulgated its Judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code as
restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a generic aggravating circumstance and none of
mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH.

The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00),
Philippine currency as indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as moral
damages."

The Antecedents
Prior to the filing of her Appeal Brief, appellant submitted an Urgent Omnibus Motion,4 to bring "to the attention of the x x x
Court certain facts and circumstances which, if found valid, could warrant the setting aside of [her] conviction and the
imposition of the death penalty."

Appellant alleges that the trial court grievously erred in concluding that she had lied about the means she employed in
killing her husband. On the contrary, she had consistently claimed that she had shot her husband. Yet the trial judge
simply ruled that the cause of his death was "cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to
a depressed fracture of the occipital bone," which resulted from her admitted act of "smashing" him with a pipe. Such
conclusion was allegedly unsupported by the evidence on record, which bore no forensic autopsy report on the body of
the victim.

Appellant further alleges that despite the evidence on record of repeated and severe beatings she had suffered at the
hands of her husband, the trial court failed to appreciate her self-defense theory. She claims that under the surrounding
circumstances, her act of killing her husband was equivalent to self-defense. Furthermore, she argues that if she "did not
lie about how she killed her husband, then she did not lie about the abuse she suffered at his hands."

She thus prays for the following reliefs:5

"1. The Honorable Court allow an exhumation of the body of the victim, Ben M. Genosa, and a re-examination of
the cause of death.

2. The Honorable Court submit accused-appellant for examination by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists of
the Court to determine her state of mind at the time of the killing of her spouse, Ben M. Genosa.

3. Thereafter, the Honorable Court allow the reports of the psychologists and psychiatrists to form part of the
records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, to allow a partial re-opening of the
case before a lower court in Metro Manila to admit the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists."

On August 22, 2000, the solicitor general, on behalf of the State, filed his Comment,6 which substantially objected to the
Motion on the ground that appellant had not been "deprived of her right to due process, substantial or procedural."

The Issues

In brief, the issues for our resolution are (1) whether the body of the victim should be exhumed and reexamined in order to
ascertain the cause of his death, and (2) whether the appellant should be examined by qualified psychologists or
psychiatrists in order to determine her state of mind at the time of the killing.

The Court's Ruling

The Court grants in part the Motion of appellant. We remand the case to the RTC for the reception of evidence from
qualified psychologists or psychiatrists whom the parties may present to establish her state of mind at the time of the
killing.

First Issue:  No Need for a Reexamination of Cause of Death

Accused-appellant seeks the exhumation of the victim's body to be able to determine his exact cause of death, assailing
the court a quo's conclusion that he was "smashed or beaten at the back of his head" rather than shot, as claimed by
appellant.

Considering that the appellant has admitted the fact of killing her husband and the acts of hitting his nape with a metal
pipe and of shooting him at the back of his head, the Court believes that exhumation is unnecessary, if not immaterial, to
determine which of said acts actually caused the victim's death. There is no need to exhume the body at this time and
conduct an autopsy thereon for the purpose.

Moreover, the matter of proving the cause of death should have been made before the trial court. Time and again, we
have said that this Court is not a trier of facts. Neither will it authorize the firsthand reception of evidence, where the
opportunity to offer the same was available to the party during the trial stage. Consistent with this principle alone, the
prayer sought by appellant for the exhumation of the victim's body cannot be granted.
Second Issue: The Need to Determine Appellant's State of Mind at the Time of the Killing

In seeking to be "examined and evaluated by psychologists and psychiatrists to bring into evidence the abuse inflicted
upon her; [and] to determine whether such abuse will support the 'battered woman syndrome'," the appellant brings to the
fore a novel defense theory. Through Counsel Katrina Legarda, she asks the Court to "re-evaluate the traditional
elements" used in determining self-defense and to consider the "battered woman syndrome" as a viable plea within the
concept of self-defense.

Allegedly, there are four characteristics of the syndrome: (1) the woman believes that the violence was her fault; (2) she
has an inability to place the responsibility for the violence elsewhere; (3) she fears for her life and/or her children's lives;
and (4) she has an irrational belief that the abuser is omnipresent and omniscient.7 Living in constant danger of harm or
death, she knows that future beatings are almost certain to occur and will escalate over time. Her intimate knowledge of
the violent nature of her batterer makes her alert to when a particular attack is forthcoming, and when it will seriously
threaten her survival. Trapped in a cycle of violence and constant fear, it is not unlikely that she would succumb to her
helplessness and fail to perceive possible solutions to the problem other than to injure or kill her batterer. She is seized by
fear of an existing or impending lethal aggression and thus would have no opportunity beforehand to deliberate on her
acts and to choose a less fatal means of eliminating her sufferings.

Appellant further alleges that the syndrome is already a recognized form of self-defense in the United States and in
Europe. In the US particularly, it is classified as a post-traumatic stress disorder, rather than a form of mental illness.8 It
has been held admissible in order to assess a defendant's perception of the danger posed by the abuser.9

In view of the foregoing, Appellant Genosa pleads that she be allowed to present evidence to prove that her relationship
with her spouse-victim had afflicted her with the syndrome. Allegedly, an expert can explain how her experiences as a
battered woman had affected her perception of danger and her honest belief in its imminence, and why she had resorted
to force against her batterer.

The records of the case already bear some evidence on domestic violence between appellant and her deceased
husband. A defense witness, Dr. Dino Caing, testified that she had consulted him at least six (6) times due to injuries
related to domestic violence and twenty-three (23) times for severe hypertension due to emotional stress.10 Even the
victim's brother and mother attested to the spouses' quarrels every now and then. The court a quo, however, simplistically
ruled that since violence had not immediately preceded the killing, self-defense could not be appreciated.

Indeed, there is legal and jurisprudential lacuna with respect to the so-called "battered woman syndrome" as a possible
modifying circumstance that could affect the criminal liability or penalty of the accused. The discourse of appellant on the
subject in her Omnibus Motion has convinced the Court that the syndrome deserves serious consideration, especially in
the light of its possible effect on her very life. It could be that very thin line between death and life or even acquittal. The
Court cannot, for mere technical or procedural objections, deny appellant the opportunity to offer this defense, for any
criminal conviction must be based on proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Accused persons facing the possibility of the
death penalty must be given fair opportunities to proffer all defenses possible that could save them from capital
punishment.

In People v. Parazo,11 after final conviction of appellant therein, this Court granted his Urgent Omnibus Motion and allowed
him to undergo mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and evaluation to determine whether he was a deaf-
mute. Based on findings that he really was deaf and mute, yet unaided during the trial by an expert witness who could
professionally understand and interpret his actions and mutterings, the Court granted him re-arraignment and retrial. It
justified its action on the principle that "only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt may [the accused] be consigned
to the lethal injection chamber."

More recently in People v. Estrada,12 we likewise nullified the trial proceedings and remanded the case "to the court a
quo for a conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to stand trial,
and for further proceedings." In that case, the defense counsel had moved to suspend the arraignment of the accused,
who could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because of his mental defect, and to confine him instead in a
psychiatric ward. But the trial court denied the Motion, after simply propounding questions to the accused and determining
for itself that he could understand and answer them "intelligently." After trial, he was convicted of murder aggravated by
cruelty and thus sentenced to death.

In nullifying the trial proceedings, this Court noted:13

"The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental
health. To determine the accused-appellant's competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least
ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latter's history of mental illness."

It was held that in denying appellant an examination by a competent medical expert, the trial court practically denied him a
fair trial prior to conviction, in violation of his constitutional rights.

Moreover, proof of insanity could have exempted appellant from criminal liability. If the accused had not performed the act
voluntarily, then he could not have been criminally liable. The Court, through Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno, emphasized:

"The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him. Under the
classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is
essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or
criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent.
Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired."14

In the instant case, it is equally important to determine whether Appellant Genosa had acted freely, intelligently and
voluntarily when she killed her spouse. The Court, however, cannot properly evaluate her battered-woman-syndrome
defense, absent expert testimony on her mental and emotional state at the time of the killing and the possible
psychological cause and effect of her fatal act. Unlike in Parazo, we cannot simply refer her for proper psychological or
psychiatric examination and thereafter admit the findings and evaluation as part of the records of the cases for purposes
of automatic review. The prosecution has likewise the right to a fair trial, which includes the opportunity to cross-examine
the defense witnesses and to refute the expert opinion given. Thus, consistent with the principle of due process, a partial
reopening of the case is apropos, so as to allow the defense the opportunity to present expert evidence consistent with
our foregoing disquisition, as well as the prosecution the opportunity to cross examine and refute the same.

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Omnibus Motion of Appellant Marivic Genosa is PARTLY GRANTED. The case is
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for the reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the "battered
woman syndrome" plea, within ninety (90) days from notice, and, thereafter to forthwith report to this Court the
proceedings taken, together with the copies of the TSN and relevant documentary evidence, if any, submitted.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 229861

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appelle

vs.
FRANCISCO EJERCITO, Accused-Appellant

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Assailed in this ordinary appeal 1 is the Decision2 dated October 28, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA); in CA-G.R. CEB
CR. HC. No. 01656, which affirmed the Decision3 dated April 8, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of █████,4 Branch 60
(RTC) in Crim. Case No. CEB-BRL-1300finding accused-appellant Francisco Ejercito (Ejercito) guilty beyond Reasonable
doubt. of the crime of Rape defined and penalized under Article 266-A, in relation to Article 266-B, of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 8353,5 otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997."

The Facts

This case stemmed from an Information 6 filed before the RTC charging Ejercito of the aforesaid crime, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about the 10th day of October, 2001 at past 7:00 o'clock in the evening, at
█████████████████████████, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge with [AAA], a minor, who is only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the
commission of the offense against her will and consent and which act demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said
minor as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

The prosecution alleged that at around six (6) o'clock in the evening of October 10, 2001, AAA, then a fifteen (15) year old
high school student, was cleaning the chicken cage at the back of their house located in █████ when suddenly, she saw
Ejercito pointing a gun at her saying, "Ato ato Zang ni. Sabta Zang ko. Ayaw gyud saba para dili madamay imo
pamilya. ''AAA pleaded, "'Tang, don't do this to me'' but the latter replied, "Do you want me to kill you? I will even include
your mother and father." Thereafter, Ejercito dragged AAA to a nearby barn, removed her shorts and underwear, while he
undressed and placed himself on top of her. He covered her mouth with his right hand and used his left hand to point the
gun at her, as he inserted his penis into her vagina and made back and forth movements. When he finished the sexual
act, Ejercito casually walked away and warned AAA not to tell anybody or else, her parents will get killed. Upon returning
to her house, AAA hurriedly went to the bathroom where she saw a bloody discharge from her vagina. The following day,
AAA absented herself from school and headed to the house of her aunt, CCC, who asked if she was okay. At that point,
AAA tearfully narrated the incident and requested CCC to remain silent, to which the latter reluctantly obliged. 8

Haunted by her harrowing experience, AAA was unable to focus on her studies. Wanting to start her life anew, AAA
moved to the city to continue her schooling there. However, Ejercito was able to track AAA down, and made the latter his
sex slave. From 2002 to 2005, Ejercito persistently contacted AAA, threatened and compelled her to meet him, and
thereafter, forced her to take shabu and then sexually abused her. Eventually, AAA got hooked on drugs, portrayed
herself as Ejercito's paramour, and decided to live together. When Ejercito's wife discovered her husband's relationship
with AAA, the former filed a complaint against AAA before the barangay. By this time, even AAA's mother, BBB, found out
the illicit relationship and exerted efforts to separate them from each other. Finally, after undergoing rehabilitation, AAA
finally disclosed to her parents that she was raped by Ejercito back in 2001 and reported the same to the authorities on
September 3, 2005.9

In his defense, Ejercito pleaded not guilty to the charge against him, and maintained .that he had an illicit relationship with
AAA. He averred that during the existence of their affair from 2002 to 2004, he and AAA frequently had consensual sex
and the latter even abandoned her family in order to live with him in various places in ███████. He even insisted that he
and AAA were vocal about their choice to live together despite vehement objections from his own wife and AAA's mother.
Finally, he pointed out that when AAA was forcibly taken from him by her mother, as well as police authorities, no charges
were filed against him. Thus, he was shocked and dismayed when he was charged with the crime of Rape which
purportedly happened when they were lovers.10
 The RTC Ruling

In a Decision11 dated April 8, 2013, the RTC found Ejercito guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and,
accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered him to separately pay AAA and her
parents ₱50,000.00 each as moral damages. 12

Aggrieved, Ejercito appealed13 to the CA.

The CA Ruling

In a Decision 14 dated October 28, 2016, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling with modification, convicting Ejercito of Rape
defined and penalized under Article 335 of the RPC, and accordingly, sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered him to pay the offended party, AAA, the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex
delicto, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages, with legal interest of six percent
( 6%) per annum to be imposed on all monetary awards from finality of the ruling until fully paid. 15

Agreeing with the RTC's findings, the CA held that through AAA's clear and straightforward testimony, the prosecution
had established that Ejercito raped her in 2001. On the other hand, it did not give credence to Ejercito's sweetheart
defense, pointing out that assuming arguendo that he indeed eventually had a relationship with AAA, their first sexual
encounter in 2001 was without the latter's consent and was attended with force and intimidation as he pointed a gun at
her while satisfying his lustful desires.16

Hence, this appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Ejercito's conviction for the crime of Rape must be upheld.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is without merit.

Time and again, it has been held that in criminal cases, "an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers the appellate court full
jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." 17

Based on this doctrine, the Court, upon careful review of this case, deems it proper to correct the attribution of the crime
for which Ejercito should be convicted and, consequently, the corresponding penalty to be imposed against him, as will be
explained hereunder.

At the onset, the Court observes that the CA, in modifying the R TC ruling, erroneously applied the old Rape Law, or
Article 335 of the RPC, since the same was already repealed upon the enactment of RA 8353 in 1997. To recount, the
Information alleges "[t]hat on or about the 10th day of October 2001 x x x [Ejercito], with lewd design and by means of
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed in having carnal knowledge
with [AAA], a minor who is only fifteen (15) years old at the time of the commission of the offense against her will and
consent x x x"; hence, in convicting Ejercito of Rape, the CA should have applied the provisions of RA 8353, which
enactment has resulted in the new rape provisions of the RPC under Articles 266-A in relation to 266-B, viz.:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed-

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

xxxx
Article 266-B. Penalties. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxxx

For a charge of Rape by sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, to prosper, the
prosecution must prove that: (a) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (b) he accomplished this act under
the circumstances mentioned in the provision, e.g., through force, threat or intimidation. The gravamen of Rape is sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will. 18

In this case, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the presence of all the elements of Rape by
sexual intercourse under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353. Through AAA's positive testimony, it was
indeed established that in the evening of October 10, 2001, AAA, then just a fifteen (15)-year old minor, was cleaning
chicken cages at the back of her house when suddenly, Ejercito threatened her, removed her lower garments, covered
her mouth, and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her without her consent. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ·found
AAA's testimony to be credible, noting further that Ejercito failed to establish any ill motive on her part which could have
compelled her to falsely accuse him of the aforesaid act. In this relation, case law states that the trial court is in the best
position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due deference
should be accorded to the same. 19 As there is no indication that the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the Court therefore finds no reason to
deviate from its factual findings.

The Court remains mindful that Section 5 (b) of RA 7610,20 which, to note, was passed prior to RA 8353 on June 17, 1992,
equally penalizes those who commit sexual abuse, by means of either (a) sexual intercourse or (b) lascivious
conduct, against "a child exploited m prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse," viz.:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected
to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code; for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x

xxxx

In Quimvel v. People (Quimvel),21 the Court set important parameters in the application of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, to wit:

(1) subjected intercourse A child is considered as one "exploited in prostitution or to other sexual abuse" when the child
indulges in sexual or lascivious conduct "under the coercion or influence of any adult":

To the mind of the Court, the allegations are sufficient to classify the victim as one  "exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse." This is anchored on the very definition of the phrase in Sec. 5 of RA 7610, which
encompasses children who indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or any other
consideration; or (b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.

Correlatively, Sec. 5 (a) of RA 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or connected with child prostitution wherein the child is
abused primarily for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct
committed on a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for
profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct. Hence, the law punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse against
children. x x x.22 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

(2) A violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7 610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against the child
victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront:

[T]he very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3 (b) of RA 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a separate and
distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of
the child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5 (b) of RA 7610' occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse
against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront. 23 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

(3) For purposes of determining the proper charge, the term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad
enough to cover "force and intimidation" as used in the Information; in fact, as these terms are almost used
synonymously, it is then "of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are different":

The term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force and intimidation" as
used in the Information. To be sure, Black's Law Dictionary defines "coercion" as "compulsion; force; duress" while
"[undue] influence" is defined as ''persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will." On the other hand, "force"
refers to "constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end' while jurisprudence
defines "intimidation" as "unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear." As can be gleaned, the terms are
used almost synonymously. It is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the
Information are different. And to dispel any remaining lingering doubt as to their interchangeability, the Court enunciated
in Caballo v. People [(710 Phil. 792, 805-806 [2013])] that:

x x x sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form
of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary
thereto, Section 2 (g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of influence
which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as:

The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to
engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.

To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and
substitutes another's objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel another to submit to
the wishes of one who wields it." 24 (emphases and underscoring supplied)

Thus, the Court, in Quimvel, observed that although the Information therein did not contain the words "coercion or
influence" (as it instead, used the phrase "through force and intimidation"), the accused may still be convicted under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Further, following the rules on the sufficiency of an Infom1ation, the Court held that the
Information need not even mention the exact phrase "exploited ·in prostitution or subjected to other abuse" for the
accused to be convicted under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610; it was enough for the Infonnation to have alleged that the
offense was committed by means of "force and intimidation" for the prosecution of an accused for violation of Section 5 (b)
of RA 7610 to prosper.25

In this case, it has 'been established that Ejercito committed the act of sexual intercourse against and without the consent
of AAA, who was only fifteen (15) years 'old at that time. As such, she is considered under the law as a child who is
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;" hence, Ejercito's act may as well be classified as a violation
of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610.

Between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353, as afore-discussed and Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the Court
deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be convicted under the former. Verily, penal laws are crafted by legislature to
punish certain acts, and when two (2) penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is
more special in nature, regardless of .the time of enactment, should prevail. In Teves v. Sandiganbayan:26

It is a rule of statutory construction that where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a
part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the
latter shall prevail regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. Or where two statutes are of contrary
tenor or of different dates but are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially
should prevail over the other.27 (Emphases supplied)
After much deliberation, the Court herein observes that RA 8353 amending the RPC should now be uniformly applied in
cas.es involving sexual intercourse committed against minors, and not Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Indeed, while RA 7610
has been considered as a special law that covers the sexual abuse of minors, RA 8353 has expanded the reach of our
already existing rape laws. These existing rape laws should not only pertain to the o]d Article 33528 of the RPC but also to
the provision on sexual intercourse under Section 5 (b )29 of RA 7610 which, applying Quimvel's characterization of a child
"exploited in prostitution or subjected to other abuse," virtually punishes the rape of a minor.

It bears to emphasize that not only did RA 8353 re-classify the crime of Rape from being a crime against chastity to a
crime against persons,30 it also provided· for more particularized instances of rape and conjunctively, a new set of
penalties therefor. Under RA 8353, Rape is considered committed not only through the traditional means of having carnal
knowledge of a woman (or penile penetration) but also through certain lascivious acts now classified as rape by sexual
assault:

Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. - Rape is committed-

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, RA 8353 provides for new penalties for Rape that may be qualified under the following circumstances:

Article 266-B. Penalty. - Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall become reclusion
perpetua to death.

When the rape is attempted and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following aggravating/qualifying
circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the commonlaw spouse of the
parent of the victim;

2) When the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities or any law enforcement or penal
institution;

3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other relatives within the
third civil degree of consanguinity;
 4) When the victim is a religious engaged in legitimate religious vocation or calling and is personally known to be
such by the offender before or at the time of the commission of the crime;

5) When the victim is a child below seven (7) years old;

6) When the offender knows that he is afflicted with the Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus (HIV)/Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or any other sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transmitted to
the victim;

7) When committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or para-military units thereof or the
Philippine National Police or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the offender took advantage
of his position to facilitate the commission of the crime;

8) When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation or
disability;

9) When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime; and

10) When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended
party at the time of the commission of the crime.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Significant to this case, the above-highlighted provisions of RA 83 53 already accounted for the circumstance of minority
under certain peculiar instances. The consequence therefore is a clear overlap' with minority as an element of the crime of
sexual intercourse against a minor under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. However, as it was earlier intimated, RA 8353 is not
only the more recent statutory enactment but more importantly, the more comprehensive law on rape; therefore, the Court
herein clarifies that in cases where a minor is raped through sexual intercourse, the provisions of RA 8353 amending the
RPC ought to prevail over Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 although the latter also penalizes the act of sexual intercourse against
a minor.

The Court is not unaware of its previous pronouncements in People v. Tubillo, 31 citing the cases of People v.
Abay32 and People v. Pangilinan33 (Tubillo, et al.), wherein the potential conflict in the application of Section 5 (b) of RA
7610, on the one hand, vis-a-vis RA 8353 amending the RPC, on the other, was resolved by examining whether or not
the prosecution's evidence focused on the element of "coercion and influence" or ''force and intimidation." In Tubillo:

To reiterate, the elements of rape under Section 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the
victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age.

On the other hand, the elements of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, are: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. It is also stated there that children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse are those children, whether male or female, who, for money, profit, or any other
consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct.

In the recent case of Quimvel v. People, the Court ruled that the term "coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is
broad enough to cover "force ·and intimidation." Black's Law Dictionary defines coercion as compulsion; force; duress,
while undue influence is defined as persuasion carried to the point of overpowering the will. On the other hand, force
refers to constraining power, compulsion; strength directed to an end; while jurisprudence defines intimidation as unlawful
coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. As can be gleaned, the terms are used almost synonymously. Thus, it is
not improbable that an act of committing carnal knowledge against a child, twelve (12) years old or older,
constitutes both rape under Section 266-A of the RPC and child abuse under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

In People v. Abay, the Court was faced with the same predicament. In that case, both the elements of Section 266-A of
the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 were alleged in the information.' Nevertheless, these provisions were
harmonized, to wit:
Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is below 12 years of age,
the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) ( d) of the Revised
Penal Code and penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph
1 [d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his
right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be complexed
with an offense penalized by a special law. (Emphasis supplied)

In Abay, the offended party was thirteen (13) years old at the time of the rape incident. Again, the information therein
contained all the elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. Nevertheless, the Court
observed that the prosecution's evidence only focused on the specific fact that accused therein sexually violated
the offended party through force and intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to
submit to his bestial designs. Thus, accused therein was convicted of the crime of rape under Article 266-A(1) of
the RPC. Notably, the prosecution did not tackle the broader scope of "influence or coercion" under Section 5 (b)
of R.A. No. 7610.

Similarly, in People v. Pangilinan, the Court was faced with the same dilemma because all the elements of Article 266-A
(1) of the RPC and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 were present. It was ruled therein that the accused can be charged with
either rape or child abuse and be convicted therefor. The Court observed, however, that the prosecution's evidence
proved that accused had carnal knowledge with the victim through force and intimidation by threatening her with
a samurai sword. Thus, rape was established. Again, the evidence in that case did not refer to the broader scope
of "influence or coercion" under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.

In the present case, the RTC convicted Tubillo for the crime of rape because the prosecution proved that there was carnal
knowledge against by means of force or intimidation, particularly, with a bladed weapon. On the other hand, the CA
convicted Tubillo with violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 because the charge of rape under the information was in
relation to R.A. No. 7610.

After a judicious study of the records, the Court rules that Tubillo should be convicted ofrape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of
the RPC.

A reading of the information would show that the case at bench involves both the elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC
and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. As elucidated in People v. Abay and People v. Pangilinan, in such instance, the court
must examine the evidence of the prosecution, whether it focused on the specific force or intimidation employed
by the off ender or on the broader concept of coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with the victim.

Here, the evidence of the prosecution unequivocally focused on the force or intimidation employed by Tubillo against HGE
under Article 266- A (1) (a) of the RPC.1âwphi1 The prosecution presented the testimony of HGE who narrated that
Tubillo unlawfully entered the house where she was sleeping by breaking the padlock. Once inside, he forced himself
upon her, pointed a knife at her neck, and inserted his penis in her vagina. She could not resist the sexual attack against
her because. Tubillo poked a bladed weapon at her neck. Verily, Tubillo employed brash force or intimidation to carry out
his dastardly deeds.

In fine, Tubillo should be found guilty of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC with a prescribed penalty of reclusion
perpetua, instead of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. 34 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

As may be gleaned therefrom, the Court examined the evidence of the prosecution to determine "whether it focused on
the specific force or intimidation employed by the offender or on the broader concept of coercion or influence to have
carnal knowledge with the victim."35 The premise in Tubillo that "coercion or influence" is the broader concept in contrast
to "force or intimidation" appears to have been rooted from that statement in Quimvel wherein it was mentioned that "[t]he
term 'coercion and influence' as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover 'force and intimidation' as used in the
Information."36 However, Quimvel did not intend to provide any distinction on the meanings of these terms so as to
determine whether an accused's case should fall under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or RA 8353 amending the RPC, much
more foist any distinction depending on what the prosecution's evidence "focused" on. In fact, the Court in Quimvel stated
"the terms ['coercion and influence' and 'force and intimidation'] are used almost synonymously";37 as such, the Court
in Quimvel held that "[i]t is then of no moment that the terminologies employed by RA 7610 and by the Information are
different"; 38 and that "the words 'coercion or influence' need not specifically appear"39 in order for the accused to be
prosecuted under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. As such, the Court misconstrued the aforesaid statement in Quimvel and
misapplied the same to somehow come up with Tubillo, et al.' s "focus of evidence" approach.

However, the mistaken interpretation of Quimvel in Tubillo, et al. only compounds the fundamental error of the "focus of
evidence" approach, which is "to rely on evidence appreciation, instead of legal interpretation. Ultimately, there is no
cogent legal basis to resolve the possible conflict between two (2) laws by ascertaining what was the focus of the
evidence presented by the prosecution. Presentation of evidence leads to determining what act was committed. Resolving
the application of either RA 8353 amending the RPC or Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 already presupposes that evidentiary
concerns regarding what act has been committed (i.e., the act of sexual intercourse against a minor) have already been
settled. Hence, the Court is ·only tasked to determine what law should apply based on legal interpretation using the
principles of statutory construction. In other words, the Court need not unearth evidentiary concerns as what remains is a
pure question of law - that is: in cases when the act of sexual intercourse against a minor has been committed, do we
apply RA 8353 amending the RPC or Section 5 (b) of RA 7610? Herein lies the critical flaw of the. "focus of evidence"
approach, which was· only compounded by the mistaken reading of Quimvel in the cases of Tubillo, et al. as above-
explained.

Neither should the conflict between the application of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 and RA 8353 be resolved based on which
law provides a higher penalty against the accused.1avvphi1 The superseding scope of RA 8353 should be the sole
reason of its prevalence over Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. The higher penalty provided under RA 8353 should not be the
moving consideration, given that penalties are merely accessory to the act being punished by a particular law. The term "'
[p]enalty' is defined as '[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment or fine'; '[p]unishment
imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or negligent act. "'40 Given its accessory nature, once
the proper application of a penal law is determined over another, then the imposition of the penalty attached to that act
punished in the prevailing penal law only follows as a matter of course. In the final analysis, it is the determination of
the act being punished together with its attending circumstances - and not the gravity of the penalty ancillary to
that punished act - which is the key consideration in resolving the conflicting applications of two penal laws.

Notably, in the more recent case of People v. Caoili (Caoili),41 the Court encountered a situation wherein the punishable
act committed by therein accused, i.e., lascivious conduct, may be prosecuted either under "Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA 7610" or "Lascivious Conduct under Sect.ion 5 (b) of RA 7610." In
resolving the matter, the Court did not consider the "focus" of the evidence for the prosecution nor the gravity of the
penalty imposed. Rather, it is evident that the determining factor in designating or charging the proper offense, and
consequently, the imposable penalty therefor, is the nature of the act committed, i.e., lascivious conduct, taken together
with the attending circumstance of the age of the victim:

Accordingly, for the guidance of public prosecutors and the courts, the Court takes this opportunity to prescribe the
following guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5
(b) of R.A. No. 7610, and in determining the imposable penalty:

1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the offense, and in determining the
imposable penalty.

2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of Lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 (b) of RA. No. 7610." Pursuant to the second proviso in
Section 5 (b) of RA. No. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.

3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is
eighteen (18) years old or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be
designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.42

Thus, being the more recent case, it may be concluded that Caoili implicitly abandoned the "focus of evidence" approach
used in the Tubillo, et al. rulings. Likewise, it is apt to clarify that if there appears to be any rational dissonance or
perceived unfairness in the imposable penalties between two applicable laws (say for instance, that a person who
commits rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC,43 as amended by RA 8353 is
punished less than a person who commits lascivious conduct against a minor under Section 5 (b) of RA 761044), then the
solution is through remedial legislation and not through judicial interpretation. It is well-settled that the determination of
penalties is a policy matter that belongs to the legislative branch of government.45 Thus, however compelling the dictates
of reason might be, our constitutional order proscribes the Judiciary from adjusting the gradations of the penalties which
are fixed by Congress through its legislative function. As Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta had instructively
observed in his opinion in Caoli:

Curiously, despite the clear intent of R.A. 7610 to provide for stronger deterrence and special protection against child
abuse, the penalty [reclusion temporal medium] when the victim is under 12 years old is lower compared to the
penalty [reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua]  when the victim is 12 years old and below 18. The same
holds true if the crime of acts of lasciviousness is attended by an aggravating circumstance or committed by persons
under Section 31, Article XII of R.A. 7610, in which case, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. In contrast, when
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attended the crime of acts of lasciviousness, the penalty therefor when
committed against a child under 12 years old is aptly higher than the penalty when the child is 12 years old and below 18.
This is because, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term in the case of the younger victims shall be
taken from reclusion temporal minimum, whereas as [sic] the minimum term in the case of the older victims shall be taken
from prision mayor medium to reclusion temporal minimum. It is a basic rule in statutory construction that what
courts may correct to reflect the real and apparent intention of the legislature are only those which are clearly
clerical errors or obvious mistakes, omissions, and misprints, but not those due to oversight, as shown by a
review of extraneous circumstances, where the law is clear, and to correct it would be to change the meaning of
the law. To my mind, a corrective legislation is the proper remedy to address the noted incongruent penalties for
acts of lasciviousness committed against a child.46 (Emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing considerations, the Court therefore holds that in instances where an accused is charged and
eventually convicted of having sexual intercourse with a minor, the provisions on rape under RA 8353 amending the RPC
should prevail over Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Further, to reiterate, the "focus of evidence" approach used in the Tubillo, et
al. rulings had already been abandoned.

In this case, it has been established that Ejercito had carnal knowledge of AAA through force, threat, or intimidation.
Hence, he should be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 (a), Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA 8353. To
note, although AAA was only fifteen (15) years old and hence, a minor at that time, it was neither alleged nor proven that
Ejercito was her "parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consan guinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim" so as to qualify the crime and impose a higher penalty. As
such, pursuant to the first paragraph of Article 266-B of the same law, Ejercito should be meted with the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, as ruled by both the RTC and the CA. Further, the Court affirms the monetary awards in AAA's
favor in the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until fully paid, since
the same are in accord with prevailing jurisprudence.47

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The .Decision dated October 28, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB
CR. HC. No. 01656 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Francisco Ejercito is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353. Accordingly, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, he is ordered to
pay AAA the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary
damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from finality of this ruling until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173988, October 08, 2014

FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with and found guilty of child abuse, a violation of Republic Act No.
7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil whom she physically maltreated for having accidentally bumped her knee
while she was drowsing off on a bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her maltreatment left him with physical
injuries, as duly certified by a physician.

Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child abuse  is the question that this appeal must determine, in light of the
Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People of the Philippines2 that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic
Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to
debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.

Antecedents

The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, summed up the factual antecedents in its comment,3 as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary School
located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the
knee of his teacher, petitioner Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6).
Roused from sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded
to his seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by
his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he fell, Michael Ryan's body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness.
Petitioner proceeded to pick Michael Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. Michael Ryan
cried (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).

After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied by two of his
classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about the incident (TSN, March
14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo
Larroza (TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan's
aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was
examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise, reported the incident to the Police Station (TSN, July 27, 1997, p. 6;
TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).

The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador reads, in part:

1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.

The petitioner was criminally charged with child abuse in the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City (RTC), and the case was
assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information alleged as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo, upon approval and Directive of the Deputy OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses
FELINA ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD ABUSE LAW (Section 10 (a) of R..A. 7610), committed as
follows:

That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a public school teacher in Grade 1 of Pughanan
Elementary School, with a Salary Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
maltreat her pupil Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child, by pinching him on different parts of his body, and
thereafter slumping him to the ground, thereby causing Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness and has
suffered injuries on different parts of his body.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting the petitioner of child abuse,5 disposing as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI of R.A. 7610,
the Court sentences her to an indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correctional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.

No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not having been proved.

SO ORDERED.6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the petitioner through its assailed decision promulgated on May 11,
2005,7 with a modification of the penalty, viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in this case
and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal Case No. 46893 with
the MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of  prision mayor,
as the maximum thereof.

IT IS SO ORDERED.8chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner submits that:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that the acts of the petitioner constitute child abuse
penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610[,] and not under the Revised Penal Code.

II

The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by holding that petitioner's constitutional right to due process and
her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her was not violated when the essential
elements of the crime charged were not properly recited in the information.10

Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the issues the petitioner is raising are mainly factual and, therefore,
not reviewable under the mode of appeal chosen; that the affirmance of her conviction by the CA was in accord with the
pertinent law and jurisprudence, and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial; and that the information
charging her with child abuse was sufficient in form and substance.11

Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

First of all, the State correctly contends that the petitioner could raise only questions of law in her present recourse. Under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the appeal is limited to questions of law. The immediate implication of the limitation is to
have the findings of fact by the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial court, conclude the Court by virtue of its
not being a trier of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the evidence all over again.

It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law admits of exceptions. Under Section 4, Rule 3 of the Internal
Rules of the Supreme Court, the following situations are the exceptions in which the Court may review findings of fact by
the lower courts, to wit: (a) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (b) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond the issues of
the case, and their findings are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the findings of fact of the
collegial appellate courts are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on the
supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the evidence on record; and (k) all other similar and exceptional cases
warranting a review of the lower courts' findings of fact. A further exception is recognized when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.12 Yet, none of the exceptions applies herein.

Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by Michael Ryan to
maltreat or malign him in a manner that would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She characterizes her
maltreatment as an act of discipline that she as a schoolteacher could reasonably do towards the development of the
child. She insists that her act further came under the doctrine of  in loco parentis.

The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.

Although the petitioner, as a schoolteacher, could duly discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the physical
injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence suffered at her
hands.13 She could not justifiably claim that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her physical maltreatment of
him was precisely prohibited by no less than the Family Code, which has expressly banned the infliction of corporal
punishment  by a school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority
(i.e., in loco parentis), viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental authority shall have the same authority over the person of the child
as the parents.

In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care exercising special parental authority
inflict corporal punishment upon the child, (n)

Proof of the severe results of the petitioner's physical maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr. Teresita
Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who examined the victim at
about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from the time the boy had sustained his
injuries. Her Medical Report stated as follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1 cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially at the area of femoral head.

Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based on the testimonial explanations of Dr. Castigador, the trial judge
observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador is a discoloration of the skin caused by the extravasation of blood
beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and tenderness of the ears of the victim could have been caused by
pinching. As to the lumbar pain and tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae (wound no. 2), the
doctor testified that during her examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put pressure on the said
area. She stated that this could be caused by pressure or contact with a hard object. Wound No. 3 is located on
the victim's left inner thigh. According to her this could not have been caused by ordinary pinching with
pressure. Wound No. 4 is located on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified that she noticed that the
boy was limping as he walked.14

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 7610 defines child abuse thusly:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

xxxx

(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:

(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional maltreatment;chanrobleslaw

(2)  Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being;

(3)  Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting in serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent incapacity or death.

xxxx

In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the maltreatment may consist of an act by deeds or by
words  that  debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act need not
be habitual. The CA concluded that the petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan, a helpless and weak 7-
year old boy, when she pinched hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held him in the armpits and threw him
on the floor[; and as] the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a
sense of remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."15 On her
part, the trial judge said that the physical pain experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an emotional trauma
that caused him to stop going to school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling his parents to transfer him to
another school where he had to adjust again.16 Such established circumstances proved beyond reasonable doubt that the
petitioner was guilty of  child abuse by deeds that degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael Ryan
as a human being.

It was also shown that Michael Ryan's physical maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or only maltreatment of
a child. Prosecution witness Louella Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also experienced the petitioner's
cruelty.17 The petitioner was also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in Criminal Case No. 348921 for
maltreatment of another child named Dariel Legayada.18 Such previous incidents manifested that the petitioner had "a
propensity for violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of June 26, 2003.19

Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form and substance, in
that the essential elements of the crime charged were not properly alleged therein; and that her constitutional and
statutory right to due process of law was consequently violated.

The petitioner's submission deserves scant consideration.

Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name
of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was
committed.

The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against the petitioner in the context of the statutory
definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610,  supra, and thus complied with the requirements
of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.

Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner's challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form
and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a
motion to quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge
an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.

Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil liability ex delicto because no evidence had been adduced
thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the omission by the trial court. The explanation tendered by the trial judge for
the omission was misplaced, however, because even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victim's
feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense and the means to
fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It
cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment. We hold that both lower courts committed a
plain error that demands correction by the Court. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People,21 it was
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to
be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its
recovery," explaining the reason for doing so in the following manner:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of
the Rules of Court  to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted
by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission
to be recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest
the Court be unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the
correction of the omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal,
has not only the authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by
law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully
determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights
and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be
alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be
invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the
complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement
of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.22

Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the moral and emotional sufferings of the victim, and in that respect the
Court believes and holds that P20,000.00 is reasonable. The victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages,
considering that Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended
the commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated her being a public
schoolteacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its maximum period pursuant to Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610.
The amount of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages is imposed on in order to set an example for the public good and as a
deterrent to other public schoolteachers who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family Code, supra, against
the infliction of corporal punishment on children under their substitute parental authority. The lack of proof of the actual
expenses for the victim's treatment should not hinder the granting of a measure of compensation in the form of temperate
damages, which, according to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty. There being no question about the injuries sustained requiring
medical treatment, temperate damages of at least P20,000.00 are warranted, for it would be inequitable not to recognize
the need for the treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be charged on all the items of civil liability, to be
reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.

The penalty for the child abuse committed by the petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of Republic Act No.
7610,  viz:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Section 10.  Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's
Development. -

(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor  in its
minimum period.

xxxx

The CA revised the penalty fixed by the RTC by imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two months and one
day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum, on the ground that
the offense was aggravated by the petitioner being a public schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 31(e) of Republic Act No.
7610, which commands that the penalty provided in the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a
public officer or employee." Her being a public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and established by evidence
as well as admitted by her. The revised penalty was erroneous, however, because Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No.
7610 punishes the crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in its minimum period, whose three periods are
six years and one day to six years and eight months, for the minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to
seven years and four months, for the medium period; and seven years, four months and one day to eight years, for the
maximum period. The maximum of the indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum period, therefore, and the
Court fixes it at seven years, four months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence
should come from prision correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next lower than prision mayor in its minimum
period, whose range is from four years, two months and one day to six years. Accordingly, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and 11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months and one
day of prision mayor.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a)
the petitioner shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days of prision
correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the maximum; (b) the
petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales P20,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P20,00Q.00 as temperate damages, plus interest at the rate of 6%  per annum on each item of the civil liability reckoned
from the finality of this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED
 CRIMES AGAINST LIBERTY

[G.R. No. 189093 : April 23, 2010]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS Y GARCIA, BRYAN

BRINGAS Y GARCIA, JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO Y CRUZ, ERICKSON PAJARILLO Y BASER (DECEASED), AND
EDEN SY CHUNG, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

The Case

In the instant appeal,1 accused-appellants John Robert Navarro y Cruz, Christopher Bringas y Garcia, Bryan Bringas y
Garcia, and Eden Sy Chung seek their acquittal by a reversal of the January 3, 2006 Decision2 and June 6, 2007
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00911, which affirmed their earlier conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 258 in Parañaque City for violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 6539 (Carnapping) and
for violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (Kidnapping for Ransom) in Criminal Case Nos. 95-136 and
95-137, respectively.

The Facts

On April 28, 1995, accused-appellants Christopher Bringas y Garcia alias "Jimboy," John Robert Navarro y Cruz alias
"Jun," Dennis Ticsay y Peña alias "Peng," Aruel Ross y Picardo, Bryan Bringas y Garcia alias "Bobby," Roger Calaguas y
Jimenez alias "Bronson," Ericson Pajarillo4 y Baser alias "Erick," Edgardo Sulayao y Petilla alias "Eddie," Eden Sy Chung
alias "Kim," Glen Sangalang, and Ricky Castillo were indicted for Carnapping or violation of RA 6539. The Information5 in
Criminal Case No. 95-136 reads:

That at about 1:30 in the afternoon of December 14, 1994 at Marina Subdivision, Municipality of Parañaque and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, while in the process of executing their criminal design to kidnap for ransom a minor child named PATRICK
TENG, with intent to gain and with violence and intimidation, did then and there, take a motor vehicle, Toyota Corolla, with
Plate No. TNK-782, owned by Erick Teng.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

The same accused were likewise indicted for Kidnapping for Ransom or violation of Art. 267 of the RPC. The
Information6 in Criminal Case No. 95-137 reads:

That at about 1:30 in the afternoon of December 14, 1994 at Marina Subdivision, Municipality of Parañaque and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, did then and there take, carry away and kidnap a minor, PATRICK TENG, against his will and detained him for
the purpose of extorting ransom for his release which was effected after payment by his parents of the amount of TWO
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P2.5 Million) to the damage and prejudice of aforementioned victim and
his parents.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Jason Rosales, a member of the group, was not included in both indictments as he was utilized as state witness and
placed under the Witness Protection Program of the Government.

Except for Glen Sangalang and Ricky Castillo who remain at large, the rest of the accused were apprehended. When
arraigned on September 28, 1995, the apprehended accused, assisted by their respective counsels, uniformly entered a
plea of "not guilty."

To substantiate the accusations, the prosecution presented the testimonies of: (1) Rosales (state witness); (2) Maricel
Hipos, house-helper of Eric Teng; (3) Police Chief Inspector Gilbert C. Cruz of the Philippine Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC); (4) Police Chief Inspector Michael Ray Aquino of Task Force Habagat; (5) Police Chief Inspector Paul Tucay of
Task Force Habagat; (6) Eric, the father of the minor kidnap victim Patrick Teng; and (7) Antonio Nebrida (Tony) of PTV 4.

Version of the Prosecution

Culled from the records, the People's version of the incident is synthesized as follows:
That sometime around 11:30 a.m. on December 14, 1994, Eric's house helper Maricel received a phone call purportedly
from Eric's brother-in-law, Johnson, informing that a gift will be delivered for Patrick, and she was instructed to wait for the
driver who will be arriving soon.7 At around 1:30 p.m., the doorbell rang and Maricel went to check the gate.8 When she
asked who it was, the men outside answered that they were delivering the gift for Patrick from Johnson.9 Peering through
the gate she saw two men,10 whom she came to know later on to be Rosales and Calaguas with the latter holding a large
gift in Christmas wrapper.11 Since the gift could not fit the aperture in the gate, Maricel opened the gate.12

Calaguas then poked a gun at Maricel and pulled her towards Eric's house.13 She was made to knock at the front door
which was opened by Sweeney, the sister of Eric.14 Maricel, Sweeney, and the other house helpers, Dina and Melanie,
were herded by Calaguas to the children's room at the second floor together with Eric's children, Patrick and
Mikee.15 While on the stairway, Rosales asked for the key to Eric's car.16 Maricel was then gagged with packing tape by
Pajarillo,17 and the three of them went down.18 Maricel pointed to the car key in the kitchen.19 Thereafter, Maricel was
brought upstairs to the children's room by Pajarillo.20 Already inside the children's room were Sulayao and
Calaguas.21 Pajarillo then tied the hands and feet of Maricel,22 while the others did the same to Sweeney, Dina and
Melanie.23 However, Dina's feet were not tied.24 One of the men said "kunin na ninyo ang bata."25 Maricel identified Ross
as among those who took Patrick.26 The kidnappers also took Eric's red Toyota Corolla (Model GLI 1994).27

After the kidnappers left, Dina looked for a pair of scissors.28 After the girls extricated themselves from their bindings, they
immediately called Kim Teng (Kimbol), the brother of Eric, who rushed to Eric's house.29 Shortly thereafter, at around 2:30
p.m., Kimbol called Eric to tell him about the kidnapping of his son, Patrick.30 Eric rushed home.31 At around 3:10 p.m.,
Eric received the first call from one of the kidnappers (negotiator) demanding a ransom of PhP 10 million for his son and
ordered him not to report the matter to the police else Patrick will be harmed.32 A friend of the grandparents of Patrick,
however, reported the kidnapping to the PACC Special Operations Task Force Habagat.33

While Eric was trying to pool resources from friends and relatives, he continued receiving calls from the same negotiator
urging him to cooperate.34 At about 4:00 p.m., Eric received a call from Gen. Panfilo Lacson, then head of the PACC
Special Operations Task Force Habagat.35 Eric was only able to raise PhP 200,000 that afternoon.36

Through another call, the negotiator instructed Eric to produce six individuals for them to interview and choose from to
deliver the money, the qualifications given was "kailangang matalik ninyong kaibigan na mapapagkatiwalan ng pera, hindi
ninyo kamag-anak, mukhang instik at marunung managalog."37 The negotiator gave his name as Eric.38 They then called
Racquel Chung, the wife of Eden Sy Chung (Chung), asking if Chung could help.39 Imelda, Eric's wife, was able to talk to
Chung who was willing to help deliver the money if selected.40 At around 10:00 p.m., Eric again received a call from the
negotiator which was followed by another call, this time by a different person.41

The next day, December 15, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., Chung arrived.42 Chung encouraged Eric to pay the ransom as soon as
possible.43 Thereafter, Eric received so many calls but was able to identify the negotiator's voice. Upon query on the six
individuals, he informed the negotiator that they could only come up with two: Chung and John Tuang.44 The negotiator
interviewed both Chung and John Tuang on the phone.45 By lunchtime, the ransom was reduced to PhP 8 million,46 which
was further reduced to PhP 5 million at 4:00 p.m.47 But Eric still could not raise the amount. After dinner, the negotiator
instructed Chung and John Tuang to go home.48 Chung borrowed Eric's car.49 Thereafter, they received another call
threatening, "puputulin ko ang daliri ng anak mo, puputulin ko ang bayag ng anak mo papatayin ko kayo."50

After a while, the negotiator called again demanding for Chung to come back, and Chung came back to the Teng's
residence at around 8:00 p.m.51 Eric was then instructed to have the ransom money delivered, which at that time was
significantly reduced to PhP 2.5 million and which he was able to raise that day.52 It was to be placed in a box and gift
wrapped.53 Chung was instructed by the negotiator to deliver the ransom money at the Quezon Memorial Circle near
GSIS.54 Chung then took Eric's two-door Honda Civic with Plate No. TGH 439.55

On the way, Chung called Eric telling him that he was intercepted by two cars which he had to follow.56 The PACC
operatives tailing Chung who were on radio contact with the PACC, however, belied Chung's allegation of
interception.57 The PACC then suspected Chung to be in cahoots with the kidnappers.58 Gen. Lacson thereafter instructed
Eric to delay Chung upon his return.59 Eventually, Chung, bringing Patrick, arrived at Eric's place past midnight.60 Chung
reported to Eric that "hinarang ako inipit ako sa dalawang kotse at nakita ko si Johnson sa isa sa mga sasakyan."61 Five
minutes after Chung's arrival, Gen. Lacson and his men arrived and arrested Chung.62

A few hours thereafter, at around 4:00 a.m. of December 16, 1994, Eric received a call from Gen. Lacson informing him
that the ransom money was recovered except for PhP 100,000 which was given by Chung to Navarro.63 At around noon of
December 16, 1994, Eric again received a call from the PACC informing him that Chung wanted to talk to him.64 Chung
apologized to Eric saying, "Sorry, ginawa ko sa inyo ito, napipilitan lang ako" and "[T]utulong naman ako sa PACC
ibinigay ko na yung dalawang pangalan."65 Chung named Navarro and Jimboy Bringas.66 At 4:00 p.m. of December 16,
1994, Eric again received a call from the PACC confirming the arrest of both Navarro and Jimboy Bringas.67 And, later, at
9:00 p.m., the PACC further informed Eric that they have arrested the other kidnappers who were pointed out by Jimboy
Bringas.68 Moreover, Eric's red Toyota Corolla was likewise recovered.69

During the December 17, 1994 press conference at the PACC Headquarters in Camp Crame, Eric recognized the voice of
the negotiator among the kidnappers whom he identified later on to be that of Navarro.70 In the same press conference,
Navarro admitted to the media that he made three calls to the Teng family regarding the ransom and that Pajarillo likewise
admitted to the media that Chung supplied them with handguns except the ammunition.71 Eric Teng was able to tape
segments of the news aired over Channels 2 and 4 covering the admissions of Navarro and Pajarillo.72

Tony of PTV 4 testified73 that he was the newscaster of PTV 4 of the December 17, 1994 evening news edition that what
was taped by Eric Teng.

Police Chief Inspector Aquino was the Operations Chief of the PACC Task Force Habagat who coordinated the operation,
monitoring and response to the kidnapping of Patrick Teng; he assigned Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza to
secure the house of Eric Teng and monitor the communications with the negotiator of the kidnappers.74 Police Chief
Inspector Cruz was the one who led a team in arresting Navarro and Jimboy Bringas at around half past 1:00 p.m. on
December 16, 1994 in the vicinity of Malate.75 And Police Chief Inspector Tucay was the team leader who led the team
which tailed Chung in the evening of December 15, 1994 to the house of Chung's mother, the Bowling Inn and Philippine
Westin Plaza; and also led the team in the afternoon and evening of December 16, 1994 in arresting Calaguas, Sulayao,
Ross, Pajarillo, Bobby Bringas and Dennis Ticsay in Pampanga and in recovering Eric Teng's red Toyota Corolla.76

Version of the Defense

The fractious defense offered in evidence the testimonies of: (1) John Robert Navarro; (2) Sr. Police Inspector Michael
Ray Aquino; (3) Eden Sy Chung (Chung); (4) Christopher Bringas (Jimboy Bringas); (5) Roger Calaguas (Calaguas); (6)
Lourdes Bringas, mother of Christopher and Bryan; (7) Bryan Bringas (Bobby Bringas); (8) Edgardo Sulayao (Sulayao),
also known as Kosa; (9) Ericson Pajarillo (Pajarillo); and (10) Aruel Ross (Ross).

The accused's divergent defenses uniformly assailed the credibility of Maricel Hipos and state witness Rosales, and in
assiduously declaring their innocence they pointed to each other as the perpetrator or mastermind of the kidnapping for
ransom.

From their testimonies, Navarro77 and Chung78 similarly asserted being implicated by the other in the crime and pointed at
each other as the mastermind thereof. Calaguas,79 Sulayao,80 Pajarillo81 and Ross82 uniformly point to Chung and Navarro
as the brains behind the kidnapping who were assisted by Rosales and Jimboy Bringas, and that they were merely
implicated for they were merely hired as factory workers (Calaguas and Sulayao), for a driving job (Ross) or was only
doing a favor for Rosales (Pajarillo). They admitted the taking of Patrick Teng but denied doing any violence and the use
of handguns. Calaguas and Sulayao repudiated their joint August 21, 1995 Pinagsanib na Salaysay ng
Pagpapabulaan83  sworn to before the state prosecutor for allegedly not being true as their former counsel, Atty. Gasmen,
did not put therein what they actually narrated to him.

Jimboy Bringas maintained that he was only implicated by Chung and Navarro for he was neither involved with the crime
nor participated in its commission as he was only tasked to look for factory workers by Chung and for tourist guides by
Navarro.84

It must be noted that, while all the accused pinpointed and identified Navarro as one of the masterminds, only Pajarillo
testified otherwise that John Robert Navarro is not the same person as John or Jun Navarro who was with him and
Rosales in the evening of December 13, 1994 in Tradewinds Hotel, and on December 14, 1994 when they delivered gifts
and the kidnapping of Patrick was committed.

Bobby Bringas strongly protested his innocence as he was in Pampanga on the days material and was never involved in
the crime but was merely implicated by Rosales. His testimony85 and that of his mother, Lourdes Bringas,86 were
dispensed with upon the prosecution's stipulation that he was in Pampanga from December 14, 1994 until his arrest by
PACC operatives on December 16, 1994.

Acquittal of Dennis Ticsay

On July 30, 1997, accused Dennis Ticsay (Ticsay) filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence87 which
was unopposed and granted by the trial court.88 Accordingly, on August 22, 1997, Ticsay filed his Demurrer to
Evidence.89 On December 3, 1997, the trial court granted the demurrer and acquitted Ticsay.90

Subsequently, on June 10, 1998, the motions to grant bail filed by the other accused were denied by the trial court.91
 The Ruling of the RTC and CA

The RTC, finding the testimonies of prosecution witnesses more credible, rendered, on March 26, 1999, its Joint
Decision92 finding accused-appellants and the other accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.
The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

In Criminal Case No. 95-136 for CARNAPPING, defined and penalized under Republic Act No. 6539, finding accused
CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia; JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; ROGER CALAGUAS
y Jimenez; ERICKSON PAHARILLO y Baser; EDGARDO SULAYAO y Petilla and EDEN SY CHUNG GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nineteen (19) years
as minimum to twenty-seven (27) years, as maximum.

For failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of BRYAN BRINGAS y GARCIA, he is hereby ACQUITTED.

In Criminal Case No. 95-137, for KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act no. 7659, finding accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia; JOHN
ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; BRYAN BRINGAS y Garcia; ROGER CALAGUAS y Jimenez;
ERICKSON PAHARILLO y Baser; EDGARDO SULAYAO y Petilla; and EDEN SY CHUNG guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH.

Likewise, accused JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz is hereby directed to pay Eric Teng the sum of PhP100,000.00 as
actual damages with interest thereon at the legal rate from December 15, 1994 until fully paid and all the accused are
directed to pay Eric Teng jointly and severally the amount of PhP5,000,000.00 as moral damages; PhP2,000,000.00 as
exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Let Alias Warrants of Arrest issued against GLEN SANGALANG and RICKY CASTILLO for their immediate apprehension
which need not be returned until after they have been arrested.

SO ORDERED.93

Thru its Order of Commitment (Mittimus),94 the RTC sent the accused to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa
City.95 The RTC also elevated the records of the case to this Court for automatic review, docketed under G.R. Nos.
139115-16.

In accordance, however, with People v. Mateo,96 the Court, per its September 7, 2004 Resolution,97 transferred the case
to the CA for intermediate review, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00911.

Eventually, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dated January 3, 2006, affirming the trial court. The dispositive portion
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the March 26, 1999 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court or Parañaque City,
Branch 258, is hereby AFFIRMED. However, considering that the death penalty was imposed, instead of entering
judgment, We hereby CERTIFY the case and elevate its entire record to the Supreme Court for review and final
disposition, pursuant to Section 13 (a & b), Rule 124 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

SO ORDERED.98

Navarro, Pajarillo and Chung filed their respective motions for reconsideration99 of the assailed decision. As stated at the
threshold hereof, the CA, in the herein equally assailed Resolution100 dated June 6, 2007, denied the motions, but, noting
the passage of RA 9346101 lifting the death penalty, accordingly reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. In the same
assailed Resolution, however, the CA further noted that the accused failed to file their motions for reconsideration or
notices of appeal as regards Criminal Case No. 95-136 for Carnapping, the lesser offense, and, citing Sec. 13(b) of Rule
124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it pronounced finality of the affirmed RTC decision as regards Criminal
Case No. 95-136.

Subsequently, on July 16, 2007, the CA issued a Resolution102 for the issuance of a Partial Entry of Judgment103 in
Criminal Case No. 95-136 as to Ross, Jimboy Bringas, Calaguas and Sulayao. Undaunted, accused-appellants Navarro,
Jimboy Bringas, Bobby Bringas and Chung filed their respective notices of appeal104 pursuant to Sec. 13 (b), Rule 124 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In the meantime, on April 8, 2006, Pajarillo died from aspiration pneumonia secondary to PTB,105 while Sulayao died on
March 10, 2007.106

On June 23, 2009, the CA issued a Resolution107 giving due course to the notices of appeal filed by accused-appellants
and ordered the issuance of a (Partial) Entry of Judgment108 against Ross who opted not to take any further appeal to this
Court, and dismissed the instant criminal case as to Sulayao on account of his death on March 10, 2007 without prejudice
to his civil liability.

We take notice, however, that the CA failed to note the May 4, 2009 letter109 from the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa
City belatedly informing it, on May 6, 2009, of the death of Pajarillo way back on April 8, 2006. Consequently, the
appeal110 of Pajarillo filed by his counsel on July 4, 2007 is rendered moot and academic. Moreover, we further note that
the CA failed to pronounce an entry of judgment as regards Calaguas who failed to file either a motion for reconsideration
or to take a further appeal of the January 3, 2006 CA Decision. Consequently, for his failure to file an appeal as required
by the rules, the instant case has become final as to Calaguas.

Thus, the instant appeals before us from accused-appellants Navarro, Jimboy Bringas, Bobby Bringas and Chung who
prayed for their respective acquittal from the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

The Issues/Assignment of Errors

The People of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, and accused-appellants Navarro and Chung chose not to file any
supplemental briefs, maintaining their respective positions, assignment of errors and arguments in their respective briefs
earlier filed in G.R. Nos. 139115-16.

In his appellant's brief,111 Chung raises the following assignment of errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT CHUNG HAD CONSPIRED WITH THE OTHER
APPELLANTS CONSIDERING THAT:

A. There is no clear and sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant Chung participated in the planning of the
crime;

B. The evidence of conspiracy against Appellant fails to establish his participation in the planning of the offense
beyond reasonable doubt;

C. There are no overt acts attributable to Appellant Chung which would establish that he intended to, or did actually
carry out the alleged conspiracy;

D. There is no evidence which would establish Appellant Chung's presence at the scene of the crime, or his alleged
participation in aiding his co-appellants in the commission thereof.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE ALLEGED WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE'S EVIDENCE RATHER
THAN ON THE DOUBTFUL STRENGHT OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION.

III

THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING, WITHOUT ANY BASIS WHATSOEVER, THAT APPELLANT
CHUNG IS THE MASTERMIND OF THE CONSPIRACY.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF JASON ROSALES, AN
ADMITTED CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE PLANNING AND COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
 V

THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO PERFORM ITS DUTY OF RESOLVING ALL DOUBTS IN THE INTERPRETATION OF
EVIDENCE IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT CHUNG.112

Navarro, on the other hand, raises in his Appellant's Brief113 the sole assignment of error that: The Court a quo committed
serious error when it convicted him on the basis of what may at best be considered circumstantial evidence despite clear
and direct testimonies of law enforcers and the other accused that proved his absence of involvement in the crimes
charged.114

In their Accused-Appellants' Brief,115 Jimboy and Bobby Bringas raise the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY AS PRINCIPALS OF THE
CRIMES CHARGED.116

Moreover, in their supplemental brief,117Jimboy and Bobby Bringas additionally raise the assignment of errors that: (a) The
Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding them guilty despite the prosecution's failure to prove it beyond reasonable doubt;
and, (b) that they conspired with the other perpetrators.118

The foregoing issues or assignment of errors can actually be reduced and summarized as follows: first, on the credibility
of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in general and, in particular, of Maricel Hipos and of the state witness
Rosales; and, second, on the finding of conspiracy.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

First Core Issue: Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses

Accused-appellants strongly assert that Maricel Hipos and state witness Rosales only made up their respective
testimonies relative to how the kidnapping transpired.

There is no dispute that Patrick Teng was kidnapped. It is admitted by the accused that Patrick Teng was brought to
Pampanga on the day he was abducted and was released shortly before midnight the next day or on December 15, 1994.
There is likewise no dispute that a PhP 2.5 million ransom was raised by the Teng family on December 15, 1994 and was
handed to Chung in the evening of the same day for the payment and release of Patrick Teng as instructed by the
negotiator. The undisputed facts also show that Chung was apprehended by the PACC shortly after midnight or very early
on December 16, 1994; while Jimboy Bringas and Navarro were apprehended at past 1:00 p.m. on December 16, 1994;
and the other accused were apprehended in Pampanga late afternoon and early evening on December 16, 1994.

Both courts a quo found all accused guilty beyond reasonable for the crime of carnapping and kidnapping. With the instant
appeal, what remains to be resolved is the respective criminal liability or lack thereof of accused-appellants Navarro,
Chung, Jimboy and Bobby Bringas. An assiduous review of the records at hand, particularly the testimonies of both
prosecution and defense witnesses, however, constrains this Court to affirm the appellate court's decision and resolution
affirming their conviction except that of Bobby Bringas.

Prosecution Witnesses More Credible

First. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Maricel Hipos and Eric Teng were straightforward, cohesive, positive and
credible. More so when they are corroborated on material points by the testimonies of both prosecution and defense
witnesses. Besides, there is no showing that Maricel Hipos and Eric Teng had any motive to falsely testify against the
accused. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical
conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.110
The testimony of Maricel was initially assailed by accused-appellant Sulayao who testified that when the kidnapping was
carried out they did not use any weapon or handgun, that they were let into the house voluntarily by Maricel and that it
was Rosales who took Patrick Teng without a struggle. This assertion was uniformly shared by Pajarillo, Calaguas and
Ross. However, aside from their mere assertion, they did not present any evidence supporting such contention.

The testimony of Maricel on what occurred is corroborated by the testimony of the accused that the gift Calaguas was
holding did not fit the aperture in the gate. Maricel never intended them to enter the Teng's premises but was merely
constrained to open the gate due to the ruse adopted by the accused.

Very telling are the testimonies of Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross asserting that they did not see Maricel. This is incredulous
for Maricel positively identified them as among the companions of Rosales during the extra-judicial line-up conducted by
the PACC in Camp Crame. Aside from Calaguas, Maricel picked out Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross from a line-up of about
15 men. During her testimony in open court, she again positively identified them. If indeed they did not meet her, Maricel
could not have identified them as among the companions of Rosales and Calaguas.

Moreover, the mere denials of Calaguas, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross cannot prevail over the positive assertion of Maricel
that she was with Sweeney, the sister of Eric Teng, and two other helpers, Dina and Melanie, who were the "yayas" of
Patrick and Mikee. Pajarillo, Sulayao, Calaguas and Ross want the Court to believe that it was only Maricel who was in
the house of Eric Teng or that aside from her there was nobody in the first floor of Eric Teng's house when Rosales
supposedly brought down Patrick Teng.

Further, the testimony of Maricel is not only credible but cohesive as well considering the events that transpired from the
phone call received at around 11:30 a.m. to the arrival of the kidnappers at 1:30 p.m., the time Dina was able to find
scissors to cut their bindings and being freed therefrom and calling Kimbol, who rushed to Eric's place; then Kimbol calling
Eric at around 2:30 p.m. with the latter rushing home. The testimony of Eric would show how he received the call from his
brother, his rushing home and receiving the first call from the negotiator [kidnappers] at around 3:10 p.m.

As to the use of violence and intimidation, it is abundantly clear from Maricel's testimony that the accused indeed used
guns to threaten and intimidate them. At the very least, Maricel positively identified Calaguas as the one holding the gift
and poking her with a gun when she opened the gate, and her being herded together with Sweeney and the other house
helpers to the children's room at the second floor. The use of guns to threaten and intimidate is not only plausible but well
nigh credible considering the crime involved. Besides, it must be noted that during the press conference on December 17,
1994, caught on camera and shown during the evening news on the same day was Pajarillo uttering words to the effect
that Chung provided them with a .45 caliber and a .38 caliber handguns.

It must be noted that there is no showing that Maricel simply made up the details of her testimony or that she was
coached. Both courts a quo found her testimony credible, cohesive and straightforward. We find no cogent reason to
substitute the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court. Besides, the trial court is in the best position to
assess the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies because of their unique opportunity to observe the witnesses
firsthand, and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grueling examination--significant factors in evaluating
the sincerity of witnesses, in the process of unearthing the truth.[117]

Furthermore, the testimony of Eric supplies what transpired after he received the call from his brother Kimbol on
December 14, 1994 until the morning of December 17, 1994 when the PACC held a press conference presenting the
alleged kidnappers and his being able to tape segments of the evening news showing footages of the press conference.
His testimony is likewise straightforward, cohesive and credible, which was not at all rebutted by the defense.

Second. The testimony of state witness Rosales was likewise straightforward, cohesive and credible. And it was likewise
corroborated on some material points by the officers of the PACC Task Force Habagat.

Rosales was among the six arrested on December 16, 1994 in Pampanga. Jimboy Bringas pinpointed them to PACC
operatives led by Police Chief Inspector Tucay. He was not included in the two Informations since he was utilized as a
state witness and placed under the witness protection program of the government. It must be noted that prosecutorial
powers include the discretion of granting immunity to an accused in exchange for testimony against another.[118] And the
fact that an individual had not been previously charged or included in an Information does not prevent the prosecution
from utilizing said person as a witness.[119]

In People v. Bohol, the Court held that the fact that an accused has been "discharged as a state witness and was no
longer prosecuted for the crime charged does not render his testimony incredible or lessen its probative weight."[120]

The testimony of Rosales was not rebutted by the accused. His narration of the events transpiring from December 7 to 13,
1994 leading up to the actual kidnapping on December 14, 1994 cohesively showed the specific roles of the other
accused relative to the instant crime. Although the Court believes that he had a greater role than what he testified to as
being merely coerced. Be that as it may, it would not change the fact that in his participation of the crime, he knew and
clearly pointed out the specific roles of the accused in the conspiracy and actual execution of the kidnapping and the
carnapping.

The testimonies of police officers from the PACC corroborated the transfer of the Patrick to Chung at around or shortly
before midnight of December 15, 1994 in the parking lot of Philippine Westin Plaza.

It bears stressing that prosecution witnesses Maricel Hipos, Eric Teng and state witness Jason Rosales never wavered in
their testimonies under rigorous cross-examination by the various counsels representing the accused during trial. The
same holds true with the testimonies of the PACC police officers.

In fine, when the credibility of witnesses is in issue, the trial court's assessment is accorded great weight unless it is
shown that it has overlooked a certain fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case.[121] In the instant
case, we find no fact or circumstance of substance overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated by the courts a quo,
except as to that of Bobby Bringas.

Third. The prosecution witnesses PACC police officers gave clear, credible and straightforward testimonies on what
transpired on their end regarding the kidnapping: their monitoring of the negotiation, the surveillance of Chung and the
arrest of the accused. Their testimonies were not at all rebutted. In fact, as aptly narrated by Police Chief Inspector Tucay,
accused-appellants Chung and Navarro could not deny seeing each other in the evening of December 15, 1994 in the
vicinity of their houses in Paco, their subsequent meeting at the Bowling Inn and at the Philippine Westin Plaza. After his
arrest in the house of Eric Teng, Chung supplied to the PACC the names and identities of Jimboy Bringas and Navarro
which led to their arrest at past 1 p.m. on December 16, 1994 in Malate. And, after his arrest, Jimboy Bringas in turn
pinpointed to the PACC operatives led by Police Chief Inspector Tucay the other accused who were arrested in
Pampanga late in the afternoon and early evening of December 16, 1994.

Fourth. From the defense testimonies of Jimboy Bringas, Ross, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Calaguas--upon the backdrop of
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses--they collectively point to Chung and Navarro as the brains of the kidnapping.
Pajarillo, however, asserted that his co-accused Navarro is not the same person as the mastermind Navarro. This
assertion, however, fails vis-á -vis the testimony of Rosales and other accused who testified that Navarro worked closely
with Chung.

Second Core Issue: Presence of Conspiracy

Kidnapping for ransom proven

beyond reasonable doubt

The crime of Kidnapping and serious illegal detention, under Art. 267125 of the RPC, has the following elements:

(1) the offender is a private individual; not either of the parents of the victim or a public officer who has a duty under the
law to detain a person;

(2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;

(3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and

(4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days;
(b) it is committed by simulating public authority;
(c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made or
(d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.126

It must be noted that when the victim is a minor and the accused is any of the parents, the crime is Inducing a minor to
abandon his home defined and penalized under the second paragraph of Art. 271 of the RPC. While if it is a public officer
who has a duty under the law to detain a person but detains said person without any legal ground is liable for Arbitrary
detention defined and penalized under Art. 124 of the RPC.

The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of
intent of the accused to effect the same.127 Moreover, if the victim is a minor, or the victim is kidnapped and illegally
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention becomes inconsequential.128 Ransom means
money, price or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that will release him from
captivity.129

In the instant case, all the elements of the crime of kidnapping for ransom has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
The accused are all private individuals. The kidnapping of Patrick Teng, then three years old, a minor is undisputed. That
ransom was demanded and paid is established. The only issue to be resolved is whether the accused are equally guilty of
kidnapping for ransom having conspired with each other.

Duly-Proven Conspiracy

Accused-appellants uniformly assail the court a quo's findings of conspiracy in the commission of the kidnapping for
ransom of Patrick Teng. Our assiduous review of the records of the case shows the presence of conspiracy. However, we
fail to appreciate the direct participation of Bobby Bringas in the conspiracy. Thus, accused-appellants Jimboy Bringas,
Chung and Navarro together with the other accused Pajarillo, Sulayao, Ross and Calaguas are equally guilty and liable
for the crime charged for having conspired to commit and did commit kidnapping for ransom of Patrick.

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it. It may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence consisting of acts, words or conduct of the alleged
conspirators before, during and after the commission of the felony to achieve a common design or purpose.130

Proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be inferred from the conduct of the parties
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. Corollarily, it is not
necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement setting out the details of
an unlawful scheme or the details by which an illegal objective is to be carried out.131

To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity--mere presence when the transaction was made does not necessarily lead to
an inference of concurrence with the criminal design to commit the crime.132 Moreover, the same degree of proof
necessary to prove the crime is required to support a finding of criminal conspiracy.133

The testimony of state witness Rosales is the lynchpin by which the conspiracy is proven. Jimboy Bringas brought
together Rosales, Calaguas and Sulayao from Pampanga, while Rosales brought in Ross and Pajarillo from Laguna.
They thus formed the team, although Jimboy Bringas did not join the team but was in on the sharing of the ransom.
Together with Chung, Navarro and two others (Glenn Sangalang and Ricky Castillo), they proceeded to Eric's house on
December 14, 1994 and kidnapped Patrick. Verily, a conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal
than by any other method.134

Together with Ricky Castillo and Rosales, accused Ross, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Calaguas actively participated in the
kidnapping. Ross drove

one of the cars. Pajarillo, Sulayao and Calaguas entered the house with Rosales. Calaguas poked a gun at Maricel.
Pajarillo gagged and bound Maricel. The others herded the house helpers, the kids and Sweeney to the second floor.
They took Patrick after binding everyone except Mikee Teng. Then they brought Patrick to Pampanga. In all, they carried
out a concerted plan of kidnapping and detaining Patrick until they were given word to bring back the child to Manila which
they did the very next day shortly before midnight at the Philippine Westin Plaza.

Then they went back to Pampanga, apparently to await their share of the ransom money. Clearly, Ross' testimony that he
is employed as a driver who can earn so much as PhP5,000 in a day and can ill afford to be absent is belied by his
accompanying the others to Pampanga after they delivered Patrick Teng to Chung on December 15, 1994 shortly before
midnight. And he continued to stay in Pampanga with the others until his arrest on December 16, 1994 while on a drinking
spree. In all, he was absent from work from the 14th until the 16th of December 1994.

Jimboy Bringas evidently participated in the planning and the subsequent execution of the conspiracy by bringing in
Calaguas and Sulayao from Pampanga. Together with them, he met with Chung and Navarro. And together with Rosales
he went to Laguna to fetch Pajarillo and Ross. In effect, he recruited or brought in the team that would carry out the
kidnapping. He knows the other accused and was the one who went with the PACC team led by Police Chief Inspector
Tucay to Pampanga in the late afternoon of December 16, 1994 and identified them to be arrested.

Rosales' actuations, first in ringing the doorbell at the gate and urging Maricel to open it and in asking for the car key and
taking the Toyota Corolla of Eric do not tend to show that he was merely coerced. This is, however, academic considering
his turning state witness.

Accused-appellant Navarro's assertion that he was only implicated fails to persuade. His direct involvement in the
conspiracy is clearly shown in that: (1) the testimony of Rosales shows Navarro's involvement with Chung; (2) the
unanimous testimonies of Calaguas, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Ross to the effect that Navarro was together with Chung in
their meetings before the kidnapping and Navarro was with them when they went to Eric Teng's place on December 14,
1994; (3) Navarro's admission caught on camera during the December 17, 1994 press conference that he made calls to
negotiate the ransom which bolsters Eric's testimony that he recognized the voice of Navarro as the negotiator calling his
residence; (4) Navarro received PhP100,000 from Chung in the evening of December 15, 1994 at the Bowling Inn; (5)
Navarro was with Chung when Patrick Teng was delivered by the other accused in the parking lot of Philippine Westin
Plaza.

Similarly, accused-appellant Chung's assertion that he was only implicated flies from logic given that not only Rosales
pinned him as the mastermind but that the other accused testified to the effect that together with Navarro he orchestrated
the kidnapping. The foregoing clearly shows his involvement: (1) per Pajarillo's admission during the December 17, 1994
press conference, Chung provided the guns; (2) Chung's admission to Eric through a phone call he made at noon on
December 16, 1994 asking pardon and forgiveness; (3) Chung gave misleading information to Eric about his being
intercepted when he was supposed to deliver the ransom money; (4) Chung proceeded to his parents' place in Paco and
gave PhP50,000 from the ransom money to his mother; (5) Chung left the remaining PhP2.35 million in his parents' place
without telling Eric about it; (6) Chung took Patrick from the other accused at the parking lot of Philippine Westin Plaza
shortly before midnight of December 15, 1994 without paying the ransom; (7) Chung brought Patrick back home without
telling Eric upon their arrival about the ransom money.

Where the acts of the accused collectively and individually demonstrate the existence of a common design towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose, conspiracy is evident, and all the perpetrators will be liable as principals.135

Bobby Bringas' participation either

as accomplice or as co-conspirator not
established

As to Bobby Bringas, it is undisputed that he did not participate in the actual kidnapping. He was in Pampanga from
December 10, 1994 until he was arrested together with the others on December 16, 1994. It may be true that the other
accused brought Patrick to Bobby Bringas' place but it was not shown that Bobby Bringas took care of Patrick as the
group moved to different places. It was neither clearly shown that Bobby Bringas recruited the other accused to carry out
the kidnapping. It was only Rosales' testimony that Bobby Bringas asked him to drive. Aside from that, the fact alone that
the other accused went to his place does not point to his direct involvement in the conspiracy considering that he knows
them. He worked as driver for the mother of Rosales and Pajarillo is his kumpare. There is therefore no clear and
convincing evidence of Bobby Bringas' direct involvement either in the kidnapping of Patrick or in the conspiracy to its
commission.

In the absence of evidence showing the direct participation of the accused in the commission of the crime, conspiracy
must be established by clear and convincing evidence in order to convict the accused.136 Given our observation that the
involvement of Rosales was not merely of a person under coercion, there is reasonable doubt as to Bobby Bringas'
involvement for it was Jimboy Bringas who brought or recruited Sulayao and Calaguas from Pampanga. There is
therefore a palpable reasonable doubt of the existence of conspiracy on the part of Bobby Bringas. The presence of
reasonable doubt as to the existence of conspiracy suffices to negate not only the participation of the accused in the
commission of the offense as principal but also, in the absence of proof implicating the accused as accessory or
accomplice, the criminal liability of the accused.137Consequently, Bobby Bringas must be acquitted from the crime of
kidnapping for ransom.

The penalty for kidnapping for ransom under Art. 267 of the RPC, as amended, would have been the supreme penalty of
death. However, the passage of RA 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty has banned the death
penalty and reduced all death sentences to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.138

Award of damages modified

Anent the award of damages, we find proper the award of actual damages against Navarro in the amount of PhP 100,000
with legal interest of 12 from December 15, 1994 until fully paid. We, however, find the award of PhP 5 million as moral
damages and PhP 2 million as exemplary damages to be exorbitant and not in accord with jurisprudence.

In line with current jurisprudence,139 an award of PhP 50,000 as civil indemnity is proper. An award of PhP 200,000 as
moral damages is likewise proper considering the minority of Patrick.140 Moreover, when the crime of kidnapping is
attended by a demand for ransom, by way of example or correction, PhP 100,000 exemplary damages is also proper.141

With the affirmance of the conviction of accused appellants Jimboy Bringas, Navarro and Chung, they are jointly and
severally liable together with Ross, Pajarillo, Sulayao and Calaguas for the payment of the damages awarded.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appeals of accused-appellants Christopher Bringas, John Robert Navarro and Eden Sy Chung
are DENIED; while the appeal of accused-appellant Bryan Bringas is GRANTED. Accordingly, the January 3, 2006
Decision and June 6, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00911 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as the amount of the damages awarded and the acquittal of Bryan
Bringas. As modified, the dispositive portion of the March 26, 1999 Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 258
in Parañaque City, pertaining to Criminal Case No. 95-137, for Kidnapping for Ransom, shall read:

In Criminal Case No. 95-137, for KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act no. 7659, finding accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia; JOHN
ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; ROGER CALAGUAS y Jimenez; and EDEN SY CHUNG guilty
beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for
parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.

The instant criminal charge is DISMISSED as to accused ERICSON PAJARILLO y Baser and EDGARDO SULAYAO y
Petilla on account of their death pursuant to Article 89, 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

The accused JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz is hereby directed to pay Eric Teng the sum of PhP100,000.00 as actual
damages with interest thereon at the legal rate of 12 from December 15, 1994 until fully paid.

The accused CHRISTOPHER BRINGAS y Garcia; JOHN ROBERT NAVARRO y Cruz; ARUEL ROSS y Picardo; ROGER
CALAGUAS y Jimenez; ERICSON PAJARILLO y Baser; EDGARDO SULAYAO y Petilla and EDEN SY CHUNG are
directed to pay Eric Teng jointly and severally the amount of PhP50,000.00 as civil indemnity, PhP200,000.00 as moral
damages; and PhP100,000.00 as exemplary damages and to pay the costs.

Accused BRYAN BRINGAS y GARCIA is hereby ACQUITTED for reasonable doubt as to his involvement.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 222965

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
USTADZ IBRAHIM ALI y KALIM, ABDUL HASSAN AND TWO OTHER COMPANIONS IDENTIFED ONLY AS "JUL"
AND "AMAT," Accused,
USTADZ IBRAHIM ALI y KALIM, Accused-Appellant.

This is an appeal from the 30 April 2015 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00473-MIN, which
affirmed the 30 July 1999 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Zamboanga City (RTC), in Criminal Case No.
15599, finding accused Ustadz Ibrahim Ali y Kalim (Ali) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention, defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

THE FACTS

In an Information dated 17 December 1998, Ali, together with Abdul Hassan (Hassan), and individuals identified as "Jul"
and Amat," were charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the RPC. Only Ali
was the subject of the criminal proceedings because his co-accused Hassan, Jul, and Amat remain at large. The
accusatory portion of the information reads:

That on or about December 14, 1998, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused being then armed with high powered firearm, conspiring and confederating together,
mutually aiding and assisting with one another, by means of force and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, KIDNAP the person of CHRISTIA OLIZ y EUCOGCO, a young woman, 19 years old, particularly on the
occasion when she was together with her employer named Antonio Yu Lim Bo and the latter's wife and daughter, on
board a Blue Nissan Vehicle then driven by one Rene Igno who was ordered by the herein accused to stop said vehicle
somewhere at the vicinity of EAAB at Sta. Maria Road, this City, and thereafter through intimidation, commandeered and
drove said vehicle with all its occupants aboard towards San Roque and finally to the area of Pitogo beach with the clear
intention on the part of the accused to extort ransom money from said victim or other person; however, when victim
Christia Oliz alighted from the vehicle and was walking towards the direction of Pitogo beach she was able to run away
and with the timely assistance of some residents thereat as well as the arrival of the police authorities, prompted all the
accused to escape except accused Ustadz Ibrahim Ali y Kalim who was arrested thus briefly depriving the liberty of said
victim against her will; furthermore, the commission of said crime has been attended by the aggravating circumstance of
NIGHT TIME AND USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE.3

During his arraignment, Ali, duly assisted by counsel, pleaded "Not Guilty."4

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution presented six (6) witnesses, namely: Senior Police Officer 2 Salvador F. Arcillas, Police Inspector Jesus
Belarga, private complainant Christia Oliz (Oliz), Police Inspector Jose Bayani Gucela, Mario C. Agarte, Police Officer 3
Bernardino Bayot. Their combined testimonies tended to establish the following:

On 14 December 1998, at around 7:30 P.M., Antonio Lim (Antonio), Mary Lim (Mary), and Cherry Lim (Cherry) left their
family-owned grocery and were on their way to their house in Pasonanca, Zamboanga City, on board a Nissan vehicle.
With them were their driver Rene Igno (Jgno) and Oliz, their helper.5

When they were near Edwin Andrews Airbase (EAAB) along Sta. Maria Road, Igno stopped the car to avoid bumping into
a motorcycle with three persons on board. The three men, later identified as Ali, Hassan, and Amat, approached the
Nissan vehicle and told the passengers that they were policemen.6 They ordered Antonio and Igno to transfer to the back
of the vehicle and sit with Oliz, Mary, and Cherry. The passengers were told that they would be brought to the police
station on a tip that they were transporting contraband goods. Thereafter, the three armed men boarded the Nissan
vehicle with Amat in the driver's seat, Ali beside him, and Hassan at the back with the other passengers. Once inside, Ali
instructed Hassan to handcuff Igno and Antonio.7

Amat did not stop when they reached the Sta. Maria police station but kept on driving. Due to the buildup of traffic at the
intersection after the Sta. Maria police station, Mary was able to escape her captors by jumping out of the vehicle.8
Amat continued to drive towards Pitogo and then veered towards the beach. There, the occupants were ordered to alight
from the vehicle. Oliz was able to escape when she saw a woman walking nearby because only Antonio, Cherry, and Igno
were guarded. She then told the woman that her employer was being kidnapped.9

Oliz was then accompanied to a nearby house where they contacted the authorities. Before the police arrived, Oliz heard
a commotion outside and saw bystanders mauling Ali. Oliz told the people around that he was their abductor. When the
police arrived, Ali was turned over to the authorities who brought him to the police station together with Oliz.10

Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented four (4) witnesses, namely: Ali's sister Nauda Ali (Nauda), Ali's wife Rahima
Saulan (Rahima), Ali's cousin Siddik Alfad Abubakar (Siddik), and the accused himself. Their testimonies sought to prove
the following:

On 14 December 1998, Ali, Rahima, and Nauda left Manalipa to proceed to Sinunuc and stay in Siddik's house before
going home to Pagadian City. On their way to Sinunuc, they parted ways in Zamboanga City because Ali wanted to pray
at the Sta. Barbara Mosque; Rahima and Nauda went ahead to Siddik's place.11

At around 7:00 P.M., while Ali was waiting outside the Mosque for a ride to Sinunuc, he met Hassan, who was riding a
motorcycle with Amat. Hassan told him to ride with them as they would be going somewhere in Recodo. When they were
near the EAAB, Hassan overtook a motor vehicle and almost collided with it. Amat approached the driver of the motor
vehicle while Hassan went to the other side. Amat and Hassan eventually boarded the vehicle with the latter forcing Ali to
do the same. Hassan pushed Ali inside while he was holding a gun and told him to follow or he would be in trouble.
Meanwhile, Hassan ordered a certain Jun12 to ride the motorcycle and follow them.13

As Amat was driving, Ali asked what they were doing but was told to stop talking and just follow. Upon reaching Sinunuc,
Ali asked Amat to stop the vehicle so he could get off but he was ignored. Eventually, they stopped at the seashore of
Pitogo.14

There, all the occupants alighted with Hassan and Amat escorting and guarding Antonio, Cherry, Igno, and Oliz further
down the seashore. Ali remained by the vehicle. Later, Jun arrived on Hassan's motorcycle. After sensing something
suspicious with his companions, Ali decided to walk away and proceed to the main road to catch a ride to Sinunuc. While
he was waiting for transportation, several persons suddenly held him and beat him up, accusing him of being a thief. Ali
was eventually brought to a house where the beatings continued.15

After a few minutes, policemen arrived at the house where Ali was held. He was made to board the police vehicle where
he was blindfolded and beaten again. Ali was detained at the police station where he was forced to admit to the
kidnapping.16

The RTC Ruling

In its 30 July 1999 decision, the RTC found Ali guilty of violating Article 267 of the RPC, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused IBRAHIMALIyKALIMGUILTYBEYONDREASONABLEDOUBT as principal

of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention defined and penalized under Article 267, paragraphs 2 and of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 8 of Republic Act No. 7659, and SENTENCES said accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSIONPERPETUA with the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.17

Aggrieved, Ali appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed 30 April 2015 decision, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the instant Appeal is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated 30 July 1999 of the
trial court is AFFIRMED in toto.18

Hence, this appeal, anchored on the following:

 ISSUES

WHETHER THE ACCUSED IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION; AND

II

WHETHER THE ACCUSED WAS IDENTIFIED WITH MORAL CERTAINTY.

THE COURT'S RULING

The appeal has no merit.

Period of detention immaterial if

victim is a female

Ali argues that he could not be guilty of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention because the alleged deprivation of liberty did
not last for more than three (3) days as the incident only lasted for about an hour or two. In order for the accused to be
guilty of serious illegal detention, the following elements must concur: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he or she
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must
be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed by simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries
are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill the victim are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.19

In other words, deprivation of liberty is qualified to serious illegal detention if at least one of the following circumstances
exists: (a) detention lasts for more than three (3) days; (b) accused simulated public authority; (c) victim suffers serious
physical injuries or is threatened to be killed; or (d) the victim is a minor, female or public officer.

In the case at bar, the elements of serious illegal detention were duly proven by the prosecution. First, Ali and his cohorts
were clearly private individuals. Second, they deprived Oliz of her liberty. This was manifested by the fact that they forcibly
boarded the vehicle and placed Igno and Antonio in handcuffs evincing their intent to detain the occupants of the motor
vehicle. Third, Oliz was a female victim. The CA was correct in ruling that the period of detention became immaterial in
view of the victim's circumstances. If, during the deprivation of liberty, any of the circumstances under Article 267(4) of the
RPC occurs, i.e, the victim was a female, the crime of serious illegal detention is consummated.20

Intent to detain or restrain the

victim's movement is tantamount to
illegal detention.

Ali likewise assails that there was insufficient evidence to hold that he forcefully transported, locked up or restrained Oliz
and her companions especially considering that the alleged handcuffs were never presented in court. The essence of
serious illegal detention is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with the indubitable proof of intent of the
accused to effect such deprivation-it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home.21 It contemplates situations
where the victim is restricted or impeded in one's liberty to move.22 Oliz's testimony clearly demonstrates the intent of the
accused to deprive her and her companions of their liberty, to wit:

FISCAL NUVAL:

Q: Aside from asking the license of the driver, what else did they tell you?

A: They told us there was a tip that we were bringing contraband goods.

Q: Did they identify themselves?

A: Yes.
Q: What did they tell you?

A: They said that they are policemen.

Q: Then, what happen (sic) after that?

A: They went inside our vehicle and they asked the driver and this Boa to transfer at the back seat, together with us.

xxxx

Q: You said three persons approached your vehicle two of them went inside the front seat, one on the behind the steering
wheel (sic) and other one sitting beside him and the other one went at the back of that vehicle, now, tell us where did this
accused sat (sic)?

A: At the front seat also.

Q: Was he behind the steering wheel?

A: No, he was sitting at the side of the driver.

Q: And after he sat beside the driver's seat, what did this person do?

A: He instructed that Rene will be handcuffed.

Q: To whom did he instruct to handcuffed (sic) this Rene?

A: His companion, the one sitted (sic) at the back.

Q: What did this person at the back do, after this accused instructed him to handcuffed (sic) Rene Egno?

A: Then his companion handcuffed Egno.

xxxx

COURT:

Then after Sta. Maria, road, where did you proceed?

A: Then they said we will brought (sic) to the police station.

[FISCAL NUVAL:]

Q: Were you able to go the police station?

A: None, (sic) we just passed by.23

Oliz's testimony clearly shows the intent of Ali and his cohorts to deprive the liberty and restrain the movement of the
occupants of the motor vehicle. They misrepresented themselves as policemen and claimed they would bring Oliz and her
companions to the police station; but they never got there and were let go only when they arrived at Pitogo. Further, Oliz
categorically stated that Ali ordered his companions to handcuff Antonio and Igno. As pointed out by the CA, Oliz's
testimony demonstrates that her freedom of movement was effectively restrained by the abductors who exercised
complete control and dominion over the person of the victims.

