Aristotle on Genus and Differentia

Granger, Edgar Herbert, 1944-

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 22, Number 1, January

1984, pp. 1-23 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/hph.1984.0001

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 Aristotle o n
Genus and Differentia
HERBERT GRANGER

IN ARISTOTLE'S WRITINGS t h e r e a r e at least t h r e e a c c o u n t s o f the n a t u r e o f

g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a . T h e s e a c c o u n t s m a y be briefly d e s c r i b e d in t h e s e
t e r m s : (I) g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a a r e radically distinct in c h a r a c t e r , a n d the
g e n u s is t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t in the definition; (II) g e n u s a n d d i f f e r -
entia a r e v e r y similar in c h a r a c t e r a n d i m p o r t a n c e ; ( I I I ) g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n -
tia are similar in c h a r a c t e r , b u t t h e d i f f e r e n t i a is t h e m o r e i m p o r t a n t e l e m e n t
in the definition. T h e s e a c c o u n t s r e p r e s e n t , I believe, t h r e e stages in t h e
d e v e l o p m e n t o f Aristotle's t h o u g h t . I n this p a p e r I shall e x a m i n e e a c h ac-
c o u n t a n d e x p l a i n , at least in part, w h y Aristotle a d o p t s t h e m .

Preliminary Remarks:
T h e Topics, especially b o o k s IV, V I , a n d V I I , o f f e r s t h e m o s t d e t a i l e d discus-
sion o f g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a , a n d it also p r o v i d e s e v i d e n c e f o r all t h r e e
stages. T h e Categories also c o n t a i n s e v i d e n c e f o r e a c h stage. T h e plainest
e v i d e n c e f o r t h e first two stages is in the Topics a n d Categories; a n d since t h e
bulk o f these w o r k s is v e r y e a r l y , ' the first two stages p r o b a b l y b e l o n g to
early p e r i o d s in Aristotle's t h o u g h t . T h e t h i r d stage s e e m s to be last, since it
a p p e a r s m o s t clearly in the Metaphysics, a relatively late w o r k . 2 A n d if it is t h e
last stage, t h e n t h e o r d e r o f t h e o t h e r two seems r e a s o n a b l e . F o r the t h i r d
stage w o u l d s e e m m o r e likely to d e v e l o p f r o m a view in w h i c h g e n u s a n d
d i f f e r e n t i a a r e r o u g h l y the s a m e in c h a r a c t e r t h a n f r o m o n e in w h i c h t h e y

' The generally accepted view is that the Topics is very early. See Pamela M. Huby, "The
Date of Aristotle's Topics and its Treatment of the Theory of Ideas," Classical Quarterly 12
0962): 72; in n. a on p. 72 Huby notes many of the scholars who believe the Topics to be very
early. For the view that the Topics and Categories were written about the same time, see: Isaac
Husik, "On the Categories of Aristotle," Philosophical Review 13 (19o4): 514-28; L. M. De Rijk,
"The Authenticity of Aristotle's Categories," Mnemosyne 4 ( 1951 ): 129-57.
2 For a relatively late date for the bulk of the Metaphysics, see: W. D. Ross, Aristotle's "Meta-
physics', 2 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), I: xiv-xv (hereafter cited as "Met.').
[,]
2 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 1 J A N 1 9 8 4,

are quite distinct and in which the genus plays a more important role in the
definition than the differentia.
Other works, such as the Analytics and Parts of Animals, also contain im-
portant discussions of genus and differentia. On the whole, however, they
do not provide any significant information, at least beyond what the Topics,
Categories and Metaphysics provide, toward an account of the three stages I
analyze. Other stages, besides the three I distinguish, might very well be
found concerning genus and differentia, stages that might represent transi-
tional ones between those I consider. 1 simply maintain that the three I
investigate are readily discernible, when one undertakes an examination of
Aristotle's comments on genus and differentia.
The evidence for these three incompatible accounts can be found in the
same work, even, as it turns out, in the same chapter in some cases) Why
then do I prefer to represent them as three stages in Aristotle's thought,
instead of incompatible views he holds simultaneously? Since the accounts do
conflict, and if they can truly be attributed to Aristotle, it seems only reason-
able and charitable, even if some of the evidence for them arises in the same
work, to argue that they represent different stages in his thought, at least
initially and until additional contrary evidence is available, rather than to
accuse him of holding simultaneously incompatible views. Moreover, it is
certainly possible that many of Aristotle's works contain material from vari-
ous periods in his career. For it is a plausible and generally accepted view
that his extant works are lecture notes or provided, the memoranda for bis
actual lectures and that he would have used them over long periods, during
which he would probably revise them periodically and introduce new mate-
rial into them. 4 In addition, it is not at all surprising that the Topics contains
evidence for many different periods in Aristotle's thought; for, as a hand-
book of dialectical debate, it would be especially open to the addition of new
material as it developed) And since it is a very early work, it would collect
material from many periods. Also, since the Categories is perhaps a collection

3 E.g., Cat. 5.
4 C f , , e.g, G. B. Kerferd, "Aristotle," The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 8 vols. (London: Collier-
MacMillan Limited, ~967), I: 154; W. D. Ross, Aristotle, 5th ed. (London: Methuen, 1949): 17; J.
H. Randall, Aristotle (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 196o): 23-26; G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle:
The Growth and Structure of his Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1968): 15. See also
Henry Jackson's "Aristotle's Lecture-Room and Lectures" for a good account of the many
elements in Aristotle's works that suggest their presentation in a lecture room and therefore
their character as notes or at least m e m o r a n d a for lectures: Journal of Philology 35 (192~ 191-
200.
5 G. E. L. Owen, "Logic a n d Metaphysics in Some Earlier Works of Aristotle," Aristotle and
Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century, eds. I. Dtiring and G. E. L. Owen, Studia Graeca et Latina
Gothoburgensia, vot. 11 (GOteborg, 196o): 173.
 GENUS AND OIFr'Ert~NTXA 3
o f pieces c o m p o s e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f o n e a n o t h e r , 6 m a t e r i a l f r o m various
periods m i g h t h a v e f o u n d its way into it, e v e n into the s a m e c h a p t e r .
I n this p a p e r I shall o f t e n r e f e r to Aristotle's categorical distinction be-
tween substances (or s e c o n d a r y substances) a n d non-substances. I take it to
distinguish b e t w e e n the kinds Aristotle d e e m s ontologically significant a n d
the characteristics o f the instances o f those kinds. T h e distinction b e t w e e n
kinds a n d characteristics arises f r o m the syntactical distinction b e t w e e n
n o u n s a n d adjectives: n o u n s e x p r e s s kinds; adjectives e x p r e s s characteristics.
T h e ontologically significant kinds h a v e f o r their instances the basic entities
in Aristotle's ontology. T h e s e kinds reveal what kinds o f things the basic
entities a r e with r e s p e c t to t h e i r essential n a t u r e . F o r this reason, a c c o r d i n g
to Aristotle, the ontologically significant kinds are the g e n e r a a n d species o f
the basic entities. 7 I shall r e f e r to these kinds as "substantial kinds."
A species is a c o m p l e x o f its g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a (or differentiae). 8 F o r
e x a m p l e , the species m a n is a c o m p l e x o f the g e n u s a n i m a l a n d the d i f f e r e n -
tia two-footed. 9 Accordingly, g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a define the species, a n d
they b e l o n g necessarily to the species. '~ Because g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a m a k e
u p the de.finition o f the species, they p r o v i d e the a c c o u n t o f its basic n a t u r e
o r essence, its ti ~n einai (Top. I. 5- t o i b 3 8 ) - F u r t h e r m o r e , in the definition
the g e n u s divides the species f r o m things in g e n e r a l , a n d the d i f f e r e n t i a
distinguishes it fi'om the o t h e r things falling u n d e r its g e n u s (Top. VI. 3.
1 4 o a 2 7 - 2 9 ) , T h i s b r i e f a c c o u n t o f analysis in t e r m s o f genus, d i f f e r e n t i a
a n d species, which I d e r i v e p r i m a r i l y f r o m the Topics, is c o m m o n to the first
a n d second stages, a n d s o m e t h i n g very m u c h like it r e m a i n s to this day the
core o f that analysis." T h e third stage, h o w e v e r , r e p r e s e n t s a c o n s i d e r a b l e
d e p a r t u r e f r o m this account.

