G.R. No.

171855               October 15, 2012 Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping with
FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F. one another, taking advantage of their superior strength as elements of
APAREJADO, represented by EDGAR AP the Philippine Army, armed with their government issued firearms,
AREJADO, Petitioners, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and evident premeditation,
vs. did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of RTC-Branch 47, and shoot Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo Villanueva y
Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON RURAL, CAA JOSE MATU, CAA Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado y
MORIE FLORES, CAA GUILLEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado and
FLORES, CAA LEONARDO CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE Norberto Aranilla y Cordova, hitting them on different parts of their
ROM, Respondents. bodies, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which
caused their deaths.
DECISION
CONTRARY TO LAW.
PERALTA, J.:
Masbate City, February 15, 2005.
Before this Court is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners Fe Rapsing, Tita C. On July 28, 2005, a warrant5 for the arrest of respondents was issued
Villanueva and Annie Aparejado, · as represented by Edgar by the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 47, but before respondents could
Aparejado, seeking to set aside the Orders dated December 6, be arrested, the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) of the
20051 and January 11, 2006,2 respectively, of the Regional Trial Court Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) filed an Omnibus
(RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 47, in Criminal Case No. 11846. Motion6 dated July 20, 2005, with the trial court seeking the cases
against respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal.7 Initially, the trial court denied the motion filed by the JAGO
The antecedents are as follows: on the ground that respondents have not been arrested. The JAGO filed
a Motion for Reconsideration,8 and in an Order9 dated December 6,
Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu, CAA Morie Flores, 2005, the trial court granted the Omnibus Motion and the entire
CAA Guillien Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan records of the case were turned over to the Commanding General of
and CAA Rene Rom are members of the Alpha Company, 22nd the 9th Infantry Division, Philippine Army, for appropriate action.
Infantry Battalion, 9th Division of the Philippine Army based at
Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate. Petitioners sought reconsideration10 of the Order, but was denied by the
trial court in an Order11 dated January 11, 2006.
Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of Teogenes Rapsing,
Teofilo Villanueva and Edwin Aparejado, who were allegedly killed in Hence, the present petition with the following arguments:
cold blood by the respondents.
I
Respondents alleged that on May 3, 2004, around 1 o'clock in the
afternoon, they received information about the presence of armed
elements reputed to be New People’s Army (NPA) partisans in Sitio HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO ABLES GRAVELY ABUSED HIS
Gaway-gaway, Barangay Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. Acting on the DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
information, they coordinated with the Philippine National Police and GRANTING THE MOTION TO TRANSFER THE INSTANT
proceeded to the place. Thereat, they encountered armed elements CRIMINAL CASE OF MULTIPLE MURDER TO THE
which resulted in an intense firefight. When the battle ceased, seven JURISDICTION OF THE MILITARY COURT MARTIAL, AS THE
(7) persons, namely: Teogenes Rapsing y Manlapaz, Teofilo SAID TRIBUNAL, BASED ON FACTS AND IN LAW, HAS NO
Villanueva y Prisado, Marianito Villanueva y Oliva, Edwin Aparejado JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT MURDER CASE.
y Valdemoro, Isidro Espino y Arevalo, Roque Tome y Morgado and
Norberto Aranilla y Cordova were found sprawled on the ground II
lifeless. The post-incident report of the Philippine Army states that a
legitimate military operation was conducted and in the course of IT IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
which, the victims, armed with high-powered firearms, engaged in a EXCESS IN JURISDICTION IF NOT GROSS IGNORANCE OF
shoot-out with the military. THE LAW ON THE PART OF HONORABLE JUDGE MAXIMINO
ABLES TO HOLD THAT HIS ORDER DATED DECEMBER 6,
On the other hand, petitioners complained that there was no encounter 2005 COULD ONLY BE REVIEWED THROUGH AN APPEAL, AS
that ensued and that the victims were summarily executed in cold THERE IS NO TRIAL ON THE MERIT YET ON THE INSTANT
blood by respondents. Hence, they requested the National Bureau of CRIMINAL CASE.12
Investigation (NBI) to investigate the case. After investigation, the
NBI recommended to the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate City that a Petitioners alleged that the trial court gravely abused its discretion
preliminary investigation be conducted against respondents for the amounting to excess of jurisdiction when it transferred the criminal
crime of multiple murder. In reaching its recommendation, the NBI case filed against the respondents to the jurisdiction of the military
relied on the statements of witnesses who claim that the military tribunal, as jurisdiction over the same is conferred upon the civil courts
massacred helpless and unarmed civilians. by Republic Act No. 7055 (RA 7055).13 On the other hand, the
respondents and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) alleged that
On February 9, 2005, the provincial prosecutor issued a the acts complained of are service connected and falls within the
Resolution3 recommending the filing of an Information for Multiple jurisdiction of the military court.
Murder. Consequently, respondents were charged with multiple
murder in an Information4 dated February 15, 2005, which reads: The petition is meritorious. The trial court gravely abused its
discretion in not taking cognizance of the case, which actually falls
The undersigned 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor accuses SSGT within its jurisdiction.
Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu. CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillen
Topas, CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the
Rom, stationed at Alpha Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th subject matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the
Division, Philippine Army, Cabangcalan Detachment, Aroroy, allegations of the complaint irrespective of whether the plaintiff is
Masbate, committed as follows: entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. 14 As
a necessary consequence, the jurisdiction of the court cannot be made
That on May 9, 2004, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon thereof, to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to
at Barangay Lagta, Municipality of Baleno, Province of Masbate, dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would almost
entirely depend upon the defendant. What determines the jurisdiction under the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. 408.20 (Emphasis
of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as appearing from the supplied.)
allegations in the complaint. The averments in the complaint and the
character of the relief sought are the matters to be consulted.15 The said amendment was later on reflected in the final version of the
statute as Paragraph 2 of Section 1. Section 1 of R.A. 7055 reads in
In the case at bar, the information states that respondents, "conspiring full:
together and mutually helping with one another, taking advantage of
their superior strength, as elements of the Philippine Army, armed with Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other
their government-issued firearms with intent to kill, by means of persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot the [victims], penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or
hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting upon local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are
them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths." 16 Murder is co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or
a crime punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when
(RPC), as amended, and is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.17 Hence, the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is
irrespective of whether the killing was actually justified or not, service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-
jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the respondents has been martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
vested upon the RTC by law. interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that
any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
Respondents, however, contend that the military tribunal has
jurisdiction over the case at bar because the crime charged was a As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be
service-connected offense allegedly committed by members of the limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
AFP. To support their position, respondents cite the senate Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
deliberations on R.A. 7055. (Emphasis supplied)

c, to wit: The second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. 7055 explicitly specifies

what are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408), as amended,21 to wit:
the Sponsor of this amendment to consider, perhaps, defining what this
service-related offenses would be under the Articles of War. And so, I Articles 54 to 70:
would submit for her consideration the following amendment to her
amendment which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS
SECTION, SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO
70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND ARTICLES 84 Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO.
408 AS AMENDED. Art. 56. False Muster.

This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these service-related or Art. 57. False Returns.
connected offenses or crimes would be. (Emphasis supplied.)

Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.

The President. What will happen to the definition of "service-
connected offense" already put forward by Senator Shahani?
Art. 59. Desertion.
Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in the
specification of the Article I have mentioned in the Articles of War. Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out between Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
the two of you? I will suspend the session for a minute, if there is no
objection. There was none. Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of
the Philippines, or Secretary of National Defense.
It was 5:02 p.m.
Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
The President. The session is resumed.
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Senator Tañada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has graciously
accepted my amendment to her amendment, subject to refinement and Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
style.
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
The President. Is there any objection? Silence There being none, the
amendment is approved.19
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

In the same session, Senator Tañada emphasized:

Articles 72 to 92

Senator Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses

Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
committed by persons subject to military law ... will be tried by the
civil courts, except, those which are service-related or connected. And
we specified which would be considered service-related or connected Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority. SO ORDERED.

Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.

Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.

Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.

Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.

Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.

Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

Art. 83. Spies.

Art. 84. Military Property. – Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or

Wrongful Disposition.

Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to

Soldiers.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.

Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.

Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.

Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.

Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.

Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures.

Art. 92. Dueling.

Articles 95 to 97:

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government.

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman.

Art. 97 General Article.

In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals cannot

exercise jurisdiction over respondents' case since the offense for which
they were charged is not included in the enumeration of "service-
connected offenses or crimes" as provided for under Section 1 thereof.
The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the
AFP who commit crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and which
are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts. Where the law is
clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says
and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
There is no room for interpretation, but only application.22 Hence, the
RTC cannot divest itself of its jurisdiction over the alleged crime of
multiple murder.1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of the Regional Trial Court of

Masbate City, Branch 47, dated December 6, 2005 and January 11,
2006, respectively, in Criminal Case No. 11846 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 47, Masbate City, is
DIRECTED to reinstate Criminal Case No. 11846 to its docket and
conduct further proceedings thereon with utmost dispatch in light of
the foregoing disquisition.
 SN1 WILLIAM ABLITER, SN1 GERMINIO FERNANDEZ, SN1
ARNEL CAPUNO, SN1 CLEOFAS PAMIENTA, S1HM
TIMOTEO ABARRACOSO, S1CD GERARDO DEDICATORIA,
G.R. No. 162318             October 25, 2004 SN1 LEONOR FORTE, JR., CPL. JEOBAL GONZALES, CPL.
ALADIN GOMEZ, CPL. HARDY GLAGARA, CPL. CESAR A.
1LT. JULIUS R. NAVALES, 1LT. EMERSON L. MARGATE, PADILLA, CPL. JERSON ALABATA, CPL. OLIVER GERIO,
2LT. RYAN H. QUISAI, TSG. ELMER D. COLON, CAPT. CPL. TEDDY ANTONIO, CPL. DENNIS LOPEZ, CPL. RUEL
JULIUS W. ESPORO, SGT. NOLI FORONDA, SGT. GIL P. MOLINA, CPL. ALVIN CELESTINO, CPL. BENJAMIN
LOZADA, SGT. RAYMUND DUMAGO and PFC. REGIE A. RAMBOYONG, JR., CPL. GERRY CALINGACION, CPL.
ALAGABAN, petitioners, ALEXANDER RODRIGUEZ, CPL. JONATHAN DAGOHOY,
vs. CPL. CLECARTE DAHAN, CPL. RAYMOND PASTRETA,
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces CPL. LORENZO BIAO, CPL. ALEX PENA, CPL. ROGUN
of the Philippines (AFP), B.GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO, OLIVIDO, CPL. MONCHITO LUSTERIO, CPL. GEORGE
JR., as Judge Advocate General (JAG) of the AFP, and OTHER GANADOS, CPL. MICHAEL BALISTA, PVT. 1ST CLASS
PERSONS ACTING UNDER THEIR AUTHORITY, respondents. MAXINIAR BALANAY, PVT. 1ST CLASS BONIFACIO
CAOALO, PVT. 1ST CLASS REGGIE ALAGABAN, PVT. 1ST
x--------------------------x CLASS ANGELO MARQUEZ, PVT. 1ST CLASS JOHN
GAIHAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS MARCIAL CAISA, PVT. 1ST
CLASS CARLOS FILLIOS, PVT. 1ST CLASS PATROCENIO
G.R. No. 162341             October 25, 2004 PATENO, PVT. 1ST CLASS ROLLY BERNAL, PVT. 1ST
CLASS NOVIDA RUIZ, PVT. 1ST CLASS MELCHOR ALOOS,
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE HABEAS PVT. 1ST CLASS JOEL MALALAY, PVT. 1ST CLASS
CORPUS OF CPT. RUPERTO L. REASO, LTSG. NORBERTO JULIETO BANAS, JR., PVT. 1ST CLASS ROLAND BANAAG,
E. SANTIAGO, 1LT. DANNY C. CANAVERAL, 1LT. JULIUS R. PVT. 1ST CLASS NIXON MAGALLIS, PVT. 1ST CLASS
NAVALES, 1LT. EMERSON L. MARGATE, 1LT. JEFFREY RICHARD LARCE, PVT. 1ST CLASS SINDY BONOTAN, PVT.
GAUGUIRAN, LTJG. CEFERINO CHECA, LTJG. MARCO 1ST CLASS ARNOLD PULPULAAN, PVT. 1ST CLASS
ANGELO J. ANCHETA, LTJG. ELMER TORRIADO, LTJG. ABRAHAM APOSTOL, PFC. CHARLES AGNER, S2RM
RONALD A. GALICIA, 2LT. LAUREFEL P. DABALES, 2LT. JULIUS CEAZAR ALFUENTE, PFC. EDILON ANDALEON,
MARY JAMES A. TAYABAN, 2LT. JASON P. PANALIGAN, PFC. RONALDO BAYOS, PFC. MARCIAL BAYSA, S2EM
2LT. RYAN QUISAI, 2LT. NESTOR JASON CAMBA, 2LT. ABRAHAM BILLONES, CPL. ABNER BIRAL, PFC. JEFFREY
ARCHIBALD RANEL, 2LT. RESINO S. ORTEZA, 2LT. NOEL BOLALIN, SN2 JEFFREY BONCACAS, 1LT PATRICIO
F. TOMENGLAY, 2LT. LEOPOLDO APELLANES, JR., 2LT. BUMIDANG, JR., S2BM JOSEPH BUSCATO, CPT. EINSTEIN
JONATHAN D. COSTALES, 2LT. OSWALD IAN DIRA, 2LT. CALAOA, JR., PFC. EDWIN CANETE, SN2 EZRA JERRY
SAMSUDIN T. LINTONGAN, 2LT. ALQUIN CANSON, 2LT. CARUMBA, S2PH GLENN CARUMBA, SGT. ARIMATEO B.
JUNIBERT S. TUBO, 2LT. EDWIN DUETAO, 2LT. MARK P. CEDENO, SN2 ALEX CHAN, PO3 COCARI GONZALES, FN2
DAMASO, 2LT. JIOVANNI PALLIAN, 2LT. EDGARDO ALEX DEL CALLE, PFC. HANZEL DELA TORRE, SN2
AGUILAR, 2LT. NORMAN SPENCER, 2LT. LARRY S. SONNY DELA VEGA, PFC. JOSE DEMONTEVERDE, 1LT.
CENDANA, 2LT. AVELINO SAHLI, 2LT. LEXINGTON JOSE ENRICO M. DINGLE, PFC. ALADINO DOGOMEO, ENS.
ALONZO, 2LT. FILMORE RULL, ENS. VICTOR ODULLO, DENNIS DONGA, PFC. RUEL ESPINILLA, PFC. RODRIGO
ENS. IAN LUIS BADECAO, ENS. RONALD E. DISO, ENS. FERNANDEZ, SN2 JULIUS GARCIA, SGT. ALLAN
ARJOHN ELUMBA, ENS. BRIAN BABANG, ENS. ANTONIO INOCENCIO. TSQ. JESUCRAIS SOLEDAD, PFC. JERSON
BOSCH, ENS. TED CEREZO, ENS. HAROLD DAVE PRE, ENS. LABILLES, CPL. DANILO LAGRIMAS, SN2 ALLAN
JEFFREY BANGSA, ENS. JONAH ARUGAY, ENS. LEONOR. 2LT. NORMAN SPENCER LO, S2BM JERIC
JONATHAN J. ADLAWAN, ENS. EMERSON ROSALES, ENS. LORENA, S2DP ANGELITO LOYLOY, PFC. LUIS NOVIDA,
ELMER CRUZ, ENS. REX P. CALLANO, ENS. JUVENAL SN2 EMMANUEL LUMACANG, CPL. RIZAL MANIMTIM,
AZURIN, ENS. LYLE ROSOS, ENS. CESAR CARMEL PFC. GALIB MOHAMMAD, SSG. GIL MONTOJO. PFC.
TAMBA, CPO. LEONIDO FERNIN, EM3 RONNIE GUMIA, BENJAMIN NANGGAN, PFC. ARNOLD NIALLA, SN2
PO3 ROULEX MAGISA, TSG. JESUCRAIS SOLEDAD, SSG. FERNANDO PACARDO, SGT. JOVITO PACLEB. PFC.
NORBERTO MARTINEZ, SSG. BERTING CABANA, SSG. CHRISTOPHER PEREZ, LTJG. JENNIFER PILI, PFC.
JOERY ROJO, PO2 EDWARD ABUAC, SSG. LEO GAPAYAO, CARLOS PILLOS. PFC. JOCIL REGULACION. S2DC GARY
SSG. ROMAR ARQUERO, SSG. RALLON BEBASA, SSG. REYES. S2EM VALENTIN SAMAR. LT/SG. NORBERTO
LORENZO GLORIOSO, SSG. NOEL AGGALUT, SSG. PHILIP SANTIAGO, JR.. FN2 FRANCISCO SEVILLA, JR.. SN2 MIKE
VITALES, SSG. FRANCISCO BOSI, JR., SSG. BONIFACIO SOLAR. SN2 ROMMEL SOLIS. PFC. JOJIT SORIANO. CPT.
BARRION, SSG. RUBEN SORIANO, SSG. RONALD REYES, EDMAR B. SORIOSO. SSG. JUAN TUQUIB. SN2 JOEL
SSG. WILFREDO LEAL, SSG. GUILLERMO LAVITORES, TYBACO. S1BM RONALDO URBANO. S2HM EDGAR
SGT. ALFREDO ALEGADO, JR., SGT. GREGORIO VASQUEZ. SGT. IGNACIO VIGAR, ROBERTO RAFAEL
SANDAGON, SGT. JIGGER PACULBA SGT. JOJO ABANDO, ("ROEL") PULIDO, petitioner,
SGT. JUANITO JILBURY, SGT. ERIC CASTINO, SGT. vs.
ANTONIO CARABATA, SGT. REYNANTE DANTE GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
ESCATRON. SGT. NOLI FORONDA, SGT. JERAN of the Philippines, BRIG. GEN. MARIANO M. SARMIENTO,
TABUJARA, SGT. RESTITUTO DEBORJA, SGT. NILO JR., as AFP Judge Advocate General, and ALL PERSONS
ENASO, SGT. JULIUS WESFIRO, SGT. ROLDAN ANDO, SGT. ACTING IN THEIR STEAD AND UNDER THEIR
LORENZO CARRANZA, SGT. DANTE SANTOS, SGT. AUTHORITY, respondents.
WALTER MANALANSAN, SGT. JUDE ARQUISOLA, SGT.
HERMAN LINDE, SGT. ALEXANDER SICAT, SGT. DECISION
FLORANTE ROSETTE, SGT. ROMELO SY, SGT. JOEY
MEMBREVE, SGT. ADONIS PRADO, PO3 JESSMAR
LANDONG, PO3 ROBERTO TRIPULCA, PO3 SONNY CALLEJO, SR., J.:
MADARANG, PO3 RHOMMEL LORETE, PO3 CARISTOFEIL
TIKTIK, PO3 RENATO BUSTILLO,PO3 JERRY ASUNCION, Before the Court are two petitions essentially assailing the jurisdiction
PO3 LUDIVICO CLEMENTE, CPL. REY RUBIOS, CPL. of the General Court-Martial to conduct the court-martial proceedings
EMMANUEL TIRADOR, CPL. OLIVER COMBAUCER, CPL. involving several junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces
JOEL ABAYA, CPL. RANDEL CENO, CPL. RONALD of the Philippines (AFP) charged with violations of the Articles of War
RETUTA, CPL. JULIUS TANALLON, CPL. FILOMENO (Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended) in connection with their
RAMIREZ, CPL. JIGGER ALAMEDA, CPL. RAYMUND participation in the take-over of the Oakwood Premier Apartments in
DUMAGAO, CPL. EDGAR VELASCO, CPL. RAMONCITO Ayala Center, Makati City on July 27, 2003.
TAMPON, SN1 ALLAN DULAP, SN1 JERRY REGALARIO,
SN1 JOEL MASENAS, SN1 JONATHAN PEREZ, S1HM In G.R. No. 162341, Roberto Rafael Pulido, a lawyer, filed with this
ROMUALDO GANANCIAL, SN1 ROEL GADON, F1EM GARY Court a Petition for Habeas Corpus seeking the release of his clients,
PAYOS, SN1 ZANDRIX GACU, SN1 ROMMEL ANONUEVO,
junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP, who are allegedly being The Filing of Charges
unlawfully detained by virtue of the Commitment Order1 dated August
2, 2003 issued by General Narciso L. Abaya, Chief of Staff of the Under the Information5 dated August 1, 2003 filed with the Regional
AFP, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles of War. Under the said Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
commitment order, all the Major Service Commanders and the Chief charged 321 of those soldiers who took part in the "Oakwood
of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Incident" with violation of Article 134-A (coup d’etat) of the Revised
(ISAFP) were directed to take custodial responsibility of all the Penal Code.6 Among those charged were petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et
"military personnel involved in the 27 July 2003 mutiny" belonging to al. (G.R. No. 162318) and those who are subject of the petition for
their respective commands. This included all the junior officers and habeas corpus Capt. Reaso, et al. (G.R. No. 162341). The case, entitled
enlisted men (hereinafter referred to as Capt. Reaso,2 et al.) who are People v. Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, et al., was docketed as Criminal
subject of the instant petition for habeas corpus. The commitment Case No. 03-2784 and raffled to Branch 61 presided by Judge Romeo
order, however, expressly stated that LtSG. Antonio F. Trillanes, F. Barza.
LtSG. James A. Layug, Capt. Garry C. Alejano, Capt. Milo D.
Maestrecampo, Capt. Gerardo O. Gambala, and Capt. Nicanor E.
Faeldon would remain under the custody of the Chief of the ISAFP.3 On September 12, 2003, several (243 in number) of the accused in
Criminal Case No. 03-2784 filed with the RTC (Branch 61) an
Omnibus Motion praying that the trial court:
In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners (hereinafter referred to as 1Lt.
Navales, et al.), seven of the detained junior officers and enlisted men,
filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1. [A]ssume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military
Rules of Court seeking to enjoin the General Court-Martial from tribunal in accordance with Republic Act No. 7055; and
proceeding with the trial of the petitioners and their co-accused for
alleged violations of the Articles of War. 2. Order the prosecution to present evidence to establish probable
cause against 316 of the 321 accused and, should the prosecution fail
Named as respondents in the two petitions are General Narciso Abaya to do so, dismiss the case as against the 316 other accused.7
who, as Chief of Staff of the AFP, exercises command and control
over all the members and agencies of the AFP, and Brigadier General While the said motion was pending resolution, the DOJ issued the
Mariano Sarmiento, Jr., the Judge Advocate General of the AFP and Resolution dated October 20, 2003 finding probable cause for coup
officer in command of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), d’etat8 against only 31 of the original 321 accused and dismissing the
the agency of the AFP tasked to conduct the court-martial proceedings. charges against the other 290 for insufficiency of evidence.

Background4 Thus, upon the instance of the prosecution, the RTC (Branch 61), in its
Order9 dated November 14, 2003, admitted the Amended
At past 1:00 a.m. of July 27, 2003, more than three hundred junior Information10 dated October 30, 2003 charging only 31 of the original
officers and enlisted men, mostly from the elite units of the AFP – the accused with the crime of coup d’etat defined under Article 134-A of
Philippine Army’s Scout Rangers and the Philippine Navy’s Special the Revised Penal Code.11 Only the following were charged under the
Warfare Group (SWAG) – quietly entered the premises of the Ayala Amended Information: CPT. MILO D. MAESTRECAMPO, LTSG.
Center in Makati City. They disarmed the security guards and took ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY C. ALEJANO, LTSG.
over the Oakwood Premier Apartments (Oakwood). They planted JAMES A. LAYUG, CPT. LAURENCE LUIS B. SOMERA, CPT.
explosives around the building and in its vicinity. Snipers were posted GERARDO O. GAMBALA, CPT. NICANOR FAELDON, CPT.
at the Oakwood roof deck. ALBERT T. BALOLOY, CPT. SEGUNDINO P. ORFIANO, JR.,
CPT. JOHN P. ANDRES, CPT. ALVIN H. EBREO, 1LT.
FLORENTINO B. SOMERA, 1LT. CLEO B. DUNGGA-AS, 1LT.
The soldiers, mostly in full battle gear and wearing red arm bands, SONNY S. SARMIENTO, 1LT. AUDIE S. TOCLOY, 1LT. VON
were led by a small number of junior officers, widely known as the RIO TAYAB, 1LT. REX C. BOLO, 1LT. LAURENCE R. SAN
Magdalo Group. The leaders were later identified as including Navy JUAN, 1LT. WARREN LEE G. DAGUPON, 1LT. NATHANIEL N.
LtSG. Antonio Trillanes IV, Army Capt. Gerardo Gambala, Army RABONZA, 2LT. KRISTOFFER BRYAN M. YASAY, 1LT.
Capt. Milo Maestrecampo, Navy LtSG. James Layug, and Marine JONNEL P. SANGGALANG, 1LT. BILLY S. PASCUA, 1LT.
Capt. Gary Alejano. FRANCISCO ACEDILLO, LTSG. MANUEL G. CABOCHAN,
LTSG. EUGENE LOUIE GONZALES, LTSG. ANDY G.
Between 4:00 to 5:00 a.m., the soldiers were able to issue a public TORRATO, LTJG. ARTURO S. PASCUA, JR., ENS. ARMAND
statement through the ABS-CBN News (ANC) network. They claimed PONTEJOS, PO3 JULIUS J. MESA, PO3 CESAR GONZALES, and
that they went to Oakwood to air their grievances against the several JOHN DOES and JANE DOES. Further, the said Order
administration of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. Among those expressly stated that the case against the other 290 accused, including
grievances were: the graft and corruption in the military, the sale of petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and those who are subject of the petition
arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, the bombings in for habeas corpus, Capt. Reaso, et al., was dismissed. In another Order
Davao City which were allegedly ordered by Brig. Gen. Victor dated November 18, 2003, the RTC (Branch 61) issued commitment
Corpus, Chief of the ISAFP, in order to obtain more military orders against those 31 accused charged under the Amended
assistance from the United States government, and the "micro- Information and set their arraignment.
management" in the AFP by then Department of National Defense
(DND) Secretary Angelo Reyes. They declared their withdrawal of Meanwhile, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who were
support from the chain of command and demanded the resignation of earlier dropped as accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, were
key civilian and military leaders of the Arroyo administration. charged before the General Court-Martial with violations of the
Articles of War (AW), particularly: AW 67 (Mutiny), AW 97
Around 9:00 a.m., Pres. Arroyo gave the soldiers until 5:00 p.m. to (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline), AW 96
give up their positions peacefully and return to barracks. At about 1:00 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman), AW 63
p.m., she declared the existence of a "state of rebellion" and issued an (Disrespect to the President, the Secretary of Defense, etc.) and AW 64
order to use reasonable force in putting down the rebellion. A few (Disrespect Towards Superior Officer).12 On the other hand, Capt.
hours later, the soldiers again went on television reiterating their Maestrecampo and the 30 others who remained charged under the
grievances. The deadline was extended twice, initially to 7:00 p.m., Amended Information were not included in the charge sheets for
and later, indefinitely. violations of the Articles of War.

In the meantime, a series of negotiations ensued between the soldiers Thereafter, Criminal Case No. 03-2784 was consolidated with
and the Government team led by Ambassador Roy Cimatu. An Criminal Case No. 03-2678, entitled People v. Ramon Cardenas,
agreement was forged between the two groups at 9:30 p.m. Shortly pending before Branch 148 of the RTC of Makati City, presided by
thereafter, Pres. Arroyo announced that the occupation of Oakwood Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
was over. The soldiers agreed to return to barracks and were out of the
Oakwood premises by 11:00 p.m.
On February 11, 2004, acting on the earlier Omnibus Motion filed by dated February 11, 2004 promulgated by the RTC (Branch 148),
the 243 of the original accused under the Information dated August 1, insofar as it resolved the Omnibus Motion and declared that the
2003, the RTC (Branch 148) issued an Order, the dispositive portion charges against all the accused, including those excluded in the
of which reads: Amended Information, were not service-connected, is null and void.
They aver that at the time that the said motion was resolved,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in view of the Orders dated petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. (as movants
November 14 and 18, 2003 of Judge Romeo Barza, the Omnibus therein) were no longer parties in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 as the
Motion to: 1) Assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the charge against them was already dismissed by the RTC (Branch 61) in
Military Courts in accordance with R.A. 7055; and 2) Implement the the Order dated November 14, 2003. Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and
August 7, 2003 Order of the Court requiring the prosecution to Capt. Reaso, et al. no longer had any personality to pursue the
produce evidence to establish probable cause are hereby considered Omnibus Motion since one who has no right or interest to protect
MOOT AND ACADEMIC and, lastly, all charges before the court- cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court. In other words, the
martial against the accused (those included in the Order of November petitioners were not "real parties in interest" at the time that their
18, 2003) as well as those former accused (those included in the Order Omnibus Motion was resolved by the RTC (Branch 148).
of November 14, 2003) are hereby declared not service-connected, but
rather absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup The respondents further claim denial of due process as they were not
d’etat.13 given an opportunity to oppose or comment on the Omnibus Motion.
Worse, they were not even given a copy of the Order dated February
In the Notice of Hearing dated March 1, 2004, the General Court- 11, 2004. As such, the same cannot be enforced against the
Martial set on March 16, 2004 the arraignment/trial of those charged respondents, especially because they were not parties to Criminal Case
with violations of the Articles of War in connection with the July 27, No. 03-2784.
2003 Oakwood Incident.
The respondents, likewise, point out a seeming ambiguity in the
The present petitions were then filed with this Court. Acting on the February 11, 2004 Order as it declared, on one hand, that the charges
prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order in the petition filed before the court-martial were not service-connected, but on the
for prohibition in G.R. No. 162318, this Court, in the Resolution dated other hand, it ruled that the Omnibus Motion was moot and academic.
March 16, 2004, directed the parties to observe the status quo According to the respondents, these two pronouncements cannot stand
prevailing before the filing of the petition.14 side by side. If the Omnibus Motion was already moot and academic,
because the accused who filed the same were no longer being charged
with coup d’etat under the Amended Information, then the trial court
The Petitioners’ Case did not have any authority to further resolve and grant the same
Omnibus Motion.
In support of the petitions for prohibition and for habeas corpus, the
petitioners advance the following arguments: The respondents maintain that since 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.
Reaso, et al. were not being charged with coup d’etat under the
I. UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7055, THE RESPONDENTS AND Amended Information, the trial court could not make a finding that the
THE GENERAL COURT-MARTIAL ARE WITHOUT ANY charges filed against them before the General Court-Martial were in
JURISDICTION TO FURTHER CONDUCT PROCEEDINGS furtherance of coup d’etat. For this reason, the declaration contained in
AGAINST THE PETITIONERS AND THEIR COLLEAGUES the dispositive portion of the February 11, 2004 Order - that charges
BECAUSE THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS ALREADY filed against the accused before the court-martial were not service-
DETERMINED THAT THE OFFENSES ARE NOT SERVICE- connected - cannot be given effect.
RELATED AND ARE PROPERLY WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF THE CIVILIAN COURTS;15 and Similarly invoking Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055, the respondents
vigorously assert that the charges against 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt.
II. THE RESPONDENTS HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO FURTHER Reaso, et al. filed with the General Court-Martial, i.e., violations of the
DETAIN THE JUNIOR OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN AS THE Articles of War 63, 64, 67, 96 and 97, are, in fact, among those
CHARGES FOR COUP D’ETAT BEFORE THE REGIONAL TRIAL declared to be service-connected under the second paragraph of this
COURT HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE provision. This means that the civil court cannot exercise jurisdiction
UPON MOTION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.16 over the said offenses, the same being properly cognizable by the
General Court-Martial. Thus, the RTC (Branch 148) acted without or
Citing Section 117 of Republic Act No. 7055,18 the petitioners theorize in excess of jurisdiction when it declared in its February 11, 2004
that since the RTC (Branch 148), in its Order dated February 11, 2004, Order that the charges against those accused before the General Court-
already declared that the offenses for which all the accused were Martial were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance of
charged were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance the crime of coup d’etat. Said pronouncement is allegedly null and
of the crime of coup d’etat, the General Court-Martial no longer has void.
jurisdiction over them. As such, respondents Gen. Abaya and the
JAGO have no authority to constitute the General Court-Martial, to The respondents denounce the petitioners for their forum shopping.
charge and prosecute the petitioners and their co-accused for violations Apparently, a similar petition (petition for habeas corpus, prohibition
of the Articles of War in connection with the July 27, 2003 Oakwood with injunction and prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining
Incident. The petitioners posit that, as a corollary, there is no longer order) had been filed by the petitioners’ co-accused with the Court of
any basis for their continued detention under the Commitment Order Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 82695. The case was resolved
dated August 2, 2003 issued by Gen. Abaya considering that the against the petitioners therein.
charge against them for coup d’etat had already been dismissed.
The respondents pray that the petitions be dismissed for lack of merit.
In G.R. No. 162318, the petitioners pray that the respondents be
enjoined from constituting the General Court-Martial and from further Issue
proceeding with the court-martial of the petitioners and their co-
accused for violations of the Articles of War in connection with the
Oakwood Incident of July 27, 2003. In G.R. No. 162341, the petitioner The sole issue that needs to be resolved is whether or not the
prays that the respondents be ordered to explain why the detained petitioners are entitled to the writs of prohibition and habeas corpus.
junior officers and enlisted men subject of the petition for habeas
corpus should not be released without delay. The Court’s Ruling

The Respondents’ Arguments We rule in the negative.

The respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge the We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by
Court to dismiss the petitions. The respondents contend that the Order the RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated
February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. The RTC (Branch 148) itself
accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance recognized this as it made the statement, quoted earlier, that "in view
of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. For reasons which of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the
shall be discussed shortly, such declaration was made without or in case against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can no longer
excess of jurisdiction; hence, a nullity. assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military courts and
this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November 14, 2003 of
The trial court’s declaration was Judge Barza there being no motion filed by the prosecution to
made when the Omnibus Motion reconsider the order or by any of the accused."21
had already been rendered moot
and academic with respect to Thus, 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., who are no longer
1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. charged with coup d’etat, cannot find solace in the declaration of the
Reaso, et al. by reason of the RTC (Branch 148) that the charges filed before the General Court-
dismissal of the charge of coup Martial against them were not service-connected. The same is a
d’etat against them superfluity and cannot be given effect for having been made by the
RTC (Branch 148) without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
The Order dated February 11, 2004 was issued purportedly to resolve
the Omnibus Motion, which prayed for the trial court to, inter alia, Such declaration was made by the RTC (Branch 148) in violation of
acquire jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the military courts Section 1, Republic Act No. 7055
in accordance with Rep. Act No. 7055. The said Omnibus Motion was
filed on September 12, 2003 by 243 of the original accused under the Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 reads in full:
Information dated August 1, 2003. However, this information was
subsequently superseded by the Amended Information dated October
20, 2003 under which only 31 were charged with the crime of coup Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other
d’etat. In the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch 61), the persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Amended Information was admitted and the case against the 290 Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
accused, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., was penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or
dismissed. The said Order became final and executory since no motion local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are
for reconsideration thereof had been filed by any of the parties. co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or
juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when
the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is
Thus, when the RTC (Branch 148) eventually resolved the Omnibus service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court-
Motion on February 11, 2004, the said motion had already been martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
rendered moot by the November 14, 2003 Order of the RTC (Branch interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that
61) admitting the Amended Information under which only 31 of the any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
accused were charged and dismissing the case as against the other 290.
It had become moot with respect to those whose charge against them
was dismissed, including 1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al., As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be
because they were no longer parties to the case. This was conceded by limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
the RTC (Branch 148) itself as it stated in the body of its February 11, Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
2004 Order that:
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial
Now, after going over the records of the case, the Court is of the view may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the
that the movants’ first concern in their omnibus motion, i.e., assume Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government
jurisdiction over all charges filed before military courts in accordance ordinances.
with R.A. 7055, has been rendered moot and academic by virtue of the
Order dated November 14, 2003 dismissing the case against TSg. The second paragraph of the above provision explicitly specifies what
Leonel M. Alnas, TSg. Ramon B. Norico, SSg. Eduardo G. Cedeno, et are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses" under
al. and finding probable cause in the Order dated November 18, 2003 Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408), as amended, also known as the
against accused Cpt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, LtSg. Antonio F. Articles of War, to wit:
Trillanes IV, et al., issued by Judge Barza.
Articles 54 to 70:
In view of the Order of Judge Barza dated November 14, 2003
dismissing the case against aforesaid accused, the Court, therefore, can Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.
no longer assume jurisdiction over all charges filed before the military
courts and this Court cannot undo nor reverse the Order of November
14, 2003 of Judge Barza, there being no motion filed by the Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.
prosecution to reconsider the order or by any of the accused.19
Art. 56. False Muster.
Accordingly, in the dispositive portion of the said Order, the RTC
(Branch 148) held that the Omnibus Motion was considered "moot and Art. 57. False Returns.
academic." And yet, in the same dispositive portion, the RTC (Branch
148) still proceeded to declare in the last clause thereof that "all the
Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
charges before the court-martial against the accused (those included in
the Order of November 18, 2003) as well as those former accused
(those included in the Order of November 14, 2003) are hereby Art. 59. Desertion.
declared not service-connected," on its perception that the crimes
defined in and penalized by the Articles of War were committed in Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.
furtherance of coup d’etat; hence, absorbed by the latter crime.
Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.
As earlier explained, insofar as those whose case against them was
dismissed, there was nothing else left to resolve after the Omnibus
Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.
Motion was considered moot and academic. Indeed, as they were no
longer parties to the case, no further relief could be granted to them.
1Lt. Navales, et al. and Capt. Reaso, et al. could be properly Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President, Congress of
considered as strangers to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 03- the Philippines, or Secretary of National Defense.
2784. And in the same manner that strangers to a case are not bound
by any judgment rendered by the court,20 any rulings made by the trial Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
court in Criminal Case No. 03-2784 are no longer binding on 1Lt.
Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer. Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts
the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. The following
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer. deliberations in the Senate on Senate Bill No. 1468, which, upon
consolidation with House Bill No. 31130, subsequently became Rep.
Act No. 7055, are instructive:
Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
Senator Shahani. I would like to propose an addition to Section 1, but
Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition. this will have to be on page 2. This will be in line 5, which should be
another paragraph, but still within Section 1. This is to propose a
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders. definition of what "service-connected" means, because this appears on
line 8. My proposal is the following:
Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.
"SERVICE-CONNECTED OFFENSES SHALL MEAN THOSE
Articles 72 to 92 COMMITTED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL PURSUANT TO THE
LAWFUL ORDER OF THEIR SUPERIOR OFFICER OR WITHIN
THE CONTEXT OF A VALID MILITARY EXERCISE OR
Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners. MISSION."

Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received. I believe this amendment seeks to avoid any confusion as to what
"service-connected offense" means. Please note that "service-
Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority. connected offense," under this bill, remains within the jurisdiction of
military tribunals.
Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
So, I think that is an important distinction, Mr. President.
Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
Senator Tañada. Yes, Mr. President. I would just want to propose to
the Sponsor of this amendment to consider, perhaps, defining what this
Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.
service-related offenses would be under the Articles of War. And so, I
would submit for her consideration the following amendment to her
Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign. amendment which would read as follows: AS USED IN THIS
SECTION, SERVICE-CONNECTED CRIMES OR OFFENSES
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard. SHALL BE LIMITED TO THOSE DEFINED IN ARTICLES 54 TO
70, ARTICLES 72 TO 75, ARTICLES 76 TO 83 AND ARTICLES 84
TO 92, AND ARTICLES 95 TO 97, COMMONWEALTH ACT NO.
Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
408 AS AMENDED.

Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.

This would identify, I mean, specifically, what these service-related or
connected offenses or crimes would be.
Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.
The President. What will happen to the definition of "service-
Art. 83. Spies. connected offense" already put forward by Senator Shahani?

Art. 84. Military Property. – Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage or Senator Tañada. I believe that would be incorporated in the
Wrongful Disposition. specification of the Article I have mentioned in the Articles of War.

Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property Issued to SUSPENSION OF THE SESSION
Soldiers.
The President. Will the Gentleman kindly try to work it out between
Art. 86. Drunk on Duty. the two of you? I will suspend the session for a minute, if there is no
objection. [There was none.]
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel.
It was 5:02 p.m.
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions.
RESUMPTION OF THE SESSION
Art. 88-A. Unlawfully Influencing Action of Court.
At 5:06 p.m., the session was resumed.
Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions.
The President. The session is resumed.
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed.
Senator Tañada. Mr. President, Senator Shahani has graciously
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures. accepted my amendment to her amendment, subject to refinement and
style.
Art. 92. Dueling.
The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the
amendment is approved.22
Articles 95 to 97:

In the same session, Senator Wigberto E. Tañada, the principal

Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government. sponsor of SB No. 1468, emphasized:

Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. Senator Tañada. Section 1, already provides that crimes of offenses
committed by persons subject to military law ... will be tried by the
Art. 97 General Article. civil courts, except, those which are service-related or connected. And
we specified which would be considered service-related or connected The late Mr. Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee enunciated in the case
under the Articles of War, Commonwealth Act No. 408.23 of Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34 that "the greatest threat to
freedom is the shortness of human memory."
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the
military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of PD No. 1822 and PD No. 1850 made all offenses committed by
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92 and Articles 95 to 97 of the Articles members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine
of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or offenses." Constabulary, the Integrated National Police, including firemen and
In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court-martial. jail guards, and all persons subject to military law exclusively triable
by military courts though, clearly, jurisdiction over common crimes
Indeed, jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try rightly belongs to civil courts.
and decide a case.24 Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter or
nature of the action is conferred only by the Constitution or by law. 25 It Article II, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that civilian
cannot be (1) granted by the agreement of the parties; (2) acquired, authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. Likewise, Article
waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties; VIII, Section 1 declares that "the judicial power shall be vested in one
or (3) conferred by the acquiescence of the courts.26 Once vested by Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject law."
matter or nature of the action cannot be dislodged by any body other
than by the legislature through the enactment of a law. The power to In the case of Anima vs. The Minister of National Defense, (146
change the jurisdiction of the courts is a matter of legislative Supreme Court Reports Annotated, page 406), the Supreme Court
enactment which none but the legislature may do. Congress has the through Mr. Justice Gutierrez declared:
sole power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the
courts.27
The jurisdiction given to military tribunals over common crimes at a
time when all civil courts were fully operational and freely functioning
In view of the clear mandate of Rep. Act No. 7055, the RTC (Branch constitutes one of the saddest chapters in the history of the Philippine
148) cannot divest the General Court-Martial of its jurisdiction over Judiciary.
those charged with violations of Articles 63 (Disrespect Toward the
President etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer), 67 (Mutiny
or Sedition), 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) The downgrading of judicial prestige caused by the glorification of
and 97 (General Article) of the Articles of War, as these are military tribunals ... the many judicial problems spawned by extended
specifically included as "service-connected offenses or crimes" under authoritarian rule which effectively eroded judicial independence and
Section 1 thereof. Pursuant to the same provision of law, the military self-respect will require plenty of time and determined efforts to cure.
courts have jurisdiction over these crimes or offenses.
The immediate return to civil courts of all cases which properly belong
There was no factual and legal basis for the RTC (Branch 148) to rule to them is only a beginning.
that violations of Articles 63, 64, 67, 96, and 97 of the Articles of War
were committed in furtherance of coup d’etat and, as such, absorbed ...
by the latter crime. It bears stressing that, after a reinvestigation, the
Panel of Prosecutors found no probable cause for coup d’etat against Thus, as long as the civil courts in the land remain open and are
the petitioners and recommended the dismissal of the case against regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise
them. The trial court approved the recommendation and dismissed the jurisdiction over military men for criminal offenses committed by
case as against the petitioners. There is, as yet, no evidence on record them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts. ...32
that the petitioners committed the violations of Articles 63, 64, 96, and
97 of the Articles of War in furtherance of coup d’etat.
Clearly, in enacting Rep. Act No. 7055, the lawmakers merely
intended to return to the civilian courts the jurisdiction over those
In fine, in making the sweeping declaration that these charges were not offenses that have been traditionally within their jurisdiction, but did
service-connected, but rather absorbed and in furtherance of the crime not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the
of coup d’etat, the RTC (Branch 148) acted without or in excess of Articles of War.
jurisdiction. Such declaration is, in legal contemplation, necessarily
null and void and does not exist.28
Conclusion
At this point, a review of its legislative history would put in better
perspective the raison d’etre of Rep. Act No. 7055. As early as 1938, The writs of prohibition (G.R. No. 162318) and habeas corpus (G.R.
jurisdiction over offenses punishable under CA 408, as amended, also No. 162341) prayed for by the petitioners must perforce fail. As a
known as the Articles of War, committed by "persons subject to general rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person
military law" was vested on the military courts. Thereafter, then alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
President Ferdinand E. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree (PD) under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do
Nos. 1822,29 185030 and 1852.31 These presidential decrees transferred so.33 Further, the writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the
from the civil courts to the military courts jurisdiction over all offenses party sought to be released had been charged before any court or
committed by members of the AFP, the former Philippine quasi-judicial body.34 The term "court" necessarily includes the
Constabulary, the former Integrated National Police, including General Court-Martial. These rules apply to Capt. Reaso, et al., as they
firemen, jail guards and all persons subject to military law. are under detention pursuant to the Commitment Order dated August
2, 2003 issued by respondent Chief of Staff of the AFP pursuant to
Article 7035 of the Articles of War.
In 1991, after a series of failed coup d’etats, Rep. Act No. 7055 was
enacted. In his sponsorship speech, Senator Tañada explained the
intendment of the law, thus: On the other hand, the office of the writ of prohibition is to prevent
inferior courts, corporations, boards or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been
Senator Tañada. The long and horrible nightmare of the past continues vested by law.36 As earlier discussed, the General Court-Martial has
to haunt us to this present day. Its vestiges remain instituted in our jurisdiction over the charges filed against petitioners 1Lt. Navales, et
legal and judicial system. Draconian decrees which served to prolong al. under Rep. Act No. 7055. A writ of prohibition cannot be issued to
the past dictatorial regime subsist to rule our new-found lives. Two of prevent it from exercising its jurisdiction.
these decrees, Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Presidential Decree
No. 1850, as amended, remain intact as laws, in spite of the fact that
four years have passed since we regained our democratic freedom. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are
hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 Prosecutor of the Department of Justice (DOJ) recommended the filing
of the corresponding Information against them.
G.R. No. 164007 August 10, 2006
Meanwhile, on August 2, 2003, pursuant to Article 70 of the Articles
of War, respondent General Narciso Abaya, then AFP Chief of Staff,
LT. (SG) EUGENE GONZALES, LT. (SG) ANDY TORRATO, ordered the arrest and detention of the soldiers involved in the
LT. (SG) ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, CPT. GARY ALEJANO, Oakwood incident and directed the AFP to conduct its own separate
LT. (SG) JAMES LAYUG, CPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, CPT. investigation.
NICANOR FAELDON, LT. (SG) MANUEL CABOCHAN, ENS.
ARMAND PONTEJOS, LT. (JG) ARTURO PASCUA, and 1LT.
JONNEL SANGGALANG, Petitioners, On August 5, 2003, the DOJ filed with the Regional Trial Court
vs. (RTC), Makati City an Information for coup d’etat 2 against those
GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, in his capacity as Chief of Staff of the soldiers, docketed as Criminal Case No. 03-2784 and eventually
Armed Forces of the Philippines, and B. GEN. MARIANO M. raffled off to Branch 61, presided by Judge Romeo F.
SARMIENTO, JR., in his capacity as the Judge Advocate General Barza. 3 Subsequently, this case was consolidated with Criminal Case
of the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO), Respondents. No. 03-2678, involving the other accused, pending before Branch 148
of the RTC, Makati City, presided by Judge Oscar B. Pimentel.
DECISION
On August 13, 2003, the RTC directed the DOJ to conduct a
reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

On the same date, respondent Chief of Staff issued Letter Order No.
For our resolution is the Petition for Prohibition (with prayer for a 625 creating a Pre-Trial Investigation Panel tasked to determine the
temporary restraining order) filed by the above-named members of the propriety of filing with the military tribunal charges for violations of
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), herein petitioners, against the the Articles of War under Commonwealth Act No. 408, 4 as amended,
AFP Chief of Staff and the Judge Advocate General, respondents. against the same military personnel. Specifically, the charges are: (a)
violation of Article 63 for disrespect toward the President, the
The facts are: Secretary of National Defense, etc., (b) violation of Article 64 for
disrespect toward a superior officer, (c) violation of Article 67 for
On July 26, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo received mutiny or sedition, (d) violation of Article 96 for conduct unbecoming
intelligence reports that some members of the AFP, with high-powered an officer and a gentleman, and (e) violation of Article 97 for conduct
weapons, had abandoned their designated places of assignment. Their prejudicial to good order and military discipline.
aim was to destabilize the government. The President then directed the
AFP and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to track and arrest them. Of the original 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784, only 243
(including petitioners herein) filed with the RTC, Branch 148 an
On July 27, 2003 at around 1:00 a.m., more than 300 heavily armed Omnibus Motion praying that the said trial court assume jurisdiction
junior officers and enlisted men of the AFP – mostly from the elite over all the charges filed with the military tribunal. They invoked
units of the Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s Special Warfare Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7055. 5
Group – entered the premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments on Ayala Avenue, Makati City. They disarmed the On September 15, 2003, petitioners filed with the Judge Advocate
security guards and planted explosive devices around the building. General’s Office (JAGO) a motion praying for the suspension of its
proceedings until after the RTC shall have resolved their motion to
Led by Navy Lt. (SG) Antonio Trillanes IV, the troops sported red assume jurisdiction.
armbands emblazoned with the emblem of the "Magdalo" faction of
the Katipunan. 1 The troops then, through broadcast media, announced On October 29, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel submitted its
their grievances against the administration of President Gloria Initial Report to the AFP Chief of Staff recommending that the
Macapagal Arroyo, such as the graft and corruption in the military, the military personnel involved in the Oakwood incident be charged
illegal sale of arms and ammunition to the "enemies" of the State, and before a general court martial with violations of Articles 63, 64, 67,
the bombings in Davao City intended to acquire more military 96, and 97 of the Articles of War.
assistance from the US government. They declared their withdrawal of
support from their Commander-in-Chief and demanded that she resign Meanwhile, on November 11, 2003, the DOJ, after conducting a
as President of the Republic. They also called for the resignation of her reinvestigation, found probable cause against only 31 (petitioners
cabinet members and the top brass of the AFP and PNP. included) of the 321 accused in Criminal Case No. 03-2784.
Accordingly, the prosecution filed with the RTC an Amended
About noontime of the same day, President Arroyo issued Information. 6
Proclamation No. 427 declaring a state of rebellion, followed by
General Order No. 4 directing the AFP and PNP to take all necessary In an Order dated November 14, 2003, the RTC admitted the
measures to suppress the rebellion then taking place in Makati City. Amended Information and dropped the charge of coup d’etat against
She then called the soldiers to surrender their weapons at five o’clock the 290 accused.
in the afternoon of that same day.

Subsequently, or on December 12, 2003, the Pre-Trial Investigation

In order to avoid a bloody confrontation, the government sent Panel submitted its Final Pre-Trial Investigation Report 7 to the JAGO,
negotiators to dialogue with the soldiers. The aim was to persuade recommending that, following the "doctrine of absorption," those
them to peacefully return to the fold of the law. After several hours of charged with coup d’etat before the RTCshould not be charged before
negotiation, the government panel succeeded in convincing them to lay the military tribunal for violation of the Articles of War.
down their arms and defuse the explosives placed around the premises
of the Oakwood Apartments. Eventually, they returned to their
barracks. For its part, the RTC, on February 11, 2004, issued an Order 8 stating
that "all charges before the court martial against the accused…are
hereby declared not service-connected, but rather absorbed and in
A total of 321 soldiers, including petitioners herein, surrendered to the furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat." The trial court then
authorities. proceeded to hear petitioners’ applications for bail.

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigated the incident In the meantime, Colonel Julius A. Magno, in his capacity as officer-
and recommended that the military personnel involved be charged in-charge of the JAGO, reviewed the findings of the Pre-Trial
with coup d’etat defined and penalized under Article 134-A of the Investigation Panel. He recommended that 29 of the officers involved
Revised Penal Code, as amended. On July 31, 2003, the Chief State in the Oakwood incident, including petitioners, be prosecuted before a
general court martial for violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming members of the reserve force, from the dates of their call to active duty
an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War. and while on such active duty; all trainees undergoing military
instructions; and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered
On June 17, 2004, Colonel Magno’s recommendation was approved into, or to duty or for training in the said service, from the dates they
by the AFP top brass. The AFP Judge Advocate General then directed are required by the terms of the call, draft, or order to obey the same.
petitioners to submit their answer to the charge. Instead of complying,
they filed with this Court the instant Petition for Prohibition praying Upon the other hand, Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055 reads:
that respondents be ordered to desist from charging them with
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War in relation to the SEC. 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other
Oakwood incident. 9 persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
Petitioners maintain that since the RTC has made a determination in its penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or
Order of February 11, 2004 that the offense for violation of Article 96 local government ordinances, regardless of whether or not civilians are
(conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of co-accused, victims, or offended parties, which may be natural or
War is not service-connected, but is absorbed in the crime of coup juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court, except when
d’etat, the military tribunal cannot compel them to submit to its the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is
jurisdiction. service-connected, in which case, the offense shall be tried by court-
martial, Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, counters that R.A. interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that
No. 7055 specifies which offenses covered by the Articles of War any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts.
areservice-connected. These are violations of Articles 54 to 70, 72 to
92, and 95 to 97. The law provides that violations of these Articles are As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be
properly cognizable by the court martial. As the charge against limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and
petitioners is violation of Article 96 which, under R.A. No. 7055 is a Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
service-connected offense, then it falls under the jurisdiction of the
court martial. In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial
may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the
Subsequently, petitioners filed with this Court a Supplemental Petition Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government
raising the additional issue that the offense charged before the General ordinances.
Court Martial has prescribed. Petitioners alleged therein that during the
pendency of their original petition, respondents proceeded with the Section 1 of R.A. No. 7055, quoted above, is clear and unambiguous.
Pre-Trial Investigation for purposes of charging them with violation of First, it lays down the general rule that members of the AFP and other
Article 96 (conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Articles of War; that the Pre-Trial Investigation Panel then referred the Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses
case to the General Court Martial; that "almost two years since the penalized under the Revised Penal Code (like coup d’etat), other
Oakwood incident on July 27, 2003, only petitioner Lt. (SG) Antonio special penal laws, or local ordinances shall be tried by the proper civil
Trillanes was arraigned, and this was done under questionable court. Next, it provides the exception to the general rule, i.e., where the
circumstances;" 10 that in the hearing of July 26, 2005, herein civil court, before arraignment, has determined the offense to be
petitioners moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that they service-connected, then the offending soldier shall be tried by a court
were not arraigned within the prescribed period of two (2) years from martial. Lastly, the law states an exception to the exception, i.e., where
the date of the commission of the alleged offense, in violation of the President of the Philippines, in the interest of justice, directs before
Article 38 of the Articles of War; 11 that "the offense charged arraignment that any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper
prescribed on July 25, 2005;" 12 that the General Court Martial ruled, civil court.
however, that "the prescriptive period shall end only at 12:00 midnight
of July 26, 2005;" 13 that "(a)s midnight of July 26, 2005 was
approaching and it was becoming apparent that the accused could not The second paragraph of the same provision further identifies the
be arraigned, the prosecution suddenly changed its position and "service-connected crimes or offenses" as "limited to those defined
asserted that 23 of the accused have already been arraigned;" 14 and in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97" of the
that petitioners moved for a reconsideration but it was denied by the Articles of War. Violations of these specified Articles are triable by
general court martial in its Order dated September 14, 2005. 15 court martial. This delineates the jurisdiction between the civil courts
and the court martial over crimes or offenses committed by military
personnel.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General prays that the Supplemental
Petition be denied for lack of merit. He alleges that "contrary to
petitioners’ pretensions, all the accused were duly arraigned on July 13 Such delineation of jurisdiction by R.A. No. 7055 is necessary to
and 18, 2005." 16 The "(r)ecords show that in the hearing on July 13, preserve the peculiar nature of military justice system over military
2005, all the 29 accused were present" and, "(o)n that day, Military personnel charged with service-connected offenses. The military
Prosecutor Captain Karen Ong Jags read the Charges and justice system is disciplinary in nature, aimed at achieving the highest
Specifications from the Charge Sheet in open court (pp. 64, TSN, July form of discipline in order to ensure the highest degree of military
13, 2005)." 17 efficiency. 18 Military law is established not merely to enforce
discipline in times of war, but also to preserve the tranquility and
security of the State in time of peace; for there is nothing more
The sole question for our resolution is whether the petitioners are dangerous to the public peace and safety than a licentious and
entitled to the writ of prohibition. undisciplined military body. 19 The administration of military justice
has been universally practiced. Since time immemorial, all the armies
There is no dispute that petitioners, being officers of the AFP, are in almost all countries of the world look upon the power of military
subject to military law. Pursuant to Article 1 (a) of Commonwealth law and its administration as the most effective means of enforcing
Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War, the discipline. For this reason, the court martial has become invariably an
term "officer" is "construed to refer to a commissioned officer." indispensable part of any organized armed forces, it being the most
Article 2 provides: potent agency in enforcing discipline both in peace and in war. 20

Art. 2. Persons Subject to Military Law. – The following persons are Here, petitioners are charged for violation of Article 96 (conduct
subject to these articles and shall be understood as included in the term unbecoming an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles of War before
"any person subject to military law" or "persons subject to military the court martial, thus:
law," whenever used in these articles:
All persons subject to military law, did on or about 27 July 2003 at
(a) All officers and soldiers in the active service of the Armed Oakwood Hotel, Makati City, Metro Manila, willfully, unlawfully and
Forces of the Philippines or of the Philippine Constabulary, all feloniously violate their solemn oath as officers to defend the
Constitution, the law and the duly-constituted authorities and Art. 57. False Returns.
abused their constitutional duty to protect the people and the
State by, among others, attempting to oust the incumbent duly-elected Art. 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion.
and legitimate President by force and violence, seriously disturbing the
peace and tranquility of the people and the nation they are sworn to
protect, thereby causing dishonor and disrespect to the military Art. 59. Desertion.
profession, conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, in
violation of AW 96 of the Articles of War. Art. 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring ours) Art. 61. Entertaining a Deserter.

Article 96 of the Articles of War 21 provides: Art. 62. Absence Without Leave.

ART. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. – Any Art. 63. Disrespect Toward the President, Vice-President,
officer, member of the Nurse Corps, cadet, flying cadet, or
probationary second lieutenant, who is convicted of conduct Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be dismissed from the
service. (Underscoring ours)
Defense.
We hold that the offense for violation of Article 96 of the Articles of
War is service-connected. This is expressly provided in Section 1 Art. 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer.
(second paragraph) of R.A. No. 7055. It bears stressing that the charge
against the petitioners concerns the alleged violation of their solemn Art. 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer.
oath as officers to defend the Constitution and the duly-constituted
authorities.Such violation allegedly caused dishonor and disrespect
Art. 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned Officer.
to the military profession. In short, the charge has a bearing on
their professional conduct or behavior as military officers. Equally
indicative of the "service-connected" nature of the offense is the Art. 67. Mutiny or Sedition.
penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal from the service
– imposable only by the military court.Such penalty is purely Art. 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition.
disciplinary in character, evidently intended to cleanse the military
profession of misfits and to preserve the stringent standard of military
Art. 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders.
discipline.

Art. 70. Arrest or Confinement.

Obviously, there is no merit in petitioners’ argument that they can no
longer be charged before the court martial for violation of Article 96 of
the Articles of War because the same has been declared by the RTC in Articles 72 to 92:
its Order of February 11, 2004 as "not service-connected, but rather
absorbed and in furtherance of the alleged crime of coup d’etat," Art. 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners.
hence, triable by said court (RTC). The RTC, in making such
declaration, practically amended the law which expressly vests in the
court martial the jurisdiction over "service-connected crimes or Art. 73. Report of Prisoners Received.
offenses." What the law has conferred the court should not take away.
It is only the Constitution or the law that bestows jurisdiction on the Art. 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Authority.
court, tribunal, body or officer over the subject matter or nature of an
action which can do so. 22 And it is only through a constitutional Art. 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities.
amendment or legislative enactment that such act can be done. The
first and fundamental duty of the courts is merely to apply the law "as
they find it, not as they like it to be." 23 Evidently, such declaration by Art. 76. Misbehavior Before the Enemy.
the RTC constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and is, therefore, void. Art. 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender.

In Navales v. Abaya., 24 this Court, through Mr. Justice Romeo J. Art. 78. Improper Use of Countersign.
Callejo, Sr., held:
Art. 79. Forcing a Safeguard.
We agree with the respondents that the sweeping declaration made by
the RTC (Branch 148) in the dispositive portion of its Order dated Art. 80. Captured Property to be Secured for Public Service.
February 11, 2004 that all charges before the court-martial against the
accused were not service-connected, but absorbed and in furtherance
of the crime of coup d’etat, cannot be given effect. x x x, such Art. 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property.
declaration was made without or in excess of jurisdiction; hence, a
nullity. Art. 82. Relieving, Corresponding With, or Aiding the Enemy.

The second paragraph of the above provision (referring to Section 1 of Art. 83. Spies.
R.A. No. 7055) explicitly specifies what are considered "service-
connected crimes or offenses" under Commonwealth Act No. 408, as Art. 84. Military Property.–Willful or Negligent Loss, Damage
amended, also known as the Articles of War, to wit:

or wrongful Disposition.
Articles 54 to 70:

Art. 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property

Art. 54. Fraudulent Enlistment.

Issued to Soldiers.
Art. 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment.

Art. 86. Drunk on Duty.

Art. 56. False Muster.
Art. 87. Misbehavior of Sentinel. disciplinary system is the President who exercises review powers over
decisions of courts-martial (citing Article 50 of the Articles of War;
Art. 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions. quoted provisions omitted).

Art. 88-A. Unlawful Influencing Action of Court. xxx

Art. 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions. While the Court had intervened before in courts-martial or similar
proceedings, it did so sparingly and only to release a military
personnel illegally detained (Ognir v. Director of Prisons, 80 Phil. 401
Art. 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed. [1948] or to correct objectionable procedures (Yamashita v. Styer, 75
Phil. 563 [1945]). The Court has never suppressed court-martial
Art. 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures. proceedings on the ground that the offense charged ‘is absorbed and in
furtherance of’ another criminal charge pending with the civil courts.
Art. 92. Dueling. The Court may now do so only if the offense charged is not one of the
service-connected offenses specified in Section 1 of RA 7055. Such is
not the situation in the present case.
Articles 95 to 97:
With respect to the issue of prescription raised by petitioners in their
Art. 95. Frauds Against the Government. Supplemental Petition, suffice it to say that we cannot entertain the
same. The contending parties are at loggerheads as to (a) who among
Art. 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman. the petitioners were actually arraigned, and (b) the dates of their
arraignment. These are matters involving questions of fact, not within
our power of review, as we are not a trier of facts. In a petition for
Art. 97. General Article.
prohibition, such as the one at bar, only legal issues affecting the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved
Further, Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 7055 vests on the military courts on the basis of the undisputed facts. 26
the jurisdiction over the foregoing offenses. x x x.
Clearly, the instant petition for prohibition must fail. The office of
It is clear from the foregoing that Rep. Act No. 7055 did not divest the prohibition is to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exercise of
military courts of jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of authority and is directed against proceedings that are done without or
Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of the in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, there being
Articles of War as these are considered "service-connected crimes or no appeal or other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
offenses." In fact, it mandates that these shall be tried by the court- course of law. 27 Stated differently, prohibition is the remedy to
martial. prevent inferior courts, corporations, boards, or persons from usurping
or exercising a jurisdiction or power with which they have not been
Moreover, the observation made by Mr. Justice Antonio T. Carpio vested by law. 28
during the deliberation of this case is worth quoting, thus:
In fine, this Court holds that herein respondents have the authority in
The trial court aggravated its error when it justified its ruling by convening a court martial and in charging petitioners with violation of
holding that the charge of Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Article 96 of the Articles of War.
Gentleman is ‘absorbed and in furtherance to the alleged crime of coup
d’etat.’ Firstly, the doctrine of ‘absorption of crimes’ is peculiar to
criminal law and generally applies to crimes punished by the same
statute, 25 unlike here where different statutes are involved. Secondly,
the doctrine applies only if the trial court has jurisdiction over both
offenses. Here, Section 1 of R.A. 7055 deprives civil courts of
jurisdiction over service-connected offenses, including Article 96 of
the Articles of War. Thus, the doctrine of absorption of crimes is not
applicable to this case.

Military law is sui generis (Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 [1975]),
applicable only to military personnel because the military constitutes
an armed organization requiring a system of discipline separate from
that of civilians (see Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 [1953]).
Military personnel carry high-powered arms and other lethal weapons
not allowed to civilians. History, experience, and the nature of a
military organization dictate that military personnel must be subjected
to a separate disciplinary system not applicable to unarmed civilians or
unarmed government personnel.

A civilian government employee reassigned to another place by his

superior may question his reassignment by asking a temporary
restraining order or injunction from a civil court. However, a soldier
cannot go to a civil court and ask for a restraining or injunction if his
military commander reassigns him to another area of military
operations. If this is allowed, military discipline will collapse.

xxx

This Court has recognized that courts-martial are instrumentalities of

the Executive to enable the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to
effectively command, control, and discipline the armed forces (see
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875 [1946], citing Winthrop’s Military
Law and Precedents, 2nd edition, p. 49). In short, courts-martial form
part of the disciplinary system that ensures the President’s control, and
thus civilian supremacy, over the military. At the apex of this
 CADAPAN, a female person, and deprive her of liberty by detaining
G.R. No. 223272, February 26, 2018 her against her will first at Camp Tecson, in San Miguel, Bulacan, then
subsequently in other places to include the barangay hall of Sapang,
San Miguel, Bulacan; the camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion of the
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS Philippine Army in Limay, Bataan; and, a resort/safehouse in Iba,
CORPUS, SSGT. EDGARDO L. Zambales, from June 2006 to July 2007, a period of more than three
OSORIO, Petitioner, v. ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR (3) days, resulting in the said female victim's continuing
JUAN PEDRO C. NAVERA; ASSISTANT STATE disappearance, to the damage and prejudice of SHERLYN T.
PROSECUTOR IRWIN A. MARAYA; ASSOCIATE CADAPAN and her heirs.
PROSECUTION ATTORNEY ETHEL RHEA G. SURIL OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MANILA; COLONEL CONTRARY TO LAW.7 (Emphasis in the original)
ROBERT M. AREVALO, COMMANDER, HEADQUARTERS
AND HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT GROUP PHILIPPINE
ARMY; COLONEL ROSALIO G. POMPA, INF (GSC), PA, Warrants of arrest were issued against SSgt. Osorio on December 19,
COMMANDING OFFICER, MP BATALLION, HHSG, PA; AND 2011.8
CAPTAIN TELESFORO C. BALASABAS, INF PA, AND/OR
ANY AND ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL The next day, at about 3:00 p.m., SSgt. Osorio was arrested by Colonel
CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF SSGT. EDGARDO L. Herbert Yambing, the Provost Marshall General of the Armed Forces
OSORIO, Respondents. of the Philippines. SSgt. Osorio was turned over to the Criminal
Investigation and Detection Unit Group in Camp Crame, Quezon City
and was detained in Bulacan Provincial Jail. He was later transferred
RESOLUTION to the Philippine Army Custodial Center in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig
City where he is currently detained.9
LEONEN, J.: Contending that he was being illegally deprived of his liberty, SSgt.
Osorio filed a Petition10 for Habeas Corpus before the Court of
Kidnapping should never be part of the functions of a soldier. It cannot Appeals on July 21, 2015. Impleaded as respondents were Presiding
be done in a soldier's official capacity. If a soldier nonetheless Judge Teodora Gonzales of Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Malolos
proceeds allegedly on the orders of a superior officer, the soldier shall City, Bulacan, the judge who issued the warrants of arrest; Assistant
be tried before the civil courts. The remedy of habeas corpus, on the State Prosecutors Juan Pedro Navera and Irwin A. Maraya, and
argument that only courts-martial have jurisdiction over members of Associate Prosecution Attorney Ethel Rhea G. Suril, who filed the
the Armed Forces, will not lie. Informations for kidnapping and illegal detention; and Colonel Robert
M. Arevalo, Colonel Rosalio G. Pompa, and Captain Telesforo C.
This resolves the Petition1 for Review on Certiorari assailing the Balasabas, SSgt. Osorio's superiors.11
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 141332 dated
July 27, 20152 and February 22, 2016.3 The Court of Appeals found SSgt. Osorio mainly argued that courts-martial, not a civil court such
that custody over Staff Sergeant Edgardo L. Osorio (SSgt. Osorio) was as the Regional Trial Court, had jurisdiction to try the criminal case
by virtue of a valid judicial process; thus, it denied SSgt. Osorio's considering that he was a soldier on active duty and that the offense
Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus.4 charged was allegedly "service-connected." In the alternative, SSgt.
Osorio argued that the Ombudsman had jurisdiction to conduct
Together with his superior officer, Major General Jovito Palparan preliminary investigation and the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try
(Major General Palparan),5 SSgt. Osorio was charged in two (2) the case because among his co-accused was Major General Palparan, a
Informations before Branch 14, Regional Trial Court, Malolos City for public officer with salary grade higher than 28.12
allegedly kidnapping University of the Philippines students Karen E.
Empeño (Empeño) and Sherlyn T. Cadapan (Cadapan). The accusatory SSgt. Osorio added that he could not be charged with the felony of
portion of these Informations read: kidnapping and serious illegal detention because under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code,13 the felony may only be committed by a
private individual, not a ranking officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.14 Lastly, he claimed deprivation of due process because he
was allegedly charged without undergoing proper preliminary
CRIM. CASE NO. 3905-M-2011
investigation.15

The Court of Appeals held that SSgt. Osorio's confinement was "by
That on or about the 26th of June 2006, in the house of one Raquel
virtue of a valid judgment or a judicial process[.]"16 Under Republic
Halili at Barangay San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan, and within the
Act No. 7055, Section 1, a crime penalized under the Revised Penal
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting
Code, even if committed by a member of the Armed Forces of the
as private individuals, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
Philippines, is to be tried "by the proper civil court." The only
one another, did then and there, by taking advantage of nighttime and
exception to this rule is when the crime is "service-connected," i.e.,
with the use of a motor vehicle, forcibly abduct KAREN E.
those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to
EMPEÑO, a female person, and deprive her of liberty by detaining
97 of the Articles of War,17 in which case, the courts-martial have
her against her will first at Camp Tecson, in San Miguel, Bulacan, then
jurisdiction. Since the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
subsequently in other places to include the barangay hall of Sapang,
detention is punished under the Revised Penal Code and is not
San Miguel, Bulacan; the camp of the 24th Infantry Battalion of the
"service-connected," the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City
Philippine Army in Limay, Bataan; and, a resort/safehouse in Iba,
properly took cognizance of the case and, consequently, the warrants
Zambales, from June 2006 to July 2007, a period of more than three
of arrest against SSgt. Osorio were issued under a valid judicial
(3) days, resulting in the said female victim's continuing
process.
disappearance, to the damage and prejudice of KAREN E.
EMPEÑO and her heirs.
As to SSgt. Osorio's other arguments, the Court of Appeals said that
they "should be resolved through other appropriate remedies such as a
CONTRARY TO LAW.6 (Emphasis in the original)
motion to quash." According to the Court of Appeals, habeas corpus is
not a "writ of error," and questions relating to procedure or merits of
CRIM. CASE NO. 3906-M-2011
the case cannot be addressed in habeas corpus proceedings.18

In its July 27, 2015 Resolution,19 the Court of Appeals denied SSgt.

That on or about the 26th of June 2006, in the house of one Raquel
Osorio's Petition for Habeas Corpus. SSgt. Osorio's Motion for
Halili at Barangay San Miguel, Hagonoy, Bulacan, and within the
Reconsideration was likewise denied in the Court of Appeals February
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting
22, 2016 Resolution.20
as private individuals, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding
one another, did then and there, by taking advantage of nighttime and
with the use of a motor vehicle, forcibly abduct SHERLYN T.
On April 20, 2016, SSgt. Osorio filed his Petition for Review on liberty."34 Its primary purpose "is to inquire into all manner of
Certiorari.21 Upon the directive of this Court, respondents, through the involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a
Office of the Solicitor General, filed their Comment22 on the Petition. person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will
preclude freedom of action is sufficient."35
SSgt. Osorio maintains that he is being illegally deprived of his liberty
because he was charged with an "inexistent offense." He argues that The restraint of liberty need not be confined to any offense so as to
kidnapping and serious illegal detention can only be committed by a entitle a person to the writ. Habeas corpus may be availed of as a post-
private person, not by a member of the Armed Forces of the conviction remedy36 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty
Philippines.23 of abode.37

Given that he is a soldier on active duty, SSgt. Osorio adds that only In In re: Saliba v. Warden,38 this Court allowed the issuance of the writ
courts-martial have jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide a criminal case due to mistaken identity. Instead of Butukan S. Malang, authorities
against him. In the alternative, SSgt. Osorio argues that the arrested and detained one Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo) for his
Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, not the Department of Justice or the alleged participation in the Maguindanao Massacre. Salibo, having
Regional Trial Court, have jurisdiction to conduct preliminary proved that he was not the accused Butukan S. Malang named in the
investigation and to hear, try, and decide the criminal case because one arrest warrant, and that he was in Mecca for the Hajj pilgrimage at the
of his co-accused, Major General Palparan, was an officer in the time of the incident, was ordered released. To detain a person, when he
Philippine Army with a rank higher than colonel and with a salary has proven that he is not the person accused of the crime, is a
grade of 28.24 deprivation of liberty without due process of law.

Lastly, SSgt. Osorio claims that he was deprived of his right to due Habeas corpus, therefore, effectively substantiates the implied
process of law because no preliminary investigation was allegedly autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in
conducted in this case.25 Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution.39 With liberty being a
constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate
Respondents counter that a public officer such as SSgt. Osorio may be level of scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be
charged under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping further curtailed in the labyrinth of other processes.40
and serious illegal detention. A public officer detaining a person
without authority is acting in a private, not official, capacity. Since However, a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the
kidnapping is not part of the duties of an officer of the Armed Forces person allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful
of the Philippines, respondents argue that SSgt. Osorio acted in a process or order of the court.41 The restraint then has become
private capacity when he took part in illegally detaining Empeño and lega1.42 Therefore, the remedy of habeas corpus is rendered moot and
Cadapan.26 academic.43 Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:

On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents argue that the Regional Trial Section 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. — If it
Court properly took cognizance of the case. Under Republic Act No. appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
7055, Section 1, members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by
charged with crimes or offenses punished under the Revised Penal virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
Code "shall be tried by the proper civil court." The only exception is judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or
when the crime is "service-connected," in which case, courts-martial make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
assume jurisdiction. Considering that kidnapping is not a "service- appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
connected" offense, SSgt. Osorio was properly charged before a civil reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order.
court.27 Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of
Lastly, respondents argue that no writ of habeas corpus should be a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
issued in this case. Respondents contend that habeas corpus "does not
extend beyond an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court by which it
was issued and the validity of the process upon its face."28 Habeas If an accused is confined under a lawful process or order of the court,
corpus, being an extraordinary remedy, "will not issue where the the proper remedy is to pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust
person alleged to be restrained of his [or her] liberty is in custody of an the usual remedies.44 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash
officer under a process issued by the court which has jurisdiction to do the information or the warrant of arrest45 based on one or more of the
so."29 grounds enumerated in Rule 117, Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

The principal issue for this Court's resolution is whether or not a writ Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint
of habeas corpus is petitioner SSgt. Edgardo L. Osorio's proper or information on any of the following grounds:
remedy. Subsumed in the resolution of this issue are the following:
first, whether or not a civil court may take cognizance of a criminal
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
case against a soldier on active duty; and, second, whether or not a
public officer may be charged with kidnapping and serious illegal
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charg
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, considering
that the provision speaks of "any private individual."
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
This Petition must be denied.
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
I
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;

(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single punishmen
Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides:
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
Section 1. To what habeas corpus extends. — Except as otherwise
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all (h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excus
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person (i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the of
is withheld from the person entitled thereto. terminated without his express consent.

The "great writ of liberty"30 of habeas corpus "was devised and exists
as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful With a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal complaint or information ... for insufficiency on its face in [a] point of
freedom."31 Habeas corpus is an extraordinary,32 summary,33 and law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
equitable writ, consistent with the law's "zealous regard for personal information."46 An accused filing a motion to quash "hypothetically
admits the facts alleged in the information" and cannot present
evidence aliunde or those extrinsic from the Information.47 ARTICLE 59. Desertion ...

The effect of the grant of the motion to quash depends on the grounds ARTICLE 60. Advising or Aiding Another to Desert ...
availed of. When the defect in the complaint or information can be
cured by amendment, the grant of the motion to quash will result in an ARTICLE 61. Entertaining a Deserter ...
order directing the amendment.48 If the ground is that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution ARTICLE 62. Absence Without Leave ...
"an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."49 If, despite
amendment, the complaint or information still suffers from the same ARTICLE 63. Disrespect toward the President, Vice-President,
defect, the complaint or information shall be quashed.50 Congress of the Philippines, or Secretary of National Defense ...