Otiz identified Ali as the accused in a

categorical and straightforward
manner.
Ali also challenges Oliz's identification of him claiming that her testimony was marred with inconsistencies and that she
was only able to identify him after reading the newspapers two days after the incident. We have held that inconsistencies
on immaterial details do not negate the probative value of the testimony of a witness regarding the very act of the
accused.24 In fact, minor inconsistencies tend to strengthen the credibility of the witness because it shows that the
testimony was not rehearsed.25

In the case at bar, the inconsistencies, e.g., the position of the occupants inside the vehicle, assailed by Ali, pertain to
trivial matters. On the contrary, Oliz remained consistent in identifying Ali as one of those involved in the kidnapping, viz:

FISCAL NUVAL:

xxxx

Q: Now, madam witness, can you recognize those three persons who approached you and identified themselves as
policemen and that person who went inside that car, can you identify those three persons?

A: Yes.

Q: Are they inside this courtroom, will you please look around and tell us if they are inside this courtroom? A: There is one
here.

COURT:

Go down and touch him

A: (Witness went down from the witness stand and approached the accused and at the same time holding his hand, and
when the accused was asked, identified himself as Ibrahim Ali).

xxxx

[Cross-Examination]

ATTY. PAK.AM: xxx

Q: Madam witness, how far were you sitted (sic) to the rear of the car from accused Ibrahim Ali? From where you were
sitted (sic) to the rear of the car, how far were you to Ibrahim Ali?

A: Ten inches in distance.

Q: You were sitted (sic) ten inches according to you, from Ibrahim Ali, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: Is there a bar that separates you from Ibrahim Ali?

A: Yes.

Q: What is this?

A: Just after the seat from the driver there is a sort of bar, a wall or bar, it is an iron bar.

xxxx

Q: You said accused Ibrahim Ali instructed that Rene be handcuffed, who did he give the instruction?

A: He instructed his companion to handcuffed (sic) Rene.26

Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity.27 In order that identification be deemed with moral certainty
enough to overcome the presumption of innocence, it must be impervious to skepticism on account of its
distinctiveness.28 Such distinctiveness is achieved through identification evidence which encompass unique physical
features or characteristics like the face, voice or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the rest of
humanity.29 In the case at bar, it is unquestionable that Ali was identified with moral certainty. Oliz was able to distinguish
and identify accused considering their proximity inside the vehicle and the duration of the captivity. Thus, she was
intimately familiar with Ali's facial features and voice-enough to lend credibility to her identification of the accused.

Ali's contention that Oliz was only able to identify him after reading the newspaper is erroneous. During cross-
examination, she merely stated that she became aware of Ali's name after reading the dailies. To wit:

ATTY. PAKAM:

Q: Now, specifically you mentioned the name Ali Ibrahim, by the way, do you know Ali Ibrahim before? A: No.

Q: When did you come to know the name Ali Ibrahim?

A: At the police station and in the newspaper.

Q: You come to know the name Ali Ibrahim thru newspaper and police station, where?

A: Southcom.

Q: So, not at the police station?

A: At Southcom.

Q: Who told you that his person's name is Ali Ibrahim?

A: When I read the newspaper.

Q: When did you read the newspaper?

A: Last December 16.30

Clearly, the only information Oliz derived from newspapers or third-party sources is the name of the accused. It was
reasonably expected that she would be oblivious of Ali's name because the latter was a stranger to her prior to the
abduction. Nevertheless, Oliz was able to sufficiently and consistently identify Ali as her abductor even if she did not know
his name.

Further, Ali challenging his identification is absurd considering that he himself admits his presence during the abduction.
In his cross-examination, he narrated:

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

xxxx

Q: Now, you said you overtook a jeep. What kind of a jeep was this, will you please describe?

A: Well, I do not know what kind of a jeep is this.

Q: Is that the color blue?

A: Yes.

Q: Is it a pick up type?
A: Well, I do not know. I did not examine.

COURT:

Q: Is it not a fact that you were following this jeep while it was travelling in front of you before you overtook it?

A: Yes, Your Honor, but, I do not know, I was not thinking that it will happen like that Your Honor.

Q: Since when did you notice that you were following this blue jeep?

A: When we were already near the gate of that Air Base Your Honor.

Q: But, before you overtook this jeep you already noticed that this jeep was travelling ahead of you?

A: I do not know, Your Honor. I was not thinking about that jeep Your Honor.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

Q: And this Hassan, when you overtook this jeep almost bumped this jeep?

A: Yes.

Q: And he purposely stopped this motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: And, he also make the motorcycle fell on the ground (sic), correct?

A: No. Well, it was not the motorcycle, he was just about to fall down.

Q: Were you able to fall down?

A: No.

Q: So, what did he do with his motorcycle?

A: It was on a stop, standing.

Q: And then, what happened next?

A: All of us alighted.

Q: What about the motorcycle?

A: It was just in front of the jeep.

COURT:

Q: You blocked the jeep?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

Q: So, the jeep had no choice but to stop otherwise, it will run over your motorcycle?
A: Yes.

Q: Did the driver of the jeep apply the break so as to avoid running over the motorcycle which stopped in front?

A: Yes, Your Honor.

xxxx

1awp++i1

PROSECUTOR NUVAL:

Q: And then, you said the three of you approached the driver?

A: No.

Q: So, when you stopped, was it parked purposely in front of the jeep, this motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: With its stand?

A: Yes.

Q: And, you alighted from the motorcycle?

A: Yes.

Q: Who alighted first from the motorcycle?

A: It was Ahmad, the one driving.

Q: And followed by you?

A: Then we were together with Hassan who alighted from the motorcycle.

Q: And then, when you alighted from that motorcycle, what did you do?

A: I was just there at the side of the motorcycle.

Q: And, what did this Ahmad do?

A: I approached the driver.

Q: What about Abduhassan, what did he do?

A: Abduhassan, went to the right side of the jeep and I was called by him.

Q: How did he call you?

A: You (sic) said, "you come with me".

Q: Did you approach him?

A: Well, I was following him from behind.

Q: And what happened Mr. Witness?

A: Then, he instructed me to go up immediately in that jeep so that we will not be in trouble.

Q: You went immediately? Okey (sic). Who was the driver of that jeep at that time?

A: When I boarded already the jeep, I saw Ahmad was already in the place of the driver.

xxxx

Q: Okey (sic), from the Air Base, you said, this Abduhassan called you. And voluntarily, you approached him?

A: I was just behind.

Q: And, he asked you to go inside the vehicle?

A: Yes, I was instructed to go up in fact, he was pushing me.

Q: He just pushed you, no more no less?

A: Yes, I was being pushed.

Q: Did he not poke his gun to you and threatened you to go inside?

A: No. I was just pushed.

Q: He did not also utter any words which threatened you if you will not go with them, Mr. Witness?

A: No, but what he said was just to hurry up in going up that vehicle so that there will be no trouble.

Q: So you just followed his command, you also hurriedly went up inside that jeep?

A: Well, I did not hurry but, I just went up the jeep. And according to him, to avoid trouble.31

Instead of refuting the version of Oliz, Ali's testimony in fact corroborates its material points. He admitted that he was with
Hassan and Amat when their motorcycle stopped in front of the Nissan vehicle; and that the three decided to board the
vehicle and take control. Ali merely denied his participation feigning that Hassan coerced him.

This, however, is refuted by the categorical and straightforward testimony of Oliz that it was Ali who was giving commands
to his companions. Thus, he could not have been an unwilling participant as he was in fact the one calling the shots.
Further, even if Ali were to be believed, nothing in his testimony shows that Hassan exerted such force or coercion or
uttered threats that would have deprived Ali with the free exercise of his will. Absent any showing that Oliz was motivated
by ill will to falsely testify against Ali, her testimony should be granted credence32 especially since it was candid,
straightforward, and devoid of any material inconsistencies.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 30 April 2015 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00473-
MIN is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207949               July 23, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO DIONALDO y EBRON, RENATO DIONALDO y EBRON, MARIANO GARIGUEZ, JR. y RAMOS, and
RODOLFO LARIDO y EBRON, Accused-Appellants.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1 dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 02888 finding accused-appellants Armando Dionaldo y Ebron (Armando), Renato Dionaldo y Ebron
(Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr. y Ramos (Mariano), and Rodolfo Larido y Ebron (Rodolfo) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention.

The Facts

At around 8 o'clock in the morning of May 16, 2003, Roderick Navarro (Roderick) dropped his brother Edwin Navarro
(Edwin) off at the Health Is Wealth Gym in Caloocan City. Thirty minutes later, he received a text message from another
brother who told him that Edwin had been kidnapped.2 Records show that three (3) men, later identified as Armando,
Renato, and Mariano, forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin down the stairway of the gym and pushed him inside a dark
green Toyota car with plate number UKF 194.3 Upon receiving the message, Roderick immediately reported the incident
to the police. At around 10 o’clock in the morning of the same day, he received a phone call from Edwin‟s kidnappers who
threatened to kill Edwin if he should report the matter to the police.4

The following day, Roderick received another call from the kidnappers, who demanded the payment of ransom money in
the amount of ₱15,000,000.00. Roderick told them he had no such money, as he only had ₱50,000.00. On May 19, 2003,
after negotiations over the telephone, the kidnappers agreed to release Edwin in exchange for the amount of
₱110,000.00. Roderick was then instructed to bring the money to Batangas and wait for their next call.5

At around 7:30 in the evening of the same day, as Roderick was on his way to Batangas to deliver the ransom money, the
kidnappers called and instructed him to open all the windows of the car he was driving and to turn on the hazard light
when he reaches the designated place. After a while, Roderick received another call directing him to exit in Bicutan
instead and proceed to C-5 until he arrives at the Centennial Village. He was told to park beside the Libingan ng mga
Bayani. After several hours, an orange Mitsubishi car with plate number DEH 498 pulled up in front of his vehicle where
four (4) men alighted. Roderick saw one of the men take a mobile phone and upon uttering the word "alat," the men
returned to their car and drove away.6

Meanwhile, a team had been organized to investigate the kidnapping of Edwin, headed by SPO3 Romeo Caballero
(SPO3 Caballero) and PO3 Nestor Acebuche (PO3 Acebuche) of the Camp Crame Police Anti-Crime Emergency
Response (PACER). During the course of the investigation, Rodolfo, an employee at the Health Is Wealth Gym,
confessed to PO3 Acebuche that he was part of the plan to kidnap Edwin, as in fact he was the one who tipped off
Mariano, Renato, Armando and a certain Virgilio7 Varona8 (Virgilio) on the condition that he will be given a share in the
ransom money. Rodolfo gave information on the whereabouts of his cohorts, leading to their arrest on June 12, 2003. In
the early morning of the following day or on June 13, 2003, the PACER team found the dead body of Edwin at Sitio
Pugpugan Laurel, Batangas, which Roderick identified.9

Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information10 which reads:

That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then private persons, did
then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior
strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of extorting
ransom as in fact a demand of ₱15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the victim’s release and on the occasion
thereof, the death of the victim resulted.

Contrary to law.
During arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty11 and interposed the defenses of denial and alibi. Except for
Rodolfo, they individually claimed that on said date and time, they were in their respective houses when they were taken
by men in police uniforms, then subsequently brought to Camp Crame, and there allegedly tortured and detained. On the
other hand, Rodolfo, for himself, averred that at around 8 o’clock in the evening of June 12, 2003, while walking on his
way home, he noticed that a van had been following him. Suddenly, four (4) persons alighted from the vehicle, boarded
him inside, blindfolded him, and eventually tortured him. He likewise claimed that he was made to sign an extrajudicial
confession, purporting too that while a certain Atty. Nepomuceno had been summoned to assist him, the latter failed to do
so.12

During trial, the death of the victim, Edwin, was established through a Certificate of Death13 with Registry No. 2003-050
(subject certificate of death) showing that he died on May 19, 2003 from a gunshot wound on the head.

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision14 dated June 13, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 129 (RTC), in Crim. Case No. C-
68329, convicted accused-appellants of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing each of them to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

It gave credence to the positive and straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which clearly established
that it was the accusedappellants who forcibly dragged a bloodied Edwin into a car and, consequently, deprived him of his
liberty.15 In light thereof, it rejected accused-appellants‟ respective alibis and claims of torture, which were not
substantiated. It also held that the crime of Kidnapping had been committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, which is
punishable by death. However, in view of the suspended imposition of the death penalty pursuant to Republic Act No.
(RA) 9346,16 only the penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed.17 Further, the RTC found that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime, as the accused-appellants’ individual participation was geared toward a joint purpose and
criminal design.18

Notably, while the RTC found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses prove that the victim Edwin was abducted,
deprived of liberty, and eventually killed,19 a fact which is supported by the subject certificate of death, it did not consider
said death in its judgment. The CA Ruling

In a Decision20 dated February 15, 2013, the CA affirmed in toto the RTC’s conviction of accused-appellants, finding that
the prosecution was able to clearly establish all the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention,
namely: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of
his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (2) it is committed
simulating public authority; (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats
to kill him are made; or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer.21 It likewise sustained the finding that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom, as sufficiently proven by the testimony of the brother of the victim.22 Moreover, the CA affirmed that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime, as the acts of accused-appellants emanated from the same purpose or common
design, and they were united in its execution.23

Separately, the CA found that accused-appellants’ claims of torture were never supported, and that Rodolfo voluntarily
signed the extrajudicial confession and was afforded competent and independent counsel in its execution.24

Aggrieved by their conviction, accused-appellants filed the instant appeal.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not accusedappellants are guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention.

The Court’s Ruling

The appeal is devoid of merit.

Well-settled is the rule that the question of credibility of witnesses is primarily for the trial court to determine. Its
assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and it is conclusive and binding unless shown to be
tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of weight and influence has not been
considered. Absent any showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight which would affect the result of the case, or that the judge acted arbitrarily, his assessment of the
credibility of witnesses deserves high respect by the appellate court.25

In this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, gave weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
which they found to be straightforward and consistent. Through these testimonies, it was clearly established that accused-
appellants, who were all private individuals, took the victim Edwin and deprived him of his liberty, which acts were illegal,
and for the purpose of extorting ransom.26 Thus, seeing no semblance of arbitrariness or misapprehension on the part of
the court a quo, the Court finds no compelling reason to disturb its factual findings on this score.1âwphi1

Anent the finding that conspiracy attended the commission of the crime, the Court likewise finds the conclusion of the
RTC in this regard, as affirmed by the CA, to be well-taken. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, and when conspiracy is established, the
responsibility of the conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of
their respective participations.27 In this relation, direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy, as it can be presumed
from and proven by the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of
interests.28 Hence, as the factual circumstances in this case clearly show that accused-appellants acted in concert at the
time of the commission of the crime and that their acts emanated from the same purpose or common design, showing
unity in its execution,29 the CA, affirming the trial court, correctly ruled that there was conspiracy among them.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the Court is, however, constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the
crime the accusedappellants have committed does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of
the victim’s (i.e., Edwin’s) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information,30 and (b) clearly established during
the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should
nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws
open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be
found in the appealed judgment.31

After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by RA 7659, Article 267 of the same Code now
provides:

Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any
other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:

1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or
a public officer;

The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the
offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing
acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (Emphases supplied)

The Court further elucidated in People v. Mercado:32

In People v. Ramos, the accused was found guilty of two separate heinous crimes of kidnapping for ransom and murder
committed on July 13, 1994 and sentenced to death. On appeal, this Court modified the ruling and found the accused
guilty of the "special complex crime" of kidnapping for ransom with murder under the last paragraph of Article 267, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This Court said:
x x x This amendment introduced in our criminal statutes the concept of „special complex crime‟ of kidnapping with
murder or homicide. It effectively eliminated the distinction drawn by the courts between those cases where the killing of
the kidnapped victim was purposely sought by the accused, and those where the killing of the victim was not deliberately
resorted to but was merely an afterthought. Consequently, the rule now is: Where the person kidnapped is killed in the
course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the
kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but
shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Art. 267, as amended by RA No.
7659.33 (Emphases supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, further taking into account the fact that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, accused-
appellants’ conviction must be modified from Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention to the special complex crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, which carries the penalty of death. As earlier intimated, the enactment of RA 9346
had suspended the imposition of the death penalty. This means that the accused-appellants could, as the CA and trial
court properly ruled, only be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. To this, the Court adds that the accused-
appellants are not eligible for parole.34

On a final note, the Court observes that the RTC and the CA failed to award civil indemnity as well as damages to the
family of the kidnap victim. In People v. Quiachon,35 the Court explained that even if the death penalty was not to be
imposed on accused-appellants in view of the prohibition in RA 9346, the award of civil indemnity was nonetheless
proper, not being dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the crime.36 In the present case, considering
that both the qualifying circumstances of ransom and the death of the victim during captivity were duly alleged in the
information and proven during trial, civil indemnity in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must therefore be awarded to the family
of the victim, to conform with prevailing jurisprudence.37

Similarly, the Court finds that the award of moral damages is warranted in this case. Under Article 2217 of the Civil Code,
moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, moral shock and
similar injury, while Article 2219 of the same Code provides that moral damages may be recovered in cases of illegal
detention. It cannot be denied, in this case, that the kidnap victim‟s family suffered mental anguish, fright, and serious
anxiety over the detention and eventually, the death of Edwin. As such, and in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,38 moral damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 must perforce be awarded to the family of the victim.

Finally, exemplary damages must be awarded in this case, in view of the confluence of the aforesaid qualifying
circumstances and in order to deter others from committing the same atrocious acts. In accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence,39 therefore, the Court awards exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to the family of the kidnap
victim.

In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from the date of
finality of judgment until fully paid, pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence.40

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated February 15, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 02888 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that all the accusedappellants herein are equally found
GUILTY of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, and are sentenced to each suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and to pay, jointly and severally, the family of the kidnap victim
Edwin Navarro the following amounts: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and (3)
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, all with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum ·from the date of finality of
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 143644              August 14, 2002

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUBIROSA PASTRANA y TEFORA, accused-appellant.

This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, convicting accused-appellant
Rubirosa Pastrana y Tefora of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and imposing upon her the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.

The information filed against accused-appellant reads:

That on or about March 16, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then entrusted with the
custody of one WILLY SIASON Y GARPEN,2 a minor child, nine (9) years of age, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap and detain said Willy Siason y Garpen, by then and there taking and carrying him away and
deliberately failed to restore him to his mother or guardian.

Contrary to law.3

When arraigned on April 7, 1999, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty.4 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The antecedent facts reveal that complainant Erma Postejo was then working as a domestic helper in Canada. She has
four children namely, Jenny, Doroteo, Aresola, and 9-year old Willy Garpen, Jr., her son by a common-law-relationship.5

Sometime in January 1997, while in Canada, Erma was introduced by her sister, Elma Saludarez6 to spouses Leopoldo
and Rebecca Frias who informed her that their daughter, accused-appellant Rubirosa Pastrana of Tondo, Manila, can
help process Willy’s travel documents to Canada. Erma agreed to hand the processing of her son’s papers to accused-
appellant and consequently sent her, on various occasions, Canadian dollars equivalent to a total of P18,300.00.7

On February 15, 1997, accused-appellant went to the house of Erma at 1229 Sampaguita St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan
City and introduced herself to the children of Erma as the one who will work out the processing of their travel documents
to Canada.8

In one of the telephone conversations of Erma and accused-appellant, the latter informed Erma that Willy was suffering
from acute bronchitis. Thus, Erma sent P5,610.00 to accused-appellant with the instruction that P3,000.00 thereof should
be given to her other son, Doroteo, and the balance to be spent for Willy’s medical treatment. Accused-appellant,
however, gave Doroteo only P2,500.00 and not P3,000.00 as instructed by Erma.9

On March 16, 1997, accused-appellant fetched Willy and Aresola from Caloocan and brought them to her apartment in
Tondo, for the purpose of bringing Willy to the hospital. On March 17, 1997, Aresola went home to attend her classes.
That same day, Erma called up accused-appellant who informed her that she was not able to bring Willy to the hospital
because she used the money to pay her personal obligations.10

On March 19, 1997, Erma learned that Willy had already been treated and that accused-appellant demanded P4,000.00
for the alleged expenses she incurred for Willy’s medical treatment. Accused-appellant also told Erma that the tap water in
Tondo is not safe for Willy, thus, she asked her to send P60,000.00 to purchase a water purifier. Likewise, accused-
appellant requested financial assistance from Erma for her job application in Singapore. Erma, however, refused to
transmit the amounts asked by accused-appellant and ordered her to return Willy to Caloocan but the latter ignored her.11

On March 25, 1997, Erma found out from Aresola that accused-appellant did not return Willy to Caloocan. Aresola then
tried to contact accused-appellant in Tondo, but she was told that she has left her apartment.12

On March 27, 1997, at around 11:00 a.m., accused-appellant went to Caloocan and informed Doroteo that Willy was
missing. He was allegedly last seen playing inside her apartment in the morning of March 26, 1997. They searched for
Willy but their efforts were fruitless.13

On April 24, 1997, Erma returned to the Philippines to look for her son. Through the help of the Volunteers Against Crime
and Corruption (VACC), Erma discovered that, contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, Willy was not actually treated
by Dr. Rebecca Nakpil Miranda.14
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the charges against her. She testified that she resided in an apartment in Tondo,
Manila, and used to work as a liaison officer of a travel agency. Sometime in February 1997, she received a letter from
her parents in Canada, requesting her to help Erma Postejo in the procurement of the travel papers of her son, Willy
Garpen. On February 15, 1997, she went to the house of Erma Postejo in Caloocan, and introduced herself to the children
of Erma. On March 16, 1997, she took Willy to her apartment in Tondo for the purpose of bringing him to Mary Johnston
Hospital, where he was treated by Dr. Rebecca Nakpil Miranda for acute bronchitis. On various occasions, she received
the total amounts of P18,000.00 and P5,610.00 from Erma for the expenses of Willy. On March 26, 1997, Willy
disappeared. She allegedly last saw him playing inside their apartment that morning.15

On the same day, she reported Willy’s disappearance to the authorities and did her best to find him. The following day,
March 27, 1997, she went to Erma’s relatives in Caloocan and informed them that Willy was missing. They searched for
Willy but to no avail.16

On May 11, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The decretal portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused, Rubirosa Pastrana, y Tefora, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences her to
suffer reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs. On the civil liability of the
accused she is ordered to pay the complainant moral damages and nominal damages in the sum of P500,000.00 and
P100,000.00, respectively, with interest thereon at the legal rate of 6% per annum from this date until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.17

Hence, the instant appeal based on the following assignment of errors:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS ENTRUSTED WITH THE CUSTODY OF WILLY
SIASON Y GARPEN (sic) (WILLY).

II

ASSUMING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS ENTRUSTED WITH THE CUSTODY OF WILLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED KIDNAPPED, DETAINED AND/OR DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE WILLY
TO HIS MOTHER OR GUARDIAN.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FOCUSING ON PERCEIVED WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE INSTEAD OF
DETERMINING WHETHER THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE IS STRONG ENOUGH TO MEET THE REQUISITE
STANDARD OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED AND IN NOT ACQUITTING HER ON THE GROUND OF
REASONABLE DOUBT.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ACCUSED TO PAY COMPLAINANT P500,000.00 MORAL DAMAGES
AND P100,000.00 NOMINAL DAMAGES, WITH INTEREST THEREON AT 6% PER ANNUM FROM DATE OF THE
JUDGMENT UNTIL FULL PAYMENT.18

Kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code has two essential elements, namely:
(1) the offender is entrusted with the custody of a minor person; and (2) the offender deliberately fails to restore the said
minor to his parents or guardians. What is actually being punished is not the kidnapping of the minor but rather the
deliberate failure of the custodian of the minor to restore the latter to his parents or guardians. The word deliberate as
used in Article 270 must imply something more than mere negligence - it must be premeditated, headstrong, foolishly
daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.19
In the case at bar, there is no question that accused-appellant was entrusted with the custody of 9-year old Willy. Erma
and her children trusted accused-appellant that they sent her money for the processing of Willy’s travel documents, and
more importantly, they allowed Willy to stay in her apartment. Regardless of whether Willy stayed in accused-appellant’s
apartment permanently or temporarily, the first element of the offense charged is satisfied because during said period
Willy was entrusted to accused-appellant who undertook the responsibility of seeing to it that he was well-taken care of.

As to the second element, accused-appellant contends that her failure to return Willy was never deliberate inasmuch as
her inability to return him to his mother and/or guardian was due to his disappearance which was definitely beyond her
control.

The contention is without merit. It was actually her failure to heed Erma’s order on March 19, 1997 to return Willy to their
residence in Sampaguita St., Malaria, Tala, Caloocan City, that consummated the offense. We agree with the finding of
the trial court that accused-appellant deliberately failed to return Willy in order to use him as a pawn when her demands
were turned down by Erma. The willfulness of accused-appellant’s omission is adequately established by the following
circumstances, to wit: 1) accused-appellant’s representation that she had Willy treated by Dr. Rebecca Nakpil Miranda of
Mary Johnston Hospital which was found to be false; 2) accused-appellant’s act of giving Doroteo P2,500.00 and not
P3,000.00 as instructed by Erma; 3) accused-appellant’s use for her personal indebtedness of the money sent by Erma
and her demand for additional P4,000.00 allegedly for the hospital expenses of Willy; 4) accused-appellant’s demand of
P60,000.00 for the installation of a water purifier in her apartment allegedly for Willy’s safety, and for additional money for
her job application in Singapore; and 5) the lapse of seven days during which accused-appellant willfully failed to return
Willy to Caloocan, which is only an hour away from her residence in Tondo, until his disappearance.

Evidently, accused-appellant deliberately ignored Erma’s instruction to return Willy to Caloocan so she can use him as a
pawn to demand money. She had 7 days from the time she was ordered by Erma on March 19, 1997, until March 26,
1997 when Willy mysteriously disappeared, to bring him to Caloocan but she stubbornly refused to return him. It was this
deliberate failure of accused-appellant to return custody of Willy to his relatives that gave rise to her culpability under
Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the disappearance of Willy and accused-appellant’s inability to return him
to Caloocan by reason thereof has no bearing on the crime charged as it was her wilfull disobedience to Erma’s order that
consummated the crime. Accused-appellant’s self-serving denial cannot prevail over the prosecution witnesses’ positive
testimony disproving her representations. As observed by the trial court, her "demeanor and attitude…on the witness
stand had given [the court] the impression that, unlike the complainant and the other prosecution witnesses, [she] was not
sincere, straightforward and truthful."20

Then too, the Court is not convinced of accused-appellant’s argument that the information filed against her is defective
because it states that the crime was committed on March 16, 1997 when in fact, Willy disappeared on March 26, 1997. To
repeat, the disappearance of Willy on March 26, 1997 is not material to the crime charged. The first element of the crime
was met on March 16, 1997, when accused-appellant took custody of Willy and the second requisite attached on March
19, 1997, when accused-appellant deliberately failed to return Willy. Furthermore, the objection to the information should
have been raised by accused-appellant before she entered her plea if she truly believed that the information failed to
conform substantially with the prescribed form. Failure to do so is deemed a waiver of such ground.21

In the final analysis, the issue posed here is the credibility of witnesses.1âwphi1 As consistently ruled by the Court, we will
not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there appears on record
some fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. Factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are accorded great weight and
respect. This is so because the trial court has the advantage of observing the witnesses through the different indicators of
truthfulness or falsehood.22 In the instant case, there is no reason for us to disregard the trial court’s finding that the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are entitled to full faith and credit.

Considering that accused-appellant’s guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court correctly imposed
upon her the penalty of reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code.

In People v. Bernardo,23 the Court held that Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code is clearly analogous to cases of illegal
and arbitrary detention or arrest which justify the award of moral damages as provided for in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. Likewise, under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. Conformably, the Court sustains the trial court’s award of damages but reduces the
amount of moral damages from P500,000.00 to P100,000.00, and the nominal damages from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The award of interest on damages is proper and allowed under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, which states that in crimes
and quasi-delicts, interest as part of the damages may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the court.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 18, convicting
accused-appellant Rubirosa Pastrana y Tefora of the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor and imposing upon
her the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the awards of moral and nominal
damages are reduced to P100,000.00, and P50,000.00, respectively, with legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from May 11, 2000, the date of the judgment of the trial court.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 152997             November 10, 2004

SALVADOR MARZALADO,* JR., petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22645, which affirmed the Decision2 dated November 5, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 79, in Criminal Case No. Q-98-74695. The RTC upheld the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 35, convicting herein petitioner Salvador Marzalado, Jr., for violation of Article 2803 of the Revised Penal Code on
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor and to pay a fine of P500 and to pay the costs.4 This petition likewise assails the Resolution5 dated April 23, 2002,
of the Court of Appeals, denying the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Cristina N. Albano was the lessee of a unit in the house owned by Luz Marzalado, the mother of herein petitioner,
Salvador Marzalado, Jr. Sometime in February 1993, Luz Marzalado filed an ejectment case against Albano. Judgment
was rendered against Albano, who was ordered to vacate the leased premises and to pay the unpaid rentals. Albano
appealed to the RTC.

In September 1993, during the pendency of the appeal, the electricity supply of the unit was cut off due to non-payment of
bills. As a result, Albano transferred her children to her father's house, four houses away, leaving a maid to sleep in the
unit.

Albano claims that on November 2, 1993, at around 1:00 p.m., she went to her unit. She noticed that the lead pipe she
used to hang clothes to dry was missing. When she returned at about 8:00 a.m. the following day, November 3, 1993, she
discovered the padlock of the main door changed, preventing her from entering the premises. She went to see petitioner
but he was not around.

On November 4, 1993, Albano again returned to her unit. She peeked through the window jalousies and saw that the
place was already empty. She immediately reported the matter to the barangay officials, who in turn, advised her to go to
the police. Thereafter, she filed a complaint for grave coercion, qualified trespass to dwelling and theft against petitioner.

On November 14, 1993, Albano tried to see the accused, but again failed. This time she noticed that the roofing of her unit
had been removed and the main door locked from the inside. She was informed that on November 1, 1993, Marzalado,
Jr., and his female companion took her lead pipe and on November 2, 1993, Marzalado, Jr., took her personal belongings
and brought them inside his house.

Accordingly, Albano filed a suit for trespass to dwelling with the MeTC of Quezon City against Marzalado, Jr., thus:

The undersigned accuses SALVADOR MAR[Z]ALADO, JR., of the crime of Trespass to Dwelling, committed as follows:

That on or about the 2nd day of November, 1993, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused without
any justifiable cause, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the dwelling place of CRISTINA
N. ALBANO located at No. 241 Road 1, Pag-Asa, this City, against the latter's will and without her consent or any
members of the household, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Quezon City, Philippines, March 16, 1994.6

On May 12, 1994, the accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. A summary hearing followed, with
Albano and her witness, Narciso Raniedo, testifying for the prosecution.

Raniedo, the owner of the house fronting Albano's unit, testified that at around 5:00 p.m., on November 1, 1993, he was
about to enter his house, when he glanced at the unit leased by Albano. He saw Marzalado, Jr., take a lead pipe and
hand it to a woman waiting at the terrace of Marzalado, Jr.'s house. Raniedo further said that on November 2, 1993,
sometime between 4:30 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. he was relaxing in front of his house, when he heard noises coming from
Albano's apartment. There he saw Marzalado, Jr., forcibly open the door of the unit, bring out the belongings of Albano,
and take these to his own house.

For his defense, Marzalado, Jr., testified that after the MeTC ruled against Albano in the MeTC ejectment case filed by his
mother and because of the disconnection of the electricity, Albano already vacated the leased unit and moved to her
father's place. According to petitioner, on November 3, 1993, he was on his way home when he saw water in a continuous
stream flowing out of Albano's unit. He then searched for Albano but to no avail. He reported the matter to the barangay
officers and asked for two barangay tanods to accompany him to the vacated unit. They went inside the unit where they
found an open faucet, with water flooding the floor. He accused Albano of deliberately leaving the faucet open. He
claimed Albano filed the criminal case of trespass to dwelling to harass him and to retaliate against him and his family.

On October 28, 1997, the MeTC handed down the following judgment:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Salvador Mar[z]alado, Jr. "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of
Qualified Trespass To Dwelling under Article 280 of the Revised Penal Code and he is hereby sentenced the
penalty of TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of Arresto Mayor and to pay a fine of P 500.00 and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.7

The trial court observed that the defense would have been "a good defense" had the alleged entry been made on
November 2, 1993, the date stated in the Information, instead of November 3, 1993, the date the accused said he entered
the premises because Albano deliberately left the faucet open.

Marzalado, Jr., appealed to the RTC, which ruled the matter in this wise:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed decision dated October 28, 1997, the same is hereby
affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.8

Undaunted, Marzalado, Jr., elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22645. The Court of Appeals
found no error in the challenged RTC decision and held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the lower court's decision is hereby AFFIRMED in toto and the instant
petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, petitioner comes to this Court assigning as errors of the court a quo the following:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BOTH OF QUEZON CITY BECAUSE THE INCIDENT
HAPPENED ON NOVEMBER 3, 1993, AND NOT NOVEMBER 2, 1993, AND THE PETITIONER'S ENTRY IN
THE PREMISES IS FULLY JUSTIFIED BECAUSE HE WAS ASSISTED BY THEIR BARANGAY SECRETARY
AND TWO BARANGAY TANOD[S] AND THE ENTRY IS FOR A VALID PURPOSE. HENCE, THERE IS NO
TRESPASS TO DWELLING.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE INFORMATION THAT THE ALLEGED
TRESPASS TO DWELLING HAPPENED ON NOVEMBER 2, 1993. THUS, WITH DUE RESPECT TO THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THERE WAS A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, AND IT SHOULD NOT
HAVE ADOPTED THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT AND REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT.10
The foregoing may be reduced to one issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in sustaining the conviction of Marzalado, Jr., for
qualified trespass to dwelling?

The petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in sustaining the lower court, since in the
proceedings below, there was a grave misapprehension of facts by both the MeTC and RTC in finding that he committed
trespass to dwelling despite the glaring proof that his entry was justifiable under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code11 - to prevent an imminent danger to property. He stresses that while he did enter the unit, he did so with the
aid of barangay officers and for the sole purpose of turning off the faucet that was causing the flooding of the unit. He
adds that the Information filed against him should be considered fatally defective for having stated that his entry was on
November 2, 1993, when in fact it was on November 3, 1993.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that petitioner's entry cannot be justified since the flooding of the floor
was not a danger to life nor property. Rather, the OSG claims that the flooding of the unit could have been averted had
the petitioner resorted to merely turning off the inlet valve of the water source. The OSG also stresses petitioner's failure
to refute the charge that he entered the complainant's unit on November 2, 1993. Moreover, the OSG asserts that the
exact time of the commission of the crime in the Information need not be so accurate to preclude other dates near the
actual date. It is sufficient that the Information states a time as near to the actual date, more so, where the time is not an
essential element of the offense, as in this case.

Anent the Information, the contention of petitioner that the Information is defective is untenable. Admittedly, there is a
discrepancy on the precise date of the alleged trespass - the Information charges petitioner Marzalado, Jr., with trespass
to dwelling allegedly committed on November 2, 1993, while petitioner's defense relate to an entry made the following
day. The discrepancy however, does not make the information defective. Facts and circumstances necessary for inclusion
in the information are determined by reference to the definition and elements of the specific crime.12 In trespass to
dwelling, the elements are: (1) the offender is a private person; (2) that he enters the dwelling of another; and (3) such
entrance is against the latter's will.

The exact date when the alleged trespass occurred is not an essential element of the offense of trespass. It is sufficient
that the Complaint or Information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible to the date of
its actual commission.13 Rule 110, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that it is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the
offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense
was committed as the information or complaint will permit. A variance between the time set out in the indictment and that
established by the evidence during trial does not constitute an error so serious as to warrant reversal of a conviction solely
on that score.14 Thus, the error invoked by the petitioner in the date of the alleged trespass in the Information is of no
grave import, for it is far from being the decisive issue in this case.

However, still incumbent upon the prosecution is to establish the criminal intent and the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Criminal cases rise and fall on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution and not the weakness of
the evidence of the defense or the lack of it.15 In the prosecution for trespass, the material fact or circumstance to be
considered is the occurrence of the trespass. The gravamen of the crime is violation of possession16 or the fact of having
caused injury to the right of the possession.17

To prove trespass, the prosecution presented as witness Narciso Raniedo who testified that he saw petitioner enter the
unit at around 4:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on November 2 and take out Albano's belongings. No other eyewitness corroborated
Raniedo's testimony. However, by her own account, Albano declared that she discovered the trespass in the evening of
November 3,18 the same day the barangay certified Marzalado, Jr.'s entry. This obviously does not discount the fact that
although the exact date of entry varied as between petitioner and respondent, they both were referring to the same entry.

What remains now is the issue of whether the entry of petitioner Marzalado, Jr., was legally justified. We rule that it is,
based on the circumstances of this case.

As certified by Barangay Lupon Secretary Romulo E. Ragaya, the unit rented by Albano was "forcibly opened by the
owner because of the strong water pressure coming out of the faucet…"19 As Albano herself admitted, she and her
children already left the unit when the electricity supply was cut off in the month of September. Hence, nobody was left to
attend to the unit, except during some nights when Albano's maid slept in the unit. Clearly, Marzalado, Jr., acted for the
justified purpose of avoiding further flooding and damage to his mother's property caused by the open faucet. No criminal
intent could be clearly imputed to petitioner for the remedial action he had taken. There was an exigency that had to be
addressed to avoid damage to the leased unit. There is nothing culpable concerning Marzalado, Jr.'s judgment call to
enter the unit and turn off the faucet instead of closing the inlet valve as suggested by the OSG.
Thus, we find the evidence on record insufficient to hold petitioner guilty of the offense charged. Palpable doubt exists in
our mind as to the guilt of petitioner. In our view, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court and of the Metropolitan Trial Court when it found petitioner guilty of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling. In a situation of
ambiguity, where the act of the accused permits of two possible signification, one culpable and another innocent, the
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the accused. The evidence in this case simply fails to convince us of his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 9, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 22645, and its Resolution dated April 23, 2002 denying the Motion for Reconsideration, are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Petitioner SALVADOR MARZALADO, JR., is hereby ACQUITTED of the charge against him for lack of evidence
to sustain a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
 CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

G.R. No. 179943               June 26, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO, Appellant.

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant Marlon Lambert De Leon y Homo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato
Lacambra III, both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security guard; all employees of
Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint green-colored
Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said gasoline station.3

Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to the driver’s side in order to take the key of the
vehicle from the driver so that he could open the gas tank. He saw through the lowered window shield that there were
about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to fill up ₱50.00 worth of diesel in the gas tank. After doing
this, he returned the key to the driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the vehicle would not
start.4 Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push. While Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato
Lacambra III were positioned at the back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six male passengers of the same
vehicle, except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber pistol.5

Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down,6 while Eduardo Zulueta was directed to go near the Car Wash
Section.7 At that instance, guns were poked at them.8

Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the latter's wallet containing a pawnshop
ticket and ₱50.00, while the companion of the former, hit the latter on his nape with a gun.9

Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took the money worth ₱3,000.00.10 Those four
robbers were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the stomach.11 Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin
Macahis' service firearm.12

After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his companions immediately leave the
place.13 The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal.14 When the robbers left, Eduardo
Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also saw that
Edralin Macahis had a gunshot wound in the stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the injured
Edralin Macahis to the hospital.15 Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to the gunshot wound.16

The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers who poked a gun at him.17

However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the house of his Tita Emma at Pantok,
Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her canteen. On the evening of January 6, at approximately 9 o'clock, appellant
asked permission from his Tita Emma to go to Antipolo. Catherine Homo, appellant's cousin and the latter's younger
brother, accompanied appellant to the terminal. While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, of a certain Christian
Gersalia, a relative of appellant and Catherine Homo, passed by. Catherine Homo asked Christian Gersalia if he would
allow appellant to hitch a ride on his vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside from Christian Gersalia, there were other
passengers in the said vehicle.18

When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight, he was not allowed to do so; instead, he
was asked by the other passengers to join them in their destination. While on the road, appellant fell asleep. When he
woke up, they were in a gasoline station. He then saw Christian Gersalia and the other passengers conducting a hold-up.
He never left the vehicle and was not able to do anything because he was overwhelmed with fear. After he heard the
gunshots, Christian Gersalia and the other passengers went to the vehicle and proceeded towards Marikina. On their way,
they were followed by policemen who fired at them. The other passengers fired back at the policemen. It was then that the
vehicle hit a wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in different directions leaving him behind. When the
policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.19

As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with Homicide were filed against appellant, Rudy Gersalia,
Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, an alias "Rey," an alias "Jonard," an alias
"Precie," and an alias "Renato," which read as:

Criminal Case No. 4747

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
" Precie" and Alias "Renato" whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large,
and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
band, with intent of gain with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud
or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE STATION, owned by Regino C. Natividad, and represented by
Macario C. Natividad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away its cash earnings
worth ₱3,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of said Energex Gasoline Station in the aforesaid amount of ₱3,000.00 and
on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill,
conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela,
Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 4748

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating , together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
" Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large
and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise,
fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon the person of JULIETA A. AMISTOSO, the Cashier of Energex Gasoline Station, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following, to wit:

a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at ₱1,500.00

b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at ₱2,000.00

c) Guess black bag valued at ₱500.00

d) Leather wallet valued at ₱150.00

e) White T-Shirt valued at ₱175.00

to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱4,325.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named
accused while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
"Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of
Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.
 Criminal Case No. 4749

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
"Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large,
and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise,
fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal, and carry away his service firearm .12 gauge shotgun with serial number
13265 valued at ₱12,000.00 owned by Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated represented by its General
Manager Alberto T. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of said Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated in
the aforesaid amount of ₱12,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery the above-named accused, while armed with
unlicensed firearms, with intent to kill conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia,
Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey", Alias "Jonard", Alias " Precie" and Alias
"Renato", whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot
wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 4750

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
"Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and
conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a band,
with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or
craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon the person of EDUARDO ZULUETA, a gasoline boy of Energex Gasoline Station, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following to wit:

a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for one (1) black Citizen men's watch (automatic) valued at
₱2,000.00

b) Cash money worth ₱50.00

to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱2,050.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-
named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together
with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey,"
Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound
on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty on
all the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C. Natividad,20 then officer-in-charge of Energex Gasoline
Station where the incident took place; Edito Macahis,21 a cousin of the deceased security guard Edralin Macahis;
Fortunato Lacambra III,22 a gasoline boy of the same gas station; Eduardo Zulueta,23 also a gasoline boy of the same gas
station, and Alberto Quintos,24 general manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc., where the deceased security
guard was employed.

The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: Catherine Homo,25 a cousin of appellant and the
appellant26 himself.
On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision27 convicting appellant beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges
against him, the dispositive portion of which reads:

1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A.
8294, having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the
said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed
firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to pay Energex Gasoline Station owned
by Regino Natividad and represented by Macario C. Natividad the amount of ₱3,000.00 as compensatory
damages and to pay the costs;

2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294,
having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said
Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm
in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance, and to pay the costs;

3. In Crim. Case No. 4749, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable ground of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A.
8294, having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the
said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed
firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis
in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity; to pay ₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen
service firearm if restitution is no longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;

4. In Crim. Case No. 4750, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294,
having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said
Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm
in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance and to pay Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the robbery,
in the amount of ₱2,050.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen properties if restitution is no longer possible
and to pay the costs.

As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who have, to date, remained at-large, let a warrant of arrest be
issued against them and let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement
upon apprehension of the said accused.

As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie
and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and are still at-large, let
these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon the identification and
apprehension of the said accused.

SO ORDERED.

The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21, 2004,28 in conformity with the Decision dated July 7,
2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87 entitled The People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, more particularly Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of this Court, en banc dated September 19,
1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's
power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VII, Section 5 of the Constitution, and allowing an
intermediate review by the CA before such cases are elevated to this Court. This Court transferred the cases to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.

The CA, on June 29, 2007,29 affirmed with modification, the Decision of the RTC, with the dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide of only one count.

Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24 June 2006, the penalty imposed upon Marlon de Leon y
Homo is hereby reduced or commuted to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal,30 the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of the
Supplemental Brief31 dated February 4, 2008 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental brief, considering that
appellant has not raised any new issue that would require the filing of a supplemental brief.

Appellant filed a Manifestation32 on February 22, 2008 stating that he re-pleads and adopts his Appellant's Brief and Reply
Brief as Supplemental Brief.

Appellant, in his Brief,33 assigned the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE

COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
SAME AND GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE

TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING FOUR (4) DEATH PENALTIES DESPITE THAT THE CRIME
CHARGED WAS PRODUCED BY ONE SINGLE ACT WHICH SHOULD BE METED WITH A SINGLE PENALTY.

The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,34 insisted that all the elements of the crime and the appellant's participation in the crime
had been established.

Appellant, in his Reply Brief,35 argued that the penalty should not be death, but only reclusion perpetua, because the
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, although alleged in the Information, was not alleged with
specificity.

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use
of violence against or any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

In People v. De Jesus,36 this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of robbery with homicide, thus:

For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following
elements:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

(2) the property taken belongs to another;

(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and

(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed.37

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery.38 The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life.39 The
homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction
as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration.40 There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation
of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.

Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. When the fact
of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the property
subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away
and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner.41 The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the
property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the
victim is of no moment, because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.42

When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery
would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not
actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same.43

If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery
and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such
crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized.44

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there
is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the
robbery.

From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the
crime of robbery with homicide was indeed committed. There was no mistaking from the actions of all the accused that
their main intention was to rob the gasoline station and that on occasion of such robbery, a homicide was committed. The
question now is whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime. According to appellant, the prosecution
failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator. However, this Court finds no merit to appellant's argument.

If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy.45 The prosecution
was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the robbers.
Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at him, thus:

Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked their guns at you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Kindly look around inside this courtroom and inform the Hon. Court whether those two (2) persons who poked
their guns at you were (sic) present now?

A: Only one, sir, and there he is.

 (At this juncture, witness pointing to a certain person who answered by the name of MARLON ALBERT DE LEON
when asked.)

Q: This Marlon De Leon was he the one who guarded you in the carwash or not?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, what happened to you at the carwash where this Marlon De Leon was guarding you?

A: His gun was poked at me, sir.

Q: What else transpired, Mr. Witness, or what else happened to you aside from that?

A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir.

Q: What else, Mr. Witness?

A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir.

Q: Who hit you with a gun?

A: His other companion, sir.46

Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:

Q: What about that person who ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section and hit him, was he also armed?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then?

A: Also .38 caliber, sir.

Q: Were you able to identify or recognize that person who approached and ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash
section?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Kindly point to him?

A: That man, sir. (Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Marlon Albert de Leon).47

Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of the robbery, that a conspiracy existed
and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take
part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.
Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact,
constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective.48 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary,49 since all the conspirators are principals.

As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be disturbed. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is
that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the result of the case.50

For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the robbery. However, his presence during the commission of the
crime was well-established as appellant himself testified as to the matter. Granting that he was merely present during the
robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed
an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission
thereof.51 Appellant offered no evidence that he performed an overt act neither to escape from the company of the robbers
nor to prevent the robbery from taking place. His denial, therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the defenses of
denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can concoct them to suit his defense. As
both evidence are negative and self-serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed.52

Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of robbery with homicide. In the
crime of robbery with homicide, there are series of acts, borne from one criminal resolution, which is to rob. As
decided53 by the Court of Appeals:

A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of acts but all arising from
one criminal resolution.54 Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime committed; hence, only one penalty
shall be imposed.55

In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only to rob one place; and that is the Energex gasoline
station. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and valuables of the employees working in
said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal
resolution. A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated
by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.56 This can be said of the case at hand.

Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,57 wherein the robbery that took place in several houses belonging
to different persons, when not absolutely unconnected, was held not to be taken as separate and distinct offenses. They
formed instead, component parts of the general plan to despoil all those within the vicinity. In this case, the Solicitor
General argued that the [appellant] had committed eight different robberies, because the evidence shows distinct and
different acts of spoilation in different houses, with several victimized persons.58 The Highest Tribunal, however, ruled that
the perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and unconnected from one another.59 Thus, the single offense or crime.

Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The decision60 merely states that, in view of the enactment of
R.A. 9346, the sentence of Death Penalty, imposed upon appellant, is automatically commuted to reclusion perpetua, but
is silent as to how it had arrived into such a conclusion.1avvphi1

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with homicide is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that, in all cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the
commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance.61 It must be remembered that the Informations filed
with the RTC alleged the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm. Pursuant to the third paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed firearm is a special and not a
generic aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. As explained by this Court in Palaganas v.
People:62

Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14,
paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the
penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be
alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated.63 Moreover, it can
be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to increase the
penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree.
Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does
not change the character of the offense charged.64 It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be
proven during the trial in order to be appreciated.65 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.
It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the
same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas
in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under
Presidential Decree No. 1866,66 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,67 which is a special law. Its pertinent provision
states:

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is "silent as to whether it is generic or
qualifying."68 Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor of the accused."69 Since a
generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as
the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to
declare that the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating
circumstance.70 This interpretation is erroneous, since we already held in several cases that with the passage of Republic
Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL
aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance.71 Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant
case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm
by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and
not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.

In another case,72 this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the
presentation of the firearm.73 In the said case, it was established that Elmer and Marcelina Hidalgo died of, and Pedro
Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The ballistic examination of the slugs recovered from the place of the incident
showed that they were fired from a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm. It was also established that the same
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, this Court ruled that the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated
the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.

After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that the use of unlicensed firearm was not duly
proven by the prosecution. Although jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the firearm can be established by mere
testimony, the fact that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder must still be established. The prosecution failed to
present written or testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not have a license to carry or own a firearm, hence, the
use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated.

Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis the amount of
₱50,000.00 as death indemnity, ₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution is no
longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. Actual damages were never proven during the trial. Hence, this
Court's rulings74 on temperate damages apply, thus:

In People vs. Abrazaldo,75 we laid down the doctrine that where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses
cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in the
amount of ₱25,00076 This doctrine specifically refers to a situation where no evidence at all of funeral expenses was
presented in the trial court. However, in instances where actual expenses amounting to less than ₱25,000 are proved
during the trial, as in the case at bar, we apply the ruling in the more recent case of People vs. Villanueva77 which modified
the Abrazaldo doctrine. In Villanueva, we held that "when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to
less than ₱25,000, the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser
amount." To rule otherwise would be anomalous and unfair because the victim’s heirs who tried but succeeded in proving
actual damages of an amount less than ₱25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no
receipts at all but would now be entitled to ₱25,000 temperate damages.78

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion perpetua in view of the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of the victim, ₱25,000.00
as temperate damages, in addition to the other civil indemnities and damages adjudged by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal.
G.R. No. 171579 : November 14, 2012

LILY SY, Petitioner, v. HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, BENITO FERNANDEZ

GO, BERTHOLD LIM, JENNIFER SY, GLENN BEN TIAK SY and MERRY SY, Respondents.

In a Complaint-Affidavit1filed on August 7, 2000, petitioner Lily Sy (petitioner) claimed that in the morning of December 16,
1999, respondents Benito Fernandez Go (Benito) and Glenn Ben Tiak Sy (Glenn), together with "Elmo," a security guard
of Hawk Security Agency, went to petitioner's residence at the 1oth Floor, Fortune Wealth, 612 Elcano St., Binondo,
Manila and forcibly opened the door, destroyed and dismantled the door lock then replaced it with a new one, without
petitioner's consent.2Ï‚rνll She, likewise, declared that as a diversionary ruse, respondent Jennifer Sy (Jennifer) was at
the lobby of the same building who informed petitioners helper Geralyn Juanites (Geralyn) that the elevator was not
working.3Ï‚rνll Glenn and Benitos act of replacing the door lock appeared to be authorized by a resolution of Fortune
Wealth Mansion Corporations Board of Directors, namely, respondents Glenn, Jennifer, William Sy (William), Merlyn Sy
(Merlyn), and Merry Sy (Merry).4ςrνll

In the evening of the same date, petitioner supposedly saw Benito, Glenn, Jennifer, Merry and respondent Berthold Lim
(Berthold) took from her residence numerous boxes containing her personal belongings without her consent and, with
intent to gain, load them inside a family-owned van/truck named "Wheels in Motion."5Ï‚rνll The same incident supposedly
happened in January 2000 and the "stolen" boxes allegedly reached 34,6Ï‚rνll the contents of which were valued at
P10,244,196.00.7ςrνll

Respondents Benito and Berthold denied the accusations against them. They explained that petitioner made the baseless
charges simply because she hated their wives Merry and Jennifer due to irreconcilable personal differences on how to go
about the estates of their deceased parents then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch
51.8Ï‚rνll They also manifested their doubts on petitioners capability to acquire the personal belongings allegedly stolen
by them.9ςrνll

Merry, Glenn, and Jennifer, on the other hand, claimed that petitioners accusations were brought about by the worsening
state of their personal relationship because of misunderstanding on how to divide the estate of their deceased
father.10Ï‚rνll They also pointed out that the whole condominium building where the alleged residence of petitioner is
located, is owned and registered in the name of the corporation.11Ï‚rνll They explained that the claimed residence was
actually the former residence of their family (including petitioner).12Ï‚rνll After their parents death, the corporation
allegedly tolerated petitioner to continuously occupy said unit while they, in turn, stayed in the other vacant units leaving
some of their properties and those of the corporation in their former residence.13Ï‚rνll They further stated that petitioner
transferred to the ground floor because the 10th floors electric service was disconnected.14Ï‚rνll They explained that they
changed the units door lock to protect their personal belongings and those of the corporation as petitioner had initially
changed the original lock.15Ï‚rνll They supported their authority to do so with a board resolution duly issued by the
directors. They questioned petitioners failure to report the alleged incident to the police, considering that they supposedly
witnessed the unlawful taking.16Ï‚rνll They thus contended that petitioners accusations are based on illusions and wild
imaginations, aggravated by her ill motive, greed for money and indiscriminate prosecution.17ςrνll

In the Resolution18Ï‚rνll dated September 28, 2001, Assistant City Prosecutor Jovencio T. Tating (ACP Tating)
recommended that respondents Benito, Berthold, Jennifer, Glenn and Merry be charged with Robbery In An Uninhabited
Place; and that the charges against William Go19Ï‚rνll (the alleged new owner of the building), and "Elmo Hubio" be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.20Ï‚rνll ACP Tating found that the subject condominium unit is in fact petitioners
residence and that respondents indeed took the formers personal belongings with intent to gain and without petitioners
consent. He further held that respondents defenses are not only contradictory but evidentiary in nature.21Ï‚rνll The
corresponding Information22Ï‚rνll was filed before the RTC of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-199574 and was
raffled to Branch 19. On motion of Jennifer, Glenn and Merry, the RTC ordered a reinvestigation on the ground of newly-
discovered evidence consisting of an affidavit of the witness.23Ï‚rνll This notwithstanding, the Office of the City Prosecutor
(OCP) sustained in a Resolution24Ï‚rνll dated September 23, 2002 its earlier conclusion and recommended the denial of
respondents motion for reconsideration.

When elevated before the Secretary of Justice, then Secretary Simeon A. Datumanong (the Secretary) reversed and set
aside25Ï‚rνll the ACPs conclusions and the latter was directed to move for the withdrawal of the Information against
respondents.26Ï‚rνll The Secretary stressed that the claimed residence of petitioner is not an uninhabited place under the
penal laws, considering her allegation that it is her residence.27Ï‚rνll Neither can it be considered uninhabited under
Article 300 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), since it is located in a populous place.28Ï‚rνll The Secretary opined that the
elements of robbery were not present, since there was no violence against or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things, as the replacement of the door lock was authorized by a board resolution.29Ï‚rνll It is likewise his conclusion that
the element of taking was not adequately established as petitioner and her helper were not able to see the taking of
anything of value. If at all there was taking, the Secretary concluded that it was made under a claim of
ownership.30Ï‚rνll Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied on June 17, 2004.31Ï‚rνll

Aggrieved, petitioner went up to the Court of Appeals (CA) in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. On December 20, 2004, the CA rendered a Decision32Ï‚rνll granting the petition and, consequently, setting aside
the assailed Secretarys Resolutions and reinstating the OCPs Resolution with the directive that the Information be
amended to reflect the facts as alleged in the complaint that the robbery was committed in an inhabited place and that it
was committed through force upon things.33ςrνll

The CA held that petitioner had sufficiently shown that the Secretary gravely abused her discretion in reversing the OCPs
decision.34Ï‚rνll While recognizing the mistake in the designation of the offense committed because it should have been
robbery in an inhabited place, the CA held that the mistake can be remedied by the amendment of the
Information.35Ï‚rνll Indeed, since the element of violence against or intimidation of persons was not established, the same
was immaterial as the crime was allegedly committed with force upon things.36Ï‚rνll Thus, it held that petitioner
adequately showed that at the time of the commission of the offense, she was in possession of the subject residential unit
and that respondents should not have taken the law into their own hands if they indeed had claims over the personal
properties inside the subject unit.37Ï‚rνll It also did not give credence to the newly-discovered evidence presented by
respondents, because the affidavit was executed two years after the filing of petitioners complaint.38Ï‚rνll Lastly, the CA
held that the element of taking was shown with circumstantial evidence.39ςrνll

On motion of respondents, the CA rendered an Amended Decision40Ï‚rνll dated May 9, 2005, setting aside its earlier
decision and reinstating the DOJ Secretaries Resolutions.41Ï‚rνll It concluded that as part-owner of the entire building and
of the articles allegedly stolen from the subject residential unit, the very same properties involved in the pending estate
proceedings, respondents cannot, as co-owners, steal what they claim to own and thus cannot be charged with
robbery.42Ï‚rνll It continued and held that assuming that the door was forced open, the same cannot be construed as an
element of robbery as such was necessary due to petitioners unjustified refusal to allow the other co-owners to gain
access to the premises even for the lawful purpose of allowing prospective buyers to have a look at the building.43ςrνll

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in the assailed Resolution44Ï‚rνll dated February 10, 2006.

Hence, this petition raising the following issues:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRIEVOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT A
CORPORATION MAY ARBITRARILY TAKE THE LAW INTO THEIR OWN HANDS BY MEANS OF A MERE BOARD
RESOLUTION.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRIEVOUS ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THE
PETITIONER WAS NO LONGER IN POSSESSION OF THE UNIT SIMPLY BECAUSE THE PETITIONER WAS IN
POSSESSION OF ANOTHER UNIT.45ςrνll

We find no merit in the petition.

At the outset, a perusal of the records of Criminal Case No. 02-199574 in People of the Philippines v. Benito Fernandez
Go, et al., pending before the RTC where the Information for Robbery was filed, would show that on March 12, 2008,
Presiding Judge Zenaida R. Daguna issued an Order46Ï‚rνll granting the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by ACP
Armando C. Velasco. The withdrawal of the information was based on the alleged failure of petitioner to take action on the
Amended Decision issued by the CA which, in effect, reversed and set aside the finding of probable cause, and in order
for the case not to appear pending in the docket of the court. The propriety of the determination of probable cause is,
however, the subject of this present petition. Besides, in allowing the withdrawal of the information, the RTC in fact did not
make a determination of the existence of probable cause. Thus, the withdrawal of the information does not bar the Court
from making a final determination of whether or not probable cause exists to warrant the filing of an Information for
Robbery against respondents in order to write finis to the issue elevated before us.47ςrνll

From the time the complaint was first lodged with the OCP, the latter, the Secretary of Justice and the CA had been in
disagreement as to the existence or absence of probable cause sufficient to indict respondents of the offense charged.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find no reason to depart from the CA conclusion that the evidence
presented was not sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.
Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.48Ï‚rνll There is no definitive standard by
which probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant conditions.49ςrνll

Respondents were charged with robbery in an uninhabited place, which was later amended to reflect the facts as alleged
in the complaint that the robbery was committed in an inhabited place and that it was committed through force upon
things.50ςrνll

"Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against
or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, is guilty of robbery."51Ï‚rνll To constitute robbery, the following
elements must be established:

(1) The subject is personal property belonging to another;

(2) There is unlawful taking of that property;

(3) The taking is with the intent to gain; and

(4) There is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon things.52ςrνll

Admittedly, the subject 10th floor unit is owned by the corporation and served as the family residence prior to the death of
petitioner and respondents parents. The 10th floor unit, including the personal properties inside, is the subject of estate
proceedings pending in another court and is, therefore, involved in the disputed claims among the siblings (petitioner and
respondents). Respondents admitted that armed with a Board Resolution authorizing them to break open the door lock
system of said unit and to install a new door lock system, they went up to the subject unit to implement said resolution.
The said corporate action was arrived at because petitioner had allegedly prevented prospective buyers from conducting
ocular inspection.

Petitioner, however, claims that on December 16, 1999 and sometime in January 2000, respondents brought out from the
unit 34 boxes containing her personal belongings worth more than P10 million. We cannot, however, fathom why
petitioner did not immediately report the first incident and waited for yet another incident after more or less one month. If
the value involved is what she claims to be, it is contrary to human nature to just keep silent and not immediately protect
her right. Her general statement that she was intimidated by Benito who was known to be capable of inflicting bodily harm
cannot excuse her inaction. Petitioner, therefore, failed to establish that there was unlawful taking.

Assuming that respondents indeed took said boxes containing personal belongings, said properties were taken under
claim of ownership which negates the element of intent to gain.

x x x Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender.
The unlawful taking of anothers property gives rise to the presumption that the act was committed with intent to gain. This
presumption holds unless special circumstances reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator x x x.53ςrνll

Taking as an element of robbery means depriving the offended party of ownership of the thing taken with the character of
permanency. The taking should not be under a claim of ownership. Thus, one who takes the property openly and
avowedly under claim of title offered in good faith is not guilty of robbery even though the claim of ownership is
untenable.54Ï‚rνll The intent to gain cannot be established by direct evidence being an internal act. It must, therefore, be
deduced from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense.55ςrνll

In this case, it was shown that respondents believed in good faith that they and the corporation own not only the subject
unit but also the properties found inside. If at all, they took them openly and avowedly under that claim of
ownership.56Ï‚rνll This is bolstered by the fact that at the time of the alleged incident, petitioner had been staying in
another unit because the electric service in the 10th floor was disconnected. We quote with approval the CA conclusion in
their Amended Decision, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Indeed, on second look, We note that what is involved here is a dispute between and among members of a family
corporation, the Fortune Wealth Mansion Corporation. Petitioner Lily Sy and respondents Merry, Jennifer, and Glenn, all
surnamed Sy, are the owners-incorporators of said corporation, which owns and manages the Fortune Wealth Mansion
where petitioner allegedly resided and where the crime of robbery was allegedly committed. As part-owners of the entire
building and of the articles allegedly stolen from the 10th floor of said building the very same properties that are involved
between the same parties in a pending estate proceeding, the respondents cannot, as co-owners, be therefore charged
with robbery. The fact of co-ownership negates any intention to gain, as they cannot steal properties which they claim to
own.

Hence, even if we are to assume that private respondents took the said personal properties from the 10th floor of the
Fortune Wealth Mansion, they cannot be charged with robbery because again, the taking was made under a claim of
ownership x x x57ςrνll

Respondents should not be held liable for the alleged unlawful act absent a felonious intent. "Actus non facit reum, nisi
mens sit rea. A crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained of is 58Ï‚rνll innocent.

The Court adheres to the view that a preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State, but more
importantly, it is a significant part of freedom and fair play which every individual is entitled to. It is thus the duty of the
prosecutor or the judge, as the case may be, to relieve the accused of going through a trial once it is determined that
there is no sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause to form a sufficient belief that the accused has
committed a crime. In this case, absent sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the prosecution of respondents
for the crime of robbery, the filing of information against respondents constitute grave abuse of discretion.59ςrνll

WHEREFORE,- premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.ςrαlαωlιbrαr

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197562, April 20, 2015

AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed persons and robbery with violence against or intimidation
of persons was committed when the accused, who held firearms, entered the residential house of the victims and inflicted
injury upon the victims in the process of committing the robbery. Hence, the penalty is that imposed for the robbery in an
inhabited house, the more serious crime. All the accused are liable because the act of one is the act of
all.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Case

Aurora Engson Fransdilla (Fransdilla), the lone appellant, seeks to reverse the decision promulgated on February 28,
2011,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her conviction and that of her co-accused for robbery on the basis of
conspiracy, with modifications as to the penalty imposed, under the decision rendered on September 15, 1999 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, in Quezon City2

As factual background, the CA adopted the summary rendered by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in its
appellee's brief, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On February 20, 1991 between 3 o'clock and 4 o'clock in the afternoon, at private complainants' residence at No. 24,
Mabait St., Teachers Village, Quezon City, private complainant Lalaine Yreverre saw appellant Aurora Engson in front of
their gate. Upon noticing Aurora, Lalaine went to the gate and asked Aurora what is their purpose, as there were four (4)
of them. Aurora then inquired about Cynthia Yreverre, Lalaine's sister. The latter replied that Cynthia was in the Japanese
Embassy and asked Aurora if there was any other person whom she wanted to talk to. It was then that Aurora told Lalaine
that she was from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). It was upon said pretension that Lalaine offered
herself to instead talk to her and allowed her to enter their house. When they were already having a conversation, Aurora
asked Lalaine if she could use the telephone, which the latter acceded to and handed her a cordless telephone. Lalaine
noticed that Aurora seemed to keep on dialing the telephone and even said that the person she was calling did not know
how to use the telephone. But still, Aurora kept on dialing the telephone.

Thereafter, appellant Aurora asked for a cigarette. After Lalaine gave Aurora the cigarette, the four (4) other men outside
the gate, who were with Aurora, suddenly came inside the house. The four (4) men stood behind Aurora who was still
dialing the telephone. When Aurora told that she could not contact the person she was calling, she asked Lalaine if she
could use the comfort room, which the latter again permitted. Aurora stood up, put down the telephone, got her bag and
went to the comfort room. When Aurora came back, she sat down again but in crossed-legs as she said she was having a
menstrual period. Upon saying that, Lalaine's attention was focused on her. At this juncture, accused Edgardo Cacal
poked a gun at Lalaine's neck and announced that it was a hold-up. While appellant Edgardo Cacal was poking a gun at
Lalaine's neck, accused Danilo Cuanang and the two (2) other men proceeded to the kitchen. In the kitchen, Danilo and
his two (2) other companions herded their maids, private complainant's niece and cousin inside the bodega.

Accused Cacal who was still poking the gun at Lalaine's neck, thereafter, pulled Lalaine's hair and dragged her upstairs
and brought her inside Cynthia's room. The gun still being poked at Lalaine, Cacal looked around the room and when he
spotted upon the vault he dropped Lalaine, opened the door and called for his companions to come along. Accused
Cuanang came up and the two (Cacal and Cuanang) carried the vault and brought it downstairs. But before they went
downstairs, they threatened Lalaine not to follow them and to just stay in the room, but Lalaine opened the door and
followed them.

When Lalaine was halfway downstairs, accused Cacal turned his back and saw her. Accused Cacal then brought her
inside her room. Inside the room, Cacal pushed her towards her bed and she fell. Cacal told her to just stay, and then he
searched the room. Lalaine managed to stand up but Cacal slapped her. While sitting, accused Cuanang came and tied
her arms at her back. While she was being tied, appellant Aurora Fransdilla peeped inside the room. It was also at the
time that accused Cacal and Cuanang searched the entire room and took all the jewelries and things they saw.

When Cuanang and Cacal left the room, Lalaine followed them. While in the middle downstairs, she saw Cacal, Cuanang
and their two other companions tucking their guns around their waists. Appellants and their co-accused then left the
house on board two (2) cars that were waiting for them just outside the house, and one of which, a black Colt Mirage, was
driven by accused Manuel Silao, together with appellant Edgardo Silao who was seated at the front passenger seat.

At this point, Lalaine shouted for help, thereafter, a relative came by to help and untied her. Lalaine then called her sister
Cynthia and related the incident. Cynthia reported the incident to the police authorities. Not too long thereafter, the police
investigated the incident.

In relation thereto, Lalaine executed her sworn statement on February 20, 1991 (Exhibit "J"). After said investigation,
Lalaine underwent medical examination at the East Avenue Medical Center as her hands were bruised when she was tied
by her hands and her face being slapped by one of the accused. A medical certificate was issued in relation thereto
(Exhibit "N").

Thereafter, Lalaine went to Camp Karingal at Sikatuna, Quezon City where there were at least fifteen (15) person(s)
presented before her in the police line-up, but she was not able to identify any of the accused among said line-up.

After which, she went to the Station Investigation Division (SID) Station 4, Quezon City where she was shown about fifty
(50) pictures in order for her to identify the robbers, but she was not able to identify any of them.

Since she failed to identify any of the malefactors, she proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila.
She was referred to a cartographer for the sketch of herein appellants and their co-accused as the malefactors in robbing
their house (Exhibits "B", "C" and "D").

Thereafter, Lalaine proceeded to the Western Police District, Manila. There, she went to the rogues gallery where a
picture of about (5) persons were shown to her. After carefully examining the pictures, Lalaine was able to pinpoint the
picture of accused Danilo Cuanang as one of the robbers. She was also able to identify Manuel "Sonny" Silao in a group
picture where she identified accused Cuanang (Exhibits "E" and "F") It was also in said rogues gallery that they were able
to get accused Cuanang's address at Iriga, Cubao, Quezon City.

Lalaine, together with her police officers companions, proceeded to Cuanang's indicated address. Upon arrival thereat,
they inquired from the security guard of the townhouse if Danilo Cuanang was residing there, which the latter confirmed.

On the following day Lalaine and her police companions went back to Cuanang's house. Lalaine knocked at the door and
accused Cuanang himself opened the door. When Lalaine confronted him and told him that he was one of those who
entered their house, the latter did not answer. Lalaine asked Cuanang if he could come with them at the PNP-SID, Station
4, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City and the latter acceded.

On their way to the police station, Lalaine inquired on Cuanang about their lady companion (herein appellant Fransdilla),
but the latter just bowed his head. When Lalaine threatened him that if he would not tell the whereabouts of their lady
companion (herein appellant Aurora) he would be answerable for all the things stolen, the latter replied that they had no
share in the stolen items. Lalaine then asked the name of their lady companion and the latter said that her name was
Jessica Engson (also known as Aurora Engson Fransdilla) and she was living in Antipolo Street, Sampaloc, Manila.
Cuanang also volunteered himself to accompany them to Aurora's house provided that they should not hurt him. Agreeing
thereto, the group of Lalaine, accompanied by Cuanang, proceeded to Aurora's house at the given address. Upon arrival
thereat, Lalaine inquired from a child if Aurora was awake, and upon asking, she saw appellant Aurora who was trembling
at that time. Lalaine noticed that Aurora was nervous and even told her that Lalaine was able to remember her face.
Appellant even voluntarily told Lalaine that she would tell her the whole truth. She (Aurora) told that she was instructed by
her companions Edgar (Silao), Sonny (Manuel Silao) and Danilo Cacal. Lalaine even confronted her when she implicated
her cousins (Sonny and Edgar).

Upon reaching PNP Station 4, SID, Kamuning, Quezon City, Lalaine and her police companions rested for a while before
they proceeded to 921 Adelina St., Sampaloc, Manila, where accused Manuel "Sonny" Silao lived. Upon reaching the said
address, Lalaine knocked at the gate, and a maid opened the same and allowed them to enter the house. In the house,
Lalaine asked the maid where Sonny's room was and the latter said it was on the third floor. When Lalaine and her police
companions were going upstairs, they passed by the second floor and saw accused Cacal sitting on a folding bed. She
then told her police companions that that man (Cacal) was among those who entered and robbed their house, Cacal just
remained silent. Thereafter, the group proceeded to the third floor of the house, knocked at the door and it was Manuel's
(a.k.a. Sonny) wife who opened it. At this point, Manuel (a.k.a. Sonny) was lying on the bed and holding his gun, thus,
Pat. Randy Quitoriano immediately handcuffed him. Lalaine's group invited Manuel and Danilo to go with them at the
police station; both acceded.

On March 21, 1991, Lalaine went back to the PNP Station 4, SID, Kamuning, Quezon City, where she was informed that
they (Rod Fortaleza's group) were able to recover some money (dollar bills) from appellant Edgardo Silao. When these
dollar bills were shown to her, she recognized that these were the same dollar bills withdrawn by her sister Cynthia from
the RCBC Bank as the bills bear red markings (Exhibits "M" to "M-5".3
Fransdilla and her co-accused were eventually charged with robbery under the following information, to
wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 20th day of February, 1991, in Quezon City Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, and by means of violence and intimidation upon person rob the
residence of CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y PANGANIBAN located at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, this
City, by pretending to be from PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT AGENCY (POEA) and once inside took, rob, and
carried away the following items therefrom, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
nine (9) pieces of expensive jewelry .... P1 .5 M
$30,000.00 (U.S. Dollars equivalent to ... 900,000.00
belonging to CYNTHIA YREVERRE Y PANGANIBAN.
two (2) pairs of gold earings P 10,000.00  
one (1) gold necklace with pendant 180,000.00  
one (1) Louie Viton Brown Leather (sic)... 11,000.00  
one (1) Gucci Ladies watch 13,000.00  
two (2) gold earrings w/diamond pendant... 80,000.00  
CASH MONEY 7,000.00  
belonging to LALAINE YREVERRE Y Panganiban, all in the total amount of PhP2,701,000.00, Philippines Currency, to
the damage and prejudice of the said offended party in the aforementioned sum and in such other amounts as maybe
awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4
At the pre-trial conference, the parties stipulated as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

1. The identity of all the accused as indicated in the information.

2. The accused Manuel Silao and Edgar Silao are brothers and first cousins of private  complainant Cynthia
Yreverre and prosecution witness Lalaine Yreverre.

3. The accused Manuel Silao had entered the house of complainant on several occasions to visit relatives.

4. The accused Edgardo Cacal is the driver of Manuel Silao and knows Manuel's brother accused Edgar
Silao.

5. The accused Manuel Silao has a pending criminal case for illegal possession of firearms before the RTC,
Manila.

6. The accused Manuel Silao is the owner of one Cal. 9mm Springfield bearing Serial No. 64624 with one
magazine containing eight (8) ammunitions, although only 4 were delivered to the Court.

7. The accused were all investigated in connection with the instant case, without the assistance of counsel.

8. The person depicted in the picture marked as Exhibit "E" is accused Manuel Silao while the one in the
photograph marked as Exhibit "D" is accused Danilo Cuanang.

9. On February 20, 1991, Edgar Silao was in Quezon City.5

The prosecution presented complainants Lalaine Yreverre and Cynthia Yreverre, NBI Illustrator Amando Mendoza, SPO2
Randolf Quitoriano, RCBC Manager Ma. Teresa Jamir, Joel Yreverre and Dr. Richard Pascual as its witnesses during the
trial on the merits. On its part, the defense relied on Celia Syquian, Edgardo Y. Silao, Dominador Pilar, Lourdes Samson
Lopez, and Danilo Cuanang as witnesses.

As stated, the RTC convicted Fransdilla and her co-accused of robbery, decreeing in its decision of September 15,
1999, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA, EDGARDO CACAL Y
SANCHEZ, DANILO CUANANG Y VALDEZ, MANUEL SILAO Y YREVERRE and EDGARDO SILAO Y YREVERRE
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime of Robbery punished under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code
and in the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusión temporal as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS oí reclusión temporal as maximum. Said accused are
likewise ordered to indemnify the herein private complainants the amount of TWO MILLION TWO HUNDRED FIFTY
THOUSAND, the value of the property taken less the amount recovered, and to pay the amount of PhP200,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.6
As to Fransdilla, the RTC ruled that several facts and circumstances either proved by the Prosecution or admitted by the
Defense established her having conspired with her co-accused in committing the offense charged.7

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of all of the accused, but modified the penalty imposed by the RTC, as
follows:8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 15, 1999 of the trial court is affirmed subject to the modification that
accused-appellants and accused are sentenced to an imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusión temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
Rejecting the claim of insufficiency of the proof of conspiracy raised by Fransdilla, the CA observed that the clear and
categorical testimony of Lalaine positively showed that Fransdilla's acts demonstrated her common design with the other
accused to commit the robbery,9 stressing that "it is a common design which is the essence of conspiracy, though the
conspirators may act separately and on different manner but always leading to the same unlawful result." It adverted to
Fransdilla's various acts as evincing her role in the concerted resolve to commit the robbery, such as introducing herself to
Lalaine as a representative of the POEA in order to gain access into the house; trying to distract Lalaine by using the
telephone, asking for a cigarette, going to the bathroom, and pretending that she was then having her menstrual period in
order to have her cohorts enter the house; and peeping inside the bedroom when her co-accused were tying Lalaine up to
enable themselves to search for and take away jewelry and other valuables inside the latter's bedroom without
hindrance.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Issue

The accused still insists on her innocence, protesting that the CA erred in affirming the conviction despite the failure to
establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator in robbery.10

Ruling of the Court

The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the CA.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1.
Conspiracy of Fransdilla with
her co-accused was established
beyond reasonable doubt

It bears stressing that Fransdilla opted not to present evidence in her defense during the trial. On appeal, the core of her
contentions in the CA was that the Prosecution did not establish her having conspired with the other accused in
committing the robbery. She reiterates such contentions here, stating that the State's formal offer of evidence did not
include any reference to any evidence specifically incriminating her.

The Court rejects Fransdilla's contentions.

Our review of the records of the trial reveals that contrary to Fransdilla's contentions, the State competently and credibly
established her active participation in the execution of the robbery through Lalaine's testimony detailing her specific acts,
as follows:

Q - Miss Yrreverre, do you recall if there was any unusual incident that happened on that particular date and time on
February 20, 1991 between 3:00 o'clock to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon?
A - Yes, sir.

Q - What was it?

A- On February 20, 1991, between 3:00 to 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon while I was resting at our sala I saw them and I
met them at the gate and I asked the lady because there were four of them I asked the lady to come in.

Q - How did the lady come in?

A - When I saw the lady I asked the lady what is her purpose and she said I am from the POEA and she is looking for my
sister Cynthia Yrreverre, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - When she inquired about my sister I told her that my sister Cynthia Yrreverre is in Japan embassy and she said if
there is any other person she could talked to.

Q - What was your answer?

A - When she said that she is from POEA I recommended myself to her and I said you can talk to me and I allowed her to
enter our house, sir.

Q - After you allowed that lady who represented herself to you that she is from the POEA to enter, what happened next?
A - I let her enter our house and I inquired and asked from her who are the persons she know in POEA, sir.

Q - And what happened next after that?

A - She mentioned a name whom according to her from the POEA but I do not remember anymore, sir.

Q - What happened next after that?

A - While we were chatting or conversing for a while she asked if she can use our telephone, sir.

Q - And what was your answer to that?

A - I said yes and I handed to her the cordless telephone, sir.

Q - What happened after you gave the telephone to the lady who represented herself that she is from the POEA?
A - After I gave the cordless telephone she keep on dialing, dialing and dialing and according to her she constantly dialing
the number and she even remarked: "the person she is calling does not know how to use the telephone"...

Q - What happened after that remarks?

A - She still kept on dialing and she remarked that she did not know how to use the phone...

Q - What happened after that?

A - After that, she asked for a cigarette sir.

Q - Did you give to the lady who represented herself that she is from the POEA a cigarette?
A - Yes, sir.

Q - What happened next after that? A - After I gave the cigarette the four (4) men entered suddenly and came in our
house.

Q - Where did they come from?

A - I do not know, sir.

Q - From what direction of the house they came from Miss Witness, do you know?
A - They came from the outside of the gate, sir, and suddenly entered our house, sir.

Q - When for the first time did you see that lady who represented herself that she is from the POEA and the four (4) men
burged (sic) in your house?
A- Last February 20, 1991 only, sir.

xxxx

ATTYl COPE:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, would you look around the courtroom and pinpoint if that lady who represented herself from the POEA
is here present?
A - Witness is pointing to a lady wearing black and when asked by the interpreter she answered to the name of Aurora
Engson Fransdilla.

xxxx
Q - Miss Yrreverre, what happened after four (4) men suddenly entered your residence on that particular date and time
you mentioned earlier?
A - As I was looking on the lady dialing, kept on dialing the number in the telephone I saw the four (4) men standing
behind the lady, sir.

Q - And when you saw the lady, you are referring to Aurora Engson Fransdilla?
A - Yes, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - When we were in the sala we were talking Aurora Engson Fransdilla remarked she can not really contact the number
as it was busy, sir.

Q - What happened next after that?

A - And Aurora Engson Fransdilla after which asked if she can use the comfort room to which I agreed, sir.

Q - What happened next?

A - She stood up and put down the cordless telephone and took her bag because she wanted to get a napkin as she said
she still has to call up before going to the comfort room, sir.

Q - What happened next?

A - After which she sat down again and crossed legs and remarked that she had a monthly period so my attention was
focused on her, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - While my attention was with Aurora Engson Fransdilla, Cacal approached me and poked the gun on my neck, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - And he announced hold-up.

Q - Who announced that hold-up?

A - Cacal, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - While Cacal poked a gun at my neck Cuanang and the two other men went to the kitchen to which I could see very
well in my position from where I stood, sir.

COURT:
Q - How many men went to the kitchen?
A- The three (3) others went to the kitchen, sir.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - What happened next?
A - While Cacal was poking the gun at my neck, I saw Cuanang and the two (2) men herded our maids my one cousin
and my niece, sir in the bodega, sir.

Q - What happened next?

A - And our maids and my niece and my cousin were locked inside the bodega, sir.

Q - Where is this bodega located Miss Witness?

A - In our kitchen, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A — While Cacal who was still poking the gun at my neck held and pulled the tail of my hair and dragged me upstairs and
brought me upstairs to the room of my sister Cynthia Irreverre, sir

Q - What happened next?

A - While I was at the room of my sister Cynthia and while the gun was still poked at my neck and still held by Cacal he
looked around the room, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A — While I was looking around the room he saw the vault of my sister Cynthia Yrreverre, sir.
Q - What happened next then?
A- Suddenly he dropped me and opened the door and shouted that one (1) of your should come up.

Q - What happened after that?

A- While they carried the vault of my sister downstairs Cuanang came up and Cuanang carried the vault with Cacal and
before they went down they told me, Cacal told me that you should not follow us.   You should stay here.

xxxx

ATTY. COPE:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, will you please describe the vault which Cuanang and Cacal got from the room of your sister Cynthia
Yrreverre?
A - Witness is demonstrating the size of the vault it is a small one it is as small television.

ATTY. VALDEZ:
Can we measure that Your Honor.

COURT:
You agree on the size.

WITNESS:
A- Witness is pointing half of the area of the table which is more or less 1 1/2 x 1 1/2 cubic feet.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - After Cuanang and Cacal brought out the vault from the room and you were told by Cacal to stay from the room and
not to get out, what did you do?
A - When the two (2) got out I just stay and they simultaneously closed the door, sir.

Q - What happened next then?

A — When they closed the door I got the courage to open the door and followed them, sir.

Q - What happened then?

A - I went down the stairs when I was at the middle of the stairs Cacal turned his back and he saw me and came after me
and brought me up to my room, sir.

Q - How far was your room to the room of your sister Cynthia Yrreverre?
A - Just near sir, the dividing portion for the room of my niece is so near.

Q - What happened after Cacal brought you to your room?

A - While I was in my room he pushed me towards my bed, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - So when he pushed me and I was felt on my back he said to me just stay right there and he searched my room
(naghalughog), sir.

xxxx

ATTY. COPE:
Q - How did you fall Miss Witness?
A - When he pushed me I felt at my back sir and Cacal searched my room, sir.

Q - What happened after that?

A - While Cacal was searching (naghahalughog) I stood up when Cacal saw me stood up he slapped me, sir.

Q - What happened when you were slapped by Cacal?

A - He said (putang ina mo matigas ang ulo mo) son of a bitch you are hard headed.

Q - And what happened after that?

A — While I was sitting Cuanang came inside my room and he tied my hands at my back, sir

Q - What happened after that?

A - While I was being tied by Cuanang at my back Aurora Engson Fransdilla peeped inside my room, sir.
Q - Is that Aurora Engson Fransdilla the lady who represented to you from the POEA?
A - Yes, sir.

Q - What happened after that while you were hogtied by Cuanang and Aurora Fransdilla peeped into your room?
A - While my hands was (sic) tied, that was the time Cacal and Cuanang took my jewelries, sir.

COURT:
Q - Where did she get those pieces of jewelry?
A - In my room at the headboard of my bed, sir.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - What else if there were any taken by Cacal and Cuanang?
A - Many sir.

Q - What are those?

A - They took the following: two pairs of gold earrings, one gold necklace with pendant, one Loui(s) Vuitton brown leather,
one Gucci Ladies watch, two gold earrings with diamond pendant and cash money of SEVEN THOUSAND (P7,000.00)
PESOS.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - This one gold necklace with pendant how much did you buy this?
A- I bought that for PI80,000.00, sir.

COURT:
How many karats this gold necklace?

WITNESS:
That is 18 karats gold, sir.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - Miss Yrreverre, how about the two gold earrings with diamond pendant, how much did you buy this?
A- I bought that for EIGHTY THOUSAND (P80,000.00) PESOS.

COURT:
Q - Do you know the karats of this diamond? How big is this?
A - It is as big as big mongo, sir.

ATTY. COPE:
Q - This two pairs of gold earrings, how much did you buy this, how much is this?
A-TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS, sir.

Q - What else?
A - One gold necklace with pendant, sir.

Q - How much is this?

A- ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND (PI80,000.00) PESOS, sir.

Q - How about this Louie Vitton brown leather bag, how much did you buy this?
A- I bought that for ELEVEN THOUSAND (PI 1,000.00) PESOS, sir.

Q - This Gucci ladies watch, how much did you buy this?
A-THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00) PESOS, sir.

COURT:
What kind of Gucci is this, US Gucci or Hongkong?

WITNESS:
I do not remember anymore, Your Honor.

COURT:
Q - How much did you buy this?
A - I bought that for THIRTEEN THOUSAND (P13,000.00) PESOS, sir.11
The State thus discharged its burden to produce before the trial court sufficient evidence against all the accused, including
Fransdilla, that would warrant a judgment of conviction. Fransdilla's non-presentation of her defense, despite her being
directly incriminated by Lalaine, denied the Court her explanation for her specific overt acts of complicity in the robbery
and thus rendered the incriminating evidence unrefuted. By this the Court simply means that Fransdilla did not discharge
her burden of evidence, which is "the duty of a party to start and continue giving evidence at any stage of the trial until he
has established a prima facie case, or the like duty of the adverse party to meet and overthrow that prima facie case thus
established."12

As such, the prosecution successfully discharged its burden of proof against Fransdilla.

In the eyes of the law, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a crime and decide to commit it.13 For an accused to be validly held to have conspired with her co-accused in committing
the crime, her overt acts must evince her active part in the execution of the crime agreed to be committed. The overt acts
of each of the conspirators must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive conspirator cannot be
held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such conspirator is the mastermind. Here, Fransdilla
was satisfactorily shown not to have been a mere passive co-conspirator, but an active one who had facilitated the access
into the house by representing herself as an employee of the POEA. In that respect, it is not always required to establish
that two or more persons met and explicitly entered into the agreement to commit the crime by laying down the details of
how their unlawful scheme or objective would be carried out.14 Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and
manner in which the offense is perpetrated, or can be inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or
common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.15 Once conspiracy is established, the act of
each conspirator is the act of all.

In establishing conspiracy, the State could rely on direct as well as circumstantial evidence. Lalaine's testimony against
Fransdilla constituted both kinds of evidence. Lalaine's direct testimony showed the latter's overt participation in the
execution of the robbery, while the following circumstances indicated the unity of action and common purpose or design to
commit the robbery among Fransdilla and her co-accused, specifically: (1) Fransdilla and her co-accused went together to
the complainants' house at around 3:00 to 4:00 p.m. of February 20, 1991; (2) she talked to Joel to solicit information on
the whereabouts of Cynthia; (3) upon learning that Cynthia was not home, she stepped outside the gate and talked to two
men sitting inside a vehicle parked outside the house; (4) she pretended to be an employee of the POEA in order to gain
entry into the house; (5) she performed acts purposely aimed to distract Lalaine in order to give her cohorts the
opportunity to enter the house and commit the robbery; (5) during the robbery, she was not tied up like the household
members, but moved freely around the house, and at one point Lalaine spotted her peeping into the bedroom where
Lalaine was then being held; and (7) she and the others fled together in two separate vehicles after the robbery.