In the first stage a radical distinction holds b e t w e e n the g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n -

tia o f substances. T h i s distinction is the categorical distinction b e t w e e n kind
6 Because of their clear lack of connection with the chapters preceding them, Chapters
lo-15 have generally been thought not to be original parts of the Categories: see De Rijk,
pp. 149-59; cf. J~ L Ackrill, Aristotle's "Categories"and 'De lnterpretatione" (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1963): 69-7o. De Rijk has also argued that Chapters 7-9 were originally a "separate
treatise," p. 146. Chapters l - 3 clearly provide material needed to understand the discussion of
the categories in Chapters 4-9- But the abrupt beginning of the Categories, the lack of clear
transitions between each of the chapters making up 1-3, and the lack of a clear transition
between the two sets, 1- 3 and 4-9, suggest that Chapters l - 3 were not written together and
that 1-3 and 4-9 did not originally form a single work.
7 See Cat. 5. 2al 1--19, 2b~9-37.
8 E.g., t. 8. lo3bt5-16, VI. 4- ~41625-27, VII. 3- 153a15--18-
9 E.g., see Cat. 5. 3a~3, Top. VI. 4- 14163~-32ff.
'~ VI. 4. 141bz2--34, 5. 144a23-z7-
~ Richard Robinson, Definition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 195o): 96, t4o-48.
4 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 22:1 JAN ~ 9 8 4
a n d characteristic, which Aristotle m a r k s by h o l d i n g that the g e n u s alone
shows the ti e~ti, the "what-it-is," o f the d e f i n i e n d u m a n d that the d i f f e r e n t i a
shows only a poion ti, a "certain quality," o f the d e f i n i e n d u m .
I n Topics I. 5, w h e n Aristotle first i n t r o d u c e s the predicables, he defines
the g e n u s in these terms: " T h e g e n u s is what is p r e d i c a t e d in the ti esti o f
m a n y things d i f f e r i n g in species" (I. 5. 1 ~ -'~ Elsewhere it is evident
that at least at o n e p e r i o d in his t h o u g h t the g e n u s alone o f the elements in
the definition r e p r e s e n t s the ti esti; for Aristotle holds that it is an e r r o r n o t
to place the ti esti first in the definition a n d that this is why the g e n u s is
p r o p e r l y placed first, since it is m e a n t to indicate the ti esti (Top. VI. 5.
14~b22-29). T h e differentia, in contrast with the genus, d o e s n o t c o n c e r n
the ti e~ti a n d is clearly distinct f r o m the g e n u s ; a "bad mistake" then is m a d e ,
a c c o r d i n g to Aristotle, if o n e r e n d e r s the d i f f e r e n t i a as the genus: " f o r the
d i f f e r e n t i a is the g e n u s o f n o t h i n g . T h a t this is t r u e is evident; f o r n o
differentia signifies the ti esti, b u t r a t h e r a poion ti ("certain quality"), such as
footed a n d t w o - f o o t e d " (Top. IV. 2. t 2 2 b I 5 - 1 7 , cf. VI. 6. 1 4 4 a 1 5 - i 9 ) .
T h e s e views c o n c e r n i n g the roles o f g e n u s a n d differentia are surely Aris-
totle's, since in e x p r e s s i n g t h e m he does not qualify t h e m by h o l d i n g that
each "seems" to be the case, as h e o f t e n does w h e n p r e s e n t i n g a particular
position in the Topics; m o r e o v e r , his h o l d i n g that a "bad mistake" is m a d e
when o n e r e n d e r s the differentia as a g e n u s strongly suggests that he o f f e r s
his o w n view. T h e s e distinct roles f o r g e n u s a n d differentia obtain n o t only'
for substances but f o r non-substances as well: f o r instance, state, the g e n u s
o f the n o n - s u b s t a n c e virtue, indicates the ti esti o f virtue, whereas g o o d , its
differentia, does not indicate the ti esti but r a t h e r a poion ti. '3

'~ Unless otherwise noted, the translations are mine.

,3 Top. VI. 6. 144a15-16; also the genus of anger is a predicate in the ti esti of anger, IV. 6.
~7b3o- 3 L Since I believe that Aristotle thinks primarily of genus and differentia as the genus
and differentia of"substantial kinds, 1 concentrate on them in my discussion. Several considera-
tions support this view. First, Aristotle's paradigmatic genus and species are substantial kinds
rather than characteristics. The first example of the genus in the Topics is animal (I. I. 1otb3t);
in his first discussion of the genus, animal is its only illustration, and the species are illustrated
by man and ox. D. M. Balme points out that the "stock" examples of genus and species in the
logical works are animal and man: "Genos and E/dos in Aristotle's Biology,"Ctas~:al Quarterly te
(1963): 84- That Aristotle uses substantial kinds as his paradigmatic examples suggests that he
construes analysis in terms of genus, differentia, and species primarily in terms of substantial
kinds. (I also make use of this argument in n. e2 of my paper, "Aristotle and the Genus-Species
Relation," Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (198o): 37-5o; hereafter cited as "Genus-Species.")
Second, in the Topics, the only work in which Aristotle discusses at Length the genera and
differentiae of both substantial kinds and characteristics, he does not seem to distinguish in
important respects between their genera and differentiae. Third, in his discussions of genus
and differentia outside the 7bpics Aristotle rarely refers to the genus and differentia of charac-
teristics. Fourth, Aristotle seems plainly to deny in the Metaphysics that analysis in terms of
genus, differentia and species applies to the non-substantial categories (VII. 4-5).
 GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA 5

T h e Categories maintains that the genus and species o f p r i m a r y sub-

stances, because they reveal the ti esti o f p r i m a r y substances, are the only
predicates that are substances (5, 2 b 2 9 - 3 3 ) - T h e Categories also notes that the
differentia is not a substance (5. 3 a 2 1 - 2 2 ) 9 T h u s the genus a n d species, like
their specimens, are f o u n d in the c a t e g o r y o f substance; the differentia is
not. T h e Topics reflects these doctrines: it holds that the genus is in the same
category as its species (IV. 1. 1 2 o b 3 6 - 1 2 1 a 9 ) ; it remains silent a b o u t
w h e t h e r the differentia is in the same category as its subjects; it maintains
that the differentia can never signify a "this," a tode, which on Aristotle's
terms r e p r e s e n t s a substance. '4 Clearly, as one would expect, Aristotle's dis-
tinction between genus a n d differentia in terms o f ti esti a n d poion ti, "what-
it-is" a n d "certain quality," a m o u n t s to a categorical distinction in the case o f
substances. T h e genus as the ti esti o f a substantial d e f i n i e n d u m is a sub-
stance o r substantial kind; the differentia as a poion ti is a non-substance o r
characteristic in the category o f quality.
Aristotle's few r e m a r k s in the Topics which c o n c e r n the mealaing o f ti esti
s u p p o r t the interpretation that a predicate in the ti esti o f a substance must be
a substance o r substantial kind. In Topics I. 5, where Aristotle gives his a c c o u n t
of the g e n u s as a predicate in the ti esti, he explains that such a predicate is
given in r e s p o n s e to the question, "what is the object b e f o r e you?" By way o f
illustration, he says that if p r e s e n t e d with a man, one says what it is by saying
that it is an "animal" (~o2a32-35). T h u s , as one would expect, a predicate in
the ti esti signifies what k i n d o f t h i n g the object is. Moreover, in the case o f
substances it signifies the object's kind with respect to its nature, its substantial
kind, not just any kind it h a p p e n s to fall u n d e r . ~5 This interpretation is sup-
p o r t e d by Aristotle's examples o f these predicates in Topics I. 5 a n d in the
i m p o r t a n t discussion o f the categories in I. 9, the only o t h e r place in which he
indicates the m e a n i n g o f predicates in the ti esti. For Aristotle limits his ex-
amples to the species a n d g e n e r a o f the substances and non-substances used in
illustration a n d at no point offers a differentia as a predicate in the ti esti.
(Besides, substantial kinds seem to be the only kinds Aristotle recognizes as
a p p r o p r i a t e for substances. W h e n he considers some o t h e r kinds a substance

~4 Top. VI. 6. 144a2o-2~; cf. Cat. 5.3 bl~

~5 The ti esti, of course, contributes to an account of the nature or essence of an item, its ti
~n einai, and remarks outside the Topics indicate that the ti esti may be equivalent to the ti ~n einai
(see Post. Ana. II. t 3. 96a2o-b2, Met. VII. 4. 1o3oa16-18, 5. lo3a11-12; cf, J. D. G. Evans,
Aristotle's Concept of Dialectic [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977]: 112). This equivalence
cannot, however, hold in every use of ti esti in the Topics. For, as I have noted, at certain points
Aristotle holds that the differentia does not contribute to the ti esti; but the differentia is an
element in the definition, which is the account of the ti ~n einai, and as such an element the
differentia would contribute to the ti ~n einai (cf. V. 4. t32b35-t33a3); thus ti esti and ti ~n einai
are not always synonymous expressions.
6 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:1 JAN 198 4
might b e l o n g to, for e x a m p l e , " b o x e r " and " r u n n e r " in the Categories, he
seems to treat t h e m as characteristics (8. l o a 2 7 - b l 1).) It is evident t h e n why
the differentia is not a predicate in the ti esti o f a substance. For the d i f f e r e n -
tia, insofar as it is a characteristic, is not a kind and a fortiori not one o f
Aristotle's substantial kinds. H e n c e , when it applies to a substantial definien-
d u m , it c a n n o t indicate the latter's ti esti. Aristotle implies this about charac-
teristics in general in Topics I. 9 w h e r e he maintains that predicates in the
non-substantial categories, when they are predicates o f things outside their
categories, namely substances, d o not signify' a ti esti but only a quality o r a
quantity o r some o t h e r non-substantial item ( l o 3 b 3 5 - 3 9 ) .
Besides the i m p o r t a n t distinctions already n o t e d between genus a n d dif-
ferentia, o t h e r p e r h a p s less i m p o r t a n t differences are also relevant to my
discussion. As I noted, the genus is p r o p e r l y the first t e r m in the definition
because it is the ti esti; it is also the m o r e familiar or knowable t e r m a n d p r i o r
in intelligibility to the differentia. '6 T h e s e latter two points o f difference,
which may in fact c o m e to the same thing, also p e r h a p s reflect the categori-
cal distinction between genus and differentia because Aristotle believes that
substances are p r i o r in k n o w l e d g e to non-substances (Met. VII. a. l o 2 8 a 3 2 -
33)- At any event, these two differences, t o g e t h e r with its being the first term
in the definition, indicate that the genus is the m o r e i m p o r t a n t t e r m in the
definition; its p r e e m i n e n c e is no d o u b t d u e to its role as the ti esti. In
addition, at o n e point in the Topics Aristotle holds that the specimens a n d
species o f a genus " p a r t a k e " (metechein) o f the genus, w h e r e " p a r t a k e " means
"admit the definition of" (IV. x. x 2 1 a l o - 1 9 ) . In this same context he says
nothing about the differentia, a l t h o u g h elsewhere in the Topics he does hold
that it belongs to its subject as an "attribute according to participation" (kata
methexin huparchon); he explains that such a predicate is in the ti ~n einai, but
he does not say that its subjects admit its definition (V. 4- 132b35-133a3). At
other points in the Topics Aristotle holds that genus a n d species are "synony-
mous," that is, possess the same definition, a n d that the species a n d its
specimens are synonymous. '7 Aristotle ignores the d i f f e r e n t i a also in these
discussions. P e r h a p s these d i f f e r e n c e s c o n c e r n i n g participation and syno-
n y m y also reflect the categorical distinction between genus and differentia.
Aristotle might believe that if a substantial subject admits the definition o f
the non-substantial predicates applied to it, it would a p p e a r to be a non-sub-
stantial item? 8

