REMEDIAL LAW GABRIEL D.

ADORA

DRAFT NO.: 1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BRENDO P. PAGAL a.k.a “DINDO”

G.R. No. 241257, 29 September 2020, EN BANC (GESMUNDO, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

The duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense

as follows: (1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full

comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt; (2) to require the prosecution

to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and; (3) to

inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow

him to do so if he desires. As regards the first duty, the records are barren of any

proceeding where the trial court gauged the mindset of the accused when he pleaded

guilty. Hence there is an improvident plea. As to the second duty, the prosecution did

not present any witness, despite being given four (4) separate hearing dates to do so.

Thus, the RTC's conviction of Brendo relied solely on his improvident plea of guilty. As

to the third duty, this was not fulfilled since the RTC did not comply with the guidelines

set forth in jurisprudence.

Convictions involving improvident pleas are affirmed if the same are supported

by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the conviction is set aside and the case

remanded for further proceedings when the conviction is predicated solely on the basis

of the improvident plea of guilt, meaning that the prosecution was unable to prove the
accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. "Further proceedings" usually entails re-

arraignment and reception of evidence from both the prosecution and the defense in

compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116. In this case, the prosecution was already given

reasonable opportunity to prove its case against Brendo. Regrettably, the State

squandered its chances to the detriment of Brendo. Therefore, in instances where an

improvident plea of guilt has been entered and the prosecution was given reasonable

opportunity to present evidence to establish the guilt of the accused but failed to do so,

the accused is entitled to an acquittal, if only to give rise to the constitutionally

guaranteed right to due process and the presumption of innocence.

FACTS

The accused-appellant Brendo P. Pagal (Brendo) was indicted under an

Information that charged him of the crime of murder. During his arraignment, he pleaded

guilty to the crime charged. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the plea to be

voluntary and with full understanding of its consequences. Thus, it directed the

prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of accused-appellant and to

determine the exact degree of his culpability in accordance with Section 3, Rule 116 of

the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000 Revised Rules).

In its Order dated August 20, 2009, the RTC ordered for trial as well as the first

prosecution witness to proceed. It then issued a subpoena to Angelito Pagal (Angelito),

Cesar Jarden (Cesar), and Emelita Calupas (Emelita) to appear and testify before it on
the said date. Another subpoena directed to Angelita was issued, which was received

by Angelito himself and a certain Malima Pagal. In its Order dated February 22, 2011,

the RTC noted the request of the prosecution that other witnesses be subpoenaed for

them to testify in court in the event that Angelito could not come to court on the next

setting. A repeat subpoena was issued to Angelito, Cesar, and Jaimelito Calupas

(Jaimelito). Added to the subpoena was Dr. Radegunda Uy (Dr. Uy). After which,

another subpoena was issued to the same persons, the court noting once more the

prosecution’s request. None of the prosecution witnesses appeared and testified on the

scheduled hearing dates and for the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence despite

repeat subpoenas duly issued and received by them. The defense chose not to present

any evidence in view of the prosecution's non-presentation. Both the prosecution and

the defense moved for the submission of the case for decision.

The RTC found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt based solely

on his plea of guilty. It stated that accused-appellant maintained his plea despite being

apprised that he will be sentenced and imprisoned on the basis thereof. Brendo

appealed the RTC Order to the Court of Appeals (CA) on the ground that the RTC erred

in convicting him of the crime charged solely on the basis of the latter’s plea of guilt and

despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The

CA held that the RTC failed to comply with the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 116

regarding the treatment of a plea of guilty to a capital offense, particularly the conduct of

a searching inquiry into Brendo’s voluntariness and full comprehension of the

consequences of his plea. Also, the CA observed that the prosecution's evidence was
insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction independent of the plea of guilty. In fact,

the CA noted that the prosecution did not present any evidence; thus, it remanded the

case to the RTC with a directive that it follow the mandate of Sec. 3, Rule 116. Hence,

this recourse.

ISSUE

(1) Did the RTC err in convicting Brendo on the sole basis of his guilty plea

despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

(2) Is it correct for the case to be remanded to the trial court for further

proceedings so that the trial court may comply with the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule

116?