As an exception, the Court said in In re: Salibo that a motion to quash ARTICLE 64. Disrespect Toward Superior Officer ...
would be ineffectual because none of the grounds would have applied
under the circumstances of that case. The information and warrant of ARTICLE 65. Assaulting or Willfully Disobeying Superior Officer ...
arrest were issued on the premise that the accused named Butukan S.
Malang and the person named Datukan Malang Salibo were the same ARTICLE 66. Insubordinate Conduct Toward Non-Commissioned
person, a premise proven as false. An amendment from "Butukan S. Officer ...
Malang" to "Datukan Malang Salibo" in the information will not cure
this defect. ARTICLE 67. Mutiny or Sedition ...

II ARTICLE 68. Failure to Suppress Mutiny or Sedition ...

ARTICLE 69. Quarrels; Frays; Disorders ...

In availing himself of habeas corpus, SSgt. Osorio mainly contends
that the Regional Trial Court that issued the warrants for his arrest had ARTICLE 70. Arrest or Confinement ...
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the kidnapping case against him.
SSgt. Osorio argues that courts-martial, not civil courts, have ARTICLE 72. Refusal to Receive and Keep Prisoners ...
jurisdiction to try and decide a case against a soldier on active duty. In
the alternative, SSgt. Osorio argues that the Ombudsman and ARTICLE 73. Report of Prisoners Received ...
Sandiganbayan should have conducted the preliminary investigation
and decided the kidnapping case against him since his co-accused, ARTICLE 74. Releasing Prisoner Without Proper Authority ...
Major General Palparan, had a rank higher than colonel and had salary
grade 28 at the time of the commission of the offense. ARTICLE 75. Delivery of Offenders to Civil Authorities ...

SSgt. Osorio's claim lacks merit. The Regional Trial Court properly ARTICLE 76. Misbehaviour Before the Enemy ...
took cognizance of the kidnapping case against him.
ARTICLE 77. Subordinates Compelling Commander to Surrender ...
Republic Act No. 7055,51 Section 1 provides that if the accused is a
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the crime ARTICLE 78. Improper Use of Countersign ...
involved is one punished under the Revised Penal Code, civil courts
shall have the authority to hear, try, and decide the case, thus: ARTICLE 79. Forcing a Safeguard ...

Section 1. Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and other ARTICLE 80. Captured Property to Be Secured for Public Service ...
persons subject to military law, including members of the Citizens
Armed Forces Geographical Units, who commit crimes or offenses ARTICLE 81. Dealing in Captured or Abandoned Property ...
penalized under the Revised Penal Code, other special penal laws, or
local government ordinances regardless of whether or not civilians are ARTICLE 82. Relieving, Corresponding with, or Aiding the Enemy ...
co-accused, victims, or offended parties which may be natural or
juridical persons, shall be tried by the proper civil court except when ARTICLE 83. Spies ...
the offense, as determined before arraignment by the civil court, is
service-connected, in which case the offense shall be tried by court- ARTICLE 84. Military Property — Willful or Negligent Loss,
martial: Provided, That the President of the Philippines may, in the Damage or Wrongful Disposition ...
interest of justice, order or direct at any time before arraignment that
any such crimes or offenses be tried by the proper civil courts. ARTICLE 85. Waste or Unlawful Disposition of Military Property
Issued to Soldiers ...
As used in this Section, service-connected crimes or offenses shall be
limited to those defined in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and ARTICLE 86. Drunk on Duty ...
Articles 95 to 97 of Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended.
ARTICLE 87. Misbehaviour of Sentinel ...
In imposing the penalty for such crimes or offenses, the court-martial
may take into consideration the penalty prescribed therefor in the ARTICLE 88. Personal Interest in Sale of Provisions ...
Revised Penal Code, other special laws, or local government
ordinances. ARTICLE 89. Intimidation of Persons Bringing Provisions ...

Under this Section, the only time courts-martial may assume ARTICLE 90. Good Order to be Maintained and Wrongs Redressed ...
jurisdiction is if, before arraignment, the civil court determines that the
offense is "service-connected." These service-connected offenses are ARTICLE 91. Provoking Speeches or Gestures ...
found in Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 to 97 of
the Articles of War, to wit: ARTICLE 92. Dueling ...
....
ARTICLE 54. Fraudulent Enlistment ...
ARTICLE 95. Frauds Against the Government Affecting Matters and
ARTICLE 55. Officer Making Unlawful Enlistment ... Equipments ...

ARTICLE 56. False Muster ... ARTICLE 96. Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman ...

ARTICLE 57. False Returns-Omission to Render Returns ... ARTICLE 97. General Article ...

ARTICLE 58. Certain Acts to Constitute Desertion ...

SSgt. Osorio was charged with kidnapping, a crime punishable under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. [52 Applying Republic Act No. G.R. No. 448           September 20, 1901
7055, Section 1, the case shall be tried by a civil court, specifically by
the Regional Trial Court, which has jurisdiction over the crime of
kidnapping.53 The processes which the trial court issued, therefore, THE UNITED STATES, complainant-appellee,
were valid. vs.
PHILIP K. SWEET, defendant-appellant.
Contrary to SSgt. Osorio's claim, the offense he committed was not
service-connected. The case filed against him is none of those Theofilus B. Steele, for appellant.
enumerated under Articles 54 to 70, Articles 72 to 92, and Articles 95 Office of the Solicitor-General Araneta, for appellee.
to 97 of the Articles of War.
LADD, J.:
Further, kidnapping is not part of the functions of a soldier. Even if a
public officer has the legal duty to detain a person, the public officer
must be able to show the existence of legal grounds for the detention. The offense charged in the complaint is punishable under the Penal
Without these legal grounds, the public officer is deemed to have acted Code now in force by arresto mayor and a fine of from 325 to 3,250
in a private capacity and is considered a "private individual." The pesetas. (Art. 418.) By Act No. 136 of the United States Philippine
public officer becomes liable for kidnapping and serious illegal Commission, section 56 (6), Courts of First Instance are given original
detention punishable by reclusion perpetua, not with arbitrary jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which a penalty of more than six
detention punished with significantly lower penalties. months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars may be
imposed." The offense was therefore cognizable by the court below
The cases cited by respondents are on point. In People v. unless the fact that the appellant was at the time of its alleged
Santiano,54 members of the Philippine National Police were convicted commission an employee of the United States military authorities in
of kidnapping with murder. On appeal, they contended that they the Philippine Islands, and the further fact that the person upon whom
cannot be charged with kidnapping considering that they were public it is alleged to have been committed was a prisoner of war in the
officers. This Court rejected the argument and said that "in abducting custody of such authorities, are sufficient to deprive it of jurisdiction.
and taking away the victim, [the accused] did so neither in furtherance We must assume that both these facts are true, as found, either upon
of official function nor in the pursuit of authority vested in them. It is sufficient evidence or upon the admissions of the prosecuting attorney,
not, in fine, in relation to their office, but in purely private capacity, by the court below.
that they [committed the crime]."55 This Court, thus, affirmed the
conviction of the accused in Santiano. Setting aside the claim that the appellant was "acting in the line of
duty" at the time the alleged offense was committed, which is not
In People v. PO1 Trestiza,56 members of the Philippine National Police supported by the findings or by any evidence which appears in the
were initially charged with kidnapping for ransom. The public record, the contention that the court was without jurisdiction, as we
prosecutor, however, filed a motion to withdraw information before understand it, is reducible to two propositions: First, that an assault
the trial court and filed a new one for robbery. According to the public committed by a soldier or military employee upon a prisoner of war is
prosecutor, the accused cannot be charged with kidnapping because not an offense under the Penal Code; and second, that if it is an offense
the crime may only be committed by private individuals. Moreover, under the Code, nevertheless the military character sustained by the
the accused argued that the detention was allegedly part of a person charged with the offense at the time of its commission exempts
"legitimate police operation." him from the ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals.

The trial court denied the motion to withdraw. It examined the Pre- As to the first proposition, it is true, as pointed out by counsel, that an
Operation/Coordination Sheet presented by the defense and found that assault of the character charged in the complaint committed in time of
it was neither authenticated nor its signatories presented in court. The war by a military person upon a prisoner of war is punishable as an
defense failed to show proof of a "legitimate police operation" and, offense under the Spanish Code of Military Justice (art. 232), and it is
based on Santiano, the accused were deemed to have acted in a private also true that under the provisions of the same Code (arts. 4, 5) the
capacity in detaining the victims. This Court affirmed the conviction military tribunals have, with certain exceptions which it is not material
of the police officers for kidnapping. to state, exclusive cognizance of all offenses, whether of a purely
military nature or otherwise, committed by military persons. But the
It is not impossible for a public officer to be charged with and be fact that the acts charged in the complaint would be punishable as an
convicted of kidnapping as Santiano and Trestiza illustrated. SSgt. offense under the Spanish military legislation does not render them
Osorio's claim that he was charged with an "inexistent crime" because any less an offense under the article of the Penal Code above cited.
he is a public officer is, therefore, incorrect. There is nothing in the language of that article to indicate that it does
not apply to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of the law.
Further, since SSgt. Osorio is charged with a crime committed in a Under articles 4 and 5 of the Code of Military Justice above cited a
private capacity, the Sandiganbayan cannot take cognizance of the military person could not be brought to trial before a civil tribunal for
case. Under Presidential Decree No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan was an assault upon a prisoner of war, but by the commission of that
created and was vested jurisdiction over crimes or offenses committed offense he incurred a criminal responsibility for which he was
by public officers in relation in to their offices.57 amenable only to the military jurisdiction. That criminal responsibility,
however, arose from an infraction of the general penal laws, although
All told, the arrest warrants against SSgt. Osorio were issued by the the same acts, viewed in another aspect, might also, if committed in
court that has jurisdiction over the offense charged. SSgt. Osorio's time of war, constitute an infraction of the military code. We are
restraint has become legal; hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is unable to see how these provisions of the Spanish Military Code, no
already moot and academic.[58 SSgt. Osorio's proper remedy is to longer in force here and which indeed never had any application to the
pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual remedies, the Army of the United States, can in any possible view have the effect
first of which would be a motion to quash, filed before arraignment, on claimed for them by counsel for the appellant.
the following grounds: the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
and the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.59 The second question is, Does the fact that the alleged offense was
committed by an employee of the United States military authorities
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari deprive the court of jurisdiction? We have been cited to no provision
is DENIED. The Resolutions dated July 27, 2015 and February 22, in the legislation of Congress, and to none in the local legislation,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 141332 which has the effect of limiting, as respects employees of the United
are AFFIRMED. States military establishment, the general jurisdiction conferred upon
the Courts of First Instance by Act No. 136 of the United States
SO ORDERED. Philippine Commission above cited, and we are not aware of the
existence of any such provision. The case is therefore open to the
application of the general principle that the jurisdiction of the civil
tribunals is unaffected by the military or other special character of the
person brought before them for trial, a principle firmly established in
the law of England and America and which must, we think, prevail
under any system of jurisprudence unless controlled by express
legislation to the contrary. (United States vs. Clark, 31 Fed. Rep., 710.)
The appellant's claim that the acts alleged to constitute the offense G.R. No. 125865           January 28, 2000
were performed by him in the execution of the orders of his military
superiors may, if true, be available by way of defense upon the merits JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner,
in the trial in the court below, but can not under this principle affect vs.
the right of that court to take jurisdiction of the case. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Whether under a similar state of facts to that which appears in this case YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
a court of one of the United States would have jurisdiction to try the
offender against the State laws (see In re Fair, 100 Fed. Rep., 149), it Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development Bank
is not necessary to consider. The present is not a case where the courts (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory words
of one government are attempting to exercise jurisdiction over the against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged before the
military agents or employees of another and distinct government, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City with two
because the court asserting jurisdiction here derives its existence and counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
powers from the same Government under the authority of which the 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued
acts alleged to constitute the offense are claimed to have been by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner's bail at P2,400.00 per criminal
performed. charge, the MeTC released him to the custody of the Security Officer
of ADB. The next day, the MeTC judge received an "office of
It may be proper to add that there is no actual conflict between the two protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that
jurisdictions in the present case nor any claim of jurisdiction on the petitioner is covered by immunity from legal process under Section 45
part of the military tribunals. On the contrary it appears from the of the Agreement between the ADB and the Philippine Government
findings of the court below that the complaint was entered by order of regarding the Headquarters of the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the
the commanding general of the Division of the Philippines, a fact not country. Based on the said protocol communication that petitioner is
important, perhaps, as regards the technical question of jurisdiction, immune from suit, the MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution
but which relieves the case from any practical embarrassment which dismissed the two criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for
might result from a claim on the part of the military tribunals to reconsideration which was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was
exclusive cognizance of the offense. denied, the prosecution filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City which set aside the MeTC rulings and ordered the latter
court to enforce the warrant of arrest it earlier issued. After the motion
for reconsideration was denied, petitioner elevated the case to this
Court via a petition for review arguing that he is covered by immunity
under the Agreement and that no preliminary investigation was held
before the criminal cases were filed in court.1âwphi1.nêt

The petition is not impressed with merit.

First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFA's determination that a certain person is covered by
immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In
receiving ex-parte the DFA's advice and in motu propio dismissing the
two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the latter's right
to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process is a
right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed
inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged
utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time. 1 At any rate, it has been ruled that the
mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in
the dropping of the charges.2

Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy
the following privileges and immunities:

a.) immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by

them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the
immunity.

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the

exception that the acts was done in "official capacity." It is therefore
necessary to determine if petitioner's case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the
chance to rebut the DFA protocol and it must be accorded the
opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire.

Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the

immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of
a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.3 The
imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official
functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may
be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may
have caused by his act done with malice or in bad faith or beyond the
scope of his authority or jurisdiction.4 It appears that even the
government's chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not
support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
G.R. No. L-44896             July 31, 1936

Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a

diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, petitioner,
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an vs.
action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by MANUEL V. MORAN, Judge of First Instance of
the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official Manila, respondent.
functions.5 As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime is
not part of official duty. Cardenas and Casal for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for respondent.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary investigation
conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not a ABAD SANTOS, J.:
matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at
bar.6 Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be The petitioner was duly accredited honorary consul of Uruguay at
invoked only when specifically granted by law.7 The rule on the Manila, Philippine Islands on June 11, 1934. He was subsequently
criminal procedure is clear that no preliminary investigation is charged in the Court of First Instance of Manila with the crime of
required in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. 8 Besides falsification of a private document. He objected to the jurisdiction of
the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's the court on the ground that both under the Constitution of the United
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or States and the Constitution of the Philippines the court below had no
otherwise render it defective.9 jurisdiction to try him. His objection having been overruled, he filed
this petition for a writ of prohibition with a view to preventing the
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Court of First Instance of Manila from taking cognizance of the
criminal action filed against him.

In support of this petition counsel for the petitioner contend (1) That
the Court of First Instance of Manila is without jurisdiction to try the
case filed against the petitioner for the reason that under Article III,
section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, the Supreme Court
of the United States has original jurisdiction in all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and such jurisdiction
excludes the courts of the Philippines; and (2) that even under the
Constitution of the Philippines original jurisdiction over cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is
conferred exclusively upon the Supreme Court of the Philippines.

This case involves no question of diplomatic immunity. It is well

settled that a consul is not entitled to the privileges and immunities of
an ambassador or minister, but is subject to the laws and regulations of
the country to which he is accredited. (Ex parte Baiz, 135 U. S., 403;
34 Law. ed., 222.) A consul is not exempt from criminal prosecution
for violations of the laws of the country where he resides. (U.
S. vs. Ravara, 2 Dall., 297; 1 Law. ed., 388; Wheaton's International
Law [2d ed.], 423.) The substantial question raised in this case is one
of jurisdiction.

1. We find no merit in the contention that Article III, section 2, of the

Constitution of the United States governs this case. We do not deem it
necessary to discuss the question whether the constitutional provision
relied upon by the petitioner extended ex propio vigore over the
Philippines. Suffice it to say that the inauguration of the Philippine
Commonwealth on November 15, 1935, has brought about a
fundamental change in the political and legal status of the Philippines.
On the date mentioned the Constitution of the Philippines went into
full force and effect. This Constitution is the supreme law of the land.
Not only the members of this court but all other officers, legislative,
executive and judicial, of the Government of the Commonwealth, are
bound by oath to support the Constitution. (Article XIII, section 2.)
This court owes its own existence to the great instrument, and derives
all its powers therefrom. In the exercise of its powers and jurisdiction,
this court is bound by the provisions of the Constitution. The
Constitution provides that the original jurisdiction of this court "shall
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
consuls." In deciding the instant case this court cannot go beyond this
constitutional provision.

2. It remains to consider whether the original jurisdiction thus

conferred upon this court by the Constitution over cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, is exclusive. The
Constitution does not define the jurisdiction of this court in specific
terms, but merely provides that "the Supreme Court shall have such
original and appellate jurisdiction as may be possessed and exercised
by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution." It then goes on to provide that the
original jurisdiction of this court "shall include all cases affecting
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls."
In the light of the constitutional provisions above adverted to, the
question arises whether the original jurisdiction possessed and
exercised by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution was exclusive. G.R. No. 142396             February 11, 2003

The original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by the Supreme KHOSROW MINUCHER, petitioner,
Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of the vs.
Constitution was derived from section 17 of Act No. 136, which reads HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARTHUR
as follows: The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue SCALZO, respondents.
writs of mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, habeas corpus, and quo
warranto in the cases and in the manner prescribed in the Code of DECISION
Civil Procedure, and to hear and determine the controversies thus
brought before it, and in other cases provided by law." Jurisdiction to VITUG, J.:
issue writs of quo warranto, certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and
habeas corpus was also conferred on the Courts of First Instance by the
Code of Civil Procedure. (Act No. 190, secs. 197, 217, 222, 226, and Sometime in May 1986, an Information for violation of Section 4 of
525.) It results that the original jurisdiction possessed and exercised by Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise also known as the "Dangerous
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption Drugs Act of 1972," was filed against petitioner Khosrow Minucher
of the Constitution was not exclusive of, but concurrent with, that of and one Abbas Torabian with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 151, of
the Courts of First Instance. Inasmuch as this is the same original Pasig City. The criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation"
jurisdiction vested in this court by the Constitution and made to conducted by the Philippine police narcotic agents in the house of
include all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and Minucher, an Iranian national, where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited
consuls, it follows that the jurisdiction of this court over such cases is drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic agents were
not exclusive. accompanied by private respondent Arthur Scalzo who would, in due
time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution. On 08
January 1988, Presiding Judge Eutropio Migrino rendered a decision
The conclusion we have reached upon this branch of the case finds acquitting the two accused.
support in the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. The Constitution of the United States provides that the
Supreme Court shall have "original jurisdiction" in all cases affecting On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case No. 88-45691 before
ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. In construing this the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 19, of Manila for damages on
constitutional provision, the Supreme Court of the United States held account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug
that the "original jurisdiction thus conferred upon the Supreme Court trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it
by the Constitution was not exclusive jurisdiction, and that such grant had found to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.
of original jurisdiction did not prevent Congress from conferring
original jurisdiction in cases affecting consuls on the subordinate "The testimony of the plaintiff disclosed that he is an Iranian national.
courts of the Union. (U. S. vs. Ravara, supra; Bors vs. Preston, 111 U. He came to the Philippines to study in the University of the Philippines
S., 252; 28 Law. ed., 419.) in 1974. In 1976, under the regime of the Shah of Iran, he was
appointed Labor Attaché for the Iranian Embassies in Tokyo, Japan
3. The laws in force in the Philippines prior to the inauguration of the and Manila, Philippines. When the Shah of Iran was deposed by
Commonwealth conferred upon the Courts of the First Instance Ayatollah Khomeini, plaintiff became a refugee of the United Nations
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases to which a penalty of more and continued to stay in the Philippines. He headed the Iranian
than six months' imprisonment or a fine exceeding one hundred dollars National Resistance Movement in the Philippines.
might be imposed. (Act No. 136, sec. 56.) Such jurisdiction included
the trial of criminal actions brought against consuls for, as we have "He came to know the defendant on May 13, 1986, when the latter was
already indicated, consuls, not being entitled to the privileges and brought to his house and introduced to him by a certain Jose Iñigo, an
immunities of ambassadors or ministers, are subject to the laws and informer of the Intelligence Unit of the military. Jose Iñigo, on the
regulations of the country where they reside. By Article XV, section 2, other hand, was met by plaintiff at the office of Atty. Crisanto Saruca,
of the Constitution, all laws of the Philippine Islands in force at the a lawyer for several Iranians whom plaintiff assisted as head of the
time of the adoption of the Constitution were to continue in force until anti-Khomeini movement in the Philippines.
the inauguration of the Commonwealth; thereafter, they were to
remain operative, unless inconsistent with the Constitution until "During his first meeting with the defendant on May 13, 1986, upon
amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly. the introduction of Jose Iñigo, the defendant expressed his interest in
The original jurisdiction granted to the Courts of First Instance to try buying caviar. As a matter of fact, he bought two kilos of caviar from
criminal cases was not made exclusively by any, law in force prior to plaintiff and paid P10,000.00 for it. Selling caviar, aside from that of
the inauguration of the Commonwealth, and having reached the Persian carpets, pistachio nuts and other Iranian products was his
conclusion that the jurisdiction conferred upon this court by the business after the Khomeini government cut his pension of over
Constitution over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, $3,000.00 per month. During their introduction in that meeting, the
and consuls, is not an exclusive jurisdiction, the laws in force at the defendant gave the plaintiff his calling card, which showed that he is
time of the adoption of the Constitution, granting the Courts of First working at the US Embassy in the Philippines, as a special agent of the
Instance jurisdiction in such cases, are not inconsistent with the Drug Enforcement Administration, Department of Justice, of the
Constitution, and must be deemed to remain operative and in force, United States, and gave his address as US Embassy, Manila. At the
subject to the power of the National Assembly to amend alter, modify, back of the card appears a telephone number in defendant’s own
or repeal the same. (Asiatic P. Co. vs. Insular Collector of Customs, U. handwriting, the number of which he can also be contacted.
S. Supreme Court [Law. ed.], Adv. Ops., vol. 80, No. 12, pp. 620,
623.)
"It was also during this first meeting that plaintiff expressed his desire
to obtain a US Visa for his wife and the wife of a countryman named
We conclude, therefore, that the Court of First Instance of Manila has Abbas Torabian. The defendant told him that he [could] help plaintiff
jurisdiction to try the petitioner, an that the petition for a writ of for a fee of $2,000.00 per visa. Their conversation, however, was more
prohibition must be denied. So ordered. concentrated on politics, carpets and caviar. Thereafter, the defendant
promised to see plaintiff again.

"On May 19, 1986, the defendant called the plaintiff and invited the
latter for dinner at Mario's Restaurant at Makati. He wanted to buy 200
grams of caviar. Plaintiff brought the merchandize but for the reason
that the defendant was not yet there, he requested the restaurant people
to x x x place the same in the refrigerator. Defendant, however, came
and plaintiff gave him the caviar for which he was paid. Then their
conversation was again focused on politics and business.
"On May 26, 1986, defendant visited plaintiff again at the latter's in cases involving the United States government, as well as its
residence for 18 years at Kapitolyo, Pasig. The defendant wanted to agencies and officials, a motion for extension was peculiarly
buy a pair of carpets which plaintiff valued at $27,900.00. After some unavoidable due to the need (1) for both the Department of State and
haggling, they agreed at $24,000.00. For the reason that defendant did the Department of Justice to agree on the defenses to be raised and (2)
not yet have the money, they agreed that defendant would come back to refer the case to a Philippine lawyer who would be expected to first
the next day. The following day, at 1:00 p.m., he came back with his review the case. The court a quo denied the motion for reconsideration
$24,000.00, which he gave to the plaintiff, and the latter, in turn, gave in its order of 15 October 1989.
him the pair of carpets.1awphi1.nét
Scalzo filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, there
"At about 3:00 in the afternoon of May 27, 1986, the defendant came docketed CA-G.R. No. 17023, assailing the denial. In a decision, dated
back again to plaintiff's house and directly proceeded to the latter's 06 October 1989, the appellate court denied the petition and affirmed
bedroom, where the latter and his countryman, Abbas Torabian, were the ruling of the trial court. Scalzo then elevated the incident in a
playing chess. Plaintiff opened his safe in the bedroom and obtained petition for review on certiorari, docketed G.R. No. 91173, to this
$2,000.00 from it, gave it to the defendant for the latter's fee in Court. The petition, however, was denied for its failure to comply with
obtaining a visa for plaintiff's wife. The defendant told him that he SC Circular No. 1-88; in any event, the Court added, Scalzo had failed
would be leaving the Philippines very soon and requested him to come to show that the appellate court was in error in its questioned
out of the house for a while so that he can introduce him to his cousin judgment.
waiting in a cab. Without much ado, and without putting on his shirt as
he was only in his pajama pants, he followed the defendant where he Meanwhile, at the court a quo, an order, dated 09 February 1990, was
saw a parked cab opposite the street. To his complete surprise, an issued (a) declaring Scalzo in default for his failure to file a responsive
American jumped out of the cab with a drawn high-powered gun. He pleading (answer) and (b) setting the case for the reception of
was in the company of about 30 to 40 Filipino soldiers with 6 evidence. On 12 March 1990, Scalzo filed a motion to set aside the
Americans, all armed. He was handcuffed and after about 20 minutes order of default and to admit his answer to the complaint. Granting the
in the street, he was brought inside the house by the defendant. He was motion, the trial court set the case for pre-trial. In his answer, Scalzo
made to sit down while in handcuffs while the defendant was inside denied the material allegations of the complaint and raised the
his bedroom. The defendant came out of the bedroom and out from affirmative defenses (a) of Minucher’s failure to state a cause of action
defendant's attaché case, he took something and placed it on the table in his complaint and (b) that Scalzo had acted in the discharge of his
in front of the plaintiff. They also took plaintiff's wife who was at that official duties as being merely an agent of the Drug Enforcement
time at the boutique near his house and likewise arrested Torabian, Administration of the United States Department of Justice. Scalzo
who was playing chess with him in the bedroom and both were interposed a counterclaim of P100,000.00 to answer for attorneys' fees
handcuffed together. Plaintiff was not told why he was being and expenses of litigation.
handcuffed and why the privacy of his house, especially his bedroom
was invaded by defendant. He was not allowed to use the telephone. In
fact, his telephone was unplugged. He asked for any warrant, but the Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of
defendant told him to `shut up.’ He was nevertheless told that he the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
would be able to call for his lawyer who can defend him. ground that, being a special agent of the United States Drug
Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
He attached to his motion Diplomatic Note No. 414 of the United
"The plaintiff took note of the fact that when the defendant invited him States Embassy, dated 29 May 1990, addressed to the Department of
to come out to meet his cousin, his safe was opened where he kept the Foreign Affairs of the Philippines and a Certification, dated 11 June
$24,000.00 the defendant paid for the carpets and another $8,000.00 1990, of Vice Consul Donna Woodward, certifying that the note is a
which he also placed in the safe together with a bracelet worth true and faithful copy of its original. In an order of 25 June 1990, the
$15,000.00 and a pair of earrings worth $10,000.00. He also trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
discovered missing upon his release his 8 pieces hand-made Persian
carpets, valued at $65,000.00, a painting he bought for P30,000.00
together with his TV and betamax sets. He claimed that when he was On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction
handcuffed, the defendant took his keys from his wallet. There was, with this Court, docketed G.R. No. 94257 and entitled "Arthur W.
therefore, nothing left in his house. Scalzo, Jr., vs. Hon. Wenceslao Polo, et al.," asking that the complaint
in Civil Case No. 88-45691 be ordered dismissed. The case was
referred to the Court of Appeals, there docketed CA-G.R. SP No.
"That his arrest as a heroin trafficker x x x had been well publicized 22505, per this Court’s resolution of 07 August 1990. On 31 October
throughout the world, in various newspapers, particularly in Australia, 1990, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision sustaining the
America, Central Asia and in the Philippines. He was identified in the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the
papers as an international drug trafficker. x x x complaint against him. Minucher filed a petition for review with this
Court, docketed G.R. No. 97765 and entitled "Khosrow Minucher vs.
In fact, the arrest of defendant and Torabian was likewise on the Honorable Court of Appeals, et. al." (cited in 214 SCRA 242),
television, not only in the Philippines, but also in America and in appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals. In a decision, dated
Germany. His friends in said places informed him that they saw him 24 September 1992, penned by Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
on TV with said news. Davide, Jr., this Court reversed the decision of the appellate court and
remanded the case to the lower court for trial. The remand was ordered
"After the arrest made on plaintiff and Torabian, they were brought to on the theses (a) that the Court of Appeals erred in granting the motion
Camp Crame handcuffed together, where they were detained for three to dismiss of Scalzo for lack of jurisdiction over his person without
days without food and water."1 even considering the issue of the authenticity of Diplomatic Note No.
414 and (b) that the complaint contained sufficient allegations to the
effect that Scalzo committed the imputed acts in his personal capacity
During the trial, the law firm of Luna, Sison and Manas, filed a special and outside the scope of his official duties and, absent any evidence to
appearance for Scalzo and moved for extension of time to file an the contrary, the issue on Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity could not be
answer pending a supposed advice from the United States Department taken up.
of State and Department of Justice on the defenses to be raised. The
trial court granted the motion. On 27 October 1988, Scalzo filed
another special appearance to quash the summons on the ground that The Manila RTC thus continued with its hearings on the case. On 17
he, not being a resident of the Philippines and the action being one in November 1995, the trial court reached a decision; it adjudged:
personam, was beyond the processes of the court. The motion was
denied by the court, in its order of 13 December 1988, holding that the "WHEREFORE, and in view of all the foregoing considerations,
filing by Scalzo of a motion for extension of time to file an answer to judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff, who successfully
the complaint was a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of established his claim by sufficient evidence, against the defendant in
summons which could likewise be construed a waiver of the the manner following:
requirement of formal notice. Scalzo filed a motion for reconsideration
of the court order, contending that a motion for an extension of time to "`Adjudging defendant liable to plaintiff in actual and compensatory
file an answer was not a voluntary appearance equivalent to service of damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million;
summons since it did not seek an affirmative relief. Scalzo argued that
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00; attorney's fees in the 7. Exh. '4' - Diplomatic Note No. 414, appended to the 1st Indorsement
sum of P200,000.00 plus costs. (Exh. '3'); and

`The Clerk of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, is ordered to take note 8. Exh. '8' - Letter dated 18 November 1992 from the Office of the
of the lien of the Court on this judgment to answer for the unpaid Protocol, Department of Foreign Affairs, through Asst. Sec.
docket fees considering that the plaintiff in this case instituted this Emmanuel Fernandez, addressed to the Chief Justice of this Court.5
action as a pauper litigant.’"2
The documents, according to Scalzo, would show that: (1) the United
While the trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the States Embassy accordingly advised the Executive Department of the
evidence presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to Philippine Government that Scalzo was a member of the diplomatic
immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held staff of the United States diplomatic mission from his arrival in the
accountable for the acts complained of committed outside his official Philippines on 14 October 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988;
duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the (2) that the United States Government was firm from the very
trial court and sustained the defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently beginning in asserting the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo with respect
clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby to the case pursuant to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on
immune from the criminal and civil jurisdiction of the "Receiving Diplomatic Relations; and (3) that the United States Embassy
State" pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. repeatedly urged the Department of Foreign Affairs to take appropriate
action to inform the trial court of Scalzo’s diplomatic immunity. The
Hence, this recourse by Minucher. The instant petition for review other documentary exhibits were presented to indicate that: (1) the
raises a two-fold issue: (1) whether or not the doctrine of Philippine government itself, through its Executive Department,
conclusiveness of judgment, following the decision rendered by this recognizing and respecting the diplomatic status of Scalzo, formally
Court in G.R. No. 97765, should have precluded the Court of Appeals advised the "Judicial Department" of his diplomatic status and his
from resolving the appeal to it in an entirely different manner, and (2) entitlement to all diplomatic privileges and immunities under the
whether or not Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic Vienna Convention; and (2) the Department of Foreign Affairs itself
immunity. authenticated Diplomatic Note No. 414. Scalzo additionally presented
Exhibits "9" to "13" consisting of his reports of investigation on the
surveillance and subsequent arrest of Minucher, the certification of the
The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment, or its kindred rule of res Drug Enforcement Administration of the United States Department of
judicata, would require 1) the finality of the prior judgment, 2) a valid Justice that Scalzo was a special agent assigned to the Philippines at all
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties on the part of the times relevant to the complaint, and the special power of attorney
court that renders it, 3) a judgment on the merits, and 4) an identity of executed by him in favor of his previous counsel 6 to show (a) that the
the parties, subject matter and causes of action.3 Even while one of the United States Embassy, affirmed by its Vice Consul, acknowledged
issues submitted in G.R. No. 97765 - "whether or not public Scalzo to be a member of the diplomatic staff of the United States
respondent Court of Appeals erred in ruling that private respondent diplomatic mission from his arrival in the Philippines on 14 October
Scalzo is a diplomat immune from civil suit conformably with the 1985 until his departure on 10 August 1988, (b) that, on May 1986,
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" - is also a pivotal with the cooperation of the Philippine law enforcement officials and in
question raised in the instant petition, the ruling in G.R. No. 97765, the exercise of his functions as member of the mission, he investigated
however, has not resolved that point with finality. Indeed, the Court Minucher for alleged trafficking in a prohibited drug, and (c) that the
there has made this observation - Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs itself recognized that Scalzo
during his tour of duty in the Philippines (14 October 1985 up to 10
"It may be mentioned in this regard that private respondent himself, in August 1988) was listed as being an Assistant Attaché of the United
his Pre-trial Brief filed on 13 June 1990, unequivocally states that he States diplomatic mission and accredited with diplomatic status by the
would present documentary evidence consisting of DEA records on his Government of the Philippines. In his Exhibit 12, Scalzo described the
investigation and surveillance of plaintiff and on his position and functions of the overseas office of the United States Drugs
duties as DEA special agent in Manila. Having thus reserved his right Enforcement Agency, i.e., (1) to provide criminal investigative
to present evidence in support of his position, which is the basis for the expertise and assistance to foreign law enforcement agencies on
alleged diplomatic immunity, the barren self-serving claim in the narcotic and drug control programs upon the request of the host
belated motion to dismiss cannot be relied upon for a reasonable, country, 2) to establish and maintain liaison with the host country and
intelligent and fair resolution of the issue of diplomatic immunity."4 counterpart foreign law enforcement officials, and 3) to conduct
complex criminal investigations involving international criminal
Scalzo contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, conspiracies which affect the interests of the United States.
to which the Philippines is a signatory, grants him absolute immunity
from suit, describing his functions as an agent of the United States The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of
Drugs Enforcement Agency as "conducting surveillance operations on centuries-old customary law and, by the time of its ratification on 18
suspected drug dealers in the Philippines believed to be the source of April 1961, its rules of law had long become stable. Among the city
prohibited drugs being shipped to the U.S., (and) having ascertained states of ancient Greece, among the peoples of the Mediterranean
the target, (he then) would inform the Philippine narcotic agents (to) before the establishment of the Roman Empire, and among the states
make the actual arrest." Scalzo has submitted to the trial court a of India, the person of the herald in time of war and the person of the
number of documents - diplomatic envoy in time of peace were universally held
sacrosanct.7 By the end of the 16th century, when the earliest treatises
1. Exh. '2' - Diplomatic Note No. 414 dated 29 May 1990; on diplomatic law were published, the inviolability of ambassadors
was firmly established as a rule of customary international
law.8 Traditionally, the exercise of diplomatic intercourse among states
2. Exh. '1' - Certification of Vice Consul Donna K. Woodward dated was undertaken by the head of state himself, as being the preeminent
11 June 1990; embodiment of the state he represented, and the foreign secretary, the
official usually entrusted with the external affairs of the state. Where a
3. Exh. '5' - Diplomatic Note No. 757 dated 25 October 1991; state would wish to have a more prominent diplomatic presence in the
receiving state, it would then send to the latter a diplomatic mission.
Conformably with the Vienna Convention, the functions of the
4. Exh. '6' - Diplomatic Note No. 791 dated 17 November 1992; and
diplomatic mission involve, by and large, the representation of the
interests of the sending state and promoting friendly relations with the
5. Exh. '7' - Diplomatic Note No. 833 dated 21 October 1988. receiving state.9

6. Exh. '3' - 1st Indorsement of the Hon. Jorge R. Coquia, Legal The Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions to
Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs, dated 27 June 1990 include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of
forwarding Embassy Note No. 414 to the Clerk of Court of RTC state,10 (b) envoys,11 ministers or internuncios accredited to the heads
Manila, Branch 19 (the trial court); of states; and (c) charges d' affairs12 accredited to the ministers of
foreign affairs.13 Comprising the "staff of the (diplomatic) mission" are
the diplomatic staff, the administrative staff and the technical and proper and appropriate recourse. It should not have been overwhelmed
service staff. Only the heads of missions, as well as members of the by the self-serving Diplomatic Note whose belated issuance is even
diplomatic staff, excluding the members of the administrative, suspect and whose authenticity has not yet been proved. The undue
technical and service staff of the mission, are accorded diplomatic haste with which respondent Court yielded to the private respondent's
rank. Even while the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations claim is arbitrary."
provides for immunity to the members of diplomatic missions, it does
so, nevertheless, with an understanding that the same be restrictively A significant document would appear to be Exhibit No. 08, dated 08
applied. Only "diplomatic agents," under the terms of the Convention, November 1992, issued by the Office of Protocol of the Department of
are vested with blanket diplomatic immunity from civil and criminal Foreign Affairs and signed by Emmanuel C. Fernandez, Assistant
suits. The Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of Secretary, certifying that "the records of the Department (would) show
missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus impliedly that Mr. Arthur W. Scalzo, Jr., during his term of office in the
withholding the same privileges from all others. It might bear stressing Philippines (from 14 October 1985 up to 10 August 1988) was listed
that even consuls, who represent their respective states in concerns of as an Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and
commerce and navigation and perform certain administrative and was, therefore, accredited diplomatic status by the Government of the
notarial duties, such as the issuance of passports and visas, Philippines." No certified true copy of such "records," the supposed
authentication of documents, and administration of oaths, do not bases for the belated issuance, was presented in evidence.
ordinarily enjoy the traditional diplomatic immunities and privileges
accorded diplomats, mainly for the reason that they are not charged
with the duty of representing their states in political matters. Indeed, Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a
the main yardstick in ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat prerogative of the executive branch of the government. In World
entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he Health Organization vs. Aquino,15 the Court has recognized that, in
performs duties of diplomatic nature. such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst
apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity,
designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should
Scalzo asserted, particularly in his Exhibits "9" to "13," that he was an behoove the Philippine government, specifically its Department of
Assistant Attaché of the United States diplomatic mission and was Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no
accredited as such by the Philippine Government. An attaché belongs less than compelling, in its post litem motam issuances. It might be
to a category of officers in the diplomatic establishment who may be in recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of
charge of its cultural, press, administrative or financial affairs. There the law of the territorial sovereign or from ensuing legal liability; it is,
could also be a class of attaches belonging to certain ministries or rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. 16 The
departments of the government, other than the foreign ministry or government of the United States itself, which Scalzo claims to be
department, who are detailed by their respective ministries or acting for, has formulated its standards for recognition of a diplomatic
departments with the embassies such as the military, naval, air, agent. The State Department policy is to only concede diplomatic
commercial, agricultural, labor, science, and customs attaches, or the status to a person who possesses an acknowledged diplomatic title and
like. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are "performs duties of diplomatic nature."17 Supplementary criteria for
administratively under him, but their main function is to observe, accreditation are the possession of a valid diplomatic passport or, from
analyze and interpret trends and developments in their respective fields States which do not issue such passports, a diplomatic note formally
in the host country and submit reports to their own ministries or representing the intention to assign the person to diplomatic duties, the
departments in the home government.14 These officials are not holding of a non-immigrant visa, being over twenty-one years of age,
generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they and performing diplomatic functions on an essentially full-time
normally designated as having diplomatic rank. basis.18 Diplomatic missions are requested to provide the most accurate
and descriptive job title to that which currently applies to the duties
In an attempt to prove his diplomatic status, Scalzo presented performed. The Office of the Protocol would then assign each
Diplomatic Notes Nos. 414, 757 and 791, all issued post litem motam, individual to the appropriate functional category.19
respectively, on 29 May 1990, 25 October 1991 and 17 November
1992. The presentation did nothing much to alleviate the Court's initial But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might thus remain
reservations in G.R. No. 97765, viz: contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for
the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to
"While the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, the public conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on
respondent gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur
88-45691 on the basis of an erroneous assumption that simply because Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he
of the diplomatic note, the private respondent is clothed with committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy
diplomatic immunity, thereby divesting the trial court of jurisdiction could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity
over his person. from Suit.

