Topic:

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

People v. Bayya (2000)

Topic: RULE 10 - Sec. 6 Sufficiency of Complaint/Information

Facts:
Respondent, Lodrigo Bayya was charged and convicted with the crime of incestuous rape as defined
and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 before
the Regional Trial Court in Ilagan, Isabela.

On Appeal, respondent challenged the penalty of death against him on the grounds that the
information charging of the offense did not made any mention of Republic Act 7659 and that he was
only charged using Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, the penalty should be that which is
provided for in the Revised Penal Code and not as provided for in Republic Act 7659. As such, in
convicting him under the provisions of Republic Act 7659, a transgression of his right to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him.

Issue:
Whether or not there is a transgression of the respondent’s right to be informed of the nature and
cause of accusation against him.

Ruling:
Yes, the respondent may only be convicted of the charges under the information indicting him and
nothing more.

Instructive in this regard is Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

In the case under scrutiny, the information does not allege the minority of the victim, Rosie S. Bayya,
although the same was proven during the trial as borne by the records. The omission is not merely
formal in nature since doctrinally, an accused cannot be held liable for more than what he is indicted
for. It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilt may be, but an accused cannot
be convicted of any offense, not charged in the Complaint or information on which he is tried or
therein necessarily included. He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he
is charged before he is put on trial. To convict an accused of an offense higher than that charged in
the Complaint or information on which he is tried would constitute unauthorized denial of that right.

People v. Sandiganbayan (GR 160619)

Topic: RULE 10 - Sec. 6 Sufficiency of Complaint/Information

Facts:
Jessie B. Castillo (Castillo) was elected mayor of the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite in the May 1998
elections. On September 19, 2000, an Information was filed against Castillo charging him with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, in relation to the alleged illegal operation of
the Villa Esperanza dumpsite located in Molino, Bacoor, Cavite. According to the Information, Castillo,
while in the performance of his official functions as Mayor of Bacoor, gave unwarranted benefits to his
co-accused Melencio and Emerenciano Arciaga by allowing the latter to operate the Villa Esperanza
dumpsite without the requisite Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) and permit from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB).

After arraignment and pre-trial, Castillo, on August 21, 2001, filed with the Sandiganbayan a
Motion to Dismiss or Terminate Proceedings.7 He argued that the case against him had been
decriminalized by Section 37 of Republic Act No. 9003. On September 21, 2001, Castillo filed a
Supplemental Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the same does not charge an
offense.10 He claimed that a public officer may only be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
No. 3019 if he caused undue injury to the government or any private person. Thus, Castillo argued
that the undue injury must not only be mentioned in the Information, its extent must be specified.
Invoking the ruling of this Court in Llorente, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,11 Castillo asserted that the claim
of undue injury must be "specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty."

Issue:
Whether or not the not Information is sufficient which would warrant the denial of the Supplemental
Motion to Quash.

Ruling:
Yes. The information is sufficient.

Sections 6 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court are relevant. They state:

Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. - A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the

name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of
the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed.

Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not
necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

For as long as the ultimate facts constituting the offense have been alleged, an Information
need not state, to the point of specificity, the exact amount of unwarranted benefit granted nor
specify, quantify or prove, to the point of moral certainty, the undue injury caused.

People v. Bayabos (2015) GR 171222

Topic: RULE 10 - Sec. 6 Sufficiency of Complaint/Information

Facts:
Fernando C. Balidoy, Jr. was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the Philippine Merchant
Marine Academy (PMMA). In order to reach active status, all new entrants were required to
successfully complete the mandatory “Indoctrination and Orientation Period,” which was set from 2
May to 1 June 2001. Balidoy died on 3 May 2001. PMMA were criminally charged before the
Sandiganbayan as accomplices to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law. Before they were arraigned, the
Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against them on the basis of the dismissal of the criminal
case against the principal accused and, the failure to include in the Information the material
averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law. Consequently, this petition was filed before this Court
questioning the Sandiganbayan’s quashal of the Information.

Issue:
Whether the Information filed against respondents contains all the material averments for the
prosecution of the crime of accomplice to hazing under the Anti-Hazing Law.

Ruling:
No. The Information does not include all the material facts constituting the crime of accomplice to
hazing.
The indictment merely states that psychological pain and physical injuries were inflicted on the victim.
There is no allegation that the purported acts were employed as a prerequisite for admission or entry
into the organization. Failure to aver this crucial ingredient would prevent the successful prosecution
of the criminal responsibility of the accused, either as principal or as accomplice, for the crime of
hazing. Plain reference to a technical term – in this case, hazing – is insufficient and incomplete, as it
is but a characterization of the acts allegedly committed and thus a mere conclusion of law.

Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly states that the information must include, inter
alia, both "the designation of the offense given by the statute" and "the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense."

The Special Prosecutor’s belated argument in his Petition before this Court that the successful
completion of the indoctrination and orientation program was used as a prerequisite for continued
admission to the academy – i.e., attainment of active midshipman status – does not cure this defect in
the Information. Thus, the Information must be quashed, as the ultimate facts it presents do not
constitute the crime of accomplice to hazing.

Finally, we reject the Special Prosecutor’s claim that the Sandiganbayan should just have ordered the
filing of another information or the correction of the defect by amendment, instead of dismissing the
case outright. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, provides that if a motion to quash is
based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the court shall give the
prosecution a chance to correct the defect by amendment. However, the provision also states that if
the prosecution fails to make the amendment, the motion shall be granted. Here, we point out that
the Special Prosecutor insisted in his Comment on the Motion to Quash that there was no defect in the
Information. Neither has he filed a new information after the motion was sustained, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 117. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ordering the quashal of the Information
and the eventual dismissal of the case.

People v. Tuando (2016) GR 207816

Topic: RULE 10 - Sec. 6 Sufficiency of Complaint/Information

Facts:
Raul Yamon Tuando was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape by the trial court for
raping a 13-year-old girl who is the daughter of his common-law wife.

The victim AAA was repeatedly raped and abused by Tuando to her damage and prejudice. The
mother of AAA learned about the ordeal of her daughter when she was found to be pregnant after a
check-up. AAA’s mother let her stay at her employer’s house until she gave birth. When AAA visited
her bothers at their home, she was again raped by Tuando, which prompted AAA’s mother to file a
complaint before the barangay officials. Tuando was then transferred in the custody of the NBI.

Tuando denied raping AAA. He testified that sometime in the year 2005, he and AAA had a
relationship like a husband and wife but only started to be sexually intimate in January 2006. Their
relationship was kept secret because during that time, he and BBB were still in a common-law
relationship.

The appellate court found no error on the conviction of the accused. It placed more weight on the
findings of fact of the trial judge who was in the best position to competently rule on the veracity of
AAA’s testimony.