,6 Top. VI. 11. 149a14-28; VI. 6. 144b9-al, cf. 4. 141b5-9-

,7 IV. 3. 123a27-~9, 6. l~7b5- 7, VII. 4. 154a17-18.
~8 Aristotle would seem to be committed to this view by his belief that the categories--
substance, quality, quantity and so forth--are the summa genera of the items falling in the
categories (see Met. V.6. lo16633-34, On the Soul I. 1.4o~a~3-~4) and his belief that the said-
 GENUS AND D I F F E R E N T I A 7
W h e n one considers that Aristotle derives his notion o f definition f r o m the
Platonic p r o c e d u r e used to develop a definition t h r o u g h division, '9 o n e can
readily a p p r e c i a t e how he comes to i n t r o d u c e into the definition o f a sub-
stance categorically distinct predicates: a substantial kind and a characteristic,
or, in his terms, the genus and differentia o f the substance. According to the
bare features o f division, one develops a definition first by distinguishing the
d e f i n i e n d u m f r o m things in general t h r o u g h o n e broadly encompassing
p r e d i c a t e - - w h i c h would be Aristotle's highest g e n u s - - a n d t h e n by distin-
guishing the d e f i n i e n d u m frord the o t h e r things e n c o m p a s s e d by that predi-
cate t h r o u g h additional predicates--Aristotle's differentiae. This p r o c e d u r e is
reflected in the definition by what Aristotle says in the Topics about distin-
guishing between genus and differentia in the definition: the genus o u g h t to
separate the d e f i n i e n d u m f r o m things in general and the differentia f r o m the
o t h e r things e n c o m p a s s e d by the genus (VI. 3- 1 4 ~ I f one follows the
p r o c e d u r e o f division in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f the definition and also uses the
definition to express the n a t u r e o f the d e f i n i e n d u m , as Aristotle does, t h e n it
would only be natural in the case o f kinds to i n t r o d u c e a kind as well as
characteristics into the definition. It seems only natural that in separating a
kind f r o m e v e r y t h i n g in general, f r o m all o t h e r kinds and f r o m all character-
istics, o n e would use a kind to p e r f o r m this task, especially if one were also
trying to c a p t u r e the n a t u r e o f the d e f i n i e n d u m : kinds would divide kinds
from all else and would show their n a t u r e as kinds. And once one delineates
the d e f i n i e n d u m by one o f its kinds, t h e r e would be no reason to distinguish it
by additional kinds to capture its n a t u r e as a kind. O n e would then be free to
use characteristics to differentiate it f r o m the o t h e r kinds o f the same kind,
and, since things d i f f e r mostly in terms o f the characteristics they possess (see
Cat. 8. 1 1 a 1 5 - 1 9 ) , it would be natural to pick t h e m as the additional d i f f e r e n -
tiating p r e d i c a t e s ? ~ H e n c e , characteristics as well as a kind would e n t e r into
the definition o f a substantial d e f i n i e n d u m .

II
W h e n Aristotle first distinguishes between the f o u r predicables in the Topics,
he does not find it necessary to single out the differentia as a distinct subject
for investigation. Since it is "genus-like" in character, it may be r a n k e d with
the genus: hOs ousan genik~n homou tOi genei takteon (I. 4- 1o 1b 18-19). T h e fact

of relation is transitive in nature, that what is said of a predicate is also said of that which the
predicate is said of, where "said of" signifies predication in name and definition (Cat. 2 and 3).
If quality is said of two-footed, then quality would be said of whatever two-footed is said of.
,9 D. M. Balme, "Aristotle's Use of Differentiae in Zoology," reprinted in Articles on Aristotle:
i. Science, eds. J. Barnes, M. Schofield, R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1975): 183-185 (here-
after cited as "Differentiae"); cf. Met. VII. 12, Pr. Ana. I. 3 l, Post. Ana. II. 13. 96b25-97a6.
2o See Ackrill, p. 86.
8 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 1 J A N 198 4
that Aristotle ranks the differentia with the genus suggests that he assimi-
lates the differentia to the class o f the genus, that in the case o f substances
he treats their differentiae like substantial kinds. There is additional evi-
dence in the Topics and also in the Categories for such an assimilation.
Toward the end o f Topics IV Aristotle finds it necessary to point out
again that the genus is predicated of the species in the ti esti; yet this time he
pauses to remark that "some believe" that the differentia too is predicated of
the species in the ti esti. He does not try to refute this opinion, but rather
remarks that one should distinguish the genus from the differentia by ap-
pealing to three considerations, one of which is that in giving the ti esti it is
"more fitting" tor one to state the genus than the differentia (IV. 6. 128a23-
26). At some point, then, Aristotle believes that the differentia also indicates
the ti esti of the definiendum, although not so clearly as the genus indicates
the ti esti.
At the beginning of Topics VI, one o f the subjects Aristotle designates fbr
later examination is the placement of the definiendum in its appropriate
genus, and he remarks in passing that the definiendum should be placed in
the genus first and then the differentiae should be added: "for o f the ele-
ments in the definition the genus seems especially to signify the substance
(ou~ia) o f the definiendum" (VI. 1. 139a~9-31). Aristotle's use o f "seems"
suggests that this view may not be his own. But its use need not mean that. For
he speaks in this way throughout the Topics, and his stating an opinion in this
fashion may mean no more than that it is a "generally held" view. It is evident,
however, that according to this view the other things in the definition, the
differentiae, also contribute to the ousia of the definiendum; for if the genus
alone contributes to the ousia it would not be the one that contributes "espe-
cially" to the ousia. And if here ousia means ti esti (see I. 9. l o 3 b ~ ) , then the
differentia would contribute to the ti esti of the definiendunL
At any event, there are places in the Topics in which Aristotle clearly
embraces the view that the differentia, as well as the genus, is a predicate in
the ti esti, and in which he also does not seem to consider the differentia to
be any less important than the genus in the definition:
a definition is an expression showing the t/~n einai of a thing, and it is necessary that
the predicates in the definition are only those predicated in the ti esti of the thing,
and the genera and differentiae are predicated in the ti esti... (VII. 3. 153a15--
18) . . . that of the things in the definition having been rendered, one is the genus
and the other is the differentia, and the genus and the differentia are predicated in
the ti esti (VII. 5. 154a26-28).
These remarks from the Topics concerning t/esti indicate that at some point
Aristotle weakens considerably the distinction between genus and differentia.
Both become predicates in the ti esti, and both seem to be about the same in
 GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA 9

importance in the definition. Accordingly, the differentia takes on an impor-

tant mark of tile genus and, although a characteristic, thereby comes to re-
semble a substantial kind or in effect to be implicitly replaced by such a kind.
For the differentia would seem no longer to be a characteristic but instead a
substantial kind, if, like the genus, it is given in response to the question
concerning the ti esti of the definiendum. For example, the differentia two-
footed is a characteristic, nevertheless, when it comes to indicate what a sub-
stance is, its ti esti, it is in fact replaced by the kind, "two-footed thing," which
as the ti esti would be a substantial kind. I f this replacement occurs, then genus
and differentia are in fact no longer categorically distinct, and all the terms in
the definition are actually substantial kinds. As far as I know, Aristotle always
considers the differentia to be a characteristic, and certainly he does so late in
his career. ~' Thus, if this replacement occurs, he probably never realized the
extent of the assimilation o f genus and differentia.
The Categories indicates another dimension in this assimilation of genus
and differentia. Before the relevant passages can be appreciated, however,
some distinctions made in the Categories need to be summarized. In Categories
2 and 5 Aristotle distinguishes between the relations of being-said-of-another
and being-in-another. Things said of another are predicates that have their
name and definition predicated of their subject: the genus animal is said of its
species man, and they in turn are said of particular men; the genus color is
said of its species white, and they are said o f instances of white. Things in a
subject have sometimes their name, but never their definition predicated of
the subject they are in: color and white are in body, both body in general and
particular bodies. No substance is ever in a subject, both the primary sub-
stances, particular men, for instance, and the secondary substances, the gen-
era and species of primary substances. The genera and species of primary
substances are themselves substances because they alone of predicates reveal
the ti esti o f the primary substances. Things in a subject are non-substances or
characteristics, and they are found only in substances, both the primary and
secondary types. From Aristotle's explanations and his examples it would
appear that the said-of relation is an intra-categorical one, that only things in
the same category or type can be said o f one another, and that the in-relation
is an inter-categorical one, that it can hold only between substances and char-
acteristics, and every characteristic must be in a substanceY
But Aristotle does not agree, or at least did not always agree, with all of
these conclusions. For the differentiae of substances, which Aristotle expli-
citly says are not substances, nevertheless are, like any substance, not in a
~ See, e.g., Met. V. 14, ,28. ao~4b8-9, VII. ~. lo4~b~2, X. 9. Io58a37, PA I. 4.644a35, t f A
I. 1. 486a26 ff.
** see Ackrill, pp. 8 5 - 8 6 .
IO JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2:2:1 JAN 1 9 8 4
subject, and, like s e c o n d a r y substances, they are said o f their substantial
subjects, p r i m a r y substances and their species:
For footed and two-footed are said of man as subject but are not in a subject; neither
two-footed nor footed is in man. Moreover, the definition of the differentia is predi-
cated of that of which the differentia is said. For example, if footed is said of man the
definition of footed will also be predicated of man; for man is footed (Cat. 5.3a21 -
28, Ackrill's trans.).