In light of the foregoing, the CA justly concluded that the State established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt for of all the
accused, including Fransdilla, for the robbery.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

2.
Correction of the Indeterminate Sentence
was necessary to conform to the letter and spirit
the Indeterminate Sentence Law

That the trial judge fixed the indeterminate sentence at "imprisonment of TWELVE (12) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal  as maximum" was a patent
elementary error. Such fixing contravened the letter and spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Section 1 of which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that
which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the
minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; and if
the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the
minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225)
The CA justifiably deemed it necessary to correct the indeterminate sentence. Under Section 1, supra, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is a penalty "within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the [Revised Penal]
Code for the offense," and the maximum is "that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed
under the rules of the said Code." Considering that the clear objective of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to have the
convict serve the minimum penalty before becoming eligible for release on parole pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law,16 both the minimum and the maximum penalties must be definite, not ranging. This objective cannot be achieved
otherwise, for determining when the convict would be eligible for release on parole would be nearly impossible if the
minimum and the maximum were as indefinite as the RTC fixed the indeterminate sentence. Indeed, that the sentence is
an indeterminate one relates only to the fact that such imposition would leave the period between the minimum and the
maximum penalties indeterminate "in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be released from
serving said period in whole or in part."17

3.
Crime committed was the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house by armed men
under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code

Citing Napolis v. Court ofAppeals.,18 the CA ruled that all the accused, including Fransdilla, were guilty of committing the
complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation or
violence under Article 294, Revised Penal Code. Thus, it held that the penalty for the complex crime under Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code was that for the more serious offense, to be imposed in its maximum period. Taking into
consideration that no mitigating or aggravating circumstances were present, it set the indeterminate sentence of 12 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal,  as maximum.

We concur with the CA.

In Napolis v. Court of Appeals, the Court abandoned the doctrine adopted in United States v. De los Santos19 that when
the felonies of robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence
against or intimidation of a person under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code are committed, the penalty for the latter
crime (although the lighter one) should be imposed because the violence against or intimidation of a person was the
"controlling qualification," on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence or intimidation against the person
is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things, because where violence or intimidation against
the person is present there is greater disturbance of the order of society and the security of the individual." Writing for the
Court, Chief Justice Roberto R. Concepción observed:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall,
enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or
intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal. Pursuant to
the above view, adhered to in previous decisions, if, aside from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person,
without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of
the same Code, the imposable penalty - under paragraph (5) thereof- shall be much lighter. To our mind, this result and
the process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.

The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the "controlling qualification," is far
from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the
person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We
cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited - reduction of the penalty for the latter offense
owing to the concurrence of violation or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to
believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of a person takes
place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.

We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements of both provisions are present, that the
crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition — as provided in Art. 48 of said Code — of the penalty for the most
serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This
penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period - from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days
to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal - owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. xxx.20
Napolis v. Court of Appeals is controlling in this case. To start with, the information fully alleged the complex crime of
robbery in an inhabited house under Article 299, Revised Penal Code, and robbery with intimidation or violence under
Article 294, Revised Penal Code by averring that "the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and
mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, and by means of
violence and intimidation upon person rob the residence x x x." And, secondly, the Prosecution competently proved the
commission of the complex crime by showing during the trial that the accused, after entering the residential house of the
complainants at No. 24-B Mabait St., Teacher's Village, Quezon City, took away valuables, including the vault containing
Cynthia's US dollar currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence against and intimidation of persons during
the robbery by slapping and threatening Lalaine and tying her up, and herding the other members of the household inside
the bodega of the house.

Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Article 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. — Any person guilty of robbery with the
use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusión perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed.21

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusión perpetua when the robbery shall have been
accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation, or if by reason or on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries
penalized in subdivision 1 of Article 263 shall have been inflicted; Provided, however, that when the robbery accompanied
with rape is committed with a use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death (As amended by PD No. 767).

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal,  when by reason or on occasion of the  robbery, any of the physical  injuries
penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the violence or
intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree clearly unnecessary for the
commission of the crime, or when the  course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not
responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries covered by sub-divisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.

5. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other cases. (As
amended by R. A. 18).
Paragraph 5, supra, is the relevant provision, under which the penalty is prision correccional in its maximum period
to prision mayor in its medium period.

On the other hand, Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship. — Any armed person who
shall commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished
by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if:

(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery was committed, by any of the following means:

1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress.

2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window.

3. By using false keys, picklocks or similar tools.

4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.

Or if —

(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:

1. By the breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle;

2. By taking such furniture or objects to be broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery.

When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in
degree shall be imposed.

The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the property taken does not exceed 250
pesos.

When said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos, they shall suffer
the penalty prescribed in the two next preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period.

If the robbery be committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to
religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than those prescribed in this article shall be imposed.
Relevant are paragraph (a)4 (because Fransdilla pretended to be from the POEA) and paragraph (b)2 (because the
accused brought the vault down from Cynthia's upstairs bedroom and forced it open outside the place where the robbery
was committed), supra. The penalty for the crime is reclusion temporal.

Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the complex crime is that for the more serious felony, which,
in this case, was the robbery in an inhabited house by armed men punishable by reclusion temporal, to be imposed in the
maximum period (i.e., 17 years, four months and one day to 20 years). Hence, the maximum of the indeterminate
sentence of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four months of reclusion temporal, must be corrected
to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal.

4.
Exemplary damages to be deleted
for lack of legal basis

The CA affirmed the order of the RTC for the accused to return the value of the articles stolen totaling P2,250,000.00 and
to pay to the complainants P200,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes the grant of exemplary damages as part of the civil liability in crimes only when
one or more aggravating circumstances were present in the commission of the crime. With the conceded absence of any
aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, therefore, we delete the P200,000.00 as exemplary damages
for lack of legal basis. However, interest of 6% per annum should be imposed on the P2,250,000.00,22 to be reckoned
from the filing of the information until full payment because the value of the stolen articles, which the information
individually averred, could be established with reasonable certainty.23

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRMS in all respects the conviction of
accused AURORA ENGSON FRANSDILLA for the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men under
Article 299 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons under Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, subject to the following MODIFICATIONS, namely: (1) she shall suffer the indeterminate
sentence of 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; (2) the award of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal basis; and (3) and the actual
damages of P2,250,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the filing of the information until full
payment.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 220889

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee

vs.
MARLON BELMONTE y SUMAGIT, MARVIN BELMONTE y SUMAGIT, ENRILE GABAY y DELA TORRE a.k.a
"PUNO", and NOEL BAAC y BERG ULA, Accused
MARLON BELMONTE y SUMAGIT, Accused-Appellant.

Accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte y  Sumagit assails the Decision1 dated April 22, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05774, affirming his conviction for Robbery with Rape in Criminal Case No. 135982-H.

The Facts

Accused-appellant and his co-accused, namely, Marvin Belmonte (Marvin), Enrile Gabay (Enrile), and Noel Baac (Noel)
were charged with Robbery with Rape in an Information dated September 3, 2007 that reads:

The Prosecution, through the undersigned Public Prosecutor, charges Marlon Belmonte y Sumagit, Marvin Belmonte y
Sumagit and Enrile Gabay y Dela Torre @ "Puno" with the crime of robbery with rape, committed as follows:

On or about September 1, 2007, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above accused,
armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one Noel Baac who is still at-large and all of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, with intent to gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and divest from complainants the following, to wit:

xxxx

x x x [A]nd on the occasion thereof said Noel Baac, by means of force, threats and intimidation and with the use of a gun,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, have carnal knowledge with AAA,2 against her will and consent, which is aggravated
by the circumstances of nighttime and dwelling, to the damage and prejudice of the said victim.

Contrary to law.3

The trial of the case proceeded against the accused-appellant, his cohorts, Marvin and Enrile, who all pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. However, Noel remained at large.4

The prosecution evidence established that, in the evening of August 31, 2007, Hiroshi Emmanuel Zorilla (Hiroshi)
celebrated his 17th birthday with his friends in the house of his aunt Teodora and uncle Robert Dela Cruz in Pasig City.
When it was already 12:00 midnight, Jolly Pantaleon (Jolly), one of Hiroshi's friends who was present at the celebration,
left the group to buy some beer from a nearby store. At the store, Jolly met Enrile, who asked him if he could join them in
the drinking spree at Hiroshi's place. Enrile then helped Jolly carry the half case of beer and joined in the drinking spree at
Hiroshi's house.5

At around 2:00 a.m. of September 1, 2007, Jolly left the group and was followed by Enrile, but the latter soon returned to
the party and was accompanied by accused-appellant and his brother Marvin, and Noel. Armed with guns and a
knife,6 the three men approached and suddenly boxed Enrile, then tied the hands of all the persons inside the house and
ordered them to lie down on the floor as they took their personal belongings.

Meanwhile, the maids of spouses Teodora and Robert, namely, AAA and Rhea Brioso, were awakened inside their
quarters by the presence of two men, later identified as accused-appellant and Noel. Upon Noel's order, AAA was left
inside the room. Noel immediately locked the door, and at gunpoint, ordered AAA to remove her pants. He told AAA to lie
down, then he inserted his penis into her vagina.7

Thereafter, Noel and Marvin entered the room of spouses Teodora and Robert through the window. Teodora was
awakened and was surprised, hence, she shouted which prompted Robert to get up from bed. At gunpoint, Noel and
Marvin ordered the spouses to lie on the bed while they searched . the room; then they took away some pieces of jewelry,
laptop, ATM card, cash amounting to PhP 6,700 and 23 pieces ofYen.8 Teodora recognized the faces of Noel and Marvin
since the room was illuminated by light coming from a lamp shade.
For his part, Enrile, testified that, at around 1:00 a.m. of September 1, 2007, he and other bystanders were in front of a.
bakery store, about four streets away from Hiroshi's house when Jolly arrived to buy one and a half cases of beer. He
helped Jolly carry the cases of beer upon the latter's request, and when they arrived at Hiroshi's house, he was asked to
join in the drinking session. Thereafter, some men entered the house and suddenly ordered them to lie down on the floor
and tied their hands. The men took away his jewelry and cellular phone.9

Accused-appellant and Marvin, on the other hand, proffered alibi and claimed that they were sleeping in their house when
the alleged crime was committed.10

After trial, the RTC convicted accused-appellant, Marvin, and Enrile of the crime of Robbery with Rape, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused Marlon Belmonte y Sumagit, Marvin Belmonte y Sumagit, and Enrile Gabay y
Dela Torre a.k.a. "Puno" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape and hereby sentences each of
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The accused are also ordered to jointly and severally pay Hiroshi
Emmanuel L. Zorilla the amount of ₱23,000.00, as actual damages; Spouses Teodora and Robert Dela Cruz, the amount
of ₱132,150.00, as actual damages; and [AAA], the amount of ₱50,000.00, as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00, as moral
damages.

SOORDERED.11

On appeal, the CA modified the trial court's decision as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated June 6, 2012 is modified as follows:

(1) Accused-appellant Enrile Gabay y Dela Torre is acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. Unless detained for some
other lawful reasons, accused-appellant Emile Gabay y Dela Torre is hereby ordered released immediately.

(2) Accused-appellant Marvin Belmonte is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of simple robbery
and _is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment at 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional medium, as the
minimum period, to 10 years of prision mqyor maximum, as the maximum period. As ordered by the trial court, accused-
appellant Marvin Belmonte and accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte should jointly and severally pay actual damages to
Hiroshi Emmanuel Zorilla in the amount of Php23,000.00, and to spouses Teodora and Robert Dela Cruz in the amount of
Php132,150.00.

(3) The conviction of accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte for robbery with rape is affirmed. He is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua  without eligibility for parole. He is also ordered to pay AAA Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php75,000.00 as moral damages and Php30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum on all damages awarded from the date of finality of judgment.

SO ORDERED.12

Only accused-appellant appealed to this Court for review.

The Issue

Whether or not accused-appellant's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The crime of Robbery with Rape is penalized under Article 294 of the · Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7659. Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. It
contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property
belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.13

In People v. Tamayo,14 the Court ruled that:

For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by reason or on
the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This speci.al complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC
contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property
belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.15

There is no basis to disturb the findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA respecting accused-appellant's criminal
culpability. The prosecution's evidence established with certainty that accused-appellant, together with his brother Marvin,
and co-accused Noel, have intruded the house of spouses Teodora and Robert on the occasion of Hiroshi's birthday
celebration thereat. They aided each other in divesting the guests of Hiroshi of their personal belongings through violence
and intimidation. The evidence disclosed that they were armed with guns and knife, and they tied the hands of their
victims and threatened them with harm if they disobeyed their orders. Noel and Marvin, on the same occasion, entered
the room of spouses Teodora and Robert through the window and succeeded in taking away from their possession some
pieces of jewelry, laptop, ATM card, and cash.

It behooves Us to rule that the testimonies of prosecution witnesses, Teodora and Hiroshi, as to the foregoing, are
sufficient and credible to sustain the conviction of accused-appellant. Evidence to be believed, must proceed not only from
the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in .itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the knowledge and
common experience of mankind.16 Here, the prosecution witnesses' positive identification of the accused-appellant as one
of the malefactors in the robbery that took place on September 1, 2007 defeats accused-appellant's lone defense
of alibi.  Absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the witnesses, a categorical, consistent, and positive identification
of the accused-appellant shall prevail over the latter's alibi  and denial. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing
proof, alibi and denial are negative, self-serving and undeserving of any weight in law.17

The evidence further show that, on the occasion of the robbery, AAA · was raped. The RTC and the CA are correct in
their appreciation that the original intent of the accused-appellant and his cohorts was to take, with intent to gain, the
personal effects of their victims. Rape was committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. Accused-
appellant was implicated because he was positively identified as Noel's companion inside the room where AAA and Rhea
were soundly sleeping. The CA, affirming the RTC's finding ruled, viz.:

The trial court correctly convicted accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte of the special complex crime of robbery with rape
even if he did not rape AAA, as accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte had the opportunity but did not endeavor to stop
accused Noel Baac from raping AAA.x x x The accused's failure to prevent his co-accused from committing rape despite
an opportunity to do so made him liable for the rape committed. x x x.18 (Emphasis and underscoring ours)

While the evidence directly points to Noel as AAA's rapist, accused-appellant did not prevent him from committing the
lustful act despite an opportunity to do so.

Pertinently, in People v. Verceles, et al.,19 We held:

In the course of the robbery, one of them, particularly Mamerto Soriano, succumbed to lustful desires and raped [the
victim] while accused-appellants just stood outside the door and did nothing to prevent Mamerto Soriano. We have
previously ruled that once conspiracy is established between two accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they
would be both equally culpable for the rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them
proves that he endeavored to prevent the other from committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a
rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as
principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape. (Emphasis ours)

As stated above, once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, as
in the present case, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the
robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape. 20 The immediately
preceding condition is absent in this case. The factual finding of the trial court as affirmed by the CA is already irreversible
holding that while accused-appellant did not rape AAA, he, however, did not endeavor to stop Noel despite an opportunity.

The fact that AAA was raped cannot be o:ver-emphasized. The CA made the following categorical findings:

AAA's testimony was straightforward, candid and consistent on material points detailing the bestial act of accused Noel
Baac in ravishing her.1avvphi1 Besides, her statement was corroborated by the medical certificate dated September 7,
2007 finding AAA's genitals to have suffered from deep fresh laceration. No young and decent woman in her right mind
especially of tender age as that of AAA who is 18 years old would concoct a story of defloration, allow the examination of
her private parts and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by her
desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.21

On the face of the evidence against him, accused-appellant's defense consisting merely of his bare allegation that he and
his brother Marvin were · at their house when the crime was committed does not persuade Us to rule in his favor. By their
own admission, they live at 97 Eastbank Road, Kapitbahayan, Floodway, Sta. Lucia, Pasig City. It was easy for them to
negotiate the distance between their house and the victims' house. Their place of residence and· the place where the
crime was committed are both situated in Barangay Sta. Lucia, and the distance could be negotiated within 15minutes.

Ergo, his conviction is sustained.

The CA correctly noted that the imposable penalty upon accused-appellant should have been death considering that the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling was alleged in the Information and proven. However, with the passage of R.A. No.
934622  prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the trial court correctly reduced the penalty of death to  reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole.23

Clearly, the imposable penalty against accused-appellant is death. However, by reason of R.A. No. 9346 as stated above,
the penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua.  In view hereof, the CA's award of civil indemnity in the amount of PhP
75,000, moral damages in the amount of PhP 75,000, and exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 30,000 to AAA,
must be modified pursuant to the guidelines iaid down in People  v. Jugueta,24 to wit:

II. For Simple Rape/Qualified Rape:

1.1 Where the penalty imposed is Death but reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346 :

a. Civil indemnity- PhP 100,000.00

b. Moral damages-PhP 100,000.00

c. Exemplary damages-PhP 100,000.00

Accordingly, accused-appellant shall pay AAA civil indemnity of PhP 100,000, moral damages of PhP 100,000, and
exemplary damages of PhP 100,000.

The CA's order directed against accused-appellant to pay, jointly and severally with Marvin. Belmonte, actual damages to
Hiroshi and spouses Teodora and Robert must stand. The CA on the matter held that:

The trial court correctly awarded actual damages suffered by Hiroshi Emmanuel L. Zorilla and spouses Teodora and
Robert Dela Cruz in the amounts of ₱23,000.00 and ₱132,150.00, respectively, as they are duly supported by
receipts.25 (Emphasis ours)

Truly, actual damages to be compensable must be proven by clear evidence, as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05774
dated April 22, 2014, finding accused-appellant Marlon Belmonte GUILTY of the crime of Robbery with Rape is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay AAA civil indemnity of PhP 100,000,
moral damages of PhP 100,000, and exemplary damages of PhP 100,000. Interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. The rest of
the assailed CA Decision STANDS.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200922               July 18, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
CESAR CONCEPCION y BULANIO, Appellant,

The Case

This is a criminal case filed against the accused Cesar Concepcion y Bulanio (Concepcion) for the crime of robbery with
homicide under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of May 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with his co-accused ROSENDO OGARDO, JR. Y VILI.H1AS, with intent to gain, by means of !(nee,
violence and intimidation of person, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one JENNIFER
ACAMPADO Y QUIMPO, in the following manner, to wit: While complainant was walking along Panay Avenue corner
Timog Avenue,

Barangay Paligsahan, this Cit), accused suddenly appeared from behind riding in a Suzuki motorcycle with Plate no. RCi-
7037 and forcibly took, robbed and carried away con1plainant 's shoulder bag containing wrist watch, earring, brochure,
bracelet and wallet all valued at P3,000.00, Philippiine Currency, and that on the occasion of the said robbery, accused
ROSENDO OGARDO, JR. Y VILLEGAS died due to vehicular accident; to the damage and prejudice of the said offended
party in the aforementioned amount.

Contrary to law.1

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, in its Decision dated 1 August 2006 (RTC Decision),2 found
Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all accessory penalties provided by law, and to reimburse private complainant Jennifer Q.
Acampado (Acampado) the amount of ₱ 3,000 representing the cash, jewelry and other personal items taken from her.
On appeal, the Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed in toto the RTC Decision.

Prosecution’s Version of Facts

The RTC Decision provided the prosecution’s version of facts, as supported by the records:

At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of May 25, 2004, while private complainant Jennifer Acampado was at the corner of Mother
Ignacia Street, Quezon City and at another street which she could not remember and seemed to be deserted at that time,
a male person riding at the back of the driver of a motorcycle whom she later identified in open court as accused Cesar

Concepcion, snatched her brown Avon bag with black strap which at that time, was placed on her left shoulder. The black
motorcycle with white covering at the back side and with plate number which is not visible to the eye, came from behind
her. As the motorcycle sped away, the accused even raised and waved the bag that he snatched from Jennifer who was
unable to do anything but just cry and look at the snatcher so much so that she recognized him in the process.

Meanwhile, while prosecution witness Joemar de Felipe was driving his R & E Taxi, in the same vicinity, he witnessed the
subject snatching incident. As the accused was waving the bag at Jennifer, he blew his horn. Ogardo drove faster so that
de Felipe gave a chase and kept on blowing his horn. Eventually, Ogardo lost control of the motorcycle and it crashed in
front of his taxi, sending its two occupants to the pavement. De Felipe immediately alighted from the taxi with the intention
to arrest the snatchers. At that juncture, some policemen from the Kamuning Police Station 10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon
City, arrived. Seeing that the snatchers were badly injured, the policemen brought them to the East Avenue Medical
Center, Quezon City where Ogardo later expired.3

Defense’s Version of Facts

The RTC Decision likewise summarized the defense’s version of facts, as follows:

For the defense, the accused testified. He denies participation in the snatching incident and contends that at around 11:00
a.m. of May 25, 2004, he and his companion, Rosendo Ogardo, were riding in a motorcycle when suddenly there was this
chasing by another motorcycle. A taxi bumped their motorcycles and Rosendo was thrown to the gutter. Rosendo was
severely injured. The police brought them to the East Avenue Medical Center where Rosendo died. Thereafter, he was
brought to the police station where a woman pointed to him as snatcher. A case for robbery with homicide was filed
against him on the same day.4

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court

The RTC declared Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive
portion of the RTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused CESAR CONCEPCION y BULANIO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE described and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
R.A. 7659 in relation to Article 61 of the RPC and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all
the accessory penalties provided by law and to reimburse private complainant Jennifer Acampado the amount of P3,000
representing the cash, jewelry and other personal items taken from her.5

The RTC declared that all elements of the crime of robbery were duly proven. The prosecution sufficiently established the
identity of Concepcion as the person who snatched Acampado’s bag because Concepcion was positively identified by the
victim Acampado and Joemar de Felipe (de Felipe), who both had no ill-motive to falsely testify against Concepcion.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the conviction of Concepcion. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City, dated August 1, 2006 is hereby
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.6

The CA declared that robbery with homicide was committed. The CA held that, for as long as the homicide resulted
during, or because of, the robbery, even if the killing was by mere accident, robbery with homicide was committed. It is
immaterial that death supervened by mere accident or that the victim of homicide was a person other than the victim of
robbery or that two or more persons were killed. What is essential is that there is a direct relation or intimate connection
between the robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be
committed at the same time.7

The Issues

Concepcion, in his brief, raised the following issues:

I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE HIGHLY
INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.8

Concepcion discussed the issues jointly, claiming that the CA erred because: (a) it gave credence to the inconsistent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses regarding the date and manner of the commission of the crime; (b) even
assuming that he snatched Acampado’s shoulder bag, Concepcion should be held liable for simple theft only; and (c) the
prosecution failed to establish that Ogardo’s death was by reason or on the occasion of the alleged robbery.9

The Ruling of the Court

Inconsistent Testimonies of Prosecution Witnesses

Concepcion claims that Acampado and de Felipe, both prosecution witnesses, made inconsistent testimonies. First, de
Felipe testified that the snatching incident happened on 26 May 2004, when the information states that the alleged crime
was committed on 25 May 2004.10 Second, Acampado testified that Concepcion was on board the motorcycle, sitting at
the back of Ogardo, when Concepcion snatched Acampado’s shoulder bag from behind. In contrast, de Felipe testified
that Concepcion alighted from the motorcycle and forcibly took Acampado’s shoulder bag.11 Lastly, de Felipe, on direct
examination, claimed that the motorcycle slid and Ogardo and Concepcion fell on the street. On cross examination,
however, de Felipe admitted that his taxi bumped the motorcycle, causing Concepcion and Ogardo to be thrown off the
motorcycle.12

It is a general principle of law that factual findings of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal unless the court a quo is
perceived to have overlooked, misunderstood or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight, which, if properly
considered, would have materially affected the outcome of the case.13 We find no compelling reason to disturb the factual
findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, in this case.

Robbery vs. Theft

On the second and third issues, Article 293 of the RPC defines robbery as a crime committed by "any person who, with
intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any
person, or using force upon anything." Robbery with homicide occurs when, by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the
crime of homicide shall have been committed.14 In Article 249 of the RPC, any person who shall kill another shall be
deemed guilty of homicide. Homicide, as used in robbery with homicide, is to be understood in its generic sense to include
parricide and murder.15 The penalty for the crime of robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death.16

Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against or intimidation
of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal property of another without the latter’s consent.17 The penalty of
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods is imposed upon persons guilty of theft, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than P200 but does not exceed P6,000.18

By definition in the RPC, robbery can be committed in three ways, by using: (a) violence against any person; (b)
intimidation of any person; and/or (c) force upon anything. Robbery by use of force upon things is provided under Articles
299 to 305 of the RPC.

The main issue is whether the snatching of the shoulder bag in this case is robbery or theft. Did Concepcion employ
violence or intimidation upon persons, or force upon things, when he snatched Acampado’s shoulder bag?

In People v. Dela Cruz,19 this Court found the accused guilty of theft for snatching a basket containing jewelry, money and
clothing, and taking off with it, while the owners had their backs turned.

In People v. Tapang,20 this Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for frustrated theft because he stole a white gold
ring with diamond stones from the victim’s pocket, which ring was immediately or subsequently recovered from the
accused at or about the same time it was stolen.

In People v. Omambong,21 the Court distinguished robbery from theft. The Court held:

Had the appellant then run away, he would undoubtedly have been guilty of theft only, because the asportation was not
effected against the owner’s will, but only without his consent; although, of course, there was some sort of force used by
the appellant in taking the money away from the owner.

xxxx

What the record does show is that when the offended party made an attempt to regain his money, the appellant’s
companions used violence to prevent his succeeding.

xxxx

The crime committed is therefore robbery and not theft, because personal violence was brought to bear upon the offended
party before he was definitely deprived of his money.22

The prosecution failed to establish that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching Acampado’s shoulder
bag. Acampado herself merely testified that Concepcion snatched her shoulder bag which was hanging on her left
shoulder. Acampado did not say that Concepcion used violence, intimidation or force in snatching her shoulder bag.
Given the facts, Concepcion’s snatching of Acampado’s shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery.
Concepcion’s crime of theft was aggravated by his use of a motorcycle in committing the crime. Under Article 14(20) of
the RPC, the use of a motor vehicle as a means of committing a crime is a generic aggravating circumstance. Thus, the
maximum period of the penalty for the crime of theft shall be imposed upon Concepcion due to the presence of a generic
aggravating circumstance and the absence of any mitigating circumstance.

Based on the RTC Decision’s statement of facts which was affirmed by the CA, Concepcion’s co-conspirator, Rosendo
Ogardo, Jr. y Villegas (Ogardo), who was driving the motorcycle, died because he lost control of the motorcycle and
crashed in front of de Felipe’s taxi. Since Concepcion, as passenger in the motorcycle, did not perform or execute any act
that caused the death of Ogardo, Concepcion cannot be held liable for homicide.

Indeterminate Sentence Law

Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (The Indeterminate Sentence Law) provides:

In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense x x x

xxxx

This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life-imprisonment; to those
convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion,
sedition or espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who have escaped
from confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall
have violated the terms thereof; to those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year, not to those
already sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in Section 5 hereof.

Since Concepcion is guilty of the crime of theft of property valued at P3,000, the penalty shall be the maximum period
imposed by the RPC due to the presence of the generic aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle in the
commission of the crime. The maximum penalty to be imposed upon Concepcion is prision correccional in its medium
period. However, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of Concepcion’s penalty shall be within
the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for the offense, which is arresto mayor in its maximum
period. For this reason, we impose upon Concepcion the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period, which is 6
months, to prision correccional in its medium period, which is 4 years and 2 months.

WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the 6 September 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04200
affirming the judgment of conviction of robbery with homicide of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81 of Quezon City in
Criminal Case No. 04-127163 dated 1 August 2006. We find appellant Cesar Concepcion y Bulanio GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of THEFT with the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle
in the commission of the crime and impose upon him the indeterminate penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period, or
6 months, to prision correccional in its medium period, or 4 years and 2 months.

We DIRECT the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement this Decision and to report to this Court the action
taken within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 209227

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
CHARLIE OROSCO, Accused-Appellant.

On appeal is the Decision1 dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05171 which
affirmed the Decision2 dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10 finding the accused-
appellant Charlie Orosco guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

Appellant, along with Abner Astor, "John Doe" and "Peter Doe," were charged with Robbery with Homicide defined and
penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of May, 2006, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent of gain and
by means of violence, did then and there [willfully], unlawfully, feloniously and forcibly enter the store owned by one
Lourdes Yap situated at Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City, and once inside said store, take, steal and carry away
cash money, to the damage and prejudice of said Lourdes Yap, and by reason of or on occasion of said robbery, and for
the purpose of enabling them to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid cash money in pursuance of their conspiracy, did
then and there [willfully], unlawfully and feloniously and taking advantage of their superior strength and with intent to kill,
attack, assault and stab the aforesaid Lourdes Yap, thereby inflicting upon her injury which directly caused her untimely
death, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The factual scenario presented by the prosecution is based on the eyewitness account of Albert M. Arca (Arca), the
postmortem findings of Sr. Pol. Chief Insp. Dr. James Margallo Belgira who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of the
victim, and the victim’s grandson, Ryan Francis Yap.

Arca testified that on May 16, 2006, about one o’clock in the afternoon, he went to the store of Lourdes Yap (Yap) at
Purok 4, Barangay Rawis, Legazpi City. He was buying ice but it was not yet hardened (frozen) so he went home. At
around two o’clock, he was again sent on errand to buy ice at the same store. After purchasing the ice, he noticed there
was a verbal tussle between Yap and two male customers. The men were arguing that they were given insufficient
change and insisting they gave a P500 bill and not P100. When Yap opened the door, the two men entered the store.
From outside the store and thru its open window grills, he saw one of the men placed his left arm around the neck of Yap
and covered her mouth with his right hand while the other man was at her back restraining her hands. He recognized the
man who was holding the hands of Yap as Charlie Orosco (appellant), while he described the man who covered her
mouth as thin, with less hair and dark complexion. The latter stabbed Yap at the center of her chest. When they released
her, she fell down on the floor. Appellant then took a thick wad of bills from the base of the religious icon or "santo" at the
altar infront of the store’s window, after which he and the man who stabbed Yap fled together with two other men outside
who acted as lookouts. Arca went near the bloodied victim but also left and went home afraid because he was seen by
one of the lookouts.4

Yap was brought to the Aquinas University Hospital but she was declared dead on arrival. Later, at the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Legazpi City District office, Arca gave descriptions of the faces of appellant and the dark thin man who
stabbed Yap ("John Doe"). From a surveillance digital photo and video clip shown to him, Arca positively identified Abner
Astor (Astor) as one of the two men sitting beside the store as lookouts. Consequently, warrants of arrest were issued
against appellant and Astor. But only appellant was arrested as Astor, John Doe and Peter Doe remained at large.

Dr. Belgira affirmed the findings in his Medico-Legal Report5 stating:

TRUNK:

1)Stab wound, left anterior costal region, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm, 5 cm from the anterior midline, 9 cm deep. The wound
tract is directed posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, cutting the sixth anterior thoracic rib and piercing the heart.

CONCLUSION:

The cause of death is hemorrhagic shock secondary to a stab wound of the trunk.
He explained that it was possible that the lone stab wound caused by a sharp object, such as a knife, was inflicted while
the victim was standing, and found no other injuries such as defense wounds.6

For his defense, appellant testified that on the date and time of the incident, he was at his house in Bigaa taking care of
his three-year-old child while his wife was washing clothes. He stayed in the house until his wife finished the laundry at
past 3:00 p.m. He denied knowing Yap and his co- accused Astor. While he admitted that he was a resident of Purok 4,
Bgy. Rawis, his family transferred to their other house at Bigaa. He denied knowing Arca and he does not know of any
motive for Arca to testify against him. He worked in a copra company in Lidong but stopped reporting for work after May
16, 2006 as he was selling fish. He was arrested by the police at the rotunda in Legazpi when he was buying medicine for
his sick child.7

Appellant’s wife, Teresa Magdaong-Orosco also testified to confirm that at the time of the incident he was at their house
while she was doing the laundry just adjacent to their house. On cross-examination, she was asked the distance between
their place and Bgy. Rawis and she replied that it will take less than one hour from Bigaa to Rawis.8

On June 24, 2011, the trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime charged, thus:

WHEREFORE, above premises considered, the Court hereby finds accused Charlie Orosco GUILTY of the crime of
robbery with homicide. He is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Lourdes Yap
P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

Insofar as the other accused is concerned, the case is hereby sent to the archives, pending their eventual arrest.

SO ORDERED.9

Appellant went to the CA but his appeal was dismissed. The CA upheld his conviction as it found no compelling reason to
deviate from the factual findings and conclusions of the trial court.

In this petition, appellant reiterates the arguments he raised before the CA that the trial court erred in giving credit to the
uncorroborated eyewitness testimony of Arca who could not point to him during the trial, and that even granting that
criminal charges may be imputed against him, it should only be robbery and not the complex crime of robbery with
homicide considering the fact that it was not him who stabbed Yap.

The appeal lacks merit.

It is settled that witnesses are to be weighed not numbered, such that the testimony of a single, trustworthy and credible
witness could be sufficient to convict an accused. The testimony of a sole witness, if found convincing and credible by the
trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Corroborative evidence is necessary only
when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been
inaccurate.10

In this case, both the trial and appellate courts found the testimony of the lone eyewitness, Arca, convincing
notwithstanding that he was quite slow in narrating the incident to the court and that he initially desisted from physically
pointing to appellant as the one who held Yap’s hands from behind and took her money at the store after she was stabbed
by appellant’s cohort (John Doe).

In his direct examination, Arca named appellant as one of those who robbed and killed Yap but refused to pinpoint him in
open court, thus:

ACP NUQUI x x x x

Q.This person who was holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, were you able to identify him?

A.Yes, sir.

Q.Do you know the name of this person?

A.Yes, sir. He is Charlie.

Q.Do you know the family name?

A.Orosco, sir.

Q.If this Charlie Orosco whom you said was then holding the hands of Lourdes Yap, if he is in Court, would you please
point to him?

WITNESS (answering)

A.Yes, sir.

Q.Please look around you and point at him.

A.He is here.

Q.If he is in Court, please point at him.

Q.Why can’t you point at him? COURT INTERPRETER

At this juncture, the witness is somewhat trembling. ACP NUQUI

Oh, you see. ATTY. BAÑARES

The witness can not answer. ACP NUQUI

By the look of the witness, Your Honor, he is afraid. Perhaps….

xxxx

ACP NUQUI (continuing)

Q.Please point at him.

ATTY. BAÑARES

We have already foreseen the witness to pinpoint at anyone. ACP NUQUI

No. He said that the…. ATTY. BAÑARES

Then, let him voluntarily do it. ACP NUQUI

Okay.

ATTY. BAÑARES

Your Honor, I move that the prosecutor will transfer to another question because we keep on waiting already.

ACP NUQUI

Your Honor, it is understandable that even he is slow, he keeps on glancing at the person.

COURT

Observations are all noted.

 xxxx

ACP NUQUI

At this point, Your Honor, I would like to make of record that when it comes to the person of Charlie Orosco, Your Honor,
he stopped and did not say ---- he did not nod or do anything of what he has been doing when the other persons were
identified.

COURT

Okay. Noted.11

Arca continued with his testimony on how Yap was stabbed by appellant’s companion and appellant taking the thick wad
of P1,000 bills before fleeing along with the two lookouts. When asked for the fourth time to pinpoint appellant, Arca was
still hesitant:Q.Now, is this Charlie Orosco here in Court?

A.Yes, sir, he is around.

Q.This person who took the money or Charlie Orosco you said "he is in Court," will you please look at him.

xxxx

ACP NUQUI (continuing)

Q.Is he now in Court?

A.Yes, sir.

Q.Please point at him. ATTY BAÑARES

The same observation, Your Honor. COURT

Oh, the same observation? ACP NUQUI

Yes, Your Honor, he is hesitant. It is understandable because he is afraid.

xxxx

COURT (to the witness)

Q.Why can you not point at Charlie Orosco who according to you he is inside the Court?

WITNESS (answering)

A.I can’t afford to point at him.

ACP NUQUI (to the witness)

Q.Why?

A. I am afraid.

COURT

He can not because he is afraid.12 (Emphasis supplied)

At the next hearing, Arca was recalled to the witness stand and this time he was able to pinpoint appellant as among
those persons who robbed and killed Yap, thus:

PROSECUTOR NUQUI

Q- You mentioned that you saw two (2) persons talking to Lourdes Yap. Who are these persons you are referring to?

ATTY. CHAN

Your Honor please, we are again registering our objection.

COURT

Witness may answer.

WITNESS

A- Charlie Orosco and a certain thin person.

PROSECUTOR NUQUI

Q- Why are you able to say that Charlie Orosco was one of the persons talking, how long have you known Charlie
Orosco?

A- He always go with a fisherman and act as helper and because of that I know him.

xxxx

PROSECUTOR NUQUI

Q- You mentioned that you have long known Charlie Orosco. Will you look around and point to him if he is in
Court?

INTERPRETER

At this juncture, the witness is pointing to a man wearing a yellow T-shirt with handcuff and when asked answered
by the name of Charlie Orosco.

PROSECUTOR NUQUI

No further questions Your Honor.13

Assessing the identification made by Arca, the trial court concluded that he had positively identified appellant as one of
the perpetrators of the robbery and killing of Yap, viz:

Here, Albert Arca, the prosecution’s main witness, positively identified accused Orosco as one of [the] two men who
robbed and killed Lourdes Yap on that fateful day. As observed by the trial court during the bail hearings, when asked to
identify one of the men who robbed and killed the victim, Arca was trembling and constantly looking towards the direction
of accused Orosco. Though simple-minded, Arca was well-aware of the possible consequences his testimony could
trigger. To the Court’s mind, Arca’s act of constantly looking towards Orosco’s direction whenever he was asked to point
out one of the culprits, is a mute but eloquent manner of identifying Orosco as one of the perpetrators of the crime. As
such, Arca’s act is sufficient identification already.

Later, when Arca was recalled to the stand to answer some additional questions, he was able to gather enough courage
to point out to Orosco as the man who held the hands of Lourdes Yap while his companion stabbed her. Arca stated that
he was hesitant to identify and point out accused earlier because he feared what Orosco might do to him. Incidentally,
both Orosco and his wife stated that they do know neither Albert Arca nor Lourdes Yap. Thus, it appears that there is no
reason whatsoever for Arca to lie and attribute the crime to Orosco. Following settled jurisprudence, Arca’s positive
identification of Orosco prevails over the latter’s alibi.14

We find no compelling or cogent reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court on its evaluation of Arca’s testimony.
The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the
highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood
or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the result of the case.15

Appellant repeatedly harped on the hesitation of Arca to point to him at the trial. However, as the trial court’s firsthand
observation of said witness’ deportment revealed, Arca’s fear of appellant sufficiently explains his initial refusal to point to
him in open court during his direct examination. Arca was finally able to point to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
robbery and killing of Yap during his additional direct examination when he had apparently mustered enough courage to
do so.

Robbery with homicide is defined under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which provides in part:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. – Any person guilty of robbery with the use
of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

The elements of the crime of robbery with homicide are: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi; and (4)
by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is committed.16 Homicide is said
to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if it is committed (a) to facilitate the robbery or the
escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of
the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses to the commission of the crime.17 In robbery with homicide, the original criminal
design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The
intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the
robbery.18

Here, the homicide was committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery as appellant and John Doe had to kill
Yap to accomplish their main objective of stealing her money. The earlier verbal tussle where the two pretended to have
paid a greater amount and asked for the correct change was just a ploy to get inside the store where the victim kept her
earnings. To verify whether the cash payment was indeed a P500 or P100 bill, the victim let them enter the store but once
inside they got hold of her and stabbed her. Appellant, however, argues that if he had committed any offense, it was only
robbery since Arca testified that it was John Doe, whom he described as a thin man, who stabbed the victim.

We disagree.

The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly showed that appellant acted in conspiracy with his co-accused.
Appellant and John Doe first engaged the unsuspecting victim in a verbal altercation until she allowed them to enter the
store. Upon getting inside, they held the victim with John Doe wrapping his arm around her neck while appellant held her
hands at the back. With the victim pressed between the two of them, John Doe stabbed her once in her chest before
releasing her. Once she fell down, appellant quickly took the money placed at the altar inside the store and fled together
with John Doe and the two lookouts outside the store. All the foregoing indicate the presence of conspiracy between
appellant and his co- accused in the perpetration of robbery and killing of the victim.

It must be stressed that appellant played a crucial role in the killing of the victim to facilitate the robbery. He was behind
the victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her at the neck. His act contributed in rendering the victim without
any means of defending herself when John Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in conspiracy with his co-
accused, appellant is equally liable for the killing of Yap.

As we held in People v. Baron19

The concerted manner in which the appellant and his companions perpetrated the crime showed beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of conspiracy. When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those
who took part shall be guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide whether they actually
participated in the killing, unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent the killing. There was no
evidence adduced in this case that the appellant attempted to prevent the killing. Thus, regardless of the acts individually
performed by the appellant and his co-accused, and applying the basic principle in conspiracy that the "act of one is the
act of all," the appellant is guilty as a co-conspirator. As a result, the criminal liabilities of the appellant and his co-accused
are one and the same. (Emphasis supplied)

In sum, the CA did not err in affirming the conviction of appellant for robbery with homicide. Appellant was positively
identified by prosecution eyewitness Arca as among those who perpetrated the robbery and killing of Yap at the latter’s
store on May 16, 2006 in Bgy. Rawis, Legazpi City. This positive identification prevails over accused’s defense of alibi. As
pointed out by the trial court, it was not physically impossible for appellant to be at the scene of the crime considering the
presence of many public conveyances which would drastically cut the one hour walk from Bigaa to Rawis to only a
"couple of minutes."20

On the award of damages, the trial court was correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordering him to pay P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for the fact of death and P75,000.00 as moral damages,
conformably with prevailing jurisprudence.21 We also find the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00
proper due to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, though these
were not alleged in the information. While an aggravating circumstance not specifically alleged in the information (albeit
established at trial) cannot be appreciated to increase the criminal liability of the accused, the established presence of one
or two aggravating circumstances of any kind or nature entitles the offended party to exemplary damages under Article
2230 of the Civil Code because the requirement of specificity in the information affected only the criminal liability of the
accused, not his civil liability.22

The aforesaid sums shall earn the legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment
until full payment.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated March 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 05171 affirming the Decision dated June 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, Branch 10 in
Criminal Case No. 10916 is AFFIRMED. The sums awarded as civil indemnity (P75,000.00), moral damages
(P75,000.00) and exemplary damages (P30,000.00) shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the finality
of judgment until full payment.

With costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 181138               December 3, 2012

RICKY "TOTSIE" MARQUEZ, ROY BERNARDO, and JOMER MAGALONG, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

"The testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward
manner and it contains details which could not have been the result of a deliberate afterthought."1

Factual Antecedents

For our review is the July 27, 2007 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28814 which affirmed the
June 30, 2004 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 121 in Criminal Case No. C-65837
finding herein petitioners Ricky "Totsie" Marquez (Marquez), Roy Bernardo (Bernardo), Jomer Magalong (Magalong) and
accused Ryan Benzon (Benzon) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery. With Force Upon Things and
sentencing them to imprisonment of six (6) years of prison correccional to nine (9) years of prison mayor and to pay the
private complainant Sonia Valderosa (Valderosa) the amount of P42,000.00.

The Information4 filed against petitioners and Benzon contained the following accusatory allegations:

That on or about the 6th day of April, 2002 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused confederating together and mutually aiding each other, with intent of gain by means of
force upon things, that is, by destroying the door lock of the stall of one SONIA VALDEROSA and passing/entering thru
the same, once inside, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the following items,
to wit:

Two (2) pieces Rice Cooker (heavy duty)

One (1) piece of [Teppanyaki] (big)

1,000 pieces of Boxes (printed)

Kitchen Utensils

Fresh Meat (48 kls)

Three (3) boxes of Ter[i]yaki Sauce

One (1) Heavy duty blender

One (1) Programmer Calculator

One (1) Transistor Radio

all belonging to the said complainant, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the total amount of P42,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

All of them pleaded "not guilty" during arraignment.6 After the pre-trial conference was held and terminated,7 trial ensued.
In the course of the trial, however, Benzon failed to appear despite due notice.8 The trial court therefore ordered the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and the cancellation of his bail bond.9 Benzon was then tried in absentia.10

Prosecution’s Version

At around 2:30 a.m. of April 6, 2002, Marlon Mallari (Mallari) was with petitioners and Benzon in front of the University of
the East (U.E.), Caloocan City. Marquez suggested that the group rob the Rice-in-a-Box store located at the corner of
U.E.11 Marquez then got a lead pipe and handed it to Magalong, which he and Bernardo used to destroy the padlock of the
store.12 Mallari was designated as the look-out while petitioners and Benzon entered the store and carried away all the
items inside it which consisted of rice cookers, a blender and food items.13 They then brought the stolen items to the house
of Benzon’s uncle.14 Apprehensive that Mallari might squeal,15 the group promised to give him a share if they could sell the
stolen items.16

At 9:30 a.m. of the same day, Valderosa received information from the daughter of the owner of the premises where her
Rice-in-a- Box franchise store was located, that her store had been forcibly opened and its padlock destroyed.17 Upon her
arrival thereat, she discovered that the contents of her freezer were missing along with other items inside the store, such
as two rice cookers valued at P3,900.00 each, teppanyaki worth P2,700.00, a thousand pieces of rice boxes at P5.00 a
piece, kitchen utensils valued at P4,500.00, an estimated 48 kilos of fresh meat at P250.00 per kilo, three boxes of teriyaki
sauce worth P3,600.00, a blender costing P2,200.00, a programmer calculator valued at P3,500.00, and a transistor radio
worth P1,500.00. The total value of these stolen items was approximately P42,000.00.18 She reported the robbery to the
police.19

Meanwhile, on April 7, 2002, Mallari informed his older brother of his involvement in the said robbery.20 At around 4:00
p.m. of the next day, he again confessed but this time to Valderosa.21

Petitioners’ Version

From 11:00 p.m. of April 5, 2002 until 2:00 a.m. of April 6, 2002, petitioners and Ferdie Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), Jay
Maranan (Maranan) and Randy Badian, were enjoying a videoke session in the house of Gerard "Boy Payat" Santiago,
which was just near U.E.22 Before going home, they decided to eat lugaw at a rolling eatery in the Monumento Circle,
Caloocan City.23 While on their way to the lugawan, they passed by Mallari, who was standing in front of the Rice-in-a-Box
store.24 They later went home aboard a jeepney.25 Maranan alighted first while Benzon and Dela Cruz followed.26 When it
was petitioners’ turn to get off the jeepney, they saw the Rice-in-a-Box store already opened.27 However, they did not
report the incident to the police or barangay authorities.28

The Regional Trial Court’s Decision

On June 30, 2004, the trial court rendered a Decision29 in favor of the prosecution. It ruled that Mallari’s personal
identification of petitioners and Benzon, and his narration of their individual participation in the robbery were sufficient to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.30 The trial court disregarded the petitioners’ denial and alibi considering that
it was not physically impossible for them to be in the crime scene or its vicinity at the time of the commission of the
crime.31 It stressed that the place petitioners claimed to be in was a mere walking distance from the site of the
burglary.32 Moreover, the RTC found Mallari’s testimony more worthy of credence than that of petitioners since Bernardo
and Magalong themselves admitted that Mallari had no motive to falsely testify against them.33 The dispositive portion of
the trial court’s Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds accused RICKY "TOTSIE" MARQUEZ, RYAN BENZON, ROY
BERNARDO and JOMER MAGALONG GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery With Force Upon
Things and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS of Prision Correctional [sic]
to NINE (9) YEARS Of Prision Mayor and to indemnify private complainant Sonia Valderosa the amount of P42,000.00
representing the value of the stolen articles. With costs.

SO ORDERED.34

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal which was given due course by the trial court.35

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

Before the CA, petitioners imputed error upon the trial court in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. According to them, the trial court should not have given credence to Mallari’s testimony because he is not a
credible witness. They likewise contended that even assuming that they committed the crime, the trial court erred in ruling
that there was conspiracy since the participation of Bernardo in the alleged robbery was vague.

In its assailed Decision of July 27, 2007,36 the appellate court did not find merit in petitioners’ appeal. Its review of the
transcript of Mallari’s testimony only resulted in the affirmation of the trial court’s ruling that he was a credible witness. The
CA held that while Mallari was a co-conspirator and his testimony was uncorroborated, same was still sufficient to convict
petitioners since it "carries the hallmarks of honesty and truth."37 It clearly established Bernardo’s participation in the
conspiracy in that he, together with another petitioner, carried away from the store all the stolen items.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from finding all the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
with force upon things is hereby AFFIRMED. Considering that Ryan Benson was tried in absentia, the trial court is
directed to issue an alias warrant of arrest against him.

SO ORDERED.39

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.40

Issue

In their Memorandum, petitioners raised the sole issue of:

WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
FINDING THE PETITIONERS, IN CONSPIRACY WITH EACH OTHER,
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED.41

Petitioners argue that their defense of denial and alibi should not have been disregarded since the prosecution’s case was
based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of a co-conspirator, Mallari.42 And while Mallari admitted to participating in
the commission of the crime, he was not charged together with petitioners in the Information for robbery and was instead
utilized as a state witness.43 It is therefore in this light that petitioners assert that Mallari’s testimony does not deserve any
credence since he merely concocted his testimony in order to save himself and escape criminal liability.44 Moreover,
petitioners claim that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy.45

The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, insists through its Memorandum46 that Mallari is a credible witness
and that his testimony is sufficient to establish petitioners’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt.47 It explains that Mallari’s
confession to the crime immediately after its commission resulted in petitioners’ arrests prior to the filing of the
Information.48 For the said reason, the former was not indicted and was merely utilized as a prosecution witness.49 Be that
as it may, Mallari’s testimony, though uncorroborated, can stand by itself and also deserves credence since it was "given
in a straightforward manner and contained details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought."50 Also,
Mallari’s positive identification of petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime, without evil motive on his part, prevails over
the latter’s defense of denial and alibi.51

Our Ruling

There is no merit in the petition.

Robbery with force upon things in an
uninhabited place under Article 302 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC)

"Article 293 of the [RPC] defines robbery to be one committed by any ‘person who, with intent to gain, shall take any
personal property belonging to another, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon
anything . . .’ Robbery may thus be committed in two ways: (a) with violence against, or intimidation of persons and (b) by
the use of force upon things."52

With respect to robbery by the use of force upon things, same is contained under Section Two, Chapter 1,53 Title Ten54 of
the RPC. Falling under said section two, among others, are Article 299 which refers to robbery in an inhabited house or
public building or edifice devoted to worship  and Article 302, to robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private
building. Said articles provide, to wit:

ART. 299. Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship. - Any armed person who shall
commit robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to religious worship, shall be punished
by reclusion temporal, if the value of the property taken shall exceed 250 pesos, and if –

(a) The malefactors shall enter the house or building in which the robbery is committed, by any of the following
means:
 1. Through an opening not intended for entrance or egress;

2. By breaking any wall, roof, or floor or breaking any door or window;

3. By using false keys, picklocks, or similar tools;

4. By using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority.

Or if –

(b) The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances:

1. By breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle;

2. By taking such furniture or objects away to be broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery.

When the offenders do not carry arms, and the value of the property taken exceeds 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in
degree shall be imposed.

The same rule shall be applied when the offenders are armed, but the value of the property taken does not exceed 250
pesos.

When the said offenders do not carry arms and the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos, they shall
suffer the penalty prescribed in the two next preceding paragraphs, in its minimum period.

If the robbery committed in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house, public building or building dedicated to
religious worship, the penalties next lower in degree than those prescribed in this article shall be imposed.

ART. 302. Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building. - Any robbery committed in an uninhabited place or
in a building other than those mentioned in the first paragraph of Article 299, if the value of the property taken
exceeds 250 pesos shall be punished by prision correccional  in its medium and maximum periods, provided that any of
the following circumstances is present:

1. If the entrance has been effected through any opening not intended for entrance or egress;

2. If any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken;

3. If the entrance has been effected through the use of false keys, picklocks, or other similar tools;

4. If any door, wardrobe, chest, or any sealed or closed furniture or receptacle has been broken;

5. If any closed or sealed receptacle, as mentioned in the preceding paragraph, has been removed, even if the
same be broken open elsewhere.

When the value of the property taken does not exceed 250 pesos, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)

Meanwhile, Article 301 of the RPC defines an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious worship
and their dependencies as follows:

Inhabited house means any shelter, ship, or vessel constituting the dwelling of one or more persons, even though the
inhabitants thereof shall temporarily be absent therefrom when the robbery is committed.

All interior courts, corrals, warehouses, granaries, barns, coach-houses, stables, or other departments, or inclosed places
contiguous to the building or edifice, having an interior entrance connected therewith and which form part of the whole,
shall be deemed dependencies of an inhabited house, public building, or building dedicated to religious worship.
Orchards and other lands used for cultivation or production are not included in the terms of the next preceding paragraph,
even if closed, contiguous to the building, and having direct connection therewith.

The term "public building" includes every building owned by the Government or belonging to a private person but used or
rented by the Government, although temporarily unoccupied by the same.

Here, the Information did not specify whether the robbery with force upon things was committed in an inhabited house or
uninhabited place. It merely stated that petitioners committed the robbery "by means of force upon things, that is, by
destroying the door lock of the stall of one of SONIA VALDEROSA and passing/entering thru the same, once inside, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and carry away the [earlier mentioned] items x x x."55

Likewise, the trial court, in its judgment of conviction, did not discuss whether the robbery in this case was committed in
an inhabited house or in an uninhabited place. It was different, though, when the case was decided by the CA. Unlike the
trial court, the appellate court discussed about robbery in an inhabited house under the above-quoted Article 299 of the
RPC in its assailed Decision.56 Pursuant to the same provision, it then proceeded to affirm the penalty imposed by the trial
court upon the petitioners after finding them guilty of the crime charged.57

The Court, however, notes at the outset that the CA erred in applying Article 299 of the RPC. The records show that the
store alleged to have been robbed by petitioners is not an inhabited house, public building or building dedicated to
religious worship and their dependencies under Article 299 and as defined under Article 301. From Valderosa’s testimony,
it can be deduced that the establishment allegedly robbed was a store not used as a dwelling. In fact, after the robbery
took place, there was a need to inform Valderosa of the same as she was obviously not residing in the store.58 "If the store
was not actually occupied at the time of the robbery and was not used as a dwelling, since the owner lived in a separate
house, the robbery committed therein is punished under Article 302."59 Neither was the place where the store is located
owned by the government. It was actually just a stall rented by Valderosa from a private person.60 Hence, the applicable
provision in this case is Article 302 and not Article 299 of the RPC.

Petitioners committed the crime charged

and acted in conspiracy

Under Article 293 of the RPC, robbery is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal
property belonging to another by using force upon anything. When committed in an uninhabited place or a private building
with the circumstance, among others, that any wall, roof, floor, or outside door or window has been broken, the same is
penalized under Article 302.

As testified to by Valderosa, she rented the premises located at No. 269 corner Samson Road, Caloocan City and therein
operated her Rice-in-a-Box store.61 On April 6, 2002, burglars destroyed the store’s padlock and broke into the store. The
burglars then went inside the store through the broken door and took various items valued at P42,000.00. As she was not
living therein and only utilized it as a store, Valderosa only learned of the burglary after being informed about it by the
daughter of the owner of the building where her store was located.

Save from the identities of the perpetrators, Valderosa’s testimony clearly indicates that a robbery under Article 293 in
relation to Article 302 of the RPC was committed. Luckily for her, it was not long before a co-conspirator to the crime,
Mallari, revealed the identities of his companions and the details of the crime to complete the picture.

Mallari testified that he participated in the commission of the crime after petitioners told him to be the look-out while they
entered and burglarized the store. He first confessed to his brother his participation in the crime and later reported the
incident to the store owner herself, Valderosa.

In clear and concise language, Mallari narrated the incident as follows:

Q: On April 6, 2002 at 2:30 in the morning, where were you?

A: In front of the University of the East, Caloocan City.

Q: Who were with you at that time?

A: Ryan Benzon, Ricky Marquez, Jomer Magalong and Roy Bernardo, ma’am.
Q: While you were with them, what happened?

A: Totsie invited us to stage a robbery in the rice box.

Q: You said Totsie, are you referring to accused Ricky Marquez?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: What is this rice box?

A: A store selling viands and rice, ma’am.

Q: [W]here is it located?

A: At the corner of University of the East.

Q: How far was this rice box from the place where you were standing with the four accused?

A: About 5 meters (as stipulated by counsel for both parties).

Q: When Totsie or Ricky Marquez invited you to stage a robbery in the rice box, what did you do together with the group?

A: Totsie got a lead pipe and handed it to Jomer.

Q: You are referring to [Jomer] Magalong, one of the accused in this case?

A: Yes, ma’am.

Q: After Totsie Marquez handed a lead pipe to Jomer Magalong, what happened?

A: The lock was removed, ma’am.

Q: Who destroyed the lock?

A: Roy and Jomer, ma’am.

Q: What happened when Ryan [sic] and Jomer were destroying the padlock of the rice box?

A: None sir, I was just looking and then afterwards, it was opened.

Q: After opening the store by destroying the padlock, what did you and your companions do?

A: I was instructed to be the look-out.

Q: What did the four accused do inside the store?

A: Ryan and Totsie entered x x x the store.

Q: What did you do inside the store?

A: They took all the things inside.

Q: What were the things taken inside the store?

A: Two (2) rice cookers, one (1) big as if a rice cooker, blender and foods.
Q: What did Roy and Jomer do after the padlock was destroyed and the door was already opened?

A: They carried all the things robbed.

Q: Where did they bring those items taken from the said store?

A: [To] the house of the uncle of Ryan in Marcela, ma’am.

Q: What happened after that?

A: They cooked foods but I remained [seated].

Q: What did the accused tell you if any while they were cooking in the house of the uncle of Ryan?

A: "Baka raw kumanta ako."

Q: What else did they tell you?

A: According to them, they will give me my share if they would be able to sell [them].62

To recall, Marquez was the one who proposed the robbery. When all acceded, he then provided Magalong with a lead
pipe, who, together with Bernardo, smashed and destroyed the padlock of the store and which likewise caused the door to
be broken. All petitioners and Benzon then entered the store and took things, with the intention to sell the items stolen and
share among themselves the proceeds thereof. It is therefore clear from the testimony of Mallari that petitioners acted in
conspiracy in the commission of the robbery. It must be stressed that what is important in conspiracy is that all
conspirators "performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate an unmistakably common
purpose or design to commit the crime."63 The responsibility of the conspirators is therefore collective rendering all of them
equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective participations.64

Mallari’s testimony deserves full weight

and credence

Contrary to the petitioners’ argument, Mallari’s credibility was not adversely affected by his non-inclusion as an accused in
the Information. This was not an attempt to escape criminal liability. Rather, the prosecution merely availed of its legal
option to immediately utilize him as a state witness instead of undergoing the judicial procedure of charging him as a co-
conspirator then moving for his discharge as a witness.

Besides, it is established that the assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a function best discharged by the trial court
due to its position to observe the behavior and demeanor of the witness in court.65 This rule is set aside only when the trial
court’s evaluation was reached arbitrarily, or when it "overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts or
circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case."66 Here, no such situation occurred.

Also, Mallari’s positive identification of petitioners as the perpetrators of the robbery and the absence of any ill-motive on
his part to testify falsely against them prevail over petitioners’ denial and alibi. As repeatedly held, alibi is the weakest
defense since it can easily be fabricated and difficult to disprove.67 Hence as a rule, the defenses of denial and alibi can
only prosper if there is evidence that the accused were not only in another place at the time of the commission of the
crime, but also that it was physically impossible for them to be within the immediate vicinity.68 Here, while petitioners
denied being at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, they failed to prove that it was physically impossible
for them to be in the store at the time of the robbery. In fact, they testified that they were in a place only about 15 meters
away from the scene of the crime.

Moreover, while the Court is well-aware of the general rule that "the testimony of a co-conspirator is not sufficient for the
conviction of the accused unless such testimony is supported by evidence,"69 there is, however, an exception. Thus, "the
testimony of a co-conspirator, even if uncorroborated, will be considered sufficient if given in a straightforward manner and
it contains details which could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought,"70 as in this case. A review of the
transcript of stenographic notes of the testimony of Mallari showed that same was sincere since it was given without
hesitation and in a simple manner. His recollection of the events was detailed and candid such that it could not have been
a concoction from a polluted mind. Thus, Mallari’s testimony, even if uncorroborated, deserves full weight and credence
and, therefore, sufficient to establish petitioners’ commission of the crime charged.

Penalty

Article 302 of the RPC provides that when the robbery is committed in an uninhabited place or in a private building and
the value of the property exceeds P250.00, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods
provided that, among other circumstances, any wall, roof, floor, or the outside door or window has been broken.
Considering that petitioners burglarized the store of Valderosa which was not used as a dwelling by breaking its door and
stealing property therein with a total value of P42,000.00, the penalty that must be imposed is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, which has a prison term of two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances the range of the penalty that must be imposed as maximum
penalty is three (3) years six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years nine (9) months and ten (10) days.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty that should be imposed upon petitioners is arresto
manor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period with a range of four (4) months and one (1) day
to two (2) years and four (4) months. Consequently there is a need to modify the prison term imposed by the trial court.

Anent the amount to be indemnified, the trial court and the CA correctly held that petitioners must indemnify Valderosa the
sum of P42,000.00 representing the value of the goods taken.

WHEREFORE the Petition for Review on Centiorari is DENIED. The July 27, 2007 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 28814, which affirmed the June 30, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City Branch
421, in Criminal Case No. C-65837, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioners are sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of one (1) year and eight (8) months to four (4) years nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of prision correccional.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 79543 October 16, 1996

JOSE D. FILOTEO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is constitutionally guaranteed certain rights. One of the
most cherished of these is the right "to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his choice". The 1987
Constitution, unlike its predecessors, expressly covenants that such guarantee "cannot be waived except in writing and in
the presence of counsel". In the present case, petitioner claims that such proscription against an uncounselled waiver of
the right to counsel is applicable to him retroactively, even though his custodial investigation took place in 1983 — long
before the effectivity of the new Constitution. He also alleges that his arrest was illegal, that his extrajudicial confession
was extracted through torture, and that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to convict him. Finally, though not
raised by petitioner, the question of what crime —- brigandage or robbery — was committed is likewise motu
proprio addressed by the Court in this Decision.

Challenged in the instant amended petition is the Decision 1 of respondent Sandiganbayan 2 in Criminal Case No. 8496
promulgated on June 19, 1987 convicting petitioner of brigandage, and the Resolution 3 promulgated on July 27, 1987
denying his motion for reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner Jose D. Filoteo, Jr. was a police investigator of the Western Police District in Metro Manila, an old hand at
dealing with suspected criminals. A recipient of various awards and commendations attesting to his competence and
performance as a police officer, he could not therefore imagine that one day he would be sitting on the other side of the
investigation table as the suspected mastermind of the armed hijacking of a postal delivery van.

Along with his co-accused Martin Mateo, Jr. y Mijares, PC/Sgt. Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino, CIC Ed Saguindel y
Pabinguit, Ex-PC/Sgt. Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo and civilians Ricardo Perez, Reynaldo Frias, Raul Mendoza, Angel
Liwanag, Severino Castro and Gerardo Escalada, petitioner Filoteo was charged in the following Information: 4

That on or about the 3rd day of May, 1982, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, two of whom were
armed with guns, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with intent of gain and by means of violence, threat and intimidation, stop the
Postal Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Postal while it was travelling along the MacArthur Highway of said
municipality, at the point of their guns, and then take, rob and carry away with them the following, to wit:

1) Postal Delivery Truck

2) Social Security System Medicare Checks and Vouchers

3) Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers

4) Treasury Warrants

5) Several Mail Matters from abroad

in the total amount of P253,728.29 more or less, belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS
Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals from Bulacan, Pampanga, Bataan,
Zambales and Olongapo City, to the damage and prejudice of the owners in the aforementioned amount.

Contrary to law

On separate dates, accused Filoteo, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator and Miravalles, assisted by their respective counsel,
pleaded not guilty. Their co-accused Perez, Frias, Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada were never arrested and
remained at large. Accused Mateo escaped from police custody and was tried in absentia  in accordance with Article IV,
Section 19 of the 1973 Constitution. Accused Saguindel and Relator failed to appear during the trial on February 21, 1985
and on March 31, 1986, respectively, and were thus ordered arrested but remained at large since then. Like in the case of
Mateo, proceedings against them were held in absentia. 5 Only Filoteo filed this petition, after the respondent Court
rendered its assailed Decision and Resolution.

Before trial commenced and upon the instance of the prosecution for a stipulation of facts, the defense admitted the
following: 6

The existence of the bound record of Criminal Case No. 50737-B-82, consisting of 343 pages from the
Bulacan CFI (Exhibit A); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Bernardo Relator was a PC Sergeant at Camp
Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila; as such PC Sergeant, accused Relator was issued a service
revolver, Smith & Wesson Revolver, 32 (sic), with Serial No. 11707 (Exhibit B) and holster (Exhibit B-1)
with six (6) live ammo (Exhibit B-2); in 1982 or thereabouts, accused Eddie Saguindel was a PC
Constable First Class; on May 30, 1982, accused Saguindel, together with accused Relator and Danilo
Miravalles, a former PC Sergeant, was invited for investigation in connection with the hijacking of a
delivery van by the elements of the Special Operations Group, PC, and the three availed of their right to
remain silent and to have counsel of their choice, as shown by their Joint Affidavit (Exhibit A-20); and the
existence of the sworn statement executed by accused Martin Mateo (Exhibit A-11) as well as the
Certification dated May 30, 1982, subject to the qualification that said document was made under duress.

The prosecution sought to prove its case with the testimonies of Bernardo Bautista, Rodolfo Miranda, Capt. Rosendo
Ferrer, M/Sgt. Noel Alcazar and Capt. Samuel Pagdilao, Jr. 6-a and the submission of Exhibits A to K. In their defense,
accused Filoteo and Miravalles presented their respective testimonies plus those of Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera.
Filoteo also submitted his Exhibits 1-14-Filoteo, but Miravalles filed no written evidence. Thereafter, the prosecution
proffered rebuttal evidence and rested with the admission of Exhibits A-16-a, A-31 and L.

Evidence for the Prosecution

At about 6:30 in the morning of May 3, 1982, Bureau of Post mail van no. MVD 02 left San Fernando, Pampanga to pick
up and deliver mail matters to and from Manila. On board the vehicle were Nerito Miranda, the driver, and two couriers
named Bernardo Bautista and Eminiano Tagudar who were seated beside the driver. They arrived at around 9:40 that
morning at the Airmail Distribution Center of the Manila International Airport where they were issued waybills 7 for the
sacks of mail they collected. They then proceeded to the Central Post Office where they likewise gathered mail matters
including 737 check letters 8 sent by the United States Embassy. All the mail matters were placed inside the delivery van,
and its door padlocked.

As they had to deliver mail matters to several towns of Bulacan, they took the MacArthur Highway on the return trip to
Pampanga. When they reached Kalvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan at about 4:30 in the afternoon, an old blue Mercedes
Benz sedan9 overtook their van and cut across its path. The car had five (5) passengers — three seated in front and two
at the back. The car's driver and the passenger beside him were in white shirts; the third man in front and the person
immediately behind him were both clad in fatigue uniforms, while the fifth man in the back had on a long-sleeved shirt. 10

Two of the car passengers aimed an armalite and a hand gun at driver Nerito Miranda as someone uttered, "Are you not
going to stop this truck?" 11 Frightened, Miranda pulled over and stopped the van's engine. Alighting from the car, the
armed group identified themselves as policemen. 12 They ordered the postal employees to disembark from the van. As he
stepped out of the van, Miranda took the ignition key with him, but when threatened, he surrendered it to one of the car
passengers. 13 The three postal employees were then ordered to board the Benz.

As he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and saw one of the malefactors, who turned out to be Reynaldo
Frias, going up the van. Inside the car, the three delivery employees were ordered to lower their heads. They sat between
two of their captors at the back of the car while two others were in front. Later, Nerito Miranda asked permission to
straighten up as he was feeling dizzy for lack of air. As he stretched, he caught a glimpse of the pimply face of the man to
his left. He also recognized the driver who had glanced back. These men turned out to be Angel Liwanag and Reynaldo
Frias, respectively. 14

As the car started moving, Bautista complained about feeling "densely confined." We was allowed to raise his head but
with eyes closed. However, he sneaked a look and recognized the driver of the car as Raul Mendoza and the fellow
beside him who poked a "balisong" at him as Angel Liwanag. The man in uniform on the front seat was Eddie Saguindel.
Earlier, as he was about to enter the car, Bautista looked back and recognized Frias. 15 These incidents yielded the pieces
of information critical to the subsequent identification of Mendoza, Liwanag, Saguindel and Frias in the line-up of suspects
at Camp Crame later on.
The car seemed to move around in circles. When it finally came to a stop, the captured men discovered that they were
along Kaimito Road in Kalookan City They were made to remove their pants and shoes and then told to run towards the
shrubs with their heads lowered. Upon realizing that the hijackers had left, they put on their pants and reported the
incident to the Kalookan Police Station.

The Security and Intelligence Unit of the Bureau of Posts recovered the postal van at the corner of Malindang and Angelo
Streets, La Loma, Quezon City on May 4, 1982. Discovered missing were several mail matters, 16 including checks and
warrants, along with the van's battery, tools and fuel. 17

In a letter-request dated May 6, 1982 to then Col. Ramon Montaño, then Postmaster General Roilo S. Golez sought the
assistance of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the Philippine Constabulary in the investigation of the hijacking
incident. 18 Responding to the request, the SOG, which was tasked to detect, investigate and "neutralize" criminal
syndicates in Metro Manila and adjacent provinces, organized two investigative teams. One group was led by Capt.
Rosendo Ferrer and the other by 1st Lt. Samuel Pagdilao. Initially, they conducted a "massive intelligence build-up" to
monitor the drop points where the stolen checks could be sold or negotiated.

On May 28, 1982, the SOG received a tip from a civilian informer that two persons were looking for buyers of stolen
checks. Capt. Ferrer requested the informer to arrange a meeting with them. The meeting materialized at about 9:00 P.M.
of May 29, 1982 at the Bughaw Restaurant in Cubao, Quezon City. With cash on hand, Capt. Ferrer posed as the buyer.
The informer introduced him to Rey Frias and Rafael Alcantara. Frias in turn showed Capt. Ferrer a sample Social
Security System (SSS) pension check and told him that the bulk of the checks were in the possession of their companions
in Obrero, Tondo, Manila. After some negotiations, they agreed to proceed to Tondo. Then as they boarded a car, Capt.
Ferrer introduced himself and his companions as lawmen investigating the hijacking incident. Shocked and distressed,
Frias calmed down only when assured that his penalty would be mitigated should he cooperate with the authorities. Frias
thus volunteered to help crack the case and lead the SOG team to Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza.

Capt. Ferrer instructed Lt. Pagdilao, his assistant operations officer who was in another car during the mission, to
accompany Frias to Obrero Tondo while he escorted Alcantara to their headquarters at Camp Crame. On the way to the
headquarters, Alcantara denied participation in the hijacking although he admitted living with Martin Mateo who allegedly
was in possession of several checks. Alcantara was turned over to the investigation section of the SOG for further
questioning.

Meanwhile, Lt. Pagdilao's group was able to corner Ricardo Perez in his house in Tondo. Confronted with the hijacking
incident, Perez admitted participation therein and expressed disappointment over his inability to dispose of the checks
even after a month from the hijacking. He surrendered the checks in his possession to Lt. Pagdilao.'s. 19

An hour and a half later, Capt. Ferrer received information over their two-way radio that Ricardo Perez and Raul Mendoza
were in Lt. Pagdilao's custody. Capt. Ferrer ordered that, instead of returning to headquarters, Lt. Pagdilao and his
companions should meet him in Quirino, Novaliches to apprehend Martin Mateo. They met at the designated place and
proceeded to Gulod, Novaliches arriving there at about 10:30 P.M. of May 29, 1982.

Walking atop a ricefield dike to the house of Mateo, they noticed two men heading in their direction. Perez identified them
as Martin Mateo and Angel Liwanag. The latter threw something into the ricefield which, when retrieved, turned out to be
bundles of checks wrapped in cellophane inside a plastic bag. 20 As the two were about to board the SOG teams's car,
Mateo said, "Sir, Kung baga sa basketball, talo na kami. Ibibigay ko yong para sa panalo. Marami pa akong tseke doon
sa bahay ko, sir, kunin na natin para di na natin
babalikan." 21 Capt. Ferrer accompanied Mateo to his house where they retrieved several other checks in another plastic
bag.

On the way to the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, Mateo and Liwanag admitted participation in the postal hijacking.
At a confrontation with Perez and Mendoza, all four of them pointed to petitioner, Jose D. Filoteo, Jr., as the mastermind
of the crime.

Consequently, Capt. Ferrer directed Lt. Pagdilao to accompany Mateo to the house of petitioner in Tondo, Manila. The
lawmen found petitioner at home. Upon being invited to Camp Crame to shed light on his participation in the hijacking,
petitioner was dumbfounded (" parang nagulat). Pursuant to standard operating procedure in arrests, petitioner was
informed of his constitutional rights, 22 whereupon they proceeded to Camp Crame. However, the group, including
petitioner, returned to the latter's place to recover the loot. It was "in the neighborhood," not in petitioner's house, where
the authorities located the checks. 23
The authorities confronted Filoteo about his participation in the hijacking, telling him that Frias, Mendoza and Perez had
earlier volunteered the information that petitioner furnished the Benz used in the hijacking. Thereupon, Filoteo admitted
involvement in the crime and pointed to three other soldiers, namely, Eddie Saguindel, Bernardo Relator and Jack
Miravalles (who turned out to be a discharged soldier), as his confederates. At 1:45 in the afternoon of May 30, 1982,
petitioner executed a sworn statement in Tagalog before M/Sgt. Arsenio C. Carlos and Sgt. Romeo P. Espero which,
quoted in full, reads as follows:

BABALA — Nais kong ipaalam sa iyo, Patrolman

Filoteo, na ang dahilan ng pagsisiyasat na ito ay tungkol
sa isang kasong Robbery-in-Band/Hi-Jacking na
naganap noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982 doon sa
Meycauayan, Bulacan, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng
hapon, humigit-kumulang, kung saang maraming
tsekeng US, tseke ng BIR at iba pang mga personal na
tseke ang nabawi mula sa iyo. Nais ko ring ibigay sa iyo
ang babala alinsunod sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20,
Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng
Pilipinas, kagaya ng mga sumusunod:

a. Na ikaw ay may karapatang tumahimik;

b. Na ikaw ay may karapatang kumuha ng isang abugadong sarili mong pili upang may magpapayo sa
iyo habang ikaw ay sinisiyasat;

c. Na ikaw ay may karapatang huwag sumagot sa mga katanungang maaring makasira sa iyo sa
dahilang anumang iyong isasalaysay ay maaring gamitin pabor or laban sa iyo sa kinauukulang
hukuman;

d. Na kung ikaw ay walang maibabayad sa isang abugado, ako mismo ang makipag-ugnayan sa CLAO-
IBP upang ikaw ay magkaroon ng isang abugadong walang bayad.

1. TANONG: — Ang mga bagay-bagay bang akin nang naipaliwanag sa iyo ay iyong
lubos na naiintindihan at nauunawaan?

SAGOT: —Opo.

2. T: — Handa mo bang lagdaan ang ilalim ng katanungan at sagot na ito bilang

katibayan na iyo ngang naiintindihan ang iyong mga karapatan at gayun na rin sa dahilan
ng pagsisiyasat na ito, at ikaw din ay nakahanda ngang magbigay ng isang malaya at
kusang-loob na salaysay, sumagot sa mga katanungan at sumusumpang lahat ng iyong
isasalaysay ay pawang mga katotohanan lamang?

S: — Opo, pipirma ako Ser.

(Sgd.)
JOSE D. FILOTEO
(Affiant)

MGA SAKSI:

(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ROMEO P. ESPERO THERESA L. TOLENTINO
Ssg., PC C1C, WAC (PC)

3. T: — Maari bang sabihin mong mull ang iyong buong pangalan, edad at iba pang
bagay-bagay na maaring mapagkakikilalanan sa iyo?

S: — Jose Filoteo y Diendo, 30-anyos, may-asawa, isang Patrolman ng Western Police

District, Metropolitan Police Force na kasalukuyang nakatalaga sa General Assignment
Section, Investigation Division ng naturang Distrito ng Pulisya at kasalukuyang nakatira
sa No. 810 Cabesas St., Dagupan, Tondo, Manila.

4. T: — Kailan ka pa na-appoint sa service bilang isang Kabatas?

S: — Noon pong October 1978, hindi ko maalaala ang exactong petsa, noong ako ay
mapasok sa serbisyo.

5. T: — Kailan ka pa naman na-assign sa GAS, WPD, MPF?

S: — Noon lamang pong January 1982.

6. T: — Patrolman Filoteo, ikaw ba ay tubong saang bayan, lungsod or lalawigan?

S: — Pagkakaalam ko sa tatay ko ay Bulacan samantalang ang aking ina naman ay

Bisaya, pero ako ay ipinanganak na sa Maynila noon July 17, 1951.

7. T: — Ano naman ang natapos mong kurso sa pag-aaral?

S: — Undergraduate ako ng BS Criminology sa PCCr, dahil hindi ko natapos ang second

semester ng 4th year ko.

8. T: — Ano naman ang iyong specific designation sa GAS, ID, WPD-MPF?

S: — Sa Follow-Up Unit ako.

9. T: — At bilang miyembro ng follow-up unit no GAS, ano naman ang iyong mga specific
duties?

S: — Kami po ang magsasagawa ng follow-up kung may mga at-large sa mga suspects
namin sa mga kasong hawak ng investigation.

10. T: — Noong ika-3 ng Mayo 1982, mga bandang alas-4:00 ng hapon humigit-
kumulang, saan ka naroroon at ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S: — Nasa Plaza Lawton ho kami, eh, at inaantay na namin iyong hi-nayjack namin na
Philippine Mail delivery van.

11. T: — Wika mo'y kami, sinu-sino ang tinutukoy mong mga kasamahan?

S: — Si Carding Perez, ho; si Junior ho (Affiant pointed to Martin Mateo, Jr. who was
seated in the investigation room and asked the name and was duly answered: Martin
Mateo, Jr.); si Rey Frias, Raul Mendoza; Angelo Liwanag at ang mga taga LRP ng PC
Brigade na sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravales at isa pang Sergeant na ang alam
ko lang sa kanya ay JUN ang tawag namin. Walo (8) (corrected and initialled by affiant to
read as "SIYAM [9]") kaming lahat doon noon at ang mga gamit naman naming kotse
noon ay ang kotse ng kumpare kong si Rudy Miranda na isang Mercedes Benz na may
plakang NMJ-659 kung saang ang driver namin noon ay si Raul Mendoza (corrected and
initialled by affiant to read as "AKO") at ang mga kasama naman naming sakay ay sina
Angelo Liwanag, Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP (affiant added and
initialled this additional fact: "AT RAUL MENDOZA"). Ang isang kotse namang gamit
namin ay pag-aari daw ng pinsan ni Carding Perez na kanya na rin mismong minaneho
na isang Lancer na dirty-white ang kulay at ang mga sakay naman ni Carding Perez ay
sina Junior Mateo, Rey Frias at Sgt. Dan Miravalles ng LRP rin. Pero may kasama pa
kaming contact ni Carding Perez na taga-loob ng Post Office na sina Alias  NINOY na
isang dispatcher at Alias  JERRY, dahil ang mastermind dito sa trabahong ito ay si
Carding PEREZ at kami naman ng mga sundalong taga-LRP ay kanila lamang inimporta
upang umeskort sa kaniia sa pag-hijack ng delivery van.
12. T: — Anong oras naman noong umalis ang delivery van ng Post Office patungong
norte?

S: — Kung hindi ako nagkakamali ay nasa pagitan na noon ng alas- 4:00 hanggang alas-
5:00 ng hapon.

13. T: — Isalaysay mo nga ng buong-buo kung ano ang mga naganap noong hapon na
iyon?

S: — Noon pong lumakad na ang delivery van ng Central Post Office, sinundan na
namin, una ang van, sumunod ang Lancer at huli ang Mercedes Benz namin. Pagdating
namin sa Malinta, Valenzuela Metro Manila ay nagpalit kami ng puwesto sa pagsunod,
van naman ngayon, sunod ang Mercedes Benz at huli na ang Lancer. Noong makapasok
na kami ng boundary ng Meycauayan, Bulacan ay kumuha na kami ng tiyempo at noon
makatiyempo kami ay kinat namin ang delivery van. Tumigil naman ito at bumaba
kaagad sina Sgt. Ed Saguindel at Sgt. Jun ng LRP datiil sila noon ang may hawak ng
kanilang Armalite Rifle pero may service pa silang maiksing baril. Pinababa nila ang
tatlong maydala ng delivery van at pinasakay sa Mercedes Benz, habang nakatutok ang
kanilang mga baril sa kanila. Ako naman ay bumaba na sa aming kotse at sumakay ng
delivery van at ako na mismo ang nagmaneho at sinamahan naman ako nina Junior
Mateo at si Rey Frias, tatlo (3) rin kaming pumalit sa puwesto noong tatlong (3) taga-Post
Office na maydala ng delivery van. Nag-Utturn (sic) kami ngayon at ibinalik na namin sa
Manila ang van. Iyong Mercedes Benz na minaneho pa rin ni Raul Mendoza ay
dumeretso pa norte samantalang ang Lancer naman ay nag-U-turn din at sumunod sa
amin. Noong makarating na kami sa Malinta, Valenzuela, Metro Manila ay inunahan na
kami ng Lancer at iyon na nga, parang follow the leader na dahil siya na noon ang aming
guide.

14. T: — Ipagpatuloy mo ang iyong pagsasalaysay?

S: — Dumeretso kami ngayon sa may Obrero, sa bahay mismo nina Carding Perez, at
noong nakarating na kami roon ay iniyatras ko na ang van sa kaniling garahe at doon ay
ibinaba namin lahat ang mga duffle bag, hindi ko na ho alam kung ilan lahat iyon, na
siyang laman ng delivery van at pagkatapos ay umalis kaming muli ng mga kasama ko
rin sa van papuntang Quezon City kung saan namin inabandon ang delivery van. Sa
Retiro ho yata iyong lugar na iyon, kung hindi ako nagkakamali.

15. T: — Ano ang mga sumunod na nangyari?

S: — Sumakay kami ngayon ng taksi at bumalik na kami kina Carding Perez sa may
bahay nila sa Obrero, Tondo, Manila at inabutan na namin sila na nagkakarga na noong
mga duffle bag sa (sic), madilim na ho noon, sa isang kotseng mamula-mula o orange na
Camaro at isa pang Mercedes Benz na brown, dahil ang Lancer ay isinoli na raw nila sa
may-ari. Dinala nila ngayon ang mga duffle bag sa Bocaue, Bulacan, iyon kasi ang
usapan namin noon dahil sumilip lamang ako noon at kasama ko si Carding Perez, kami
naman ngayon ay pumunta sa bahay nina Rudy Miranda sa San Marcelino, Malate,
Manila na sakay ng isang Toyota Corona na brown na si Carding Perez ang nagmaneho.
Pagdating namin doon sa kina Rudy Miranda ay naroon na rin noon ang Mercedes Benz
na ginamit namin, pero wala na ang crew ng delivery van dahil ibinaba at iniwanan daw
nila sa Caloocan City. Ang naroroon na lamang noon ay sina Angelo Liwanag, si Raul
Mendoza, si Sgt. Ed Saguindel at si Sgt. Jun na parehong taga-LRP. Naiwan na noon
ang Mercedes Benz namin doon kina Rudy Miranda at iniwan na rin ang susi doon sa
kamag-anak, dahil hindi nila alam ang trabahong ito. Sumakay na iyong apat naming
kasama sa Toyota Corona na sakay namin at inihatid namin sina Sgt. Saguindel at Sgt.
Jun doon sa tinitirhan nitong huling nabanggit na sundalo doon sa malapit sa Del Pan
Bridge sa may Recto Avenue sa San Nicolas yata iyon sa Manila. Kami naman ngayong
apat, sina Carding Perez, Angelo Liwanag at si Raul Mendoza ay tumuloy na sa Bocaue,
Bulacan. Dumaan kami sa North Diversion Road at paglabas namin sa exit papuntang
Bocaue, Bulacan ay hindi na kalayuan doon, hindi ko alam ang lugar pero alam kong
puntahan. Bahay daw yata ng kamag-anak ni Carding Perez iyon pero hindi ko alam ang
pangalan. Naroon na ngayon ang buong tropa, maliban sa mga dalawang sundalong
naihatid na namin sa may Manila, at may mga nadagdag pang ibang mukha pero hindi
ko ito mga kakilala. Si JACK o Sgt. Dan Miravalles ay naroon din noon. Kumain kami,
pagkatapos ay nagbukasan na ng mga duffle bag. Iyon na nga, nakita na namin ang mga
tsekeng ito, (Affiant pointed to the checks he voluntarily surrendered) at aming inihiwalay
ngayon sa mga sulat na naroon na sinunog lahat pagkatapos doon sa bahay ni Junior
Mateo sa Novaliches. Di magdamag ngayon ang trabaho namin, kinabukasan ay kanya-
kanyang uwian na, pagkatapos ay pahinga. Kinabukasan mull, gabi, inilipat na namin
doon sa bahay ni Junior Mateo ang mga tsekeng ito (Affiant again referred to said
checks). Isinakay namin noon sa isang cargo truck na pag-aari din daw nina Carding.
lyong mga tsekeng iyan ngayon ay nakalagay noon doon sa isang sikretong
compartment sa gitna ng truck, doon ba sa may chassis. Sikretong compartment iyon, na
mahirap mahalata.

16. T: — Ikaw ba naman ay mayroong dalang baril noon at kung ganoon, sabihin mo nga
kung anong uring baril iyon?

S: — Wala po akong baril, Ser.

17. T: — Paano naman napunta ang mga tsekeng ito (the checks recovered from the
Affiant was referred to) sa iyo?

S: — E, di ganoon na nga he, habang tumatagal ay umiinit ang situwasyon sa aming

grupo, dahil iyong partehan sana namin ay puro pangako ang nangyari. Kaya
napagpasyahan namin na hatiin na lamang iyong mga tseke upang walang onsehan sa
amin. Ito ngayon ay parte namin nina Sgt. Ed Saguindel, Sgt. Dan Miravalles Alias  JACK
at ni Sgt. Jun, dahil noong una ay doon muna sa amin ito nakatago (The checks
recovered from the Affiant was referred to). Pero habang tumatagal ay umiinit at nalaman
namin pati na may alarma na, kaya't inilipat namin doon sa may Raxa Bago sa may likod
ng Alhambra Cigar & Cigarette Factory sa Tondo, Manila at akin munang ipinatago sa
isang kumare ko doon, pansamantala, pero hindi alam nitong kumare ko ang laman noon
dahil mahigpit kong ipinagbilin na huwag nilang bubuksan. Doon na rin namin kinuha iyon
noong isurender ko ang mga tsekeng ito kagabi, at hanggang sa kinuha na namin ang
supot na ito (the checks placed in a plastic bag was again referred to) ay wala pa rin
kamalay- malay ang kumare ko.

18. T: — Iyong sinasabi mong mga kontak nina Carding Perez sa Central Post Office,
mga kakilala mo rin ba ang mga ito?

S: — Iyong araw lamang na iyon ko sila nakita, dahil maghapon ko noon silang nakikita,
itong si Alias  NINOY lamang ang dispatcher, dahil palabas-labas siya noon at nakikipag-
usap kina Carding Perez, Raul Mendoza at saka si Rey Frias. Makikilala ko itong
si Alias NINOY kung makita ko siyang muli.

19. T: — Sino naman ang kumontak sa iyo upang sumama sa trabahong ito?

S: — Si Junior Mateo po, ipinakilala niya ako kina Carding at sa buong tropa na namin.

20. T: — Pansamantala ay wala na muna akong itatanong pa sa iyo, mayroon ka bang

nais na idagdag, bawasin o palitan kaya sa salaysay na ito?

S: — Wala na po.

21. T: — Handa mo bang lagdaan ang iyong salaysay na ito bilang patotoo sa
katotohanan nito nang hindi ka pinilit, sinaktan or pinangakuan kaya ng anuman upang
lumagda lamang?

S: — Opo.

