Complaint Gregory v. LAICC
Complaint Gregory v. LAICC
Complaint Gregory v. LAICC
FILE copy
ORIGINAL FILED
1 LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT R. AMES Superior Court of Californih
County of Los Angeles
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
2 Scott R. Ames (SBN 146093) AUG 28 2018
Erin M. Kelly (SBN 308309)
3 Sherri R. Carter, Executive Officer/Clark of Court
1880 Century Park East, Suite 614
4 Los Angeles, CA 90064 By: Kristina Vargas, Deputy
Tel: (310) 478-2500
5 Fax: (310) 478-2501
Email: [email protected]
6 [email protected]
7
Attorneys for Plaintiff
8 JERI GREGORY
9
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
10 FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
11
JERI GREGORY, Case No. 8(719902
12 Plaintiff,
V. COMPLAINT FOR:
13 LOS ANGELES INTERNATIONAL
CHURCH OF CHRIST, a California 1. VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA
14 Corporation; SHINING STARS CHRISTIAN FAMILY RIGHTS ACT ("CFRA")
15 PRESCHOOL, form of entity unknown; and (Cal. Gov. Code§ 12945.2)
DOES 1-25, Inclusive, 2. VIOLATION OF THE FAMILY
16 Defendants. MEDICAL LEAVE ACT ("FMLA")
(29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq)
17 3. INTERFERENCE WITH EXERCISE
OF CFRA RIGHTS
18 4. INTERFERENCE WITH EXERCISE
19 OF FMLA RIGHTS
5. RETALIATION FOR EXERCISE OF
20 CFRARIGHTS
6. RETALIATION FOR EXERCISE OF
21 FMLARIGHTS
7. VIOLATION OF THE PREGNANCY
22
DISCRIMINATION ACT (42 U.S.C.
23 § 2000e(k) et seq)
8. RETALIATION (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3
24 et seq)
9. VIOLATION OF LABOR CODE
25 § 1102.5
26 10. WRONGFUL TERMINATION IN
VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES
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JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
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COMPLAfNT
1 unknown, with its principal place of business located in the state of California, County of Los
2 Angeles.
3 5. Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that Defendants LAICC and the
4 Preschool have common management, centralized control of labor relations, common ownership
5 and financial control, overlapping employees, common corporate headquarters, and interrelated
6 operations such that these entities operated as a single, integrated enterprise with regard to
7 Plaintiff's employment. Alternatively, Plaintiff is informed, believes, and thereon alleges that
10 Los Angeles County Superior Court is also the proper venue for this action under, among other
11 reasons, California Government Code§ 12965(a) and 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(3) because the
12 unlawful practices alleged herein were committed in the county of Los Angeles, and because the
13 records relevant to these unlawful practices are maintained and administered by Defendants at their
14 corporate headquarters located in the city of Santa Monica, county of Los Angeles, and state of
15 California.
16 7. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as
17 Does 1 through 25, inclusive, and therefore sues said Defendants by such fictitious names.
18 Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein relevant each such
19 fictitiously named Defendant was and is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein
20 alleged, and that Plaintiff's injuries and/or damages were and are directly and/or proximately
21 caused thereby. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each such fictitiously
22 named Defendant is directly and/or indirectly liable on one or more causes of action set forth
23 herein. LAICC, the Preschool and Doe Defendants will sometimes be collectively referred to as
24 the "Defendants."
25 8. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all times herein
26 relevant, each of the Defendants, including each fictitiously named Defendant, was the agent,
27 servant, joint venture, authorized representative and/or employee of each of the remaining
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COMPLAINT
1 Defendants, and, except as provided herein, in doing the acts and things hereinafter alleged, was
2 acting within the course and scope of said agency, joint venture, representative, servitude and/or
3 employment, consent, approval and subsequent satisfaction of each of the remaining Defendants.