RULING

(1) YES. It must be noted that murder remains a capital offense despite the

proscription against the imposition of death as a punishment. Thus, when Brendo

pleaded guilty during his arraignment, he pleaded to a capital offense. For this, Sec. 3,

Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules is relevant since it provides that when the accused

pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the

voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require

the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
 The rule encapsulated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 was not the rule prior to the advent of

the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Even prior to the adoption of the 1940 Rules of

Court, jurisprudence has had to grapple with instances where an accused pleaded guilty

to a capital offense. In such instances, the Court maintained a policy of restraint in

rendering judgment on the sole basis of such plea.

This jurisdiction places a premium on ensuring that an accused pleading guilty to

a grave crime understands his plea and the possible consequences thereof. This is

evident in the early cases of U.S. v. Patala (1903), where the Court cautioned against

the acceptance of pleas of guilty and opined that the trial judge should freely exercise

his discretion in allowing pleas of guilty to be withdrawn if the accused does not fully

realize the probable effects of his admission, and U.S. v. Jamad, where the Court noted

that notwithstanding the plea of 'guilty,' several witnesses were examined, under the

well-settled practice in this jurisdiction which contemplates the taking of additional

evidence in cases wherein pleas of 'guilty' are entered to complaints or information

charging grave crimes, and more especially crimes for which the prescribed penalty is

death.

According to Jamad, the better practice would indicate that, when practicable,

such additional evidence should be sufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction

independently of the plea of guilty, or at least to leave no room for reasonable doubt in
the mind of either the trial or the appellate court as to the possibility of a

misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to the precise nature of the charges-to

which he pleaded guilty. This, however, lies in the sound judicial discretion of the trial

judge whether he will take evidence or not in any case wherein he is satisfied that a

plea of "guilty" has been entered by the accused, with full knowledge of the meaning

and consequences of his act. But in the event that no evidence is taken, this court, if

called upon to review the proceedings had in the court below, may reverse and send

back for a new trial, if, on the whole record, a reasonable doubt arises as to whether the

accused did in fact enter the plea of " guilty" with full knowledge of the meaning and

consequences of the act.

The Court has already recognized the wisdom in receiving evidence in such

cases. It must be noted, however, that the reception of evidence in cases where the

accused pleads guilty remained discretionary on the part of the trial court. In fact,

convictions solely on the basis of a plea of guilty were upheld by this Court. In US. v.

Burlado, the Court affirmed therein accused's conviction for the crime of qualified theft

on the strength of his plea of guilty. The Court explained that a plea of guilty, when

formally entered on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense

charged in the information without the introduction of further evidence, the defendant

himself having supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty. The only question left

for decision is the penalty.

Rules of Court which stated that where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint or

information, if the court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the

offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed. Thus,

when an accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court may hear witnesses for

purposes of determining the punishment to be imposed; the guilt of the accused was a

forgone conclusion. The rule seemed to institutionalize Jamad as shown by the

discretionary nature of the hearing. Hence, in the cases of People v. Ng Pek, People v.

Santa Rosa, and People v. Acosta, the court held that a plea of guilty suffices to sustain

a conviction of any offense charged in the information without the introduction of further

evidence, and this leaves the court with no other alternative than to impose the penalty

prescribed by law. To this point, the reception of evidence when an accused pleads

guilty depended on the sound discretion of the trial court. This discretionary role of trial

courts, however, was changed by a paradigm shift in the 1985 Rules on Criminal

Procedure that was retained by the 2000 Revised Rules in Sec. 3, Rule 116 as

mentioned above.

The 2000 Revised Rules retained the salient points of the 1985 amendment.

Hence, at present, the three (3)-fold duty of the trial court in instances where the

accused pleads guilty to a capital offense is as follows: (1) conduct a searching inquiry,

(2) require the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt and precise degree of culpability,

and (3) allow the accused to present evidence on his behalf. The present rules

formalized the requirement of the conduct of a searching inquiry as to the accused's

mandatory the reception of evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a

capital offense. Most importantly, the present rules require that the prosecution prove

beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused. Evidently, starting with the 1985

Rules, the accused may no longer be convicted for a capital offense on the sole basis of

his plea of guilty. This paradigm shift was recognized in the case of People v. Lagarto.

People v. Gambao restated the duties of the trial court when the accused pleads

guilty to a capital offense as follows: (1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the

voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt; (2) to

require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of

his culpability, and; (3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present

evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. The primordial purpose is to

avoid improvident pleas of guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are

involved since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting -his life

and liberty without having fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence

of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on

appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.