WAKAS NG SALAYSAY: . . . ./ac

 (Sgd)
JOSE D. FILOTEO

MGA SAKSI SA LAGDA:

(Sgd.)
SSG ROMEO P. ESPERO PC

(Sgd.)
C1C THERESA TOLENTINO WAC (PC) 24

Petitioner executed two other documents on the same day, May 30, 1982. One was a certification stating that he
voluntarily surrendered "voluminous assorted US checks and vouchers," that because of the "large number of pieces" of
checks, he affixed his signature upon the middle portion of the back of each check "to serve as identification in the future,
prior to the completion of its proper inventory and listing conducted by elements of SOG" in his presence, and that he
"guided the elements of SOG" to the residence of Rodolfo C. Miranda, the owner of the sky-blue Mercedes Benz car
which was surrendered to the SOG Headquarters. 25 The other document was a sworn statement wherein petitioner
attested to his waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the following facts: (a) that he was
apprised of his constitutional rights under Section 20, Article IV of the (1973) Constitution, that he understood all his rights
thereunder, and that the investigators offered him counsel from the CLAO-IBP but he refused to avail of the privilege; (b)
that he was arrested by SOG men in his house at around 11:00 p.m. of May 29, 1982" sa dahilang ako ay kasangkot sa
pagnanakaw ng mga US Treasury Warrants, SSS Pension Checks and Vouchers at SSS Medicare Checks and Vouchers
mula sa delivery van ng Philippine Mail;" (c) that the SOG men confiscated from him numerous checks and a Mercedes
Benz 200 colored sky-blue, and (d) that he was not hurt or maltreated nor was anything taken from him which was not
duly receipted
for. 26

As certified to by petitioner (in the above described document), he led the SOG operatives to the house of Rodolfo
Miranda on Singalong where the latter admitted that petitioner was his friend. He denied, however, having knowledge that
his car was used in the hijacking until the authorities came to his house. According to Miranda, he was made to believe
that his car would be used for surveillance purposes because petitioner's jeep was not available. The car was not returned
until the evening following that when it was borrowed. 27 After the trip to Miranda's house, petitioner informed the
investigators that some more checks could be recovered from his kumare. Said checks were retrieved and turned over to
headquarters along with the car surrendered by Miranda who later executed a sworn statement dated May 31, 1992 at the
SOG.28

Upon learning of the whereabouts of Miravalles, Eddie Saguindel and Bernardo Relator, the team of Capt. Ferrer
proceeded to Taguig, Metro Manila in the afternoon of May 30, 1982. They met Miravalles along the way to his house.
Informed by Capt. Ferrer that six of his companions were already under custody and that they implicated him as one of
their confederates, Miravalles reacted by saying, "Sir, ang hihina kasi ng mga loob niyan,  eh." 29

Capt. Ferrer later asked Miravalles to bring him to Eddie Saguindel. At the barracks of the Long Range Patrol in Bicutan,
Metro Manila, Saguindel voluntarily accepted the invitation to proceed to the SOG headquarters, after Miravalles initially
informed him of the facts obtained during the investigation. Saguindel was heard saying, "Hindi na kami interesado, sir, sa
mga tsekeng iyan kasi isang buwan na hindi pa nabebenta." 30 With Miravalles and Saguindel, Capt. Ferrer and his team
moved on to Binondo, Manila to look for Bernardo Relator. When they found him at home, Relator excused himself, went
upstairs, returned with a .32 caliber revolver with six bullets 31 and said, "Sir, ito yong baril na nagamit." 32 The three
suspects were brought to Camp Crame for further investigation. Thereafter, Capt. Ferrer submitted an after-operations
report about their mission and executed jointly with Lt. Pagdilao an affidavit on the same matter. 33

Aside from petitioner, Liwanag, Mateo and Perez executed sworn statements. 34 Prior to doing so, they waived their right
to counsel. Liwanag and Mateo admitted their participation and implicated petitioner in the crime. Perez, on the other
hand, denied having driven a Lancer car in the hijacking and stated that he was implicated in the crime only because in
one drinking spree with petitioner, Mateo and one alias  "Buro" during that month of May, they had a heated altercation.
Like petitioner, Liwanag and Mendoza certified that they voluntarily surrendered vouchers and checks which were part of
their loot in the hijacking; they also executed waivers under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. For his part, Relator
executed a certification to the effect that he voluntarily surrendered his .32 caliber Smith & Wesson service revolver used
in the commission of the crime. In spite of the fact that his father-in-law was a lawyer, petitioner did not manifest that he
needed the assistance of counsel. During the taking of his statement, petitioner was visited by Jimmy Victorino and
another comrade from the General Assignment Section of the WPD.
For their part, Relator, Saguindel and Miravalles executed a joint affidavit 35 manifesting their option to avail of their right to
remain silent until such time as they would have retained a counsel of their choice. Frias and Mendoza executed a similar
joint affidavit. 36 Severino Castro, the postal employee implicated, also chose to remain silent as he wanted to testify in
court. However, he linked to the crime a certain Gerardo Escalada, a former clerk of the Central Post Office and son of a
director of the Bureau of Posts in Region I. 3 7

On May 31, 1982, then Postmaster General Golez summoned postal employees Miranda, Bautista and Tagudar and
directed them to proceed to Camp Crame. At the office of the SOG, they were told to go over some pictures for
identification of the culprits. The three recognized and pointed to the suspects in a line-up. Tagudar identified Saguindel
and Liwanag. 38 Miranda pointed at Frias and Liwanag 39 while Bautista identified Frias, Mendoza and
Liwanag. 40 Petitioner himself, when told to identify his alleged cohorts, pointed to Severino Castro as their contact at the
post office. 41 Five of the suspects who were not identified in the line-up were however implicated by Liwanag, Mateo and
petitioner.

SOG Chief Investigator Jorge C. Mercado filed a complaint for robbery-in-band (hijacking) before the Municipal Court of
Meycauayan, Bulacan against petitioner and ten (10) others, namely, Mateo, Saguindel, Relator, Miravalles, Perez, Frias,
Mendoza, Liwanag, Castro and Escalada (Criminal Case No. 7885). 42

On August 8, 1983, the Information previously referred to and aforequoted was filed with the Sandiganbayan and
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8496.

On September 20, 1983, Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal issued orders for the arrest of the
accused 43 and fixed bail at P13,000.00 each. Saguindel and Relator filed a motion to quash the Information asserting that
under the Articles of War and Section 1 of P.D. 1850, they should be tried by a court martial. 44 The Sandiganbayan
denied the motion on January 3, 1984 45 on the ground that courts martial could no longer exercise jurisdiction over them
by virtue of their separation from military service.

Evidence for the Defense

Testifying in his own defense, petitioner alleged that as a patrolman since August 21, 1978 assigned to the Investigation
Division or the Detective Bureau of the WPD to which the General Assignment Section belonged, he was the recipient of
several awards and recognitions starting with ranking fifth in the Final Order of Merit in the basic course for police
officers. 46 He also claimed to have received a loyalty medal for meritorious service above the call of
duty 4 7 and several commendations 48 for the distinguished performance of his duties. On that fateful date of May 3, 1982,
he was a member of the Special Task Force Unit covering the tourist belt area.

Of the ten other accused in this case, petitioner admitted knowing only Martin Mateo whose name appeared in the initial
follow-up operation he allegedly participated in regarding a P250,000 qualified theft case on May 16, 1980 at the
Shemberg Marketing Corporation. 49 Although a suspect, Mateo was not charged in the information subsequently filed in
that case. Sometime in March 1981, Mateo visited petitioner at the police headquarters seeking assistance in his bid to
lead a new life. Considering Mateo's familiarity with underworld characters, petitioner readily made him an informer who
was paid from time to time out of the police intelligence fund. Mateo proved to be an effective informer. In fact, he
allegedly supplied vital information on the identities and whereabouts of suspects in robbery cases at the La Elegancia
Jewelry Store, at the Likha Antique and Crafts, 50 and in an alleged racket in Aranque Market in Manila involving jewelries.

As such informer, Mateo became accustomed to borrowing petitioner's owner-type jeep whenever he was given an
assignment. In one instance however, petitioner saw Mateo using his jeep with some male companions. Because Mateo
denied the occurrence of the incident, petitioner from then on refused to lend his jeep to Mateo. Instead, Mateo was given
an allowance to cover his traveling expenses.

About a month prior to May 3, 1982, petitioner met Mateo and requested the latter to give him a good project as he was
working for his transfer to the Metrocom Intelligence Security Group (MISG). On May 2, 1982, Mateo urged petitioner to
lend him his jeep in order that he could follow-up a bank robbery case. That same evening, petitioner approached
his kumpare, accused Rodolfo Miranda, to borrow the latter's old Mercedes Benz since, if the jeep was used, Mateo could
be identified as an informer. Petitioner left his jeep with Miranda and "went around boasting of the Mercedes Benz." 51

Mateo took the Benz in the morning of May 3, 1982. Petitioner advised him to return the car between the hours of two and
three in the afternoon at the Lakan Beer House at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Zurbaran Streets in Sta. Cruz, Manila
where petitioner was to meet his friend Manolo Almoguera who would be celebrating his birthday there. Petitioner met
Almoguera and company at around 3:30 in the afternoon. He waited for Mateo until shortly before 5:00 in the afternoon
when he was constrained to leave without seeing Mateo because he had to attend a mandatory regular troop formation at
5:00 P.M. at the police headquarters. From there, petitioner proceeded to his area of responsibility in the tourist belt. He
returned to the beer house at about 6:00 in the evening hoping to find Mateo and the automobile. A little before 8:00
o'clock, someone informed him that Mateo had finally arrived. Petitioner went out and scolded Mateo for being late; the
latter apologized and said that his surveillance bore good results. Petitioner then returned the car to Miranda, through the
latter's cousin.

At around 11:00 in the evening of May 29, 1982, Mateo, escorted by a group of military men, went to petitioner's house at
810 Cabezas St., Tondo, Manila. The group refused to give any reason for their visit but arrested him. Wearing only short
pants, petitioner was made to board a car where he was handcuffed. The men asked him about the Benz and the
identities of his companions in an alleged hijacking incident. Petitioner admitted having knowledge of the exact location of
the car but denied participation in the crime. Nobody apprised him of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to be
assisted by counsel. 52

Petitioner was then instructed to accompany Lt. Pagdilao to the residence of Miranda to get the Benz. They were on
board two cars. When petitioner noticed that they were not heading for Miranda's place, he clutched the hand of Lt.
Pagdilao, pleading for pity and thinking that he was about to be "salvaged". Lt. Pagdilao however informed him that they
would be dropping by petitioner's house first per the investigator's information that more checks could be recovered
thereat. A warrantless search was then allegedly conducted in petitioner's house but nothing was found. Suddenly,
someone from the other car came out of a nearby house owned by Mateo and reported that they had recovered some
checks. Thereafter, they proceeded to the house of Miranda who was also invited for questioning. The latter surrendered
his Benz to the group.

At the SOG headquarters in Camp Crame, petitioner was repeatedly coaxed to admit participation in the hijacking. As he
vehemently denied the accusation against him, someone blindfolded him from behind, led him outside and loaded him in
a car. He was taken to an unidentified place and made to lie flat on his back. An object was tied to his small finger to
electrocute him. While a wet handkerchief was stuffed in his mouth, someone mounted his chest and applied the "water
cure" ("tinutubig") through his nose. Because these ordeals were simultaneously carried out, petitioner felt unbearable
pain. He sought permission to get in touch with his father-in-law, Atty. Felix Rosacia, but his request was denied. They
urged him to cooperate otherwise something terrible would happen to him.

Meanwhile, petitioner's wife reported to the WPD General Assignment Section her husband's forcible abduction by armed
men whom she mistook for CIS agents. A check with the CIS yielded negative results. Thereafter, Lt. Reynaldo Dator
went to the SOG where he was informed that petitioner was being investigated but no details were given thereon pending
clearance with superior officers. 53 Consequently, a newspaper carried an item on the SOG's refusal to allow petitioner's
co-police officers to see him in his detention cell. 54

Among his comrades, only Jimmy Victorino, formerly of the WPD who was transferred to the SOG, was able to visit him.
Petitioner revealed to Victorino the maltreatment done him but the latter expressed helplessness about it. In fact, Victorino
advised him to just cooperate so that the SOG would not incriminate him ("  para hindi ka pag-initan dito"). 55 The advice
came after petitioner was warned that he, like Pat. Serrano of the WPD, would be liquidated by the SOG, 56 should he
refuse to cooperate. Later, Mateo came to petitioner's cell and confided that he had been similarly maltreated and forced
to implicate petitioner.

After Mateo left, a prepared statement was shown and read to petitioner. Because its contents were false, petitioner
refused to sign it. Placing his arm around petitioner, a certain Capt. Lagman told petitioner that he thought they had an
understanding already. Petitioner later discovered that Lagman was not member of the military but an "agent" of the SOG,
and a member of the "Contreras gang". Petitioner was therefore constrained to sign the statement because of his
excruciating experience ("hirap na hirap"). He however admitted having read the document before affixing his signature
thereto and initialing the corrections therein. The waiver under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code and the certification
he executed were allegedly also obtained by duress. Although he picked out one Severino Castro in a police line-up, he
did not even know Castro. He implicated Castro because he was threatened by a certain Boy Zapanta.

Petitioner filed a complaint for grave coercion and maltreatment against Lt. Rosendo Ferrer and several John Does. On
August 4, 1982, Asst. City Fiscal Emelita H. Garayblas recommended its dismissal for petitioner's failure to appear despite
subpoenas and to answer clarificatory questions as well as to authenticate his statement. 57 However, petitioner swore
that he never received the subpoenas.

Petitioner's alibi was supported by Manolo Almoguera whose birthday on May 3, 1995 was the reason for the celebration
at the Lakan Beer House. While his baptismal certificate indicated that he was born on May 4, 1956, 58 a joint
affidavit 59 also attested that his birth date was actually May 3, 1956. Gary Gallardo, the owner of the beer house,
corroborated Almoguera's testimony as to petitioner's alleged presence during the birthday celebration.

The Respondent Court's Decision

On June 18, 1987, the Sandiganbayan rendered the herein questioned 51-page Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo, Martin Mateo, Jr.
y Mijares, Bernardo Relator, Jr. y Retino and Eddie Saguindel y Pabinguit GUILTY as co-principals
beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of Presidential
Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974 and hereby
sentences each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from TWELVE (12) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY as minimum, to THIRTEEN (13) YEARS, ONE (1) MONTH and ELEVEN (11) DAYS as
maximum, both of reclusion temporal, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the action.
Accused Danilo Miravalles y Marcelo is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio, for insufficiency of
evidence.

No civil indemnity is hereby awarded due to the complete dearth of any proof as to the actual damages
suffered by the Bureau of Posts or the owners of the pilfered mail matters, and it further appearing that
the mail van which was hijacked had been recovered, as well as most of the checks and warrants which
were surrendered by some of the accused, without prejudice to the institution of the proper civil action to
recover damages should proof thereof be available.

Consequently, it is hereby ordered that Exhibits B, B-l and B-2, which are the .32 Cal. Revolver, Smith
and Wesson, Serial No. 11707, its holster and six (6) live ammunition respectively, which were
surrendered by accused Relator, and Exhibits J, J-l to J-5, consisting of 187, 222, 215, 197, 194 and 22
pieces, respectively, of Social Security System and Medicare checks and vouchers, be returned to the
Firearm and Explosives Unit (FEU), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City and the Social Security System,
respectively, upon proper receipts.

Let copies of this decision be furnished the Postmaster-General, Central Post Office, Liwasang Bonifacio,
Metro Manila and the Commanding General and Chief, PC-INP, Camp Crame, Quezon City for their
information and guidance with respect to the other accused who are still at-large.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Decision was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its challenged Resolution of
July 27, 1987. Hence, the instant alternative petition for certiorari and/or review on certiorari  charging the Sandiganbayan
with having gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and with reversible error in arriving at
said Decision.

The Issues

The amended petition raises the following:

Assignments of Error
and/or
Excess of Jurisdiction/Grave Abuse of Discretion

xxx xxx xxx

First

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction when it
made its determination of the alleged guilt of petitioner on the basis of mere preponderance of evidence
and not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Second
The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in
finding that petitioner's having borrowed the Mercedes Benz car utilized by the other accused in the
hijacking of the mail van indubitably established his direct participation and/or indispensable cooperation
in the said hijacking, the same being in gross disregard of basic Rules of Law.

Third

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in
finding that the voluminous SSS Medicare and Pension Checks were confiscated from and surrendered
by petitioner and three of the other accused and in finding the testimonies and investigation reports
relative thereto. "credible and unrefuted", said findings being, insofar as petitioner is concerned,
absolutely without any basis in the evidence and in fact contrary to the prosecution's only evidence that
has some measure of competency and admissibility.

Fourth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion in finding that dorsal portions of the checks
and warrants allegedly taken from petitioner were signed by him to indicate his admission of
accountability therefor and that his signatures thereon confirm the confiscation from and/or surrender by
him of said checks, said findings being absolutely without any support in the evidence.

Fifth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in
admitting and considering against petitioner his alleged extra judical confession, despite petitioner's
uncontradicted testimony and documentary proof that he was made to give or sign the same through
torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion, threats and intimidation and without the presence and
assistance of counsel, his request for which was refused, in gross violation of Constitutional Provisions
and the prevailing jurisprudence.

Sixth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in
finding that petitioner's participation in the hijacking of the mail van is indubitably established "by the
manner by which the SOG operatives succeeded in ferreting out the members of the hijacking syndicate
one by one through patient sleuthing" and in finding that they did so "without resorting to extra-legal
measures" and that "no evidence having been adduced to show that they were actuated by improper
motives to testify falsely against the herein accused, then their testimonies should be accorded full
credence".

Seventh

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in
finding that "even setting aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo, Mateo and
Liwanag, . . substantial and sufficient evidence exist which indubitably prove the guilt of Filoteo"
(Petitioner).

Eighth

Insofar as petitioner is concerned, the respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as
exceeded its jurisdiction in finding that  "accused Filoteo's ( petitioner's) and
Mateo's  [alleged] unexplained possession of the stolen checks raised the presumption that "they were
responsible for the robbery in question",  petitioner's alleged possession not being borne out but disputed
by the prosecution's own evidence.

Ninth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in
finding that "accused Filoteo's denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak and
 implausible". The truth of the matter being that they should have been sustained since petitioner was not
identified by direct victims-eyewitnesses as among those who participated in or were present at the hijack
and none of the checks and treasury warrants were found in his possession or retrieved from him.

Tenth

The respondent court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in
finding that the participation of petitioner in the criminal conspiracy has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt by the evidence of record and that said evidence "not only confirms the conspiracy between [him
and the other accused] as easily discernible from their conduct before, during and after the commission of
the offense, but also their participation and/or indispensable cooperation".

Eleventh

The respondent Court erred and gravely abused its discretion as well as exceeded its jurisdiction in
cavalierly rejecting, through the use of pejorative words, and without stating the legal basis of such
rejection, the various vital factual points raised by petitioner, in gross violation of the express mandate of
the 1987 Constitution.

The Court believes that the above "errors" may be condensed into four:

(1) Are the written statements, particularly the extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of
his lawyer, admissible in evidence against him?

(2) Were said statements obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and intimidation and therefore illegal and
inadmissible?

(3) Was petitioner's warrantless arrest valid and proper?

(4) Is the evidence of the prosecution sufficient to find the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

The Court's Ruling

Preliminary Issue: Rule 4 or Rule 65?

Before ruling on the foregoing issues, it is necessary to dwell on the procedural aspects of the case. Petitioner, a
"segurista", opted to file an (amended) "alternative petition" for certiorari under Rule 65 and for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We however hold that the instant petition must be considered as one for review
on certiorari  under Rule 45. In Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 60 this Court clearly ruled:

Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended by P.D. No. 1606, which created the Sandiganbayan,
specified that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review on certiorari by
this Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. And Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides, in Section 2, that only questions of law may be raised in the Petition for Review and these must
be distinctly set forth. Thus, in principle, findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are not to be reviewed by
this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. There are, of course, certain exceptions to this general
principle. Here, reading petitioner's Petition for Review and Memorandum in the most favorable possible
light, petitioner may be seen to be in effect asserting that the Sandiganbayan misapprehended certain
(f)acts in arriving at its factual conclusions.

As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly provides that "(d)ecisions and final orders of
the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of
law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court." However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of
questions of fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable error or grave misapprehension of facts by
the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted public officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough
treatment by this Court as criminal cases involving ordinary citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of
innocence must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a person's life and liberty are at
stake. 61
As a petition for review under Rule 45 is the available remedy, a petition for certiorari  under Rule 65 would not prosper.
Basic it is that certiorari is invocable only where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy. For waffling on
procedural matters, petitioner could have lost this battle through a summary dismissal of his "alternative" petition. But in
view of the importance of the issues raised, the Court decided to take cognizance of the matter.

First Issue: Uncounselled Waiver

On the merits of the petition, we find that the pivotal issue here is the admissibility of petitioner's extrajudicial confession
which lays out in detail his complicity in the crime.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court erred in admitting his extrajudicial confession notwithstanding uncontradicted
testimony and documentary proof that he was made to sign the same through torture, maltreatment, physical compulsion,
threats and intimidation and without the presence and assistance of counsel. He also claims that in executing the
extrajudicial confession, he was denied the right to counsel in the sameway that his waiver of the said right was likewise
without the benefit of counsel. Petitioner therefore questions the respondent Court's admission evidence of his
extrajudicial confession on the strength of cases 62 upholding the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions notwithstanding
the absence of counsel "especially where the statements are replete with details and circumstances which are indicative
of voluntariness." We shall first tackle the issue of his uncounselled waiver of his right to counsel.

The pertinent provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution reads as follows:

No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such
rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.

In comparison, the relevant rights of an accused under Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution are, inter alia, as
follows:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation; or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as
compensation to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices and their families." (emphasis
supplied. Obviously, the 1973 Constitution did not contain the right against an uncounselled waiver of the
right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
above underscored.)

In the landmark case of Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 the Court categorically held that the aforequoted provisions of the 1973
Constitution (which were not included in the 1935 Charter) must be prospectively applied. This Court said:

We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective
and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for
the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is
inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on
January 17, 1973. Conversely, such confession is admissible in evidence against the accused, if the
same had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if presented after January
17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel, since no law gave the accused the
right to be so informed before that date.
By parity of reasoning, the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his right to
counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may not be applied retroactively or in
cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the
right to counsel during custodial investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
should, by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial confessions made while
the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made with the assistance of counsel, 64 the definitive
ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile,65 issued the guidelines to be
observed by law enforcers during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that "(t)he right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. 66 Thereafter, in People
vs. Luvendino, 67 the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught:

. . . The doctrine that an uncounseled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal effect was
initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs. Enrile and reiterated
on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. . . .

While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12(1) of the 1987 Constitution, that
doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and restrictions outlined in
Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers made prior to 26 April 1983 the
date of promulgation of Morales.

Pursuant to the above doctrine, petitioner may not claim the benefits of the Morales and Galit rulings because he
executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982, or before April 26, 1983. The
prospective application of "judge-made" laws was underscored in Co vs. Court of Appeals  68 where the Court ruled thru
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa that in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code which provides that "(j)udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines," and
Article 4 of the same Code which states that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided," the
principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply to judicial decisions, which, although in
themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law means.69

Petitioner's contention that Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution should be given retroactive effect for being
favorable to him as an accused, cannot be sustained. While Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)enal
laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who is not a habitual criminal," what
is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically contained in the Bill of Rights which is obviously not a
penal statute. A bill of rights is a declaration and enumeration of the individual rights and privileges which the Constitution
is designed to protect against violations by the government, or by individuals or groups of individuals. It is a charter of
liberties for the individual and a limitation upon the power of the state. 70 Penal laws, on the other hand, strictly and
properly are those imposing punishment for an offense committed against the state which the executive of the state has
the power to pardon. In other words, a penal law denotes punishment imposed and enforced by the state for a crime or
offense against its law. 71

Hence, petitioner's vigorous reliance on People vs. Sison  72 to make his extrajudicial confession inadmissible is
misplaced. In that case, the extrajudicial confession was executed on May 19, 1983, clearly after the promulgation of
Morales on April 26, 1983.

The admissibility of petitioner's uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel notwithstanding, the Court has still to
determine whether such waiver was made voluntarily and intelligently. 73 The waiver must also be categorical and
definitive, 74 and must rest on clear evidence. 75

In his affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, 76 petitioner stated that:

. . . matapos akong mapagpaliwanagan ng mga imbestigador ng Special Operations Group, PC/INP

Central Anti-Organized Crime Task Force, Camp Crame, Quezon City ng aking mga karapatan alinsunod
sa mga isinasaad ng Section 20, Article IV ng Bagong Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas ay
malaya at kusang-loob na nagsasalaysay ng mga sumusunod kahit na walang abugadong magpapayo sa
akin sa pagsasagawa nito sa dahilang alam at nauunawaan ko ang aking ginagawa at wala naman akong
isasalaysay kung hindi mga katotohanan lamang, bagama't ako ay inalok ng mga imbestigador na ikuha
ng isang abugadong walang bayad mula sa CLAO-IBP na akin namang tinanggihan:

xxx xxx xxx

 Na ako ay hindi sinaktan a minaltrato gayunding walang kinuha mula sa akin na hindi niresibohan;

x x x           x x x          x x x

Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he apprised petitioner of his right to counsel even in waiving the
same right77 but petitioner did not even inform him that his father-in-law was a lawyer. Although allowed to talk for thirty
minutes with Jimmy Victorino, who was his comrade at the WPD General Assignment Section, 78 still, petitioner did not
invoke his right to counsel.

It should be emphasized that petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an accused. He was a fourth year
criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic course. 79 Having been in the police force since 1978, with
stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, he knew the tactics used by investigators to incriminate criminal
suspects. 80 In other words, he was knowledgeable on the matterof extrajudicial confessions.

The Second Issue: Confession Extracted Through Torture?

Petitioner's claim that he was tortured into signing the confession appears incredible, or at least susceptible to serious
doubts. The allegation of torture was negated by the medical report 81 showing no evidence of physical injuries upon his
person. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, there is no reason to maltreat him in particular when the record
shows that the investigating team respected the right of the other suspects to remain silent. When he was presented
before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan, petitioner even waived his right to present
evidence82 instead of impugning his confession on account of the torture allegedly inflicted upon him. If indeed he had
been tortured, he would have revived the case he filed against his alleged torturers upon learning of its dismissal.

Furthermore, an examination of his signatures in the different documents on record bearing the same discloses an
evenness of lines and strokes in his penmanship which is markedly consistent in his certification, extrajudicial confession
and waiver of detention. Human experience has proven that the lines and strokes of a person's handwriting reflect his
disposition at a certain given time. In the present case, no handwriting expert is needed to declare that petitioner's
signatures were written voluntarily and not under compulsion of fear immediately after he had been subjected to
maltreatment. In view of the foregoing, his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily made, in the
absence of conclusive evidence showing that petitioner's consent in executing the same had been vitiated. 83

Besides, the question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to torture or maltreatment is a factual question
addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings of which are binding on this Court whose function, as afore-discussed, is
principally to review only of questions of law. Moreover, we have pored over the assailed Decision and we are satisfied
that respondent Court performed its duty in evaluating the evidence. More on this later.

The Third Issue: Illegal Arrest?

Petitioner questions the manner of his arrest, stating that the arresting officers "invited" him without a warrant of arrest and
brought him to Camp Crame where he was allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after the commission of the
crime. 84 Petitioner's claim is belatedly made. He should have questioned the validity of his arrest before he entered his
plea in the trial court. On this point, this Court explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.: 85

Finally, it is much too late for appellant to raise the question of his arrest without a warrant. When
accused-appellant was arrested and a case was filed against him, he pleaded not guilty upon
arraignment, participated in the trial and presented his evidence. Appellant is thus estopped from
questioning the legality of his arrest. It is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made
before he enters his plea, otherwise the objection is deemed waived. Besides, this issue is being raised
for the first time by appellant. He did not move for the quashal of the information before the trial court on
this ground. Consequently, any irregularity attendant to his arrest, if any, was cured when he voluntarily
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in
the trial. Moreover, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.

The only move petitioner made in regard to his arrest was to file a complaint for "grave coercion, grave threat &
maltreatment" which was docketed as I.S. No. 82-12684 before the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City. 86 The complaint was
an offshoot of his alleged maltreatment in the hands of the SOG upon his arrest. However, as stated above, he did not lift
a finger to revive it upon its dismissal.
 The Fourth Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence

Contrary to petitioner's claim, his culpability has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He borrowed a car to use in the
hijacking knowing fully well that his owner-type jeep would give away his identity. Hecould not be identified by the postal
employees in the postal van simply because after overtaking said vehicle and forcing its driver to pull over, he gave up
driving the Mercedes Benz where the postal employees were made to ride, and commandeered the van. That the checks
were not found in his own home is of no moment. Before the arrest and upon learning that the authorities had begun to
nail down the identities of the malefactors, hehad entrusted them to his "kumare". It was petitioner himself who led the
team of Lt. Pagdilao back to his place after he had admitted to Sgt. Arsenio Carlos that his share of the checks were in the
possession of his "kumare" in the neighborhood. 87

In view of these facts, it is beyond dispute that petitioner was a direct participant in the commission of the crime. His alibi
has been correctly considered by the Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. The distance between Kalvario,
Meycauayan, Bulacan and downtown Manila where petitioner claimed to have been at the crucial time was between
fifteen (15) to twenty (20) kilometers, which, through first-class roads, could be negotiated during that time in
approximately thirty (30) minutes. It could not therefore have been physically impossible for him to be at the crime scene
or its immediate vicinity when the crime was committed. 88

Having already ruled on the admissibility of petitioner's confession, this Court holds that the full force of the totality of the
prosecution's evidence proves his guilt well beyond reasonable doubt. Weighing heavily against the defense is the well-
settled doctrine that findings of facts of the trial courts — in this case, the Sandiganbayan itself — particularly in the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable error.

. . . It is well-settled that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the
credibility of the witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misapprehended or
misinterpreted. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the question,
having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial. 89

The doctrine is firmly settled that the trial court's conclusion on issues of credibility is accorded with
highest respect by the appellate courts (People v. Dominguez, 217 SCRA 170). Appellate courts will
generally respect the findings of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses since trial courts are in a better
position to weigh conflicting testimonies. They heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying. . . . 90

So overwhelming is the prosecution's evidence that respondent Court opined that even without the "inter-locking
confessions of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag" the remaining evidence would still be sufficient for conviction. 91 Said the
respondent tribunal:

However, even setting aside the inter-locking confessional statements of Filoteo, Mateo and Liwanag, we
are of the considered opinion that substantial and sufficient evidence exist which indubitably prove the
guilt of Filoteo, Relator, Mateo and Saguindel who had submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of this
Court. As above-stated, Filoteo was responsible for securing the use of the Mercedes Benz car used by
the co-conspirators in the hi-jacking. Together with Mateo, Liwanag and Mendoza, he surrendered
voluminous assorted checks which were part of the loot. Relator admitted that his service firearm was
used by him in the hi-jacking, which firearm was identified by prosecution witnesses Miranda and
Bautista. Saguindel was identified in line-ups at the SOG office as the suspect clad in fatigue uniform and
carrying an Armalite rifle by prosecution witnesses Tagudar and Bautista. All three (3) accused, namely,
Mateo, Relator and Saguindel also jumped bail during the trial and did not offer any evidence to refute the
evidence presented by the prosecution against them. Such flight to evade prosecution constitutes an
implied admission of guilt.

Moreover, accused Filoteo's and Mateo's unexplained possession of the stolen checks raises the
presumption that they were responsible for the robbery in question. It is a rule established by an
abundance of jurisprudence that when stolen property is found in the possession of one, not the owner,
without a satisfactory explanation of his possession, he will be presumed the thief. This rule is in
accordance with the disputable presumption "that a person found in possession of a thing taken in the
doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and doer of the whole act." In the instant case, said accused
has not given such satisfactory explanation, much more so when their possession had been positively
 established by the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Capt. Ferrer and Sgt. Carlos and by accused's
own signatures at the back of said checks.

Furthermore, accused Filoteo's denials and alibi cannot be entertained for being quite weak and
implausible. His claim that he merely borrowed the Mercedes Bent car from Rodolfo Miranda to help out
his co-accused Mateo, who had been utilized by the police as an "informer" and was following up tips in
certain unsolved cases, appears to be incredible and fantastic. He also claimed that he could not have
participated in the hi-jack because after giving the car to Mateo in the morning of May 2, 1982, he waited
at the corner of Zurbaran St. and Avenida Rizal between 2-3:00 o'clock p.m. of the same day and then
went to the WPD headquarters to attend the police formation at around 5:00 o'clock p.m. when Mateo
failed to show up. Thereafter, he tried to show through his witnesses Gary Gallardo and Manolo Almogera
that he was with them between 3:00 o'clock to 4:45 o'clock p.m., then from 6:00 o'clock to 8:30 o'clock
p.m. and, finally, from 10:45 o'clock p.m. to 11:00 o'clock of the same date. It was through said witnesses
that he tried to establish his whereabouts between 4:30 o'clock to 7:30 o'clock p.m. of May 2, 1982, the
period from the time the mail van was hi-jacked up to when postal employees Bautista, Miranda and
Tagudar were brought to Caloocan City and freed by their captors. Such alibi, however, fails to show that
it was physically impossible for him to be present at the scene of the hi-jacking. We take judicial notice
that the distance between the crime scene and down-town Manila is some 15-20 kilometers and
negotiable over first- class roads in some thirty (30) minutes.

We are likewise convinced that there is sufficient evidence of conspiracy as convincing as the evidence of the
participation of each of the accused. As ratiocinated in the assailed Decision: 92

The participation of accused Filoteo, Mateo, Relator and Saguindel in the criminal conspiracy have (sic)
been proved beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence on record and which evidence not only confirms
the existence of the conspiracy between them as easily discernible from their conduct before, during and
after the commission of the offense, but also their participation therein as co-principals by direct
participation and/or indispensable cooperation. Their concerted efforts were performed with closeness
and coordination indicating their common purpose. Hence, there being collective criminal responsibility,
the act of one is the act of all, and each of the participants are responsible for what the others did in all
the stages of execution of the offense.

Final Question: Brigandage or Robbery?

The Court believes that, though not raised as an issue and though not argued by the parties in their pleadings, the
question of which law was violated by the accused should be discussed and passed upon. In fact, petitioner should have
brought up such question as it may benefit him with a reduced penalty.

The respondent Court convicted the accused of brigandage punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532. 93

Justifying the above disposition, the assailed Decision ratiocinates:

Accused herein are charged with the violation of Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974. Under said decree, with respect to the highway
robbery aspect, the offense is committed on a "Philippine Highway" which under Section 2 (c) thereof has
been defined as "any road, street, passage, highway and bridges or any part thereof, or railway or
railroad within the Philippines, used by persons or vehicles, or locomotives or trains for the movement or
circulation of persons or transportation of goods, articles or property or both", while under Section 2 (e)
thereof "Highway Robbery/ Brigandage" has been defined as the "the seizure of any person for ransom,
extortion or other unlawful purposes or the taking away of property of another by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any
person on any Philippine Highway". (Emphasis supplied)

The offense described in the information and established by the evidence presented by the prosecution
properly falls within the ambit of the aforesaid special law. Therein, it was conclusively proven that a
postal van containing mail matters, including checks and warrants, was hi-jacked along the national
highway in Bulacan by the accused, with the attendant use of force, violence and intimidation against the
three (3) postal employees who were occupants thereof, resulting in the unlawful taking and asportation
of the entire van and its contents consisting of mail matters. Also the evidence further showed that the
crime was committed by the accused who were PC soldiers, policeman (sic) and private individuals in
 conspiracy with their co-accused Castro and Escalada who were postal employees and who participated
in the planning of the crime. Accordingly, all the essential requisites to constitute a consummated offense
under the law in point are present. (Emphasis in the original text.)

Obviously, the Court a quo labored under the belief that because the taking or robbery was perpetrated on a national
highway  (McArthur Highway), ergo, Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974, must have been the statute violated. Such reasoning has already been debunked by this Court in
the case of People vs. Isabelo Puno, 94 where it was ruled in unmistakable language that it takes more than the situs  of
the robbery to bring it within the ambit of PD 532. Said the Court through Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado:

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise
on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers.
The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed
persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a
violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a
member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and
purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art. 306. On the other
hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized
for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more
than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of
brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos
para dedicarse a robar." (Emphasis ours.)

In fine, the purpose of brigandage, is inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there are at least four armed
participants. The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the
objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have
adopted the same, there being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the circumstances under
which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and
strongest in the law.

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of
robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine highways as
defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim, is
evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress
of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which

are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries:

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating

such acts of depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in
view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people; (Emphasis supplied.)

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the
accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless
inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation would be capable
of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest
 forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries, and would accordingly constitute
an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, such that said
isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished is said
decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

From the above, it is clear that a finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not just the locus of the crime or the
fact that more than three (3) persons perpetrated it. It is essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely organized not
just for one act of robbery but for several indiscriminate commissions thereof. In the present case, there had been no
evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for the purpose of "depredation upon the persons
and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another." What was duly proven in
the present case is one isolated hijacking of a postal van. There was also no evidence of any previous attempts at similar
robberies by the accused to show the "indiscriminate" commission thereof. 95

Upon the other hand, the Information did not specifically mention P.D. 532. 96 The facts alleged therein and proven by the
evidence constitute the offense of robbery defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art. 244, par. 5, all of
the Revised Penal Code. 97 From the facts, it was duly proven that:

* personal property (treasury warrants, checks, mail, van, tools, etc.)

* belonging to another were

* unlawfully taken by the accused

* with intent to gain (animo lucrandi)

* with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293)

* in an uninhabited place, or

* by an band, or

* by attacking a moving motor vehicle

* on a highway; and

* the intimidation was made with the use of firearms (Art. 295)

Hence, the offender shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty provided under paragraph 5 of Art. 294,
which is, " prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period".

Effectively, the penalty imposed by the Court a quo  should be lightened. However, such lighter penalty shall benefit only
herein petitioner and not his co-accused who did not contest or appeal the Sandiganbayan's Decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, but the first paragraph of the dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is partially
MODIFIED to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Jose Filoteo, Jr. y Diendo GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt as co-principal in the crime of robbery as defined in Arts. 293 and 295 and penalized
under Art. 294, paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code Code IMPOSING on him an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years
of prision mayor  as maximum, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs of the action.

All other parts of the disposition are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182648               June 17, 2015

HERMAN MEDINA, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the January
7, 2008 Decision1 and April 21, 2008 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 29634, which affirmed
in toto the March 31, 2005 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal
Case No. 35-4021 convicting petitioner Herman Medina (Medina) of the crime of simple theft, defined and penalized
under Article 308, in relation to Article 309, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).

The Information4 filed against Medina states:

That on or about the 27th day of April, 2002 and for sometime thereafter, in the City of Santiago, Philippines, within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal, and carry away the following to wit:
one (1) unit alternator worth Php5,000.00, Starter worth Php5,000.00, battery worth Php2,500.00[,] and two (2) sets of tire
2.75 x 15 with mugs worth Php10,000.00 all valued at Php22,500.00, owned by HENRY LIM, represented by PURITA
LIM[,] to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the total amount of Php22,500.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW[.]

The factual antecedents appear as follows:

Henry Lim (Lim) is a resident of Calao West, Santiago City, Isabela. He is the registered owner of a Sangyong Korando
Jeep with Plate No. WPC-207, which was involved in an accident that caused damage to its roof and door. On April 27,
2002,he engaged the services of Medina, who is a mechanic and maintains a repair shop in Buenavista, Santiago City,
Isabela. At the time the jeep was delivered to Medina’s shop, it was still in running condition and serviceable because the
under chassis was not affected and the motor engine, wheels, steering wheels and other parts were still functioning.

A reasonable time elapsed, but no repairs were made on the jeep. So, in the morning of September 4, 2002, Purita Lim
(Purita), Lim’s sister, instructed Danilo Beltran (Beltran) to retrieve the jeep from Medina’s shop on the agreement that he
would instead repair the vehicle in his own auto shop. Beltran, however, was not able to get the jeep since its alternator,
starter, battery, and two tires with rims worth ₱5,000.00, ₱5,000.00, ₱2,500.00, and ₱10,000.00, respectively, could not
be found. Upon inquiry, Medina told him that he took and installed them on Lim’s another vehicle, an Isuzu pick-up, which
was also being repaired in the shop. Beltran went back in the afternoon of the same day and was able to get the jeep, but
without the missing parts. He had it towed and brought it to his own repair shop. Before placing the jeep therein, he
reported the incident to Purita. Later, the jeep was fully repaired and put back in good running condition.

On September 12, 2002, a criminal complaint5 for simple theft was filed by Purita, representing her brother. The City
Prosecutor found probable cause to indict Medina.6 Subsequently, an Information was filed before the court a quo.

In his arraignment, Medina pleaded not guilty.7 No settlement, stipulation or admission was made by the parties during the
pre-trial.8 During the trial proper, Beltran and Lim were presented as witnesses for the prosecution, while Medina and a
certain Angelina Tumamao, a former barangay kagawad of Buenavista, Santiago City, testified for the defense.
Eventually, the case was submitted for decision, but without the formal offer of evidence by the defense.9

The trial court found Medina guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of the March 31, 2005
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt, and considering the
absence of mitigating [or] aggravating circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of
prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The
accused is likewise ordered to indemnify Henry Lim the total amount of ₱22,500.00. No imprisonment in case of
insolvency.

SO ORDERED.10
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of Medina. While the trial court was not convinced with Medina’s justification
that he installed the jeep’s missing parts to the pick-up also owned by Lim, the CA opined that his excuse is "so lame and
flimsy." The CA agreed with the lower court’s findings that Medina admitted that the jeep is more valuable than the pickup;
that unlike the pick-up, the needed repairs on the jeep is only minor in nature; that Medina failed to prove that the pick-up
was completely repaired and was placed in good running condition; and that he failed to prove that the pick-up is owned
by Lim. The CA also held that the positive testimony of Beltran deserves merit in contrast with the self-serving testimony
of Medina. Finally, no credence was given to Medina’s assertion that the missing auto parts were turned over to Crispin
Mendoza, who is alleged to be an employee of Lim. For the CA, the trial court correctly ruled that such claim was
unsubstantiated in view of Medina’s failure to formally offer in evidence the purported acknowledgment receipt. Assuming
that the exception in Mato v. CA11 is taken into account, the receipt could not still be considered because it was not
incorporated in the records of the case.

When his motion for reconsideration was denied, Medina filed this petition which alleges the following errors:

I.

THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION ONLY PRESENTED CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN
THEIR ATTEMPT TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. WORST, IT
SPECIFICALLY ADVANCED ONLY ONE SINGLE CIRCUMSTANCE[,] THAT IS[,] THE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS DANILO BELTRAN THAT THE STARTER, [ALTERNATOR], BATTERY[,] AND TWO (2)
PIECES [OF] TIRES WITH MUGS (MAG WHEELS) OF THE KORANDO JEEP WERE SIMPLY MISSING, THUS[,] NOT
SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN CONVICTION IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 4, RULE 133 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

II.

THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE CONVICTION OFTHE
PETITIONER DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PROSECUTION RELIED NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE
BUT ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN
PHILIPPINES VS. ALVARIO.

III.

THE [HONORABLE] COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT [AFFIRMED] THE CONVICTION OF THE
PETITIONER DESPITE [THE] FACT [THAT] THERE WAS NO FURTIVE TAKING OR UNLAWFUL ASPORTATION, IN
THE CRIMINAL SENSE, CONSIDERING THAT THE TAKING, IF AT ALL, WAS WITH THE KNOWLEDGE AND
ACQUIESCENCE OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT PURSUANT TO THE RULING OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN
ABUNDO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL. AND THE UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE RECEIPT MARKED AS EXHIBIT "2" FOR
THE DEFENSE, LIKEWISE MARKED AS EXHIBIT "C" FOR THE PROSECUTION (COMMON EVIDENCE) NOT
FORMALLY OFFERED IN EVIDENCE DUE TO THE GROSS NEGLIGENCE OF THE FORMER COUNSEL FOR THE
PETITIONER IN THE GREATER INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ONE OFTHE EXCEPTIONS PROVIDED FOR BY THE
HONORABLE COURT IN SARRAGA, SR. VS. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK.12

We deny.

Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.13 As defined and penalized, the elements
of the crime are: (1) there was taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done
with intent to gain; (4) the taking was without the consent of the owner; and (5) the taking was accomplished without the
use of violence against, or intimidation of persons or force, upon things.14 Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal
act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation.15 Although proof as to
motive for the crime is essential when the evidence of the theft is circumstantial, the intent to gain is the usual motive to
be presumed from all furtive taking of useful property appertaining to another, unless special circumstances reveal a
different intent on the part of the perpetrator.16 As to the concept of "taking" –
The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the penal code is that it be capable of
appropriation. It need not be capable of "asportation," which is defined as "carrying away." Jurisprudence is settled that to
"take" under the theft provision of the penal code does not require asportation or carrying away.

To appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing. The word "take" in the Revised Penal Code includes any
act intended to transfer possession which x x x may be committed through the use of the offenders' own hands, as well as
any mechanical device x x x.17

In this case, Medina acknowledged without hesitation the taking of the jeep’s alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with
magwheels, but he put up the defense that they were installed in the pick-up owned by Lim.18 With such admission, the
burden of evidence is shifted on him to prove that the missing parts were indeed lawfully taken. Upon perusal of the
transcript of stenographic notes, the Court finds that Medina unsatisfactorily discharged the burden. Even bearing in mind
the testimony of Tumamao, he failed to substantiate, through the presentation of supporting documentary evidence or
corroborative testimony, the claims that: (1) Lim was the owner of the pick-up; (2) the missing parts of the jeep were
exactly the same items that were placed in the pick-up; (3) Lim consented, expressly or impliedly, to the transfer of auto
parts; and (4) Mendoza witnessed the removal of the spare parts from the jeep and their placement to the pick-up. Neither
did Medina adduce any justifying19 or exempting20 circumstance to avoid criminal liability.

On the contrary, Lim firmly testified that when he entrusted to Medina the jeep’s repair it was still in running condition and
complete with alternator, starter, battery, and tires, which went missing by the time the vehicle was recovered from the
auto shop.21 Likewise, the testimony of Beltran is definite and straightforward. He declared that he was not able to get the
jeep in the morning of September 4, 2002 because its alternator, starter, battery, and two tires with rims could not be
found, and that when he asked Medina as to their whereabouts the latter told him that he took them, placed the starter in
Lim’s pick-up while the alternator was in the repair shop.22 Medina informed him that the jeep’s missing parts were actually
installed to Lim’s other vehicle which was also being repaired at the time.23 However, Beltran did not know or had not seen
other vehicles owned by Lim at Medina’s shop.24 In the afternoon of the sameday, he was able to get the jeep but not its
missing parts.25 He concluded that they were lost because he inspected the jeep.26

Abundo v. Sandiganbayan,27 which was relied upon by Medina, does not apply. In said case, the element of lack of
owner's consent to the taking of the junk chassis was absent since the records showed that Abundo made a request in
writing to be allowed to use one old jeep chassis among the pile of junk motor vehicles. His request was granted. A
memorandum receipt was issued and signed. Pursuant thereto, the chassis was taken out. There was no furtive taking or
unlawful asportation. The physical and juridical possession of the junk chassis was transferred to Abundo at his request,
with the consent or acquiescence of the owner, the Government, represented by the public officials who had legal and
physical possession of it. We noted that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession; therefore, there can be no
theft when the owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing. The Court agreed with the observation of the
Solicitor General that a thief does not ask for permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the consent or
acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious.28

Medina cannot acquit himself on the basis of a purported acknowledgment receipt29 that he and Tumamao identified
during their presentation as witnesses for the defense. According to his testimony, Mendoza came to his (Medina’s) place
and saw the subject auto parts while being transferred from the jeep to the pick-up and that, relative thereto, Medina even
called barangay officials and let them signed a document to bear witness on the matter.30 The document, dated July 25,
2002, which was marked as Exhibit "2," was signed byMendoza, Jovy Bardiaga (said to be Lim’s chief mechanic), Mario
Pascual (said to be Medina’s helper), and Rosalina Bautista and Tumamao (said to be barangay kagawads). Ostensibly,
they signed the document while facing each other in front of Medina’s house.31

In Mato v. CA,32 which referred to People v. Napat-a,33 citing People v. Mate,34 We relaxed the application of Section 34,
Rule 13235 of the Rules of Court by allowing the admission of evidence not formally offered. To be admissible, however,
two essential conditions must concur: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and,
second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.36

As regards this case, the acknowledgment receipt was not considered by the trial court because it was not formally
offered in evidence. While it was duly identified by the defense testimony that was duly recorded, the receipt itself was not
incorporated in the case records. For its part, the CA opined that nowhere from the case records does Medina’s
acknowledgment receipt appear. Yet, upon examination, it appears that the July 25, 2002 acknowledgment receipt was
attached as Annex "3" of Medina’s Appellant’s Brief.37 Accordingly, the CA should have mulled over this piece of
document, especially so since the prosecution even prayed, and was granted, during the trial proper that said receipt be
marked as Exhibit "C."38
Nevertheless, even if this Court admits in evidence the acknowledgment receipt, the same would still not exonerate
Medina.1âwphi1 This is due to his admission that Bardiaga, Pascual, and Bautista did not actually see him remove the
alternator, starter, battery, and tires with rims from the jeep and put the same to the pick-up.39 Likewise, while Medina
asserted that Mendoza came to his place and was shown that the missing auto parts were transferred from the jeep to the
pick-up, the latter was not presented as a hostile witness to confirm such expedient claim. As against the positive and
categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, Medina’s mere denials cannot prevail for being self-serving and
uncorroborated. Denial is considered with suspicion and always received with caution because it is inherently weak and
unreliable, easily fabricated and concocted.40

Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact. Thus, courts – both trial
and appellate – have generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable caution, if not with
outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by virtue
of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration at all, denial
should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and self-
serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.41 Further, Medina did not demonstrate any evidence of ill motive on the part
of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him. In the absence of any evidence that the prosecution
witnesses were motivated by improper motives, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses shall not be
interfered with by this Court.42

There being no compelling reason to disregard the same, the Court yields to the factual findings of the trial court, which
were affirmed by the CA. This is in line with the precept that when the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the
appellate court, said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon Us.43 It is only in exceptional circumstances, such
as when the trial court overlooked material and relevant matters, that We will recalibrate and evaluate the factual findings
of the court below.44 As held in Co Kiat v. Court of Appeals:45

It is a well-settled doctrine in this jurisdiction, that factual findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight and authority
(Macua vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 29) and that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought
toit from the Court of Appeals, is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of facts being
conclusive (Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 737).

In a petition for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to reviewing questions
of law, unless the factual findings are totally bereft of support in the records or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
a serious abuse of discretion (Canete, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, 171 SCRA 13).

Except in criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher, appeals to the Supreme Court are
not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion and are allowed only on questions of law and only when there are
special and important reasons, which we do not find in this case (Balde vs. Court of Appeals, 150 SCRA 365).46

Now on the propriety of the penalty imposed by the trial court:

Under Article 309 of the RPC, an accused found guilty of simple theft when the value of the stolen property exceeds
₱22,000.00 shall be sentenced to:

Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:

1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000
pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed the latter amount, the penalty shall be
the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.47

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into
consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the RPC.48 As the value of the auto parts
stolen from Lim is in excess of ₱22,000.00, the penalty imposable is the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by
Article 309, which is the maximum of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since the penalty prescribed is
composed of only two periods, Article 65 of the RPC requires the division into three equal portions the time included in the
penalty, forming one period of each of the three portions. Thus, the minimum, medium, and maximum periods of the
penalty prescribed are:
 Minimum - 6 years and l day to 7 years and 4 months

Medium - 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and 8 months

Maximum - 8 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 10 years

The minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be-anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that
prescribed for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission of the
crime.49 In this case, the pep.alty next lower in degree to that prescribed for the offense is prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, or anywhere from Two (2) years,. Four (4) months and One (1) day to Six (6) years. Thus,
the trial court did not err when it sentenced Medina to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Three (3) years, Six (6)
months and Twenty-One (21) days of prision correccional, as minimum, to Eight (8) years, Eight (8) months and One (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum.50 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The January 7, 2008
Decision and April 21, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR. No. 29634,1 which affirmed in toto the
March 31, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3), Santiago City, Isabela, in Criminal Case No. 35-4021
convicting Herman Medina for the crime of simple theft, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155076             February 27, 2006

LUIS MARCOS P. LAUREL, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. ZEUS C. ABROGAR, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, Branch 150, PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES& PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY, Respondents.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68841
affirming the Order issued by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 150, which denied
the "Motion to Quash (With Motion to Defer Arraignment)" in Criminal Case No. 99-2425 for theft.

Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) is the holder of a legislative franchise to render local and
international telecommunication services under Republic Act No. 7082.2 Under said law, PLDT is authorized to establish,
operate, manage, lease, maintain and purchase telecommunication systems, including transmitting, receiving and
switching stations, for both domestic and international calls. For this purpose, it has installed an estimated 1.7 million
telephone lines nationwide. PLDT also offers other services as authorized by Certificates of Public Convenience and
Necessity (CPCN) duly issued by the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC), and operates and maintains an
International Gateway Facility (IGF). The PLDT network is thus principally composed of the Public Switch Telephone
Network (PSTN), telephone handsets and/or telecommunications equipment used by its subscribers, the wires and cables
linking said telephone handsets and/or telecommunications equipment, antenna, the IGF, and other telecommunications
equipment which provide interconnections.3 1avvphil.net

PLDT alleges that one of the alternative calling patterns that constitute network fraud and violate its network integrity is
that which is known as International Simple Resale (ISR). ISR is a method of routing and completing international long
distance calls using International Private Leased Lines (IPL), cables, antenna or air wave or frequency, which connect
directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the terminating country (the country where the call is destined). The
IPL is linked to switching equipment which is connected to a PLDT telephone line/number. In the process, the calls
bypass the IGF found at the terminating country, or in some instances, even those from the originating country.4

One such alternative calling service is that offered by Baynet Co., Ltd. (Baynet) which sells "Bay Super Orient Card"
phone cards to people who call their friends and relatives in the Philippines. With said card, one is entitled to a 27-minute
call to the Philippines for about ¥37.03 per minute. After dialing the ISR access number indicated in the phone card, the
ISR operator requests the subscriber to give the PIN number also indicated in the phone card. Once the caller’s identity
(as purchaser of the phone card) is confirmed, the ISR operator will then provide a Philippine local line to the requesting
caller via the IPL. According to PLDT, calls made through the IPL never pass the toll center of IGF operators in the
Philippines. Using the local line, the Baynet card user is able to place a call to any point in the Philippines, provided the
local line is National Direct Dial (NDD) capable.5

PLDT asserts that Baynet conducts its ISR activities by utilizing an IPL to course its incoming international long distance
calls from Japan. The IPL is linked to switching equipment, which is then connected to PLDT telephone lines/numbers and
equipment, with Baynet as subscriber. Through the use of the telephone lines and other auxiliary equipment, Baynet is
able to connect an international long distance call from Japan to any part of the Philippines, and make it appear as a call
originating from Metro Manila. Consequently, the operator of an ISR is able to evade payment of access, termination or
bypass charges and accounting rates, as well as compliance with the regulatory requirements of the NTC. Thus, the ISR
operator offers international telecommunication services at a lower rate, to the damage and prejudice of legitimate
operators like PLDT.6

PLDT pointed out that Baynet utilized the following equipment for its ISR activities: lines, cables, and antennas or
equipment or device capable of transmitting air waves or frequency, such as an IPL and telephone lines and equipment;
computers or any equipment or device capable of accepting information applying the prescribed process of the
information and supplying the result of this process; modems or any equipment or device that enables a data terminal
equipment such as computers to communicate with other data terminal equipment via a telephone line; multiplexers or
any equipment or device that enables two or more signals from different sources to pass through a common cable or
transmission line; switching equipment, or equipment or device capable of connecting telephone lines; and software,
diskettes, tapes or equipment or device used for recording and storing information.7

PLDT also discovered that Baynet subscribed to a total of 123 PLDT telephone lines/numbers.8 Based on the Traffic
Study conducted on the volume of calls passing through Baynet’s ISR network which bypass the IGF toll center, PLDT
incurred an estimated monthly loss of P10,185,325.96.9 Records at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) also
revealed that Baynet was not authorized to provide international or domestic long distance telephone service in the
country. The following are its officers: Yuji Hijioka, a Japanese national (chairman of the board of directors); Gina C.
Mukaida, a Filipina (board member and president); Luis Marcos P. Laurel, a Filipino (board member and corporate
secretary); Ricky Chan Pe, a Filipino (board member and treasurer); and Yasushi Ueshima, also a Japanese national
(board member).

Upon complaint of PLDT against Baynet for network fraud, and on the strength of two search warrants10 issued by the
RTC of Makati, Branch 147, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents searched its office at the 7th Floor, SJG
Building, Kalayaan Avenue, Makati City on November 8, 1999. Atsushi Matsuura, Nobuyoshi Miyake, Edourd D. Lacson
and Rolando J. Villegas were arrested by NBI agents while in the act of manning the operations of Baynet. Seized in the
premises during the search were numerous equipment and devices used in its ISR activities, such as multiplexers,
modems, computer monitors, CPUs, antenna, assorted computer peripheral cords and microprocessors, cables/wires,
assorted PLDT statement of accounts, parabolic antennae and voltage regulators.

State Prosecutor Ofelia L. Calo conducted an inquest investigation and issued a Resolution11 on January 28, 2000, finding
probable cause for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code and Presidential Decree No. 40112 against the
respondents therein, including Laurel.

On February 8, 2000, State Prosecutor Calo filed an Information with the RTC of Makati City charging Matsuura, Miyake,
Lacson and Villegas with theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting the requisite preliminary
investigation, the State Prosecutor filed an Amended Information impleading Laurel (a partner in the law firm of Ingles,
Laurel, Salinas, and, until November 19, 1999, a member of the board of directors and corporate secretary of Baynet),
and the other members of the board of directors of said corporation, namely, Yuji Hijioka, Yasushi Ueshima, Mukaida,
Lacson and Villegas, as accused for theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The inculpatory portion of the
Amended Information reads:

On or about September 10-19, 1999, or prior thereto, in Makati City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
accused, conspiring and confederating together and all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to
gain and without the knowledge and consent of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone (PLDT), did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and use the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT by
conducting International Simple Resale (ISR), which is a method of routing and completing international long distance
calls using lines, cables, antennae, and/or air wave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the country where the call is destined, effectively stealing this business from PLDT while using its facilities in
the estimated amount of P20,370,651.92 to the damage and prejudice of PLDT, in the said amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.13

Accused Laurel filed a "Motion to Quash (with Motion to Defer Arraignment)" on the ground that the factual allegations in
the Amended Information do not constitute the felony of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. He averred
that the Revised Penal Code, or any other special penal law for that matter, does not prohibit ISR operations. He claimed
that telephone calls with the use of PLDT telephone lines, whether domestic or international, belong to the persons
making the call, not to PLDT. He argued that the caller merely uses the facilities of PLDT, and what the latter owns are the
telecommunication infrastructures or facilities through which the call is made. He also asserted that PLDT is compensated
for the caller’s use of its facilities by way of rental; for an outgoing overseas call, PLDT charges the caller per minute,
based on the duration of the call. Thus, no personal property was stolen from PLDT. According to Laurel, the
P20,370,651.92 stated in the Information, if anything, represents the rental for the use of PLDT facilities, and not the value
of anything owned by it. Finally, he averred that the allegations in the Amended Information are already subsumed under
the Information for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 401 filed and pending in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 276766.

The prosecution, through private complainant PLDT, opposed the motion,14 contending that the movant unlawfully took
personal property belonging to it, as follows: 1) intangible telephone services that are being offered by PLDT and other
telecommunication companies, i.e., the connection and interconnection to their telephone lines/facilities; 2) the use of
those facilities over a period of time; and 3) the revenues derived in connection with the rendition of such services and the
use of such facilities.15

The prosecution asserted that the use of PLDT’s intangible telephone services/facilities allows electronic voice signals to
pass through the same, and ultimately to the called party’s number. It averred that such service/facility is akin to electricity
which, although an intangible property, may, nevertheless, be appropriated and be the subject of theft. Such service over
a period of time for a consideration is the business that PLDT provides to its customers, which enables the latter to send
various messages to installed recipients. The service rendered by PLDT is akin to merchandise which has specific value,
and therefore, capable of appropriation by another, as in this case, through the ISR operations conducted by the movant
and his co-accused.

The prosecution further alleged that "international business calls and revenues constitute personal property envisaged in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code." Moreover, the intangible telephone services/facilities belong to PLDT and not to
the movant and the other accused, because they have no telephone services and facilities of their own duly authorized by
the NTC; thus, the taking by the movant and his co-accused of PLDT services was with intent to gain and without the
latter’s consent.

The prosecution pointed out that the accused, as well as the movant, were paid in exchange for their illegal appropriation
and use of PLDT’s telephone services and facilities; on the other hand, the accused did not pay a single centavo for their
illegal ISR operations. Thus, the acts of the accused were akin to the use of a "jumper" by a consumer to deflect the
current from the house electric meter, thereby enabling one to steal electricity. The prosecution emphasized that its
position is fortified by the Resolutions of the Department of Justice in PLDT v. Tiongson, et al. (I.S. No. 97-0925) and in
PAOCTF-PLDT v. Elton John Tuason, et al. (I.S. No. 2000-370) which were issued on August 14, 2000 finding probable
cause for theft against the respondents therein.

On September 14, 2001, the RTC issued an Order16 denying the Motion to Quash the Amended Information. The court
declared that, although there is no law that expressly prohibits the use of ISR, the facts alleged in the Amended
Information "will show how the alleged crime was committed by conducting ISR," to the damage and prejudice of PLDT.

Laurel filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the Order, alleging that international long distance calls are not personal
property, and are not capable of appropriation. He maintained that business or revenue is not considered personal
property, and that the prosecution failed to adduce proof of its existence and the subsequent loss of personal property
belonging to another. Citing the ruling of the Court in United States v. De Guzman,18 Laurel averred that the case is not
one with telephone calls which originate with a particular caller and terminates with the called party. He insisted that
telephone calls are considered privileged communications under the Constitution and cannot be considered as "the
property of PLDT." He further argued that there is no kinship between telephone calls and electricity or gas, as the latter
are forms of energy which are generated and consumable, and may be considered as personal property because of such
characteristic. On the other hand, the movant argued, the telephone business is not a form of energy but is an activity.

In its Order19 dated December 11, 2001, the RTC denied the movant’s Motion for Reconsideration. This time, it ruled that
what was stolen from PLDT was its "business" because, as alleged in the Amended Information, the international long
distance calls made through the facilities of PLDT formed part of its business. The RTC noted that the movant was
charged with stealing the business of PLDT. To support its ruling, it cited Strochecker v. Ramirez,20 where the Court ruled
that interest in business is personal property capable of appropriation. It further declared that, through their ISR
operations, the movant and his co-accused deprived PLDT of fees for international long distance calls, and that the ISR
used by the movant and his co-accused was no different from the "jumper" used for stealing electricity.

Laurel then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, assailing the Order of the RTC. He alleged that the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in denying his Motion to Quash the Amended Information.21 As gleaned from the material
averments of the amended information, he was charged with stealing the international long distance calls belonging to
PLDT, not its business. Moreover, the RTC failed to distinguish between the business of PLDT (providing services for
international long distance calls) and the revenues derived therefrom. He opined that a "business" or its revenues cannot
be considered as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, since a "business" is "(1) a commercial
or mercantile activity customarily engaged in as a means of livelihood and typically involving some independence of
judgment and power of decision; (2) a commercial or industrial enterprise; and (3) refers to transactions, dealings or
intercourse of any nature." On the other hand, the term "revenue" is defined as "the income that comes back from an
investment (as in real or personal property); the annual or periodical rents, profits, interests, or issues of any species of
real or personal property."22

Laurel further posited that an electric company’s business is the production and distribution of electricity; a gas company’s
business is the production and/or distribution of gas (as fuel); while a water company’s business is the production and
distribution of potable water. He argued that the "business" in all these cases is the commercial activity, while the goods
and merchandise are the products of such activity. Thus, in prosecutions for theft of certain forms of energy, it is the
electricity or gas which is alleged to be stolen and not the "business" of providing electricity or gas. However, since a
telephone company does not produce any energy, goods or merchandise and merely renders a service or, in the words of
PLDT, "the connection and interconnection to their telephone lines/facilities," such service cannot be the subject of theft
as defined in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.23
He further declared that to categorize "business" as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code would
lead to absurd consequences; in prosecutions for theft of gas, electricity or water, it would then be permissible to allege in
the Information that it is the gas business, the electric business or the water business which has been stolen, and no
longer the merchandise produced by such enterprise.24

Laurel further cited the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice in Piltel v. Mendoza,25 where it was ruled that the Revised
Penal Code, legislated as it was before present technological advances were even conceived, is not adequate to address
the novel means of "stealing" airwaves or airtime. In said resolution, it was noted that the inadequacy prompted the filing
of Senate Bill 2379 (sic) entitled "The Anti-Telecommunications Fraud of 1997" to deter cloning of cellular phones and
other forms of communications fraud. The said bill "aims to protect in number (ESN) (sic) or Capcode, mobile identification
number (MIN), electronic-international mobile equipment identity (EMEI/IMEI), or subscriber identity module" and "any
attempt to duplicate the data on another cellular phone without the consent of a public telecommunications entity would be
punishable by law."26 Thus, Laurel concluded, "there is no crime if there is no law punishing the crime."

On August 30, 2002, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition.27 The appellate court ruled that a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court was not the proper remedy of the petitioner. On the merits of the petition, it
held that while business is generally an activity

which is abstract and intangible in form, it is nevertheless considered "property" under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code. The CA opined that PLDT’s business of providing international calls is personal property which may be the object of
theft, and cited United States v. Carlos28 to support such conclusion. The tribunal also cited Strochecker v.
Ramirez,29 where this Court ruled that one-half interest in a day’s business is personal property under Section 2 of Act No.
3952, otherwise known as the Bulk Sales Law. The appellate court held that the operations of the ISR are not subsumed
in the charge for violation of P.D. No. 401.

Laurel, now the petitioner, assails the decision of the CA, contending that -

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PERSONAL PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN
PER THE INFORMATION IS NOT THE "INTERNATIONAL LONG DISTANCE CALLS" BUT THE "BUSINESS OF
PLDT."

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE TERM "BUSINESS" IS PERSONAL PROPERTY
WITHIN THE MEANING OF ART. 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE.30

Petitioner avers that the petition for a writ of certiorari may be filed to nullify an interlocutory order of the trial court which
was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. In support of his petition before the
Court, he reiterates the arguments in his pleadings filed before the CA. He further claims that while the right to carry on a
business or an interest or participation in business is considered property under the New Civil Code, the term "business,"
however, is not. He asserts that the Philippine Legislature, which approved the Revised Penal Code way back in January
1, 1932, could not have contemplated to include international long distance calls and "business" as personal property
under Article 308 thereof.

In its comment on the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that the amended information clearly
states all the essential elements of the crime of theft. Petitioner’s interpretation as to whether an "international long
distance call" is personal property under the law is inconsequential, as a reading of the amended information readily
reveals that specific acts and circumstances were alleged charging Baynet, through its officers, including petitioner, of
feloniously taking, stealing and illegally using international long distance calls belonging to respondent PLDT by
conducting ISR operations, thus, "routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables, antenna
and/or airwave frequency which connect directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities of the country where the call
is destined." The OSG maintains that the international long distance calls alleged in the amended information should be
construed to mean "business" of PLDT, which, while abstract and intangible in form, is personal property susceptible of
appropriation.31 The OSG avers that what was stolen by petitioner and his co-accused is the business of PLDT providing
international long distance calls which, though intangible, is personal property of the PLDT.32

For its part, respondent PLDT asserts that personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code comprehends
intangible property such as electricity and gas which are valuable articles for merchandise, brought and sold like other
personal property, and are capable of appropriation. It insists that the business of international calls and revenues
constitute personal property because the same are valuable articles of merchandise. The respondent reiterates that
international calls involve (a) the intangible telephone services that are being offered by it, that is, the connection and
interconnection to the telephone network, lines or facilities; (b) the use of its telephone network, lines or facilities over a
period of time; and (c) the income derived in connection therewith.33

PLDT further posits that business revenues or the income derived in connection with the rendition of such services and
the use of its telephone network, lines or facilities are personal properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code; so
is the use of said telephone services/telephone network, lines or facilities which allow electronic voice signals to pass
through the same and ultimately to the called party’s number. It is akin to electricity which, though intangible property, may
nevertheless be appropriated and can be the object of theft. The use of respondent PLDT’s telephone network, lines, or
facilities over a period of time for consideration is the business that it provides to its customers, which enables the latter to
send various messages to intended recipients. Such use over a period of time is akin to merchandise which has value
and, therefore, can be appropriated by another. According to respondent PLDT, this is what actually happened when
petitioner Laurel and the other accused below conducted illegal ISR operations.34

The petition is meritorious.

The issues for resolution are as follows: (a) whether or not the petition for certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner
in the Court of Appeals; (b) whether or not international telephone calls using Bay Super Orient Cards through the
telecommunication services provided by PLDT for such calls, or, in short, PLDT’s business of providing said
telecommunication services, are proper subjects of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code; and (c) whether or
not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion of
the petitioner to quash the amended information.

On the issue of whether or not the petition for certiorari instituted by the petitioner in the CA is proper, the general rule is
that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to nullify an order denying a motion to quash
the Information is inappropriate because the aggrieved party has a remedy of appeal in the ordinary course of law. Appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive of each other. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to continue with the case in due
course and, when an unfavorable judgment is rendered, assail the order and the decision on appeal. However, if the trial
court issues the order denying the motion to quash the Amended Information with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction, or if such order is patently erroneous, or null and void for being contrary to the Constitution,
and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the accused may resort to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari.35 A special civil action for certiorari is also available where there are special circumstances clearly
demonstrating the inadequacy of an appeal. As this Court held in Bristol Myers Squibb (Phils.), Inc. v. Viloria:36

Nonetheless, the settled rule is that a writ of certiorari may be granted in cases where, despite availability of appeal after
trial, there is at least a prima facie showing on the face of the petition and its annexes that: (a) the trial court issued the
order with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) appeal would not prove to be a
speedy and adequate remedy; (c) where the order is a patent nullity; (d) the decision in the present case will arrest future
litigations; and (e) for certain considerations such as public welfare and public policy.37

In his petition for certiorari in the CA, petitioner averred that the trial court committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it denied his motion to quash the Amended Information despite his claim
that the material allegations in the Amended Information do not charge theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
or any offense for that matter. By so doing, the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature of the charge against him. He further averred that the order of the trial court is contrary to the constitution and is,
thus, null and void. He insists that he should not be compelled to undergo the rigors and tribulations of a protracted trial
and incur expenses to defend himself against a non-existent charge.

Petitioner is correct.

An information or complaint must state explicitly and directly every act or omission constituting an offense38 and must
allege facts establishing conduct that a penal statute makes criminal;39 and describes the property which is the subject of
theft to advise the accused with reasonable certainty of the accusation he is called upon to meet at the trial and to enable
him to rely on the judgment thereunder of a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.40 It must show, on its face, that
if the alleged facts are true, an offense has been committed. The rule is rooted on the constitutional right of the accused to
be informed of the nature of the crime or cause of the accusation against him. He cannot be convicted of an offense even
if proven unless it is alleged or necessarily included in the Information filed against him.

As a general prerequisite, a motion to quash on the ground that the Information does not constitute the offense charged,
or any offense for that matter, should be resolved on the basis of said allegations whose truth and veracity are
hypothetically committed;41 and on additional facts admitted or not denied by the prosecution.42 If the facts alleged in the
Information do not constitute an offense, the complaint or information should be quashed by the court.43

We have reviewed the Amended Information and find that, as mentioned by the petitioner, it does not contain material
allegations charging the petitioner of theft of personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. It, thus,
behooved the trial court to quash the Amended Information. The Order of the trial court denying the motion of the
petitioner to quash the Amended Information is a patent nullity.

On the second issue, we find and so hold that the international telephone calls placed by Bay Super Orient Card holders,
the telecommunication services provided by PLDT and its business of providing said services are not personal properties
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The construction by the respondents of Article 308 of the said Code to
include, within its coverage, the aforesaid international telephone calls, telecommunication services and business is
contrary to the letter and intent of the law.

The rule is that, penal laws are to be construed strictly. Such rule is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of
individuals and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in Congress, not in the judicial department. It
is Congress, not the Court, which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.44 Due respect for the prerogative of
Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a
"narrow interpretation" is appropriate. The Court must take heed to language, legislative history and purpose, in order to
strictly determine the wrath and breath of the conduct the law forbids.45 However, when the congressional purpose is
unclear, the court must apply the rule of lenity, that is, ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be
resolved in favor of lenity.46

Penal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or intent beyond the fair meaning of the language used; and may not
be held to include offenses other than those which are clearly described, notwithstanding that the Court may think that
Congress should have made them more comprehensive.47 Words and phrases in a statute are to be construed according
to their common meaning and accepted usage.

As Chief Justice John Marshall declared, "it would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle that a case which is within
the reason or

mischief of a statute is within its provision, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute because it is of equal
atrocity, or of kindred character with those which are enumerated.48 When interpreting a criminal statute that does not
explicitly reach the conduct in question, the Court should not base an expansive reading on inferences from subjective
and variable understanding.49

Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code defines theft as follows:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.– Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence, against
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.

The provision was taken from Article 530 of the Spanish Penal Code which reads:

1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin violencia o intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las cosas
muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño.50

For one to be guilty of theft, the accused must have an intent to steal (animus furandi) personal property, meaning the
intent to deprive another of his ownership/lawful possession of personal property which intent is apart from and
concurrently with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of a felony of dolo (dolus malus).

An information or complaint for simple theft must allege the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the
said property belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with intent to gain; and (d) the taking be accomplished without the
use of violence or intimidation of person/s or force upon things.51

One is apt to conclude that "personal property" standing alone, covers both tangible and intangible properties and are
subject of theft under the Revised Penal Code. But the words "Personal property" under the Revised Penal Code must be
considered in tandem with the word "take" in the law. The statutory definition of "taking" and movable property indicates
that, clearly, not all personal properties may be the proper subjects of theft. The general rule is that, only movable
properties which have physical or material existence and susceptible of occupation by another are proper objects of
theft.52 As explained by Cuelo Callon: "Cosa juridicamente es toda sustancia corporal, material, susceptible de ser
aprehendida que tenga un valor cualquiera."53

According to Cuello Callon, in the context of the Penal Code, only those movable properties which can be taken and
carried from the place they are found are proper subjects of theft. Intangible properties such as rights and ideas are not
subject of theft because the same cannot be "taken" from the place it is found and is occupied or appropriated.

Solamente las cosas muebles y corporales pueden ser objeto de hurto. La sustracción de cosas inmuebles y la cosas
incorporales (v. gr., los derechos, las ideas) no puede integrar este delito, pues no es posible asirlas, tomarlas, para
conseguir su apropiación. El Codigo emplea la expresión "cosas mueble" en el sentido de cosa que es susceptible de ser
llevada del lugar donde se encuentra, como dinero, joyas, ropas, etcétera, asi que su concepto no coincide por completo
con el formulado por el Codigo civil (arts. 335 y 336).54

Thus, movable properties under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code should be distinguished from the rights or interests
to which they relate. A naked right existing merely in contemplation of law, although it may be very valuable to the person
who is entitled to exercise it, is not the subject of theft or larceny.55 Such rights or interests are intangible and cannot be
"taken" by another. Thus, right to produce oil, good will or an interest in business, or the right to engage in business, credit
or franchise are properties. So is the credit line represented by a credit card. However, they are not proper subjects of
theft or larceny because they are without form or substance, the mere "breath" of the Congress. On the other hand,
goods, wares and merchandise of businessmen and credit cards issued to them are movable properties with physical and
material existence and may be taken by another; hence, proper subjects of theft.

There is "taking" of personal property, and theft is consummated when the offender unlawfully acquires possession of
personal property even if for a short time; or if such property is under the dominion and control of the thief. The taker, at
some particular amount, must have obtained complete and absolute possession and control of the property adverse to the
rights of the owner or the lawful possessor thereof.56 It is not necessary that the property be actually carried away out of
the physical possession of the lawful possessor or that he should have made his escape with it.57 Neither asportation nor
actual manual possession of property is required. Constructive possession of the thief of the property is enough.58

The essence of the element is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner without his privity and consent and
without animus revertendi.59

Taking may be by the offender’s own hands, by his use of innocent persons without any felonious intent, as well as any
mechanical device, such as an access device or card, or any agency, animate or inanimate, with intent to gain. Intent to
gain includes the unlawful taking of personal property for the purpose of deriving utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and
pleasure.60

We agree with the contention of the respondents that intangible properties such as electrical energy and gas are proper
subjects of theft. The reason for this is that, as explained by this Court in United States v. Carlos61 and United States v.
Tambunting,62 based on decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain and of the courts in England and the United States of
America, gas or electricity are capable of appropriation by another other than the owner. Gas and electrical energy may
be taken, carried away and appropriated. In People v. Menagas,63 the Illinois State Supreme Court declared that
electricity, like gas, may be seen and felt. Electricity, the same as gas, is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and
sold like other personal property and is capable of appropriation by another. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought
and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being
transported from place to place. Electrical energy may, likewise, be taken and carried away. It is a valuable commodity,
bought and sold like other personal property. It may be transported from place to place. There is nothing in the nature of
gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of being feloniously taken and carried away.

In People ex rel Brush Electric Illuminating Co. v. Wemple,64 the Court of Appeals of New York held that electric energy is
manufactured and sold in determinate quantities at a fixed price, precisely as are coal, kerosene oil, and gas. It may be
conveyed to the premises of the consumer, stored in cells of different capacity known as an accumulator; or it may be
sent through a wire, just as gas or oil may be transported either in a close tank or forced through a pipe. Having reached
the premises of the consumer, it may be used in any way he may desire, being, like illuminating gas, capable of being
transformed either into heat, light, or power, at the option of the purchaser. In Woods v. People,65 the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared that there is nothing in the nature of gas used for illuminating purposes which renders it incapable of
being feloniously taken and carried away. It is a valuable article of merchandise, bought and sold like other personal
property, susceptible of being severed from a mass or larger quantity and of being transported from place to place.
Gas and electrical energy should not be equated with business or services provided by business entrepreneurs to the
public. Business does not have an exact definition. Business is referred as that which occupies the time, attention and
labor of men for the purpose of livelihood or profit. It embraces everything that which a person can be
employed.66 Business may also mean employment, occupation or profession. Business is also defined as a commercial
activity for gain benefit or advantage.67 Business, like services in business, although are properties, are not proper
subjects of theft under the Revised Penal Code because the same cannot be "taken" or "occupied." If it were otherwise,
as claimed by the respondents, there would be no juridical difference between the taking of the business of a person or
the services provided by him for gain, vis-à-vis, the taking of goods, wares or merchandise, or equipment comprising his
business.68 If it was its intention to include "business" as personal property under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code,
the Philippine Legislature should have spoken in language that is clear and definite: that business is personal property
under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code.69

We agree with the contention of the petitioner that, as gleaned from the material averments of the Amended Information,
he is charged of "stealing the international long distance calls belonging to PLDT" and the use thereof, through the ISR.
Contrary to the claims of the OSG and respondent PLDT, the petitioner is not charged of stealing P20,370,651.95 from
said respondent. Said amount of P20,370,651.95 alleged in the Amended Information is the aggregate amount of access,
transmission or termination charges which the PLDT expected from the international long distance calls of the callers with
the use of Baynet Super Orient Cards sold by Baynet Co. Ltd.

In defining theft, under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, as the taking of personal property without the consent of
the owner thereof, the Philippine legislature could not have contemplated the human voice which is converted into
electronic impulses or electrical current which are transmitted to the party called through the PSTN of respondent PLDT
and the ISR of Baynet Card Ltd. within its coverage. When the Revised Penal Code was approved, on December 8, 1930,
international telephone calls and the transmission and routing of electronic voice signals or impulses emanating from said
calls, through the PSTN, IPL and ISR, were still non-existent. Case law is that, where a legislative history fails to evidence
congressional awareness of the scope of the statute claimed by the respondents, a narrow interpretation of the law is
more consistent with the usual approach to the construction of the statute. Penal responsibility cannot be extended
beyond the fair scope of the statutory mandate.70

Respondent PLDT does not acquire possession, much less, ownership of the voices of the telephone callers or of the
electronic voice signals or current emanating from said calls. The human voice and the electronic voice signals or current
caused thereby are intangible and not susceptible of possession, occupation or appropriation by the respondent PLDT or
even the petitioner, for that matter. PLDT merely transmits the electronic voice signals through its facilities and equipment.
Baynet Card Ltd., through its operator, merely intercepts, reroutes the calls and passes them to its toll center. Indeed, the
parties called receive the telephone calls from Japan.

In this modern age of technology, telecommunications systems have become so tightly merged with computer systems
that it is difficult to know where one starts and the other finishes. The telephone set is highly computerized and allows
computers to communicate across long distances.71 The instrumentality at issue in this case is not merely a telephone but
a telephone inexplicably linked to a computerized communications system with the use of Baynet Cards sold by the
Baynet Card Ltd. The corporation uses computers, modems and software, among others, for its ISR.72

The conduct complained of by respondent PLDT is reminiscent of "phreaking" (a slang term for the action of making a
telephone system to do something that it normally should not allow by "making the phone company bend over and grab its
ankles"). A "phreaker" is one who engages in the act of manipulating phones and illegally markets telephone
services.73 Unless the phone company replaces all its hardware, phreaking would be impossible to stop. The phone
companies in North America were impelled to replace all their hardware and adopted full digital switching system known
as the Common Channel Inter Office Signaling. Phreaking occurred only during the 1960’s and 1970’s, decades after the
Revised Penal Code took effect.

The petitioner is not charged, under the Amended Information, for theft of telecommunication or telephone services
offered by PLDT. Even if he is, the term "personal property" under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be
interpreted beyond its seams so as to include "telecommunication or telephone services" or computer services for that
matter. The word "service" has a variety of meanings dependent upon the context, or the sense in which it is used; and, in
some instances, it may include a sale. For instance, the sale of food by restaurants is usually referred to as "service,"
although an actual sale is involved.74 It may also mean the duty or labor to be rendered by one person to another;
performance of labor for the benefit of another.75 In the case of PLDT, it is to render local and international
telecommunications services and such other services as authorized by the CPCA issued by the NTC. Even at common
law, neither time nor services may be taken and occupied or appropriated.76 A service is generally not considered property
and a theft of service would not, therefore, constitute theft since there can be no caption or asportation.77 Neither is the
unauthorized use of the equipment and facilities of PLDT by the petitioner theft under the aforequoted provision of the
Revised Penal Code.78

If it was the intent of the Philippine Legislature, in 1930, to include services to be the subject of theft, it should have
incorporated the same in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code. The Legislature did not. In fact, the Revised Penal Code
does not even contain a definition of services.

If taking of telecommunication services or the business of a person, is to be proscribed, it must be by special statute79 or
an amendment of the Revised Penal Code. Several states in the United States, such as New York, New Jersey, California
and Virginia, realized that their criminal statutes did not contain any provisions penalizing the theft of services and passed
laws defining and penalizing theft of telephone and computer services. The Pennsylvania Criminal Statute now penalizes
theft of services, thus:

(a) Acquisition of services. --

(1) A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally obtains services for himself or for another which he knows are available
only for compensation, by deception or threat, by altering or tampering with the public utility meter or measuring device by
which such services are delivered or by causing or permitting such altering or tampering, by making or maintaining any
unauthorized connection, whether physically, electrically or inductively, to a distribution or transmission line, by attaching
or maintaining the attachment of any unauthorized device to any cable, wire or other component of an electric, telephone
or cable television system or to a television receiving set connected to a cable television system, by making or maintaining
any unauthorized modification or alteration to any device installed by a cable television system, or by false token or other
trick or artifice to avoid payment for the service.

In the State of Illinois in the United States of America, theft of labor or services or use of property is penalized:

(a) A person commits theft when he obtains the temporary use of property, labor or services of another which are
available only for hire, by means of threat or deception or knowing that such use is without the consent of the person
providing the property, labor or services.

In 1980, the drafters of the Model Penal Code in the United States of America arrived at the conclusion that labor and
services, including professional services, have not been included within the traditional scope of the term "property" in
ordinary theft statutes. Hence, they decided to incorporate in the Code Section 223.7, which defines and penalizes theft of
services, thus:

(1) A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains services which he knows are available only for compensation, by
deception or threat, or by false token or other means to avoid payment for the service. "Services" include labor,
professional service, transportation, telephone or other public service, accommodation in hotels, restaurants or elsewhere,
admission to exhibitions, use of vehicles or other movable property. Where compensation for service is ordinarily paid
immediately upon the rendering of such service, as in the case of hotels and restaurants, refusal to pay or absconding
without payment or offer to pay gives rise to a presumption that the service was obtained by deception as to intention to
pay; (2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services of others, to which he is not entitled, he
knowingly diverts such services to his own benefit or to the benefit of another not entitled thereto.

Interestingly, after the State Supreme Court of Virginia promulgated its decision in Lund v. Commonwealth,80 declaring
that neither time nor services may be taken and carried away and are not proper subjects of larceny, the General
Assembly of Virginia enacted Code No. 18-2-98 which reads:

Computer time or services or data processing services or information or data stored in connection therewith is hereby
defined to be property which may be the subject of larceny under § § 18.2-95 or 18.2-96, or embezzlement under § 18.2-
111, or false pretenses under § 18.2-178.

In the State of Alabama, Section 13A-8-10(a)(1) of the Penal Code of Alabama of 1975 penalizes theft of services:

"A person commits the crime of theft of services if: (a) He intentionally obtains services known by him to be available only
for compensation by deception, threat, false token or other means to avoid payment for the services …"

In the Philippines, Congress has not amended the Revised Penal Code to include theft of services or theft of business as
felonies. Instead, it approved a law, Republic Act No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of
1998, on February 11, 1998. Under the law, an access device means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic
serial number, personal identification number and other telecommunication services, equipment or instrumentalities-
identifier or other means of account access that can be used to obtain money, goods, services or any other thing of value
or to initiate a transfer of funds other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument. Among the prohibited acts
enumerated in Section 9 of the law are the acts of obtaining money or anything of value through the use of an access
device, with intent to defraud or intent to gain and fleeing thereafter; and of effecting transactions with one or more access
devices issued to another person or persons to receive payment or any other thing of value. Under Section 11 of the law,
conspiracy to commit access devices fraud is a crime. However, the petitioner is not charged of violation of R.A. 8484.

Significantly, a prosecution under the law shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provisions of the
Revised Penal Code inclusive of theft under Rule 308 of the Revised Penal Code and estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, if an individual steals a credit card and uses the same to obtain services, he is liable of the
following: theft of the credit card under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code; violation of Republic Act No. 8484; and
estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code with the service provider as the private complainant. The
petitioner is not charged of estafa before the RTC in the Amended Information.

Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8792, Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 provides:

Sec. 33. Penalties.— The following Acts shall be penalized by fine and/or imprisonment, as follows:

a) Hacking or cracking which refers to unauthorized access into or interference in a computer system/server or
information and communication system; or any access in order to corrupt, alter, steal, or destroy using a computer or
other similar information and communication devices, without the knowledge and consent of the owner of the computer or
information and communications system, including the introduction of computer viruses and the like, resulting on the
corruption, destruction, alteration, theft or loss of electronic data messages or electronic documents shall be punished by
a minimum fine of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) and a maximum commensurate to the damage incurred
and a mandatory imprisonment of six (6) months to three (3) years.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court and the
Decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is directed to issue an order
granting the motion of the petitioner to quash the Amended Information.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207175               November 26, 2014

EDUARDO MAGSUMBOL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the December 14, 2012 Decision1 and the May
6, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 filed by Eduardo Magsumbol (Magsumbol),
questioning his conviction for Theft.

The Facts

Petitioner Magsumbol, together with Erasmo Magsino (Mogsino). Apolonio Inanoria (Jnanoria), and Bonifacio Ramirez
(Ramirez). vvas charged with the crime of Theft in the Information, dated August 30, 2002, filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Lucena City, Branch 55 (RTC) and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2002-1017. The Information indicting
Magsumbol and his co-accused reads:

That on or about the 1st day of February 2002, at Barangay Kinatihan I, in the Munipality of Candelaria, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating together with seven (7) John Does whose true names and real identities are still unknown and whose
physical descriptions were not made known by available witnesses, and who are all still at large, and mutually helping one
another, with intent togain and without the consent of the owner, Menandro Avanzado, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously cut, take, steal and carry away with them thirty three (33) coconut trees from the coconut
plantation of the said owner, valued at FORTY FOUR THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (₱44,400.00), Philippine
currency, belonging to said Menandro Avanzado, to his damage and prejudice in the aforesaid amount.3

Culled from the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Ernesto Caringal (Caringal), private complainant Engr. Menandro
Avanzado (Menandro), and SPO1 Florentino Manalo (SPO1 Manalo), it appears that at around 11:00 o’clock in the
morning of February 1, 2002, Caringal, the overseer of a one-hectare unregistered parcel of land located in Candelaria,
Quezon, and co-owned by Menandro, saw the four accused, along with seven others, cutting down the coconut trees on
the said property. Later, the men turned the felled trees into coco lumber. Caringal did not attempt to stop the men from
cutting down the coconut trees because he was outnumbered. Instead, Caringal left the site and proceeded toSan Pablo
City to inform Menandro about the incident.

On February 3, 2002, Menandro and Caringal reported the incident to the police. Thereafter, the two, accompanied by
SPO1 Manalo, went to the coconut plantation only to discover that about thirty three (33) coconut trees (subject trees) had
been cut down. The coco lumber were no longer in the area. They took photographs of the stumps left by the men.

The defense, on the other hand, presented Atanacio Avanzado (Atanacio),accused Ramirez, petitioner Magsumbol,
Barangay Captain Pedro Arguelles (Brgy. Captain Arguelles)and accused Inanoria, to substantiate its claim of innocence
for all the accused.

