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Guide: Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
179 views39 pages

Guide: Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme

Guide Jericho Forum(r) Self-Assessment Scheme Copyright (c) 2010, The Open Group Licensed under creative commons Attribution-No derivative Works.

Uploaded by

Stanislav Ondac
Copyright
© Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Guide

Jericho Forum® Self-Assessment Scheme


Copyright © 2010, The Open Group

Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 2.0 UK:

England & Wales – http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/2.0/uk/

You are free to copy, distribute, display, and perform the work, subject to appropriate attribution (the Jericho Forum),
except that in addition you may make derivative works, providing such works do not claim to be endorsed by the Jericho
Forum.

This document has not been verified for avoidance of possible third-party proprietary rights. In implementing this
document, usual procedures to ensure the respect of possible third-party intellectual property rights should be followed.

Guide
®
Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme

Published by The Open Group, March 2010.

Comments relating to the material contained in this document may be submitted to:

The Open Group


Thames Tower
37-45 Station Road
Reading
Berkshire, RG1 1LX
United Kingdom

or by electronic mail to:

[email protected]

ii Jericho Forum 2010


Contents
1 Background and Rationale ...........................................................................................................1
1.1 Why this Self-Assessment Scheme?.................................................................................1
1.2 Value-Add: Why will a Vendor or Customer use this Self-Assessment Scheme? .............2
1.3 Self-Policing ......................................................................................................................3
1.4 Initial Industry Response ...................................................................................................3

2 Using the Self-Assessment Scheme ............................................................................................5


2.1 Caveats .............................................................................................................................5
2.2 How to Use this Document ................................................................................................5
2.3 How to Complete a Self-Assessment ................................................................................6

3 Self-Assessment Template...........................................................................................................7

4 Self-Assessment Scorecard .......................................................................................................31

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme iii
Preface
The Jericho Forum
The Jericho Forum is a Managed Consortium of The Open Group. Founded in January 2004,
the Jericho Forum is an international IT security thought-leadership group dedicated to defining
ways to deliver effective IT security solutions that will match increasing business demands for
secure IT operations in our open, Internet-driven, globally networked world. Its members include
multi-national corporate user organizations, major security vendors, solutions providers, and
academics, all working together to:

• Drive and influence development of secure architectures, technology solutions, and


implementation approaches, for securing our de-perimeterizing IT world, to enable safe,
secure collaborative interworking, globally between enterprises – business partners,
customers, suppliers, and out-workers.

• Support development of open standards that will underpin these solutions.

By 2008, the Jericho Forum had raised industry awareness of the major information security
challenges that increasing erosion of corporate boundaries was creating, published its
commandments (design principles) on requirements for effective information security in de-
perimeterized environments. It also published a number of requirements papers explaining de-
perimeterization and effective security responses. In these papers, the requirement for
information-centric security – moving the protection close to the data asset – is a key objective.
In January 2009, the Jericho Forum published its Collaboration Oriented Architectures (COA)
Framework for developing secure architectures for de-perimeterized environments.

Current activities are focused on maturing the COA Framework solution space, and analyzing
requirements for enabling secure business collaboration in the de-perimeterized environment
that Cloud Computing represents. In April 2009, the Jericho Forum published its Cloud Cube
Model, which assessed the Cloud Computing space from the viewpoint of a business manager
assessing the risks and benefits of extending business operations and collaborative partnerships
into different types of cloud. It is building on this with developments in several related areas, one
in particular being Identity and Access Management, as part of the essential security
infrastructure for managing business collaborations in de-perimeterized environments. It has
established its own collaborative partnerships with other expert groups – including the Cloud
Security Alliance – to share knowledge and experience in influencing development of effective
information security solutions.

The Jericho Forum is now recognized in the industry as the visionary thought-leadership group it
set out to become, pointing the way forward on the security solutions that IT-dependent
organizations need and want to buy to secure their business operations in the future.

For more information, see www.jerichoforum.org.

This Document
In 2006, the Jericho Forum published its commandments (design principles) for effective security
in de-perimeterized environments). This Self-Assessment Scheme takes each commandment in

iv Jericho Forum 2010


turn, and asks “nasty” (i.e., difficult, searching, probing) questions to reveal how effectively a
given information security product or solution meets the criteria implicit in that commandment. It
then gathers the answers into a Self-Assessment Scorecard.

The “self-assessment” aspect of this scheme is important – it is a self-policing scheme to ensure


it is low-cost and low-maintenance for the Jericho Forum, while representing high value to
product suppliers who wish to show how well they satisfy our commandments, to customers who
wish to check how well a product or solution meets their requirements, and to IT architects and
designers who want to check how secure their designs are.

Trademarks
Boundaryless Information Flow™ and TOGAF™ are trademarks and Making Standards Work®,
The Open Group®, UNIX®, and the “X” device are registered trademarks of The Open Group in
the United States and other countries.

Jericho Forum® is a registered trademark of the Jericho Forum.

The Open Group acknowledges that there may be other brand, company, and product names
used in this document that may be covered by trademark protection and advises the reader to
verify them independently.