Accordingly, the differentia, unlike any o t h e r characteristic, takes on two

i m p o r t a n t p r o p e r t i e s o f the s e c o n d a r y substance, and thus it comes to re-
semble strongly the n a t u r e o f a substantial kind. Aristotle goes o n to u n d e r -
score the similarity between s e c o n d a r y substance a n d differentia with respect
to the points raised h e r e by maintaining that by virtue o f their being said o f
their subjects they are the only predicates whose subjects called after t h e m are
so called "synonymously," that their subjects have the n a m e a n d definition in
c o m m o n with t h e m ( 5 . 3 a 3 3 - b 9 ) . H e n c e in the Categories Aristotle contradicts
a position he a p p e a r s to hold in the Topics, which I take to be a m a r k o f the
first stage in his account o f genus a n d differentia: that the definition o f the
genus, but not that o f the differentia, is p r e d i c a t e d o f the subject. "~3
A l t h o u g h in the Categories Aristotle draws a categorical distinction be-
tween genus and d i f f e r e n t i a a n d also holds that the genus, along with the
species, but not the differentia, reveals the ti esti, he, nonetheless, considera-
bly weakens the distinction between genus and differentia a n d in effect
treats t h e m as items o f the same type and as if they were both substantial
kinds: things said o f their substantial subjects and things not in their sub-
stantial subjects.
( T h e Categories offers p e r h a p s a n o t h e r interesting indication o f the weak-
e n e d distinction between genus and differentia: Aristotle uses the phrase,
poion t/--"certain q u a l i t y " - - w h i c h he uses in the Topics to characterize the
differentia and to m a r k its d i f f e r e n c e f r o m the genus as the ti esti (e.g., IV. 2.
122b15-17), to try to c a p t u r e the sense in which secondary substances, the
genus and species, are kinds and are items not to be c o n f u s e d with their
instances, p r i m a r y substances (5. 3 b i 5 - 2 1 ) 9 A l t h o u g h he is careful to say
that a secondary substance is not simply a quality, like white, but r a t h e r a
"quality in r e f e r e n c e to substance" (peri ousian to poion) o r a "certain quality
o f substance" (poion tina ousian), he certainly suggests by describing it as a
poion that he thinks o f it in terms o f the notion o f quality. Aristotle n o d o u b t
finds it t e m p t i n g to use poion to c a p t u r e the notion o f kind because o f its
original interrogative force, " o f what sort, T M but h e may find this t e m p t a t i o n

~ IV. 1. l~lalo--I 9, 3" 1~3a27--29, 6.127b5-7; see also pp. 7-8.

34 See Ackrill, pp. 88-89.
 GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA 11
especially attractive because o f his i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f s e c o n d a r y substance a n d
d i f f e r e n t i a as items o f m u c h the s a m e type a n d his view t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t i a
is a type o f quality.)
T h e ~bregoing e x a m i n a t i o n o f the Topics a n d Categories strongly suggests
that t h e r e is a second stage in the d e v e l o p m e n t o f Aristotle's t h o u g h t con-
c e r n i n g g e n u s a n d differentia. T h e passages first e x a m i n e d f r o m the Topics
a n d Categories suggest that Aristotle initially d r a w s a s h a r p distinction be~
tween g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a . I n the case o f substances the g e n u s is a kind in
the s a m e c a t e g o r y as its substantial d e f i n i e n d u m , a n d thus it is categorically
distinct f r o m the differentia, a characteristic outside the c a t e g o r y o f the
d e f i n i e n d u m . Because the g e n u s is the substantial kind o f the d e f i n i e n d u m ,
it a l o n e o f the t e r m s o f the definition indicates the ti esti o f the d e f i n i e n d u m ,
a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y it is the m o r e i m p o r t a n t t e r m in the definition, F u r t h e r -
m o r e , the definition o f the genus, b u t n o t t h a t o f the d i f f e r e n t i a , applies to
the d e f i n i e n d u m . B u t the passages s u b s e q u e n t l y e x a m i n e d f r o m the Topics
a n d Categories also clearly indicate that Aristotle d o e s n o t always h o l d to such
a s h a r p distinction b e t w e e n g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a a n d that h e c o m e s to think
o f t h e m as a b o u t the s a m e in c h a r a c t e r a n d in i m p o r t a n c e in the definition.
Passages in the "lu which indicate this s e c o n d stage, h o l d t h a t the d i f f e r -
entia, as well as t h e genus, signifies t h e ti esti o f t h e d e f i n i e n d u m , a n d in
effect t r e a t the d i f f e r e n t i a as if it too w e r e a substantial kind. Since b o t h
d i f f e r e n t i a a n d g e n u s indicate the ti esti, b o t h would s e e m to be equally
i m p o r t a n t in the definition. As I n o t e d , s o m e passages s e e m to t r e a t t h e m as
the s a m e in status; o t h e r s still f a v o r the genus. ~ Nonetheless, since the
d i f f e r e n t i a also reveals the ti esti, it s e e m s to h a v e an increased i m p o r t a n c e in
the definition, since in the first stage it is i n f e r i o r to the g e n u s because it
does not reveal the ti esti. T h e Categories reflects this second stage in which
g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a a r e m u c h the s a m e in n a t u r e , i n a s m u c h as it holds
that, like any substantial g e n u s a n d unlike any o t h e r characteristic, the dif-
f e r e n t i a is not in its substantial subject a n d its n a m e a n d definition a p p l y to
its substantial subject. Since these passages f r o m the Topics a n d Categories
treat g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a as the s a m e in i m p o r t a n t respects, I suggest t h a t
they b e l o n g to the s a m e p e r i o d , a p e r i o d in which t h e r e is an assimilation o f
g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a a n d in which o n the whole t h e d i f f e r e n t i a , a l t h o u g h
still labeled a characteristic, c o n f o r m s to the c h a r a c t e r o f the g e n u s a n d thus
a p p e a r s to be m o r e like a substantial k i n d t h a n a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c ) 6 I also

~ Top. IV~ 6. 1~8ae3-~6 and VI. 1. 139a29--3t favor the genus, and VII. 3- 153a15-18
and 5- 154a26-~8 do not favor one over the other.
~ As I also noted, in the Categories the genus also takes on the nature of the differentia
insofar as it too is in some sense a type of po/on (5- 3bi 5-~ i). tf in the second stage Aristotle
treats genus and differentia as much the same in nature, then each would be in a position to
 12 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 22:1 JAN ~984
suggest that for two reasons it makes good sense for Aristotle to have passed
through the second stage, if there are, as I maintain, the first and third
stages. First, the third stage requires among other things that genus and
differentia be the same type of term, and Aristotle would more likely come
to this view from the second rather than the first stage. For in the second
stage, unlike in the first, genus and differentia are very similar in character.
Second, in the third stage Aristotle treats the differentia as the more impor-
tant term in the definition, and he would more likely adopt this view after he
first held, as he seems to do in the second stage, that they are roughly the
same in importance, rather than if he held, as he does in the first stage, that
the genus is more important than the differentia.
T h e following considerations perhaps can explain how the assimilation o f
genus and differentia comes about. 27 Since the differentia plays a role in the
definition of the essence, since it, as well as the genus, is given in rendering
an account of the nature of the definiendum and belongs necessarily to the
definiendum, Aristotle might come to think of it, like the substantial genus,
as playing a categorizing role and as capable of being given in response to
the question concerning ti esti. Man, for instance, is a two-footed thing as
well as an animal. But, if so, Aristotle in effect converts a characteristic into a
kind; he replaces his differentia, which is supposed to be a characteristic,
with a kind formed from it--the characteristic two-footed is replaced by the
kind, two-footed t h i n g - - a n d as a predicate in the ti esti it is replaced by a
substantial kind. It is perhaps easy for Aristotle to carry out this replacement
without clearly recognizing its occurrence because of the ambiguity of the
expressions he uses to signify differentiae. Aristotle's examples of the differ-
entia in the Categories are the characteristics, pezon and diapoun (footed and
two-footed), which are some of his most popular examples of the differentia
and for this reason would seem to be paradigmatic differentiae?8 The ex-
pressions, pezon and diapoun, although strictly neuter adjectives, can function
in Greek as nouns; they are analogous to the English substantival phrases
that are formed through the addition of the d u m m y word "thing" to an
adjective: for example, "white thing." Pezon and diapoun might then be trans-
lated by the substantival phrases, "footed thing" and "two-footed thing," or
even by the substantives, "pedestrian" and "biped," as well as by the adjec-