Atanacio testified that he authorized his brothers-in-law, Magsino and Magsumbol, to cut down the coconut trees within
the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land co-owned by Menandro. Atanacio admitted that he had never
set foot on his property for about 20 years already and that he was not present whenthe cutting incident happened.

Defense witness Brgy. Captain Arguelles testified that on January 28, 2002, Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and Inanoria
came to his office seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land of Atanacio.

All the accused vehemently denied the charges against them. Ramirez and Magsumbol claimed that only the coconut
trees which stood within the land owned by Atanacio, a relative of the private complainant, were cut down on that morning
of February 1, 2002. Ramirez added that he was a coco lumber trader and that Atanacio offered to sell the coconut trees
planted on his lot. Magsumbol claimed that he took no part in the felling of the coconut trees but merely supervised the
same. He claimed that he did not receive any remuneration for the service he rendered or a share from the proceeds of
the coco lumbers sale. Inanoria likewise denied participation in the cutting down of the coconut treesbut confirmed the
presence of Magsumbol and Magsino at the site to supervise the accomplishment of the work being done thereat.
Inanoria corroborated the narration of Magsumbol and Ramirez that all the felled trees were planted inside the lot owned
by Atanacio. Inanoria intimated that Menandro included him in the complaint for theft due to his refusal to accede to
latter’s request for him to testify against his co-accused in relation to the present criminal charge.4
 Ruling of the RTC

On March 15, 2011, the RTC rendered its decision5 stating that the prosecution was able to establish with certitude the
guilt of all the accused for the crime of simple theft. The RTC rejected the defense of denial invoked by the accused in the
face of positive identification by Caringal pointing to them as the perpetrators of the crime. It did not believe the testimony
of Atanacio and even branded him as biased witness on account of his relationship with accused Magsino and
Magsumbol. The trial court adjudged:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding all the accused Erasmo Magsino, Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo
Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez guilty as charged and applying the Indeterminate sentence law, the court hereby
sentences them to suffer an imprisonment of 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of Prision Correccional as minimum to 6 years
and 1 day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

The accused are likewise directed to pay jointly and severally Engr. Menandro Avanzado and the other heirs of Norberto
Avanzado the sum of ₱13,200.00 representing the value of the 33 coconut trees they have cut and sold to accused
Ramirez.

SO ORDERED.

Aggrieved, the accused appealed from the March 15, 2011 judgment of the RTC before the CA insisting that the
prosecution evidence did not meet the quantum of proof necessary towarrant their conviction of the crime charged. They
posited that the RTC erred in failing to appreciate the lack of criminal intent on their part to commit the crime of simple
theft. They claimed that not a scintilla of evidence was presented to prove the element of intent to gain.6

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed Decision, dated December 14, 2012, the CA sustained the findings of facts and conclusions of law by the
RTC and upheld the judgment of conviction rendered against the accused. The CA was of the view, however, that the
crime committed in this case would not fall under the general definition of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the same provision which penalizes theft of damaged property. The CA
ruled that the RTC was correct in giving full faith and credence to the testimony of Caringal who was not shown to have
been motivated by any ill will to testify falsely against the accused. It agreed with the RTC that Atanacio’s testimony
should not be given any evidentiary weight in view of his relationship with Magsino and Magsumbol, which provided
sufficient reason for him to suppress or pervert the truth. Anent the element of intent to gain, the CA stated that the mere
fact that the accused cut the coconut trees on Menandro’s land and made them into coco lumber, gave rise to the
presumption that it was done with intent to gain. The falloreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated March 15, 2011, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 55, Lucena City is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the accused-appellants Erasmo Magsino,
Apolonio Inanoria, Eduardo Magsumbol and Bonifacio Ramirez are sentenced to suffer imprisonment of tw0 (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day as minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as maximum; and to
pay jointly and severally private complainant Menandro Avanzado the amount of Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos
(₱13,200.00).

SO ORDERED.7

The accused moved for reconsideration of the December 14, 2012 Decision but their motion was denied by the CA on
May 6, 2013.

Issues:

Bewailing his conviction, Magsumbolfiled the present petition before this Court and imputes to the CA the following

ERRORS:

THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW WHEN IT FOUND THE
ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 308 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, IN THAT:

I
NO COMPETENT EVIDENCEWAS ADDUCED BY THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THAT THE COCONUT TREES
THAT WERE CUT WERE BEYOND THE PROPERTY OWNED BY ATANACIO AVANZADO; and

II

MALICE AND INTENT TO GAIN, AS ELEMENTS OF THE CRIME OF THEFT, ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT
HAND.8

The Court’s Ruling

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is a time-honored rule that the assessment of the trial court with regard to the credibility of witnesses deserves the
utmost respect, if not finality, for the reason that the trial judge has the prerogative, denied to appellate judges, of
observing the demeanor of the declarants in the course of their testimonies. Though it is true that the trial court’s
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal, this rule, however, is not a hard and fast one. The exception is observed if there is a showing that the trial judge
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some factor circumstance of weight and substance that would have cast doubt
on the guilt of the accused.9 The said exception apparently exists in the case at bench.

It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under the RPC, while the elements in turn
unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and accompanying criminal intent. In the case at bench, petitioner
Magsumbol and his co-accused were convicted by the CA of the crime of theft of damaged property under paragraph (2)
of Article 308 of the RPC which provides:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.–: xxxx

Theft is likewise committed by:

1. xxxxx;

2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the
fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and xxx.

[Emphasis Supplied]

To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of damaged property, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property belonging to another and, thereafter, removed or used the
fruits or object thereof, with intent to gain. Evidently, theft of damaged property is an intentional felony for which criminal
liability attaches only when it is shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal intent must be
clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed.10 Was criminal intent
substantiated tojustify the conviction of Magsumbol and his co-accused?

It does not so appear in this case.

There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the land owned by Atanacio. The prosecution
claimed that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were planted within the land co-owned by Menandro. The defense, on
the other hand, averred that only the coconut trees found within the land of Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol and his
co-accused. Menandro testified that there were muniments that delimit the boundaries between the adjacent lots11 while
Atanacio claimed that there were none and that "x" marks were just etched on the trunk of the trees to delineate the
boundary of his land.12 Apart from the bare allegations of these witnesses, no concrete and competent evidence was
adduced to substantiate their respective submissions. In view of such conflicting claims and considering the meager
evidence on hand, the Court cannot determine with certainty the owner of the 33 felled coconut trees. The uncertainty of
the exact location of the coconut trees negates the presenceof the criminal intent to gain.

At any rate, granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within Menandro’s land, no malice or criminal intent could
be rightfully attributed to Magsumbol and his co-accused. The RTC and the CA overlooked one important point in the
present case, to wit: Magsumbol and his co-accused went to Barangay KinatihanI, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut down the
coconut trees belonging to Atanacio upon the latter’s instruction.
Such fact was confirmed by Atanacio who narrated that due to financial reversals, he sold all the coconut trees in his land
to Ramirez, a coco lumber trader; that since he could not go to the site due to health reasons, he authorized Magsumbol
and Magsino to cut down his trees and to oversee the gathering of the felled trees; that he informed Menandro about this
and even offered to pay for the damages that he might have sustained as some of his (Menandro’s) trees could have
been mistakenly cut down in the process; that Menandro refused his offer of compensation and replied that a case had
already been filed against the four accused; and that he tried to seek an audience again from Menandro, but the latter
refused to talk to him anymore.13

Both the RTC and the CA chose to brush aside the foregoing unrebutted testimony of Atanacio for being unreliable and
considered him a biased witness simply because he is related by affinity to Magsumbol and Magsino. Family relationship,
however, does not by itself render a witness’ testimony inadmissible or devoid of evidentiary weight.14 To warrant rejection
of the testimony of a relative or friend, it must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the testimony was
inherently improbable or defective, or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness to incriminate the accused
falsely.15

The relationship of Atanacio to the accused, per se, does not impair his credibilty.1âwphi1 It bears stressing that while
Magsumbol and Magsino are Atanacio’s brothers-in-law, Menandro ishis cousin. Considering that both the accused and
the accuser are Atanacio’s relatives, and purportedly both have bearing with regard to his decision, why would then
Atanacio support one over the other? The logical explanation could only be that Atanacio had indeed ordered Magsumbol
and Magsino to cut the trees on his land. The Court is convinced that Atanacio was telling the truth.

If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacio’s instructions, Magsumbol and his co-accused encroached on the land co-
owned by Menandro, because they missed the undetectable boundary between the two lots, and cut down some of
Menandro’s trees, such act merely constituted mistake or judgmental error. The following pronouncement in the case of
Lecaroz vs. Sandiganbayan16 may serve as a guidepost, to wit:

If what is proven is mere judgmental error on the part of the person committing the act, no malice or criminal intent can be
rightfully imputed to him. x x x. Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for a crime to exist. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea. There can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. As a general rule, ignorance or mistake
as to particular facts, honest and real, will exempt the doer from felonious responsibility. The exception of course is
neglect in the discharge of duty or indifference to consequences, which is equivalent to criminal intent, for in this instance,
the element of malicious intent is supplied by the element ofnegligence and imprudence.17

[Emphasis supplied]

The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-accused even sought prior permission
from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was done openly and during broad daylight effectively
negated malice and criminal intent on their part. It defies reason that the accused would still approach the barangay
captain if their real intention was tosteal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute their
criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the commission of a crime or a
wrongdoing.

The findings of this Court in this case should not create the mistaken impression that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses should always be looked at with askance. The point is that courts should carefully scrutinize the prosecution
evidence to make sure that no innocent person is condemned. An allegation, or even a testimony, that an act was done
should never be hastily accepted as proof that it was really done. Evidence adduced must be closely examined under the
lens of a judicial microscope to ensure that conviction only flows from moral certainty that guilt has been established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt.

Here, that quantum of proof has not been satisfied.1âwphi1 The prosecution miserably failed to establish proof beyond
reasonable doubt that Magsumbol, together with his co-accused, damaged the property or Menandro with malice and
deliberate intent and then removed the felled coconut trees from the premises.

Hence, we must reckon with a dictum of the law, in dubilis reus est absolvendus. All doubts must be resolved in favor of
the accused.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed December 14, 2012 Decision and the May 6, 2013 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34431 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Eduardo Magsumbol is
ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.
G.R. No. 205180               November 11, 2013

RYAN VIRAY, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 to reverse and set aside the August 31, 2012 Decision1 and
January 7 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076, which affirmed with modification the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite City, Branch 16 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 66-07.

The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:

An Information for qualified theft was filed against petitioner Ryan Viray before the RTC, which reads:

That on or about 19 October 2006, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, then being employed as a helper of ZENAIDA VEDlJA y SOSA with intent to
gain and with grave abuse of confidence did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously steal, take and carry away
several pieces of jewelry, One (1) Gameboy, One (1) CD player, One (1) Nokia cell phone and a jacket with a total value
of ₱297,800.00 belonging to the said Zenaida S. Vedua, without the latter s consent and to her damage and prejudice in
the aforestated amount of ₱297,800.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

When arraigned, the accused pleaded "not guilty."4 At the pre-trial, the defense proposed the stipulation, and the
prosecution admitted, that the accused was employed as a dog caretaker of private complainant ZenaidaVedua (Vedua)
and was never allowed to enter the house and he worked daily from 5:00 to 9:00 in the morning.5

During trial, the prosecution presented evidence to prove the following:

Private complainant Vedua maintains seventy-five (75) dogs at her compound in Caridad, Cavite City.6 To assist her in
feeding the dogs and cleaning their cages, private complainant employed the accused who would report for work from
6:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.7 On October 19, 2006, at around 6:30 in the morning, accused arrived for work. Half an hour later
or at 7 o’clock, private complainant left for Batangas. Before leaving, she locked the doors of her house, and left the
accused to attend to her dogs. Later, at around 7:00 in the evening, private complainant arrived home, entering through
the back door of her house. As private complainant was about to remove her earrings, she noticed that her other earrings
worth PhP 25,000 were missing. She then searched for the missing earrings but could not find them.8

Thereafter, private complainant also discovered that her jacket inside her closet and her other pieces of jewelry (rositas)
worth PhP 250,000 were also missing. A Gameboy (portable videogame console), a compact disc player, a Nokia cellular
phone and a Nike Air Cap were likewise missing. The total value of the missing items supposedly amounted to PhP
297,800. Private complainant immediately checked her premises and discovered that the main doors of her house were
destroyed.9 A plastic bag was also found on top of her stereo, which was located near the bedroom. The plastic bag
contained a t-shirt and a pair of shorts later found to belong to accused.10

Witness Nimfa Sarad, the laundrywoman of Vedua’s neighbor, testified seeing Viray at Vedua’s house at 6:00 a.m. By
11:00 a.m., she went out on an errand and saw Viray with an unidentified male companion leaving Vedua’s house with a
big sack.11

Another witness, Leon Young, who prepares official/business letters for Vedua, testified that he went to Vedua’s house
between 10:00 and 11:00 am of October 19, 2006 to retrieve a diskette and saw petitioner with a male companion
descending the stairs of Vedua’s house. He alleged that since he knew Viray as an employee of private complainant, he
simply asked where Vedua was. When he was told that Vedua was in Batangas, he left and went back three days after,
only to be told about the robbery.12

Prosecution witness Beverly Calagos, Vedua’s stay-out laundrywoman, testified that on October 19, 2006, she reported
for work at 5:00 a.m. Her employer left for Batangas at 7:00 am leaving her and petitioner Viray to go about their chores.
She went home around 8:30 a.m. leaving petitioner alone in Vedua’s house. Meanwhile, petitioner never reported for work
after that day.13
For his defense, Viray averred that he did not report for work on the alleged date of the incident as he was then down with
the flu. His mother even called up Vedua at 5:30 a.m. to inform his employer of his intended absence. Around midnight of
October 20, 2006, Vedua called Viray’s mother to report the loss of some valuables in her house and alleged that Viray is
responsible for it. Petitioner’s sister and aunt corroborated his version as regards the fact that he did not go to work on
October 19, 2006 and stayed home sick.14

After the parties rested their respective cases, the trial court rendered a Decision dated December 5, 2009,15 holding that
the offense charged should have been robbery and not qualified theft as there was an actual breaking of the screen door
and the main door to gain entry into the house.16 Similarly, Viray cannot be properly charged with qualified theft since he
was not a domestic servant but more of a laborer paid on a daily basis for feeding the dogs of the complainant.17

In this light, the trial court found that there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to conclude that Viray was the one
responsible for the taking of valuables belonging to Vedua.18 Hence, the RTC found petitioner Viray guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of robbery and sentenced him, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused RYAN VIRAY GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate imprisonment ranging
from FOUR (4) years, TWO (2) months and ONE (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) years of
prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.19

Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA.

The appellate court found that the Information filed against Viray shows that the prosecution failed to allege one of the
essential elements of the crime of robbery, which is "the use of force upon things." Thus, to convict him of robbery, a
crime not necessarily included in a case of qualified theft, would violate the constitutional mandate that an accused must
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.20

Nonetheless, the CA held that a conviction of the accused for qualified theft is warranted considering that Viray enjoyed
Vedua’s confidence, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets. Viray committed a grave abuse of this confidence when,
having access to the outside premises of private complainant’s house, he forced open the doors of the same house and
stole the latter’s personal belongings.21 In its assailed Decision, the appellate court, thus, modified the ruling of the trial
court holding that the accused is liable for the crime of qualified theft.

As to the penalty imposed, considering that there was no independent estimate of the value of the stolen properties, the
CA prescribed the penalty under Article 309(6)22 in relation to Article 31023 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).24 The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision of the court a quo
is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the accused-appellant be convicted for the crime of QUALIFIED THEFT
and is hereby sentenced to suffer indeterminate imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor , as
minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional , as maximum. The appellant is also
ordered to return the pieces of jewelry and other personal belongings taken from private complainant. Should restitution
be no longer possible, the accused appellant must pay the equivalent value of the unreturned items.

SO ORDERED.25

When the appellate court, in the adverted Resolution of January 7, 2013,26 denied his motion for reconsideration,27 Viray
interposed the present petition asserting that the CA committed a reversible error in finding him guilty. Petitioner harps on
the supposed inconsistencies of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in advancing his position that the evidence
presented against him fall short of the quantum of evidence necessary to convict him of qualified theft.28

In the meantime, in its Comment29 on the present petition, respondent People of the Philippines asserts that the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are so insignificant and do not affect the credibility and
weight of their affirmation that petitioner was at the crime scene when the crime was committed.30 In fact, these minor
inconsistencies tend to strengthen the testimonies because they discount the possibility that they were fabricated.31 What
is more, so respondent contends, these positive testimonies outweigh petitioner’s defense of denial and alibi.32
In resolving the present petition, We must reiterate the hornbook rule that this court is not a trier of facts, and the factual
findings of the trial court, when sustained by the appellate court, are binding in the absence of any indication that both
courts misapprehended any fact that could change the disposition of the controversy.33

In the present controversy, while the CA modified the decision of the trial court by convicting petitioner of qualified theft
rather than robbery, the facts as found by the court a quo were the same facts used by the CA in holding that all the
elements of qualified theft through grave abuse of confidence were present. It is not, therefore, incumbent upon this Court
to recalibrate the evidence presented by the parties during trial.

Be that as it may, We find it necessary to modify the conclusion derived by the appellate court from the given facts
regarding the crime for which petitioner must be held accountable.

Art. 308 in relation to Art. 310 of the RPC describes the felony of qualified theft:

Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without violence against,
or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.

xxxx

Art. 310. Qualified Theft. – The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees than those
respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence,
or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the
plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic
eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)

The crime charged against petitioner is theft qualified by grave abuse of confidence. In this mode of qualified theft, this
Court has stated that the following elements must be satisfied before the accused may be convicted of the crime charged:

1. Taking of personal property;

2. That the said property belongs to another;

3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain;

4. That it be done without the owner’s consent;

5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things;
and

6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.34

As pointed out by both the RTC and the CA, the prosecution had proved the existence of the first four elements
enumerated above beyond reasonable doubt.

First, it was proved that the subjects of the offense were all personal or movable properties, consisting as they were of
jewelry, clothing, cellular phone, a media player and a gaming device.

Second, these properties belong to private complainant Vedua. Third, circumstantial evidence places petitioner in the
scene of the crime during the day of the incident, as numerous witnesses saw him in Vedua’s house and his clothes were
found inside the house. He was thereafter seen carrying a heavy-looking sack as he was leaving private complainant’s
house. All these circumstances portray a chain of events that leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion that petitioner took
the personal properties with intent to gain, especially considering that, fourth, Vedua had not consented to the removal
and/or taking of these properties.

With regard to the fifth and sixths elements, however, the RTC and the CA diverge in their respective Decisions.

The RTC found that the taking committed by petitioner was not qualified by grave abuse of confidence, rather it was
qualified by the use of force upon things. The trial court held that there was no confidence reposed by the private
complainant on Viray that the latter could have abused. In fact, Vedua made sure that she locked the door before leaving.
Hence, Viray was compelled to use force to gain entry into Vedua’s house thereby committing the crime of robbery, not
theft.

The CA, on the other hand, opined that the breaking of the screen and the door could not be appreciated to qualify
petitioner’s crime to robbery as such use of force was not alleged in the Information. Rather, this breaking of the door, the
CA added, is an indication of petitioner’s abuse of the confidence given by private complainant. The CA held that "[Viray]
enjoyed the confidence of the private complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets. He was given access to the
outside premises of private complainant’s house which he gravely abused when he forced open the doors of the same
house and stole the latter’s belongings."35 Committing grave abuse of confidence in the taking of the properties, petitioner
was found by the CA to be liable for qualified theft.

This Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the taking committed by petitioner cannot be qualified by the breaking of
the door, as it was not alleged in the Information. However, we disagree from its finding that the same breaking of the
door constitutes the qualifying element of grave abuse of confidence to sentence petitioner Viray to suffer the penalty for
qualified theft. Instead, We are one with the RTC that private complainant did not repose on Viray "confidence" that the
latter could have abused to commit qualified theft.

The very fact that petitioner "forced open" the main door and screen because he was denied access to private
complainant’s house negates the presence of such confidence in him by private complainant. Without ready access to the
interior of the house and the properties that were the subject of the taking, it cannot be said that private complaint had a
"firm trust" on petitioner or that she "relied on his discretion"36 and that the same trust reposed on him facilitated Viray’s
taking of the personal properties justifying his conviction of qualified theft.

To warrant the conviction and, hence, imposition of the penalty for qualified theft, there must be an allegation in the
information and proof that there existed between the offended party and the accused such high degree of confidence37 or
that the stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the accused.38 In other words, where the accused
had never been vested physical access to,39 or material possession of, the stolen goods, it may not be said that he or she
exploited such access or material possession thereby committing such grave abuse of confidence in taking the property.
Thus, in People v. Maglaya,40 this Court refused to impose the penalty prescribed for qualified theft when the accused was
not given material possession or access to the property:

Although appellant had taken advantage of his position in committing the crime aforementioned,

We do not believe he had acted with grave abuse of confidence and can be convicted of qualified theft, because his
employer had never given him the possession of the machines involved in the present case or allowed him to take hold of
them, and it does not appear that the former had any special confidence in him. Indeed, the delivery of the machines to
the prospective customers was entrusted, not to appellant, but to another employee.

Inasmuch as the aggregate value of the machines stolen by appellant herein is ₱13,390.00, the crime committed falls
under Art. 308, in relation to the first subdivision of Art.309 of the Revised Penal Code, which prescribes the penalty of
prisión mayor in its minimum and medium periods.1âwphi1 No modifying circumstance having attended the commission
of the offense, said penalty should be meted out in its medium period, or from 7 years, 4 months and 1 day to 8 years and
8 months of prisión mayor. The penalty imposed in the decision appealed from is below this range. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

The allegation in the information that the offender is a laborer of the offended party does not by itself, without more, create
the relation of confidence and intimacy required by law for the imposition of the penalty prescribed for qualified
theft.41 Hence, the conclusion reached by the appellate court that petitioner committed qualified theft because he "enjoyed
the confidence of the private complainant, being the caretaker of the latter’s pets" is without legal basis. The offended
party’s very own admission that the accused was never allowed to enter the house42 where the stolen properties were
kept refutes the existence of the high degree of confidence that the offender could have allegedly abused by "forcing open
the doors of the same house."43

Without the circumstance of a grave abuse of confidence and considering that the use of force in breaking the door was
not alleged in the Information, petitioner can only be held accountable for the crime of simple theft under Art. 308 in
relation to Art. 309 of the RPC.

As for the penalty, We note with approval the observation made by the appellate court that the amount of the property
taken was not established by an independent and reliable estimate. Thus, the Court may fix the value of the property
taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case or impose the minimum penalty under Art. 309 of the RPC.44 In
this case, We agree with the observation made by the appellate court in accordance with the rule that "if there is no
available evidence to prove the value of the stolen property or that the prosecution failed to prove it, the corresponding
penalty to be imposed on the accused-appellant should be the minimum penalty corresponding to theft involving the value
of ₱5.00."45 Accordingly, We impose the prescribed penalty under Art. 309(6) of the RPC, which is arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods. The circumstance of the breaking of the door, even if proven during trial, cannot be
considered as a generic aggravating circumstance as it was not alleged in the Information.46 Thus, the Court finds that the
penalty prescribed should be imposed in its medium period, that is to say, from two (2) months and one (1) day to three
(3) months of arresto mayor.

Lastly, We delete the order for the reparation of the stolen property. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code is clear that one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him, as he has duly proved. Since, as aforesaid,
the testimony of the private complainant is not sufficient to establish the value of the property taken, nor may the courts
take judicial notice of such testimony, We cannot award the reparation of the stolen goods.47

WHEREFORE, the C Decision of August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 33076 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioner Ryan Viray is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of SIMPLE THEFT and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for two (2) months and one (1) day to three (3) months of arresto mayor. Further, for want of
convincing proof as to the value of the property stolen, the order for reparation is hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102070 July 23, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. DAVID A. ALFECHE, JR., Presiding Judge, Branch 15, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, Capiz, respondent.

Which court has jurisdiction over cases involving a violation of Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code where the
intimidation employed by the accused consists of a threat to kill?

This is the issue in this case.

Upon a complaint for Grave Threats and Usurpation of Real Property filed against Ruperto Dimalata and Norberto
Fuentes, and after the appropriate preliminary investigation wherein Dimalata presented evidence showing that he is a
successor-in-interest of the alleged original owner of the land, and that the threat was established to have been directed
against the complainants' tenant-encargado, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Juliana C. Azarraga of the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Capiz handed down a Resolution, duly approved by the Provincial Prosecutor, finding prima
facie  evidence of guilt for the crime charged. 1 The complainants are co-owners of the parcel of land allegedly usurped.

On 5 July 1991, Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga filed the corresponding Information 2 for "Usurpation of Real
Rights In Property defined and penalized under Article 312 in relation to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code" with the
Regional Trial Court of Capiz. It was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3386 and was raffled to Branch 15 thereof. The
Information reads as follows:

The undersigned, with the prior authority and approval of the Provincial Prosecutor, accuses RUPERTO
DIMALATA and NORBERTO FUENTES of the crime of Usurpation of Real Rights in Property defined and
penalized under Article 312 in relation to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

That sometime in the month of November, 1990, at Brgy. Cabugao, Municipality of

Panitan, Province of Capiz, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter, possess and occupy a portion of Lot No. 3000,
Panitan Cadastre, belonging to and owned in common by Teresita Silva and the latter's
brothers and sisters, after threatening to kill the tenant-encargado if the latter would resist
their taking of the portion of the land, and thereafter, plowed, cultivated and planted palay
on said portion of land to the exclusion of the above-named owners thereof who,
therefore, were prevented from appropriating the property's produce or earning profits
therefrom from the time of the said usurpation by accused up to the present to the
damage and prejudice of the said Teresita Silva and her co-owners.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On 17 July 1991, respondent Judge, as Presiding Judge of Branch 15 of the court below, dismissed the case motu
proprio on the ground of lack of jurisdiction considering that "the crime committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of
the Revised Penal Code and the violence or intimidation by the accused is (sic) a means to commit it or a mere incident in
its commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged," and considering that "the impossable (sic) fine as
penalty is from P200.00 to P500.00" because the value of the gain cannot be ascertained. The order of dismissals 3 reads
as follows:

Upon personal examination and evaluation of the affidavit of the complainant, annexes and the resolution
in support of the information, the crime committed by the accused falls under Article 312 of the Revised
Penal Code and the violence or intimidation by the accused is (sic) a means to commit it or a mere
incident in its commission, hence, the threat is absorbed by the crime charged.

Under above (sic) facts, an (sic) act of the accused was not a means to commit the other or by their single
act, it resulted to (sic) two or more offenses thereby making paragraph 1 of Article 282 the basis in
imposing the penalty. In fine, the act of the accused as alleged could not be a complex crime under Article
312 in relation to Article 282. One is a distinct crime from the other with separate elements to prove in
case of prosecution.
 On the basis of the allegations of the information the value of the gain incurred for the act of violence or
intimidation executed by the accused cannot be ascertained, hence the impossable (sic) fine as penalty is
from P200 to P500 which is below the jurisdiction of this court.

For lack of jurisdiction over the case the herein information is dismissed.

Assistant Prosecutor Azarraga filed a motion to reconsider the above order 4 alleging therein that it is true that the crime
charged is not a complex crime and if mention is made of Article 282, it is because "the penalty of the crime defined under
Article 312 is dependent on Article 282. Article 312 'borrows' the pertinent provision on penalty from Article 282, because
Article 312 does not provide a penalty" as "Article 312 expressly provides that the penalty for the violence shall likewise be
imposed in addition to the fine." In the instant case, the intimidation consists of the threat to kill the encargado, penalized
under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code; considering that the accused attained their purpose, the penalty imposable
thereunder is that which is one degree lower than that prescribed by law for the crime they had threatened to commit —
homicide. In his Order of 24 July 1991, 5 respondent Judge denied the motion for reconsideration. The order reads:

This refers to the motion for reconsideration on (sic) the order of this court dated July 17, 1991,
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the case as charged in the information.

The legal basis of the dismissal is founded on the fact that paragraph 1 of Article 282, and Article 312, of
the Revised Penal Code, are separate and distinct offenses. They could not be made a complex crime.
Both are simple crimes where only one juridical right or interest is violated. Neither is Article 312 a special
complex crime. The mere circumstance that the two crimes may be so related does not make them a
special complex crime or be treated (sic) like one for the purpose of imposing the penalty.

Seemingly, the information charges two (2) separate and distinct crimes, one under paragraph 1, Article
282 and the other under Article 312, of the Revised Penal Code. Close examination reveals that the
violence or intimidation by the accused as alleged therein is a means to commit the crime under Article
312 or a mere incident, in its commission. Under the premises, the test of jurisdiction of the court over the
case is the impossable (sic) penalty under Article 312.

Above premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

SO ORDERED

Hence, this petition was filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Azarraga for and in behalf of the People of the Philippines
against respondent Judge to whom is imputed the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction for dismissing the criminal case. In support thereof, it is argued that: (a) respondent Judge erred in not
considering the penalty prescribed under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code as the basis for the imposable penalty in
the crime defined in Article 312 thereof, and (b) the crime charged in the information is not complexed with Article 282 by
the mere allegation in the caption of the information that it is a prosecution under said Article 312 in relation to Article 282.

Before acting on the petition, this Court required the Office of the Solicitor General to comment on the petition filed by the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor. 6

In its Comment 7 filed on 13 November 1991, the Office of the Solicitor General, while observing that the Assistant
Provincial Fiscal lacks the authority to file the instant petition as only the Solicitor General is authorized by law to
represent the People of the Philippines in cases this nature, declares, nevertheless, that the petition is impressed with
merit and, consequently, it ratifies the same and prays that it be admitted, given due course and the questioned orders of
the respondent Judge be reversed. It, however, urges that the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor be advised to be more
circumspect in filing cases of this nature with this Court without the intervention of, or prior authorization from, the Solicitor
General.

In sustaining the position of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that "in
prosecution for Usurpation of Real Property as provided for in Art. 312 of the Revised Penal Code, the over-all penalty,
imposable on the accused is determined not only by the penalty provided therein but also by the penalty incurred for the
acts of violence executed by him . . . ." The accused in Crim. Case No. 3386 committed acts of violence an the
complainant's tenant. The violent acts with which the accused were charged in attaining their wishes constituted threats to
kill Inocencio Borreros, if the latter prevented or prohibited both accused in (sic) taking possession of the lot in question.
Hence, accused's threats on the life of Borreros may be considered as the 'violence or intimidation of persons' mentioned
in Art. 312, supra, as the means by which accused took possession of the lot in question. And, under Art. 282, the
imposable penalty for the threatening act of both accused — to kill Borreros — is one (1) degree lower than that
prescribed by law for the crime accused threatened to commit — homicide; hence, that additional penalty imposable on
both accused is prision mayor  minimum to prision mayor  maximum, which is well within the jurisdiction of (sic) Regional
Trial Court.

Acting on the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General, this Court admitted the petition and required respondent
Judge to file his Comment thereon, which he complied with on 9 December 1991. 8 Defending his challenged orders,
respondent Judge argues that: (a) only the crime of usurpation of real property is charged in the information; the violence
against or intimidation of persons alleged therein is an element of the crime charged; it cannot constitute a distinct crime
of grave threats or give rise to the complex crime of usurpation of real property with gave threats as basis for determining
the jurisdiction of the court; (b) the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him"
does not refer to Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code; both Articles 312 and 282 are distinct offenses where only one
juridical interest is violated; if ever there are resultant offenses arising from the acts of violence of the accused in their
occupation of the real property or usurpation of real rights over the same, they shall be subject to other criminal
prosecutions not necessarily under Article 282. He further claims that although not dwelt upon in his order of dismissal,
there is another ground for the dismissal of the case; this ground is the failure to allege intent to gain in the information, an
essential element of Article 312.

On 29 January 1992, this Court required the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to file a Reply to the respondent's Comment.
Considering the appearance of the Office of the Solicitor General, she moved to be excused from complying with the sale.
The Office of the Solicitor General subsequently filed the Reply.

This Court thereafter resolved to give due course to the petition.

Article 312 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 312. Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property. — Any person who, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, shall take possession of any real property or shall
usurp any real rights in property belonging to another, in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of
violence executed by him, shall be punished by a fine of from 50 to 100  per centum of the gain which he
shall have obtained, but not less than 75 pesos.

If the value of the gain cannot be ascertained, a fine of from 200 to 500 pesos shall be imposed.

The Article is not as simple as it appears to be. What is meant by the phrase "by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons" and the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him"? What penalty
should be made the basis for determining which court shall acquired jurisdiction over a case involving a violation of the
said Article?

An inquiry into the nature of the crime may yield the desired answers.

The offense defined in this Article is one of the crimes against property found under Title Ten, Book Two of the Revised
Penal Code, and is committed in the same manner as the crime of robbery with violence against or intimidation of
persons defined and penalized in Article 294 of the same Code. The main difference between these two (2) crimes is that
the former involves real property or real rights in property, while the latter involves personal property. 9 In short, Article
312 would have been denominated as robbery if the object taken is personal property.

Accordingly, the phrase "by means of violence against or intimidation of persons" in Article 312 must be construed to refer
to the same phrase used in Article 294. There are five (5) classes of robbery under the latter, namely: (a) robbery with
homicide (par. 1); (b) robbery with rape, intentional mutilation, or the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 1 of Article
263 (par. 2); (c) robbery with the physical injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of Article 268
(par. 3); (d) robbery committed with unnecessary violence or with physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of
Article 263 (par. 4); and (e) robbery in other cases, or simple robbery (par. 5), where the violence against or intimidation of
persons cannot be subsumed by, or where it is not sufficiently specified so as to fall under, the first four paragraphs. 10

Paragraphs one to four of Article 294 indisputably involve the use of violence against persons. The actual physical force
inflicted results in death, rape, mutilation or the physical injuries therein enumerated. The simple robbery under paragraph
five may cover physical injuries not included in paragraphs two to four. Thus, when less serious physical injuries or slight
physical injuries are inflicted upon the offended party on the occasion of a robbery, the accused may be prosecuted for
and convicted of robbery under paragraph five. 11
It seems obvious that intimidation is not encompassed under paragraphs one to four since no actual physical violence is
inflicted; evidence then, it can only fall under paragraph five.

But what is meant by the word  intimidation? It is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 12 as "unlawful coercion; extortion;
duress; putting in fear". To take, or attempt to take, by intimidation means "willfully to take, or attempt to take, by putting in
fear of bodily harm". As shown in United States vs. Osorio, 13 material violence is not indispensable for there to be
intimidation; intense fear produced in the mind of the victim which restricts or hinders the exercise of the will is sufficient.
In an appropriate case, the offender may be liable for either (a) robbery under paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code if the subject matter is personal property and there is intent to gain or animus furandi, or (b) grave coercion
under Article 286 of said Code if such intent does not exist.14

In the crime of grave coercion, violence through force or such display of force that would produce intimidation and control
the will of the offended party is an essential ingredient. 15

In the crime of Grave Threats punished under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, intimidation is also present.
However, this intimidation, as contra-distinguished from the intimidation in paragraph 5, Article 294 or Article 286 — which
is actual, immediate and personal — is conditional and not necessarily personal because it may be caused by an
intermediary. 16

Paragraphs one to five of Article 294 are single, special and indivisible felonies, not complex crimes as defined under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. 17 The penalties imposed do not take into account the value of the personal
property taken, but the gravity of the effect or consequence of the violence or intimidation.

Article 312 may also be considered as defining and penalizing the single, special and indivisible crime of occupation of
real property or usurpation of real rights in property by means of violence against or intimidation of persons. It is likewise
not a complex crime as defined under Article 48. However, while Article 294 provides a single penalty for each class of
crime therein defined, Article 312 provides a single, albeit two-tiered, penalty consisting of a principal penalty, which is
that incurred for the acts of violence, and an additional penalty of fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the
accused. This is clear from the clause "in addition to the penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him." For
want of a better term, the additional penalty may be designated as an incremental penalty.

What Article 312 means then is that when the occupation of real property is committed by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, the accused may be prosecuted under an information for the violation thereof, and not for a
separate crime involving violence or intimidation. But, whenever, appropriate, he may be sentenced to suffer the penalty
for the acts of violence and to pay a fine based on the value of the gain obtained. Thus, if by reason or on the occasion of
such occupation or usurpation, the crime of homicide, or any of the physical injuries penalized in either subdivisions 1 or 2
of Article 263 is committed; or when the same shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation; or when, in
the course of its execution, the offender shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the
physical injuries covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of Article 263; or when it is committed through intimidation or through the
infliction of physical injuries not covered by subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., physical
injuries penalized under Articles 265 and 266 of the Revised Penal Code, the accused may be convicted for the violation
of Article 312. However, he shall be sentenced: (a) to suffer the penalty for homicide, rape, intentional mutilation and
physical injuries provided under subdivisions 1 to 4 of Article 263, other physical injuries 18 or for the  intimidation, which
may fall under Article 282 (Grave Threats) or Article 286 (Grave Coercion) of the Revised Penal Code, as the case may
be, and (b) to pay a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by him, which shall be an amount equivalent to 50 to
100 per centum of such gain, but in no case less than seventy-five (P75.000) pesos, provided, however, that if such value
cannot be ascertained, the fine shall be from 200 to 500 (P200.00 to P500.00)  pesos.

Respondent Judge then was wrong in his two (2) inconsistent propositions.

This Court cannot agree with the first which postulates that the threat was the means employed to occupy the land and is
therefore absorbed in the crime defined and penalized in Article 312. If that were the case, the clause "in addition to the
penalty incurred for the acts of violence executed by him "would be meaningless. As earlier explained, intimidation is a
form of violence which may come in the guise of threats or coercion. Besides, the peculiar theory of absorption would
result in an absurdity whereby a grave or less grave felony defined in paragraph 1 of Article 282 and punished by an
afflictive correctional penalty 19 consisting of the deprivation of liberty, would be absorbed by a crime (Article 312)
penalized only by a fine. Neither can this Court accept his second proposition that Article 282 and Article 312 refer to two
(2) separate crimes, both of which "are simple crimes where only one juridical right or interest is violated." As already
stated, the crime of occupation of real right in property is a single, special and indivisible crime upon which is imposed a
two-tiered penalty. Also, such a proposition obfuscates the first proposition and ignores the distinction between the two
Articles. Article 286 is a crime against personal security while Article 312 is a crime against real property or real rights
thereon.

It does not, however, necessarily follow that just because the respondent Judge is wrong, the petitioner is correct. This
Court finds the proposition of petitioner similarly erroneous and untenable. As earlier stated, the complainants in the case
are the co-owners of the lot and  not the tenant-encargado who was the person threatened. The latter was in actual
physical possession of the property for, as found by the investigating prosecutor:

. . . This lot was tenanted by Inocencio Borreros after the latter was installed thereat by Teresita Silva
herself. Lot No. 3000 is an agricultural land devoted to palay. 20

Accepting this to be a fact and without necessarily inquiring into the effects of P.D. No. 27 and R.A. No. 6657 on
such tenancy, the tenant has, at the very least, a real right over the property — that of possession — which both
accused were alleged to have usurped through the threat to kill. Borreros is, therefore, the offended party who
was directly threatened by the accused; while the information expressly states this fact, Borreros is not, most
unfortunately, made the offended party. The information does not even suggest that the accused threatened
complainants or their families with the infliction upon their persons, honor or property of any wrong amounting to a
crime so as to bring the former within the purview of Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code. At most, the liability of
the accused to the complainants would only be civil in nature. Hence, to the extent that it limits the offended
parties to just the co-owners of the property who were not even possession thereof, the information in question
does not charge an offense. 21 It may, therefore, in dismissed in accordance with Section 3 (a), Rule 117 of the
Rules of Court. Considering, however, that both accused have not yet been arraigned, the information may be
accordingly amended to include the tenant as the offended party. This of course is on the assumption that the
accused usurped the tenant's real right with intent to gain or with animus furandi; for without such intent, he could
only be charged with coercion. 22 In so holding, this Court does not preclude the owner of a piece of property
from being the offended party in the crime of occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in property by
means of intimidation consisting of a threat, under Article 282, provided, however, that all the elements thereof are
present. In such a case, the penalty imposable upon the accused would be the penalty prescribed therein plus a
fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the accused. As stated earlier,  intimidation as found in Article 312
could result in either the crime of grave threats under Article 282 or grave coercion under Article 286 of the
Revised Penal Code. Thus, if complainants were in fact the parties threatened and paragraph 1 of Article 282 is
applicable, 23 the Regional Trial Court would have exclusive original jurisdiction over the offense charged
because the corresponding penalty for the crime would be prision mayor, which is the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed for the offense threatened to be committed homicide — which is reclusion
temporal, 24 and a fine based on the value of the gain obtained by the accused. 25

WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of 17 July 1991 and 24 July 1991 in Criminal Case No. 3386 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The petitioner may amend the information as suggested above; otherwise, it should be dismissed not for the
reason relied upon by the respondent Judge, but because it does not charge an offense.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203466               February 25, 2015

CHERRY ANN M. BENABAYE, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated August 31, 2011 and the Resolution3 dated
September 6, 2012 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 00722-MIN which sustained the conviction
of petitioner for the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The Facts

Petitioner Cherry Ann Benabaye (Benabaye) was the Loans Bookkeeper of Siam Bank Inc., Iligan City Branch (Siam
Bank). As such, she was authorized to collect and/or accept loan payments of Siam Bank's clients and issue provisional
receipts therefor,4 accomplish a cash transfer s lip at the end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money that
she has received, and remit such payments to Jenkin U. Tupag (Tupag), her supervisor.5

Sometime in 2001, Siam Bank conducted an audit investigation of its loan transactions for the period December 1, 2000
to June 15, 2001, and thereby found out that fraud and certain irregularities attended the same. Specifically, it discovered
the non-remittance of some loan payments received from its clients based on the provisional receipts issued by its
account officers, as well as the daily collection reports corresponding to the said provisional receipts.6 Based on the audit,
853 provisional receipts in the aggregate amount of ₱470,768.00 were issued by Benabaye but were unreported, and,
more significantly, the corresponding payments were unremitted based on the daily collection reports on file.7

Thus, in a memorandum8 dated July 13, 2001, Siam Bank directed Benabaye to explain, among others, the discrepancies
between the provisional receipts she had issued and the unremitted money involved. Likewise, Siam Bank made a final
demand upon her to return the amount of the money involved. In her written explanation9 dated July 18, 2001, Benabaye
claimed, among others, that the discrepancies could be clarified by her supervisor, Tupag, to whom she had submitted
her daily cash transfer slips together with the corresponding provisional receipts.

Meanwhile, Siam Bank also sent a memorandum10 dated July 13, 2001 to Tupag requiring him to explain, among others,
the same discrepancies between the provisional receipts and daily collection reports that were submitted to him; it further
demanded the return of the amount involved. In his written explanation11 dated July 16, 2001, Tupag admitted his
accountability and, while claiming that some of his co-employees were privy to the acts which resulted in the
discrepancies, he did not disclose their identities.

Apparently dissatisfied with their explanations, Siam Bank Terminated12 the employment of both Benabaye and Tupag
and subsequently filed a criminal case for Estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 4 (RTC), docketed
as Crim. Case No. 9344, against them. On March 5, 2002, they were charged in an Information13 which reads:

That sometime between the period from December 1, 2000 up to June 15, 2001, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud Siam Bank, Inc. in the following manner, to wit: the said accused being then employed as Micro Finance Unit
Supervisor and Loans Bookkeeper, respectively of Siam Bank, Inc.-Iligan Branch and authorized to collect and receive
payments of loans, did collect and receive payments from the bank's borrowers or clients in the total amount of
₱688,833.00, under the express obligation on the part of said accused to remit the amount collected to the bank, but once
in possession of said amount and far from complying with their obligation, said accused converted, misapplied said
amount to their own use and benefit, and despite repeated demands, they failed and refused and still fails and refuses to
pay the said amount of ₱688,833.00, to the damage and prejudice of the said Siam Bank, Inc. in the aforesaid amount of
₱688,833.00, Philippine currency.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code.14

In her defense, Benabaye reiterated15 the contents of her written explanation dated July 18, 2001 that she remitted the
provisional receipts together with the corresponding amounts collected, as well as the daily cash transfer slips, to her
supervisor, Tupag, at the end of each banking day. Unfortunately, she was required to make only one (1) copy of the daily
cash transfer slips, which were all remitted to and remained in the possession of Tupag.16 She asseverated, however, that
when she was allowed to inspect the files of the bank after the audit, she learned that Tupag had reissued several
provisional receipts, for which she had previously issued provisional receipts, which were unremitted to the bank.17 At the
dorsal portion of the reissued provisional receipts, Tupag had annotated the numbers of the unremitted ones that she had
issued.18 She also claimed that other Siam Bank employees were authorized to issue provisional receipts, e.g. their
janitor, the bank manager, and even on-the-job trainees (OJTs), asserting that it was the bank's standard operating
procedure.19

As for Tupag, he was unable to testify, hence, the trial was concluded sans his testimony.20

The RTC Ruling

In a Decision21 dated July 31, 2000, the RTC found both Benabaye and Tupag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b ), and sentenced each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. They
were likewise ordered to indemnify Siam Bank the total amount of ₱688,833.00 as actual damages.22

In so ruling, the RTC found that all the elements of the crime charged have been established, to wit: (a) that any goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property to the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.23 From
the evidence presented, the RTC found that both Benabaye and Tupag held.the loan payments of Siam Bank's clients in
trust for the latter, with the obligation to remit it to the Bank, in the total amount of ₱688,833.00 insofar as Benabaye is
concerned and ₱25,955.00 on the part of Tupag.24 However, they misappropriated the same to the damage and prejudice
of Siam Bank, and despite demand, failed to account for the money. As for Benabaye, while she claimed that she remitted
the loan payments to Tupag, she failed to offer evidence that Tupag had actually received the said amount.25

Dissatisfied, Benabaye appealed26 her conviction to the CA, maintaining her innocence on the grounds that: (a) her
possession of the money comprising the loan payments of Siam Bank's clients was merely material, not juridical, hence,
she cannot be validly indicted for Estafa; ( b) the R TC erred in holding that the acts described in the Information
constituted only one (1) single offense; and ( c) there was no conspiracy between her and Tupag.27

On the other hand, Tupag likewise appealed28 his conviction, but was however denied by the RTC in an Order29 dated
October 9, 2009. The RTC held that Tupag lost his remedy to appeal under Section 6, Paragraph 5, Rule 12030 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Records of this case were then elevated to the CA.31

The CA Ruling

In a Decision32 dated August 31, 2011, the CA affirmed Benabaye's conviction in toto, similarly finding that all the
elements of Estafa through misappropriation have been established. It ruled that Benabaye, together with Tupag, held the
money collected in trust for Siam Bank.33 Likewise, the CA found that while there were 853 unremitted provisional receipts
involved in this case, Benabaye's "continuing intention to commit Estafa constituted a single intention although committed
on different dates."34 Thus, her crime was a "continuing offense" as all the acts of misappropriation were part of a "single
criminal design."35 Finally, the CA ruled that conspiracy between Benabaye and Tupag was sufficiently established,
considering that both had access and facility to determine if payments made by Siam Bank's clients were properly
remitted.36 As such, if there were unremitted payments, both of them would likewise be aware thereof. Moreover, while
Benabaye claimed that she remitted the provisional receipts and corresponding payments to Tupag, she however failed to
show, through sufficient evidence, that Tupag actually received the same.37

Benabaye moved for reconsideration,38 which the CA denied m a Resolution39 dated September 6, 2012, hence, this
petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is whether or not the CA erred in sustaining Benabaye's conviction for the
crime of Estafa through misappropriation.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, as amended, under which Benabaye was charged and prosecuted, states:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:

1st. The penalty of pr is ion correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be[.]

xxxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods or any other personal property received
by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of, or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property[.]

The elements of Estafa under this provision are: (a) the offender's receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the
same; (b) misappropriation or conversion by the offender of the money or property received, or denial of receipt of the
money or property; (c) the misappropriation, conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) demand by the
offended party that the offender return the money or property received.40

Under the first element, when the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the
offended party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical
possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession means a possession which gives the
transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner.41

It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the
material possession of the employee.42 The material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment,
to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. So long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated
did not pass to the employee-perpetrator, the offense committed remains to be theft, qualified or otherwise.43 Hence,
conversion of personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property
constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred,
misappropriation of the same property constitutes Estafa.44

In this case, Benabaye maintains that the first element of Estafa through misappropriation has not been established,
insisting that her possession of the collected loan payments was merely material and not juridical; therefore, she cannot
be convicted of the said crime.45

The Court agrees.

Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan payments from Siam Bank's clients.1âwphi1 At the end of
every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments received together with the corresponding cash transfer
slips to her supervisor, Tupag.46 As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for
the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose
tasks are akin to a bank teller,47 she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical or material
possession.

In Chua-Burce v. CA,48 the Court acquitted therein petitioner Cristeta Chua-Burce (Chua-Burce) of Estafa on the ground
that the element of juridical possession was absent. As a bank cash custodian, the Court ruled that she had no juridical
possession over the missing funds. Relative thereto, in Guzman v. CA,49 where a travelling sales agent was convicted of
the crime o f Estafa for his failure to return to his principal the proceeds of the goods he was commissioned to sell, the
Court had occasion to explain the distinction between the possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of
determining criminal liability for Estafa, viz.:
There is an essential distinction between the possession of a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to
the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In
the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or
keeper of the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An
agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain the
money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has
made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault.50 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent who could have asserted a right
against Siam Bank over the same, Benabaye had only acquired material and not juridical possession of such funds and
consequently, cannot be convicted of the crime of Estafa as charged. In fine, the dismissal of the Estafa charge against
Benabaye should come as a matter of course, without prejudice, however, to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge
against her as may be warranted under the circumstances of this case.

Separately, in light of the foregoing, Benabaye's supervisor and co-accused in this case, Tupag, who likewise was not
appointed as an agent of Siam Bank and thus had no juridical possession of the subject sums, must also be discharged of
the same Estafa charge in view of Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended,
which states:

SEC. 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused.-

(a) An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. While it is true that only Benabaye was able to
successfully perfect her appeal, the rule is that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review
of all its aspects, including those not raised by the parties.51 Considering that under Section 11 (a), Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as above-quoted, a favorable judgment, as in this case, shall benefit the co-accused
who did not appeal or those who appealed from their judgments of conviction but for one reason or another, the conviction
became final and executory,52 Benabaye's discharge for the crime of Estafa is likewise applicable to Tupag. Note that the
dismissal of the Estafa charge against Tupag is similarly without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge
against him as may be warranted under the circumstances pertinent to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 31, 2011 and the Resolution dated September 6,
2012 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00722-MIN are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The criminal
charges against petitioner Cherry Ann M. Benabaye and her co-accused, Jenkin U. Tupag, in Crim. Case No. 9344, are
DISMISSED without prejudice.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 211917

NORMA C. GAMARO and JOSEPHINE G. UMALI, Petitioners
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks the reversal of the
Decision2 dated November 25, 2013, and Resolution3 dated February 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 34454. The CA affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 32, San Pablo City in Criminal
Case No. 15407 finding petitioner Norma C. Gamaro guilty of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the Revised
Penal Code, while exonerating petitioner Josephine G. Umali from the crime charged. The RTC also adjudged the
petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the monetary awards in favor of private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza.

The factual antecedents are as follows:

On March 1, 2005, the petitioners were charged with Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code
before Branch 3 2 of the RTC of San Pablo City under the following Information:

That on or about January 2, 2002, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused above-named, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and
there, defraud one JOAN FRUCTOZA E. FINEZA, in the following manner, to wit: That Norma C. Gamaro, pretending that
she is knowledgeable in the business of buy and sell of jewelry, other merchandise and financing, assuring complainant of
a sure market and big profit lure and entice complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza to enter into the business and the latter
purchased and delivered to her the jewelry amounting to ₱2,292,519.00 with the obligation to manage the business for
private complainant and remit the proceeds of the sale to her, but accused, far from complying, with her obligation,
managed the business as her own, failing to remit the proceeds of the sale and pledging jewelries to Lluillier Pawnshop
where accused Josephine Umali work while the checks issued by respondent Rowena Gamaro to guarantee their
payment were all dishonoured for having been drawn against insufficient funds, to the damage and prejudice of the
offended party in the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

When arraigned on August 4, 2005, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, while accused Rowena C.
Gamaro remained at-large.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence disclosed the following facts:

Sometime in 2002, private complainant Joan Fructoza E. Fineza (Fineza) engaged in a business venture with petitioner
Norma C. Gamaro and her daughters - petitioners Josephine G. Umali (Umali) and accused Rowena Gamaro Fineza
would buy any foreclosed pieces of jewelry from M. Lhuillier Pawnshop whenever informed by Umali who was then the
manager of the said pawnshop located at Basa St., San Pablo City, Laguna. The pieces of jewelry would then be sold for
profit by Norma Gamaro to her co-employees at the Social Security System (SSS) in San Pablo City. The proceeds of the
sale would then be divided among them in the following manner: fifty percent (50%) would go to Fineza, while the other
fifty percent (50%) would be divided among Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro. As security for the pieces of
jewelry which were placed in the possession of Norma Gamaro and her daughter Rowena Gamaro, the two would issue
several checks drawn from their joint bank account in favor of Fineza reflecting the appraised amount of the pieces of
jewelry.6

The business venture was initially successful. However, when Fineza discovered that Norma Gamaro, together with her
daughters Rowena Gamaro and Umali, also engaged in a similar business with other suppliers of pieces of jewelry, she
decided to terminate the business. To wind up the business, it was agreed that Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro
would just dispose or sell the remaining pieces of jewelry in their possession. But when Fineza tried to encash the checks
which were issued to her by Rowena Gamaro, the same were dishonored because the account of the Gamaros had been
closed. Fineza then confronted petitioner Norma Gamaro about the dishonored checks, and the latter confessed that she
did not have enough money to cover the amount of the checks. Fineza also learned that the pieces of jewelry were
pawned to several pawnshops and private individuals contrary to what they had agreed upon. Petitioner Norma Gamaro
furnished Fineza with a list of the pawnshops, such that, the latter was compelled to redeem the pieces of jewelry with her
own money. It appeared in the pawnshop tickets that it was the nephew of Norma Gamaro named Frederick San Diego
who pledged the pieces of jewelry.7
To settle the matter, Fineza asked Norma Gamaro to return the remaining pieces of jewelry in her possession but the
latter failed to do so, and instead, offered her house and lot as payment for the pieces of jewelry. Fineza, however, did not
accept the said offer.8

A demand letter was then sent by Fineza to Umali, Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro, dated February 16, 2004,
asking for the return of the amount of ₱2,292,519.00 as payment for all the pieces of jewelry which were not returned to
her, including the cash given by Fineza for the rediscounting business. The demand letter was left unanswered.9

For her part, Norma Gamaro, averred that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters. Umali
likewise denied having any business dealings with her sister Rowena Gamaro and with Fineza. While admitting that there
were pieces of jewelry pledged by her cousin, Frederick San Diego, in the pawnshop where she was the manager, Umali
denied that she knew where those pieces of jewelry came from.10

On July 25, 2011, the RTC issued a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment, as follows:

a. FINDING accused Norma Gamaro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa as defined and penalized
under Section 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences her to suffer the indeterminate prison
term of Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months of Prision Correccional, as Minimum, to Twenty (20) Years of Reclusion
Temporal,  as Maximum;

b. EXONERATING accused Josephine G. Umali of any criminal liability;

c. DIRECTING both accused Norma Gamaro and Josephine Umali to pay the private complainant jointly and solidarily
the following amounts:

1. ₱1,259,841.46, plus legal interest from date of demand on February 16, 2004, until fully paid;

2. ₱50,000.00 for and by way of moral damages;

3. ₱25,000.00, for and by way of exemplary damages;

4. ₱50,000.00, for and by way of attorney's fees; and

5. To pay the costs.

Let a warrant issue for the arrest of Rowena Gamaro. The Bureau of Immigration is likewise directed to issue a HOLD
DEPARTURE ORDER against ROWENA GAMARO, her personal circumstances are as follows:

Name: ROWENA C. GAMARO

Former Residence: Lot 20, Block 16, National Housing Authority (NHA), Brgy. San Jose, San Pablo City

SO ORDERED.11

Aggrieved, petitioners filed an appeal before the CA. In a Decision dated November 25, 2013, the CA affirmed the
Decision of the RTC. The fallo  of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 25, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 32, San Pablo City, in Criminal Case No. 15407 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.12

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners, but the same was denied by the CA on February 21, 2014.

Hence, this petition, raising the following errors:

A) THE CA COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RTC
DECISION FINDING NORMA GAMARO GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER SECTION l(B), ARTICLE 315 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE DESPITE THE INFORMATION ACCUSING HER OF THE CRIME OF ESTAFA UNDER
PARAGRAPH 2(A) ARTICLE 315 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE PETITIONER'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE CHARGE AGAINST HER;

B) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT (RTC) RELIED ON
THE FINDINGS ON THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WITH SSS AGAINST NORMA GAMARO;

C) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE FINDINGS OF THE RTC DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT (RTC)
CONSIDERED THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS ATTY. BALDEO DESPITE CONFLICT OF INTEREST
IN THAT SHE (ATTY. BALDEO) GAVE NORMA GAMARO ADVISE REGARDING HER CASE; AND

D) THE CA COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION WHEN IT UPHELD THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE RTC THAT NORMA GAMARO RECEIVED THE
SUBJECT JEWELRIES DESPITE THE INCOMPETENT AND CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION
ITSELF.13

The first issue for resolution is whether a conviction for the crime of Estafa under a different paragraph from the one
charged is legally permissible.

The Bill of Rights of the 1987 Constitution guarantees some rights to every person accused of a crime, among them the
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, viz.:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf However, after arraignment, trial may proceed
notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.14

The constitutional provision requiring the accused to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him"
is for him to adequately and responsively prepare his defense. The prosecutor is not required, however, to be absolutely
accurate in designating the offense by its formal name in the law. It is hornbook doctrine that what determines the real
nature and cause of the accusation against an accused is the actual recital of facts stated in the information or complaint
and not the caption or preamble of the information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to
have been violated, they being conclusions of law.15

The controlling words of the information are found in its body. Accordingly, the Court explained the doctrine in Flores v.
Hon. Layosa16as follows:

The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that an information shall be deemed sufficient if it states, among
others, the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts of omissions complained of as constituting the
offense. However, the Court has clarified in several cases that the designation of the offense, by making reference to the
section or subsection of the statute punishing, it [sic] is not controlling; what actually determines the nature and
character of the crime charged are the facts alleged in the information. The Court's ruling in US. v. Lim San  is
instructive:

x x x Notwithstanding the apparent contradiction between caption and body, we believe that we ought to say and hold that
the characterization of the crime by the fiscal in the caption of the information is immaterial and purposeless, and that the
facts stated in the body of the pleading must determine the crime of which the defendant stands charged and for which he
must be tried. The establishment of this doctrine is permitted by the Code of Criminal Procedure, and is thoroughly in
accord with common sense and with the requirements of plain justice x x x.17

In the instant case, the crime of estafa charged against petitioners is defined and penalized by Article 315, paragraph 2
(a) of the Revised Penal Code, viz.:
Article 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned herein below shall
be punished by:

1st.  The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed under the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision
mayor  or reclusion temporal,  as the case maybe.

2nd. The penalty of prision correccional  in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional  in its minimum period if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in the four cases
mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

x x xx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits. 18

The elements of the said crime are as follows: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means; (2)
such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means
and was thus induced to part with his money or property; and (4) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered
damage.19

However, the crime petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of is estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised
Penal Code:

Article 315. Swindling (estafa).

x x x x the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

x x xx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

x x x20

The elements of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) are as follows: (1) that money, goods, or other personal
properties are received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same; (2) that there is a misappropriation or conversion of such
money or property by the offender or a denial of the receipt thereof; (3) that the misappropriation or conversion or denial is
to the prejudice of another; and (4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender.21
The question then is whether the facts in the Information do indeed constitute the crime of which petitioner Norma
Gamaro was convicted. In other words, was the RTC correct in convicting her of estafa under Article 315, paragraph l(b)
instead of paragraph 2(a)?

What is of vital importance to determine is whether or not petitioner Norma Gamaro was convicted of a crime charged in
the Information as embraced within the allegations contained therein. A reading of the Information yields an affirmative
answer. The Information filed sufficiently charges estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Fineza entrusted
petitioner Norma Gamaro with the pieces of jewelry amounting to ₱2,292,5l 9.00 on the condition that the same will be
sold for profit. Petitioner Nonna Gamaro was under obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However,
instead of complying with the obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner
Umali worked as Branch Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice of Fineza.

Paragraph 1 (b) provides liability for estafa committed by misappropriating or converting to the prejudice of another
money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though that obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property. This, at
least, is very clearly shown by the factual allegations of the Information.22

There is, therefore, no ambiguity in the Information. The factual allegations therein sufficiently inform petitioners of the
acts constituting their purported offense and satisfactorily allege the elements of estafa by misappropriation. Petitioners
are fully apprised of the charge against them and for them to suitably prepare their defense. Therefore, petitioner Norma
Gamaro was not deprived of any constitutional right. She was sufficiently apprised of the facts that pertained to the charge
and conviction for estafa, because the RTC has the discretion to read the Information in the context of the facts alleged. In
the case of Flores v. Hon. Layosa,23 We explained the rationale behind this discretion in this manner:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the
crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. Whatever its purpose may be, its
result is to enable the accused to vex the court and embarrass the administration of justice by setting up the technical
defense that the crime set forth in the body of the information and proved in the trial is not the crime characterized by the
fiscal in the caption of the information. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all
things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given
in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in
the manner therein set forth. If he did, it is of no consequence to him, either as a matter of procedure or of substantive
right, how the law denominates the crime which those acts constitute. The designation of the crime by name in the caption
of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the
designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended. For his full and complete defense
he need not know the name of the crime at all. It is of no consequence whatever for the protection of his substantial
rights ... If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner, stated, the law determines what the name of the crime is
and fixes the penalty therefore. It is the province of the court alone to say what the crime is or what it is named x x
x. 24

Also, the prosecution was able to prove the crime of estafa under paragraph 1 (b). As held by the CA, Fineza positively
and categorically testified on the transaction that transpired between her and petitioners and accused Rowena Gamaro.
The failure to account upon demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. As
mentioned, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to account for, upon demand, the jewelry which was received by her in trust.
This already constitutes circumstantial evidence of misappropriation or conversion to petitioner's own personal use. The
failure to return upon demand the properties which one has the duty to return is tantamount to appropriating the same for
his own personal use.25 As in fact, in this case, Fineza, herself redeemed the pieces of jewelry using her own money.

The essence of this kind of estafa is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
entity to whom a return should be made. The words convert and misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing of
another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To
misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to
dispose of the property of another without right. In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal
presumption of misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to
be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts.26

Thus, petitioners having been adequately informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them, petitioner
Norma Gamaro could be convicted of the said offense, the same having been proved.
Furthermore, We are not persuaded by the argument raised by petitioners that the testimony of prosecution witness Atty.
Baldeo violated the rule on "privileged communication between attorney and client" for the reason that Atty. Baldeo
allegedly gave petitioner Norma Gamaro "advise" regarding her case.

The factors essential to establish the existence of the privilege are:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this
relationship that the client made the communication;

(2) The client made the communication in confidence;

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.27

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential. A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the
information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given. The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be
intended for mere information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations.
The communication must have been transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.28

Applying the rules to the case at bar, We hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate petitioner's allegation. The
testimony of Atty. Baldeo consisted merely of observations that petitioner Norma Gamaro was indeed engaged in the
business of selling jewelry supplied by private complainant Fineza. We note that the testimony is merely corroborative to
the testimony of private complainant Fineza. Atty. Baldeo is an officemate of petitioner Norma Gamaro. Atty. Baldeo
testified primarily on the fact that she personally saw petitioner Gamaro, on several occasions, showing the jewelry for
sale to their officemates. As in fact, Atty. Baldeo was offered to buy the pieces of jewelry on some instances, and she was
told by petitioner Norma Gamaro that the pieces of jewelry came from Fineza.29

The aforesaid testimony of Atty. Baldeo was considered by the RTC to dispute the defense of petitioner Norma Gamaro
that she had no involvement in the jewelry business of her daughters:

Thus, based on the testimony of Atty. Baldeo in this case and in the aforementioned administrative case, accused Norma
Gamaro's defense of denial of her participation in the business transaction involving the sale of jewelry supplied by private
complainant, fall flat on its face.30

Lastly, the argument of petitioner Norma Gamaro that the RTC erred in finding that she was the one who received the
pieces of jewelry is a finding of fact. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the appellate court, are accorded the highest degree of respect and are considered conclusive between the
parties. Though jurisprudence recognizes highly meritorious exceptions, none of them obtain herein which would warrant
a reversal of the challenged Decision.31

We stick to the findings of fact of the RTC which was sustained by the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro received some
pieces of jewelry from Fineza, and accused Rowena Gamaro pawned the jewelry entrusted to them by Fineza which is a
clear act of misappropriation, thus:

x x x x. The attempt of the defense to exculpate Norma and Josephine through the testimony of Frederick San Diego is
understandable.1âwphi1 The argument, however, that it was Frederick San Diego, upon instructions of RowenaGamaro
who pledged the jewelry, without the knowledge of Norma or Josephine is unavailing. The records show that Frederick
San Diego is not only a mere nephew of Norma, and cousin to Rowena and Josephine, but also the messenger and
collector of Rowena, who had knowledge of the fact that Rowena's partner was the private complainant, Frederick San
Diego also knew that the private complainant went to the house of Norma asking the missing jewelry.

As earlier stressed, some of the jewelry were delivered by the private complainant to Norma Gamaro, not Rowena
Gamaro. Yet the defense admits that Frederick San Diego pledged the same pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop,
Cebuana Lhuillier, and the owner of Collette's upon instructions of Rowena Gamaro. Clearly then, Norma turned over the
said jewelry to Rowena with knowledge that they will be pledged to the pawnshops and to the owner of Collette's. To hold
otherwise would run counter to human nature and experience.32
It must be stressed that the prosecution offered in evidence the eighteen (18) index cards given by accused Rowena
Gamaro to Fineza stating the pieces of jewelries that were given to them by Fineza, with the corresponding appraised
values. The due dates of the checks issued in favor of Fineza (Exhibits "F" to "F-7"and "F-11""F-27") were also indicated
on the index cards.33 The pieces of jewelry were pawned to various pawnshops and individuals, instead of offering them
for sale. Hence, petitioner Norma Gamaro failed to return the jewelry to the damage and prejudice of Fineza. She even
offered her house and lot to Fineza as payment for the jewelry.

We agree with the findings of the RTC and the CA that petitioner Norma Gamaro was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of estafa. The CA ruled that the prosecution's evidence showed that Fineza entrusted the possession of the jewelry to
petitioner. The CA observed that the prosecution duly proved petitioner's misappropriation by showing that she failed to
return the diamond ring upon demand. That misappropriation took place was strengthened when petitioner Norma
Gamaro informed Fineza that they pawned the jewelry, an act that ran counter to the terms of their business agreement.

Likewise, as to the civil liability of Umali despite her acquittal, We note the declaration of the RTC that Umali had
knowledge as to who owned the jewelry pledged with M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. The RTC further pointed out that Umali was
part of the business transaction between Norma Gamaro and Rowena Gamaro with Fineza, as she too signed the Joint
Solidary Account Agreement with Banco Filipino to enable them to open a checking account. It was against this account
that Norma and Rowena Gamaro drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the share of Fineza from the proceeds of
the sale of the pieces of jewelry. These findings support the conclusion of the CA that Umali's acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt. Hence, Umali's civil liability was not extinguished by her discharge.34 We, therefore, concur with the
findings of the CA:

On the other hand, We likewise find appellant Umali civilly liable to private complainant Fineza. As may be recalled,
appellant Umali was exonerated from the crime of estafa. Notwithstanding, she is not entirely free from any liability
towards private complainant Fineza. It has been held that an acquittal based on reasonable doubt that the accused
committed the crime charged does not necessarily exempt her from civil liability where a mere preponderance of evidence
is required.35 There is no question that the evidence adduced by the prosecution is preponderant enough to sustain
appellant Umali's civil liability. Accordingly, We agree with the court a quo’s ratiocination in this wise:

"What militates against the posture of Josephine is the admission by Frederick that it was Rowena Gamaro who instructed
him to pledge the jewelry to M. Lhuiller Pawnshop. If this were true, then, with more reason Josephine had knowledge as
to who owns the jewelry. It may well be pointed out, as earlier stated, that Josephine is part of the business transaction
between Norma and Rowena with the private complainant, as she too signed the Joint Solidary Account Agreement with
Banco Filipino purposely to enable them to open a checking account, and it was against this account that Norma and
Rowena drew the checks that they issued to guarantee the share of Joan from the proceeds of the sale of the jewelry. It
follows then that Josephine also knows beforehand who owns the jewelry pledged with her (sic)  M. Lhuillier Pawnshop
Branch. x x x"

With the foregoing premises considered, We sustain the court a quo’s ruling that herein appellants be held jointly and
solidarily liable to herein private complainant Fineza. Thus, there is no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of the
court a quo.36

There is no reason for this Court to review the findings when both the appellate and the trial courts agree on the
facts.37 We, therefore, adopt the factual findings of the lower courts in totality, bearing in mind the credence lent to their
appreciation of the evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 25, 2013, and its
Resolution dated February 21, 2014 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34454 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199907

ANITA CAPULONG, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

This petition for review on certiorari  under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to annul the November 12, 2010
Decision1 and December 22, 2011 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)  in CA-G.R. CR No. 28713, the dispositive
portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 1, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Third Judicial
Region, Branch 86 of Cabanatuan City, convicting Appellant Anita Capulong of the crime of Estafa as defined and
penalized under Article 315, par. 3(c) of the Revised Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, in that the
Appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,  as
minimum, to twenty years (20) of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.3

In an Information filed on February 28, 1995, petitioner Anita Capulong (Anita) and her husband, Fernando
Capulong (Fernando), (Spouses Capulong) were accused of the crime of Estafa, committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of December, 1990, in Cabanatuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused Spouses Fernando Capulong and Anita M. Capulong, having previously
chattel mortgaged their Isuzu truck with Plate No. PLV-227 in the amount of ₱700,000.00 in favor of one FRANCISCA P.
DE GUZMAN, with grave abuse of confidence, with intent to defraud and in conspiracy with each other, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously induce, thru false representation, said Francisca P. de Guzman to lend back to them
the Registration Certificate and the Official Receipt of Payment of registration fees of the above mortgaged truck under
the pretext that they would use said documents in applying for additional loan and/or show said documents to somebody
interested to buy said truck, but said accused once in possession of said documents, instead of doing so and with intent to
cause damage, concealed or destroyed the above-described registration certificate and the official receipt, thereby
preventing Francisca P. de Guzman from registering said chattel mortgage with the Land Transportation Office; that
thereafter, herein accused even replaced the motor of subject truck with a different one, to the damage and prejudice of
Francisca P. de Guzman in the aforestated amount of ₱700,000.00 as she was unable to register, much less foreclose,
said chattel mortgage with the LTO because the motor number of the mortgaged truck indicated in the chattel mortgage
was already different from the number of the new motor installed in said truck.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The Spouses Capulong pleaded not guilty in their arraignment.5 Trial on the merits ensued.

Private complainant Francisca P. de Guzman (De Guzman),  who was a relative6 and neighbor of the Spouses Capulong,
was presented as the lone witness for the prosecution. She testified that, on August 7, 1990, the accused obtained from
her an amount of ₱700,000.00. As stipulated in the Promissory Note,7 said amount, plus an agreed interest of 3% per
month, would be paid by June 7, 1991. As a security for the loan, the Spouses Capulong executed a Chattel Mortgage
with Power of Attorney8 over their ten-wheeler Isuzu cargo truck, the original Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration (OR-CR)9 of which were likewise delivered to De Guzman. On December 10, 1990, Anita requested to
borrow the OR-CR for a week, excusing that she would apply for the amendment of the registration certificate to increase
the weight or load capacity of the truck and show it to a prospective buyer. De Guzman was hesitant at first since the
chattel mortgage was not yet registered, but she later on acceded. She gave the ORCR in Cabanatuan City, where the
same were being kept in a bank's safety deposit box. As proof of receipt, Anita issued a handwritten note.10 Despite the
expiration of the one-week period and De Guzman's repeated demands, the documents were not returned by Anita who
countered that the loaned amount was already paid.

On the other hand, Anita admitted that she and her husband received from De Guzman the amount of ₱700,000.00; that
they executed a chattel mortgage over their Isuzu cargo truck and delivered its OR-CR; and, that she borrowed the OR-
CR and issued a handwritten receipt therefor. However, she claimed that the OR-CR were borrowed in De Guzman's
house in Talavera, Nueva Ecija; that the words "Cab. City"  and "12/10/90" in the upper righthand comer of the receipt
were not written by her; and, that the OR-CR were returned to De Guzman a week after.
Due to the repeated absence of counsel for the defense, Anita did not finish her testimony and was not cross-examined.
The case was submitted for decision based on evidence on record.11

On August 1, 2003, only Anita was convicted of the crime charged. Applying the lndetenninate Sentence Law, she was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision mayor  in its minimum period which has a range of six (6) years and one (1) day
to 8 years imprisonment. In addition, she and Fernando were held jointly and severally liable to pay De Guzman the sum
of Php700,000.00, plus 12% interest per annum from the date of its maturity until fully paid.

The trial court opined:

The defense interposed by the accused is a mere denial. They are denying the allegation of the private complainant that
the documents were never returned. Accused Anita Capulong, when asked during [her] direct examination testified:

"Question: It says here, 'to be returned after one week from date,' were you able to return the said Registration Certificate
and Official Receipt as promised by you in accordance with this document?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: To whom did you return?

Answer: To Tia Pacing, sir."12

The denial of the accused cannot overcome the positive assertion of the complainant, coupled with a document which
was even in the own handwriting of accused Anita Capulong .. If it is true that the documents were returned, herein
accused should have asked for the document evidencing her receipt of the Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt.
Furthermore, it is highly improbable that herein private complainant would undergo the expense, trouble and
inconvenience of prosecuting the instant case, which lasted for several years, if her allegation is a mere fabrication.

The denials interposed by the accused are shallow and incredible. It is proven that accused Anita Capulong failed to
comply with her obligation to return the borrowed documents, as promised. She concealed the documents after she
received them from herein private [complainant]. Now the accused are even concealing the cargo truck subject of the
chattel mortgage despite orders from this Court to give information about the truck. These facts established the first
essential [element] of the crime charged.

The Certificate of Registration and Official Receipt were delivered to herein private complainant as security to the
indebtedness of the two accused. Meaning, if in case the accused fail to pay their obligation, the private complainant is
assured that she will recover what was loaned after foreclosing on the mortgaged truck. Without the aforementioned
documents, the chattel mortgage is of no effect considering that the evidence of ownership of the accused over the cargo
truck were no longer in the possession of Mrs. De Guzman. The concealment of the Certificate of Registration and Official
Receipt caused a positive injury to herein private complainant considering that she could not register the chattel mortgage
with the Land Transportation Office and neither could she exercise her right to foreclose the truck because of what the
accused did. Clearly, herein private complainant was deprived of a means to collect from the accused. The accused made
it difficult for the private complainant to collect the obligation from them. The second element is therefore, fully proven.

As to the words "Cab. City" written in the document marked as Exhibit D for the prosecution, the private complainant
admitted that she wrote the same and she was able to explain why she did that. She testified during her direct
examination:

"Question: On the uppermost right portion of this document, there appears two words 'Cab. City', do you know who wrote
this?

Answer: Yes, sir.

Question: Who?

Answer: Me, sir.

Question: Why did you write these words, 'Cab. City’?

Answer: Because such place was not written, so I wrote it, sir."

As to the extent of the injury, it was held by the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Tan Jenjua, 1 Phil. Rep.
38, "must be based upon the amount which such a note represents without regard to whether or not the amount is actually
collected subsequent to the destruction."13

Anita moved for a new trial on the alleged ground of incompetence and negligence of her former counsel.14 It was denied
in the Order15 dated February 26, 2004. In her motion for reconsideration, she added that a new and material evidence,
particularly Solidbank Check No. PA074896 dated September 8, 1992 in the amount of ₱700,000.00,had been discovered
as proof of payment of the amount subject of this case.16 However, in its Order dated May 17, 2004, the trial court denied
the motion reasoning that the check is actually a forgotten, not a newly discovered, evidence "as it was all along readily
available to [the] accused."17 Consequently, a Notice of Appeal18 was filed.

On November 12, 2010, the CA affirmed Anita's conviction, but modified her sentence to an indeterminate prison term of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,  as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.

We paraphrase the CA's pronouncements:

Contrary to Anita's interpretation, the documents or papers referred to in Article 315, Paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC are not
limited to those emanating from the courts or government offices. Based on the rulings in United States v. Tan
Jenjua,19 United States v. Kilayko,20 and People v. Dizon,21 it is clear that the OR-CR fall within the purview of said article.
The fact that the motor vehicle is nowhere to be found only leads to the conclusion that Anita concealed the borrowed
documents. Besides, if she really returned the same, she should have caused the cancellation of the note when she
borrowed the OR-CR or, at the very least, made an entry therein of the date of return of the documents. With the
concealment of the OR-CR, Anita clearly had the intention to defraud De Guzman, who was effectively deprived of the
convenient way of foreclosing the chattel mortgage absent the evidence of ownership of the chattel itself.

Further, Anita was not denied of her constitutional right to due process. While her counsel failed to object to the
prosecution's verbal motion to strike out her testimonies from the records, which was granted on May 23, 2002, her
counsel filed a petition to lift the trial court's Order. The petition was granted per Order dated October 17, 2002, which
likewise allowed Anita to testify at the next scheduled hearing. Despite due notice, Anita's counsel, however, again failed
to appear at the March 21, 2003 hearing scheduled for the presentation of further evidence. Prior thereto, the trial court, in
its Order dated January 31, 2003, already warned that the case would be deemed submitted for resolution if Anita and her
counsel fail to appear on March 21, 2003.

Finally, Solidbank Check No. PA074896 dated September 8, 1992 does not satisfy the requisites of a newly-discovered
evidence as it already existed long before the filing of the Information on February 28, 1995. Had Anita exercised
reasonable diligence, she could have produced said check during the trial. It is too unbelievable for her not to have
searched and produced the check considering that it was for the payment of a ₱700,000.00 indebtedness. Even if the
check qualifies as a newly-discovered evidence, the same would still be inconsequential since reimbursement or belated
payment does not extinguish criminal liability in estafa.

Anita filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but it was denied.

Before Us, Anita pleads for an acquittal or, in the alternative, the remand of the case to the court a quo  for new trial. The
following issues are raised:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SUCH A SEVERE DEGREE OF SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION THAT WARRANTS THE RELAXATION OF THE
RESTRICTION OF RAISING ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW IN PETITIONS FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 45 OF THE
RULES OF COURT;

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OUTRIGHT ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THE
ELEMENTS OF EST AF A UNDER ARTICLE 315, PARAGRAPH 3 (C), PERTAINING TO PREJUDICE ARE MARKEDLY
ABSENT;
III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OUTRIGHT DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS
SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED THAT SHE HAD ALREADY PAID HER OBLIGATIONS IN FULL; AND

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING THE REMAND OF THE CASE TO THE COURT OF ORIGIN FOR RE-TRIAL AT THE
MINIMUM AS THE PETITIONER WAS CLEARLY DEPRIVED OF HER DAY IN COURT.22

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Fraud and injury are the two essential elements in every crime of estafa.

The elements of estafa in general are:

1. That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and

2. That damage or prejudice  capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.

The first element covers the following ways of committing estafa:

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;

2. By means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts;

3. Through fraudulent means.

The first way of committing estafa is known as estafa  with abuse of confidence, while the second and the third ways cover
by means of deceit. 23

The elements of estafa by means of deceit are as follows:

a. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means

b. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to ot simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud.

c. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means, that is, he was
induced to part with his money or property because of the fraudulent act or fraudulent means.

d. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.24

Anita is convicted of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of RPC, which provides:

Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be
punished by:

x x xx

x x x the fraud be committed by any of the following means:

x x xx

3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:

xxx
(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in whole or in part, any court record, office files, document or any other
papers.25

This provision originated from Article 535, paragraph 9 of the Spanish Penal Code,26 which stated:

The following shall incur the penalties of the preceding articles:

Those who shall commit fraud by withdrawing, concealing, or destroying, in whole or in part, any process, record,
document, or any other paper of any character whatsoever.

If the crime should be committed without the intent to fraud, a fine of from 325 to 3,250 pesetas shall be imposed on the
author.27

The old penal law was applied in the cases of Tan Jenjua  (concealment of a private document evidencing a
deposit), Kilayko  (destruction of a promissory note), and Dizon (destruction of chits for articles bought on credit).
Likewise, in United States v. Gomez Ricoy,28 this Court held that the maker of a promissory note, which was given to
cover losses incurred at monte  in a gambling house, who obtained possession of his note and concealed or destroyed it,
is prima facie guilty of estafa.

Justice Charles E. Willard, however, dissented from the majority ruling in Ricoy.  He asserted that if ever there was a
binding obligation, the one liable should be the casino because it was the one which issued the chips and checks, as well
as promised to redeem them. Nevertheless, there was no obligation that could be validly enforced considering that, by
express terms of Article 1305 of the Old Civil Code,29 the casino and the private complainant were engaged in illegal
gambling. He further opined:

Was the concealment or destruction of the vale  by Ricoy an offense punished by Article 535, 9 of the PENAL Code?

It represented no obligation. It did not prove or tend to prove the existence or extinction of any right. It was simply a small
piece of paper with writing on it. As a mere piece of paper, its intrinsic value is too small to be appreciable. Its destruction
could not injure Angeles, for it had no value extrinsic or intrinsic.

The words of Article 535, 9, are "any process, record, document, or any other paper of any character whatsoever." While
this language is broad, it cannot be construed as including the destruction of any kind of a paper regardless of what it is in
itself or what it represents. A letter of friendship, a card of invitation, a note of regret, which have no value extrinsic or
intrinsic, cannot be covered by it.

The constant doctrine of the Supreme Court has been that no person could be convicted of estafa  unless damage has
resulted. It matters not that there may have been deceit or that the defendant thought he was causing damage. If the act
which he did was from the nature of the object incapable of causing that damage, there can be no conviction. (Judgment
of February 4, 1874.)30

In this case, Anita contends that there is no competent proof that she actually removed, concealed or destroyed any of the
papers contemplated in Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC. Allegedly, pursuant to Tan Jenjua,
Kilayko,  and Dizon,  the document removed, concealed or destroyed must contain evidence of indebtedness so as to
cause prejudice, and the OR-CR are not of this nature.

Contrary to Anita's supposition, neither Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC nor Article 535, paragraph 9 of the old
penal code requires that the documents or papers are evidence of indebtedness. Notably, while the old provision broadly
covered "any process, record, document, or any other paper of any character whatsoever," the new provision refers to
"documents or any other papers." Indeed, there is no limitation that the penal provision applies only to documents or
papers that are evidence of indebtedness.

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Article 315, paragraph 3 (c) of the RPC merely penalizes the removal,
concealment or destruction of documents or papers that are evidence of indebtedness, still Anita cannot be acquitted. In
Our mind, the promissory note, the chattel mortgage, and the checks that she executed are not the only proof of her debt
to De Guzman. In a chattel mortgage of a vehicle, the OR-CR should be considered as evidence of indebtedness
because they are part and parcel of the entire mortgage documents, without which the mortgage's right to foreclose
cannot be effectively enforced.
In case of default in payment, the mortgaged property has to be sold at public auction so that its proceeds would satisfy,
among others, the payment of the obligation secured by the mortgage. Prior to the foreclosure, however, the
encumbrance must be annotated in the Chattel Mortgage Registry of the Register of Deeds and the LTO, where the OR-
CR must be presented. The LTO requires, among others, not just the original copy of the CR and the latest OR of the
payment of motor vehicle user's charge and other fees but even the actual physical inspection of the motor vehicle by the
District Office accepting the annotation. As a businesswoman, Anita knows or is expected to know these procedures. In
fact, the Spouses Capulong initially surrendered the OR-CR of the cargo truck precisely to give effect to the chattel
mortgage they executed in favour of De Guzman.

Based on records, it cannot be doubted that the subject OR-CR were never returned by Anita. Her testimony, aside from
not having been subject to cross-examination, is self-serving and not corroborated by testimonial or documentary
evidence. As correctly opined by the courts below, if it is true that the OR-CR were returned, Anita should have taken
possession of the document evidencing her receipt of the OR-CR, or caused its cancellation, or made an entry therein of
the date of return of the subject documents. Further, it is highly improbable that De Guzman would undergo the expense,
trouble, and inconvenience of prosecuting this case, which has dragged on for more than 20 years already, if her
accusation is just a made-up story. In like manner, We held in Tan Jenjua:

x x x The latter's refusal to return the document is shown in the record solely by the testimony of the complaining witness.
No other witness testifies upon this point nor has any attempt been made to introduce evidence on the subject.
Nevertheless, we can entertain no reasonable doubt as to the truth of this fact. Supposing that the complainant had had
no difficulty in recovering possession of the document, unquestionably she would not have failed to do so when it is
considered that the recovery of the document was a matter of great interest to her as evidence of a deposit of a
considerable sum of money. Furthermore, if this fact was not true, the defendant could have shown such to be the case
from the first by simply returning the document; it was to his interest to do so, but nevertheless he has not done it. The
failure to return the document up to the present time, notwithstanding the criminal prosecution brought against him on this
account, conclusively shows his determination to conceal the paper. There are some facts which do not require proof
because they are self-evident; and the unvarying attitude of the defendant in this case is the most complete and
convincing proof of his refusal to return the document.31

Fraudulent intent, being a state of mind, can only be proved by unguarded expressions, conduct and circumstances, and
may be inferred from facts and circumstances that appear to be undisputed.32 For failure to comply with her promise to
return the original OR-CR, or even furnish new ones in lieu thereof, and in misrepresenting that she already gave De
Guzman the subject documents, Anita's intent to defraud is shown beyond question. Such malicious intent was even
made more prominent with the replacement of the truck's engine without De Guzman's knowledge and the unknown
whereabouts of the vehicle.

With the concealment of the OR-CR, Anita's act certainly caused a positive injury to De Guzman.1âwphi1 The absence of
the OR-CR practically rendered useless the chattel mortgage. Since the mortgage could not be properly registered with
the LTO, the right to foreclose the truck could not be exercised. Anita made it difficult for De Guzman to collect the unpaid
debt as the latter would be forced to file a collection suit instead of conveniently going through the foreclosure
proceedings. It is of judicial notice that, as opposed to a civil case for sum of money, a foreclosure of mortgage involves
much less time, effort and resources.

Justice Willard's dissent in Ricoy  finds no application in this case, on the grounds that: (1) unlike in Tan Jenjua,
Kilayko,  and Dizon,  the decision in Ricoy is not a final and executory judgment on the merits;33 (2) the parties involved
therein are engaged in an illicit transaction which cannot give rise to a cause of action enforceable before the courts of
law; and (3) in contrast with the OR-CR, the vale  was considered as a mere piece of paper with no extrinsic or intrinsic
value and, therefore, incapable of causing damage.

For the purpose of proving the existence of injury or damage, it is unnecessary to inquire whether, as a matter of fact, the
unpaid debt could be or had been successfully collected.34 The commission of the crime is entirely independent of the
subsequent and casual event of collecting the amount due and demandable, the result of which, whatever it may be, can
in no wise have any influence upon the legal effects of the already consummated concealment of documents.

The extent of a fraud, when it consists of the concealment of a document, should be graded according to the amount
which the document represents, as it is evident that the gravity of the damage resulting therefrom would not be the
same.35 Here, the OR-CR concealed pertains to the loan amount of ₱700,000.00; consequently, this must serve as the
basis for grading the penalty corresponding to the crime. The damage results from the deprivation suffered by De
Guzman of the concealed documents which are indispensable parts of the chattel mortgage, not the loss of the loan value
itself.
The CA correctly modified Anita's sentence to an indeterminate prison term of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional,  as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum. It erred, however, in not eliminating
that part of the RTC judgment wherein the Spouses Capulong were likewise sentenced to jointly and severally pay De
Guzman the sum of ₱700,000.00, plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum  from the date of its maturity until fully
paid. No indemnity for the injury caused is allowed notwithstanding the fact that the sentence of imprisonment is exactly
the same as if the defendant had received the amount and appropriated it to his or her own use.36 The reason being that
the concealment of the document does not necessarily involve the loss of the money loaned, and for this reason, it would
not be just to give judgment against the defendant for the payment of that amount.37

With regard to the other issues raised by Anita, the Court deems it wise not to dwell on the same. It would be superfluous
to discuss since the matters were satisfactorily passed upon by the RTC and the CA.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The November 12, 2010 Decision and December 22, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 28713, which affirmed with modification the August 1, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 86, Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, convicting appellant Anita Capulong of
the crime of Estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, Paragraph 3 (c) of the Revised Penal Code,
are AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court judgment, which ordered the Spouses Capulong to jointly and severally pay De
Guzman the sum of ₱700,000.00, plus twelve percent (12%) interest per annum  from the date of its maturity until fully
paid, is DELETED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184320               July 29, 2015

CLARITA ESTRELLADO-MAINAR Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Clarita Estrellado-Mainar assailing the
resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated November 28, 2007,2 and July 29, 2008,3 respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No.
00429.