Acknowledgements
The Jericho Forum gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Paul Simmonds (Founding
Member & Board Member of the Jericho Forum) as project leader, chief contributor, and editor of
this Self-Assessment Scheme. It also acknowledges the significant contributions by Andrew
Yeomans (Founding Member & Board Member) and Jamie Bodley-Scott (Member) in the
development of this document, and the contributions of other members in extensive review and
feedback during its development.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme v
vi Jericho Forum 2010
1 Background and Rationale

1.1 Why this Self-Assessment Scheme?


The Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme has been described as “the set of nasty questions
to ask your security vendors”, to check whether they provide the security solutions you need,
and expose shortcomings in the features they may be claiming their offerings provide. In this
context, “nasty” means searching, probing, difficult – raising issues that are critical to providing
effective security in de-perimeterized environments.

In 2006, the Jericho Forum published its commandments 1 (with a minor revision in May 2007).
Whilst building on “good security”, these commandments specifically address those areas of
security that are necessary to achieve secure operation in environments where corporate
boundaries are increasingly being undermined – i.e., becoming de-perimeterized – with
perimeter firewalls being bypassed by VPN tunnels, wireless/mobile, etc. These commandments
have been adopted as design principles by many IT architects and designers. They continue to
serve as a set of benchmarks by which the effectiveness of information security concepts,
solutions, standards, and systems can be assessed and measured.

The Jericho Forum has known for a long time that enlightened organizations have been using
the Jericho Forum commandments as part of their Request for Procurement (RFP) processes
with vendors, and also that system and security architects use them to evaluate the
effectiveness of their security designs. The reason why is that the commandments raise those
searching issues that customers need to ask their vendors about how effectively a security
product or solution will perform in their de-perimeterizing environments, and that system
architects and designers find valuable in evaluating the security of their designs.

Over this time, the Jericho Forum has been pressed by the buy-side of our IT industry to “tell us
the searching questions we should ask our vendors so we can judge how well their products
meet our security needs”. In the April 2008 Infosecurity Europe event we did just that – we ran a
“chalk & talk” session in which we presented some of the IT security architectures you might
wish to use, explained how these operate in perimeterized environments, and then how they
could be re-designed to provide the same functionality but as if you were outside your corporate
perimeter (i.e., de-perimeterized). Effective security should work to the same effect whether you
are inside your corporate perimeter (perimeterized) or outside it (de-perimeterized).
Unsurprisingly, out of this came a set of “nasty” questions that we invited our audience to ask
their vendors so they could differentiate which competing products performed best for their
needs. Feedback from that session was so encouraging that we decided to formalize it into a set
of “searching questions to ask your vendor”, which we present in this document.

So, in this Self-Assessment Scheme, for each of our 11 commandments, we present a set of
questions which aim to bring out answers indicating how well a security product satisfies each
commandment. The answers can then be compiled into a Self-Assessment Scorecard that can
be used by vendors, customers, and system architects/designers alike:

1
Jericho Forum Commandments: published by the Jericho Forum and freely available for viewing and download from
www.opengroup.org/jericho/commandments_v1.2.pdf.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 1
• Vendors can self-assess their product and may then choose to use their Self-Assessment
Scorecard in responses to Requests for Quotation (RFQs), to indicate how “ready” their
product is.

• Customers – especially middle managers and buyers from the many small and medium
business enterprises who have not been closely involved in our development of these
commandments, and who do not have the depth of IT security expertise that larger
corporations have – can ask their vendors the “nasty” questions, and thereby make their
own assessment of how each product performs against their requirements.

• User organizations can apply the Self-Assessment Scheme to their own IT system
implementations and architectures to assess how secure they are.

• System Architects can use them to evaluate the effectiveness of the security aspects in
their designs.

Good examples always help to bring a scheme like this alive. So, for example, one of the
commandments is that you should not use inherently insecure protocols. In other words, you
should not be using telnet; instead you should use the secure version of telnet; i.e., SSH.
Similarly, you should not use FTP but instead use SFTP – which is secure. So the Jericho
Forum has said from the start “use secure protocols”. The self-assessment question here,
therefore, to score “Good” asks:

• Out-of-the-box are you using secure protocols?

• Are they documented?

• Have you explained that if you give the option to downgrade (e.g., for a web server, out-
of-the-box it is https, but there’s an option to downgrade to the insecure version – http),
what are the pros and cons of downgrading to the less secure protocol?

We appreciate this requires additional work by the vendor, but it is so important to insist that
vendors configure their products to be secure out-of-the-box. This in itself will significantly raise
the game.

1.2 Value-Add: Why will a Vendor or Customer use this Self-


Assessment Scheme?

Raise the Bar for Effective Security


Of course, no vendor will want to publish a Self-Assessment Scorecard which shows a very low
score. We know the self-assessment searching questions are not trivial. We’re not expecting any
vendors initially to score “Good” across the board. So, we anticipate the initial impact will be that
security product vendors will keep their self-assessment results internal.

We do hope, however, that they will show that they are using the Self-Assessment Scheme and
that it helps them to raise their game, and so raise the bar towards establishing a more secure
marketplace where products are acceptably secure out-of-the-box. Product features are largely
market-driven, so if vendors actually find they are losing market share because they score low
on this (or any other credible) Self-Assessment Scheme, then that alone demonstrates its value.

2 Jericho Forum 2010


Be Prepared with Good Answers
Since the self-assessment questions are available to both vendors and customers, we anticipate
that vendors will want to make their own self-assessment of what their product looks like from a
Jericho Forum security standpoint – how ready it is to operate effectively in a rapidly de-
perimeterizing world? – so that they have ready answers to questions their customers are likely
to raise.