"x x x x x x x x x The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign

state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then
"And now, to the core issue - the alleged diplomatic immunity of the closely identified with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign
private respondent. Setting aside for the moment the issue of from suit20 and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to
authenticity raised by the petitioner and the doubts that surround such attach not just to the person of the head of state, or his representative,
claim, in view of the fact that it took private respondent one (1) year, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. 21 If the
eight (8) months and seventeen (17) days from the time his counsel acts giving rise to a suit are those of a foreign government done by its
filed on 12 September 1988 a Special Appearance and Motion asking foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but
for a first extension of time to file the Answer because the acting in his official capacity, the complaint could be barred by the
Departments of State and Justice of the United States of America were immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing
studying the case for the purpose of determining his defenses, before a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect, suing the state
he could secure the Diplomatic Note from the US Embassy in Manila, itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual
and even granting for the sake of argument that such note is authentic, but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim - par in
the complaint for damages filed by petitioner cannot be peremptorily parem, non habet imperium - that all states are sovereign equals and
dismissed. cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.22 The implication, in broad
terms, is that if the judgment against an official would require the state
itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the award, such as the
"x x x x x x x x x appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages decreed
against him, the suit must be regarded as being against the state itself,
"There is of course the claim of private respondent that the acts although it has not been formally impleaded.23
imputed to him were done in his official capacity. Nothing supports
this self-serving claim other than the so-called Diplomatic Note. x x x. In United States of America vs. Guinto,24 involving officers of the
The public respondent then should have sustained the trial court's United States Air Force and special officers of the Air Force Office of
denial of the motion to dismiss. Verily, it should have been the most Special Investigators charged with the duty of preventing the
distribution, possession and use of prohibited drugs, this Court has later acting as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, and
ruled - then becoming a principal witness in the criminal case against
Minucher, Scalzo hardly can be said to have acted beyond the scope of
"While the doctrine (of state immunity) appears to prohibit only suits his official function or duties.
against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them All told, this Court is constrained to rule that respondent Arthur
in the discharge of their duties. x x x. It cannot for a moment be Scalzo, an agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency
imagined that they were acting in their private or unofficial capacity allowed by the Philippine government to conduct activities in the
when they apprehended and later testified against the complainant. It country to help contain the problem on the drug traffic, is entitled to
follows that for discharging their duties as agents of the United States, the defense of state immunity from suit.
they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal,
which has not given its consent to be sued. x x x As they have acted on WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the petition is DENIED.
behalf of the government, and within the scope of their authority, it is No costs.
that government, and not the petitioners personally, [who were]
responsible for their acts."25
SO ORDERED.
This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. Thus, Shauf vs.
Court of Appeals26 elaborates:

"It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in

his capacity as such for acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights
of the plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director
of the Bureau of Telecommunications, et al., vs. Aligaen, et al. (33
SCRA 368): `Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its
officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not
acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one
whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the
protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of
immunity of the State from suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that
an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director
of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the
State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the
plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of
authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within
the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its
consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state
immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

"x x x x x x x x x

"(T)he doctrine of immunity from suit will not apply and may not be
invoked where the public official is being sued in his private and
personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. The cloak of protection
afforded the officers and agents of the government is removed the
moment they are sued in their individual capacity. This situation
usually arises where the public official acts without authority or in
excess of the powers vested in him. It is a well-settled principle of law
that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for
whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and
in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority and jurisdiction."27

A foreign agent, operating within a territory, can be cloaked with

immunity from suit but only as long as it can be established that he is
acting within the directives of the sending state. The consent of the
host state is an indispensable requirement of basic courtesy between
the two sovereigns. Guinto and Shauf both involve officers and
personnel of the United States, stationed within Philippine territory,
under the RP-US Military Bases Agreement. While evidence is
wanting to show any similar agreement between the governments of
the Philippines and of the United States (for the latter to send its agents
and to conduct surveillance and related activities of suspected drug
dealers in the Philippines), the consent or imprimatur of the Philippine
government to the activities of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency, however, can be gleaned from the facts heretofore elsewhere
mentioned. The official exchanges of communication between
agencies of the government of the two countries, certifications from
officials of both the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs and the
United States Embassy, as well as the participation of members of the
Philippine Narcotics Command in the "buy-bust operation" conducted
at the residence of Minucher at the behest of Scalzo, may be
inadequate to support the "diplomatic status" of the latter but they give
enough indication that the Philippine government has given
its imprimatur, if not consent, to the activities within Philippine
territory of agent Scalzo of the United States Drug Enforcement
Agency. The job description of Scalzo has tasked him to conduct
surveillance on suspected drug suppliers and, after having ascertained
the target, to inform local law enforcers who would then be expected
to make the arrest. In conducting surveillance activities on Minucher,
 falling under paragraph 2 of this article is committed by any member
of the armed forces of the United States.
G.R. No. L-1988             February 24, 1948
(a) While engaged in the actual performance of a specific military
duty, or
JESUS MIQUIABAS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMANDING GENERAL, PHILIPPINE-RYUKYUS (b) during a period of national emergency declared by either
COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY, respondents. Government and the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) so finds from the
evidence, he shall immediately notify the officer holding the offender
in custody that the United States is free to exercise jurisdiction. In the
Lorenzo Sumulong and Esteban P. Garcia for petitioner. event the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) finds that the offense was not
J. A. Wolfson for respondent. committed in the actual performance of a specific military duty, the
offender's commanding officer shall have the right to appeal from such
MORAN, C.J.: finding to the Secretary of Justice within ten days from the receipt of
the decision of the fiscal and the decision of the Secretary of Justice
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Jesus Miquiabas shall be final.
against the Commanding General Philippine-Ryukyus Command,
United States Army, who is alleged to have petitioner under custody 5. In all cases over which the Philippines exercises jurisdiction the
and to have appointed a General Court-Martial to try petitioner in custody of the accused, pending trial and final judgment, shall be
connection with an offense over which the said court has no entrusted without delay to the commanding officer of the nearest base,
jurisdiction. who shall acknowledge in writing that such accused has been delivered
to him for custody pending trial in a competent court of the Philippines
Petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a civilian employee of the United and that he will be held ready to appear and will be produced before
States Army in the Philippines, who has been charged with disposing said court when required by it. The commanding officer shall be
in the Port of Manila Area of things belonging to the United States furnished by the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) with a copy of the
Army, in violation of the 94th Article of War of the United States. He information against the accused upon the filing of the original in the
has been arrested for that reason and a General Court-Martial competent court.
appointed by respondent tried and found him guilty and sentenced him
to 15 years imprisonment. This sentence, however, is not yet final for 6. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions, it is naturally agreed that
it is still subject to review. in time of war the United States shall have the right to exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over any offenses which may be committed by
It may be stated as a rule that the Philippines, being a sovereign nation, members of the armed forces of the United States in the Philippines.
has jurisdiction over all offenses committed within its territory, but it
may, by treaty or by agreement, consent that the United States or any 7. The United States agrees that it will not grant asylum in any of the
other foreign nation, shall exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses bases to any person fleeing from the lawful jurisdiction of the
committed within certain portions of said territory. On March 11, Philippines. Should such person be found in any base, he will be
1947, the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the surrendered on demand to the competent authorities of the Philippines.
United States of America, entered into an agreement concerning
military bases, and Article XIII thereof is as follows: 8. In every case in which jurisdiction over an offense is exercised by
the United States, the offended party may institute a separate civil
JURISDICTION action against the offender in the proper court of the Philippines to
enforce the civil liability which under the laws of the Philippines may
1. The Philippines consents that the United States shall have the right arise from the offense.
to exercise jurisdiction over the following offenses:
Under paragraph 1 (a), the General Court-Martial would have
(a) Any offense committed by any person within any base except jurisdiction over the criminal case against petitioner if the offense had
where the offender and offended parties are both Philippine citizens been committed within a base. Under paragraph 1 (b), if the offense
(not members of the armed forces of the United States on active duty) had been committed outside a base, still the General Court-Martial
or the offense is against the security of the Philippines; would have jurisdiction if the offense had been committed by a
"member of the armed forces of the United States" there being no
question that the offended party in this case is the United States. It is
(b) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the not necessary therefore, to consider whether the offense is against "the
armed forces of the United States in which the offended party is also a security of the United States" under paragraph 1 (c), or whether
member of the armed forces of the United States; and petitioner committed it in "the actual performance of a specific
military duty" or in time of a declared "national emergency" under
(c) Any offense committed outside the bases by any member of the paragraph 4, or whether we are still in a state of war under paragraph
armed forces of the United States against the security of the United 6, for in all these instances the military jurisdiction depends also upon
States. whether the offender is a member of the armed forces of the United
States. We shall then determine in this case (1) whether the offense has
2. The Philippines shall have the right to exercise jurisdiction over all been committed within or without a base, and, in the second instance,
other offenses committed outside the bases by any member of the (2) whether the offender is or is not a member of the armed forces of
armed forces of the United States. the United States.

3. Whenever for special reasons the United States may desire not to As to the first question, Article XXVI of the Agreement provides that
exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraphs 1 and 6 of this "bases are those area named in Annex A and Annex B and such
Article, the officer holding the offender in custody shall so notify the additional areas as may be acquired for military purposes pursuant to
fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province in which the the terms of this Agreement." Among the areas specified in Annexes A
offense has been committed within ten days after his arrest, and in and B, there is none that has reference to the Port Area of Manila
such case the Philippines shall exercise jurisdiction. where the offense has allegedly been committed. On the contrary, it
appears in Annex A that "army communications system" is included,
but with "the deletion of all stations in the Port of Manila Area."
4. Whenever for special reasons the Philippines may desire not to
exercise the jurisdiction reserved to it in paragraph 2 of this Article,
the fiscal (prosecuting attorney) of the city or province where the Paragraph 2 of Article XXI is invoked by respondent. The whole
offense has been committed shall so notify the officer holding the article is as follows:
offender in custody within ten days after his arrest, and in such a case
the United States shall be free to exercise jurisdiction. If any offense TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS
1. It is mutually agreed that the United States shall retain the right to the Philippines. And not because a person is subject to military law
occupy temporary quarters and installations now existing outside the under the Articles of War does he become, for that reason alone, a
bases mentioned in Annex A and Annex B, for such reasonable time, member of the armed forces under the Base Agreement. And even
not exceeding two years, as may be necessary to develop adequate under the Articles of War, the mere fact that a civilian employee is in
facilities within the bases for the United States armed forces. If the service of the United States Army does not make him a member of
circumstances require an extension of time, such a period will be fixed the armed forces of the United States. Otherwise, it would have been
by mutual agreement of the two Governments; but such extension shall necessary for said Article to enumerate civilian employees separately
not apply to the existing temporary quarters and installations within from members of the armed forces of the United States.
the limits of the City of Manila and shall in no case exceed a period of
three years. Respondent maintains that petitioner has no cause of action because
the Secretary of Justice had not notified the officer holding the
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, the Port petitioner in custody whether or not the Philippines desired to retain
of Manila reservation with boundaries as of 1941 will be available for jurisdiction under Article XXI, paragraph 3, of the Military Base
use to the United States armed forces until such time as other Agreement. It is sufficient to state in this connection that in cases like
arrangements can be made for the supply of the bases by mutual the present where the offender is a civilian employee and not a
agreement of the two Governments. member of the Unites States armed forces, no waiver can be made
either by the prosecuting attorney of by the Secretary of Justice, under
3. The terms of this agreement pertaining to bases shall be applicable paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article XIII in connection with paragraph 3 of
to temporary quarters and installations referred to in paragraph 1 of Article XXI, of the Agreement.
this article while they are so occupied by the armed forces of the
United States; provided, that offenses committed within the temporary We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the General Court-
quarters and installations located within the present limits of the City Martial appointed by respondent has no jurisdiction to try petitioner
of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within the bases but shall for the offense allegedly committed by him and, consequently, the
be governed by the provisions of Article XIII, paragraphs 2 and 4, judgment rendered by said court sentencing the petitioner to 15 years'
except that the election not to exercise the jurisdiction reserved to the imprisonment is null and void for lack of jurisdiction.
Philippines shall be made by the Secretary of Justice. It is agreed that
the United States shall have full use and full control of all these It is ordered that petitioner be released immediately by respondent
quarters and installations while they are occupied by the armed forces without prejudice to any criminal action which may be instituted in the
of the United States, including the exercise of such measures as may proper court of the Philippines.
be necessary to police said quarters for the security of the personnel
and property therein.
Let a copy of this decision be sent immediately to the Honorable,
Secretary of Justice.
The subject matter of this article, as indicated by its heading, is
"Temporary Installations." Paragraph 1 refers to temporary quarters
and installations existing outside the bases specified in Annex A and
Annex B, which may be retained by the United States armed forces for
such reasonable time as may be necessary not exceeding two years in
duration, extendible fro not more than three years, the extension not
being applicable to existing temporary quarters and installations within
the limits of the City of Manila.

Paragraph 2, of Article XXI, refers to the Port of Manila Reservation,

which will be available for use to the United States armed forces, also
as a temporary quarters and installations, its temporariness not being
for a definite period of time, but "until such time as other arrangements
can be made for supply of the bases by mutual agreement of the two
Governments." There is in paragraph 2 absolutely nothing that may be
construed as placing the Port of Manila Reservation in the category of
a permanent base.

Paragraph 3, of Article XXI, provides "that offenses committed within

the temporary quarters and installations located within the present
limits of the City of Manila shall not be considered as offenses within
the bases but shall be governed by the provisions of Article XIII,
paragraphs 2 and 4." Therefore, the offense at bar cannot be
considered as committed within, but without, a base, since it has been
committed in the Port of Manila Area, which is not one of the bases
mentioned in Annexes A and B to the Agreement, and is merely
temporary quarters located within the present limits of the City of
Manila.

The next inquiry is whether or not the offender may be considered as a

member of the armed forces of the United States under Article XIII,
paragraph 1 (b). As above stated, petitioner is a Filipino citizen and a
civilian employee of the United States Army in the Philippines. Under
the terms of the Agreement, a civilian employee cannot be considered
as a member of the armed forces of the United States. Articles XI, XVI
and XVIII of the Agreement make mention of civilian employees
separately from members of the armed forces of the United States,
which is a conclusive indication that under said Agreement armed
forces do not include civilian employees.

Respondent invokes Articles II of the Articles of War of the United

States, which enumerates, among the persons subject to military law,
persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States.
But this case should be decided not under the Articles of War, but
under the terms of the Base Agreement between the United States and
 within the Philippine Islands, shall provide suitable means for securing
such animals while in transit so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary
suffering to the animals, and suitable and proper facilities for loading
G.R. No. L-5270             January 15, 1910 and unloading cattle or other animals upon or from vessels upon which
they are transported, without cruelty or unnecessary suffering. It is
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, hereby made unlawful to load or unload cattle upon or from vessels by
vs. swinging them over the side by means of ropes or chains attached to
H. N. BULL, defendant-appellant. the thorns.

Bruce & Lawrence, for appellant. Section 3 of Act No. 55 provides that —
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.
Any owner or master of a vessel, or custodian of such animals, who
ELLIOTT, J.: knowingly and willfully fails to comply with the provisions of section
one, shall, for every such failure, be liable to pay a penalty of not less
The appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of a that one hundred dollars nor more that five hundred dollars, United
violation of section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act States money, for each offense. Prosecution under this Act may be
No. 275, and from the judgment entered thereon appealed to this court, instituted in any Court of First Instance or any provost court organized
where under proper assignments of error he contends: (1) that the in the province or port in which such animals are disembarked.
complaint does not state facts sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the
court; (2) that under the evidence the trial court was without 1. It is contended that the information is insufficient because it does
jurisdiction to hear and determine the case; (3) that Act No. 55 as not state that the court was sitting at a port where the cattle were
amended is in violation of certain provisions of the Constitution of the disembarked, or that the offense was committed on board a vessel
United States, and void as applied to the facts of this case; and (4) that registered and licensed under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
Act No. 55 confers jurisdiction over the offense created thereby on
The information alleges: Courts of First Instance or any provost court organized in the province
or port in which such animals are disembarked, and there is nothing
That on and for many months prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, inconsistent therewith in Act No. 136, which provides generally for the
the said H. N. Bull was then and there master of a steam sailing vessel organization of the courts of the Philippine Islands. Act No. 400
known as the steamship Standard, which vessel was then and there merely extends the general jurisdiction of the courts over certain
engaged in carrying and transporting cattle, carabaos, and other offenses committed on the high seas, or beyond the jurisdiction of any
animals from a foreign port and city of Manila, Philippine Islands; that country, or within any of the waters of the Philippine Islands on board
the said accused H. N. Bull, while master of said vessel, as aforesaid, a ship or water craft of any kind registered or licensed in the Philippine
on or about the 2d day of December, 1908, did then and there Islands, in accordance with the laws thereof. (U.S. vs. Fowler, 1 Phil.
willfully, unlawfully, and wrongly carry, transport, and bring into the Rep., 614.) This jurisdiction may be exercised by the Court of First
port and city of Manila, aboard said vessel, from the port of Ampieng, Instance in any province into which such ship or water upon which the
Formosa, six hundred and seventy-seven (677) head of cattle and offense or crime was committed shall come after the commission
carabaos, without providing suitable means for securing said animals thereof. Had this offense been committed upon a ship carrying a
while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the Philippine registry, there could have been no doubt of the Jurisdiction
said animals, in this, to wit, that the said H. N. Bull, master, as of the court, because it is expressly conferred, and the Act is in
aforesaid, did then and there fail to provide stalls for said animals so in accordance with well recognized and established public law. But
transit and suitable means for trying and securing said animals in a the Standard was a Norwegian vessel, and it is conceded that it was
proper manner, and did then and there cause some of said animals to not registered or licensed in the Philippine Islands under the laws
be tied by means of rings passed through their noses, and allow and thereof. We have then the question whether the court had jurisdiction
permit others to be transported loose in the hold and on the deck of over an offense of this character, committed on board a foreign ship by
said vessel without being tied or secured in stalls, and all without the master thereof, when the neglect and omission which constitutes
bedding; that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and failure of the the offense continued during the time the ship was within the territorial
accused to provide suitable means for securing said animals while so waters of the United States. No court of the Philippine Islands had
in transit, the noses of some of said animals were cruelly torn, and jurisdiction over an offenses or crime committed on the high seas or
many of said animals were tossed about upon the decks and hold of within the territorial waters of any other country, but when she came
said vessel, and cruelly wounded, bruised, and killed. within 3 miles of a line drawn from the headlines which embrace the
entrance to Manila Bay, she was within territorial waters, and a new
set of principles became applicable. (Wheaton, Int. Law (Dana ed.), p.
All contrary to the provisions of Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the 255, note 105; Bonfils, Le Droit Int., sec 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer
Philippine Commission. Ter., ch. 1.) The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction
of the territorial sovereign subject through the proper political agency.
Section 1 of Act No. 55, which went into effect January 1, 1901, This offense was committed within territorial waters. From the line
provides that — which determines these waters the Standard must have traveled at least
25 miles before she came to anchor. During that part of her voyage the
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or violation of the statue continued, and as far as the jurisdiction of the
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals, from one port in the court is concerned, it is immaterial that the same conditions may have
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port existed while the vessel was on the high seas. The offense, assuming
within the Philippine Islands, shall carry with them, upon the vessels that it originated at the port of departure in Formosa, was a continuing
carrying such animals, sufficient forage and fresh water to provide for one, and every element necessary to constitute it existed during the
the suitable sustenance of such animals during the ordinary period voyage across the territorial waters. The completed forbidden act was
occupied by the vessel in passage from the port of shipment to the port done within American waters, and the court therefore had jurisdiction
of debarkation, and shall cause such animals to be provided with over the subject-matter of the offense and the person of the offender.
adequate forage and fresh water at least once in every twenty-four
hours from the time that the animals are embarked to the time of their The offense then was thus committed within the territorial jurisdiction
final debarkation. of the court, but the objection to the jurisdiction raises the further
question whether that jurisdiction is restricted by the fact of the
By Act No. 275, enacted October 23, 1901, Act No. 55 was amended nationality of the ship. Every. Every state has complete control and
by adding to section 1 thereof the following: jurisdiction over its territorial waters. According to strict legal right,
even public vessels may not enter the ports of a friendly power without
permission, but it is now conceded that in the absence of a prohibition
The owners or masters of steam, sailing, or other vessels, carrying or such ports are considered as open to the public ship of all friendly
transporting cattle, sheep, swine, or other animals from one port in the powers. The exemption of such vessels from local jurisdiction while
Philippine Islands to another, or from any foreign port to any port within such waters was not established until within comparatively
recent times. In 1794, Attorney-General Bradford, and in 1796 country "The right to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differences
Attorney-General Lee, rendered opinions to the effect that "the laws of as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels belonging
nations invest the commander of a foreign ship of war with no to the nation whose interests are committed to their charge, without the
exemption from the jurisdiction of the country into which he comes." interference of the local authorities, unless the conduct of the crews or
(1, Op. U.S. Attys. Gen., 46, 87.) This theory was also supported by of the captains should disturb the order or tranquillity of the country."
Lord Stowell in an opinion given by him to the British Government as (Comp. of Treaties in Force, 1904, p. 754.) This exception applies to
late as 1820. In the leading case of the Schooner Exchange controversies between the members of the ship's company, and
vs. McFadden (7 Cranch (U.S.), 116, 144), Chief Justice Marshall said particularly to disputes regarding wages. (2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., sec.
that the implied license under which such vessels enter a friendly port 206, p. 318; Tellefsen vs. Fee, 168 Mass., 188.) The order and
may reasonably be construed as "containing exemption from the tranquillity of the country are affected by many events which do not
jurisdiction of the sovereign within whose territory she claims the amount to a riot or general public disturbance. Thus an assault by one
rights of hospitality." The principle was accepted by the Geneva member of the crew upon another, committed upon the ship, of which
Arbitration Tribunal, which announced that "the priviledge of the public may have no knowledge whatever, is not by this treaty
exterritoriality accorded to vessels of war has been admitted in the law withdrawn from the cognizance of the local authorities.
of nations; not as an absolute right, but solely as a proceeding founded
on the principle of courtesy and mutual deference between nations." In 1876 the mates of the Swedish bark Frederike and
(2 Moore, Int. Law Dig., secs. 252 and 254; Hall, Int. Law, sec. 55; Carolina engaged in a "quarrel" on board the vessel in the port of
Taylor, Int. Law, sec. 256; Ortolan, Dip de la Mer, 2. C.X.) Galveston, Texas. They were prosecuted before a justice of the peace,
but the United States district attorney was instructed by the
Such vessels are therefore permitted during times of peace to come Government to take the necessary steps to have the proceedings
and go freely. Local official exercise but little control over their dismissed, and the aid of the governor of Texas was invoked with the
actions, and offenses committed by their crew are justiciable by their view to "guard against a repetition of similar proceedings." (Mr. Fish,
own officers acting under the laws to which they primarily owe Secretary of State, to Mr. Grip, Swedish and Norwegian charged, May
allegiance. This limitation upon the general principle of territorial 16, 1876; Moore, Int. Law Dig.) It does not appear that this "quarrel"
sovereignty is based entirely upon comity and convenience, and finds was of such a nature as to amount to a breach of the criminal laws of
its justification in the fact that experience shows that such vessels are Texas, but when in 1879 the mate for the Norwegian bark Livingston
generally careful to respect local laws and regulation which are was prosecuted in the courts of Philadelphia County for an assault and
essential to the health, order, and well-being of the port. But comity battery committed on board the ship while lying in the port of
and convenience does not require the extension of the same degree of Philadelphia, it was held that there was nothing in the treaty which
exemption to merchant vessels. There are two well-defined theories as deprived the local courts of jurisdiction.
to extent of the immunities ordinarily granted to them, According to (Commonwealth vs. Luckness, 14 Phila. (Pa.), 363.) Representations
the French theory and practice, matters happening on board a merchant were made through diplomatic channels to the State Department, and
ship which do not concern the tranquillity of the port or persons on July 30, 1880, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State, wrote to Count
foreign to the crew, are justiciable only by the court of the country to Lewenhaupt, the Swedish and Norwegian minister, as follows:
which the vessel belongs. The French courts therefore claim exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes committed on board French merchant vessels I have the honor to state that I have given the matter careful
in foreign ports by one member of the crew against another. (See consideration in connection with the views and suggestion of your note
Bonfils, Le Droit Int. (quat. ed.), secs. 624-628; Martens, Le Droit Int., and the provisions of the thirteenth article of the treaty of 1827
tome 2, pp. 338, 339; Ortolan, Dip. de la Mer, tit. 1, p. 292; Masse, between the United States and Sweden and Norway. The stipulations
Droit Int., tome 2, p. 63.) Such jurisdiction has never been admitted or contained in the last clause of that article . . . are those under which it
claim by Great Britain as a right, although she has frequently conceded is contended by you that jurisdiction is conferred on the consular
it by treaties. (Halleck, Int. Law (Baker's ed.), vol. 1, 231; British officers, not only in regard to such differences of a civil nature
Territorial Waters Act, 1878.) Writers who consider exterritoriality as growing out of the contract of engagement of the seamen, but also as
a fact instead of a theory have sought to restrict local jurisdiction, but to disposing of controversies resulting from personal violence
Hall, who is doubtless the leading English authority, says that — involving offense for which the party may be held amenable under the
local criminal law.
It is admitted by the most thoroughgoing asserters of the territoriality
of merchant vessels that so soon as the latter enter the ports of a This Government does not view the article in question as susceptible
foreign state they become subject to the local jurisdiction on all points of such broad interpretation. The jurisdiction conferred upon the
in which the interests of the country are touched. (Hall, Int. Law, p. consuls is conceived to be limited to their right to sit as judges or
263.) abitrators in such differences as may arise between captains and crews
of the vessels, where such differences do not involve on the part of the
The United States has adhered consistently to the view that when a captain or crew a disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the
merchant vessel enters a foreign port it is subject to the jurisdiction of country. When, however, a complaint is made to a local magistrate,
the local authorities, unless the local sovereignty has by act of either by the captain or one or more of the crew of the vessel,
acquiescence or through treaty arrangements consented to waive a involving the disturbance of the order or tranquillity of the country, it
portion of such jurisdiction. (15 Op. Attys. Gen., U. S., 178; 2 Moore, is competent for such magistrate to take cognizance of the matter in
Int. Law Dig., sec. 204; article by Dean Gregory, Mich. Law Review, furtherance of the local laws, and under such circumstances in the
Vol. II, No. 5.) Chief Justice Marshall, in the case of the Exchange, United States it becomes a public duty which the judge or magistrate is
said that — not at liberty voluntarily to forego. In all such cases it must necessarily
be left to the local judicial authorities whether the procedure shall take
When merchant vessels enter for the purpose of trade, in would be place in the United States or in Sweden to determine if in fact there
obviously in convinient and dangerous to society and would subject had been such disturbance of the local order and tranquillity, and if the
the laws to continual infraction and the government to degradation if complaint is supported by such proof as results in the conviction of the
such individual merchants did not owe temporary and local allegiance, party accused, to visit upon the offenders such punishment as may be
and were not amendable to the jurisdiction of the country. defined against the offense by the municipal law of the place." (Moore,
Int. Law Dig., vol. 2, p. 315.)
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently said that the
merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the The treaty does not therefore deprive the local courts of jurisdiction
purpose of trade, subject themselves to the laws which govern the over offenses committed on board a merchant vessel by one member
ports they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in of the crew against another which amount to a disturbance of the order
peace, unless otherwise provided by treaty. (U. S. vs. Diekelman, 92 or tranquillity of the country, and a fair and reasonable construction of
U. S., 520-525.) the language requires un to hold that any violation of criminal laws
disturbs the order or traquillity of the country. The offense with which
the appellant is charged had nothing to so with any difference between
Certain limitations upon the jurisdiction of the local courts are the captain and the crew. It was a violation by the master of the
imposed by article 13 of the treaty of commerce and navigation criminal law of the country into whose port he came. We thus find that
between Sweden and Norway and the United States, of July 4, 1827, neither by reason of the nationality of the vessel, the place of the
which concedes to the consul, vice-consuls, or consular agents of each
commission of the offense, or the prohibitions of any treaty or general 2. The appellant's arguments against the constitutionality of Act No.
principle of public law, are the court of the Philippine Islands deprived 55 and the amendment thereto seems to rest upon a fundamentally
of jurisdiction over the offense charged in the information in this case. erroneous conception of the constitutional law of these Islands. The
statute penalizes acts and ommissions incidental to the transportation
It is further contended that the complaint is defective because it does of live stock between foreign ports and ports of the Philippine Islands,
not allege that the animals were disembarked at the port of Manila, an and had a similar statute regulating commerce with its ports been
allegation which it is claimed is essential to the jurisdiction of the enacted by the legislature of one of the States of the Union, it would
court sitting at that port. To hold with the appellant upon this issue doubtless have been in violation of Article I, section 3, of the
would be to construe the language of the complaint very strictly Constitution of the United States. (Stubbs vs. People (Colo.), 11 L. R.
against the Government. The disembarkation of the animals is not A., N. S., 1071.)
necessary in order to constitute the completed offense, and a
reasonable construction of the language of the statute confers But the Philippine Islands is not a State, and its relation to the United
jurisdiction upon the court sitting at the port into which the animals are States is controlled by constitutional principles different from those
bought. They are then within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, which apply to States of the Union. The importance of the question
and the mere fact of their disembarkation is immaterial so far as thus presented requires a statement of the principles which govern
jurisdiction is concerned. This might be different if the disembarkation those relations, and consideration of the nature and extent of the
of the animals constituted a constitutional element in the offense, but it legislative power of the Philippine Commission and the Legislature of
does not. the Philippines. After much discussion and considerable diversity of
opinion certain applicable constitutional doctrines are established.
It is also contended that the information is insufficient because it fails
to allege that the defendant knowingly and willfully failed to provide The Constitution confers upon the United States the express power to
suitable means for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid make war and treaties, and it has the power possessed by all nations to
cruelty and unnecessary suffering. The allegation of the complaint that acquire territory by conquest or treaty. Territory thus acquired belongs
the act was committed willfully includes the allegation that it was to the United States, and to guard against the possibility of the power
committed knowingly. As said in Woodhouse vs. Rio Grande R.R. of Congress to provide for its government being questioned, the
Company (67 Texas, 416), "the word 'willfully' carries the idea, when framers of the Constitution provided in express terms that Congress
used in connection with an act forbidden by law, that the act must be should have the power "to dispose of and make all needful rules and
done knowingly or intentionally; that, with knowledge, the will regulations respecting territory and other property belonging to the
consented to, designed, and directed the act." So in Wong vs. City of United States." (Art. IV, sec. 3, par. 3.) Upon the acquisition of the
Astoria (13 Oregon, 538), it was said: "The first one is that the territory by the United States, and until it is formally incorporated into
complaint did not show, in the words of the ordinance, that the the Union, the duty of providing a government therefor devolves upon
appellant 'knowingly' did the act complained of. This point, I think, Congress. It may govern the territory by its direct acts, or it may create
was fully answered by the respondent's counsel — that the words a local government, and delegate thereto the ordinary powers required
'willfully' and 'knowingly' conveyed the same meaning. To 'willfully' for local government. (Binns vs. U. S., 194 U. S., 486.) This has been
do an act implies that it was done by design — done for a certain the usual procedure. Congress has provided such governments for
purpose; and I think that it would necessarily follow that it was territories which were within the Union, and for newly acquired
'knowingly' done." To the same effect is Johnson vs. The People (94 territory not yet incorporated therein. It has been customary to
Ill., 505), which seems to be on all fours with the present case. organize a government with the ordinary separation of powers into
executive, legislative, and judicial, and to prescribe in an organic act
The evidence shows not only that the defendant's acts were knowingly certain general conditions in accordance with which the local
done, but his defense rests upon the assertion that "according to his government should act. The organic act thus became the constitution
experience, the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks and in of the government of the territory which had not been formally
the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of the incorporated into the Union, and the validity of legislation enacted by
animals." It was conclusively proven that what was done was done the local legislature was determined by its conformity with the
knowingly and intentionally. requirements of such organic act. (National Bank vs. Yankton, 11 Otto
(U. S.), 129.) To the legislative body of the local government Congress
has delegated that portion of legislative power which in its wisdom it
In charging an offense under section 6 of General Orders, No. 58, deemed necessary for the government of the territory, reserving,
paragraph 3, it is only necessary to state the act or omission however, the right to annul the action of the local legislature and itself
complained of as constituting a crime or public offense in ordinary and legislate directly for the territory. This power has been exercised
concise language, without repitition. It need not necessarily be in the during the entire period of the history of the United States. The right of
words of the statute, but it must be in such form as to enable a person Congress to delegate such legislative power can no longer be seriously
of common understanding to know what is intended and the court to questioned. (Dorr vs. U. S., 195 U. S., 138; U. S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.
pronounce judgment according to right. A complaint which complies S., 370, 385.)
with this requirement is good. (U.S. vs. Sarabia, 4 Phil. Rep., 556.)
The Constitution of the United States does not by its own force operate
The Act, which is in the English language, impose upon the master of within such territory, although the liberality of Congress in legislating
a vessel the duty to "provide suitable means for securing such animals the Constitution into contiguous territory tended to create an
while in transit, so as to avoid all cruelty and unnecessary suffering to impression upon the minds of many people that it went there by its
the animals." The allegation of the complaint as it reads in English is own force. (Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 289.) In legislating with
that the defendant willfully, unlawfully, and wrongfully carried the reference to this territory, the power of Congress is limited only by
cattle "without providing suitable means for securing said animals those prohibitions of the Constitution which go to the very root of its
while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and unnecessary suffering to the power to act at all, irrespective of time or place. In all other respects it
said animals in this . . . that by reason of the aforesaid neglect and is plenary. (De Lima vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 1; Downes vs. Bidwell,
failure of the accused to provide suitable means for securing said 182 U. S., 244; Hawaii vs. Mankichi, 190 U. S., 197; Dorr vs. U. S.,
animals were cruelty torn, and many of said animals were tossed about 195 U. S., 138; Rassmussen vs. U. S., 197 U. S., 516.)
upon the decks and hold of said vessels, and cruelty wounded, bruised,
and killed."
This power has been exercised by Congress throughout the whole
history of the United States, and legislation founded on the theory was
The appellant contends that the language of the Spanish text of the enacted long prior to the acquisition of the present Insular possessions.
information does not charge him with failure to provide "sufficient" Section 1891 of the Revised Statutes of 1878 provides that "The
and "adequate" means. The words used are "medios suficientes" and Constitution and all laws of the United States which are not locally
"medios adecuados." In view of the fact that the original complaint inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within all the
was prepared in English, and that the word "suitable" is translatable by organized territories, and in every Territory hereafter organized, as
the words "adecuado," "suficiente," and "conveniente," according to elsewhere within the United States." When Congress organized a civil
the context and circumstances, we determine this point against the government for the Philippines, it expressly provided that this section
appellant, particularly in view of the fact that the objection was not of the Revised Statutes should not apply to the Philippine Islands.
made in the court below, and that the evidence clearly shows a failure (Sec. 1, Act of 1902.)
to provide "suitable means for the protection of the animals."
In providing for the government of the territory which was acquired by compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself; that the
the United States as a result of the war with Spain, the executive and right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
legislative authorities have consistently proceeded in conformity with be violated; that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist
the principles above state. The city of Manila was surrendered to the except as a punishment for crime; that no bill of attainder or ex post
United States on August 13, 1898, and the military commander was facto law shall be passed; that no law shall be passed abridging the
directed to hold the city, bay, and harbor, pending the conclusion of a freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to
peace which should determine the control, disposition, and peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of
government of the Islands. The duty then devolved upon the American grievances; that no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
authorities to preserve peace and protect person and property within religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and that the free
the occupied territory. Provision therefor was made by proper orders, exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship without
and on August 26 General Merritt assumed the duties of military discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed."
governor. The treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898. On the
22d of December, 1898, the President announced that the destruction To prevent any question as to the legality of these proceedings being
of the Spanish fleet and the surrender of the city had practically raised, the Spooner amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill passed
effected the conquest of the Philippine Islands and the suspension of March 2, 1901, provided that "all military, civil, and judicial powers
the Spanish sovereignty therein, and that by the treaty of peace the necessary to govern the Philippine Islands . . . shall until otherwise
future control, disposition, and government of the Islands had been provided by Congress be vested in such person and persons, and shall
ceded to the United States. During the periods of strict military be exercised in such manner, as the President of the United States shall
occupation, before the treaty of peace was ratified, and the interim direct, for the establishment of civil government, and for maintaining
thereafter, until Congress acted (Santiago vs. Noueral, 214 U.S., 260), and protecting the inhabitants of said Islands in the free enjoyment of
the territory was governed under the military authority of the President their liberty, property, and religion." Thereafter, on July 4, 1901, the
as commander in chief. Long before Congress took any action, the authority, which had been exercised previously by the military
President organized a civil government which, however, had its legal governor, was transferred to that official. The government thus created
justification, like the purely military government which it gradually by virtue of the authority of the President as Commander in Chief of
superseded, in the war power. The military power of the President the Army and Navy continued to administer the affairs of the Islands
embraced legislative, executive personally, or through such military or under the direction of the President until by the Act of July 1, 1902,
civil agents as he chose to select. As stated by Secretary Root in his Congress assumed control of the situation by the enactment of a law
report for 1901 — which, in connection with the instructions of April 7, 1900, constitutes
the organic law of the Philippine Islands.
The military power in exercise in a territory under military occupation
includes executive, legislative, and judicial authority. It not The Act of July 1, 1902, made no substancial changes in the form of
infrequently happens that in a single order of a military commander government which the President had erected. Congress adopted the
can be found the exercise of all three of these different powers — the system which was in operation, and approved the action of the
exercise of the legislative powers by provisions prescribing a rule of President in organizing the government. Substantially all the
action; of judicial power by determination of right; and the executive limitations which had been imposed on the legislative power by the
power by the enforcement of the rules prescribed and the rights President's instructions were included in the law, Congress thus
determined. extending to the Islands by legislative act nor the Constitution, but all
its provisions for the protection of the rights and privileges of
President McKinley desired to transform military into civil individuals which were appropriate under the conditions. The action of
government as rapidly as conditions would permit. After full the President in creating the Commission with designated powers of
investigation, the organization of civil government was initiated by the government, in creating the office of the Governor-General and Vice-
appointment of a commission to which civil authority was to be Governor-General, and through the Commission establishing certain
gradually transferred. On September 1, 1900, the authority to exercise, executive departments, was expressly approved and ratified.
subject to the approval of the President. "that part of the military Subsequently the action of the President in imposing a tariff before
power of the President in the Philippine Islands which is legislative in and after the ratification of the treaty of peace was also ratified and
its character" was transferred from the military government to the approved by Congress. (Act of March 8, 1902; Act of July 1, 1902;
Commission, to be exercised under such rules and regulations as U.S. vs. Heinszen, 206 U.S., 370; Lincoln vs. U.S., 197 U.S., 419.)
should be prescribed by the Secretary of War, until such time as Until otherwise provided by law the Islands were to continue to be
complete civil government should be established, or congress governed "as thereby and herein provided." In the future the enacting
otherwise provided. The legislative power thus conferred upon the clause of all statutes should read "By authority of the United States"
Commission was declared to include "the making of rules and orders instead of "By the authority of the President." In the course of time the
having the effect of law for the raising of revenue by taxes, customs legislative authority of the Commission in all parts of the Islands not
duties, and imposts; the appropriation and expenditure of public funds inhabited by Moros or non-Christian tribes was to be transferred to a
of the Islands; the establishment of an educational system to secure an legislature consisting of two houses — the Philippine Commission and
efficient civil service; the organization and establishment of courts; the the Philippine Assembly. The government of the Islands was thus
organization and establishment of municipal and departmental assumed by Congress under its power to govern newly acquired
government, and all other matters of a civil nature which the military territory not incorporated into the United States.
governor is now competent to provide by rules or orders of a
legislative character." This grant of legislative power to the This Government of the Philippine Islands is not a State or a Territory,
Commission was to be exercised in conformity with certain declared although its form and organization somewhat resembles that of both. It
general principles, and subject to certain specific restrictions for the stands outside of the constitutional relation which unites the States and
protection of individual rights. The Commission were to bear in mind Territories into the Union. The authority for its creation and
that the government to be instituted was "not for our satisfaction or for maintenance is derived from the Constitution of the United States,
the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, which, however, operates on the President and Congress, and not
and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Island, and the measures directly on the Philippine Government. It is the creation of the United
adopted should be made to conforms to their customs, their habits, and States, acting through the President and Congress, both deriving power
even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the from the same source, but from different parts thereof. For its powers
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective and the limitations thereon the Government of the Philippines looked
government." The specific restrictions upon legislative power were to the orders of the President before Congress acted and the Acts of
found in the declarations that "no person shall be deprived of life, Congress after it assumed control. Its organic laws are derived from
liberty, or property without due process of law; that private property the formally and legally expressed will of the President and Congress,
shall not be taken for public use without just compensation; that in all instead of the popular sovereign constituency which lies upon any
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and subject relating to the Philippines is primarily in Congress, and when it
public trial, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, exercise such power its act is from the viewpoint of the Philippines the
to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory legal equivalent of an amendment of a constitution in the United
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance States.
of counsel for his defense; that excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted;
that no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense or be
Within the limits of its authority the Government of the Philippines is the laws of Congress. They are valid acts of the Government of the
a complete governmental organism with executive, legislative, and Philippine Islands until annulled. (Miners Bank vs. Iowa, 12 How. (U.
judicial departments exercising the functions commonly assigned to S.), 1.)
such departments. The separation of powers is as complete as in most
governments. In neither Federal nor State governments is this In order to determine the validity of Act No. 55 we must then ascertain
separation such as is implied in the abstract statement of the doctrine. whether the Legislature has been expressly or implication forbidden to
For instance, in the Federal Government the Senate exercises enact it. Section 3, Article IV, of the Constitution of the United States
executive powers, and the President to some extent controls legislation operated only upon the States of the Union. It has no application to the
through the veto power. In a State the veto power enables him to Government of the Philippine Islands. The power to regulate foreign
exercise much control over legislation. The Governor-General, the commerce is vested in Congress, and by virtue of its power to govern
head of the executive department in the Philippine Government, is a the territory belonging to the United States, it may regulate foreign
member of the Philippine Commission, but as executive he has no veto commerce with such territory. It may do this directly, or indirectly
power. The President and Congress framed the government on the through a legislative body created by it, to which its power in this
model with which Americans are familiar, and which has proven best respect if delegate. Congress has by direct legislation determined the
adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection duties which shall be paid upon goods imported into the Philippines,
of individual rights and priviliges. and it has expressly authorized the Government of the Philippines to
provide for the needs of commerce by improving harbors and
In instituting this form of government of intention must have been to navigable waters. A few other specific provisions relating to foreign
adopt the general constitutional doctrined which are inherent in the commerce may be found in the Acts of Congress, but its general
system. Hence, under it the Legislature must enact laws subject to the regulation is left to the Government of the Philippines, subject to the
limitations of the organic laws, as Congress must act under the reserved power of Congress to annul such legislation as does not meet
national Constitution, and the States under the national and state with its approval. The express limitations upon the power of the
constitutions. The executive must execute such laws as are Commission and Legislature to legislate do not affect the authority
constitutionally enacted. The judiciary, as in all governments operating with respect to the regulation of commerce with foreign countries. Act
under written constitutions, must determine the validity of legislative No. 55 was enacted before Congress took over the control of the
enactments, as well as the legality of all private and official acts. In Islands, and this act was amended by Act No. 275 after the Spooner
performing these functions it acts with the same independence as the amendment of March 2, 1901, was passed. The military government,
Federal and State judiciaries in the United States. Under no other and the civil government instituted by the President, had the power,
constitutional theory could there be that government of laws and not of whether it be called legislative or administrative, to regulate commerce
men which is essential for the protection of rights under a free and between foreign nations and the ports of the territory.
orderly government. (Cross vs. Harrison, 16 How. (U.S.), 164, 190; Hamilton vs. Dillin, 21
Wall. (U.S.), 73, 87.) This Act has remained in force since its
Such being the constitutional theory of the Government of the enactment without annulment or other action by Congress, and must
Philippine Islands, it is apparent that the courts must consider the be presumed to have met with its approval. We are therefore satisfied
question of the validity of an act of the Philippine Commission or the that the Commission had, and the Legislature now has, full
Philippine Legislature, as a State court considers an act of the State constitutional power to enact laws for the regulation of commerce
legislature. The Federal Government exercises such powers only as are between foreign countries and the ports of the Philippine Islands, and
expressly or impliedly granted to it by the Constitution of the United that Act No. 55, as amended by Act No. 275, is valid.
States, while the States exercise all powers which have not been
granted to the central government. The former operates under grants, 3. Whether a certain method of handling cattle is suitable within the
the latter subject to restrictions. The validity of an Act of Congress meaning of the Act can not be left to the judgment of the master of the
depends upon whether the Constitution of the United States contains a ship. It is a question which must be determined by the court from the
grant of express or implied authority to enact it. An act of a State evidence. On December 2, 1908, the defendant Bull brought into and
legislature is valid unless the Federal or State constitution expressly or disembarked in the port and city of Manila certain cattle, which came
impliedly prohibits its enaction. An Act of the legislative authority of from the port of Ampieng, Formosa, without providing suitable means
the Philippines Government which has not been expressly disapproved for securing said animals while in transit, so as to avoid cruelty and
by Congress is valid unless its subject-matter has been covered by unnecessary suffering to said animals, contrary to the provisions of
congressional legislation, or its enactment forbidden by some section 1 of Act No. 55, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 275. The
provision of the organic laws. trial court found the following facts, all of which are fully sustained by
the evidence:
The legislative power of the Government of the Philippines is granted
in general terms subject to specific limitations. The general grant is not That the defendant, H. N. Bull, as captain and master of the Norwegian
alone of power to legislate on certain subjects, but to exercise the steamer known as the Standard, for a period of six months or
legislative power subject to the restrictions stated. It is true that thereabouts prior to the 2d day of December, 1908, was engaged in the
specific authority is conferred upon the Philippine Government transportation of cattle and carabaos from Chines and Japanese ports to
relative to certain subjects of legislation, and that Congress has itself and into the city of Manila, Philippine Islands.
legislated upon certain other subjects. These, however, should be
viewed simply as enactments on matters wherein Congress was fully That on the 2d day of December, 1908, the defendant, as such master
informed and ready to act, and not as implying any restriction upon the and captain as aforesaid, brought into the city of Manila, aboard said
local legislative authority in other matters. (See Opinion of Atty. Gen. ship, a large number of cattle, which ship was anchored, under the
of U. S., April 16, 1908.) directions of the said defendant, behind the breakwaters in front of the
city of Manila, in Manila Bay, and within the jurisdiction of this court;
The fact that Congress reserved the power to annul specific acts of and that fifteen of said cattle then and there had broken legs and three
legislation by the Government of the Philippine tends strongly to others of said cattle were dead, having broken legs; and also that said
confirm the view that for purposes of construction the Government of cattle were transported and carried upon said ship as aforesaid by the
the Philippines should be regarded as one of general instead of defendant, upon the deck and in the hold of said ship, without suitable
enumerated legislative powers. The situation was unusual. The new precaution and care for the transportation of said animals, and to avoid
government was to operate far from the source of its authority. To danger and risk to their lives and security; and further that said cattle
relieve Congress from the necessity of legislating with reference to were so transported abroad said ship by the defendant and brought into
details, it was thought better to grant general legislative power to the the said bay, and into the city of Manila, without any provisions being
new government, subject to broad and easily understood prohibitions, made whatever upon said decks of said ship and in the hold thereof to
and reserve to Congress the power to annul its acts if they met with maintain said cattle in a suitable condition and position for such
disapproval. It was therefore provided "that all laws passed by the transportation.
Government of the Philippine Islands shall be reported to Congress,
which hereby reserves the power and authority to annul the same." That a suitable and practicable manner in which to transport cattle
(Act of Congress, July 1, 1902, sec. 86.) This provision does not abroad steamship coming into Manila Bay and unloading in the city of
suspend the acts of the Legislature of the Philippines until approved by Manila is by way of individual stalls for such cattle, providing
Congress, or when approved, expressly or by acquiescence, make them partitions between the cattle and supports at the front sides, and rear
thereof, and cross-cleats upon the floor on which they stand and are
transported, of that in case of storms, which are common in this
community at sea, such cattle may be able to stand without slipping
and pitching and falling, individually or collectively, and to avoid the .R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910
production of panics and hazard to the animals on account or cattle
were transported in this case. Captain Summerville of the THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
steamship Taming, a very intelligent and experienced seaman, has vs.
testified, as a witness in behalf of the Government, and stated LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant-appellant.
positively that since the introduction in the ships with which he is
acquainted of the stall system for the transportation of animals and Thos. D. Aitken for appellant.
cattle he has suffered no loss whatever during the last year. The Attorney-General Villamor for appellee.
defendant has testified, as a witness in his own behalf, that according
to his experience the system of carrying cattle loose upon the decks
and in the hold is preferable and more secure to the life and comfort of
the animals, but this theory of the case is not maintainable, either by ARELLANO, C. J.:
the proofs or common reason. It can not be urged with logic that, for
instance, three hundred cattle supports for the feet and without stalls or The first complaint filed against the defendant, in the Court of First
any other protection for them individually can safely and suitably Instance of Cebu, stated that he "carried, kept, possessed and had in his
carried in times of storm upon the decks and in the holds of ships; such possession and control, 96 kilogrammes of opium," and that "he had
a theory is against the law of nature. One animal falling or pitching, if been surprised in the act of selling 1,000 pesos worth prepared opium."
he is untied or unprotected, might produce a serious panic and the
wounding of half the animals upon the ship if transported in the The defense presented a demurrer based on two grounds, the second of
manner found in this case. which was the more than one crime was charged in the complaint. The
demurrer was sustained, as the court found that the complaint
The defendant was found guilty, and sentenced to pay a fine of two contained two charges, one, for the unlawful possession of opium, and
hundred and fifty pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of the other, for the unlawful sale of opium, and, consequence of that
insolvency, and to pay the costs. The sentence and judgment is ruling, it ordered that the fiscal should separated one charge from the
affirmed. So ordered. other and file a complaint for each violation; this, the fiscal did, and
this cause concerns only the unlawful possession of opium. It is
registered as No. 375, in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and as
No. 5887 on the general docket of this court.