ANTECEDENT FACTS

Sometime in February 2005, the petitioner offered for sale to Eric Naval (Naval) portions of land located in Matina Aplaya,
Davao City. During the negotiations for this sale, the petitioner told Naval that the title to the land she was selling had no
problems. The petitioner also informed Naval that the area subject of the proposed sale would "still be segregated from
the mother title."4

On March 24, 2003, the parties executed an Agreement to Buy and Sell5 where the petitioner agreed to sell to Naval a
200:-square meter portion of the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-19932 representing a portion of
the petitioner's share in the estate of her deceased father, Nicolas Estrellado.6 Naval paid a down payment totaling
₱100,000.00,7 and then asked permission from the petitioner if he could construct his house on the land he bought. After
the petitioner issued an Authorization dated March 24, 2003, Naval built his house on the subject land.

On June 3, 2005, representatives from JS Francisco & Sons, Inc. (JS Francisco) demolished Naval's house. It was only
then that Naval discovered that the lot sold to him had been the subject of a dispute between the petitioner's family and JS
Francisco. Naval demanded from the petitioner the return of the amount he paid for the land, as well as to pay the value of
the house demolished, but the latter refused to heed these demands.

The prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Davao City8 in an
Information that provides:

That sometime in February 2005, in the city of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-mentioned accused, with deceit and intent to defraud, pretending to be the lawful owner of a two hundred (200)
square meters lot portion of a lot covered by TCT-19932 located at Cogan, Matina Aplaya, this City, with deceit and intent
to gain, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeeded in selling the same to one Eric C. Naval for which the said Eric C.
Naval paid to the accused the total amount ofl!l23,000.00, as partial payment of the said lot when in truth and in fact and
despite her knowledge that the entire property covered by TCT No. 19931 [sic] had been sold and was already owned by
JS Francisco and Sons, Inc., thereby defrauding the said Eric C. Naval in the aforesaid amount of ₱123,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.9

In its decision10 dated December 27, 2006, the MTCC found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of other forms
of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentenced her to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor.

The MTCC essentially ruled that the petitioner "represented to the complainant that the property is free from lien and
encumbrance."11 It added that Naval relied on the first page of the title .that had been shown to him, and that the petitioner
deliberately did not inform him of the fact that she (petitioner) no longer owned the area sold.

Accordingly, the MTCC directed the petitioner to pay the following amounts to the offended party: (a) ₱123,000.00 fine
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; (b) ₱123,000.00 civil indemnity; (c) ₱65,755.45 as actual expenses
incurred and proven; (d) ₱10,000.00 attorney's fees; and (e) ₱10,000.00 moral damages.

On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Davao City, affirmed the MTCC decision in toto.12 The RTC
essentially adopted the factual findings and the conclusions of the MTCC. The petitioner moved to reconsider this
decision, but the RTC denied her motion in its Order of May 29, 2007.

The petitioner challenged the RTC rulings before the CA via a petition for review, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. In
its resolution13 dated August 16, 2007, the CA directed the petitioner to "show cause why the petition should not be
dismissed for its failure to: (1) allege the date of receipt of the assailed decision in the petition; (2) allege the date of
receipt of the denial of the petitioner's motion for reconsideration with the court a quo; and (3) attach Exhibits "03" to "05"
referred to on pages 8 and 9 of the petition."

In her Compliance and Manifestation,14 the petitioner specified the date when her counsel's messenger received the
assailed RTC decision and order. She, however, manifested that her petition for review bore no Exhibits '"03" to "05" on
pages 8-9.

In its resolution of November 28, 2007,15 the CA dismissed the petition for the petitioner's failure to attach the exhibits that
would support the allegations of her petition in violation of Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.

The petitioner moved to reconsider this decision, but the CA denied her motion in its resolution dated July 29, 2008.

THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI

In the present petition,16 the petitioner claimed that the CA erred in dismissing her petition for review on mere
technicalities. She further argued that the courts a quo erred in convicting her of violation of Article 316, paragraph 2 of
the Revised Penal Code because the Information charged her with violation of paragraph 1 of the same article. The
petitioner also maintained that she did not misrepresent the subject land to be free from any lien or encumbrance.

OUR RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to grant the petition.

Noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court

The right to appeal is not a natural right and is not part of due process, but merely a statutory privilege to be exercised
only in accordance with the law. As the appealing party, the petitioner must comply with the requirements of the relevant
rules; otherwise, she loses the statutory right to appeal. We emphasize that the procedures regulating appeals as laid
down in the Rules of Court must be followed because strict compliance with them is indispensable for the orderly and
speedy disposition of justice.17

Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 2. Form and contents. - The petition shall be filed in seven (7) legible copies, with the original copy intended for
the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the specific material dates
showing that it was filed on time; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or both, allegedly committed by the Regional Trial Court, and the reasons or
arguments relied upon for the allowance of the appeal; (d) be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate originals or true
copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial
Court, the requisite number of plain copies thereof and of the pleadings and other material portions of the record as would
support the allegations of the petition. (emphasis ours)

Corollarily, Section 3 of this Rule states that. "[t]he failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding, among others, the contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof."

We note that the CA exercised liberality in .its treatment of the petitioner's petition for review when - instead of dismissing
it outright - it still directed her to show cause why her petition should not be dismissed for failing to strictly comply with
Section 2 of Rule 42, particularly for failure to: (1) allege the date of receipt of the assailed decision in the petition; (2)
allege the date of receipt of the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration; and (3) attach exhibits "03" to "05"
referred to on pages 8 and 9 of the petition.18

Instead of complying with the third directive, however, the petitioner stated that the petition had no exhibits "03" and "05"
on pages 8-9. An examination of the records revealed that, indeed, exhibits "03" to "05" were stated on pages 4 to 5. The
CA itself admitted that it inadvertently stated in its directive that exhibits "03" to "05" were on pages 8 and 9, instead of on
pages 4 to 5.
Notwithstanding the CA's inadvertence, the petitioner ought to have complied with the latter's third directive, considering
that there could have been no other exhibits "03" to "05" referred to other than those mentioned on pages 4 and 5 of the
petition, namely TCT No. T-364319 (Exh. "03"); Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Renunciation of Shares, Donation
and Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. "04"); and Agreement to Buy and Sell (Exh. "05").

Without doubt, these documents would have supported the material allegations in the petitioner's petition for review. The
petitioner should have been more prudent and vigilant in pursuing her petition, instead of capitalizing on the CA's
misquotation of the pages. The CA already gave the petitioner the opportunity to rectify the procedural infirmities in her
petition, but the latter did not take advantage of this liberality by exerting utmost diligence to comply with the CA's
directives.

The records likewise showed that the petitioner did attach Exhibits "03" to "05" in her motion for reconsideration before the
CA. The CA, nonetheless, disregarded these annexes due to the petitioner's failure to offer any explanation why she did
not attach these documents to her petition. While the CA could have stretched the limits of its liberality a bit more, we
could not fault it for ruling the way it did at that point since the petitioner did not even bother to offer any explanation why
she did not attach these relevant documents to her petition. As the CA held: Despite petitioner's second attempt to rectify
the procedural infirmities in the motion for reconsideration by attaching therein the exhibits, yet, petitioner did not even
proffer any explanation why she failed in the first instance to attach the same in the petition.

xxxx

Finally, concomitant to petitioner's plea for liberal application of the rules of procedure is her obligation to exert her utmost
to comply therewith. Sadly, petitioner is wanting of the traits that could qualify her to invoke liberality in the application of
the Rules.19

What constitutes a good and sufficient cause that will merit a reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition is a
discretionary call by the CA, and the Court will not interfere with the exercise of this prerogative unless there has been a
grave abuse of discretion. Following the clear provisions of Section 2, in relation with Section 3, of Rule 42, we hold that
the CA did not act in a whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious manner that amounted to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The petitioner's improper conviction

under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the RPC

Notwithstanding the petitioner's noncompliance with Section 2, Rule 42, we resolve the substantive issue raised by the
petitioner in the interest of justice. This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure
where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake. It has allowed some meritorious
cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tends to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must always be avoided.20 Section 14(2) of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that an
accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
must be alleged in the Information. Section 8 of said rule provides that the Information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute and aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense. The real nature of the crime charged
is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the
caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must be alleged in the
Information.21

To recall, the prosecution charged the petitioner with the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which punishes "[a]ny person who, pretending to be the owner of any real
property, shall convey, sell, encumber, or mortgage the same."

The trial courts, however, convicted the petitioner under Article 316, paragraph 2 which punishes the act of any person
who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance is not recorded.

The elements of other forms of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows: (1)
that the thing disposed of be real property; (2) that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether the
encumbrance is recorded or not; (3) that there must be express representation by the offender that the real property is
free from encumbrance; and (4) that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another.22
The Information in the present case, aside from expressly indicating in its caption that it is charging the petitioner under
Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, alleged that the petitioner "with deceit and intent to defraud,"
pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter portion of a lot covered by TCT No. T-19932 despite her
knowledge that the entire property had already been sold and was owned by JS Francisco. Notably, it had not been
alleged that the petitioner expressly represented to Naval that the subject property was free from any encumbrance.

In Naya v. Abing,23 the Court set aside the petitioner's conviction for estafa under Article 316(2) of the Revised Penal
Code since there had been no allegation in the Information that he (petitioner) expressly represented in the sale of the
subject property to William Po that the said property was free from any encumbrance. We explained that the gravamen of
the crime is the disposition of legally encumbered real property by the offender under the express representation that
there is no encumbrance thereon; and that the accused must make an express representation in the deed of conveyance
that the property sold or disposed of is free from any encumbrance for one to be criminally liable. The Court explained
that:

x x x there is no allegation in the Information that petitioner expressly represented in the sale of the subject property to
William Po that the said property was free from any encumbrance. Irrefragably, then, petitioner was not charged with
estafa under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court committed a reversible error in
finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under said provision and that the Court of Appeals likewise
erred in affirming the decision of the trial court on appeal.24

We reiterate that the Information in the present case did not allege that the petitioner made an express representation that
the property sold is free from any encumbrance. This Information was crafted in such a way that only one particular crime
was charged (i.e., Article 316, paragraph 1), and the alleged manner through which such offense was committed (that is,
by pretending to be the lawful owner x x x) did not constitute ground for conviction under paragraph 2, which may be
committed even by the owner of the property.

Significantly, the Agreement to Buy and Sell between the petitioner and Naval also did not contain any representation by
the petitioner that the property being sold was free from any encumbrance.

It is not disputed that TCT No. T-19932 bore the following annotations:

xxxx

Entry No. 1131326 - AFFIDAVIT OF ADVERSE CLAIM - filed by J.S. Francisco and Sons, Inc. represented by Joselito
Franscisco affecting the property covered by this Certificate of Title which is the subject of Deed of Sale executed
between the said corporation and the registered owner. This instrument was executed before Notary Public of Davao City
Francis Arnold de Vera, as Doc No. x x x

Date of instrument : Oct. 28, 1998;

Date of inscription : Oct. 29, 1998 at 8: 10 a.m.

At any rate, paragraph 2 of Article 316 does not prohibit the sale of an encumbered property; the vendor must have
represented to the buyer that the property was free from encumbrance.25 What brings about criminal liability is the deceit
in selling the property. Corollarily, the deed must have a statement of warranty that is false in order to commit the
offense.26 The petitioner's passive attitude regarding the presence of an adverse claim (she assumed that Naval became
aware of this inscription after showing to him a copy of TCT No. T-19932 and "never complained") is not sufficient to
constitute fraud within the meaning of the law. The fraud and/or deceit by misrepresentation contemplated by law must be
the result of overt acts; they cannot be implied or presumed.

In the light of these considerations, we hold that the trial courts erroneously convicted the petitioner of other forms of
swindling under Article 316, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. To uphold the petitioner's conviction for an offense
other than that charged in the Information would be a violation of her right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her.

Violation of Article 316, paragraph 1

of the Revised Penal Code not proven
The presented pieces of evidence do not also warrant a conviction for the crime for which the petitioner had been
charged, that is, Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.

For a successful prosecution of the crime of swindling under Article 316, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following essential elements of this crime must be established: (1).that the thing be immovable, such as a parcel of land or
a building; (2) that the offender who is not the owner of said property should represent that he; is the owner thereof; (3)
that the offender should have executed an act of ownership, e.g., selling, leasing, encumbering, or mortgaging the
property; and (4) that the act be made to the prejudice of the owner or a third person.27

The presence of the first and third elements are beyond question, as the parties admitted that the petitioner sold to Naval
a 200-square meter parcel of land located in Matina Aplaya, Davao City. The fourth element is likewise settled, as the
petitioner did not deny that Naval paid her a total of ₱123,000.00. The fact of destruction of Naval's house by the
representatives of JS Francisco is also not disputed.

With regard to the second element, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove the allegation in the Information that the
petitioner pretended to be the lawful owner of a 200-square meter portion of a lot covered by TCT No. 19932.

It is not disputed that the petitioner was one of the nine (9) children of Nicolas and Narcisa, who was the registered owner
of TCT No. T-19932 entered at the Registry of Deeds of Davao City on October 31, 1967. The Register of Deeds of
Davao City eventually cancelled TCT No. T-19932 and issued a new title (TCT No. T-364319) in the name of "Nicolas
Estrellado, married to Narcisa Trono, both of legal age, Filipinos and residents of Davao City, Philippines."28 Naval's court
testimony showed that he was aware that the title to the land being sold to him was still under the name of Nicolas, thus:

ATTY. PERCY JANE ABIAN-FUÑE:

Q: Mr. Naraval (sic), how long have you known the accused Clarita Mainar?

ERIC NAVAL:

A: We knew each other in 1999 for three years.

Q: And you personally know that she is the daughter of the late Mr. Nicolas Estrellado?

A: Yes, ma' am.

Q: And that you approached sometime in February, you said you approached her and made known your intent to buy the
property?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And that you knew that the property that you are buying will still be segregated from the mother title?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And at that time the accused had shown you copy of the owner's duplicate of title?

A: Correct.

Q: Under the name of the late Nicolas Estrellado?

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: And at that time you knew you were buying a titled property, right?

A: Correct.

Q: And at that time you did not verify with the Register of Deeds?
A: Yes, I did not.

Q: Because you have already seen the duplicate copy of the title, right?

A: I just seen [sic] the front page of the title.

Q: And knowing that you have only seen the front title, you did not check with the Register of Deeds?

A: I did not.

Q: And did you find any other burden on the property other than what is stated in the title?

A: None.29

xxxx

In Naval's own complaint-affidavit, he stated that the petitioner informed him during the negotiations for the sale "that the
area that I will buy would still be segregated from the mother title."30 In this same complaint-affidavit, Naval also stated that
he caused the property to be surveyed in order to determine the boundaries of the area he bought, and to separate it from
the mother title. These statements were corroborated by Naval's wife, Josephine, who stated in her own affidavit that the
petitioner told her and Naval that the subject property was still part of the mother title. In addition, stipulation no. 3 of the
Agreement to Buy and Sell provides that "xxx the SELLER shall cause the subdivision of the title and take out two
hundred (200) square meters portion of the BUYER from the SELLER 's nine hundred thirty six (936) square meters
share." Under these circumstances, it is clear that the petitioner did not pretend to be the owner of the property sold. From
the very start, the petitioner made it clear to Naval that the subject property was still under the name of her (petitioner's)
father; and that the area subject of the sale would still be segregated from the mother title. Naval also admitted that he
saw the front page of the land's title showing Nicolas to be its registered owner. The element of deceit - central to
prosecutions for swindling - is therefore wanting. We additionally point out that Nicolas' heirs (Narcisa and his nine
legitimate children) eventually executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Renunciation of Shares, Donation and
Deed of Absolute Sale31 where they agreed, among others, to give a portion (totalling 1,236-square meters) of the land
covered by TCT No. T-364319 to the petitioner.

In the light of these considerations, we cannot hold the petitioner liable for other forms of swindling under Article 316,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code absent a finding that she employed fraud or deceit in the form of false pretenses
with regard to her ownership of the real property sold.

We are aware that a decision32 (attached to the records) had been issued by the MTCC, Branch 3, Davao City, on April
26, 1999, in Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98, where the trial court ruled in favor of JS Francisco (plaintiff) against Nicolas
Estrellado and Narcisa Trono-Estrellado (Estrellado spouses). In this case, the MTCC ordered the Estrellado spouses,
their successors-in-interest, and other persons acting on their behalf, to immediately vacate Lot 377-A-1-B-4-B (LRC)
Psd-78004 (covered by TCT No. T-19932) and to restore its peaceful possession to the plaintiff.

This MTCC decision, however, bears no relevance on the issue whether the petitioner misrepresented to be the owner of
the property covered by TCT No. T-19932.1âwphi1 We point out that this case arose from an action for forcible entry filed
by J.S. Francisco against the petitioner's parents, the Estrellado spouses. The issue in an ejectment case is the right to
physical possession of the premises or possession de facto, and the court may pass upon such issue but only to
determine the question of possession especially if the former is inseparably linked with the latter. Corollarily, a party who
can prove prior possession de facto may recover the possession even from the owner himself, since such cases proceed
independently of any claim of ownership.

In its April 26,· 1999 decision in Civil Case No. 6, 297-C-98, the MTCC merely resolved the issue of prior physical
possession or possession de facto, and did not resolve the issue of ownership of the disputed property. The MTCC, in
fact, recognized that the title (TCT No. T-19932) to the disputed property was registered under the name of Nicolas.

We also point out that the petitioner sought the assistance of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao to require the
Register of Deeds of Davao City to produce the deed of absolute sale between Nicolas and JS Francisco referred to in the
affidavit of adverse claim. While the Register of Deeds could not yet certify with finality as to the nonexistence of this
deed,33 the petitioner's act of seeking the aid of the Ombudsman shows her honest and earnest desire to protect her
family's interest over the subject property (she claims that the deed of sale between her father and JS Francisco was
spurious), and that she had no intention to deceive, Naval. Naval and Josephine, in fact, lived on the subject property for
two years, more or less, before their house was destroyed by the representatives of JS Francisco. Josephine even
intimated that she had been hoping that the petitioner's family would be able to settle the dispute with JS Francisco over
the subject property while she (Josephine) and Naval were living there.

On a final note, we stress that it is the prosecution who determines the charges to be filed and how the legal and factual
elements in the case shall be utilized as components of the information. Fairness demands that the petitioner should not
be convicted of a crime which she has not been charged with or which is not necessarily included therein.

WHEREFORE, in the light of these considerations, we GRANT the petition, and SET ASIDE the resolutions of the Court
of Appeals dated November 28, 2007, and July 29, 2008, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 00429. Accordingly, we
ACQUIT petitioner Clarita Estrellado-Mainar of the crime of other forms of swindling under Article 316 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 207711

MARIA C. OSORIO, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

Persons who receive money for investment in a particular company but divert the same to another without the investor's
consent may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 318 of the
Revised Penal Code is broad in scope intended to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315, 316, and
317 of the Revised Penal Code.

For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 challenging the January 30, 2013 Decision2 and June 14, 2013
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34274. The assailed judgments affirmed Maria C. Osorio's
(Osorio) conviction for the crime of estafa.

In an Information, Osorio was charged with estafa, punished under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal
Code, committed as follows:

That in or about and sometime during the period comprised from November 19, 2001 to January 11, 2002, in the City of
Manila[,] Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud JOSEFINA O.
GABRIEL, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations which she made to said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of
the fraud, to the effect that her money, if invested with Philamlife Fund Management will earn 20% interest per annum,
and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing the said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL to give and
deliver, as in fact, she gave and delivered to the said accused the total amount of Php200,000.00, on the strength of the
manifestations and representations of said accused well knowing that the said manifestation and representation were
false and fraudulent and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact she did obtain the total amount of
Php200,000.00, which amount once in her possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to her own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice
of said JOSEFINA O. GABRIEL in the aforesaid amount Php200,000.00, Philippine Currency.

Contrary to law.4

Osorio pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. 5

The prosecution presented as witnesses private complainant, Josefina O. Gabriel (Gabriel), and Alberto G. Fernandez
(Fernandez), head of Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance Department. Their collective testimonies produced
the prosecution's version of the incident.6

Gabriel was a proprietor of a stall in Paco Market, Manila. Sometime in December 2000, Osorio visited Gabriel's store and
introduced herself as an agent of the Philippine American Life and General Insurance Company (Philam Life). As proof,
Osorio presented her company ID and calling card. During their meeting, Osorio offered insurance coverage to Gabriel.
Gabriel told Osorio to come back at a later date as she needed more time to think about the offer. 7

When Osorio returned, Gabriel availed Philam Life's Tri-Life Plan and Excelife Gold Package. 8 Gabriel consistently paid
the quarterly premiums from February 2001 to November 2001.9

On November 19, 2001, Osorio offered Gabriel an investment opportunity with Philam Life Fund Management.10 The
proposed investment would be placed under a time deposit scheme11 and would earn 20% annually. Osorio informed
Gabriel that the proceeds of her investment may be channeled to pay for her insurance premiums. Enticed by the offer,
Gabriel tendered ₱200,000.00 to Osorio, who in turn issued Philam Life receipts. 12

A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to non-payment of premiums. When
Gabriel confronted Osorio about the matter, Osorio assured Gabriel that she would take responsibility.13

Meanwhile, in May 2002, Gabriel received a letter from Philippine Money Investment Asset Management (PMIAM),
thanking her for investing in the company. In the same letter, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her investment would earn
interest on a semi-annual basis starting June 20, 2002. 14 Gabriel confronted Osorio on why her investment was diverted
to PMIAM. Osorio explained that PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate of return. Displeased with what had
happened, Gabriel asked for a refund of her initial investment. 15

On August 2, 2002, Gabriel received ₱13,000.00 from PMIAM as evidenced by PMIAM Voucher No. 001854. 16 In spite of
this, Gabriel insisted on the refund. 17

Later, PMIAM informed Gabriel that her initial investment and unpaid interest income would be released to her on May 14,
2004. Unfortunately, she was unable to recover it. She then visited the Philam Life office to see Osorio but she was
nowhere to be found. Philam Life referred Gabriel to a certain Atty. Cabugoy18 who sent a demand letter to Osorio. 19

Fernandez testified that Osorio was a Philam Life agent and that she was allowed to engage in other lines of work. He
stated that Osorio should not have issued Philam Life receipts for Gabriel's ₱200,000.00 investment.20 Although the
receipts were genuine, Fernandez claimed that they should only be issued for insurance premium payments.21

The defense presented Osorio as its sole witness. Osorio admitted that aside from being a Philam Life agent, she was
also a referral agent of PMIAM. She received ₱4,000.00 from the company as commission for Gabriel's investment.22 She
asserted that she initially planned to place Gabriel's investment in Phil am Life but decided later on to divert it to PMIAM
since the latter offered a higher rate of return.23 When Osorio informed Gabriel of her decision, Gabriel allegedly gave her
consent.24 Osorio claimed that her husband also failed to recover his ₱300,000.00 investment in PMIAM25 due to internal
problems with its mother company in the United States.26

On April 19, 2011, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Osorio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
estafa.27 It ruled that Gabriel was induced to part with her money through Osorio's misrepresentation that it would be
invested in Philam Life, a company with an established reputation. It rejected Osorio's defense that Gabriel later on
consented to the placement. When she was informed of the placement with PMIAM, Gabriel had no other choice but to
agree.28

The dispositive portion of the Regional Trial Court April 19, 2011 Decision stated:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused MARIA C. OSORIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa punishable
under Article 315 par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment ranging from four ( 4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal as maximum.

Accused MARIA C. OSORIO is also directed to reimburse the private complainant, Josefina Gabriel the sum of
Php200,000.00, with legal rate of interest fixed at 6% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until the same is
fully settled, which the accused received from the offended party.

With costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.29

Osorio was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. She was also directed to pay ₱200,000.00 plus
six percent (6%) legal interest per annum from the date of the filing of the complaint until satisfaction.30

Osorio appealed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, arguing that her act of investing Gabriel's money with PMIAM
was done in good faith. 31

On January 30, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming Osorio's conviction.32 Osorio moved for
reconsideration but her motion was denied. 33

On August 8, 2013, Osorio filed a Petition for Review before this Court34 to which the People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Comment.35

In its February 10, 2014 Resolution, this Court required petitioner to file a reply to the comment on the petition. 36 On April
24, 2014, petitioner manifested that she would no longer file a reply.37
On June 18, 2014, this Court gave due course to the petition and required both parties to submit their respective
memoranda. 38 However, both parties manifested that they would no longer file their memoranda. 39

In praying for her acquittal, 40 petitioner asserts that not all the elements of estafa under Article 3 15(2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code were established by the prosecution. Only damage on the part of the private complainant was proven.
Petitioner argues that she did not employ any deceit in soliciting private complainant's investment as nothing in the
records shows that she used a fictitious name or that she pretended to possess power, agency, or certain qualifications.
Fernandez, one of the prosecution's witnesses, even admitted that she was a Philam Life agent.41

Furthermore, petitioner claims that she acted in good faith when she decided to place private complainant's investment in
PMIAM. She adds that she did not conceal this from private complainant, who later on agreed to the placement.42

In its Comment, 43 respondent claims that the main issue raised by petitioner is factual in nature. Thus, it is beyond the
scope of review in a Rule 45 petition. Respondent argues that even if this Court undertakes a factual review in this case,
the lower courts did not err in convicting petitioner of estafa.44 Petitioner misrepresented to private complainant that the
latter's investment would be placed in Philam Life and that its proceeds would be channeled to pay for her insurance
premiums. This misrepresentation caused private complainant to part with her money.45

The principal issue presented by this case is whether or not petitioner's acts constitute estafa as defined and punished
under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.

The rule with respect to petitions for review brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is that only questions of law may
be raised. 46 The factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court and will
not be disturbed on appeal.47

There is a question of law when "doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain set of facts or
circumstances."48 On the other hand, there is a question of fact when "the issue raised on appeal pertains to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts."49 This includes an assessment of the probative value of evidence presented during trial.50 If the
principal issue may be resolved without reviewing the evidence, then the question before the appellate court is one of law.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution failed to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the ground that she did not
employ deceit in soliciting private complainant's funds. The determination .of whether the element of deceit or fraud is
present in a charge for estafa is a question of fact as it involves a review of the lower court's appreciation of the
evidence.51

Petitioner concedes that the case involves mixed questions of fact and law. However, she claims that this Court is
authorized to undertake a factual review if the findings of the lower courts do not conform to the evidence on record. 52 Her
contention is well-taken.

Petitioner was charged with estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 315. Swindling (Estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall
be punished by:

....

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.

In sustaining a conviction under this provision, the following elements must concur:

(a) [T]hat there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b) that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or property; and (d) that, as a result
thereof, the offended party suffered damage. 53
There are different modalities of committing the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a). The false pretense or fraudulent
representation referred to under the first element exists when the accused uses a fictitious name, pretends to possess
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or when the accused
commits other similar deceits.

There is no evidence to prove that petitioner committed any of these acts when she obtained private complainant's
money.

Petitioner neither used a fictitious name nor misrepresented herself as an agent of Philam Life. During her first meeting
with private complainant, petitioner presented her company ID and calling card as proof of her identity and
employment.54 Fernandez, head of Philam Life's Business Values and Compliance Department, even admitted during trial
that petitioner had been a Philam Life agent as of December 2000.55

There is also no proof that petitioner pretended to possess the authority to solicit investments for Philam Life Fund
Management. All that F emandez stated was that the issuance of Philam Life receipts to private complainant was
improper because the receipts only cover insurance premium payments. 56 Thus, in the absence of contrary evidence, it is
presumed that petitioner was authorized to solicit money for investment purposes.

In estafa by means of deceit under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the element of deceit consisting of the
false pretense or representation must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, criminal liability will not attach.
In Aricheta v. People,57 the accused was charged of estafa for selling property that she had previously sold to a third party.
She allegedly misrepresented to the buyer that she was still the owner at the time of the sale.58 In acquitting the accused,
this Court found that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged false representation she made:

As can be gleaned from the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged with Estafa for allegedly selling to
private complainant the subject property knowing fully well that she had already sold the same to a third party. From this,
it is therefore clear that the supposed false representation or false pretense made by petitioner to private complainant was
that she was still the owner of the property when she sold it to private complainant.

....

The question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the alleged false
representation or false pretense contained in the information.

As above explained, the alleged false representation or false pretense made by petitioner to private complainant was that
she was still the owner of the property when she sold it to private complainant. To prove such allegation, the prosecution
should first establish that the property was previously sold to a third party before it was sold to private complainant. The
prosecution utterly failed to do this. The fundamental rule is that upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. It made
this allegation but it failed to support it with competent evidence. Except for private complainant's bare allegation that
petitioner told her that she (petitioner) sold the property to another person, the records are bereft of evidence showing that
the property was indeed previously sold to a third person before it was sold again to private complainant. What was
shown by the prosecution and admitted by the defense is the fact that the property is being currently occupied by a person
other than private complainant. This fact does not prove that the property was previously sold to another person before
being sold again to private complainant.59 (Citation omitted)

In this case, although there is no proof that petitioner used a fictitious name or pretended to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in soliciting private complainant's money, petitioner should
nevertheless be held criminally liable for misrepresenting to private complainant that the latter's money would be invested
in Philam Life Fund Management and that its proceeds may be utilized to pay for private complainant's insurance
premiums.

Private complainant accepted the investment opportunity offered by petitioner due to the promise that her money would
be invested in Philam Life, a company with which she had existing insurance policies. She parted with her funds because
of the representation that her investment's earnings would be conveniently channeled to the payment of her insurance
premiums. As a result of petitioner's representations, private complainant no longer saw the need to pay for the
succeeding insurance premiums as they fell due.60 Moreover, petitioner's issuance of Philam Life receipts61 led private
complainant to believe that her money was already as good as invested in the company.

The false representations committed by petitioner in this case fall beyond the scope of "other similar deceits" under Article
315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The phrase "other similar deceits" in Article 3 l 5(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code
has been interpreted in Guinhawa v. People62 as limited to acts of the same nature as those specifically enumerated.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, "other similar deceits" cannot be construed in the broadest sense to include all
kinds of deceit:

[T]he petitioner's reliance on paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is misplaced. The said provision
reads:

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency,
business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.

The fraudulent representation of the seller, in this case, that the van to be sold is brand new, is not the deceit
contemplated in the law. Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where a statement ascribes things of a particular class or
kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will usually be limited to things of a similar nature
with those particularly enumerated unless there be something in the context to the contrary. 63 (Citation omitted)

Nevertheless, petitioner may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is broad in application. It is intended as a catch-all provision to cover all other kinds
of deceit not falling under Articles 3 15, 316, and 31 7 of the Revised Penal Code. 64

For an accused to be held criminally liable under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must
exist:

(a) [The accused makes a] false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense other than those in [Articles 315, 316, and 317]; (b)
such false pretense, fraudulent act or pretense must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission
of the fraud; and (c) as a result, the offended party suffered damage or prejudice. 65 (Citation omitted)

All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case.

Petitioner, in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely represented that it would be invested in Philam Life and that
its proceeds would be used to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums. This false representation is what
induced private complainant to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance premiums. Since petitioner
deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the investment in another company, private complainant's
insurance policies lapsed.

The present case is different from money market transactions where dealers are usually given full discretion on where to
place their client's investments.1âwphi1 In MERALCO v. Atilano,66 this Court explained the nature of money market
transactions and the corresponding liabilities that dealers may face when dealing with their clients' investments:

[I]n money market transactions, the dealer is given discretion on where investments are to be placed, absent any
agreement with or instruction from the investor to place the investments in specific securities.

Money market transactions may be conducted in various ways. One instance is when an investor enters into an
investment contract with a dealer under terms that oblige the dealer to place investments only in designated securities.
Another is when there is no stipulation for placement on designated securities; thus, the dealer is given discretion to
choose the placement of the investment made. Under the first situation, a dealer who deviates from the specified
instruction may be exposed to civil and criminal prosecution; in contrast, the second situation may only give rise to a civil
action for recovery of the amount invested. 67 (Emphasis in the original)

Although petitioner was charged of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, she may
be convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

As a rule, an accused can only be convicted of the crime with which he or she is charged. This rule proceeds from the
Constitutional guarantee that an accused shall always be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
or her.68 An exception to this is the rule on variance under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which states:
RULE 120

Judgment

Section 4. Judgment in Case of Variance Between Allegation and Proof - When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of
the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure simply means that if there is a variance between the
offense charged and the offense proved, an accused may be convicted of the offense proved if it is included in the offense
charged. An accused may also be convicted of the offense charged if it is necessarily included in the offense proved.

In Sales v. Court of Appeals,69 the accused was charged with estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)( d) of the
Revised Penal Code. She was convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. In holding that
there was no violation of the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against her, this Court held
that the elements of the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code also constitute one (1) of the
elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(d) of the Revised Penal Code:

In the information filed against her, the petitioner with the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code which reads:

....

"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or
his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the
payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of
deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act. (As amended by Rep. Act No. 4885, approved June 17, 1967.)"

Under the aforequoted provision, the elements of estafa as defined therein are as follows: (1) postdating or issuance of a
check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover
the check and (3) damage to the payee thereof. . . Basically, the two essential requisites of fraud or deceit and damage or
injury must be established by sufficient and competent evidence in order that the crime of estafa may be established.

On the other hand, Article 318 of the same Code partly provides that:

"Other deceits. - The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more
than twice such amount shall be imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not
mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter."

....

Clearly, the principal elements of deceit and damage are likewise present in the preceding article cited.1âwphi1 The
petitioner's conviction under the latter provision instead of that with which she was charged was merely an application of
the rule on variance between allegation and proof defined under Rule 120, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court which
states that:

"Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof - When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged is included in or
necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is
charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved."

Simply put, an accused may be convicted of an offense proved provided it is included in the charge or of an offense
charged which is included in that which is proved. In the case at bar, the petitioner was convicted of the crime falling
under "Other deceits" which is necessarily included in the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) considering
that the elements of deceit and damage also constitute the former. Hence, the petitioner's right to be properly informed of
the accusation against her was never violated.70 (Citation omitted)
In the present case, the crime of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code is necessarily included in the
crime of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. Therefore, petitioner may be
convicted of other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code.

The imposable penalty for other deceits under paragraph 1 of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code71 has been retained
by Republic Act No. 10951. 72 Accordingly, petitioner should suffer the penalty of arresto mayor and pay a fine, which
should neither be less than nor more than twice the amount of the damage caused. The amount of damage caused
against private complainant in this case is ₱200,000.00.

As a final note, the defense that private complainant eventually consented to the investment in PMIAM deserves scant
consideration. Records show that private complainant asked petitioner for a refund of her initial investment when she
discovered that her investment was placed in PMIAM. 73 The ratification allegedly given by private complainant hardly
qualifies as genuine consent. When private complainant discovered the transaction, her insurance policies had already
lapsed. She was trapped in a difficult situation where she could potentially lose another investment. Thus, she had no
other choice but to agree to the placement. The lack of genuine consent is further evidenced by private complainant's
repeated requests for a refund of her initial investment even after she received the first tranche of interest income. 74

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals January 30, 2013 Decision and the June 14, 2013 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No.
34274 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Maria C. Osorio is GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
other deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of two (2) months and (1) day to four (4) months of arresto mayor in its
medium period,75 and to pay a fine of ₱200,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185833               October 12, 2011

ROBERT TAGUINOD, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

For this Court's consideration is the petition for review1 dated February 5, 2009 of petitioner Robert Taguinod seeking to
reverse the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 8, 2008 and its Resolution3 dated December 19,
2008 affirming the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City (RTC)4 and the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati
City (MeTC)5 dated September 6, 2007 and November 8, 2006, respectively.

The following are the antecedent facts:

This case started with a single incident on May 26, 2002 at the parking area of the Rockwell Powerplant Mall. Pedro Ang
(private complainant) was driving his Honda CRV (CRV) from the 3rd basement parking, while Robert Taguinod
(petitioner) was driving his Suzuki Vitara (Vitara) from the 2nd basement parking. When they were about to queue at the
corner to pay the parking fees, the respective vehicles were edging each other. The CRV was ahead of the queue, but the
Vitara tried to overtake, which resulted the touching of their side view mirrors. The side view mirror of the Vitara was
pushed backward and naturally, the side view mirror of the CRV was pushed forward. This prompted the private
complainant's wife and daughter, namely, Susan and Mary Ann, respectively, to alight from the CRV and confront the
petitioner. Petitioner appeared to be hostile, hence, the private complainant instructed his wife and daughter to go back to
the CRV. While they were returning to the car, petitioner accelerated the Vitara and moved backward as if to hit them. The
CRV, having been overtaken by the Vitara, took another lane. Private complainant was able to pay the parking fee at the
booth ahead of petitioner. When the CRV was at the upward ramp leading to the exit, the Vitara bumped the CRV's rear
portion and pushed the CRV until it hit the stainless steel railing located at the exit portion of the ramp.

As a result of the collision, the CRV sustained damage at the back bumper spare tires and the front bumper, the repair of
which amounted to ₱57,464.66. The insurance company shouldered the said amount, but the private complainant paid
₱18,191.66 as his participation. On the other hand, the Vitara sustained damage on the right side of its bumper.

Thereafter, an Information6 was filed in the MeTC of Makati City against petitioner for the crime of Malicious Mischief as
defined in and penalized under Article 3277 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The Information reads as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of May, 2002, in the City of Makati, Philippines, a place within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to cause damage, and motivated by hate and revenge
and other evil motives, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously bump the rear portion of a Honda CRV car
bearing Plate No. APS-222 driven by Pedro N. Ang, thus, causing damage thereon in the amount of ₱200.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Petitioner pleaded Not Guilty during the arraignment on March 10, 2003. Consequently, the trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimony of private complainant. The defense, on the other hand, presented the
testimonies of Mary Susan Lim Taguinod, the wife of petitioner, Jojet N. San Miguel, Jason H. Lazo and Engr. Jules
Ronquillo.

Afterwards, the MeTC, in its Decision dated November 8, 2006, found petitioner guilty of the crime charged in the
Information, the dispositive portion of which, reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ROBERT TAGUINOD y AYSON
GUILTY of Malicious Mischief penalized under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing accused to FOUR
(4) MONTHS imprisonment.

Accused Robert Taguinod y Ayson is likewise ordered to pay complainant Pedro Ang the amount of ₱18,191.66,
representing complainant's participation in the insurance liability on the Honda CRV, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages, and the amount of ₱25,000.00 as attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.8

The case was appealed to the RTC of Makati City, which rendered its Decision dated September 6, 2007, affirming the
decision of the MeTC, disposing the appealed case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated 8 November 2006 is AFFIRMED in all respects.

SO ORDERED.9

Undaunted, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA, praying for the reversal of the decision of the RTC. The CA
partly granted the petition in its Decision dated September 8, 2008, ruling that:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the petition for review filed in this case is hereby PARTLY GRANTED.
The assailed decision dated September 6, 2007 of Branch 143 of the Regional Trial Court in Makati City in Criminal Case
No. 07-657 is hereby MODIFIED as follows:

1. The petitioner is penalized to suffer the penalty of 30 days imprisonment;

2. The award of moral damages is reduced to ₱20,000.00; and

3. The award of attorney's fee is reduced to ₱10,000.00.

SO ORDERED.10

Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari dated February 5, 2009. On March 16, 2009, this Court
denied11 the said petition. However, after petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration12 dated May 14, 2009, this Court
reinstated13 the present petition and required the Office of the Solicitor General to file its Comment.14

The grounds relied upon are the following:

A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN UPHOLDING

PETITIONER'S CONVICTION.

B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AWARDING

MORAL DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PRIVATE COMPLAINANT.15

This Court finds the petition partly meritorious.

The first argument of the petitioner centers on the issue of credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence
presented. Petitioner insists that between the witness presented by the prosecution and the witnesses presented by the
defense, the latter should have been appreciated, because the lone testimony of the witness for the prosecution was self-
serving. He also puts into query the admissibility and authenticity of some of the pieces of evidence presented by the
prosecution.

Obviously, the first issue raised by petitioner is purely factual in nature. It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that factual
findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not
be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case.16 This doctrine is premised on the
undisputed fact that, since the trial court had the best opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while on the
stand, it was in a position to discern whether or not they were telling the truth.17 Moreover, the testimony of a witness must
be considered and calibrated in its entirety and not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.18

It is apparent in this present case that both the RTC and the CA accorded respect to the findings of the MeTC; hence, this
Court finds no reason to oppose the other two courts in the absence of any clear and valid circumstance that would merit
a review of the MeTC's assessment as to the credibility of the witnesses and their testimonies. Petitioner harps on his
contention that the MeTC was wrong in not finding the testimony of his own witness, Mary Susan Lim Taguinod, to be
credible enough. However, this Court finds the inconsistencies of said petitioner's witness to be more than minor or trivial;
thus, it does not, in any way, cast reasonable doubt. As correctly pointed out by the MeTC:

Defense witness Mary Susan Lim Taguinod is wanting in credibility. Her recollection of the past events is hazy as shown
by her testimony on cross-examination. While she stated in her affidavit that the Honda CRV's "left side view mirror hit our
right side view mirror, causing our side view mirror to fold" (par. 4, Exhibit "3"), she testified on cross-examination that the
right side view mirror of the Vitara did not fold and there was only a slight dent or scratch. She initially testified that she
does not recall having submitted her written version of the incident but ultimately admitted having executed an affidavit.
Also, while the Affidavit stated that Mary Susan Lim Taguinod personally appeared before the Notary Public, on cross-
examination, she admitted that she did not, and what she only did was to sign the Affidavit in Quezon City and give it to
her husband. Thus, her inaccurate recollection of the past incident, as shown by her testimony on cross-examination, is in
direct contrast with her Affidavit which appears to be precise in its narration of the incident and its details. Such Affidavit,
therefore, deserves scant consideration as it was apparently prepared and narrated by another.

Thus, the Court finds that the prosecution has proven its case against the accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt.19

What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable
doubt. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;

(2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction;

(3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it.20

In finding that all the above elements are present, the MeTC rightly ruled that:

The following were not disputed: that there was a collision between the side view mirrors of the two (2) vehicles; that
immediately thereafter, the wife and the daughter of the complainant alighted from the CRV and confronted the accused;
and, the complainant, in view of the hostile attitude of the accused, summoned his wife and daughter to enter the CRV
and while they were in the process of doing so, the accused moved and accelerated his Vitara backward as if to hit them.

The incident involving the collision of the two side view mirrors is proof enough to establish the existence of the
element of "hate, revenge and other evil motive." Here, the accused entertained hate, revenge and other evil
motive because to his mind, he was wronged by the complainant when the CRV overtook his Vitara while
proceeding toward the booth to pay their parking fee, as a consequence of which, their side view mirrors
collided. On the same occasion, the hood of his Vitara was also pounded, and he was badmouthed by the complainant's
wife and daughter when they alighted from the CRV to confront him for the collision of the side view mirrors. These
circumstances motivated the accused to push upward the ramp complainant's CRV until it reached the steel railing of the
exit ramp. The pushing of the CRV by the Vitara is corroborated by the Incident Report dated May 26, 2002 prepared by
SO Robert Cambre, Shift-In-Charge of the Power Plant Mall, as well as the Police Report. x x x21

The CA also accurately observed that the elements of the crime of malicious mischief are not wanting in this case, thus:

Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the
existence of the foregoing elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly
deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased
him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioner's
version that it was private complainant's CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the
steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the private complainant
and his family to move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his
speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute
arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just
giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private complainant.

In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had proven the guilt of the petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malicious mischief. This adjudication is but an affirmation of the finding of guilt of
the petitioner by both the lower courts, the MeTC and the RTC.22

Petitioner likewise raises the issue that the CA was wrong in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees to the private
complainant claiming that during the trial, the latter's entitlement to the said monetary reliefs was not substantiated. This
Court finds petitioner's claim, with regard to the award of moral damages, unmeritorious.1avvphi1

In Manuel v. People,23 this Court tackled in substance the concept of the award of moral damages, thus:

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages
may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission. An award for moral
damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental
or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually
established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained
by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.24

It is true that the private complainant is entitled to the award of moral damages under Article 222025 of the New Civil Code
because the injury contemplated by the law which merits the said award was clearly established. Private complainant
testified that he felt bad26 and lost sleep.27 The said testimony is substantial to prove the moral injury suffered by the
private complainant for it is only him who can personally approximate the emotional suffering he experienced. For the
court to arrive upon a judicious approximation of emotional or moral injury, competent and substantial proof of the
suffering experienced must be laid before it.28 The same also applies with private complainant's claim that his wife felt
dizzy after the incident and had to be taken to the hospital.29

However, anent the award of attorney's fees, the same was not established. In German Marine Agencies, Inc. v.
NLRC,30 this Court held that there must always be a factual basis for the award of attorney’s fees. This present case does
not contain any valid and factual reason for such award.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review dated February 5, 2009 of petitioner Robert Taguinod is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated September 8, 2008 and its Resolution dated December 19, 2008 are hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the attorney’s fees are OMITTED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131540 December 2, 1999

BETTY KING, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a check that was
subsequently dishonored. It must also established that the accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored,
and that he or she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount
due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such notice, a prosecution
for violation of the Bouncing Check Law cannot prosper.

The Case

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January 30, 1997
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 (CA) in CA-GR CR No. 18226 and its November 5, 1997
Resolution 3 denying reconsideration. The CA affirmed the June 14, 1994 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati, Metro Manila 5 in Criminal Case Nos. 93-3335 to 93-3345 which convicted petitioner of 11 counts of violation of
BP 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Check Law.

On April 28, 1993, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jaime A. Adoc filed against petitioner eleven separate
Informations, 6 which are identically worded, except for the check number, the amount and the date, as follows:

That in or about the month of January, 1992 in the Municipality of Las Piñas, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to EILEEN FERNANDEZ herein represented by
________ to apply on account or for value the check described below:

EQUITABLE BANK

Check No. 021711

In the amount of P50,000.00

Postdated July 24, 1992

said accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment in full of the face amount of such check upon their presentment, which
check when presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof were subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed" and despite receipt of notice of such
dishonor the accused failed to pay the face amount thereof or make arrangement for the full payment
thereof within five (5) working days after receiving notice. 7

When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. After the prosecution presented its evidence and
rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court, on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the Demurrer in its assailed Decision, the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer to evidence without prior leave of court is DENIED for
lack of merit.

Since accused has waived her right to present evidence, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in the eleven (11) above-
entitled cases and is ordered to:

1. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3335;
 2. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3336;

3. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P50,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P50,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3337;

4. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P64,200.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P64,200.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3338;

5. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P66,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P66,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3339;

6. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P100,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P100,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3340;

7. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P150,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P150,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3341;

8. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P150,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P150,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3342;

9. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P130,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3343;

10. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P130,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3344; and,

11. Suffer imprisonment for thirty (30) days, to pay a fine in the amount of P130,000.00, and to pay
complainant Eileen Fernandez the amount of P130,000.00 as actual damages in Criminal Case No. 93-
3345. 8

As already stated, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in this wise: 9

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed [I]N TOTO. Costs against appellant.

Hence, this Petition. 10

The Facts

Evidence for the Prosecution

The Office of the Solicitor General 11 summarized the facts, as viewed by the prosecution, in this wise:

On several occasions in January, 1992, at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, petitioner discounted with
complainant Ellen Fernandez several Equitable Bank checks postdated from July 23 to 29, 1992 in the
total amount of P1,070,000.00 in exchange for cash in the amount of P1,000,000.00. When the checks
were deposited for payment, they were dishonored by the drawee bank because they were drawn against
an account without sufficient funds. Petitioner failed to make good the checks despite demand.
(Memorandum dated April 7, 1993 of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to the Rizal Provincial Prosecutor)
 During the hearing on the merits of this case on September 17, 1998, the prosecution offered in evidence
its documentary evidence. Petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documents
presented.12

Evidence for the Defense

As noted earlier, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence without leave of court. In doing so, she waived her right to
present evidence and submitted the case for judgment on the basis of the documentary exhibits adduced by the
prosecution. 13

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals explained that the prosecution proved all the elements of the crime. The
CA also pointed out that the failure of petitioner to sign the pretrial order was not fatal to the prosecution, because her
conviction was based on the evidence presented during the trial.

The Issues

Petitioner submits the following issues for the Court's consideration:

Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in admitting in evidence all the
documentary evidence of the prosecution though their due execution and genuineness were not duly
established in evidence pursuant to the provisions of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence;

II

Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in declaring that Rule 118, Section 4
of the Rules of Court, as applied in the case of Fule vs.  Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 446, which states
that no agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence
against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel, is inapplicable in the
case at bar;

III

Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that the burden of evidence
has already been shifted from the prosecution to the defense despite the definite factual issues in the pre-
trial order; and

IV

Whether or not the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the prosecution has proven the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt albeit the prosecution did not produce any evidence. 14

In the main, the resolution of the Petition hinges on (1) the admissibility and (2) the sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence.

This Court's Ruling

The Petition has merit insofar as it contends that the elements of the crime charged have not all been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.

First Issue:

Admissibility of Documentary Evidence

Because the first, the second and the third issues raised by petitioner all refer to the same matter, they will be discussed
together. She contends that the pieces of documentary evidence presented by the prosecution during pretrial are
inadmissible, because she did not sign the pretrial agreement as required under Section 4 of Rule 118 of the Rules of
Court. 15 Hence, she argues that there is no basis for her conviction.

True, a pretrial agreement not signed by a party is inadmissible. However, the conviction of petitioner was based not on
that agreement but on the documents submitted during the trial, all of which were admitted without any objection from her
counsel. During the hearing on September 17, 1993, the prosecution offered as evidence the dishonored checks, the
return check tickets addressed to private complainant, the notice from complainant addressed to petitioner that the checks
had been dishonored, and the postmaster's letter that the notice had been returned to sender. Petitioner's counsel did not
object to their admissibility. This is shown by the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing on September
17, 1993:

COURT:

You have no objection to the admissibility, not that the Court will believe it.

ATTY. MANGERA

No, Your Honor.

COURT:

Exhibits "A" to "A" to "K" are admitted.

ATTY. MAKALINTAL:

We offer Exhibit "L", the return-check ticket dated July 27, 1992, relative to checks No.
021745 and 021746 indicating that these checks were returned DAIF, drawn against
insufficient funds; Exh. M, returned check ticket dated July 28, 1992, relative to Check
No. 021727, 021711 and 021720 likewise indicating the said checks to have been drawn
against insufficient funds, Your Honor. Exhibit N, returned check ticket dated July 29,
1992, relative to Check Nos. 021749 and 021748, having the same indications;

Exhibits O, returned check ticket dated July 29, 1992 relative to Check Nos. 021750 and
021753, with the same indications;

Exhibits P, returned check ticket dated August 4, 1992 relative to Check No. 021752,
having the same indication as being drawn against insufficient funds;

Exhibit Q, the demand letter sent to the accused by Atty. Horacio Makalintal dated
August 3, 1992;

Exhibit R, the letter-request for certification addressed to the Postmaster General sent by
the same law office dated 17 September 1992, showing that the said letter was
dispatched properly by the Central Post Office of Makati;

Exhibit S, 1st Indorsement of the Makati Central Post Office dated 21 September 1992;

Exhibit T, the Philippine Postal Corporation Central Post Office letter dated 24 September
1992, addressed to this representation showing that there were 3 notices sent to the
herein accused who received the said letter.

COURT:

Let's go to the third check slip; any objection to the third slip?

ATTY. MANGERA:
 We have no objection as to the due execution and authenticity.

COURT:

Admitted.

ATTY. MAKALINTAL:

We are offering Exhibits Q, R, S and T, for the purpose of showing that there was
demand duly made on the accused and that the same had been appropriately served by
the Central Post Office Services of Manila.

ATTY. MANGERA:

We admit as to the due execution and authenticity only as to that portion, Your Honor.

COURT:

We are talking of admissibility now, so admitted. In other words, at this point, he makes
an offer and the Court will either grant admission, [admit] it in evidence or deny it. It can
deny admission if it is not properly identified etcetera.

ATTY. MANGERA:

I think it is already provided.

COURT:

So, admitted.

ATTY. MAKALINTAL:

With the admission of our offer, Your Honor, the prosecution

rests. 16

From the foregoing, it is clear that the prosecution evidence consisted of documents offered and admitted during the trial.
In view of this, the CA correctly ruled that Fule v. Court of Appeals 17 would not apply to the present controversy. In that
case, a hearing was conducted during which the prosecution presented three exhibits. However, Fule's conviction was
"based solely on the stipulation of facts made during rile pre-trial on August 8, 1985, which was not signed by the
petitioner, nor by his counsel." Because the stipulation was inadmissible in evidence under Section 4 of Rule 118, the
Court held that there was no proof of his guilt.

In the present case, petitioner's conviction was based on the evidence presented during trial, and not on the stipulations
made during the pretrial. Hence, petitioner's admissions during the trial are governed not by the Fule ruling or by Section
4 of Rule 118, but by Section 4 of Rule 129 which reads:

Sec. 4. Judicial Admissions. — An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Hence, the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not err in taking cognizance of the said documentary evidence.

Second Issue:

Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

Petitioner argues that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the elements of the offense. After a careful
consideration of the records of this case, we believe and so rule that the totality of the evidence presented does not
support petitioner's conviction for violation of BP 22.

Sec. 1 of BP 22 defines the offense as follows:

Sec. 1. Checks without sufficient funds. — Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to
apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case
exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any person who having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to
maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from
the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank.

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed
the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

Accordingly, this Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows: 18

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value.

2. The checks subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or
credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.

3. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment.

We shall analyze the evidence, purportedly establishing each of the aforementioned elements which the trial and the
appellate courts relied upon.

Issuance of the Questioned Checks

Contending that the prosecution failed to prove the first element, petitioner maintains that she merely signed the
questioned checks without indicating therein the date and the amount involved. She adds that they were improperly filled
up by Eileen Fernandez. Thus, she concludes, she did not "issue" the dishonored checks in the context of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, which defines "issue" as the "first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as
a holder." 19

Petitioner's contentions are not meritorious. The questioned checks, marked as Exhibits "A" to "K," contained the date of
issue and the amount involved. In fact, petitioner even admitted that she signed those checks. On the other hand, no
proof was adduced to show that petitioner merely signed them in blank, or that complainant filled them up in violation of
the former's instructions or their previous agreement. The evidence on record is clear that petitioner issued eleven checks,
all of which were duly filled up and signed by her.

Checks Dishonored

Neither are we persuaded by petitioner's argument that "there appears no evidence on record that the subject checks
were unpaid and dishonored." 20 Under Section 3 of BP 22, "the introduction in evidence of any unpaid and dishonored
check, having the drawee's refusal to pay stamped or written thereon, or attached thereto, with the reason therefor as
aforesaid, shall be prima facie evidence of the making or issuance of said check, and the due presentment to the drawee
for payment and the dishonor thereof, and that the same was properly dishonored for the reason written, stamped, or
attached by the drawee on such dishonored check."

In the present case, the fact that the checks were dishonored was sufficiently shown by the checks themselves, which
were stamped with the words "ACCOUNT CLOSED." This was further supported by the returned check tickets issued by
PCI Bank, the depository bank, stating that the checks had been dishonored.

Clearly, these documents constitute prima facie evidence that the drawee bank dishonored the checks. Again, no
evidence was presented to rebut the prosecution's claim.

Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds

To hold a person liable under BP 22, it is not enough to establish that a check issued was subsequently dishonored. It
must be shown further that the person who issued the check knew "at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment." Because this element
involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish, Section 2 of the law creates a  prima facie presumption of such
knowledge, as follows: 21

Sec. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. — The making, drawing and issuance of a check
payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank, when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of knowledge
of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount
due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such check within five (5)
banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

In other words, the  prima facie presumption arises when a check is issued. But the law also provides that the presumption
does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, BP 22 gives the accused an
opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. As the Court held in Lozano
v.  Martinez, the aforecited provision serves to "mitigate the harshness of the law in its application." 22 This opportunity,
however, can be used only upon receipt by the accused of a notice of dishonor. This point was underscored by the Court
in Lina Lim Lao v.  Court of Appeals: 23

It has been observed that the State, under this statute, actually offers the violator a "compromise by
allowing him to perform some act which operates to preempt the criminal action, and if he opts to perform
it the action is abated." This was also compared "to certain laws allowing illegal possessors of firearms a
certain period of time to surrender the illegally possessed firearms to the Government, without incurring
any criminal liability." In this light, the full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five
banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete defense." The absence of a notice of dishonor
necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to preclude a criminal prosecution. Accordingly,
procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually served on petitioner.
Petitioner has a right to demand — and the basic postulates of fairness require — that the notice of
dishonor be actually sent to and received by her to afford her the opportunity to avert prosecution under
BP 22.

Thus, in order to create the  prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown
that he or she received a notice of dishonor and, within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the
check or make arrangement for its payment.

To prove that petitioner knew of the insufficiency of her funds, the prosecution presented Exhibits "Q" to "T." Based on
these documents, the Court of Appeals concluded that "[p]rivate complainant sent a demand letter to appellant to make
good said checks . . .. Appellant failed to pay the face value of the eleven checks or make arrangement for the full
payment thereof within 90 days after receiving the notice." 24

Upon closer examination of these documents, we find no evidentiary basis for the holding of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that petitioner received a notice that the checks had been dishonored.

True, complainant sent petitioner a registered mail, as shown in Exhibit "Q" informing the latter that the checks had been
dishonored. But the records show that petitioner did not receive it. In fact, Postmaster Wilfredo Ulibarri's letter addressed
to complainant's counsel certified that the "subject registered mail was returned to sender on September 22, 1992 . . .. " 25
Notwithstanding the clear import of the postmaster's certification, the prosecution failed to adduce any other proof that
petitioner received the post office notice but unjustifiably refused to claim the registered mail. It is possible that the drawee
bank sent petitioner a notice of dishonor, but the prosecution did not present evidence that the bank did send it, or that
petitioner actually received it. It was also possible that she was trying to flee from complainant by staying in different
address. Speculations and possibilities, however, cannot take the place of proof. Conviction must rest on proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Clearly, the evidence on hand demonstrates the indelible fact that petitioner did not receive notice that
the checks had been dishonored. Necessarily, the presumption that she knew of the insufficiency of funds cannot arise.

Be that as it may, the Court must point out that it cannot rule on petitioner's civil liability, for the issue was not raised in the
pleadings submitted before us.

We must stress that BP 22, like all penal statutes, is construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused. 26 Likewise, the prosecution has the burden to prove beyond reasonable doubt each element of the crime.
Hence, the prosecution's case must rise or fall on the strength of its own evidence, never on the weakness or even
absence of that of the defense.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Betty
King is ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crimes charged. No pronouncement as
to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 95796-97 May 2, 1997

ANTONIO NIEVA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

The herein petition seeks the review of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 which affirmed the judgment of conviction
3 of the petitioner Antonio Nieva, Jr. rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga 4 in criminal cases involving
Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

The following antecedent facts are not disputed:

Sometime in 1982, one Alberto Joven had his car repaired in an auto repair shop in Quezon City, which was owned by
petitioner. Alberto had frequently visited said repair shop to avail himself of its services and so, he had become friendly
with petitioner as owner of the shop. Alberto learned that, like his father, the late Atty. Ramon Joven, petitioner was
engaged in the construction business. Alberto then informed petitioner that they had idle construction equipment in
Bacolor, Pampanga, which were not being attended to because his father had become quite ill. Petitioner expressed
interest in the equipment and requested Alberto to introduce him to his father.

During a meeting sometime in 1985 in Bacolor, Pampanga, petitioner offered to lease a Toyota Dump Truck, with Motor
No. 2D-58961, with the intention to use it for some construction project in Quezon Province. Atty. Joven, now deceased,
commented that he could not accept the offer unless the dump truck was first repaired. Petitioner thus offered to have the
dump truck repaired at his expense, with the repair expenses to be deducted, however, from the rentals for the use of the
truck, Atty. Joven agreed to such a proposal.

On April 30, 1985, Atty. Joven who was at that time confined at the Lung Center, signed an order to turn over the
possession and custody of subject dump truck to petitioner. On May 14, 1985, a lease contract 5 covering the above-
described transaction was executed and entered into between the petitioner and Atty. Joven.

Petitioner, however, failed to fulfill his obligations under the said lease contract: he did not repair the subject dump truck
nor did he pay any rentals. The dump truck was left idle in petitioner's auto repair shop on Mayon Street in Quezon City.
Learning about petitioner's non-compliance with their lease agreement, Atty. Joven secured a pass from the Lung Center,
confronted petitioner at petitioner's repair shop in Quezon City, and asked petitioner to return the dump truck. Petitioner
countered by offering to buy the truck. When Atty. Joven manifested that the selling price of the truck was P70,000.00,
petitioner accepted the offer and agreed to the consideration thereof.

On June 10, 1985, an absolute deed of sale 6 evidencing this most recent transaction between petitioner and Atty. Joven,
was executed and entered into by said parties.

A week later, petitioner delivered to Atty. Joven a post-dated check 7 drawn against the Commercial Bank of Manila in the
amount of P70,000.00 as payment for the subject dump truck.

Said check was deposited in the Angeles City branch of the Bank of Philippine Islands. Thereafter, Atty. Joven was
advised that the Commercial Bank of Manila returned the check for the following reason: "closed accounts". 8 Repeated
verbal demands were made on petitioner for him to make good the returned check, but to no avail. Thus, Atty. Joven
availed himself of the services of counsel who made a formal written demand 9 upon petitioner to pay his obligations.
Petitioner, however, ignored the written demand. Hence, the criminal cases for Estafa and Violation of B.P. Blg. 22, were
filed against him.

For having issued a worthless check, petitioner was charged with Estafa under paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code and with Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 under two separate Informations filed by the Provincial Fiscal of San
Fernando, Pampanga before, the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 45. For ready reference, the two
informations are reproduced below:

In Criminal Case No. 3228 for Estafa:

That on or about the 31st day of July, 1985, in the municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ANTONIO M.
NIEVA, JR., knowing fully well that he had insufficient funds in the bank, with intent to defraud, with grave
 abuse of confidence and by means of deceit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
maliciously issue, draw and deliver Commercial Bank of Manila Check No. KAM 015417 in the amount of
SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000.00) PESOS, to and in favor of Atty. Ramon R. Joven in payment of the
Toyota dump truck purchased by accused Antonio M. Nieva, Jr. from Atty. Ramon R Joven, and when
said check was presented for encashment, the same was dishonored and returned with the information
that the same was drawn against an "Account Closed", and in spite of repeated demands made upon the
accused to redeem said check, he failed and refused and presently fails and refuses to redeem the same,
to the damage and prejudice of said Atty. Ramon R. Joven in the total amount of P70,000.00, Philippine
Currency. 10

In Criminal Case No. 3229 for Violation of B.P. Blg. 22:

That on or about the 31st day of July, 1985, in the municipality of Bacolor, province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ANTONIO M.
NIEVA, JR., knowing fully well that he had no sufficient funds in the bank, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously draw, issue and deliver a Commercial Bank of Manila Check NO.
KAM 015417 in the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND (P70,000.00) PESOS, drawn against his
checking/current account with the Commercial Bank of Manila, Kamuning Branch, Quezon City, to and in
favor of Atty. Ramon R. Joven, and when said check was presented for payment to the drawee bank, the
same was dishonored and refused payment for the reason that it was drawn against an "Account Closed",
and notwithstanding several and repeated demands made upon the accused to redeem said check, said
accused failed and refused and presently fails and refuses to comply therewith, to the damage and
prejudice of said Atty. Ramon R. Joven in the total amount of P70,000.00. 11

At the arraignment, petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" as to each of the aforesaid charges, after which trial was held
on the merits.

After trial, the trial court rendered a judgment of conviction 12 in both Informations, the decretal portion of which decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby renders judgment finding accused ANTONIO NIEVA, JR. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as PRINCIPAL 1) of the crime of ESTAFA defined and penalized under Par. 2 (d) of
Art. 315, Revised Penal Code as amended by P.D. 818 and of the offense of violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 . . . and sentencing the said accused as follows:

a) For Crim. Case No. 3228.

a.1. To suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of SIX (6) years and ONE (1)
day of PRISION MAYOR as MINIMUM to SEVENTEEN (17) years FOUR (4) months and
ONE (1) day of RECLUSION TEMPORAL as MAXIMUM;

a.2. To suffer the accessory penalties provided by law;

a.3. To pay the cost; and

a.4. To indemnify the complainant, heirs of Atty. RAMON JOVEN the sum of P70,000.00;
and

b) For Crim. Case No. 3229

a.l. To suffer imprisonment of TWO (2) months; and,

a.2. Pay a fine of P70,000.00.

SO ORDERED. 13

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the respondent appellate court which, however, affirmed the same. 14 Hence, this
petition.
Petitioner asks us to set aside the herein assailed decision rendered by respondent Court of Appeals, upon the following
grounds:

1. The elements of Estafa as re-defined in Sales vs. Court of Appeals were not present and were not duly
proved, because:

a. The post-dated check was not issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the
time the check was issued;

b. There is no sufficient and competent evidence to show that there is lack or insufficient
funds to cover the check; and,

c. There was no damage to the payee thereof.

2. The conviction of petitioner was based on the sole and only uncorroborated testimony of prosecution
witness, Alberto Joven, whose testimony is bias [sic], incredible and hearsay.

3. The trial court has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged against petitioner, as none of the essential
elements of the offenses charged was ever committed in Pampanga.

The instant petition is meritorious insofar as it appeals petitioner's conviction for estafa.

Petitioner was convicted for estafa under paragraph 2 (d), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code basically upon the
finding that petitioner issued the postdated check in question as consideration for the dump truck subject of the contract of
sale between petitioner and Atty. Ramon Joven and that when said check was deposited with the Angeles City Branch of
the Bank of the Philippine Islands, the same was dishonored and returned per Check Return slip 15 for the following
reason: "Account Closed."

In this appeal, petitioner does not dispute the fact that he did issue the postdated check in payment of the dump truck as
in fact he made an annotation at the back thereof which reads: "for payment Toyota dump truck." However, he contends
that the postdated check was not issued at the time the contract of sale involving the dump truck was entered into by and
between petitioner and Atty. Ramon Joven, said transaction being evidenced by a deed of absolute sale dated June 10,
1985, the fact being that he issued and delivered the said check to Atty. Joven a week thereafter.

Evidently, there is a need to resolve in this case the question of whether the postdated check was issued at the time the
obligation of the petitioner to pay the consideration for the dump truck was contracted or thereafter.

It is significant to note that the trial court did not make any finding or any categorical statement on the matter, it having
concluded simply that petitioner issued a worthless check in payment of the dump truck. Neither did the Court of Appeals
make such finding in affirming petitioner's conviction, it having also simply stated that:

xxx xxx xxx

What motivated the accused to issue the postdated check was the sale of the vehicle to him. Had there
been no contract of sale in the first place, he would not have issued the check. 16

The testimony of the sole prosecution witness Alberto Joven is also not enlightening. A perusal of said testimony would
readily show that no categorical statement was made either relative to the date in issue. Alberto Joven testified on direct
examination that:

xxx xxx xxx

Q: And when Mr. Nieva offered to buy the dump truck instead of just bringing it back to Bacolor, because
it was repaired and rentals were not paid, what did your father say?

A: My father quoted his price for the truck, sir.

Q: And after quoting the price, what happened?

 A: They both agreed and the accused gave him a postdated check. 17

and on cross-examination, that:.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: You were present when the negotiation for the purchase of the motor vehicle was
made by your father and the accused?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell the date?

A: I cannot remember the date, sir.

Q: But it was in 1985?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And that sale was consummated I presume?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Can you tell when it was consummated?

A: I cannot remember, sir.

Q: But it is in 1985?

A: Yes, sir. 18

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: On August 2, 1985, did you know where your father was the whole day of August 2,
1985?

A: I cannot remember.

Q: You cannot remember either whether your father received a check from the accused
for this, did you?

A: I can remember he received the check but not the date, sir.

Q: But it was in 1985?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Neither could you remember when your father, after receiving the said check delivered
by the accused to your father, encashed the same?

A: No, Sir.19

(Emphasis ours.)

In contrast, we note the petitioner's positive averment that he issued and delivered the postdated check to Atty. Joven one
week after Atty. Joven and he entered into the contract of sale, stressing that the deed of sale was handed to him by Atty.
Joven without asking for any payment. Petitioner testified in this manner:
 x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: You just stated in the direct examination that the said check was postdated July 31,
1985. Mr. Nieva, when did you actually issue the said check postdated July 31, 1985?

A: That was one week after he gave me the deed of sale. He gave me the deed of sale
without asking me for the payment. 20

Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be
the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. 21 The
offender must be able to obtain money or property from the offended party because of the issuance of the check or that
the person to whom the check was delivered would not have parted with his money or property had there been no check
issued to him. Stated otherwise, the check should have been issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party
deceived of his money or property and not in payment of a pre-existing obligation. 22

It will be recalled that petitioner has been in possession of the dump truck as early as April 30, 1985. The property had
been delivered to and obtained by petitioner initially for the purpose of having the same repaired by the petitioner so that it
could be rented out to him. When it turned out, however, that the same was not repaired nor the rentals therefor paid,
Atty. Joven demanded that it be returned and what dissuaded him from taking it away from petitioner in order to be
brought back to Bacolor, Pampanga was petitioner's offer to buy the same. The offer having been accepted with the
consideration having also been agreed upon, Atty. Joven let the dump truck remain in the possession of petitioner. An
absolute deed of sale was accordingly executed and entered into by the parties on June 10, 1985, during which Atty.
Joven did not ask for payment. As has heretofore been clearly shown, petitioner issued and delivered to Atty. Joven the
postdated check in payment of the dump truck a week later. Needless to state, it was not by reason of the issuance of the
check that petitioner has remained to be in possession of the dump truck but the perfected contract of sale entered into by
petitioner and Atty. Joven a week earlier than the issuance of the check.

In fine, we find and so hold that petitioner did not commit the fraud or deceit envisioned in the law as to make him liable
for estafa when he issued the postdated check, such issuance having been clearly made in payment of a pre-existing
obligation.

We, however, sustain petitioner's conviction for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.

It bears stressing that while this is also an appeal on petitioner's conviction of the offense under BP Blg. 22, the
arguments in his brief, except on the issue of jurisdiction, had not dwelt thereon. Nevertheless, we note that upon the facts
adduced, his conviction of the said offense is proper.

The elements of the offense under Section 1, BP Blg 22, are: (1) the making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply
to account or for value; (2) the maker, drawer or issuer knows that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such in full upon presentment; and (3) the check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment. 23

It will be noted that BP Blg. 22 requires that the drawer of the check must have knowledge at the time of issue that he
does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank. Under Section 2 thereof, the making, drawing and
issuance of a check, payment of which is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank,
is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency when the check is presented within 90 days from the date of
the check. However, the prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency does not lie when the maker or drawer
pays the holder of the check the amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the drawee of such
check within five (5) banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee.

It has been established in this case that petitioner issued to Atty. Joven the postdated check — CBM Check No. 015417
dated July 31, 1985 in the amount of P70,000.00 as payment for the dump truck sold by Atty. Joven to him. He knew that
he had no funds with the bank to cover the said check at the time he issued or postdated it, such knowledge being evident
from his own admission that the check would be funded from out of his collectibles from the Development Bank of the
Philippines but which, however, did not materialize as expected, not to mention the legal presumption of such knowledge
arising from the dishonor of his check for insufficiency of funds. The check was presented for payment on August 2, 1985
or within 90 days from date of issue and the same was dishonored by reason of "closed account" stamped on its face.
Petitioner did not pay Atty. Joven the amount due on the check despite demand; neither did he make arrangements for
payment in full by the drawee bank of such check within five (5) banking days after notice of non-payment.
As to petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga has no jurisdiction to try the cases charged herein
as none of the essential elements thereof took place in Pampanga, suffice it to say that such contention has no basis. The
evidence discloses that the check was deposited and/or presented for encashment with the Angeles City Branch of the
Bank of the Philippine Islands. This fact clearly confers jurisdiction upon the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga over the
crimes of which petitioner is charged. It must be noted that violations of BP Blg. 22 are categorized as transitory or
continuing crimes 24 and so is the crime of estafa. 25 The rule is that a person charged with a transitory crime may be
validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed. 26

WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court in Criminal Case No. 3228 is hereby
REVERSED and petitioner Antonio Nieva, Jr. is ACQUITTED of the crime of estafa under par. 2(d), Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. The decision in Criminal Case No. 3229 sustaining the conviction of petitioner of the offense under
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 is hereby AFFIRM ED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

 
 CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY

G.R. No. 166441               October 8, 2014

NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness.
The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does not. Only the direct overt acts
of the offender establish the intent to lie with the female. However, merely climbing on top of a naked female does not
constitute attempted rape without proof of his erectile penis being in a position to penetrate the female's vagina.

The Case

This appeal examines the decision promulgated on July 26, 2004,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
conviction for attempted rape of the petitioner by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 34, in Balaoan, La Union (RTC), and
imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and ordering him to pay moral damages of ₱20,000.00 to
AAA,2 the victim.

Antecedents

The petitioner was charged in the RTC with attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness involving different victims. At
arraignment, he pleaded not guiltyto the respective informations, to wit: Criminal Case No. 2388

Attempted Rape

That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road,
Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar,Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and
intimidation commenced the commission ofrape directly byovert acts, to wit: While private complainant AAA, an unmarried
woman, fifteen (15) yearsold, was sleeping inside the tentalong Bangar-Luna Road, the said accused remove her panty
and underwear and lay on top of said AAA embracing and touching her vagina and breast with intent of having carnal
knowledge of her by means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge
of the said AAA it was not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting
the criminal attempt of said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

Criminal Case No. 2389

Acts of Lasciviousness

That on or about the 21st day of December 1993, at about 3:00 o’clock in the morning, along the Bangar-Luna Road,
Barangay Central West No. 2, Municipality of Bangar, Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touch
the vagina of [BBB]4 against the latter’s will and with no other purpose but to satisfy his lascivious desire to the damage
and prejudice of said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Version of the Prosecution

The CA summarized the version of the Prosecution as follows:6

x x x [Petitioner] Norberto Bartolome and [his wife] Belinda Cruz were engaged in the selling of plastic wares and glass
wares in different municipalities around the country. On December 20, 1993, Norberto and Belinda employed AAA and
BBB to help them in selling their wares in Bangar, La Union which was then celebrating its fiesta. From Libsong East,
Lingayen, Pangasinan to Bangar, La Union, AAA and BBB boarded a passenger jeepney owned by Norberto. The young
girls were accompanied by Norberto, Belinda, Ruben Rodriguez (driver) and a sales boy by the name of "Jess".

Upon reaching Bangar, La Union, at around 8:00 in the evening of December 20, 1993, they parked in front of Maroon
enterprises. They brought out all the goods and wares for display. Two tents were fixed in order that they will have a place
to sleep. Belinda and the driver proceeded to Manila in order to get more goods to be sold.

On December 21, 1993, at around 1:00 o’clock in the morning, AAA and BBB went to sleep. Less thanan hour later, AAA
was awakened when she felt that somebody was on top of her. Norberto was mashing her breast and touching her private
part. AAA realized that she was divested of her clothing and that she was totally naked. Norberto ordered her not to
scream or she’ll be killed. AAA tried to push Norberto away and pleaded to have pity on her but her pleas fell on deaf
ears. She fought back and kicked Norberto twice.

Norberto was not able to pursue his lustful desires. Norberto offered her money and told her not totell the incident to her
mother otherwise, she will be killed. AAA went out of the tent to seek help from Jess (the house boy) but she failed to
wake him up.

Thirty minutes later, when AAA returned to their tent, she saw Norberto touching the private parts of BBB. AAA saw her
companion awake but her hands wereshaking. When she finally entered the tent, Norberto left and went outside.

Later that day, AAA and BBB narrated to Jess the incident that took place that early morning. Later still, while they were
on their way to fetch water, AAA and BBB asked the people around where they can find the municipal building. An old
woman pointed to them the place.

In the evening of December 21, 1993, AAA and BBB went straight to the municipal hall where they met a policeman by
the name of "Sabas".

They told Sabas the sexual advances made to them by Norberto. Norberto was summoned to the police station where he
personally confronted his accusers. When Norberto’s wife, Belinda, arrived at the police station, an argument ensued
between them.

On December 22, 1993, at around 2:20 o’clock in the morning, the police investigator ordered the complainants to return
at6:00 o’clock in the morning. Norberto and Belinda were still able to bring AAA and BBB home with them and worked for
them until December 30, 1994, after which they were sent back to Lingayen, Pangasinan.

On January 10, 1994, AAA and BBB went back to La Union and executed their respective sworn statements against
Norberto.

Version of the Defense

The petitioner denied the criminal acts imputed to him. His version was presented in the assailed decision of the CA,7 as
follows:

In a bid to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presents a totally different version of the story. The accused maintains
that it was not possible for him to commit the crimes hurled against him. On the date of the alleged incident, there were
many people around who were preparing for the "simbang gabi". Considering the location of the tents, which were near
the road and the municipal hall, he could not possibly do the dastardly acts out in the open, not to mention the fact that
once AAA and BBB would scream, the policemen in the municipal hall could hear them. He believes that the reason why
the complainants filed these cases against him was solely for the purpose of extorting money from him.

Judgment of the RTC

After the joint trial of the two criminal cases, the RTC rendered its judgment on April 6, 2000 finding the petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of attempted rape in Criminal Case No. 2388 and acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No.
2389,8 to wit:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment declaring the accused NORBERTO CRUZ
Y BARTOLOME guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of ATTEMPTED RAPE and ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
as defined and penalized in Article 335 in relation with (sic) Article 6, par. 3 and Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
respectively. With respect to the crime of ATTEMPTED RAPE, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as
Minimum to TEN (10) YEARS PRISION MAYOR as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay
the victim AAA the amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.

With regard to the crime ofACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS, the Court hereby sentences the accused to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from FOUR (4) MONTHS ARRESTO MAYOR as Minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS
and TWO (2) MONTHS PRISION CORRECCIONAL as Maximum and the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to
pay the victim BBBthe amount of ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.

The preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused by reason of the two cases is counted in his favor.

SO ORDERED.9

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the petitioner contended that the RTC gravely erred in convicting him of attempted rape despite the dubious
credibility of AAA, and of acts of lasciviousness despite the fact that BBB did not testify.

On July 26, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the conviction of the petitioner for attempted rape in Criminal
Case No. 2388, but acquitting him of the acts of lasciviousness charged in Criminal Case No. 2389 due to the
insufficiency of the evidence,10 holding thusly:

In sum, the arguments of the accused-appellant are too puerile and inconsequential as to dent, even slightly, the overall
integrity and probative value of the prosecution's evidence insofar as AAA is concerned.

Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony is the "penalty lower by two (2) degrees"
prescribed by law for the consummated felony. In this case, the penalty for rape if it had been consummated would have
been reclusion perpetuapursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penalty Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The
penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetuais prision mayor.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be the medium period of prision
mayorin the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance and the minimum shall be within the range of the
penalty nextlower to that prescribed for the offense which in this case is prision correccionalin any of its periods.

We also find that the trial court correctly assessed the amount of ₱20,000.00 by way of moral damages against the
accused-appellant. In a rape case, moral damages may be awarded without the need of proof or pleading since it is
assumed that the private complainant suffered moral injuries, more so, when the victim is aged 13 to 19.

Insofar as the crime of acts of lasciviousness committed against BBB, the accused argues that there is not enough
evidence to support such accusation. BBB did not testify and neither her sworn statement was formally offered in
evidence to support the charge for acts of lasciviousness.

In this case, the evidence adducedby the prosecution is insufficient to substantiate the charge of acts of lasciviousness
against the accusedappellant. The basis of the complaint for acts of lasciviousness is the sworn statement of BBB to the
effectthat the accused-appellant likewise molested her by mashing her breast and touching her private part. However, she
was not presented to testify. While AAA claims that she personally saw the accused touching the private parts of BBB,
there was no testimony to the effect that suchlascivious acts were without the consent or against the will of BBB.11

Issues

In this appeal, the petitioner posits that the CA’s decision was not in accord with law or with jurisprudence, particularly:

I. In giving credence to the incredulous and unbelievable testimony of the alleged victim; and

II. In convicting the accused notwithstanding the failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the petitioner
beyond reasonable doubt.
Anent the first issue, the petitioner assails the behavior and credibility of AAA. He argues that AAA still continued working
for him and his wife until December 30, 1994 despite the alleged attempted rape in the early morning of December 21,
1994, thereby belying his commission of the crime against her; that he could not have undressed her without rousing her if
she had gone to sleep only an hour before, because her bra was locked at her back; that her testimony about his having
been on top of her for nearly an hour while they struggled was also inconceivable unless she either consented to his act
and yielded to his lust, or the incident did not happen at all, being the product only of her fertileimagination; that the record
does not indicate if he himself was also naked, or that his penis was poised to penetrate her; and that she and her mother
demanded from him ₱80,000.00 as settlement, under threat that she would file a case against him.12

On the second issue, the petitioner assails the glaring inconsistencies in the testimony of AAA that cast doubt on her
veracity.

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is partly meritorious.

In an appeal under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,13 the Court reviews only questions of law. No review of the findings of
fact by the CA is involved. As a consequence of thisrule, the Court accords the highest respect for the factual findings of
the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies and the
conclusions drawn from its factual findings, particularly when they are affirmed by the CA. Judicial experience has shown,
indeed, that the trial courts are in the best position to decideissues of credibility of witnesses, having themselves heard
and seen the witnesses and observed firsthand their demeanor and deportment and the manner of testifying under
exacting examination. As such, the contentionsof the petitioner on the credibility of AAA as a witness for the State cannot
beentertained. He thereby raises questions of fact that are outside the scope of this appeal. Moreover, he thereby
proposes to have the Court, which is not a trier of facts, review the entire evidence adduced by the Prosecution and the
Defense.

Conformably with this limitation, our review focuses only on determining the question of law of whether or not the
petitioner’s climbing on top of the undressed AAA such thatthey faced each other, with him mashing her breasts and
touching her genitalia with his hands, constituted attempted rape, the crime for which the RTC and the CA convicted and
punished him. Based on the information, supra, he committed such acts "with intent of having carnal knowledge ofher by
means of force, and if the accused did not accomplish his purpose that is to have carnal knowledge of the said AAA it was
not because of his voluntary desistance but because the said offended party succeeded in resisting the criminal attempt of
said accused to the damage and prejudice of said offended party."

There is an attempt, according to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender commences the commission of
a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. In People v. Lamahang,14 the Court, speaking
through the eminent Justice Claro M.Recto, eruditely expounded on what overt acts would constitute anattempted felony,
to wit:

It is our opinion that the attempt to commit an offense which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical relation
to a particular, concrete offense; that, which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the
perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation. The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense,
inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal
Code. xxxx But it is not sufficient, for the purpose of imposing penal sanction, that an act objectively performed constitute
a mere beginning of execution; it is necessary to establish its unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation
of the cause and its effect, with the deed which, upon its consummation, will develop into one of the offenses defined and
punished by the Code; it is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination
following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the
perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. x x x x.

"It must be borne in mind (I Groizard, p. 99) that in offenses not consummated, as the material damage iswanting, the
nature of the action intended (accion fin) cannot exactly be ascertained, but the same must be inferred from the nature of
the acts of execution (accion medio). Hence, the necessity that these acts be such that by their very nature, by the facts to
which they are related, by the circumstances of the persons performing the same, and by the things connected therewith,
they must show without any doubt, that they are aimed at the consummation of a crime. Acts susceptible of double
interpretation, that is, in favor as well as against the culprit, and which show an innocent aswell as a punishable act, must
not and cannot furnish grounds by themselves for attempted or frustrated crimes. The relation existing between the facts
submitted for appreciation and the offense of which said facts are supposed to produce must be direct; the intention must
be ascertainedfrom the facts and therefore it is necessary, in order to avoid regrettable instance of injustice, that the mind
be able to directly infer from them the intention of the perpetrator to cause a particular injury. This must have been the
intention of the legislator in requiring that in order for an attempt to exist, the offender must commence the commission of
the felony directly by overt acts, that is to say, that the acts performed must be such that, withoutthe intent to commit an
offense, they would be meaningless."15

To ascertain whether the acts performed by the petitioner constituted attempted rape, we have to determine the law on
rape in effect on December 21, 1993, when the petitioner committed the crime he was convicted of. That law was Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, which pertinently provided as follows:

Article335. When and how rape is committed. — Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived ofreason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the circumstances mentioned in the two
next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

xxxx

The basic element of rape then and now is carnal knowledge of a female. Carnal knowledge isdefined simply as "theact of
a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman,"16 which explains why the slightest penetration of the female
genitalia consummates the rape. In other words, rape is consummated once the peniscapable of consummating the
sexual act touches the external genitalia of the female.17 In People v. Campuhan,18 the Court has defined the extent of
"touching" by the penis in rape in the following terms:

[T]ouching when applied to rape cases does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a
slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s vagina, or the mons pubis, as in this case. There
must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeedtouched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which
are required to be "touched" bythe penis, are by their natural situsor location beneath the mons pubisor the vaginal
surface, to touch them with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion
that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape.

The pudendumor vulvais the collective term for the female genital organs that are visible in the perineal area, e.g., mons
pubis, labia majora, labia minora, the hymen, the clitoris, the vaginal orifice, etc. The mons pubisis the rounded eminence
that becomes hairy after puberty, and is instantly visible within the surface. The next layer is the labia majoraor the outer
lips of the female organ composed of the outer convex surface and the inner surface. The skin of the outer convex surface
is covered with hair follicles and is pigmented, while the inner surface is a thin skin which does not have any hair but has
many sebaceous glands. Directly beneath the labia majorais the labia minora. Jurisprudence dictates that the labia
majoramust be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the surface of the female
organ. xxxx Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ or touching the mons pubisof the pudendum is not
sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching of either labia of the pudendumby the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be
attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [Bold emphasis supplied]

It is noteworthy that in People v. Orita,19 the Court clarified that the ruling in People v. Eriñia20 whereby the offender was
declared guilty of frustrated rapebecause of lack of conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended
party, was a stray decisionfor not having been reiterated in subsequent cases. As the evolving case law on rape stands,
therefore, rape in its frustrated stage is a physical impossibility, considering that the requisites of a frustrated felony under
Article 6 of the Revised Penal Codeare that: (1) the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce
the felony; and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will. Obviously, the
offender attains his purpose from the moment he has carnal knowledge of his victim, because from that moment all the
essential elements of the offense have been accomplished, leaving nothing more to be done by him.21

Nonetheless, rape admits of an attempted stage. In this connection, the character of the overt actsfor purposes of the
attempted stage has been explained in People v. Lizada:22
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime,
more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d’etrefor the law requiring a direct overtact is that, in a majority of
cases, the conduct of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act
becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any
fragment of the crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality
remains, no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is.It is necessary that the overt act should have
been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step
in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not
constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to
the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
(Bold emphasis supplied)

In attempted rape, therefore, the concrete felony is rape, but the offender does not perform all the acts of execution of
having carnal knowledge. If the slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape, and rape in its attempted
stage requires the commencement of the commission of the felony directly by overt actswithout the offender performing all
the acts of execution that should produce the felony, the only means by which the overt acts performed by the accused
can be shown to have a causal relation to rape as the intended crime is to make a clear showing of his intent to lie with
the female. Accepting that intent, being a mental act, is beyond the sphere of criminal law,23 that showing must be through
his overt acts directly connected with rape. He cannot be held liable for attempted rape withoutsuch overt acts
demonstrating the intent to lie with the female. In short, the State, to establish attempted rape, must show that his overt
acts, should his criminalintent be carried to its complete termination without being thwarted by extraneous matters, would
ripen into rape,24 for, as succinctly put in People v. Dominguez, Jr.:25 "The gauge in determining whether the crime of
attempted rape had been committed is the commencement of the act of sexual intercourse, i.e., penetration of the penis
into the vagina, before the interruption."

The petitioner climbed on top of the naked victim, and was already touching her genitalia with his hands and mashing her
breasts when she freed herself from his clutches and effectively ended his designs on her. Yet, inferring from such
circumstances thatrape, and no other,was his intended felony would be highly unwarranted. This was so, despite his lust
for and lewd designs towards her being fully manifest. Such circumstances remained equivocal, or "susceptible of double
interpretation," as Justice Recto put in People v. Lamahang, supra, such that it was not permissible to directly infer from
them the intention to cause rape as the particular injury. Verily, his felony would not exclusively be rapehad he been
allowed by her to continue, and to have sexual congress with her, for some other felony like simple seduction (if he should
employ deceit to have her yield to him)26 could also be ultimate felony.