Future-Proofing
After a while, we hope that most vendors will have used this Self-Assessment Scheme to
improve their products and solutions sufficiently to score well in the self-assessment. How will
customers then be able to differentiate the competing vendor products? There are two
considerations here:

• If most (and hopefully all) vendors eventually achieve near-perfect scores on the self-
assessment, then we will have succeeded in raising the security bar for the entire industry
– which is a huge win for everyone.

• Of course we know that nothing is perfect, so we expect to revisit our set of searching
questions in future, in the light of vendor and customer feedback and experience, and
revise them to optimize how well they differentiate the key features and so deliver best
value to both vendor and customer communities.

1.3 Self-Policing
As a Self-Assessment Scheme, neither the Jericho Forum nor its trademark holder The Open
Group take any responsibility for validating self-assessment scores or associated claimant
information. This scheme is entirely self-policing. It relies on the honesty of the submitters of
Self-Assessment Scorecards, in the knowledge that their reputation will be tarnished if their Self-
Assessment Scorecard is exposed as including false claims. This self-policing approach
achieves the Jericho Forum goal of promoting industry awareness and use of our
commandments while making the scheme very low-cost and low-maintenance.

1.4 Initial Industry Response


The response to-date has been encouraging.

A number of vendors have indicated that they welcome a tool like this because it enables them
to differentiate their product from competing products that don’t perform as well in practice. Also,
because it is a Jericho Forum scheme, and the Jericho Forum is a totally independent thought-
leader in this space, it provides the necessary degree of independence and objectivity that a
vendor-driven scheme could not achieve.

Customer feedback similarly indicates a welcome for the scheme. Not surprisingly, as buyers
they tend to be sceptical of vendor claims, so they welcome having an objective process that
enables them to verify vendor claims on specified key features.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 3
4 Jericho Forum 2010
2 Using the Self-Assessment Scheme

2.1 Caveats
• This Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme is not a formal certification process. It has
no relationship or links with The Open Group certification programs.

• It is a deliberately lightweight management process intended to provide a framework for


vendors of products and solutions to claim how well their product/solution satisfies the
Jericho Forum commandments.

• The Self-Assessment Scheme is intended to be self-policing.

• This scheme must not be used to represent a measure of how secure an overall
application or device is, nor should it be used to support any statement that purports to
assert that any product or solution of any kind is “fit-for-purpose”.

2.2 How to Use this Document

As a vendor or customer:
• This document is open source and royalty-free. There is no cost impact to use it in any
way you wish.

As a vendor of a product:
• You may use this document to complete the Self-Assessment Scorecard – see Section 4.

• Some commandments may not be applicable to your product, in which case the relevant
part in your Self-Assessment Scorecard should be used to indicate this.

• You may use and publish your results in any form you wish, but you must not claim or
imply that the Jericho Forum (or its trademark-holder, The Open Group) have in any way
endorsed the results.

As a prospective purchaser of a product:


• As part of any purchasing decision, we recommend that you ask the vendor to provide a
detailed self-assessment of their product in terms of their answers to questions on each of
the 11 commandments.

• Should this not be available, then we recommend that you incorporate this document into
any tender or Request for Quote (RFQ) that you issue to prospective vendors. If you wish
to edit the questions or criteria in this Self-Assessment Scheme to better meet your
requirements, then you are free to do so. If you do this, however, you may not then use

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 5
the term “Jericho Forum Self-Assessment” to refer to its use (except in a “derived from”
acknowledgement) or to the resulting self-assessment score(s).

• If the vendor of the product offers you a self-assessment summary, then we recommend
you compare their assessment against the complete Self-Assessment Scheme document
to ensure their summary is complete, and evaluate how far you agree with their self-
assessment results.

2.3 How to Complete a Self-Assessment


The template self-assessment table for each of the 11 commandments is presented in Section 3.
Each self-assessment table includes:

• A statement of the commandment

• A set of questions to be answered on specific key aspects implicit in that commandment

• Columns for “Acceptable” and “Good”, in which the criteria for scoring one or the other
against each question is described

• A note explaining how to arrive at an overall score for that commandment

Having completed answering all questions in all applicable self-assessment tables, and arrived
at an overall score for each commandment:

• Enter these scores in the Self-Assessment Scorecard – see Section 4.

• Complete the identification details on the Self-Assessment Scorecard.

• Use the Scorecard and the detailed Self-Assessment in whichever way you find beneficial,
subject to the constraints expressed earlier in this section.

6 Jericho Forum 2010


3 Self-Assessment Template

The following section presents each of the 11 Jericho Forum commandments in turn, along with a self-assessment table listing
the key requirements implicit in that commandment, and the criteria for scoring “Acceptable” or “Good” against each
requirement.

Guidance notes preceding each self-assessment table explain how to arrive at an overall score for that commandment. For any
given product, answer each requirement, assessing it as “Acceptable” or “Good”. If it achieves neither, then the score is
“Unacceptable”. As already explained, the objective is to show where and how to improve the security capabilities of products,
and initially we are not expecting vendors to score all “Good” on each commandment.

Then, enter the score for each commandment into the Self-Assessment Scorecard (see Section 4) to arrive at a summary Self-
Assessment Scorecard.

If a commandment does not apply to your product, then indicate this in the Not Applicable column of the Scorecard for that
commandment.