Hence, the appeal. Tuando raises that he was denied of due process thereby violating his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

Issue:
WON the appellate court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant under a different criminal
information thereby violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him

Ruling:
NO.

As embodied in Section 14 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution, no person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law. Further, paragraph 2 of the same section, it provides
that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused has a right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. It is further provided under Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Court that a complaint or information to be filed in court must contain a designation given to the
offense by the statute, besides the statement of the acts or omissions constituting the same, and if
there is no such designation, reference should be made to the section or subsection of the statute
punishing it and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense.

The accused was charged with rape committed sometime in January 2006 against AAA. He was able to
present evidence proving where he was on January 2006 when the crime was committed. In fact, he
was able to present evidence based on sweetheart defense in that he and AAA were lovers and that
they had a consensual sexual intercourse on the said date. During trial, he testified that he and AAA
were in a secret relationship as husband and wife and he was surprised when he was charged with
rape.

He was sufficiently informed of the crime he was accused of. This is clear from the defense that he
mounted, i.e., that the victim is his sweetheart and that they treated each other as spouses. In short,
Tuando was not denied of his constitutional right and was given every opportunity to answer the
accusation against him.

People v. Ramos (March 4, 1950)

Topic: RULE 10 - Sec. 7 Name of the accused

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

People v. Rodriguez 341 SCRA 645

Topic: RULE 113 - Sec. 3 Duty of Arresting Officer (but more on custodial ang ge discuss sa
case)

Facts:
Artellero was employed as a cement mixer and helper of co-accused Rodriguez, a mason in the
construction of the upper floors of the Far East Bank and Trust Company - Manila. Both were charged
with the crime of robbery with homicide for the killing of the bank security guard, Matias.

On October 11, 1991, early in the morning, at the FEBTC-Manila, a messenger discovered the lifeless
body of Matias, inside the bank premises. The body was hogtied with a nylon cord, and bore 32 stab
wounds. The chairs and tables inside the bank were in disarray. The banks emergency exit vault bore
chisel marks.
The head guard of the bank's security agency also reported that three .38 cal. revolvers and five 12
gauge shotguns were missing from the guard rostrum. At around 4:00 P.M., SPO3 Jamoralin and four
other WPD policemen conducted a follow-up investigation. They learned from Vargas that there was
an on-going construction on the upper floors of the bank, and that Artellero and his Rodriguez had
access to the bank after office hours. SPO3 Jamoralin asked Vargas to accompany them to the
barracks of the construction workers where they saw Artellero at the ground floor of the construction
site. On the third floor, they saw Rodriguez, packing his personal belongings. When asked why he was
packing, Rodriguez replied that he had nothing more to do at the site. SPO3 Jamoralin and the other
police officers saw a pair of worn-out maong pants on Artellero's bed, which had reddish stains on the
right leg. The police also saw reddish stains on Rodriguez's shirt. Rodriguez explained that he had a
wound on his neck. However, when the police examined his neck, they found no wound. The police
then arrested Rodriguez and Artellero and brought them to the police station for interrogation. The
police took the maong and t-shirt and had them examined by the Chemistry Section of NBI. On
October 15, 1991, Rodriguez executed a sworn statement confessing that he and Artellero together
with one Mendoza, and two other men whose names he did not know, killed Matias. Rodriguez was
assisted by the Public Attorneys Office. On October 18, 1991, Artellero and Rodriguez were charged
with the crime of Robbery with Homicide. Upon arraignment, Artellero and Rodriguez entered their
respective pleas of not guilty.

Rodriguez claimed that on the night of October 11, 1991, he was mauled by policemen to confess to
the crime. Artellero, on his part, testified that the policemen merely placed him outside the room
where Rodriguez was being interrogated, and that the police did not take any statement from him. He
also denied owning the maong pants which the police said were taken from his bed.

After due trial, the trial court rendered a decision finding Artellero and Rodriguez guilty of murder,
instead of robbery with homicide. The charge of Robbery with Homicide is dismissed it being not the
proper charge. Both the accused are acquitted from the charge of Robbery for insufficiency of
evidence. Both appealed. However, Rodriguez withdrew his appeal for financial reasons.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by Rodriguez be admissible under examination even
without the presence of a counsel and would make him guilty of the crime

Ruling:
No. Appellant and Rodriguez are ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

The moment the accused was arrested and brought to the police station, he was already under
custodial investigation. Requisites for Admissibility.—The four fundamental requisites for the
admissibility of a confession are (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be
made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the confession must be express;
and (4) the confession must be in writing.

Custodial investigation refers to the crucial pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.—
Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular person as a suspect.
When Rodriguez and appellant were arrested by the police in the afternoon of October 11, 1991, they
were already the suspects in the slaying of the security guard, Ramon Matias, and should have been
afforded the rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, particularly the right
to counsel. The records do not show that Rodriguez and appellant, at the time of their arrest in the
afternoon of October 11, 1991, were informed of the well-known Miranda rights. Worse, they were not
provided with competent and independent counsel during the custodial investigation prior to the
execution of the extrajudicial confession.

Jurisprudence is clear that a suspect under custodial investigation must continuously have a counsel
assisting him from the very start thereof.—In People v. De la Cruz , 279 SCRA 245 (1997), we
declared as inadmissible the extrajudicial confession of accused where the interrogation started at
9:00 A.M. and his lawyer arrived only at 11:00 A.M. Jurisprudence is clear that an accused under
custodial investigation must continuously have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. In
this case, Rodriguez and appellant were in the hands of the police for about four days
without the assistance of counsel.

Sayo v. Chief of Police 80 Phil 859

Topic: RULE 113 - Sec. 3 Duty of Arresting

Facts:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging Melencio Sayo (D) and Joaquin Mostero (D) with
having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested
the Sayo (D) and Mostero (D), and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of
Manila. When the petition for habeas corpus was heard, the Sayo (D) and Mostero (D) were still
detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed charges against them with
the proper courts justice.

Issue:
Is the warrantless arrest valid?

Ruling:
No. Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his
witness.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon
complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in those cases expressly
authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the
city fiscal or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political
subdivisions. A fortiori a police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an
offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even though, after investigation, he
becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.

Under the constitution, no person may be deprived of his liberty except by warrant of arrest or
commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his
witness.

George Antiquera vs. People (Dec. 11, 2013)

Topic: RULE 113 - Sec. 3 Duty of Arresting

Facts:
Police officers were conducting a police visibility patrol in Pasay City when they saw two unidentified
men rush out of a house and boarded a jeep. Believing that there was a crime, the police officers
approached the house. When they peeked through the partially opened door, they saw Antiquera and
Cruz engaged in a pot session. The police officers entered the house, introduced themselves and
arrested Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the vicinity, PO1 Cabutihan saw a jewellery box which
contained shabu and unused paraphernalia.