We clarify that the direct overt acts of the petitioner that would have produced attempted rape did not include equivocal
preparatory acts. The former would have related to his acts directly connected to rape as the intended crime, but the
latter, whether external or internal, had no connection with rape as the intended crime. Perforce, his perpetration of the
preparatory acts would not render him guilty of an attempt to commit such felony.27 His preparatory acts could include his
putting up of the separate tents, with one being for the use of AAA and BBB, and the other for himself and his assistant,
and his allowing his wife to leave for Manila earlier that evening to buy more wares. Such acts, being equivocal, had no
direct connection to rape. As a rule, preparatory acts are not punishable under the Revised Penal Codefor as long as they
remained equivocal or of uncertain significance, because by their equivocality no one could determine with certainty what
the perpetrator’s intent really was.28

If the acts of the petitioner did not constitute attempted rape, did they constitute acts of lasciviousness?

It is obvious that the fundamental difference between attempted rape and acts of lasciviousness is the offender’sintent to
lie with the female. In rape, intent to lie with the female is indispensable, but this element is not required in acts of
lasciviousness.29 Attempted rape is committed, therefore, when the "touching" of the vagina by the penis is coupled with
the intent to penetrate. The intent to penetrate is manifest only through the showing of the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act touching the external genitalia of the female.30 Without such showing, only the felony of acts of
lasciviousness is committed.31

Based on Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the felony of acts of lasciviousness is consummated whenthe following
essential elements concur, namely: (a) the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness upon another person
of either sex; and (b) the act of lasciviousness or lewdness is committed either (i) by using force or intimidation; or (ii)
when the offended party is deprived ofreason or is otherwise unconscious; or (iii) when the offended party is under 12
years of age.32 In that regard, lewdis defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous; it signifies that form of immorality
that has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner.33

The information charged that the petitioner "remove[d] her panty and underwear and la[id] on top of said AAA embracing
and touching her vagina and breast." With such allegation of the information being competently and satisfactorily proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, he was guilty only of acts of lasciviousness, not attempted rape. His embracing her and
touching her vagina and breasts did not directly manifest his intent to lie with her. The lack of evidence showing his
erectile penis being in the position to penetrate her when he was on top of her deterred any inference about his intent to
lie with her. At most, his acts reflected lewdness and lust for her.

The intent to commit rape should not easily be inferred against the petitioner, even from his own declaration of it, if any,
unless he committed overt acts directly leading to rape. A good illustration of this can be seen in People v.
Bugarin,34 where the accused was charged with attempted rape through an information alleging that he, by means of force
and intimidation, "did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape
directly by overt acts, by then and there kissing the nipples and the vagina of the undersigned [complainant], a minor, and
about to lay on top of her, all against her will, however, [he] did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced the crime of Rape by reason of some causes other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is, undersigned
complainant push[ed] him away." The accused was held liable only for acts of lasciviousness because the intent to
commit rape "is not apparent from the actdescribed," and the intent to have sexual intercourse with her was not inferable
from the act of licking her genitalia. The Court also pointed out that the "act imputed to him cannot be considered a
preparatory act to sexual intercourse."35

Pursuant to Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the petitioner, being guilty of acts of lasciviousness, is punished with
prision correccional. In the absence of modifying circumstances, prision correccional is imposed in its medium period,
which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months and one day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty should come from arresto mayor, the penalty next lower than
prision correccionalwhich ranges from one (1) month to six (6) months. Accordingly, the Court fixes the indeterminate
sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision
correccional, as the maximum.

In acts of lasciviousness, the victim suffers moral injuries because the offender violates her chastity by his
lewdness.1âwphi1 "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for
omission."36 Indeed, Article 2219, (3), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in acts of
lasciviousness to recover moral damages.37 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the record, decrees that
₱30,000.00 is a reasonable award of moral damages.38 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of
₱20,000.00.39

Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, the courts are vested with the discretion to impose interest as a part of the damages
in crimes and quasidelicts. In that regard, the moral damages of ₱20,000.00 shall earn interest of 6% per annum
reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment.40

WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES petitioner NORBERTO CRUZ y BARTOLOME guilty of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS, and, ACCORDINGLY, PENALIZES him with the indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of
arresto mayor, as the minimum, to two (2) years, four (4) months and one day of prision correccional, as the maximum;
ORDERS him to pay moral damages of ₱30,000.00 and civil indemnity of ₱20,000.00 to the complainant, with interest of
6% per annum on such awards reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS him to pay the
costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221443

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
DOMINADOR LADRA, Accused-Appellant

On appeal1 is the Decision2 dated June 30, 2015 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01160-
MIN, which affirmed the Joint Decision3 dated February 6, 2013 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 22 (RTC) in FC Crim. Case Nos. 2008-426 and 2008-427 finding accused-appellant Dominador Ladra (accused-
appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Rape and Unjust Vexation.

The Facts

Private complainant AAA4 was born on September 3, 19955 and the eldest of five (5) siblings. At the time material to these
cases, she lived with her family in a remote area in Dumarait, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental.6

On the other hand, it was alleged that accused-appellant was a relative of BBB, AAA's mother, who allowed him to stay
with their family out of pity. He ran errands for them and attended to the children when BBB was busy washing clothes
and her husband, CCC, was tending to their farm.7

Sometime between 2000 to 2001,8 when AAA was around five (5) years old, she and her siblings were left at home with
accused-appellant. After their meal, accused-appellant ordered them to sleep. Suddenly, AAA was awakened when she
felt accused-appellant, who was already naked, on top of her, forced his penis into her vagina, and made push and pull
movements, causing her pain. Accused-appellant threatened to kill her if she told anyone. Thereafter, accused-appellant
repeatedly molested her, each time bringing his bolo with him.9 The sexual abuse ceased in 2002, when accused-
appellant left their house.10

Years later, or on the evening of April 16, 2008, AAA - who was already twelve (12) years old at the time - was surprised
when she saw accused-appellant in their kitchen. To her shock, accused-appellant squeezed her vagina and told her that
they were going to visit his house. Scared, AAA cried and told her cousin, DDD, about the incident.11 She also told DDD
about the first rape incident and the subsequent ones committed by accused-appellant. Eventually, AAA told BBB about
her traumatic experiences in the hands of accused-appellant when she was five (5) years old. Together, they reported the
incident to the barangay and thereafter, had the incident recorded in the police blotter.12 Later, AAA filed criminal cases
against accused-appellant, who was subsequently arrested.13

On April 19, 2008, Dr. Ma. Josefina Villanueva Taleon (Dr. Taleon), Medical Officer III at the Northern Mindanao Medical
Center, conducted a physical examination on AAA and found the presence of old healed lacerations in her genitalia at the
three (3), eigth (8), and ten (10) o'clock positions.14

Hence, accused-appellant was charged with violation of Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No.  (RA) 7610 in an
Information15 that reads:

Sometime in 2000 up to 2001, when the private complainant is about five to six [5 to 6] years old, at Dumarait,
Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused
knowing full well the minority, with obvious ungratefulness, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
acts of sexual abuse on one [AAA], five to six years old, by inserting his penis into her vagina, against her will and without
her consent, and which act debases, degrades and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of [AAA] as a child and as a
human being and is prejudicial to the child's development.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Section 5 Paragraph B of RA 7610.16

Likewise, accused-appellant was charged with Acts of Lasciviousness  in an Information17 that reads:

On 16 April 2008 at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening in Dumarait, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who knew full well the minority
of the victim, through force and intimidation, actuated by lust or lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit a lascivious conduct on twelve-year [12] old [AAA] by squeezing her vagina against her will and to her
damage and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code as amended.18

When arraigned, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty  to the offenses charged.19

In defense, accused-appellant denied the charges and claimed that AAA' s family were angry at him when he left their
house, leaving no one to attend to their errands. He asserted that he left them because he could no longer understand
what they were asking him to do for them.20

The RTC Ruling

In a Joint Decision21 dated February 6, 2013, the RTC convicted accused-appellant of: (a) Rape in FC Crim. Case No.
2008-426, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (b) Unjust Vexation in FC Crim.
Case No. 2008-427, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a period of 30 days of arresto menor and to
pay a fine of ₱200.00 with accessory penalties.22

In finding accused-appellant guilty of Rape in FC Criminal Case No. 2008-426, the RTC found that although the
allegations in the Information are sufficient to make out a case for child abuse, it also constitutes Statutory Rape  under
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Relative thereto, it found that AAA's narration of her
defloration in the hands of accused-appellant more than sufficiently established the offense, as well as the identity of the
offender. Despite her tender age, she was straightforward, clear, categorical, and positive in her testimony, indicating that
she was telling the truth. Moreover, her account of the incident was supported by the medical findings of Dr. Taleon, who
testified that there were healed lacerations in AAA' s genitalia at the 3, 8, and 10 o'clock positions.23

As regards FC Criminal Case No. 2008-427, the RTC found that the prosecution has established that on the evening of
April 16, 2008, when AAA went to their kitchen, she encountered accused-appellant who, without warning, "just squeezed
her vagina."24 The RTC opined, however, that the prosecution failed to establish the element of lasciviousness or
lewdness  as would justify accused-appellant's conviction for the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness. The overt act of
accused-appellant of squeezing AAA's vagina did not show that he intended to gratify his sexual desires nor was it
demonstrative of carnal lust. Nonetheless, AAA was clearly annoyed by the act; perforce, the R TC found accused-
appellant guilty of Unjust Vexation, defined and penalized under Article 28725 of the RPC.26

Conversely, the RTC brushed aside the defense proffered by accused-appellant, which it found insufficient to debunk the
positive evidence of the prosecution.27 Dissatisfied, accused-appellant appealed his conviction.28

The CA Ruling

In its assailed Decision29 dated June 30, 2015, the CA affirmed in toto30  the RTC's Joint Decision convicting accused-
appellant of Rape and Unjust Vexation. Apart from concurring with the RTC's findings and conclusions, the CA found no
merit in accused-appellant's contention that it was impossible for him to commit the crime as AAA's younger brother was
sleeping beside her at the time of the alleged rape incident. Disregarding the argument, the CA ruled that the presence of
another person at the scene does not render it impossible for accused-appellant to commit the crime of Rape. As regards
its affirmance of accused-appellant's conviction for Unjust Vexation, the CA did not proffer any justification.31

Aggrieved, accused-appellant is now before the Court seeking the reversal of his conviction.32

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA erred in affirming accused-appellant's conviction for
Rape and Unjust Vexation.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

Time and again, the Court has held that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. This rule, however, admits of exceptions such as
where there exists a fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been ignored or misconstrued, or where the
trial court has acted arbitrarily in its appreciation of the facts.33
In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-426, the Court accords credence to the RTC's finding, as affirmed by the CA, that accused-
appellant indeed committed the crime of Rape against then five (5)-year-old AAA. As astutely observed by the R TC,
which had the opportunity to personally scrutinize AAA's conduct and demeanor during trial, she was a credible witness
whose testimony must be given great weight. The trial judge's evaluation, which the CA sustained, now binds the Court,
leaving to the accused-appellant the burden to bring to the fore facts or circumstances of weight, which were otherwise
overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted that would materially affect the disposition of the case differently if duly
considered.34 Unfortunately for accused-appellant, he miserably failed to discharge this burden, and the Court finds no
reason to reverse the CA's conclusions.

Moreover, the CA correctly disregarded accused-appellant's argument that he could not have committed the crime in the
presence of AAA's younger brother, who slept beside her.35 It cannot be denied that the presence of AAA' s brother in the
room does not negate the commission of the crime. "Rape can be committed even in places where people congregate, in
parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same
room where other members of the family are also sleeping. It is not impossible or incredible for the members of the
victim's family to be in deep slumber and not to be awakened while a sexual assault is being committed. It is settled that
lust is not a respecter of time or place and rape is known to happen in the most unlikely places."36

In view thereof, the courts a quo correctly found accused-appellant guilty of Rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.  However, the Court modifies the amounts of damages awarded conformably with prevailing
jurisprudence.37 Accordingly, accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amount of ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-427, however, the Court disagrees with the CA's affirmance of the RTC's finding that
accused-appellant can only be held guilty of Unjust Vexation. After a punctilious review of the evidence, the Court finds
that he should instead be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness, as charged in the information, in relation to Section 5 (b) of
RA 7610.

Acts of Lasciviousness is defined and penalized under Article 336 of the RPC, which reads:

Article 336. Acts of lasciviousness. - Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons of either
sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned on the preceding article, shall be punished by prision correccional.

Conviction for such crime requires the concurrence of the following elements: (a) that the offender commits any act of
lasciviousness or lewdness; (b)  that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (i) through force, threat, or
intimidation, (ii) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, (iii) by means of fraudulent
machination or grave abuse of authority, and (iv)  when the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is
demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present; and (c) that the offended party is
another person of either sex.38

Meanwhile, Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 provides:

Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.  - Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious

conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period; and

Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the requisites of
the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Article 336 of the RPC above-enumerated must be met in addition
to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.39

A judicious examination of the records reveals that all the elements of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC
and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 have been sufficiently established. The prosecution was able to
prove AAA's minority at the time of the incident through the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth40 showing that she
was born on September 3, 1995. At the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was then 12 years old. It was
likewise established that accused-appellant, an adult who exercised influence on AAA, committed a lascivious act by
"squeezing" her vagina.

The courts a quo convicted accused-appellant of the crime of Unjust Vexation instead of Acts of Lasciviousness on the
finding that there was no element of lasciviousness or lewdness in accused-appellant's act. In its Decision, the RTC even
pointed out that accused-appellant could not have intended to lie with AAA at that moment considering that she still had
her underwear on, and the act of "squeezing" her private part was not demonstrative of carnal lust.41

The Court disagrees.

"Lascivious conduct" is defined in Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child
Abuse Cases, as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex,
with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

In Amployo v. People,42 the Court expounded on the definition of the word "lewd," to wit:

The term "lewd" is commonly defined as something indecent or obscene; it is characterized by or intended to excite crude
sexual desire. That an accused is entertaining a lewd or unchaste design is necessarily a mental process the existence of
which can be inferred by overt acts carrying out such intention, i.e.,  by conduct that can only be interpreted as lewd or
lascivious. The presence or absence of lewd designs is inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the
environmental circumstances. What is or what is not lewd conduct, by its very nature, cannot be pigeonholed into a
precise definition. As early as US. v. Gomez we had already lamented that -

It would be somewhat difficult to lay down any rule specifically establishing just what conduct makes one amenable to the
provisions of article 439 of the Penal Code. What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct must be determined from the
circumstances of each case. It may be quite easy to determine in a particular case that certain acts are lewd and
lascivious, and it may be extremely difficult in another case to say just where the line of demarcation lies between such
conduct and the amorous advances of an ardent lover.43

After a careful evaluation, the Court finds that the mere fact of "squeezing" the private part of a child - a young girl 12
years of age  - could not have signified any other intention but one having lewd or indecent design. It must not be forgotten
that several years prior, accused-appellant had raped AAA in the same house, for which act he was appropriately
convicted. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching  - more so, "squeezing," in this case, which strongly suggests
that the act was intentional - of AAA's genitalia clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely
to annoy or vex her, as opined by the courts a quo. That AAA was fully clothed at that time, which led the courts a quo  to
believe that accused-appellant could not have intended to lie with her, is inconsequential. "'Lewd' is defined as obscene,
lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is
carried on a wanton manner."44 As such, accused-appellant's act of squeezing AAA's vagina was a lewd and lascivious
act within the definitions set by law and jurisprudence.

Under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the prescribed penalty for lascivious conduct is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua.  In the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence shall
be taken from the medium period45 thereof. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be taken
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor  in its medium and maximum periods
to reclusion temporal in its minimum period.46 Accordingly, accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,  as minimum, to 17 years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,  as maximum. In addition, and conformably with recent jurisprudence,
accused-appellant is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱l5,000.00 as moral damages, ₱l
5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱l 5,000.00 as fine, all of which shall earn interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.47

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 30, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01160-MIN is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-426, accused-appellant Dominador Ladra is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and, accordingly,
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay private complainant the amounts of ₱75,000.00
as moral damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages;

(2) In FC Criminal Case No. 2008-427, accused-appellant Dominador Ladra is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in
relation to Section 5 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610 and, accordingly, sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison
term of 10 years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, four (4), months and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal,  as maximum, and to pay private complainant the amounts of ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱15,000.00 as moral damages, ₱l 5,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱l 5,000.00 as fine;

(3) Accused-appellant Dominador Ladra is ordered to pay the private complainant interest on all monetary awards
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 225743

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs.
SANDY DOMINGO y LABIS, Accused-Appellant

There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary objective of the accused is to commit rape.

The Case

The accused appeals the affirmance by the Court of Appeals (CA) of his conviction for forcible abduction with rape under
the decision promulgated on September 24, 2015,1 viz.:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision dated 6 September 2013 of the
Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 17, Cavite City in Criminal Case No. 39-04 is hereby AFFIRMED.
Appellant is hereby ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. SO ORDERED. 2

Antecedents

The factual and procedural antecedents as summarized by the CA follow:

On 26 January 2004, an Information was filed charging appellant with the crime of Forcible Abduction with Rape in this
wise: That on or about the period between January 24 and 25, 2004, in the Municipality of Rosario, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, motivated by lust and with lewd
designs, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, abduct
and take away one AAA, against her will and consent, and thereafter, by means of force, violence and intimidation, with
the use of [a] bladed weapon and actuated by lust and lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of said victim, against her
will and consent, to the damage and prejudice of said AAA.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment on 2 March 2004, appellant, assisted by counsel entered a plea of NOT GUILTY.

Thereafter, trial ensued. The Prosecution presented AAA, SP03 Felipe Gomez, Jr., and Elmer Marquez. The defense on
the other hand presented Sandy Domingo and Jocelyn Mariano as witnesses.

xxxx

People's Version

AAA is a saleslady in a public market in Rosario, Cavite. On 24 January 2004, at around 8:00 in the evening, private
complainant was waiting for her cousin to fetch her, when appellant, who worked in a fish stall in the market, approached
her. Appellant asked if he could accompany private complainant to her aunt's home, where she resided. Since AAA's
cousin was not around to fetch her, she agreed for appellant to accompany her home.

The two boarded a tricycle. As they were about to leave, appellant brought out a bladed weapon and poked the same on
AAA's right waist. Struck with fear, AAA was unable to ask for help. Along the way, AAA realized that they were no longer
proceeding to her aunt's house because the tricycle made a different turn. They stopped at a place that was not familiar to
her. Thereafter, the two of them alighted after appellant paid the tricycle driver. The entire time, however, appellant was
holding the knife and poking it against AAA's side.

With appellant still holding the knife and poking it against AAA's waist, the two walked toward a house, appellant knocked
on the door, and a man came out. Appellant and AAA were allowed entry inside the house. The man did not say anything
and immediately went inside a room.
Appellant ordered AAA to enter another room. Once inside, appellant who was still holding the knife, undressed himself.
Appellant ordered AAA to undress next, but AAA did not obey. Appellant, still holding the knife, forcibly undressed AAA
until the latter was completely naked.

Appellant ordered AAA to lie down on the wooden bed. While still holding the knife, appellant inserted his penis into
private complainant's vagina. AAA felt pain in her private part. Appellant also kissed AAA's neck and lips. Appellant made
a pumping motion while his penis was inserted in AAA's vagina. Afterwards, appellant pulled out his penis, kissed AAA,
and played with the knife on the latter's face. They did not sleep. After a while, appellant again inserted his penis inside
her vagina and kissed her. After removing his penis, he inserted it again for the fourth time. Thereafter, appellant dressed
up and ordered her to put on her clothes. While he was helping her put on her clothes, she told him that she wants to go
home. He answered that he will let her go home if she will not tell anybody what happened. At around 3:00 in the morning,
they went out of the house and headed towards the tricycle terminal. She went home and told her Aunt what happened.
Thereafter, they went to the police station to report the incident.

Defense's Version:

AAA was appellant's girlfriend. On 24 January 2004 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, he and AAA eloped and went
to the house of his brother-in-law in Sapa II, Cavite. They spent the night there and agreed that they will go to her Aunt's
house and get her things and will proceed to Bicol. When they reached her aunt's house, AAA went inside while he
waited. After a few minutes, a man came out and chased him with a bolo which prompted him to run. At around 7:00
o'clock in the morning, he was at his sister's house when the policemen arrived and informed him that there was a
complaint filed against him. He went with them to the police station. 3

On September 6, 2013, the RTC rendered judgment finding the accused-appellant guilty as charged, decreeing thusly:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Sandy Domingo y Labis @ Bitoy
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of forcible abduction with rape, defined and penalized under Article 342, in
relation to Article 266-A (as amended by R.A. 8353) and Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, accused Sandy Domingo is hereby ordered to pay AAA: (1) the
amount of ₱50,000.00, as civil indemnity ex delicto,  and (2) the amount of ₱50,000.00, as moral damages; and to pay the
costs.

SO ORDERED.4

Judgment of the CA

On September 24, 2015, the CA affirmed the RTC, holding that AAA's testimony categorically describing how the
appellant had abducted and ravaged her was credible; that her failure to shout for help or to offer tenacious resistance did
not make her submission to him voluntary; that his use of the knife was sufficient to compel her to submit to his demands;
that the presentation of the examining physician as a witness was not indispensible in proving the rape; that his
"sweetheart theory" could not be given weight as a defense because he did not thereby establish that such relationship
had really existed.1âwphi1

Issue

In his appeal, the appellant submits that:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT5

The appellant contends that AAA's testimony was incomplete and incredible, and as such did not substantiate the charges
against him; that she had not thereby elaborated how she was forced, coerced or intimidated into submitting to him; that
she had voluntarily gone with him, and had consented to the sexual congress;6 that her conduct before, during and
immediately following the crime belied her allegations against him; that her testimony was uncorroborated because the
Prosecution did not present the examining physician; and that on the other hand his own witness, Jocelyn Mariano,
corroborated his having a romantic relationship with AAA. 7
In other words, the appellant submits that the CA committed serious reversible errors in finding him guilty of forcible
abduction with rape despite (a) the incredible testimony of AAA; (b) the failure of the Prosecution to present the
examining physician to explain the findings; and (c) the "sweetheart theory" advanced by him.

Ruling of the Court

We affirm the CA's decision with modification of the characterization of the crime committed.

We note at the outset that the RTC and the CA both found AAA's testimony to be credible. Consequently, it became
incumbent upon the appellant to present clear and persuasive reasons to persuade the Court to reverse their unanimous
determination of her credibility as a witness in order to resolve the appeal his way. Alas, he did not discharge his burden,
and, consequently, we declare that the CA aptly held that:

Our review of the records reveals that AAA's testimony was candid and straightforward. During cross-examination, she
remained steadfast, consistent and unwavering in her testimony. She categorically described how appellant took
advantage of her. She narrated that appellant offered to accompany her home. However, when they boarded the tricycle,
appellant poked a bladed weapon on her right waist. Paralyzed with fear, she was unable to shout or ask for help. x x x x
[W]hile it appears that AAA initially agreed for appellant to accompany her home, her willingness ceased when appellant
pointed a bladed weapon at her right waist. Overcome by fear, she was not able to react when the tricycle proceeded to
an unfamiliar place. Considering the foregoing circumstances, AAA's failure to shout for help does not give less credit to
her testimony. Time and again, it has been held that physical resistance is not an element in the crime of rape and need
not be established when intimidation is exercised upon the victim. The victim's failure to shout or offer tenacious
resistance did not make voluntary her submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. Appellant's use of a knife was
enough for AAA to submit to his demands. Not every victim can be expected to act with reason or in conformity with the
usual expectations of everyone. The workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable; people
react differently.8

We remind the appellant that the trial court's evaluation and conclusion on the credibility of witnesses in rape cases are
generally accorded great weight and respect, and at times even finality, especially after the CA as the intermediate
reviewing tribunals has affirmed the findings, unless there is a clear showing that the findings were reached arbitrarily, or
that certain facts or circumstances of weight, substance or value were overlooked, misapprehended or misappreciated
that, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. In this case, the appellant has not made such showing.
Indeed, we have no reason to reverse the well-considered findings and observations of the lower courts.

We do not find the non-presentation of the physician who had examined AAA to affect in any significant manner the
credibility of the victim's testimony. After all, the medical findings have never been considered indispensable in supporting
convictions for rape. In contrast, we reiterate that the rape victim's testimony, standing alone, can be made the basis of
the successful prosecution of the culprit provided such testimony meets the test of credibility.9

Anent the sweetheart defense of the appellant, the CA and the trial court justly rejected it. Such defense, being
uncorroborated and self-serving, deserved scant consideration. Nonetheless, that the appellant and the victim had been
sweethearts was no excuse in the eyes of the law for him to employ force and intimidation in gratifying his carnal
desires. 10

Was the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape committed?

Under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code,  the elements of forcible abduction are: (1) the taking of a woman against
her will; and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when the
abductor has carnal knowledge of the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or
intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under 12
years of age or is demented.

Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, the appellant should be convicted only of rape. His forcible
abduction of AAA was absorbed by the rape considering that his real objective in abducting her was to commit the rape.
Where the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of the victim of rape was to have carnal knowledge of her, he
could be convicted only of rape. 11

The penalty of reclusion perpetua  was properly imposed pursuant to Article 266(B)12 of the Revised Penal Code.  13
To accord with jurisprudence, 14 the awards of damages are increased as follows: (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2)
P75,000.00 as moral damages; and (3) ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages. Moreover, the CA correctly imposed interest
of 6% per annum on all such items of civil liability reckoned from the finality of judgment until fully paid.15

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on September 24, 2015, with the MODIFICATION that

accused SANDY DOMINGO y LABIS is: (a) DECLARED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of SIMPLE
RAPE as defined under Article 266- A of the Revised Penal Code  and penalized with reclusion perpetua;  and
(b) ORDERED TO PAY to AAA ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as
exemplary damages, plus interest of 6o/o per annum  on all the items of civil liability reckoned from the finality of judgment
until fully paid. The accused shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 200233               JULY 15, 2015

LEONILA G. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

We resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago from the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566.1 The CA affirmed the Decision and Order of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 7232 2 convicting her of bigamy.

THE FACTS

Four months after the solemnization of their marriage on 29 July 1997, 3 Leonila G. Santiago and Nicanor F. Santos faced
an Information 4 for bigamy. Petitioner pleaded "not guilty," while her putative husband escaped the criminal suit. 5

The prosecution adduced evidence that Santos, who had been married to Estela Galang since 2 June 1974, 6 asked
petitioner to marry him. Petitioner, who 'was a 43-year-old widow then, married Santos on 29 July 1997 despite the advice
of her brother-in-law and parents-in-law that if she wanted to remarry, she should choose someone who was "without
responsibility." 7

Petitioner asserted her affirmative defense that she could not be included as an accused in the crime of bigamy, because
she had been under the belief that Santos was still single when they got married. She also averred that for there to be a
conviction for bigamy, his second marriage to her should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case, she argued
that their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license.

Eleven years after the inception of this criminal case, the first wife, Estela Galang, testified for the
prosecution.1âwphi1 She alleged that she had met petitioner as early as March and April 1997, on which occasions the
former introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos. Petitioner denied this allegation and averred that she met Galang
only in August and September 1997, or after she had already married Santos.

THE RTC RULING

The RTC appreciated the undisputed fact that petitioner married Santos during the subsistence of his marriage to Galang.
Based on the more credible account of Galang that she had already introduced herself as the legal wife of Santos in
March and April 1997, the trial court rejected the affirmative defense of petitioner that she had not known of the first
marriage. It also held that it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to be easily duped by a person like
Santos. 8

The RTC declared that as indicated in the Certificate of Marriage, "her marriage was celebrated without a need for a
marriage license in accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code, which is an admission that she cohabited with Santos
long before the celebration of their marriage." 9Thus, the trial court convicted petitioner as follows: 10

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the accused Leonila G. Santiago GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Bigamy, defined and penalized under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code and imposes against her the
indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correctional as minimum to six ( 6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor as maximum.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She contended that her marriage to Santos was void ab initio for having been
celebrated without complying with Article 34 of the Family Code, which provides an exemption from the requirement of a
marriage license if the parties have actually lived together as husband and wife for at least five years prior to the
celebration of their marriage. In her case, petitioner asserted that she and Santos had not lived together as husband and
wife for five years prior to their marriage. Hence, she argued that the absence of a marriage license effectively rendered
their marriage null and void, justifying her acquittal from bigamy.

The RTC refused to reverse her conviction and held thus: 11

Accused Santiago submits that it is her marriage to her co-accused that is null and void as it was celebrated without a
valid marriage license x x x. In advancing that theory, accused wants this court to pass judgment on the validity of her
marriage to accused Santos, something this court cannot do. The best support to her argument would have been the
submission of a judicial decree of annulment of their marriage. Absent such proof, this court cannot declare their marriage
null and void in these proceedings.

THE CA RULING

On appeal before the CA, petitioner claimed that her conviction was not based on proof beyond reasonable doubt. She
attacked the credibility of Galang and insisted that the former had not known of the previous marriage of Santos.

Similar to the RTC, the CA gave more weight to the prosecution witnesses' narration. It likewise disbelieved the testimony
of Santos. Anent the lack of a marriage license, the appellate court simply stated that the claim was a vain attempt to put
the validity of her marriage to Santos in question. Consequently, the CA affirmed her conviction for bigamy. 12

THE ISSUES

Before this Court, petitioner reiterates that she cannot be a co-accused in the instant case, because she was not aware of
Santos's previous marriage. But in the main, she argues that for there to be a conviction for bigamy, a valid second
marriage must be proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

Citing People v. De Lara, 13 she contends that her marriage to Santos is void because of the absence of a marriage
license. She elaborates that their marriage does not fall under any of those marriages exempt from a marriage license,
because they have not previously lived together exclusively as husband and wife for at least five years. She alleges that it
is extant in the records that she married Santos in 1997, or only four years since she met him in 1993. Without completing
the five-year requirement, she posits that their marriage without a license is void.

In the Comment 14 filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), respondent advances the argument that the instant
Rule 45 petition should be denied for raising factual issues as regards her husband's subsequent marriage. As regards
petitioner's denial of any knowledge of Santos' s first marriage, respondent reiterates that credible testimonial evidence
supports the conclusion of the courts a quo that petitioner knew about the subsisting marriage.

The crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

In Montanez v. Cipriano, 15 this Court enumerated the elements of bigamy as follows:

The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally
dissolved x x x; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent
marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. (Emphasis supplied)

For the second spouse to be indicted as a co-accused in the crime, People v. Nepomuceno, Jr. 16 instructs that she should
have had knowledge of the previous subsisting marriage. People v. Archilla 17 likewise states that the knowledge of the
second wife of the fact of her spouse's existing prior marriage constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the commission
of bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice.

THE RULING OF THE COURT

The penalty for bigamy and petitioner's knowledge of Santos's first marriage

The crime of bigamy does not necessary entail the joint liability of two persons who marry each other while the previous
marriage of one of them is valid and subsisting. As explained in Nepomuceno: 18
In the crime of bigamy, both the first and second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances,
as when the second spouse married the accused without being aware of his previous marriage. Only if the second spouse
had knowledge of the previous undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in the information as a co-
accused. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the lower courts correctly ascertained petitioner's knowledge of Santos's marriage to Galang. Both courts
consistently found that she knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality of the following circumstances: 19 (1) when
Santos was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her in-laws, they openly showed their disapproval of him; (2) it
was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to not know of his true civil status; and (3) Galang, who was the more
credible witness compared with petitioner who had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she
had already told petitioner on two occasions that the former was the legal wife of Santos.

After a careful review of the records, we see no reason to reverse or modify the factual findings of the R TC, less so in the
present case in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. Indeed, the trial court's assessment of the credibility of
witnesses deserves great respect, since it had the important opportunity to observe firsthand the expression and
demeanor of the witnesses during the trial. 20

Given that petitioner knew of the first marriage, this Court concurs with the ruling that she was validly charged with
bigamy. However, we disagree with the lower courts' imposition of the principal penalty on her. To recall, the RTC, which
the CA affirmed, meted out to her the penalty within the range of prision correctional as minimum to prision mayor as
maximum.

Her punishment as a principal to the crime is wrong. Archilla 21 holds that the second spouse, if indicted in the crime of
bigamy, is liable only as an accomplice. In referring to Viada, Justice Luis B. Reyes, an eminent authority in criminal law,
writes that "a person, whether man or woman, who knowingly consents or agrees to be married to another already bound
in lawful wedlock is guilty as an accomplice in the crime of bigamy." 22 Therefore, her conviction should only be that for an
accomplice to the crime.

Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the penalty for a principal in the crime of bigamy is prision
mayor, which has a duration of six years and one day to twelve years. Since the criminal participation of petitioner is that
of an accomplice, the sentence imposable on her is the penalty next lower in degree, 23 prision correctional, which has a
duration of six months and one day to six years. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, this penalty
shall be imposed in its medium period consisting of two years, four months and one day to four years and two months of
imprisonment. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 24 petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken
from the penalty next lower in degree, arresto mayor, which has a duration of one month and one day to six months
imprisonment.

The criminal liability of petitioner resulting from her marriage to Santos

Jurisprudence clearly requires that for the accused to be convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity. 25 If the accused wants to raise the nullity of the marriage, he or she can do it
as a matter of defense during the presentation of evidence in the trial proper of the criminal case. 26 In this case, petitioner
has consistently27 questioned below the validity of her marriage to Santos on the ground that marriages celebrated without
the essential requisite of a marriage license are void ab initio. 28

Unfortunately, the lower courts merely brushed aside the issue. The RTC stated that it could not pass judgment on the
validity of the marriage.1âwphi1 The CA held that the attempt of petitioner to attack her union with Santos was in vain.

On the basis that the lower courts have manifestly overlooked certain issues and facts, 29 and given that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case open for review, 30 this Court now resolves to correct the error of the courts a quo.

After a perusal of the records, it is clear that the marriage between petitioner and Santos took place without a marriage
license. The absence of this requirement is purportedly explained in their Certificate of Marriage, which reveals that their
union was celebrated under Article 34 of the Family Code. The provision reads as follows:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at
least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing
facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under
oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties are found no legal impediment to the marriage.31
Here, respondent did not dispute that petitioner knew Santos in more or less in February 1996 32 and that after six months
of courtship,33 she married him on 29 July 1997. Without any objection from the prosecution, petitioner testified that
Santos had frequently visited her in Castellano, Nueva Ecija, prior to their marriage. However, he never cohabited with
her, as she was residing in the house of her in-laws,34 and her children from her previous marriage disliked him.35 On
cross examination, respondent did not question the claim of petitioner that sometime in 1993, she first met Santos as an
agent who sold her piglets.36

All told, the evidence on record shows that petitioner and Santos had only known each other for only less than four years.
Thus, it follows that the two of them could not have cohabited for at least five years prior to their marriage.

Santiago and Santos, however, reflected the exact opposite of this demonstrable fact. Although the records do not show
that they submitted an affidavit of cohabitation as required by Article 34 of the Family Code, it appears that the two of
them lied before the solemnizing officer and misrepresented that they had actually cohabited for at least five years before
they married each other. Unfortunately, subsequent to this lie was the issuance of the Certificate of Marriage, 37 in which
the solemnizing officer stated under oath that no marriage license was necessary, because the marriage was solemnized
under Article 34 of the Family Code.

The legal effects in a criminal case of a deliberate act to put a flaw in the marriage

The Certificate of Marriage, signed by Santos and Santiago, contained the misrepresentation perpetrated by them that
they were eligible to contract marriage without a license. We thus face an anomalous situation wherein petitioner seeks to
be acquitted of bigamy based on her illegal actions of (1) marrying Santos without a marriage license despite knowing that
they had not satisfied the cohabitation requirement under the law; and (2) falsely making claims in no less than her
marriage contract.

We chastise this deceptive scheme that hides what is basically a bigamous and illicit marriage in an effort to escape
criminal prosecution. Our penal laws on marriage, such as bigamy, punish an individual's deliberate disregard of the
permanent and sacrosanct character of this special bond between spouses.38 In Tenebro v. Court of Appeals,39 we had
the occasion to emphasize that the State's penal laws on bigamy should not be rendered nugatory by allowing individuals
"to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of
contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and commitment."

Thus, in the case at bar, we cannot countenance petitioner's illegal acts of feigning a marriage and, in the same breath,
adjudge her innocent of the crime. For us, to do so would only make a mockery of the sanctity of marriage. 40

Furthermore, it is a basic concept of justice that no court will "lend its aid to x x x one who has consciously and voluntarily
become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of action is founded." 41 If the cause of action appears to arise ex
turpi causa or that which involves a transgression of positive law, parties shall be left unassisted by the courts. 42 As a
result, litigants shall be denied relief on the ground that their conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 43

Here, the cause of action of petitioner, meaning her affirmative defense in this criminal case of bigamy, is that her
marriage with Santos was void for having been secured without a marriage license. But as elucidated earlier, they
themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license
requirement based on their fabricated claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years
prior their marriage. In violation of our law against illegal marriages,44 petitioner married Santos while knowing full well that
they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently,
it will be the height of absurdity for this Court to allow petitioner to use her illegal act to escape criminal conviction.

The applicability of People v. De Lara

Petitioner cites De Lara as the relevant jurisprudence involving an acquittal for bigamy on the ground that the second
marriage lacked the requisite marriage license. In that case, the Court found that when Domingo de Lara married his
second wife, Josefa Rosales, on 18 August 1951, the local Civil Registrar had yet to issue their marriage license on 19
August 1951. Thus, since the marriage was celebrated one day before the issuance of the marriage license, the Court
acquitted him of bigamy.

Noticeably, Domingo de Lara did not cause the falsification of public documents in order to contract a second marriage. In
contrast, petitioner and Santos fraudulently secured a Certificate of Marriage, and petitioner later used this blatantly illicit
act as basis for seeking her exculpation. Therefore, unlike our treatment of the accused in De Lara, this Court cannot
regard petitioner herein as innocent of the crime.

No less than the present Constitution provides that "marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State." 45 It must be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the contracting
parties. 46 in keeping therefore with this fundamental policy, this Court affirms the conviction of petitioner for bigamy

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Leonila G. Santiago is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 33566 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. As modified, petitioner
Leonila G. Santiago is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy as an accomplice. She is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years of prision
correctional as maximum plus accessory penalties provided by law.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision correccional as minimum
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the
appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed
to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar,
Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.

On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of
nullity of accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of his
marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied
upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional  as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null and
void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even
if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9 which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by
said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good faith in contracting the second
marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that
one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial court
rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no
marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished
by Article 34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been
dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning is not a valid defense in a
bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be
accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public
policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual
by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for
good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16 However, the denial was by a split vote.
The ponente of the appellate court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in
the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first marriage was validly
declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the
first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES
PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE]
PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND
EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT.17

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his defense of
good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court.
He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy
would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in
the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and
hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference
between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his
intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient
but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of
no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good
faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020,
seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether all the
elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has
not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of
Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage
entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing
the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.21

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing
officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of the
Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This simply means that there was no
marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all
intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of the law, never married."24 The records show that no
appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final
and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the
principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The
contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes,
petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the
validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the
instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We
held therein that:

A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a
judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites.
Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage
contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without
more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy
unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and
weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need
not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and
academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182438               July 2, 2014

RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008
decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
(RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.

The Factual Antecedents

The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March
29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding, the
supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a wedding
gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also
known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the
latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage certificate.

The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in
the presence of the groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited
guests.4

An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner
before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5

The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on arraignment.

The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil
sponsor while Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk down the
aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a document.6 She heard the
petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception, had lunch
and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7

Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare during the ceremony that they take each
other as husband and wife.8 Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license was issued to the
couple.9

The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount
to a solemnization of the marriage as contemplated by law.10

The MTC Judgment

The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00
fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage
ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and wife.11 It further
ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of
the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the
Marriage Law which pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or of the
regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not
more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court.

The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these
laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12

The RTC Ruling

The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in
"blessing" the couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC,
however, ruled that the basis of the fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.

The CA Decision

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although there is no prescribed form or religious rite
for the solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony has
been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they
should declare that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal
age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage
certificate is not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.15

The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent
on whether Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16

The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it
covers violation of regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.

The Petition

The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and
does not define what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally
constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions require the
verbal declaration that the couple take each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The
petitioner likewise maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared that they
take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of separation of church and State, the State cannot
interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19

Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral
guidance to the couple.20

Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should
preclude the filing of the present case against him.21

Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The present case is not covered by Section
44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22

THE COURT’S RULING:

We find the petition unmeritorious.

The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, were proven by the prosecution

Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any
illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has authority to
solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended.

While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its
"illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were taken from
Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments. Article 625 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the contracting parties to appear personally before the
solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take each other as
husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage
ceremony as that which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age.

Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form
of religious rite for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets the
minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal appearance of the
contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.

As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by
witnesses. On the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution has proven,
through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as husband
and wife.

The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge
may examine or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness
and to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one party.28

At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it
from belatedly invoking any irregularity.

In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of
the ceremony, support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they take each
other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome
these clear and convincing pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses,
Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the petitioner.

We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of church and State precludes the State from
qualifying the church "blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has been
duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting
its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core requirements of law be observed.

We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and
that our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is
vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of
the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage.

From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum
requirements set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of the
requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.

We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.

Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage
certificate. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship.

Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and formal
requirements of marriage set by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability in the present
case. For purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in
the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.

Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper

On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall
be imposed in accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are
Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:

Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being authorized by
the Director of the Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization in
force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having charge and any
bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who authorized the immediate
solemnization of a marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in
violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine
of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:

Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not specifically penalized, or of the
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos
or by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]

From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable
in the present case is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.

The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the
MTC, the petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It
is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point,
Article 352 falls squarely under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty for any violation
of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted
after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations.

Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR.
No. 31028.

SO ORDERED.
 CRIMES AGAINST HONOR

G.R. No. 172203               February 14, 2011

DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., Respondents.

Freedom of expression enjoys an exalted place in the hierarchy of constitutional rights. Free expression however, "is not
absolute for it may be so regulated that [its exercise shall neither] be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society."1 Libel stands as an exception to the enjoyment of that
most guarded constitutional right.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Dionisio Lopez
(petitioner) assailing the Decision2 dated August 31, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28175. The CA
affirmed with modification the Decision3 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City, Branch 60 finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel.

Procedural and Factual Antecedents

On April 3, 2003, petitioner was indicted for libel in an Information dated March 31, 2003, the accusatory portion of which
reads in full as follows:

That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the herein accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to impeach the
integrity, reputation and putting to public ridicule and dishonor the offended party MAYOR SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE,
JR., City Mayor of Cadiz City and with malice and intent to injure and expose the said offended party to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule put up billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel, Villena Street, Cadiz City and at Gustilo
Boulevard, Cadiz City, which billboards/signboards read as follows:

"CADIZ FOREVER"

"______________ NEVER"

thereby deliberately titillating the curiosity of and drawing extraordinary attention from the residents of Cadiz City and
passers-by over what would be placed before the word "NEVER". Later on November 15, 2002, accused affixed the
nickname of the herein private complainant "BADING" and the name of the City of "SAGAY" before the word "NEVER"
thus making the billboard appear as follows

"CADIZ FOREVER"

"BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"

For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to induce the readers/passers-by to suppose
and understand that something fishy was going on, therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of
Mayor Salvador G. Escalante, Jr., and hence were highly libelous, offensive and defamatory to the good name, character
and reputation of the offended party and his office and that the said billboards/signboards were read by thousands if not
hundred[s] of thousands of persons, which caused damage and prejudice to the offended party by way of moral damages
in the amount [of]:

₱5,000,000.00 – as moral damages.

ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment on May 8, 2003, petitioner, as accused, entered a plea of "not guilty." During the pre-trial, the parties
stipulated, among others, on the identity of the accused, that the private complainant is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz
City and is popularly known by the nickname "Bading" and that the petitioner calls the private complainant "Bading."
Thenceforth, trial on the merits commenced in due course.
Evidence introduced for the prosecution reveals that in the early part of November 2002, while exercising his official duties
as Mayor of Cadiz City, private respondent saw billboards with the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank space
before the word "NEVER" directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena
streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and
wondered on what the message conveyed since it was incomplete.

Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call relating that the blank space preceding
the word "NEVER" was filled up with the added words "BADING AND SAGAY." The next day, he saw the billboards with
the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was being
maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a "tuta" of Sagay, private respondent, after consultation
with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for libel against petitioner. He claimed that the incident resulted
in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. He thus prayed for damages.

Jude Martin Jaropillo (Jude) is a licensing officer of the Permit and License Division of Cadiz City. While on a licensing
campaign, he was able to read the message on the billboards. He wondered what fault the person alluded therein has
done as the message is so negative. He felt that the message is an insult to the mayor since it creates a negative
impression, as if he was being rejected by the people of Cadiz City. He claimed that he was giving his testimony
voluntarily and he was not being rewarded, coerced or forced by anybody.

Nenita Bermeo (Nenita), a retired government employee of Cadiz City, was at Delilah’s Coffee [Shop] in the morning of
November 19, 2002 when she heard the petitioner shouting "Bading, Bading, Never, Never." She and the tricycle drivers
drinking coffee were told by petitioner "You watch out I will add larger billboards." When she went around Cadiz City, she
saw larger billboards with the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER," thus confirming what petitioner
had said. With the message, she felt as if the people were trying to disown the private respondent. According to her,
petitioner has an ax to grind against the mayor. Like Jude, she was not also forced or rewarded in giving her testimony.

Bernardita Villaceran (Bernardita) also found the message unpleasant because Mayor Escalante is an honorable and
dignified resident of Cadiz City. According to her, the message is an insult not only to the person of the mayor but also to
the people of Cadiz City.

Petitioner admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all the things happening around Cadiz City. He
mentioned "BADING" because he was not in conformity with the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He
insisted that he has no intention whatsoever of referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta" of Sagay. He contended that it was
private respondent who referred to Bading as "Tuta" of Sagay. He further maintained that his personal belief and
expression was that he will never love Bading and Sagay. He concluded that the message in the billboards is just a wake-
up call for Cadiz City.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner

of libel. The trial court ruled that from the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution vìs-a-vìs that of the
defense, all the elements of libel are present. The fallo of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds accused DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI (bonded) GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Libel defined and penalized under Article 353 in relation to Article 355 of the
Revised Penal Code and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attendant thereto hereby sentences him
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of FOUR MONTHS AND TWENTY DAYS of Arresto Mayor maximum
as the minimum to TWO YEARS, ELEVEN MONTHS AND TEN DAYS of Prision Correccional Medium as the maximum
and a FINE of ₱5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

The accused is further ordered to pay the private complainant the sum of ₱5,000,000.00 by way of moral damages.

The cash bond posted by the accused is hereby ordered cancelled and returned to the accused, however the penalty of
Fine adjudged against the accused is hereby ordered deducted from the cash bond posted by the accused pursuant to
Section 22 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and the remaining balance ordered returned to the accused. The accused is
hereby ordered immediately committed to the BJMP, Cadiz City for the service of his sentence.

Cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.5

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA which, as stated earlier, rendered judgment on August 31, 2005,
affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC. Like the trial court, the appellate court found the presence of all the
elements of the crime of libel. It reduced however, the amount of moral damages to ₱500,000.00. Petitioner then filed his
Motion for Reconsideration, which the appellate court denied in its Resolution6 dated April 7, 2006.

Disgruntled, petitioner is now before us via the instant petition. Per our directive, private respondent filed his Comment7 on
August 29, 2006 while the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) representing public respondent People of the Philippines,
submitted a Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment8 on even date. After the filing of petitioner’s Reply to private
respondent’s Comment, we further requested the parties to submit their respective memoranda. The OSG filed a
Manifestation in Lieu of Memorandum, adopting as its memorandum, the Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment it
earlier filed. Petitioner and private respondent submitted their respective memoranda as required.

Issues

Petitioner raised the following arguments in support of his petition:

WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE WORDS "CADIZ FOREVER[,] BADING
AND SAGAY NEVER" CONTAINED IN THE BILLBOARDS/SIGNBOARDS SHOW THE INJURIOUS NATURE OF THE
IMPUTATIONS MADE AGAINST THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT AND TENDS TO INDUCE SUSPICION ON HIS
CHARACTER, INTEGRITY AND REPUTATION AS MAYOR OF CADIZ CITY.

II

ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE WORDS "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
CONTAINED IN THE BILLBOARDS ERECTED BY PETITIONER ARE DEFAMATORY, DID THE COURT OF APPEALS
ERR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THEY COMPRISE FAIR COMMENTARY ON MATTERS OF PUBLIC INTEREST WHICH
ARE THEREFORE PRIVILEGED?

III

WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE IN THE
CASE AT BAR HAS NOT BEEN OVERTHROWN.

IV

WHETHER X X X THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING PETITIONER OF THE CHARGE OF LIBEL
AND IN HOLDING HIM LIABLE FOR MORAL DAMAGES IN THE AMOUNT OF ₱500,000.9

Summed up, the focal issues tendered in the present petition boil down to the following: 1) whether the printed phrase
"CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" is libelous; and 2) whether the controversial words used constituted
privileged communication.

Our Ruling

We ought to reverse the CA ruling.

At the outset, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The factual findings of the lower courts are final and conclusive and are not reviewable by this Court, unless the case falls
under any of the following recognized exceptions:

1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures;
 2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;

4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;

6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;

7. When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

8. When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and,

10. When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.10

Indeed, the CA affirmed the factual findings of the RTC that all the elements of the crime of libel are present in this case.
Thus, following the general rule, we are precluded from making further evaluation of the factual antecedents of the case.
However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that both lower courts have greatly misapprehended the facts in arriving at their
unanimous conclusion. Hence, we are constrained to apply one of the exceptions specifically paragraph 4 above, instead
of the general rule.

Petitioner takes exception to the CA’s ruling that the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. He
avers that there is nothing in said printed matter tending to defame and induce suspicion on the character, integrity and
reputation of private respondent.

The OSG, in its Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment, asserts that "there is nothing in the phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER" and "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" which ascribe to private respondent any crime, vice or defect, or any
act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which will either dishonor, discredit, or put him into contempt."11

The prosecution maintains that the appellate court correctly sustained the trial court’s finding of guilt on petitioner. Citing
well-established jurisprudence12 holding that "[w]ords calculated to induce suspicion are sometimes more effective

to destroy reputation than false charges directly made" and that "[i]ronical and metaphorical language is a favored vehicle
for slander," it argued that the words printed on the billboards somehow bordered on the incomprehensible and the
ludicrous yet they were so deliberately crafted solely to induce suspicion and cast aspersion against private respondent’s
honor and reputation.

A libel is defined as "a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act,
omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial
person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead."13 "For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must
concur: a) it must be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be
identifiable."14 Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.

Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed phrase must be proved first because
this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not
prosper. Malice is necessarily rendered immaterial.

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put
him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine "whether a statement is
defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense."15 Moreover, "[a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to
suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are
sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule."16

Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s finding that the phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" tends to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity and
reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its
entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private respondent’s
integrity. Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the
word did not cast aspersion upon private respondent’s integrity and reputation much less convey the idea that he was
guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is
our considered view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondent’s performance
of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and dignity more so to deprive him of
public confidence.

Indeed, the prosecution witnesses were able to read the message printed in the billboards and gave a negative
impression on what it says. They imply that the message conveys something as if the private respondent was being
rejected as city mayor of Cadiz. But the trustworthiness of these witnesses is doubtful considering the moral ascendancy
exercised over them by the private respondent such that it is quite easy for them to draw such negative impression. As
observed by the OSG, at the time the billboards were erected and during the incumbency of private respondent as mayor
of Cadiz City, these witnesses were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall or active in the project of the city government.
Bernardita was a member of the Clean and Green Program of Cadiz City; Jude was employed as a licensing officer under
the Permit and License Division of the Cadiz City Hall and Nenita held the position of Utility Worker II of the General
Services Office of Cadiz City. These witnesses, according to the OSG, would naturally testify in his favor. They could have
verbicide the meaning of the word "NEVER." Prudently, at the least, the prosecution could have presented witnesses
within the community with more independent disposition than these witnesses who are beholden to private respondent.

According to the private respondent, the message in the billboards would like to convey to the people of Cadiz that he is a
tuta of Sagay City.

We disagree. Strangely, the OSG adopted a position contrary to the interest of the People. In its Manifestation and Motion
in Lieu of Comment, instead of contesting the arguments of the petitioner, the OSG surprisingly joined stance with him,
vehemently praying for his acquittal. We quote with approval the OSG’s analysis of the issue which was the basis for its
observation, thus:

During the proceedings in the trial court, private respondent testified that the subject billboards maligned his character and
portrayed him as a puppet of Sagay City, Thus:

Q: You do not know of course the intention of putting those billboards "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"?

A: Definitely, I know the intention because to answer your question, it will not only require those "BADING AND SAGAY
NEVER" billboard[s], it was after which additional billboards were put up. That strengthen, that I am being a "Tuta of
Sagay. I am being maligned because of those billboards that states and I repeat: "Ang Tubig san Cadiz, ginkuha sang
Sagay", "Welcome to Brgy. Cadiz" and there is a small word under it, Zone 2, very small, very very small, you cannot see
it in [sic] a glance.

xxxx

A: That is the meaning of the signboard[s]. The message that the signboards would like to convey to the people of Cadiz,
that the Mayor of Cadiz City is a "Tuta" or Puppet of Sagay City.

x x x x17

Contrary to private respondent’s assertion, there is nothing in the subject billboards which state, either directly or
indirectly, that he is, in his words, a "tuta" or "puppet" of Sagay City. Except for private respondent, not a single
prosecution witness testified that the billboards portray Mayor Bading Escalante, Jr. as a "tuta or "puppet" of Sagay City.
The billboards erected by petitioner simply say "CADIZ FOREVER", "BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"18
Apparently, private respondent refers to the circumstances mentioned in another billboard that is not the subject matter in
the present charge. The aforesaid facts dismally failed to support the allegations in the instant information. Be that as it
may, private respondent nevertheless did not specify any actionable wrong or particular act or omission on petitioner’s
part that could have defamed him or caused his alleged injury. While it may be that the Court is not bound by the analysis
and observation of the OSG, still, the Court finds that it deserves meritorious consideration. The prosecution never
indulged to give any reason persuasive enough for the court not to adopt it.

Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was not pleased with the controversial printed matter. But that is
grossly insufficient to make it actionable by itself. "[P]ersonal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not
automatically equivalent to defamation,"19 "words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se,
and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute bases for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that the
language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself," as the Court ruled in MVRS Publications, Inc. v.
Islamic Da’ Wah Council of the Phils., Inc.201avvphil

In arriving at an analogous finding of guilt on petitioner, both lower courts heavily relied on the testimony of the petitioner
pertaining to the reasons behind the printing of the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER."21 Our in-
depth scrutiny of his testimony, however, reveals that the reasons elicited by the prosecution mainly relate to the
discharge of private respondent’s official duties as City Mayor of Cadiz City. For that matter, granting that the controversial
phrase is considered defamatory, still, no liability attaches on petitioner. Pursuant to Article 361 of the Revised Penal
Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to the discharge of his official duties and
functions and the truth of the allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not
prove that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. As the Court held in United States v.
Bustos,22 the policy of a public official may be attacked, rightly or wrongly with every argument which ability can find or
ingenuity invent. The public officer "may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged by
the balm of a clear conscience. A public [official] must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official
acts."

"In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the offense be established
with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of guilt."23 In this case, contrary to the conclusion of
the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court, the prosecution failed to prove that the controversial phrase "CADIZ
FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" imputes derogatory remarks on private respondent’s character, reputation
and integrity. In this light, any discussion on the issue of malice is rendered moot.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2005 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 28175 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 159787             May 25, 2007

OGIE DIAZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (Eleventh
Division) dated March 15, 2002, in CA-G.R. CR No. 22545.

On October 16, 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Manila an
Information for libel against Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz (Ogie Frias in real life), petitioner. The Information, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 92-1113377, reads:

That on or about December 28, 1991, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then the Managing Editor
and writer, respectively of Bandera, a newspaper of general circulation, conspiring and confederating together and
mutually helping each other, with the malicious purpose of impeaching the integrity, honor and reputation of one
FLORINDA BAGAY, and with the evident intent of exposing her to public interest, hatred, contempt, and ridicule, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously write and publish, or cause to be written and published in the movie section
of said newspaper an article which reads in part as follows:

Ilang beses na nakaladkad ang pangalan ng isang Miss S sa buhay ni Philip Henson ang lalaking mahilig makipagsex sa
asawa. Nasulat na sa ibang tabloid na limang beses diumanong ginalaw ni Philip ang babaing kine-claim na  "nabuntis
ako ni Philip."

Dahil sa pahayag na yon ay nagpaliwanang at nagbigay pa ng detalye si Philip. Nagpa-interbyu siya sa ilang piling
reporters.

At muli, babanggitin lang namin ang kanyang mga pahayag tungkol sa pagkakasangkot niya sa buhay ni Miss S.

Inamin ni Philip na limang beses niyang ginalaw si Miss S. Pero hindi ko pinasok ang akin sa ano niya dahil siya rin ang
may ayaw.

Ang sabi niya kasi sa akin, isa siyang malinis na babae at hindi siya basta-basta nagpapaganuon. So ang ginawa namin,
ipit method.

Yung ipitin niya iyong akin sa dalawa niyang hita kunwari sa ano niya nakapasok habang nagpa-pump ako.

Siya pa nga ang nagturo sa akin ng iba’t ibang posisyon, e yung helicopter at saka ang galing niyang bumlow job. Sanay
na sanay siya.

Kahit itanong nyo pa kay Ray Ravelo. Nagalaw din siya ni Rey, pahayag ni Philip at kami mismo ang nakarining ng mga
linyang iyon sa isa naming pag-uusap sa Jaloux Disco.

In which words and phrases, which were used by many people, the said accused meant and intended to convey as in
fact, they meant and conveyed false and malicious imputations that the said Florinda Bagay is a sexual pervert and
possesses lascivious and immoral habits, the accused well knowing that said imputations are devoid of truth and without
foundation in fact whatsoever, highly libelous and offensive to the good name, character, and reputation of the said
Florinda Bagay.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon being arraigned on June 8, 1993, petitioner Ogie Diaz and his co-accused Pichel, assisted by counsel, pleaded not
guilty. After the pre-trial, the case was heard on the merits.

Florinda Bagay, complaining witness, testified that she is a graduate of medical secretarial course. She tried her luck in
the movies under the guidance of her godmother, Mila Parawan, a writer covering the entertainment industry. Florinda
adopted and used "Patricia Santillan" as her screen name.
During her brief stint in the movies, she met Philip Henson, an aspiring bit player. A whirlwind romance between them
followed and on June 16, 1988, they started living together. On March 9, 1991, she gave birth to a girl she named Maria
Briana Bagay. By that time, her relationship with Philip Henson ended.

Florinda claimed she was the "Miss S" alluded to in petitioner’s column "Pakurot" considering that her screen name is
"Patricia Santillan."

One Nonette Lim called her attention to the article and she felt embarrassed. Mila Parawan showed her the item. Her
family and neighbors also read it. As a result, she was forced to stop her studies as a medical technology student at the
United Doctors’ Medical Center.

Florinda further testified that at the time the article came out, she and Philip were no longer living together.

Mila Parawan also took the witness stand and corroborated Florinda’s testimony. She further testified that after Philip and
Florinda parted ways, her former press relations officer, who used the nom de plume "Isko Peta," wrote an item
entitled "Ibinulgar namin ang babaeng inanakan ni Philip Henson" which appeared in the December 2, 1991 issue
of Artista Magazine. Philip believed that Florinda released their story to the press. He then caused the publication of the
libelous article against her.

Mila Parawan added that Florinda came from a well respected family in their community. Thus, she could not have done
the acts being imputed to her.

On cross-examination, Mila Parawan stated she was certain the "Miss S" referred to in the article is Florinda because
petitioner and Pichel, her good friends, told her that "Miss S" is her "alaga" (ward).

Pichel testified that he had been a journalist covering show business for the past 21 years. He denied having met or
known the complaining witness. He also denied being the editor of Bandera. He was only its lay-out artist, a part time job.

Petitioner Ogie Diaz admitted that while he wrote the column "Pakurot" where the alleged libelous statements appeared,
however, he did not know the complaining witness or "Miss S." The source of his article was Philip Henson.

The defense also presented as witness two movie journalists – Ernie Pecho and Mario Bautista. Both had more than 50
years covering the entertainment industry.

Pecho testified that he has never heard the screen name "Patricia Santillan"; that reading the article in question would not
give the reader any idea that "Miss S" is "Patricia Santillan"; and that in the movie world, the letter "S" refers to "shabu,"
not to a person.

Bautista, for his part, stated that he has never heard of any actress or starlet named "Patricia Santillan." After reading the
article, it never came to his mind that "Miss S" is one "Patricia Santillan."

Douglas Quijano, a long-time line producer and talent manager, testified that in his many years of managing movie and
TV stars, he could not recall an actress named "Miss S." He has never heard of "Patricia Santillan."

On May 12, 1998, the trial court rendered its judgment convicting petitioner and Pichel of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the above discussion and findings, the Court finds both accused Manny Pichel and Ogie Diaz
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of libel, defined in Article 353 and penalized under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS
AND ONE (1) DAY as minimum to FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correcional in its Minimum and
Medium Periods, as maximum and to pay a fine of P3,000.00 each.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision, sustained the conviction of petitioner but acquitted Pichel.
Petitioner timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court in its Resolution dated August
29, 2003.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.

The sole issue for our resolution is whether the subject article is libelous.

Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides:

ART. 353. Definition of libel. – A libel is a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice, or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of
a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.

This provision should be read in relation with Article 355 of the same Code which states:

ART. 355. Libel by means of writings or similar means. – A libel committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the offended party.

Thus, for an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.2 Absent one of these elements, a case for
libel will not prosper.

We find the first element present. In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed
in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by
the persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.3 In the instant case,
the article in question details the sexual activities of a certain "Miss S" and one "Philip Henson" who had a romantic
liaison. In their ordinary sense, the words used cast aspersion upon the character, integrity, and reputation of "Miss S."
The words convey that "Miss S" is a sexual libertine with unusually wanton proclivities in the bedroom. In a society such
as ours, where modesty is still highly prized among young ladies, the behavior attributed to "Miss S" by the article in
question had besmirched both her character and reputation.

As to the element of malice, we find that since on its face the article is defamatory, there is a presumption that the
offender acted with malice. In Article 354 of the same Code, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. There is malice when the author of the
imputation is prompted by personal ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of
the person who claims to have been defamed.4 We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was neither good reason
nor motive why the subject article was written except to embarrass "Miss S" and injure her reputation.

On the element of publication, there can be no question that the article appeared in the December 28, 1991 issue
of Bandera, a local tabloid.

The last element of libel is that the victim is identified or identifiable from the contents of the libelous article. In order to
maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable, although it is not necessary that the person be named. It
is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference
to facts and circumstances from which others reading the article may know the person alluded to, or if the latter is pointed
out by extraneous circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person
referred to.5 Kunkle v. Cablenews-American and Lyons6 laid the rule that this requirement is complied with where a third
person recognized or could identify the party vilified in the article.

The libelous article, while referring to "Miss S," does not give a sufficient description or other indications which identify
"Miss S." In short, the article fails to show that "Miss S" and Florinda Bagay are one and the same person.

Although the article is libelous, we find that Florinda Bagay could not have been the person defamed therein. In Uy Tioco
v. Yang Shu Wen,7 we held that where the requirement for an identified or identifiable victim has not been complied with,
the case for libel must be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22545
is REVERSED. Petitioner Ogie Diaz is ACQUITTED of the crime of libel. The bail on appeal posted for his temporary
liberty is ordered CANCELLED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 170341

MANILA BULLETIN PUBLISHING CORPORATION AND RUTHER BATUIGAS, Petitioners

vs.
VICTOR A. DOMINGO AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

Through their petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners plead that the Court nullify and set aside
the 30 March 2005 decision1 and 25 October 2005 xesolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),  Eighteenth Division in CA-
G.R. CR. No. 19089 affirming the joint decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban City, in Civil Case No. 91-
02-23 and Criminal Case No. 91-03-159.

THE FACTS

Petitioner Ruther D. Batuigas (Batuigas)  was a writer of the widely circulated tabloid Tempo, published by the Manila
Bulletin Publishing Corporation (Manila Bulletin).

On 20 December 1990, Batuigas wrote an article in his Bull's Eye column in Tempo titled "Crucial task for JoeCon's
successor." The article dealt with the letter-complaint of the Waray employees of the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI),  Region VIII on the "[m]ismanagement, low moral[e], improper decorum, gross inefficiency, nepotism, etc."
in the office. One of the public officials complained of was petitioner Regional Director Victor Domingo (Domingo)  who
was accused of dereliction of official duties, among others.4 The "JoeCon" referred to was the outgoing DTI Secretary,
Jose Concepcion.

On 4 January 1991, Batuigas wrote in his column titled "A challenge to Sec. Garrucho"  about the alleged "lousy
perfoRMance of Regional Director R.D. Domingo in DTI Region 8," among others.5 Peter Garrucho was the newly
appointed DTI Secretary who took over from Jose Concepcion.

Offended by these two articles, Domingo filed, on 18 January 1991, a complaint for libel against Ba.tuigas before the
Provincial Prosecutor of Palo, Leyte.6

On 7 February 1991, Domingo likewise filed a complaint for Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palo,
Leyte, against Batuigas and the Manila Bulletin. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-02-23, was raffled to the
RTC, Branch 6, Palo, Leyte.7

On 18 March 1991, the Provincial Prosecutor terminated the preliminary investigation with the filing of an Information for
Libel8 against Batuigas, viz:

That on or about the 20th day of December 1990, and the 4th day of January 1991, the above-named accused, with
malice afterthought and with intent to damage, ruin and discredit the good name and reputation of one VICTOR A.
DOMINGO of Tacloban City, Leyte, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wr[o]te and publish[ed] in the
TEMPO Publication in Manila, the following, to wit:

December 20, 1990

But whoever will succeed JoeCon (Mr. Jose Concepcion, then the Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry),
will inherit a brewing problem at the Eastern Visayas office of the Department of Trade and industry.

Eastern Visayas in Region 8 is made up of two Leyte and three Samar provinces.

In their letter to this comer, the Waray employees of DTI-8 say they are disgusted over how things are being run and
handled in the regional office in Tacloban City.

Mismanagement, low morale, improper decorum, gross inefficiency, nepotism, etc.

"These complaints, they say, were brought last year to the attention of DTI Makati. Civil Service Commission and
Ombudsman.

Wala raw nangyari sa reklamo nila.

Kaya kami lumapit sa inyo, Gg. Batuigas, dahil nagbibigay ng resulta ang kolum ninyo," his letter said.

To JoeCon's successor, here are the specifics:

Regional Director V. Domingo is accused of dereliction of official duties.

PECS are allegedly mismanaged, the Kalakalan program not given any direction arid non-implementation of the rules on
product standards.

The complainants charge that Director Domingo is more interested in night[-]clubbing the female members of his staff.

He also brings out the staff to seminars and conferences because he enjoys the pleasure of their company and his being
out of his region, they aver.

A provincial director has organized his staff composed of clan members. Only his house pets were not included.

A couple are in the same office holding sensitive positions.

P. Caludac, a division chief, has hired an aunt to assume a vital post.

On the pretext that they are on fieldwork, time cards of ass-kissers are punched to the detriment of those loyal to the
public service.

And these spoiled brats are led by no less than Director Domingo's secretary.

This corner is also told that the director's personal secretary is more often seen in the city hotels and beauty parlors than
in her office.

The civil status of the media specialist is officially recorded as 'single' although her three children were sired by different
fathers.

And Director Domingo has full knowledge of such immorality.

The Leyte provincial director has neglected to perform his functions causing a downfall in business.

This outright neglect is detrimental to DTI and the region's progress.

These national employees should be commended for bringing into the open this garbage that has piled in their own
backyard.

To JoeCon's successor, the chopping board is ready.

All you need is a Muslim kris.

Palakulin mo, Pare ko!

January 4, 1991 issue:

Newly appointed Secretary of the Department of Trade and Industry Peter Garrucho has a difficult job ahead of him.

He is like sailing in turbulent waters.

If he fails the exception (sic) of the public, it is not only his name: at stake, but of Tita Cory, too,

He must perform something extraordinary to surpass what JoeCon did at DTI.

One problem that he should give priority [to] is the lousy perfom1ance of Regional Director (sic) Domingo in DTI Region 8.
There is a serious breakdown of morale of DTI employees in that region because of Domingo's mismanagement.

After we exposed the alleged shenanigans of Domingo and his minions in our Dec. 20 column, the guy reportedly went on
the air over PR TV 12 and radio station

DYXL (sic) in Tacloban City and announced that he would sue this columnist with a 'multi-million pesos' libel [case].

But why should Domingo threaten us with libel suits instead of presenting his side is something that we can't understand.

We have volumes of documents against you, Mr. Domingo, furnished us by your people there at DTI Region 8.

Maybe you should answer them point by point instead of issuing threats against us.

Ms. Lilia Bautista, DTI Undersecretary for personnel and administration should know all the charges against you by this
time.

Your people there have been sending her documented complaints long time ago, before I exposed your kalokohan in my
Dec. 20 column.

You will be reading more about them soon.

Abangan!"

thereby injuring the good name, integrity and honor of said Victor A. Domingo and causing and exposing him to public
hatred, ridicule and contempt.9

The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-03-159, was raffled to the RTC, Branch 6, Palo, Leyte. The criminal
case was subsequently consolidated with Civil Case No. 91-02-23.

When called to the witness stand, Domingo, then the DTI Director for Region VIII, denied the allegations against him
which were contained in the 20 December 1990 and 4 January 1991 articles of Batuigas.10 He claimed that he felt like he
had been assassinated because of these articles, while his family members were emotionally upset and traumatized.11

To support his claim that the allegations against him were not true, Domingo presented the following: (a) his sworn
statement12 for the filing of a libel case against Batuigas;13 (b) the Joint Affidavit14 of all the employees of the DTI Provincial
Office denying that they had sent a letter of complaint to Batuigas as mentioned in the 20 December 1990 article and as
to the allegations contained therein;15 (c) the 8 January 1991 letter16 of Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman Patricia
Sto. Tomas (Chairman Sto. Tomas)  to Batuigas in response to the 20 December 1990 article on the alleged
"mismanagement, low morale, gross inefficiency and nepotism" pervading at the DTI Region VIII;17 (d) the CSC
Indorsement18 of Region VIII Director Eliseo Gatchalian relative to the findings and recommendations on the complaint of
R. De Paz and company;19 (e) the 7 November 1990 letter20 of Victoria E. Valeriano (Valeriano) to the CSC Regional
Director with reference to her investigation on the complaint of R. De Paz and company against him, among others, and
which contained Valeriano' s recommendaion that the complaint be dismissed and be considered closed and terminated21;
(f) the CSC Region VIII Report of Investigation22 where the complaint of immorality against him and Jacqueline G. Aguiles
was dismissed;23 (g) his draft letter24 to Batuigas protesting the inaccuracies and the ill motivation of the 20 December
1990 column but which letter he no longer sent to Batuigas;25 (h) the 28 September 1989 letter26 of the DTI Director of
Legal Affairs transmitting the 7 August 1989 resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman in OSP-88-02282 dismissing the
complaint of Arturo Salvacion against him, among others;27 (i) the 7 August 1989 resolution28 of the Office of the
Ombudsman in OSP-88-02282;29 (J) the 21 August 1989 memorandum.30 of the Office of the Ombudsman on the
qomplaint against him by Jose Amable;31 (k) the 14 January 1991 resolution32 of the Regiona1 Development Council
expressing its support and confidence in him;33 (l) the 4 January 1991 resolution34 of the Leyte Private Media, Inc. where
he was commended for being a clean public official and a model family man;35 (m) the respective affidavits of DTI
Assistant Secretary Jose Mari S. Yu36 and DTI Director Zafrullah G. Masahud37 vouching for his integrity and morality;38 (n)
the DTI certification39 of Amando T. Alvis stating that the DTI Region VIII has no employee by the name of R. de Paz or
Meillin dela Cruz either in the past or at present; (o) the resolution40 of Provincial Prosecutor Joventino P. Isidro on the
libel complaint he filed against Batuigas;41 and, (p) the affidavit42 of the DTI Region VIII employees denying the statements
of Batuigas in his column.43
Domingo stated that his friends who knew him well knew that the articles were fabrications; those who did not know him
that well would think him guilty of these charges, some of whom made hurtful comments. He quantified the mental
anguish, sleepless nights, and wounded feelings that he suffered as a result of the false and malicious charges against
him by Batuigas in the amount of ₱2 million. He asked that he be paid Pl million and ₱500,000.00 for moral and
exemplary damages, respectively. He claimed to have paid ₱l0,000.00 as filing fee for his complaint against Batuigas and
that he agreed to pay his lawyer ₱200.00 per appearance.44

Domingo claimed that after his exoneration by the CSC no other charges were filed against him before any court or body.
On the complaint of immorality, similar charges were filed against him but these were also dismissed.45

Atty. Imelda Nartea,46 a resident of Tacloban; Gilene Sta. Maria Advincula,47 an employee of the DTI Region VIII during
the time that Domingo was the Regional Director; and Jose Nicolasora,48 a businessman from Tacloban, testified to deny
the allegations against Domingo.

Batuigas took the witness stand for his defense. As the chief reporter and a columnist of Tempo, he described his work as
an expose, a product of investigative work. He claimed that he exposes anomalies and other shenanigans in the
government and even of private individuals in the hope that corruption in the government might be minimized. As a result
of his exposes, he was able to cause the dismissal of some officials in the government, although cases were also filed
against him by officials of the government. At the time he testified, he had not been convicted in any of the cases filed
against him.49

He stated that he met Domingo for the first time during the previous hearing of the cases. He only came to know of
Domingo when he received several letters of complaint against the Regional Director. He presumed that the copies of the
complaints were those filed against Domingo before the CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, he wrote the
questioned articles because he found the complaints to be of public interest as these involved the shenanigans committed
by Domingo in his office. He no longer had copies of the complaints claiming he lost these when he left the Manila
Bulletin.50

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In a joint decision51 dated 2 December 1994, the RTC resolved Civil Case No. 91-02-23 and Crim. Case No. 91-03-159 as
follows:

Wherefore, finding accused Ruther Batuigas guilty beyond reasonable doubt and principal of the crime of Libel defined by
Article 353 in relation to Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, and penalized under Article 355 of the same Code,
hereby imposes upon accused Ruther Batuigas a fine of Six Thousand (₱6,000.00) Pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.

In Civil Case No. 91-02-23, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants:

1. Ordering defendants Ruther Batuigas and the Manila Bulletin Corporation to solidarily pay plaintiff moral
damages in the amount of One Million (₱l,000,000.00) Pesos;

2. Ordering the same defendants to solidarily pay the same plaintiff the sum of Five Hundred Thousand
(₱500,000.00) Pesos exemplary damages;

3. Ordering the same defendants to solidarily pay the same plaintiff the sum of Two Hundred Thousand
(₱200,000.00) Pesos attorney's fees; litigation expenses in the sum of Ten Thousand (₱l0,000.00) Pesos; and

4. Ordering the same defendants to solidarily pay the costs of this suit.52

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Batuigas and the Manila Bulletin raised the decision of the RTC via an appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CR. No. 19089, to
the CA, Cebu City. On 30 March 2005, the CA Eighteenth Division53 rendered its decision the dispositive portion of which
reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the joint decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Tacloban
City in criminal case no. 91-03159 for libel and in civil case no. 91-02-23 for damages is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellant.54

Undeterred, Batuigas and the Manila Bulletin sought a reconsideration of the decision which was denied by the CA in its
resolution55 promulgated on 25 October 2005.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issues

Batuigas and the Manila Bulletin anchored their unanimous plea for the reversal of the CA's decision and resolution on the
following grounds:

I.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS DECISION IN DISREGARDING,
CONTRARY TO LAW, CONTROLLING JURISPRUDENCE, WHICH WOULD HA VE COMPELLED THE COURT TO
CONCLUDE THAT (1) THE ARTICLES IN QUESTION WERE QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATION; (2) IT
WAS INCUMBENT UPON THE PROSECUTION AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PROVE THE FACT OF "ACTUAL
MALICE," WHICH BURDEN WAS NOT DISCHARGED BY THE LATTER IN THESE CASES; AND (3) THERE WAS NO
"ACTUAL MALICE" IN THE SUBJECT ARTICLES, THEREBY REQUIRING THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT A
QUO  AND THE ACQUITTAL OF PETITIONER BATUIGAS.

II.

WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, EVEN ASSUMING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT LIBEL WAS PRESENT IN THIS
CASE, THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE RTC EGREGIOUSLY AND GRAVELY ERRED IN THEIR DECISIONS IN
AWARDING UNWARRANTED AND EXCESSIVE MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENT VICTOR DOMINGO, CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. ACCORDINGLY, THE
AW ARD OF MORAL DAMAGES SHOULD CONSIDERABLY BE REDUCED, AND THE A WARD OF EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES BE DELETED AND SET ASIDE.56

THE RULING OF THE COURT

We grant the petition.

The petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall raise only questions
of law, which must be distinctly set forth.57 In a case,58 the Court reiterated its earlier rulings on the distinction between a
question of law from a question of fact, as follows:

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of
fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one oflaw, the same must not
involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of
the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue
invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the test of whether a question is one
of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the
appellate court can determine the issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question
of law; otherwise it is a question of fact.59

Under Rule 45, the Court is not required to examine and evaluate all over again the evidence which had already been
passed upon by the lower courts. Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect by an
appellate tribunal and, absent a clear disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the results of the case,
those findings should not be ignored.60 This becomes even more significant when the factual findings of the lower court
had been sustained by the CA. Thus, the rule that factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal.61 This is the rule in which Domingo finds refuge in opposing the plea of
Batuigas and the Manila Bulletin in their quest before the Court to reverse the findings of the RTC and the CA. Domingo
asserted that the findings of the RTC had been rendered as conclusive upon this Court because these had been adopted
by the CA.62
We must be reminded, however, that the general rule that the factual findings of the lower courts are conclusive is not
cast in stone since accruing jurisprudence continuously reiterate the exceptions to the limitation of an appeal
by certiorari to only questions of law, viz: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the interference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.63

An evaluation of the records of these cases, however, prods the Court to apply the fourth exception above instead of the
general rule. As will be discussed later, the RTC and the CA had misapprehended the facts when these courts concluded
that Batuigas was guilty of libel, and that both he and the Manila Bulletin were liable for damages.

The criminal case of Libel

Under our law, criminal libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of
a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.64 For an imputation to be libelous under Art.
353 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),  the following requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be
malicious; (c) it must be given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.65

An allegation is considered defamatory  if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or
defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or
put him in contempt, or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead.66 In determining whether a statement
is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and
understood in another sense.67 Moreover, a charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to
suppose and understand that the person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are
sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.68

Malice  connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person
defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence
of the crime of libel.69

There is publication  if the material is communicated to a third person. It is not required that the person defamed has read
or heard about the libelous remark. What is material is that a third person has read or heard the libelous statement, for "a
man's reputation is the estimate in which others hold him, not the good opinion which he has of himself."70 Simply put, in
libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is written, known to someone other than the person against
whom it has been written.71 "The reason for this is that [a] communication of the defamatory matter to the person defamed
cannot injure his reputation though it may wound his selfe-steem. A man's reputation is not the good opinion he has of
himself, but the estimation in which others hold him."72

On the other hand, to satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was
able to identify him as the object of the defamatory statement.73 It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is
apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from which others
reading the article may know the person alluded to; or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous circumstances so that
those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred to.74

The element of publication is clearly not at issue in this case considering that both articles of Batuigas were published
in Tempo,  a tabloid widely circulated all over the country. As to the elements of identifiability, defamatory allegation, and
malice, the Court shall examine the two articles with the following as its guidepost:

For the purpose of determining the meaning of any publication alleged to be libelous "that construction must be adopted
which will give to the matter such a meaning as is natural and obvious in the plain and ordinary sense in which the public
would naturally understand what was uttered. The published matter alleged to be libelous must be construed as a whole.
In applying these rules to the language of an alleged libel, the court will disregard any subtle or ingenious explanation
offered by the publisher on being called to account. The whole question being the effect the publication had upon the
minds of the readers, and they not having been assisted by the offered explanation in reading the article, it comes too late
to have the effect of removing the sting, if any there be, from the word used in the publication.75

a) The 20 December 1990 article

The Court cannot sustain the findings of the R TC and the CA that this article was libelous. Viewed in its entirety, the
article withholds the finding that it impeaches the virtue, credit, and reputation of Domingo. The article was but a fair and
true report by Batuigas based on the documents received by him and thus exempts him from criminal liability under Art.
354(2) of the RPC, viz:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no
good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:

1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty; and

2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official
proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of
any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.

Noteworthy, the first sentence on the 20 December 1990 article76 warns the successor of JoeCon of the brewing problem
that he will inherit at the DTI Region VIII office. The immediately following sentences relate that in a letter to Batuigas, the
Waray employees of Region VIII made known their disgust on how DTI Region VIII was being run and handled. According
to the Waray employees, the complaints as to the "mismanagement, low morale, improper decorum, gross inefficiency,
nepotism" in the office had already been made known to the DTI Makati office, the CSC and the Ombudsman, only that
"[w]ala raw nangyari sa reklamo nila."  The letter further provided that the Waray employees turned instead to Batuigas
knowing that his column produces results, i.e., "Kaya kami lumapit sa inyo  Gg. Batuigas dahil nagbibigay ng resulta ang
kolum ninyo."

As culled by Batuigas from the letter, the succeeding sentences in the article merely enumerated the specifics of the
complaints against several employees and officials of the DTI Region VIII, among whom was Domingo, that had been
brought to the attention of DTI, CSC, and the Office of the Ombudsman, from which the Waray employees claimed
nothing happened.1âwphi1

The article cannot be considered as defamatory because Batuigas had not ascribed to Domingo the commission of a
crime, the possession of a vice or defect, or any act or omission9 condition, status or circumstance which tends to
dishonor or discredit the latter. The article was merely a factual report which, to stress, were based on the letter of the
Waray employees reiterating their earlier complaints against Domingo and other co-workers at the DTI Region VIII.
"Where the words imputed [are] not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper.1âwphi1 Malice is necessarily
rendered immaterial."77

Parenthetically, it was through the evidence, consisting of public documents,78 presented by Domingo during the hearing
of these cases that it was confirmed that there were indeed complaints filed against him and the other DTI officials before
the CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman relative to "mismanagement, low morale, improper decorum, gross
inefficiency, nepotism." Although, based on these pieces of evidence, the complaints against Domingo had already been
dismissed by the CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman, the fact remains that there were actual complaints against him,
among others, the particulars of which were those plainly enumerated in the article. True, it was embarrassing that these
complaints were disclosed to the public; but equally factual was that these were matters clearly supported by public
records.

The CA, however. moored on these statements its resolution that the 20 December 1990 article was libelous, viz:

These national employees should be commended for bringing into the open this garbage that has piled [up] in their own
backyard.

To JoeCon's successor, the chopping board is ready.

All you need is a Muslim kris!

Palakulin mo, Pare ko!79

The CA held that because of the comments or remarks made by Batuigas, the article would not fall under the exceptions
of Art. 354 of the RPC. The CA ruled that the test of the defamatory character was whether or not the words were
calculated to induce suspicion, a manner more effective to destroy reputation than false charges directly made, and that
the meaning of the writer was even immaterial.80

A plain reading of the statements found by the CA as libelous cannot support a ruling that these were disparaging to
Domingo or calculated to induce suspicion upon his person. In the statement "[t]hese national employees should be
commended for bringing into the open this garbage that has piled [up] in their own backyard,"  Batuigas was merely
commending the DTI employees who brought into the open their complaints which had already been made known to the
CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman. It was a fair remark directed to the DTI employees and made no reference to
Domingo or imputed to him any defamatory allegation.

On the last three sentences, Batuigas explained that this was only a figure of speech.81 The statements were obviously
addressed to the new DTI Secretary suggesting that he use a chopping board and a Muslim kris  to solve the mounting
problems at the DTI office. A plain, natural, and ordinary appreciation of the statements fails to validate the finding that
these ascribed something deprecating against Domingo. The sentences merely meant that heads should roll at the DTI
office but palpably absent were the identities of those persons. Corollary thereto, the article could not have qualified as
libelous because it is the well-entrenched rule that statements are not libelous unless they refer to an ascertained or
ascertainable person.82

b) The 4 January 1991 article

The CA ruled that this article contained statements not lifted from another source, as is true in the 20 December 1990
column, but were the words of Batuigas. According to the CA, the tenor of the article showed that Batuigas had already
formed his conclusions that Domingo had committed "shenanigans" in his office and that Domingo's "kalokohan"  were
supported by voluminous documents but which were never presented during the hearing of the cases.83 Apparently, it was
because of the words "shenanigans"  and "kalokohan" that the CA found the article libelous.

It must be noted that Batuigas qualified as "alleged' the "shenanigans"  of Domingo as referred to in the 20 December
1990 column. By stating that what he had exposed were "alleged shenanigans,"  Batuigas unmistakably did not confirm
the truth as to the specifics of the complaints made against Domingo or form a conclusion that Domingo had actually
committed mischiefs or misbehaved in office. Batuigas was merely relying on the documents furnished him by the
employees of DTI Region VIII thus, his mention that these were "alleged shenanigans." On the other hand,
the "kalokohan"  unmistakably had reference to the "alleged shenanigans" mentioned in the early part of the article
considering that both alluded to the exposes in the December column. It is for this reason that a finding that
the "kalokohan"  was a conclusion of Batuigas, as with the "alleged shenanigans," cannot be sustained.

However, when Batuigas made statements referring to the "lousy performance" of Domingo and his "mismanagement"
resulting in the breakdown of morale of the DTI Region VIII employees, the former was actually impeaching the virtue and
reputation of Domingo as DTI Regional Director. At that instance, Batuigas was relaying to his readers his comments
about Domingo.

In contrast to the 20 December 1990 article where the statement as to the "mismanagement, low morale, improper
decorum, gross inefficiency, nepotism, etc." were merely lifted by Batuigas from the letter of the DTI Region VIII
employees, the allegation in the 4 January 1991 article as to the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" of Domingo
amounts to Batuigas' personal remarks about the Regional Director.

Notwithstanding the defamatory imputation in the 4 January 1991 article of Batuigas, Art. 354 of the RPC provides for the
instances when its author can be exempted from criminal liability. Evaluated against the exceptions enumerated in Art.
354 of the RPC, it is beyond doubt that the statements of Batuigas as to the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement"
of Domingo cannot be considered as either private communication or a report without any comments or remarks. The
Court hastens to add, however, that the exceptions in Art. 354 of the RPC are not exclusive since jurisprudence provides
for the additional exceptions to the privileged communications, viz: in Borja! v. Court of Appeals,84 where it was held that in
view of the constitutional right on the freedoms of speech and of the press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest
are privileged; and in Guingguing v. Court of Appeals,85 where the remarks directed against a public figure were ruled as
privileged.86

A privileged communication may be classified as either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.87 The absolutely
privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. This classification
includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their functions as such, official communications
made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and allegations or statements made by the parties or their
counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers given by
witnesses in reply to questions propounded to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or
statements are relevant to the issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said
witnesses.88

The qualifiedly privileged communications are those which contain defamatory imputations but which are not actionable
unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive, and to which "private communications" and
"fair and true report without any comments or remarks" belong.89 Since the qualifiedly privileged communications are the
exceptions to the general rule, these require proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held
actionable.90 But when malice in fact is proven, assertions and proofs that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged
communications are futile, since being qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice
from attaching to a defamatory imputation.91

The conduct, moral fitness, and ability of a public official to discharge his duties are undoubtedly matters of public interest
for he is, after all, legally required to be at all times accountable to the people and is expected to discharge his duties with
utmost responsibility, integrity, competence, and loyalty; and to act with patriotism and justice, lead modest lives, and
uphold public interest over personal interest.92 Indeed, as early as 1918, the Court had already laid down a legal
teaching93 recognizing the right to criticize the action and conduct of a public official, viz:

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe
relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism
does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be
born[e] for the common good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief Executive, to the Legislature, to
the Judiciary-to any or all the agencies of Government-public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and
democracy.