4 Each of the Defendants was authorized and empowered by each of the other Defendants to act and
5 did act as the principal, employee or agent of each of the other Defendants. Plaintiff is further
6 informed and believes and thereon alleges that, except as provided herein, each Defendant was
7 acting within the course and scope of his/her/its authority in performing the acts herein alleged, and
8 that the acts of each Defendant as alleged herein were authorized and/or ratified by the other
9 Defendants.
10 FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
11 9. Defendants hired Plaintiff in or around October, 2015, as a lead preschool teacher,
12 and she remained in this position until Defendants wrongfully terminated her employment on
13 January 31, 2018. Plaintiff also enrolled her daughter in the Preschool at the time she was hired.
14 Plaintiff was not married when she was hired and enrolled her daughter, nor was she married at any
15 time throughout her employment with Defendants. Plaintiff is informed, believes and thereon
16 alleges that Plaintiffs supervisors, and LAICC and Preschool management, knew at all times
17 herein relevant that Plaintiff was not married throughout her employment with Defendants.
18 10. Plaintiff received favorable performance evaluations throughout her employment,
19 including her evaluation on June 19, 2017 in which the Preschool Director and Plaintiffs
20 supervisor Stacy Williams ("Williams") described Plaintiff as follows: "Jeri is a great teacher. The
21 children and parents love her. Her room is usually neat, clean & organized . . . . I believe that she
22 really loves the children and it shows in her teaching style in the classroom."
23 11. In or around June, 2017, Plaintiff notified Williams and her colleagues that she was
24 pregnant with her second child, and that her due date was in early December, 2017. Around this
25 same time, Plaintiff was suffering from back pain and sciatica, and her symptoms caused weakness
26 and instability in her leg. Plaintiff spoke with Williams and Defendants' Assistant Director Pam
27 Mammen ("Mammen") about accommodations for her back pain and sciatica, and asked them for
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COMPLAINT
1 an assistant because of these disabilities. Defendants never provided Plaintiff with an assistant
2 despite telling her they would.
3 12. On or about August 24, 2017, Plaintiffs physician wrote a doctor's note taking
4 Plaintiff off work from August 24, 2017 until January 21, 2018 because of her back pain and
5 sciatica. On August 25, 2017, Plaintiff provided this note to Defendants' Human Resources
8 leave from August 25, 2017 through January 21, 2018 under the Family and Medical Leave Act
9 ("FMLA") and related leave laws. These documents included Whitcomb's August 25, 2017 letter
10 to Plaintiff, a Notice of Eligibility and Rights & Responsibilities under the Family and Medical
11 Leave Act ("Notice"), and a Certification of Health Care Provider for Employee's Serious Health
14 bed rest until January 21, 2017, and Whitcomb asked Plaintiff to complete and return the Notice
15 she previous! y provided her. On or about November 16, 201 7, Plaintiffs physician signed and
16 returned the Notice to Defendants. Defendants accepted this paperwork, and never once indicated
17 that the duration of the leave was unacceptable or not approved under the FMLA or CFRA.
18 15. Plaintiffs daughter was born on December 9, 201 7. On January 19, 2018, Plaintiff
19 sent an email to her supervisor Williams that she would be released to return to work on February
20 1, 2018. She also asked Williams if she would be returning to the Lead Teacher position she held
21 prior to her approved leave. Williams responded that Plaintiff could not return to her position as
22 Lead Teacher. Instead, Williams told Plaintiff that she could return to work as a Floating Teacher
23 on a full-time basis from 9am to 6pm where Plaintiff would substitute for absent teachers, work on
24 program development in the mornings, and run a class in the evenings.