The RTC found them guilty of illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. The court
affirmed the decision of RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the arrest was invalid.
Ruling:
Yes, there was unlawful arrest.

Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer. But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest
made in flagrante delicto. 1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two
unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime
had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two
fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the
fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even
when they heard no cry for help from it. 2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything
amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood.

Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted
their entering it. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that
authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule.
Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was like wise
illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the
house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. The failure of
the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

Mamangon v. CFI 189 SCRA 217

Topic: Sec. 4 Execution of Warrant

Facts:
Petitioner was appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II and represented himself as
a lawyer. He was charged for violation of Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code ("Execution of Deeds
by Intimidation").

On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge Gabriel Dunuan of respondent Court.
He filed before this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court to try the criminal case and seeking to stay
the Order of Arrest. It was dismissed for non-payment of legal fees.

On the dates set for preliminary investigation, petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared for
about a year. Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before the Court of
Appeals and was eventually dismissed the Petition for "absolute lack of legal and factual basis" and
holding, among others, that "the non-withdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds by
intimidation . . . is not covered by mandamus".

Petitioner resorted for a motion for certiorari praying for the annulment of the proceedings in the
Criminal Case "on the ground that the accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty
of the crime . . . was rendered." It was dismissed. On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused
filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that: "(1) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged or the person of the accused; and (2) the accused has been previously convicted or in
jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged."

Issue:
Whether the Warrant of Arrest is valid?

Ruling:
Contrary to petitioner's pretensions, the Alias Warrant of Arrest is valid. Petitioner had evaded arrest
by disappearing from the jurisdiction of respondent Court. Neither is there any indication in the
records that the property bond, filed by petitioner-accused in the Municipal Circuit Court of San
Miguel, Zamboanga del Sur, had been accepted by respondent Court and petitioner discharged on the
basis thereof. The Alias Warrant is not "stale or functus officio," as alleged. Unlike a search
warrant, which is valid for only ten (10) days from date (Rule 126, Sec. 10), a Warrant of
Arrest remains valid until arrest is effected or the Warrant lifted. Respondent Court, therefore,
cannot be faulted with grave abuse of discretion for holding that said Warrant is in full force and
effect.

Saluday v. People (April 3, 2018)

Topic: RULE 126 - Search conducted on a moving vehicle

Facts:
Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down at a military checkpoint in Davao City. SCAA
Junbert M. Buco (Buco), a member of the Task Force Davao of the Philippine Army, requested all male
passengers to disembark from the vehicle allowing the female to remain inside. He then boarded the
bus to check the presence and intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearm or explosives, and
suspicious individuals.

SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small gray-back
pack bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too
heavy for its small size. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the bus
conductor answered that Marcelo Saluday herein petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at
the back.

SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and the
bag revealed the following contents: 1) an improvised 30 caliber bearing serial number 64702; 2) one
magazine with three live ammunitions.; 3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and 4) a ten-inch hunting
knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produced proof of his authority to carry firearms and
explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by
SCAA Buco.

Petitioner was then brought for inquest before the Office of the City Prosecutor for Davao City. Having
dound probable cause, the prosecutor charged him with illegal possession of high-powered firearm,
ammunition and explosive under PD 866.

Finding the denials of petitioner as self-serving and weak, the trial court declared him to be in actual
or constructive possession of firearm and explosive without authority or license and was adjudged
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

He filed a Notice to Appeal. On appeal, petitioner challenged his conviction raising as grounds the
alleged misappreciation of evidence by the trial court and the supposed illegality of the search.

Issue:
Whether or not the inspection conducted in the bus constitutes unreasonable search.

Ruling:
NO. It was a reasonable search. The Constitutional right guaranteed by section 2, article 3 of the
Constitution is not a blanket prohibition it operates against unreasonable searched and seizures only.
Conversely, if the search is reasonable it does not apply.

Since the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures is patterned to the Fourth Amendment
of the US Constitution, in determining what qualifies as “reasonable search” the pronouncements of
the US Supreme Court which are also doctrinal in this jurisdiction were cited to shed light in this
matter.
In the seminal case of Katz vs United States, the US Supreme Court clarified that the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even
in his home or office is not protected under the Fourth Amendment. But what he seeks to protect as
private, even accessible to public may be constitutionally protected. Further, Justice John Harlan laid
down in his concurring opinion the two-part test that would trigger the application of the Fourth
Amendment. First, a person exhibited an actual expectation of privacy. Second, the expectation is one
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.

Hence, to determine if there exist a reasonable expectation of privacy, first the person must show a
subjective expectation that his activities and items are private and second that his expectation of
privacy is one which the society considers as reasonable.

In this case, the expectations of privacy of the passengers riding in a public transportation were
reduced. The state, in view of its police power can impose non-intrusive security measures
and filter those going in a private premise that is accessible to public to ensure that the
safety of others may be not be put at risk.

The reasonable search arises from a reduced expectation of privacy, for which reason section 2, article
3 of the Constitution finds no application in this case.

In the conduct of bus searches, the Court Jays down the following guidelines. Prior to entry,
passengers and their bags and luggage can be subjected to a routine inspection akin to airport and
seaport security protocol. In this regard, metal detectors and x-ray scanning machines can be installed
at bus terminals. Passengers can also be frisked. In lieu of electronic scanners, passengers can be
required instead to open their bags and luggage for inspection, which inspection must be made in the
passenger's presence. Should the passenger object, he or she can validly be refused entry into the
terminal.

While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus
owner in the following three instances. First, upon receipt of information that a passenger carries
contraband or illegal articles, the bus where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow
for an inspection of the person and his or her effects. This is no different from an airplane that is
forced to land upon receipt of information about the contraband or illegal articles carried by a
passenger onboard. Second, whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger
can be frisked and his or her bag or luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by
government agents or private security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the
terminal. This is because unlike an airplane, a bus is able to stop and pick passengers along the way,
making it possible for these passengers to evade the routine search at the bus terminal. Third, a bus
can be flagged down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the
vehicle for a routine inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggage.

People v. Sapla (GR 244045, June 16, 2020)

Topic: RULE 126 - Search conducted on a moving vehicle

Facts:
In the morning of 10 January 2014, an unnamed officer at the Regional Public Safety Battalion (RPSB)
in Tabuk, Kalinga received a text message from an informant (concerned citizen) that an individual will
be transporting marijuana from Kalinga to Isabela. PO2 Jim Mabiasan (not the officer who received the
text message) then relayed the information to the deputy commander who coordinated with the PDEA.