The facts of the case are contained in the following finding of the trial
court:

The evidence, it says, shows that between 11 and 12 o'clock a. m. on

the present month (stated as August 19, 1909), several persons, among
them Messrs. Jacks and Milliron, chief of the department of the port of
Cebu and internal-revenue agent of Cebu, respectively, went abroad
the steamship Erroll to inspect and search its cargo, and found, first in
a cabin near the saloon, one sack (Exhibit A) and afterwards in the
hold, another sack (Exhibit B). The sack referred to as Exhibit A
contained 49 cans of opium, and the other, Exhibit B, the larger sack,
also contained several cans of the same substance. The hold, in which
the sack mentioned in Exhibit B was found, was under the defendant's
control, who moreover, freely and of his own will and accord admitted
that this sack, as well as the other referred to in Exhibit B and found in
the cabin, belonged to him. The said defendant also stated, freely and
voluntarily, that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong
with the intention of selling them as contraband in Mexico or Vera
Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several times for
opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack. Exhibit A.

It is to be taken into account that the two sacks of opium, designated as

Exhibits A and B, properly constitute the corpus delicti. Moreover,
another lot of four cans of opium, marked, as Exhibit C, was the
subject matter of investigation at the trial, and with respect to which
the chief of the department of the port of Cebu testified that they were
found in the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep, and
that they were delivered to the first officer of the ship to be returned to
the said firemen after the vessel should have left the Philippines,
because the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the
instructions he had from the Manila custom-house, were permitted to
retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be
taken shore.

And, finally, another can of opium, marked "Exhibit D," is also corpus

delicti and important as evidence in this cause. With regard to this the
internal-revenue agent testified as follows:itc-alf

FISCAL. What is it?

WITNESS. It is a can opium which was bought from the defendant by

a secret-service agent and taken to the office of the governor to prove
that the accused had opium in his possession to sell.
On motion by the defense, the court ruled that this answer might be It is also found: That, even admitting that the quantity of the drug
stricken out "because it refers to a sale." But, with respect to this seized, the subject matter of the present case, was considerable, it does
answer, the chief of the department of customs had already given this not appear that, on such account, the two penalties fixed by the law on
testimony, to wit: the subject, should be imposed in the maximum degree.

FISCAL. Who asked you to search the vessel? Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six
months and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the
WITNESS. The internal-revenue agent came to my office and said that judgment appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the
a party brought him a sample of opium and that the same party knew appellant. So ordered.
that there was more opium on board the steamer, and the agent asked
that the vessel be searched.

The defense moved that this testimony be rejected, on the ground of its
being hearsay evidence, and the court only ordered that the part thereof
"that there was more opium, on board the vessel" be stricken out.

The defense, to abbreviate proceedings, admitted that the receptacles

mentioned as Exhibits A, B, and C, contained opium and were found
on board the steamship Erroll, a vessel of English nationality, and that
it was true that the defendant stated that these sacks of opium were his
and that he had them in his possession.

According to the testimony of the internal-revenue agent, the

defendant stated to him, in the presence of the provincial fiscal, of a
Chinese interpreter (who afterwards was not needed, because the
defendant spoke English), the warden of the jail, and four guards, that
the opium seized in the vessel had been bought by him in Hongkong,
at three pesos for each round can and five pesos for each one of the
others, for the purpose of selling it, as contraband, in Mexico and
Puerto de Vera Cruz; that on the 15th the vessel arrived at Cebu, and
on the same day he sold opium; that he had tried to sell opium for P16
a can; that he had a contract to sell an amount of the value of about
P500; that the opium found in the room of the other two Chinamen
prosecuted in another cause, was his, and that he had left it in their
stateroom to avoid its being found in his room, which had already been
searched many times; and that, according to the defendant, the
contents of the large sack was 80 cans of opium, and of the small one,
49, and the total number, 129.

It was established that the steamship Erroll was of English nationality,

that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound for Mexico, via the
call ports of Manila and Cebu.

The defense moved for a dismissal of the case, on the grounds that the
court had no jurisdiction to try the same and the facts concerned
therein did not constitute a crime. The fiscal, at the conclusion of his
argument, asked that the maximum penalty of the law be imposed
upon the defendant, in view of the considerable amount of opium
seized. The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the
crime had been committed within its district, on the wharf of Cebu.

The court sentenced the defendant to five years' imprisonment, to pay

a fine of P10,000, with additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, though not to exceed one third of the principal penalty,
and to the payment of the costs. It further ordered the confiscation, in
favor of the Insular Government, of the exhibits presented in the case,
and that, in the event of an appeal being taken or a bond given, or
when the sentenced should have been served, the defendant be not
released from custody, but turned over to the customs authorities for
the purpose of the fulfillment of the existing laws on immigration.

From this judgment, the defendant appealed to this court.lawphi1.net

The appeal having been heard, together with the allegations made
therein by the parties, it is found: That, although the mere possession
of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in
transit, in any of their ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a
crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such vessel
being considered as an extension of its own nationality, the same rule
does not apply when the article, whose use is prohibited within the
Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of opium, is landed from
the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of
the laws of the land, with respect to which, as it is a violation of the
penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, only the
court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in
the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
 question but what the opium came from Saigon to Cebu. However, in
the opinion in the Jose case, we find the following which may
be obiter dicta, but which at least is interesting as showing the view of
G.R. No. L-13005        October 10, 1917 the writer of the opinion:

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, The importation was complete, to say the least, when the ship carrying
vs. it anchored in Subic Bay. It was not necessary that the opium
AH SING, defendant-appellant. discharged or that it be taken from the ship. It was sufficient that the
opium was brought into the waters of the Philippine Islands on a boat
Antonio Sanz for appellant. destined for a Philippine port and which subsequently anchored in a
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee. port of the Philippine Islands with intent to discharge its cargo.

Resolving whatever doubt was exist as to the authority of the views

MALCOLM, J.: just quoted, we return to an examination of the applicable provisions
of the law. It is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins,
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of "Any person who shall unlawfully import or bring any prohibited drug
Cebu finding the defendant guilty of a violation of section 4 of Act No. into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous
2381 (the Opium Law), and sentencing him to two years terms. The Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere
imprisonment, to pay a fine of P300 or to suffer subsidiary act of going into a port, without breaking bulk, is prima facie evidence
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again,
the importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house,
but merely the bringing them into port; and the importation is
The following facts are fully proven: The defendant is a subject of complete before entry of the Custom House. (U. S. vs. Lyman [U. S.],
China employed as a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang. The Shun 26, Fed. Cas., 1024, 1028; Perots vs. U. S., 19 Fed. Cas., 258.) As
Chang is a foreign steamer which arrived at the port of Cebu on April applied to the Opium Law, we expressly hold that any person
25, 1917, after a voyage direct from the port of Saigon. The defendant unlawfully imports or brings any prohibited drug into the Philippine
bought eight cans of opium in Saigon, brought them on board the Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's control
steamship Shun Chang, and had them in his possession during the trip on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within
from Saigon to Cebu. When the steamer anchored in the port of Cebu the jurisdictional limits of the Philippine Islands. In such case, a
on April 25, 1917, the authorities on making a search found the eight person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary
cans of opium above mentioned hidden in the ashes below the boiler of circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the
the steamer's engine. The defendant confessed that he was the owner facts herein, it would be absurb to think that the accused was merely
of this opium, and that he had purchased it in Saigon. He did not carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere
confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that
say that it was his intention to import the prohibited drug into the the accused needed so large an amount of opium for his personal use.
Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that the
the intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium into the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine
Philippine Islands, was introduced. Islands. We accordingly find that there was illegal importation of
opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate
Has the crime of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine any possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do
Islands been proven? not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a situation not present.

Two decisions of this Court are cited in the judgment of the trial court, The defendant and appellant, having been proved guilty beyond a
but with the intimation that there exists inconsistently between the reasonable doubt as charged and the sentence of the trial court being
doctrines laid down in the two cases. However, neither decision is within the limits provided by law, it results that the judgment must be
directly a precedent on the facts before us. affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
In the case of United States vs. Look Chaw ([1910], 18 Phil., 573), in
the opinion handed down by the Chief Justice, it is found —

That, although the mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in

these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any of their
ports, does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the
courts of this country, on account of such vessel being considered as
an extension of its own nationality, the same rule does no apply when
the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the
present case a can of opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine
soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the land, with
respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the
place of the commission of the crime, only the court established in the
said place itself has competent jurisdiction, in the absence of an
agreement under an international treaty.1awphil.net

A marked difference between the facts in the Look Chaw case and the
facts in the present instance is readily observable. In the Look Chaw
case, the charge case the illegal possession and sale of opium — in the
present case the charge as illegal importation of opium; in the Look
Chaw case the foreign vessel was in transit — in the present case the
foreign vessel was not in transit; in the Look Chaw case the opium was
landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil — in the present case of
United States vs. Jose ([1916], 34 Phil., 840), the main point, and the
one on which resolution turned, was that in a prosecution based on the
illegal importation of opium or other prohibited drug, the Government
must prove, or offer evidence sufficient to raise a presumption, that the
vessel from which the drug is discharged came into Philippine waters
from a foreign country with the drug on board. In the Jose case, the
defendants were acquitted because it was not proved that the opium
was imported from a foreign country; in the present case there is no
 . . . The principle which governs the whole matter is this: Disorder
which disturb only the peace of the ship or those on board are to be
dealt with exclusively by the sovereignty of the home of the ship, but
G.R. No. L-18924             October 19, 1922 those which disturb the public peace may be suppressed, and, if need
be, the offenders punished by the proper authorities of the local
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- jurisdiction. It may not be easy at all times to determine which of the
appellant, two jurisdictions a particular act of disorder belongs. Much will
vs. undoubtedly depend on the attending circumstances of the particular
WONG CHENG (alias WONG CHUN), defendant-appellee. case, but all must concede that felonious homicide is a subject for the
local jurisdiction, and that if the proper authorities are proceeding with
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellant. the case in the regular way the consul has no right to interfere to
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide for appellee. prevent it.

ROMUALDEZ, J.: Hence in United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), this court held
that:
In this appeal the Attorney-General urges the revocation of the order
of the Court of First Instance of Manila, sustaining the demurrer Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the
presented by the defendant to the information that initiated this case Philippine Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit in any local port,
and in which the appellee is accused of having illegally smoked does not, as a general rule, constitute a crime triable by the courts of
opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English nationality the Islands, such vessels being considered as an extension of its own
while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of
from the shores of the city. which is prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessels upon
Philippine soil; in such a case an open violation of the laws of the land
is committed with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law
The demurrer alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the lower in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court other
court, which so held and dismissed the case. than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in
the absence of an agreement under an international treaty.
The question that presents itself for our consideration is whether such
ruling is erroneous or not; and it will or will not be erroneous As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or
according as said court has or has no jurisdiction over said offense. otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find
nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation
The point at issue is whether the courts of the Philippines have the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs. Besides,
jurisdiction over crime, like the one herein involved, committed in his work "Treaties, Conventions, etc.," volume 1, page 625, Malloy
aboard merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters. 1awph! says the following:
l.net
There shall be between the territories of the United States of America,
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection and all the territories of His Britanic Majesty in Europe, a reciprocal
with International Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which liberty of commerce. The inhabitants of the two countries,
crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should not be respectively, shall have liberty freely and securely to come with their
prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial ships and cargoes to all such places, ports and rivers, in the territories
jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the aforesaid, to which other foreigners are permitted to come, to enter
peace and security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the into the same, and to remain and reside in any parts of the said
territorial principle and followed in the United States, according to territories, respectively; also to hire and occupy houses and
which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general warehouses for the purposes of their commerce; and, generally, the
triable in the courts of the country within territory they were merchants and traders of each nation respectively shall enjoy the most
committed. Of this two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this complete protection and security for their commerce, but subject
jurisdiction, because at present the theories and jurisprudence always to the laws and statutes of the two countries, respectively. (Art.
prevailing in the United States on this matter are authority in the 1, Commerce and Navigation Convention.)
Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
We have seen that the mere possession of opium aboard a foreign
In the cases of The Schooner Exchange vs. M'Faddon and Others (7 vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or courts, because
Cranch [U. S.], 116), Chief Justice Marshall said: it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants
of the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of
. . . When merchant vessels enter for the purposes of trade, it would be this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without being used in our
obviously inconvenient and dangerous to society, and would subject territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that
the laws to continual infraction, and the government to degradation, if our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is
such individuals or merchants did not owe temporary and local not considered a disturbance of the public order.
allegiance, and were not amenable to the jurisdiction of the
country. . . . But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a
foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
In United States vs. Bull (15 Phil., 7), this court held: established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious
effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that
our Legislature has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.
. . . No court of the Philippine Islands had jurisdiction over an offense Moreover, as the Attorney-General aptly observes:
or crime committed on the high seas or within the territorial waters of
any other country, but when she came within three miles of a line
drawn from the headlands, which embrace the entrance to Manila Bay, . . . The idea of a person smoking opium securely on board a foreign
she was within territorial waters, and a new set of principles became vessel at anchor in the port of Manila in open defiance of the local
applicable. (Wheaton, International Law [Dana ed.], p. 255, note 105; authorities, who are impotent to lay hands on him, is simply
Bonfils, Le Droit Int., secs. 490 et seq.; Latour, La Mer Ter., ch. 1.) subversive of public order. It requires no unusual stretch of the
The ship and her crew were then subject to the jurisdiction of the imagination to conceive that a foreign ship may come into the port of
territorial sovereign subject to such limitations as have been conceded Manila and allow or solicit Chinese residents to smoke opium on
by that sovereignty through the proper political agency. . . . board.

It is true that in certain cases the comity of nations is observed, as The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to
in Mali and Wildenhus vs. Keeper of the Common Jail (120 U.., 1), the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law,
wherein it was said that: without special findings as to costs. So ordered.
 mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war,
are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
G.R. No. 17958             February 27, 1922
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for
decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff- Code dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to
appellee, 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the
subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants. with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another

MALCOLM, J.: nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty
of presidio mayor.
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers
like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first
gripped the imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty
flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. of cadena perpetua or death, and those who commit the crimes
Nevertheless, the record before us tells a tale of twentieth century referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena
piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of temporal to cadena perpetua:
generosity, so as to present a horrible case of rapine and near murder.

1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon

On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, the same.
for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one
individual, a Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women,
and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of 2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any
navigation, at about 7 o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen
between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. and four hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article
There the boat was surrounded by six vintas manned by twenty-four four hundred and sixteen.
Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the
Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo, attacked some of the 3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity
men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with the
exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of
were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter
saving themselves.
of fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were
succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch
possession. Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped 5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to
escape. ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all
others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as
Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi- including any part of the national territory.
Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were
charged in the Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code,
A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has
on the grounds that the offense charged was not within the jurisdiction the status of a Spaniard shall be considered as such.
of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine
Islands, and that the facts did not constitute a public offense, under the
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United
laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was
States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State
overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a judgment was
to the United States are well-known. The political law of the former
rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of
sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is
them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
consistent with the Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended
characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As
parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to
a corollary to the main rules, laws subsisting at the time of transfer,
indemnify them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half
designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are
part of the costs.
strictly of a municipal character, continue until by direct action of the
new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands,
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain
questions can be quickly disposed of.
These principles of the public law were given specific application to
the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19,
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of 1898, to General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the
piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
high seas, without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the
spirit and intention of universal hostility.

It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the

lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First
Instance was without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in law hostes
humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but
against all mankind. It may be punished in the competent tribunal of
any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be
carried. The jurisdiction of piracy unlike all other crimes has no
territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor
does it matter that the crime was committed within the jurisdictional 3-
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, either cadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied
and immediately operate upon the political condition of the by (1) an offense against chastity and (2) the abandonment of persons
inhabitants, the municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only
affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the necessary for us to determine as to whether the penalty of cadena
punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far as perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial
they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of nocturnity,
suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent; and practice and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack
they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code,
to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating
before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime
to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary was deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for
Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that
August 14, 1898.) means were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of
the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty.
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code Considering, therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying
dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by
Article 156 of the Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the the sole mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible
Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital
of the Code applicable not only to Spaniards but to Filipinos. punishment.

The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety
same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and
The specific provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to appellant Lo-lo (the accused who raped on of the women), but is not
statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers
This must necessarily be so, considering that the Penal Code finds its his nonconformity. In accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it
inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the
the Novisima Recopilacion. defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed, and is reversed as to the
defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of
piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at such time and
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-
have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang
on the high seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and
Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall
necessary ancillary legislation, provided that whoever, on the high pay a one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and
is afterwards brought into or found in the United States, shall be
imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly
death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of the Constitution and
the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest
on its universal conception under the law of nations.

It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the
Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the
corresponding provisions in force in the United States.

By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the

United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like
the articles dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever
"Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United
States" and wherever "Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be
substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens
of the Philippine Islands." somewhat similar reasoning led this court in
the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to
the word "authority" as found in the Penal Code a limited meaning,
which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil
officers, but only public officers in the Government of the Philippine
Islands.

Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code
would read as follows:

The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States

and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation
not at war with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty
ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.

If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another

nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the
penalty of presidio mayor.

We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of
piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the
Philippines.

The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal
Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the
circumstances named in the last cited article as authorizing
 That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
[G.R. No. 123918. December 9, 1999] feloniously possess and carry outside of his residence, a firearm,
Caliber .38 revolver (Paltik) bearing Serial Number 853169, without
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff- any legal authority or permit from any government official or
Appellee, v. AUGUSTO LORETO RINGOR, JR., accused- authority concerned, in violation of the above cited provision of law.
appellant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
DECISION
With the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entering a plea of Not
PURISIMA, J.: Guilty upon arraignment, a joint trial of the two cases ensued.

For automatic review is the Decision1 ated November 13, 1995 of The inculpatory facts and circumstances sued upon are succinctly
Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court in Baguio City, finding accused- summarized in the Appellees Brief as follows:
appellant Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in Criminal On June 23, 1994, at around 6:00 P.M.(sic), Fely Batanes, a waitress
Case No. 13102-R, also guilty of illegal possession of firearms under at Peoples Restaurant located at Kalantiao St., Baguio City, saw
P.D. No. 1866 in Criminal Case No. 13100-R for and disposing thus: appellant Ringor and his two companions enter the restaurant. (Tsn,
December 8, 1994, p. 4). After seating themselves, the group ordered
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered as follows: a bottle of gin (ibid., p. 6). Minutes later, appellant approached one of
the tables where Florida, the restaurants cook was drinking beer.
1. In Criminal Case No. 13102, the Court Finds (sic) the accused Without any warning, appellant pulled Floridas hair and poked a
Augusto Loreto Ringor Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of knife on the latters throat. Florida stood up and pleaded with
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal appellant not to harm him (ibid., p. 7). Appellant relented and
Code as amended by Section 6, RA 7659, qualified by Treachery and released his grip on Florida. Thereafter, he left the restaurant
as further qualified by the use of an unlicensed firearm and hereby together with his companions. However, a few minutes latter he was
sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of Death; to indemnify the back (ibid, p.8).
heirs of deceased Marcelino Florida, Jr., the sum of P50,000.00 for
his death and the sum of P100,000.00 as Moral damages for his death, Appellant brandished a gun and menacingly entered the restaurant.
both indemnification being without subsidiary imprisonment in case of Not encountering any resistance, he thus proceeded to the kitchen
insolvency and to pay the costs. where Florida worked (ibid). Stealthily approaching Florida from
behind, appellant fired six successive shots at Florida who fell down
2. In Criminal Case No. 13100-R, the Court Finds (sic) accused (Ibid., p. 9). His evil deed accomplished, appellant left the kitchen and
Augusto Loreto Ringor Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense fled (ibid).
of Violation of Section 1 PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of firearm and
ammunitions) as charged in the Information and hereby sentences Appellant was chased by a man who while running, shouted at
him, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to an imprisonment onlookers that the person he was running after was armed and had
ranging from 17 years 4 months and I day as Minimum to 20 years as just killed somebody. Alerted, SPO2 Fernandez, who was then in the
Maximum and to pay the costs. vicinity, went into action and nabbed appellant. He frisked appellant
and recovered from him a Paltik revolver, caliber. 38, with Serial
The subject gun, caliber .38 (Paltik) bearing Serial Number 853169 Number 853169 (Exh. A). He checked the revolvers cylinder and
(Exh. A) being the subject of the offense is hereby declared confiscated found six empty cartridges (Exhs. T to T-6). He noted that it smelled of
and forfeited in favor of the State. gunpowder. He and PO1 Ortega turned over appellant and the
confiscated firearm to the Investigation Division of the Baguio Police
The accused Augusto Loreto Ringor is entitled to be credited in the and then executed a Joint Affidavit of Arrest (Exhibit O). On the same
service of his sentence four fifth (4/5) of his preventive imprisonment night, Fely Batanes gave her sworn statement (Exhibit E) to the
in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. Baguio Police wherein she positively identified appellant as the
assailant.
SO ORDERED.2
xxx xxx xxx
Filed on June 28, 1994, the Informations against accused-appellant,
alleges: xxx xxx xxx

In Criminal Case No. 13102-R NBI Forensic Chemist Ms. Carina Javier found both hands of
appellant positive for nitrates as stated in her Chemist Report No. C-
That on or about the 23rd day of June, 1994, in the City of Baguio, 94-22. She conducted a microscopic chemical examination on the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the subject firearm and found that the gun was fired within one week prior
above-named accused, being then armed with a Caliber 38 handgun to June 27, 1994.
paltick with Serial Number 853169 and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Elmer Nelson Piedad, Ballistician of the Firearm Investigation
MARCELINO BUSLAY FLORIDA, JR. thereby inflicting upon the Division, NBI, Manila, tested and concluded that the slugs recovered
latter hypovolemic shock secondary to massive hemorrhage; multiple from the victim were fired from appellants firearm. Upon verification
gunshot wounds of the liver, stomach, small intestine and mesentric from the Firearms Explosive division, Camp Crame, Quezon City, it
blood vessels, which injuries directly caused his death. was found that appellant is not a licensed firearm holder nor, was the
subject firearm duly registered with the said office (Exh.
That the qualifying circumstance of TREACHERY attended the A).5cräläwvirtualibräry
commission of the crime when the accused suddenly attacked victim
and shot him several times at the back, with the use of a handgun, thus The autopsy conducted by Dr. John Tinoyan on the cadaver of the
employing means, methods of forms in the execution thereof which deceased yielded a Necropsy Report, which states:
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

CONTRARY TO LAW.3 Body of a male, 1.66 m. height, medium built, with complete rigor
mortis, lividity well developed on the dependent parts, cloudy cornea
and in Criminal Case No. 13100-R and dilated pupils with very pale papebral conjunctive.
Gunshot wounds: GSW no.1 measuring 10 x 10 mm. serrated edges, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT
positive powder burns located at the left mid clavicular line, posterior, FOR SIMPLE ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND
2 inches below the shoulder. It was directed downward towards the SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER AN INDETERMINATE
mid-body, penetrating the skin. (sic) soft tissue, middle 3rd of the 3rd SENTENCE OF 17 YEARS AND 1 DAY AS MINIMUM TO 20
rib, the upper and lower lobes of the left lung to the diaphragm, YEARS AS MAXIMUM.
through and through the stomach, lacerating the superior mesentric
vessels, perforating the small intestine then lodged at the superior II
surface of the urinary bladder (slug was recovered marked no. 1)
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
GSW no.2 measures 8 mm. diameter, positive powder burns, located OF MURDER.
on the right shoulder near the s. joint posteriorly, penetrating the skin,
soft tissue, then lodged at the surface of the fractured surgical neck of III
the humorous (sic) (slug recovered). Marked no. 2.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SENTENCING THE
GSW no. 3 measures 8 mm. Diameter, positive powder burns, located ACCUSED TO DEATH ON THE GROUNDS THAT: (i) THE
on the right shoulder posteriorly near the joint penetrating the skin, CHARGE OF MURDER WAS NOT PROVED BY THE
soft tissues, and the head of the Humorous, (sic) then dislodged form PROSECUTION; AND (ii) ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
the same entry point. MURDER WAS COMMITTED BY APPELLANT, THE
APPROPRIATE PENALTY FOR THE OFFENSE IS RECLUSION
GSW no. 4 measures 8 x 10 mm, oval shaped, with abrasion PERPETUA THERE BEING NO AGGRAVATING
superiorly located at the anterior left parasternal line at the level of CIRCUMSTANCE TO RAISE THE PENALTY TO DEATH.8
the 6th ICS. It was directed downward towards the posterior of the
body, penetrating the skin, soft tissue, the left lobe of the liver with Well-settled is the rule that in interposing self-defense, the offender
partial avulsion, then perforating the stomach through and though the admits authorship of the killing. The onus probandi is thus shifted to
duodenum lumbar muscle then lodged underneath the skin, (1) him to prove the elements of self-defense and that the killing was
paravertebral, level of L3 (slug recovered marked no. 4). justified;9 otherwise, having admitted the killing, conviction is
inescapable. Concomitantly, he must rely on the strength of his own
CAUSE OF DEATH: evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence.10