25 16. On January 25, 2018, Plaintiff sent Williams an email that she had a legal right to
26 reinstatement to the Lead Teacher position she held prior to her approved leave. She again
27 confirmed that her doctor officially released her to return to work on February 1, 2018, and that she
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COMPLAINT
1 intended to return to the position she held prior to her leave. Plaintiff also confirmed that she
2 intended to return to her position on a full-time basis, as she and Williams had exchanged emails
3 about a part-time position. That same day Williams responded that she had forwarded Plaintiffs
6 an email with an attached letter terminating Plaintiffs employment. Whitcomb confirmed in her
7 email that she had received Plaintiffs doctor's note releasing her to return to work. Whitcomb's
8 letter states in pertinent part as follows: "While the Church commends you for carrying your baby
9 to term, ... the lifestyle decision to have unmarried sex as evidenced by a baby out of wedlock is
10 not consistent with your obligations as an employee of the Church to live in accordance with the
11 doctrines of the Christian faith. Therefore, now that your unpaid leave is coming to a close, based
12 on the facts known at this time, the Church is electing to terminate your employment for the
13 reasons stated. This termination is effective immediately and you should not report back to work
14 for any reason" (emphasis in original). A true and correct copy of Whitcomb's letter is attached
17 Plaintiff was not married when they learned she was pregnant, knew that Plaintiff was not married
18 when they approved her leave, and knew that Plaintiff was not married when they discussed her
21 discrimination and retaliation, policies providing for leaves of absences under the FMLA and
22 CFRA, policies providing for medical leaves of absences due to pregnancy, childbirth, or serious
25 20. On or about June 12, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Fair
26 Employment & Housing (the "DFEH Complaint") against Defendants for, inter alia, violations of
27 CFRA, FMLA, sex and pregnancy discrimination, and retaliation. The DFEH cross-filed
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COMPLAINT
1 Plaintiffs complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). On or
2 about June 18, 2018, the DFEH and EEOC (under a separate EEOC case number) issued a Notice
3 of Case Closure and Right to Sue ("Right to Sue Letter") on said Complaint. True and correct
4 copies of the DFEH/EEOC Complaint and Right to Sue Letter are attached hereto as Exhibits "B"
5 and "C", respectively.
6 21. On or about July 11, 2018, Plaintiff served true and correct copies of her
7 DFEH/EEOC Complaint and Right to Sue Letter via certified mail pursuant to Government Code
8 § 12962.
12 22. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,
15 reinstate an eligible employee on an approved CFRA leave to said employee's same position, or a
18 § 12945.2(c)(2)(A). At all times herein relevant, Plaintiff was an eligible employee on an approved
19 CFRA leave for the birth of her child and a serious health condition under Government Code
20 § 12945.2(c)(3)(A).
21 25. Defendants violated the CFRA by, inter alia, refusing to reinstate Plaintiff to her
22 prior position or a comparable position, and by terminating her employment the day before she was
23 to return to work.
24 26. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
25 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits, and/or out of pocket expenses in an amount
26 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants'
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COMPLAINT
1 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,
2 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
3 27. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has
4 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress, and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
5 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the
6 time of trial.
7 28. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, these Defendants, and each of them, acted
8 oppressively, maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously towards Plaintiff, with conscious
9 disregard for her known rights and with the intention of causing, and/or willfully disregarding the
10 probability of causing, unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, these Defendants
11 intended to and did vex, injury, and annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages
12 should be made against Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them
22 31. The Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA") provides that an employer must reinstate
25 32. Defendants were and are a covered employer under the FMLA, 29 U.S.C.
26 § 2611 (4 )(A). At all times herein relevant, Plaintiff was an eligible employee on an approved
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COMPLAINT
1 FMLA leave for the birth of her child and a serious health condition under 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2)(A),
2 and 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(l)(A),(D).
3 33. Defendants violated the FMLA by, inter alia, refusing to reinstate Plaintiff to her
4 prior position or an equivalent position, and by terminating her employment the day before she was
5 to return to work.
6 34. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
7 special damages in an amount equal to 12 weeks of wages or salary under 29 U.S.C.
8 § 2617(a)(l )(A)(i). Plaintiff is also entitled to liquidated damages under 29 U .S.C.
9 § 2617(a)(l )(A)(iii) as Defendants did not act in good faith and had no reasonable grounds for
10 believing they were not violating the FMLA. Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate equitable relief,
11 including employment, reinstatement and promotion under 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(B).
12 35. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 29
13 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(A)(3).
14 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
15 VIOLATION OF THE CALIFORNIA FAMILY RIGHTS ACT
16 INTERFERENCE WITH EXERCISE OF FAMILY LEAVE RIGHTS
17 (As Against All Defendants)
18 3 6. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,
19 inclusive, as if fully set forth herein.