About 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, a follow up information via text message was
received by the RPSB this time detailing the description of the drug courier, to wit: male, wearing
collared white shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack; he will be boarding a
passenger jeepney bearing plate number AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela. Based on this
information, a checkpoint was organized by the PNP.
At around 1:20 o’clock, the jeepney arrived. The police officers stopped the jeepney and inside they
saw the person described in the text message they received. They approached said person and asked
him if the blue sack in front of him was his. The person answered yes. The police officers then
requested the person to open the blue sack. The person hesitated but he eventually complied. The
content of the blue sack was four bricks of marijuana. The person was later identified as Jerry Sapla.

In court, Sapla denied the allegations as he claimed that when he boarded the jeep, he did not have
any sack with him; that the blue sack was only attributed as belonging to him by the police. Sapla was
convicted by the trial court. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and ruled that the
informant’s tip was sufficient to engender probable cause upon the minds of the police officers; that it
was sufficient to conduct a warrantless search and seizure.

Issue:
Whether or not the police officers may justify the search as a search of a moving vehicle.

Ruling:
No. As a rule, searches and seizures must be done with a court issued warrant. There are exceptions
such as search of a moving vehicle where a valid warrantless search and seizure may be effected. But
this exception comes with strict parameters which are: a) if the vehicle is parked on public fair
grounds, the officer may only draw aside its curtain, b) the officer may only look into the vehicle, c)
the officer may only flash a light without opening the vehicle’s doors, d) the occupants of the vehicle
are not subjected to physical/body search, e) limited to visual search, f) if done as a routine check,
must be conducted in a fixed area.

This case does not fall under search of a moving vehicle because the target of the search was not the
jeepney boarded by Sapla but rather the target was the person of Sapla. Based on the testimony of
the police officers, their actual target was the person fitting the description provided by the tip which
corresponded to Sapla and not the vehicle.

Tan v. Sy tiong Gue – GR 174570

Topic: Sec. 14 Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress; where to file

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

World Wide Webb v. People (Jan 13, 2014)

Topic: Sec. 14 Motion to quash a search warrant or to suppress

Facts: Police Chief Inspector Villegas filed applications for search warrants before the RTC of Quezon
City to search the office of Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC) in Quezon city and the office of Planet
Internet Corporation in Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll
bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of PD. 401 to the prejudice of PLDT.

The trial court conducted a hearing on the applications. Rivera of PLDT testified that petitioners were
able to provide international long distance call services to any part of the world by using PLDT's
telephone lines, but bypassing its international gateway facilities (IGF). This scheme constitutes toll
bypass, a "method of routing and completing international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antenna and/or wave or frequency which connects directly to the local or domestic exchange facilities
of the originating country or the country where the call is originated." Gali of PLDT further alleged that
because PLDT lines and equipment had been illegally connected by petitioners to a piece of equipment
that routed the international calls and bypassed PLDT's IGF, they violated P.D. 401, on unauthorized
installation of telephone connections. Petitioners also committed theft, because through their misuse
of PLDT phone lines and equipment and with clear intent to gain, they illegally stole its business and
revenues. Moreover, they acted contrary to R.A. 7925, because in bypassing the IGF of PLDT, they
evaded the payment of access and bypass charges in its favor while "piggy-backing" on its multi-
million dollar facilities. Further, petitioners acted in gross violation of Memorandum Circular No. 6-2-
92 of the NTC prohibiting the use of customs premises equipment without first securing type approval
license from the latter.

During the hearing, the trial court required the identification of the office premises to be searched, and
their floor plans showing the location of particular items to be taken. The RTC granted the application.
The warrants were implemented on the same day by RISOO operatives of the NCR Police Office. Over
a hundred items were seized, even personal diskettes of its employees; and areas not devoted to the
transmission of international calls were searched. Petitioners then filed their motions to quash the
search warrants, on the ground that: (1) the warrants were issued without probable cause, since the
acts complained of did not constitute theft; (2) toll bypass was not a crime; (3) the warrants were
general warrants; and (4) the objects seized pursuant thereto were "fruits of the poisonous tree." The
RTC granted the motions to quash holding they were general warrants, and the properties seized were
ordered released to petitioners. However, on appeal, the CA declared the warrants valid and effective.

Issues:
1. WON PLDT had personality to question the quashal of the SW without the conformity of the public
prosecutor. (YES)
2. WON appeal to the CA was the proper remedy to assail the quashal orders, and not certiorari under
Rule 65 (YES)
3. WON the SW were issued upon probable cause considering that the acts allegedly do not constitute
theft. (YES)
4. WON the CA erred in holding that the SW were not general warrants. (NO)

Ruling:
1. Yes. An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; conformity of the public
prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order
quashing search warrants.

The public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of all criminal actions commenced
by a complaint or information. However, a SW is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an
information, but by the filing of an application therefor. An application for a SW is a "special criminal
process," rather than a criminal action. A SW is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of
discovery. It is a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a
public necessity.

Clearly, an application for a SW is not a criminal action. The conformity of the public prosecutor is not
necessary before an aggrieved party moves for reconsideration of an order granting a motion to quash
SWs.

2. Yes. An order quashing a search warrant, which was issued independently prior to the
filing of a criminal action, partakes of a final order that can be the proper subject of an
appeal.

An application for a SW is a judicial process conducted either as an incident in a main criminal case
already filed in court or in anticipation ofone yet to be filed. Where the SW is issued as an incident in a
pending criminal case, its quashal is merely interlocutory. There is still something more to be done in
the said criminal case, which is to determine the guilt of the accused therein.

In contrast, where a SW is applied for and issued in anticipation of a criminal case yet to be filed, the
order quashing the warrant and denial of a MR of the grant ends the judicial process. Herein, the
applications for SWs were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal
actions. When the SWs issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be
done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory,
and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom.
3. Yes. Trial judges determine probable cause in the exercise of their judicial functions. A
trial judge's finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded
respect by reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis.

In the issuance of a SW, probable cause requires such facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. Their determination of probable cause in
the issuance of search warrants is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in their
judicial discretion. When a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a
judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts, as long as there was substantial basis for
that determination. The transcript shows that Judge Lopez asked searching questions to the witnesses
and sought clarification. Thus, the Court will no longer disturb the finding of probable cause by the
trial judge during the hearing for the application for the SWs.

A trial judge's finding of probable cause may be set aside and the SW issued may be quashed if the
person against whom the warrant is issued presents clear and convincing evidence that when the
police officers and witnesses testified, they committed a deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth on matters that are essential to a showing of probable cause. On the other hand, innocent
and negligent omissions or misrepresentation will not cause the quashal of a SW. Herein, the
testimonies of Rivera and Gali that the test calls they conducted did not pass through PLDT's IGF are
true. They neglected, however, to look into the possibility that the test calls may have passed through
other IGFs in the Philippines, which was exactly what happened. Nevertheless, the witnesses did not
commit a deliberate falsehood.