We encourage you to use your Self-Assessment in whichever way you find beneficial, subject to the constraints expressed in
Section 2 of this Guide.

Any queries may be addressed to [email protected].

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 7
1. The scope and level of protection should be specific and appropriate to the asset at risk.

Introduction
Risk should always be considered in the context of where the application/service/solution will be used. Thus, the ultimate assessment of risk
will be in the domain of the purchaser of the product.
However, the vendor also plays a major part to ensure that all the facts are available to prospective purchasers, thus enabling a proper risk
assessment to be made.
Vendors will also see where their solutions are used and therefore should understand where successful implementations are implemented,
and more importantly where other clients have encountered problems.
Typically, a vendor should define the limits and/or risks in using their product or solution in particular environments. This may be regulatory
(or lack of compliance or approval with a particular regulatory environment) or may be due to a particular design constraint with the product.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


There should not be any need for compensating controls in this section.
Compliance with particular regulations and standards should be stated.
Limits or design constraints should be identified here, particularly as a result of meeting a local regulatory environment; for example,
downgrading the encryption from AES because of a local requirement to use a particular approved encryption algorithm.
Areas for which the product is not suitable should be clearly stated, such as cannot be used in China as the encryption algorithms are not
approved.
Where assumptions about security or other controls are made they must be stated; for example, this server must be operated in an access
controlled server room, as admin access could be gained through physical access to the server.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.

8 Jericho Forum 2010


Risk
Jericho Forum Commandment #1 Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
The scope and level of protection should Businesses must understand the risk to the asset To enable businesses to make a risk analysis, full
be specific and appropriate to the asset being protected prior to purchase and vendors disclosure is provided on types of use that the
at risk. should provide adequate documentation of the product is suitable for and clearly details areas
security model in use to enable the prospective where this product may have issues (legal,
vendor to perform a risk analysis and determine technical, etc.) that will need further investigation,
whether the proposed solution is fit-for-purpose. or areas for which this product is not suitable.
Business demands that security enables Aspirational statement, not applicable to complete. Aspirational statement, not applicable to complete.
business agility and is cost-effective.
Whereas boundary firewalls may continue to The system or application should not be reliant on The model used to protect and/or harden the
provide basic network protection, individual any external devices to provide an adequate level product and/or service should be fully documented.
systems and data will need to be capable of of security. Details of any assumptions made must be fully
protecting themselves. There should be no constraint (topologically) where disclosed.
this device can be used.
In general, it’s easier to protect an asset the A description of the protection method(s) used is The explanation of the security model should be
closer protection is provided. provided. Clear explanation of how overall detailed by Confidentially, Integrity, and Availability
protection/security is achieved is provided. (CIA) and ideally reference to the seven-layer stack
and, where appropriate, physical controls.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 9
2. Security mechanisms must be pervasive, simple, scalable, and easy to manage.

Introduction
As a rule of thumb, security solutions that are simple tend not only to work but also be implementable. By contrast, complex solutions that
are not understood by the majority of people are bypassed, or are so complex they have loopholes in them.
Vendors should be able to provide a simple conceptual diagram describing the security model in use, where the protection is provided, and
how the solution is managed, thus enabling understanding of how a secure solution is achieved.
Management of the solution should also be described – from ensuring that systems are updated (and describing how), to explaining how
administrator access is gained (bearing in mind much maintenance will be performed remotely – refer to Jericho Forum Commandment #3),
and how user accounts are managed – bearing in mind that data and objects should be managed consistently in one place – so not
inventing its own user repository, but instead the default should be to leverage the existing repository of users (e.g., Active Directory).

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


There should not be any need for compensating controls, further guidance, or examples in this section.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.

10 Jericho Forum 2010


Scalability
Jericho Forum Commandment # 2 Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
Security mechanisms must be pervasive, Clear limits on size, scalability, and any defined For every architectural parameter of the system,
simple, scalable, and easy to manage. limits on size (scalability). This should cover items their constraints (and potentially interdependencies)
such as number of users, number of servers, are clearly defined.
distributed servers, transaction limits, throughput
limits, physical distances, etc.
Unnecessary complexity is a threat to good There is broad alignment to the task, with The solution is singularly focused on the task at
security. appropriate mitigation of risk. hand.
A simple security diagram is provided showing how Controls are singularly aligned to the task/mitigation
security is architected into the solution to provide a of the risk.
secure solution.
Coherent security principles are required There are acceptable levels of system integration The application/system integrates into a centralized
which span all tiers of the architecture. with appropriate APIs provided. All APIs or other control system, allowing logging, etc. to take place.
interfaces are fully documented to allow integration.
Security mechanisms must scale; from small The management of security should demonstrably The system is capable of supporting small (10) to
objects to large objects. decrease as you get larger. large (100,000+) objects/users.
Expansion of the system should not detract from
being able to perform granular management.
Objects should be capable of being nested, such as
users managed as groups, groups within groups,
nested rules, etc.
To be both simple and scalable, There is a full (and rich) definition of secure APIs or All interfaces are secure and use open interface
interoperable security “building blocks” need other secure interface standards (the majority of standards.
to be capable of being combined to provide which use open standards) allowing centralized Where propriety standards or APIs are in use, they
the required security mechanisms. management/logging/integration/APIs. The glueing are fully documented and free of all charges.
has been done for you.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 11
3. Assume context at your peril.