20 37. The CFRA provides that an employer must provide an eligible employee with up to
21 12 workweeks of leave to care for a newborn child. The CFRA also requires the employer to
22 guarantee the eligible employee the same or a comparable position upon the termination of the
23 leave. Plaintiff is an eligible employee under the CFRA.
24 38. Defendants interfered with Plaintiff's rights under the CFRA by, inter alia,
2 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form oflost future earnings,
3 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
4 40. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has
5 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress, and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
6 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the
7 time of trial.
9 maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously toward Plaintiff, with conscious disregard for her
10 known rights and with the intention of causing, and/or willfully disregarding the probability of
11 causing, unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, Defendants intended to and did vex,
12 injure and annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages should be made against
13 Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them from willfully engaging in
23 44. The FMLA provides that an employer must provide an eligible employee with up to
24 12 workweeks of leave to care for a newborn child. The FMLA also requires the employer to
25 guarantee the eligible employee the same or a comparable position upon the termination of the
6 § 2617(a)(l)(A)(iii) as Defendants did not act in good faith and had no reasonable grounds for
7 believing they were not violating the FMLA. Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate equitable relief,
17 retaliate against an employee who exercises her right to family care leave. Government Code
18 § 12945.2(1) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to refuse to hire, or to
19 discharge, fine, suspend, expel, or discriminate against, any individual because of ... [a]n
20 individual's exercise of the right to family care and medical leave."); see also 2 Cal. Code Regs.
23 CFRA by, inter alia, terminating Plaintiffs employment during her approved CFRA leave six (6)
24 days after she complained that Defendants were not returning her to the same or comparable
3 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
4 52. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has
5 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
6 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the
7 time of trial.
8 53. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, Defendants acted oppressively,
9 maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously toward Plaintiff, with conscious disregard for her
10 known rights and with the intention of cause, and/or willfully disregarding the probability of cause,
11 unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, Defendants intended to and did vex, injury and
12 annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages should be made against Defendants
13 in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them from willfully engaging in future
14 unlawful conduct.
15 54. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to
22 56. The FMLA also makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against or
23 retaliate against an employee who exercises her right to family care leave. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(l)
24 ("It shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with. restrain, or deny the exercise of or the
25 attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter."); 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (" It shall
26 be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any
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1 individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter. ") Plaintiff is an eligible
3 57. Defendants retaliated against Plaintiff because she exercised her rights under the
4 FMLA by, inter alia, terminating Plaintiff's employment during her approved FMLA leave six (6)
5 days after she complained that Defendants were not returning her to the same or comparable
7 58. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has
8 suffered special damages in an amount equal to 12 weeks of wages or salary under 29 U.S.C.
10 § 26 l 7(a)(l )(A)(iii) as Defendants did not act in good faith and had no reasonable grounds for
11 believing they were not violating the FMLA. Plaintiff is entitled to appropriate equitable relief,
13 59. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 29
14 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(l)(A)(3).
17 SEX/PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION
19 60. Plaintiff realleges and incorporates herein by reference paragraphs 1 through 21,
21 61. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") prohibits discrimination
23 62. Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff because of her pregnancy and sex by,
24 inter alia, terminating Plaintiff's employment because she was pregnant and gave birth out of
25 wedlock.
26 63. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
27 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits, and/or out-of-pocket expenses in an amount
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COMPLAINT
1 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants'
2 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,
3 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
4 64. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has
5 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
6 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the
7 time of trial.
9 maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously toward Plaintiff, with conscious disregard for her
10 known rights and with the intention of cause, and/or willfully disregarding the probability of cause,
11 unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, Defendants intended to and did vex, injury and
12 annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages should be made against Defendants
13 in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them from willfully engaging in future
14 unlawful conduct.
15 66. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42
16 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
19 RETALIATION
23 68. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from retaliating
24 against employees for engaging in protected activity.