The applications charge petitioners with the crime, not of toll bypass per se, but of theft of PLDT's
international long distance call business by means of the alleged toll bypass operations. In Laurel v.
Abrogar, it was held that the use of PLDT's communications facilities without its consent constitutes
theft of its telephone services and business.

4. No. The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled

when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is sought.

A general warrant is a search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested
or the property to be seized. It is one that allows the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing
another and gives the officer the discretion over which items to take. Such discretion is abhorrent, as
it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses.

The SC, however, has been mindful of the difficulty faced by law enforcement in describing the items
to be searched, especially when these items are technical in nature, and when the extent of the illegal
operation is largely unknown to them. Any description of the place or thing to be searched that will
enable the officer, with reasonable certainty, to locate such place or thing is sufficient. A SW need not
describe the items in precise and minute detail. It is valid when it enables the police officers to readily
identify the properties and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized. A SW is
“particular in the description of the things to be seized” when the things described are limited to those
that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being issued. PLDT was able to
establish the connection between the items to be searched and the crime of theft of its
telephone services and business.

Almeda v. Villaluz 86 SCRA 38

Topic: RULE 114 - Sec. 1 Bail defined

Facts:
Leonardo Almeda was charged, together with five others, with the crime of qualified theft of a
motor vehicle in the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by Judge Onofre Villauz. The
amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda was P15,000, and this was
approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing,
Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of
him but such request was denied.
Because of this, Almeda filed the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction
against respondent Judge Villaluz. Almeda contends that the judge has no authority to require that the
bond be strictly in cash.

Issue:
Whether or not the judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond and disallow the petitioner’s
attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional liberty

Ruling:
No. Bail is "the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as
stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused
from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. In order to
safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that "excessive bail shall
not be required." This is logical because the imposition of an unreasonable bail may negate the very
right itself

The condition that the accused may have provisional liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is
abhorrent to the nature of bail and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to
insure the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion
of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The allowance of a
cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide
for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be
countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of
sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered. And even where cash bail is allowed, the
option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. The trial court may
not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the accused obtain his provisional liberty only
thru a cash bond.

But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge, we cannot fault the
motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety bond. Based on the petitioner's
past record, 7 the range of his career in crime weighs heavily against letting him off easily on a
middling amount of bail. The likelihood of his jumping bail or committing other harm to the citizenry
while on provisional liberty is a consideration that simply cannot be ignored.

Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. First, it could increase
the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of the power of the court over the
person of the accused and for the purpose of discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a
notorious defendant while on provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions
of his bail bond, to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his
movements. And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the
requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution. "Trial may proceed notwithstanding
his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified."

People vs Ricardo Rio GR No. 90294, 24 September 1991201 SCRA 702

TOPIC: RULE 116 – Sec. 7 Appointment of counsel de officio

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Ricardo Rio was charged and convicted of the crime of rape before the RTC of
Makati City and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He filed an appeal and as a
consequence, the branch clerk of court forwarded the records to the CA. the appellate court, however,
forwarded the records to the SC in view of the penalty imposed upon the accused.

However, accused-appellant, in his two letters addressed to the clerk of court,

manifested his intention to withdraw the appeal “due to his poverty.” Upon inquiry of the clerk of court
of the trial court, through the recommendation of the SolGen, the accused-appellant submits that he
was no longer interested in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal. The Court
denied his motion to withdraw and appointed a counsel de officio for him. All the letters reveal that
the only reason he offered for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a
counsel de officio on account of his poverty.

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to counsel of accused-appellant ceased upon his conviction by the
trial court.

RULING:
The Supreme Court held in the negative. This right to counsel de officio does not cease upon the
conviction of an accused by the trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such duty of the
court to assign a counsel de officio persists where an accused interposes intent to appeal. Even in a
case, where the accused has signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire
into the reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, the
court must assign a counsel de officio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of
the accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, “those who have less in life must
have more in law.”

The Court admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of their
clients causes whether acting de parte or de officio for public interest requires that an attorney exert
his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his client’s cause.

Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. And
a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interests if his client;
he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the Bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. This is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with
it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the public.

While a lawyer is not supposed to know all the laws, he is expected to take such reasonable
precaution in the discharge of his duty to his client and for his professional guidance as will not make
him, who is sworn to uphold the law, a transgressor of its precepts.

The fact that he merely volunteered his services or the circumstance that he was a counsel
de officio neither diminishes nor alters the degree of professional responsibility owed to his
client. The ethics of the profession require that counsel display warm zeal and great dedication to
duty irrespective of the client's capacity to pay him his fees. Any attempted presentation of a case
without adequate preparation distracts the administration of justice and discredits the Bar.

People v. Abad Santos, 76 Phil. 744

Topic: RULE 116 – Sec. 9 Bill of particulars

Facts:
Joseph Arcache was charged with the crime of treason. The information specified the different kinds of
properties alleged to have been sold by him to the Japanese imperial forces “and other similar
equipments”. Arcache was duly arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. On the day of the trial,
counsel verbally petitioned respondent judges that the prosecution make specific the phrase “and
other similar equipments” or have it stricken therefrom, unless the prosecution should furnish a bill
of particulars specifying what the phrase means. Special prosecutor objected to said petition as it
was filed out of time or after the accused has entered a plea of not guilty. Nevertheless, respondent
judges granted the petition due to the fact that the allegation was too broad. The special prosecutor
requested that trial be postponed to give them time to prepare the bill of particulars. On the date of
the scheduled trial, instead of submitting such bill, the special prosecutor filed an MR of said order of
the court, stating that it was contrary to law and that the judge acted in excess of its jurisdiction. MR
was denied.

Issue:
WON a bill of particulars may be ordered after entering of plea.

Ruling:
YES. In the absence of specific provisions of law prohibiting the filing of specifications or bill of
particulars in criminal cases, their submission may be permitted, as they cannot prejudice any
substantial rights of the accused. On the contrary, it will serve to apprise of the accused clearly of the
charges against him considering that conviction in criminal cases involve the deprivation of the
accused of his life and liberty.

In criminal cases, any defect in the accusation other than lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter
may be cured by good and sufficient evidence introduced by the prosecution. Ambiguous phrases
therefore should not be permitted in criminal complaints or informations and if such phrase
has been included therein, on motion of the defense and before the commencement of trial, the
court should order its elimination as surplusage OR the filing of the necessary specification,
which is but an amendment in mere matters of form.

Rocaberte v. People, 193 SCRA 152

Topic: RULE 116 – Sec. 9 Bill of particulars

A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the approximate time of the commission of the
offense. A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not,
however, a ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. The remedy against an
indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness is a
motion for a bill of particulars.