take o n p r o p e r t i e s that b e l o n g p r o p e r l y to o n e or t h e o t h e r insofar as each is a substantial kind

o r characteristic as such. It is n o t s u r p r i s i n g t h e n to find that t h e g e n u s takes o n to s o m e e x t e n t
t h e n a t u r e o f t h e differentia, e v e n t h o u g h , as I have a r g u e d , it is primarily t h e d i f f e r e n t i a that
c o n f o r m s to t h e g e n u s , r a t h e r t h a n t h e o t h e r way a r o u n d .
,7 My discussion h e r e is m u c h i n d e b t e d to Ackrill, pp. 8 6 - 8 7 .
9s Besides t h e discussion in Categories 5, both o f t h e m or o n e o r t h e o t h e r o f t h e m s h o w s u p
in t h e i m p o r t a n t d i s c u s s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a in Cat. 3, Top. VI. 6 . 1 4 4 b l 2 - 3 0 ,
Pr. Ana. I. 31, Post. Ana. II. 5, 13, Met. VII. i2, X. 9 a n d P A I . 2 - 3.
 GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA 13
tires, "footed" and "two-footed." This account of pezon and diapoun also
applies to Aristotle's other common examples of the differentia. ~9 Accord-
ingly, Aristotle's expressions for differentiae can indicate kinds as well as
characteristics, although kinds formed from characteristics. I suggest that
the ambiguity of these expressions for differentiae may have made it easier
for Aristotle to reinterpret the differentia in terms of the notion of kind, or
in effect to replace it with a substantial kind, without his seeing clearly the
depth of his change in attitude toward the differentia, which in the Catego-
ries, as well as t h r o u g h o u t his career, he still regards as a non-substance or
characterisficW

III
In the third stage genus and differentia continue to be terms of the same
type, but the differentia is more important than the genus. The definition,
instead o f a complex of distinct elements, the genus and the differentia, is in
some sense only" the differentia (or rather the differentiae). I propose that
the best way to appreciate how the differentia dominates the genus is to view
them in terms of the notions of determinable and determinate. 3'
The determinable-determinate relation, first examined at length by W. E.
Johnson in his Logic, ~ applies only to characteristics: color, shape, number,
sound, smell, and so forth. For instance, color and the shades o f color, red,
blue, yellow, and so on, stand in the determinable-determinate relation:
color is the determinable, and red is one of its determinates. Color is inde-
terminate compared to red because it characterizes an object less informa-
tively than does red. Red then is a more specific or determinate form o f
color, and as such it entails color but is not entailed by color. Nonetheless, as
Johnson maintains, it is misleading simply to say that color and shape, for

,9 Schizopoun, pt~non, pteron, enudron, thn~ton and h~meron; these too show up in many of the
important discussions of genus and differentia which are noted in n. 28.
30 Cat, 5. 3a21-22; see n~ 21,
3, In "Genus-Species" I also argue that the relation between Aristotle's genus and differen-
tia should be construed in terms o f the determinable-determinate relation, pp, 42-47; the
defense of this thesis in the present paper differs in important respects from the earlier one
and, [ think, is more adequate,
~* Logic, Part I (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1921): Ch. xi. Other important works
on the determinable-determinate relation include an article by A. N. Prior, which, among other
things, surveys the various attempts to give an account of the relation, "Determinables, Determi-
nates and Determinants," Parts I and II, Mind 58 (1949): 1-2o, 178-94, and an article by J o h n
R. Searle, which argues for a clear distinction between the genus-species and determinable-de-
terminate relation, "Determinables and the Notion of Resemblance," Proceedings of the Ari~tote-
lian Society 33, suppl, vol. 0959): 141-58. See, also: John Cook Wilson, Statement and Inference,
With Other Philosophical Papers, 2 vols., ed. A. S. L. Farquharson (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1926), I: 356-61; J o h n Wisdom, Problems of Mind and Matter (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1934): 29-31.
14 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 1 J A N 198 4
instance, are "indeterminate," as if they do not possess a "distinctly positive
content." For determinables, such as color and shape, are distinct f r o m one
another, since, as J o h n s o n metaphorically puts it, they are that f r o m which
distinct groups o f determinates "emanate": red, blue, a n d yellow f r o m color;
triangular, square, a n d octagonal f r o m shape. Determinables then are not
merely indeterminate; they can be f u r t h e r d e t e r m i n e d inasmuch as they
each specify a "definite series o f determinates." T h e determinable "less than
four," which is J o h n s o n ' s example, specifies the series, three, two, a n d one.
Red "emanates" f r o m color inasmuch as red is a more specific f o r m o f color
by virtue o f no element logically distinct f r o m color. Color alone yields red
and the other determinates o f color without the aid o f any elements logically
distinct f r o m color. T h e r e f o r e , red is not a conjunction o f color a n d some
element logically distinct f r o m color, which would be responsible for its
being more specific t h a n color, a n d which would also distinguish it f r o m the
other determinates o f color. Red simply is color, neither more n o r less,
although it is a m o r e specific f o r m o f color; it is like other colors in that it is
a color, and it differs f r o m colors only in that it is a d i f f e r e n t color, 33 On the
other hand, color cannot be analyzed apart f r o m its determinates: any analy-
sis of color would just be an account of the various shades of color, a n d thus
on such an analysis color would just be its shades in the f o r m of a complex
disjunction with its shades as its disjuncts. In o t h e r words, the determinable
a n d d e t e r m i n a t e are n o t h i n g apart from one another. It makes no sense to
speak o f red as a n y t h i n g apart f r o m color, because it is f o r m e d f r o m color
alone a n d is not a conjunction o f color plus s o m e t h i n g else logically distinct
f?om color; it makes no sense to speak o f color as s o m e t h i n g apart f r o m the
shades o f color, because the shades are f o r m e d f r o m it alone and not f r o m it
plus s o m e t h i n g logically distinct f r o m it. In light o f the determinable-deter-
minate relation I shall now e x a m i n e some remarks f r o m the Metaphysics
concerning genus a n d differentia.
In Metaphysics VII. 12 Aristotle considers definition developed by divi-
sion, a n d he tries to show how the genus a n d differentia f o r m a unified
w h o l e ~ a single element in effect in the definition. After maintaining that
the definition is composed o f two basic elements, the genus and the differen-
tia, he makes this rather obscure comment: " I f then the genus absolutely
does not exist apart from the species-of-a-genus, or if it exists but exists as
m a t t e r . . , clearly the definition is the f o r m u l a which comprises the differen-

.~3 "Take, for instance, redness and blueness, which we naturally call species of colour. If we
eliminate all that is meant by colour, nothing whatever is left, or if we suppose some differenti-
ating element left, it would have to be something different from colour, whereas it is colour in
which they agree and colour in which they differ. We cannot give verbal expression to the
differentiating element except by using the species name itself, red or blue." Cook Wilson, 358.
 GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA 15

tiae" 0 o 3 8 a 5 - 9 , Ross's trans.). T h e r e are several points to note before I

proceed. Beyond this c o m m e n t Aristotle does not consider the genus any
f u r t h e r in his deliberations about unity in VII. 12. Rather he goes on to
consider the types o f differentiae that ought to be introduced in the activity
o f division and how these are related in o r d e r to form a unity. T h e r e f o r e ,
the above c o m m e n t alone suffices to account for the genus and its relation to
the differentia, and it is in the area o f the differentiae that the real issue o f
unity arises for Aristotle. Moreover, Aristotle clearly maintains that since the
genus does not exist apart fi'om its species, or exists merely as matter, it
follows that the definition just is the differentiae, that it includes only the
differentiae. T h a t the definition is the differentiae is repeated in VII. 1~ at
l o 3 8 a 1 9 - ~ o and at z 9 - 3 o, and it is corroborated by Aristotle's identifica-
tion o f the differentia with the form ( l o 3 8 a e 5 - 2 6 ) , which is the substance or
essence o f the composite substance and the p r o p e r subject o f definition. ~4
One is then presented in VII. 12 with the domination o f the genus by the
differentia: the differentia alone defines the definiendum, and the genus in
some sense drops out o f the definition. Consideration o f the differentiae
and how they are related to one another and to the genus in light of the
determinable-determinate relation will help to explain how the differentia
can dominate the genus.
In VII. le Aristotle is concerned with how a p r o p e r division should
proceed. For it seems that it is through the p r o p e r development o f a division
that unity can be obtained, at least with regard to the differentiae. Division
should proceed "by the differentia o f the differentia"; the differentia o f
footed animal should apply to footed animal insofar as it is footed; footed
should be divided by its own "forms" or "species" (eid~), for instance, by
split-footed and not-split-footed and not by feathered and featherless. Divi-
sion should proceed in this fashion until no furt her divisions or differences
are possible and the "species" are reached. T h e r e will then be as many
"forms" or "species of foot" as there are differentiae, and the n u m b e r o f
kinds o f footed animal will be the same as the n u m b e r o f types of differen-
tiae. Aristotle concludes that the last differentia will be the substance and
definition o f the definiendum. Since divisions are made "by the differentia
o f the differentia," the last differentia entails all the previously articulated
differentiae: two-footed entails footed. Aristotle makes it clear that he re-
cognizes that an entailment relation obtains between the differentiae when
he says that one will repeat oneself if mention is made of anything m o r e
than the last differentia: footed is superfluous when two-footed has been
expressed. Division "by the differentia of the differentia" generates, then, a

~4 E.g., Met. VII. 7- 1~ 5" lo31al 1--12.