HYPOVOLEMIC SHOCK SECONDARY TO MASSIVE For self-defense to prosper, it must be established that: (1) there was
HEMORRHAGE; MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUND(S) OF THE unlawful aggression by the victim; (2) that the means employed to
LIVER, STOMACH, SMALL INTESTINE AND MESENTRIC BLOOD prevent or repel such aggression was reasonable; and (3) that there was
VESSELS. Multiple Gunshot Wound(s) of the body.6 lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.11
Accused-appellant admitted shooting the victim but theorized that he
acted in self-defense. As embodied in the Appellants Brief, the defense In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to prove the element of
version runs thus: unlawful aggression. The allegation that the victim allegedly went out
of the kitchen armed with a bolo, and was about to hack him (accused-
3.01 On June 23, 1994, at a little after five oclock in the afternoon, appellant) who was then at an almost prone lying position on the table
appellant, together with two (2) other companions, entered the he was occupying,12 is a self-serving and unconvincing statement
Peoples Restaurant in Baguio City to order drinks. They sat at a table which did not in anyway constitute the requisite quantum of proof for
next to another then occupied by Marcelino B. Florida, Jr. (Florida) unlawful aggression. Prosecution witness Fely Batanes, a waitress in
and a woman companion (TSN, Testimony of Augusto Loreto G. the restaurant where the shooting incident occurred, was firm in her
Ringor, Jr., May 4, 1995, pp. 3-6). declaration that the victim was in the kitchen unarmed13 hen the
accused-appellant shot him. The victim had no weapon or bolo. He
3.02 Soon after receiving their orders, appellants companion, Ramon was neither threatening to attack nor in any manner manifesting any
Fernandez, stood up and approached Florida to inquire about his aggressive act which could have imperiled accused-appellants safety
(Fernandez) brother, Cesar. Florida angrily responded to the query and well-being.
and said, Putang ina ninyo! anong pakialam ko diyan!
No improper motive having been shown on the part of Fely Batanes to
3.03 A quarrel thereafter ensued between Fernandez and Florida testify falsely against accused-appellant or to implicate him in the
prompting the appellant to intervene and pacify Fernandez. When commission of the crime, the logical conclusion is that there was no
Fernandez drew out a gun from his waist, appellant immediately such improper motive and her testimony is worthy of full faith and
seized the same directing his friend to leave the restaurant before he credit.14
started hurting other people with his gun. No sooner had Fernandez
stepped out, however, Florida, armed with a bolo, came charging in What is more, the testimony of Fely Batanes is buttressed by the fact
from the kitchen and headed towards the appellant. (Ibid, pp. 6 - 7) that immediately after the incident, the body of the victim was found
lying in the kitchen and not outside; thus weakening further the theory
3.04 Surprised, appellant shot Florida with the gun he was holding of accused-appellant that he shot the victim while they were at the
just as the latter was about to hit him with the bolo. Thereafter, dining area.15
appellant put the gun on the table and walked out of the restaurant.
Once already outside the restaurant, appellants other companion, Then too, the nature, location and number of gunshot wounds inflicted
Virgilio, followed him and handed to him the gun he (appellant) left at on the deceased belie accused-appellants theory of self-defense.16 The
the table. He then proceeded to surrender the gun and report the deceased sustained three gun shot wounds on the back and one in
incident at the nearest police station. (Ibid, pp. 8 - 9) front. Dr. John Tinoyan, who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of
the victim, testified that the gunshot wound on the frontal portion of
3.05 Before appellant could reach the police station, however, the victims body showed a downward trajectory of the bullet on his
appellant was already arrested by off-duty policeman who brought chest, penetrating the liver, perforating the stomach down to the small
him back to the Peoples Restaurant. Appellant was thereafter intestine, and then lodged underneath the skin.17 Verily, such finding
incarcerated at the Baguio City Police Station. (Ibid, pp. 10 - 12) 7 negates the claim of accused-appellant that he shot the victim while he
was at an almost prone lying position and the victim was standing in
On November 13, 1995, the trial court handed down the decision front of him about to strike with a bolo. If this were true, the trajectory
under automatic review. Accused-appellant contends that: of the bullet should have been upward or better still, it should have
been at the level at which the gun was fired while he (accused-
appellant) was in a prone lying position.
I
Rather telling are the three gunshot wounds on the back of the victim,
which wounds showed traces of gunpowder which, according to Dr.
Tinoyan, indicated that the weapon used was at a distance of less than intention of the lawmaker because the term penalty in the subject
one meter.18 Evidently, accused-appellant stealthily approached the provision is obviously meant to be the penalty for illegal possession of
victim from behind and fired at him six successive shots, four of which firearm and not the penalty for for homicide or murder. We explicitly
hit him, to ensure his death. 19 If he shot the victim merely to defend stated in Tac-an:
himself, there would have been no cause for accused-appellant to
pump several bullets into the body of the victim. There is no law which renders the use of an
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance
In light of the foregoing, the imputation of unlawful aggression on the in homicide or murder. Under an information
part of the victim cannot be believed. Absent the element of unlawful charging homicide or muder, the fact that the death
aggression by the deceased, there can be no self-defense, complete or weapon was an unlicensed firearm cannot be used
incomplete. If there was no unlawful aggression, there was nothing to to increase the penalty for the second offense of
prevent or repel and the second and third requisites of self-defense homicide or murder to death (or reclusion
would have no basis.20 perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The essential
point is that the unlicensed character or condition of
The Court a quo properly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of the instrument used in destroying human life or
treachery which qualified the crime to murder. It was clearly committing some other crime, is not included in the
established that the accused-appellant fired six successive shots on the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in
victim, suddenly, without warning, and from behind, giving the victim Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code.
no chance to flee or to prepare for his defense or to put up the least
resistance to such sudden assault. There is treachery when the means, A law may, of course, be enacted making  the use of an unlicensed
manner or method of attack employed by the offender offered no risk firearm as a qualifying circumstance.28(Emphasis supplied)
to himself from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might
have taken.21 Thus, before R.A. No. 8294 (which took effect on July 6, 1997) made
the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in
All things studiedly considered and viewed in proper perspective, the murder or homicide, the penalty for the murder committed by accused-
mind of the Court can rest easy on a finding that accused-appellant appellant on June 23, 1994 was not death, as erroneously imposed by
Augusto Loreto Ringor, Jr. is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the the trial court. There was yet no such aggravating circumstance of use
crime of murder, and did not act in self-defense. of unlicensed firearm to raise the penalty for murder from reclusion
perpetua to death, at the time of commission of the crime.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, prescribes the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. When, The amendatory law making the use of an unlicensed firearm as an
as in this case, neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance is aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, cannot be applied
attendant, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua has to be here because the said provision of R.A. No. 8294 is not favorable to
applied,22 in accordance with Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code. accused-appellant, lest it becomes an ex post facto law.29

With respect to the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal WHEREFORE, the decision in Criminal Case No. 13102-R is
possession of firearms under P. D. No. 1866, it was held in the case of AFFIRMED with the modification that accused-appellant Augusto
People vs. Molina23 nd reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Loreto Ringor, Jr. is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
Ronaldo Valdez,24 that in cases where murder or homicide is of reclusion perpetua. It is understood that the civil liabilities imposed
committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, there can be no below are UPHELD.
separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of firearms
under P.D. No. 1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Criminal Case No. 13100-R instituted pursuant to Presidential Decree
Republic Act No. 8294. Thereunder, the use of unlicensed firearm in No. 1866 is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
murder or homicide is simply considered as an aggravating
circumstance in the murder or homicide and no longer as a separate SO ORDERED.
offense. Furthermore, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms
shall be imposed provided that no other crime is committed. 25 In other
words, where murder or homicide was committed, the penalty for
illegal possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes
merely a special aggravating circumstance.26

It bears stressing, however, that the dismissal of the present case for
illegal possession of firearm should not be misinterpreted to mean that
there can no longer be any prosecution for the offense of illegal
possession of firearms. In general, all pending cases involving illegal
possession of firearms should continue to be prosecuted and tried if no
other crimes expressly provided in R. A. No. 8294 are involved
(murder or homicide, under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection,
sedition or attempted coup d etat, under Section 3).27

Pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, where the new law
is favorable to the accused, it has to be applied retroactively. Thus,
insofar as it spares accused-appellant a separate conviction for illegal
possession of firearms, Republic Act No. 8294 has to be given
retroactive application in Criminal Case No. 13100-R.

On the matter of the aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed

firearm in the commission of murder or homicide, the trial court erred
in appreciating the same to qualify to death the penalty for the murder
committed by accused-appellant. It should be noted that at the time
accused-appellant perpetrated the offense, the unlicensed character of
a firearm used in taking the life of another was not yet an aggravating
circumstance in homicide or murder; to wit:

Neither is the second paragraph of Section 1 meant to punish homicide

or murder with death if either crime is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, i.e., to consider such use merely as a qualifying
circumstance and not as an offense. That could not have been the
 2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence
G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019 they have failed to surrender voluntarily.

If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same

INMATES OF THE NEW BILIBID PRISON, MUNTINLUPA disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall do so in
CITY, NAMELY: VENANCIO A. ROXAS, SATURNINO V. writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the
PARAS, EDGARDO G. MANUEL, HERMINILDO V. CRUZ, service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has
ALLAN F. TEJADA, ROBERTO C. MARQUEZ, JULITO P. undergone preventive imprisonment.
MONDEJAR, ARMANDO M. CABUANG, JONATHAN O.
CRISANTO, EDGAR ECHENIQUE, JANMARK SARACHO, Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of  reclusion
JOSENEL ALVARAN, AND CRISENCIO NERI, JR., perpetua shall be deducted from thirty (30) years.
PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY LEILA M. DE LIMA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND SECRETARY MANUEL A. Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a
ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense
GOVERNMENT, RESPONDENTS. charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet
terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the
ATTY. RENE A.V. SAGUISAG, SR., PETITIONER- continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the
INTERVENOR, same is under review. Computation of preventive imprisonment for
purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the
WILLIAM M. MONTINOLA, FORTUNATO P. VISTO, AND actual period of detention with good conduct time
ARESENIO C. CABANILLA, PETITIONERS-INTERVENORS, allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent without
justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu
[G.R. No. 214637] proprio order the rearrest of the accused:  Provided, finally, That
recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged
REYNALDO D. EDAGO, PETER R. TORIDA, JIMMY E. with heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In
ACLAO, WILFREDO V. OMERES, PASCUA B. GALLADAN, case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced
VICTOR M. MACOY, JR., EDWIN C. TRABUNCON, is destierro, he shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive
WILFREDO A. PATERNO, FEDERICO ELLIOT, AND imprisonment.
ROMEO R. MACOLBAS, PETITIONERS, v. SECRETARY
LEILA M. DE LIMA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; ART. 94. Partial extinction of criminal liability — Criminal liability is
SECRETARY MANUEL A. ROXAS II, DEPARTMENT OF THE extinguished partially:
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT; ACTING
DIRECTOR FRANKLIN JESUS B. BUCAYU, BUREAU OF 1. By conditional pardon;
CORRECTIONS; AND JAIL CHIEF SUPERINTENDENT
DIONY DACANAY MAMARIL, BUREAU OF JAIL 2. By commutation of the sentence; and
MANAGEMENT AND PENOLOGY, RESPONDENTS.
3. For good conduct allowances which the culprit may earn while he
is undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving his sentence.
DECISION
ART. 97. Allowance for good conduct. - The good conduct of
any offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment
PERALTA, J.: pursuant to Article 29 of this Code, or of any convicted prisoner in
any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other
The sole issue for resolution in these consolidated cases1 is the legality local jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period
of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of his sentence:
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10592,2 which states:
1. During the first two years of (his) imprisonment, he shall be allowed
a deduction of twenty days for each month of good behavior during
detention;
SECTION 4. Prospective Application. - Considering that these Rules
provide for new procedures and standards of behavior for the grant of 2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he
good conduct time allowance as provided in Section 4 of Rule V shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-three days for each month of
hereof and require the creation of a Management, Screening and good behavior during detention;
Evaluation Committee (MSEC) as provided in Section 3 of the same
Rule, the grant of good conduct time allowance under Republic Act 3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his
No. 10592 shall be prospective in application. imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty-five days for
each month of good behavior during detention;
The grant of time allowance of study, teaching and mentoring and of
special time allowance for loyalty shall also be prospective in 4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he
application as these privileges are likewise subject to the management, shall be allowed a deduction of thirty days for each month of good
screening and evaluation of the MSEC.3 behavior during detention; and
The Case
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be
On May 29, 2013, then President Benigno S. Aquino III signed into allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in addition to numbers
law R.A. No. 10592, amending Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99 of Act one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring
No. 3815, or the Revised Penal Code (RPC).4 For reference, the service time rendered.
modifications are underscored as follows:
ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of An appeal by the accused shall not deprive him of entitlement to
imprisonment. — Offenders or accused who have undergone the above allowances for good conduct.
preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during ART. 98. Special time allowance for loyalty. - A deduction of one fifth
which they have undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention of the period of his sentence shall be granted to any prisoner who,
prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his
effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the sentence under the circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours following the
the following cases: issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity or catastrophe referred to in said article. A deduction of two-
1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said
or more times of any crime; and prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement
notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catastrophe On October 24, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition15 was
enumerated in Article 158 of this Code. filed by Reynaldo D. Edago, Peter R. Torida, Jimmy E. Aclao,
Wilfredo V. Omeres, Pascua B. Galladan, Victor M. Macoy, Jr.,
This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing Edwin C. Trabuncon, Wilfredo A. Paterno, Federico Elliot, and
preventive imprisonment or serving sentence. Romeo R. Macolbas (Edago et al.), who are all inmates at the
Maximum Security Compound of the NBP, against DOJ Secretary De
ART. 99. Who grants time allowances. - Whenever lawfully justified, Lima, DILG Secretary Roxas, BUCOR Acting Director Franklin Jesus
the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau B. Bucayu, and BJMP Chief Superintendent (Officer-in-Charge)
of Jail Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a Diony Dacanay Mamaril. The grounds of the petition are as follows:
provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant allowances for A.
good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked.
(Emphases ours) SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR PROVIDING FOR A
Pursuant to the amendatory law, an IRR was jointly issued by PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF R.A.
respondents Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Leila M. De Lima 10592 WAS ISSUED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
and Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION AND
Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II on March 26, 2014 and became THEREBY VOID AND ILLEGAL FOR BEING CONTRARY AND
effective on April 18, 2014.5 Petitioners and intervenors assail the ANATHEMA TO R.A. 10592.
validity of its Section 4, Rule 1 that directs the prospective application a. R.A. 10592 does not state that its provisions shall have
of the grant of good conduct time allowance (GCTA), time allowance prospective application.
for study, teaching and mentoring (TASTM), and special time
allowance for loyalty (STAL) mainly on the ground that it violates
Article 22 of the RPC.6 b. Section 4 of the IRR of R.A. 10592 is contrary to Article 22
of the Revised Penal Code providing that penal laws that are
G.R. No. 212719 beneficial to the accused shall have retroactive application.

On June 18, 2014, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with

Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction)7 was filed against
c. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR contravenes public policy and
respondents DOJ Secretary De Lima and DILG Secretary Roxas by
the intent of Congress when it enacted R.A. 10592.
Atty. Michael J. Evangelista acting as the attorney-in-fact8 of
convicted prisoners in the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), namely:
Venancio A. Roxas, Saturnino V. Paras, Edgardo G. Manuel, B.
Herminildo V. Cruz, Allan F. Tejada, Roberto C. Marquez, Julito P.
Mondejar, Armando M. Cabuang, Jonathan O. Crisanto, Edgar SECTION 4, RULE I OF THE IRR WAS ISSUED BY
Echenique, Janmark Saracho, Josenel Alvaran, and Crisencio Neri, Jr. RESPONDENTS WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
(Roxas et al.). Petitioners filed the case as real parties-in-interest and AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
as representatives of their member organizations and the organizations' BECAUSE IT IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
individual members, as a class suit for themselves and in behalf of all a. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates the Equal Protection
who are similarly situated. They contend that the provisions of R.A. Clause of the Constitution.
No. 10592 are penal in nature and beneficial to the inmates; hence,
should be given retroactive effect in accordance with Article 22 of the
RPC. For them, the IRR contradicts the law it implements. They are d. Section 4, Rule I of the IRR violates substantive due
puzzled why it would be complex for the Bureau of Corrections process.16
(BUCOR) and the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP)
to retroactively apply the law when the prisoners' records are complete Per Resolution17 dated November 11, 2014, respondents were ordered
and the distinctions between the pertinent provisions of the RPC and to file their comment to the petition. In compliance, BJMP Chief
R.A. No. 10592 are easily identifiable. Petitioners submit that the Mamaril filed a Comment18 on December 10, 2014, while the OSG did
simple standards added by the new law, which are matters of record, the same on February 9, 201519 in behalf of all the respondents.
and the creation of the Management, Screening and Evaluation
Committee (MSEC) should not override the constitutional guarantee of Subsequently, Edago et al. filed a Motion with Leave of Court to File
the rights to liberty and due process of law aside from the principle and Admit Reply,20 attaching therein said Reply. On July 28, 2015, We
that penal laws beneficial to the accused are given retroactive effect. granted the motion and noted the Reply.21

Almost a month after, or on July 11, 2014, Atty. Rene A.V. Saguisag, The Court's Ruling
Sr. filed a Petition (In Intervention).9 He incorporates by reference the
Roxas et al. petition, impleads the same respondents, and adds that The petition is granted.
nowhere from the legislative history of R.A. No. 10592 that it intends
to be prospective in character. On July 22, 2014, the Court resolved to Procedural Matters
grant the leave to intervene and require the adverse parties to comment
thereon.10 Actual case or controversy

Another Petition-in-Intervention11 was filed on October 21, 2014. This Respondents contend that the petition of Edago et al. did not comply
time, the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) served as counsel for with all the elements of justiciability as the requirement of an actual
William M. Montinola, Fortunato P. Visto, and Arsenio C. Cabanilla case or controversy vis-a-vis the requirement of ripeness has not been
(Montinola et al.), who are also inmates of the NBP. The petition complied with. For them, the claimed injury of petitioners has not
argues that Section 4, Rule I of the IRR is facially void for being ripened to an actual case requiring this Court's intervention: First, the
contrary to the equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution; it MSEC has not been constituted yet so there is effectively no authority
discriminates, without any reasonable basis, against those who would or specialized body to screen, evaluate and recommend any
have been benefited from the retroactive application of the law; and is applications for time credits based on R.A. No. 10592. Second, none of
also ultra vires, as it was issued beyond the authority of respondents to petitioners has applied for the revised credits, making their claim of
promulgate. In a Resolution dated November 25, 2014, We required injury premature, if not anticipatory. And third, the prison records
the adverse parties to comment on the petition-in-intervention.12 annexed to the petition are neither signed nor certified by the BUCOR
Director which belie the claim of actual injury resulting from alleged
On January 30, 2015, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a extended incarceration. What petitioners did was they immediately
Consolidated Comment13 to the Petition of Roxas et al. and Petition-in- filed this case after obtaining their prison records and computing the
Intervention of Atty. Saguisag, Sr. More than two years later, or on purported application of the revised credits for GCTA under R.A. No.
July 7, 2017, it filed a Comment14 to the Petition-in-Intervention of 10592.
Montinola et al.
We disagree.
G.R. No. 214637
It is well settled that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided unless We do not subscribe to respondents' supposition that it is the Congress
the following requisites for judicial inquiry are present: (a) there must which may claim any injury from the alleged executive encroachment
be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial of the legislative function to amend, modify or repeal laws and that the
power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to challenged acts of respondents have no direct adverse effect on
question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of petitioners, considering that based on records, there was no GCTA
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the granted to them.
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.22 As to It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the requirement of actual case or controversy, the Court stated the name of the real party-in-interest, who stands to be benefited or
in Province of North Cotabato, et al. v. Gov't of the Rep. of the Phils. injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain (GRP), et al.:23 the suit.
The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue
hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By real interest is
controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into areas expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential
committed to the other branches of government. interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an real owner of the right sought to be enforced."
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. "Legal standing" or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized
There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and grievance. The concept has been defined as a personal and substantial
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence, x x x. interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult
prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed constitutional questions.
by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the
petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must
injury to itself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that show "not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or
he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury
injury as a result of the act complained of.24 as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in
There is an actual case or controversy in the case at bar because there some indefinite way." It must [be] shown that he has been, or is about
is a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled,
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. Respondents stand for the or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by
prospective application of the grant of GCTA, TASTM, and STAL reason of the statute complained of.29
while petitioners and intervenors view that such provision violates the In this case, petitioners are directly affected by Section 4, Rule 1 of the
Constitution and Article 22 of the RPC. The legal issue posed is ripe IRR because they are prisoners currently serving their respective
for adjudication as the challenged regulation has a direct adverse effect sentences at the NBP. They have a personal stake in the outcome of
on petitioners and those detained and convicted prisoners who are this case as their stay in prison will potentially be shortened (if the
similarly situated. There exists an immediate and/or threatened injury assailed provision of the IRR is declared unlawful and void) or their
and they have sustained or are immediately in danger of sustaining dates of release will be delayed (if R.A. No. 10592 is applied
direct injury as a result of the act complained of. In fact, while the case prospectively). It is erroneous to assert that the questioned provision
is pending, petitioners are languishing in jail. If their assertion proved has no direct adverse effect on petitioners since there were no GCTAs
to be true, their illegal confinement or detention in the meantime is granted to them. There is none precisely because of the prospective
oppressive. With the prisoners' continued incarceration, any delay in application of R.A. No. 10592. It is a proof of the act complained of
resolving the case would cause them great prejudice. Justice demands rather than an evidence that petitioners lack legal standing. Further, the
that they be released soonest, if not on time. submission of certified prison records is immaterial in determining
whether or not petitioners' rights were breached by the IRR because, to
There is no need to wait and see the actual organization and operation repeat, the possible violation was already fait accompli by the issuance
of the MSEC. Petitioners Edago et al. correctly invoked Our ruling of the IRR. The prison records were merely furnished to show that
in Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Aguirre.25 There, We dismissed the novel respondents have prospectively applied R.A. No. 10592 and that
theory that people should wait for the implementing evil to befall on petitioners will be affected thereby.
them before they could question acts that are illegal or
unconstitutional, and held that "[by] the mere enactment of the Propriety of legal remedy:
questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is
said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other Respondents argue that the petitions for certiorari and prohibition, as
overt act." Similar to Pimentel, Jr., the real issue in this case is well as the petitions-in-intervention, should be dismissed because such
whether the Constitution and the RPC are contravened by Section 4, petitions are proper only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising
Rule 1 of the IRR, not whether they are violated by the acts judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR is an
implementing it. Concrete acts are not necessary to render the present administrative issuance of respondents made in the exercise of their
controversy ripe.26 An actual case may exist even in the absence of rule-making or quasi-legislative functions.
tangible instances when the assailed IRR has actually and adversely
affected petitioners. The mere issuance of the subject IRR has led to True, a petition for certiorari and prohibition is not an appropriate
the ripening of a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. remedy to assail the validity of the subject IRR as it was issued in the
If this Court cannot await the adverse consequences of the law in order exercise of respondents' rule-making or quasi-legislative function.
to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial Nevertheless, the Court has consistently held that "petitions
intervention,27 the same can be said for an IRR. Here, petitioners need for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise
not wait for the creation of the MSEC and be individually rejected in constitutional issues and to review, prohibit or nullify the acts of
their applications. They do not need to actually apply for the revised legislative and executive officials."30 In Araullo v. Aquino III,31 former
credits, considering that such application would be an exercise in Associate Justice, now Chief Justice, Lucas P. Bersamin, explained the
futility in view of respondents' insistence that the law should be remedies of certiorari and prohibition, thus:
prospectively applied. If the assailed provision is indeed What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion
unconstitutional and illegal, there is no better time than the present amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
action to settle such question once and for all.28 instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution?
Legal standing
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners'
determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform
lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately
for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a
similar remedy of certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is temporary restraining order.
expressly applicable only to the judgments and final orders or With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and
resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ
Audit. of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of
jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but
present system are aptly explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
Bank and Trust Company: amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise
writ of certiorari was issued out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is
commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to return the expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section
record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more 1, supra.
sure and speedy justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to
determine from an inspection of the record whether the inferior court's Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies
judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify
nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury the acts of legislative and executive officials.
to the petitioner to whom no other remedy was available. If the inferior
court acted without authority, the record was then revised and Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right
corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases and undo any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
in which the inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
was not proceeding according to essential requirements of law and Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry
would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts. provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected
parties. The Court has been thereby entrusted expressly or by
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains necessary implication with both the duty and the obligation of
much the same as it has been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed
however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ of certiorari is legislative or executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the
largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in republican system of checks and balances.32
the Rules of Court in which a superior court may issue the writ In view of the foregoing, We shall proceed to discuss the substantive
of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1, Rule 65 of issues raised herein so as to finally resolve the question on the validity
the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that of Section 4, Rule 1 of the IRR, which is purely legal in nature. This is
purpose, viz.: also because of the public importance of the issues raised, 33 and the
interest of substantial justice,34 not to mention the absence of any
xxxx dispute as to any underlying fact.35

The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of Hierarchy of courts
jurisdiction, which includes the commission of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse Respondents contend that the petition for certiorari and prohibition, as
of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The well as the petitions-in-intervention, should still be dismissed for
abuse of discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial failure to observe the rule on hierarchy of courts. According to them,
or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic this Court's jurisdiction over actions assailing the validity of
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the administrative issuances is primarily appellate in nature by virtue of
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the Constitution. 36 An action assailing
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, the validity of an administrative issuance is one that is incapable of
such as when such judge, tribunal or board exercising judicial or quasi- pecuniary estimation, which, under Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P.
judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be Blg.) 129, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has exclusive original
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. jurisdiction. Further, a petition for declaratory relief filed before the
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of RTC, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, is the proper remedy
jurisdiction, certiorari is to be distinguished from prohibition by the to question the validity of the IRR.37
fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-examination of some
action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding Indeed, under Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, the question presented
in the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a here is a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation, which exclusively
preventative remedy issuing to restrain future action, and is directed to and originally pertained to the proper RTC.38 Fundamentally, there is
the court itself. The Court expounded on the nature and function of the no doubt that this consolidated case captioned as petition
writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. for certiorari and prohibition seeks to declare the unconstitutionality
Defensor: and illegality of Section 4 Rule 1 of the IRR; thus, partaking the nature
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an of a petition for declaratory relief over which We only have appellate
IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition jurisdiction pursuant to Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the
is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, Constitution. In accordance with Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules, the
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or special civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive
ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from jurisdiction of the RTC.
further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of
said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave Nevertheless, the judicial policy has been to entertain a direct resort to
abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy this Court in exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies of national interest and of serious implications, and those of
against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or transcendental importance and of first impression. 39 As the petitions
quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of clearly and specifically set out special and important reasons therefor,
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction We may overlook the Rules. Here, petitioners Edago et al. are correct
in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. in asserting that R.A. No. 10592 and its IRR affect the entire
Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of correctional system of the Philippines. Not only the social, economic,
jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of and moral well-being of the convicts and detainees are involved but
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the also their victims and their own families, the jails, and the society at
inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or large. The nationwide implications of the petitions, the extensive scope
where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of of the subject matter, the upholding of public policy, and the
law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief repercussions on the society are factors warranting direct recourse to
sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary Us.
action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the
Yet more than anything, there is an urgent necessity to dispense
substantive justice on the numerous affected inmates. It is a must to In the case at bar, petitioners assert that Article 22 of the RPC applies
treat this consolidated case with a circumspect leniency, granting because R.A. No. 10592 is a penal law. They claim that said law has
petitioners the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of their case become an integral part of the RPC as Articles 29, 94, 97, 98 and 99
rather than lose their liberty on the basis of technicalities. 40 It need not thereof. Edago et al. further argue that if an amendment to the RPC
be said that while this case has been pending, their right to liberty is on that makes the penalties more onerous or prejudicial to the accused
the line. An extended period of detention or one that is beyond the cannot be applied retroactively for being an ex post facto law, a law
period allowed by law violates the accused person's right to that makes the penalties lighter should be considered penal laws in
liberty.41 Hence, We shunt the rigidity of the rules of procedure so as accordance with Article 22 of the RPC.
not to deprive such birthright.42 The Court zealously guards against the
curtailment of a person's basic constitutional and natural right to We concur.
liberty.43 The right to liberty, which stands second only to life in the
hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away.44 At its While R.A. No. 10592 does not define a crime/offense or
core, substantive due process guarantees a right to liberty that cannot provide/prescribe/establish a penalty67 as it addresses the rehabilitation
be taken away or unduly constricted, except through valid causes component68 of our correctional system, its provisions have the
provided by law.45 purpose and effect of diminishing the punishment attached to the
crime. The further reduction on the length of the penalty of
Substantive Issues imprisonment is, in the ultimate analysis, beneficial to the detention
and convicted prisoners alike; hence, calls for the application of
Every new law has a prospective effect. Under Article 22 of the RPC, Article 22 of the RPC.
however, a penal law that is favorable or advantageous to the accused
shall be given retroactive effect if he is not a habitual criminal. These The prospective application of the beneficial provisions of R.A. No.
are the rules, the exception, and the exception to the exception on the 10592 actually works to the disadvantage of petitioners and those who
effectivity of laws.46 are similarly situated. It precludes the decrease in the penalty attached
to their respective crimes and lengthens their prison stay; thus, making
In criminal law, the principle favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa more onerous the punishment for the crimes they committed.
restrigenda (penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given Depriving them of time off to which they are justly entitled as a
retroactive effect) is well entrenched.47 It has been sanctioned since the practical matter results in extending their sentence and increasing their
old Penal Code.48 punishment.69 Evidently, this transgresses the clear mandate of Article
x x x as far back as the year 1884, when the Penal Code took effect in 22 of the RPC.
these Islands until the 31st of December, 1931, the principle
underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an In support of the prospective application of the grant of GCTA,
exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the TASTM, and STAL, respondents aver that a careful scrutiny of R.A.
law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried over No. 10592 would indicate the need for "new procedures and standards
into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines of behavior" to fully implement the law by the BUCOR (as to persons
through article 22 x x x. This is an exception to the general rule that all serving their sentences after conviction) and the BJMP (as to accused
laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the who are under preventive detention). It is alleged that the amendments
following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, introduced are substantial and of utmost importance that they may not
not backward); lex defuturo, judex de proeterito (the law provides for be implemented without a thorough revision of the BUCOR and the
the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with BJMP operating manuals on jail management. In particular, the
a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience and good establishment of the MSEC is said to be an administrative mechanism
law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known to address the policy and necessity that the BUCOR superintendents
aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. As one and the BJMP jail wardens must follow uniform guidelines in
distinguished author has put it, the exception was inspired by managing, screening and evaluating the behavior or conduct of
sentiments of humanity, and accepted by science.49 prisoners prior to their recommendation to the heads of the two
According to Mr. Chief Justice Manuel Araullo, the principle is "not as bureaus on who may be granted time allowances.
a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles on which
the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are Respondents fail to persuade Us.
based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice."50 Except for the benefits of TASTM and the STAL granted to a prisoner
who chose to stay in the place of his confinement despite the existence
Further, case law has shown that the rule on retroactivity under Article of a calamity or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of the RPC, the
22 of the RPC applies to said Code51 and its amendments,52 as well as provisions of R.A. No. 10592 are mere modifications of the RPC that
to special laws,53 such as Act No. 2126,54 Presidential Decree No. have been implemented by the BUCOR prior to the issuance of the
603,55 R.A. No. 7636,56 R.A. No. 8293,57 R.A. No. 8294,58 R.A. No. challenged IRR. In view of this, the claim of "new procedures and
9344,59 and R.A. No. 10586,60 to cite a few. standards of behavior" for the grant of time allowances is untenable.