It is for this reason that, when confronted with libel cases involving publications which deal with public officials and the
discharge of their official functions, this Court is not confined within the wordings of the libel statute; rather, the case
should likewise be examined under the constitutional precept of freedom of the press.94 But if the utterances are false,
malicious, or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving
public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability.95 In contrast, where the subject of the libelous article is
a private individual, malice need not be proved by the plaintiff. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law)
from the defamatory character of the assailed statement.96

The statements on the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" of Domingo are matters of public interest as these
relate to his moral conduct, his capacity to lead the DTI Region VIII employees, and to manage and supervise the affairs
of the office. These statements undoubtedly make it to the grade of qualifiedly privileged communication and thus, would
require actual malice to be actionable. It must be stressed, however, that once it is established that the article is of a
privileged character, the onus of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff who must then convince the court that the
offender was prompted by malice or ill will.97

In Disini v. The Secretary of Justice,98 the Court explained "actual malice" as follows:

There is "actual malice" or malice in fact when the offender makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it is
false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. The reckless disregard standard used here requires a high
degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused in
fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is not
sufficient to establish actual malice.99 (citations omitted)

Records cannot sustain a finding that Domingo was able to establish that Batuigas had actual malice in writing this article.
Batuigas testified that sometime in the latter part of 1990 and until 1991, he received letters of complaint denouncing
Domingo.100 Although Batuigas was not able to present these letters during the hearing of these cases it can be rationally
deduced that he was in actual receipt of the complaints against the DTI Region VIII officials and employees because he
was able to cite the specifics of the grievances of the Waray employees in his 20 December 1990 article. Presumably,
too, the letters that Batuigas received were those complaints that had been dismissed by the CSC and the Office of the
Ombudsman, and with the corresponding resolutions evidencing the dismissal of these complaints having been presented
by Domingo during the hearing of the cases.

It was evident that the statements as to the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" of Domingo cannot be regarded to
have been written with the knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard of whether these were false, bearing
in mind that Batuigas had documentary evidence to support his statements. Batuigas merely expressed his opinion based
on the fact that there were complaints filed against Domingo, among others. If the comment is an expression of opinion,
based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably
be inferred from the facts.101

Moreover, these statements were but fair commentaries of Batuigas which can be reasonably inferred from the contents
of the documents that he had received and which he qualified, in his 20 December 1990 article, to have been brought
already to the attention of the DTI, CSC, and the Ombudsman. Jurisprudence defines fair comment as follows:

To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable,
it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of
opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.102 (emphasis omitted)

True, the complaints had already been dismissed by the government offices tasked to resolve these, and of which fact
Batuigas had not been informed when he wrote the 20 December 1990 and 4 January 1991 articles; but it must be
pointed out that even assuming that the contents of the articles were false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone
does not prove actual malice.103

In order to constitute malice, ill will must be personal.104 Domingo testified that he did not personally know Batuigas or had
met him before.105 When Domingo was asked as to the motive of Batuigas in writing the articles putting his (Domingo's)
name in a bad light, he explained that the employees he had dismissed during the reorganization could have caused the
writing of the articles. Domingo further stated that, likewise, he suspected a group of loggers in the region he had been
very vocal against for the past ten years.106

When cross-examined, Domingo reiterated his earlier testimony that he had no dealings with Batuigas, or had not
personally met or spoken with him. When further probed, Domingo said that Batuigas could have been (used as) a tool by
people who were interested in going after his neck because he had stepped on them in the discharge of his duties. When
asked to confirm whether Batuigas had a personal grudge against him, Domingo said: "I do not think he harbors ill will
against me."107

The absence of personal ill will of Batuigas against Domingo disavows actual malice and buttresses the finding that
Batuigas was prompted by a legitimate or plausible motive in writing the articles. It was pointed out that Batuigas
characterized his writing akin to an expose where he revealed anomalies and shenanigans in the government in the hope
that corruption might be minimized.108 Moreover, Batuigas had no reason to doubt that R. de Paz, the sender of the letter
containing the complaints against Domingo, did not exist considering that the letter was signed by one claiming to be R.
de Paz.109

Art. 354 of the RPC provides that good intention and justifiable motives are defenses for a defamatory imputation even if it
be true. Batuigas was able to firmly establish his defenses of good faith and good motive when he testified that, after he
received several letters of complaint against Domingo, he came up with the said columns because he found the
complaints on the shenanigans by Domingo at the DTI to be of public interest.110 Batuigas' defense was reinforced by the
records bereft of any showing that the prosecution offered evidence to support a conclusion that Batuigas had written the
articles with the sole purpose of injuring the reputation of Domingo.

In his 16 January 1991 article111 titled "The other side of DTI 8 issue," Batuigas acknowledged that he might have been
used by the detractors of Domingo due to their failure to establish a prima facie case against the Regional Director. In the
same article, Batuigas quoted portions of the separate letters sent to him by Zaldy Lim and Lions International Deputy
Vice-Governor Prudencio J. Gesta, who both denied the allegations against Domingo. Additionally, Batuigas had written
the 16 January 1991 article before Domingo could file criminal and civil cases against him and the Manila Bulletin. These
truths evidently refuted malice or ill will by Batuigas against Domingo.
The CA found fault in the failure of Batuigas to check his sources despite the 21 December 2000112 letter of Domingo
denouncing the accusations against him, and the 4 January 1991 letter of Chairman Sto. Tomas absolving Domingo of
these accusations. Further to this, the CA ruled that Domingo was not accorded the fair and equal opportunity to have
these letters published in order to balance the issue.113

Domingo admitted that he had drafted a letter114 to Batuigas protesting the inaccuracies in the 20 December 1990 article.
Unfortunately, Domingo eventually changed his mind and did not send his letter to Batuigas115 as this could have informed
Batuigas that the charges against him (Domingo) had already been dismissed by the CSC and the Office of the
Ombudsman; thus, not having known of the dismissal of the complaints against Domingo, Batuigas could not have
mentioned it in his 4 January 1991 article. In the same vein, it was implausible that the letter116 of Chaiman Sto. Tomas
could have been included in the 4 January 1991 Bull's Eye article since the letter was dated only 8 January 1991.
Additionally, there was nothing from the records that would prove when Batuigas had received the letter of Chairman Sto.
Tomas. Notwithstanding the absence of this proof, Batuigas unmistakably acknowledged the dismissal of the charges
against Domingo, the main topic of Chairman Sto. Tomas' letter, when he stated in his 16 January 1991 article: "It is
indeed unfortunate that we published the charges against him six weeks after he was cleared by the Civil Service
Commission of the same charges."117

The failure of Batuigas to counter-check the status of the complaints against Domingo was indeed unfortunate, but such
failure cannot be considered as enough reason to hold him liable. While substantiation of the facts supplied is an
important reporting standard, still, a reporter may rely on information given by a lone source although it reflects only one
side of the story provided the reporter does not entertain a high degree of awareness of its probable falsity.118 Domingo,
who had the burden of proving actual malice, was not able to present proof that Batuigas had entertained awareness as to
the probable falsehood of the complaints against him (Domingo). Indeed, on the basis of the documents in Batuigas'
possession, which were actually complaints against Domingo, Batuigas wrote his comments on Domingo's "lousy
performance" and "mismanagement." The Court thus finds it significant to restate its legal teaching in Vasquez v. Court of
Appeals,119 viz:

A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives
and justifiable ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art. 361 of the Revised Penal Code. It
would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Such a rule would deter citizens from
performing their duties as members of a self-governing community. Without free speech and assembly, discussions of our
most abiding concerns as a nation would be stifled. As Justice Brandeis has said, "public discussion is a political duty"
and "the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people."120

For sure, the words "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" had caused hurt or embarrassment to Domingo and even
to his family and friends, but it must be emphasized that hurt or embarrassment even if real, is not automatically
equivalent to defamation; words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words
of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.121 If a writer in the course of temperate and
legitimate criticism falls into error as to some detail, or draws an incorrect inference from the facts before him, and thus
goes beyond the limits of strict truth, such inaccuracies will not cause judgment to go against him, if the jury are satisfied,
after reading the whole publication, that it was written honestly, fairly, and with regard to what truth and justice
require.122 Domingo must remember that one of the costs associated with participation in public affairs is an attendant loss
of privacy.123

It may be well for us to keep in mind that the rule on privileged communications in defamation cases developed because
"public policy, the welfare of society and the orderly administration of justice" have demanded protection for public
opinion.124 "While the doctrine of privileged communication can be abused, and its abuse can lead to great hardships, to
allow libel suits to prosper strictly on this account will give rise to even greater hardships. The doctrine itself rests on
public policy which looks to the free and unfettered administration of justice. It is as a rule applied liberally."125 Equally
important is the following pronouncement which this Court had consistently reiterated, to wit:

A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and developments in
which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled (sic) to court by one group or another on
criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards of morality and civility
prevailing within the general community.

To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules governing
liability for injury to reputation are required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for
the same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that liability for defamation of a public official or public figure
may not be imposed in the absence of proof of "actual malice" on the part of the person making the libelous statement.126
The civil case for Damages

The Court finds that there can be no civil liability in Civil Case No. 91-02-23 because no libel was committed. The 20
December 1990 article was not libelous because it was only a fair and true report by Batuigas using the documents
received by him thus relieving him of criminal liability pursuant to Art. 354 (2) of the RPC. On the one hand, the privileged
nature of the 16 January1991 article and the failure of Domingo to discharge his burden of proving actual malice on the
part of Batuigas failed to support a finding that there was libel. Clearly, there was no act that exists from which the civil
liability may arise.127

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the 30 March 2005 decision and 25 October 2005 resolution of the Court of
Appeals, Eighteenth Division in CA-G.R. CR. No. 19089 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruther
Batuigas is ACQUITTED of the charge against him in Criminal Case No. 91-03-159 while the complaint for damages in
Civil Case No. 91-02-23 is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 160351             April 10, 2006

NOEL VILLANUEVA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and YOLANDA CASTRO, Respondents.

This is no ordinary word war story. Here, the Councilor and Vice-Mayor of a town, both holders of exalted government
positions, became slaves to their human limitations and engaged in a verbal scuffle at the municipal hall as if they were
ordinary men in the streets. A moment of unguarded emotional outburst lead to the long-drawn out twists and turns of this
case, which should have been avoided if only they have imbedded in their complex emotions, habits and convictions that
consciousness to regulate these deflecting forces and not to let them loose, either to their own detriment or to that of the
public they serve. This is the high price they have to pay as occupants of their exalted positions.1

At bar is a petition for review assailing the decision2 dated 28 March 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
22932 which affirmed with modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, likewise affirming with
modification the joint decision of the 2nd Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, convicting
petitioner of the crime of Grave Oral Defamation in Criminal Case No. 139-94 and Slander by Deed in Criminal Case
No.140-94. Also assailed is the resolution3 dated 9 October 2003 of the Court of Appeals denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner.

Petitioner Noel Villanueva was then a member of the Municipal Council while private complainant Yolanda C. Castro was
then Municipal Vice Mayor, both of Concepcion, Tarlac. Upon complaint of private complainant, two separate Criminal
Complaints were filed on 9 October 1994 against the petitioner in the 2nd MCTC of Capas-Bamban-Concepcion, to wit:

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 139-94

For: Grave Oral Defamation

On September 12, 1994 on or about 10:00 in the morning at the SB Office in the Municipal Building of Concepcion,
Tarlac, in the presence of several persons and again in the afternoon on or about four thirty (4:30 PM) at the Old Session
Hall of the Municipal Building in my presence and in the presence of several persons, defendant NOEL L. VILLANUEVA,
in a loud voice and within hearing distance of everyone present, unlawfully, maliciously and feloniously uttered in a
serious and insulting manner at the undersigned complainant the following words: ["]Nagmamalinis ca, ena ca man
malinis, garapal ca["] and "Balamu mansanas cang malutu, pero queng quilib ularan ca, tictac carinat" (You are
pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt; you are like a red apple, but inside
you are worm infested and extremely dirty), which utterances are serious and insulting in nature, tending to cause
dishonor, discredit and contempt of undersigned complainant and causing her extreme mental anguish, wound (sic)
feelings, besmirched reputation and serious anxiety for which she is entitled to recover moral and exemplary damages in
an amount to be determined by the honorable court. Contrary to law.

CRIM.CASE NO. 140-94

For: Slander by Deed

On September 12, 1994 around four thirty (4:30 P.M.) in the afternoon, more or less, at the Municipal Building of
Concepcion, Tarlac, where public authorities are engaged in the discharge of their duties, and in the presence of several
persons, the accused Noel L. Villanueva while in the process of hurling verbal insults at the complainant, then and there
unlawfully, feloniously and contemptuously gave the complainant what is commonly known as "dirty finger" by poking his
hand at complainant’s face with the middle finger extended and the rest of his fingers half-closed, an act tending to cause
dishonor, discredit and contempt on the complainant and causing her mental anguish, wounded feelings and moral
suffering for which she is entitled to moral and exemplary damages in an amount to be determined by the honorable court.
Contrary to law.4

Petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty" on both counts and trial ensued. The prosecution witnesses presented were the
complainant and her two witnesses.

The MCTC restated the facts as presented by the prosecution evidence as follows:
On 12 September 1994, at 10:00 o’clock in the morning, two utility men came to complainant’s office, bringing with
them the application for monetized leave of Sangguniang Bayan member Noel Villanueva, petitioner in this case.
The application for monetized leave was not immediately attended to by complainant as she was then busy dictating
some important matters to her secretary.5

The accused at that time was standing in front of the Vice Mayor’s Office and he allegedly said: "E ano kung wala sa
mood, e ano kung galit sya."6 These utterances of accused were disregarded by complainant but accused then entered
the complainant’s office bringing with him his Application for Monetized Leave. The accused addressed the complainant’s
secretary: "Malou, pag atiu ne keng mood, papirma mu ne." The alleged request of accused to the Secretary was made in
a very sarcastic manner.7

Complainant got the monetized leave and filed it in her "in and out" files and while doing this, the paper accidentally fell on
the floor. When she was about to pick it up, the accused allegedly got a yellow pad and swung it at complainant’s face,
but she was able to evade it. Accused then said: "Ibuat daka ken, inabu daka keng awang, e baling masukul naku." (I will
lift you from there and I will throw you out of the window and I don’t care if I will go to jail). Then the accused went out of
the office and before leaving, he pointed a "dirty finger" at complainant, prompting the latter to stand and get an empty
bottle of coke to shield her face. Accused proceeded towards the office of the municipal mayor. Because accused was still
frothing invectives, complainant purportedly "rolled" the empty bottle of coke towards him. The incident was witnessed by
so many people numbering about 20 to 30 who were then at the municipal hall.8

Prosecution evidence further showed that accused allegedly mouthed the following disparaging remarks, "Magmalinis ka,
ena ka man malinis, garapal ka." "Balamu mansanas kang malutu, pero king kilub ularan ka, tiktak karinat" (You are
pretending to be clean and honest yet you are not clean and honest, you are corrupt. You are like red apple, you are
worm infested inside and extremely dirty). While this was going on, the Municipal Attorney, Atty. Pepito Torres, intervened
to pacify the accused, but he was unable to do so.9

Based on the account of the prosecution witnesses, from the municipal session hall, the complainant was persuaded to
enter the office of the Sangguniang Bayan Secretary. Accused followed her and inside said office, the accused again said,
"Ibuat daka, inabu daka keng awang, e baling masukul ku (I will lift you from there and I will throw you out of the window
and I don’t care if I will go to jail). I Tata mu tinagal yang kapitan pero masambut ya, pero ing kaputul ku sinambut ne
man" (Your father ran for barangay captain and lost but my brother won)10 and again, the accused pointed a "dirty finger"
at complainant.11

The defense, on the other hand, presented six witnesses. From their testimonies, the MCTC gathered that on 12
September 1994, accused requested Flora Calayag to prepare the application for monetized leave and asked her to have
it approved by the complainant. Because the application remained unsigned by the latter, it was Joel Cecilio who in the
afternoon went to her office for the approval of the monetized leave, but again, to no avail.12

Accused then personally carried his application to complainant’s office. At that time, complainant was dictating something
to the Secretary and as he was about to give the copy to the Secretary, complainant got up and grabbed the paper from
him and placed it on the right side of her table.13

This angered the accused and he said to complainant, "[i]s this the actuation of the high government official?" The
complainant replied, "Bolang (Insane)." A verbal squabble ensued and the complainant allegedly said, "nung munta kayo
keng municipiyong ayni balamu ninu kayong hari, ala nakong depatan nung-e gawang pera, sira nako kareng tau." (When
you go to the municipal building as if you are a king, you did nothing except to make money, the people no longer believe
in you.)14

Complainant, at that instant, hurled a bottle of coke at petitioner and hit one of the Barangay Captains then present.15

After trial, the MCTC found petitioner guilty of Grave Oral Defamation and Serious Slander by Deed in a joint decision
dated 26 February 1998. The MCTC held that the statements uttered by petitioner and the act of making a dirty finger
constitute an affront on complainant who, as Vice Mayor and a lady, deserves greater respect.1avvphil.net The MCTC
posited that the defense interposed by the petitioner that complainant brought the havoc upon herself when she refused to
approve his application for accrued leave credits monetization cannot be considered as valid to obviate or obliterate the
crime or damage done unto the complainant. The MCTC then held:

With these, this Court finds overwhelming evidence against the accused and as such this Court finds the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of a charged (sic) of Grave Oral Defamation punishable under Art. 358 of the Revised Penal
Code and Slander by Deed punishable under Art. 359 of the Revised Penal Code. x x x The complainant although she
can estimate the value of the moral damages is entitled to the sum of P50,000.00 and attorney’s fees of P30,000.00
and P1,000.00 as appearance fee plus litigation expenses.

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the offenses or charges mentioned above, he is
hereby sentenced to an imprisonment of FOUR (4) MONTHS and one (1) day to one (1) year in each case which the
accused shall served (at the same time), and to pay by way of moral damages the sum of P50,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and litigation expenses and attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per
appearance fee.16

Both parties appealed to the RTC of Tarlac, which affirmed petitioner’s conviction, but modified the penalty and the
manner of serving accused’s sentence, and with a substantial increase in the award of damages. The fallo reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, insofar as it finds the accused guilty
of grave oral defamation in Criminal Case No. 139 and slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140 is hereby AFFIRMED
with the modification that the accused is to be sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from three
(3) months as minimum to TWO (2) years and TWO (2) months as maximum in each of the cases, the same to be served
SUCCESSIVELY.

Likewise, the decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court is further modified and the accused is ordered to pay the amount
of P100,000.00 as moral damages and another amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, including the amount
of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee.17

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court with the modification that the award of exemplary
damages was deleted because according to the Court of Appeals it was shown from the records that the petitioner
himself was a victim of complainant’s indiscretion for refusing, for no reason at all, to approve petitioner’s
application for monetization of his accrued leave credits. The Court of Appeals disposed as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the assailed decision is hereby affirmed with the modification that the award of
exemplary damages is hereby deleted.18

As petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise met with failure, petitioner, in a last stab at absolution, lodged the
present petition for reviewhttp://elibrary.supremecourt.gov.ph/dtSearch/ - _ftn36 on the following arguments:

I.

The honorable court of appeals gravely erred in ruling on only ONE (1) issue raised by petitioner in his petition for review
and in not ruling squarely on the other FIVE (5) issues, thus, denying petitioner of his right to be heard and to due
process.

II.

III.

IV.

19

The issues are: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for grave oral defamation
in Criminal Case No. 139-94, and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the conviction of petitioner for
serious slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140-94.

Anent the first issue, Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 358. Slander. – Oral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature; otherwise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding 200 pesos.
Slander is libel committed by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. The term oral defamation or slander as now
understood, has been defined as the speaking of base and defamatory words which tend to prejudice another in his
reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood.20

There is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature. The gravity of the oral defamation depends not only (1)
upon the expressions used, but also (2) on the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and (3) the
circumstances surrounding the case.21 Indeed, it is a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under
one or the other, depending not only upon their sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging
them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended
party and the offender, which might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time.22

In our previous rulings, we held that the social standing and position of the offended party are also taken into account and
thus, it was held that the slander was grave, because the offended party had held previously the Office of Congressman,
Governor, and Senator and was then a candidate for Vice-President,23 for which no amount of sophistry would take the
statement out of the compass of grave oral defamation.24 However, we have, likewise, ruled in the past that uttering
defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light
felony.25

In the case at bar, as a public official, petitioner, who was holding the position of Councilor at that time, is hidebound to be
an exemplar to society against the use of intemperate language particularly because the offended party was a Vice-
Mayor. However, we cannot keep a blind eye to the fact that such scathing words were uttered by him in the heat of
anger triggered by the fact, as found by the Court of Appeals, that complainant refused, without valid justification
to approve the monetization of accrued leave credits of petitioner. In a manner of speaking, she sowed the wind that
reaped the storm.

In the words of the Court of Appeals:

The already existing animosity between them does not vest in the complainant the prerogative to deny petitioner
a right to which he was legally entitled. Exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right. They are
designed to permit the court to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by
public policy to suppress the wanton acts of the offender. It cannot be invoked as a matter of right. x x x 26

The above findings of fact of the Court of Appeals supported by substantial evidence are conclusive and binding on the
parties and are not reviewable by this Court.27 Considering this finding, the Court of Appeals not only should have struck
out the award of exemplary damages but should have modified as well the offense committed to be of simple nature
punishable by arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding P200.00 under the above-quoted Art. 358 of the Revised Penal
Code.

In Pader v. People,28 complainant was conversing with his political leaders at the terrace of his house at Morong, Bataan,
when petitioner appeared at the gate and shouted "putang ina mo Atty. Escolango. Napakawalanghiya mo!" The latter
was dumbfounded and embarrassed. At that time, Atty. Escolango was a candidate for Vice Mayor of Morong, Bataan in
the elections of 8 May 1995. We held that the offense committed was only slight slander. We explained why in this wise:

The issue is whether petitioner is guilty of slight or serious oral defamation. In resolving the issue, we are guided by a
doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their
sense, grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which might tend to
prove the intention of the offender at the time.

Unquestionably, the words uttered were defamatory. Considering, however, the factual backdrop of the case, the oral
defamation was only slight. The trial court, in arriving at its decision, considered that the defamation was deliberately done
to destroy Atty. Escolango’s reputation since the parties were political opponents.

We do not agree. Somehow, the trial court failed to appreciate the fact that the parties were also neighbors; that petitioner
was drunk at the time he uttered the defamatory words; and the fact that petitioner’s anger was instigated by what
Atty. Escolango did when petitioner’s father died. In which case, the oral defamation was not of serious or insulting
nature.

In Reyes v. People [137 Phil. 112, 120 (1969)], we ruled that the expression "putang ina mo" is a common enough
utterance in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact,
more often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity. We do not find it seriously insulting that
after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk Rogelio Pader on seeing Atty. Escolango would utter words
expressing anger. Obviously, the intention was to show his feelings of resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter.
Being a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional gestures and words of disapproval or dislike of his person are not
uncommon.

In similar fashion, the trial court erred in awarding moral damages without proof of suffering. Accordingly, petitioner may
be convicted only of slight oral defamation defined and penalized under Article 358, Revised Penal Code, prescribing the
penalty of arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.29 (Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly, in Cruz v. Court of Appeals,30 petitioner and complainant, a Municipal Judge, were next door neighbors.
Animosity grew between their two families because of some disputes. Petitioner resented the practice of complainant of
throwing garbage and animal excrement into her premises. There was also a boundary dispute between petitioner's
mother and complainant, which was the subject of a civil suit for "Recovery of Possession, Ownership, Enforcement of
Legal Easement and Abatement of Nuisance" filed by the mother before the Court of First Instance of Iloilo against
complainant. Additionally, petitioner's mother had previously instituted an administrative complaint against the
complainant before the Supreme Court, but the same was dismissed. There was a pent-up feeling of being aggrieved,
resentment, anger, and vexation on petitioner's part, culminating in her outburst against complainants. For having called
the complainant judge "land grabber," "shameless" and "hypocrite," petitioner was charged and subsequently convicted by
the Court of First Instance of three separate offenses of Grave Oral Defamation committed on 5, 6 and 8 August 1976. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdicts of conviction. On review, however, we held that although the abusive
remarks may ordinarily be considered as serious defamation, under the environmental circumstances of the case, there
having been provocation on complainant's part, and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of
unrestrained anger and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for the crime of Slight Oral Defamation. Petitioner was
sentenced to pay a fine of P200.00 in each of the criminal cases, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
to pay the costs.

Guided by the foregoing precedents, we find petitioner guilty only of slight oral defamation because of the attendant
circumstances in the case at bar.

Lest we be misconstrued, the Court does not condone the vilification or use of scurrilous language on the part of
petitioner, but following the rule that all possible circumstances favorable to the accused must be taken in his favor, it is
our considered view that the slander committed by petitioner can be characterized as slight slander following the doctrine
that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party, constitutes
only a light felony.31

In fact, to be denied approval of monetization of leave without valid justification, but as an offshoot of a political dissension
may have been vexing for petitioner and may have been perceived by him as provocation that triggered him to blow his
top and utter those disparaging words. In hindsight, to be denied monetization of leave credits must have stirred upon the
petitioner a feeling akin to begging for money that he was legally entitled to. This oppressive conduct on the part of
complainant must have scarred petitioner’s self-esteem, too, to appear as begging for money. But again, this is not an
excuse to resort to intemperate language no matter how such embarrassment must have wreaked havoc on his ego.

The next issue that faces this Court is whether or not petitioner’s act of poking a dirty finger at complainant constitutes
grave slander by deed.

Following the same principle as enunciated in our foregoing discussion of the first issue, we find petitioner guilty only of
slight slander by deed in Criminal Case No. 140-94 inasmuch as we find complainant’s unjust refusal to sign petitioner’s
application for monetization and her act of throwing a coke bottle at him constituted a perceived provocation that triggered
the "poking of finger" incident.

Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 359. Slander by deed. – The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period or a fine ranging from 200 to 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall perform any act not
included and punished in this title, which shall cast dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon another person. If said act is not
of a serious nature, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos.

Slander by deed is a crime against honor, which is committed by performing any act, which casts dishonor, discredit, or
contempt upon another person. The elements are (1) that the offender performs any act not included in any other crime
against honor, (2) that such act is performed in the presence of other person or persons, and (3) that such act casts
dishonor, discredit or contempt upon the offended party. Whether a certain slanderous act constitutes slander by deed of
a serious nature or not, depends on the social standing of the offended party, the circumstances under which the act was
committed, the occasion, etc.32 It is libel committed by actions rather than words. The most common examples are
slapping someone or spitting on his/her face in front of the public market, in full view of a crowd, thus casting dishonor,
discredit, and contempt upon the person of another.

In Mari v. Court of Appeals,33 complainant and petitioner were co-employees in the Department of Agriculture, with office
at Digos, Davao del Sur, although complainant occupied a higher position. On 6 December 1991, petitioner borrowed
from complainant the records of his 201 file. However, when he returned the same three days later, complainant noticed
that several papers were missing which included official communications from the Civil Service Commission and Regional
Office, Department of Agriculture, and a copy of the complaint by the Rural Bank of Digos against petitioner. Upon
instruction of her superior officer, complainant sent a memorandum to petitioner asking him to explain why his 201 file was
returned with missing documents. Instead of acknowledging receipt of the memorandum, petitioner confronted
complainant and angrily shouted at her: "Putang ina, bullshit, bugo." He banged a chair in front of complainant and choked
her. With the intervention of the security guard, petitioner was prevailed upon to desist from further injuring complainant.
We held:

Prescinding from the foregoing, it would serve the ends of justice better if the petitioner were sentenced to pay a fine
instead of imprisonment. The offense while considered serious slander by deed was done in the heat of anger and was in
reaction to a perceived provocation. The penalty for serious slander by deed may be either imprisonment or a fine. We opt
to impose a fine.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals and in lieu thereof renders
judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of serious slander by deed defined and penalized under Article
359 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.34 (Emphasis supplied.)

In Mari, the Court found petitioner guilty of serious slander by deed defined and penalized under Article 359 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentenced him to pay a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The deed involved was the banging of a chair in front of complainant and choking her.

In another case, Teodoro v. Court of Appeals,35 the incident, which gave rise to this case, is narrated as follows:

Petitioner Amado B. Teodoro was vice-president and corporate secretary of the DBT-Marbay Construction, Inc., while
complainant, Carolina Tanco-Young, was treasurer of the same corporation. Petitioner is the brother of the president of
the corporation, Donato Teodoro, while complainant is the daughter of the chairman of the board of the corporation,
Agustin Tanco. x x x

Records show that the incident complained of took place at the Board Room of the D.B.T. Mar Bay Construction
Incorporated in the afternoon of August 17, 1984. Present at the meeting were Agustin Tanco, Chairman of the Board; the
President, Donato Teodoro; the accused, Amado Teodoro, as Corporate Secretary; the complainant, Carolina Tanco-
Young who is the Treasurer; and one Oscar Benares.

xxxx

It appears that there was a controversial document being insisted upon by the accused, as secretary, to be signed by the
chairman. The Board Treasurer, Carolina Tanco-Young questioned the propriety of having the document signed as there
was, according to her, no such meeting that ever took place as to show a supposed resolution to have been deliberated
upon. A verbal exchange of words and tirades took place between the accused Secretary and the Treasurer. One word
led to another up to the point where Carolina Tanco-Young, the treasurer, either by implication or expressed domineering
words, alluded to the accused as a "falsifier" which blinded the accused-appellant to extreme anger and rage, thus
leading him to slap Tanco-Young — the alleged name caller.[36] (Emphasis supplied.)

This Court in Teodoro held that there was grave slander by deed.

In another case, the acts of pushing and slapping a woman in order to ridicule and shame her before other people
constitute the felony of slander by deed defined and penalized under Article 359 of the Revised Penal Code by arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period.37
In the cases as above-cited, there was no provocation on the part of the complainants unlike the present case. Moreover,
the "poking of the finger" in the case at bar was, palpably, of less serious magnitude compared to the banging of chair, the
choking in Mari and the slapping of a face in Teodoro. Thus, we find that the poking of dirty finger in the case at bar, while
it smacks of slander by deed, is of a lesser magnitude than the acts committed in the foregoing cases.

Moreover, pointing a dirty finger ordinarily connotes the phrase "Fuck You," which is similar to the expression "Puta" or
"Putang Ina mo," in local parlance. Such expression was not held to be libelous in Reyes v. People,38 where the Court
said that: "This is a common enough expression in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the
virtues of a mother." Following Reyes, and in light of the fact that there was a perceived provocation coming from
complainant, petitioner’s act of pointing a dirty finger at complainant constitutes simple slander by deed, it appearing from
the factual milieu of the case that the act complained of was employed by petitioner "to express anger or displeasure" at
complainant for procrastinating the approval of his leave monetization. While it may have cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon complainant, said act is not of a serious nature, thus, the penalty shall be arresto menor meaning,
imprisonment from one day to 30 days or a fine not exceeding P200.00. We opt to impose a fine following Mari.39

Yes, complainant was then a Vice-Mayor and a lady at that, which circumstances ordinarily demanded respect from
petitioner. But, it was, likewise, her moral obligation springing from such position to act in a manner that is worthy of
respect. In the case at bar, complainant’s demeanor of refusing to sign the leave monetization of petitioner, an otherwise
valid claim, because of a political discord smacks of a conduct unbecoming of a lady and a Vice-Mayor at that. Moreover,
it appears that she had, indeed, thrown a bottle of coke at petitioner, which actuation reveals that she, too, had gone down
to petitioner’s level.

Holding an esteemed position is never a license to act capriciously with impunity. The fact that there was a squabble
between petitioner and complainant, both high-ranking local public officials, that a verbal brawl ostensibly took place,
speaks very poorly of their self-control and public relations. For this, they both deserve to be censured and directed to
conduct themselves in a more composed manner and keep their pose as befits ranking officials who officially deal with the
public.40

To be worthy of respect, one must act respectably, remembering always that courtesy begets courtesy.

Anent the award of damages, the Court of Appeals erred in increasing the award of moral damages to P100,000.00 in
light of its own finding that petitioner himself was "a victim of complainant’s indiscretion for her refusal, for no reason at all,
to approve petitioner’s application for monetization of his accrued leave credits."

In similar fashion, considering that petitioner and complainant belong to warring political camps, occasional gestures and
words of disapproval or dislike are among the hazards of the job.41 Considering this political reality and the fact that the
Court of Appeals concluded, based on evidence on records, that petitioner himself was a victim of complainant’s
indiscretion, her claim for damages and attorney’s fees must, likewise, fail. Akin to the principle that "he who comes to
court must have clean hands," each of the parties, in the case at bar, must bear his own loss.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 22932 is hereby MODIFIED
as follows:

1) In Crim. Case No. 139-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of slight
oral defamation only for which we impose on him a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency;

2) In Crim. Case No. 140-94, petitioner Noel Villanueva is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple slander by
deed for which we impose a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency;

3) The awards for moral damages and attorney’s fees are DELETED.

Finally, the decision of the Court of Appeals insofar as it deleted the award for exemplary damages is AFFIRMED. No
costs.

so ORDERED.
 QUASI-OFFENSES

G.R. No. 172716               November 17, 2010

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and
EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.

The Case

The petition seeks the review1 of the Orders2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower court’s
ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide and Damage to Property. This, despite the accused’s previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

The Facts

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property (Criminal Case No. 82366) for the death of
respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his
temporary release in both cases.

On 7 September 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge in Criminal Case No. 82367 and was meted out the penalty
of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.3

After unsuccessfully seeking reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 157 (RTC), in a petition for certiorari (S.C.A. No. 2803). Meanwhile, petitioner sought from the MeTC the
suspension of proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366, including the arraignment on 17 May 2005, invoking S.C.A. No.
2803 as a prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.4 Seven days later, the MeTC issued a
resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his
arrest.5 Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Relying on the arrest order against petitioner, respondent Ponce sought in the RTC the dismissal of S.C.A. No. 2803 for
petitioner’s loss of standing to maintain the suit. Petitioner contested the motion.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In an Order dated 2 February 2006, the RTC dismissed S.C.A. No. 2803, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioner’s
forfeiture of standing to maintain S.C.A. No. 2803 arising from the MeTC’s order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366. Thus, without reaching the merits of S.C.A. No. 2803, the
RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.6

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner denies absconding. He explains that his petition in S.C.A. No. 2803 constrained him to forego participation in
the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner distinguishes his case from the line of jurisprudence sanctioning
dismissal of appeals for absconding appellants because his appeal before the RTC was a special civil action seeking a
pre-trial relief, not a post-trial appeal of a judgment of conviction.7

Petitioner laments the RTC’s failure to reach the merits of his petition in S.C.A. 2803. Invoking jurisprudence, petitioner
argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense bars his
prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366, having been previously convicted in Criminal Case No. 82367 for the same
offense of reckless imprudence charged in Criminal Case No. 82366. Petitioner submits that the multiple consequences of
such crime are material only to determine his penalty.

Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTC’s decision forfeiting petitioner’s standing to maintain
his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, respondent Ponce calls the Court’s attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code with grave or less
grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for
the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to property.

In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, we granted the Office of the Solicitor General’s motion not to file a comment to the
petition as the public respondent judge is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.

The Issues

Two questions are presented for resolution: (1) whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief in S.C.A. 2803 when
the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366; and (2) if in the
negative, whether petitioner’s constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 82366.

The Ruling of the Court

We hold that (1) petitioner’s non-appearance at the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 did not divest him of
personality to maintain the petition in S.C.A. 2803; and (2) the protection afforded by the Constitution shielding petitioner
from prosecutions placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense bars further proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 82366.

Petitioner’s Non-appearance at the Arraignment in

Criminal Case No. 82366 did not Divest him of Standing
to Maintain the Petition in S.C.A. 2803

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellant’s escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail bond are
governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124,8 in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the
pendency of the appeal." The "appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

The RTC’s dismissal of petitioner’s special civil action for certiorari to review a pre-arraignment ancillary question on the
applicability of the Due Process Clause to bar proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 finds no basis under procedural
rules and jurisprudence. The RTC’s reliance on People v. Esparas9 undercuts the cogency of its ruling
because Esparas stands for a proposition contrary to the RTC’s ruling. There, the Court granted review to an appeal by
an accused who was sentenced to death for importing prohibited drugs even though she jumped bail pending trial and
was thus tried and convicted in absentia. The Court in Esparas treated the mandatory review of death sentences under
Republic Act No. 7659 as an exception to Section 8 of Rule 124.10

The mischief in the RTC’s treatment of petitioner’s non-appearance at his arraignment in Criminal Case No. 82366 as
proof of his loss of standing becomes more evident when one considers the Rules of Court’s treatment of a defendant
who absents himself from post-arraignment hearings. Under Section 21, Rule 11411 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the defendant’s absence merely renders his bondsman potentially liable on its bond (subject to cancellation
should the bondsman fail to produce the accused within 30 days); the defendant retains his standing and, should he fail to
surrender, will be tried in absentia and could be convicted or acquitted. Indeed, the 30-day period granted to the
bondsman to produce the accused underscores the fact that mere non-appearance does not ipso facto convert the
accused’s status to that of a fugitive without standing.

Further, the RTC’s observation that petitioner provided "no explanation why he failed to attend the scheduled
proceeding"12 at the MeTC is belied by the records. Days before the arraignment, petitioner sought the suspension of the
MeTC’s proceedings in Criminal Case No. 82366 in light of his petition with the RTC in S.C.A. No. 2803. Following the
MeTC’s refusal to defer arraignment (the order for which was released days after the MeTC ordered petitioner’s arrest),
petitioner sought reconsideration. His motion remained unresolved as of the filing of this petition.
 Petitioner’s Conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
Bars his Prosecution in Criminal Case No. 82366

The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense"13 protects
him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.14 It is not disputed that petitioner’s conviction in Criminal Case No. 82367
was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid charge. Thus, the case turns on the question whether
Criminal Case No. 82366 and Criminal Case No. 82367 involve the "same offense." Petitioner adopts the affirmative view,
submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does
not."15

We find for petitioner.

Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime,

its Consequences on Persons and
Property are Material Only to Determine
the Penalty

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The text of the provision reads:

Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in
its maximum period shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave
felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less
serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damages to three times such
value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty-five pesos.

A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or
negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed
in Article sixty-four.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:

1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of
this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be
imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.

2. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile Law, to death of a person shall be
caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act,
taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be
caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.

The penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend
on the spot to the injured parties such help as may be in this hand to give.

Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached to the
quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (paragraphs 1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both quasi-
offenses (paragraphs 3-4, 6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties (paragraph 5); and (4) the
definition of "reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (paragraphs 7-8). Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the
mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia
punible,"16 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These structural and conceptual features of
quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 13 Titles of Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.

Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and
penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already
sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that
"reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x"17 on three points of analysis: (1) the
object of punishment in quasi-crimes (as opposed to intentional crimes); (2) the legislative intent to treat quasi-crimes as
distinct offenses (as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent) and; (3) the
different penalty structures for quasi-crimes and intentional crimes:

The proposition (inferred from Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code) that "reckless imprudence" is not a crime in itself but
simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve unqualified
assent. There are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence: murder, treason, robbery,
malicious mischief, etc. In truth, criminal negligence in our Revised Penal Code is treated as a mere quasi offense, and
dealt with separately from willful offenses. It is not a mere question of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes,
the act itself is punished; in negligence or imprudence, what is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition
behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible. x x x x

Were criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then
it would be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of Art. 13, specially the lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
the one actually committed. Furthermore, the theory would require that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in
proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. For each penalty for the willful offense, there
would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. But instead, our Revised Penal Code (Art. 365) fixes the
penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional [medium], if the willful act would
constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to
death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the
individual willful crime, but is set in relation to a whole class, or series, of crimes.18 (Emphasis supplied)

This explains why the technically correct way to allege quasi-crimes is to state that their commission results in damage,
either to person or property.19

Accordingly, we found the Justice of the Peace in Quizon without jurisdiction to hear a case for "Damage to Property
through Reckless Imprudence," its jurisdiction being limited to trying charges for Malicious Mischief, an intentional crime
conceptually incompatible with the element of imprudence obtaining in quasi-crimes.

Quizon, rooted in Spanish law20 (the normative ancestry of our present day penal code) and since repeatedly
reiterated,21 stands on solid conceptual foundation. The contrary doctrinal pronouncement in People v. Faller22 that
"[r]eckless impudence is not a crime in itself x x x [but] simply a way of committing it x x x,"23 has long been abandoned
when the Court en banc promulgated Quizon in 1955 nearly two decades after the Court decided Faller in 1939. Quizon
rejected Faller’s conceptualization of quasi-crimes by holding that quasi-crimes under Article 365 are distinct species of
crimes and not merely methods of committing crimes. Faller found expression in post-Quizon jurisprudence24 only by dint
of lingering doctrinal confusion arising from an indiscriminate fusion of criminal law rules defining Article 365 crimes and
the complexing of intentional crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which, as will be shown shortly, rests on
erroneous conception of quasi-crimes. Indeed, the Quizonian conception of quasi-crimes undergirded a related branch of
jurisprudence applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to quasi-offenses, barring second prosecutions for a quasi-offense
alleging one resulting act after a prior conviction or acquittal of a quasi-offense alleging another resulting act but arising
from the same reckless act or omission upon which the second prosecution was based.
 Prior Conviction or Acquittal of
Reckless Imprudence Bars
Subsequent Prosecution for the Same
Quasi-Offense

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to
commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same
quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double
jeopardy as applied to Article 365 starting with People v. Diaz,25 decided in 1954. There, a full Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Montemayor, ordered the dismissal of a case for "damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because a prior
case against the same accused for "reckless driving," arising from the same act upon which the first prosecution was
based, had been dismissed earlier. Since then, whenever the same legal question was brought before the Court, that is,
whether prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of the consequences alleged for both charges, the Court unfailingly and consistently answered in the
affirmative in People v. Belga26 (promulgated in 1957 by the Court en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero27 (promulgated
in 1959, unreported, per Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas28 (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per Bengzon J.),
People v. Silva29 (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay30 (promulgated in
1966 by the Court en banc, per Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan31 (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per Reyes,
J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals32 (promulgated in 1982 by the Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and
People v. City Court of Manila33 (promulgated in 1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred
the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The reason for this consistent stance of extending the constitutional protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause to
quasi-offenses was best articulated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Buan, where, in barring a subsequent prosecution for
"serious physical injuries and damage to property thru reckless imprudence" because of the accused’s prior acquittal of
"slight physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," with both charges grounded on the same act, the Court explained:34

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.35 x x
x (Emphasis supplied)

Evidently, the Diaz line of jurisprudence on double jeopardy merely extended to its logical conclusion the reasoning of
Quizon.

There is in our jurisprudence only one ruling going against this unbroken line of authority. Preceding Diaz by more than a
decade, El Pueblo de Filipinas v. Estipona,36 decided by the pre-war colonial Court in November 1940, allowed the
subsequent prosecution of an accused for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property despite his previous
conviction for multiple physical injuries arising from the same reckless operation of a motor vehicle upon which the second
prosecution was based. Estipona’s inconsistency with the post-war Diaz chain of jurisprudence suffices to impliedly
overrule it. At any rate, all doubts on this matter were laid to rest in 1982 in Buerano.37 There, we reviewed the Court of
Appeals’ conviction of an accused for "damage to property for reckless imprudence" despite his prior conviction for "slight
and less serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence," arising from the same act upon which the second charge
was based. The Court of Appeals had relied on Estipona. We reversed on the strength of Buan:38

Th[e] view of the Court of Appeals was inspired by the ruling of this Court in the pre-war case of People vs. Estipona
decided on November 14, 1940. However, in the case of People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (March 29, 1968), this Court,
speaking thru Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that –

Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the
accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally
done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The
gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the
offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions.
xxxx

. . . the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan,
of the charge of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical
injuries through reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in
second jeopardy for the same offense.39 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, for all intents and purposes, Buerano had effectively overruled Estipona.

It is noteworthy that the Solicitor General in Buerano, in a reversal of his earlier stance in Silva, joined causes with the
accused, a fact which did not escape the Court’s attention:

Then Solicitor General, now Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his MANIFESTATION dated December 12, 1969 (page 82 of the
Rollo) admits that the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining petitioner’s plea of double jeopardy and submits that "its
affirmatory decision dated January 28, 1969, in Criminal Case No. 05123-CR finding petitioner guilty of damage to
property through reckless imprudence should be set aside, without costs." He stressed that "if double jeopardy exists
where the reckless act resulted into homicide and physical injuries. then the same consequence must perforce follow
where the same reckless act caused merely damage to property-not death-and physical injuries. Verily, the value of a
human life lost as a result of a vehicular collision cannot be equated with any amount of damages caused to a motors
vehicle arising from the same mishap."40 (Emphasis supplied)

Hence, we find merit in petitioner’s submission that the lower courts erred in refusing to extend in his favor the mantle of
protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause. A more fitting jurisprudence could not be tailored to petitioner’s case
than People v. Silva, 41 a Diaz progeny. There, the accused, who was also involved in a vehicular collision, was charged in
two separate Informations with "Slight Physical Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence" and "Homicide with Serious Physical
Injuries thru Reckless Imprudence." Following his acquittal of the former, the accused sought the quashal of the latter,
invoking the Double Jeopardy Clause. The trial court initially denied relief, but, on reconsideration, found merit in the
accused’s claim and dismissed the second case. In affirming the trial court, we quoted with approval its analysis of the
issue following Diaz and its progeny People v. Belga:42

On June 26, 1959, the lower court reconsidered its Order of May 2, 1959 and dismissed the case, holding: —

[T]he Court believes that the case falls squarely within the doctrine of double jeopardy enunciated in People v. Belga, x x
x In the case cited, Ciriaco Belga and Jose Belga were charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Malilipot, Albay, with
the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence arising from a collision between the two automobiles driven by
them (Crim. Case No. 88). Without the aforesaid complaint having been dismissed or otherwise disposed of, two other
criminal complaints were filed in the same justice of the peace court, in connection with the same collision one for damage
to property through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 95) signed by the owner of one of the vehicles involved in the
collision, and another for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence (Crim. Case No. 96) signed by the
passengers injured in the accident. Both of these two complaints were filed against Jose Belga only. After trial, both
defendants were acquitted of the charge against them in Crim. Case No. 88. Following his acquittal, Jose Belga moved to
quash the complaint for multiple physical injuries through reckless imprudence filed against him by the injured
passengers, contending that the case was just a duplication of the one filed by the Chief of Police wherein he had just
been acquitted. The motion to quash was denied and after trial Jose Belga was convicted, whereupon he appealed to the
Court of First Instance of Albay. In the meantime, the case for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by
one of the owners of the vehicles involved in the collision had been remanded to the Court of First Instance of Albay after
Jose Belga had waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. After such remand, the Provincial Fiscal filed in
the Court of First Instance two informations against Jose Belga, one for physical injuries through reckless imprudence,
and another for damage to property through reckless imprudence. Both cases were dismissed by the Court of First
Instance, upon motion of the defendant Jose Belga who alleged double jeopardy in a motion to quash. On appeal by the
Prov. Fiscal, the order of dismissal was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the following language: .

The question for determination is whether the acquittal of Jose Belga in the case filed by the chief of police constitutes a
bar to his subsequent prosecution for multiple physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence.

In the case of Peo[ple] v. F. Diaz, G. R. No. L-6518, prom. March 30, 1954, the accused was charged in the municipal
court of Pasay City with reckless driving under sec. 52 of the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, for having driven an automobile
in a ῾fast and reckless manner ... thereby causing an accident.’ After the accused had pleaded not guilty the case was
dismissed in that court ῾for failure of the Government to prosecute’. But some time thereafter the city attorney filed an
information in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, charging the same accused with damage to property thru reckless
imprudence. The amount of the damage was alleged to be ₱249.50. Pleading double jeopardy, the accused filed a
motion, and on appeal by the Government we affirmed the ruling. Among other things we there said through Mr. Justice
Montemayor —

The next question to determine is the relation between the first offense of violation of the Motor Vehicle Law prosecuted
before the Pasay City Municipal Court and the offense of damage to property thru reckless imprudence charged in the
Rizal Court of First Instance. One of the tests of double jeopardy is whether or not the second offense charged
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information (Rule 113,
Sec. 9). Another test is whether the evidence which proves one would prove the other that is to say whether the facts
alleged in the first charge if proven, would have been sufficient to support the second charge and vice versa; or whether
one crime is an ingredient of the other. x x x

xxxx

The foregoing language of the Supreme Court also disposes of the contention of the prosecuting attorney that the charge
for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could not have been joined with the charge for homicide with
serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence in this case, in view of the provisions of Art. 48 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. The prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute
the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide
with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in
the Justice of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not
now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant have been previously
cleared by the inferior court.43

Significantly, the Solicitor General had urged us in Silva to reexamine Belga (and hence, Diaz) "for the purpose of
delimiting or clarifying its application."44 We declined the invitation, thus:

The State in its appeal claims that the lower court erred in dismissing the case, on the ground of double jeopardy, upon
the basis of the acquittal of the accused in the JP court for Slight Physical Injuries, thru Reckless Imprudence. In the same
breath said State, thru the Solicitor General, admits that the facts of the case at bar, fall squarely on the ruling of the Belga
case x x x, upon which the order of dismissal of the lower court was anchored. The Solicitor General, however, urges a re-
examination of said ruling, upon certain considerations for the purpose of delimiting or clarifying its application. We find,
nevertheless, that further elucidation or disquisition on the ruling in the Belga case, the facts of which are analogous or
similar to those in the present case, will yield no practical advantage to the government. On one hand, there is nothing
which would warrant a delimitation or clarification of the applicability of the Belga case. It was clear. On the other, this
Court has reiterated the views expressed in the Belga case, in the identical case of Yap v. Hon. Lutero, etc., L-12669,
April 30, 1959.45 (Emphasis supplied)

Article 48 Does not Apply to Acts Penalized

Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

The confusion bedeviling the question posed in this petition, to which the MeTC succumbed, stems from persistent but
awkward attempts to harmonize conceptually incompatible substantive and procedural rules in criminal law, namely,
Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses and Article 48 on complexing of crimes, both under the Revised Penal
Code. Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two
categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from its operation
light felonies46); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The legislature crafted this
procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties, will only serve the maximum of the penalty
for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but "the mental attitude x x x behind
the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight x x x,"47 a single mental attitude regardless of the resulting
consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in one or more consequences.

Ordinarily, these two provisions will operate smoothly. Article 48 works to combine in a single prosecution multiple
intentional crimes falling under Titles 1-13, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, when proper; Article 365 governs the
prosecution of imprudent acts and their consequences. However, the complexities of human interaction can produce a
hybrid quasi-offense not falling under either models – that of a single criminal negligence resulting in multiple non-crime
damages to persons and property with varying penalties corresponding to light, less grave or grave offenses. The ensuing
prosecutorial dilemma is obvious: how should such a quasi-crime be prosecuted? Should Article 48’s framework apply to
"complex" the single quasi-offense with its multiple (non-criminal) consequences (excluding those amounting to light
offenses which will be tried separately)? Or should the prosecution proceed under a single charge, collectively alleging all
the consequences of the single quasi-crime, to be penalized separately following the scheme of penalties under Article
365?

Jurisprudence adopts both approaches. Thus, one line of rulings (none of which involved the issue of double jeopardy)
applied Article 48 by "complexing" one quasi-crime with its multiple consequences48 unless one consequence amounts to
a light felony, in which case charges were split by grouping, on the one hand, resulting acts amounting to grave or less
grave felonies and filing the charge with the second level courts and, on the other hand, resulting acts amounting to light
felonies and filing the charge with the first level courts.49 Expectedly, this is the approach the MeTC impliedly sanctioned
(and respondent Ponce invokes), even though under Republic Act No. 7691,50 the MeTC has now exclusive original
jurisdiction to impose the most serious penalty under Article 365 which is prision correccional in its medium period.

Under this approach, the issue of double jeopardy will not arise if the "complexing" of acts penalized under Article 365
involves only resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave felonies because there will be a single prosecution of all the
resulting acts. The issue of double jeopardy arises if one of the resulting acts is penalized as a light offense and the other
acts are penalized as grave or less grave offenses, in which case Article 48 is not deemed to apply and the act penalized
as a light offense is tried separately from the resulting acts penalized as grave or less grave offenses.

The second jurisprudential path nixes Article 48 and sanctions a single prosecution of all the effects of the quasi-crime
collectively alleged in one charge, regardless of their number or severity,51 penalizing each consequence separately.
Thus, in Angeles v. Jose,52 we interpreted paragraph three of Article 365, in relation to a charge alleging "reckless
imprudence resulting in damage to property and less serious physical injuries," as follows:

[T]he third paragraph of said article, x x x reads as follows:

When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the
offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of said damage to three times such value,
but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

The above-quoted provision simply means that if there is only damage to property the amount fixed therein shall be
imposed, but if there are also physical injuries there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The information cannot
be split into two; one for the physical injuries, and another for the damage to property, x x x.53 (Emphasis supplied)

By "additional penalty," the Court meant, logically, the penalty scheme under Article 365.

Evidently, these approaches, while parallel, are irreconcilable. Coherence in this field demands choosing one framework
over the other. Either (1) we allow the "complexing" of a single quasi-crime by breaking its resulting acts into separate
offenses (except for light felonies), thus re-conceptualize a quasi-crime, abandon its present framing under Article 365,
discard its conception under the Quizon and Diaz lines of cases, and treat the multiple consequences of a quasi-crime as
separate intentional felonies defined under Titles 1-13, Book II under the penal code; or (2) we forbid the application of
Article 48 in the prosecution and sentencing of quasi-crimes, require single prosecution of all the resulting acts regardless
of their number and severity, separately penalize each as provided in Article 365, and thus maintain the distinct concept of
quasi-crimes as crafted under Article 365, articulated in Quizon and applied to double jeopardy adjudication in the Diaz
line of cases.1avvphi1

A becoming regard of this Court’s place in our scheme of government denying it the power to make laws constrains us to
keep inviolate the conceptual distinction between quasi-crimes and intentional felonies under our penal code. Article 48 is
incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for a quasi-offense to stand for
(1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for
committing another. This is why, way back in 1968 in Buan, we rejected the Solicitor General’s argument that double
jeopardy does not bar a second prosecution for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence allegedly because the
charge for that offense could not be joined with the other charge for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence
following Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code:

The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence could
not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, because Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less grave felonies. This same argument was considered
and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs. [Silva] x x x:

[T]he prosecution’s contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to first prosecute the accused for
slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice
of the Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is not now in a
position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless imprudence of which the defendant has been previously
cleared by the inferior court.

[W]e must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant x x x by the Justice of the Peace x x x of the charge of slight
physical injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from the consequences of one
and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the appellant in second jeopardy for the same
offense.54 (Emphasis supplied)

Indeed, this is a constitutionally compelled choice. By prohibiting the splitting of charges under Article 365, irrespective of
the number and severity of the resulting acts, rampant occasions of constitutionally impermissible second prosecutions
are avoided, not to mention that scarce state resources are conserved and diverted to proper use.

Hence, we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or
severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365
for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under Article 365, and only one
information shall be filed in the same first level court.55

Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their
constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-
prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence
prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts,
whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses.
Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability,
should cushion the effect of this ruling.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against
petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double
jeopardy.

Let a copy of this ruling be served on the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 171636               April 7, 2009

NORMAN A. GAID, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the 12 July 2005 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals and its
subsequent Resolution3 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide in an information
which reads as follow:

That on or about 12:00 high noon of October 25, 2001, infront of the Laguindingan National High School, Poblacion,
Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
mentioned above while driving a passenger’s jeepney color white bearing plate no. KVG-771 owned by barangay captain
Levy Etom has no precautionary measure to preempt the accident, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
ran [sic] over Michael Dayata resulting of [sic] his untimely death as pronounced by the attending physician of Northern
Mindanao Medical Center Hospital, Cagayan de Oro City.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Petitioner entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The antecedent facts are undisputed.

At around 12:00 noon on 25 October 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the
Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis Oriental. His jeepney was filled to
seating capacity.5 At the time several students were coming out of the school premises.6 Meanwhile, a fourteen year-old
student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto) sitting near a store on the left
side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his left hand to flag down petitioner’s
jeepney7 which was traveling on the right lane of the road.8 However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis
Mellalos (Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point.9

The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayata’s feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat on the
ground behind the jeepney.10 Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also situated on the left side of
the street but directly in front of the school gate, heard "a strong impact coming from the jeep sounding as if the driver
forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an obstacle."11 Dayata was then seen lying on the ground12 and caught in between
the rear tires.13 Petitioner felt that the left rear tire of the jeepney had bounced and the vehicle tilted to the right side.14

Mellalos heard a shout that a boy was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the victim. Petitioner
stopped and saw Mellalos carrying the body of the victim.15 Mellalos loaded the victim on a motorcycle and brought him to
the hospital. Dayata was first brought to the Laguindingan Health Center, but it was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to
the El Salvador Hospital. Upon advice of its doctors, however, Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical
Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival.16

Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause of death.17 She testified that the head
injuries of Dayata could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.18

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laguindingan19 found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. The lower court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the victim was dragged to a distance of
5.70 meters from the point of impact. He was also scored for "not stopping his vehicle after noticing that the jeepney’s left
rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards the right."20 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)21 affirmed in toto
the decision of the MCTC.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with modification in that it found petitioner guilty only of simple
negligence resulting in homicide.1avvphi1.zw+
The Court of Appeals exonerated petitioner from the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide on the ground
that he was not driving recklessly at the time of the accident. However, the appellate court still found him to be negligent
when he failed "to promptly stop his vehicle to check what caused the sudden jotting of its rear tire."22

In its 6 February 2006 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.23

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that "there is (sic) absolutely lack of precaution on the part of
the petitioner when he continued even after he had noticed that the left rear tire and the jeep tilted to its right
side."24 Petitioner stressed that he, in fact, stopped his jeep when its left rear tire bounced and upon hearing that
somebody had been ran over.

Moreover, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in convicting him of the
offense of simple negligence resulting in homicide. Assuming arguendo that he failed to promptly stop his vehicle,
petitioner maintains that no prudent man placed in the same situation could have foreseen the vehicular accident or could
have stopped his vehicle in time when its left rear tire bounced due to the following reasons: (1) the victim was only a
trespasser; (2) petitioner’s attention was focused on the road and the students outside the school’s gate; and (3) the
jeepney was fully loaded with passengers and cargoes and it was impossible for the petitioner to promptly stop his
vehicle.25

The Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that petitioner was negligent when he continued to run towards the
direction of Moog, Laguindingan, dragging the victim a few meters from the point of impact, despite hearing that a child
had been run over.26

The presence or absence of negligence on the part of petitioner is determined by the operative events leading to the
death of Dayata which actually comprised of two phases or stages. The first stage began when Dayata flagged down the
jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and ended when he was run over by the jeepney. The second stage
covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point when petitioner put the
jeepney to a halt.

During the first stage, petitioner was not shown to be negligent.

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.27

In Manzanares v. People,28 this Court convicted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple
homicide and serious physical injuries when he was found driving the Isuzu truck very fast before it smashed into a
jeepney.29 Likewise, in Pangonorom v. People,30 a public utility driver, who was driving very fast, failed to slow down and
hit a swerving car. He was found negligent by this Court.

In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to by two eyewitnesses.
Prosecution witness Actub affirmed this fact on cross-examination, thus:

ATTY. MACUA:

(to the witness)

Q Mr. Witness, when the passenger jeepney passed by the gate of the Laguindingan National High School, is it
running slowly, am I correct?

A Yes, he was running slowly.31

The slow pace of the jeepney was seconded by Mellalos:

Q You testified that you heard somebody outside from the vehicle shouting that a boy was ran over, am I correct?

A Yes, Sir.
 Q Now, before you heard that shouting, did you observe any motion from the vehicle?

A The jeep was moving slowly and I noticed that there was something that [sic] the jeep a little bit bounced up as
if a hump that’s the time I heard a shout from outside.32

Petitioner stated that he was driving at no more than 15 kilometers per hour.33

It appears from the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the
right lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side.
Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In Dayata’s haste to board the jeep which was then running,
his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after he heard a strong
impact coming from the jeep.

With the foregoing facts, petitioner can not be held liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held liable for
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the accident and the death
of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving jeepney to get a ride.

In the instant case, petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity of the
school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side.

However, the Court of Appeals found petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide for failing to stop driving
at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court was referring to the second stage of the
incident.

Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.34

The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.35

The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage results to the
person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed,
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a
duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure
to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this
provision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.36

In Philippine National Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,37 the petitioner was the franchisee that operates and
maintains the toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Toll Expressways. It failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
maintaining the NLEX safe for motorists. The lighted cans and lane dividers on the highway were removed even as
flattened sugarcanes lay scattered on the ground. The highway was still wet from the juice and sap of the flattened
sugarcanes. The petitioner should have foreseen that the wet condition of the highway would endanger motorists passing
by at night or in the wee hours of the morning.38 Consequently, it was held liable for damages.

In an American case, Hernandez v. Lukas,39 a motorist traveling within the speed limit and did all was possible to avoid
striking a child who was then six years old only. The place of the incident was a neighborhood where children were
playing in the parkways on prior occasions. The court ruled that it must be still proven that the driver did not exercise due
care. The evidence showed that the driver was proceeding in lawful manner within the speed limit when the child ran into
the street and was struck by the driver’s vehicle. Clearly, this was an emergency situation thrust upon the driver too
suddenly to avoid.

In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the bouncing of his
vehicle, a circumstance which the appellate court equates with negligence. Petitioner contends that he did not
immediately stop because he did not see anybody go near his vehicle at the time of the incident.40

Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of
the accident. Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.41 In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there
was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence
that is not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.42

The head injuries sustained by Dayata at the point of impact proved to be the immediate cause of his death, as indicated
in the post-mortem findings.43 His skull was crushed as a result of the accident. Had petitioner immediately stopped the
jeepney, it would still not have saved the life of the victim as the injuries he suffered were fatal.

The evidence on record do not show that the jeepney dragged the victim after he was hit and run over by the jeepney.
Quite the contrary, the evidence discloses that the victim was not dragged at all. In fact, it is the other way around.
Bongolto narrated that after the impact, he saw Dayata left behind the jeepney.44 Actub saw Dayata in a prone position
and bleeding within seconds after impact.45 Right after the impact, Mellalos immediately jumped out of the jeepney and
saw the victim lying on the ground.46 The distance of 5.70 meters is the length of space between the spot where the victim
fell to the ground and the spot where the jeepney stopped as observed by the trial judge during the ocular inspection at
the scene of the accident.47

Moreover, mere suspicions and speculations that the victim could have lived had petitioner stopped can never be the
basis of a conviction in a criminal case.48 The Court must be satisfied that the guilt of the accused had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt.49 Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of the guilt of the accused. The
overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains doubt as
to his guilt.50

Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victim’s death was petitioner’s
alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the incident.

If at all again, petitioner’s failure to render assistance to the victim would constitute abandonment of one’s victim
punishable under Article 275 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the omission is not covered by the information. Thus,
to hold petitioner criminally liable under the provision would be tantamount to a denial of due process.

Therefore, petitioner must be acquitted at least on reasonable doubt. The award of damages must also be deleted
pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code which states that when the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated 12 July 2005 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioner Norman A. Gaid is ACQUITTED of the crime of Simple Negligence Resulting in Homicide as found
by the Court of Appeals and of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in Criminal Case No. 1937 of
the MCTC of Laguindingan, Misamis Oriental.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 187926               February 15, 2012

Dr. EMMANUEL JARCIA, Jr. and Dr. MARILOU BASTAN, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Even early on, patients have consigned their lives to the skill of their doctors. Time and again, it can be said that the most
important goal of the medical profession is the preservation of life and health of the people. Corollarily, when a physician
departs from his sacred duty and endangers instead the life of his patient, he must be made liable for the resulting injury.
This Court, as this case would show, cannot and will not let the act go unpunished.1

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court challenging the August 29, 2008 Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), and its May 19, 2009 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29559, dismissing the appeal and affirming in toto the
June 14, 2005 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Manila (RTC), finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of simple imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.

THE FACTS

Belinda Santiago (Mrs. Santiago) lodged a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) against the
petitioners, Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr. (Dr. Jarcia) and Dr. Marilou Bastan (Dr. Bastan), for their alleged neglect of
professional duty which caused her son, Roy Alfonso Santiago (Roy Jr.), to suffer serious physical injuries. Upon
investigation, the NBI found that Roy Jr. was hit by a taxicab; that he was rushed to the Manila Doctors Hospital for an
emergency medical treatment; that an X-ray of the victim’s ankle was ordered; that the X-ray result showed no fracture as
read by Dr. Jarcia;  that Dr. Bastan entered the emergency room (ER) and, after conducting her own examination of the
victim, informed Mrs. Santiago that since it was only the ankle that was hit, there was no need to examine the upper leg;
that eleven (11) days later, Roy Jr. developed fever, swelling of the right leg and misalignment of the right foot; that Mrs.
Santiago brought him back to the hospital; and that the X-ray revealed a right mid-tibial fracture and a linear hairline
fracture in the shaft of the bone.

The NBI indorsed the matter to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila for preliminary investigation. Probable cause
was found and a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries, was filed against Dr. Jarcia,
Dr. Bastan and Dr. Pamittan,5 before the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-196646.

On June 14, 2005, the RTC found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Simple Imprudence
Resulting to Serious Physical Injuries. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused DR. EMMANUEL JARCIA, JR. and DR. MARILOU
BASTAN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO SERIOUS
PHYSICAL INJURIES and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of ONE (1) MONTH and ONE (1) DAY to TWO (2)
MONTHS and to indemnify MRS. BELINDA SANTIAGO the amount of ₱ 3,850.00 representing medical expenses without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

It appearing that Dr. Pamittan has not been apprehended nor voluntarily surrendered despite warrant issued for her
arrest, let warrant be issued for her arrest and the case against her be ARCHIVED, to be reinstated upon her
apprehension.

SO ORDERED.6

The RTC explained:

After a thorough and in depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court finds that
the evidence of the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral certainty in the mind of
the Court that accused herein [are] criminally responsible. The Court believes that accused are negligent when both failed
to exercise the necessary and reasonable prudence in ascertaining the extent of injury of Alfonso Santiago, Jr.

However, the negligence exhibited by the two doctors does not approximate negligence of a reckless nature but merely
amounts to simple imprudence. Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which
the damage impending to be caused is not the immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. The elements of simple
imprudence are as follows.
 1. that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and

2. that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate of the danger is not clearly manifest.

Considering all the evidence on record, The Court finds the accused guilty for simple imprudence resulting to physical
injuries. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty provided for is arresto mayor in its minimum period.7

Dissatisfied, the petitioners appealed to the CA.

As earlier stated, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The August 29, 2008 Decision of the CA pertinently reads:

This Court holds concurrently and finds the foregoing circumstances sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against
the accused-appellants for the crime of simple imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. The elements of
imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary;
(3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack
of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.

Whether or not Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan had committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of their
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good
standing under similar circumstances, bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or the
present state of medical science. In the case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, the Supreme Court stated that, in
accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and
surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He
therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat
a condition under the same circumstances.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing accused-appellants’ negligence, and
for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of the physician as well as a
causal connection of such breach and the resulting injury of his patient. The connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words, the
negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. Negligence, no matter in what it consists, cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of. The proximate cause of an injury is that cause which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the
result would not have occurred.

In the case at bench, the accused-appellants questioned the imputation against them and argued that there is no causal
connection between their failure to diagnose the fracture and the injury sustained by Roy.

We are not convinced.

The prosecution is however after the cause which prolonged the pain and suffering of Roy and not on the failure of the
accused-appellants to correctly diagnose the extent of the injury sustained by Roy.

For a more logical presentation of the discussion, we shall first consider the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur  to the instant case. Res ipsa loquitur  is a Latin phrase which literally means "the thing or the transaction speaks
for itself. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is simply a recognition of the postulate that, as a matter of common knowledge
and experience, the very nature of certain types of occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the
person who controls the instrumentality causing the injury in the absence of some explanation by the accused-appellant
who is charged with negligence. It is grounded in the superior logic of ordinary human experience and, on the basis of
such experience or common knowledge, negligence may be deduced from the mere occurrence of the accident itself.
Hence, res ipsa loquitur  is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge.

The specific acts of negligence was narrated by Mrs. Santiago who accompanied her son during the latter’s ordeal at the
hospital. She testified as follows:

Fiscal Formoso:
Q: Now, he is an intern did you not consult the doctors, Dr. Jarcia or Dra. Pamittan to confirm whether you should go
home or not?

A: Dra. Pamittan was inside the cubicle of the nurses and I asked her, you let us go home and you don’t even clean the
wounds of my son.

Q: And what did she [tell] you?

A: They told me they will call a resident doctor, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: Was there a resident doctor [who] came?

A: Yes, Sir. Dra. Bastan arrived.

Q: Did you tell her what you want on you to be done?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What did you [tell] her?

A: I told her, sir, while she was cleaning the wounds of my son, are you not going to x-ray up to the knee because my son
was complaining pain from his ankle up to the middle part of the right leg.

Q: And what did she tell you?

A: According to Dra. Bastan, there is no need to x-ray because it was the ankle part that was run over.

Q: What did you do or tell her?

A: I told her, sir, why is it that they did not examine[x] the whole leg. They just lifted the pants of my son.

Q: So you mean to say there was no treatment made at all?

A: None, sir.

x x x           x x x          x x x

x x x           x x x          x x x

A: I just listened to them, sir. And I just asked if I will still return my son.

x x x           x x x          x x x

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q: And you were present when they were called?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And what was discussed then by Sis. Retoria?

A: When they were there they admitted that they have mistakes, sir.

Still, before resort to the doctrine may be allowed, the following requisites must be satisfactorily shown:
 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence;

2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant or defendants; and

3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated.

In the above requisites, the fundamental element is the "control of the instrumentality" which caused the damage. Such
element of control must be shown to be within the dominion of the accused-appellants. In order to have the benefit of the
rule, a plaintiff, in addition to proving injury or damage, must show a situation where it is applicable and must establish
that the essential elements of the doctrine were present in a particular incident. The early treatment of the leg of Roy
would have lessen his suffering if not entirely relieve him from the fracture. A boy of tender age whose leg was hit by a
vehicle would engender a well-founded belief that his condition may worsen without proper medical attention. As junior
residents who only practice general surgery and without specialization with the case consulted before them, they should
have referred the matter to a specialist. This omission alone constitutes simple imprudence on their part. When Mrs.
Santiago insisted on having another x-ray of her child on the upper part of his leg, they refused to do so. The mother
would not have asked them if they had no exclusive control or prerogative to request an x-ray test. Such is a fact because
a radiologist would only conduct the x-ray test upon request of a physician.

The testimony of Mrs. Santiago was corroborated by a bone specialist Dr. Tacata. He further testified based on his
personal knowledge, and not as an expert, as he examined himself the child Roy. He testified as follows:

Fiscal Macapagal:

Q: And was that the correct respon[se] to the medical problem that was presented to Dr. Jarcia and Dra. Bastan?

A: I would say at that stage, yes. Because they have presented the patient and the history. "At sabi nila, nadaanan lang
po ito." And then, considering their year of residency they are still junior residents, and they are not also orthopedic
residents but general surgery residents, it’s entirely different thing. Because if you are an orthopedic resident, I am not
trying to say…but if I were an orthopedic resident, there would be more precise and accurate decision compare to a
general surgery resident in so far as involved.

Q: You mean to say there is no supervisor attending the emergency room?

A: At the emergency room, at the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, the supervisor there is a consultant that usually comes from a
family medicine. They see where a certain patient have to go and then if they cannot manage it, they refer it to the
consultant on duty. Now at that time, I don’t [know] why they don’t….Because at that time, I think, it is the decision. Since
the x-rays….

Ordinarily, only physicians and surgeons of skill and experience are competent to testify as to whether a patient has been
treated or operated upon with a reasonable degree of skill and care. However, testimony as to the statements and acts of
physicians, external appearances, and manifest conditions which are observable by any one may be given by non-expert
witnesses. Hence, in cases where the res ipsa loquitur is applicable, the court is permitted to find a physician negligent
upon proper proof of injury to the patient, without the aid of expert testimony, where the court from its fund of common
knowledge can determine the proper standard of care. Where common knowledge and experience teach that a resulting
injury would not have occurred to the patient if due care had been exercised, an inference of negligence may be drawn
giving rise to an application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur  without medical evidence, which is ordinarily required to
show not only what occurred but how and why it occurred. In the case at bench, we give credence to the testimony of Mrs.
Santiago by applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

Res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but a rule to be cautiously applied, depending
upon the circumstances of each case. It is generally restricted to situations in malpractice cases where a layman is able to
say, as a matter of common knowledge and observation, that the consequences of professional care were not as such as
would ordinarily have followed if due care had been exercised. A distinction must be made between the failure to secure
results and the occurrence of something more unusual and not ordinarily found if the service or treatment rendered
followed the usual procedure of those skilled in that particular practice. The latter circumstance is the primordial issue that
confronted this Court and we find application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur  to be in order.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal in this case is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed decision of the
trial court finding accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.8

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the CA in its May 19, 2009 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

The petitioners pray for the reversal of the decision of both the RTC and the CA anchored on the following

GROUNDS-

1. IN AFFIRMING ACCUSED-PETITIONERS’ CONVICTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING THAT THE ACTUAL, DIRECT, IMMEDIATE, AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE PHYSICAL
INJURY OF THE PATIENT (FRACTURE OF THE LEG BONE OR TIBIA), WHICH REQUIRED MEDICAL
ATTENDANCE FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) DAYS AND INCAPACITATED HIM FROM PERFORMING HIS
CUSTOMARY DUTY DURING THE SAME PERIOD OF TIME, WAS THE VEHICULAR ACCIDENT WHERE
THE PATIENT’S RIGHT LEG WAS HIT BY A TAXI, NOT THE FAILURE OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONERS TO
SUBJECT THE PATIENT’S WHOLE LEG TO AN X-RAY EXAMINATION.

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISREGARDING ESTABLISHED FACTS CLEARLY NEGATING

PETITIONERS’ ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OR IMPRUDENCE. SIGNIFICANTLY, THE COURT OF APPEALS
UNJUSTIFIABLY DISREGARDED THE OPINION OF THE PROSECUTION’S EXPERT WITNESS, DR. CIRILO
TACATA, THAT PETITIONERS WERE NOT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE OR IMPRUDENCE COMPLAINED OF.

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FAILURE OF PETITIONERS TO SUBJECT
THE PATIENT’S WHOLE LEG TO AN X-RAY EXAMINATION PROLONGED THE PAIN AND SUFFERING OF
THE PATIENT, SUCH CONCLUSION BEING UNSUPPORTED BY, AND EVEN CONTRARY TO, THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

4. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE PATIENT EXPERIENCED PROLONGED PAIN AND SUFFERING, THE
COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ALLEGED PAIN AND SUFFERING WERE DUE
TO THE UNJUSTIFIED FAILURE OF THE PATIENT’S MOTHER, A NURSE HERSELF, TO IMMEDIATELY
BRING THE PATIENT BACK TO THE HOSPITAL, AS ADVISED BY THE PETITIONERS, AFTER HE
COMPLAINED OF SEVERE PAIN IN HIS RIGHT LEG WHEN HE REACHED HOME AFTER HE WAS SEEN BY
PETITIONERS AT THE HOSPITAL. THUS, THE PATIENT’S ALLEGED INJURY (PROLONGED PAIN AND
SUFFERING) WAS DUE TO HIS OWN MOTHER’S ACT OR OMISSION.

5. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT NO PHYSICIAN-PATIENT RELATIONSHIP

EXISTED BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND PATIENT ALFONSO SANTIAGO, JR., PETITIONERS NOT BEING
THE LATTER’S ATTENDING PHYSICIAN AS THEY WERE MERELY REQUESTED BY THE EMERGENCY
ROOM (ER) NURSE TO SEE THE PATIENT WHILE THEY WERE PASSING BY THE ER FOR THEIR LUNCH.

6. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-PETITIONERS OF THE

CRIME CHARGED."9

The foregoing can be synthesized into two basic issues: [1] whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable in
this case; and [2] whether or not the petitioners are liable for criminal negligence.

THE COURT’S RULING

The CA is correct in finding that there was negligence on the part of the petitioners. After a perusal of the records,
however, the Court is not convinced that the petitioners are guilty of criminal negligence complained of. The Court is also
of the view that the CA erred in applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in this particular case.

As to the Application of The Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur

This doctrine of res ipsa loquitur means "Where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of
the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the
accident arose from want of care." The Black's Law Dictionary defines the said doctrine. Thus:
The thing speaks for itself. Rebuttable presumption or inference that defendant was negligent, which arises upon proof
that the instrumentality causing injury was in defendant's exclusive control, and that the accident was one which ordinarily
does not happen in absence of negligence. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged
wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened provided the character of the accident and
circumstances attending it lead reasonably to belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and that
thing which caused injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the alleged wrongdoer. Under this
doctrine, the happening of an injury permits an inference of negligence where plaintiff produces substantial evidence that
the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive control and management of defendant, and that
the occurrence was such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.10

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence is unusual to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima
facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. The
doctrine, however, is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The
rule, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the
requirement of proof of culpable negligence on the party charged. It merely determines and regulates what shall
be prima facie evidence thereof and helps the plaintiff in proving a breach of the duty. The doctrine can be invoked when
and only when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available.11

The requisites for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur are: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not
ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person in charge; and (3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.12

In this case, the circumstances that caused patient Roy Jr.’s injury and the series of tests that were supposed to be
undergone by him to determine the extent of the injury suffered were not under the exclusive control of Drs. Jarcia and
Bastan. It was established that they are mere residents of the Manila Doctors Hospital at that time who attended to the
victim at the emergency room.13 While it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seem
doubtless to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the petitioners, this conclusion is still best achieved, not
through the scholarly assumptions of a layman like the patient’s mother, but by the unquestionable knowledge of expert
witness/es. As to whether the petitioners have exercised the requisite degree of skill and care in treating patient Roy, Jr. is
generally a matter of expert opinion.

As to Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan’s negligence

The totality of the evidence on record clearly points to the negligence of the petitioners. At the risk of being repetitious, the
Court, however, is not satisfied that Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan are criminally negligent in this case.

Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care,
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.14

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage
results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.15

The elements of simple negligence are: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender, and (2) that the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest.16

In this case, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the petitioners are guilty of reckless imprudence or simple
negligence. The elements thereof were not proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.

The testimony of Dr. Cirilo R. Tacata (Dr. Tacata), a specialist in pediatric orthopedic, although pointing to some medical
procedures that could have been done by Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan, as physicians on duty, was not clear as to whether
the injuries suffered by patient Roy Jr. were indeed aggravated by the petitioners’ judgment call and their diagnosis or
appreciation of the condition of the victim at the time they assessed him. Thus:

Q: Will you please tell us, for the record, doctor, what is your specialization?

A: At present I am the chairman department of orthopedic in UP-PGH and I had special training in pediatric orthopedic for
two (2) years.
Q: In June 1998, doctor, what was your position and what was your specialization at that time?

A: Since 1980, I have been specialist in pediatric orthopedic.

Q: When Alfonso Santiago, Jr. was brought to you by his mother, what did you do by way of physicians as first step?

A: As usual, I examined the patient physically and, at that time as I have said, the patient could not walk so I [began] to
suspect that probably he sustained a fracture as a result of a vehicular accident. So I examined the patient at that time,
the involved leg, I don’t know if that is left or right, the involved leg then was swollen and the patient could not walk, so I
requested for the x-ray of [the] lower leg.

Q: What part of the leg, doctor, did you request to be examined?

A: If we refer for an x-ray, usually, we suspect a fracture whether in approximal, middle or lebistal tinial, we usually x-ray
the entire extremity.

Q: And what was the result?

A: Well, I can say that it was a spiral fracture of the mid-tibial, it is the bigger bone of the leg.

Q: And when you say spiral, doctor, how long was this fracture?

A: When we say spiral, it is a sort of letter S, the length was about six (6) to eight (8) centimeters.

Q: Mid-tibial, will you please point to us, doctor, where the tibial is?

(Witness pointing to his lower leg)

A: The tibial is here, there are two bones here, the bigger one is the tibial and the smaller one is the fibula. The bigger one
is the one that get fractured.

Q: And in the course of your examination of Alfonso Santiago, Jr. did you ask for the history of such injury?

A: Yes, actually, that was a routine part of our examination that once a patient comes in, before we actually examine the
patient, we request for a detailed history. If it is an accident, then, we request for the exact mechanism of injuries.

Q: And as far as you can recall, Doctor, what was the history of that injury that was told to you?

A: The patient was sideswiped, I don’t know if it is a car, but it is a vehicular accident.

Q: Who did you interview?

A: The mother.

Q: How about the child himself, Alfonso Santiago, Jr.?

A: Normally, we do not interview the child because, usually, at his age, the answers are not accurate. So, it was the
mother that I interviewed.

Q: And were you informed also of his early medication that was administered on Alfonso Santiago, Jr.?

A: No, not actually medication. I was informed that this patient was seen initially at the emergency room by the two (2)
physicians that you just mentioned, Dr. Jarcia and Dra. Bastan, that time who happened to be my residents who were [on]
duty at the emergency room.

xxxx
A: At the emergency room, at the Manila Doctor’s Hospital, the supervisor there is a consultant that usually comes from a
family medicine. They see where a certain patient have to go and then if they cannot manage it, they refer it to the
consultant on duty. Now at that time, I don’t why they don’t … Because at that time, I think, it is the decision. Since the x-
rays…

xxx

Q: You also said, Doctor, that Dr. Jarcia and Dra. Bastan are not even an orthopedic specialist.

A: They are general surgeon residents. You have to man[x] the emergency room, including neurology,
orthopedic, general surgery, they see everything at the emergency room.

xxxx

Q: But if initially, Alfonso Santiago, Jr. and his case was presented to you at the emergency room, you would have
subjected the entire foot to x-ray even if the history that was given to Dr. Jarcia and Dra. Bastan is the same?

A: I could not directly say yes, because it would still depend on my examination, we cannot subject the whole body for x-
ray if we think that the damaged was only the leg.

Q: Not the entire body but the entire leg?

A: I think, if my examination requires it, I would.

Q: So, you would conduct first an examination?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And do you think that with that examination that you would have conducted you would discover the necessity
subjecting the entire foot for x-ray?

A: It is also possible but according to them, the foot and the ankle were swollen and not the leg, which sometimes
normally happens that the actual fractured bone do not get swollen.

xxxx

Q: Doctor, if you know that the patient sustained a fracture on the ankle and on the foot and the history that was
told to you is the region that was hit is the region of the foot, will the doctor subject the entire leg for x-ray?

A: I am an orthopedic surgeon, you have to subject an x-ray of the leg. Because you have to consider the kind of
fracture that the patient sustained would you say the exact mechanism of injury. For example spiral, "paikot yung
bale nya," so it was possible that the leg was run over, the patient fell, and it got twisted. That’s why the leg
seems to be fractured.17 [Emphases supplied]

It can be gleaned from the testimony of Dr. Tacata that a thorough examination was not performed on Roy Jr. As
residents on duty at the emergency room, Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan were expected to know the medical protocol in
treating leg fractures and in attending to victims of car accidents. There was, however, no precise evidence and scientific
explanation pointing to the fact that the delay in the application of the cast to the patient’s fractured leg because of failure
to immediately diagnose the specific injury of the patient, prolonged the pain of the child or aggravated his condition or
even caused further complications. Any person may opine that had patient Roy Jr. been treated properly and given the
extensive X-ray examination, the extent and severity of the injury, spiral fracture of the mid-tibial part or the bigger bone of
the leg, could have been detected early on and the prolonged pain and suffering of Roy Jr. could have been prevented.
But still, that opinion, even how logical it may seem would not, and could not, be enough basis to hold one criminally
liable; thus, a reasonable doubt as to the petitioners’ guilt.

Although the Court sympathizes with the plight of the mother and the child in this case, the Court is bound by the dictates
of justice which hold inviolable the right of the accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond reasonable
doubt. The Court, nevertheless, finds the petitioners civilly liable for their failure to sufficiently attend to Roy Jr.’s medical
needs when the latter was rushed to the ER, for while a criminal conviction requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only
a preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability. Taken into account also was the fact that there was no
bad faith on their part.

Dr. Jarcia and Dr. Bastan cannot pass on the liability to the taxi driver who hit the victim. It may be true that the actual,
direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the injury (fracture of the leg bone or tibia) of Roy Jr. was the vehicular accident
when he was hit by a taxi. The petitioners, however, cannot simply invoke such fact alone to excuse themselves from any
liability. If this would be so, doctors would have a ready defense should they fail to do their job in attending to victims of
hit-and-run, maltreatment, and other crimes of violence in which the actual, direct, immediate, and proximate cause of the
injury is indubitably the act of the perpetrator/s.

In failing to perform an extensive medical examination to determine the extent of Roy Jr.’s injuries, Dr. Jarcia and Dr.
Bastan were remiss of their duties as members of the medical profession. Assuming for the sake of argument that they
did not have the capacity to make such thorough evaluation at that stage, they should have referred the patient to another
doctor with sufficient training and experience instead of assuring him and his mother that everything was all right.

This Court cannot also stamp its imprimatur on the petitioners’ contention that no physician-patient relationship existed
between them and patient Roy Jr., since they were not his attending physicians at that time. They claim that they were
merely requested by the ER nurse to see the patient while they were passing by the ER for their lunch. Firstly, this issue
was never raised during the trial at the RTC or even before the CA. The petitioners, therefore, raise the want of doctor-
patient relationship for the first time on appeal with this Court. It has been settled that "issues raised for the first time on
appeal cannot be considered because a party is not permitted to change his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is
unfair to the other party and offensive to the rules of fair play, justice and due process."18 Stated differently, basic
considerations of due process dictate that theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court
need not be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court.19

Assuming again for the sake of argument that the petitioners may still raise this issue of "no physician–patient
relationship," the Court finds and so holds that there was a "physician–patient" relationship in this case.

In the case of Lucas v. Tuaño,20 the Court wrote that "[w]hen a patient engages the services of a physician, a physician-
patient relationship is generated. And in accepting a case, the physician, for all intents and purposes, represents that he
has the needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field; and that he will
employ such training, care, and skill in the treatment of the patient. Thus, in treating his patient, a physician is under
a duty to exercise that degree of care, skill and diligence which physicians in the same general neighborhood and in the
same general line of practice ordinarily possess and exercise in like cases. Stated otherwise, the physician has the
obligation to use at least the same level of care that any other reasonably competent physician would use to treat the
condition under similar circumstances."

Indubitably, a physician-patient relationship exists between the petitioners and patient Roy Jr. Notably, the latter and his
mother went to the ER for an immediate medical attention. The petitioners allegedly passed by and were requested to
attend to the victim (contrary to the testimony of Dr. Tacata that they were, at that time, residents on duty at the
ER).21 They obliged and examined the victim, and later assured the mother that everything was fine and that they could go
home. Clearly, a physician-patient relationship was established between the petitioners and the patient Roy Jr.

To repeat for clarity and emphasis, if these doctors knew from the start that they were not in the position to attend to Roy
Jr., a vehicular accident victim, with the degree of diligence and commitment expected of every doctor in a case like this,
they should have not made a baseless assurance that everything was all right. By doing so, they deprived Roy Jr. of
adequate medical attention that placed him in a more dangerous situation than he was already in. What petitioners should
have done, and could have done, was to refer Roy Jr. to another doctor who could competently and thoroughly examine
his injuries.

All told, the petitioners were, indeed, negligent but only civilly, and not criminally, liable as the facts show.

Article II, Section 1 of the Code of Medical Ethics of the Medical Profession in the Philippines states:

A physician should attend to his patients faithfully and conscientiously. He should secure for them all possible benefits
that may depend upon his professional skill and care. As the sole tribunal to adjudge the physician’s failure to fulfill his
obligation to his patients is, in most cases, his own conscience, violation of this rule on his part is discreditable and
inexcusable.22
Established medical procedures and practices, though in constant instability, are devised for the purpose of preventing
complications. In this case, the petitioners failed to observe the most prudent medical procedure under the circumstances
to prevent the complications suffered by a child of tender age.

As to the Award of Damages

While no criminal negligence was found in the petitioners’ failure to administer the necessary medical attention to Roy Jr.,
the Court holds them civilly liable for the resulting damages to their patient. While it was the taxi driver who ran over the
foot or leg of Roy Jr., their negligence was doubtless contributory.

It appears undisputed that the amount of ₱ 3,850.00, as expenses incurred by patient Roy Jr., was adequately supported
by receipts. The Court, therefore, finds the petitioners liable to pay this amount by way of actual damages.

The Court is aware that no amount of compassion can suffice to ease the sorrow felt by the family of the child at that time.
Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of Roy Jr. in the amount of ₱ 100,000.00 and ₱ 50,000.00,
respectively, is proper in this case.

It is settled that moral damages are not punitive in nature, but are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way the
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury unjustly inflicted on a person. Intended for the restoration of the psychological or
emotional status quo ante, the award of moral damages is designed to compensate emotional injury suffered, not to
impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.23

The Court, likewise, finds the petitioners also liable for exemplary damages in the said amount.1âwphi1 Article 2229 of the
Civil Code provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by way of example or correction for the public good.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 2008
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered ACQUITTING Dr. Emmanuel Jarcia, Jr. and Dr. Marilou
Bastan of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries but declaring them civilly liable in the
amounts of:

(1) ₱ 3,850.00 as actual damages;

(2) ₱ 100,000.00 as moral damages;

(3) ₱ 50,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

(4) Costs of the suit.

with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the filing of the Information. The rate shall be 12% interest per
annum from the finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.