Introduction
Solutions are often designed with a particular solution, or contact in mind. It is not uncommon to find solutions being designed for a
particular client or in ignorance of what will happen when the solution is scaled to a global 24x7 environment.
Thus, a solution that requires a 4-hour downtime to close the database and backup may fail when used in a follow-the-sun model.
The aim here is to document the scope and limitations so that the end-user or prospective purchaser can make an informed choice.
However, when an organization is new to this area, often the problem is with little prior experience they have not encountered the potential
problems. Here the vendor bears a responsibility to clearly explain limitations both in design and found in practice to “bootstrap” a
prospective purchaser’s knowledge.
Note: While the normal “sales” approach is often to hide the limitations of a product, vendors can often overcome this by requesting
competing bidders to provide their competitive intelligence on the shortlisted products and solutions.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


The compensating control should clearly state what design assumptions were made when the product was architected. Look at drug
packaging for good examples where detailed instructions are included in the packaging explaining how products are only to be used in
certain conditions, and side-effects are clearly described.
Examples in the computer industry are that a product may only support a number of users, or authenticate against Active Directory
Usernames, but not Active Directory Groups.
Other examples may be that the encryption used is of a particular type and thus not legal to be used in certain counties.
Most of this item is about good, open, and honest documentation, freely available, documenting the limits of a solution/device/product.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.

12 Jericho Forum 2010


Context
Jericho Forum Commandment #3 Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
Assume context at your peril. Do not assume your organization has full control The limitations of the solution are clearly
over the data, environment, and processing. Where documented and available for free unrestricted
assumptions have been made, these must be fully download.
documented. Documentation of such limits is in plain language
(not assuming the context of a technically literate
reader).
Security solutions designed for one The application of the solution/model should be The solution is designed to scale to a large
environment may not be transferable to work documented with assumptions and limitations distributed environment and operate securely on
in another. Thus, it is important to stated. the raw Internet.
understand the limitations of any security The documentation should clearly state the Documentation clearly states how to scale the
solution. environment this is designed to operate in and solution from small implementation to large
when it is inappropriate to use the solution. corporate solution.
A good (secure) practice guide should be provided. Documentation clearly states the data model used
and any assumptions when protecting that data.
The documentation clearly states context in which
the system and hardware is designed to be used,
the limitations of those assumptions, and methods
for augmenting those controls (if required).
Problems, limitations, and issues can come The application of the solution/model should be The solution is capable of identifying and adapting
from a variety of sources, including documented; any issues from geographic, legal, to changing or different contexts.
geographic, legal, technical, acceptability of technical, acceptability of risk, etc.
risk, etc.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 13
4. Devices and applications must communicate using open, secure protocols.

Introduction
Any application or device will communicate using a set of protocols. It is therefore essential that those protocols are known, fully
documented, and appropriate. In addition, these protocols should ideally be open and secure, and should either be the only option or the
default option.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


Where the purpose of a device or application is to deliver public information to anyone who wants it, then clearly, using http (web access) or
TPTP (unauthenticated file transfer) is appropriate, warranting an “Acceptable” rating. One could argue that https would be better as it gives
a degree of certainly that you are connected to and downloading information from the correct site.
Outside of that public interface, all administrative interfaces must use inherently secure protocols, and all passing of non-public information
must use inherently secure protocols.
Where files are being transferred, it may be determined that the data will be protected at file level (say through encryption with a pre-shared
key) and then the protocol used could be TFTP – this would rate “Acceptable”. Ideally the two systems should identify whether they are
permitted to talk to each other (using say PKI keys, but not IP or MAC addresses) and then use TFTP to exchange encrypted files – this
would warrant a “Good”.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.
4. Where an application or device-specific aim is to deliver unclassified/public information to anyone who wishes to access it, then
an insecure (open) protocol may be justifiable. Examples would be a brochure-ware web server.
5. An example of a specific (and appropriate) protocol is the GSM A5/3 voice protocol, which provides secure voice
communication but is designed to maintain time integrity. Compare against voice over IPSec (designed to maintain data
integrity) and thus is an inappropriate protocol. Compare against voice over IPsec, designed to maintain data integrity but not
time integrity, so is an inappropriate protocol.
6. Documentation should typically be provided with the software and/or manual. Providing documentation on-demand or via a
support web site where the end-user would need to search out would not be acceptable to score a “Good”.

14 Jericho Forum 2010


Protocols
Application Device
Jericho Forum Commandment #4 Acceptable Good [Best Practice] Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
Devices and applications must The application by All protocols in use are The device by default uses All protocols in use are
6 6
communicate using open, secure default only uses documented. only inherently secure documented.
protocols. inherently secure Where there is an option to protocols;4 by default all Where there is an
4
protocols. use an insecure protocol, other ports are disabled. option to enable an
then there are clear, insecure protocol, then
documented guidelines on there are clear
the issues and additional documented guidelines
security controls that should on the issues and the
be implemented. additional security
controls that should be
implemented.
Security through obscurity is a All protocols in use There are no cost All protocols in use There are no cost
flawed assumption – secure conform to open implications (licensing, conform to open standards implications (licensing,
protocols demand open peer review standards and all royalty, or other) from using and all encryption used is royalty, or other) from
to provide robust assessment and encryption used is open any of the protocols. open and has been subject using any of the
thus wide acceptance and use. and has been subject to to peer/industry review. protocols.
peer/industry review.
The security requirements of The protocol(s) used are The inherently secure The protocol(s) used are The inherently secure
5 5
confidentiality, integrity, and appropriate for the protocol(s) are specific to appropriate for the task(s) protocol(s) are specific
availability (reliability) should be task(s) being undertaken the task being undertaken being undertaken by the to the task being
assessed and built in to protocols as by the application. by the application. application. undertaken by the
appropriate, not added on. application.
Encrypted encapsulation should The application can No insecure protocols are in Any insecure protocol is No insecure protocols
only be used when appropriate and function, by default, with use and encapsulation is not encapsulated in an are in use and
does not solve everything. only inherently secure required. inherently secure protocol. encapsulation is not
protocols. required.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 15
5. All devices must be capable of maintaining their security policy on an un-trusted network.