But what exactly is a penal law? It appears that even prior to February 1, 1916 when Act No. 2557 was
enacted,70 prisoners have already been entitled to deduct the period of
A penal provision or statute has been consistently defined by preventive imprisonment from the service of their sentences. In
jurisprudence as follows: addition, good conduct time allowance has been in existence since
A penal provision defines a crime or provides a punishment for one.61 August 30, 1906 upon the passage of Act No. 1533. 71 Said law
provided for the diminution of sentences imposed upon convicted
Penal laws and laws which, while not penal in nature, have provisions prisoners in consideration of good conduct and diligence.72 Under Act
defining offenses and prescribing penalties for their violation.62 No. 1533 and subsequently under Article 97 of the RPC, the time
allowance may also apply to detention prisoners if they voluntarily
Properly speaking, a statute is penal when it imposes punishment for offer in writing to perform such labor as may be assigned to
an offense committed against the state which, under the Constitution, them.73 Such prerequisite was removed by R.A. No. 10592.
the Executive has the power to pardon. In common use, however, this
sense has been enlarged to include within the term "penal statutes" all Subject to the review, and in accordance with the rules and
statutes which command or prohibit certain acts, and establish regulations, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Public
penalties for their violation, and even those which, without expressly Instruction, the wardens or officers in charge of Insular or provincial
prohibiting certain acts, impose a penalty upon their commission.63 jails or prisons were mandated to make and keep such records and take
such further actions as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts Act No. 1533.74 When the RPC took effect on January 1, 1932,75 the
and establish penalties for their violations; or those that define crimes, Director of Prisons was empowered to grant allowances for good
treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.64 conduct whenever lawfully justified.76 With the effectivity of R.A. No.
The "penal laws" mentioned in Article 22 of the RPC refer 10592 on June 6, 2013, such authority is now vested on the Director of
to substantive laws, not procedural rules.65 Moreover, the mere fact the BUCOR, the Chief of the BJMP and/or the Warden of a provincial,
that a law contains penal provisions does not make it penal in nature.66 district, municipal or city jail.77
Under the IRR of R.A. No. 10592, the MSECs are established to act as G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971
the recommending body for the grant of GCTA and TASTM.78 They
are tasked to manage, screen and evaluate the behavior and conduct of
a detention or convicted prisoner and to monitor and certify whether MARIO GUMABON, BLAS BAGOLBAGOL, GAUDENCIO
said prisoner has actually studied, taught or performed mentoring AGAPITO, EPIFANIO PADUA and PATERNO
activities.79 The creation of the MSEC, however, does not justify the PALMARES, petitioners,
prospective application of R.A. No. 10592. Nowhere in the vs.
amendatory law was its formation set as a precondition before its THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondent.
beneficial provisions are applied. What R.A. No. 10592 only provides
is that the Secretaries of the DOJ and the DILG are authorized to Jose W. Diokno for petitioners.
promulgate rules and regulations on the classification system for good
conduct and time allowances, as may be necessary to implement its Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor
provisions.80 Clearly, respondents went outside the bounds of their General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Eduardo C. Abaya for
legal mandate when they provided for rules beyond what was respondent.
contemplated by the law to be enforced.
Indeed, administrative IRRs adopted by a particular department of the
Government under legislative authority must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying FERNANDO, J.:
the law's general provisions into effect. The law itself cannot be
expanded by such IRRSs, because an administrative agency cannot Habeas corpus, the great writ of liberty, is relied upon by petitioners,
amend an act of Congress.81 five in number, for their release from imprisonment. Meted out life
The contention of Edago et al. stands undisputed that, prior to the terms for the complex crime of rebellion with murder and other
issuance of the assailed IRR and even before the enactment of R.A. crimes, they would invoke the People v. Hernandez1 doctrine, negating
No. 10592, a Classification Board had been handling the functions of the existence of such an offense, a ruling that unfortunately for them
the MSEC and implementing the provisions of the RPC on time was not handed down until after their convictions had become final.
allowances. While there is a noble intent to systematize and/or Nor is this the first instance, a proceeding of this character was
institutionalize existing set-up, the administrative and procedural instituted, as in Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons,2 likewise a petition for
restructuring should not in any way prejudice the substantive rights of habeas corpus, a similar question was presented. The answer given
current detention and convicted prisoners. was in the negative. Petitioners plead for a new look on the matter.
They would premise their stand on the denial of equal protection if
Furthermore, despite various amendments to the law, the standard of their plea would not be granted. Moreover they did invoke the codal
behavior in granting GCTA remains to be "good conduct." In essence, provision that judicial decisions shall form part of the legal system of
the definition of what constitutes "good conduct" has been invariable the Philippines,3 necessarily resulting in the conclusion that the
through the years, thus: Hernandez decision once promulgated calls for a retroactive effect
Act No. 1533: "not been guilty of a violation of discipline or any of the under the explicit mandate of the Revised Penal Code as to penal laws
rules of the prison, and has labored with diligence and fidelity upon all having such character even if at the time of their application a final
such tasks as have been assigned to him."82 sentence has been rendered "and the convict is serving the
same."4 These arguments carry considerable persuasion. Accordingly
BUCOR Operating Manual dated March 30, 2000: "displays good we find for petitioners, without going so far as to overrule Pomeroy.
behavior and who has no record of breach of discipline or violation of
prison rules and regulations."83 Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on
May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua for the complex crime of
IRR of R.A. No. 10592: "the conspicuous and satisfactory behavior of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping.
a detention or convicted prisoner consisting of active involvement in Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito, Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua,
rehabilitation programs, productive participation in authorized work likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
activities or accomplishment of exemplary deeds coupled with faithful murder and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same
obedience to all prison/jail rules and regulations"84 penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on March 8, 1954
Among other data, an inmate's prison record contains information on and, as to the third, on December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas
his behavior or conduct while in prison.85 Likewise, the Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the complex crime of rebellion with
certificate/diploma issued upon successful completion of an multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized
educational program or course (i.e., elementary, secondary and college with reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then
education as well as vocational training) forms part of the imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions. Each of them has
record.86 These considered, the Court cannot but share the same served more than 13 years.5
sentiment of Roxas et al. It is indeed perplexing why it is complex for
respondents to retroactively apply R.A. No. 10592 when all that the
MSEC has to do is to utilize the same standard of behavior for the Subsequently, in People v. Hernandez,6 as above noted, this Court
grant of time allowances and refer to existing prison records. ruled that the information against the accused in that case for rebellion
complexed with murder, arson and robbery was not warranted under
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions are GRANTED. Section Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no such complex
4, Rule 1 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act offense.7 In the recently-decided case of People vs. Lava,8 we
No. 10592 is DECLARED invalid insofar as it provides for the expressly reaffirmed the ruling in the Hernandez case rejecting the
prospective application of the grant of good conduct time allowance, plea of the Solicitor General for the abandonment of such doctrine. It
time allowance for study, teaching and mentoring, and special time is the contention of each of the petitioners that he has served, in the
allowance for loyalty. The Director General of the Bureau of light of the above, more than the maximum penalty that could have
Corrections and the Chief of the Bureau of Jail Management and been imposed upon him. He is thus entitled to freedom, his continued
Penology are REQUIRED to RE-COMPUTE with reasonable detention being illegal.9
dispatch the time allowances due to petitioners and all those who are
similarly situated and, thereafter, to CAUSE their immediate release The fear that the Pomeroy ruling stands as an obstacle to their release
from imprisonment in case of full service of sentence, unless they are on a habeas corpus proceeding prompted petitioners, as had been
being confined thereat for any other lawful cause. mentioned, to ask that it be appraised anew and, if necessary,
discarded. We can resolve the present petition without doing so. The
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY. plea there made was unconvincing, there being a failure to invoke the
contentions now pressed vigorously by their counsel, Attorney Jose W.
SO ORDERED. Diokno, as to the existence of a denial of a constitutional right that
would suffice to raise a serious jurisdictional question and the
retroactive effect to be given a judicial decision favorable to one
already sentenced to a final judgment under Art. 22 of the Revised
Penal Code. To repeat, these two grounds carry weight. We have to
grant this petition.
1. The fundamental issue, to repeat, is the availability of the writ of Mangum: 30 "But habeas corpus cuts through all forms and goes to the
habeas corpus under the circumstances disclosed. Its latitudinarian very tissue of the structure."
scope to assure that illegality of restraint and detention be avoided is
one of the truisms of the law. It is not known as the writ of liberty for 2. Where, however, the detention complained of finds its origin in
nothing. The writ imposes on judges the grave responsibility of what has been judicially ordained, the range of inquiry in a habeas
ascertaining whether there is any legal justification for a deprivation of corpus proceeding is considerably narrowed. For if "the person alleged
physical freedom. Unless there be such a showing, the confinement to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
must thereby cease. If there be a valid sentence it cannot, even for a process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
moment, be extended beyond the period provided for by law. Any of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
deviation from the legal norms call for the termination of the issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order," the writ
imprisonment. does not lie. 31 That principle dates back to 1902, 32 when this Court
announced that habeas corpus was unavailing where the person
Rightly then could Chafee refer to the writ as "the most important detained was in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
human rights provision" in the fundamental law. 10 Nor is such praise court or magistrate. This is understandable, as during the time the
unique. Cooley spoke of it as "one of the principal safeguards to Philippines was under American rule, there was necessarily an
personal liberty." 11 For Willoughby, it is "the greatest of the adherence to authoritative doctrines of constitutional law there
safeguards erected by the civil law against arbitrary and illegal followed.
imprisonment by whomsoever detention may be exercised or
ordered." 12 Burdick echoed a similar sentiment, referring to it as "one One such principle is the requirement that there be a finding of
of the most important bulwarks of liberty." 13 Fraenkel made it jurisdictional defect. As summarized by Justice Bradley in Ex
unanimous, for to him, "without it much else would be of no parte Siebold, an 1880 decision: "The only ground on which this
avail." 14 Thereby the rule of law is assured. court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will
give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and
A full awareness of the potentialities of the writ of habeas corpus in sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over
the defense of liberty coupled with its limitations may be detected in the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings
the opinions of former Chief Justices Arellano, 15 Avanceña, 16 Abad void." 33
Santos, 17 Paras, 18 Bengzon, 19 and the present Chief Justice. 20 It fell to
Justice Malcolm's lot, however to emphasize quite a few times the There is the fundamental exception though, that must ever be kept in
breadth of its amplitude and of its reach. In Villavicencio v. mind. Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the
Lukban, 21 the remedy came in handy to challenge the validity of the court that rendered the judgment is deemed ousted of jurisdiction and
order of the then respondent Mayor of Manila who, for the best of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to assail the legality of the
reasons but without legal justification, ordered the transportation of detention. 34
more than 150 inmates of houses of ill-repute to Davao. After referring
to the writ of habeas corpus as having been devised and existing "as a
speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful 3. Petitioners precisely assert a deprivation of a constitutional right,
restraint" the opinion of Justice Malcolm continued: "The essential namely, the denial of equal protection. According to their petition: "In
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all the case at bar, the petitioners were convicted by Courts of First
manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to Instance for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez, Geronimo,
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint and others were convicted. The law under which they were convicted
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient." 22 is the very same law under which the latter were convicted. It had not
and has not been changed. For the same crime, committed under the
same law, how can we, in conscience, allow petitioners to suffer life
The liberality with which the judiciary is to construe habeas corpus imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?" 35
petitions even if presented in pleadings on their face devoid of merit
was demonstrated in Ganaway v. Quilen, 23 where this Court, again
through Justice Malcolm, stated: "As standing alone the petition for They would thus stress that, contrary to the mandate of equal
habeas corpus was fatally defective in its allegations, this court, on its protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.
motion, ordered before it the record of the lower court in the case What is required under this required constitutional guarantee is the
entitled Thomas Casey, et al. v. George Ganaway." 24 It is to Justice uniform operation of legal norms so that all persons under similar
Malcolm likewise in Conde v. Rivera, 25 to whom is traceable the circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both in the
doctrine, one that broadens the field of the operation of the writ, that a privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a
disregard of the constitutional right to speedy trial ousts the court of recent decision: "Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed.
jurisdiction and entitles the accused if "restrained of his liberty, by For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
habeas corpus to obtain his every person under circumstances, which if not identical are
freedom." 26 analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those
that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 36
So it is in the United States. An 1830 decision 27 of Chief Justice
Marshall put the matter thus: "The writ of habeas corpus is a high
prerogative writ, known to the common law, the great object of which The argument of petitioners thus possesses a persuasive ring. The
is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned without sufficient continued incarceration after the twelve-year period when such is the
cause." Then there is this affirmation from an 1869 decision 28 of the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with our controlling
then Chief Justice Chase: "The great writ of habeas corpus has been doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught
for centuries esteemed the best and only sufficient defense of personal with implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it
freedom." The passing of the years has only served to confirm its life. On the contrary, it would render it nugatory. Otherwise, what
primacy as a weapon on in the cause of liberty. Only the other year, would happen is that for an identical offense, the only distinction lying
Justice Fortas spoke for the United States Supreme Court thus: "The in the finality of the conviction of one being before the Hernandez
writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding ruling and the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. ... The would be made to suffer different penalties. Moreover, as noted in the
scope and flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of petition before us, after our ruling in People v. Lava, petitioners who
illegal detention — its ability to cut through barriers of form and were mere followers would be made to languish in jail for perhaps the
procedural mazes — have always been emphasized and jealously rest of their natural lives when the leaders had been duly considered as
guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very nature of the writ demands having paid their penalty to society, and freed. Such a deplorable result
that it be administered with the initiative and flexibility essential to is to be avoided.
insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are surfaced and
corrected." 29 Justice Fortas explicitly made reference to Blackstone, 4. Petitioners likewise, as was made mention at the outset, would rely
who spoke of it as "the great and efficacious writ, in all manner of on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which requires that penal
illegal confinement." Implicit in his just estimate of its pre-eminent judgment be given a retroactive effect. In support of their contention,
role is his adoption of Holmes' famous dissent in Frank v. petitioners cite U.S. v. Macasaet, 37 U.S. vs.Parrone, 38 U.S. v.
Almencion, 39 People v. Moran, 40 and People v. Parel. 41 While
reference in the above provision is made not to judicial decisions but
to legislative acts, petitioners entertain the view that it would be
merely an exaltation of the literal to deny its application to a case like
the present. Such a belief has a firmer foundation. As was previously G.R. No. L-44988             October 31, 1936
noted, the Civil Code provides that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the Constitution, as well as legislation, form part of our THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-
legal system. Petitioners would even find support in the well-known appellee,
dictum of Bishop Hoadley: vs.
CANUTO BERNAL, defendant-appellant.
"Whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken
laws, it is he who is truly the law-giver to all intents and purposes, and Juan M. Ladaw for appellant.
not the person who first thought or spoke them." It is to be admitted Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for appellee.
that constitutional law scholars, notably
Frankfurter, 42 Powell, 43 and Thayer, 44 in discussing judicial review as
well as the jurist John Chipman Gray, were much impressed with the IMPERIAL, J.:
truth and the soundness of the above observations. We do not have to
go that far though. Enough for present purposes that both the Civil
Code and the Revised Penal Code allow, if they do not call for, a The accused was charged with the crime of theft, the information
retroactive application. alleging that, aside from the presence of the aggravating circumstance
of nocturnity, the accused is an habitual delinquent because he had
been convicted, prior to the commission of the offense at bar, thrice of
It being undeniable that if the Hernandez ruling were to be given a the same crime of theft. The accused pleaded not guilty, but the court,
retroactive effect petitioners had served the full term for which they after trial, found him guilty as charged, and sentenced him to four (4)
could have been legally committed, is habeas corpus the appropriate months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, to pay the accessories of the
remedy? The answer cannot be in doubt. As far back as 1910 the law, to return the three stolen roosters to Mariano de Leon or to
prevailing doctrine was announced in Cruz v. Director of indemnify the latter the value thereof in the sum of P3, and to pay the
Prisons. 45 Thus: "The courts uniformly hold that where a sentence costs. As an habitual delinquent, because previously convicted three
imposes punishment in excess of the power of the court to impose, times of the same crime of theft, he was sentenced to an additional
such sentence is void as to the excess, and some of the courts hold that penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor.
the sentence is void in toto; but the weight of authority sustains the
proposition that such a sentence is void only as to the excess imposed
in case the parts are separable, the rule being that the petitioner is not The facts are not disputed by the defense. It has been established that
entitled to his discharge on a writ of habeas corpus unless he has late in the evening of October 11, 1935, the accused, without the
served out so much of the sentence as was valid." 46 There is a owner's consent, took three gamecocks belonging to Elias Piamonte
reiteration of such a principle in Director v. Director of valued at P50, and three other roosters belonging to Mariano de Leon
Prisons  47 where it was explicitly announced by this Court "that the valued at P3. Only two of the gamecocks of Elias Piamonte, valued at
only means of giving retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable P30, were recovered. It has equally been established that the accused
to the accused ... is the writ of habeas corpus." 48 While the above had been thrice convicted of the crime of theft; The first time on April
decision speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, 25, 1935 by the justice of the peace court of San Pablo, Laguna; the
insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the emphatic second time on June 24, 1935 by the justice of the peace court of San
affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by the Pablo, Laguna; and third time on October 19, 1935, by the justice of
retroactive character of a favorable decision holds true. Petitioners the peace court of Tanauan, Batangas.
clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying their
release. The defense assigns only one error of law in the judgment, to wit, the
accused an habitual delinquent under subsection (b) of paragraph 5 of
WHEREFORE, the petition for habeas corpus is granted, and it is article 62 of the Revised Penal Code, and in imposing upon him the
ordered that petitioners be forthwith set at liberty. penalty therein provided. It contends that the applicable provision is
that found in subsection (a) of the aforesaid codal paragraph and
article, because in truth and according to the decisions, the accused has
no more than two prior convictions, the third being the one at bar.
Elaborating on this contention, the defense alleges that the conviction
on October 19, 1935, for the crime of theft should not be counted
against the accused because it took place after the commission of the
offense at bar on the 11th of the said month and year. The Solicitor-
General in his brief agrees with the defense, and recommends that the
penalty fixed in subsection (a) of paragraph 5 of article 62 of the
Revised Penal Code be imposed upon the accused. We hold that the
third conviction, having taken place after the commission of the last
offense with which the accused is now charged, should not be
reckoned with in determining habitual delinquency and the additional
penalty to be imposed, upon the authority of the decisions of this court
in People vs. Santiago (55 Phil., 266), People vs. Ventura (56 Phil., 1,
5), and People vs. Reyes (G.R. Nos. 43904, 43905, October 18, 1935
[62 Phil., 966).

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into

account in the commission of the crime of theft in view of the
established fact that the accused was thrice convicted of the said crime
prior to the trial of this case on November 4, 1935 (art. 14, par. 9,
Revised Penal Code). For this reason, the penalty imposable should be
six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. As an habitual
delinquent, because he was twice convicted of the crime of theft prior
to the commission of the offense at bar (art. 62, last paragraph of the
Revised Penal Code), he should be sentenced to the additional penalty
of three (3) years of prision correccional pursuant to subsection (a) of
paragraph 5 of the said article.

The question arose, in the course of our deliberation on this case, of

whether or not in instances where the accused turns out to be an
habitual delinquent the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, when
alleged and proved, should be taken into account in fixing the penalty
applicable for the commission of the principal offense, independently
of the additional penalty provided by law for habitual delinquency. It G.R. No. L-2873             February 28, 1950
has been urged that said aggravating should not be considered,
otherwise it would be twice held against the accused inasmuch as it is THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
necessarily taken into account in ascertaining whether he is a habitual vs.
delinquent or not. The majority of the court hold to the contrary view, EUGENIO GARCIA Y MADRIGAL, defendant-appellant.
namely, that recidivism should be reckoned with; hence, the accused is
sentenced to the minimum of the maximum penalty fixed by law. Dominador A. Alafriz for appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor
In resolving this question as above set out, the majority of the court Rafael P. Cañiza for appellee.
gave heed to the following considerations:
TUASON, J.:
First: This is not the first time that the question has been submitted to
the consideration of the court. In People vs. Melendrez (59 Phil., 154), The sole question presented on this appeal is whether the appellant,
and People vs, Espina (62 Phil., 607), we have already held that in being 17 years of age at the time of at the time of the commission of
cases similar to the one at bar, the aggravating circumstance of the crime, was entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
recidivism should be taken into consideration, notwithstanding the article 68, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code. The lower court,
allegation and proof that the accused were habitual delinquents and ignoring defendant's minority, sentenced him to an indeterminate
should accordingly be sentenced to the additional penalty provided by penalty of from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day of prision correccional to
law; and 8 years of prision mayor for the crime of robbery of which he was
found guilty. He was also sentenced to pay the offended party, jointly
Second: It is not correct to assume that recidivism is twice taken into and severally with the other accused, the sum of P85 as indemnity.
account when the accused is declared an habitual delinquent and when
it is deemed to aggravate the crime in fixing the principal penalty to be Republic Act No. 47, which amended article 80 of the Revised Penal
imposed, because recidivism as an aggravating circumstance Code by reducing from 18 to 16 the age below which accused have to
modifying criminal liability is not an inherent or integral element of "be committed to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent
habitual delinquency which the Revised Penal Code considers as an or charitable institution," instead of being convicted and sentenced to
extraordinary and special aggravating circumstance. prison, has given rise to the controversy. The Solicitor General
believes that the amendment by implication has also amended
Under the last subsection of paragraph 5 of article 62 of he Revised paragraph 2 of article 68 of the Revised Pena Code, which provides
Penal Code, a person shall be deemed to be habitually delinquent, if that when the offender is over fifteen and under eighteen years age,
within a period of ten years from the date of his release or last "The penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed,
conviction of the crime of robbery, theft, estafa, or falsification, he is but always in the proper period."
found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener. Paragraph 9
of article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines recidivism by stating There are well recognized rules of statutory construction which are
that it is committed by a person who, at the time of his trial for one against the Government's contention.
crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the same title of the Code. Defining
reiteration or habituality paragraph 10 of the same article provides that One of these rules is that all parts of a statute are to be harmonized and
it is committed when the offender has been previously punished for an reconciled so that effect may be given to each and every part thereof,
offense to which the law attaches at an equal or greater penalty or for and that conflicting intention in the same statute are never to be
two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty. Reflecting on supposed or so regarded, unless forced upon the court by an
these definitions it will be seen that recidivism, viewed as an unambiguous language. (59 C. J., 999.)
aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or element which necessarily
forms an integral part of habitual delinquency. It will be noted that the This rule applies in the construction of a statute and its amendment,
elements as well as the basis of each of these circumstances are both being read together as whole. "An amended act is ordinarily to be
different. For recidivism to exist, it is sufficient that the accused, on construed as if the original statute has been repealed, and a new and
the date of his trial, shall have been previously convicted by final independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead; or,
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title. For the as frequently stated by the courts, so far as regards any action after the
existence of habitual delinquency, it is not enough that the accused adoption of the amendment, as if the statute had been originally
shall have been convicted of any of the crimes specified, and that the enacted in its amended form the amendment becomes a part of the
last conviction shall have taken place ten (10) years before the original statute as if it had always been contained therein, unless such
commission of the last offense. It is necessary that the crimes amendment involves the abrogation of contractual relations between
previously committed be prior to the commission of the offense with the state and others. Where an amendment leaves certain portions of
which the accused is charged a third time or oftener. the original act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with
the same meaning and effect they had before the amendment. So
In view of the foregoing, the appealed judgment is modified, and the where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute shall be
accused-appellant is found guilty of the crime of theft charged in the amended to read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the
complaint and sentenced to six (6) months and one (1) day of prision existing law as are retained, either literally or substantially, are
correccional, to return to the offended parties the stolen and regarded as a continuation of the existing law, and not as a new
unrecovered roosters, or in default thereof to indemnify Elias Piamonte enactment." (59 C. J., 1096, 1097.)
in the sum of P20 and Mariano de Leon in the sum of P3, with the
corresponding subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to We find no irreconcilable conflict between article 68, paragraph 2, as
an additional penalty of three (3) years of prision correccional, with it nowstands and article 80 as amended. There is no incompatibility
the costs in both instances. So ordered. between granting accused of the ages of 15 to 18 a privileged
mitigating circumstance and fixing at 16 the maximum age of persons
who are to be placed in a reformatory institution. In other words, there
is no inconsistency between sending defendants of certain ages to
prison and giving them a penalty lower than the imposable one on
adults under the same or similar circumstances. Let it be remember
that the privilege of article 68, supra, is not by its nature inherent in
age but purely statutory and conventional, and that this privilege is
granted adult offenders under given conditions.

At least there is no clear intention on the part of the Congress to amend

article 68. Indeed the rational presumption is that if there had been
such an intention the lawmakers should have said so expressly, instead
of leaving the change to inference.
G.R. No. 150762             January 20, 2006
One other rule of interpretation that quarrels with the theory of implied
repeal or amendment is that penal law is to be construed, in case of
doubt, strictly against the state. "Criminal and penal statutes must be COVERDALE ABARQUEZ, y EVANGELISTA, Petitioner,
strictly construed, that is, they cannot be enlarged or extended by vs.
intendment, implication, or by any equitable considerations. In other THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
words, the language cannot be enlarged beyond the ordinary meaning
of its terms in order to carry into effect the general purpose for which DECISION
the statute was enacted. Only those persons, offenses, and penalties,
clearly included, beyond any reasonable doubt, will be considered CARPIO, J.:
within the statute's operation. They must come clearly within both the
spirit and the letter of the statute, and where there is any reasonable
doubt, it must be resolved in favor of the person accused of violating The Case
the statute; that is, all questions in doubt will be resolved in favor of
those from whom the penalty is sought." (Statutory Construction, Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 23 June 2000
Crawford, pp. 460-462.) Decision2 and the 7 November 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450. The Court of Appeals affirmed
The offense charged in the information of which the appellant was the 30 September 1997 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court of
found guilty is punishable under article 294, case No. 5, of the Revised Manila, Branch 50 ("trial court") in Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-
Penal Code, as amended by section 6 of Republic Act No. 18, with 56. The trial court found Coverdale Abarquez y Evangelista
prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its ("Abarquez") guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the
medium period. The penalty one degree lower than this is arresto crime of homicide in Criminal Case No. 94-135055.
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium
period. There being no modifying circumstance, the appropriate The Charge
penalty in the present case is from 6 months and 1 day of arresto
mayor to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. Being entitled The prosecution charged Abarquez with the crimes of homicide and
to an indeterminate penalty as provided in section 1 of Act No. L-4103 attempted homicide in two Informations,5 as follows:
as amended, the accused should be, and he is hereby sentenced to
imprisonment of not less than 4 months of arresto mayor and not more
than 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional. In all other respect Criminal Case No. 94-135055
the appealed judgment is affirmed. The appellant will pay the costs of
this appeal. The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y
EVANGELISTA of the crime of HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes
and Torres, JJ., concur. That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with one
ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has already been
charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, under Crim. Case No. 93-129891 and mutually helping each
other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon one
RICARDO QUEJONG Y BELLO, by then and there stabbing him
twice with a bladed weapon and hitting him with a gun at the back,
thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 94-135056

The undersigned accuses COVERDALE ABARQUEZ Y

EVANGELISTA of the crime of ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE,
committed as follows:

That on or about November 21, 1993, in the City of Manila,

Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating with one
ALBERTO ALMOJUELA Y VILLANUEVA, who has already been
charged for the same offense before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila under Crim. Case No. 93-129892 and mutually helping each
other, with intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commence the commission of the crime of homicide
directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there holding one JOSE
BUENJIJO PAZ Y UMALI and stabbing him with a bladed weapon,
hitting him on the left arm, but the said accused did not perform all the
acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide
as a consequence, by reason of causes other than his own spontaneous
desistance, that is, the injury inflicted upon said JOSE BUENJIJO
PAZ Y UMALI is only slight and not fatal.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Abarquez entered a plea of not guilty to both charges. The cases were
tried jointly.
The Version of the Prosecution house, Abarquez saw Almojuela on the ground being strangled by
Quejong. Paz was holding Almojuela’s waist and boxing him at the
On 21 November 1993 at 2:00 p.m., Jose Buenjijo Paz8 ("Paz"), stomach. Masula was near Almojuela’s head holding a piece of stone
Ricardo Quejong ("Quejong") and their friends were in the house of as if waiting for a chance to hit him. Abarquez shouted at the group to
one Boyet at 3342 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. They were stop. The group did not heed Abarquez, forcing him to fire a warning
drinking liquor in celebration of the birthday of Boyet’s son. About shot into the air. Still, the group did not heed Abarquez who then fired
7:45 p.m., Paz and Quejong decided to go home. Boyet Tong, a second warning shot. Paz, Quejong, and Masula scampered away.
Abarquez’s son Bardie and Sonito Masula ("Masula") joined Paz and
Quejong. They proceeded towards the exit of San Jose St. Almojuela told Abarquez that he was merely trying to stop the group
of Paz from smoking marijuana. Almojuela then went inside his house
Meanwhile, about six or seven meters away from Boyet’s house, while Abarquez went home. On his way home, Abarquez met the
Alberto Almojuela also known as Bitoy ("Almojuela"), a certain Ising Chief Tanod of the barangay and two kagawads. Kagawad Rudy Lego
and Abarquez also known as Dale, were likewise drinking liquor in ("Lego") advised him to report the incident to the police. They all
front of Almojuela’s house. As the group of Paz was passing towards proceeded to Precinct No. 4 where Lego reported the incident to the
the main road, Almojuela and his companions blocked their path. desk officer. The desk officer told them that a person had been
stabbed. When Abarquez reached their house, he saw policemen and
media men with their barangay chairman. He informed them that he
Almojuela asked Paz, "Are you brave?" Paz replied, "Why?" had just reported the incident. Upon the request of SPO1 Vidad,
Almojuela got angry and attacked Paz with a knife. Paz parried the Abarquez then went to the police station to shed light on the incident.
attack with his left arm but sustained an injury. Abarquez held Paz on
both shoulders while Bardie pacified Almojuela. Paz asked Abarquez,
"What is our atraso, we were going home, why did you block our Almojuela testified that he was inside his house when his daughter
way?" Abarquez answered, "Masyado kang matapang. Tumigil ka na, informed him that there was marijuana smoke coming to their window.
tumigil ka na." He went outside to look for the source of the smoke and saw Quejong,
Paz, and Masula smoking marijuana. Almojuela asked the group to
move away as there were children inside the house. He was on his way
Almojuela then confronted Quejong and they had an altercation, back to the house when Quejong tried to strangle him. Later,
followed by a scuffle. Paz tried to get away from Abarquez who Almojuela heard a gunshot. He also heard Abarquez shouting,
continued restraining him. Upon seeing Almojuela and Quejong fall on "Tumigil na kayo." Quejong, Masula, and Paz ran away.
the ground, Paz struggled to free himself from Abarquez. Paz
approached Quejong and found him already bloodied. It turned out the
Almojuela stabbed Quejong with a knife. Paz tried to pull up Quejong Winfred Evangelista10 ("Evangelista") testified that he was resting in
but failed. Paz left Quejong and ran instead towards the exit of San front of his house when he heard a commotion. He noticed that Paz
Jose St. to ask for help. While Paz was running away, he heard and Quejong were quarreling. Evangelista saw Paz kicking Almojuela.
Abarquez shout, "You left your companion already wounded!" Abarquez arrived to break up the fight but he was told not to interfere.
Abarquez was forced to fire a warning shot and the persons involved
in the commotion ran away.
When Paz and his companions returned, they found Quejong still on
the ground. Almojuela and Abarquez were still in the area. Paz and his
companions brought Quejong to the UST Hospital. They next The Ruling of the Trial Court
proceeded to Police Precinct No. 4 to report the incident. However,
there was nobody in the precinct. With Kagawad Villanio Usorio, Paz In its Decision11 dated 30 September 1997, the trial court found
went to the WPD General Headquarters to report the incident. At the Abarquez guilty as an accomplice in the crime of homicide. The trial
WPD General Headquarters, they learned that Quejong died at the court held that the prosecution failed to prove that Abarquez was a co-
UST Hospital. Paz then had his injury treated by Dr. Vic Managuelod conspirator of Almojuela in the killing of Quejong. Hence, Abarquez
at Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital. The medico-legal certificate showed could not be convicted as a principal in the crime of homicide.
that Paz sustained a 3-cm. lacerated wound on his left forearm. However, the trial court ruled that Abarquez, in holding and
restraining Paz, prevented the latter from helping Quejong and allowed
About 9:15 p.m., while SPO1 Danilo Vidad ("SPO1 Vidad") was at Almojuela to pursue his criminal act without resistance.
the WPD Homicide Division, his station received a call from the UST
Hospital informing them of the death of Quejong. SPO1 Vidad and The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Decision reads:
PO3 Ed Co went to the UST Hospital morgue and investigated the
incident. They learned that Almojuela, assisted by Abarquez, stabbed WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 94-135055, this Court finds the
Quejong. Upon the execution of sworn statements by Paz and Masula, accused, Coverdale Abarquez, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
SPO1 Vidad booked Almojuela and Abarquez for homicide and crime of homicide only as accomplice and hereby sentences him to
frustrated homicide and prepared the referral letter to the inquest suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) years of prision
prosecutor. correccional to ten (10) years of prision mayor. In Criminal Case No.
94-135056, the accused is hereby acquitted.
Abarquez voluntarily appeared at the police station. Almojuela
voluntarily surrendered to one SPO4 Soriano at Police Station No. 10 With costs de oficio.
and was turned over to the WPD Homicide Division.
SO ORDERED.12
Dr. Antonio Rebosa9 ("Dr. Rebosa"), a medico-legal consultant at UST
Hospital, conducted the post-mortem examination and autopsy on
Quejong. Dr. Rebosa reported that Quejong sustained two stab wounds Abarquez appealed the trial court’s Decision before the Court of
and suffered from massive hemorrhage due to penetrating stab wounds Appeals.
to the heart and left lung. According to Dr. Rebosa, a sharp instrument
probably caused the wound. Dr. Rebosa also reported that Quejong In its Decision13 of 23 June 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
sustained abrasions and contusions on the right upper body, the wrist trial court’s Decision. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in
and on the lower extremities. giving more credence to the testimony of Paz. The Court of Appeals
held that the prosecution was able to establish that Abarquez aided
The Version of the Defense Almojuela in fatally stabbing Quejong. The Court of Appeals rejected
Abarquez’s allegation that he was merely at the crime scene to pacify
the quarreling parties.
Abarquez countered that on 21 November 1993, he was in his
residence at 3363 San Jose St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. About 7:30 p.m.,
Almojuela’s wife informed him that the group of Paz was challenging In its 7 November 2001 Resolution,14 the Court of Appeals denied
Almojuela to a fistfight. Abarquez, being a barangay kagawad, Abarquez’s motion for reconsideration.
proceeded to Almojuela’s house. Almojuela’s house was about twenty
meters away from Abarquez’s house. When he arrived at Almojuela’s Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues I would like to make it of record demonstrated being held by the
accused holding both shoulders, your Honor.
The issues15 Abarquez raises before the Court may be summarized as
follows: q. Now, when this Dale Abarquez held both on your shoulders, what
happened next, if any?
1. Whether the prosecution was able to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt; a. He got angry scolding us. While scolding me the two

2. Whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in giving who were grappling each other walking away, sir. (sic)
more credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
q. Now, you said Bitoy and Ricky were moving, what happened in the
Abarquez alleges that the prosecution’s evidence does not satisfy the course of grappling, if any?
test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support his conviction as
an accomplice. He further alleges that there was a misapprehension of You testified that Ricky and Bitoy were grappling each other, what
facts and that the trial court and the Court of Appeals reached their happened in the course of grappling? (sic)
conclusion based entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures.
Abarquez also assails the credibility of the witnesses against him.
a. They fell to the ground, sir.
The Ruling of This Court
q. After that what happened next, if any?
The petition is meritorious.
a. When I saw them fall I struggle and I was able to release from the
hold of Dale and I approach the two. I saw Ricky blooded so I was
The rule is that the trial court is in the best position to determine the trying to pull him, sir. (sic)
value and weight of the testimony of a witness. The exception is if the
trial court failed to consider certain facts of substance and value, which
if considered, might affect the result of the case. 16 This case is an q. You said you saw Ricky blooded, why was he blooded? (sic)
exception to the rule.
a. He was stabbed by Bitoy, sir.
Concurrence in Criminal Design
q. And did you see what instrument did Bitoy used in stabbing Ricky
Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those or Ricardo? (sic)
persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts."17 a. It was a knife, sir. (Witness indicating a length about 6 inches
including the handle).
Two elements must concur before a person becomes liable as an
accomplice: (1) community of design, which means that the q. Now, you said also that while the two were grappling while you
accomplice knows of, and concurs with, the criminal design of the were trying to free yourself from the hold Dale Abarquez, "Pinagalitan
principal by direct participation; and (2) the performance by the kayo", in what way or manner did Dale Abarquez reprimanded you?
accomplice of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable (sic)
to the commission of the crime.18 Mere commission of an act, which
aids the perpetrator, is not enough.19 Thus: a. You Jose is too brave, sir. (sic)22

The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly xxx xxx xxx
rendered, which cannot exist without the previous cognizance of the
criminal act intended to be executed. It is therefore required in order to
be liable as an accomplice, that the accused must unite with the q. You said you were first attacked by Bitoy, is that correct?
criminal design of the principal by direct participation.20
a. Yes, sir.
Indeed, in one case, the Court ruled that the mere presence of the
accused at the crime scene cannot be interpreted to mean that he q. After Bitoy pacified Bardy Abarquez, he went after Ricky Quejong,
committed the crime charged.21 is it not?23

Here, in convicting Abarquez, the trial court and the Court of Appeals a. They were just arguing, sir.
relied mainly on the testimony of Paz. Paz testified that he was held by
Abarquez on the shoulders, thus preventing him from helping Quejong
[q.] And it was during that time when you were held in both shoulders
who was grappling with Almojuela. Paz testified:
by the accused [C]overdale Abarquez?

q. And what happened in the exchange of words or altercations

a. Yes, sir.
between Bitoy and Ricardo Quejong?

q. and that Coverdale Abarquez was infront of you, is it not?

a. They grappled with each other, sir.

a. Yes, sir on my side.

q. When Bitoy and Ricardo grappled with each other, what did you do,
if any?
q. And he was holding your shoulder to pacify you and Bitoy from
further quarrelling you, is it not?
a. I was intending to help Ricky but I was held back by Dale, sir.

a. That is not the way of pacifying, sir.

q. And how this Dale hold you?

q. How can you demonstrate how you were held on the shoulder by
a. He held my two shoulders, sir.
Abarquez?

PROSECUTOR F. G. SUPNET:
ATTY. GASCON:
Make I make it of record your Honor that the interpreter act as the Paz stated that Abarquez did not do anything to stop Almojuela.
witness while the witness act as the accused demonstrating holding However, Paz testified that Abarquez’s son Bardie, who was one of
both hands of interpreter preventing the witness and saying Joey Paz’s companions, was the one trying to pacify Almojuela. The trial
tumigil ka na, joey tumigil ka na. court in its factual findings confirmed this when it stated that while
Abarquez was holding Paz, his son Bardie was pacifying Almojuela.26
COURT:
The prosecution argues that Abarquez was remiss in his duties as a
q. How many times? barangay kagawad in not extending assistance to the then wounded
Quejong. This, however, does not necessarily show concurrence in
Almojuela’s criminal act. When Paz ran away, Abarquez shouted at
a. Twice, Your Honor. him that he left his wounded companion. Apparently, Abarquez was
not aware of the extent of Quejong’s injury and he expected Paz to
ATTY. GASCON: look after his own companion.

The accused told you Joey tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na because When there is doubt on the guilt of an accused, the doubt should be
you were trying to attack Bitoy, is it not? resolved in his favor. Thus:

a. How can I be charged, he was the one holding the knife, sir. (sic) Every person accused has the right to be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of
q. So what was the reason why the accused restrained you and told you innocence stands as a fundamental principle of both constitutional and
Joey tumigal ka na, Joey tumigil ka na. What would be the reason? criminal law. Thus, the prosecution has the burden of proving every
single fact establishing guilt. Every vestige of doubt having a rational
basis must be removed. The defense of the accused, even if weak, is no
a. While I was just talking to Bitoy, when he told me to stop. reason to convict. Within this framework, the prosecution must prove
its case beyond any hint of uncertainty. The defense need not even
COURT: speak at all. The presumption of innocence is more than sufficient.27

Does the Court get from you that you are trying to explain to Bitoy We apply in this case the equipoise rule. Where the evidence on an
when the accused tried to hold you and prevent you? issue of fact is in issue or there is doubt on which side the evidence
preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses.28 Hence:
a. Yes, sir.
xxx The equipoise rule finds application if, as in this case, the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
q. That is why the reason you concluded that the accused is not
explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
pacifying you but to stop you from helping the victim?
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence
does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to
a. Yes, sir. produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to
convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking.29
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 23 June
q. The only word that the accused [C]overdale Abarquez uttered was 2000 Decision and 7 November 2001 Resolution of the Court of
Joey, tumigil ka na, Joey tumigil ka na, is it not? Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21450, which affirmed the 30 September
1997 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 50 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 94-135055-56. We ACQUIT Coverdale
a. He uttered that you are MATAPANG, Joey tumigil ka na, Joey
Abarquez y Evangelista as an accomplice in the crime of homicide in
tumigil ka na.24
Criminal Case No. 94-135055. No pronouncement as to costs.

Paz’s testimony does not show that Abarquez concurred with

SO ORDERED.
Almojuela’s criminal design. "Tumigil" literally means "stop." Clearly,
Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from joining the fray, not from
helping Quejong. Paz claims that he was only trying to talk to
Almojuela. However, Paz could not have been merely talking to
Almojuela, as he tried to portray, because Almojuela was already
grappling with Quejong at that time. Paz interpreted Abarquez’s action
as an attempt to prevent him from helping Quejong. His interpretation
was adopted by the trial court and sustained by the Court of Appeals.
Yet, in his testimony, Paz admitted that while restraining him,
Abarquez was scolding or reprimanding him and telling him to stop. It
was not shown that Abarquez was stopping Paz from helping
Almojuela. It is more likely that Abarquez was trying to stop Paz from
joining the fight. Abarquez’s act of trying to stop Paz does not
translate to assistance to Almojuela.

In People v. Fabros, 25 the Court explained:

To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge

of and participation in the criminal act. In other words, the principal
and the accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their
efforts to the same end. Thus, it is essential that both were united in
their criminal design.

xxx. The mere fact that the (accused) had prior knowledge of the
(principal’s) criminal design did not automatically make him an
accomplice. This circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence
in the principal’s criminal intent.
 Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley.

G.R. No. L-38725             October 31, 1933 The defendant renewed his motion for dismissal in the case on the
ground of double jeopardy, but his motion was denied; and upon the
termination of the trial the defendant was found guilty and sentenced
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff- as hereinabove stated.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
Appellee, vs. PEDRO MANABA, Defendant-Appellant. law library
Jose Ma. Cavanna for appellant. Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time or
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee. not when he was tried in the present case depends on whether or not he
was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. The offense in question
VICKERS, J.: was committed on May 9, 1932, or subsequent to the date when the
Revised Penal Code became
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Eulalio Garcia in this Court effective.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
of First Instance of Oriental Negros in criminal case No. 1827 dated
November 15, 1932, finding the defendant guilty of rape and The third paragraph of the article 344 of the Revised Penal Code,
sentencing him to suffer seventeen years and four months of reclusion which relates to the prosecution of the crimes of adultery,
temporal, and the accessory penalties of the law, to indemnify the concubinage, seduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness reads as
offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the amount of P500, to maintain follows:
the offspring, if any, at P5 a month until said offspring should become
of age, and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness,
virtual law library shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the
The defendant appealed to this court, and his attorney de oficio now offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as
makes the following assignments of error: the case may be.

The Spanish text of this paragraph is as follows:

1. El juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en favor del acusado apelante la
defensa de double jeopardy o legal jeopardy que ha Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o
interpuesto.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o
de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al
2. El Juzgado a quo erro al no declarar insuficientes las pruebas de ofensor, perdon expreso por dicha partes, segun los casos.
identificacion del acusado
apelante.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library It will be observed that the Spanish equivalent of the word "filed" is
not found in the Spanish text, which is controlling, as it was the
3. El Juzgado a quo tambien erro al pasar por alto las incoherencias de Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code that was approved by the
los testigos de la acusacion y al no declarar que no se ha establecido Legislature.
fuera de toda duda la responsabilidad del
apelante.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and sworn
to by the chief of police of Dumaguete. As it was not the complaint of
4. El Juzgado a quo erro al condenar al acusado apelante por el delito the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance with the
de violacion y al no acceder a su mocion de nueva vista. law. The judgment of the court was therefore void for lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and the defendant was never in
It appears that on May 10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete jeopardy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
subscribed and swore to a criminal complaint wherein he charged
Pedro Manaba with the crime of rape, committed on the person of It might be observed in this connection that the judgment was set aside
Celestina Adapon. This complaint was filed with the justice of the and the case dismissed on the motion of defendant's attorney, who
peace of Dumaguete on June 1, 1932 and in due course the case subsequently set up the plea of double jeopardy in the present
reached the Court of First Instance. The accused was tried and case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
convicted, but on motion of the attorney for the defendant the
judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on the ground that the The other assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the
court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the evidence, which in our opinion fully sustains the findings of the trial
subject matter of the action, because the complaint had not been filed judge.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
by the offended party, but by the chief of police (criminal case No.
1801).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The recommendation of the Solicitor-General is erroneous in several
respects, chiefly due to the fact that it is based on the decision of July
30, 1932 that was set aside, and not on the decision now under
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl subscribed and swore to a consideration. The accused should not be ordered to acknowledge the
complaint charging the defendant with the crime of rape. This offspring, if should there be any, because the record shows that the
complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance (criminal case No. accused is a married man.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
1872), but was referred to the justice of the peace of Dumaguete for virtual law library
preliminary investigation. The defendant waived his right to the
preliminary investigation, but asked for the dismissal of the complaint
on the ground that he had previously been placed in jeopardy for the It appears that the lower court should have taken into consideration the
same offense. This motion was denied by the justice of the peace, and aggravating circumstances of nocturnity. The defendant is therefore
the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance, where the sentenced to suffer seventeen years, four months, and one day
provincial fiscal in an information charged the defendant with having of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina
committed the crime of rape as follows: Adapon, in the sum of P500, and to support the offspring, if any. As
thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs
of both instances against the appellant.chan
Que en o hacia la noche del dia 9 de mayo de 1932, en el Municipio de
Dumaguete, Provincia de Negros Oriental, Islas Filipinas, y dentro de
la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado. el referido acusado Pedro Manaba,
aprovechandose de la oscuridad de la noche y mediante fuerza,
violencia e intimidacion, voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente yacio y
tuvo acceso carnal con una niña llamada Celestina Adapon, contra la
voluntad de esta. El acusado Pedro Manaba ya ha sido convicto por
Juzgado competente y en sentencia firme por este mismo delito de
violacion.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
 In its Motion to Deny Due Course, private respondent also argues that
the petition should now be denied as its title to the land subject of this
G.R. No. 138962             October 4, 2002 case has already been adjudged in its favor. 8

PRESCILLA TUATES and ANDRES DE LA PAZ, petitioners, In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public
vs. respondents, agrees with petitioners that both the criminal and civil
HON. LUCAS P. BERSAMIN, as Presiding Judge, Branch 96, liability were rendered extinct with the repeal of P.D. 772, and
RTC Quezon City, recommended that the assailed issuances be reversed and set aside.
People of the Philippines and I.C. Construction, Inc., respondents.
We find the petition to be meritorious.
DECISION
Republic Act No. 8368, otherwise known as the "Anti-Squatting Law
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: Repeal Act of 1997," provides:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the "SECTION 1. Title. -- This Act shall be known as the ‘Anti-Squatting
Rules of Court, seeking to annul the following: (1) Decision dated Law Repeal Act of 1997.’
April 30, 1999 and Resolution dated June 9, 1999, rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46845; 1 (2) Decision dated "SEC. 2. Repeal. -- Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled ‘Penalizing
September 10, 1997 and the Order dated January 28, 1998 issued by Squatting and Other Similar Acts’ is hereby repealed.
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429;2 and (3) Decision dated "SEC. 3. Effect on Pending Cases. -- All pending cases under the
December 16, 1996 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed upon the
(Branch 38) in Criminal Cases Nos. 38-0130 and 38-0131.3 effectivity of this Act.