26 Plaintiff reasonably and in good faith believed were unlawful. Plaintiff's opposition included, but
27 was not limited to, Plaintiff's complaint to Williams on January 25, 2017, that she was not being
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COMPLAINT
1 returned to her Lead Teacher position because of her pregnancy and pregnancy disability.
2 Defendants terminated Plaintiff's employment six days after she engaged in this protected activity.
3 70. As a direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
4 special damages in the form oflost earnings, benefits, and/or out-of-pocket expenses in an amount
5 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants'
6 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,
7 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
8 71. As a further direct and proximate result of Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has
9 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
10 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the
11 time of trial.
12 72. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, Defendants acted oppressively,
13 maliciously, fraudulently, and/or outrageously toward Plaintiff, with conscious disregard for her
14 known rights and with the intention of cause, and/or willfully disregarding the probability of cause,
15 unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, Defendants intended to and did vex, injury and
16 annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages should be made against Defendants
17 in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them from willfully engaging in future
18 unlawful conduct.
19 73. Finally, Plaintiff is entitled to costs and reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to 42
20 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
6 has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation of state or
7 federal statute, or a violation of or noncompliance with a local, state, or federal rule
8 or regulation, regardless of whether disclosing the information is part of the
9 employee's job duties.
10 76. Defendants violated Labor Code § 1102.5 by retaliating against and terminating
11 Plaintiffs employment after she complained to person(s) with authority over her and/or person(s)
12 who have authority to investigate, discover, or correct the violation or noncompliance, about
13 Defendants' unlawful treatment of her because of her pregnancy and pregnancy disability, and
14 about Defendants' failure to return her to the same or a comparable position she held prior to her
15 approved leave of absence. Plaintiff had reasonable cause to believe that her complaints
18 and/or prohibiting discrimination and retaliation in the workplace including, but limited to,
19 California Government Code§ 12945.2, Article I, Section 8 of the California Constitution, 29
22 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits, and/or out of pocket expenses in an amount
. ,.,
2 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants'
24 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,
25 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
26 78. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has
27 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress, and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
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COMPLAINT
1 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the
2 time of trial.
3 TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION FOR
18 employment.
19 82. As a direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has suffered
20 special damages in the form of lost earnings, benefits, and/or out of pocket expenses in an amount
21 according to proof at the time of trial. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants'
22 conduct, Plaintiff will suffer additional special damages in the form of lost future earnings,
23 benefits, and/or other prospective damages in an amount according to proof at the time of trial.
24 83. As a further direct and proximate result of these Defendants' conduct, Plaintiff has
25 suffered mental and emotional pain, distress, and discomfort, all to her detriment and damage in
26 amounts not fully ascertained but within the jurisdiction of this court and subject to proof at the
27 time of trial.
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COMPLAINT
1 84. In engaging in the conduct alleged herein, these Defendants, and each of them, acted
3 disregard for her known rights and with the intention of causing, and/or willfully disregarding the
4 probability of causing, unjust and cruel hardship to Plaintiff. In so acting, these Defendants
5 intended to and did vex, injury, and annoy Plaintiff. Therefore, an assessment of punitive damages
6 should be made against Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish them and to prevent them
10 as follows:
11 1. For special damages, including, but not limited to, lost earnings, benefits, and/or out
12 of pocket expenses in an amount according to proof at the time of trial, all in an amount set forth
15 benefits and other prospective damages in an amount set forth above and/or according to proof at
17 "' .
.) For general damages in an amount set forth above and/or according to proof at the
18 time of trial;
19 4. For punitive and exemplary damages in an amount according to proof at the time of
20 trial;
22 6. For interest;
25 Ill
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COMPLAINT
1 9. For costs of suit.
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DATED: Augus~ 2018 LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT R. AMES
4 A PROF ON ORATION
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Scott R. s, s .
7 Erin M. Kelly, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jeri Gregory
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COMPLAINT
1 JURY TRIAL DEMAND
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LAW OFFICES OF SCOTT R. AMES
6 DATED: Augu~::(, 2018 AP ON ORATION
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Scott R. es, Esq.
9 Erin M. Kelly, Esq.
Attorneys for Plaintiff Jeri Gregory
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