Facts:
Rocaberte and two others were charged with the crime of theft. The Information states:

That on or about the period from 1977 to December 28, 1983 at the off offshore of West Canayaon,
municipal of Garcia-Hernandez, province of Bohol, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping each other, with intent to gain and without the consent of the owner, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following
properties...

Rocaberte moved to quash the information, alleging that the statement of the time of commission of
the felony charged, "from 1977 to December 1983, a period of 7 years," or "about 2,551 days," was
fatally defective; there was "so great a gap as to defy approximation in the commission of one and the
same offense"; "the variance is certainly unfair to the accused for it violates their constitutional right
to be informed before the trial of the specific charge against them and deprives them of the
opportunity to defend themselves. The trial court denied the motion. Hence, the appeal.

Issues:
1. Is the statement of the time of the commission of the offense "between October, 1910 to August,
1912," defective?

2. Is a defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged a ground for a
motion to quash?

3. What then is the remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the
commission of the offense with sufficient definiteness?
Ruling:
1. The rules of criminal procedure declare that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
approximate time of the commission of the offense. Where, however, the statement of the time of the
commission of the offense is so general as to span a number of years, i.e., "between October, 1910 to
August, 1912," it has been held to be fatally defective because it deprives the accused an opportunity
to prepare his defense.

2. A defect in the averment as to the time of the commission of the crime charged is not, however, a
ground for a motion to quash under Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Even if it were, a motion for
quashal on that account will be denied since the defect is one that can be cured by amendment.

3. The remedy against an indictment that fails to allege the time of the commission of the
offense with sufficient definiteness is a motion for a bill of particulars.

The information against Rocaberte is indeed seriously defective. It places on him and his co-accused
the unfair and unreasonable burden of having to recall their activities over a span of more than 2,500
days. It is a burden nobody should be made to bear. The public prosecutor must make more
definite and particular the time of the commission of the crime of theft attributed to
Rocaberte and his co-defendants. If he cannot, the prosecution cannot be maintained, the case
must be dismissed. 

Talabon v. Warden, 78 Phil 599

Topic: RULE 120 –Sec. 1 Judgment: Definition and form

Facts:
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo denying the petitioner's
petition for habeas corpus.

On November 2, before the attorney for the petitioner was notified of the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo dated October 31 denying the petitioner's petition, another petition for habeas
corpus was originally filed with this Court by the same petitioner based on substantially the same
grounds. In view of the objection of the attorney for the respondent to the jurisdiction of this Court to
entertain the original petition for habeas corpus, based on the ground that the petitioner had also
appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo denying his petition, the attorney for
the petitioner, in his reply, moved that the petition and other pleadings filed originally with this Court,
together with the papers sent up from the lower court, be considered as an appeal from the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

The grounds of the petition for habeas corpus filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and with
this Court are, that the "petitioner was charged of (with) murder and was confined in the
concentration camp in the provincial jail of Iloilo since 1942 up to the present time, and under the
pretext of a fantastic trial he was continually imprisoned and restrained of his liberty without having
promulgated the corresponding authority of any decision against him;" and "the petitioner is deprived
of his absolute right of appeal and denied of prompt and speedy justice," because "he cannot
prosecute any appeal to a higher tribunal of justice;" for the reason that the judgment which convicted
the defendant to be imprisoned for not less than 12 years and 1 day to not more than 20 years and 1
day of reclusion temporal, was rendered verbally by the trial judge, without the court's findings of
facts.

Issue:
WON the petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus on the ground that the
petitioner is illegally detained for the reason that the judgment rendered by said court is not in writing
and does not contain findings of facts as the basis of conviction
Ruling:
No. After considering the facts and law of the case, it is obvious that the lower court did not err in
denying the petitioner's petition, because the lower court had jurisdiction over the petitioner, the
offense with which the latter was charged and of which he was convicted, and to impose upon him the
penalty above stated. And for that reason, the petitioner does not question the jurisdiction of the trial
court. The principal ground alleged in the petition is, that the petitioner is illegally detained for the
reason that the judgment rendered by said court is not in writing and does not contain findings of
facts as the basis of conviction, in violation of the provision of section 2, Rule 116, of the Rules of
Court which was enacted in conformity with the provision of section 12, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and provides the following:

SEC. 2. Form of judgment. — The judgment must be written in the official language, personally and
directly prepared by the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctively a
statement of the facts proved or admitted by the defendant and upon which the judgment is based. If
it is of conviction the judgment or sentence shall state (a) the legal qualification of the offense
constituted by the acts committed by the defendant, and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances
attending the commission thereof, if there is any; (b) the participation of the defendant in the
commission of the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (c) the
penalty imposed upon the defendant; and (d) the civil liability or damages caused by the wrongful act
to be recovered from the defendant by the offended party, if there is any.

The fact that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo was made verbally
without prejudice to put it subsequently in writing, and that no written decision with
findings of facts has been rendered up to the filing of the petition, did not make that
judgment absolutely void, because failure on the part of the court to comply with the above
quoted provisions of the Rules of Court and the Constitution did not divest the lower court
of its jurisdiction acquired over the offense and the petitioner. In many cases (among them,
those of Montelibano and Sichon vs. Director of Lands, 21 Phil., 449; Ungson vs. Basco and Zandueta,
29 Phil., 575; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil., 117) in which the trial court had failed to
comply with the provision of section 133 of the old Code of Civil Procedure requiring that a
decision in civil cases must be in writing and contain findings of facts, this Court did not
dismiss the appeal on the ground that the court a quo had thereby lost its jurisdiction, but
remanded the case to the lower court for compliance with said requirement. To hold
otherwise would be to rule that a court that has jurisdiction will preserve it if it does not commit any
error or applies correctly the law, and it will lose its jurisdiction if it does not act in accordance with
the law, which is obviously untenable.

The provision of section 12, Article VIII, of the Constitution that "no decision shall be rendered by any
court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based," which had been incorporated substantially in section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, refers
only to the form of the judgment. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the court rendering it.
The substance of the judgment is defined in section 1, of said Rule 116, which says that it is "the
adjudication by the court that the defendant is guilty or is not guilty of the offense charged, and the
imposition of the penalty provided for by law on the defendant who pleads or is found guilty thereof."

It is evident that noncompliance with the above-quoted provision of the Constitution by a

court of competent jurisdiction, as noncompliance with the provision of a statute relating to
the same matter, is an error or irregularity; but it is not jurisdictional, nor does it make the
judgment absolutely void for lack of jurisdiction. The Constitution is superior to a statute, and is
called the supreme law of the land, not because it is different in nature or character from the latter,
nor because noncompliance therewith is jurisdictional, where it does not so provide, but because it is
the fundamental or organic law. A constitution only differs from a statute in that the latter must
provide the details of the subject of which it treats, whereas a constitution states the general
principles and builds the substantial foundation and general framework of law and government, and
for that reason a statute contrary to or in violation of the Constitution is null and void.