16 JOURNAL OF T H E HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:1 JAN 1984
series in which the differentiae form a unity in the sense that successive
differentiae entail the differentiae preceding them. Accordingly, Aristotle
achieves the unification of the differentiae through e n t a i l m e n t , ~5
From the foregoing it s h o u l d be clear that division "by the differentia of
the differentia" generates a series of differentiae that stand in the deter-
minable-determinate relation: the characteristic two-footed stands to the
characteristic footed as a determinate of a determinable. Two-footed is n o t
footed plus some other attribute; i t is m e r e l y a more specific form of
f o o t e d . ~6 H e n c e , since two-footed just is a d e t e r m i n a t e form of footed,
~5 In his discussion o f division in Parts of Animals I. 2 - 3, Aristotle also adopts the view that
division should proceed "by the differentia o f the differentia," except in that discussion h e
makes it clear that one should first divide the genus by a multiplicity of differentiae; for in so
doing one avoids several problems, such as cross-division, which arise t h r o u g h division by a
single differentia. Balme points o u t that Aristotle introduces division "by the differentia of the
differentia" as a reform of Platonic division, which divides "according to accident" (Met. VII. 12.
~o38a26-27) and thus cannot r e n d e r differentiae that t o r n a unity (e.g., Soph. 223B): "Differ-
entiae," 184-85; Aristotle's 'De Partibus Animalium' 1 and 'De Generatione Animalium' I (Oxford:
Oxford Univ. Press, 197e): 1o2 (hereafter cited as 'De Part. Ani.'). I do not think that Parts of
Animals I. 2 - 3 contributes significantly to or conflicts with my analysis of the third stage I find
in Metaphysics Vtl. 12. T h e stages I deal with concern the nature of genus and differentia as
such, including their relation to o n e another in the definition, not the proper form division
should take, and in my account o f the third stage I am primarily concerned with an explication
o f genus a n d differentia in terms of determinable a n d determinate. T h e view that in the p r o p e r
development o f division the genus should be initially divided by a multiplicity o f differentiae,
which is the important new element introduced into the discussion o f division by Parts of Animals
t. 2-3, is not relevant to my analysis of genus a n d differentia in terms o f determinable a n d
determinate. Hence 1 do not think that I am called upon to introduce Parts of Animals I, 2 - 3
directly into my discussion of the third stage. T h e view that the genus should be divided by a
multiplicity of differentiae, and not dichotomously, does affect the issue o f the unity of the
elements in the definition, which is of primary interest in Metaphysics VII. 12. Each differentia is
united, as I shall argue, with the genus by the determinable-determinate relation, but since in
each case, according to Parts of Animals I. 2-3, the genus is divided by a multiplicity of differen-
tiae, several differentiae would be in the definition. One wonders then how they form a unity,
especially since in Parts of Animals I. 2 - 3 Aristotle does not seem to give unity up as a concern
(e.g., I. 3- 64369 ff,)- These considerations, however, do not affect my concerns in this paper.
For any disunity there might be b r o u g h t about by a multiplicity o f differentiae does not prevent
each differentia in the definition from being a determinate o f the genus.
~6 I do not think that o n e should be tempted to construe two-footed as if it were like
rational plus animal or rational animal, as if, like the latter, it were a conjunction of logically
distinct elements, as if two-footed were a more specific form of footed a n d distinct from o t h e r
forms o f footed by virtue o f the logically distinct element two or twoness. First, if two-footed
were like rational animal, then it would make sense t o s a y , which it does not, that what is
two-footed is "two" and "footed," just as it makes sense to say that what is a rational animal is
"rational" and "an animal." Second, the kind rational anintal differs from the other kinds of
animals by virtue of rationality. But two-footed does not differ from three-footed by virtue of
two or twoness. They differ just by being two-footed and three-footed, or by one of them
specifying one more or one less foot than the other one. Third, two, unlike rational or animal, is
an incomplete notion and cannot stand on its own logically. What is two must always be two of
something, whatever it may be~ such as footed, which supplements the notion of two so that it
may have an intelligible application. Fourth, and most important, footed already entails some
 GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA 17

t w o - f o o t e d e n t a i l s f o o t e d , a n d it is n o t n e c e s s a r y to m e n t i o n b o t h o f t h e m
t o g e t h e r . T h e r e f o r e , A r i s t o t l e a c h i e v e s t h e u n i f i c a t i o n o f the d i f f e r e n t i a e by
i n t r o d u c i n g i n d i v i s i o n o n l y d i f f e r e n t i a e t h a t s t a n d in t h e d e t e r m i n a b l e -
determinate relation.
B u t h o w d o e s A r i s t o t l e a c h i e v e u n i t y with r e g a r d to d i f f e r e n t i a a n d ge-
n u s ? A r i s t o t l e says t h a t t h e d e f i n i t i o n is t h e d i f f e r e n t i a e , o r strictly t h e last
d i f f e r e n t i a . Yet t h e g e n u s in s o m e s e n s e is a p a r t o f t h e d e f i n i t i o n . It d o e s
n o t exist a p a r t f r o m t h e s p e c i e s - o f - a - g e n u s , o r if it does, o n l y as m a t t e r .
A l t h o u g h Aristotle does not have a clear idea of the d e t e r m i n a b l e - d e t e r m i -
n a t e r e l a t i o n , I p r o p o s e , n o n e t h e l e s s , t h a t i n Metaphysics V I I . 12 h e t r e a t s t h e
g e n u s as if it w e r e a d e t e r m i n a b l e o f its d i f f e r e n t i a e : that the differentia
s t a n d s to t h e g e n u s as a s u b o r d i n a t e d i f f e r e n t i a i n a division m a d e by a
d i f f e r e n t i a o f a d i f f e r e n t i a s t a n d s to its s u p e r o r d i n a t e differentiae. If one
views g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a i n t h e s e t e r m s , t h e n , as I shall a r g u e , o n e c a n
better appreciate how they form a unity, how the differentia d o m i n a t e s the
g e n u s a n d also t h e two ways A r i s t o t l e c o n s t r u e s t h e m o d e o f e x i s t e n c e o f t h e
g e n u s : e i t h e r as n o t e x i s t i n g a p a r t f r o m its species o r as e x i s t i n g a p a r t as
matter.
I n V I I . 12 A r i s t o t l e c l e a r l y s e e m s to h o l d t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t i a e n t a i l s its
g e n u s . T h e d i f f e r e n t i a a l o n e m a k e s u p t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e species, yet t h e
g e n u s d o e s n o t exist a p a r t f r o m its species. I f t h e g e n u s r e m a i n s i n s o m e
s e n s e a p a r t o f t h e species, a n d t h e species is d e f i n e d by the d i f f e r e n t i a , t h e n
t h e d i f f e r e n t i a w o u l d c e r t a i n l y s e e m to e n t a i l t h e g e n u s . 37 T h e e n t a i l m e n t o f

number of feet: what is footed must have some specific number of feet. It is not then as if
two-footed results from the application of two to footed, as if two-footed were like the conjunc-
tion rational animal, which results from the application of rational to animal. I suggest that
footed as a determinable specifies the series composed of the types of numbered feet--one-
footed, two-footed, three-tboted and so on--and that its determinates, such as two-footed, are
simply the specifications of components of the series.
37 Cf. Ross's comments on lo38a5- 9 and 19, 'Met.' II: 2o7. There is evidence from passages
elsewhere that Aristotle views, at least at certain points, the relation between genus and differ-
entia in terms of some sort of entailment. One of the most interesting of these passages is Topics
VI. 6. 144612-3o. There Aristotle reports the position that the same differentia cannot be used
of two non-subordinate genera. Since the differentia "imports" (epipherei) its own genus--for
instance, footed and two-footed import with them the genus animal--the species will be in
non-subordinate genera. "Import" here clearly seems to mean "entail," which is also the way
others have taken it: Ackrill, p. 77, cf. 86; G. E. R. Lloyd, "The Development of Aristotle's
Theory of the Classification of Animals," Phronesis 6 (1961): 61; Balme: 'De Part. Ani.,' lo6.
Therefore, Aristotle must bar the differentia from belonging to non-subordinate genera. Since
the differentia "imports" or entails its genus, it introduces the species, as the differentia and the
genus, into non-subordinate genera. Aristotle goes on, however, to suggest that the same differ-
entia, for instance, two-footed, can be used of non-subordinate genera, such as footed animal
and winged animal, but only as long as those genera themselves are subordinate to the same
genus, such as animal, since the differentia, as he continues to insist, "imports" its genus:
18 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 2 : 1 J A N I 9 8 4

the genus by the differentia supports nay s u g g e s t i o n t h a t i n V I I . 12 A r i s t o t l e