The facts are as follows: "SEC. 4. Effect on Republic Act No. 7279. -- Nothing herein shall be
construed to nullify, eliminate or diminish in any way Section 27 of
Convicted by the MTC-Quezon City (Branch 38) of the crime of Republic Act No. 7279 or any of its provisions relative to sanctions
Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772 or the Anti-Squatting Law, against professional squatters and squatting syndicates.
petitioners Prescilla Tuates and Andres de la Paz, appealed to the RTC
of Quezon City (Branch 96). Their conviction was affirmed in toto by "SEC. 5. Effectivity. -- This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after
the RTC in its decision dated September 10, 1997. Pending resolution its publication in two (2) newspapers of national circulation.
of their motion for reconsideration, however, Republic Act No. 8368,
"An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772, entitled ‘Penalizing
Squatting and Other Similar Acts’" was enacted. "Approved, October 27, 1997."9

In its Order, dated January 28, 1998, the RTC ruled that only The repeal of P.D. No. 772 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8368 is
petitioners’ criminal convictions were extinguished by R.A. 8368, and explicit, categorical, definite and absolute. As such, the act that was
the civil aspect, i.e., the removal of petitioners’ illegally constructed penalized by P.D. 772, i.e., squatting, ceases to be criminal under R.A.
house and improvements, shall remain executory against them.4 8368, and the previous offense is obliterated. 10

On a petition for review, the Court of Appeals sustained the ruling of In the same vein, the absolute repeal of P.D. 772 has the effect of
the RTC and denied due course to the petition per its Decision, dated depriving a court of its authority to punish a person charged with
April 30, 1999.5 Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was likewise violation of the old law prior to its repeal. This is because an
denied by the CA in its Resolution dated June 9, 1999.6 unqualified repeal of a penal law constitutes a legislative act of
rendering legal what had been previously declared as illegal, such that
the offense no longer exists and it is as if the person who committed it
Hence, the present recourse taken by petitioners, raising the following never did so.11 Specially so, as in the present case where it is
issues: unconditionally stated in Section 3 of R.A. No. 8368 that: "(A)ll
pending cases under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772
"1. That petitioners, being charged with Violation of Presidential shall be dismissed upon the effectivity of this Act."12 Obviously, it was
Decree No. 772, the express repeal of said decree absolves the the clear intent of the law to decriminalize or do away with the crime
petitioners of any criminal or civil liability; of squatting. Hence, there being no criminal liability, there is likewise
no civil liability because the latter is rooted in the former. Where an
"2. That public respondent erred in holding that ‘the civil aspect of the act or omission is not a crime, no person can be held liable for such act
judgment rendered x x x shall be executory against the accused; and or omission. There being no delict, logically, civil liability ex delicto is
out of the question. 13
"3. That the Honorable Court of Appeals, in affirming the Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96), dated June 9, 1999, In fact, in People v. Leachon, Jr.14 we implicitly recognized the
grossly erred in ignoring applicable laws and jurisprudence."7 unconditional repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 when we ordered the
dismissal of the petition filed in said case, without any qualification
whatsoever, because of the enactment of R.A. 8368, viz.:
Petitioners argue that the repeal of P.D. 772 by R.A. 8368 carries with
it the extinction of both the criminal and civil aspects of the crime.
Private respondent, however, insists that public respondents were "But the foregoing antecedent facts and proceedings notwithstanding,
correct in ruling that only the criminal liability was absolved and the the petition cannot now prosper because on October 27, 1997,
civil liability remains inasmuch as it was not extinguished in Republic Act No. 8368, entitled ‘An Act Repealing Presidential
accordance with Article 113 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads: Decree No. 772 Entitled ‘Penalizing Squatting and Other Similar Acts’
was "enacted. Section 3 of the said Act provides that ‘all pending cases
under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 772 shall be dismissed
"ART. 113. Obligation to satisfy civil liability. -- Except in case of upon the effectivity of this Act.’"15
extinction of his civil liability as provided in the next preceding article,
the offender shall continue to be obliged to satisfy the civil liability
resulting from the crime committed by him, notwithstanding the fact This is not to say, however, that people now have the unbridled license
that he has served his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty or to illegally occupy lands they do not own. R.A. No. 836816 was
other rights, or has not been required to serve the same by reason of unanimously approved by the members of the Senate of the
amnesty, pardon, commutation of sentence or any other reason." Philippines present on its third reading. 17 The legislature considered it
a major piece of legislation on the country’s anti-poverty program18 as
it sought to confront the perennial problem of poverty at its root,
abolish an otherwise inutile and oppressive law, and pave the way for
a genuine urban housing and land reform program. Senate records
reveal that it is the manifest intent of the authors of R.A. 8368 to
decriminalize squatting but does not encourage or protect acts of G.R. No. 125359 September 4, 2001
squatting on somebody else’s land.19 The law is not intended to
compromise the property rights of legitimate landowners.20 Recourse ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO and HECTOR T.
may be had in cases of violation of their property rights, such as those RIVERA, petitioners,
provided for in Republic Act No. 7279 or the Urban Development and vs.
Housing Act, penalizing professional squatters and squatting THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. GUILLERMO L. LOJA, SR.,
syndicates as defined therein, who commit nefarious and illegal PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
activities21; the Revised Penal Code providing for criminal prosecution MANILA, BRANCH 26, and PEOPLE OF THE
in cases of Trespass to Property, 22 Occupation of Real Property or PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Usurpation of Real Rights in Property,23 and similar violations, and,
cases for Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer under the Rules of QUISUMBING, J.:
Court,24 as well as civil liability for Damages under the Civil Code.
Assailed in this petition is the consolidated decision rendered on May
Considering that prosecution for criminal as well as civil liability 23, 1996, by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA-
under P.D. 772 has been rendered nugatory with the passage of R.A. G.R. SP No. 35719. CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 had affirmed the order
8368, both criminal and civil aspects of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-97- dated September 6, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch
70428 and Q-97-70429 in the RTC as well as Criminal Cases Nos. 38- 26, insofar as it denied petitioners’ respective Motions to Quash the
0130 and 38-0131 in the MTC filed against petitioners should be Informations in twenty-five (25) criminal cases for violation of Central
dismissed. Bank Circular No. 960. Therein included were informations involving:
(a) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883 filed
WHEREFORE, finding the petition for review to be with merit, the against Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Roberto S. Benedicto, and Hector T.
Decision dated April 30, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Rivera; (b) consolidated Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892
No. 46845, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is filed against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto; and (c) Criminal Cases Nos.
hereby entered modifying the Decision dated September 10, 1997 of 92-101959 to 92-101969 also against Mrs. Marcos and Benedicto.
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 96) in Criminal Note, however, that the Court of Appeals already dismissed Criminal
Cases No. Q-97-70428 and Q-97-70429 and the Decision dated Case No. 91-101884.
December 16, 1996 issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City (Branch 38), to the effect that the dismissal of the aforementioned The factual antecedents of the instant petition are as follows:
criminal cases likewise include the dismissal of the civil aspects
thereof, without prejudice to the filing of civil and/or criminal actions
under the prevailing laws. On December 27, 1991, Mrs. Imelda Marcos and Messrs. Benedicto
and Rivera were indicted for violation of Section 10 of Circular No.
9601 relation to Section 342 of the Central Bank Act (Republic Act No.
No costs. 265, as amended) in five Informations filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila. Docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-
SO ORDERED. 101883, the charge sheets alleged that the trio failed to submit reports
of their foreign exchange earnings from abroad and/or failed to register
with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within the
period mandated by Circular No. 960. Said Circular prohibited natural
and juridical persons from maintaining foreign exchange accounts
abroad without prior authorization from the Central Bank.3 It also
required all residents of the Philippines who habitually earned or
received foreign currencies from invisibles, either locally or abroad, to
report such earnings or receipts to the Central Bank. Violations of the
Circular were punishable as a criminal offense under Section 34 of the
Central Bank Act.

That same day, nine additional Informations charging Mrs. Marcos

and Benedicto with the same offense, but involving different accounts,
were filed with the Manila RTC, which docketed these as Criminal
Cases Nos. 91-101884 to 91-101892. The accusatory portion of the
charge sheet in Criminal Case No. 91-101888 reads:

That from September 1, 1983 up to 1987, both dates inclusive, and for
sometime thereafter, both accused, conspiring and confederating with
each other and with the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, all
residents of Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously fail to submit reports in the prescribed form and/or register
with the Foreign Exchange Department of the Central Bank within 90
days from October 21, 1983 as required of them being residents
habitually/customarily earning, acquiring or receiving foreign
exchange from whatever source or from invisibles locally or from
abroad, despite the fact they actually earned interests regularly every
six (6) months for the first two years and then quarterly thereafter for
their investment of $50-million, later reduced to $25-million in
December 1985, in Philippine-issued dollar denominated treasury
notes with floating rates and in bearer form, in the name of Bank
Hofmann, AG, Zuring, Switzerland, for the benefit of Avertina
Foundation, their front organization established for economic
advancement purposes with secret foreign exchange account Category
(Rubric) C.A.R. No. 211925-02 in Swiss Credit Bank (also known as
SKA) in Zurich, Switzerland, which earned, acquired or received for
the accused Imelda Romualdez Marcos and her late husband an
interest of $2,267,892 as of December 16, 1985 which was remitted to
Bank Hofmann, AG, through Citibank, New York, United States of
America, for the credit of said Avertina account on December 19, Two separate petitions for certiorari and prohibition, with similar
1985, aside from the redemption of $25 million (one-half of the prayers for temporary restraining orders and/or writs of preliminary
original $50-M) as of December 16, 1985 and outwardly remitted from injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35719 and CA-G.R. SP No.
the Philippines in the amounts of $7,495,297.49 and $17,489,062.50 35928, were respectively filed by Mrs. Marcos and petitioners with the
on December 18, 1985 for further investment outside the Philippine Court of Appeals. Finding that both cases involved violations of
without first complying with the Central Bank reporting/registering Central Bank Circular No. 960, the appellate court consolidated the
requirements.1âwphi1.nêt two cases.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 On May 23, 1996, the Court of Appeals disposed of the consolidated
cases as follows:
The other charge sheets were similarly worded except the days of the
commission of the offenses, the name(s) of the alleged dummy or WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
dummies, the amounts in the foreign exchange accounts maintained, respondent Judge in denying petitioners’ respective Motions to Quash,
and the names of the foreign banks where such accounts were held by except that with respect to Criminal Case No. 91-101884, the instant
the accused. petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed
September 6, 1994 Order, in so far as it denied the Motion to Quash
On January 3, 1992, eleven more Informations accusing Mrs. Marcos Criminal Case No. 91-101884 is hereby nullified and set aside, and
and Benedicto of the same offense, again in relation to different said case is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioners.
accounts, were filed with the same court, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969. The Informations were similarly SO ORDERED.7
worded as the earlier indictments, save for the details as to the dates of
the violations of Circular No. 960, the identities of the dummies used, Dissatisfied with the said decision of the court a quo, except with
the balances and sources of the earnings, and the names of the foreign respect to the portion ordering the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 91-
banks where these accounts were maintained. 101884, petitioners filed the instant petition, attributing the following
errors to the appellate court:
All of the aforementioned criminal cases were consolidated before
Branch 26 of the said trial court. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
INFORMATIONS/CASES FILED AGAINST PETITIONERS-
On the same day that Criminal Cases Nos. 92-101959 to 92-101969 APPELLANTS ARE QUASHABLE BASED ON THE FOLLOWING
were filed, the Central Bank issued Circular No. 1318 5 which revised GROUNDS:
the rules governing non-trade foreign exchange transactions. It took
effect on January 20, 1992. (A) LACK OF JURISDICTION/FORUM SHOPPING/NO VALID
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
On August 24, 1992, the Central Bank, pursuant to the government’s
policy of further liberalizing foreign exchange transactions, came out (B) EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
with Circular No. 1356,6 which amended Circular No. 1318. Circular
No. 1353 deleted the requirement of prior Central Bank approval for
foreign exchange-funded expenditures obtained from the banking 1) REPEAL OF CB CIRCULAR NO. 960 BY CB CIRCULAR NO.
system. 153;

Both of the aforementioned circulars, however, contained a saving 2) REPEAL OF R.A. 265 BY R.A. 76538
clause, excepting from their coverage pending criminal actions
involving violations of Circular No. 960 and, in the case of Circular (C) PRESCRIPTION
No. 1353, violations of both Circular No. 960 and Circular No. 1318.
(D) EXEMPTION FROM CB REPORTING REQUIREMENT
On September 19, 1993, the government allowed petitioners Benedicto
and Rivera to return to the Philippines, on condition that they face the GRANT OF ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY.9
various criminal charges instituted against them, including the dollar-
salting cases. Petitioners posted bail in the latter cases.
Simply stated, the issues for our resolution are:
On February 28, 1994, petitioners Benedicto and Rivera were
arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty to the charges of violating Central (1) Did the Court of Appeals err in denying the Motion to Quash for
Bank Circular No. 960. Mrs. Marcos had earlier entered a similar plea lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court, forum shopping by the
during her arraignment for the same offense on February 12, 1992. prosecution, and absence of a valid preliminary investigation?

On August 11, 1994, petitioners moved to quash all the Informations (2) Did the repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Republic Act
filed against them in Criminal Cases Nos. 91-101879 to 91-101883; No. 265 by Circular No. 1353 and Republic Act No. 7653
91-101884 to 91-101892, and 91-101959 to 91-101969. Their motion respectively, extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners?
was grounded on lack of jurisdiction, forum shopping, extinction of
criminal liability with the repeal of Circular No. 960, prescription, (3) Had the criminal cases in violation of Circular No. 960 already
exemption from the Central Bank’s reporting requirement, and the prescribed?
grant of absolute immunity as a result of a compromise agreement
entered into with the government.
(4) Were petitioners exempted from the application and coverage of
Circular No. 960?
On September 6, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners’ motion. A
similar motion filed on May 23, 1994 by Mrs. Marcos seeking to
(5) Were petitioners’ alleged violations of Circular No. 960 covered by
dismiss the dollar-salting cases against her due to the repeal of
the absolute immunity granted in the Compromise Agreement of
Circular No. 960 had earlier been denied by the trial court in its order
November 3, 1990?
dated June 9, 1994. Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration,
but the trial court likewise denied this motion on October 18, 1994.
On the first issue, petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court. They aver that the dollar-salting charges filed against
On November 21, 1994, petitioners moved for leave to file a second
them were violations of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act No. 3019,
motion for reconsideration. The trial court, in its order of November
and the Sandiganbayan has original and exclusive jurisdiction over
23, 1994, denied petitioners’ motion and set the consolidated cases for
their cases.
trial on January 5, 1995.
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case Preliminary investigation is not part of the due process guaranteed by
is determined by the law in force at the time the action is the Constitution.15 It is an inquiry to determine whether there is
instituted.10 The 25 cases were filed in 1991-92. The applicable law on sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
jurisdiction then was Presidential Decree 1601.11 Under P.D. No. 1606, been committed and the respondent is probably guilty
offenses punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years fall thereof.16 Instead, the right to a preliminary investigation is personal. It
within the jurisdiction of the regular trial courts, not the is afforded to the accused by statute, and can be waived, either
Sandiganbayan.12 expressly or by implication.17 The waiver extends to any irregularity in
the preliminary investigation, where one was conducted.
In the instant case, all the Informations are for violations of Circular
No. 960 in relation to Section 34 of the Central Bank Act and not, as The petition in the present case contains the following admissions:
petitioners insist, for transgressions of Republic Act No. 3019.
Pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, violations of Circular 1. Allowed to return to the Philippines on September 19, 1993 … on
No. 960 are punishable by imprisonment of not more than five years the condition that he face the criminal charges pending in courts,
and a fine of not more than P20,000.00. Since under P.D. No. 1606 the petitioner-appellant Benedicto, joined by his co-petitioner Rivera, lost
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try criminal cases where the no time in attending to the pending criminal charges by posting bail in
imposable penalty is less than six years of imprisonment, the cases the above-mentioned cases.
against petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960 are, therefore
cognizable by the trial court. No error may thus be charged to the
Court of Appeals when it held that the RTC of Manila had jurisdiction 2. Not having been afforded a real opportunity of attending the
to hear and try the dollar-salting cases. preliminary investigation because of their forced absence from the
Philippines then, petitioners-appellants invoked their right to due
process thru motions for preliminary investigation … Upon denial of
Still on the first issue, petitioners next contend that the filing of the their demands for preliminary investigation, the petitioners intended to
cases for violations of Circular No. 960 before the RTC of Manila elevate the matter to the Honorable Court of Appeals and actually
Constitutes forum shopping. Petitioners argue that the prosecution, in caused the filing of a petition for certiorari/prohibition sometime
an attempt to seek a favorable verdict from more than one tribunal, before their arraignment but immediately caused the withdrawal
filed separate cases involving virtually the same offenses before the thereof … in view of the prosecution’s willingness to go to pre-trial
regular trial courts and the Sandiganbayan. They fault the prosecution wherein petitioner would be allowed access to the records of
with splitting the cases. Petitioners maintain that while the RTC cases preliminary investigation which they could use for purposes of filing a
refer only to the failure to report interest earnings on Treasury Notes, motion to quash if warranted.
the Sandiganbayan cases seek to penalize the act of receiving the same
interest earnings on Treasury Notes in violation of the Anti-Graft
Law’s provisions on prohibited transactions. Petitioners aver that the 3. Thus, instead of remanding the Informations to the Department of
violation of Circular No. 960 is but an element of the offense of Justice … respondent Judge set the case for pre-trial in order to afford
prohibited transactions punished under Republic Act No. 3019 and all the accused access to the records of prosecution…
should, thus, be deemed absorbed by the prohibited transactions cases
pending before the Sandiganbayan. xxx

For the charge of forum shopping to prosper, there must exist between 5. On the basis of disclosures at the pre-trial, the petitioners-appellants
an action pending in one court and another action pending in one court Benedicto and Rivera moved for the quashing of the
and another action before another court: (a) identity of parties, or at informations/cases…18
least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; (b)
identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being The foregoing admissions lead us to conclude that petitioners have
founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two preceding expressly waived their right to question any supposed irregularity in
particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, the preliminary investigation or to ask for a new preliminary
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the investigation. Petitioners, in the above excerpts from this petition,
action under consideration.13 Here, we find that the single act of admit posting bail immediately following their return to the country,
receiving unreported interest earnings on Treasury Notes held abroad entered their respective pleas to the charges, and filed various motions
constitutes an offense against two or more distinct and unrelated laws, and pleadings. By so doing, without simultaneously demanding a
Circular No. 960 and R.A. 3019. Said laws define distinct offenses, proper preliminary investigation, they have waived any and all
penalize different acts, and can be applied independently.14 Hence, no irregularities in the conduct of a preliminary investigation. 19 The trial
fault lies at the prosecution’s door for having instituted separate cases court did not err in denying the motion to quash the informations on
before separate tribunals involving the same subject matter. the ground of want of or improperly conducted preliminary
investigation. The absence of a preliminary investigation is not a
With respect to the RTC cases, the receipt of the interest earnings ground to quash the information.20
violate Circular No. 960 in relation to Republic Act No. 265 because
the same was unreported to the Central Bank. The act to be penalized On the second issue, petitioners contend that they are being prosecuted
here is the failure to report the interest earnings from the foreign for acts punishable under laws that have already been repealed. They
exchange accounts to the proper authority. As to the anti-graft cases point to the express repeal of Central Bank Circular No. 960 by
before the Sandiganbayan involving the same interest earnings from Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 as well as the express repeal of Republic
the same foreign exchange accounts, the receipt of the interest Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653. Petitioners, relying on Article
earnings transgresses Republic Act No. 3019 because the act of 22 of the Revised Penal Code,21 contend that repeal has the effect of
receiving such interest is a prohibited transaction prejudicial to the extinguishing the right to prosecute or punish the offense committed
government. What the State seeks to punish in these anti-graft cases is under the old laws.22
the prohibited receipt of the interest earnings. In sum, there is no
identity of offenses charged, and prosecution under one law is not an
obstacle to a prosecution under the other law. There is no forum As a rule, an absolute repeal of a penal law has the effect of depriving
shopping. a court of its authority to punish a person charged with violation of the
old law prior to its repeal. 23 This is because an unqualified repeal of a
penal law constitutes a legislative act of rendering legal what had been
Finally, on the first issue, petitioners contend that the preliminary previously declared as illegal, such that the offense no longer exists
investigation by the Department of Justice was invalid and in violation and it is as if the person who committed it never did so. There are,
of their rights to due process. Petitioners argue that government’s ban however, exceptions to the rule. One is the inclusion of a saving clause
on their travel effectively prevented them from returning home and in the repealing statute that provides that the repeal shall have no effect
personally appearing at the preliminary investigation. Benedicto and on pending actions.24 Another exception is where the repealing act
Rivera further point out that the joint preliminary investigation by the reenacts the former statute and punishes the act previously penalized
Department of Justice, resulted to the charges in one set of cases under the old law. In such instance, the act committed before the
before the Sandiganbayan for violations of Republic Act No. 3019 and reenactment continues to be an offense in the statute books and
another set before the RTC for violation of Circular No. 960.
pending cases are not affected, regardless of whether the new penalty An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done
to be imposed is more favorable to the accused.25 before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it
In the instant case, it must be noted that despite the repeal of Circular was when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
No. 960, Circular No. 1353 retained the same reportorial requirement punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4)
for residents receiving earnings or profits from non-trade foreign alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less
exchange transactions.26 Second, even the most cursory glance at the or different testimony than the law required at the time of the
repealing circulars, Circular Nos. 1318 and 1353 shows that both commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights, and
contain a saving clause, expressly providing that the repeal of Circular remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
No. 960 shall have no effect on pending actions for violation of the something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person
latter Circular.27 A saving clause operates to except from the effect of accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
the repealing law what would otherwise be lost under the new law.28 In entitled such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
the present case, the respective saving clauses of Circular Nos. 1318 proclamation of amnesty.35
and 1353 clearly manifest the intent to reserve the right of the State to
prosecute and punish offenses for violations of the repealed Circular The test whether a penal law runs afoul of the ex post facto clause of
No. 960, where the cases are either pending or under investigation. the Constitution is: Does the law sought to be applied retroactively
take "from an accused any right that was regarded at the time of the
Petitioners, however, insist that the repeal of Republic Act No. 265, adoption of the constitution as vital for the protection of life and
particularly Section 34,29 by Republic Act No. 7653, removed the liberty and which he enjoyed at the time of the commission of the
applicability of any special sanction for violations of any non-trade offense charged against him."36
foreign exchange transactions previously penalized by Circular No.
960. Petitioners posit that a comparison of the two provisions shows The crucial words in the test are "vital for the protection of life and
that Section 3630 of Republic Act No. 7653 neither retained nor liberty."37 We find, however, the test inapplicable to the penal clause
reinstated Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265. Since, in creating of Republic Act No. 7653. Penal laws and laws which, while not penal
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, Congress did not include in its charter in nature, nonetheless have provisions defining offenses and
a clause providing for the application of Section 34 of Republic Act prescribing penalties for their violation operate prospectively.38 Penal
No. 265 to pending cases, petitioners’ pending dollar-salting cases are laws cannot be given retroactive effect, except when they are favorable
now bereft of statutory penalty, the saving clause in Circular No. 1353 to the accused.39 Nowhere in Republic Act No. 7653, and in particular
notwithstanding. In other words, absent a provision in Republic Act Section 36, is there any indication that the increased penalties provided
No. 7653 expressly reviving the applicability of any penal sanction for therein were intended to operate retroactively. There is, therefore,
the repealed mandatory foreign exchange reporting regulations no ex post facto law in this case.
formerly required under Circular No. 960, violations of aforesaid
repealed Circular can no longer be prosecuted criminally. On the third issue, petitioners ask us to note that the dollar interest
earnings subject of the criminal cases instituted against them were
A comparison of the old Central Bank Act and the new Bangko remitted to foreign banks on various dates between 1983 to 1987. They
Sentral’s charter repealing the former show that in consonance with maintain that given the considerable lapse of time from the dates of the
the general objective of the old law and the new law "to maintain commission of the offenses to the institution of the criminal actions in
internal and external monetary stability in the Philippines and preserve 1991 and 1992, the State’s right to prosecute them for said offenses
the international value of the peso,"31 both the repealed law and the has already prescribed. Petitioners assert that the Court of Appeals
repealing statute contain a penal cause which sought to penalize in erred in computing the prescriptive period from February 1986.
general, violations of the law as well as orders, instructions, rules, or Petitioners theorize that since the remittances were made through the
regulations issued by the Monetary Board. In the case of the Bangko Central Bank as a regulatory authority, the dates of the alleged
Sentral, the scope of the penal clause was expanded to include violations are known, and prescription should thus be counted from
violations of "other pertinent banking laws enforced or implemented these dates.
by the Bangko Sentral." In the instant case, the acts of petitioners
sought to be penalized are violations of rules and regulations issued by In ruling that the dollar-salting cases against petitioners have not yet
the Monetary Board. These acts are proscribed and penalized in the prescribed, the court a quo quoted with approval the trial court’s
penal clause of the repealed law and this proviso for proscription and finding that:
penalty was reenacted in the repealing law. We find, therefore, that
while Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 was repealed, it was
nonetheless, simultaneously reenacted in Section 36 of Republic Act [T]he alleged violations of law were discovered only after the EDSA
No. 7653. Where a clause or provision or a statute for the matter is Revolution in 1986 when the dictatorship was toppled down. The date
simultaneously repealed and reenacted, there is no effect, upon the of the discovery of the offense, therefore, should be the basis in
rights and liabilities which have accrued under the original statute, computing the prescriptive period. Since (the) offenses charged are
since the reenactment, in effect "neutralizes" the repeal and continues punishable by imprisonment of not more than five (5) years, they
the law in force without interruption. 32 The rule applies to penal laws prescribe in eight (8) years. Thus, only a little more than four (4) years
and statutes with penal provisions. Thus, the repeal of a penal law or had elapsed from the date of discovery in 1986 when the cases were
provision, under which a person is charged with violation thereof and filed in 1991.40
its simultaneous reenactment penalizing the same act done by him
under the old law, will neither preclude the accused’s prosecution nor The offenses for which petitioners are charged are penalized by
deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear and try his case. 33 As Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 "by a fine of not more than
pointed out earlier, the act penalized before the reenactment continues Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) and by imprisonment of not
to remain an offense and pending cases are unaffected. Therefore, the more than five years." Pursuant to Act No. 3326, which mandates the
repeal of Republic Act No. 265 by Republic Act No. 7653 did not periods of prescription for violations of special laws, the prescriptive
extinguish the criminal liability of petitioners for transgressions of period for violations of Circular No. 960 is eight (8) years.41 The
Circular No. 960 and cannot, under the circumstances of this case, be period shall commence "to run from the day of the commission of the
made a basis for quashing the indictments against petitioners. violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its
Petitioners, however, point out that Section 36 of Republic Act No. investigation and punishment."42 In the instant case, the indictments
7653, in reenacting Section 34 of the old Central Act, increased the against petitioners charged them with having conspired with the late
penalty for violations of rules and regulations issued by the Monetary President Ferdinand E. Marcos in transgressing Circular No. 960.
Board. They claim that such increase in the penalty would give Petitioners’ contention that the dates of the commission of the alleged
Republic Act No. 7653 an ex post facto application, violating the Bill violations were known and prescription should be counted from these
of Rights.34 dates must be viewed in the context of the political realities then
prevailing. Petitioners, as close associates of Mrs. Marcos, were not
only protected from investigation by their influence and connections,
Is Section 36 of Republic Act No. 7653 and ex post facto legislation? but also by the power and authority of a Chief Executive exercising
strong-arm rule. This Court has taken judicial notice of the fact that
Mr. Marcos, his family, relations, and close associates "resorted to all
sorts of clever schemes and manipulations to disguise and hide their entered into with the government on November 3, 1990. Petitioners
illicit acquisitions."43 In the instant case, prescription cannot, therefore, cite our decision in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 226 SCRA 314
be made to run from the dates of the commission of those offenses (1993), upholding the validity of the said Agreement and directing the
were not known as of those dates. It was only after the EDSA various government agencies to be consistent with it. Benedicto and
Revolution of February, 1986, that the recovery of ill-gotten wealth Rivera now insist that the absolute immunity from criminal
became a highly prioritized state policy,44 pursuant to the explicit investigation or prosecution granted to petitioner Benedicto, his
command of the Provisional Constitution.45 To ascertain the relevant family, as well as to officers and employees of firms owned or
facts to recover "ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and controlled by Benedicto under the aforesaid Agreement covers the
supporters of the (Marcos) regime"46 various government agencies suits filed for violations of Circular No. 960, which gave rise to the
were tasked by the Aquino administration to investigate, and as the present case.
evidence on hand may reveal, file and prosecute the proper cases.
Applying the presumption "that official duty has been regularly The pertinent provisions of the Compromise Agreement read:
performed",47 we are more inclined to believe that the violations for
which petitioners are charged were discovered only during the post-
February 1986 investigations and the tolling of the prescriptive period WHEREAS, this Compromise Agreement covers the remaining claims
should be counted from the dates of discovery of their commission. and the cases of the Philippine Government against Roberto S.
The criminal actions against petitioners, which gave rise to the instant Benedicto including his associates and nominees, namely, Julita C.
case, were filed in 1991 and 1992, or well within the eight-year Benedicto, Hector T. Rivera, x x x
prescriptive period counted from February 1986.
WHEREAS, specifically these claims are the subject matter of the
The fourth issue involves petitioners’ claim that they incurred no following cases (stress supplied):
criminal liability for violations of Circular No. 960 since they were
exempted from its coverage. 1. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 9

Petitioners postulate that since the purchases of treasury notes were 2. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 24
done through the Central Bank’s Securities Servicing Department and
payments of the interest were coursed through its Securities Servicing 3. Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 34
Department/Foreign Exchange Department, their filing of reports
would be surplusage, since the requisite information were already with
the Central Bank. Furthermore, they contend that the foreign currency 4. Tanodbayan (Phil-Asia)
investment accounts in the Swiss banks were subject to absolute
confidentiality as provided for by Republic Act No. 6426, 48 as 5. PCGG I.S. No. 1.
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1035, 1246, and 1453, and fell
outside the ambit of the reporting requirements imposed by Circular
xxx
No. 960. Petitioners further rely on the exemption from reporting
provided for in Section 10(q),49 Circular No. 960, and the
confidentiality granted to Swiss bank accounts by the laws of WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss
Switzerland. cases, and also without admitting the merits of their respective claims
and counterclaims presently involved in uncertain, protracted and
expensive litigation, the Republic of the Philippines, solely motivated
Petitioners correctly point out that Section 10(q) of Circular No. 960
by the desire for the immediate accomplishment of its recovery
exempts from the reporting requirement foreign currency eligible for
mission and Mr. Benedicto being interested to lead a peaceful and
deposit under the Philippine Foreign Exchange Currency Deposit
normal pursuit of his endeavors, the parties have decided to withdraw
System, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6426, as amended. But, in order
and/or dismiss their mutual claims and counterclaims under the cases
to avail of the aforesaid exemption, petitioners must show that they fall
pending in the Philippines, earlier referred to (underscoring supplied);
within its scope. Petitioners must satisfy the requirements for
eligibility imposed by Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426. 50 Not only do
we find the record bare of any proof to support petitioners’ claim of xxx
falling within the coverage of Republic Act No. 6426, we likewise find
from a reading of Section 2 of the Foreign Currency Deposit Act that II. Lifting of Sequestrations, Extension of Absolute Immunity and
said law is inapplicable to the foreign currency accounts in question. Recognition of the Freedom to Travel
Section 2, Republic Act No. 6426 speaks of "deposit with such
Philippine banks in good standing, as may…be designated by the
a) The Government hereby lifts the sequestrations over the assets listed
Central Bank for the purpose."51 The criminal cases filed against
in Annex "C" hereof, the same being within the capacity of Mr.
petitioners for violation of Circular No. 960 involve foreign currency
Benedicto to acquire from the exercise of his profession and conduct
accounts maintained in foreign banks, not Philippine banks. By
of business, as well as all the haciendas listed in his name in Negro
invoking the confidentiality guarantees provided for by Swiss banking
Occidental, all of which were inherited by him or acquired with
laws, petitioners admit such reports made. The rule is that exceptions
income from his inheritance…and all the other sequestered assets that
are strictly construed and apply only so far as their language fairly
belong to Benedicto and his corporation/nominees which are not listed
warrants, with all doubts being resolved in favor of the
in Annex "A" as ceded or to be ceded to the Government.
general proviso rather than the exception.52 Hence, petitioners may not
claim exemption under Section 10(q).
Provided, however, (that) any asset(s) not otherwise settled or covered
by this Compromise Agreement, hereinafter found and clearly
With respect to the banking laws of Switzerland cited by petitioners,
established with finality by proper competent court as being held by
the rule is that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
Mr. Roberto S. Benedicto in trust for the family of the late Ferdinand
laws.53 Laws of foreign jurisdictions must be alleged and
E. Marcos, shall be returned or surrendered to the Government for
proved.54 Petitioners failed to prove the Swiss law relied upon, either
appropriate custody and disposition.
by: (1) an official publication thereof; or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied by a certification from the secretary of the Philippine b) The Government hereby extends absolute immunity, as authorized
embassy or legation in such country or by the Philippine consul under the pertinent provisions of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2, 14 and
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent stationed in such 14-A, to Benedicto, the members of his family, officers and employees
country, or by any other authorized officer in the Philippine foreign of his corporations above mentioned, who are included in past, present
service assigned to said country that such officer has custody. 55 Absent and future cases and investigations of the Philippine Government, such
such evidence, this Court cannot take judicial cognizance of the that there shall be no criminal investigation or prosecution against said
foreign law invoked by Benedicto and Rivera. persons for acts (or) omissions committed prior to February 25, 1986,
that may be alleged to have violated any laws, including but not
limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in relation to the acquisition of any
Anent the fifth issue, petitioners insist that the government granted
asset treated, mentioned or included in this Agreement.lawphil.net
them absolute immunity under the Compromise Agreement they
 x x x56

In construing contracts, it is important to ascertain the intent of the

parties by looking at the words employed to project their intention. In
the instant case, the parties clearly listed and limited the applicability
of the Compromise Agreement to the cases listed or identified therein.
We have ruled in another case involving the same Compromise
Agreement that:

[T]he subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are

Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case
No. 0034, the Phil-Asia case before the Tanodbayan and PCGG I.S.
No. 1. The cases arose from complaints for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution, and damages against former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, members of his family, and alleged cronies, one
of whom was respondent Roberto S. Benedicto.57

Nowhere is there a mention of the criminal cases filed against

petitioners for violations of Circular No. 960. Conformably with
Article 1370 of the Civil Code,58 the Agreement relied upon by
petitioners should include only cases specifically mentioned therein.
Applying the parol evidence rule,59 where the parties have reduced
their agreement into writing, the contents of the writing constitute the
sole repository of the terms of the agreement between the
parties.60 Whatever is not found in the text of the Agreement should
thus be construed as waived and abandoned. 61 Scrutiny of the
Compromise Agreement will reveal that it does not include all cases
filed by the government against Benedicto, his family, and associates.

Additionally, the immunity covers only "criminal investigation or

prosecution against said persons for acts (or) omissions committed
prior to February 25, 1986 that may be alleged to have violated any
penal laws, including but not limited to Republic Act No. 3019, in
relation to the acquisition of any asset treated, mentioned, or included
in this Agreement."62 It is only when the criminal investigation or case
involves the acquisition of any ill-gotten wealth "treated mentioned, or
included in this Agreement"63 that petitioners may invoke immunity.
The record is bereft of any showing that the interest earnings from
foreign exchange deposits in banks abroad, which is the subject matter
of the present case, are "treated, mentioned, or included" in the
Compromise Agreement. The phraseology of the grant of absolute
immunity in the Agreement precludes us from applying the same to
the criminal charges faced by petitioners for violations of Circular No.
960. A contract cannot be construed to include matters distinct from
those with respect to which the parties intended to contract.64

In sum, we find that no reversible error of law may be attributed to the

Court of Appeals in upholding the orders of the trial court denying
petitioners’ Motion to Quash the Informations in Criminal Case Nos.
91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 91-101892, and 92-101959 to
92-101969. In our view, none of the grounds provided for in the Rules
of Court65 upon which petitioners rely, finds applications in this case.

On final matter. During the pendency of this petition, counsel for

petitioner Roberto S. Benedicto gave formal notice to the Court that
said petitioner died on May 15, 2000. The death of an accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon.66

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed

consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 1996, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 35928 and CA G.R. SP No. 35719, is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION that the charges against deceased
petitioner, Roberto S. Benedicto, particularly in Criminal Cases Nos.
91-101879 to 91-101883, 91-101884 to 101892, and 92-101959 to 92-
101969, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
26, are ordered dropped and that any criminal as well as civil
liability ex delicto that might be attributable to him in the aforesaid
cases are declared extinguished by reason of his death on May 15,
2000.lawphil.net No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.