Introduction
When a device is connected to a network, no assumption should be made by the application/device vendor about the state of the network.
The working assumption should be that the network is un-trusted. It is imperative that the vendor understands, designs, and then explains
how their solution works in normal use, is managed (super-user access), updated, and interacts with other typical components.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


Where security of the device/application is unable to be assured in its native state, then the vendor should specify exactly what additional
components should be added to deliver a holistic and secure solution. This should be documented, with examples, clearly demonstrating
how secure operation of all aspects of operational usage is achieved.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.

16 Jericho Forum 2010


Device
Jericho Forum Commandment #5 Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
All devices must be capable of The device(s)/systems security model is All devices are architected; non-de-perimeterized
maintaining their security policy on an designed to work identically on an un-trusted issues are mitigated with appropriate solutions.
un-trusted network. (hostile) network, and any Intranet. The architecture is designed to operate in an un-
All device services, applications, etc. must trusted environment.
support this. Backwards compatibility to insecure, or non-de-
perimeterized solutions is not permitted.
All device services are externalized and allow
identical management on or off-Intranet.
A “security policy” defines the rules with The security policy requires no reference to the The state can be maintained and/or updated
regard to the protection of the asset. connection parameters and/or the location. dependent on the risk.
A minimum level of security state can be The device/systems can audit and report on the
maintained and that minimum state updated configuration, current state, current risk, and current
regardless of environment or location. threats, with ability to be able to report and confirm
The solution will fail safe should an unacceptable regardless of environment or location.
level of threat be encountered. The device/systems can self-heal, repair itself, and
be fully managed.
Rules must be complete with respect to Security solutions require no reference to the A risk and controls review/analysis has been carried
arbitrary contexts. connection parameters/location. out and is freely available.
There are no caveats or footnotes to the rule set. The risk and controls review has addressed all
possible (feasible) operating contexts, is
documented, and freely available.
Any implementation must be capable of The device(s) security model is designed to work All inputs for the device will be rejected if not certified
surviving on the raw Internet; e.g., will not identically on an un-trusted (hostile) network, and for the device.
break on any input. any Intranet. All data is validated and rejected if inappropriate.
The device must not accept any management
packets that are not specifically meant for the
device.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 17
6. All people, processes, and technology must have declared and transparent levels of trust for any transaction to take place.

Introduction
Trust needs to happen at all levels of a transaction, whether it is user to user, user to machine, or machine to machine.
For a transaction to take place it is essential that systems can communicate trust levels and the attributes associated with those trust levels.
For a vendor, they should document the trust model being used, and also those attributes that go to make up that trust, plus any
assumptions they make about devices and/or people and the attributes they can provide.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


There should not be any need for compensating controls, further guidance, or examples in this section.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.
4. "Contract" includes agreed understandings between collaborating parties, not just legal contracts. They include electronically
brokered agreements, as defined in the Jericho Forum position paper on "Collaboration Oriented Architectures".

18 Jericho Forum 2010


Trust
Jericho Forum Commandment #6 Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
All people, processes, and technology The trust model in use is fully documented for all Access (device, systems, application) is restricted /
must have declared and transparent transactions, transaction routes, inputs, and outputs. modified based on the strength of the trust model.
levels of trust for any transaction to
take place.
Trust in this context is establishing For all transactions, a contract (see Note 4) is in place Each transaction can be traced to the applicable
understanding between contracting parties with clearly understood obligations and rights on all contracts (see Note 4).
to conduct a transaction and the sides.
obligations this assigns on each party
involved.
Trust models must encompass The documentation of the trust model covered how all The trust model is dynamic based on changing
people/organizations and aspects of trust is achieved [people, organizational, environment, circumstances, or changing
devices/infrastructure. devices, infrastructure]. reputation.
Trust level may vary by location, The trust model in use can adapt to changing Both parties in the transaction are considered in the
transaction type, user role, and circumstances such as location, type (value) of adapting circumstances.
transactional risk. transaction, and risk associated with the transaction.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 19
7. Mutual trust assurance levels must be determinable.

Introduction
Trust needs to be bi-directional. For example, financial banks need to be sure it’s actually their customer who is connecting, and their
banking customers need to ensure it’s actually their bank and not a phishing site they are transacting with.
Devices need to ensure that the latest firmware is from their vendor and not a rogue update with a back-door added.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


There should not be any need for compensating controls, further guidance, or examples in this section.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.