The duty of conducting a searching inquiry means more than informing cursorily

the accused that he faces a jail term but also, the exact length of imprisonment under

the law and the certainty that he will serve time at the national penitentiary or a penal

colony. The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness
of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. It likewise

compels the judge to content himself reasonably that the accused has not been coerced

or placed under a state of duress - and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given

improvidently - either by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or

simply because of his, the judge's, intimidating robes.

Further, a searching inquiry must also expound on the events that actually took

place during the arraignment, the words spoken and the warnings given, with special

attention to the age of the accused, his educational attainment and socio-economic

status as well as the manner of his arrest and detention, the provision of counsel in his

behalf during the custodial and preliminary investigations, and the opportunity of his

defense counsel to confer with him. Lastly, the trial court must explain the essential

elements of the crime he was charged with and its respective penalties and civil

liabilities, and also direct a series of questions to defense counsel to determine whether

he has conferred with the accused and has completely explained to him the meaning of

a plea of guilty. This formula is mandatory and absent any showing that it was followed,

a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken.

Corollary to this duty, a plea of guilty to a capital offense without the benefit of a

searching inquiry or an ineffectual inquiry, as required by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000

Revised Rules, results to an improvident plea of guilty. It has been held that failure to

comply with the said formula constitutes a violation of the accused's fundamental right
to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his

right to due process.

The duty to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the

precise degree of his culpability is that the plea of guilt alone can never be sufficient to

produce guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It must be remembered that a plea of guilty is

only a supporting evidence or secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main proof

being the evidence presented by the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond

reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a capital offense enters a plea of

guilty, a regular trial shall be conducted just the same as if no such plea was entered.

The court cannot, and should not, relieve the prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of

the accused and the precise degree of his culpability by the requisite quantum of

evidence. The reason for such rule is to preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the

mind of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as to the possibility that the

accused might have misunderstood the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty,

and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which may

justify or require either a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the

prescribed penalties.

The duty of giving the accused a reasonable opportunity to present evidence is to

allow the accused to present exculpatory or mitigating evidence on his behalf in order to

properly calibrate the correct imposable penalty. This duty, however, does not mean
that the trial court can compel the accused to present evidence. Of course, the court

cannot force the accused to present evidence when there is none. The accused is free

to waive his right to present evidence if he so desires. According to People v. Bedoso, in

case of such waiver, the unequivocal duty of the trial court is to observe, as a

prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a " searching inquiry"

when an accused pleads guilty. Trial courts may also abide by the foregoing procedure

even when the waiver of the right to be present and be heard is made in criminal cases

involving non-capital offenses since in whatever action or forum the accused is situated,

the waiver that he makes if it is to be binding and effective must still be exhibited in the

case records to have been validly undertaken, that is, it was done voluntarily, knowingly

and intelligently with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely

consequences.

Applying the foregoing principles in this case, it is evident that the trial court failed

miserably to comply with the duties imposed by the 2000 Revised Rules. As regards the

first duty, the trial court failed to conduct a searching inquiry to determine the

voluntariness and full comprehension by Brendo of his plea of guilty. The Court scanned

the records of the case to see compliance with the said duty. The search, however, was

in vain. The records are barren of any proceeding where the trial court gauged the

mindset of Brendo when he pleaded guilty. There is no transcript of stenographic notes

which would reveal what actually took place, what words were spoken, what warnings

were given, if a translation was made and the manner by which it was made, and
whether or not the guidelines for a searching inquiry were duly observed. Brendo’s plea

of guilt is therefore improvident.

What compounded the RTC's strenuous oversight is the fact that the trial court

penalized Brendo of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to present

evidence of his guilt. This is in direct contravention of the mandate of the second duty

stated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules. In this regard, the Court agrees

with the CA that Brendo’s guilt for the crime of murder was not proven beyond

reasonable doubt. It is beyond cavil that the prosecution did not present any witness,

despite being given four (4) separate hearing dates to do so. Thus, the RTC's conviction

of Brendo relied solely on his improvident plea of guilty.

Lastly, as regard the third requisite, the October 5, 2011 Order of the RTC stated

that Brendo, despite the non-reception of prosecution's evidence, opted not to present

any evidence in his behalf." It would appear that Brendo waived his right to present

evidence under Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules. However, the same Order

and the records of the case are bereft of any showing that the trial court complied with

the guidelines promulgated by the Court in People v. Bodoso. Such cavalier attitude of

the trial court to the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence leaves much to be

desired.
 (2) NO. The conviction of the accused simply depends on whether the plea of

guilty to a capital offense was improvident or not. An indubitable admission of guilt

automatically results to a conviction. Otherwise, a conviction on the basis of an

improvident plea of guilt, on appeal, would be set aside and the case would be

remanded for presentation of evidence. An exception to this is when, despite the

existence of an improvident plea, a conviction will not be disturbed when the

prosecution presented sufficient evidence during trial to prove the guilt of the accused

beyond reasonable doubt. The existing rules, however, shifted the focus from the nature

of the plea to whether evidence was presented during the trial to prove the guilt of the

accused.

The plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in place of the evidence that must

be presented and is called for by Sec. 3 of Rule 116. Trial courts should no longer

assume that a plea of guilty includes an admission of the attending circumstances

alleged in the information as they are now required to demand that the prosecution

prove the exact liability of the accused. The requirements of Sec. 3 would become idle

and fruitless if we were to allow conclusions of criminal liability and aggravating

circumstances on the dubious strength of a presumptive rule. As it stands, the

conviction of the accused shall be based principally on the evidence presented by the

prosecution. The improvident plea of guilty by the accused becomes secondary.

Accordingly, convictions involving improvident pleas are affirmed if the same are

supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the conviction is set aside and

the case remanded for further proceedings when the conviction is predicated solely on
the basis of the improvident plea of guilt, meaning that the prosecution was unable to

prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. "Further proceedings" usually

entails re-arraignment and reception of evidence from both the prosecution and the

defense in compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116. Jurisprudence has developed in such a

way that cases are remanded back to the trial court for re-arraignment and re-trial when

undue prejudice was brought about by the improvident plea of guilty.

In this case, the Court cannot sustain the conviction as there is nothing in the

records that would show Brendo’s guilt. Neither is it just to remand the case. This is not

a situation where the prosecution was wholly deprived of the opportunity to perform its

duties under the 2000 Revised Rules to warrant a remand. In this case, the prosecution

was already given reasonable opportunity to prove its case against Brendo. Regrettably,

the State squandered its chances to the detriment of Brendo. If anything, the State,

given its vast resources and awesome powers, cannot be allowed to vex an accused

with criminal prosecution more than once. The State should, first and foremost, exercise

fairness. The records also do not disclose that the improvident plea of guilty jeopardized

the presentation of evidence by the prosecution, to the prejudice of either the

prosecution or accused-appellant. Therefore, in instances where an improvident plea of

guilt has been entered and the prosecution was given reasonable opportunity to present

evidence to establish the guilt of the accused but failed to do so, the accused is entitled

to an acquittal, if only to give rise to the constitutionally guaranteed right to due process

and the presumption of innocence. Since the prosecution was given four (4) separate

hearing dates to present evidence against accused-appellant and, despite these

failure of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of

murder.

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, this Court adopts the following

guidelines concerning pleas of guilty to capital offenses:

1. AT THE TRIAL STAGE. When the accused makes a plea of guilty to a

capital offense, the trial court must strictly abide by the provisions of Sec.

3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. In

particular, it must afford the prosecution an opportunity to present

evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his

culpability. Failure to comply with these mandates constitute grave abuse

of discretion.

a. In case the plea of guilty to a capital offense is supported by proof

beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court shall enter a judgment of

conviction.

b. In case the prosecution presents evidence but fails to prove the

accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court shall enter

a judgment of acquittal in favor of the accused.

c. In case the prosecution fails to present any evidence despite

opportunity to do so, the trial court shall enter a judgment of

acquittal in favor of the accused.

explain in writing within ten (10) days from receipt its failure to

present evidence. Any instance of collusion between the

prosecution and the accused shall be dealt with to the full extent of

the law.

2. AT THE APPEAL STAGE:

a. When the accused is convicted of a capital offense on the basis of

his plea of guilty, whether improvident or not, and proof beyond

reasonable doubt was established, the judgment of conviction shall

be sustained.

b. When the a9cused is convicted of a capital offense solely on the

basis of his plea of guilty, whether improvident or not, without proof

beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution was not given

an opportunity to present its evidence, or was given the opportunity

to present evidence but the improvident plea of guilt resulted to an

undue prejudice to either the prosecution or the accused, the

judgment of conviction shall be set aside and the case remanded

for re-arraignment and for reception of evidence pursuant to Sec. 3,

Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

c. When the accused is ·convicted of a capital offense solely on the

basis of a plea of guilty, whether improvident or not, without proof

beyond reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed to prove

conviction shall be set aside and the accused acquitted.

Said guidelines shall be applied prospectively.