People v. Amondina, 220 SCRA 6 (not anymore in the syllabus)

Topic: RULE 120 –Sec. 1 Judgment: Definition and form

Facts:
The 17-page single-spaced decision of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental convicted Esrael
Amondina, Aquillo Cataytay and Romulo Amantillo of the murder of Floro Gantalao and sentenced
them to reclusion perpetua and a civil indemnity of P30,000.00.1 It is now on appeal, but not because
of its inordinate verbosity although this is a valid ground for distress. The claim is that a proper
appreciation of the evidence, especially of the defense, should have led the trial judge to a verdict of
acquittal.

According to Francisco Tangon, he was pasturing his carabao at the time and from where be was be
saw the three accused sitting on the side of the road some 36 feet away. He recognized all of them
because he had known Amondina since 1969 and Cataytay and Amantillo were his neighbors. When
Floro Gantalao arrived, the three men immediately and suddenly attacked him. Amondina swung a
pestle at Floro and hit him in the left jaw, sending him sprawling to the ground. Cataytay followed suit
by hacking Floro with a long bolo that bloodied and fractured the defenseless man's head. Amantillo
then struck Floro in the nape with a piece of wood around 2 feet long as the latter lay wounded and
helpless. The three men then fled, as so did Tangon who ran in the opposite direction toward his
house.

Issue:
The issue in this case is the conviction of the accused however in relation to the topic the SC said this
in the beginning of the case regarding the form of the 17-page decision of the RTC.

Ruling:
The decision of the trial court is exceedingly long, without any effort to trim the fat and keep it lean.
Judges are not stenographers transcribing the testimony of the witnesses word for word. Judges must
know how to synthetize, to summarize, to simplify. Their failure to do so is one of the main reasons
for the delay in the administration of justice. It also explains the despair of the public over the foot-
dragging of many courts and their inability to get to the point and to get there fast.

LIGAYA SANTOS AND ROBERT BUNDA V. DOMINGO ORDA JR., G.R. NO 189402 (MAY 6,
2010)

NOTE: THIS IS THE FIRST CASE UNDER RULE 120 in the SYLLABUS BUT I CANNOT FIND THE TOPIC
ABOUT THE DEFINITION AND FORM OF JUDGMENT :((((( This was already assigned before under
Preliminary Investigation

Topic: RULE 120 –Sec. 1 Judgment: Definition and form

FACTS:
Francis Orda, son of Respondent, was shot to death in Parañaque City. Petitioners were then accused
of ordering the killing of Francis, as per sworn statements of witnesses (Gina, Ernesto, and Dennis).
But thereafter, the three witnesses recanted their testimonies, so the Department of Justice (DOJ)
issued a Resolution directing the City Prosecutor to cause the withdrawal of the Information for
murder
against the accused. Based upon the motion of the prosecutor to withdraw the case, the RTC of
Parañaque then decided to dismiss the case filed against the accused. RTC of Parañaque fund that
there exists no probable cause to indict the accused.

Aggrieved, Respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA, claiming that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion in finding that no probable cause existed. The CA then ruled in favor or
Respondent.

Hence, Petitoners then brought this case to the Supreme Court questioning the Petition for Certiorari
filed by Respondents with the CA; saying that it is the improper remedy since an APPEAL would have
been the proper step to take. Petitioners argue that the decision of the RTC already became final,
since Respondent did not timely file an appeal.
ISSUES:
1. WON a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 ROC is the correct remedy in assailing
the RTC decision
2. WON CA erred in finding that there was probable cause against petitioners

HELD:
FIRST ISSUE: No. The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 ROC is inappropriate.

Respondent filed with the CA the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
instead of an ordinary appeal, not because it was the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
available to him under the law, but, obviously, to make up for the loss of his right to an ordinary
appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for
an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil action under Rule
65 cannot cure a party’s failure to timely appeal the assailed decision or resolution. Rule 65 is an
independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal.

The general rule is that a petition for certiorari is dismissible for being the wrong remedy, except:
1. When the public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate
2. When the broader interest of justice so requires
3. When the writs issued are null and void
4. When the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority
5. When, for persuasive reasons, the rules may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not
commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; or
6. In other meritorious cases

None of the above exceptions are present in the instant case; hence, the general rule must
apply. Respondent not having availed himself of the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of the case
against petitioners, the dismissal has become final and executory.

SECOND ISSUE: No. When an information is filed, the task for the court is to first determine whether a
probable cause exists for the arrest of the accused.

Probable cause is such set of facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that the offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein
has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. In determining probable cause, the average
man weighs the facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence
of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than suspicion; it requires less
than evidence that would justify conviction.

Moreover, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information on the ground of lack of
probable cause based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary, the bounden duty of the trial court is to
make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the
case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution, but is required to evaluate it before proceeding
further with the trial and should embody such assessment in the order disposing the motion.

Records show that the RTC, on motion of the prosecution, allowed the withdrawal of the Informations
for murder, holding that the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies were not credible. Pursuant to the
SC’s decision in G.R. No. 158236, RTC reviewed again the records of the case and made an
independent evaluation of the evidence presented to ascertain the existence or non-existence of
probable cause to indict the petitioners. After such evaluation, the court, on September 30, 2005,
dismissed the case for murder against the accused, including petitioners herein, ratiocinating that no
probable cause existed to indict them for their crime.

RTC allowed the withdrawal of the Information and consequently dismissed the case against
petitioners on the following grounds:
 1. The incredibility of the earlier statements of Gina, Ernesto and Dennis because of their
subsequent recantation
2. The improbability of Ernesto and Dennis’ testimony in view of the counter-evidence presented
by Santos
3. Lack or insufficiency of evidence at the level of prosecution for determining probable cause
4. The incredibility of the testimonies of Frias and Agnote because of the absence of
corroborating evidence

Based on these, RTC did not err in finding that no probable cause existed to indict the petitioners for
the crime of murder. Neither did it gravely abuse its discretion in making said conclusion. There was
no hint of whimsicality, nor of gross and patent abuse of discretion as would amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law on the part of the Presiding Judge. On the contrary, he came to the conclusion that there was
no probable cause for petitioners to commit murder, by applying basic precepts of criminal law to the
facts, allegations and evidence on record.

Director of Prisons v. Teodoro, 97 Phil 372

NOTE: cant find under that citation but kita ko using 97 PHIL 391

Topic: RULE 122 APPEAL - Sec. 5 Waiver of Notice

Facts:
On August 21, 1954, respondent Rafael Lacson was convicted and sentenced to death by judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in a criminal case (of 3220) together with other 21 co-
accused.