20 Jericho Forum 2010


Trust
Devices Users
Jericho Forum Commandment #7 Acceptable Good [Best Practice] Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
Mutual trust assurance levels
must be determinable.
Devices and users must be capable End-points can mutually End-points can mutually Parties can mutually Parties can mutually
of appropriate levels of (mutual) authenticate each other. authenticate each other authenticate each other. authenticate each other
authentication for accessing systems according to externalized according to externalized
and data. policies. policies.
Authentication and authorization Access policies can be Access policies are Access policies can be Access policies are
frameworks must support the trust related to relevant risk externalized from the end- related to relevant risk externalized from the
model. factors. point. factors. end-point.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 21
8. Authentication, authorization, and accountability must interoperate/exchange outside of your locus/area of control.

Introduction
Often vendors provide solutions with an in-built solution for user management, authorization, and accountability.
Such management of a localized and highly defined/controlled ecosystem, while useful from a vendor point of view, is rarely ideal in the real
world, where the aim is to manage a user once and consistently.
As organizations operate outside their own boundaries, so the ability to federate that management becomes essential; otherwise,
organizations end up managing users for whom they do not manage the primary information source related to that user.
This also applies to machine authentication.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


There should not be any need for compensating controls, further guidance, or examples in this section.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.

22 Jericho Forum 2010


Control
Jericho Forum Commandment #8 Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
Authentication, authorization, and Authentication: The ability to use and Ability to use and validate the identity of entities
accountability must interoperate/ validate the identity of external entities independent of organization or location.
exchange outside of your locus/area of (people and/or systems and/or devices). Directly consume the external identity from multiple
control. sources, to open standards.
Authorization: The ability to link the Consuming claims, link claims to authorization.
authentication to the authorization system. Ability to link who, what (requested), when, how, where,
to a risk-based access model.
Accountability: The ability to determine Ability to determine who, what, when, how, where,
(audit) who, what, when, how, where, for independent of organization or location.
internal access.
People/systems must be able to manage Access to YOUR data/system can be Claims/context rules-based access control to resources
permissions of resources and rights of users controlled by your ACLs/rules including users based on multiple applicable factors.
they don't control. you don’t control.
Granular user/system access control to
resources.
There must be capability of trusting an Capability exists to accept user credentials Ability to on-board and off-board individuals.
organization, which can authenticate from third parties (either through company or Visibility into what is being professed from the third-party
individuals or groups, thus eliminating the individual). trust organization – transient trust from validation
need to create separate identities. Ability to on-board and off-board organization, provider.
and/or trust brokers (need business process Support of delegated authorization from organizations
behind this). and individuals.
In principle, only one instance of Ability to authenticate an identity against a Single identity and able to manage multiple claims
person/system/identity may exist, but range of repositories. against it.
privacy necessitates the support for multiple
instances, or one instance with multiple
facets.
Systems must be able to pass on security Transitive claims are supported. Bi-directional validation required; respond to and request
credentials/assertions. security credential and assertions.
Pass-on (transitive) claims.
Multiple loci (areas) of control must be Access to systems and/or data may be Handle combination of claims with multiple attributes,
supported. achieved using multiple sources of and modify claims dependent on other attributes.
authentication and credentials.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 23
9. Access to data should be controlled by security attributes of the data itself.

Introduction
Data, and access to that data, is (generally) what we are trying to secure. It is therefore essential that the data model for securing that data
is fully understood.
Usually a data flow diagram will aid understanding of a system, from user access, interaction with other programs (maybe through APIs),
and then storage, both on systems and on backups.
Data in all of its states should have its access controlled appropriately. This is especially necessary at the points where data transits outside
of the system under consideration and into foreign systems, or worst-case is roaming freely on the Internet.
Ideally where the data model means that data will transit outside the system, then consideration must be given to how that data will be
protected. Where access was controlled within the systems, then such access constraints should continue, either by natively protecting the
data itself, or by transferring that access information along with the data (where you trust the receiving system). When transferring data,
attributes may be negotiated to meet the receiving system's policies, with the agreement of the sending system.
Such solutions could involve Digital Rights Management (DRM) applied to the data itself; or transfer to a foreign system for which a trust
relationship exists; or transfer to a foreign device where a cryptographically secure container has been established under your control to
hold your data.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


There should not be any need for compensating controls, further guidance, or examples in this section.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.

24 Jericho Forum 2010


Access to Data
Jericho Forum Commandment #9 Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
Access to data should be controlled by The solution should be able to support a wide Data should be linked to (or have embedded) a rich
security attributes of the data itself. range of data classifications from public to set of metadata which will control access based on
confidential. who, where, when, what, etc.
When transferring data to other parties, attributes of
the data may be negotiated.
Attributes can be held within the data Data and metadata is irrevocably bound together. By default, attributes should be inherited when
(DRM/metadata) or could be a separate copied. An attribute should be the ability to modify
system. the attributes!
Access/security could be implemented by Where the data is required (by risk Encryption key management is open, flexible, and
encryption. assessment/classification) to be confidential, then scalable and temporal.
strong encryption should be used to protect it.
Some data may have “public, non- Where the data needs high integrity, then a There is support for mixed data, and behaviors of
confidential” attributes. cryptographic fingerprint is used. that mixed data.
Access and access rights have a temporal The ability exists to define changes in attribute The attributes have the capability to void old or
component. based on time (for example, an embargoed press expired data.
release).

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 25
10. Data privacy (and security of any asset of sufficiently high value) requires a segregation of duties/privileges.