treats differentia a n d g e n u s as i f t h e y s t o o d in t h e d e t e r m i n a b l e - d e t e r m i n a t e
relation, for the determinate entails the determinable. Some further consid-
erations concerning the mode of existence of the genus contribute additional
strong support fbr my suggestion.
In VII. I 2 A r i s t o t l e says, as I h a v e n o t e d , t h a t t h e g e n u s d o e s n o t e x i s t
a p a r t f r o m its s p e c i e s , a n d t h a t f r o m t h i s f a c t it f o l l o w s t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n t i a e
m a k e u p t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s p e c i e s . It w o u l d s e e m t h a t i f t h e g e n u s d o e s
n o t e x i s t a p a r t f r o m its s p e c i e s a n d its s p e c i e s a r e d e f i n e d e x c l u s i v e l y b y t h e
differentiae, and thus would seem to be just t h e d i f f e r e n t i a e , ~8 t h e g e n u s
would also not exist apart from its d i f f e r e n t i a e . But if the genus does not
e x i s t a p a r t f r o m its d i f f e r e n t i a e , a n d its d i f f e r e n t i a e alone d e f i n e t h e s p e c i e s ,
t h a t is, u p o n a n a l y s i s only t h e d i f f e r e n t i a e , and not the genus, are found in
the definitions, then it w o u l d seem that the genus as t h a t w h i c h d o e s n o t

two-footed still entails animal. According to this modified interpretation, which Aristotle may
express as his own view, the differentia entails, as well as its ultimate genus, the possible
intermediate genera in the form of a disjunction. In other words, the differentia two-footed
entails the disjunction, 'footed animal or winged animal,' the genera in the form of a disjunction
with which it might be found, and not simply its ultimate genus, animal as such. On the
modified interpretation, it is difficult to make a case for Aristotle's modeling the genus-differ-
entia relation on the determinable-determinate relation. According to this interpretation,
among other things, two-footed would entail footed as such, and not also winged, and two-
footed and footed would both entail animal. At best then this passage from the Topics only
supports the view that Aristotle takes the differentia to entail in some sense its genus. This
supposition could apply as welt to all the other passages, which I know of, indicating entailment,
with the important exception of Metaphysics VII. 1~, because of their lack of any significant
elaboration of the nature of the genus-differentia relation (Top. I. 15. lo7b t9-~6, Cat, 3,
lb16-2o, Post. Ana. II. 13. 96a~4-b14, 97a28-34). Metaphysics Vll. 12 alone, I believe, indi-
cates on a careful analysis that Aristotle models the genus-differentia relation on the determin-
able-determinate relation, at least at some point in his career. It is possible that initially Aristotle
held that the genus-differentia relation is an entaihnent relation in some sense other than that
found in the determinable-determinate relation, and then may have come subsequently to view
it in terms of the kind of entailment found between a determinate and its determinable. At any
event, my primary obligation is to make a case for the view that in MetaphysicsVII. 12 Aristotle
construes the genus-differentia relation in terms of the determinable-determinate relation. In
"Genus-Species" I discuss in detail all the passages supporting entailment which I know of,
including the ones discussed in the present paper, 41-47. I also argue there, in conformity with
Searle, that it is a mistake to construe the relation between an authentic genus and differentia as
one of entailment and thus that it is also a mistake to construe it in terms of the determinable-
determinate relation, 38 , 47-48 . For an authentic genus and differentia are logically indepen-
dent of one another: Searte, 14z-43; cf. Prior, 7.
3s This suggestion is supported by one passage in which Aristotle actually allows some
differentiae to function as substantial species. In Categories 13 Aristotle has occasion to give
examples of a genus and its coordinate species. His example of a genus is "animal," but for
examples of its coordinate species he does not say, as one might expect, "bird, beast and fish,"
but instead the differentiae, "winged, footed and aquatic" 0 4 b 3 3 - 3 8 L Here characteristics in
the form of differentiae take on the rote of kinds in the category of substance (cf. Top. VI. 6~
144a2o--22).
 GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA 19

exist a p a r t f r o m the d i f f e r e n t i a e is simply n o t h i n g a p a r t f r o m o r n o t h i n g in

its own right above a n d b e y o n d the d i f f e r e n t i a e o r species.
T h e consideration that the genus is n o t h i n g a p a r t f r o m the d i f f e r e n t i a e
makes especially attractive the suggestion that in VII. 12 genus and d i f f e r e n -
tia are best viewed in terms o f d e t e r m i n a b l e and d e t e r m i n a t e . As I a r g u e d ,
d e t e r m i n a b l e and d e t e r m i n a t e are n o t h i n g apart f r o m one another. A deter-
minate is n o t h i n g apart f r o m its d e t e r m i n a b l e because it is f b r m e d f r o m its
d e t e r m i n a b l e alone and is not a conjunction o f its d e t e r m i n a b l e and some-
thing else logically distinct f r o m its determinable. T h e d e t e r m i n a b l e is noth-
ing a p a r t f r o m its determinates, because the latter are f o r m e d f r o m it alone
and not f r o m it plus s o m e t h i n g logically distinct f r o m it. T h a t the genus is
n o t h i n g a p a r t f r o m the differentia suggests that it is like a d e t e r m i n a b l e o f
the differentia. It is like a d e t e r m i n a b l e r a t h e r than a d e t e r m i n a t e because
Aristotle would surely view the d i f f e r e n t i a as m o r e specific than the genus
since he picks it to be the defining term.
I f Aristotle does construe his genus-differentia relation in terms o f the
d e t e r m i n a b l e - d e t e r m i n a t e relation, then p r e s u m a b l y animal as a genus would
not be a n y t h i n g distinct from, for instance, footed or winged animal or any
o t h e r d i f f e r e n t i a t e d animal kind, but it just would be footed animal, winged
animal and all o f the differentiated a n i m a l kinds in the f o r m o f a c o m p l e x
disjunction. And, o n the ternls o f this interpretation, since animal is n o t h i n g
apart f r o m f o o t e d animal, winged animal a n d so forth, the latter would a p p e a r
to be n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n m o r e d e t e r m i n a t e forms o f animal and not animal
plus s o m e t h i n g logically distinct f r o m animal. F o o t e d just is footed animal for
Aristotle, without being the conjunction, f o o t e d plus animal. I f my interpreta-
tion is w a r r a n t e d , t h e n the definition is the differentiae, and the genus need not
be m e n t i o n e d because the differentiae, as d e t e r m i n a t e s o f their genus, are
simply m o r e d e t e r m i n a t e forms o f the genus and the genus is nothing a p a r t
f r o m its differentiae. Also, a unification o f genus and differentia obtains in the
definition because the relation between them, like that between the d i f f e r e n -
tiae, is c o n s t r u e d in terms of" the d e t e r m i n a b l e - d e t e r m i n a t e relation.
Aristotle holds that the genus does not exist a p a r t f r o m its species, but he
also says in VII. 12 that if the genus does exist a p a r t f r o m its species, it does
so as matter. T h e r e is a c o n t r o v e r s y a b o u t the m e a n i n g o f " g e n u s as matter."
Does Aristotle m e a n that in the definition the genus r e p r e s e n t s the material
e l e m e n t o f the composite substance, for example, flesh a n d bones in the case
o f man? O r is he m e r e l y drawing an analogy between genus and m a t t e r a n d
suggesting t h e r e b y that the genus stands to the differentia or the species in
the way m a t t e r stands to the form, as the potential stands to the actual? 3~

39 The latter view is held by Ross, 'Met/II: 2o6-o7, 238 and Marjorie Grene, "Is Genus to
Species as Matter to Form? Aristotle and Taxonomy," Synthese 28 (1974): 51-69. Richard Rorty
20 JOURNAL O F T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:1 JAN 1984
At the very least Aristotle a d h e r e s to the view that the g e n u s is a n a l o g o u s
to m a t t e r as t h e potential e l e m e n t in the definition. I n Metaphysics V I I I . 6 he
maintains: " O f m a t t e r s o m e is intelligible, s o m e perceptible, a n d in a for-
m u l a t h e r e is always a n e l e m e n t o f m a t t e r as well as o n e o f actuality; e.g., the
circle is 'a p l a n e figure.'-4o H e r e " p l a n e figure," the material e l e m e n t in the
definition, is the g e n u s o f circle (see Met. V I I . 7. l o 3 3 a 3 - 4 ) , a n d since it
seems to be in contrast with the e l e m e n t that is the actuality in the def-
i n i t i o n - a p p a r e n t l y the d i f f e r e n t i a (Met. V I I . 12. l o 3 8 a 2 5 - 2 6 ) - - i t can be
i n t e r p r e t e d as the potential e l e m e n t in the definition.
P r e s u m a b l y , the g e n u s as m a t t e r r e p r e s e n t s the alternative potentialities
which w h e n c o m p l e t e l y actualized f o r m the various d i f f e r e n t i a e that m a k e
u p the species o f the genus. T h e g e n u s as such d o e s not r e p r e s e n t the
specific d i f f e r e n t i a e o f its species, but r a t h e r the multiple generic d i f f e r e n -
tiae into which it can be d i v i d e d - - f o o t e d , winged, aquatic, a n d so f o r t h in
the case o f animal. In o t h e r words, it r e p r e s e n t s the alternative possible
characteristics in unspecified f o r m s that the species m i g h t take (see P A I. 3.
6 4 3 b 9 - 2 6 ). I suggest that o n e can m a k e g o o d sense o f the idea that the
g e n u s is the potential version o f its d i f f e r e n t i a e in t e r m s o f the notions o f
d e t e r m i n a b l e a n d d e t e r m i n a t e . O n such an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the g e n u s a n i m a l
is a d e t e r m i n a b l e , which specifies its various generic differentiae, which in
t u r n are d e t e r m i n a b l e s . W h e n these are b r o u g h t to a c o m p l e t e d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n - m a d e "actual" out o f the "potential" in Aristotle's t e r m i n o l o g y - - t h e
specific d i f f e r e n t i a e o f the species o f the g e n u s a r e f o r m e d , the m o s t d e t e r -
m i n a t e f o r m s o f the genus. Accordingly, the d i f f e r e n t i a e a r e not a d d e d to
the g e n u s f r o m outside, as if they were e l e m e n t s logically distinct f r o m the
genus, instead they, to recall .Johnson's language, " e m a n a t e " f r o m the g e n u s
alone as m o r e specific d e t e r m i n a t e s o f it. I n o t h e r words, the g e n u s as the
potentiality o f the d i f f e r e n t i a e is that " f r o m which," to recall o n e o f Aristo-
tle's characterizations o f m a t t e r (e.g., Met. V. 2. 1013a24), the d i f f e r e n t i a e
come. T h e r e f o r e , in light o f the d e t e r m i n a b l e - d e t e r m i n a t e relation, the ge-
nus exists a p a r t f r o m its species as their m a t t e r i n a s m u c h as the g e n u s as such