On August 24, 1954, respondent Lacson was confined in the Provincial Hospital of Negros Occidental
under guard by the Philippine Constabulary by order of the court.

Lacson instituted a special civil action of certiorari in the said Court of First Instance (No.
3157, Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental) against the Director of Prisons, the Provincial
Commander of the Philippine Constabulary at Bacolod City, and all persons acting under them, the
Provincial Governor and the Provincial Warden, alleging that his transfer from the hospital to the new
Bilibid Prisons at Muntinlupa, Rizal for incarceration, would cause excitement and shock and aggravate
his already worsening condition, supporting this allegation with certificates of two physicians, and
petitioning that he be retained under guard in the Provincial Hospital for 30 days more, and that in the
meantime a writ of preliminary injunction issue against respondents.

In accordance with this petition, Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez issued the writ of preliminary injunction,
which is now the subject of certiorari.

The Director of Prisons alleged that Lacson is a national prisoner subject to confinement in the Insular
Penitentiary that the actions of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not lie against him; and that
the Insular Penitentiary at Muntinlupa offer the same if not better facilities than those of the Provincial
Hospital of Negros Occidental. The Provincial Commander asked to be excluded as a party respondent
for the reason that he has no obligation or authority to act in the determination of the issue in the
case, i.e., whether Lacson is fit to be transferred to the new Bilibid Prisons, or not.

After the issues were joined, the Provincial Fiscal presented an urgent motion to lift the preliminary
injunction and for a reconsideration of the order granting the writ of preliminary injunction for the
reason that more than 30 days have elapsed since the original injunction had been granted and for the
further reason that the court has no jurisdiction to issue the said injunction.

The physicians in the hospital rendered a report giving the opinion that Lacson should remain yet
confined in the hospital for further observation. On the basis of this report, the Honorable Jose
Teodoro, Sr. denied the motion to lift the preliminary injunction.
Issue:
Did the Court of First Instance that convicted respondent Lacson have the power and authority to
issue the writ of preliminary injunction

Ruling:
No. It is contrary to the generally accepted principles of procedure for said court to be invested with
said power or authority. A necessary regard for orderly procedure demands that once a case, whether
civil or criminal, has been appealed from a trial court to an appellate court and the appeal therefrom
perfected, the court a quo loses jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the subject
of the case.

Thus in civil cases the rule is that after the appeal has been perfected from a judgment of the Court of
First Instance, the trial court losses jurisdiction over the case, except to issue orders for the protection
and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal
(Rule 41, Sec. 9). The jurisdiction of the court over the matters involved in the case is lost by the
perfected appeal, save in those cases which the rules expressly except therefrom.

While no express provision similar to Section 9 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is contained
in the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the same general principal should obtain in criminal
cases. As a matter of principle, when an appeal has been perfected from a judgment in a
criminal case, the court from which the appeal is made loses jurisdiction over the case, and
this (case) means both the record and the person of the accused-appellant. In the same
manner that after the judgment has become final, the trial court loses jurisdiction to amend the same,
so also upon the perfection of the appeal which brings about the finality of the judgment or order of
the court, the sentencing court must also lose jurisdiction or power to do anything or any matter in
relation to the person of the accused-appellant.

Consistent with the above principles, after the expiration of the period of 15 days within which
the appeal could be had from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros in Criminal Case No. 3220, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rafael Lacson, et al., the
said Court of First Instance lost jurisdiction over the case and had no more power or
authority either over the record or of the subject of the case, namely, the accused-
appellants.

As the judgment of conviction against Lacson was promulgated on August 21, 1954, and the said
judgment became 􀀼nal on September 5, 1954, the trial court had no power or authority to grant the
injunction or prohibition affecting the person of Lacson. Since September 5, 1954, the criminal case
(No. 3220) has been pending before us and this jurisdiction may not be interfered with by the trial
court.

Tan v. Sy tiong Gue – GR 174570

Topic:

Facts:
An information on the crime of Robbery was filed against Sy Tiong Gue and others for the taking of a
large amount of cash, post dated checks and other equipments in the office of Guan Yiak Hardware in
Binondo Manila belonging to Sy Siy Ho and Sons represented by Romer S. Tan. Two search warrants
were applied for stating therein the personal knowledge of the police officer of the items lost. Judge
Lanzanas issued the Search warrants. The warrants were later served. Under the first search warrant,
twelve Hennessy XOs and one box containing seven Hennessy XOs, were seized. However, the
enforcement of the other search warrant yielded negative results.

Hence, respondents filed a Motion to Quash the Search Warrants which petitioner opposed. The RTC
issued an order denying the motion. Hence, the respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA. CA granted the motion to quash the search warrants. Hence, this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not there was probable cause warranting the issuance by RTC of the subject search
warrants.

Ruling:
No, petitioner cannot include the seized items as part of the evidence in the new information. Sec. 4 of
Yes. A search warrant is an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines, signed
by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property described
therein and to bring it before the court. The issuance of a search warrant is governed by Rule 126 of
the Rules of Court.

Therefore, the validity of the issuance of a search warrant rests upon the following factors: (1) it must
be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and
not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must
examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce;
and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things
to be seized.

Jurisprudence dictates that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a search warrant, is such
reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a cautious man to believe that his action
and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just and proper. Probable cause requires facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched.
It does not call for an application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction
requires after trial on the merits. Applying these set standards, this Court finds that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge in issuing the subject search warrants.

The power to issue search warrants is exclusively vested in the trial judges in the exercise of their
judicial functions. A finding of probable cause, which would merit the issuance of a search warrant,
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and
that it was committed by the accused. The determination of whether probable cause exists as to
justify the issuance of a search warrant is best left to the sound discretion of a judge.

Apparent in the case at bar and as aptly found by the RTC judge, there was probable cause justifying
the issuance of the search warrants. This was established by the Sinumpaang Salaysay and the
testimonies, consisting of no less than 37 pages, given by witnesses who had personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the crime of robbery had been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense were in the place sought to be searched. The facts narrated by the
witnesses while under oath, when they were asked by the examining judge, were sufficient
justification for the issuance of the subject search warrants.

A Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is intended for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction only, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction, or to prevent it from
committing such grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. This Court finds
nothing irregular, much less, grave abuse of discretion, committed by the RTC judge in issuing the
subject search warrants

People v. Bascuguin 144404 Sept 24, 2001

Topic: RULE 116 - sec. 8 Time for counsel de officio to prepare for arraignment

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:
THIS IS THE FIRST CASE UNDER RULE 120 in the SYLLABUS BUT I CANNOT FIND THE TOPIC ABOUT
THE DEFINITION AND FORM OF JUDGMENT :((((( This was already assigned before under Preliminary
Investigation