Introduction
Applications or devices that handle any kind of sensitive data – personal, intellectual property, financial – should be capable of providing the
appropriate level of segregation. This segregation should ideally be capable of more than just binary control (Joe is a user, John is an
admin, or Jim does a particular role). In a de-perimeterized world, where the levels of trust are key to decision-making, the device and
application should be able to utilize this trust information to allow/modify the access being granted.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


Only where the device/application can have no possibility of holding assets of high value can an application or device be exempt from this
commandment. Thus, a Blu-ray player or TV that has an ethernet connection to update its firmware may be exempt (but not from the need
to ensure the code update is trusted); but a database cannot.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.

26 Jericho Forum 2010


Access to Data
Jericho Forum Commandment #10 Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
Data privacy (and security of any asset of All data is assessed for confidentiality. Data is also assessed for integrity and availability.
sufficiently high value) requires a Access to data is managed against individual
segregation of duties/privileges. user rights (potentially role-based).
Permissions, keys, privileges, etc. must Key management and key escrow is under a Data is regularly monitored for segregation of duties
ultimately fall under independent control, or separate chain of access to the data with no with inappropriate access levels highlighted.
there will always be a weakest link at the top overlap of personnel or administrators. The need for continuing access is regularly reviewed
of the chain of trust. and logged.
Administrator access must also be subject to Administrators for key management should not Administrators for key management should be
these controls. overlap with data administrators. managed via an independent authentication system
with a higher level of validation and logging.
Logging should be to WORM (or similar) media and
should be tamper-evident.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 27
11. By default, data must be appropriately secured when stored, in transit, and in use.

Introduction
Data needs to be secure for a number of reasons – from providing the integrity of that data, to ensuring that it is properly protected from
being viewed by unauthorized persons or systems.
The use of a risk analysis should be undertaken to understand the potential risks the data may be subject to, and then appropriate
measures implemented.
Providers of devices and systems should understand the worst-case requirements their product will be used for and provide.

Compensating Controls, Guidance, and Examples


Data intended to be completely in the public domain – i.e., totally available to all, with no requirements on confidentiality or integrity –
requires no measures to secure that data. Otherwise, compliance with this requirement applies.

Notes
1. “Good” is a further build on “Acceptable” – to achieve a “Good”, the criteria for “Acceptable” must be met as well.
2. (Scoring) To achieve an overall “Good”, a rating of “Good” in all areas must be achieved.
3. (Scoring) To achieve an overall rating of “Acceptable”, a rating of “Good” and/or “Acceptable” in all areas must be achieved.

28 Jericho Forum 2010


Access to Data
Jericho Forum Commandment #11 Acceptable Good [Best Practice]
By default, data must be appropriately All data is assessed for confidentiality. Data is also assessed for integrity. All confidential data
secured when stored, in transit, and in All confidential data is adequately protected is encrypted when stored. Key escrow is fully managed
use. against theft (physical & logical). to ensure long-term recovery. The integrity of the “in-
use” environment can be validated, and
Data in transit uses only inherently secure repatriation/destruction of the data guaranteed.
protocols (see Jericho Forum Commandment
#4).
Data in-use only operates in a secured
environment.
Removing the (secure) default must be a There is no alternative other than “secure”. Security enforced by security policy, or the data itself,
conscious act. The user must be made fully aware of the with removal logged, or removal not possible.
consequences of their actions. Removal by translation of the data is also enforced.
High security should not be enforced for Data is protected appropriate to the highest Systems should use the data’s classification to
everything; “appropriate” implies varying level of classification of the data being handled. appropriately apply variable levels of protection
levels with potentially some data not appropriate to the risk the data will be subjected to.
secured at all.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 29
30 Jericho Forum 2010
4 Self-Assessment Scorecard

Having completed answering all the self-assessment questions for all the applicable commandments, and arrived at an overall
score for each commandment:

• Enter these scores in the Self-Assessment Scorecard – see below.

• Complete the identification details at the head of the Self-Assessment Scorecard.

• Add any relevant Notes or Observations you wish to make to clarify your answer to any specific questions in any
commandment.

• Then use the Scorecard and the detailed Self-Assessment in whichever way you find beneficial, subject to the
constraints expressed earlier in this section. In particular, we hope you will review the areas where your score is not
“Good”, with a view to taking appropriate measures to improve the security of your product such that it achieves “Good”.

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 31
Jericho Forum® Self-Assessment Scorecard

Product Name: Vendor Name:

Product Type(s):

Description:

Version Number: Date (dd/mm/yyyy):

Named Controllers:

Assessor Name: Assessor Organization:

Not Not
Applicable Acceptable Acceptable Good
(enter “X”) (enter “X”) (enter “X”) (enter “X”) Notes/Observations
1 Specific & appropriate to the asset at risk
2 Security, simple, scalable, & manageable
3 Assume context at your peril
4 Open & secure protocols
5 Maintain security policy on un-trusted network
6 Transparent trust
7 Mutual trust assurance levels
8 Authentication outside of locus of control
9 Access by security attributes of the data
10 Data privacy requires segregation of duties
11 Data appropriately secured
Overall self-assessment of software or device:

32 Jericho Forum 2010


Additional Notes and Observations

Commandment Notes/Observations

1 <none>

2 <none>

3 <none>

4 <none>

5 <none>

6 <none>

7 <none>

8 <none>

9 <none>

10 <none>

11 <none>

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Jericho Forum Self-Assessment Scheme 33

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