defends the former view, "Matter as Goo: Comments on Grene's Paper," Synthese 28 (1974): 71-
77, and "Genus as Matter, A Reading of Metaphysics Z-H," Exegesisand Argument: Studies in Greek
Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, eds. E. N. Lee, A. P. D. Mourelatos, and R. Rorty, Phronesis
suppl, vol. 1 (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973): 393-42o. D. M. Balme defends the former view,
although he regards them as coming to the same thing: 'De Part. Ani.,' 114, and his comments
on Grene's paper, which are quoted in n. lo of Grene's paper. A. C. Lloyd also seems to hold
the former view, "Genus, Species and Ordered Series in Aristotle," Phronesis 7 (196~): 67-9o.
40 1o45a33_35 ' Ross's trans.; cf. Met. V. 28. ao~4b8- 9, Phys. II. 9- 2~ See Ross's
comment on this passage, 'Met." II: p. ~38, and H. Tredennick's note on this passage in the Loeb
translation: Metaphysics, ~ vols., trans. H. Tredennick (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1933),
I: 4~4-
 GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA 21

is merely the determinable o f its differentiae. 41 This view o f the way the
genus can serve as matter makes m ore plausible my suggestion that the
genus-differentia relation in VII. 12 can best he evaluated in terms o f the
determinable-determinate relation.
My analysis o f Metaphysics VII. 12 supports the view that there is a third
stage in Aristotle's account o f genus and differentia. In this stage genus and
differentia could very well be terms of the same type, and, as I shall soon
argue, there is good reason to believe that they should be. Nothing prevents
them f r o m representing, as in the second stage, the ti esti of the definiendum
and from having their name and definition said o f the definiendum. In
other words, genus and differentia could still be equally substantial kinds o f
the definiendum. But, unlike in the second stage, they are not o f equal or
nearly equal importance in the definition. Instead, the differentia becomes
the d o min ant term in the definition, and, as I have argued, this domination
can be appreciated by considering Aristotle's account o f the genus-differen-
tia relation in Metaphysics VII. as in terms of the determinable-determinate
relation.
Yet since the determinable-determinate relation applies properly to char-
acteristics rather than to kinds, 4~ the relation between the genus and differ-
entia o f kinds, such as man, ought not to be construed in terms o f the
determinable-determinate relation. For the genus o f a kind is a kind and its
differentia is a characteristic, animal and footed in the case o f man. More-
over, in an authentic genus-differentia relation genus and differentia are
logically i n d e p e n d e n t o f one another, 4~ whereas in the determinable-deter-
minate relation, as I have noted, the determinate entails its determinable.
Why then does Aristotle interpret the genus-differentia relation in terms o f
the determinable-determinate relation? A n u m b e r of reasons, I think, con-
spire to bring about this interpretation, and a thorough examination of them
is beyond the scope of this paper. 44 But one set of considerations that is
4, This also might be Balme's view, at least in part: "Aristotle's Biology was not Essentialist,"
Archivfi~r Geschichte der Phitosophie 62 0 9 8 o ) : 6, and his c o m m e n t s on Grene's paper, "Is G e n u s
to Species as Matter to Form? Aristotle and T a x o n o m y . " For instance, in the latter Balme
maintains: " I f I define a genus in my way o f thinking, I have to state a g r o u p o f possibilities;
e.g., Bird is Animal having two long/short thick/thin legs, long/short feathers, etc. T h e s e are the
differences possible within the generic similarity. T h e r e f o r e the definition o f a genus cannot be
a list o f d e t e r m i n a t i o n s (as the species is) but a list o f alternative possibilities . . . . the catfish's
attributes are d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f fish-possibilities--such fins, such organs, all being quantitative
variations o f given structures . . . . Wieland seems to m e w r o n g in saying that the genus c a n n o t
be the out-of-which. T h e specific d i f f e r e n c e is not s o m e t h i n g a d d e d to the generic definition, but
is a d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f potentialities already given in the genus," 68-69.
4~ See J o h n s o n , 173.
4~ See n. 37.
44 In "Genus-Species" I examine some o f these reasons, pp. 4 7 - 4 8 , but, except the consid-
eration c o n c e r n i n g unity in the definition, not the ones o f f e r e d in this paper.
22 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 22:1 JAN 198 4
especially relevant to the discussion in Metaphysics VII. 12, and which may be
most important, can be offered here.
In the correct development of a definition by" division one begins by
dividing the genus by its generic differentiae. This division results in sub-
genera, and, as my analysis o f Metaphysics VII. 12 shows,45 one of these
subgenera is in turn divided by differentiae that are determinates of the
generic differentia used in the initial division and in the articulation o f the
subgenus subsequently subject to division. In other words, one divides "by
the differentia of the differentia" and continues to divide in this fashion
until no further divisions are possible. 46 Since each of the divisions, except
the first one, in which the genus is divided by its generic differentiae, is a
division according to a determinate o f a determinable--a division "by the
differentia of the differentia'--Aristotle might have thought that the first
division was the same in nature as the subsequent ones, so that he also may
have taken the genus to be divided by items he thought functioned as its
determinates. Accordingly, he would come to take genus and differentia to
be linked by the determinable-determinate relation.
This interpretation appears more plausible if one considers that in the
second stage Aristotle has come to think of genus and differentia as basically
terms of the same type. Since the determinable-determinate relation holds
between terms of the same type, that is, characteristics, it is more likely that
Aristotle would interpret the relation between genus and differentia in
terms of the determinable-determinate relation if he atready views them as
roughly the same in character. This seems clearly to be the case in the
second stage. In other words, Aristotle's thought develops something along
the foUowing lines. Aristotle finds himself analyzing the relation between
differentiae, which are characteristics, in terms o f the determinable-determi-
nate relation (division proceeds "by the differentia of the differentia"),
which is certainly a correct analysis on his part and which also shows him
how the differentiae form a unity. Since Aristotle views the genus as basically
a term of the same sort as its differentiae, he thinks it only reasonable to
construe the relation between genus and differentia as the same in nature as
the one he finds between differentiae, as a determinable-determinate rela-
tion, and in the series composed of genus and differentiae to take the genus
as the most indeterminate term and the differentiae as the more determi-
nate forms of the genus. Since the differentiae form a unity through the
determinable-deternqinate relation, he takes genus and differentia to form
the same kind of unity and thereby thinks that he achieves unity in the
~ Also as P A I . 2 - 3 shows; see n. 35-
~6 Met. V I I . 12; of. Pr. Ana. I. 3 l, Post. Ana. II. 13.96b95-97a6, Balme, "Differentiae," 1 8 3 -
85.
 GENUS AND DIFFERENTIA 23

d e f i n i t i o n . M o r e o v e r , b e c a u s e o f his d e s i r e to a c h i e v e u n i t y i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n ,
A r i s t o t l e p e r h a p s f o u n d it e s p e c i a l l y t e m p t i n g to c o n s t r u e t h e g e n u s - d i f f e r -
e n t i a r e l a t i o n i n t e r m s o f t h e d e t e r m i n a b l e - d e t e r m i n a t e r e l a t i o n , since it was
by m e a n s o f t h e l a t t e r t h a t h e a c h i e v e d u n i t y a m o n g t h e d i f f e r e n t i a e . 47

University of Texas, Austin

47 1 wish to thank E. B. Allaire and an anonymous referee for the]ou~ml of the Hi.~toryof
Philosophy for helpful criticisms of earlier versions of my paper. I presefited a version of my
account of the first two stages under the title "Aristotle on Genus and Differentia in the Topics
and Categories" to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at the 1983 World Congress of
Philosophy and to the 1983 Eastern Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Associa-
tion. I presented versions of my account of the third stage under the title, "Aristotle's Genus
and Differentia in Metaphysics Z. 12," at the 1982 Pacific Division Meetings of the American
Philosophical Association and at the 1983 Conference on Aristotle's Metaphysics and Epistemol-
ogy sponsored by Florida State University.